Moldovanu, B. and Winter, E. (1994) Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23 (6). pp. 533-548. ISSN 0304-4068
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6
Abstract
In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation. © 1994.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2600/2604
Subjects:
?? CORE IMPLEMENTATIONNON-COOPERATIVE BARGAININGECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICSAPPLIED MATHEMATICS ??
Departments:
ID Code:
126872
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 10:34
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
18 Sep 2023 01:25