The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Winter, E. (1994) The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation. Economic Theory, 4 (2). pp. 255-273. ISSN 0938-2259

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Abstract

A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126876
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 10:42
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 11:28
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126876

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