Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability:Evidence from Italian Local Elections

Bracco, Emanuele and Revelli, Federico (2018) Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability:Evidence from Italian Local Elections. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 148. pp. 135-149. ISSN 0167-2681

[img]
Preview
PDF (1-s2.0-S0167268118300374-main)
1_s2.0_S0167268118300374_main.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs.

Download (732kB)

Abstract

This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered government structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial electoral data from Italy during the 2000s. When the less salient provincial elections are held concurrently with the highly salient municipal elections, we observe three main effects: (1) turnout increases significantly by almost ten percentage points; (2) issues that are specific to the more salient (mayoral) contest affect the less salient (provincial) contest, with mayors’ fiscal decisions impacting on the vote share of provincial incumbents; (3) issues that are specific to the less salient (provincial) contest stop affecting provincial elections outcomes. These findings shed light on how voters acquire information on incumbent politicians, and suggests that the effectiveness of an election as an accountability tool may be hindered by the concurrence with higher-stakes elections.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Additional Information:
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 148, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.006
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
123475
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
16 Feb 2018 10:30
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
24 Oct 2020 05:24