A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

Winter, E. (1989) A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation. International Journal of Game Theory, 18 (2). pp. 227-240. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Game Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126866
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 10:16
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2019 21:04
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126866

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