The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games

Deb, R. and Weber, S. and Winter, E. (1996) The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25 (2). pp. 189-198. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Game Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126874
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 10:38
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2019 21:05
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126874

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