The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure

Winter, E. (1992) The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure. Games and Economic Behavior, 4 (1). pp. 132-144. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (1985, "The Potential: A New Approach to the Value in Multi-person Allocation Problems," Discussion Paper 1157, Harvard Institute for Economic Research) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values for coalition structure, namely, R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze's (1974, Int. J. Game Theory 3, 217-237) value (AD value) and G. Owen's (1977), "Values of Games with Priori Unions," in Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory (R. Heim and O. Moeschlin, Eds.), New York: Springer-Verlag) value for games with coalition structure. © 1992.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Games and Economic Behavior
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
126870
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 10:24
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 11:28