Deb, R. and Weber, S. and Winter, E. (1996) The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25 (2). pp. 189-198. ISSN 0020-7276
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.