Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations.

Donohue, William A. and Taylor, Paul J. (2003) Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations. International Negotiation, 8 (3). pp. 527-547. ISSN 1382-340X

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This article examines the effects of role on terrorists’ use of power and affiliative strategies in negotiation as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome that is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed to reflect the dynamics of 186 terrorist negotiations, as reported in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the hypothesized one-down effect with terrorists’ use of power-oriented strategies complemented by authority’s use of affiliation-oriented strategies. The extent to which terrorists used aggressive strategies was related to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more likely for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics differed across incident type, with aerial hijackings involving more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally, terrorist ideology and the associated identity concerns magnified the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists engaging in more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists with other ideological backgrounds.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
International Negotiation
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? roleone-down effectpoweraffiliationcomplementarityterrorismideology.political science and international relationssociology and political sciencebf psychology ??
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Deposited On:
30 Jul 2008 09:09
Last Modified:
17 Apr 2024 23:51