Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Moldovanu, B. and Winter, E. (1994) Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23 (6). pp. 533-548. ISSN 0304-4068

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In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation. © 1994.

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Journal of Mathematical Economics
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14 Aug 2018 10:34
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22 Nov 2022 06:12