Community-level natural resource management institutions:A noncooperative equilibrium example

Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva (2018) Community-level natural resource management institutions:A noncooperative equilibrium example. International Journal of the Commons, 12 (1). pp. 548-572. ISSN 1875-0281

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The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.

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Journal Article
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International Journal of the Commons
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Deposited On:
25 Apr 2018 08:30
Last Modified:
28 May 2023 04:08