

**UNDERSTANDING DISCURSIVE HEGEMONY IN TURKISH POLITICS:  
DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEGEMONIC  
PROJECTS**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS AND  
ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**AT**

**LANCASTER UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**CAN KÜÇÜKALİ, M.A., B.A.**

**LANCASTER, MAY 2014**

## STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Date: 21. 5. 2014

Signed: *C. Küçükali*



# **Understanding Discursive Hegemony in Turkish Politics: Discursive Strategies as Instruments of Hegemonic Projects**

by

**Can Küçükali, M.A., B.A.**

Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

Lancaster University, May 2014

## **Abstract:**

This research on the use of discursive strategies in Turkish politics is a result of an interest in the ways language is employed in politics. Although the political science literature about Turkey concentrates on the power struggles between political actors on the policy level, the use of language as a strategic tool to establish a discursive hegemony as an indispensable part of wider political hegemony is neglected. Especially since the AKP has come to power as a single party government in 2002, the increasing executive capacity of the party makes it crucial to deal with the discursive practices both to identify and evaluate the party as well as its policy-making preferences.

Hence, this research approaches Turkish politics from an interdisciplinary discourse-analytical perspective in order to deepen our understanding of political power and discourse, with the help of a critical realist approach. Thus, this study re-conceptualizes discursive strategies as hegemonic projects and analyzes them with the help of the DHA (discourse-historical approach) in order to see the ways in which the ruling AKP tries to establish and maintain its political hegemony on the discursive level.

In order to achieve these aims, thirteen governmental texts from three sub-genres of election rally speeches, party-group speeches and ministerial speeches are analyzed with the methodological tools provided by the DHA. After the analysis, the findings are interpreted to evaluate the current policy making process and AKP's role of realizing the particular policy preferences.

**Keywords:** Justice and Development Party, rhetorical figures, Critical Discourse Analysis, discursive strategies, hegemony

## **Acknowledgements:**

I am grateful to Ruth Wodak who supervised this thesis and helped me in every aspect during this process. It has been an honour to be her Ph.D. student. I am very pleased that I was able to reflect my vision and ideas to the research and this is because she provided me with such necessary flexibility.

I also would like to thank Tim Jacoby and Bülent Diken who read the earlier drafts of the chapters and also commented on them. Their invaluable expertise on the subject contributed to my understanding and helped me develop my analysis. I also thank Gerard Hearne and Pamela Olmos Lopez for editing the thesis, revising the language, and making the thesis ready for submission.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me with their positive feedbacks. Especially the thought-provoking political discussions with my father have always been a substantial part of my intellectual development. I am also very grateful for their support and encouragement.

Can Küçükali

*Lancaster University*

May 2014

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>	
1.1. Guiding research interests, aims and questions .....	4
1.2. Outline of the thesis .....	17
<b>2. POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT</b>	
2.1. Short political history of the CHP .....	21
2.2. Short political history of the AKP .....	35
2.3. Conclusion .....	46
<b>3. LITERATURE REVIEW</b>	
3.1. Literature on critical approaches to political discourse .....	48
3.2. Understanding neo-liberalism and locating it in the research .....	53
3.3. Discourse-oriented studies on politics in Turkey .....	58
3.4. Politically-oriented studies on the AKP .....	62
<b>4. THEORY AND APPROACH:</b>	
4.1. Conceptualizing democratic politics in terms of conflict .....	72
4.2. Deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism: premises and criticisms .....	76
4.3. Critical realist theory of hegemony and critical discourse analysis .....	88
<b>5. METHODOLOGY AND DATA</b>	
5.1. Categorization of political speeches .....	94
5.2. Discourse-historical approach and its implementation .....	97
5.3. Data, selection criteria and research questions .....	116
5.4. Conclusion .....	118
<b>6. THE ANALYSIS OF AN ELECTION RALLY SPEECH</b>	
6.1. Text .....	120
6.2. Analysis .....	135
6.3. Conclusion .....	147
<b>7. THE ANALYSIS OF A PARTY GROUP SPEECH</b>	
7.1. Text .....	149
7.2. Analysis .....	155
7.3. Conclusion .....	166
<b>8. THE ANALYSES OF ELEVEN TEXTS FROM MINISTERIAL SPEECHES</b>	
8.1. Texts and analyses .....	169
8.2. Conclusion .....	191
<b>9. EVALUATING THE POLITICS OF THE AKP IN LIGHT OF THE ANALYSIS</b>	
9.1. Evaluation of the research aims, questions and methodology .....	192
9.2. Results revisited on the discursive level .....	196
9.3. Links between the results and the wider socio-political context .....	206
9.4. Concluding remarks .....	214
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>218</b>
<b>APPENDICES .....</b>	<b>229</b>

## **LIST OF TABLES:**

2.1. A comparison of three political parties according to main policy issues....	41
5.1. Sub-genres of political speeches according to their function and content...96	
5.2. Discursive strategies, their objectives and devices.....	101
5.3. Sub-genres and the number of speeches to be analyzed.....	117

## **LIST OF DIAGRAMS:**

2.1. The parties associated with the National View.....	37
6.1. Operationalization of topos of numbers in the discourse of political and economic succes.....	138
6.2. Topos of numbers in the field of university education discourse.....	138
6.3. Topos of numbers in the merging of hospitals discourse.....	139
6.4. Overall structure of successful policymaking discourse.....	140
6.5. Syllogistic structure of the human-donkey analogy.....	142
6.6. Legitimation of police violence in discourse.....	143
6.7. In- and extended out-groups in the speech of Erdoğan.....	144
6.8. The use of tu quoquo (appeal to hypocrisy) in Erdoğan's discourse.....	145
7.1. Argument about democracy standards.....	157
7.2. Argument about the economic crisis in Europe.....	158
7.3. Topos of history as a form of argumentum ad hominem.....	161
7.4. Argumentum ad exemplum in the discourse topic Uludere strike.....	162



## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

It has been more than a decade since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power as a single political party in 2002 in Turkey. Irrespective of who criticizes or appreciates its policy preferences and implementations, many would agree that, going beyond its institutional existence, this party, which has its roots in the political Islamic tradition,<sup>1</sup> symbolizes a new era in Turkish politics, in the sense that the socioeconomic structure of the country has changed immensely in favor of the current needs of global markets and politics, respectively (Şen, 2010). Although the transformation is an ongoing process and started long before the party came to power (adaptation to neoliberal capital accumulation and the societal effects of these policy preferences began in the 1980s), the AKP has taken many initiatives to speed up the process. Alongside its political and financial power, the political discourse of the party has also been crucial in this process. The party has benefited from strategic language use to create its political hegemony. It has sought to establish a discursive sphere which imposes neoliberal policymaking as the only way of making progress. This attempt to create a discursive hegemony as a part of wider political hegemony attracted my interest and motivated me to further investigate the discursive-strategic aspects of such a policy-making in a systematic way to decipher the actual content, direction and effects of the proposed policies as opposed to their representation.

### **1.1. Guiding research interests, aims and questions**

This research aims to make these discursive strategies explicit and thus the main trends in Turkish politics comprehensible by adding a discursive dimension to the analysis (Yıldızcan & Yaka, 2010). That is a point which has been generally neglected when analyzing and evaluating power politics in Turkey. Because critical language awareness is not taken into consideration, political actors and historical periods are seen as static entities which are either glorified or blamed according to the fixed labels attached to them. For instance, the CHP (Republican People's Party), which is the founding party of the Turkish Republic in 1923, might be labelled the party of the status quo, the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) the ethnic party of the Kurdish population, the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) an ultranationalist party and the AKP a pro-Islamist party

---

<sup>1</sup> The predecessors of the AKP (Welfare Party and Felicity Party), which share the same sociopolitical backgrounds, were banned by the Constitutional Court for their actions against the secular Turkish Republic.

(Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). These labels presuppose that these political entities will always preserve their ideological stances and practise their discourses consistently according to these political/ ideological positions. However, that way of classifying parties prevents one from considering the dynamic and multidimensional character of political discourses which makes them goal-oriented.

Discourse in this research is understood as patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, which are based on: a) macro-topics, b) argumentativity and c) pluri-perspectivity (Wodak, 2009, p. 38). The reason for developing a critical perspective towards discourses is to make it possible to analyze and expose opaque representations of power, domination, discrimination and control as manifestations of language (Meyer and Wodak, 2001, p. 2). So, if one develops a critical perspective towards Turkish politics through the analysis of its manifold discourses, it becomes possible to decipher how political power is exercised through language, how certain economic and political paradigms are replaced by others and how these changes effect society as well as politics in a broader context. In that sense, the main aim of adding a linguistic dimension to the analysis is to help deconstruct discourses which have become predominant, what the determining paradigm of Turkish politics with respect to AKP policies is, and how the governing party itself should be defined and evaluated as a political actor. Making projections about the AKP's political career or evaluating potential challenges to the party's rule are not the foci of this research.<sup>2</sup>

Turkish politics have been frequently interrupted by military interventions and the bureaucratic militarist character of the state has been seen as the main reason for explaining the weakness of Turkish democracy. The current government discursively positions itself as the representative of the ordinary people against the bureaucratic and military elite. This kind of argumentation claims that the bureaucratic/ militarist state apparatus hinders the democratization process and the AKP as a civil political actor is succeeding in reducing the power of military tutelage. For example, Sarıgil (2010) evaluates the bargaining process of military-civilian politics by focusing on the AKP and the military as two opposing actors. He tries to show how the military found itself in a 'normative entrapment' which made it accept the institutional reforms realized by the government, although these reforms would decrease their political authority in the

---

<sup>2</sup> Still, the discussion based on the research findings in the conclusion chapter may give the reader an insight into these aspects.

Europeanization process. According to the author, this is because blocking the reform package and sticking to the status quo would be perceived as an obstacle to Turkey's century-old Westernization process and therefore an 'inappropriate' or 'illegitimate' act by society (Sarigil, 2010, p. 475). So, the AKP and the military are antithetically placed with one indirectly representing democratization and the other the status quo, respectively. One consequence of this dichotomization is to see the AKP as a pro-European democratic party acting against military tutelage. However, the AKP's discourses and policies vis-à-vis the European Union, the Kurdish issue, the military and the democratization process are not fixed and they can show controversial traits. The reason for this variety and inconsistency is the instrumental rationalism of the party. In my opinion, analyzing the discursive sphere as part of the political reality is therefore crucial because it denaturalizes the process of policymaking. A critical analysis of political discourse can reveal the rationalization and legitimization processes of the political actors so that what seems consensual and therefore indisputable is demystified (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 2).

Demystifying notions which are presented as if their meanings were consensual is crucial, because political consensus is constructed around the main premises of a certain political ideology (Carroll, 2006). The last decade of Turkish politics between 2002 and 2012, which might be identified with AKP rule, has witnessed the operationalization of neoliberal policies, such as the deregulation of capital markets, the privatization and marketization of public services, minimizing state-led investment and encouraging foreign capital investment, which have actually started in the 1980s. I observe that these policy preferences have been implemented through the conceptualization and instrumentalization of moderate Islam which de/recontextualizes useful notions of religious discourse and harmonizes them with neoliberal policymaking preferences. According to Çulhaoğlu (2009), one distinguishing feature of the political identity of the AKP is its effort to combine consent with coercion in order to maintain the hegemonic power of the bourgeoisie, and therefore religion plays a crucial role in seeking consent for the aforementioned policies. This is a Gramscian understanding of hegemony, which extends the scope of the notion (1971). It refers not only the actions of a specific social group or class but also to the general social requirement for the construction of rule which has internal and external aspects. External aspects are the relations between dominated and dominant groups, whereas internal aspects are the relations within

groups/ classes and hegemonic blocs. If one looks at hegemony from a realist perspective, it is relevant to take into account the construction of hegemonic blocs in order to secure the reproduction or transformation of society through a complex political strategy (Joseph, 2002, p. 28)<sup>3</sup>.

When considering the increasing electoral success of the party since 2002, it is obvious that religious discourses have become not only an important part of political discussions but that they have also affected the political sphere as a whole. This effect is so intense that it has forced other opposition parties to reconsider and reposition themselves in order to maintain their political existence and struggle against the ruling party. I assume that what we experience in the beginning of twenty first century is a new epoch where the premises of democratic deliberation and dialogism fail to explain this struggle. Rather, there is a kind of political discourse which tries to weaken alternative discourses and thus realize particular policymaking proposals by redefining and determining the content of democratic politics as a crucial part of wider political hegemony.

The notion of democracy, which I view as empty signifier,<sup>4</sup> has been articulated into a hegemonic formation by a neoliberal discourse for thirty years (Kircher, 2009), and the political discourses of the AKP seems to be preparing a suitable base on which neoliberal policymaking can be implemented in Turkey. This does not necessarily mean that physical violence has disappeared from the political sphere and that there is an established political hegemony without any resistance, but the strategic use of language is becoming an important part of political struggle and domination. In this struggle, various discursive strategies, including nomination/ labelling, predication, perspectivation, argumentation and intensification/ mitigation (Wodak, 2009), are used to establish legitimacy/ illegitimacy (Van Leeuwen, 2007) for policy preferences or to frame political issues from a particular perspective (Lakoff, 2004) and thus try to limit the existence of alternative discourses and alternative ways of policymaking.

This is why Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)<sup>5</sup> is the determining analytical approach to theorizing and analysing discourse in this research. Via CDA, one is able to detect: 1)

---

<sup>3</sup> See the theory chapter for the extensive discussion.

<sup>4</sup> An 'empty' or 'floating signifier' is variously defined as a signifier with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified. Such signifiers mean different things to different people: they may stand for many or even any signified; they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean (Chandler, 2002, p. 250).

<sup>5</sup> See the methodology chapter for the details and implementation of this approach.

the main discourse topics<sup>6</sup> of the political struggle in multiple contexts, 2) how power is asymmetrically dispersed between political actors according to changing circumstances, and 3) how it is exercised in covert and strategic ways as hegemonic projects to legitimize, invigorate and thus maintain structural hegemony which is neoliberal capital accumulation. If one looks at the Turkish case from this perspective, it becomes problematic to analyze Turkish politics on the basis of an overarching centre-periphery paradigm which places Kemalist state ideology at the centre of social criticism as an omnipotent state power.<sup>7</sup> Because, in doing so, socially determining capacity of Kemalism might be mystified and overemphasized<sup>8</sup> in an ahistorical way which would make it difficult to comprehend the shift of power and its changing operationalization methods and effects in accordance with economic and political transformations.

In my opinion, when the dichotomy is understood between Kemalist state ideology and the others (others as an abstract catch-all phrase which embraces all those people except the military-bureaucratic elite) the political actors who claim to act in the name of others can be supported unconditionally, irrespective of their identity, their policy proposals and their means for the sake of abolishing authoritarian state ideology. Thus, a false dichotomy is created between the will of the people and political actors like the CHP which are depicted as historical representatives of elitist state ideology.<sup>9</sup> For example, in his party group speech on 7 February 2012, Erdoğan targets the CHP in order to emphasize this dichotomy:

I am speaking the language of my nation. Because we apprehended our nation's language, the AKP is here today. But you, because you did not walk with the nation, you did not understand the language of the nation, you did not speak the language of the nation, you could not come to power for decades and you will not be able to.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, this research will also look at the traits of language used in politics in order to elaborate on the democratic/non-democratic character of political communication. In that

---

<sup>6</sup> Discourse topics can be defined as central themes in the texts around which discourses are organized in order to provide a particular elaboration of the issue at hand.

<sup>7</sup> See Mardin (1975) for this kind of approach.

<sup>8</sup> See the analysis chapter to see the ways in which it is mystified and overemphasized.

<sup>9</sup> For an analysis focusing on the discursive reconstruction of political history as a political strategy, see Küçükali (2014).

<sup>10</sup> The original version of the speech can be found at:

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/humusun-hesabi-er-gec-sorulacak/19897>.

sense, this study should be assessed not only as a case study but also as an initial effort to enrich the tools, concepts and perspectives that we use to understand political discourse in parliamentary democracies. While investigating the Turkish case, the reader will thus have an idea of the strategies which are functionalized/instrumentalized against the democratic premises of political communication. Moreover, if these strategies are used in various and continuous ways to gain political power, one needs to reconsider the definition of and conditions for democratic politics according to the results of the analysis.<sup>11</sup>

In these circumstances, the researcher's first aim is to decipher and show the instrumentalization of discursive strategies and how they are actualized in various texts and genres. The assumption is that if the dynamic mechanism of discursive strategies is understood, then wider and interrelated mechanisms of linguistic/ ideological domination can be perceived, and the tools as well as the meaning of that political/ discursive contention can be evaluated, which is the second aim of the research.

As the single executive power for more than a decade, the AKP became the only party that remained in power for so long after the end of single-party rule, i.e. from 1923 to 1946, in Turkey. This elective power gave the party the initiative to implement an economic and political agenda aiming to converse with global capitalism as a domestic and foreign actor.<sup>12</sup> Due to the political power that the governing party holds and the increasing electoral support that strengthens it, this necessitates putting the AKP at the centre of the analysis.

Although I will not be especially focusing on other political parties, I will give some examples of how the governing AKP tries to weaken its opponents politically by using several discursive strategies which are mainly based on 'negative other presentation'. In these examples, I expect to see some references to opposition parties. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to highlight all the political parties and their political discourses and how they relate to each other. Nevertheless, future research can focus on individual actors and their discursive-strategic positioning, which is not taken into consideration in this study. The socialist/communist political parties for instance have made substantial critiques of the current government and their policymaking preferences

---

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed discussion, see the theory chapter.

<sup>12</sup> For a detailed analysis of the AKP's policy preferences and neoliberal character see Uzgel and Duru (2010).

but have never found enough electoral support. Actually, they were totally excluded from the parliamentary system, except for the Turkish Workers' Party success in the 1965 and 1969 elections (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). Their socialist discourses and political struggles were often ignored by the mainstream media and government. They were always accused of being marginal. It is thought-provoking that these movements faced serious material sanctions for their critiques and actions although they never had the chance to become large-scale political actors. In that sense, these political parties and their efforts to influence the political system as non-parliamentary actors could be the subject of future research.

Likewise, the Kurdish movement and its efforts to become a legal political actor faced military and legal sanctions until today. Kurdish political parties were constantly closed down for being linked to a terrorist organization, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), although they gained the support of many Kurdish citizens. Despite not getting over the 10 per cent national threshold, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) managed to get into the parliament with 34 members who were independently elected in the 2011 elections. Although this party and its predecessors were labelled as ethnic parties fighting for an independent Kurdish state, their discourse and political struggle were oversimplified and therefore require a more detailed analysis which should focus on the gap between their discursive representation and their discursive self-representation.

There are also protest movements that have tried to challenge AKP rule as a reaction to the policies of the party. Especially, the Gezi protests, which began to contest the urban development planning of Taksim Gezi Park in the last days of May 2013, quickly turned into massive protests against the government as a result of the brutal eviction of protestors from the park. During those protests, many creative ways were employed to show the people's discontent with the ongoing policymaking preferences of the party. Especially, political humour, which is a counter-hegemonic discursive strategy, could be the focus of future research.<sup>13</sup>

The main reason for focusing only the discourses of the AKP is to investigate how the governing party's discourse tries to establish and maintain a discursive hegemony. For instance, religious discourses employed by the governing party are functional in creating a certain level of political hegemony such that the opposition parties also increasingly

---

<sup>13</sup> For a collection of studies on political humour, see Tsakona and Popa (2011).

use religious discourses and counter-discourses in order to criticize the policymaking preferences of the party and justify their political existence. This observation, which is an example of discursive hegemony, helps to materialize the theoretical position mentioned above: Political actors try to impose their political preferences through conscious and manipulative use of language so as to counteract the alternative representations of political reality, and in so doing shrink the ‘space for disagreement’ (Schröter, 2013).

Therefore, democratic politics cannot be seen as a final aim or an ideal position to be in, because it is always conditional and appears only when there is tension between political actors who are unable to impose their interests. Otherwise, it is only possible to talk about police order which is what one also sees in the Turkish case. According to Rancière (2010), the police is thus first an order of bodies that define the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being and ways of saying, and they see to it that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees whether one activity is visible and another is not, and if one speech is to be understood as discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1998, p. 29). Therefore, the revival of political contradiction is the only condition for democratic politics. The revival of political contradiction also necessitates the demystification of power and domination in political discourse which is one of the concerns of this research as well.

Power as domination invokes the idea of constraint on interests; to speak of a third dimension of such power is to speak of interests imputed to and unrecognized by the actors involved (Lukes, 2005, p. 146). For instance, the AKP usually takes economic growth as a prerequisite of political success (Babacan, 2012). But economic growth does not necessarily mean that the economy policies of the government are successful and that the economic prosperity of the people will increase. There are other indicators like the unemployment rate or current debt which should also be considered in order to evaluate economic prosperity. Another aspect of the governmental discourse on economic growth is the deliberate ignorance of inequality. Onaran (2013) states that AKP has deliberately used policies of redistribution to improve the position of the poorest to enhance its power without conflicting with the high income groups and these policies have helped to create a broad basis of consent.<sup>14</sup> Hence, the discourse of

---

<sup>14</sup> For a discussion by Onaran (2013), see <http://researchturkey.org/the-political-economy-of-inequality-redistribution-and-the-protests-in-turkey>

economic growth tries to eliminate or weaken other instruments for assessing economic prosperity and justifies a certain kind of policymaking as being for the general good of society. This strategy illustrates a typical covert implementation of power in a discourse which is manipulative, because it reduces the multiple determinants of social reality into one.

Thus, in order to pursue a political struggle as in the first condition, so to say, in order to assess, criticize and propose a political alternative, one would first have to get involved in a discursive struggle and deconstruct as well as decipher the manipulating elements of political discourse so that opposing interests, alternative interpretations of and solutions to political problems can be realized and their discursive representations could become part of the political decision-making process. This is also the reason why an interdisciplinary approach which evaluates political theories and processes in the light of discourse analysis is needed.<sup>15</sup>

In this way, the research itself becomes part of the power struggle by: 1) showing the asymmetric distribution of power which reflects the language so that less powerful political actors and repressed groups could reconsider and reposition themselves in the discursive struggle; and 2) contributing to the realization and consideration of conflicting interests and related political actions. Hence, this study claims to be a comprehensive one which analyzes discursive strategies as an important component of hegemonic projects in Turkish politics in order to illustrate how specific language use becomes a tool for manufacturing and maintaining structural hegemony. In this research, structural hegemony is conceptualized in a way similar to that of Joseph (2002) and connotes the relationship between the state and the global economic system which tries to harmonize the overall social formation according to current trends in capital accumulation. But this kind of hegemony can only be realized via successful hegemonic projects which aim to produce hegemonic discourse in order to transform the political sphere. Thus, the political hegemony of actor/s is only possible as long as their hegemonic projects are compatible with structural hegemony. In this case, the claim is that the AKP should be taken as the main hegemonic project of neoliberal capital accumulation and the party adopts the role of pursuing the sociopolitical transformation of society. In order to do that, the party also needs to create a discursive hegemony which helps to implement structural changes with a particular set of policymaking preferences. So, the AKP's

---

<sup>15</sup> See the theory chapter for a discussion of the different approaches to discourse.

political existence becomes dependent on its capacity to realize ongoing reforms in society without disturbing social cohesion, although such reforms may lead to defiance and conflict within society.

Another shortcoming of previous studies is that they have depicted the sphere of political communication as an ideal medium to achieve political consensus which favours the interests of society as a whole and considered political actors to be equal agents, as if the power relations between them were symmetrical and their political discourses neither contextual nor relational. In my view, every actor should be considered as both a path-dependent and dynamic actor. While the historical context they inherited influences their discursive capacity (in both positive and negative ways), they adapt to the changing conditions of political struggle by modifying their discourse or creating new ones in order to maintain or expand their political influence on other opponents and, relatedly, on the masses. So, on the one hand, I assume that they are stable in the sense that they stick to a main discourse which constructs and distinguishes their identity from their opponents, while on the other they are dynamic in the sense that they blend different lines of argumentation, champion contradictory discourses about the same topic or discursively reconstruct themselves according to the political goals they want to achieve. In this research, these tensions, contradictions and creativity are systematically considered and investigated in the case of the AKP so that the reader can have a better understanding of the complex dynamics of political hegemony. The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)<sup>16</sup> thus becomes the most adequate analytical approach among other CDA approaches because historical sources and the background of social and political fields in which discursive events are embedded are taken into systematic consideration, and thus the historical dimension of discursive actions and the dynamics of change are analyzed in-depth and more comprehensively.

While Turkey will be a case study and the focus will be on the ruling party, the AKP, a further methodological aim is to combine the critical realist theory of hegemony (Joseph, 2002) with the main premises of Critical Discourse Analysis. That means the theories and methodologies of CDA are useful in order to observe, expose and explain latent forms of power struggles in language and show some links between discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics so that the notion of hegemony is not understood as an *ipso facto* phenomenon but rather a condition of continuous attempts which are in line with

---

<sup>16</sup> See the methodology chapter for details of this approach.

wider economic structures. These latent power struggles are hard to recognize only by looking superficially at the issues and content of political debates. Rather, they are to be found in the multi-faceted practices of powerful actors, and one of these practices is the strategic use of language which helps to increase and maintain the political dominance of such powerful actors.

This intentional use of language is realized by the constant operationalization of political discourse and it also has other aims of framing the political discussion, weakening the political opposition, manipulating the audience and setting the agenda so that the sociopolitical system already established can remain the hegemonic one. As Yalman (2002) emphasizes, it means that hegemony is a process which should be able to reconstruct itself at any moment. That is why using the analytical tools of CDA makes it possible to see the functionalization of language as part of a hegemonic project, and it is consistent with a critical realist understanding of hegemony.

These aims are not realized solely through the analysis of overt forms of power, because overt forms of power only include declared interests and overt conflicts between political actors. From a critical realist perspective these are the actual and empirical stages of social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1975). Hence, in order to understand undeclared interests and covert conflicts that reflect different spheres of social action, the causal mechanisms of social and discursive practices should be investigated by looking at possible links between political discourse and policymaking. This is the point where CDA can contribute to critical realist theory of hegemony. Moreover, its 'proud bias' which foresees solidarity with those who are oppressed and have an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk, in order to establish, conform or legitimate their abuse of power (Van Dijk, 1999), is also compatible with the overall research aim of making latent power structures transparent so that the oppressed parts of society can actively take part in the political decision-making process too.

In order to expand on the aforementioned contributions, there are three main questions and a number of related questions clustered around them to be answered. These questions relate to different levels of context in order to increase the validity and reliability of the analysis. In order to achieve this goal, the research benefits from the triangulatory assessment inherent to the DHA which puts context at the same level of analysis as text and takes four levels into account. These are:

1. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
2. Extralinguistic social/sociological variables;
3. The history and archaeology of texts and organizations;
4. The institutional frames of the specific context of a situation (Wodak, 2009, p. 38).

Accordingly, the main research questions are organized in accordance with the aforementioned context levels as follows:

1) Can we see similar and common discursive strategies for different policy issues?

What are the discourse topics? How are they linked to each other? Can we see the reproduction of discourse topics in the texts from different sub-genres? Which discursive strategies are employed to elaborate on these topics? How do they help to realize policymaking?

2) What are the main traits of the political discourse employed by the AKP?

Do they represent social reality from a singular perspective so that other potential aspects and actors are excluded from the discourse? What kind of policymaking do they serve? How can one evaluate the political positioning of the AKP on the basis of outcomes?

3) What is the impact of political history on discourse?

What is the particular importance of the de/recontextualization of political history in the discourse of the AKP? What are the effects of this strategy? How can we evaluate the political history of the AKP itself?

While the first meta-question focuses on the textual and discursive aspects of analysis, the second and third meta-questions mainly cover the social and historical aspects of AKP discourse. All three questions and the others clustered around them aim to expose the policymaking preferences of the party and their legitimation process in the form of discursive strategies in order to evaluate the political character of the party from a critical perspective.

Based on a qualitative analysis, thirteen political texts will be analyzed according to five discursive strategies, which are: nomination, predication, perspectivation, argumentation and intensification/ mitigation (Wodak, 2009, p. 44). These are the most suitable strategies for the research purpose of investigating argumentative reasoning in order to legitimize the policy goals and negative other presentation of political opponents by seeking to delegitimize dissident political actions as well as their discourses.<sup>17</sup> The texts to be analyzed will be collected from three sub-genres, which are party-group speeches, election rally speeches and ministerial speeches. Party-group speeches are made by the party leaders every week. They cover recent developments and clarify the party's position on these developments. These speeches are seen as an opportunity to form public opinion because they are broadcast nationally. Election rally speeches are also made by party leaders and they mainly focus on positive self and negative other representation. In these speeches, there is more interaction between orator and audience. This means that appeals to emotions or 'pathos' are used intensively. Lastly, ministerial speeches are relatively short texts which further elaborate and distribute party discourse. They are uttered by ministers and tend to focus on particular policy issues.<sup>18</sup>

There will be two principles in the clustering of texts. The first is to cover both the pre-election and post-election periods in order to see change/ stability according to the political context. Hence sample texts are taken from both before and after the general election which was held on 11 June 2011. The second principle is to cover different kinds of sub-genres in order to see the intertextuality and interdiscursivity between texts and discourses as well as to investigate how sub-genres function. For example, party-group speeches and election rally speeches are well-structured texts which represent ideas and principles, propose/ legitimize/ delegitimize policies and position the party as well as its political opponents in a coherent way, whereas ministerial speeches can be considered to be less structured public comments by government officials which consume and distribute the discourses produced in the first two sub-genres.

Issue-based /policy-oriented comments (ministerial speeches) are either published directly on the website of the political party or are performed at a local meeting and then quoted in news portals directly. That is why the first two speeches (a party group speech and an election rally speech) were selected randomly and analyzed as a whole, while in

---

<sup>17</sup> For other discursive strategies see Wodak et al. (2009) and Wodak, Mral and Khosravini (2013).

<sup>18</sup> See the methodology chapter for further information on sub-genres and their functions.

the analysis of ministerial speeches sample texts were selected according to the discourse topics which are also covered in the first two texts.

After conducting the analysis based on the selected data, the results are used to assess the validity of the claims that: a) the AKP's institutional background and discursive preferences are compatible with neoliberal policymaking preferences, and b) the party as well as its discourses should be considered as hegemonic projects aiming to realize these preferences through the strategic use of language under the domain of moderate Islamist identity/ discourses while distorting oppositional discourses and delegitimizing dissident actors in a systematic way.

Alongside with the results of the data analysis, the purpose of extending the discussion of political struggle to the discursive level could help to: a) evaluate the relation between discourse and politics from an alternative perspective, b) contribute to the identification of the AKP, and c) help in a systematic analysis of party discourses so that gaps or convergences between policies and language can be critically assessed. The research might also be used for practical goals, for example by lecturers and students of politics who are looking for a more dynamic and multi-faceted analysis of political power in the context of Turkish politics. If this is done, the influence of a dominant and unidimensional interpretation of Turkish politics and more generally of democratic politics could be challenged. Those opposition political actors who indirectly became part of the analysis in this study might also consider the findings of the research in order to reassess their position. Finally, this perspective could be used by critical researchers and thinkers and shared with those who are propelled from the political sphere by the operationalization of strategic use of language which is a covert form of power.

## **1.2. Outline of the thesis**

In accordance with the general ideas and aims of the research, this study is divided into nine chapters. The main content of the chapters is as follows:

The second chapter includes contextual information to help understand the ongoing political struggle and what kind of impact a particular political history could have on forming discursive strategies. In order to understand why some discursive strategies are superior to others, we should look at the 'arsenal' of discourses which make up the political history of prominent political actors who are active in Turkish politics. History

is discursively reconstructed by power elites, but because my main focus is on discursive strategies, I suggest that some historical events/ episodes can make certain discursive strategies operationalizable successfully. The CHP's political background as a state party can be used to the advantage of its political opponents and against it, especially by the AKP. Taking history into consideration in that sense can impact on evaluating the success of discursive strategies which are context-dependent.

In the third chapter, the main literature on political discourse analysis and work which deals with the discursive and non-discursive aspects of Turkish politics, especially that of AKP rule, are reviewed. The main aim in this chapter is to illustrate the relevance of the research by showing that the analytical tools of CDA can be adapted to Turkish politics with a critical realist perspective in order to fill the gap between studies which treat language use in politics merely as a linguistic problem without linking the discursive aspect to the wider sociopolitical context, and other studies which conduct a critical analysis of the social and political outcomes of AKP rule (in some cases with a focus on macro-discourses of the party) without conducting a systematic linguistic/ discursive analysis. The chapter also aims to provide a conceptual base for neo-liberalism by discussing the different conceptualizations of the term and clarifying how the research approaches the notion.

In the fourth chapter, I summarize and elaborate three main lines of thinking about politics, and at the end I explain the main promises of the critical realist theory of hegemony on which this research is based. The first line of thinking, which is generally identified with the works of Rawls (1971), Habermas (1984), Cohen (1997) and Fishkin (2011), puts deliberation at the centre of the democratic political system and looks for some principles on which to base a rational debate, whereas the other view takes conflict and disagreement to be a necessary step towards equal representation, which is the basic condition of democratic politics. Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Rancière (1998) and Badiou (2005) can be considered the main figures of this second view. I discuss the main arguments and shortcomings of these two ways of approaching politics and adapt a critical realist understanding of politics so that I can integrate an extended notion of hegemony into my analysis, which is discussed theoretically by referring to Joseph (2002). This chapter also aims to legitimize this choice by showing the compatibility of this theory with the main premises of CDA.

The fifth chapter clarifies the approach and methods of the analysis in order to show which governmental discourses might dominate the political sphere in the form of hegemonic projects and how they are operationalized in discourse. After the categorization of the political speeches according to their content and function as polity, policy and politics, each component is defined and discussed in detail. The analyzed speeches are assessed in light of this categorization in order to clarify their structural features and political function. The chapter then explains the main premises of the DHA and how it is implemented to pursue the aims of this research. In the last part, the research aims are defined and the research questions, data and selection criteria are explained according to the indicated aims.

The sixth, seventh and eighth chapters focus on the analysis of linguistic means, intertextuality and interdiscursivity based on the selected speeches. The discourses that will be analyzed are situated in strategically structured texts. While looking at five macro-discursive strategies (Wodak, 2009), the focus is on nominalization, word choice, topicality, topoi, rhetorical figures, deixis and derailments in argumentation in the micro-level analysis. In the sixth chapter, the election rally speech delivered by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 3 June, 2011 is analyzed. This text mainly shows the traits of a praise-blame speech and it concentrates on a particular city where the speech was made. Here, one can observe the effort to depict local improvements as evidence for successful general policymaking preferences. The seventh chapter analyzes a party group speech; this was delivered by the prime minister on 3 January 2012. Based on three macro-discourse topics of economic prosperity, regional developments and the Uludere strike, the analysis shows how the AKP deals with political criticism and delegitimizes oppositional actors that challenge the policymaking preferences of the party. The eighth chapter focuses somewhat on texts from ministerial speeches and investigates how policy proposals are reproduced, distributed, extended and legitimized through them. This chapter focuses on discourse topics which were directly or indirectly uttered in earlier speeches by the prime minister.

In the conclusion chapter, the results of the analysis are summarized, related to my assumptions formulated in this chapter and to the research questions, and discussed while considering extra-linguistic political developments. Showing the links between discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics in the case of the AKP, some policy preferences which are problematized in governmental discourse and their societal

outcomes are discussed in light of the current literature. In the concluding remarks, the overall contribution of the research, final thoughts, shortcomings and recommendations for prospective studies are elaborated.

## **CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The main focus in this chapter will be on identifying the historical heritage of Turkish politics by concentrating on the two main political parties in order to provide basic contextual information to the reader who does not have sufficient knowledge of Turkish politics. But there is a further aim of taking political history into account. In accordance with understanding discourse as both a constitutive and a constituent element of social reality in a dialectic way (Wodak, 2001), looking at the institutional and societal background gives us some hints about the possible limiting or sustaining effects of political history on political actors and their discourses.

Thus, I will be looking at the historical context in which the AKP positions itself according to changing social and political circumstances as well as showing several ways of interpreting the history of the CHP among which the AKP sticks to one instead of others in order to deal with the opposition. The political history of the parties also reveals the constant conflicts between different ideologies which reflect policymaking preferences in Turkey. Hence, I also emphasize the main premises of these ideologies, their interpretation of the world and their evolution, which reflect party politics, by examining the CHP (Republican People's Party) which has dominated the parliamentary opposition and the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) which has dominated government as a single party since 2002. There are two main reasons for taking the CHP's history into account, although the party's discourse is not analyzed in this research. Firstly, the CHP's history has shaped overall Turkish political history since it became the founder party of the Turkish Republic and ruled the country as a single party until 1950. Secondly, AKP discourses heavily rely on the criticism of the CHP, and so in order to evaluate the relevance of arguments and historical references later in the analysis, the reader needs to know more about this party and its historical evolution.

### **2.1. Short political history of the CHP**

The Turkish Republic was established in 1923, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who was a military officer in the Ottoman army. His aim was to create an independent and secular nation state that wanted to break the links with the Ottoman past and establish a Western type of democracy by adopting the contemporary institutions of the West and shifting the source of authority from religion to reason at every level of societal life. In the Western world, such changes, abolishing the monarchy and shifting

to a parliamentary democracy, industrialization, the increasing role of the bourgeoisie in economic and political life and increasing the social and political rights of citizens, were prompted by the enduring conflicts between the social classes.

However, in Turkey, they were implemented rapidly in a top-down manner by the military elite and bureaucrats who were well-educated and concerned with the future of the Turkish Republic. This cadre, who served as military officers in the Ottoman army, including Mustafa Kemal, became the first politicians and policymakers of Turkey.

The *Republican People's Party*, first called the Peoples' Party, was established in 1923 as the founding party of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The aforementioned societal aim of becoming a contemporary nation was supplemented by radical changes in every sphere of societal/ social life. These radical revisions included the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, abandonment of the sacred law of Islam, adopting the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code, the closure of religious schools and establishing a secular education system and replacing Islamic dates/times by the Gregorian calendar and the international clock. Moreover, there would be a new Turkish language, history and folklore as part of the nation-building process (Meeker, 2001, p. 285).

All these reforms aimed to secularize society and dissolve religious authority, especially in rural parts of Turkey so that people would harmonize with the modern institutions of the nation-state. Kaya (2004) indicates that the secularization of society was the overarching aim because, without it, the key signifiers of modernity, like freedom, rationality and autonomy, could not make sense. The Kemalists tried hard to eliminate differences in Anatolia by implementing these legal reforms and to standardize practices and identities with the aim of creating a single whole coherent society (p. 85). These people were a bureaucratic cadre and civil servants who held key positions in the Grand National Assembly between 1931 and 1943. So, they were able to institutionalize a considerable degree of autonomy to create an apparatus composed of bureaucratic and political power and thus impose their perception of national will on the public (Jacoby, 2004).

The effects of these radical changes expanded to the regions, even in the earlier years of the Turkish Republic and certainly by the late 1930s. Everyone was obliged to accept the new national norms in order to take part in social life (Meeker, 2001, p. 286). According

to Ahmad (1993), “these reforms were only partially successful because there was no significant indigenous social stratum outside the bureaucracy capable of taking advantage of them. There was as yet no Turkish bourgeoisie which felt restrained by the old order and endeavored to create a world of its own” (p. 4). Hence, the changes were imposed by a single party which ruled the country from 1923 to 1945 and which, at the same time, was the establishing state party of the Republic. On the one hand, the state party tried to modernize society in accordance with Western<sup>19</sup> societies by adopting their political, economic and judicial systems in order to create a capitalist and secular society; on the other hand, it suppressed any opposition which challenged the Western type of modernization as a project.

The elite of Turkey tried to create solidarity among the people for the sake of the new Turkish nation. Actually, this effort to mobilize the people neglected conflict-based interpretations of society, such as Marxism, and promoted a shared interest of the people which was to create an independent contemporary nation (Köker, 2007). Mardin believes that the Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia (including the establishers of the Turkish Republic) who turned their eyes to the West ‘in order to save the state’ only adopted positivism (which was compatible with their elitist tendency) and solidarism (which is embracing and emphasizes community and does not give importance to agency) among several schools of thought (as cited in Köker, 2007, p. 227). The outcome of these preferences led to authoritarian tendencies in the Turkish Republic. Mardin argues that positivism and solidarity led to quite an authoritarian ideology in the form of Kemalism which combined expertise and theories (theories emphasizing the priority of military power and elites for societal development) with patriotism and activism. There was a relationship of priority between societal goals. While the prior aim was the industrialization and modernization of Turkey, democracy as the political participation of citizens was subordinate to the success of the first aim, and it could only be permitted according to the level of readiness of members of society (Köker, 2007, p. 228). As a result of this analysis, the relationship between democracy and Kemalism can be summarized as three points:

- 1- A conception of democracy which connotes conflict on the basis of consensus and depends upon societal diversity is very alien to a solidarity-based understanding of society that denies conflict.

---

<sup>19</sup> The terms West or Western in this thesis mainly refer to the European countries and the USA.

- 2- By looking at the complaints of representatives of Kemalism about authoritarianism, it is possible to talk about democracy as a future element of the Turkish society which was mapped out by the Kemalists. However, the democracy designed here is in a secondary position, based on solidarity and a nation-state (as the basis of the political regime), instead of a strong central state and conflict.
- 3- Although these relations of Kemalism with democracy have similar traits to the notion of tutelage, which refers to military elites as the guardians of the Republican regime, it should be seen as a feature which complicated the democratization process instead of facilitating its development. Because only those who internalize a tutelary regime can decide if society is ready for democracy, that is to say if society has proved itself maturity enough for democratic transition (Köker, 2007, p.229). In this context, it means the military-bureaucratic elite who established the new Republic would decide if different segments of society had internalized the established rules of the new nation-state and if there were no threats to the new Republican regime.

According to this analysis, Kemalism, which was the state ideology of the Turkish Republic during the years of single-party (CHP) rule until 1945, had a fundamental and problematic relationship with democracy. Although the ruling elite of the new Republic distinguished itself from the Ottoman past and made radical changes to society, these changes were implemented in an elitist and top-down manner. In that sense, the ruling elite of the Republic failed to overcome the bureaucratic-conservative character of Ottoman rule and became the new power centre of an ideology which they had criticized and fought against. This was an ideology which prioritized the preexistence of the state and imposed sanctions on groups which did not agree with the new founding principles or which opposed the policymaking preferences of the ruling party. Such an elitist approach created a gap between the ruling elite and the rest of society, which materialized in the political existence of the CHP.

When analyzing the power struggles between different groups on an institutional level, one can observe that the authoritarian tendency suppressed and prohibited alternative ways of policymaking of the TCF (*Progressive Republican Party*) and later of the SCF (*Free Republican Party*) in order to establish single-party rule in Turkey. Although there was opposition potential, even in the CHP, which could have led to a multi-party era in

the very early years of the Republic, this potential was destroyed by political and judicial sanctions until 1930.

Koçak (1997) states that, “although all the members of the parliament were from the CHP”, this did not mean that the party and the assembly formed a homogenous political entity. On the contrary, there were serious disagreements about the declaration of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate and the constitution of 1924. These disagreements over reforms and the anxiety over the increasing influence of Mustafa Kemal would lead to resignations from the CHP and the opposition being organized as a new party (p. 98). The TCF was established as the first opposition party of Turkey in 1924 but it only lasted a year. It was banned in 1925 with a conviction for treason against homeland for encouraging religious fanaticism. The party’s activities were indirectly linked to the Sheik Said Rebellion that broke out in the eastern provinces of Turkey as a religious and ethnic uprising in 1925.<sup>20</sup> A year later, some former members of the party were executed after being convicted for taking part in a failed assassination plan to kill Mustafa Kemal. The Sheikh Said Rebellion and the failed assassination attempt to kill Mustafa Kemal were used strategically by the ruling party to purge the opposition. After 1926, no overt political opposition remained and this was the beginning of single-party rule (Koçak, 1997, pp. 99-104).

Unlike the TCF, the SCF was established in 1930, with the approval of Mustafa Kemal, as an opposition party. Its programme supported the main premises of economic liberalism, such as privatization, tax reduction, less bureaucracy and the abolition of state monopolies. It also sought expansion in political rights, such as increasing the participation of citizens in politics, control over the executive body and women’s suffrage. However, the main intention was not to have an alternative to the current government but rather to have a “soft” opposition which means that it could examine government policies and warn the CHP when necessary so that it could contribute to the overall policymaking process without politically challenging the government (ibid., pp. 99-104).

---

<sup>20</sup> Sheik Said, who was a religious leader of the Naqshbandi Islamic order, led a nationalist (Kurdish) and religious rebellion in 1925. It was framed as a holy war and he demanded the restoration of the Caliphate. Rebel forces under the control of Sheikh Said took control of an area north of Diyarbakır but were defeated. Sheikh Said and 47 other leaders of the rebellion were executed (Lundgren, 2007, p. 43).

The necessity of having an opposition party also resulted from the 1929 economic crisis that affected the weak Turkish economy in a negative way. People were dissatisfied with the CHP government which was unable to solve the problems resulting from the crisis. Thus, it is possible to say that the economic as well as the political dissatisfaction of the people made the SCF a serious political alternative and the party accepted its new role. However, this was not welcomed by Mustafa Kemal, and so he withdrew his support for the party. As a conclusion, party leaders did not want to clash with Mustafa Kemal, and the party was closed down after three and a half months (Koçak, 1997, pp. 106-107).

Another point to be mentioned here is the dichotomy of policy preferences between economic liberalism and statism,<sup>21</sup> which was resolved in favour of the latter after the annihilation of the SCF. The statist policies became the determining paradigm from the 1930s to the end of the Second World War and they were implemented during the single-party rule of the CHP. These policies were realized as state enterprises, direct intervention in economic life – especially in the industrial field – and control over all economic fields. The nationalization of foreign corporations accelerated and central planning of the economy was emphasized (Koçak, 1997, p. 109). As Boratav (cited in Yetkin, 1983) points out, after the SCF experience, the ruling cadre became anxious because they understood that without economic development they would not be able to remain in power due to increasing opposition and dissatisfaction. Thus, little by little, they became convinced of the necessity of making statist moves which would be implemented a year after the annihilation of the SCF. The years from 1930 to 1945 which can be characterized as a period of increasing state intervention into economic and social life saw a single-party regime, and the CHP became the target of all criticism as the single executive body. These criticisms had solid foundations. Zürcher (2004) indicates that by the end of the Second World War, Ismet İnönü's (the prime minister and second president of Turkey after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) government became very unpopular for several reasons. Zürcher distinguishes between the population and segments of the coalition, including bureaucrats, Muslim traders, officers and landowners in the countryside on which the Kemalist regime had been built, to explain the reasons for discontent. Some of these are listed below:

---

<sup>21</sup> Economic liberalism supports the freedom of the market in economic relations and private property in the means of production. This view opposes statism in which the state takes the initiative for economic development and makes direct investment to enhance the common wealth of the nation in a planned way (Adams, 2001).

1) People who lived in urban areas did not see any major improvements in their living standard.

2) The state's extensive and effective control over the countryside, lasting for years, by means of gendarmes and tax collectors, was creating discontent among the people. When the central state became visible to these people, it also created fear and hate among them.

3) The state's secular policies, especially the suppression of expressions of popular faith, severed the most important ideological bond between state and subject.

Industrial workers formed a small percentage of the population and their economic situation was weak. Their purchasing power was hit by the cost of living during the war (Zürcher, 2004, p. 207).

The segments of the coalition which the new Republic had been built on were also displeasing for the reasons listed below:

1) The high inflation rate and taxes decreased the purchasing power of civil servants and this created tension among the bureaucracy.

2) The wealth tax of 1942 caused discontent among the Turkish bourgeoisie because they started to question if the bureaucrats of the regime could be considered dependable defenders of their interests.

3) Large landowners were dissatisfied with the taxes on agricultural products, their low pricing and the law on giving land to the farmers (Zürcher, 2004, p. 207).

For the purposes of my research, I will not go into more detail. However, it is worth indicating that, after the Second World War, Turkey positioned herself in the Western bloc and especially strengthened her relationship with the USA against the Soviet Union. Thus, the transition to democratic rule based on a multi-party system was the result of a mixture of external and internal factors.

The aforementioned internal factors noted by Zürcher are crucial for my research because they indicate the material and context-dependent reasons for discontent which made CHP rule the main target of criticism in the later stages of Turkish politics. These factors were decontextualized and re-contextualized as various forms of arguments. For example, the contemporary CHP is depicted by the governing party as a state party

which preserved its political power and ideology without any change up until now, although the party could not come into power after 1950 and it adopted a social democrat ideology in the 1960s. However, the government officials still criticize the party by referring back to the 1930s in order to link the state party's experience with today's CHP. (Küçükali, 2014).

The external and internal factors that imposed the transition to a multi-party system resulted in the establishment of a new party in 1946. The name of this party was the *Democrat Party* (DP), and it was founded by Celal Bayar who was a senior member of the parliament as well as a former member of the CHP. Ismet İnönü supported the establishment of this new party and worked closely with Bayar in the founding process. However, the CHP was shocked when they realized it had extensive support. The DP managed to get 62 of the 465 seats available despite the high level of fraud and this made the CHP rethink its policy proposals (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 212-215). At the party congress of 1947, the CHP tried to take possession of the DP's arguments by defending free enterprise, allowing religious education, reforming the Village Institutes (public schools which were operational from 1940 to 1954 in order to foster rural development and reinforce the state ideology) which the DP was accusing of being centres of communism and retracting the law on the distribution of land to the landless peasantry (ibid., pp. 212-215).

However, this shift did not help CHP in the 1950 elections and the *Democrat Party* came into power. The CHP became the opposition party for the first time since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. After ten years of rule, the DP was closed down in 1960 because of its increasingly oppressive tendencies which had been operationalized through the agency of executive power against the old ruling elite. However, the economic policies that they implemented during this period had permanent effects on Turkish society. The majority of the landed classes and peasants, countrymen, artisans and tradesmen who fell outside the Westernized and urbanized bureaucratic elite of single-party rule found opportunities to represent themselves in the political system (Bulut, 2009, p. 77). The state invested heavily in cement, sugar, power plants and the construction industry while trying to promote private investment through offering generous credits to farmers, tax exemptions and special treatment to foreign capital. However, the real benefits of these policies went to a small group.

In so doing, the DP created a privileged middle class of capital owners and a larger group of aggressive entrepreneurs who had superficially liberal views (Karpas, 2004, pp. 40-41). Karpas also emphasizes that Turkish villagers changed their habits and thoughts because of their increasing wealth. Many of them migrated to the cities to seek their fortune. They asked for more opportunities to better their lives, not as a favour from their rulers but as their birthright. These groups with their families reached 25 per cent of the population in 1970 (p. 42). According to Bulut (2009), all these developments created a mass loyal to the DP and this loyalty would carry the *Justice Party* (AP) into power later in 1965 (p. 78). Hence, the economic power of privileged groups was also reflected in the political sphere and contributed to the establishment of a new paradigm, namely economic liberalism.

This new paradigm became rooted in Turkish politics although its de facto legal existence was interrupted by the 1960 military intervention which directly targeted the government. The initial opposition started to emerge in the political arena as a victim of state ideology and gathered support from the rural population and the newly emerging landed middle-classes who were dissatisfied with the single-party rule of the CHP. Then, the political and economic paradigm established itself as a liberal-conservative tradition in Turkish politics and was possessed by the right-wing parties. The main characteristics of this political paradigm are support for a liberal economy, a claim for minimum state intervention in social and economic life, support for the privatization of state-owned assets and foreign enterprises, collaboration with the landed classes, support for religious freedom, cultural conservatism and emphasis on building strong relationships with Western countries, especially the USA.

The view of Zürcher (2004) that political and economic liberalization is the main point of difference between the DP and the CHP overlaps with the features and policy preferences of the DP listed above and successor parties, like the AP and ANAP. All these political parties including the AKP claim that they are successors of the DP tradition. They situate themselves as the antithesis of the single-party regime and its bureaucratic-military components while supporting economic and political liberalism in the name of democratic rule. As Bulut indicates (2009), all the parties starting from the DP have claimed that challenging elitist rule is only made possible by fostering economic wealth. The support for liberal economic policies resulted from a promise that these policies would lead to greater wealth for the wider population. Countering the

elitist image of the CHP in people's eyes, DP politicians tried to be close to the masses and behaved as if they were their real representatives (p. 77). This is the reason why rural people from different class backgrounds could find common ground against the CHP.

Inevitable change came in the mid-1960s after the party lost in the 1961 and 1965 elections. These were the years when the CHP tried to reposition itself as a social democratic party in the political sphere. Ayata (1995) points out that this did not mean an ideological or programmatic shift but rather a discursive shift which redefined the already existing party policies in line with the fashionable notions of the time, like workers' rights, social democracy, distributive justice and the welfare state. The CHP's programme included principles like revolutionism, a planned economy, social justice, republicanism and statist development; Inonu was defining the programme's place in the ideological spectrum as 'left of centre' (1995, p. 82). It was a time when the relative liberal constitution of 1961 gave people social and political rights to mobilize; socialist/social democrat thoughts were spreading among students and the working class in parallel with the global protests of 1968. But still the CHP could not get enough support and faced two challenges. According to Kalaycıoğlu (2005), one of these was the negative image of the party. He argues that, "the CHP, which had been self-declared as the left of centre party also failed to find converts among the workers, landless peasants and downtrodden of Turkey. It seemed as if the image of the party as that of the symbol of the Centre (or the State) continued with little alteration in the minds of the voters" (2005, p. 104).

The CHP also faced a second adversity. It was incompetent to cope with the propaganda which was labelling the new stance of the party as communism (Ayata, 1995, p. 82). Especially during the 1965 election period, the *Justice Party* (the successor to the Democrat Party) frequently used the slogan 'ortanın solu, Moskova yolu' (the left of centre is the road to Moscow). With this slogan, the AP succeeded in creating antipathy among the rural population and townspeople with a rural background against the CHP. The CHP tried hard to prove that left of centre did not mean communism and that left-wing thoughts did not mean impiety. Moreover, the leadership was blamed for adopting this new political stance after it lost the 1965 election. The 1969 election was another big disappointment for the party as the AP managed to get 46.5 per cent of the vote while the CHP could only get 27.4 per cent (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 96). These electoral failures

triggered internal party struggles but Ecevit's<sup>22</sup> group, which was advocating the idea of left of centre, defeated İnönü who was emphasizing the party's Kemalist tradition and anti-communist character (Zürcher, 2004, p. 253).

The new leadership under Bülent Ecevit insisted that the new ideology of the party should remain 'left of centre'. Especially Ecevit's consistent stance against the government which was formed after the 1971 military intervention shaped the social democratic ideology of the party. After attaining the party leadership in 1972, Ecevit shaped the party both ideologically and institutionally. He emphasized social justice and social security. Under his leadership, the party adopted social democratic ideas and criticized landlordism in agriculture, monopolistic corporations and flawed market mechanisms. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 109).

Throughout the 1970s, the CHP's two important supporter groups were working-class people living in the suburbs of big cities and small-scale farmers (Ayata, 1995, pp. 83-91). This happened because the party succeeded in creating a new image of a party seeking equality, justice and fairness. This new image made it the party of the downtrodden fighting for the rights of the ordinary man (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). On the institutional level, the party was successful in the 1973 election and formed a coalition with the Islamist MSP (*National Salvation Party*) in 1974.

However, this coalition only lasted seven months because of disagreements between the two parties. In the 1977 election, the party lost its executive power although it managed to increase its vote and formed a weak coalition government in 1978, until the third successful military intervention of 1980.

Thus, the 1970s was a decade when the CHP managed to create a new ideological stance and convey this to segments of society that were marginalized by rapid social mobilization (p. 108). Nevertheless, this ideological shift and electoral success in the two elections of 1973 and 1977 did not lead to effective executive power because the diversification of the right-wing parties made them capable of forming coalitions or

---

<sup>22</sup> The DSP (Democratic Left Party) leader Bülent Ecevit led the CHP (Republican People's Party) for a long period prior to 1980, effectively shaping its turn toward a modern left-wing policy stance in the late 1960s. However, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, Ecevit broke his ties with the CHP. He founded a separate party of his own, the DSP, and dominated its organization, together with his wife Rahşan Ecevit, effectively keeping the social-democratic elite away from his party. His charismatic leadership distinguished the DSP from the rest of the parties and was responsible for the party's steady rise to dominance in the 1999 elections (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 24).

searching for alternatives other than the CHP. The increasing social, political and economic fragmentation in society weakened the problem-solving capacity of coalition governments, and in Kalaycıoğlu's words 'democracy degenerated into a game of voting arithmetic and distribution of the emoluments of the national budget and state jobs through patronage networks' (2005, p. 123).

The 1980 military intervention abolished all political parties, and the CHP was one of the parties affected by the intervention. After the 1983 election, a new actor, the ANAP (*The Motherland Party*), dominated Turkish politics during the 1980s. The party leader, Özal, managed to address and embrace right-wing voters and gained a majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The overall policy preferences further liberalized the economy and institutionalized market capitalism on an unprecedented level (Karpat, 2004). Meanwhile, the CHP reorganized itself as the Populist Party and it became the second strongest party in the 1983 election. In 1985, the Social Democrat Party of Erdal İnönü (son of İsmet İnönü) merged with the Populist Party and they campaigned in the 1987 election together under the name of the *Social Democrat Populist Party*. They won 22 per cent of the vote. Bülent Ecevit rejected a merger with the two social democratic parties, and his party only received 8.5 per cent of the total vote (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 126).

In the 1991 election, the AP came first and the Social Democrat Populist Party was third with a 20 per cent share of the vote. The decline led to intra-party conflict between the party leader Erdal İnönü and Deniz Baykal, who was the leader of the opposition group. This conflict had two important outcomes. The first was the reestablishment of the CHP in 1992 under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. The second was the resignation of Erdal İnönü from the Social Democrat Populist Party after the coalition government between DYP and SHP ended.

In the 1994 local elections, the RP (*Welfare Party*), which was the successor of the Islamist MSP (*National Salvation Party*), received 6 million votes and increased its share of the vote dramatically compared to the 1991 elections in which it won 4.1 million (Karpat, 2004, p. 25). The 1994 defeat made the merger of the SHP and the CHP inevitable because of the decreasing share of the vote for left-wing parties in general. However, Ecevit did not take part in the merger. The SHP merged with the CHP under the name of the CHP in 1995. In the 1995 elections, the party could only win 10.4 per

cent of the vote whereas Ecevit's Democratic Left Party gained 14.2 per cent. In the 1999 election, the DSP (Democratic Left Party) came first, gaining 22.2 per cent of the vote, and the CHP could not get into parliament until the 2002 election.

In 2002, the newly established AKP, some of whose leaders had links with the Islamist National View movement (this movement was chronologically represented by the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party and today by the Felicity Party), would come to power and dominate Turkish politics for the next few years. Meanwhile, Deniz Baykal, who became the leader of the CHP after its reestablishment in 1992, stayed as the chairman of the party until 2010. Especially after the AKP's continuous electoral success, he was increasingly criticized for the failure of the CHP but he defended the party and himself against these criticisms. In 2010, he had to resign from leadership of the party after a videotape which disclosed an affair between him and a member of parliament from the CHP was published online. Since then, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a former bureaucrat, has been the party leader. In the last election of 2011, the CHP gained 26 per cent of the total vote and remained the main opposition party, although it increased its share of the vote compared to the previous election.

This change was also as a result of increasing discontent with party politics. Although the AKP was increasing its electoral power gradually after 2002, the CHP could not catch it and stayed in opposition. Certain cadres have been criticized by the AKP officials for being outdated and anti-democratic. This criticism is linked to the single-party party experience of Turkey and the authoritarian rule of the CHP during the interwar period, which was a legacy. The early years of the CHP under the state ideology of Kemalism were associated with top-down statist modernization which did not leave any space for different views and identities. The stabilization of the regime was the priority of the party. This elitist and protectionist approach even relates to the politics of today's CHP as a political agenda which is Euro-sceptic, nationalist, anti-reformist and against globalization (Onis & Grigoriadis, 2010).

At this point, it is possible to see this legacy as a continuation of the party's history since its establishment or as a policy preference which was readopted in the 1990s. According to Onis & Grigoriadis (2010), with the coup of 1980, the centre-left parties lost their class-alliance linkages with society and related electoral success. The de-politicization of

society, splits within the social democrat parties and intra-party conflicts during the late 1980s and '90s, decreased the credibility and support for left-wing parties. Also, with the rise of political Islam in the same period, the CHP readopted a nationalist, regime-oriented and defensive (against the European Union and globalization in general) political agenda in order to revive its political power. Thus, according to this analysis, the criticized policy preferences of the party after the second half of the 1990s were conjunctural and not totally path-dependent.

A second and related way of analyzing the CHP is to place the leadership at the centre of a critique which is synonymous with Deniz Baykal rule after 1992. According to Ayan (2004), Deniz Baykal and his leadership circle, that won the intra-party conflict and dominated the party until 2010, created an oligarchic party structure by marginalizing local party organizations in decision-making processes, in both candidate selection and programmatic or ideological debates. Thus, the leadership became unchallengeable and local party members lost faith in the party leadership. The result was an illegitimate and oligarchic type of autocracy within the CHP (Ayan, 2010, p. 204). It is also the reason why a change in leadership became a crucial issue in Turkish public opinion when Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (the new leader) challenged the leadership of Baykal. It was uncertain whether Kılıçdaroğlu could take the leadership and change the party discourse and the policies discussed in the media because defeating this oligarchic structure was not easy (Ilicak, 2010; Alpman, 2010). Nevertheless, Baykal and his oligarchic leadership were the nub of the problem and therefore at the centre of criticism for supporters of this view.

A third way of interpreting the CHP is to see it as the representative of the Republican regime which has lasted until today as a state-centred mentality, although it has lost its executive political power after single-party rule. The bureaucratic-elitist tradition of the party was a political and historical legacy and the historical role of the party paved the way for an increasing gap between the ruling elite and a society which reflects party preferences even today. The proponents of this view support that a leader change in the party does not easily lead to political success because the inner structure of the party adheres to the authoritarian Kemalist tradition and the party as a whole maintains ideological conservatism in the name of protecting the Republican regime (Kahraman, 2011; Barlas, 2011; Bayramoğlu, 2010).

In all three views, the common point is that the CHP as inheritor of the Kemalist single-party regime fails to adapt to the current dynamics of both local and global politics; thus change seems vital. The party cannot proceed with its mentality, cadre and current policy preferences. Still, the third view, which labels the CHP as a continuous bureaucratic-elitist party without taking some of the aforementioned factors into account, is adopted by the ruling party as the main discursive strategy to negatively represent the political opposition. The results of the research give some insights into this relationship and its interpretation.

## **2.2. Short political history of the AKP**

In the general election of 2002, the AKP gained 49.9 per cent of the total vote and established a single-party government for a third term. The AKP's political history on the leadership level can be traced back to the *National View Movement* (Milli Görüş) which was established by an Islamist politician, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1969 and has been an influential actor in Turkish politics and represented by a number of political parties that followed each other.<sup>23</sup> The general traits of this political ideology can be summarized as having a strong emphasis on Islamic faith and culture, economic independency, industrialization, collaboration with Islamic countries and criticism of the West. It has traced many of Turkey's problems to the project of Westernization (Arat, 2005). The National View's criticism of modernity is therefore not only cultural but also economic and political.

This is the main reason why the party was always the target of the military or bureaucratic elite and faced continuous sanctions. After the closure of the MNP (National Order Party) in the 1971 military intervention, the MSP was established as its successor in 1972. Necmettin Erbakan joined the party in 1973. During the 1970s, the MSP formed coalitions with different parties from the left and right. However, these did not last long. In 1980, the military again intervened in Turkish politics and closed down all political parties including the MSP. As the successor of the MSP, the RP was

---

<sup>23</sup> In terms of the political ideology, policymaking and merger of different strands of the political spectrum, religiously conservative and economically liberal centre-right ANAVATAN (Motherland Party) can also be seen as the descendant of the AKP. For instance, Abdulkadir Aksu and Cemil Çiçek, who were among the founders of the party, were also the members of the Motherland Party. For an extensive discussion on the parallels in terms of policymaking, see Atasoy (2009) and Boyraz (2011).

established in 1983 and became popular in the 1990s.<sup>24</sup> The RP managed to get 21.4 per cent of the total vote in the general election of 1995 and formed a coalition government with the DYP (True Path Party). However, this coalition government was abolished after the military intervention of 1997. The prime minister as well as the leader of the party, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned and the party was closed down in 1998 by the Constitutional Court. The FP (Virtue Party) was replaced by the RP, but it too was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 (Atacan, 2005). This was the time when disagreements between two political groups about the future of the movement became obvious.

The first group preserved the main premises of the National View and continued their political life in the SP (Felicity Party), which is the successor of the FP. This group is known as traditionalists and they are still active in Turkish politics, although they are not in parliament.

The second group championed change and adjustment to policy preferences so that they could survive in the political system as a legitimate political actor and get the support of the wider population. The reformists – the second group – established the AKP in 2001 and came into power in the 2002 general election with a 34.29 per cent share of the vote (Yavuz, 2003). There is also a third group which formed a new party called Has Parti (People's Voice Party) after the former party leader, Numan Kurtulmuş, resigned from the Felicity Party in 2010 because of a disagreement about elections to an administrative council and a disciplinary board. Although this party criticized AKP politics and had the potential to become a centre of opposition for right-wing/religious voters<sup>25</sup>, it merged with the AKP in September 2012. I would like to emphasize the contrast between the National View and the AKP because they represent the two main streams of thought in Islamic politics.

---

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of the roots of Islamic opposition in Turkey on the basis of Welfare Party (RP), see Esmer, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> For some critical comments of Kurtulmuş in 2011, see <http://www.internethaber.com/kurtulmus-muhafazakarlari-kizdiracak-343968h.htm>




Diagram 1: The parties associated with the National View. The bold ones are identified with this tradition whereas the other two parties symbolize an ideological and institutional rupture.

The crucial difference between the two groups of politicians, which paved the way for the establishment of the AKP, was an ideological one. When the issue is framed around Islam and radicalism, it becomes impossible to see the fundamental differences between two ways of interpreting the world and Turkey. The AKP does not put Islamic principles at the centre of politics when it comes to the economic restructuring of society, foreign affairs or Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. The AKP is a pragmatic party which is conscious of its particular role in transforming Turkish society in accordance with the global trends of economic liberalism. Without questioning the current socioeconomic system and its compliance with Islamic principles, the party tries to implement neoliberal economy policies.

If we look at the privatization policies of the party, we see that almost all the big state enterprises in the energy, telecommunication, transportation and banking sectors were fully or mainly privatized (Ertuğrul, 2010). Considering these policy preferences, the AKP is no different from previous governments that implied similar economic policies. What makes the AKP different is its leading role, supported by a discourse of ‘strong government’, in implementing these policies in a rapid and courageous way without encountering any strong opposition (Boratav, 2010). The programme of the party also gives some clues about the direction of policies which would be followed in the later stages of its governance.

Under the section ‘Our Understanding of the Economy’ in the party programme, the AKP summarizes neatly the main principles of economic liberalism as its approach. These principles are listed below:

- It regards human beings as a resource and objective of economic development.

- It favours a market economy operating with all its institutions and rules.
- It recognizes that the State should remain, in principle, outside all types of economic activities.
- It defines the function of the State in the economy as a regulator and controller. Therefore, it believes that a healthy system for the flow of information and documents is important.
- It regards privatization as an important vehicle for the formation of a more rational economic structure.
- It believes that the structural transformations brought about by globalization should be carried out at least cost and that the healthiest way to do this is to increase international competitive strength. Thus, it accepts that increasing the nation's competitive strength carries strategic importance in terms of Turkey's political and economic future.
- It believes that foreign capital plays an important role in the transfer of international know-how and experience and that this will contribute to development of the Turkish economy.
- It regards quality, productivity, effectiveness and citizens' satisfaction as the main criteria in public services.
- It regards the realization of ethical values as a mixture of international norms with our cultural values, in every area of economic activity, as a precondition for continuous and sustainable growth.
- It believes that Turkey's relations with the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF and other international institutions must be maintained according to the requirements of the economy and the national interest.

The political principles, administrative aims and foreign policy proposals of the party also accord with the aforementioned economic principles. Some of these political principles and aims are:

- Provisions regarding political party bans and closure of political parties shall be revised in line with the framework of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the principles drawn up by the Venice Commission.

- The State must withdraw from all service areas and operate exclusively in the areas of foreign security, justice, basic education, health and infrastructure, which are its basic functions as an executing body, whereas its regulating and inspecting functions must continue.

- Turkey has been in close relation with Europe both geographically and historically. For this reason, relations with European nations shall continue to be at the top of the list of Turkey's foreign policy agenda (AKP Programme, 2002).

Rather than adopting the aforementioned principles, the National View and its successor the SP question and condemn the current state of the capitalist system based as it is on moneylending and Western expansionism. This criticism is also linked to so-called “Zionist capital”, which implies that the already established banking system of Turkey would be dominated by Israel and operate in favor of Israeli interests (Yavuz, 2003). It is possible to say that the anti-imperialist discourse of Erbakan was always based on anti-Semitic rhetoric. He claimed that an average Turk worked half a day for Israel and half a day for local compradors. On the price of a loaf of bread, he maintained that one third was paid toward interest on the national debt which goes through the IMF (International Money Fund) and the World Bank to Israel; one third was paid in taxes to subsidize foreign trade, and only one third went to the baker himself (as cited in Yavuz, 2003, p. 237).

On foreign policy issues, National View also adopts a so-called ‘anti-Zionist’ view. According to Erbakan, Zionists – who are according to him racist, imperialist, Jewish capital owners – are seeking to assimilate Turkey and extract Turkish society from its historical Islamic roots by integrating Turkey into the European Union. Israel, for Erbakan, represents a major locus of anti-Muslim evil in the world. The main intention behind integrating Turkey into the European Union, Erbakan contends, is to create a ‘Greater Israel’ (as cited in Yavuz, 2003, p. 237). In an article published in the official journal of the movement National Newspaper (Milli Gazete), the author elaborates on National View’s emphasis on the European Union as a ‘Zionist organization’, which means it is economically and therefore politically under the control of ‘Zionist capital’. According to the National View anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, Zionists want Turkey to be part of a common market in order to cause it to be subsumed into the European Union because it is a pioneer Muslim country. Moreover, they contend, ‘Zionists’ are trying to

seize the country by purchasing land according to the principles of free trade (Can, 2011).

It is difficult to define what ‘Zionism’, ‘Zionist capital’ or a ‘greater Israel’ mean and what their content is but it is certain that the ambivalence of these terms make them more effective. In his speeches or in interviews, Erbakan does not give any names or details of the ‘Zionist conspiracy’ which he claims overthrew the RP-DYP coalition government via a military memorandum when he was prime minister in 1997. All in all, we can say that the anti-Semitic and racist rhetoric about the Jewish community and Israel did not start with Erbakan but it did become institutionalized as a political ideology and propaganda method with him. The fundamental difference between criticizing Israeli politics and being anti-Jewish is deliberately neglected most of the time in order to mobilize the masses easily and gain their political support. This was also seen as a state policy in the past, such as the wealth tax (1942) which aimed at Turkification of the capital by confiscating non-Muslim assets, or the 1934 events against Thracian Jews in which the Jewish population in the region was attacked and their assets looted by the masses. They were provoked by the racist thoughts of nationalist authors such as Nihal Atsız and Cevat Rifat Atilhan. In both instances, the media’s role in producing and circulating anti-Semitic discourse and the responsibility of government are still discussed (Hür, 2009; Aktar, 2010). But it is also important to indicate that National View, and especially Erbakan, criticized Western capitalism as a whole and therefore targeted Israeli and Jewish lobbies in Europe and the USA. Still, the intertwined anti-Semitic rhetoric and policy critique used by him was a political propaganda method that oversimplified political conflict on the basis of religious discourse and it still functions today to shift the blame for political and economic turmoil to external actors in order to gain support in domestic politics.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, these ideologies about the West and the current economic system illustrate how National View clearly distinguishes itself from the liberal/ neoliberal paradigm which sees economic liberalization as a must for the democratization of society. Religion is not understood as a cultural aspect of life which is embraced by the principles of liberal economy and politics but as a source of conflict which reflects the political and economic spheres of life. This view found support in Turkish politics, especially in the 1980s. However, the National View tradition which was/is represented by the MNP,

---

<sup>26</sup> For a detailed historical analysis of anti-semitism in Turkey, see Bali (2013).

MSP, RP, FP and SP could not establish a counter-paradigm. After the RP was banned in 1998, the newly formed FP was cautious in its policy proposals, and it is the first time that a party from the National View tradition adopted a liberal position in different policy areas.

As Yavuz points out (2009), ‘the fear of being closed down was the main context of politics for the FP, and it adopted a much more moderate programme by stressing market forces and privatization more than the distributive role of the state, as well as individual and human rights. It also made no explicit reference to Islam or Islamic values, it emphasized the delegation of authority to municipalities, and committed itself to Turkey’s European (pro-EU) foreign policy’ (p. 72). As compared to the RP, the discourse of the FP was not based on anti-Semitic rhetoric, although the cadres who embrace the ideology of National View were still in the new party. Although the FP managed to gain 15 per cent of the vote and came third in the 1999 election, and adopted a moderate position, it shared the same destiny as its predecessors and was banned from Turkish politics in 2001. After the split in 2001 which resulted in the establishment of a new party, the AKP cadre was talking about change. This change showed itself as the policy proposals above listed and the party’s relation to political Islam. As Atacan (2005) emphasizes, members of the new party openly rejected the main ideas of National View and said that the AKP was not an Islamic party.

<b>Issue/Party</b>	<b>RP (Welfare Party)</b>	<b>FP (Virtue Party)</b>	<b>AKP (Justice and Development Party)</b>
<b>Economy</b>	The role of the state is crucial for economic development. Industrial development is needed.	The role of the state is de-emphasized and privatization is treated as a way of overcoming inequalities.	The market is the ultimate solution to social and economic problems. Encouragement of private enterprise and criticism of state intervention.
<b>Democracy</b>	Communal and religious rights are emphasized. A leader-based party system and no sense of pluralism.	Human rights discourse is fully integrated. The EU process is welcomed to increase human rights. Religious freedoms are seen as the core of human rights.	The EU process is fully embraced as a project of democratization. Leader-based and majoritarian democracy. Economic liberalism is seen as the core of democratic society.

<b>Nationalism</b>	Turkishness is defined by Islam and the Ottoman legacy. Turkey as the leader of Islamic civilization.	No time to discuss these issues.	A redefinition of Turkishness on the basis of ethnicity to recognize Kurds on the basis of their identity. Unclear discourse on nationalism and statism.
<b>Source of Values</b>	Predominance of religious values to become a moral person. Islamic values should be integrated into the political system.	Moral values are blended with secular human rights discourse.	Religious values are important but do not shape the public debate. God is not the part of a value debate. Individual success, competition and responsibility are stressed.
<b>Centralization vs Local Government</b>	An active role for central government to bring justice and achieve development.	Stress on decentralization and the empowerment of local municipalities.	Privatization and decentralization are predominant. Attempt to empower local municipalities and weaken the centre.
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	Starts with a very anti-Western and anti-EU bias but softens its position. Favours close ties with Islamic countries and pan-Islamism rhetoric is predominant.	More pro-EU and pro-Western in order to gain legitimacy. No stress on Islamic identity as a source of foreign policy conduct.	Pro-Western in order to overcome charges of Islamism and to enhance democracy as well weaken military power within the system. Strong ties with the USA.

Table 1: A comparison of three political parties according to main policy issues. Source: Adapted and revised from Yavuz (2009, p. 74).

This is the point where a definition of the AKP becomes crucial. When we say ‘the Islamist party the AKP’, the intention is to indicate that the party has a religious background. But going beyond that, if the reader does not know the context and the aforementioned points about shifting policy preferences and their meaning for overall politics, it is possible to misinterpret the AKP as a fundamentalist anti-Western party. Yalçın Akdoğan, who was one of the advisors to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (leader of the AKP and prime minister of Turkey) and a member of parliament, lists the main parameters of a conservative democrat political identity as follows:

According to this understanding, the political sphere is based on a culture of compromise. The expression of differences at societal level can only be possible through the establishment of a political sphere on the basis of compromise. Social

and cultural diversities should be part of politics on the basis of tolerance created by democratic pluralism. A participant democracy also develops by providing representation opportunities for these differences and adding them to the political process. (Akdoğan, 2010, p.61)

It is obvious that Akdoğan is talking about notions of liberal democracy and is trying to convey the message that not only do the AKP's policy preferences but also the understanding of democracy overlap with these notions. In the following paragraphs, he clarifies the party's stance towards ideology, especially towards political Islam:

Pulling its conservatism away from a rigid ideological perspective towards a moderate structure and using a palliative style instead of a provocative one are the reasons why the conservative approach of the party does not turn into a burden preventing it from becoming a mass party.

The thing the AKP wants to do is to transform cultural values including religion into an appropriate format and a political identity instead of reducing religion to an ideology. (Akdoğan, pp. 65-80)

Once Islam is detached from politics and attached to the cultural sphere, it becomes possible to reinterpret it within the framework of liberal democracy. The AKP in this framework makes no claims about an alternative way of governing the people other than in a market economy, but it offers itself as an alternative actor that is capable and legitimate enough to implement the already established paradigm of economic and political liberalism in a more effective way than its political adversaries. From this perspective, it becomes clear why the party prefers to situate itself in the 'liberal' tradition (DP-AP-ANAP) rather than in the National View (MNP, MSP, RP, FP, SP) tradition. Akdoğan also emphasizes this policy preference and its difference from the other Islamist parties when he talks about the relation between the National View and the AKP. He is clearly stating that parties that follow the National View tradition do not position Turkey as a globally integrated, EU member country as the AKP does (Akdoğan, 2004).

The conservative democracy which is used to define the AKP's political positioning is not a superficial notion. We observe that the general characteristics of conservatism, such as being resistant to change, embracing cultural and religious values, emphasizing

morality, yearning for order and authority. are very vague so that they can be used to operationalize certain policy preferences (Harvey, 2009). Thus, the Islamist character, discourses or background of the AKP can also be seen as a pragmatic device which makes it immune to the negative social and political consequences of the neoliberal transformation of society.

On the one hand, the government takes an active part in the neoliberal transformation of society by privatizing state assets, education, health and social services and creating rentable areas for foreign capital (and for partisans); on the other hand, the reaction and discontent resulting from the social and political consequences of these rapid changes are replaced by charity, based on a religious discourse which tries to hold the marginalized segments of society together. Those who oppose the core of these policy preferences or do not fit the current parameters of these political practices are criminalized and face physical sanctions. These two tools for managing the process are consistent with the notions of order and morality which Harvey (2009) talks about. This tendency towards charity is meaningful for capitalism. On the one hand, it helps the most marginalized people in society to achieve a minimum level so that they can continue to live and this makes their poverty sustainable. On the other hand, it also has an ideological function of convincing people that charity is the only possible mechanism of distribution. By doing that, it prevents any questioning of existing production and exploitation relations, the formation of private property and capitalism itself (Yaka & Yıldızcan, 2010, p. 246).

Considering its political history and self-positioning, three ways of defining the party's identity and function are possible. In the first one, the AKP can be seen as an Islamist party and its policy preferences are evaluated on the basis of its religiosity.

The party's political actions and proposals are assessed according to its conservative content. It is also blamed for having a secret agenda to overcome the secular state and replace it with an Islamic republic. According to this view, the AKP is using the instruments of democracy to achieve to its aim. Because of that, some policy proposals, like building a mosque in a park or increasing the price of alcohol, are seen as direct proof of the Islamization of society and therefore a threat to the secular life of the people.

The second view, including the AKP's self-definition, sees the party as part of a liberal tradition which has struggled against state monopoly and suppression, favoured the

individual and sought economic freedoms. The party is clearly distinguished from its counterparts, especially from the tradition of National View, as it separates religion from political ideology and redefines its place as a constituent of cultural diversity. It is continuously emphasized that the party does not have any problems with Western values or institutions and that it sees Turkey as part of the Western world, both politically and economically. Radicalism of any type is condemned and political ideologies are seen as outdated in terms of corresponding to people's interests. Rather, service-based policymaking is appreciated and the necessities of globalism are emphasized. This view can basically be seen as the antithesis of the first view which together can form a dichotomy of modern-religious. Although the second view seems to be out of kilter with this dichotomy by proving that being modern and being religious are compatible, it prevents us from discussing the third dimension which questions the political/ economic paradigm of neoliberalism that needs dichotomy and tension in order to continue its hegemony.

The third view sees the religious background of the AKP as a functional feature of governing practice which goes hand in hand with neoliberal policymaking. While the neoliberal economy necessitates the reorganization of societal life in favour of global market needs, the side-effects of these preferences are managed through neoconservative policy practices such as promoting religious morality, assigning the social functions of the state to charity organizations and increasing security measures and surveillance, as well as increasing offensiveness in foreign policymaking (Harvey, 2009). Following this view, the AKP's identity construction is not a burden on contemporary practices of global capitalism but rather a privilege to implement these practices at the nation-state level because the party can address and merge different segments of society which do not share the same interests. As the party's religious discourse addresses the rural masses and conservative people with religious sensitivities, its emphasis on social change, economic liberalism and democracy attracts the middle-classes, business circles, international finance capital and foreign investors. This means that the party can be considered neither Islamist nor conservative-democratic. Rather, this third view tends to see the AKP as a neoconservative political party which circulates neoliberal policy proposals with the help of moderate Islamic (the notion of moderate Islam is also constructed in order to detach the party from its ideological counterparts) discourse. Our research aims to prove the validity of this third view by analyzing the political discourse

of the AKP and showing how it is used pragmatically to realize certain policy preferences.

### **2.3 Conclusion**

The CHP as the establishing party of the Turkish Republic could not form a single party government after 1950 and gradually lost its political power. After the mid-1960s, the party resituated itself ideologically as a social democrat party with the label ‘left of centre’, and this change led to political success throughout the 1970s. However, it was not able to form stable coalitions and was closed down in the 1980 military coup. After 1992, the party was reformed and the new leadership stayed in power until 2010. Unlike in the 1970s, the CHP could not become a main actor in politics as an executive power in the 1990s and in 2000s. After the AKP came to power in 2002, the CHP’s permanent opposition role was questioned and the party’s bureaucratic-elitist character has been increasingly criticized by its supporters, the media and the governing AKP. Although the leadership of the party changed and the party increased its share of the vote in the 2011 election, the CHP could not mount a serious challenge to the AKP, and it remained as the main opposition actor in the Turkish Parliament. It can be said that the CHP’s legacy of being a state party in the early years of the Republic seems to have become the main departure point for criticism, and the CHP has tried hard to prove that it is not the same party that it was in the past. In its discursive struggle it has adopted a rather defensive role and the intra-party struggles for the new leadership supported the existence of this attempt at change.

Whereas the AKP which is a new political actor – as compared to the CHP – promised political change and economic development while blaming ideological parties. The party distinguished itself from the National View tradition which was identified with political Islam and adopted a pro-Western position in politics and global economics.

After 2002, it continuously increased its share of the vote and came to power for a third term as a single party with 49.8 per cent of the vote. The party defines itself as conservative-democratic and implements neoliberal policies while criticizing its main opponent, the CHP, as being outdated, state-centric and elitist. The AKP situated itself as an actor trying to rid itself of this historical legacy, mainly presented by the CHP, which puts distance between it and the people. Thus, the party presents itself as a proactive policymaker which shares a common cultural and religious background with the masses

(rural and Muslim) and claims to be shifting the balance of politics from the centre (a bureaucratic-elitist centre represented by the state ideology of Kemalism and the CHP and the bureaucratic institutions of the state and the military) to the periphery which is basically all those segments of society that are not in the center. In this depiction of society, the AKP identifies itself both as a victim of state ideology and its institutions and as a combatant which is trying to defeat those actors or institutional structures identified with this ideology in the name of the masses.

In the next chapters I will investigate how these different historical experiences and political representations relate to the discourse of the AKP and how they are operationalized as political strategies in order to establish a discursive and political hegemony. After this analysis, it will be possible to see the main dynamics of the discursive struggle, the context-dependent character of discursive strategies and how they reflect in policymaking. The reader will also be able to see which of the labels attached to the AKP seems to be more valid.

## **CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW**

In this chapter, I discuss important recent literature on political discourse analysis in general and work which deals with the discursive and non-discursive aspects of Turkish politics more specifically, especially that of AKP rule. The main aim in this chapter is to illustrate the relevance of the research by claiming that the analytic tools of CDA can be adapted to Turkish politics with a critical realist perspective in order to bridge the gap between studies which take language use in politics merely as a linguistic problem without linking the discursive aspect to the wider socio-political context, and others which conduct a critical analysis of the social and political outcomes of AKP rule (in some cases with some focus on the macro-discourses of the party) without conducting a systematic linguistic/ discursive analysis (as already mentioned in Chapter 1). The chapter also aims to provide a conceptual base for neo-liberalism by discussing different conceptualizations of the term and clarifying how research approaches the notion.

### **3.1. Literature on Critical Approaches to Political Discourse**

In the CDA literature, there are studies which delve into the problem of language use in politics from a critical perspective. While some focus on the relationship between macropolitics and language on the basis of issues like political leadership, identity construction in European politics, globalization, discrimination, anti-Semitism or mass media (Charteris-Black 2011, 2007; Wodak, 2009; Wodak et al., 2009; Fairclough, 2006; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Van Dijk, 1985, 2011; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Wodak & Van Dijk 2000; Wodak & Richardson 2013), others delve into more theoretical and methodological problems concerning political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Forchtner, 2011; Cap and Okulska, 2010; Cap, 2008; Chilton 2005, 2004; Reisigl 2007; Wodak, 1989, 2007, 2009, 2011; Wodak et al. 2013).

In her seminal work, Wodak (2009) integrates multiple theories and approaches to investigate the front stage and backstage of European politics. The research is also supported by ethnographic data, including the everyday lives of politicians. The discourse-historical approach (DHA), including five discursive strategies as well as topoi (content-related conclusion rules in an argument) used by the author<sup>27</sup> also form the basis of this research which were systematized in the earlier works of Reisigl and Wodak (2001).

---

<sup>27</sup> See the methodology chapter for details of this approach and the proposed discursive strategies.

Another methodological tool that is used here is based on the work of Van Leeuwen (2007) whereby the legitimation strategies of authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis are conceptualized and used to analyze discourses about compulsory education. These strategies are also taken into account because they provide additional sub-categories for particular legitimation devices such as authorization and moral evaluation. Likewise, Reisigl's (2007) taxonomy of political speeches and discussion of three aspects of 'the political' (polity, policy and politics) are applied in the research to determine the function and field of political speeches under investigation.

Forchtner's work (2011) is rather concentrated on finding theoretically consistent links between DHA and critical theory mainly based on the works of Frankfurt School in order to provide a solid ground for social criticism. He also discusses the limits of pragma-dialectic theory's (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004) contribution to DHA and rather refers to Habermas' language-philosophy as a more compatible approach.

In the field of cognitive linguistics, Chilton's spatial proximation model (2004) and later Cap's STA (spatial-temporal-axiological) model of proximation (2008) contribute to a prospective cognitive theory of language and politics or political discourse. These studies do not see an audience as a passive receiver of political messages but rather focus on the ways in which active participation in the communication process is achieved through mental representations, building on Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach (1993). In terms of leadership in political communication, Charteris-Black (2007, 2011) has investigated different kinds of leadership cases by analyzing the rhetoric of politicians with a special focus on metaphor. Lastly, Okulska and Cap's (2010) work is particularly useful for comprehending different aspects of political discourse, including metaphorization, legitimation, labelling, the use of phrases and hedging and also gives the reader insights into mediated aspects of political communication and the marketization of institutional discourse.

When it comes to more specific studies which try to link critical realism with CDA in line with the purposes of this study, one of the most important theoretical contributions comes from Jessop, Fairclough, and Sayer (2002). They propose two approaches that complement each other. In their essay, they draw three conclusions about this relationship:

- 1) The study of semiosis would benefit from articulation with critical realism. This has already occurred within CDA, with its even-handed concern for context as well as text.
- 2) Critical realism would benefit from sustained engagement with semiotic analysis. Because critical realism has tended to take symbol systems, language, orders of discourse and so on for granted, it excludes central features of the social world from its analysis; and as a consequence, it cannot give an adequate account of the complex semiotic, social and material overdetermination of the world. If the two of them are combined, we can progress to provide explanations that are socially adequate as well as objectively probable, in the sense that they establish discursive and extra-discursive conditions for the existence of the explanandum at an appropriate level of concretisation and complexification.
- 3) Semiosis frames social interaction and contributes to the construction of social relations. However, it should be emphasized that the production and consumption of symbolic systems are overdetermined by a range of factors that are more or less extra-semiotic (p. 9).

Fairclough (2005) explains and implements this ‘analytical duality’ in his work on organizational discourse in order to find an alternative to postmodernist and extreme social constructivist positions. He explains the critical realist position in organization studies as a moderately social constructivist one which rejects the tendency to reduce the study of organizations to a study of discourse and locates discourse analysis within an analytically dualistic epistemology which gives primacy to researching relations between agency and structure on the basis of a realist social ontology. He emphasizes that this kind of critical discourse analysis has more to offer organizational studies than postmodernist work on organizational discourse<sup>28</sup> (p. 916). Although this study is not about political discourse, it is worth taking this into consideration in terms of the perspective developed by the author. This perspective is also observed in other works of Fairclough (2000, 2006) where he discusses political developments in capitalist societies in terms of newly emerging discursive practices and their relation to wider socio-

---

<sup>28</sup> See Iedema et al. (2004), Wodak (1996) and Wodak et al. (2011) for further discussion on organizational discourse.

economic structures. In *Language and Globalization* (2006), Fairclough summarizes his approach to globalization as follows:<sup>29 30</sup>

- Globalization is in part a discursive process, involving genres and discourses;
- It is easy to confuse actual processes of globalization with discourses of globalization, and it is important to distinguish the two;
- Yet because globalization has a significantly discursive character, it is equally important to analyse the relations between discourse and other elements of the changes associated with globalization, including the constructive effects of discourse on material changes.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) constitutes a valuable resource for researching these relations between discourse and other social elements, seeing them as dialectical relations. One advantage is that it allows us to incorporate textual analysis within the social analysis of globalization (p. 11).

Likewise, Jessop (2004) investigates the constitutive role of semiosis in economic and political activities, economic and political institutions and the social order in general as part of a cultural political economy approach. He explains the particularity of this approach and the research agenda in the following:<sup>31</sup>

CPE (cultural political economy) differs from other cultural turns in part through its concern with the key mechanisms that determine the co-evolution of the semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of political economy. These mechanisms are mediated through the general features of semiosis as well as the particular forms and institutional dynamics of capitalism. Combining these general and particular mediations prompts two lines of investigation. First, given the infinity of possible meaningful communications and misunderstandings enabled by semiosis, how do extra-semiotic as well as semiotic factors affect the variation, selection and retention of semiosis and its associated practices in ordering, reproducing and transforming capitalist social formations? And second, given the contradictions,

---

<sup>29</sup> See Blommaert (2008) for a critique of this book.

<sup>30</sup> For a discussion on education and knowledge-based economies see Jessop, Fairclough and Wodak (2008) and Wodak and Fairclough (2010).

<sup>31</sup> For more on strategic-discursive moments in the production of hegemony in the process of remaking capitalist social relations, see Sum (2004, 2009).

dilemmas, indeterminacy and overall improbability of capitalist reproduction, especially during its recurrent crises, what role does semiosis play in construing, constructing and temporarily stabilizing capitalist social formations? (p. 159)

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) make a contribution to the understanding of political discourse by going beyond post-structuralist conceptualisations of it and placing practical political argumentation at the centre of analysis long after Toulmin's model of arguments (2003), which makes it possible to understand the instrumentalization of political discourse in favour of policymaking<sup>32</sup> processes. As they emphasize in their introductory chapter:

But unless we see narratives, imaginaries and such-like semiotic structures as elements of practical argumentation, we have no way of showing how they affect decisions and actions or how they may, contingently, thereby have effects on the direction of social and economic change ... We would suggest rather that getting people to accept a particular narrative of the crisis, to see it in a certain way, is generally a political concern precisely because it gives people a *reason* for favouring or accepting certain lines of action and policies rather than others. The process of giving and taking reasons is called argumentation. (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 4)

This way of understanding political argumentation not only creates links between politicoeconomic structures, policy projects and political discourse but also makes it possible to identify and evaluate powerful political actors in terms of their capacity and function to impose certain policymaking preferences through political discourse. Emphasizing that these particular attempts to shape politics do not always follow the principles of democratic deliberation and rather show a tendency towards discursive and political hegemony, their work definitely contributes to a critical understanding of discourse and specific forms of argumentation in politics.<sup>33</sup>

Joseph's critical realist conceptualization of hegemony overcomes the dichotomy between structure and agency and recognises political discourse which is limited or shaped by structural relations (production mode) but also a constitutive part of the

---

<sup>32</sup> For a discussion on strategic and collective aspects of policy-making, see Finlayson (2007).

<sup>33</sup> For a critical review of this work, see Kienpointner (2013).

superstructure (political projects). By doing that, hegemony is not reduced to discursive hegemony but understood in its relation to structural hegemony. As he indicates,

Hegemony is located within structural conditions that define its possibilities and the possibilities of the relevant agents and projects. These structural conditions empower agents to act in certain ways and to put themselves forward as leading and directing while also setting limits for the scope of hegemonic projects. Hegemony thus has an agential aspect with respect to the practices, projects and actions of different groups, and a structural aspect related to the underlying conditions that provide grounds for such action and render it meaningful. (Joseph, 2008, p. 120)

Structural hegemony today can be identified with neoliberalism, which was a reaction to the crisis of the 1970s, and political and social practices at the global level today, intentionally or unintentionally, serve this particular kind of capital accumulation. As he emphasizes, private space is legitimated by neoliberal discourse which is natural and free from state intervention, while individuals are constituted as autonomous and rational decision-makers. This discourse helps to justify hegemonic projects in a way which suggests itself as the only alternative social formation (ibid., p. 126).

### **3.2. Understanding neoliberalism and locating it in the research**

Here, it becomes crucial to define neoliberalism in relation to the aims of this research. Although Joseph's conceptualization of hegemony helps to show the relationship between discursive hegemony and structural hegemony, and therefore constitutes the basis for this research, his identification of neoliberalism obfuscates the political actor/s who manage to create a political hegemony in the current context in two ways: by defining it as a form of governmentality (in Foucauldian terms), but without specifying any particular actor that exercises it. As he explains explicitly,

Neoliberalism is not tied to any one institution, state, nation or class fraction, but is more akin to a form of governmentality or, as this Foucauldian term implies, a mentality in the sense of a certain way of seeing things and presenting issues to be addressed. It is more than just the dominant ideology of a particular set of agents, more than just the imposition of power of the dominant states on the world stage. It is a framework, a set of practices, a way of seeing and doing

things that transcends such boundaries. Neoliberalism, as a way of doing things, should be considered a particular type of intervention and regulation. (Joseph, 2008, p. 126)

By doing that, he does not only choose one from among several possible definitions of the term but also gives privilege to that particular definition, as if others are not valid. However, there is more than one definition of the term. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009), for example, give four different definitions.

The first definition is the most common one, which refers to economic reform policies. There are three sets of policies which can be considered as neoliberal: a) liberalization of the economy by the elimination of price controls, deregulating capital markets and lowering trade barriers, b) reduction in the role of the state in the economy via the privatization of state enterprises and c) fiscal austerity and macro-economic stabilization by tight control of the money supply, decreasing budget deficits and curtailing government subsidies. These components emphasise the policy aspect of neoliberalism.

The second definition refers to a development model. This model goes beyond prescriptions to economic problems and organises state-society relationships. These include the re-regulation of the relations between labour unions, private enterprise and the state according to market interests.

The third definition labels neoliberalism as an ideology. It refers to the overall normative claims or principles about how a society should be organised. It emphasises individual liberties and freedom as well as the diminishing role of the state in every sphere of social life.

The last definition of the term refers to an academic paradigm which depicts individuals as utility and profit maximising producers and consumers who act rationally according to the signals of the free market. Based on this assumption, unlike normative definitions of the term, this paradigm tries to understand the operation mechanisms of the market in a 'positivist' way (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 144).

Ward and England (2007) also show ways in which the term is used. They provide four definitions, some of which show some similarities to the aforementioned definitions:

Neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project: According to this understanding, elite and dominant actors around the world organize transnational class-based alliance projects and circulate a coherent programme of interpretations and images of the world to others, but this process also involves a certain degree of willing consent. So, the analysis focuses on these actors, ideas and the people who are affected.

Neoliberalism as a policy and programme: This frame focuses on the transfer of ownership of state or public holdings to the private sector or corporate interests. The main idea is that opening up collectively held sources to market mediation leads to greater efficiency in the economy. Privatization, deregulation, liberalization, depoliticization and monetarism can be seen as its main components. This definition overlaps with the first definition of Boas and Gans-Morse, which is identified with economic reform policies.

Neoliberalism as a state form: This definition takes neoliberalism as a transformation process in which states purposefully engage in order to remain economically competitive. It has both destructive and constructive stages. In the destruction stage, the state's potentialities and capacities are rolled back, whereas in the construction stage, reconfigured institutional mediation, economic management systems and invasive social agendas, which centre on different issues like immigration, surveillance or urban order, are rolled out (see Peck and Tickell, 2002). This definition has some similarities with the second definition of Boas and Gans-Morse which defines neoliberalism as a development model.

Neoliberalism as governmentality: This understanding sees neoliberalism as a knowledge production process via an ensemble of rationalities, strategies, technologies and techniques. It focuses on the mentality of rule which allows for the decentralization of government through an active role for auto-regulated or auto-collected selves that enable governance at a distance. It corresponds to the third definition of Boas and Gans-Morse, which labels neoliberalism as an ideology. This way of defining neoliberalism can be considered a Foucauldian one, which Joseph uses in his conceptualization.<sup>34</sup>

In my opinion, it is not possible to say that one conceptualization is sufficient to explain neoliberalism. Moreover, it is also possible that different definitions of the term lead to

---

<sup>34</sup> For studies which approach neoliberalism by combining Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian perspectives, see Jessop and Sum (2013) and Sum (2004).

misperceptions, as these alternative definitions are mutually exclusive. Neoliberalism can be seen as an ideological hegemonic project which is exercised as both a type of development model in the form of economic reform policies as well as political and social reorganization of the state and society, and also a form of governmentality which includes strategies, techniques and technologies leading to self-discipline of the body at every level of social practice. That means neoliberalism accommodates micro and macro, intentional and unintentional, sociopolitical and economic aspects within it, and these aspects are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

As Springer (2012) succinctly states, no interpretation of neoliberalism exists in isolation, each is connected to and recursive of other views (p. 137). After emphasizing the importance of amalgamating different approaches to neoliberalism, he proposes that neoliberalism can be productively understood as a circulating discourse which aims to articulate Marxist interpretations of the term with poststructuralist ones. This idea of understanding neoliberalism as a mixture of different aspects is fruitful in the sense that it overcomes the tensions between structural/ agential/ discursive interpretations and tries to create an all-encompassing explanation of the phenomenon. Still, Springer's alternative of 'circulating discourse' again relies heavily on a poststructural understanding of the term because discourse is proposed as an embracing term which determines all other aspects of neoliberalism. After all, all neoliberal practices and projects are seen as a macro-discourse and subordinate to it.

However, following critical realist premises, this research takes the view that the discursive construction of neoliberalism is a result of material conditions which can be identified with a particular organization of state-society relations according to market interests. This means a structural hegemony which can only be sustained by the political and social reorganization of society with the help of a politically powerful actor (in this case, the AKP). Discursive hegemony is a constituent part of this wider hegemony which has the function of seeking consent for policy projects as well as eliminating or weakening alternative discourses that can hinder the process. All in all, discursive strategies are instrumentalized in order to create a discursive hegemony which aims to transform society and politics in line with neoliberal premises. For example, if the government sees university education as a service rather than a social right provided by the state then, in order to increase tuition fees, it would accomplish discursive strategic goals such as redefining the concept of university education, problematizing the current

education system, justifying an increase in tuition fees in terms of a redefinition of the concept, presenting itself as the only agent of public will and deligitimizing opposing discourse/ actors.

So, following a critical realist understanding of hegemony, this study takes two intertwined understandings of neoliberalism into account (without neglecting other aspects) which can liaise with the research aims:

On the one hand, neoliberalism is taken as an ideological hegemonic project which refers to the structural hegemony of transnational class-based alliances of economically powerful actors. On the other hand, neoliberalism also encompasses policy proposals and reforms implemented by governmental actors in order to realise and maintain the structural hegemony of global capitalism. Discursive strategies which constitute the main analytical part of this research are settled between structural hegemony and hegemonic projects as an intermediary step with the function of creating discursive hegemony. By adopting this stance, it becomes possible not only to show the operationalization of structural hegemony at the discursive level but also that the actors who are the subjects and objects of this exercise of power become salient, which serves the critical function of the research.

Based on this literature it is possible to summarize that:

- 1) CDA as an approach has analytical tools to look at the relationship between language and politics in a way which exposes overt power relations and mystification in linguistic realizations;
- 2) Critical realist studies create a plausible alternative to structural and post-structural analyses of the social world and insert a semiotic aspect into the analysis in a way which overcomes the structure-agency dichotomisation;
- 3) There are few studies which combine CDA with critical realism so they are theoretically and methodologically compatible (see Fairclough, 2000, 2006; Montessori, 2011; Wodak 2009/2011; Kutter, 2013; Farrelly, 2010);
- 4) There is more than one conceptualization of the term neoliberalism and these definitions should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as different aspects of the same phenomenon;

- 5) In terms of coherence and a critical realist understanding of hegemony, neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project and neoliberalism as a policy practice should be seen as two complementary aspects of the process.

The literature mentioned here does not refer to Turkish politics in particular but provides some alternatives for the understanding and an analysis of the relation between language and politics which can also be adapted to the Turkish case. Unlike some studies mentioned above, this research neither delves into the dynamics of macro politico-economic structures nor does it compare and contrast alternative definitions of neoliberalism. Rather, it analyzes the political discourses of single-party government. Still, a concern to consider the wider socio-political and economic contexts and their relation to discourse is coherent with the aforementioned studies and the four-level model of context which is proposed by the discourse-historical approach (DHA).

This means that analyzing the political discourse of the governing party should not be reduced to linguistic realizations of party identity or discursive strategies aiming to impose certain policy proposals but rather their relation to capital accumulation processes and their particular impact on discursive preferences. The AKP, in that sense, cannot be considered a successful political party just because of its successful use of language. Instead, its political success is dependent on its capacity to liaise with the current global trends of neoliberalism.

This capacity involves combining and implementing particular policy preferences in a hegemonic way with strategic language use. This kind of language use tries to legitimize policy preferences in a convincing way as well as to deligitimize/ weaken counter-discourses/ actors that might possibly hinder or slow down policy implementation processes.

In the next section, I will summarize important studies in Turkey which delve into the problem of language use in politics or which particularly focus on the AKP and its discourse as a dominant actor in Turkish politics.

### **3.3. Discourse-oriented studies on politics in Turkey**

The first cluster of studies focuses more on the discursive aspects of politics. Within these studies, some focus on the general discursive strategies employed by political parties (Büyükkantarcıoğlu and Yazar, 2006; Taniyıcı, 2010), whereas others are

concerned with a particular aspect of political discourse like impoliteness (Yetkin, 2006) or the representation of reality (Aksu, 2008). There are also others which focus on a simple discursive event and investigate discursive strategies (Bayram, 2010), or which take a particular aspect of policymaking/ politics and problematize discourse within that realm (Akbaş, 2007; Yeşiltuna, 2007; Kubilay, 2010).

Büyükkantarcıoğlu and Yazar (2006) investigate discursive structures in Turkish politics in order to explain the propositional structures used for persuasion. They analyze the public propaganda speeches of five political parties prior to the 2002 election and draw the conclusion that Turkish political parties are similar when it comes to the use of discursive strategies, although the percentages are different. This study gives us some examples of the common discursive strategies used in politics like positive self-representation and negative-other representation, fear appeals, bandwagons, references to future acts etc. and clusters them in three groups as strategies about facts, strategies about values and strategies about future action. However, this research does not cover discursive strategies after the 2002 election which can be identified with the AKP rule as a single-party government. Because it mostly focuses on an exploratory linguistic analysis of propositional structures in Turkish politics, it also does not distinguish between powerful and powerless discourses/ actors as a result of the extra-linguistic factors covering them.

In a similar vein, Tanıyıcı (2010) also focuses on general changes in the discourses of political parties and investigates the possible effects of the European Union accession process on the discourses of political parties in Turkey. By analyzing the content of parliamentary debates between 1994 and 2002, he comes to the conclusion that democratization and human rights discourses became an important concern for all party elites in the late 1990s, whereas this was not the case before 1999. This study shows that there is an elite consensus on the necessity of reforms in the areas of human rights and democratization resulting from EU-level factors. However, due to the timespan of the data analyzed, the article scarcely touches on the current developments and changes in Turkish politics in the last decade.

Aksu (2008) focuses somewhat on a crucial aspect of political speeches, namely the representation of reality in political discourse. In her critical analysis of the discourses of AKP and CHP leaders, it is possible to see a comparative perspective. The outcomes of

her research shed light on the discursive strategies of the two party leaders. However, it is not clear what kinds of political, contextual or historic factors make actors choose particular strategies, or how they function in favour of certain particular policy preferences but against others. All in all, Aksu's work has significant outcomes which can make such a kind of comprehensive analysis possible.

Bayram (2010) analyzes a political speech by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from a critical perspective which he took at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009. This study mainly focuses on a single discursive event and shows how discursive strategies are used on a foreign policy issue in order to impress the voters in domestic politics as well as how the social background of a politician influences his political identity and communicative style.

Akbaş (2007) analyzes the parliamentary discourse of the AKP and CHP in terms of the legitimisation and deligitimisation of public administration reforms which were championed by the AKP and legalized in 2007. The analysis is based on a reconceptualization of three discursive strategies, which are a) taking responsibility b) authorization through history, and c) formation of in- and out-groups, in order to show how public administration reforms were legitimized by the government as part of neo-liberal policymaking. The whole analysis is taken as a text and a political discourse on the hegemonic struggles between the party of state (CHP) and the party of the nation (AKP).

Some of the studies in the literature focus on politeness/ impoliteness in political discourse. For instance, Yetkin (2006) is concerned with impoliteness strategies in the Turkish Parliament. She asks how derogation is expressed from a pragmatic perspective and how derogatory language use is distributed between the ruling party and the main opposition party. Analyzing seventeen instances in parliamentary meetings, the study concludes that Turkish parliamentarians use positive impoliteness and off-record impoliteness strategies more than bald on-record impoliteness, negative impoliteness and sarcasm strategies (see the article for definitions of these strategies). In terms of derogation and ethics, a threat to public face is widely used by parliamentarians. It is also indicated that personal threats are negligible in number compared to threats to public face. Still, they show diversity and appear in the forms of characters, ethics, intelligence, talking style and sexual power, which indicate that these are important

cultural features in Turkish society. Lastly, the study emphasizes that the main opposition party (CHP) made more derogatory remarks than the ruling party (AKP) did and this is related to the opposing position of the CHP (Yetkin, 2006, p. 57).

Likewise, Alagözlü and Şahin (2010) look at the pragmatic aspects of speech acts and impoliteness. Using TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) archive records as a data corpus, face-threatening acts in parliamentary discourse are scrutinized. The results show that members of parliament generally resort to insults, disapproval and accusations. They are mostly practised by opposition party members and show the traits of a bald on-record strategy.<sup>35</sup> Accusations are also used by opposition members in a direct way. Lastly, implicit and indirect disapproval are used by the governing party (AKP) to counter these strategies in order to save the positive and negative face of the party. According to the authors, this discursive preference demonstrates that a sociopolitically influential party does not always prefer face-threatening acts as signs of power talk (pp. 13-14).

There are also studies which delve into specific problems of political discourse. For instance, Yeşiltuna (2007) deals with the discursive representation of women in Turkish politics. She looks at the party programmes of the governing parties to date and possible changes. Although the article focuses solely on political discourse, it does not define a clear methodology or approach for the analysis.

Likewise, Terkan (2010) concentrates on discourse and policies affecting women in Turkish politics by analyzing the political discourse of the AKP and CHP. The analysis, which does not depend on any particular discourse-analytic theory or approach, tries to expose the similarities and differences between the two parties by focusing on the content of selected texts. Stating that both parties' discourse and policies concerning women remain inadequate and populist, she also finds a correlation between party ideology and discourse preferences. The AKP as a conservative party mostly depicts women as part of a family and important to social reproduction whereas the CHP's discourse on women is linked to modernity, laicism and participation in the public sphere (p. 133). Tok (2012) investigates party discourses on education policies by analyzing the party programmes and election manifestos of four political parties. She concludes that every political party uses discourse in line with its ideological positioning

---

<sup>35</sup> See the article for the strategies.

and that their proposals to address educational problems are rather general and abstract. She evaluates this result as the alienation of politicians and their discourse from the needs of the people (p. 308).

The last two studies I want to mention in this section put special focus on particular discursive preferences of the AKP. Kubilay (2010) investigated political Islamic discourse on 'alternative' citizenship within the framework of the headscarf question. He claims that Islamic discourse which is based on criticism of Kemalism as an ideology for its uniform and exclusionary tendencies towards difference shows a similar tendency of confining the demands for difference and equality to the Islamic lifestyle and the citizenship rights of women to headscarf freedom. The author sees this critical discourse as a strategic preference of Islamism to increase its hegemony (p. 159). Doğanay (2007) looks at the character of particular concepts that the AKP uses, such as deliberation, dialogue and participatory democracy in the context of 'deepening democracy'. Deriving from the discourse analysis of parliamentary archives of political speeches, she emphasizes that party discourse shows pragmatic and eclectic use of the term 'democracy' in order to realize its neo-liberal and new-right political agenda (p. 86). These two studies focus on the conceptual analysis of political discourse and try to link it to the political context. One can see similar tendencies in the sphere of politically oriented studies which focus on the AKP.

### **3.4. Politically-oriented studies on the AKP**

The second cluster of studies focuses on the evolution of political Islam, and especially the rise of the AKP. In addition to that, many of them also take discursive aspects of policymaking into consideration. However, they mostly do not clarify their definition and approach to political discourse and linguistically-driven political discourse analysis is also absent. Still, it is possible to say that discursive aspects are increasingly taken into consideration in the current literature on Turkish politics.

Duran (2007), for example, states that the AKP has managed to implement policies with a discourse of transformation which has been supported at the international level. This means that the party has benefited from the process of globalization (international capital flows) and the process of EU integration process which have helped it to preserve its political power on the domestic level. The party has gained support not only from the electorate but also from economic elites and the media. This new transformational

politics of the AKP has some discursive aspects which are different from that of political Islamist parties in the past. Following Duran (2007),<sup>36</sup> it is possible to reformulate some of them:

- 1- Denial of the label of Islamist. The claim to have a new understanding of politics free from the politicization of religion, populism and corruption.
- 2- A strong determination to follow neo-liberal policies which are non-populist and beneficial to big business but harmful to large sectors of agriculture and lower layers of the social strata with a discourse of ‘non-populism’.
- 3- Political pragmatism which puts forward a discourse of ‘service politics’ rather than ideological slogans.
- 4- Reconciling an Islamist discourse and lifestyle with Western economic and political institutions with a discourse about the ‘coexistence of civilizations’.
- 5- A depiction of Turkish modernization as the sum of interactive changes and continuities since the beginning of Ottoman modernization, under the impact of Islamic(ist) and Western influences and with the help of an ‘alliance of civilizations’ discourse.
- 6- A self-definition of the party as ‘conservative democrat’, which gives the party an identity without disturbing the international community or the secularist establishment in Turkey, while at the same time assuring its Islamic electorate that Islam continues to play a role in the party’s identity and policies.
- 7- A discourse of ‘national interest’ in multidimensional foreign policymaking which does not change or challenge the Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy.
- 8- A discursive preference for depicting the opposition as irresponsible and anti-religious as part of the management of mini political crises which serves the overall political interests of the party.
- 9- The loss of an internal democracy discourse as part of the increasing tensions between the AKP and the secularist establishment in order to remain a coherent parliamentary group. An example is the purge of two deputies who criticized the leadership and complained of corruption in local branches.

---

<sup>36</sup> Duran does not provide a precise definition of discourse but it is possible to derive one from his analysis that discourse is seen as strategic representations of social reality in a particular way to gain political power.

- 10- A new definition of Turkishness as an ethnic identity rather than a political identity, and seeing Islam as a ‘cement’ which unites people from different ethnicities. More than that, the preservation of a conventional nationalist discourse, by indicating one state, one nation and one flag, is also salient. (Duran, 2007, pp. 80-99)

These discursive shifts and reformulations are underlined in Duran’s work as part of the transformational politics of the AKP and each aspect is discussed in its wider political context. Although this study does not include micro-linguistic analysis or adopt CDA, it attaches importance to the discourse of the political party as part of a wider political strategy.

The party’s relationship with Islam has always been one of the important issues in the literature. At the beginning of the AKP’s executive rule, it was possible to see some studies which mainly focus on the party’s Islamic character. Heper and Toktaş (2003) argue that the Islamic discourse of the AKP’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is symbolic, although he resorts to terminology informed by Islamic themes, if not by Islamic substance (p. 164). Based on the personal background, practices and discourse of the new prime minister, the main idea is that Erdoğan may change the interface between Islam and democracy. After stating that Erdoğan’s political leadership does not clash with liberal democracy, the authors come to the conclusion that Erdoğan’s project does not favour a political Islam and this fact will sooner or later be understood (p. 178).

In a more recent and detailed analysis of the party, the discursive shift from political Islam is also emphasized by investigating the party programme. It says that:

The party is heavily influenced by the values of the post-Cold War era, the so-called ‘new world order’ – with globalism, democracy, human rights and a free market economy being the leading values. This liberal aura creates a clear contrast from the political discourse of the National View. (see the context chapter) (Yıldız, 2008, p. 46)

Overall, Yıldız divides the parties which come from the National View tradition into two. The first cluster of parties is the MNP, MSP, RP and SP, whereas the second

revisionist cluster is composed of the FP and AKP. Since the FP was banned by the constitutional court and no longer exists, the AKP is the only representative of this discursive shift. This difference in discourse reveals itself in many ways. In his words:

While heavy industrialization, material and spiritual development, national planning, national civilization, the glorious past, justice, the national consciousness and national morality constituted the root paradigms of the National View, the parties of the revisionist genre adopted such new concepts as globalization, a realistic foreign policy, international competition, a free market economy, privatization, foreign investment, the reform of bureaucracy, the strengthening of local administrations, democracy, human rights and liberties, civil society, universal standards and a civilizational dialogue. (Yıldız, 2008, p. 51)

After indicating this change in discourse, Yıldız also emphasizes it came as a result of structural necessity which can be identified with the neo-liberal transformation of the country through policies implemented by the party. Thus, it is not correct to see the changes in the discourse just as tactical changes, because these policies dictate that Turkey must be a secular and democratic country in order to become part of the EU. That is why it is impossible to label the party as Islamist in the way that the first generation of National View parties are remembered. (ibid., p. 51)

In sum, this study does not develop a critical stance towards the policymaking of the AKP or provide examples of the discursive strategies that the party has adopted in its texts. It also does not show the ways in which discursive strategies of the party are instrumentalized in order to realize certain policymaking preferences. However, it still sees this discursive shift as part of the structural changes in Turkey which can be identified with neo-liberal policies and therefore creates a balance between structure (neo-liberal transformation) and agency (the AKP's role in realizing this transformation) at the analytical level. This is also a concern of this research and therefore his work can be seen as important.

Şen (2010) focuses on the inclusion and accommodation of Turkish Islamism into the sociopolitical structure of Turkey and sees the AKP as the outcome of such a

transformational process. He summarizes this process as the articulation of Turkish nationalism and Islamism (Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the official state ideology of the ruling elite since 1980), enlargement of the religious field since the 1970s and the integration of neoliberalism with Turkish Islamism. But he also adds that the AKP should not be seen as a passive agent but an active one, with the capacity to direct and reinterpret sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions for its own aims and ideals (p. 76). This study succeeds in taking a critical realist stance to Turkish politics with a special focus on the AKP, although it does not mention it in particular. The discursive aspect of politics is taken into consideration and mentioned as part of a political and economic transformation process, but this Islamic discourse is not analyzed from a linguistic perspective.

Özbudun and Temel (2012) also adopt a very critical stance towards the AKP and its policies and their work clearly defines the AKP as a neo-conservative political party which is the political representative of a newly emerging economic class that is a growing fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie. They define the party and the socioeconomic class that it represents as follows:

The articles compiled in this book are about the new turn in Turkey in the 2000s. This corresponds to an era in which the neo-liberal economic policies were boldly generalized to cover all areas of economic and social life in the hands of the rising fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie, the economically liberal, the culturally conservative ‘Anatolian tigers’ and their political representative the AKP ... Conscious of the fact that the AKP also represents a project which may qualify as ‘neocon’, the articles in this book also try to reveal the changes in the cultural climate which are instigated by and accompany to these critical changes in the accumulation and disposal of capital. (p. 663)

Thus, this study takes account of different aspects of social and cultural life and tries to present the transformation of society and politics as a larger component of the neo-liberal project which is depicted as a hegemonic one.

In some articles, discursive aspects are also taken into account in order to decipher the political aims of the party, although these parts do not follow a systematic path in terms of linguistic analysis. For instance, in the article ‘we have tasted the same springs’, a

verse of the election rally song of the party is used as a title and the discourse of 'being the same', which is materialized in the metaphor of 'being roses from the same garden', is questioned by giving controversial examples. For instance, the author asks if students who face police violence to pursue their free and independent education demands can be seen as the same as those who give orders and exercise them, or if the sub-contractor workers who work sixteen hours a day without a proper break can belong to the 'same garden of roses' that benefits from this exploitation and enormously improves its standing (Özbudun, 2012, p. 315). In short, it is possible to say that critical language awareness is very salient and the discursive criticism is part of wider political criticism in the study, although this criticism is not based on linguistic analysis. On the political level, this study fully shares the same stance as others, which perceive the AKP as a political 'perpetrator' of the neo-liberal transformation of society with the instrumentalization of Islamist discourse. The research questions are designed to test the validity of this claim and to show the ways in which such a political position imposes itself on discourse if the claim is true.

Benefiting from the notion of an empty signifier, the character traits of such an Islamist discourse are discussed by Çavdar (2012). She indicates that such notions as democracy, human rights and freedom, on which there is no consensus, became the sphere of political struggle. A political actor that can fill the emptiness of these notions with the extreme demands of the masses can transform itself into a hegemonic project. In that sense, Islam can also be taken as an empty signifier. In the case of Turkey, Islamists could find a way to overcome the historical burden of Islam which is stopping them from adjusting to a changing world. When they confront market mechanisms they are able to renew their hegemonic discourse by emptying the content of Islam. What the AKP did was to transform the notion of Islam into an empty signifier by unifying the victims and outsiders through its victimization (p. 53). But since it came to power, the party's political practices show a contradiction in the Islamic references they refer to, because these practices create new victims in society. The conclusion she comes to is that the discourse of victimization which is at the base of the AKP's hegemony became useless because of the contradictions it creates and there is no other empty signifier to be filled in in order to maintain the discursive hegemony. The increasingly autocratic language that the party uses proves that it is also aware of this fact and the need to have an

alternative discourse. Otherwise, it will disappear from the political area and become a historical entity (p. 53).

The AKP as both an outcome and an active participant of the hegemonic transformation of society in a neoliberal way is also discussed by Yıldızcan & Yaka (2010). They emphasize the importance of a deeper understanding of hegemony. According to them, analyzing struggles within a power bloc or a bourgeoisie only describes one dimension of hegemonic processes and struggles. Another dimension, which is more important than the first one, is fabrication of the hegemony of the power bloc and its foundational hegemonic class or fraction. As a derivative of this way of understanding hegemony, they try to understand through which material and discursive mechanisms the hegemonic power of the AKP is established (pp. 239-240). They focus on issues like the transfer of the social function of the state to charity organizations, the reorganization of religious communities as a form of civil society and their economic as well as political functions, and the increasing power of the executive and its authoritarian tendencies. They give some examples of these policy preferences and also indicate some macro-discursive strategies such as equating the social state with a charitable state or provoking one segment of society to react to another one in order to produce consent, or acting like an opposition. The importance of this study is that it conceptualizes hegemony in a critical realist manner, distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive spheres and tries to conduct a comprehensive analysis by combining the two. Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to see how discursive hegemony is established as a project through political discourse.

Yalman (2002) also takes political discourse into consideration as a part of hegemony. He evaluates the structural adjustment experience of Turkey after 1980 as a hegemonic project which glorifies market discourse as the ultimate truth, and he adds that this project has been exercised by authoritarian state formation. According to him, new forms of political discourse aim to secure the neoliberal transformation of the country in line with the global economy so that minor crises during this process can be normalized and do not lead to a hegemonic crisis. Although he successfully explains the relationship between bourgeoisie and state from a historical perspective and sees different types of development models as hegemonic projects which are imposed by macro-discourses, this

study does not give details of discursive strategies and how they are linked to policymaking at micro levels.

Yalvaç (2012) adopts a critical realist stance in his study which proposes a new notion of hegemonic depth instead of strategic depth in order to understand and analyze Turkish foreign policy. His argument is that the notion of strategic depth is not only a discursive practice but is also embedded in different relations of hegemonic power within Turkey and the international domain (p. 175). All in all, he seeks to understand the active role of Turkey in the region as a result of a larger set of mutually overdetermined social relations instead of evaluating the Turkish state as the omnipotent actor. This study focuses on a single hegemonic notion and tries to deconstruct it. Moreover, it also proposes an alternative notion which helps the reader to understand the wider social aspects of foreign policy. Still, because it is not a discourse analysis, we do not see micro-linguistic aspects of discursive strategies or how certain discursive preferences relate to other discourses. Instead it focuses on one aspect of a particular policymaking domain, namely foreign policy.

Yıldırım et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of sociological variables in politics which can supersede political discourse. They claim that the presentation of people is meaningful not via discourse but through habitus. This means that irrespective of whomever the politicians are, people support the ones with whom they can associate in terms of daily living habits, consumption patterns, images, beliefs, practices and the like (p. 18). Referring to the AKP's leadership, they indicate that:

The masses looked at how Erdoğan spoke rather than the content of what he said. His gestures, appearance, lifestyle and tone of voice seemed more impressive than his words. Although he has avoided giving speeches on the headscarf problem, his wife's and daughter's attire have sufficed in terms of sending a message to the masses. Another example is Erdoğan's condolence visit to a seemingly secular family who had lost their daughter in a railway accident. During the visit the prime minister recited the Koran, which seemingly pleased the family. (p. 19)

Another important book edited by Uzgel & Duru (2010) focuses on the transformation of Turkey since the AKP came to power and concentrates on different aspects such as politics, economics, society, religion, foreign policy etc. This work helps to clarify what is meant by non-discursive aspects of policymaking and shows what kinds of changes have been made in the last decade of AKP rule. It helps by putting discursive strategies into a wider sociopolitical context.

As a particular aspect of the non-discursive effects of AKP rule, a good example is the party's perspective on social exclusion. After defining the AKP as a neo-conservative party which tries to implement neo-liberal policies, Dönmez (2011) focuses on the strategy of the party to deal with the problem of social exclusion. Deriving from semi-structured interviews with the policymakers of the party, he concludes that the AKP perceives charitable organizations as instruments for providing solidarity in society and therefore attaches importance to non-governmental organizations and facilities to counter certain side-effects of a free market economy. More than that, they securitize the social exclusion of young people and try to make them invisible with help from the aforementioned mechanisms, instead of developing a systematic and coherent social policy to address excluded segments of society (p. 79).

There are also other studies which concentrate on political communication as a sub-discipline of the communication sciences and investigate the development of the discipline with a special focus on media effects or representations. Most of them are used in universities as course books (Aziz, 2011; Kalender, 2005; Tokgöz, 2008; Yavaşgel, 2004). They cover a wide range of topics, such as persuasive strategies, voting behaviours, historical evolution of the discipline and impact of the media. However, these studies do not go near analyzing the current power relations between political actors. They emphasize discourse studies and the persuasive use of language but they do not focus on discourse analysis or the relation between politics and language in particular.

Thus, my research positions itself somewhere between linguistically-oriented studies that do not explain the wider political context in which discursive strategies might be implemented as part of a hegemonic project and more structural studies which define the AKP as a hegemonic actor but which cannot show the practice of this hegemonic power

in political discourse in terms of linguistic analysis. The first two research questions aim to fill the gap left by studies which do not show linguistic evidence for hegemonic attempts, while the third research question helps to identify the overall character of the political party and its policymaking preferences. In the end, answering these questions together helps to combine agential and structural aspects of political reality and promises a more comprehensive understanding.

## **CHAPTER 4: THEORY AND APPROACH**

This chapter delves into the theorization of democratic politics, it discusses two main lines of thinking which are deliberative action and discourse theory; then, it adopts the critical realist theory of hegemony as the third position. It first defines democratic politics as moments of overt conflict and, in so doing, proposes a conflictual understanding of politics. In the second part, it questions if either deliberative action or discourse theory is compatible with the research aims and discusses some of their shortcomings. In the last part, the critical realist theory of hegemony (Joseph, 2000) is taken as a basis which helps to realize the research aims and can be best operationalized with the analytical tools of critical discourse analysis.

The first line of thinking sees rational deliberation as the core of a democratic political system, it tries to define the rules for ideal communication and proposes a theory of communicative action and discourse ethics to approximate to this ideal condition (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1984; Cohen, 1997; Fishkin, 2011), while the second line sees antagonism and dissensus as necessary components of a democracy and therefore adopts a conflict-based understanding of politics (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2000; Rancière, 1998; Ardit, 2007). In the first part, I define democratic politics in terms of a conflictual understanding of politics. This will be a key point as I will put conflict at the centre of the analysis and thus emphasize the importance of difference. In the second part, I deal with the premises and weaknesses of deliberative action on the basis of my conceptualization of democratic politics and benefit from a critique of an agonistic view of politics which is championed by Laclau and Mouffe. Then, I discuss whether discourse theory is compatible with the premises of this research and try to develop a critical stance towards it, although I use it eclectically in order to show the weaknesses of a deliberative approach. In the third and last part, I focus on the concept of hegemony and outline the theory of hegemony of Jonathan Joseph (2000) from a critical realist perspective in order to champion the view that the political discourse of the governing party is based on neoliberal policy-making which tries to create discursive hegemony through the strategic use of language.

### **4.1. Conceptualizing democratic politics in terms of conflict**

I define democratic politics as instances of overt political conflict, in that counter-hegemonic discourses are realized and trigger political action which can challenge and

potentially lead to a rupture from the already established police order. Here I use the notion of police as Rancière uses it. In his words:

The essence of police lies in a partition of the sensible that is characterized by the absence of void and of supplement: society is here made up of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places. In this matching of functions, places and ways of being, there is no place for any void. It is this exclusion of what 'is not' that constitutes the police principle at the core of statist practices. (Ranciere, 2010, p. 37)

In that sense, it is crucial to distinguish politics from policing. An action is political only if it can intervene in what is sayable and visible so that it can reconfigure already established roles and places in the community on the basis of a more egalitarian logic. As an example, Rancière describes the transformation of a domestic household into a political space. He says that a domestic household is turned into a political space not through the simple fact that power relationships are at work in it but because it is the subject of an argument in a dispute over the capacity of women in the community (Ranciere, 1998, p. 33). This example tries to show that power relationships do not automatically lead to political action unless an argument arises and questions the mentality of the already established rules, spaces or discourses and asks for equality.

Likewise, Arditì's notion of polemicization also refers to the capacity of argument to challenge the status quo. Polemicization is the process by which political arguments and disputes lead to transformations that reconfigure, redistribute, reinstitute and 'redraw the lines' of the community (Arditi, 2007). He defines and distinguishes emancipatory politics from politics proper (or the police) according to the existence of polemicization. According to him, emancipatory politics is the practice of disturbing the given – and therefore of redefining the possible – in the pursuit of another, less unequal and oppressive world, whether at a macro level or in the local regions of a microphysics of power (Arditi, 2007, p. 100). He sees this definition as an advantageous one in the sense that it does not define equality and freedom in very abstract or concrete terms but understands them as an effect of a polemicization. This means that equality and freedom do not have a relevant political existence outside efforts to singularize them in specific cases where one makes claims concerning 1) what it means to speak of either of them, 2)

what it means to say that present conditions harm or further their cause and 3) whether or not the possibility of a different world is at stake (ibid., p. 101). Beyond this kind of polemic, he calls politics ‘politics as usual’ and does not consider it to be emancipatory politics. These polemicization spheres are defined as ‘internal peripheries’ by him, i.e. regions where the distinction between inside and outside is not clear and therefore a matter of dispute which cannot be thought outside a polemic (Arditi, p. 3).

Dispute, disagreement or dissensus in that sense are not problems to be got rid of, but healthy political instances to be encouraged. The need for this kind of understanding is because of the overall ideological function of a liberal democracy (and its neoliberal phase) or capitalism in general, which offers itself as the only socioeconomic and political paradigm by proposing consensus as a solution to the problems which are caused by the system itself. Consensus in that sense defines the boundaries of the discussion and action for the sake of a ‘noble cause’, which is to preserve the stability of the system itself. The justification and legitimation mechanisms of the market capitalism can be considered as a kind of topos of reality (Wodak, 2009) at the macro level, which tautologically defines itself as reality and proposes solutions according to that reality, which is not taken as the object of polemic at all. The result of this is a police order where clashing interests, challenging claims (claims for equality for example) or alternative ways of thinking about politics are counteracted by neglect, manipulation, denial, physical sanctions or a combination of these.

Thus, the main principle of democratic politics should be the rejection of consensual discourse which neglects clashing views, interests or ways of being in favour of a certain view, interest and way of being but favours one that proposes a common good in an abstract and ideal way in order to maintain the economic, social and political status quo on which it is based. As Barker indicates in the introduction to Badiou’s *Metapolitics*:

Politics reveals the discursive inconsistency of social statements and in so doing pierces through the common sense fabric of the existing state of the situation. In this way, politics extends the situation beyond the bounds of ordinary common sense. (2005, p. 15)

Badiou in this sense is against all kinds of parliamentary representation and calls them ‘the politics’. The politics puts common sense at the centre and tries to reduce multiple instances of politics into a single one under the name of a plurality of opinions.

However, in contrast to ‘the politics’, real politics involves a hazardous, militant and always partially undivided fidelity to an eventual singularity under a solely self-authorizing prescription. This is why every consensual vision of politics will be opposed. The essence of politics is not a plurality of opinions but the prescription of a possibility of rupture in what exists (Badiou, 2005, pp. 23-24). If this line of thinking was adapted to different kinds of political ideology, like Marxism, liberalism or fascism that all share the common ground of suppressing real politics and replacing it by a complex of state and economy, there would be something which occupies the totality of the visible (Marchart, 2007).

Here, Badiou thinks in a similar way to Rancière in the sense that he points out the totalitarian (or hegemonic) tendencies of parliamentary democracies which try to reduce the fundamental function of politics – which is to emphasize dissensus and disturb the already existing system – to policing under the domain of the state. The disturbing events of politics are therefore sublimated into the fiction of the political as, on the one hand, bond (or social relation) and, on the other, representation under an authority (or political sovereignty) (Marchart, 2007, p. 117).

Although their conceptualization of politics can be seen as the starting point of this research in the sense that a political moment is defined as a disturbance, derailment or disagreement in the already established parliamentary status quo rather than consensual policymaking on the basis of shared interests or concerns, their scepticism and denial of parliamentary systems do not provide a strategic alternative to the way policing is exercised in today’s societies. In the end, however radical they seem, this kind of approach to politics excludes itself from the political struggle by denying that there is no politics or political moment in everyday politics. However, irrespective of how one names it, policing can have political consequences for the ones who benefit from it. In that sense, Rancière’s policing, for example, can mean anything except politics for the ones who are the subjects of policing, but it is always politics for the ones who benefit from the maintenance of policing. Hence, it is always necessary to differentiate and expose the actors in a system of policing from the hegemonic discourse which tries to homogenize society and its actors. Instead of seeing politics as rare coincidental moments, seeing it as an ongoing struggle between different actors which may or may not lead to a political rupture can be a more constructive approach, which is also adopted in this research.

After understanding the conflicting nature of politics and looking for it in moments of disagreement rather than consensus, it is necessary to discuss two main lines of thinking about democratic politics and political discourse.

#### **4.2. Deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism: main premises and criticisms**

The main principle of deliberative democracy is that, in democratic policy, political decisions are taken by the deliberative action of free and equal citizens, although the envisaging of deliberation and its constituents could change in time (Mouffe, 1999). As Benhabib puts it:

Democracy, in my view, is best understood as a model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. (1996, p. 68)

Since its beginning, deliberation has played a central role in democratic thought. Historically, the proposal of deliberative democracy was an alternative to the aggregative model of democracy which tries to approach democracy in a descriptive rather than a normative way. The aggregative model seeks to reject notions like common good or general will and to promote a pluralism of values and interests because the main point is that people act according to their self-interest rather than the communal good. Political parties and organizations should be organized according to this principle and bargaining should take place between the representatives of different interests. So, it reduces democracy to interest-group pluralism. This was also a general reaction to the totalitarian regimes of the early twentieth century which tried to organize people around a general will and caused tragedies like that of nazi Germany.

Against this view, the deliberative model, mainly championed by the Rawlsian theory of justice (1971) and Habermasian communicative action (1984), supports the view that democracy cannot be reduced to procedures and, in order to make liberal democracy function, a moral dimension should be taken into account in the form of consensus. For Rawls, this moral dimension is reason; and for Habermas, it is communicative rationality (Mouffe, 1999). Rawls's reasoning is based on 'citizens who are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly,

given the assurance that others will likewise do so' (Rawls, 1996, p. 49). To reach this condition he proposes thinking of an original position where the participants decide the principles of a society in which they want to live, but with a veil of ignorance, which means they have no prior information about their and other participants' future characteristics, like social status, gender or wealth. These two principles of an original position and a veil of ignorance make the participants decide impartially and cooperatively, i.e. reasonably (Rawls, 1971). In this way, justice as fairness can be achieved by emphasizing the priority of basic liberal rights jointly with constitutional essentials, and thus a basic framework for free public reasoning is the result. Although Habermas does not set any prior limits on the content or scope of deliberation like Rawls does, he wants to achieve an ideal discourse whereby participants are equally and impartially involved in deliberation without any coercion and guided by the force of better argument (Mouffe, 1999).

All in all, both champion the view that rational deliberation is the most appropriate way to generate general interest. In Mouffe's words, "the process of public discussion can be guaranteed to have reasonable outcomes only to the extent that it realizes the conditions of ideal discourse: the more equal and impartial, the more open that process is and the less participants are coerced and ready to be guided by the force of the better argument, the more likely truly generalizable interests will be accepted by all persons relevantly affected" (Mouffe, 1999, p. 748).

The deliberative model of democracy is effective in showing the shortcomings of the aggregative model based on the instrumental rationality of self-interested people because this kind of understanding endangers the institutional framework of liberal democracy. Corruption in politics, the lobbying activities of powerful actors for particular interests, the lack of transparency in the finances of politics and public scepticism about politics and politicians can be seen as examples of degeneracy.

Mouffe also accepts this negative picture of democratic institutions that the proponents of the deliberative model portray but she is against the idea of replacing instrumental rationality with a deliberative and communicative one. According to her, the main problem is to constitute the practices that make the constitution of democratic citizens possible, and this is not about rational justification but about the availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. Both aggregative and deliberative

models overlook the fact that passions and emotions play an important role in securing democratic values. The failure of both models results from their understanding of the subject. They see the subject as an a priori entity which is detached from society, has natural rights and is rational. In both cases, they are isolated from social and power relations, culture, language and the practices they exercise to realize themselves. In that sense, what should be taken into account are the conditions for the existence of a democratic subject.

Following this line of thinking, Mouffe's main argument is that the constitution of democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, discourses and forms of life that foster identification with democratic values (Mouffe, 1999, p. 750).

Here I want to emphasize that Mouffe goes one step further than the deliberative model and uses the notion of discourse alongside other types of social practices. By doing that, Mouffe not only includes a discursive aspect into the analysis but takes it as a social practice rather than a medium of rational deliberation. Once this perspective is adopted, the political sphere can be perceived as a competitive one in which different actors try to influence the system according to the relations they are embedded in. Thus, the problem is not to identify the moral principles of deliberation and derailments from these shared principles so that agents can improve their argumentation, but to be aware of the social practices which are realized in discourse and try to avoid the hegemony of one discourse – as social practice – over others by encouraging multiple representations of reality.

According to Mouffe, this kind of understanding can only be realized by a new model which puts power relations and antagonism at the centre of analysis. She summarizes the main principles of this approach and its relation to the notion of hegemony as follows:

The central thesis of the book is that social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. This implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to show the traces of exclusion which governs its constitution. This point of convergence – or rather mutual collapse – between objectivity and power is what we mean by 'hegemony'. This way of posing the problem indicates that power should not be conceived as an external relation taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities themselves. Since any political order is the expression of a hegemony, of a specific pattern of power

relations, political practice cannot be envisaged in simply representing the interests of pre-constituted identities, but in constituting those identities themselves in a precarious and vulnerable terrain. (Mouffe, 1999, p. 753)

In accordance with its conceptualization of discourse, this view differs from the deliberative approach in its reconsideration of the relationship between democracy and power. Unlike the deliberative approach which sees an indirect proportioning between the level of democracy and the exercise of power, the agonistic view sees power as a constitutive part of social relations.

In that sense, democratic politics should not try to avoid or eliminate power relations but rather try to constitute forms of power which are more compatible with democratic values. The agonistic view sees language as the centre of a power struggle to establish hegemony. However, its understanding of hegemony is different from that of Gramsci. In its broadest sense, the Gramscian notion of hegemony emphasizes the cultural dominance of the ruling classes in order to maintain their economic/ political power in society. In 'Hegemony and Socialist Strategy' (1985), Laclau and Mouffe criticize the earlier use of the notion in two senses: firstly, they reject the idea of economic essentialism which they think constitutes the basis of the Gramscian use of the notion; and secondly, they reject fixed social actors like the working class or the bourgeoisie around which hegemonic struggle takes place. Rather, they see hegemony as an absent totality or a fissure which becomes the subject of a continuous struggle between different discourses in order to give meaning to the social world, and this politico-linguistic struggle is not determined by the economic infrastructure.

As a result of this understanding, the economic sphere becomes detached from the political sphere, and thus the political sphere gains autonomy. However, this does not mean that any political discourse can provide a totality. There is no single political solution or ideal system which can cover all the differences in social life. Different discourses can fix some meanings in a hegemonic way, but this can only last for a limited time since dominant discourses should always create their 'other' in order to realize themselves, and this 'other' constructs counter-hegemonic discourses. At this point, the agonistic model comes closer to a conceptualization of the difference between politics and the political, which was also used by Badiou and Rancière. Searching for consensus is always policing in the sense that it precludes other possible forms of social

practices which contradict each other on multiple levels for the sake of maintaining harmony in social life. In Mouffe's words:

By the political, I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different type of social relations. 'Politics', on the other hand, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'. (1999, p. 754)

Hence, the agonistic view's alternative to aggregative and deliberative models is radical democracy where different and conflicting discourses compete with each other without necessarily aiming at a political totality. Enemies become adversaries on the basis of shared principles of liberal democracy, liberty and equality. So, a functioning democracy is one where democratic positions should clash in a vibrant way. If there is too much focus on consensus and the refusal of confrontation, this can cause apathy and a decrease in political participation (Mouffe, 1999).

The agonistic view can be seen as a progressive step when it is compared to deliberative and aggregative models because of its emphasis on 1) the impossibility of shared interests for all and an a priori rationality which can lead to consensus through deliberation, and 2) a linguistic aspect which appears in the form of discourse and constitutes power relations in a hegemonic way. These two points urge us to concentrate on non-violent forms of domination which try to homogenize social life as a totality with the help of political discourse, and on counter-hegemonic forms of political action which disturb these social objectivity claims and therefore criticize the capitalist system. Although the conceptualization of hegemony by Laclau and Mouffe seems to create some room for political action and provides some alternatives to the economic reductionism of social relations, it has some weaknesses which are discussed and summarized by Montessori (2011). Among them, two points are crucial for theoretical concerns:

- 1) Blurring of the distinction between discursive and non-discursive.

Laclau and Mouffe support the view that the world acquires meaning only through discourse. But in order to understand the existence of hegemony, there should be an

instrument which creates links between discourse and social practice. This is why an approach which distinguishes the discursive from the non-discursive sphere and shows the relation between the two is needed.

2) Lack of an instrumental, operational account of power.

Montessori emphasizes two points here. Firstly, because discourse theory emphasizes the radical contingency of the social, which is always open to new articulations, it becomes impossible to understand the impact of context on discourse. Secondly and relatedly, it finds no difference between social actors on the basis of their capabilities, meaning their material conditions which make them able or unable to act. Due to this lack of distinction, there is no way to understand why certain social agents are successful in creating new articulations whereas others are not. For example, in this case it is possible to ask why the ruling party in Turkey is successful in articulating religious discourse whereas the main opposition party's similar attempts to inject religious discourse into politics do not lead to electoral success. In order to understand this there is a need to look at the historical background of these two parties and the wider socioeconomic transformation process of Turkey.

In the following, I will elaborate on these criticisms. The first point about the lack of distinction between discursive and non-discursive spheres is as a result of a definition of power which does not take different dimensions of power into account. Discourse theory seems to be deeply influenced by Foucault's conceptualization of power. Newman succinctly summarizes how Foucault defines the concept:

Power is neither a capacity to act, nor it can be concentrated within a central institution or structure. Rather, power relations are plural and emerge from a multitude of points throughout the social field; and moreover, power is productive than repressive, producing even the very subject who at the same time resists it. (Newman, 2005, p. 10)

If power is defined as the impetus of social relations which is inherent to all spheres of life, then it becomes impossible or unnecessary to 1) distinguish power from other forms of social relations (Newman, 2005), 2) distinguish between different forms and levels of power, 3) identify, differentiate and evaluate social and political actors according to their position towards power or 4) understand the emergence of resistance to power

(Newman, 2005). In my opinion, this conceptualization of power is problematic and may lead to methodological criticisms because of the decontextualized and de-personalized/institutionalized definition of the notion. In that sense, Newman's critique is very similar to that of Montessori. Another criticism of Foucault's notion of power can be developed on the basis of neglected structures which give meaning to the exercise of power and power relations. The exercise of power includes everything in Foucault's work, but it is not clear why and for what purpose power is exercised. This makes it difficult to develop a strategy for resistance to power. This is because power relations are prioritized and the underlying structures which are related to the modes of production which shape these relations are downgraded (Joseph and Roberts, 2005, p. 113).

Still, I want to add that Foucault's definition of power is very important for understanding a form of power in which power is no longer exercised but becomes the very logic of social relations. In other words, "Foucault usefully alerts us to the reproduction of capitalism through micro forms of power" (ibid., p. 113). However, this becomes meaningful only if this level is combined with other levels where social actors and contexts are taken into consideration<sup>37</sup> and the relation between language and material world is considered as a dialectic way where they reciprocally affect each other. Ives' Gramscian critique of discourse theory is also to the point in that sense:

...in separating economic factors from their 'discursive theory', Laclau and Mouffe reverse the priority of the economy versus language. Yet they still retain the dichotomy. Gramsci's approach to language and 'matter' does not assume that these two things are inimical, nor does it privilege one at the other's expense. (Ives, 2004, p. 5)

So, it is crucial to emphasize that, like every theory, discourse theory has an ideological stance and it seems that criticizing Marxism by reducing it to economism and trying to separate Marxism from discourse has some political consequences. Ives sees that tendency of distancing the language aspect from Marxism in the works of Foucault and says that his emphasis on language and the criticism of Marxism have reinforced the separation of language from Marxism (2004). In the end, Carroll (2006) identifies two disabling effects of that kind of separation between the social world and discourse in which discourse has an overarching position in critical theory and practice:

---

<sup>37</sup> For the three dimensional conceptualization of power, see Lukes (2005)

It disables the critique of unjust and ecologically perilous conditions such as the capitalist appropriation of surplus value or the advent of rapid climate change, but it also rules out the critique of the ideological mystification of such intransitive conditions. The descent into discourse, à la Laclau and Mouffe, has had a specific impact on the theorization of hegemony. As the process of articulation becomes more important than that which is articulated, hegemony and counter-hegemony appear as purely discursive matters, abstracted from political-economic context. (Carroll, 2006, p. 10)

Thus, discourse theory and the post-foundational theories of power generally try to place contradiction and disagreement at the centre of analysis. This view helps to go beyond deliberative action and shows that consensus based on rational argumentation for the shared interests of the whole society is not a realistic way of understanding the social world. Especially in politics, there are politically motivated actors that try to gain economic and political power by the strategic use of language. At this point, one should perceive language and social reality together but also distinguish the discursive and non-discursive spheres because political struggle in the discursive sphere leads to non-discursive outcomes which also disturb the balance of discursive struggle, although non-discursive outcomes or the social reality can be discursively constructed by multi-dimensional power relations. So there is a need to demystify and show the mechanisms of these relations which reflect language and then result in physical change in favour of certain political actors so that they can continue to impose their hegemonic discourses on others in order to maintain the political-economic status quo, namely policing. The reconceptualization of hegemony in discourse theory helps to see this struggle as an unending and constructive process; however, it is not possible to observe the direction and agents of the struggle. This means it is not possible to distinguish between different actors that try unequally to dominate the discursive sphere and use different dimensions of power to obscure the first dimension of power which is overt conflict (see Lukes, 2005).

Montessori suggests CDA as an approach to analyze and interpret data and overcome the weaknesses of discourse theory. The crucial thing here is to combine CDA with the right theoretical grounding for the objectives of this research, since CDA does not have a fixed theoretical stance. If a deliberative approach is taken as the theoretical base, then the assumption that political actors who share different interests reach consensus through

reasonable argumentation reduces the analyst's function to disclosing derailments from reasonable deliberation so that it can lead to action based on mutual understanding. However, there are at least two problems with this way of looking at politics:

- 1- Deliberative models of democracy try to determine some preconditions for democratic deliberation, such as support for democratic institutions, tolerance, sincerity, reasonable argumentation and open-mindedness, but why different actors that do not share the same interests should behave on the basis of common sense is not clear. That is to say, in a world where unequal distribution of material and non-material goods leads to unequal power relationships, to find common ground on the basis of a shared interest and wait for actors to obey on the basis of this principle is practically impossible.
- 2- An ideological consequence of this approach is that, in proposing such a basis and predetermining the principles, this becomes a tool to police the distribution of the sensible (Rancière, 2004) in order to avoid systemic changes in the already established political system. In other words, liberal democracy shapes the limits of deliberative action as if the institutions of liberal democracy and their discourses are neutral and context-free. In Crozier and Little's words, "the theorization of political communication plays a pivotal role in the construction of what is regarded as 'acceptable' democratic politics" (Crozier and Little, 2007).

This does not mean that Habermasian roots and premises in CDA are totally rejected in this research. The idea of deciphering and criticizing oppressive language in order to contribute to democratization of the public sphere is also a shared discursive goal of this research. That is why CDA is chosen from among other discourse analytical approaches. The crucial point is that oppressive or hegemonic language use is not the origin of political contradictions, and hence its emancipation does not per se lead to communicative action or consensual politics. Rather, CDA should be seen as an opportunity for the detection of clashing political interests and their realization in discourse so that oppressed segments of society can become involved in political struggle.

If the analyst chooses a Foucauldian approach to discourse, it is hardly possible to a) define actors that have more power to produce hegemonic discourses, b) distinguish between more and less powerful (materially or discursively) actors or c) understand

power as an instrument which can be used by the will of actors in the discursive sphere because, as Garland summarizes,

Its conceptualization of power refers to various forms of domination and subordination and the asymmetrical balance of forces which operate whenever and wherever social relations exist. These power relationships, like the social relations which they invest, display no simple pattern since, for Foucault, social life is to be thought of as taking place not within a single overarching 'society', but instead across a multiplicity of fields of forces which are sometimes connected and sometimes not. His special focus is always upon the way these power relations are organized, the forms they take and the techniques they depend upon, rather than upon the groups and individuals who dominate or are dominated as a consequence. Power is a pervasive aspect of social life and is not limited to the sphere of formal politics or of open conflict. It is also to be thought as productive in its effect rather than repressive in so far as power shapes the actions of individuals and harnesses their bodily powers to its ends.

In this sense power operates through individuals rather than against them and helps constitute the individual who is at the same time its vehicle. (As cited in Lukes, 2005, p. 89)

So, Foucault's concern was with 'structural relationships, institutions, strategies and techniques' rather than 'concrete policies and the actual people they involve' (*ibid.*, p. 89). There are two problems with this conceptualization which do not overlap with the agenda of the research. Firstly, this research is highly focused on formal and political actors/ politics and how they try to gain legitimacy for their policy proposals. So, the unit of analysis, which is political parties, should focus on political actors and their policies. Secondly, this research focuses on the political discourses of a particular actor that has the material capacity to shape the overall policymaking processes of a country which is in fact a non-discursive aspect of power. Thus, departing from discursive struggles, the aim is not only to explain the ways in which power is exercised through discourse, but also to try to disclose relatively powerful and powerless actors and how their discursive struggles lead to material outcomes. In that sense, discursive and non-discursive aspects of power are not mutually exclusive but complementary. This is the

reason for adopting a different approach, other than a deliberative and agonistic one. The approach to be used should be compatible with the following research agenda:

- 1- Distinguishing between powerful and powerless actors and explaining how powerful actor/s try to retain power by looking at their discourse;
- 2- Instead of treating power as an abstract concept and an overarching factor shaping social relations irrespective of any locus, identifying the actors that benefit most from the asymmetric relationships of discursive and non-discursive spheres of power, which can lead to *selective criticism*. This means that one should put more effort into deciphering the discourses of powerful actors in order to create a counter-hegemony rather than treating all actors as equal consumers of manipulative discourse;
- 3- Determining the extra-linguistic factors which have an effect on the discursive struggles between actors. This means focusing on non-discursive aspects of discourse in two ways: a) the material factors which have an influence on discursive preferences b) the kinds of impact that discourse has on actual policymaking preferences;
- 4- Although the unit of analysis is political parties, and specifically the governing party of Turkey, not limiting the analysis to linguistic investigation and critique but benefiting from the results of analysis to conduct an ideological critique.

Each of the four principles which form the research agenda has a special counterpart in Turkish politics. As a requirement of the first and second principles, one should focus on the governing party and its discourse. This is because, since it formed a single-party government in 2002, the AKP has increased its electoral and executive power and therefore its discourse is directly reflected in policymaking. In that sense, the manipulative language use of the governing party should be the centre of analysis because a) it has the executive power to change policy proposals into policies which can have long-lasting effects on society, b) it has a natural tendency to weaken or delegitimize the opposition actors which can potentially threaten the executive power of the party and c) it has an advantageous financial, political and organizational position to propagate its discourse to different segments of society.

Especially, the media play a key role in dominating public discussion in favour of the governing party. The party uses the press very effectively to circulate party discourse and agitate for its policies. By using its political and economic power, the party can

impose economic sanctions on press agencies which oppose government policies, with the result that these agencies are either closed down or sold to other corporate entities which have a mutual relationship with the government. The agencies which do not face such sanctions can reposition themselves so as not to experience the same outcome and implement auto-censorship (Akdağ, 2007).

Another feature of the media vis-à-vis party discourse is its capacity to close the gap between backstage and front stage politics so that every speech can include multiple fields of political action (Wodak, 2009). For example, the meetings of party member MPs in parliament seem to be party internal gatherings in which the party leader tries to form party-internal attitudes and values, but since they are broadcast live and presented on the news, they also have the function of forming public attitudes and applying political control.

Sometimes the propaganda of the government is through indirect rather than direct interventions. For instance, in broadcast news, it is likely that the discourse of the governing party will be represented more than others, since it has executive power and governmental discourse can lead to policy changes which affect the whole of society.

In that case, the government has the advantage of being able to circulate its discourse more frequently than its adversaries and this negatively contributes to the asymmetric power relationships between political actors.

Because of these factors, it would be wrong to assess all the indicated political parties on an equal basis since that kind of approach would not contribute to an understanding of the unbalanced power relationships between political actors. The third principle necessitates that one should not only focus on discursive strategies but also illustrate what kinds of historical and sociological factors have impact on the discursive preferences of the dominant political actor and how these discursive strategies effect the policymaking process overall. In that sense, the political histories of the AKP and CHP seem to be crucial to understanding the current debates and why the governing party approaches issues as it does. But more than that, it is important to concentrate on non-discursive aspects of discourse in politics, meaning how powerful discourse deals with issues, how some issues become non-issues while others frame the political debate between the parties, and inevitably what these mean for democratic politics. This last

point also coincides with the fourth principle, because it is also necessary to extend the discussion to larger sociopolitical and economic mechanisms.

### **4.3. Critical realist theory of hegemony and critical discourse analysis**

In order to create a link between political projects based on discursive strategies and wider politico-economic structures, the notion of hegemony used by Gramsci can be taken as a starting point and interpreted in a critical realist way. By doing that, it becomes possible to understand why certain discourses and political actors that produce these discourses are more powerful than others and how their linguistic preferences contribute to the establishment of hegemonic structures. That is why a critical realist understanding of hegemony is chosen as a theoretical basis for this research.

Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony is different from its earlier uses in the sense that:

- 1) It does not limit hegemony to the leadership of a particular group/class over others but extends it to an overall political leadership over society;
- 2) It is not taken only as the basis of relations between dominated and dominant groups (external aspects) but also focuses on relations within hegemonic groups or blocs (internal aspects);
- 3) It is not taken merely as consent but as a combination of force and consent in order to legitimize force in the eyes of the majority of the population. (Gramsci, 1971)

Besides these points, Ives emphasizes Gramsci's interest in language as a political issue which can be considered a powerful tool to create consent between different social groups with different interests. He attaches importance to the government policy on language, the language used in education and the everyday practices of language and uses them in the analysis of political circumstances and to show the role of culture in shaping people's beliefs and political attitudes (Ives, 2004). Thus, what makes possible the realist conceptualization of Gramscian hegemony is its capacity to understand language as a sphere of political struggle which is based on social structures and which has material effects on society. According to Ives, Gramsci's notion of hegemony has two main themes. The first one is the expansion of the notion of politics from government activities and operations of state power to questions of how seemingly

personal/ private aspects of life are aspects of the operation of power. In that sense, Gramsci's attention to language is insightful for exposing daily and molecular relations of power. The second one is the institutional and social analysis of various organizations and groups in society which paves the way for the institutional analysis of ideology (Ives, 2004, p. 71).

Joseph borrows the Gramscian notion of hegemony for a realist analysis and thus creates an alternative to a post-structural conceptualization of the term like the one we see in discourse theory. He uses critical realism (see Archer et al., 1998; Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994) to approach hegemony. In his words:

Critical realism holds that the world is comprised of real structural relations independent of their discursive description. The meaningful nature of transitive discourse presupposes the intransitive structures and objects to which it refers. Hegemony is therefore not reducible to a role as articulator of discourse. The nature of such a project is defined by the relations between social structures, human practices and group interests. Otherwise hegemony is thrown to the winds of arbitrary signification with nothing to hold it down or define it. (Joseph, 2002, p. 121)

Following Gramsci, he emphasizes the economic, political and cultural basis on which a hegemonic group can emerge and implement hegemonic projects. This means that being hegemonic involves not only forming a ruling bloc but also reproducing economic, political and cultural conditions in favour of that ruling bloc. The success of a ruling bloc (or historic bloc) and a hegemonic project is assessed by its ability to advance social reorganization according to the dominant trends of a capitalist economy (ibid., 125). This analysis extends the notion of hegemony by going beyond an agential understanding of it which does not take determinant structural factors into account. In other words, hegemonic struggles and hegemonic actors do not operate solely on the discursive level, with equal capacities; rather, their discursive goals and capacities are shaped in the economic structure. The ones that can successfully create a link between this economic base and the political superstructure become hegemonic powers. So, instead of analyzing hegemony only on an agential basis or on a social structural basis, both the function and expression of the term should be investigated.

The critical realist theory of hegemony also points out the contradictory character of function and agent. Although some groups are given the potential to develop their own projects according to their interests, this does not necessarily mean that every hegemonic project will be best suited to a functional role to secure the cohesion of social formation. Joseph gives the contradictory character of Thatcherism as an example and claims that although it was in line with neoliberal economic trends, its conservative character hindered the process as well. In that sense, it was not the ideal basis to facilitate capital accumulation (ibid., 127).

In Turkey too, there is a contradictory character to AKP rule which is in line with the neoliberal restructuring of society in economic terms but which creates tension and dissatisfaction in political terms because of its conservative practices which concern secular voters. These tendencies can also be seen as hindering factors of neoliberal capital accumulation, as in Joseph's example. Thus, approaching political discourse from a critical realist perspective, as a sphere of mediation between a hegemonic project and structural hegemony, helps us to see these tensions. Post-structural or discourse-based theories cannot make this distinction between the different levels at which hegemony operates, because in these approaches:

Hegemony becomes a textual matter, cut off from the extra-discursive world, and the material relation to the reproduction of social structures is lost. At best, post-structural accounts reduce hegemony's location to various human practices and the exercise of power, an ontologically flat description that fails to look at the underlying social structures and generative mechanisms. Such theories cannot say where hegemony comes from, or give any political specification.

Indeed, post-structuralism makes any political project impossible by de-totalizing and de-collectivizing any sort of representation. Identity is turned into fragmentation and political action is reduced to discussion. (Joseph, 2002, p. 127)

As already mentioned above, the critical realist theory of hegemony proposes two different but interrelated aspects of hegemony. The first one is structural hegemony and the second is hegemonic projects. The main idea is to conceptualize the notion in a way which takes both agential and structural aspects of hegemony into account. Structural hegemony has the function of maintaining social cohesion and ensuring the reproduction of structural processes and relations. Of particular importance is the relation between

state and economic system (Joseph, 2002, p.128). In this case, it means the economic and social transformation of Turkish society on the basis of neoliberalism and AKP's function in realizing and advancing neoliberal policies. That trend has designated a hegemonic character since the 1980s and entered a new phase in the 2000s with AKP rule. So, the AKP's political and economic agendas cannot be evaluated on the basis of the party's unique capacity but rather its compatibility with the overall trend of neoliberal policymaking. And structural hegemony is the imposition of neoliberal transformation on Turkish society with the AKP having the role of actualizing this transformation with the help of hegemonic projects.

Thus, hegemonic projects or practices show a more conscious, political and manifold character which serves the deeper hegemonic structure. Joseph reminds us that this is the common understanding of the notion of hegemony, but as stated above, they operate as a function of structural hegemony. These two aspects of hegemony are linked and interdependent (Joseph, 2002, 128). Political discourses function to realize hegemonic projects in the form of policy issues. This means that the political discourses of a powerful actor – here the AKP – harmonize with the necessities of a neoliberal political economy. All in all, this power struggle and the change that it leads to are understood with the help of a transformational model of social activity which sees society both as condition and outcome of human agency. Social structures are shaped by intentional human agency, but these activities also have material causes which are imposed on human agency. In the case under investigation, interpreting the AKP as an Islamist or conservative party can lead to false conclusions, such as expecting the party to form an Islamic state or to make Turkey totally detached from the Western bloc (US and EU). In contrast, this study sees the religious discourse and conservative character of the party as suitable conditions for the neoliberal transformation of society, which enables the party to implement hegemonic projects. As long as discourse and policy comply with the overall structural hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, this model can dominate Turkish politics.

By defining hegemony as a two-dimensional concept, critical realism gives us the chance to investigate how structural hegemony is exercised through political discourse. This means that hegemony is no longer an abstract phenomenon which is independent of any function, agent or social base but becomes an observable practice. This differentiation between different levels of hegemony can be made via a

conceptualization of power which is seen as both capacity and exercise. Bhaskar distinguishes between power1 and power2. Power1 symbolizes the capacity which enables the actor to exercise, namely the social structure, whereas power2 symbolizes the level of expression of power relations, namely the exercise of political projects (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 153). Joseph criticizes Bhaskar for restricting power relations to power2 and emphasizes the necessity to consider two interrelated levels of the concept (Joseph, 2002, p. 135). When the two levels are taken into consideration together, political struggle can be understood in its social context and not seen solely as a discursive struggle.

CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) as an approach is the closest to the premises of the critical realist theory of hegemony which sees discourse as a social practice and therefore analyzes discourse in its social and multi-level context. This is why it is adopted as an approach for this research (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 2003; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; 2009, Wodak et al. 1990; Wodak, 2002; Wodak and Meyer, 2001, 2009; van Dijk, 1993). Van Dijk defines the objectives of CDS (he prefers the term Critical Discourse Studies so as to point to the diversity of critical studies) more precisely by saying that CDS scholars are typically interested in the ways discourse reproduces social domination, i.e. the abuse of power by one group over others, and how dominated groups discursively resist such abuse (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p.3). For this purpose, critical analysis identifies the ways in which specific discursive strategies are used to dominate the political realm and how political actors might resist such hegemony by taking the wider sociopolitical context into account as a constituent and constitutive part of the discourse formation process. In that sense, CDA has the potential to overcome reductionist and relativist conceptualizations of political discourse by concentrating on the impact of extra-linguistic factors on discourse (in our research it is structural hegemony) and the linguistic exercise of power at the discursive level (hegemonic projects).

Moreover, the critical realist theory of hegemony pushes CDA in a critical realist direction and thus enables us to understand power2 (the exercise of power in language) in terms of power1 (the capacity of the political actors to comply with the hegemonic structure).

By using the linguistics tools of CDA, it becomes possible to show the operationalization of hegemonic attempts in discourse and to answer the research question concerning the ways in which such discourse is organized and linked as strategy. This is the exercise of power and can be traced in political texts. Then, extra-linguistic factors such as policymaking preferences and party history will be taken into account to check the validity of the results and hence evaluate the political character of the party and its policies, which are the second and third guiding questions in this research. In the end, the reader will be able to see the links between discursive practices and actual policymaking preferences which are critically exposed and evaluated as part of a wider structural hegemony in line with the main premises of critical realism.

## CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the method and approach used in this research to show which governmental discourses might dominate the political sphere in the form of hegemonic projects and how they are operationalized. This aim can be realized with the help of contemporary ideas on political discourse analysis. As Reisigl (2008) points out, classical rhetorical genre theory distinguishes three forms of oratory – judicial, deliberative and epideictic. Setting judicial oratory aside to focus on discourse in politics, the deliberative genre relates to differing views about political decisions in the ancient public sphere and the epideictic genre focuses on the verbalization of political values and consent. But this distinction is insufficient to understand the current dynamics of political texts. The classical genre-theoretical framework is still relevant to determine whether political speeches belong to the deliberative or epideictic genre. This is important because this distinction helps to determine the function of a political speech. But a transdisciplinary politico-linguistic approach is still needed to combine rhetoric, political science and discourse analysis for a more comprehensive analysis.

### 5.1. Categorization of political speeches

Politico-linguistics proposes dividing the concept of ‘political’ into three components: polity, policy and politics. This is more helpful for understanding the function of political texts: *polity* relates to the normative, legal and institutional manifestations of a political actor which frame the basic principles. Their aim is to establish political order and form the values of the political in-group. The overall political system, political norms and values are the main concern of such speeches. Some examples are funeral orations, necrology or laudatory speeches given by chancellors or presidents. They generally display the character traits of the epideictic genre which is based on praise and blame rhetoric.

Reisigl puts policy and politics in the same category of political action but differentiates their functions. *Policy* is the content-related dimension of political action. It has the function of the determination and formulation of political tasks, aims and programmes in different fields of policymaking (ibid., p. 246). In our case, enforcing an ‘active’ foreign policy can be realized as a necessary policy to increase military expenditure and boost related wartime industries. Another example comes from social policy. If the state shifts from a welfare to a neoliberal state, then the social benefits which are seen as the right of

all citizens should be reconceptualized as costly services. In that case, the privatization of public assets like hospitals, factories and natural resources becomes a necessary policy preference to achieve broader political aims. Among others, many speeches in parliamentary debates can be attributed to this category and they aim to justify the policymaking preferences of the government. I also include the party-group speeches which are given every week in parliament and via which the party leaders talk to their members of parliament. In these speeches, the party leaders evaluate the main occurrences and try to justify each party's policy preferences. Although it functions as speeches which target the MPs of a particular party, they actually target opponent parties and the public in general too, since these speeches are televised.

The last dimension of *politics* deals with the question of how and with whose help politics is performed (ibid., 246). It includes the formulation of political interests and the positioning of political actors against their opponents to make implementation of the aforementioned policy preferences possible. It can be said that political actors will implement their policy preferences as long as they can convince the masses that certain policymaking preferences are for the benefit of the public. While doing that, they can identify themselves with the masses against political opponents.

Another concept which is used to categorize political speeches is 'fields of action'. Reisigl defines fields of action as frameworks for social interaction and lists eight of them. These are:

- lawmaking procedure
- the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will
- the party-internal formation of attitudes, opinion and will
- the interparty formation of attitudes, opinion and will
- the organization of international and (especially) interstate relations
- political advertising
- the political executive and administration
- various forms of political control. (Wodak, 2001; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Reisigl, 2008)

Political discourses and discourse topics can cross between these fields, and in that sense it is likely that a political speech/text has more than one function. As Wodak indicates:

A discourse about a specific topic (un/employment) can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics spread to different fields and discourses.

They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked with each other. (2009, p. 40)

In the following diagram, it is possible to see the subgenres of the speeches that will be used for the analysis, their fields of action and the three dimensions of the political (see above) they comprehend:

Sub-genre	Field of Action	Polity/Policy/Politics
Election Speech	Political advertising Formation of Public Opinion	Polity + Policy + Politics
Party Group Speech	Party-Internal Formation of Attitudes, Opinion and Will Formation of Public Opinion	Politics
Ministerial Speech	Political Executive and Administration Formation of Public Opinion	Policy

Table 2. Sub-genres of political speeches according to their function and content

This research deals with three political sub-genres, which are election rally speeches, party-group speeches and ministerial speeches. These three sub-genres have more than one function (field of action) and they sometimes include different components of the political. The dimensions of politics become predominant in *election rally speeches* because they aim to mobilize potential voters and party supporters for the interests of the political actor/party. They are mostly dissent-oriented, i.e. they are based on positive self and negative other representation. The political opponent becomes a political enemy to be attacked. They do not only include justifying the policy preferences of the party or determining the overall political interests of the country but also to discredit other actors/discourses (field of political control) as well as (de)legitimize certain policy preferences (field of formation of public attitudes, opinions and will) (Reisigl, 2008, p. 253). This means that election speeches can be viewed as a mixture of polity, policy and

politics in an interrelated way so that they can paint a fully-fledged picture composed of different parts from values/general principles and policy-specific parts for the formulation of political interests as well as the positioning of political actors and their opponents.

For instance, when a foreign policy issue is covered, it is done so by including the following dimensions: a) why a certain action should be taken, b) how this action aligns with the overall interests of the country, c) why the political party/actor is the only one that can implement this action and d) why other political parties/actors cannot do it.

The second sub-genre is *party-group speeches*. The parties which are represented in parliament come together separately, once a week, and the leader of each party talks only to the members of parliament of their party. Although these speeches seem to target the MPs of only one party and to form party-internal attitudes, opinion and will, they actually target everybody because the speeches are televised. They are not only broadcast live but parts of the speeches are also quoted in news broadcast throughout the day so that they determine the agenda and function as a tool to form public opinion. In these speeches, policies are not discussed in detail but they are mentioned to justify the party's overall political stance and condemn political opponents that do not share the same policy-making preferences. In our case, it is possible to say that party group speeches are used by the governing party in a particular way which aims to dismiss criticisms coming from opponents so that the overall policymaking process can continue without disruption.

The third sub-genre is *ministerial speeches*. These texts focus on certain policy issues and comment on those issues in favour of the government. They are given in party meetings, in parliament or to local organizations of the party. The use of jargon and statistics is very common. This means logos form the basic mechanism of persuasion and legitimation. They aim to convince the audience that a certain policy proposal or preference is correct. But sometimes they also trigger a discussion about a topic which could lead to policy change.

## **5.2. Discourse-Historical Approach and its implementation:**

The selected texts are analyzed according to the main principles of the discourse-historical approach (DHA). The DHA looks at latent power dynamics and the potential

of agents because it integrates and triangulates knowledge about history and the background of the sociopolitical fields in which discursive events are embedded (Wodak, 2009, p. 38). By doing this, it aims to a) demystify the hegemony of specific discourses and powerful actors which maintain an asymmetric relationship in politics and society and b) analyze discourse on multi-contextual levels (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

These aims are also compatible with this research which investigates and evaluates the discursive strategies of the AKP in relation to the history of Turkish politics, economic and political developments in the country and institutional traits. Triangulation in that sense understood as a mechanism which creates links between different kinds of knowledge about the agent/institution under investigation. In this case, it means that the discourses of the AKP is a part of broader social and economic relations and the linguistic analysis can only be comprehensive if one takes the historical evolution of the party as well as the country, outcomes of their policy-making preferences and the structural aspects of these policy making preferences are taken into account. All three accounts are discussed throughout the thesis to complement the linguistic analysis.

Some other principles of this approach are summarized by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) as follows:

- 1) The approach is interdisciplinary in the sense that it involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application.
- 2) The approach is problem-oriented.
- 3) Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration helps to understand and explain the research project.
- 4) The research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography where required for a comprehensive analysis and theorization of the object under investigation.
- 5) The research moves recursively between data and theory.
- 6) Several genres and public spaces as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are studied.
- 7) The historical context is taken into account. Dealing with the historical context allows seeing the recontextualization processes that link differing texts and discourses over time.

- 8) Tools and categories are not fixed. They must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under consideration.
- 9) Although grand theories often serve as a foundation, middle-range theories frequently supply a better theoretical basis in a specific analysis.
- 10) The results of the research should be made available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public. (p. 96)

There are three dimensions of the DHA which constitute textual meanings and structures: these are the topics, discursive strategies and linguistic means which are used to determine both topics and strategies. The DHA takes four levels of context into consideration during a qualitative analysis:

1. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
2. Extralinguistic social/sociological variables;
3. The history and archaeology of texts and organizations;
4. The institutional frames of the context of a specific situation. (Wodak, 2009, p. 38)

With these four contextual levels, it becomes possible to understand the relationships between discourses, genres and texts as well as how they change according to the sociopolitical context. The DHA defines discourse as:

- a) Related to a macro-topic (and to the argumentation of validity claims such as truth and normative validity which involve social actors with different points of view);
- b) A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- c) Socially constituted as well as socially constitutive. (ibid., p. 38)

Following the principles of the DHA, I adopt an analytical perspective and related tools to investigate the political discourse of the governing party. For each of the texts, I will a) look at the content and topics, b) identify the discursive strategies and c) examine linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realizations. Wodak and Reisigl propose five discursive strategies for analysing identity politics and the presentation of positive self and negative others, which are nomination, predication, argumentation,

perspectivation and intensification/ mitigation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 95). I will also look at how certain policymaking preferences are legitimized by using the strategies proposed by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and van Leeuwen (2007, 2008), which are authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation, mythopoesis and appeals to emotions (see below for definitions). Besides these strategies, processes of intertextuality and interdiscursivity are also taken into consideration in order to see how texts and discourses are linked to each other and how party policies and interests try to dominate the political sphere through the reproduction, redistribution and extension of discourses.

Intertextuality implies that texts can be linked to each other through continuous reference to a topic or actor, by referring to the same events or through the reappearance of the arguments of one text in another, which is called recontextualization. Interdiscursivity indicates that topic-oriented discourses are related to each other (Wodak, 2009, p. 39). For example, the discourse of economic growth is related to other discourse topics, such as unemployment, investment or globalization. These two notions are important because they provide links between the different dimensions of the political that Reisigl emphasizes (2008).

In order for a policy to be implemented, there should be a link between the principles/values of the party, specific policymaking preferences and the political positioning of political actors. These links are maintained by cross-references between historical events, actors and values.

These discursive strategies are used in positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation processes, which include the justification/ legitimization of inclusion/ exclusion and the construction of identities (Wodak, 2009, p. 40). When the process is adapted to political discourses, it implies strategic attempts to persuade people a) which policies are for the good of the public, b) why certain actors can implement them whereas others cannot and c) what are the values/traits of competent and incompetent actors. Wodak indicates that strategy refers to a (more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal (ibid., p. 40). In order to be or remain a hegemonic actor, a political actor should be able to achieve these goals.

For example, the AKP should attempt to establish a hegemonic discourse which tries to exclude other actors/discourses from the political sphere so that certain policymaking

preferences can be implemented in the form of policing. But this discursive aim should also be compatible with the current macro-structural trends of capital accumulation so that the AKP itself can remain a hegemonic project. The AKP's own hegemonic projects, including domestic and foreign policy preferences, can then be regarded as tools for transforming society according to the needs and structural necessities of capital flows. Thus the AKP's political hegemony is also dependent on its ongoing capacity to use discursive strategies in a 'successful' way in order to transform both society and itself according to neoliberal trends and to eliminate any alternatives which could disturb the structural hegemony of neoliberal policymaking.

Wodak (2001, 2009) identifies five strategies which are used by political actors. The first is nomination (referential) strategies. These are implemented to represent and construct social actors in order to form in-groups and out-groups in a categorical way. Some linguistic devices that are functional for this strategy are metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. The second one, predication strategies, characterizes social actors according to the evaluative attribution of positive or negative traits through predicates. The main aim is to label actors positively or negatively. The third one is argumentation strategies and topoi, which try to justify and legitimize positive and negative attributions. The fourth one is perspectivation, through which political actors try to express the environment and position their point of view in the describing, reporting, narrating or quoting of relevant events or utterances in line with their political interests. The fifth strategy is intensification or mitigation. This strategy helps to modify and qualify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances.

Strategy	Objective(s)	Device(s)
Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes, actions	Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc.  Metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche  Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc.

Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (more or less positively and negatively)	<p>Stereotypical, evaluative attribution of negative and positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups)</p> <p>Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/ adjectives/ pronouns</p> <p>Collocations</p> <p>Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures</p> <p>Allusions, evocations and presuppositions/ implicatures etc.</p>
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	<p>Topoi (see below)</p> <p>Fallacies (see below)</p>
Perspectivation, Framing or Discourse Representation	Positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	<p>Deictics</p> <p>Direct, Indirect or Free Indirect Speech</p> <p>Quotation marks, discourse markers or particles</p> <p>Metaphors</p> <p>Animating Prosody</p>
Intensification and Mitigation	Modifying the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	<p>Diminutives and Augmentatives</p> <p>Modal particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions</p> <p>Hyperboles, Litotes</p> <p>Indirect speech acts</p> <p>Verbs of saying, thinking, feeling etc.</p>
Table 3. Discursive strategies, their objectives and devices (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 95)		

Legitimization and justification strategies which are part of argumentation schema are composed of topoi and fallacies. Topoi are defined as parts of argumentation which belong explicitly or tacitly to the obligatory premises of an argument. They are content-related warrants or conclusion rules which connect the argument with the conclusion or the central claim and therefore provide justification (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 102).

Topoi are crucial in detecting seemingly convincing fallacious arguments in political debates and genres (Kienpointner, 1996, p. 194). Some of them are defined and exemplified below:<sup>38</sup>

Topos of burden: If an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it.

Look, in education we made 163,000 classrooms in Turkey. In Samsun, we completed 2,781 classrooms. We sent one million computers. We sent 9,797 computers to Samsun. My precious brothers, 8 years ago, why weren't there informatics classes in Turkey? Tell this to my brothers who support the MHP. Tell this to the supporters of the CHP. They are not interested in science. Believe me, they are reactionary, they are completely reactionary. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Topos of reality: Tautologically, this infers that reality is as it is and a particular action should be performed.

But this country cannot be left to this kind of impertinence and it won't be. I am telling you frankly, whatever measures are necessary, we will continue taking them. Because nobody can attempt to break our peace. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Topos of numbers: If sufficient numerical/ statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed.

Deductions from wages, freezes on wages never cross our minds. On the contrary, we are not letting inflation oppress our employees, we are providing wage increases above the inflation rate. Here, I want to give a single example: We foresaw a minimum wage increase of 3% + 3% in the budget for 2012. Still, we pushed the circumstances and we made a minimum wage increase of 5.9% + 6% in 2012. That is to say, in total, we increased the minimum wage by 12.4% in 2012 and determined it as 701 liras for the first six months. I want to draw your attention to the fact that, when we came to power, the minimum wage was 184 liras, today it is 701 liras. That is a rate of increase of 281%. Over 9 nine years, we didn't only prevent inflation from reducing the value of the minimum wage,

---

<sup>38</sup> All the examples provided in this chapter are taken from the samples used for the analysis. The original texts can be found on the Web pages provided in the references and in the appendix.

we also, in relation to the inflation rate, achieved an increase of 33%. (Erdoğan, 2012)

Topos of history: Because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation.

Our claim is this: we do politics to serve. You voted for us, we have come to power alone. What will we do? In the past, governments were filling their own pockets. Our politics is for the nation. We will satisfy the nation's needs, solve their problems, we will make life liveable. We do politics to serve. Governments should not be the ones that patronize the people, they should not oppress but serve the people. The AKP is a government which serves the people. (Arınc, 2011)

Topos of authority: If one refers to somebody/something in a position of authority, then the action is legitimate.

Yesterday, I listened to a highly credible official who came from Syria (Davutoğlu, 2012).

In addition, there are criticisms because our land is being sold to foreigners. This is all fiction. These sales are subject to the force of bilateral agreements between countries and there is a quota of 10 per cent. For instance, no sales were made in our time in Hatay, because the quota was used up. (Çelik, 2011)

Topos of threat: If specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about them.

But we don't have a stance or position like leaving the health of our citizens only to the doctors in the clinics, leaving it to their mercy. (Çelik, 2011)

Topos of definition: A person or thing designated X should have the qualities/ traits/ attributes consistent with the meaning of X.

'Don't be interested in whatever happens there.' No, that is impossible. We cannot do that as humans. We cannot do it for the future of the country and the region. Like the government of the time which struggled with snipers, I am

memorizing it carefully; we too should adopt a certain attitude. (Davutoğlu, 2012)

Topos of justice: If persons/ actions/ situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated /dealt with in the same way.

If you have work done, show me. I am showing you what I have done. We brought hospitals into a functioning state. Our work in Turkey includes the motorway from İzmir to İstanbul, the sea route from Mudanya to İstanbul; our work includes express trains, our work is the state hospitals that we built in Bursa, dams, lakes, agricultural irrigation projects. All of these are our work. (Arınç, 2011)

Topos of urgency: Decisions or actions need to be considered/ weighed/ made very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event beyond one's own reach and responsibility.

Energy prices are the main determinant of the current debt. We need to change our energy structure. It is too late for nuclear power plants. (Çağlayan, 2011)

It is also possible to list some of the fallacies in argumentation which are widely used in political speeches. Some of them are defined with examples below:

Argumentum ad baculum: Trying to intimidate or to frighten by an appeal to physical or other forms of force, violence or fear instead of using plausible and relevant arguments. Antagonists are threatened with exposure to negative sanctions if they adopt or do not give up a specific standpoint.

Until now, we talked through our work and our services, henceforth we will also talk through our work and our services. But the one who does not come to heel with words should be warned, the one who does not come to heel with a warning deserves a beating.<sup>39</sup> This is the fact of the matter. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Argumentum ad hominem: It is a verbal attack on the antagonist's personality and character instead of challenging his/her argument with counter-arguments.

---

<sup>39</sup> Byword.

Well, how can Kılıçdaroğlu come to my nation without any shame? I don't understand. How come my brothers who gave their hearts to the CHP believe his lies? My brothers, there are things that were done, obviously. This man bankrupted the social security institution. In 8 years, not easy, you are the general director for 8 years and you bankrupt that institution. Unfortunately, every kind of mistake was made in this period and these were not seen before. His relatives, accepting people who were terrorists, from here and there. This was all told in parliament. This was flung in his face, flung in his face. But one should have one's face. He is very brazen-faced. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Argumentum ad misericordiam: It is an unjustifiable appeal to compassion and empathy. In such cases, relevant argumentation is replaced by an appeal to emotions.

Some writers were annoyed by this, quite so. But they weren't annoyed about the imam who was killed after morning prayers in Hakkari. They weren't annoyed about the BDP's silence over that imam. They weren't annoyed about our martyrs in Kastamonu, in Silopi. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Yesterday, I listened to a highly credible official who came from Syria. Filled with tears he said: 'My honourable minister, because a father who had lost his child in an air bombardment could not go out and bury him, he put the child in the fridge to avoid a smell. I saw it in person.' What kind of torture is this? (Davutoğlu, 2012)

Argumentum ad populum or pathetic fallacy: It encompasses populist appeals to the masses. It consists of an appeal to the prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the masses, instead of relevant argumentation.

Now, look dear people of Samsun, we have started this journey with you, we have started this journey with our nation. We have always walked along this way with our nation, we didn't take our power from gangs. We didn't take our power from elites. We took our power from our nation, we walked straight in the direction that our nation showed us. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Argumentum ad ignorantiam: An appeal to ignorance means that a certain argument, thesis or opinion should be regarded as true as long as the reverse has not been proven. In jurisprudence this is a positive principle which tries to protect the rights of an accused

person. However, in political speeches it can be used in a manipulative way. In this example, it is combined with a rhetorical strategy called *apophasis*, meaning that the aforementioned abuse is realized synchronically at the moment of emphasizing its absence. In addition to that, the political actor claims to be right as long as no counter-proof is provided. However, the counter-proof lies within the argument.

I cannot know her political mentality; but, for instance, the sister of the one who died there is a woman who works in the women's branch, a woman who is the chair there. There is this too. But have you ever heard abuse of this from us? We cannot do such a thing. (Erdoğan, 2012)

Argumentum ad verecundiam: This fallacy consists of supporting one's standpoint by means of reference to an authority considered as competent, superior or unimpeachable. This appeal is fallacious if the referenced authority is not competent or qualified, if it is prejudiced or if it is referenced in an inaccurate way.

In the single party era, we always showed identity cards, birth certificates. Here, we are always told how bread was distributed, how gas-oil was distributed, we always told them. The cues for oil, the stamps that were placed in identity cards, we showed them. Flour, sugar, we always listened to our fathers, grandfathers about how these were distributed with stamps. These were during periods of CHP rule. (Erdoğan, 2012)

Hasty generalization: This is a generalization on the basis of a quantitative sample that is not representative. It can be seen in the form of *compositio* (replacing the whole by a part) or *divisio* (replacing a part by the whole).

The police will establish order in this country, they will take necessary measures against terrorists in this city, bandits in the city centre. The police are there for that. They are to ensure safety of all craftsmen, of us. Precious brothers, sorry, but those who lift a hand to our police, to our security forces, get a response. The police are not the whipping boys of the bandits. If they have something to say, step up and talk in the square, hold a press conference and talk there, but they cannot attack civilians with stones in their hands, with whatever comes to hand. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc: This is the use of a temporally chronological relationship in order to explain a causal relationship. Its logical structure is: if A happens before B then B happens because of A.

This is also extremely important: Now, in Europe, governments are having difficulties in taking measures against the global economic crisis because of election concerns and populist concerns. Because they can't take these measures and show strong leadership, they lay the ground for a deepening of the crisis and high levels of devastation resulting from it. (Erdoğan, 2012)

Petito principii (Begging the question): It means that what is controversial, in question and has to be proved is presupposed as the starting point of argumentation. It is exercised linguistically by using paraphrases for the same proposition in the premise and in the conclusion.

So, we prioritized privatization practices in our periods of government which contributed largely to the increases in growth potential and development speed of our country, the decrease in the burden of employment and finance on the public. (Şimşek, 2012)

Rigged questions: If somebody asks a manipulative question containing one or more presuppositions that imply an incorrect starting point or that falsely impute something to someone, then this can be considered a rigged question.

What will they (the police) do? Will the police be beaten up? Why are there police in this country? The police will establish order in this country, they will take the necessary measures against the terrorists in this city, bandits in the city centre. The police are there for that. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Ignoratio elenchi: Ignoring the counter-proof or argument means discussing or proving a thesis or standpoint which is not the one in question but a totally different and irrelevant one that is ascribed to the antagonist and is not relevant in the actual discourse. This fallacy is widely used by politicians.

I say, in America, to George, Edward and Mary, when you come to Europe, Hans and Helga, if they are benefiting from these opportunities, then why wouldn't my Ahmet, my Mehmet, my Akif, my Ömer, my Ayşe, my Fatma, my Hatice and my

Betül from Samsun benefit from this, I say. This is my concern. These are not impossible things, here we did, we are doing and we will do. This is our difference. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Straw man fallacy: It means twisting somebody's words and thus creating a distorted picture of the antagonist's argument in order to be able to refute the standpoint more easily and to make one's own standpoint more tenable.

Once you look, he goes further. I, he says, am not even afraid of the armed, will I be afraid of Tayyip from Kasımpaşa? My concern is not to make anybody afraid. But don't forget this, I am proud of being Tayyip from Kasımpaşa. I am a servant who is honoured to serve the entire nation who came out of Kasımpaşa as a son of that place due to my people bringing us to these ranks. (Erdoğan, 2012)

Fallacies of ambiguity, equivocation, amphibole or clarity: These schemes consist of changing the interpretation of an ambiguous utterance or of playing with ambiguous, polysemic meanings for the purpose of weakening the antagonist's argument and standpoint, and for strengthening one's own argument and standpoint. In the parts of political speeches where the prime minister quotes sentences from the opposition party's leader, these kinds of fallacies can be found.

My precious brothers, we merged the hospitals. The CHP was uncomfortable with that. Kılıçdaroğlu opposed that, he opposed the merging of hospitals. Look what he says now, without any shame, it was that, it was this, he is manoeuvring. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Argumentum ad consequentiam: In this fallacy, outcomes of the thesis are emphasized instead of discussing the rightness of the overall thesis.

My brothers, look, now, there is a university in every city in Turkey. When we came, there were 76 universities. In our period we added 89 to that number and now there is a university in every city (Erdoğan, 2011).

Non sequitur: This means tying together arguments into a conclusion which might be correct per se though the connections are false.

Look, in education we built 163,000 classrooms in Turkey. In Samsun, we completed all 2,781 classrooms. We sent one million computers. We sent 9,797

computers to Samsun. My precious brothers, 8 years ago, why weren't there informatics classes in Turkey? Tell this to my brothers who support the MHP. Tell this to the supporters of the CHP. They are not interested in science. Believe me, they are reactionary, they are completely reactionary. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Trajectio in alium: This fallacy is used strategically in rationalizations, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimizer reversals etc. It means shifting the blame, responsibility or guilt onto somebody else. In politics this can be used to decrease the responsibility of executive power so that potential criticism can be directed towards other political adversaries (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 72-74).

We are trying to provide state-nation coalescence while they invite an increase in enemy state perception. We have a concern to embrace our nation, to provide unity and integrity. These serve the insemination of grudges and hatred. We struggle in every sphere to make democratization and demilitarization count. These lead to incitements to make institutions fall out with each other. (Erdoğan, 2012)

#### Legitimation:

Legitimation is one of the main goals that political actors use to persuade voters to accept a policy proposal (Cap, 2008, p. 39). Thus, legitimation deserves special attention in political discourse because, with this strategy, political actors try to justify their political agenda and to maintain or change the direction of politics (Reyes, 2011, p. 783). In terms of legitimation strategies, van Leeuwen (2007) proposes four of them which are used to justify or account for why a certain action should be done in a certain way. These are authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. I would also add an appeal to emotions as proposed by Reyes (2011). These legitimation strategies are intertwined with the argumentation strategies proposed by the DHA and they are not mutually exclusive. Still, some categorizations within the legitimation strategies provide more detailed accounts. For example, it is possible to detect various kinds of authorization that are used in political discourse to have an idea about party structure and leadership. If the source of authorization is the party leader instead of common sense or expertise, it is likely that the party leader has autocratic power in the production process of party policy and discourse. Likewise, mythopoesis helps to distinguish between moral

tales and cautionary tales, which differ in their function of encouraging or discouraging particular political action in the form of topoi or fallacies.

#### Authorization:

Van Leeuwen (2007) distinguishes between six types of authority. Personal authority is a direct reference to a person who has a status or role in a particular institution. Parents or teachers can be given as examples. In expert authority, legitimation is provided by expertise rather than status. This can be scientists, academics or doctors. Sometimes their opinions are accepted without question. In the case of role model authority, people take opinion leaders or role models as a reference and follow them. For example, a well-known artist can be used as a role model for an election campaign with the intention that this figure may have a positive effect on people so that they vote for a particular political party. Unlike personal authority, impersonal authority does not refer to an individual but to already established orders and conventions of legitimation. Nouns like law, policy and regulation or adjectives and adverbs like compulsory, regulatory or mandatory represent legal authority. The authority of tradition takes conventions and established practices as a reference point to provide legitimation. The answer to the why question is not 'because it is compulsory' but because 'we always do it like this'. Conventional practices or traditions themselves are assumed to be unchallenged and sufficient for authorization. The authority of conformity excludes itself as an authority and refers to others as a whole. In this case, the answer to the why question is not 'because we always do it like this' but 'because others do it like this'. The implication is that because most people do it like this, we or you (whomever is being subjected) should follow the same path. Again there is no argumentation included in this type of authorization.

#### Moral Evaluation:

Here, justification is based on moral values. In most cases moral evaluation is linked to specific discourses about moral value. But these evaluations are implicit and not debatable. Adjectives like healthy, normal, natural and useful are widely used in such discourse. They transform moral discourse into a kind of generalized motive. Van Leeuwen indicates that it is hard to find linguistically motivated methods to detect this kind of moral evaluation but it can be recognized according to common sense cultural knowledge (2007, p. 98). This is the point where the discourse-historical approach becomes relevant because it allows an understanding of which cultural/ historical

references are transferred to discourse in the form of moral evaluation as common values. Some types of moral legitimation are evaluation, abstraction and analogy. Evaluative adjectives are used to describe concrete qualifications of objects or actions and to commend them in terms of some domain of values. However, these values implied by adjectives are covert and beyond debate or argument. Such adjectives as sustainable, contemporary, stable and inevitable can be given as examples which are widely used in politics.

Abstraction is a reference to practices in a way which moralizes them by picking a quality from a practice so that this quality is linked to discourse about moral values. For example, instead of saying the ‘Turkish government takes legal measures to increase foreign capital’, it can also be said that ‘Turkey becomes the centre of attraction for investment’. In this sentence, there is a high level of abstraction. There is more to abstraction in practice, one also sees abstraction of the actors who perform the action and who are affected by that action. As a result of this, the whole process is naturalized in the discourse of ‘becoming the centre of attraction’.

The third method of expressing moral evaluation is by analogy, which means making comparisons in order to legitimize or delegitimize a certain action. The answer to the question ‘Why should I do it?’ is ‘because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values’ (or the reverse). Sometimes analogy is done implicitly by using a term which literally belongs to one social practice in order to refer to an activity that belongs to another social practice, like a ‘recovering economy’ or a ‘combatant government’. In the first example, a term which belongs to the social practice of healthcare is used to refer to a process of the economy. In the second example, the military term of combatant is used to define the government. Analogies can also be made explicit, like: ‘We make a politics of service, a politics of work, whereas some others make a politics of exploitation, they make a politics of ideology’ (Erdoğan, 2011). In this example, being a political party with an ideology is delegitimized and a technocratic perception of policymaking is morally justified. This legitimization strategy also contains the fallacies of argumentum ad populum, argumentum ad misericordiam and hasty generalization. So it is possible to observe that legitimation strategies can be intertwined with fallacious argumentation.

### Rationalization:

Habermas (1985) distinguishes between two types of rationality. One is instrumental rationality and the other is theoretical rationality. Instrumental rationality legitimizes practices according to their goals, uses and effects. Theoretical rationality legitimizes practices according to the natural order of things. Instrumental rationality can be goal-oriented, means-oriented or effect-oriented. In goal-oriented instrumental rationality, purposes are constructed as conscious or unconscious motives, aims, intentions or goals. The purpose can be justified by a generalized action or a moralized action (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 102). Two examples are:

I am telling it again, we took responsibility for the brotherhood, unity and integrity of this nation. We will solve this problem at any cost. (Erdoğan, 2012)

In the case of means-orientation, the purpose is constructed as ‘in the action’ and the action as a means to an end (ibid., p. 103). An example is:

We will protect the beauties and values that make us us, but we will be also open to the whole world. We have a responsibility to compromise with the world without being degenerate. (Çelik, 2011)

In the case of effect-orientation, the outcomes of actions are emphasized. The outcomes can be predicted by agents that are involved in the action, but it is not only dependent on their action. Below is an example:

I am helping the one who brings me a demand regardless of the party. But, the local authorities in Izmir do not have a demand from us. The number of the ones which demand does not exceed three. When İzmir holds our hand, we will also make İzmir stand up. (Günay, 2011)

Theoretical legitimation is not based on morally justified, purposeful or effective action but on some kind of truth. Therefore, theoretical legitimation provides overt representation of the way ‘things are’. There are three types of this kind of legitimation. The first one is definition in which one activity is defined in terms of another activity, and it can be counted as definition as long as both activities are generalized and objectivated. Besides these, the link between two activities is provided through

attributive verbs like is, constitutes, forms etc. or significative verbs like signals, means, symbolizes etc. An example of definition is:

We are not only doing coal, food and aid supplies to the poor. We are giving big support, whatever they need. These are the preconditions of being a social state. (Arınc, 2011)

Explanation, which is the second category of theoretical legitimation, describes the general attributes or habitual activities of the categories of actors in question. Below is an example of explanation:

We import petroleum both as a raw material and for energy purposes. At that moment, petroleum prices reached the level of 110 dollars. Turkey has this structure: Every 10 dollars increase in the petroleum price increases our current debt by 4 billion dollars. (Çağlayan, 2011)

The third form of theoretical legitimation is prediction. This is based on expertise and can therefore be denied by other experts or experience. As an example:

Now, with natural gas in our homes, we also understood that we are human, right? It will be better inshallah, it will be more beautiful inshallah, don't worry. In the period of Bahçeli, there was natural gas in 9 cities. But now there is natural gas in 69 cities. We will deliver it to 81 cities, 81 out of 81. (Erdoğan, 2011)

#### Mythopoesis:

Another source of legitimation is mythopoesis, i.e. storytelling. Van Leeuwen describes two types of storytelling: moral tales and cautionary tales. In moral tales, protagonists are rewarded for their legitimate actions or for restoring legitimate order (2007, p. 105). It is also possible to find that kind of legitimation in political speeches. One example is:

What were they telling on behalf of your brother? When I was going to Pınarhisar, this was the headline newspapers were writing: 'He cannot even be a village headman.' What happened? It is God who has the power and authority, it is the nation that makes the decisions. What happened? Those who said this became shamefaced, the nation won. Because the decision was of the nation, the word was of the nation, the authority was of the nation. What the nation said has happened. (Erdoğan, 2011)

Cautionary tales emphasize the negative consequences of an action which does not follow the norms of social practices. The protagonists are involved in deviant activities which lead to unhappy endings (ibid., 106). An example is taken from an election rally speech by the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In this part, the protagonist is the old generation who made a mistake by voting for CHP and Erdoğan reminds the younger generation of the consequences of this action:

Mr Kemal was the general director of the Social Insurance Institution in the 90s. He made us our mother cry, our mother. As is known, Mr Bahçeli also served as the deputy prime minister for 3.5 years. In that period, weren't our deaths taken hostage? Weren't our patients taken hostage? My precious brothers, we merged the hospitals. The CHP was uncomfortable with that. Kılıçdaroğlu opposed that, he opposed the merging of hospitals. Look what he says now, without any shame, it was that, it was this, he is manoeuvring. Because some said U to him, but I said this is not U, this is S. Because it is impossible to catch his lies. My brothers who didn't live in these periods don't know. Young people may not know it. Those who lived in the 90s know. (Erdoğan, 2011)

#### Appeal to Emotions:

Social actors appeal to emotions in order to impose, debate, legitimize and construct certain perceptions of reality, to contribute individually to form their community's vision of social behaviour (Reyes, 2011, p. 788). Emotions can also be used to distort the perception of reality. In political discourse, political actors usually appeal to the emotions in order to create a consensus between themselves and the masses so that they can form an in-group based on shared feelings, practices or the past and an out-group which does not share the same emotions with the political actor (and relatedly with the masses) because they are against the proposed policy. As Reyes states:

The negative representation of social actors and the attribution of negative qualities to their personalities or their actions allow speakers to create two sides of a given story/event, in which speaker and audience are in the 'us-group' and the social actors depicted negatively constitute the 'them-group'. (2011, p. 785)

So, we may say that an appeal to emotions (especially to fear) is a kind of legitimization strategy which is also related to the macro-strategy of positive self and negative other-

representation, and it can be realized to refer, name or demonize other actors. This means emotions can be used as predication and nomination strategies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2009). Below, it is possible to see how emotions are used in different ways to legitimize or deligitimize political actions/ actors by the governing party:

They attacked our election convoy. They martyred your fellow townsman, our brother Recep Şahin in Kastamonu. They even targeted children from Imam Hatip. In Cizre, they burnt the dormitory where our children, 13, 14 and 15 years old from Imam Hatip live. My brothers, they burnt the faces of children with Molotov cocktails. By attacking our MPs, they thought they could assimilate us, they could scare us. (Erdoğan, 2011)

We walked together on these roads. We got wet together in this rain. Now, in all the songs I listen to, everything reminds us of you. Everything reminds us of you. Everything reminds us of you. (Erdoğan, 2011)

This noble nation, whose martyrs are buried in each other's arms, will extirpate every kind of malign tumour from its body. (Erdoğan, 2012)

### **5.3. Data, selection criteria and research questions**

Thirteen texts were selected from election rally speeches, party group speeches and ministerial speeches. These sub-genres are suitable for the research aims because they officially and systematically represent the ideas, perspectives and proposals of the governing party.<sup>40</sup> The first two speeches were randomly selected from two different sub-genres (election rally speech and party group speech) and the entire speeches were analyzed. The other eleven texts belong to the third sub-genre of ministerial speeches and the analyzed texts are selected according to the eleven discourse topics which were elaborated earlier in the first two speeches, such as education, foreign policy, finance and health. The texts will cover two years (2011 to 2012).

---

<sup>40</sup> See Section 5.1. for the definition and function of sub-genres as well as the classification of political speeches.

Political party/genre speeches	Election rally speeches	Party group speeches	Ministerial speeches
Number of samples	1	1	11

Table 4. Sub-genres and the number of speeches to be analyzed

All texts have already been transcribed and can be found on the website of the political party (<http://www.akp.org.tr>). The translations of the texts were done by me and the textual analysis was made on the Turkish texts. There were three major difficulties in translation that I experienced. One of them was the translation of bywords and idioms. In those parts, additional explanations are given for those who do not have background knowledge. The second one is the excessive references to other texts, events and periods in the speeches which could not be overcome simply by the translation of the analyzed text. In order to resolve this problem, additional information about the implied event, person or period is provided in the footnotes. The last one is the violation of syntactic rules and excessive use of pronouns, which are sometimes appear incoherent and grammatically wrong in translation. In these parts, I stay loyal to the original text because those grammatically wrong or seemingly incoherent parts might have a function and therefore should be taken into account.

Analyzing texts from different sub-genres is important in order to be able observe intertextuality and interdiscursivity between different fields of action in politics. This kind of clustering is helpful when realizing the traits of sub-genres according to the different stages of political discourse. For instance, while a ministerial speech focuses on policies and therefore tries to legitimize/ justify a particular political decision, election rally speeches focus more on general values and principles as well as on criticism of the political opposition. Besides that, different sub-genres also represent different types of political action. An election rally speech aims to form public opinion and attitudes whereas a party group speech also has the function of forming party-internal opinion and attitudes and will do so because it targets the members of parliament of a party. After grouping political speeches into clusters according to their sub-genre, I analyzed the selected texts according to the macro-discourse topics they cover in order to answer these questions:

1) Can we see similar and common discursive strategies for different policy issues?

What are the discourse topics? How are they linked to each other? Can we see the reproduction of discourse topics in the texts from different sub-genres? Which discursive strategies are employed to elaborate on these topics? How do they help to realize policymaking?

2) What are the main traits of the political discourse employed by the AKP?

Do they represent social reality from a singular perspective so that other potential aspects and actors are excluded from the discourse? What kind of policymaking do they serve? How can one evaluate the political positioning of the AKP on the basis of outcomes?

3) What is the impact of political history on discourse?

What is the particular importance of the de/recontextualization of political history in the discourse of the AKP? What are the effects of this strategy? How can we evaluate the political history of the AKP itself?

These questions help us to understand the possible relations between political discourse and policymaking and to evaluate the contextual factors which may empower or weaken political actors. After answering the research questions, I would like to see if the results of the analysis provide some links between the discursive preferences of the AKP and the non-discursive aspect of politics by referring to the literature which defines the party as a neo-conservative political actor implementing pro-market reforms in order to transform society in a neoliberal way.

#### **5.4. Conclusion:**

This research follows the main premises of the DHA. It does that in order to be able to: a) analyze discourse in its wider social context; b) determine discourse topics which are functionalized in favour of non-discursive policy projects; c) show the relationship between the discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics by investigating how discursive strategies are used to prioritize/ legitimize certain policy proposals/ actors/ political ideologies and trivialize/ deligitimize others.

In accordance with the aforementioned aims, I will first investigate the specific content and topics of discourses. These discourse topics, or topicality, can be seen as policy projects. Then, I will investigate discursive strategies (perspectivization, argumentation, predication, nomination, intensification/ mitigation) to find out how the governing party tries to achieve consensus for these policy projects and proposals. In the third stage of analysis, I analyze the micro-level linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realizations which form the basis of discursive strategies.

My research contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, it can empower or weaken the arguments of the literature which focus on the political hegemony of the AKP without focusing on the party's discourse and how it is linguistically constructed; secondly it provides an interdisciplinary perspective for evaluating the AKP government and policies because this is the first research which systematically investigates party discourse as a form of political strategy and relates it to political practices by illustrating some links between the discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics.

## CHAPTER 6: THE ANALYSIS OF AN ELECTION RALLY SPEECH

### 6.1. Text

1 I send my greetings, love and respect to all my brothers<sup>41</sup> who live in Bafra, Canik,  
2 Çarşamba, Havza, İlkadım, Kavak, Ladik, Salıpazarı, Tekkeköy, Terme, Vezirköprü and  
3 Yakakent.

4 I hope the sacred three months<sup>42</sup> which have started today are blessed, propitious for my  
5 brothers from Samsun, for our mighty nation and for the Islamic community.

6 Right at the beginning of my speech, I cordially congratulate Samsunspor, the red  
7 lightnings, who have been promoted to the Super League. I wish success to the  
8 Samsunspor community, the board, the technical staff and all the players in the Super  
9 League. Samsunspor which is promoted to the Super League now clearly deserves a  
10 super stadium. If God permits,<sup>43</sup> we are bringing a new stadium with a capacity of  
11 30,000 people to our Samsun. If God permits, we will welcome the rivals of  
12 Samsunspor. We have rolled up our sleeves for a stadium befitting of Samsunspor and  
13 we are now making plans to work with our municipality. As soon as possible, we will  
14 make it and deliver it to Samsun. I already say, enjoy your new stadium.

15 Of course, that is not enough. Samsun does not have a nice indoors sports hall. In order  
16 to make Samsun a city of sports, at this stage of the infrastructure, we are also  
17 constructing a sports hall with a capacity of 7,500 people. The building of this sports hall  
18 has begun. When this hall is completed, Samsun will take its place in Turkey as well as  
19 in the world as a city of sports. We will be able to host many international organizations,  
20 if God permits,<sup>44</sup> in our Samsun.

21 My dear brothers, there are only nine days remaining to the 12 June elections. Nine days  
22 later, the ballot boxes will be in front of our nation. One more time, the nation will have  
23 the last word, you will speak. I already wish before God that the 12 June elections will

---

<sup>41</sup> The original word is 'kardeş' which includes both male and female siblings.

<sup>42</sup> These are Rajab, Sha'aban and Ramadan according to the Islamic calendar.

<sup>43</sup> The original word is 'inşallah'.

<sup>44</sup> I want to emphasize that using this expression in the middle of the sentence may have a greater effect than using it at the beginning or the end (which is common usage), because it disturbs the natural flow of the sentence and thus reminds the audience that the speaker is respectful to the authority of God and prioritizes it.

24 be beneficial to our country, to our nation, to our region. We will make the will of nation  
25 known. I hope that 12 June will go down in history as a turning point.

26 Look, dear people of Samsun, in the course of 8.5 years, very offensive criticisms were  
27 made of us, of our party, of our government. In the course of 8.5 years, on the one hand  
28 we were struggling to serve you; on the other hand, we stood out against the harsh,  
29 destructive, devastating criticisms and insults of this opposition. We have never been  
30 afraid of these criticisms, we have never shrunk away from them. We are always open to  
31 constructive critique. Both our mind and heart are open. We have always taken  
32 constructive critique into consideration. But, they don't have a project, they don't have  
33 suggestions, they only have an empty egg-basket on their saddle,<sup>45</sup> they just rant. Despite  
34 that, we have always made an effort to improve ourselves. Every moment, whenever  
35 possible, we have been present for our nation. We have reviewed ourselves in the mirror  
36 of our nation. You see, once more, the ballot box is before the nation, today once more  
37 the nation has the last word. The nation makes the last decision. Once more, black and  
38 white appear by means of the ballot box, through the hands of the nation with God's  
39 permission.

40 We said nation from the beginning, we said democracy, we said the will of the nation,  
41 we said freedom. From the beginning, we have never capitulated and given up  
42 democratic ways, we haven't capitulated before the law, we have empowered both  
43 democracy and the law further. The language of violence, anger and hatred didn't  
44 become our language. We have never been among the ones that destroy, that ruin. We  
45 always said we would compete with our opponents only in the ballot box. We have never  
46 been among the ones who have bats in their hands, we have never been among the ones  
47 who carry stones or rocks in their hands, we have never been among the ones who walk  
48 around with Molotov cocktails. We have never associated with bandits. We are also  
49 doing this today. Actually we don't talk much in Turkey, more than us, our work talks.  
50 My brothers, what thing does the CHP have that speaks for God's sake? I am asking,  
51 what thing does the MHP have that speaks, for God's sake? Ask them, ask, what work  
52 have you done in Turkey? They haven't even a planted tree.<sup>46</sup> From their past to the

---

<sup>45</sup> It refers to a Turkish idiom which is used for people who can change their direction (ideas, actions) easily because they don't have responsibility for something important (like a basket full of eggs).

<sup>46</sup> Turkish idiom. A planted tree symbolizes the minimum asset that a person/institution can have. It generally refers to material ownership.

53 present, ‘the donkey dies, its saddle remains, a man dies, his work remains’.<sup>47</sup> A saddle  
54 remains even from a donkey, but work should remain from a human. Have they done  
55 work? No.

56 Dear brothers, it is easy for someone single to divorce.<sup>48</sup> They rant abundantly, is that  
57 right? Well, once upon a time, there was someone. What was he saying? What he gives,  
58 I give five more.<sup>49</sup> What was the other one saying? Two keys.<sup>50</sup> Did the houses come,  
59 did the vehicles come? The answer is no. But this Black Sea coast road tells us, the  
60 double highway of Ankara-Samsun tells us. The new university that we brought to  
61 Samsun tells us. The classes that we opened tell us. The computers that we sent tell us.  
62 The common access to all hospitals tells us. Housing estates tell us. The steps that we  
63 have taken in energy and in natural gas tell us. The airport of Samsun tells us. We made  
64 improvements for farmers, craftsmen, the retired, these tell. My brothers, Turkey also  
65 experiences the same transformation that Samsun experiences.

66 We talk with our work in Turkey. Those who cannot talk with their work unfortunately  
67 make an effort to pave the way for an election with stones of violence. Until now, all  
68 across Turkey, more than 150 of our election offices, election vehicles, mayorships and  
69 townships were attacked. They attacked our election convoy. They martyred your fellow  
70 townsman, our brother Recep Şahin, in Kastamonu.<sup>51</sup> They even targeted children from  
71 Imam Hatip.<sup>52</sup> In Cizre, they burnt the dormitory where our children, 13, 14 and 15 years  
72 old, from Imam Hatip live. My brothers, they burnt the face of children with Molotov  
73 cocktails. By attacking our MPs, they thought they could repel us, they could scare us.  
74 Unfortunately, violence does not come from a single segment either. You see, what we  
75 experienced in Hopa, the CHP and its supporters attacked our bus. One of our policemen  
76 is seriously wounded. They didn’t stop at that. They wanted to continue this in Ankara,  
77 in Istanbul, in Kütahya. But now people in Kütahya have stood up. Why? If this  
78 continues like that, we have security of course, we will take all measures, we will take

---

<sup>47</sup> Turkish idiom. It emphasizes the importance of production in human life.

<sup>48</sup> Turkish aphorism. The exact literal meaning is that single men mistakenly think that divorcing from a wife is an easy thing. The real meaning is that unexperienced and uninformed people normally underestimate the difficulty or the importance of a work.

<sup>49</sup> This quote is uttered by the former prime minister (and also the former president) Süleyman Demirel in 1991 general elections. He is no more actively involved in politics.

<sup>50</sup> This expression was first used by Süleyman Demirel, than by Tansu Çiller who was also the former prime minister. She is no more involved in politics. Two keys symbolize house and car.

<sup>51</sup> The police officer who was killed by PKK as a result of an armed attack while escorting the convoy of the prime minister.

<sup>52</sup> This is a secondary education institution which mainly educates religious officials.

79 measures. But be careful, girl or woman; anyway, I don't know if whoever climbs on a  
80 black Maria can enjoy it, in addition to this, she is also going to attack a policeman who  
81 holds a shield and hit him with stick, supposedly a flag. Where is this partisan press,  
82 what do their candaş<sup>53</sup> in the media say in their comments? The police, it says, won't lift  
83 their hand to those. What will they do? Will the police be beaten up? Why are there  
84 police in this country? The police will establish order in this country, they will take the  
85 necessary measures against terrorists in this city, bandits in the city centre<sup>54</sup>. The police  
86 are there for that. They are there for the safety of all craftsmen, for us.<sup>55</sup> Precious  
87 brothers, sorry, but those who lift a hand to our police, to our security forces, get a  
88 response. The police are not the whipping boys of the bandits. If they want a say, step up  
89 and talk in the square, they can hold a press conference and talk there, but they cannot  
90 attack civilians with stones in their hands, with whatever comes to their hands. This is  
91 what they did to us in Hopa. We were going by bus; anyway, in the morning, they did  
92 everything not to let us into Hopa. But this country cannot be left to this kind of  
93 impertinence and it won't be. I am telling you frankly, we will continue taking whatever  
94 measures are necessary, we are taking them. Because nobody can attempt to break our  
95 peace. Nobody can stir up this country of peace, Turkey. We will continue struggling for  
96 this, we will continue taking measures in every sphere. We won't be entrapped, we  
97 won't surrender to the language of violence, we won't surrender to the language of  
98 anger, of hatred, like them. Until now, we talked through our work, our service, and  
99 henceforth we will also talk through our work, our service. But the one who does not  
100 come to heel with words should be warned, the one who does not come to heel with a  
101 warning deserves a beating.<sup>56</sup> This is the situation.

102 Now look dear people of Samsun, we have started on this journey with you, we have  
103 started on this journey with our nation. We always walked this way with our nation, we  
104 didn't take our power from gangs. We didn't take our power from elites. We took our  
105 power from our nation, we walked straight in the direction that our nation drew. I

---

<sup>53</sup> A word which is used in Alawite culture. It metaphorically refers to people who share the same heart. Here it is used to refer to media which support the CHP and its leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who is also an Alawite.

<sup>54</sup> In the original text, Erdoğan forms the whole sentence without a verb and then he wants audience to complete the sentence with the appropriate verb by asking them what to do. The structure of Turkish language makes it possible to employ such a kind of rhetorical figure and this rhetorical strategy is frequently used by him.

<sup>55</sup> In the Turkish version, he repeats the phrase 'life safety' twice, with two synonymous words for safety which are 'emniyet' and 'güvenlik'.

<sup>56</sup> Idiom.

106 especially state this: We didn't come to power with headlines, we didn't come to power  
107 with media. We came to power despite the headlines, despite the media. What were they  
108 telling on behalf of your brother? When I was going to Pınarhisar, this was the headline  
109 newspapers were writing: 'He cannot be even a village headman.' What happened? It is  
110 God who has the power and authority, it is the nation who makes the decision. What  
111 happened? Those who said this became shamefaced, the nation won. Because the  
112 decision was of the nation, the word was of the nation, the authority was of the nation.  
113 What the nation said has happened.

114 Nowadays, some media institutions, some writers, as if they are in cahoots, are  
115 criticizing us, for our style, they are criticizing our attitude towards the opposition,  
116 especially towards the BDP. I went and hugged thousands of my Kurdish brothers in  
117 Diyarbakır. Of course, at that point, I wanted to unmask the BDP, I wanted to share the  
118 violent policies of the BDP with my nation. I didn't backbite, I talked to their faces, I  
119 talked next to them. I explained how the BDP and its proponents, in collaboration with  
120 the MHP and the CHP use violence against us, use violence against my Kurdish  
121 brothers, what kind of fascism they perpetrate. Some writers were annoyed by this, quite  
122 so. But they weren't annoyed about the imam<sup>57</sup> who was killed after morning prayers in  
123 Hakkari. They weren't annoyed about the BDP's silence about that imam. They weren't  
124 annoyed about our martyrs in Kastamonu, in Silopi. They weren't annoyed about the  
125 silence of the BDP. They aren't getting annoyed about the Molotov attacks on the AKP.  
126 Without any shame, do you know what Kılıçdaroğlu said after the Hopa event? He said,  
127 'Who plants wind, harvests a storm.' I would wait for him to call and say 'Mr President,  
128 get well soon, your convoy was stoned and your security guard is badly injured, he is  
129 unconscious, he was taken to hospital,' if he would have the slightest degree of kindness,  
130 if he would know what kindness is. Honestly, I was waiting for this from the party  
131 leaders. Did any of them ring up, any of them? But we have always shown our kindness  
132 until today. We called them when something happened to them, when they had an  
133 accident. We called them when a relative of theirs died, but they don't do this. Because  
134 they have never entered the garden of kindness until today. They do not see, hear the  
135 provocative, stimulating, violently intensifying attitude of the BDP. They are not  
136 annoyed by this. What kind of love this is, they merely enjoy patting the BDP,<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> A religious officer who is responsible for leading the prayers in a mosque.

<sup>58</sup> In the Turkish version, the verb 'pıpışlamak' was used. As a trope, it is an *onomatopoeia* which means that the sound of the verb is like its meaning.

137 encouraging the BDP to violence, slapping the back of the BDP. They are also ignoring,  
138 turning a deaf ear to the interventions oriented towards politics. They are ignoring,  
139 turning a deaf ear to the ones who do social engineering under the name of businessman.  
140 They close their eyes to the conspiracies established abroad, to the intervention of  
141 international networks in politics. I repeat, we didn't come here with headlines, we came  
142 here with the admiration of our nation. I explain this attitude of encouraging, provoking  
143 violence to my nation which sent us here. My brothers, I only complain to you about the  
144 collaboration in violence between the CHP, MHP and BDP and the contribution of some  
145 media institutions.<sup>59</sup>

146 Dear people of Samsun, my dear brothers; Samsun is a city of peace, Samsun is a city of  
147 brotherhood, Samsun is a city of salvation, a city of 19 May,<sup>60</sup> Samsun is the city of  
148 Yaşar Doğu<sup>61</sup> who gave the expression 'as strong as a Turk' to the world, the city of  
149 Tevfik İleri who played a part in the opening of Imam Hatip schools, at the same time  
150 my fellow townsman. Samsun is a centre of trade, a centre of industry, a centre of  
151 logistics. It is our duty to enlarge Samsun. Being a servant of Samsun is an honour, pride  
152 for us. My farmer brother of Samsun, it is our duty to support the hard-working farmer  
153 of the Bafra Plain, Terme Plain, Çarşamba Plain. It is our responsibility to support and  
154 give rights to our retired citizen in Samsun.

155 I especially want to remind my retired brothers of some points here. My dear retired  
156 brother, as Turkey grows, as Turkey's opportunities increase, it was us who made the  
157 utmost effort to reflect this to you. We ended the ordeal of the queue for the retired,  
158 didn't we?<sup>62</sup> If they ask, we pay their pension at home, right? By having a revolution in  
159 health for 74 million, we mostly made the life of our retired citizens easier. By giving  
160 some examples of minimum wages, I want to remind you of the improvement that we  
161 made to the retired's income.

162 Do you know how much a retired worker from the SSK<sup>63</sup> was getting in 2002, in the  
163 period of MHP rule? 275 liras, during MHP rule. How much does he/she get now? 782  
164 liras. Do you know the increase rate over 8 years? 204%. Look, we didn't let that get

---

<sup>59</sup> In the Turkish version, the idiom 'değirmene su taşımak' is used. Its literal meaning is to carry water to the mill and its real meaning is to contribute to an interest willingly or unwillingly.

<sup>60</sup> 19 May 1919 was the arrival date of Atatürk to Samsun which it is agreed was the beginning of the War of Independence.

<sup>61</sup> The former title-winning Turkish wrestler who is the symbol of wrestling in Turkey.

<sup>62</sup> He refers to retired people who wait in ATM queues to get their pension.

<sup>63</sup> Abbreviation for Social Security Administration.

165 crushed, neither by inflation, nor by the interest rates. We also didn't let that get crushed  
166 by 6 zeros.<sup>64</sup> We also increased it. Do you know how much a retired artisan from BAĞ-  
167 KUR <sup>65</sup>was getting in the course of Bahçeli's<sup>66</sup> time, in the course of the MHP's time?  
168 149 liras. Do you know what he/she gets now? 634 liras. Do you know the increase in  
169 rate brother? 226%. My brothers, do you know how much a retired farmer from BAĞ-  
170 KUR was getting? Look, very, very funny. 66 liras. What are we giving now? 473 liras.  
171 Do you know the increase in rate? 617%. Ah<sup>67</sup> my retired brother ah, do you know how  
172 much a retiree from the Retirement Fund was getting in the course of Bahçeli's time?  
173 373 liras. How much does he/she get now? 936 liras. Do you know the increase in rate?  
174 148%. Inshallah,<sup>68</sup> the more Turkey grows, develops, the more these opportunities will  
175 increase further. We will also make other adjustments. As you know, with our 26 points  
176 of change in the constitution, what will our retired citizen do immediately when there is  
177 a collective agreement? He/she will benefit from it.

178 My brothers, we gave an instruction about our brothers who work under a covenant. Of  
179 course we don't rant like Mr Kılıçdaroğlu, like Bahçeli. We always talk as a result of a  
180 study. And now this study, inshallah, will be published in the Official Journal on  
181 Monday, latest Tuesday. And thus we will make sure our covenanted personnel meet  
182 their aspirations. We are, inshallah, transferring the ones who are in the 4A cadre to the  
183 4B cadre.<sup>69</sup>

184 Dear brothers, we are dedicated to making Samsun the most important centre of the  
185 middle Black Sea [region]. Because of this, from transportation to health, from education  
186 to industry, we realize very important projects in every sphere. We transform Samsun  
187 into a very important land and sea transportation centre. We completed the Black Sea  
188 coastal motorway between Samsun and Hopa. We also finished the Samsun-Ankara dual  
189 carriageway. I also have a piece of good news for Ankara. I want to repeat it now in  
190 Samsun. We start the construction of a high quality motorway between Ankara and  
191 Samsun as soon as possible. An alternative motorway, how is that? It is like this. If we  
192 make a promise, we keep it. We also completed the dual carriageway to Alaçam. Until  
193 the end of this year, we will be putting into service the dual carriageway between

---

<sup>64</sup> In 2004, the last 6 digits on the banknotes of Turkish lira were omitted.

<sup>65</sup> Turkish abbreviation for the Pension Fund for the Self-Employed.

<sup>66</sup> Devlet Bahçeli is the current leader of the nationalist party, the MHP (National Action Party).

<sup>67</sup> It is an emotional effect used before a complaint.

<sup>68</sup> If God allows.

<sup>69</sup> These numbers and letters symbolize the legal status of civil servants.

194 Samsun and Sinop . Do you know what our aim is? To connect Samsun to Istanbul via a  
195 continuous dual carriageway. Where will all the roads lead to irrespective of where you  
196 come from? Where? They will lead to Samsun, to Samsun. You know, we put a new 16  
197 km long railway line into service last year. Thus, I thank our municipality. We also  
198 solved the problem of inner-city traffic jams to a great extent.

199 We are building a health campus in Samsun. This, inshallah, will be in the form of a city  
200 hospital. As the first part of this campus, we put a training and research hospital with a  
201 capacity of 570 people into service. The construction of a psychiatric hospital with 200  
202 beds continues. Likewise, the construction of AMATEM<sup>70</sup> with 600 beds also continues.  
203 We will add a chest and cardiovascular diseases centre, a physical medicine and  
204 rehabilitation hospital, a maternity and children's research hospital, a criminal psychiatry  
205 hospital. Thus, we are making Samsun the most important health centre of the region.  
206 With hotel and shopping investment, with fair and congress centres, we are bringing  
207 Samsun a new vision. We are transforming Samsun into a centre of international  
208 organizations. Samsun had one of the most prominent universities in our country, now  
209 another new university is rising in Samsun. Thus, we are transforming Samsun, the city  
210 of decadent Ali Fuat Başgil,<sup>71</sup> into a centre of science. We are trying to make Samsun –  
211 city of the sea – benefit from this to the utmost.

212 My brothers, in 2002, there was one harbour in Samsun. Today, loading and discharging  
213 are done in three harbours. Likewise, in 2002, there was one organized industrial site in  
214 Samsun. Today there is a Samsun which produces from five organized industrial sites.  
215 Shortly before, I stated, I said, we want to transform Samsun into a centre of sport. I  
216 said, with a stadium with a capacity of 30,000 people. Inshallah, there was not a proper  
217 sports hall in the city of Yaşar Doğu, we are also building a sports hall with a capacity of  
218 7,500 people. Don't forget, my precious brothers, every service provided, every building  
219 that has started to be constructed, every facility that is launched, means work, means  
220 employment.

221 You have a nice expression. What is that? Children, people of Samsun, you have a nice  
222 expression, do you know it? I will tell you. The one who does not have a trace on the

---

<sup>70</sup> Turkish abbreviation for an alcohol and substance addiction treatment centre.

<sup>71</sup> A former right-wing conservative politician.

223 farm, does not have a cheek at the time of blending.<sup>72</sup> Thank God, we have a trace in  
224 every span of the country. On the one hand, we are telling what we did, on the other  
225 hand, we are rolling up our sleeves for projects which will carry Samsun, Turkey, to  
226 2023.<sup>73</sup> Well, what did we do for Samsun up until now? Do you want me to tell you  
227 briefly? I will tell.

228 Look, in education, we made 163,000 classrooms in Turkey. In Samsun, we completed  
229 all 2,781 classrooms. We sent one million computers. We sent 9,797 computers to  
230 Samsun. My precious brothers, 8 years ago, why weren't there informatics classes in  
231 Turkey? Tell this to my brothers who support the MHP. Tell this to the supporters of the  
232 CHP. They are not interested in science. Believe me, they are reactionary,<sup>74</sup> they are  
233 completely reactionary. Did we put books on the tables? Did we put them in the  
234 elementary schools, in the secondary schools? Did we take one kuruş<sup>75</sup> in return? We  
235 didn't distinguish between rich and poor. In the elementary schools, we gave 30 liras to  
236 the boys, 35 liras to the girls who do not have social security. In the secondary schools,  
237 we gave 45 liras to the boys, 55 liras to the girls. We also gave 150 liras to the mothers.  
238 We did this. We paid a minimum wage if the disabled were taken care of at home, did  
239 we pay? This is us.

240 But now we will give you further good news. Look, what were they giving to students as  
241 a bursary in the period of the MHP? 45 lira-cık.<sup>76</sup> To my surprise, Mr Bahçeli had that  
242 much power. Now, he says, I will give that much minimum wage. Ahh, ahh.<sup>77</sup> My nation  
243 told you to govern for 5 years, you stayed in power 3.5 years, you escaped. Why  
244 couldn't you stay 5 years? This job needs wisdom, wisdom.<sup>78</sup> He is talking about  
245 government. What government? There is nothing like your government. Skip that job,  
246 skip it. I don't understand where they have been until now. We are proud of you. My  
247 brothers, what are we giving? 240 liras. Look, Mr Bahçeli was giving 45 liras. We are  
248 giving 240 liras. If one lives in a Credit and Dormitories Institution, we are also giving  
249 nutrition aid of 150 liras. Moreover, our dormitories are not bunkhouse-style. They are

---

<sup>72</sup> A byword, it means that people who are not part of the working process cannot demand anything from the outcomes.

<sup>73</sup> 2023 will be the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

<sup>74</sup> The Arabic word 'mürteci' is used in the original version.

<sup>75</sup> The smallest unit of Turkish money, 100 kuruş = 1 Turkish lira.

<sup>76</sup> Diminutive peculiar to the Turkish language. He tries to emphasize the insufficiency of the amount.

<sup>77</sup> Exclamation. he shows an emotional reaction to strengthen his point. Here it is used before a complaint.

<sup>78</sup> The Arabic word 'dirayet' is used in the original version.

250 single-bed or three-bed rooms. In every room there is a toilet and a shower. Why? First  
251 humans, first humans we said. What will the state of humans be? We will be their  
252 servant. We didn't come to be master of this nation, we came to be its servant. This is  
253 our situation. My brothers, look, we are giving 480 liras to master students. We are  
254 giving 720 liras to doctoral students. This is us.

255 But I am coming to good news now, good news. Look, we are removing blackboards  
256 from schools. Did we tell you about that kind of project? What we are we doing? Now,  
257 we will mount smart boards in our classrooms that are computerized and connected to  
258 the world via the Internet, we are shifting to this. And we will give electronic books to  
259 all our children. Electronic books, how? We will give these to you free. We won't  
260 distinguish between poor and rich, we will give them to all our students. All courses are  
261 on these. We will mount smart boards within four years, we will also distribute  
262 electronic books within four years. My brothers, everything is ready, just after the  
263 election, we are doing the bidding and production is starting. Do you know what I say,  
264 what do I say my townsmen? I say, in America, George, Edward, Mary, when you come  
265 to Europe, Hans, Helga, if they are benefiting from these opportunities, why wouldn't  
266 my Ahmet, my Mehmet, my Akif, my Ömer, my Ayşe, my Fatma, my Hatice, my Betül  
267 from Samsun benefit from this, I say. This is my concern. These are not impossible  
268 things, here we did things, we are doing and we will do. This is our difference.

269 But look, how many days are left? 9 days left. 9 days. Are we to go from door to door?  
270 Are we to call all friends, acquaintances? Who is in first place on the ballot paper? There  
271 is the AKP. Are we going, inshallah, to explode the ballot boxes with the AKP?

272 Let's come to health. In health, my brother from Samsun, can you go to any hospital you  
273 want? Can you get your medicine from any pharmacy you want? Ah<sup>79</sup> my brothers, do  
274 you know how much we invested in Samsun for health? 331 million. Ah my brothers, as  
275 you know, Mr Kemal<sup>80</sup> was the general director of the Social Insurance Institution in the  
276 90s. He made our mother cry, our mother.<sup>81</sup> As is known, Mr Bahçeli also served as the  
277 deputy prime minister for 3.5 years. In that period, weren't our deaths taken hostage?<sup>82</sup>  
278 Weren't our patients taken hostage? My precious brothers, we merged the hospitals. The

---

<sup>79</sup> Emotional expression to start a complaint.

<sup>80</sup> Referring to the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu

<sup>81</sup> Idiom. To make somebody's mother cry means to harm somebody at the utmost level.

<sup>82</sup> He refers to the practice of not letting corpses or patients out of the hospital until their treatment costs are paid.

279 CHP was uncomfortable with that. Kılıçdaroğlu opposed that, he opposed the merging of  
280 hospitals. Look what he says now, without any shame, it was that, it was this, he is  
281 manoeuvring. Because some said U<sup>83</sup> to him, but I said this is not U, this is S. Because it  
282 is impossible to catch his lies. My brothers who didn't live in these periods don't know.  
283 Young people may not know it. Those who lived in the 90s know. What was the doctor  
284 saying to us when we went to the hospital at the Social Security Institution? Come to the  
285 private clinic, right? What was he/she doing at the private clinic? He/she was getting  
286 money. He/she gives a prescription. Half of the medicine is there, the other half is  
287 absent. What will I do? Go and buy from the pharmacy. Did they rip us off like that?  
288 Well, is there a problem like that now? Well, how can Kılıçdaroğlu come before my  
289 nation without any shame, I don't understand. How come my brothers who gave their  
290 hearts to the CHP believe his lies? My brothers, there are things that were done,  
291 obviously. This man bankrupted the Social Security Institution. In 8 years, not easy, you  
292 are the general director for 8 years and you bankrupt that institution. Unfortunately,  
293 every kind of mistake was made in this period that was not seen before. His relatives,  
294 accumulating people from terrorism, from here and there.<sup>84</sup> This was all told in  
295 parliament. This was flung in his face, flung in his face. But one should have a face. He  
296 is very brazen-faced.

297 My brothers, look, the hospitals whose construction was started before us, are done now.  
298 My brothers, inshallah I attach great importance to this campus. Do you know what was  
299 the number of tomographs, MRIs,<sup>85</sup> in this enormous Samsun? Do you know how many  
300 tomographs the state hospital had in Samsun when we came to power? One. Only one in  
301 this enormous Samsun. Now it is 7. MRIs, one. Now it is 4. There were only 35  
302 dialyzers in this enormous Samsun. Now there are 277. Do you know how many 112  
303 stations were there? 6. Now there are 27. In this enormous Samsun, how many  
304 ambulances were there? When we came to power, ey<sup>86</sup> Bahçeli, there were 8. Now there  
305 are 38.

---

<sup>83</sup> Referring to a U-turn.

<sup>84</sup> I have kept the original version of the sentence which is grammatically wrong.

<sup>85</sup> Magnetic resonance imagers.

<sup>86</sup> It is a speech act for addressing someone.

306 We put Çarşamba<sup>87</sup> Courthouse into service. We completed the construction of the  
307 Samsun Havza Courthouse. We continue with the construction of the Samsun  
308 Courthouse.

309 As for housing estates, we started the practice with 5,546 houses. We have completed  
310 4,158 of them, we delivered them to their owners. Mr Bahçeli says, I will send the  
311 director of TOKI,<sup>88</sup> the prime minister, to the Supreme Court. Dear Bahçeli, TOKI was  
312 under you, for 3.5 years, how many estates did you build, tell this, how many houses did  
313 you build? The tree which gives fruit is stoned.<sup>89</sup> We started to construct 500,000  
314 houses, We delivered 360,000 of them to their owners, is it this which disturbs you? Ah  
315 my brothers ah, and we are distributing estates with 10, 15, 20 years of delay. Is it this  
316 which disturbs you? When the fox cannot reach the grape, it calls the grape unripe.  
317 When the cat cannot reach the liver, it calls the liver filthy.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, this is the  
318 situation of comparison.

319 As part of KÖYDES,<sup>91</sup> we sent 191 million to Samsun. Because we won't leave any  
320 village without a road, without water, inshallah.

321 Dear brothers, when did we send natural gas to Istanbul? In 2005, right? You suffered a  
322 lot. My mother also suffered a lot. Go down to the cellar. Rats run wild there, right? Lift  
323 the coal from there. Dust, smells, they are all there? They are. You heat a room, others  
324 remain cold. You heat water on the stove, right? Now, press the button of the combi-  
325 boiler and the whole flat gets warm. Press the button of the combi-boiler, whenever you  
326 want, there is hot water everywhere in the house, right? I ask, why would women in the  
327 west (of Turkey) benefit from this and why would not my Ayşe sister, Fatma sister,  
328 Hatice sister benefit from all these? Why? Now, with natural gas in our homes, we also  
329 understood that we are human, right? It will be better, inshallah, it will be more  
330 beautiful, inshallah, don't worry. In the period of Bahçeli, there was natural gas in 9  
331 cities. But now there is natural gas in 69 cities. We will deliver it to 81, 81 out of 81.

---

<sup>87</sup> It is the county of Samsun.

<sup>88</sup> Turkish abbreviation for the Housing Development Administration of Turkey.

<sup>89</sup> Byword, it means that people who are productive are always subject to criticism or are hindered by others.

<sup>90</sup> People tend to downgrade the value of the things they cannot have.

<sup>91</sup> KÖYDES is a project which aims to construct infrastructure in the villages.

332 My brothers, look, now, there is a university in every city in Turkey. When we came,  
333 there were 76 universities. In our period we added 89 to that and now there is a  
334 university in every city.

335 Do you know the amount of support given to Samsun in agriculture in the period of  
336 Bahçeli? 24 million. Do you know what we gave in 2012? 105 million. Bahçeli gave 24,  
337 we gave 105. Do you know how much we gave between 2003 and 2010? We gave 550  
338 million support to Samsun. Do you know how much we gave to stockbreeding support?  
339 129 million. That is to say, 129 trillion in old numbers.

340 Ah my brothers, did banks go bankrupt in Bahçeli's period? Yes, bankrupt. They paid  
341 costs to Ziraat Bank, they paid costs to Halkbank. They ripped our nation off. What was  
342 the interest rate of the credit that Ziraat bank gave to farmers? 59%. They gave a credit  
343 with an interest rate of 59%. We are giving it at 5%. 5%. Who saves the difference  
344 between the interest rates? My farmer brother saves it. Artisans, craftsmen were getting  
345 credit from Halkbank with an interest rate of 47% in the period of Bahçeli. Now it is 5%.  
346 Ah, my craftsman brother, ah my artisan brother, is your prime minister lying to you? I  
347 ask, how you will go and vote. For Bahçeli, for the CHP? We took office. Do you know  
348 what the national income of Turkey was? 230 billion dollars. Do you know what our  
349 national income is now? 740 billion dollars. Ahh Bahçeli ahh. Ahh MHP, ahh CHP.

350 Not finished. Do you know the interest rate of state loans? 63%. 9 months delay, they  
351 could not do more. Because there was no confidence in government. But now we can get  
352 loans at 7%, 8% interest rates; and in terms of duration, it is 9, 10 years. Go as far as you  
353 can go. We are here. Why? Because there is confidence in the government. Now, there is  
354 a Turkey with high credibility. What was inflation? 30%. I am telling you, currently it  
355 has reached 7%. Look, from where to where it has fallen. From whose pocket was it  
356 paid? It was paid from my citizen's pocket. But it remains in their pocket.

357 Precious brothers, like the State Hydraulic Works, before coming that, let me tell you  
358 something.<sup>92</sup> Do you know how much the amount of debt to the IMF was? The MHP  
359 was indebted. Do you know what they handed to us? They handed us 23.5 billion dollars  
360 of debt. We paid, we paid, we paid, now there is 5 billion dollars of debt remaining, 5  
361 billion dollars. We pay this no problem, we pay. But there is still time until 2013. This  
362 will finish very easily with a very low interest rate.

---

<sup>92</sup> He continues this topic later on.

363 Isn't the central bank our national bank? Do you know how much there was in cash?  
364 27.5 billion dollars. More than the half of that belonged to our workers abroad. Do you  
365 know how much there is now in cash? 95 billion dollars. Ah Bahçeli, ah Kılıçdaroğlu.  
366 Now he<sup>93</sup> slavers to the money there. He says there is money there, I distribute from  
367 there, he says. My nation does not give that opportunity to you.

368 At the State Hydraulic Works, we invested 579 million in Samsun. We solved the  
369 problem of drinking water in Samsun, thank God. And we completed at long last the  
370 construction of Derinöz Dam and Vezirköprü Dam. And now, we continue with  
371 irrigation construction. Up to now, we have opened up 70 thousand decares of farmland  
372 to irrigation in these two projects.

373 My brothers, there is much more work we will do, it will be better, it will be more  
374 beautiful, but we are together with the rain. You were very patient, I was delayed, I  
375 brought greetings from Konya, I brought greetings from the land of Mevlana.<sup>94</sup> But let's  
376 work hard for 9 days, give your blessing to your brother. Let's take the AKP out of the  
377 ballot boxes with a loud noise, let's explode the ballot boxes. Go and tell your neighbour  
378 who is a supporter of the CHP, go and tell our neighbour who is a supporter of the MHP,  
379 let's tell all of them. Inshallah, let's win their hearts.

380 Are we ready? Let me see the flags once. Now we came to the final part. We are ready,  
381 aren't we? Is there no flag here, flag? You know our song, you know our oath. But we  
382 will not be off form. Tomorrow, there is Adana, There is Izmir.<sup>95</sup> I will take greetings  
383 from you.

384 We walked together on these roads. We got wet together in this rain. Now, in all the  
385 songs I listen to, everything reminds us of you. Everything reminds us of you.  
386 Everything reminds us of you.

387 Let our day be happy. I hope 12 June will be a means for our Turkey, our Samsun, our  
388 nation, my brothers from Samsun to achieve a bright future. I say, inshallah, the new

---

<sup>93</sup> Although it is unclear, it is possible that he refers to Kılıçdaroğlu as the closest opponent. However, Kılıçdaroğlu did not utter the statement that Erdoğan ascribes to him. This is what Erdoğan infers from Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign pledges.

<sup>94</sup> Widely known as Rumi, a 13th-century Persian poet, jurist, theologian and Sufi mystic.

<sup>95</sup> The cities of Turkey.

389 constitution becomes a milestone for fundamental rights and freedoms. I greet you with  
390 love and respect. I say, take care of yourselves.

## 6.2. Analysis

This speech was delivered by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 3 June 2011, eight days before the general election. The speech mostly concentrates on the city of Samsun where it was delivered, i.e. it is context-dependent. Here, one can observe the effort to depict local improvements as proof of successful general policymaking preferences: Local transformations in the city become the locus of the speech, although it is a general election rally. This means, instead of talking about general policymaking preferences and how the country will benefit from them, the improvements in the city are emphasized in order to convince the audience that the AKP will also be a competent actor for the next term. The speech mostly focuses on services provided in the past, not on making promises for the future. By doing that, the AKP a) benefits from statistics to show the positive change in ten years and b) easily creates ‘the other’ which tries to hinder this positive change. As a matter of fact, the overall architecture of the speech is constructed to depict the AKP as a victim which faces mistreatment, violence and conspiracy because of its successful policies.

The main discourse topics<sup>96</sup> in the text are listed below:

1. Needs of Samsun
2. Criticism and violence directed at the AKP and the party’s attitude towards them
3. Summary of the developments in Samsun
4. Source and content of violence and the AKP’s determination to counter it
5. Source of legitimacy of the party
6. ‘Coalition’ of the CHP-MHP-BDP against the AKP and the media support for it
7. Policies of the AKP and how Samsun/Turkey benefit from them
  - a) Retired
  - b) Covenanted workers
  - c) Development of Samsun in terms of transportation
  - d) Development of Samsun in terms of health
  - e) Development of Samsun in terms of the hospital sector
  - f) Development of Samsun in terms of education
  - g) Development of Samsun in terms of industry and trade
  - h) General education policies
  - i) General health policies
  - j) Development of Samsun in terms of courthouses
  - k) General housing policy
  - l) Development of Samsun in terms of village development projects
  - m) Natural gas delivery

---

<sup>96</sup> See the introduction chapter for the definition.

- n) Development of Samsun in terms of agricultural help
- o) General developments in the banking sector and finance
- p) Development of Samsun related to a solution to the drinking water problem

It is possible to cluster these discourse topics into two macro-discourses.<sup>97</sup> One of them is the *discourse of successful policy preferences of the party* and how they impact on Turkey, and Samsun in particular. Most of the topics are linked to policies the AKP implemented over ten years. Their positive outcomes are compared to the past practices of political opponents. The second one is the *discourse of unjust criticism and attacks on the AKP*. This discourse generally aims to victimize the AKP by forming an out-group mainly composed of opposition parties and the media which try to overwhelm the party by means of violence and negative propaganda. This victimization discourse of the party is linked to a *discourse about the determination to struggle against violence* which tries to delegitimize oppositional forces and legitimize all possible means to suppress any unwanted opposition by considering any attack on or criticism of the party as a violation of the people's will. These clusters are arranged according to the conceptual category of topicality.<sup>98</sup> I will start the analysis with a macro-discourse of successful policy preferences, whereby the party leader Erdoğan tries to prove that they had a successful period in power by comparing their period with that of past governments. In this part, my aim is to understand the determinants of successful policymaking, by which means it is presented as a success and how the opposing actors/ criticism are approached.

*The discourse of successful policy preferences of the party* understands political success as increasing numbers/rates in every aspect of services so that the city/country's market value grows. In order to understand this discourse, one should look at the discursive construction of the city. Samsunspor's successful promotion to the Super League is chosen as the starting point to determine an aim for the city. This aim is to become a city of sport (14, 17) in both Turkey and the world. Constructing a stadium and a sports hall with high capacity (9,15) is depicted as successful policy. From transportation to health, the ultimate aim is to make Samsun the biggest centre in the Black Sea region. (171), to transform it into a very important land and sea transportation centre (173-174). An increasing number of dual carriageways and motorways are also promoted as prior aims

---

<sup>97</sup> I define a macro-discourse as the main discourse in a text which determines the content and limits of other discourses and discourse topics.

<sup>98</sup> The dynamic pragmatic relationship between the theme (topic) and rheme (topic-comment), expressing not only with what the clause or sentence is concerned, but equally what happens to the object of this concern in terms of actions undertaken and states assumed (Cap, 2002).

of the government (177-179). In health services, the term health campus (185) shows signs of their marketization. Increasing bed capacity or centres is not the only problem in curing the patients of Samsun, the aim is also to transform Samsun into the biggest health centre in the region. It is not a coincidence that investment in hotels, shopping centres, fair and congress centres follows the issue of health, as the government brings a new vision to the city by realizing all these projects. Before speaking about a project, the prime minister refers to a prominent name in the field, like Fuat Başgil in education (195) or Yaşar Doğu in sport (137), who were born in Samsun. These are typical examples of using role-model authorization to show the legitimacy of a policy in a related field (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).

The general discursive strategy in this macro-topic of successful policies is to show the increases in numbers and blame the oppositional actors (particularly with the help of predicational strategies) who are against these policies. The two main actors targeted are the leaders of the MHP and the CHP, namely Devlet Bahçeli and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. They are mostly referred to by their surnames. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is also named as ‘this man’ (270), ‘Mr Kemal’ (256) and ‘brazen-faced’ (275). Where there is a negative comment on past governments, Erdoğan uses the phrase ‘the period of Bahçeli’ in order to direct all criticism to a particular political actor and the party, although the MHP, and its leader Bahçeli, was one of the coalition partners in the period mentioned. In these parts, Erdoğan comments on the undesired outcomes of policy preferences of the coalition government and links them to Bahçeli. By doing that, Bahçeli becomes the omnipotent actor of this period (1999-2002) and failure is depicted as a personal one resulting from not having wisdom (226). Because Kılıçdaroğlu has never been in power, Erdoğan uses another strategy to prove his incompetence. He refers to the period of Kılıçdaroğlu’s general management of the Social Security Institution and accuses him of bankrupting the institution. Overall, political opponents who criticize government policies are labelled as ‘ranter’ (51), ‘uninterested in science’ (215), ‘reactionary’ (215) and ‘liar’ (262). whereas the government is depicted as ‘servant’ (141), ‘realistic’ (167) and ‘dedicated’ (171). On the one side, there is the AKP government which works for the interests of the people, on the other there are the MHP and CHP leaders (voters who voted for these parties are never considered part of the out-group) who are uncomfortable with this success and try to hinder the process. In that sense, the audience becomes informed voters for the two parties so that they can change their minds. This

process of convincing non-voters is called ‘winning the hearts’ (354). By doing that, Erdoğan not only talks to people to convince them, but tries to make them become actively involved in the election process. The main argumentative strategy to prove the success of policies is a *topos of numbers*. Economic prosperity is directly linked to increasing numbers of assets and this increase in rates and numbers is used as proof of political success. Some examples are seen in construction of hospitals, harbours and industrial sites, sport centres, housing, classroom construction, bursaries, hospital equipment, natural gas delivery, universities, agricultural subsidies and financial records in general. The general structure of the *topos of numbers* is shown below:




Diagram 2. Operationalization of *topos of numbers* in the discourse of political and economic success.

The logic of the argumentation takes quantitative developments as defining well-being and thus political success. But there are some other aspects which are not taken into account in this argumentation. For example, the number of universities may have increased but this does not necessarily mean that the quality of the education has increased as well. Increasing the number of universities makes sense only if there are/will be enough academics, infrastructure and resources for the new ones (as well as the old ones). Thus, the question here is whether increasing the number of universities or increasing the quality of existing universities should be a prior policy preference. However, this aspect is not discussed.




Diagram 3. *Topos of numbers* in the field of university education discourse.

Another example is related to the merging of hospitals. Merging hospitals is presented as a policy success in the speech because the capacity of hospitals increases. However, the

increasing capacity of hospitals can lead to a decrease in the quality of treatment or mergers can lead to unemployment and adaptation problems as well.

**Premise:** The merging of hospitals is a policy success

**Warrant:** The merging of hospitals leads to an increase in capacity so that more patients can be treated

**Conclusion:** Merging hospitals is the result of successful policymaking by the AKP.

Diagram 4. Topos of numbers in the merging of hospitals discourse

Another argumentative strategy is the fallacy of *argumentum ad hominem* whereby Erdoğan labels his opponents as being against science and reactionary because they oppose education policies. By doing that, possible questioning of the policy, like the bidding process or bidding firms, is masked and all actors who might try to slow down the policymaking process are depicted as a burden on progress (*topos of burden*).

It is also possible to see another *ad hominem* argument where Kılıçdaroğlu is accused of being a liar, although the lie or content of his speech is not mentioned at all. Instead, *ambiguity* in the argument is observed (261). So it is possible to see the cluster of multiple argumentative strategies at once. Also, idioms are instrumentalized (292-294) in order to complement the *argumentum ad hominem*. Both idioms give the message that failure leads to jealousy. The failed actors are the opposition leaders and therefore they are jealous of the AKP.

*Topos of history* is also used in the text in the form of analogy to 1) prove that the MHP and the CHP are responsible for the implementation of past policies and 2) therefore claim that they have no right to criticize the government or be in power. After linking the managerial position of Kılıçdaroğlu at the Social Insurance Institution with problems in the healthcare system in the 1990s, he concludes that the CHP and/or Kılıçdaroğlu are shameless liars because they still talk to the nation. Rhetorical questions, especially in the form of *anacoenosis*<sup>99</sup>, *apostrophe*<sup>100</sup> and *hypophora*,<sup>101</sup> serve the aim of judging an opponent who is not present or not directly related to the issue<sup>102</sup> by creating common

---

<sup>99</sup> Posing a question to an audience, often with the implication that it shares a common interest with the speaker.

<sup>100</sup> Addressing a thing, an abstraction or a person not present.

<sup>101</sup> Answering one's own rhetorical question at length

<sup>102</sup> The CHP was not in power, Kılıçdaroğlu was not in a position of political decision-making as a bureaucrat and the MHP was a small partner in the coalition at that time.

ground with the audience on the basis of the fallacious *argumentum ad misericordiam* (appeal to emotions). This common ground comprises negative past experiences of the people with public services (258-259), national sensitivities (272-274) and low living standards (297-307). In these parts, the pronoun ‘we’ is operationalized in order to show that the AKP and the people have a shared background and that they were both victims of incompetent policymaking. Hyperbolic expressions like idioms, emotional expressions like ‘ey’<sup>103</sup> and ‘ah’<sup>104</sup>, use of the suffix ‘-cik’<sup>105</sup>, verbs like ‘explode’, ‘slaver’ and ‘rant’, repetitions and restatements of rates/numbers help to intensify or mitigate the meaning. When it comes to the policymaking of the AKP, intensifiers are used as opposed to mitigation devices which are used to downgrade the political opposition. The overall discourse in this part can be summarized as follows:




Diagram 5. Overall structure of successful policymaking discourse.

*The second macro-discourse of unjust criticism and attacks on the AKP* is intertwined with the first macro-discourse of successful policymaking and instrumentalized even before that. In the early parts of the speech, Erdoğan starts to mention that the party has been the subject of offensive criticism, although he uses the passive voice and does not mention any sources. The party struggles to serve the people (26) while dealing with harsh, destructive and devastating criticisms (26-27) and insults from the opposition (27). On every level, a stronger adjective is used to intensify the meaning, which is known as *tricolon crescens*.

Here, Erdoğan starts to take an offensive position. First, he explains the features of the party by saying that they are not afraid of these criticisms, they do not shrink from them, their minds and hearts are open and they welcome constructive criticism (27-29). The conjunction ‘but’ (30) changes the perspective of the speech and focuses on the other. The other is described as not having a project or suggestion. This labelling is backed up

<sup>103</sup> See above for the definition.

<sup>104</sup> Onomatopoeia: The use of words that attempt to emulate a sound. Here, it gives the feeling of complaint and tiredness

<sup>105</sup> See above for the definition.

with an idiom to intensify the meaning. The pronoun ‘they’ is used continuously at the beginning of every sentence as *anaphora*. The other is blamed for ranting, which is making empty promises (31). After that line, another conjunction is used (despite that) in order to continue a positive self-presentation of the actor. In these two lines, Erdoğan says that they have always improved themselves. In lines 32-35, the source of the AKP’s authority is determined as the nation. The metonymy ‘ballot box’ (35) is used to emphasize that the AKP’s authority is legitimized by the democratic system and depends on the people’s will. Another authority is divine authority, which is also used in the second part of the text. So, the people and God are the two sources of authority of the AKP. This religious preference in the discourse can also be seen as a message to conservative voters that the party respects religious values. Actually, the emphasis on elections is related to the criticism issue which was mentioned before this topic. By emphasizing elections and stating that the nation will make the last decision (34), Erdoğan in fact frames the limits of the criticism/opposition and makes the legitimacy of any kind of political opposition questionable, other than in parliamentary elections.

Emphasis on the ‘will of the people’ occurs in the next stage of the speech. The nation, freedom, the will of the nation, the rule of law and democracy are listed as principles of the government (37-38). Then, Erdoğan starts to distinguish the party from others by listing negative actions which are attached to the opposition. In this part, Erdoğan wants to underline what the opposition did to them. Using the language of violence, anger, hatred (40), destruction and ruining (41), having a bat in hand (42), carrying stones, rocks (43) and walking around with Molotov cocktails (44) are actually features of the opposition. Here, Erdoğan first defines the characteristics of a bandit and names the opposition as a bandit in the following line (44-45). Then, he says that their work speaks for itself (45-46). This is the first time Erdoğan names political opponents and starts asking rhetorical questions to the audience but answers them himself to create an in-group with the people against the opposition parties. Idioms are used to intensify the criticism (47-48). By interpreting an idiom and creating an analogy between people and donkeys, he devalues the opposition.

**Premise 1:** Living things should leave something behind them which signifies their value (a product)

**Premise 2:** Even when a donkey dies, its saddle remains (Inference = when people die, their work should remain)

**Premise 3:** The opposition has not done any work.

**Conclusion:** The opposition is even more worthless than a donkey.

Diagram 6. Syllogistic structure of the human-donkey analogy.

Here the crucial point is that Erdoğan accuses his opponents of not having worked. This implies that Erdoğan criticizes the opposition as if they were in power. Later, he refers to history fallaciously and gives an example to prove his statement, but the actors referred to and the actors who are in opposition today are not the same (52-53). After accusing political actors of being unsuccessful, Erdoğan returns to the party's success and summarises the work that they have done until now. This is later elaborated in detail, in the second part of the text that was analyzed in the domain of successful policy discourse in the first part of this analysis.

The discourse of criticism and the attacks on the AKP occur after the positive self-presentation and the negative other-presentation process is completed. Once the opposition's incompetence is proved, it becomes easier to instrumentalize the *discourse of violence against the AKP* which is seen in the next part of the speech. In lines 62-68, the examples provided to prove the violence can be categorized as an appeal to emotions. Although the subjects of the two attacks are not members of the AKP, Erdoğan creates an in-group and uses the possessive pronoun 'our' to embrace the victims. Erdoğan also gives the ages of children (although everybody knows the average age of children who go to high school) in order to create empathy among the audience. After clarifying the intention of these attacks as assimilating and scaring the party (68), Erdoğan links these attacks to the protests which took place in Hopa, Ankara, Istanbul and Kütahya, and the attackers are labelled as the CHP and its supporters (69-70). So, the discourse of attacks on the AKP depicts the protests as 1) violent acts against the government and 2) planned and synchronized by the CHP and its supporters. Once the features of the political protests are defined, Erdoğan appeals to fear and says that they will take all necessary measures against the protests if they continue.

Then, he uses the discourse marker ‘but be careful’ (73) before he gives an example to attract the attention of the audience. Here, he seems to have difficulty in defining a protestor. Erdoğan emphasizes the sexual identity of the protestor by noting the difference between a girl and a woman. Then he uses the word ‘enjoy’ to imply that the protestor makes the protest for joy (74). Erdoğan’s sensitivity about the police force is very salient in the general speech. In lines 65, 70 and 75, the police are presented as the victims of attacks and Erdoğan tries to legitimize police violence in lines 77-81 because of the attacks against the police. All the protestors are labelled as either terrorists or bandits (79) and the use of force against them is legitimized under the noble cause of ‘establishing order’. In these parts, *rigged questions* are used in sequence to manipulate the argument and, at the end, *parrhesia* (80) is used to emphasize the necessity and legitimacy of use of the police force against the protestors, along with a fake apology.

**Premise:** The duty of the police is to establish order and fight bandits and terrorists (*Topos of definition*)

**Premise 2:** Protestors are bandits and terrorists (*Argumentum ad exemplum & hasty generalization*)

**Warrant:** They use violence against the police (*Argumentum ad exemplum & hasty generalization & argumentum ad misericordiam*)

**Conclusion:** The force that the police use against terrorists and bandits is legitimate

Diagram 7. Legitimation of police violence in discourse.

The importance of this discourse is its function of changing the direction of criticism. Although the main argument in the opposing discourse is the excessive use of police force against protestors, the government victimizes the subject of criticism, creates an in-group with it (our police, our security forces, our policeman) and criticizes the victims of police violence. The political reaction which is directed at the police is seen symbolically as a threat to the ruling authority and the party discursively constructs this problem as a security and order issue so that a policy of further use of police force can be legitimized.

In lines 84-85, victimization shifts from the police to the party (as if they were the same) one more time. This is the point where Erdoğan’s *discourse of struggling violence* starts. ‘Taking measures, struggling, not surrendering, not being entrapped’ give the impression of a fight between the ones who ‘attempt to break our peace’ and the ‘government’. This part ends with an idiom, which directly threatens a vague opposition with the use of

violence if they continue with their activities (*argumentum ad baculum*). The general flow of the discourse aims at constructing a strong and vague/anonymous enemy so that it can be identified with anybody or any institution which oppose the policies of the government. Thus the discourse of violence towards the AKP legitimizes the policy of increasing the use of police force.

In lines 95-105, the source of authority is problematized. This is part and parcel of discursively marginalizing the opposition. Here, Erdoğan creates an in-group, framed by God and the nation. These two sources are the source of the party’s authority. The out-group is represented as gangs and elites (97), which are again used to classify and label the opposition and signal an extension of ‘the other’. The use of gangs and elites also connotes a more organized entity, unlike the earlier depiction of the opposition. The media are the second part of the out-group which is criticized for underestimating the capacity of the prime minister with the help of rhetorical questions (101-103). Erdoğan also implies that the power of the media is enough to control politicians by indirectly referring to the resignation of the former leader of the CHP as the result of a compromising video tape scandal. Thus, he also distinguishes himself from Kılıçdaroğlu by saying that Kılıçdaroğlu came to power as a result of a scandal which was publicized. The main argument here is that Kılıçdaroğlu does not represent the will of people who came to power as a result of a conspiracy in which the media played a major role. So, gangs, elites and the media try to work against the will of the people and against their representative, the AKP. This use of the fallacious *argumentum ad populum* has two functions: 1) to represent the party as the spokesperson of the nation; 2) to unify the party and the nation. Once these two functions are realized, the other segments of society which oppose the party can be demonized and dismissed because they are demonstrated as the ones that object to the will of people and try to disturb the unity of the nation.<sup>106</sup>

<b>In-group</b>	<b>Extended out-groups</b>
God	The opposition party leader
Nation	Gangs
AKP	Elites
	Media

<sup>106</sup> See the methodology chapter for the definitions of fallacious strategies.




Diagram 8. In- and extended out-groups in the speech of Erdoğan

In the last part of the first section of the speech, Erdoğan tries to show that the out-groups are not independent but part of a wider coalition to attack the AKP. Line 106 starts with the claim that criticisms of the AKP's attitude towards the opposition and especially of the BDP are unjust. In lines 111-112, Erdoğan justifies the AKP's attitude once again by indicating that three parties collaboratively attacked the AKP. The verbs in 'unmask, not to backbite, share, talk and explain' create the impression that Erdoğan exposes something secret to the public. The oppositional actors who were labelled as gangs, bandits or terrorists before are now depicted as part of a wider international conspiracy and linked to institutional entities (political opposition parties). In lines 112-117 Erdoğan criticizes writers for not being sensitive to the attacks on the AKP. However, the killing of an imam and a police officer, which are given as examples, are not directly related to the party (*argumentum ad exemplum*). Moreover, Erdoğan's effort to examine and invalidate writers' consistency is a typical fallacious *appeal to hypocrisy* or *tu quoquo*, where the speaker wants to discredit the criticisms against him/her by challenging the consistency of the source of criticism. By doing that, Erdoğan responds to the criticisms with a criticism, and therefore does not answer the criticism itself. Thus, by derailing the argument and depicting himself as a victim, he masks his/his party's political responsibility in the process of policymaking.




Diagram 9. The use of *tu quoquo* (*appeal to hypocrisy*) in Erdoğan's discourse.

After unifying and naming the political actors against the party, Erdoğan appeals to emotions. He talks to the audience via rhetorical questions (*hypophora*) and uses free indirect speech to quote the opposition leader (118). Then, he uses another quote to tell what he expected to hear from Kılıçdaroğlu. Kılıçdaroğlu's actual response to the prime minister is a political one (it is an idiom) which tries to emphasize that the government's undesired policies paved the way for these protests. However, Erdoğan reflects the criticism of Kılıçdaroğlu by trying to depoliticize the content of the protests. Despite of being a political event, he frames the event as a violent attack.

Because once the protests are labelled as violent attacks, the party and members of it obviously become victims of the incident. In lines 117-122, one can observe such an appeal. This appeal will be followed by a claim that the two parties are in coalition against the AKP, because the CHP does not see or hear the provocative, stimulating, violence-intensifying attitude of the BDP (125). The transitive verbs 'not to see, not to hear, to ignore or phrases like 'to turn a deaf ear' and 'to close the eyes' (122-125) are used to imply a wilful ignorance which is later used as a predicational strategy to claim that the CHP is patting, loving, encouraging, slapping the back of the BDP. (127-129). Later on, businessmen (129) and international networks (131) are also blamed for trying to weaken the party.

They all construct a *conspiracy against the AKP*, which victimizes the party and legitimizes any possible means to deal with that conspiracy. It is related to the second *macro-discourse of unjust criticism and attack on the AKP* in which the opposition parties are negatively presented and targeted, criticisms are invalidated and the 'real' reason for the attacks is exposed. This discourse is finalized with the labelling of the main opposition parties and the media as the source of violence against the AKP. Erdoğan complains about this coalition to the audience. In this last part, he victimizes the party, unlike in the earlier parts of the text, to get the support of the audience for a victim. It would not be wrong to say that the overall discourse shows both defensive and offensive traits and this not by coincidence. While the defensive parts victimize the party and therefore get votes from the audience, the aggressive parts shows that party policies will not be revised and will continue at whatever expense. These parts can be read as a message to the opposition.

### 6.3. Conclusion:

This election speech of Erdoğan has two macro-discourse topics: the successful policy preferences of the party and unjust criticism and attacks on the AKP. In the discourse about the successful policy preferences of the party, Erdoğan tries to prove that the implemented policies were/are successful and will continue. Economic prosperity is directly linked to the increasing numbers of assets and these increases in rates and numbers are used as evidence of political success. The overall aim is to increase the market value of the city/nation. In these parts, the *topos of numbers* is seen. However, different aspects of policymaking are not taken into consideration and are masked. In the second macro-discourse, oppositional actors are targeted, blamed and threatened.

Unrelated events and actors are linked together in a fallacious way in order to create a large out-group which is organized and determined to destroy the AKP. The party tries to picture itself as the representative of the nation and labels all other actors who oppose them as illegitimate. Criticism of the use of excessive police force is rejected and this policy is strongly supported because the government does not see any kinds of political action as legitimate, other than voting.

This authoritarian policy legitimized as the noble cause *of establishing and maintaining order* is dominant in the overall text. Any criticism which is directed at a policy is understood as an attack on the political existence of the party. There is no sign of reconciliation, concessions or self-criticism in the speech. The main argumentative strategy is to respond to a criticism with another criticism and to target the source of criticism (*ad hominem – tu quoque*). Unlike a classical election rally speech, the party leader does not make many promises for the future or discuss the details of an implemented policy for the sake of defence. Erdoğan's way of talking about policies does not leave any room for the possibility of not being in power. The speech is written as if the prime minister already knew that he would continue to govern in the next term, even before the election.

The main discursive strategies used in this speech show similarities to the party-group speech of Erdoğan. Understanding economic prosperity with a single indicator while neglecting all possible others, blaming the other oppositional actors as a burden on progress, merging the oppositional actors into one homogenous out-group and shifting the blame onto them, and victimization of the self are similar strategies, as detected in

the party-group speech. The difference in this speech is that the government's hostility to political action, which goes beyond the borders of elections, becomes salient. It is possible to see that any policy challenge will be seen as a threat to the political existence of the government and punished at any price. The limits of the discursive sphere are organized in three ways: 1) the efforts of the government to create a discursive hegemony are increasingly challenged by some segments in society, 2) the government does not take discursive challenges into account so that discursive challenge turns into political action, 3) the government has zero tolerance to non-discursive political action and is ready to take every measure to suppress it.

All in all, the AKP government uses the discursive sphere effectively to maintain its political hegemony, but also prepares itself for the non-discursive sphere of political contradiction between the party and segments of society that are dissatisfied with party politics and appeal to political protest. The main aim here is to use all possible discursive means to gain the utmost support for this authoritarian policy (extension of the use of police force) against those who are not convinced by discourse and who challenge the political authority of the government through political protest.

## CHAPTER 7: THE ANALYSIS OF A PARTY GROUP SPEECH

### 7.1.Text

1 Unfortunately, election years had always been lost years before, for us in Turkey. We  
2 didn't let the election cause economic, political and diplomatic uncertainty. Without  
3 damaging stability, juggling safety, disturbing money and finance policies, we organised  
4 the elections with great precision. We proved to both Turkey and the world how the bar  
5 of democracy standards<sup>107</sup> has changed.

6 This is also extremely important: Now, in Europe, governments are having difficulties in  
7 taking measures against the global economic crisis because of election concerns and  
8 populist concerns. Because they can't take these measures and show strong leadership,  
9 they lay the ground for deepening the crisis and the high levels of devastation resulting  
10 from it.

11 However, we – although it is an election year in Turkey – have shown great performance  
12 which is appreciated not only by Europe but also by the whole world. Please, look at the  
13 third quarter of 2011, the Turkish economy grew by 8.2 %. With this rate, it has become  
14 the fastest growing country after China. In the first nine months of 2011, our growth rate  
15 reached 9.6 %, which is a very high rate. Our three periods of national income realized  
16 589 billion dollars. In our retrospective four periods, national income has become 793  
17 billion dollars. That is to say, we caught the pre-crisis numbers that were the numbers of  
18 2008, even exceeded them, and now closely approximate to a national income limit of 1  
19 trillion dollars. In a similar vein, we witnessed joyful developments in unemployment. In  
20 the September period, unemployment declined to 8.8%, which is actually a record low  
21 rate. Yesterday, as you know, the Turkish Exporters Assembly announced the export  
22 rates for 2011. Our exports in 2011 increased by 18%, as compared to 2010, and have  
23 reached 134.6 billion dollars. That's to say, 135 billion dollars. Also, in exports, we  
24 exceeded the pre-crisis numbers and set a new record for our Republican history.  
25 Hereby, I voice my gratitude, on behalf of my nation, my cabinet and my government, to  
26 our exporters, our firms, our corporations, producers and associations for letting us  
27 experience this success, this joy and this record.

---

<sup>107</sup> In Turkish this expression is used to refer to the bar used in athletics, like the pole vault, where competitors raise the level of the bar in order to beat the previous record.

28 Reducing wages, freezing wages never crossed our minds. On the contrary, we are not  
29 letting inflation oppress our employees, we are providing wage increases above the  
30 inflation rate. Here, I want to give a single example: We foresaw a minimum wage  
31 increase of 3% + 3%<sup>108</sup> in the budget for 2012. Still, we pushed to the limit and we  
32 awarded a minimum wage increase rate of 5.9% plus 6% in 2012. That is to say, in total,  
33 we increased the minimum wage by 12.4% in the whole of 2012 and determined it as  
34 701 liras for the first six months. I want to draw your attention to the fact that, when we  
35 took command, the minimum wage was 184 liras, today it is 701 liras. The rate of  
36 increase is 281%. During 9 nine years, we didn't only prevent inflation from oppressing  
37 the minimum wage but we also, in real terms – that is to say above the inflation rate –  
38 gave an increase of 33%.

39 Again, from here, I want to relay a surprise to undergraduate/ graduate students. As you  
40 know, when we came into power, 45 liras as a bursary and credit were given to students  
41 in higher education and this was paid every 3 months. We gradually increased this  
42 amount and raised it to 240 liras. Also, we gave food aid to students who stay in  
43 dormitories of the General Directorate of Higher Education Credit and Hostels  
44 Institution. We now also pay bursaries and credits to students not every three months but  
45 every month. Now, we are increasing the bursaries and credits paid to students and  
46 raising the monthly bursary and credit amount to 260 liras, as of January 2012. The rate  
47 of increase of bursaries and credits in 2012, please pay attention to this, that is to say, do  
48 you know the rate of increase since we came into power?<sup>109</sup> 478%. I am coming to the  
49 monthly paid nutrition aid to students, it was 150 liras, we also raised that to 180 liras.  
50 Alongside the bursaries and credits taken by students who stay in the dormitories of the  
51 General Directorate of Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution, what else do we  
52 pay? 180 liras in nutrition aid.

53 We were paying 480 liras to master's students, we are raising it to 520 liras as of the first  
54 of January.

55 Doctoral students were getting 720 liras. We are raising this 720 liras taken by doctoral  
56 students as bursary and credit to 780 liras.

---

<sup>108</sup> 3% increase for the first six months and another 3% for the second six months of the year.

<sup>109</sup> The grammatical and syntactic mistakes in the structure of the sentence are resulting from the instantaneous parts in the oral speech. Here, the speech maker starts an informative sentence but then decides to use a rhetorical device in order to increase the effect of his speech which causes incoherence.

57 My precious MP friends, the year 2011 was an important one in which important  
58 developments took place in both our region and the world. In Tunisia, Libya and also in  
59 Egypt, the third round of elections are taking place today. You might follow the results  
60 of the second round. And today, with the third round of elections, now the parliamentary  
61 dimension of the job will be determined. Of course, the demonstrations started in these  
62 places spread all over the Middle East. And the will for change in the region, the demand  
63 for change is now uttered in a very strong way. The events in Syria, which started in this  
64 context in 2011, have unfortunately spilled over into 2012. Until now, that is to say in a  
65 period of nine months, nearly six thousand people have lost their life. For the realization  
66 of change without any pain or with minor pains as in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt and to  
67 make rulers pay attention to the people's demands, as in Turkey, we also gave the  
68 necessary warnings to Syria. Our support and contribution continue for the realization of  
69 stability after regime changes in these countries, for the completion of a transition  
70 period, I underline this, for rule of the popular will and a popular administration. Of  
71 course, as some say, why does Turkey intervene in these countries' internal affairs? We  
72 are not intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. But, as we share a common  
73 world, as a country which shares this common world, only when asked do we manifest  
74 our thoughts and approach. Above all, it is impossible<sup>110</sup> for us to be silent about a Syria  
75 with which we have 910 km of borders and with which we have affinities. Sure, there  
76 too, we will tell our ideas and manifest our approach, as we have told them until today.

77 In the last days of 2011, there were developments that deeply hurt all of us<sup>111</sup>. While my  
78 deputy prime minister, Beşir Atalay, who was responsible for the topic at the outset, my  
79 related ministers, especially my minister of environment and urban planning, our other  
80 ministers from the region, my minister of interior, our MPs from the region were  
81 continuing their work as a result of these developments – once you look – the opposition  
82 unfortunately still have non-conscientious approaches.<sup>112</sup> You see approaches like a vote  
83 of confidence etc. Sure, our friends are continuously in the region, they are coming and  
84 going, coming and going, and they also stop by from time to time, now and then. Sure,

---

<sup>110</sup> In the Turkish version, 'hiç mümkün değil' is used which is semantically wrong but helps to intensify the meaning by collocation of never (hiç) with impossible (mümkün değil).

<sup>111</sup> He implies the Uludere airstrike or massacre, which took place on 28 December 2011 near the Turkish-Iraqi border. Two Turkish jets fired at a group of Kurdish smugglers, acting on information that PKK militants were crossing the border. As a result of the attack, 34 civilians were killed in the incident.

<sup>112</sup> The Turkish version of this paragraph is an entire sentence which is incoherent and grammatically wrong. The English version is restructured with minimal changes.

85 our sensations, our sensibilities are different. We, my dear nation, are hearty but they are  
86 oblique/ shifty.<sup>113</sup> That is the difference.

87 The main opposition party tells this, tells that, this is not of very much interest. There is a  
88 continuous tongue-twister in their mouth saying that the AKP always criticizes  
89 Republican history. We manifest a calendar for a process and we say that things that  
90 have been done in this government's period weren't done in the Republican period, we  
91 say that for the first time this government realized a transformation, a change in this  
92 country. Is it wrong to make this evaluation? If you manifest what you did in your single  
93 party government ... After all, you were patched from here and there in the multiparty  
94 era,<sup>114</sup> you didn't serve any other purpose, there is nothing you will be doing thereafter.  
95 In the single party era, we always showed identity cards, birth certificates. Here, we  
96 always told how bread was distributed, how gas-oil was distributed, we always told  
97 them. The queues for oil, the stamps that were placed in identity cards, we showed them.  
98 Flour, sugar, we always listened to our fathers, grandfathers about how these were  
99 distributed with stamps.<sup>115</sup> These were periods of CHP rule. You made the people suffer.  
100 But, thank God, in the period of AKP rule, this is no longer an issue and it also won't be  
101 an issue with the permission of God. Day after day, it is becoming better, it will become  
102 better.

103 I am in the situation of emphasizing a point by underlying it with bold lines. My dear  
104 brothers,<sup>116</sup> who carry the topic onto ethnic grounds by saying that 35 Kurds were killed  
105 in Uludere, trample<sup>117</sup> every kind of national, moral value, every kind of humanistic and  
106 conscientious value. We don't look at the issue like that. We say that 35 people lost their  
107 life in Uludere.<sup>118</sup> We look at the issue like that. We look at the issue as 35 hearts were  
108 lost, 35 of our citizens, our brothers were lost. But because they – unfortunately by  
109 means of stirring up ethnic grounds – always make an effort to divide and dismantle our  
110 nation, here too they manifest this exploitation. Look at the situation, the ones who are  
111 even sorting out the funerals according to ethnic background are inhuman.

---

<sup>113</sup> The second part of the expression is not clear. The main aim is to emphasize the difference between sincerity and insincerity.

<sup>114</sup> Implying that the CHP has never formed a single party government but only formed part of coalition governments in the multi-party era.

<sup>115</sup> As much as possible, I stick to the original syntax where it has pragmatic importance.

<sup>116</sup> In Turkish, the word 'kardeş' is used which also includes sisters.

<sup>117</sup> This verb corresponds to two verbs, 'ayak altına almak' and 'çiğnemek', which are used in the Turkish version.

<sup>118</sup> Gramatically corrected and with the verb 'say' inserted. In the original version, there is no verb.

112 I cannot know her political mentality but, for instance, the sister of the one who died  
113 there, she is a woman who works in the women's branch, a woman who is the chair  
114 there. There is this too. But have you ever heard abuse of this from us? We cannot do  
115 such a thing. Their hearts are darkened, they lost their conscience. Racism and fascism,  
116 immodestly boasting, bragging is the way of demons, that is to say, the way that the  
117 devil has opened up. You see, did you watch the displays of the press release they made  
118 about this painful event in Istanbul? Their own MPs. You watched the displays, as  
119 though they are in pain, but they are also so ruthless and remorseless that they don't  
120 hesitate to laugh in front of the cameras.

121 Today there is not a state and a government which is shaped by a tutelary mentality.  
122 Today there is a state and a government which are shaped by the will of the people: just,  
123 compassionate, emancipatory. Today, there is not a state which is remembered for  
124 unidentified murders, the burning of villages, with torture, and which sees its citizens as  
125 the enemy.<sup>119</sup> On the contrary, there is a state which is remembered as an advanced  
126 democracy, with liberties and freedoms and which embraces its citizens. We don't say  
127 state first, I told you shortly before, we say nation first, people first.

128 Once you look, he goes further. I, he says, am not even afraid of the armed, will I be  
129 afraid of Tayyip from Kasımpaşa?<sup>120</sup> My concern is not to make anybody afraid. But  
130 don't forget this,<sup>121</sup> I am proud of being Tayyip from Kasımpaşa. I am a servant  
131 honoured to serve the entire nation who came out of Kasımpaşa as a son of that place,  
132 due to my people bringing us to these ranks. If 50% in this country voted for us, you  
133 should be offended. Probably, you are not cleverer than this 50%. Check yourselves  
134 once, control yourselves once. Review this once by saying where we are making a  
135 mistake so that 50% of this nation votes for these people. This is only possible with  
136 justice. This is only possible with honesty. This is only possible with being in the service  
137 of the nation. We did this. We are doing this. We will do this. But ask yourselves, what  
138 did we do? Sorry about this *messieurs*, our direction has always been drawn up by the  
139 nation. Henceforth, only the nation draws it. Unlike them, we won't be taking their

---

<sup>119</sup> These statements mainly refer to the violent measures taken on the Kurdish issue in the past.

<sup>120</sup> Refers to the place where the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, grew up.

<sup>121</sup> In the Turkish version, 'unutma' and 'unutmayın' are used separately to refer to both singular (the opposition party leader) and plural (probably CHP) agents. In English, there is no distinction.

140 subcontractor ideas, bowing down to their incitements,<sup>122</sup> which are under the cover of  
141 remorse. We are trying to provide state-nation coalescence while they invite an increase  
142 in enemy state perception. We have a concern to embrace our nation, provide unity and  
143 integrity. These serve for the insemination of grudges and hatred. We struggle in every  
144 sphere for democratization and demilitarized rule. These lead to incitements<sup>123</sup> to make  
145 institutions fall out with each other.

146 Honestly, we are having difficulties in understanding the CHP talking the language of  
147 the PKK,<sup>124</sup> the language of the BDP.<sup>125</sup> It is remarkable that the CHP's style is so  
148 similar to that of the PKK and BDP. Though, we see a political alliance in the  
149 condolence tents,<sup>126</sup> today we also saw that in the election squares,<sup>127</sup> before June 12,<sup>128</sup>  
150 It is sad for a party like the CHP to carry water to the mill of the BDP,<sup>129</sup> trail the tale of  
151 the BDP.

152 This noble nation, whose martyrs are buried in each other's arms, will extirpate every  
153 kind of malign tumour from its body. I always told, I am telling it again, we took  
154 responsibility<sup>130</sup> for the brotherhood, unity, integrity of this nation. We will solve this  
155 problem at any cost. We will solve this with democracy, within the borders of fraternal  
156 laws, shoulder to shoulder with the local community, by fighting terrorism. We will  
157 surmount every impediment. With God's permission, we will succeed. We will overrun  
158 all attempts at abuse. We will leave the ones behind who become a burden, create a  
159 burden, slow us down and we will walk together into the future.

---

<sup>122</sup> The original word is 'fitne', which refers to a religious conflict in early Islamic history that resulted in divisions within the Islamic community.

<sup>123</sup> Again the word 'fitne' is used.

<sup>124</sup> A terrorist organization which fights for the rights of the Kurdish population.

<sup>125</sup> Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party), a political party which is especially strong in the eastern regions of Turkey where the Kurdish population is dominant.

<sup>126</sup> Referring to places where politicians meet the families of people who were killed in Uludere in order to share their condolences.

<sup>127</sup> Referring to places where election rally speeches take place.

<sup>128</sup> Referring to the general election of 2011.

<sup>129</sup> It is an idiom which means that somebody unconsciously serves the interests of somebody/something else with their actions.

<sup>130</sup> The original idiom 'elini taşın altına koymak' is to put one's hand under a stone. Here, Erdoğan intensifies the meaning by changing the structure of the idiom. He says that they don't put their arms but their hearts and bodies under the stone.

## 7.2. Analysis:

This speech was delivered by Tayyip Erdoğan to MPs of the AKP at a regular party meeting on 3 January 2012, which was the first meeting after the Uludere massacre or airstrike (see line 73). Because 34 civilians were killed during the bombardment, responsibility for the incident had been discussed in the media. Another agenda was the developments which had taken place in the Middle East, especially in Syria. Turkey's increasing involvement in regional politics had been criticized by the opposition parties for showing interventionist tendencies and serving American and Israeli interests. That's why the speech is constructed in a way to deal with these two problematic issues which are in question.

The discourse topics can be summarized below. These are:

1. Elections, the global economic crisis and the AKP's attitude towards elections
2. The AKP's policies
  - 2a. Its macro-economic success using numbers
  - 2b. Its success in increasing wages despite inflation
  - 2c. Its success in education policies
3. Developments in the region and the AKP's stance towards them
4. The AKP's and the CHP's approach to the Uludere air strike
5. Single party period, comparison of the CHP and AKP
6. The AKP's stance towards the Uludere event and the condemnation of alternative views
7. Features of the AKP government
8. The aim of the AKP and criticism of the CHP's attitude and stance
9. The AKP's commitment to solve the Kurdish issue

The overall organization of the speech can be divided into three macro-discourses. The first one is the discourse of *economic prosperity* prioritizes economic success before discussing problematic issues. The second one is *Turkey's involvement in regional politics*. It is discussed in a superficial way, in contrast to the previous macro-discourse on economic prosperity. Here, it is not possible to see any details or numbers like in the previous discourse topic. The third one is the *Uludere airstrike and the government's approach to the issue*, which relates to other discourses such as the CHP's negative approach to the issue, the single party period, the comparison of the CHP and the AKP or the AKP's commitment to solving the Kurdish issue. The discursive strategies are investigated on the basis of these three macro-discourses. Thus, Uludere is taken metonymically as the entry point for a negative other presentation and a comparison.

The *economic prosperity discourse* represents and discursively constructs the economy as a fragile structure, via nominational and predicational strategies. The phrases ‘damaging stability’, ‘devastating the environment of confidence’, ‘disturbing money’ and ‘finance policies’ (2, 3) show the character of the economy, which is sensitive and easily affected by any political change. In these circumstances, economic success depends on the strong leadership (8) and performance (10) of actors. To prove its success, the AKP refers to growth (12, 13), rates (12, 14, 33, 43, 45) and records (19, 22, 25). All in all, running the economy is depicted as being in a competition in which the AKP ‘catches’ and ‘exceeds’ (16, 22) the pre-crisis numbers, ‘approximates’ (17) to certain degrees of national income, ‘pushes the circumstances’ (29) and ‘gains’ (22) success. Between lines 32 and 53, time deixis is used to show the progress from past to present. Low numbers/ rates are linked to the past (mostly to the pre-AKP period), whereas high numbers are linked to the present. Two nominalizations of inflation and unemployment are presented as natural phenomena whose magnitude the government struggles to decrease. In lines 13 and 19, the rates provided are supported by relative clauses. These clauses explain to the listener that they are very high or very low numbers, and therefore desirable. Thus economic expert jargon is linked to a narrative of success.

The pronoun ‘we’ is used for both the AKP and the Turkish nation. When it comes to implemented policies, the active voice is used to emphasize the success of the political party. Sometimes ‘we’ also creates an in-group which is composed of the party and the nation when it comes to emphasizing the success of the nation (13-23). There are also some parts in which the prime minister uses ‘I’ as a symbol of personal authority (31, 36 and 45). Another way of creating involvement is discourse markers, like ‘please look’ (11), ‘as you know’ (36), ‘I want to draw your attention’ (32) or ‘please pay attention to this’ (44). Rhetorical questions in lines 45 and 48 attempt to both involve the audience and get them to approve the numbers provided by the prime minister. They also function as intensifiers. Another discourse marker, ‘that is to say’ (15, 21, and 30), is widely used and makes the speech more didactic in the sense that Erdoğan explains the statistics in detail and thus intensifies their meaning. There are some hyperbolic expressions (strategies of intensification) which are provided by adverbs like ‘always’ (1), ‘even’ (16), ‘very’ (14), ‘very much’ (17) and ‘also’ (22, 39, 41). They are used to emphasize the precision of economic policies. When it comes to the problematic areas of inflation

and unemployment, ‘never’ (26), ‘on the contrary’ (26) and ‘still’ (29) are instrumentalized in a particular rhetorical strategy, *apophasis*. Before these adverbs, Erdoğan sets low limits and exceeds these. For example, he mentions ‘wage cuts’ as the worst scenario (although it is unacceptable to cut wages and it is not on the agenda at all) and he says they have never thought of doing that. This figure is called *apophasis*, where the speaker mentions something while trying to pass it over. In this part of the speech, this rhetorical figure has two functions: Firstly, it reminds the hearer that there could be worse cases so that it tries to lower expectations. Secondly, it decreases the chances of objective evaluation of the success of a policy, since the emphasized outcome is always better than the initial point.

Moreover, we encounter two argumentation schemes which are based on some problematic premises. Between lines 3 and 5, high democracy standards are linked to running elections without damaging stability, devastating the environment of confidence, disturbing money and finance policies. However, these factors, which should be avoided discursively, refer to neoliberal economic policies where market needs are prioritized above all other interests. This premise can be true for a certain kind of economic model, but this time it will be problematic to create a cause-effect link between high standards of democracy and market needs. These kinds of arguments are called *petitio principii* (begging the question) and are fallacious. The same argumentation scheme is seen in lines 6- 9 where the deepening economic crisis and devastation are presented as stemming from a lack of strong leadership able to take the necessary measures and populist concerns. This argument is also fallacious because the premises are ambiguous. It does not specify the measures to be taken. If it clarified these measures then the validity of the premises could be discussed. It also features another fallacy called *post hoc ergo propter hoc* which concludes that event A is the cause of event B just because event A occurred before event B.




Diagram 10. Argument about democracy standards.

**Premise:** Governments are encountering difficulties in taking measures (*ambiguity*) and showing strong leadership (*ambiguity*) in the face of the global economic crisis

**Warrant:** It is because of election concerns and populist concerns

**Conclusion:** Because they can't take these measures and show strong leadership, they lay the ground for deepening the crisis and high levels of devastation resulting from it

**Post hoc ergo propter hoc argument:** The elections were before the deepening of the crisis. So it was the elections and the politicians' attitudes which deepened the crisis and led to high levels of devastation.

Diagram 11. Argument about the economic crisis in Europe.

The *topos of numbers* is also important in this section, where economic success is proved in terms of an increase/decrease in certain rates. But, for instance, inflation rates can vary according to the goods examined. Rarely used products tend to increase less than frequently used products, like essential food products. Moreover, an increase in rates does not directly lead to economic prosperity. For instance, in line 31, the increase of 12.4 % means a minimum wage of 701 liras, but the starvation limit for a household with four people was 925 liras in June 2012.<sup>131</sup>

Two sources of legitimation in the economic prosperity discourse are authorization and rationalization (see Chapter 4, pp. 12-14). An expert authority is used (20) by referring to the Turkish Exporters Assembly. The general legitimation structure can be identified as theoretical legitimation through explanation. The orator explains things on the basis of statistical comparison so that they can be objectivized.

*Turkey's involvement in regional politics* is the second macro-discourse of the speech. Without any coherence or cohesion with the economic prosperity discourse, Erdoğan shifts to this topic and starts to mention the political uprisings in the Middle East. This process is labelled as 'important developments' (54-55), the 'parliamentary dimension of the job' (57-58), 'spread over' (58-59), 'will of change' (59), 'demand for change' (59) and 'expand' (61). From line 62 onwards, it is possible to see a call for action. Nominalizations like 'realization of change' (62), 'warnings' (64), 'support' (64), 'contribution' (64) and 'realization of stability' (65) and phrases like 'to pay attention to people's demands' (63), 'regime changes' (65) and 'completion of a transition period' (66) serve the aim of naturalizing political uprisings and the need to take the initiative. The phrases 'popular will' (66) and 'popular administration' (66, 67) label the desired

<sup>131</sup> <http://www.turkis.org.tr/source.cms.docs/turkis.org.tr.ce/docs/file/aclikhaziran12.doc>.

outcome of the process. Erdoğan utters the verb ‘to intervene’ twice (66, 67) in order to deny it later on and tries to legitimize the involvement of Turkey by using the phrase ‘sharing a common world’ (twice in 69) and the verb ‘manifest’ (69) and making use of the nouns ‘thoughts’ (69, 72) and ‘approach’ (69, 72). As a predicational strategy, this replacement of nouns, phrases and verbs helps to refer to the event in a more acceptable way which also emphasizes the necessity of the proposed political action.

Here, it is crucial to emphasize that ‘thought’ and ‘approach’ are collocated and this choice represents a link between idea and action. The words ‘affinities’ and ‘borders’ (71) are also tools for legitimizing involvement because they imply that the other side of the border is also part of the national interest. The events in the region are ‘important’ (54), the demands coming from the people are ‘very strong’ (60), Turkey’s warnings to Syria are ‘necessary’ (64) and it is ‘impossible’ (70) for Turkey to be ‘silent’ (70). The pronoun ‘we’ is used interchangeably with Turkey between lines 64-72 in order to create an in-group. Here, the state identity is emphasized in an inclusive way to give the impression that the ‘involvement’ policy is the outcome of a shared interest of the nation. In lines 69 and 71, two relative clauses are used to define Turkey and Syria in terms of their proximity to justify the policy of intervention/ involvement. Between lines 77 to 80 there is a rhetorical figure called *hypophora*, where Erdoğan asks a question to himself by quoting anonymous actors and answers his own question at length to explain that Turkey does not intervene in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries but does share its thoughts and approach when asked. However, the hearer understands that this ‘sharing of thoughts and approach’ is not optional but inevitable because of the later argumentation based on a proximity discourse which makes it impossible for Turkey to remain silent. So, one can observe that the first and second parts of the answer are contradictory.

The main fallacious argumentation schemes in this section are *argumentum ad populum* (66-67), where Turkey’s contribution and support are legitimized by the needs of the popular will and popular administration, and *argument from territorial proximity* (71) where sharing a long border becomes the justification for involvement in the domestic politics of another country. The discourse markers ‘of course’ (67), ‘above all’ (70) and ‘sure’ (71) illustrate the perspective of the actor who favours involvement. They also intensify the meaning alongside the *parenthesis* (I want to underline this) in line 66

where Erdoğan tries to highlight ‘popular will and administration’ as the cause of Turkey’s involvement in regional politics.

The *Uludere airstrike* is the third macro-discourse, it is at the centre of the rest of the speech. Erdoğan starts with a single event and links it to other discourse topics (see above). In lines 73-81, this airstrike is called ‘development’ and ‘topic’ and it is defined via a predicational strategy as ‘a development which deeply hurt all of us’ (73). It is possible to see use of the possessive pronoun ‘my’ to show the personal authority of the leader (74, 75 and 76). Starting at line 77, Erdoğan criticizes the main opposition party, the CHP. He calls the CHP’s criticism of the government’s responsibility a ‘non-conscientious approach’. Later on, he tries to compare the sincerity of the AKP with that of the CHP. The verbs ‘coming and going’ (79) are used repetitively to give the effect of high frequency, whereas the CHP’s visits to the region are uttered with the verb ‘stop by’ (80) and the adverbs ‘time to time’ (80) and ‘now and then’ (80) in order to create an effect of low frequency. Later on, this emphasis on frequency is used as evidence to claim that the CHP’s attitude is insincere. At the end of this section, Erdoğan labels his party ‘hearty’ (81) and the CHP ‘obliquely’ (81). The demonstrative ‘this’ in the last sentence helps to transfer an action into a character trait where the difference between the two parties is clarified. The overall aim here is to create two contrasting identities based on positive self and negative other representation. The *argumentum ad hominem* which starts in this section continues in the next section up to line 94, where the AKP leader shifts the direction of criticism to the opposition party instead of answering criticism of the issue. This argumentation strategy also benefits from the *topos of history* (82-94), where historical evidence discredits the political opposition and its criticism. This process of discrediting a political actor starts with an indirect quotation (81-82) and follows with a rhetorical question (87) which is directed at a non-existent actor. The rest of the section continues as an imaginary/unreal dialogue between the prime minister and the CHP leader who is again non-existent. The use of the personal pronouns ‘you’ and ‘we’ creates this dialogical effect.

**Topos of history as Argumentum ad hominem**

Stage 1: Indirect quotation of the opponent's critical statement

Stage 2: Rhetorical question and answer at length with reference to history (*hypophora*)

Stage 3: Targeting and having a dialogue with a non-existing actor (*apostrophe*)

Stage 4: Deriving generalizable conclusions from history and presenting them as negative character traits of the political actor (*labelling*)

Diagram 12. Implementation of the topos of history as a form of argumentum ad hominem.

Between lines 90 and 94, the economic outcomes of the Second World War period are solely related to the single party rule of the CHP and decontextualized and recontextualized into today's CHP to create a continuation from past to present. By doing that, the party policies and the CHP are depicted as linear and unchanging.<sup>132</sup> The *Topos of example* in lines 89-94 supports the argument that the CHP is politically unsuccessful. These examples attempt to show the level of poverty. In lines 92 and 94, Erdoğan refers to other texts (mostly to election rally speeches where he gives similar examples to remind the listener of the poverty in the single party period) by saying 'we told' (90-91) and 'we showed' (93).

Erdoğan creates a link between the wider population and his party by using the clause 'we always listened to our fathers'. In this sentence, 'we' is no longer representing the party itself but members of that party who are plain folk (92). From line 95 onwards, starting with a *parenthesis/ exclamation* 'thank God', Erdoğan uses religious references and emphasizes religious authority to predict the success of future policies. In these parts, religious jargon is used interdiscursively alongside political discourse.

All in all, this section creates a clear distinction between past and present, identifies the past with the unsuccessful policies of the CHP and the present with the success of the AKP, without giving any details about the policies of the party and without answering ongoing criticisms about the Uludere strike<sup>133</sup> which raise the possible responsibility of the government on the issue.

Line 98 starts with a new discourse topic, which is the AKP's stance towards the Uludere event and the condemnation of alternative views. This discourse topic is related to the macro-discourse topic of the Uludere strike. Erdoğan starts with a *parrhesia* (97),

<sup>132</sup> See the context chapter for a discussion of the party's history and its evolution.

<sup>133</sup> See page 3.

which means that the speaker talks openly and apologizes for doing that. The rhetorical aim is to make the audience believe that the speaker is honest and courageous. Erdoğan does not apologize, but in a similar vein he implies that he is obliged to talk openly. Then he starts to create an out-group by using a relative clause. He defines those who approach the issue from an ethnic perspective as ‘the ones who trampled every kind of value’ (99-100). The adjectival phrase ‘every kind of’ is used twice to intensify the negative labelling of the actor and demonize it. However, the actor is not named. Beginning at line 101, Erdoğan explains the AKP’s approach to the issue with the use of ‘we’. The nominations ‘people’, ‘hearts’, ‘citizens’ and ‘brothers’ are used to name people who were killed in the strike and they have an emotional meaning. ‘We’ is also used as *anaphora* at the beginning of each sentence continuously to intensify the meaning.

In lines 103-106, Erdoğan again returns to labelling the out-group. Here, he condemns the ones who ‘irritate the ethnic background’ for ‘dividing’ and ‘dismantling’ ‘our’ nation. ‘They’ are also condemned for ‘exploiting the issue’ and for ‘sorting out the funerals according to ethnic background’. Erdoğan labels them ‘inhuman’. In this section, Erdoğan implicitly refers to the BDP, the regional Kurdish party, and insults them. Omitting the name of the party and their supporters enables him to use the most offensive words and expressions. His emphasis on ‘dividing and dismantling the nation’ also refers to the terrorism argument which tries to avoid any criticism of the issue by labelling the source of these criticisms as ‘terrorist’.

Line 107 starts with a fallacious *argumentum ad exemplum* where Erdoğan tries to prove that the government is not responsible for the strike by giving an example. However, this example does not prove that the government was not responsible for the strike, because there is no direct relation between the warrant and the conclusion.

**Premise:** The Uludere strike was not directed by the government

**Warrant:** One of the people who was killed in the strike was a relative of the local party representative (*a form of example*)

**Conclusion:** The government has no responsibility for the strike.

Diagram 13. Argumentum ad exemplum in the discourse topic Uludere strike.

Then he continues with a rhetorical question which deploys a discourse of abuse. He says that they did not abuse this situation. This statement implies that they could have abused the Uludere strike for their own political interests but chose not to. As in the economic prosperity discourse, Erdoğan takes a rather offensive position and inserts an unacceptable possibility (that the government could have benefited from a dramatic event) into his discourse where he was expected to explain how the strike took place without information and confirmation from the government. By doing that, the government once again does not take responsibility for the outcomes of policy preferences or answer criticisms and concerns with reasonable explanations. Instead, they aim at the source of criticism and try to discredit it by shifting the blame to other actors who were not in charge. Lines 110-114 are a clear example of this *demonization strategy*, where Erdoğan draws an analogy between the MPs of the BDP (Kurdish political party) and the Devil. According to Erdoğan, their hearts are darkened, they lost their conscience and they are ‘ruthless’ as well as ‘remorseless’. These are used as predicational strategies to reconstruct the identity of the opposition. He hesitates to label the event as a massacre or an attack and uses the phrase ‘painful event (112) as if it happened spontaneously without any actors being involved. He uses a second rhetorical question in the same line (112) to refer to another event in order to criticize the approach of the MPs. In his answer, Erdoğan uses the statement ‘their own MPs’ which connotes a distinction between the Kurdish and Turkish populations. This statement directly contradicts the rest of the speech in which he condemns any kind of discrimination.

In sum, the implemented strategies once again help to shift the direction of criticism from Erdoğan and the AKP to the sources of criticism by defining and labelling them in a negative way.

In lines 115-121, positive self-representation becomes salient, although this representation does not include any issue-specific concerns. Erdoğan compares and contrasts the past with the present and lists the negative/ positive traits of the changing state/ government. The previous state/ government was ‘shaped by a tutelary mentality’, ‘remembered for unidentified murders, the burning of villages and with torture which saw its citizens as the enemy’, whereas the new state/ government is ‘shaped by the will of the people’, ‘just’, ‘compassionate’ and ‘emancipatory’. Today’s state is also known for its ‘advanced democracy’ with ‘liberties and freedoms’, and it ‘embraces its citizens’. These are *glittering generalities* which are always uttered by governments and they are

hard to assess, especially if there is a controversy about the definition and use of terms. For example, ‘compassionate state’ may refer to a paternal figure (mother/ father) which takes care of its citizens. but still has superior authority over them, and therefore can be authoritarian, while the term ‘advanced democracy’ is ambiguous since its content is not defined clearly and objectively. The last two lines of this section (120-121) create a controversy between state and people whereby the AKP places itself at the side of the people and fights against the authoritarian structures of the state.

In lines 122-143, Erdoğan shifts his focus to the CHP again and starts to criticize it. He targets the CHP’s leader and quotes him directly in lines 122-123. Then he uses *apostrophe* by starting a conversation with the CHP leader as if he were present. In lines 124-126 he depicts himself as a member of the *plain folk*, which means he is an average person. The district of Kasımpaşa has symbolic meaning for coming from a working-class background and this representation. The words ‘son’ and ‘servant’ are also used to label the actor as a layperson. After line 126, he uses the *topos of numbers / argumentum ad populum* to come to the conclusion that the CHP is doing something wrong and should therefore reconsider its own political stance. It is also important to emphasize that by indicating the number of people who did not vote for the CHP, Erdoğan claims that the CHP is no cleverer than the masses, as if the people who voted for the AKP might represent the whole population and as if the CHP made a claim for being cleverer than the masses. So it can be considered a *straw man strategy* where Erdoğan tries to rebut a non-existent argument.

This kind of argumentation contributes to the depiction of the CHP as an elitist party and constructs it as the anti-thesis of the popular will.

In lines 129-130, ‘this is only possible’ is used as *anaphora* repetitively to refer to the success of the AKP and to intensify the meaning. The past, present and future tenses are used respectively to show the continuity of the success of AKP rule. Line 131 continues with a rhetorical question and the answer starts with *parrhesia* where Erdoğan apologizes to the audience for telling the truth and claims that their direction was indicated by the nation. This implies that the targeted actor’s direction was not set by the nation but by other factors which are illegitimate. That is an indirect discursive strategy which tries to delegitimize the political opponent by overemphasizing its legitimacy. Lines 132-134 make this strategy explicit by comparing the AKP with the ‘other’. The

other (the CHP and possibly the BDP) is labelled as having sub-contractor ideas (meaning that they are directed by other power groups) and creating incitement under the cover of remorse (meaning they have a secret agenda). Between 134 and 138, the ‘us-them’ distinction is salient and the pronouns ‘these’, ‘they’ and ‘we’ are used repetitively. The words/ nominalizations used to depict the opposition actor/s are ‘insemination’, ‘grudge’, ‘hatred’ and ‘incitement’, whereas the AKP is depicted as a political actor which ‘embraces the citizens’, ‘provides unity/ integrity’ and struggles for ‘democratization’ and ‘demilitarization’. In this passage, once again, possible criticisms directed at the government are avoided by the negative representation of oppositional actors and the act of questioning is condemned for harming the unity/ integrity of the country.

Here, the AKP adopts a nationalist discourse to silence its opponents. In the last part of this section, the AKP merges two opposition actors into one and blames the CHP for being similar to the BDP. Erdoğan also adds the PKK – the Kurdish terrorist organization – into the comparison to discredit the CHP. ‘Honestly’ (139), ‘remarkable’ (140) and ‘sad’ (142) are used to intensify the claim that the CHP is similar to the BDP. ‘The tail’ is used as a metaphor (143) to state that the CHP does not have an independent institutional identity but simply follows BDP policies and the idiom ‘to carry water to the mill of the BDP’ connotes that the CHP serves the political interests of the BDP. In order to intensify the *discourse of similarity and proximity between the BDP and the CHP*, Erdoğan intertextually refers to the earlier visits of CHP members to condolence tents (tents established for hosting visitors who come to offer their condolences to relatives of the victims) to claim that there is an ongoing alliance between the two parties which continues in the election process because of the similar criticisms they have. This is a *syllogistic fallacy (non-sequitur)*, where the two premises ‘the CHP visited the condolence tents’ and ‘the CHP and the BDP have similar criticisms’ are true but the conclusion that ‘they formed a political alliance’ is false. It is also possible to say that the whole structure of the speech forms a *trajectio in alium* in which a political actor tries to shift the blame to oppositional actors in order to mask its political responsibility for the Uludere strike.

In the last section of the speech, Erdoğan shifts to an epideictic mode by labelling the nation as ‘noble’ and depicts the nation as a unified identity via a ‘body’ metaphor.<sup>134</sup> However, he also uses a ‘malign tumour’ metaphor to indicate danger. In line 144, he and the party take responsibility for ‘extirpating’ the tumour, which is an ambiguous danger. In the remaining section, he distinguishes between the Kurdish issue and terrorism. By doing this, he tries to own the issue and exclude the PKK and its political representative the BDP<sup>135</sup> which has caused the Kurdish issue to be recognized both domestically and internationally. The words/ verbs ‘abuse’, ‘burden’ and ‘slow down’ indicate that he has a policy preference which is burdened and slowed down by other political actors. One can observe that conjunctions between the words are omitted more than once in 145-147 and 149. This is a rhetorical figure called *brachylogia*, which aims at conciseness of speech. In this context, it also helps to emphasize each word and therefore intensifies the meaning. Later, as a typical *topos of burden*, Erdoğan says that burdens will be ‘overrun’ and ‘left behind’ in order to ‘succeed’ (148-149). The phrases ‘becoming a burden’ and ‘creating a burden’ are used separately in order to emphasize two different actors, the BDP and the CHP. As stated previously, they become a burden and create problems by interrogating the responsibility of the government and criticizing its offensive policies in the region.

### 7.3. Conclusion

In this speech, there are three macro-discourses which are discussed separately but in relation to other discourse topics (see above for a list of discourse topics) Three macro-discourse topics are economic prosperity, regional development and the Uludere strike.

The discourse about economic prosperity uses the topos of numbers in a particular way which prioritizes the increase in rates and growth as evidence of economic development. One can also see that making policy arrangements according to market needs and maintaining the stability of the market are privileged goals of the government. The notions of inflation and unemployment are presented as natural phenomena, as if they are not related to the market-based policies of the government. Economic growth is presented as the determining paradigm of economic prosperity which excludes other possible indicators such as the equal distribution of wealth, foreign debt, current debt,

---

<sup>134</sup> See Musolff (2004) for more on organismic metaphors used in politics.

<sup>135</sup> The party was closed down many times in the past and reestablished under different names.

the poverty line, unemployment among young people and the temporary employment rate.

The rhetorical figures of *apophasis* and *petitio principii* are instrumentalized to help prove economic success and convince the audience.

The discourse about regional developments shows interventionist tendencies which justify Turkey's increasing involvement in the domestic politics of the indicated countries, especially Syria. The *territorial proximity argument* and *argumentum ad populum* are the main argumentation schemes in this section. The criticisms of such an interventionist policy preference are not answered in any detail. The level and content of involvement of Turkey remain ambiguous. Political uprisings are essentialised and presented as a natural process linked to popular demand. In relation to this, the Syrian government is included in the target for not answering the people's demands. The 'call for action' is salient in the second part of the speech, although the first part denies that the Turkish government wants to intervene in Syria.

The third macro-discourse about the Uludere strike shows how the government tries not to take any responsibility for the event and to shift the blame to the opposition parties by demonizing and discrediting them. Thus, the overall discursive strategy is based on *trajectio in allium* in which the AKP shifts the blame to the CHP and the BDP. Erdoğan spends too little time answering the criticisms and proceeds to the discourse topic of the party history of the CHP. Then he merges two opposition parties and contrasts the AKP with them as a representative of the people. He also uses the *topos of burden* in order to claim that these two parties become problems/ create problems which hinder finding a solution to the Kurdish issue. However, the arguments he uses to prove this claim are not sound and conciliatory, they are mostly fallacious and ambiguous. The overall discourse manifests offensive traits which give off signals of exclusion and scapegoating alternative actors and approaches an issue which may disturb the political authority of the government.

## **CHAPTER 8: THE ANALYSIS OF ELEVEN TEXTS FROM MINISTERIAL SPEECHES:**

In previous parts of this research, two speeches from two different sub-genres (an election rally speech and a party group speech) were analyzed. One observation about the structure of the two speeches was that the party group speech converges with some features of the election rally speech in the sense that it targets a wider population, rather than just members of parliament, and focuses on a negative other presentation rather than a positive self presentation. As a macro-discursive strategy, it is possible to say that the rightness of a policy or the general success of the governing party is legitimized by the mistakes or incompetence of alternative actors instead of discussing the content or logic of the policy itself. Thus, we can say that the AKP sees party group speeches as an opportunity to reach a broader population and influence their opinion, because these speeches are broadcast and therefore contribute to the agenda-setting of public opinion as well. The election rally speeches seek to create an in-group with the audience. In these speeches, the audience takes part in the speech as if they are already convinced voters. The prime minister communicates with the audience by asking rhetorical questions, singing songs with the audience, responding to their slogans or calling them to action/ giving them duties.

The third and last sub-genre to be analyzed in this research is ministerial speeches. Unlike the other two speeches, rather than the whole speech only parts from ten ministerial speeches will be analyzed. This is done in order to examine cross-references to different policy areas which are mentioned in election rally speeches and party group speeches. In that sense, ministerial speeches are usually policy-oriented and aim to legitimize the view or policy of the government on a particular issue. Especially argumentation strategies play an important role in elaboration, distribution and extension of the particular policies that were introduced in Erdoğan's speeches. Goal-oriented practical argumentation and fallacies during this process therefore deserve special attention.

Ministerial speeches are less communicative<sup>136</sup> in terms of audience involvement and more technical in terms of register. They are usually given at local meetings of the party, at the opening of something new or at social gatherings that the local party organization

---

<sup>136</sup> See the theory chapter for the meaning of the term 'communicative action'.

organizes. They reproduce and distribute the discourse of the party in particular settings. The analyzed parts are selected according to the discourse topics, some of which are also mentioned in the election rally speech and party group speech. They are already transcribed and can be found on the party website.

## 8.1. Texts and Analyses

### Text 1.

1 In İzmir, there is a politics of ‘I don’t do, I don’t let it be done.’ Neither do they, nor do  
2 they let it be done. Every problem of Izmir is a common problem for all of us. There is  
3 no shanty remaining in Ankara or Istanbul. But the shanties of Buca, Konak and  
4 Karabağlar<sup>137</sup> still exist. We make social transformations, do urban transformation  
5 projects. We are building houses and giving them to the citizens. But İzmir is late in  
6 collaborating with Ankara. We are trying to compensate for this. İzmir does not only  
7 consist of İzmir. There are cities like Uşak and Manisa around it. The problems should  
8 be taken to Ankara by the local authorities. I help the ones who bring me demands  
9 regardless of the party. But, the local authorities in Izmir do not make demands on us.  
10 The number of those that demand does not exceed three. When İzmir holds our hand, we  
11 will make İzmir stand up. We are not interested in anybody’s appearance or table. The  
12 one that will prepares his/her meal and drinks his/her wine, drinks sorbet in his/her meal.  
13 My problem is their children’s future. We will make İzmir a city of Turkey and a world  
14 brand.

This is part of a speech delivered by the former minister of culture, Ertuğrul Günay, on 2 May 2011. It was delivered during an election campaign in İzmir at a meeting with the local party organization. İzmir is the third biggest city in Turkey and governed as a CHP municipality. So, it is a place where support for the AKP is less than for the CHP and the party wants to increase its share of the vote so that it can secure the governance of the municipality. That is why the current government of İzmir is problematized by the AKP official.

The macro-discourse topic of the text is the development of İzmir. The overall text is built on a *topos of burden* and this discourse of burden starts with the labelling of the politics in line 1. The government label is not a noun or a nominalization but a quotation

---

<sup>137</sup> Districts of İzmir.

which does not actually exist but is still uttered as if the opponent had said that. Through this quotation, Günay implies that the current local authority in İzmir has become a burden for the city because a) it does not work properly and b) it does not let others govern the city. Line 2 is a restatement of the first line which explains the character of the current local authority. Starting with line 2, Günay creates an in-group by saying that all the problems of İzmir belong to everyone and therefore inserts the AKP as a likely solution. The AKP as a solution source discourse is then supported by *argumentum ad exemplum*, in which İzmir as a negative example is compared to İstanbul and Ankara which are both governed by AKP municipalities. When it comes to positive examples whole cities are named, whereas when it comes to İzmir, districts are mentioned to show the existence of the shanty problem. This leads to an unequal comparison because there are also shanties in some districts of İstanbul and Ankara that are not mentioned in the discourse. In lines 4-5, urban transformation projects are presented as the solution to the shanty problem. They are also presented as part of a social state policy which increases the wealth of citizens at no cost to them. The verbs ‘making’ and ‘giving’ give the impression that only the state takes the initiative in the construction of houses and delivers them for free. However, urban transformation projects are highly debatable in terms of contractor firms, environmental concerns and the transfer of the city’s rents to upper-class renters and actually constitute one of the fundamental stages in the neoliberal transformation process of the economy.<sup>138</sup> However, the minister represents this debatable policy preference as a common good and blames the local authorities for not integrating İzmir into the current transformation process. Line 5 emphasizes this discourse of being late. The phrases ‘being late in collaborating’ and ‘try to compensate’ are two sides of the same coin which operationalize a *topos of urgency*. On the one hand, it emphasizes failure because of timing and on the other it implies an opportunity for the future of the city. In line 6, the locus of the discourse topic is extended to other nearby cities and further problematized. This shows that, as a policy, urban transformation is a vital part of government policy and is not only about a particular city but a general politico-economic aim. The metonymic use of Ankara (5-7) instead of the AKP government helps to neutralize the problem and the government, as if it is just a problem of organization and misgovernment. Lines 7-8 continue this discourse by using another

---

<sup>138</sup> In order to understand the monopolization of projects in the hands of contractor firms, holdings and their relationship to government in terms of the transfer of capital, see <http://www.mulksuzlestirme.org/>.

*argumentum ad exemplum* whereby the minister tries to prove this ideology-free attitude of the government by sharing his personal attitude as an example. All in all, an interest-laden ideological policy issue is represented as a natural process and the actors involved in it are either masked or neutralized in the discourse. After emphasizing the disinterest of the local authorities to collaborate with the government and providing numbers to support the argument (topos of numbers) (8-9), Günay uses the phrases ‘holding one’s hand’ and ‘make somebody stand up’ metaphorically, which indicate the power relation between local authority and government. İzmir is symbolized as a person who is about to drown and the government is depicted as a lifeguard. In lines 10-11, the minister targets CHP voters who are concerned about the conservative policies of the AKP and tries to persuade them that they are respectful of different lifestyles by the use of ‘wine’ and ‘sorbet’. These two nouns have their meaning extended and come to symbolize the secular and religious segments of society, respectively. Here the important thing is that a possible contestation of the policy is reduced to an identity clash between AKP voters and others and real concerns about the content and effect of real policy are neglected. In the last lines (12-13), Günay again tries to represent a policy as common good by *appealing to emotions* (to care for children) and exposes the aim of the government to make İzmir a ‘brand’. This notion of brand indicates the city as one to be marketed and this discourse was also seen in the speech of Erdoğan, analyzed earlier. There, Samsun was given as a positive example of a city aiming to become a centre for economic activity in terms of health, sport, education etc. Here, İzmir, although it is labelled a latecomer, is again depicted as an object for marketing. So, we see that this marketization discourse is reconstructed and distributed according to different contexts and this gives an idea of the policymaking priorities and style of the AKP.

## Text 2.

1 Turkey got out of the crisis faster than any other European country. We behaved smart.  
2 Political stability ruled the country very well. The ones who attempted to mock the  
3 prime minister on the day he said that the crisis would only slightly touch us, later  
4 acknowledged his correctness. Because we both managed the crisis well, and we also  
5 ended our relation with the IMF three years ago, while other governments were at all  
6 times dealing with the IMF, signing standby agreements, taking on debt and only trying  
7 to pay the interest. At the worst point of the crisis, ‘reach an agreement with the IMF, get  
8 hot money, transfer it to big capital’ people were saying, especially TÜSİAD,<sup>139</sup> and  
9 advising us to do this. ‘No, we will use our own capital, our own potential, we don’t  
10 need to make an agreement with the IMF’, we said. The IMF, too, said, ‘Turkey does not  
11 need us anymore.’

This speech was delivered by Bülent Arınç, former minister of state and deputy prime minister, on 19 May 2011 at a local party organization in Bursa. The reason for selecting this part of the speech is its direct relevance to the *discourse of economic prosperity and successful economic policies of the AKP* which was uttered by the prime minister in election rally speeches and party group speeches. This speech episode includes some discourse topics which were also used in previous texts and which relate to the macro-discourse topic of the economic success of the AKP. These are the *discourse of ending relations with the IMF*, the *discourse of Turkey’s positive performance in the global crisis* and the *discourse of the political incompetence of previous governments*. They are actually premises that are used to support the main argument that Turkey is economically prosperous because of the successful policies of the AKP.

Lines 1-4 start with a self-evident premise claiming that Turkey got out of the crisis faster than any other European country. There are no data to support such a claim and the reasons given, like behaving smart (1) or political stability (2), do not give a clear explanation and only create ambiguity. The wrongness of what is criticised (2-4) is again used to prove the rightness of a political statement, but this is problematic because a) the use of an adverb (the ones) does not indicate the source of criticism b) because what is critical is not clarified, and so it is not possible to prove or disprove if they acknowledge

---

<sup>139</sup> The Turkish Industry and Business Association (Turkish: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) is the top business association in Turkey.

the correctness of the prime minister (4). The only evidence is provided in line 5, ending the relationship with the IMF three years before. In so doing, ending the relationship with the IMF becomes the only indicator of economic success and other actors are evaluated on the basis of their stance on that issue. The out-groups were not very clear in the election rally speech of Erdoğan, though businessmen were part of the extended out-group of the party (see previous chapter) Here, this out-group is named as TÜSİAD, alongside previous governments. In terms of an extra-discursive effect, it is possible to say that TÜSİAD, which was one of the strongest components of the hegemonic bloc of the AKP's rule in terms of economic power (because they supported the party for years), now becomes the target of critique and the AKP's tendency to give an autonomous reaction to crisis is observed in lines 7-9. In these parts, quotations are used to emphasize the stance of both the AKP and TÜSİAD. When it comes to explaining TÜSİAD's stance, phrases with negative connotations like 'reaching an agreement', 'getting hot money' and 'transferring it to big capital' are used (7), whereas the government's stance is summarized with 'using our own capital' and 'using our own potential'. Irrespective of the consistency or rightness of the argument, the use of direct quotations serves to label the other, indirectly, as selfish (transferring money to big capital) and arrogant (advising us), whereas the government represents itself as courageous and pro-national economy (using our own capital, our own potential). However, this statement is followed by another quotation which supports the earlier statement with a statement from the IMF (9-10). Although this last statement is used as a warrant of the argument, it shows an indirect contradiction with the courageous government discourse which gives the impression that the AKP government ended the relationship with the IMF because of its independent policy concerns. After all, the expert authority of the IMF is operationalized in order to emphasize the distance from IMF policies.<sup>140</sup>

The second negative other of the text is previous governments. Unlike the reference to TÜSİAD as a particular actor, previous governmental actors are not specified in the discourse but simply merged into one. This discursive preference depends on the political aim of the actor. In the first example, there is a direct contradiction in terms of the economic interests of the actors, and the political actor tries to deligitimize the economic actor so as to legitimize its own political decision which serves its own

---

<sup>140</sup> Some extra-linguistic aspects of this discourse are discussed in the next chapter.

interests.<sup>141</sup> However, the accumulation of incompetence of previous governments is another strategic choice which helps to eliminate any possible actors by equalizing them and this intensifies the problem by giving it a historical dimension so that the government takes the credit for finding the solution to such a grave problem.

### **Text 3.**

1 Criticisms are made of missionaries that are swarming in Turkey. There are five  
2 thousand mosques in Europe, most of them built by Turks. You will do this too, but  
3 when they come and distribute a Bible, you will oppose them. This is hypocrisy. In  
4 addition, there are criticisms of the trend of our lands being sold to foreigners. This is all  
5 fiction. These sales are made by the force of bilateral agreements between countries and  
6 there is a quota of 10%. For instance, no sales were made in our period in Hatay, because  
7 the quota was used up. Now, foreign capital is coming to our country. Do we have  
8 enough local capital accumulation? No. There is money wandering in the world. This  
9 money is going to places where the investment opportunities are good. We will protect  
10 the beauty and values that make us us, but we will also be open to the whole world. We  
11 have a responsibility to compromise with the world without being degenerate.

This text is part of a speech that Hüseyin Çelik<sup>142</sup> gave on 30 May 2011 to the Chamber of Industry of Gaziantep.<sup>143</sup> This part of the speech aims to answer criticisms about particular policymaking preferences and tries to legitimize government policies. These two criticisms form the basis of the three discourse topics, which are *missionary activities in Turkey, the sale of land to foreigners* and *the necessity for foreign capital in Turkey*.

In lines 1-3, two criticisms are mentioned without clarifying any sources. In these parts, indirect voices are used. The main rhetorical strategy used in the text is *prolepsis* where the speaker raises an objection to their policy/ argument and immediately answers it. The first objection/ criticism is intensified by a hyperbolic expression, ‘swarming’, in the form of an idiom. This hyperbolic expression helps the speaker to disprove the argument more easily because the presentation of the situation is very exaggerated and sounds

---

<sup>141</sup> One of these interests may be the transfer of capital to an emerging bourgeoisie which supports the government in order to create a new hegemonic bloc.

<sup>142</sup> The vice-president of the AKP and the government spokesperson. The former Minister of Education.

<sup>143</sup> A city in Turkey.

unrealistic. After putting forward the criticism in such an exaggerated way, Çelik uses *comparison* to show the invalidity of the criticism, but the comparison itself is asymmetric and does not answer the criticism. The first part is intensified (5,000 mosques in Europe) and the second part is mitigated (a Bible). The use of the pronoun ‘you’ is generic, which does not target the audience but targets the unknown source of criticism (2-3). The pronoun ‘they’ also refers to an unknown agent who is crucial for understanding and evaluating the source of action. All in all, the unknown extent of an action is reduced to the distribution of a Bible by an unknown actor. In contrast, the other side of the comparison is clarified and its extent explained with statistical evidence. The criticism which is formulized as an asymmetrical comparison is labelled hypocrisy (3). It is a *straw man fallacy* where the speaker distorts the argument/ criticism of the opponent in order to prove it wrong. Actually the criticism here is not merely of the missionary activity of foreigners but whether their activities extend to distributing Bibles, if they are identified, under control etc.

Line 4 starts with a second criticism and is followed by a denial. This denial is expressed with the word ‘fiction’. The sale of land to foreigners is labelled a fiction, but the next sentence confirms that there are sales (4-5). Here, ‘only’ is used as a mitigation device and is followed by an example to show that the sales are legitimate. Legal authority becomes the source of legitimation but the law itself is also a policy preference of the governing authority and is not open to question. Therefore, the existence of a particular law is naturalized and the discussion is framed within the limits of that law. From line 6 onwards, the discourse extends to the necessity of foreign capital so the rationalization in the last part of the text is based on practical reasoning and is goal-oriented. The goal is to attract foreign capital, and to achieve this goal some compromise (10) is needed. The government also sees itself as ‘responsible’ in its compromising with the world. Here, the world is a replacement for global markets and creates an abstraction. This abstraction is also a way of naturalizing the market economy, which is depicted as the reality of the world. This means that the government takes an active role in marketization, and the marketization of the country as the foremost political aim surpasses the religious or conservative concerns of the party which were observed in previous speeches. Religious and nationalist discourse, which is inherent to the party, evaporates and is even criticized when it becomes a burden on a policymaking preference. Çelik’s speech is a good example to see how the party manoeuvres in discourse when its conservative/ religious

identity clashes with pro-market policymaking. This discursive manoeuvre also gives off signals about the policymaking priorities of the party and the inconsistency of its conservative/ religious identity which is frequently utilized against its political opponents to attract voters.

#### **Text 4.**

1 Ranting is not harmful to health. Peradventure, if he comes to power years later, says  
2 that he will distribute the money that we saved in the treasury. My brother, whose money  
3 are you distributing to whom? Are you a looter? It does not work to behave like a  
4 prodigal. You will come, you will form your sources, then you will distribute. We see  
5 that the citizen is not giving credit to this. The candle of someone who lies always burns  
6 just to be elected.<sup>144</sup> We will see together whose candle will burn and whose lightbulb  
7 will burn on the morning of 13 June.

This text is part of a speech that the Minister of Energy and Natural Sources, Taner Yıldız, gave on 4 June 2011 to a meeting in Bünyan.<sup>145</sup> The election concern is very salient in the text and the minister builds his discourse on one of the earlier statements of the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, although his name is never mentioned in the text. Thus, the main discourse topic is the *statement of Kılıçdaroğlu to distribute the money in the treasury*.

This discourse topic is a reproduction of the same discourse which was uttered by the prime minister in the election rally speech in Samsun. There, the prime minister was blaming Kılıçdaroğlu for ‘slavering’ to the money in the treasury. This time, Yıldız targets Kılıçdaroğlu and starts with a general statement in line 1. The use of the word ‘ranting’ was also observed in the research previously, when the prime minister was labelling the opposition actors as ‘ranters’ for their election promises. Likewise, Yıldız labels Kılıçdaroğlu as ranting although he does not mention his name. This statement has the meaning that the opposition can say anything because it is not in power and therefore incurs no cost. The adverb ‘peradventure’ implies a slim chance and ‘years later’ supports this implication by adding some distance. These linguistic devices are used here because the actor has to conduct a criticism in a hypothetical context in which the

---

<sup>144</sup> A revised version of the saying ‘the candle of someone who lies always burns just until midnight’. It means that liars never prosper.

<sup>145</sup> A town in Turkey.

opposition is in power. However, he also wants to mitigate this possibility so that the opposition party can be depicted as a weak opponent. After temporarily upgrading the opposition to government, Yıldız uses direct speech to claim that Kılıçdaroğlu will distribute the money to unknown actors (2). This money is defined as money that the AKP government saved. Then, the opposition leader is labelled as looter (3), prodigal (3) and liar (5), as a result of the decontextualization of Kılıçdaroğlu's statement. Lines 2-4 are a typical example of *apostrophe* where Yıldız asks rigged questions to a non-existent actor. These questions give the impression that the minister is struggling for the right of the people against an actor trying to waste the financial resources of the nation. The hypothetical context is presented as if it is real and the distorted statement of the opposition leader is used to blame the actor. In fact, the national bank is an independent institution and the money in it cannot be controlled or used by governments. Based on this information, it becomes easier to evaluate the validity of the argument. So, in terms of argumentation, a *straw man* is the main fallacy in this passage and it is followed by *argumentum ad populum* (4-5) where citizens are praised for their good conscience. The text is finished with a revised saying in which the CHP leader is indirectly labelled a liar who will not succeed because of this. This text is a good example to see how non-existent discourse can be created or revised and then challenged to weaken opposition actors. The macro-discursive aim is to divert the direction of criticism from the government to the opposition so that the opposition spends more time on clarifying and legitimizing itself.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> An example of Kılıçdaroğlu trying to clarify himself on this issue can be found at: <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=251744>.

### Text 5.

1 If you have done work, show me. I am showing what I have done. We brought hospitals  
2 to a functioning state. Our work in Turkey includes the motorway from İzmir to İstanbul,  
3 the sea route from Mudanya to İstanbul, our work is express trains, our work is the state  
4 hospitals that we brought to Bursa, dams, lakes, agricultural irrigation projects. All of  
5 these are our work. We are not only giving coal, food and supplies to aid th poor. We are  
6 giving big support, whatever they need. These are the preconditions of being a social  
7 state. Our claim is this: we do politics for service. You gave us the vote, we came to  
8 power alone. What will we do? In the past, governments were filling their own pockets.  
9 Our politics is for the nation. We will satisfy the nation’s needs, solve their problems, we  
10 will make life livable. We do politics for service. Governments should not be ones that  
11 patronize folk, oppress, but rather serve folk. The AKP is the one which serves folk.

This paragraph is part of a speech given by Bülent Arınç, a minister of state and deputy minister, on 7 June 2011 to a meeting organized by the local party organization of Osmangazi.<sup>147</sup> The two main discourse topics here are *the AKP’s successful policies* and *the AKP’s understanding of politics*.

The text is, discursively, a reproduction and redistribution of a political success discourse uttered before by the prime minister in an election rally speech in Samsun. In this speech, the prime minister described the process of successful policymaking as ‘talking with our work’. Likewise, Arınç also determines that a condition for success in politics is improvements in the service and construction sectors. He starts a conversation with an unknown subject and uses the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ (1). Here, ‘I’ represents the party and ‘you’ represents the oppositional actors. Then he gives examples to ‘show’ that the AKP government is successful (2-4). In these examples, there are some points worth mentioning. The repetition of ‘our work’ is *anaphora*, which intensifies the meaning and emphasizes possession, ‘bringing hospitals to a functional state’ implies that the hospitals were not functioning before. Mudanya and Bursa are mentioned to attract local voters, and dams and lakes are counted separately although the intended meaning is dam-lakes. These examples actually impose a certain way of policymaking which is represented as a success. For example, in any of the analyzed speeches, there are no

---

<sup>147</sup> A county in Turkey.

proposals or emphasis on industrial production, structural plans for decreasing unemployment or foreign-source dependency.

Lines 4-6 deal with another issue which is social policy. In this part, a *topos of definition* is used to define a social state as an entity providing people with goods in the short term. Instead of increasing employability and therefore creating economically independent citizens, allocating coal, food and other supplies to the poor (5) is seen as a precondition of being a social state. However, the positive representation of this policy masks certain other aspects. Firstly, this discourse indirectly accepts that there are large segments of society which are dependent on basic supplies after a decade of AKP rule. This fact clashes with the successful policy discourse of the government. Secondly, the unfair political competition, which is an outcome of the allocation of supplies under the name of the ruling party before the elections, is masked in the discourse. Thirdly, the representation of such a policy as a social one can be considered populist since it creates provisional wealth in the short term but does not solve structural unemployment and is therefore doomed to failure in the long run. So, this discourse of a social state successfully blurs the line between charity aid and socioeconomic rights and presents the first one as the function of a social state. After changing the content of the notion and matching it to the policymaking preferences of the party, it becomes very difficult to oppose the government aids because those who oppose this policy will be labelled ‘anti-social’ and ‘against folk’. This is in the last part of the speech where Arınç distinguishes the government from others. Politics is seen as a ‘service’ (6-9) and the government is there for ‘satisfying people’s needs’, ‘solving their problems’ and ‘making life liveable’ (8-9). This means that instead of emphasizing rights, services are underlined. The word ‘service’ has particular importance in this context because almost every service has a cost. However, these costs (in the health or transportation sectors) are masked in the discourse. The last two lines include an indirect reference to the single party rule of the CHP and Arınç blames the CHP for patronizing folk and suppressing them. This is a kind of strategy which is always observable in AKP discourse. The general idea is to praise the party politics of the AKP and to blame other actors, especially the CHP, for not realizing these policies as if they are in power now or have ever been so in the multi-party era. We also see that the ‘service discourse’ of Erdoğan is again operationalized in Arınç’s speech, and in the same form.

## Text 6.

1 We are encountering, on the one hand, a group who are against energy investment, and  
2 on the other hand another structure which complains about energy prices. Turkey is  
3 today 52% dependent on natural gas. We import petroleum both as a raw material and  
4 for energy purposes. At the moment, petroleum prices have reached the level of 110  
5 dollars. Turkey has this structure: Every 10 dollars increase in the petroleum price  
6 increases our current debt by 4 billion dollars. Energy prices are the main determinant of  
7 current debt. We need to change our energy structure. It is too late for nuclear power  
8 plants.

This speech was made by Zafer Çağlayan, Minister for the Economy, on 11 July 2011 at a meeting with members of the Chamber of Commerce of Ankara. In this text, it is possible to see how a policy is proposed as a necessity through linguistic means. The main discourse topic is *the necessity for nuclear power plants*; however, this discourse topic is supported by two other discourse topics which are *Turkey's dependency on petroleum imports* and *the increasing debt of Turkey*.

The first line starts with the formation of two out-groups against the government. But these out-groups are structured in a special way so that they contradict each other. The first one is labelled as a group, whereas the other one is labelled as a structure (2). This distinction is crucial, since the first ones, who are against energy investment, represent a minority which is compared to the second group. This second group is named as a 'structure' that actually represents the population, who are not satisfied with energy prices as consumers and want a solution to the problem. So, what we see is that the government official risks losing some prestige by articulating a complaint/ problem (for which the government should be responsible) to legitimize another policymaking preference. By doing that, the focus of criticism of the second group shifts from the government to the first group in the discourse, who are against that policy proposal (*trajectio in alium*). They are also presented as a burden on policymaking (*topos of burden*).

The general authorization mechanism in the text is theoretical rationality. In lines 2-5, Çağlayan uses an explanation to prove that there is an energy problem. Then he uses a definition (6) to clarify the reason for the increasing debt. In the problematization of energy imports, the pronoun 'we' is used inclusively, meaning that the government does

not distinguish itself from the wider population and represents itself as one of those suffering from the problem. It is possible to observe that problematization of the issue forms the main part of the text, whereas the policy proposal comes in the last two lines (6-7). The theoretical rationalization in lines 4-6 also underpins a *fear appeal*, since it informs the audience about prospective negative costs if the proposed policy is not realized. It also makes the use of a *topos of urgency* possible in the last line, where the minister emphasizes the belatedness in the construction of nuclear power plants.

In terms of politics, this discourse aims to achieve the following political and discursive goals:

- 1- It tries to impose a policy as a solution to an already accepted problem without discussing the pros and cons of the policy;
- 2- It neglects other possible solutions to the problem and condemns those who are inconsistent and complain about the problem;
- 3- It does not take responsibility for the occurrence of the problem and naturalizes it;
- 4- It tries to speed up the process of policymaking (which means less deliberation) and any opposition is seen as a burden.

Politically speaking, the government can even make the issue of current debt a discourse topic for which it is strongly criticized. However, there are some points which are not seen in the discourse but which are crucial to extend the content of the discourse topic and show some other possible aspects. These three aspects are formulized in several questions below:

- 1- What is the effect of Turkey's divergent foreign policy preferences with Russia and Iran on oil prices, since these are the two main exporters of oil to Turkey? Are these policy preferences economically sustainable?
- 2- What did the government do to decrease foreign dependency in the last ten years? If measures were taken, why is the national debt still increasing?
- 3- Does the government use and encourage the production of alternative energy sources? What is the ratio of alternative energy use to total energy consumption?

All in all, one can see that these alternative factors (and there are more) are not problematized in the discourse and the political actor can even paint a negative picture of the country –although the political actor is itself in charge – to impose a new policy.

### **Text 7.**

- 1 Annoying or offending doctors is beside the point. We never want that. This does not
- 2 even come into our mind. Labour peace is made possible by making the people who
- 3 work in that sector happy. This is an important thing. But we don't have a stance or
- 4 position like assigning the health of our citizens only to the doctors in clinics, leaving it
- 5 to their mercy.

This text is part of a speech made by Hüseyin Çelik, former Minister of Education and vice-president of the AKP on 19 July 2012 in a press release. In this part of the speech, the discourse topic is *the whole day bill*, which was passed although it was a highly debatable policy and annulled by the constitutional court. The law is still on the government's policy agenda and it aims to forbid doctors to work in private clinics and force them to decide to work either in state hospitals or the private sector/ clinics. Since the government's policy – in accordance with economic neoliberalism – sees the public sector and in particular the health sector as profitable fields, it tries to privatize health services and transfer them to the private sector. However, this de/regulatory function of the state does not continue without encountering defiance because the segments of society which are directly involved in that sector are affected by these policymaking preferences. In this example, doctors and patients are the two main groups which are affected by the whole day bill. So, the government uses a macro-discursive strategy which makes doctors and patients come face to face by supporting one group's rights against the other's. This populist discourse, which presents itself as a supporter of the wider population, tries to scapegoat the workers in that sector to legitimize the policy proposal and turn them into a target. This discursive strategy 1) helps to mask the real effects or intention of the policy by the operationalization of a 'noble cause' and 2) shifts the blame for structural problems onto the employees in that sector to gain legitimacy and suppress the opposition.

Çelik's 'noble cause' in the text is presented as the health of the citizens (4), and the government presents itself as a responsible actor that has to save its patient's health from danger. *The topos of danger* is the current form of the law which allows doctors to work

in both clinics and hospitals. 'Leaving it to their mercy' (4) also signifies a *topos of abuse* which implies that doctors abuse their right to work outside state hospitals to earn more money, and this threatens people's health. However the first three lines start with a clarification of the government's position and give some credit to doctors. This conciliatory discourse is a preparatory phase before the confrontation phase, where doctors who are against the policy will be dismissed for the benefit of the larger population. The conciliatory discourse is supported by *apophasis* where offending doctors are emphasized by restating a denial of them in three successive sentences and by a definition which gives the impression that the government knows and cares about the happiness of the sector's employees. Nevertheless, this principle is sacrificed in favour of a more important principle which is an assurance of citizens' quality health treatment.

This argumentation cannot be considered fallacious merely by looking at the linguistic devices operationalized in the discourse. Its rhetorical aim can only be questioned if the social outcomes of the general health policy can be understood. Here, the problem is the masking of the possible socio-economic effects of a policy by making the audience focus on a single point. More than that, in order to gain consent for that policy, the government uses a populist discourse and targets the victims of that policy (like the others) as the reason for the problematic point at issue. When we look at the previous discourse of the prime minister, we see how health is presented as a service in the market. The government's concern is to increase the market value of health services by reorganizing their structure. The discourse in this text appears to be inconsistent with a policy of marketing health services since the government does not try to problematize the reasons why doctors work outside state hospitals or how their working conditions can be improved so that the overall quality of health services can increase. But actually the discourse works in favour of the policy. While the policy indirectly pushes doctors to work in the private sector, and as a consequence patients will be directed to private hospitals, the discourse basically has three functions to help realize the policy: a) It masks the economic and social outcomes of the policy by focusing on a single point, b) It presents the dissident/affected actors as the cause of the problem to gain legitimacy among the wider population and c) It presents the policy as a common good to silence opposing perspectives.

## **Text 8.**

1 It is our sensitivity to struggle with every kind of extra-legal and unethical behaviour  
2 which aims to disturb societal piece, violate the freedom of try things, people's freedom  
3 to work, the innocence of the household, safety in the street. At this point, several  
4 negative developments happened from time to time, they can happen again. There may  
5 also be other attempts; but concerning the point reached today, one of the areas where  
6 our government has been most successful is the success of Turkey being a peaceful  
7 country. The efforts will continue to carry this to an advanced level.

8 Our domestic security units, our police, our gendarmerie, our coastguard organization,  
9 our private constabulary which does policing and the private security organizations with  
10 their personnel will be in an endeavour together with an integrated understanding to  
11 advance further in the field of security services as in every field. I too, as a minister, will  
12 do my share concerning paving the way for our organization, cheering them up,  
13 following up the topic of legislative arrangements that they need, providing the material  
14 that is needed I the form of technical hardware and of course ensuring the best and most  
15 appropriate use of them all. I believe that we will be successful with our friends.

This speech is part of a government statement made by İdris Naim Şahin, former Minister of the Interior on 7 July 2011. The main discourse topic in this text is *the sensitivity of the government to deal with extra-legal behaviour*. This discourse is accompanied by a *discourse of increasing the quality of the security forces* and a *discourse of ministerial support for the security forces*. They can be seen as an extension of the discourse of Erdoğan, which was supporting and legitimizing use of the police force as well as forming an in-group with police against protestors. This speech by the minister aligns with that discourse and extends it by including prospective measures as a declaration of discourse which will reinforce policymaking further. In relation to Erdoğan's speech, it shows how the government approaches anti-government protests and how it perceives the act of protesting in general.

The first three lines starts with a summary of the government's sensitivities. In this part, the political character of the government is smeared and it adopts the role of a responsible state. Instead of accepting protests as a democratic reaction to government policies, the minister represents them as a security problem which threatens ordinary citizens. By doing that, the locus of political protests shifts from the government to

ordinary citizens in the discourse. The labels for forbidden behaviour which are listed in lines 2-3 are 'extra-legal' and 'unethical'. These two labels have particular importance. Instead of illegal, the adjective extra-legal is used as a euphemism and collocates with unethical. By doing that, the intervention space of the police force is extended in the discourse. Alongside illegal activity, extra-legal activity, which connotes forbidden but legitimate acts, and unethical behaviour, which is by any means exempt from legal enforcement, become targets of the police force. The verbs 'disturbing' and 'violating' depict a harmonic/ peaceful society (2) which is threatened by undefined actors. In any case, these actors are not seen as a part of society and become 'the other' because they disturb the harmony. Line 3 starts with self-criticism which is mitigated by the phrase 'several negative developments'. The nominalization 'development' obfuscates the content and agents of the action, as well as naturalizing police violence. This naturalization continues with an indication that it can happen again (4). This short and mitigated compromise that accepts the existence of 'negative developments' is followed by a re-emphasis on dealing with 'attempts', meaning protests which try to disturb the peace of the country, and which is presented as one of the biggest successes of the government (6). Thus, the use of law-enforcement officers is seen as a warrant for a peaceful society and legal authority is used to legitimize the use of force by the police. The protests are evaluated on the basis of security. The last line of the first part of the speech underlines that this policy will continue; however, 'the advanced level' of success is not clarified.

The second part of the text forms an in-group and shows clearly where the government stands when it comes to the use of force by the police. The possessive pronoun 'our' is used repetitively, before listing the security forces, as well as while talking about organization (our organization, our friends in 12-15), and has an inclusive meaning. Private and state security forces are not distinguished and the minister indicates that they will be supported by every means (10). This support includes technical, psychological, educational and legislative aspects (12-13), and the main aim is presented as being 'paving the way for our organization'. This implies that current legal arrangements and capabilities restrict use of the security forces and so these will be changed and improved to increase their sphere of action.

All in all, the government sees political protests as a security issue, criminalizes them and takes that opportunity to advance a policy of extended use of the police/ security

forces. This discourse is totally in line with that of Erdoğan in terms of supporting not the only the use of security forces but the police as an organization. In order to secure their political existence, the government tends to emphasize state power which protects citizens from possible threats. Here again, the ones who protest against the government are separated from the main population and depicted as a threat to others (1-3) so that different segments of society can be used against each other to secure a political position.

### **Text 9.**

1 Yesterday, I listened to a highly credible official from Syria. Filled with tears, he said:  
2 ‘My honourable minister, because a father who lost his child in an air bombardment  
3 could not go out and bury him, he put the child in the fridge to avoid a stink. I personally  
4 saw it.’ What kind of torture is this? In the past, we gave friendly advice to Syria but we  
5 didn’t impose anything. But whenever folk are overrun, then it changes at that time.  
6 ‘Don’t be interested in whatever happens there.’ No, that is impossible. We cannot do it  
7 as humans. We cannot do it for the future of the country and the region. Like the  
8 Bosnian government of the time which struggled with snipers, I am memorizing it with  
9 appreciation; we too, should adopt a certain attitude. As a humanitarian aspect, we will  
10 continue to protect our Syrian brothers without making any ethnic and denominational  
11 distinction. This is a requirement of the culture of our state. We want the transition  
12 process in Syria to be completed in a peaceful and healthy way, as soon as possible, and  
13 in this way Syria can return to the international community as a strong and stable  
14 neighbour.

This text is part of an answer given by the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, on 6 November 2012, concerning criticism of the Syrian policy of Turkey in parliament. The main discourse topic is *the increasing violence in Syria and Turkey’s interest in that issue*. The discourse here mainly concerns reproduction of the *necessary involvement* discourse which was uttered by Erdoğan in a party group speech on 2 January 2012. It also extends the discussion and tries to legitimize possible armed action by analogical reference.

The first four lines start with *argumentum ad exemplum*, in which a tragic example is used to operationalize a threat to the Syrian government. The example given is also supported with *argumentum ad misericordiam*, in terms of both linguistic preferences

(discursive construction of the man who narrates the story (1) and a rhetorical question to intensify the meaning (3-4)) and the content of the story (the desperation of the father in a terrible situation). A direct quotation as observed in previous texts is also used here. One can observe the repetitive attempts to prove the truth of the story. This attempt starts with the minister's use of *personal authority based on status* in the first line, using the phrase 'highly credible official'. The minister also transfers his own experience (topos of personal experience) to the audience to increase the credibility of the story with use of the pronoun 'I'. More than that, this *topos of personal experience* continues in the direct quotation in the story and the witness in the story claims that he saw the event personally (3). 'What kind of torture is this?' (4) is not just a *rhetorical question* but also an *exclamation* which interrupts the natural flow of the text and gives emotional effect to the quoted event. Line 4 is the point where a rupture from the emotional scene occurs and a return to politics is observed. The pronoun 'we' starts to be employed instead of 'I' to emphasize the power of the state, and this ends with a threat (5). The phrases 'friendly advice' and 'not to impose anything' are followed by a policy proposal which demands 'a certain attitude' (8). Before coming to this proposal, the quasi-quotes of unknown actors are uttered in an exaggerated way to prove them wrong. Then, the minister answers these possible criticisms by using moral legitimation and a *topos of humanity* (5). He uses analogy and compares the situation by making reference to the Bosnian war to provide moral justification for possible armed action by the Turkish government. The use of 'snipers' by the government is given as an example to build legitimacy for a possible armed intervention in Syria (7-8). This analogy is false, because in the first example the indicated actor is defending its own country, whereas in the Syrian case, Turkey, or any other country, is an external actor and any direct intervention in Syria could be seen as an offence against a sovereign state. In line 8, it is also possible to see *paranthesis* where the minister cuts off the natural flow of speech and shows his personal support for the Bosnian government's attitude so as to increase the validity of the analogy. However, this offensive discourse ends in line 8 and is replaced by a more humanitarian one. Turkey's interest in Syria is legitimized with a *topos of history* (a requirement of the culture of the state) in the last part of the text (10). In the last sentence a 'peaceful and healthy' transition is emphasized as a wish but it does not contradict the offensive discourse that was observed before because this wish is supported by a *topos of urgency* (as soon as possible) in the same sentence (11), which gives the impression that

the Turkish government is also considering other options if the transition period is not completed ‘on time’.

The text shows how a particular policy statement evolves over time and is developed further for possible action. One can also see that different discursive strategies are used in relation to each other, harmonically and intensively, to achieve the discursive/ political goal. The different stages of a discourse may look contradictory sometimes, but even these contradictory elements complement each other in the entirety of the discourse. A contradiction in a discourse can also be a result of the limits of the political actor’s power. For example, this example shows that even if the Turkish government is in favour of direct intervention in Syria, it does not have the freedom to act alone so it tries to use peaceful statements with interventionist ones to retain its political flexibility while trying to gain support and legitimacy for an interventionist position.

**Text 10.**

1 Regarding the 45.1 billion dollars of privatization carried out since 1986, our success in  
2 this field will surface more explicitly. But I also want to indicate this, we as the  
3 government do not see privatization as an income channel. On the contrary, we evaluate  
4 it as a phenomenon which increases investment, employment and efficiency in the short  
5 and medium term. So, we prioritized privatization practices in our periods of  
6 government, which contributed largely to the increases in growth potential and  
7 development speed of our country, and the decreases in the burdens of employment and  
8 finance on the public. After this, we will continue these practices with the same  
9 determination.

The text above is part of a speech made by Mehmet Şimşek, Minister of the Exchequer, on 26 November 2012 to parliament's planning and budget sub-commission.

The main discourse topic in this text is *privatization and its relation to economic growth* which can be considered as a part of the macro-discourse topic of economic success. The first line starts with a *topos of numbers* to show that the current government is successful at privatization. A *topos of numbers* is used as a warrant to prove a hidden promise which takes the amount of privatization to be a successful economic policy. The second line starts with a theoretic rationalization and the minister starts to explain how they approach the policy of privatization. This explanation is operationalized by a contrast

between two kinds of approach to the notion. The first one sees it as an income channel (3), whereas the other sees it as a source of investment, employment and efficiency (4). The nominalizations used here, in the form of *hendiatris*,<sup>148</sup> are catchwords symbolizing economic development in general. However, their collocation is problematic in the sense that these notions do not need to complement each other every time. If the term efficiency is taken from the perspective of a firm, a firm can fire workers (against the principle of increasing employment) to increase efficiency so that it can maximize its profits. Likewise, the relation between investment and employment can also change according to the kind of investment. For example, Ekinçi (2011) analyzes the data between 1980 and 2010 concerning the relations between foreign direct investment (FDI), economic growth and employment in Turkey. He comes to the conclusion that there is no relation between FDI and employment. This means that it is impossible to establish a ‘taken for granted’ positive relationship, neither between privatization and economic development nor between investment, employment and efficiency.

Line 5 presents its policy practice based on this false assumption that was argumentatively proved and elaborated above. This policy preference is ‘prioritizing privatization practices’ (5). Although the practices are not described in detail (*ambiguity*), their positive effect is listed as an increase in growth potential and development speed as well as a decrease in the burdens of employment and finance on the public. A *topos of burden* is the strategy used here to defend this privatization policy and downgrade the social role of the state (6-7). The replacement of the word ‘state’ by ‘public’ obfuscates the benefits of the welfare state as a right and represents them as a ‘burden’ on the people. In the last line, the minister indicates that the government will continue the same policy with the same ‘determination’, which closes the channels for deliberation on the policy itself. Since the success of the policy is proved throughout the text, deliberation becomes unnecessary for this policy, which has been proved right and followed by the government for years. This text is a good example of how the de-regulation and re-regulation roles of the state in favour of the market are legitimized and promoted in the discourse as a common good. The overall argumentation structure can be labelled as *petitio principii* (*begging the question*), which means that what is controversial and in question and has to be proved is presupposed as the starting point of

---

<sup>148</sup> The use of three words to define an idea.

the argumentation. In this case, it is the representation and promotion of privatization as the best economic policy.

**Text 11.**

- 1 If we focus on an aim, if we want to improve the quality of the Turkish education
- 2 system, if we want to increase our children's competitive capacity at the global level, to
- 3 bring education into line with the market at the national level, to respond to our society's
- 4 expectations and needs, if we want to make our children to have societal and moral
- 5 values, to give them historical consciousness, national consciousness, what can be the
- 6 meaning of the remainder?

This text is part of a speech delivered by the former Minister of Education, Ömer Dinçer, on 6 June 2012 on Quality Management Practices at a Minister of National Education meeting. The name of the meeting already gives an idea about the market-oriented reorganization of the education sector since the notion of 'quality management' or 'total quality management' was first used to represent a new understanding of management by companies.<sup>149</sup> This part of the speech sets out *the aims for a better education system* and can also be considered as the discourse topic.

The text starts by listing the presupposed aims and ends with a rhetorical question. The whole text is organized as a particular kind of rhetorical question (*anacoenosis*), which sets a common goal to gain consent for a future proposal. In the first line, the pronoun 'we' does not refer to a particular agent which focuses on the listed aims but is rather used in an inclusive way. This implies that the listed aims are shared by all parties in the education sector. The first and foremost aim is to increase the quality of education. The other aims of a) increasing children's competitive capacity at the global level, b) bringing education into line with the market at the national level, c) responding to our society's expectations and needs, d) giving our children societal and moral values and e) historical consciousness and national consciousness are aims which are either achieved by implementation of the first aim (c-e) or the means for achieving the first aim (a-b). The last three aims, which are actually represented as outcomes of increasing education quality and the main aim of increasing education quality itself, are generally shared beliefs because their content and the means for realizing them are vague. The means represented as common goals (a-b) are, in contrast, highly disputable, because it is, for

---

<sup>149</sup> For the origins and evolution of the term, see Martínez-Lorente, Dewhurst and Dale (1998).

instance, impossible to establish a direct positive correlation between increasing children's competitive capacity at the global level and responding to societal needs, or bringing education into line with the market and making children have societal and moral values. Dinçer uses goal-oriented rationalization to justify and encourage marketization practices in the education sector. While doing so he combines nationalist (5) and religious/ moral (4) discourse with pro-market discourse so that all possible conflicts and concerns can be labelled as a 'remainder' (5) and neglected for the noble cause of increasing the marketization of the education sector.

## **8.2. Conclusion:**

In this chapter, eleven texts from ministerial speeches have been analyzed to reveal the cross-references between discourses and other texts so that the distribution of governmental discourses to realize particular policymaking preferences can be better understood. Discourses on economic prosperity, foreign policy, the healthcare system, education, energy policy, policing and finance are reproduced in the speeches of ministers and prioritize the marketization of society. As in Erdoğan's speeches, topoi of numbers, burden and history, straw men, apostrophe, indirect quotations and exclamations are the most frequent strategies used to refer to a particular aspect of a topic, legitimize policy proposals and condemn actors/discourse which oppose proposals. In particular, social rights are reframed as services, cities are evaluated according to their market value, public spending is seen as a burden and privatization is seen as a major indicator of economic success, in line with economic neoliberalism. The policies are presented from a single perspective and potential counter-arguments are restated in a fallacious way. It is also important to emphasize that the government adopts a 'strong state' discourse, when political opposition surfaces, as political action. With the help of the discursive means shown in the analysis, the AKP pretends there are security concerns in order to extend the scope and legitimize the use of force by the police.

## **CHAPTER 9: EVALUATING THE POLITICS OF THE AKP IN LIGHT OF THE ANALYSIS**

The initial motivation for this study was to understand the ways in which the AKP tries to maintain and expand its political hegemony through specific discursive strategies which are conceptualized as hegemonic projects. Once these traits are identified in the analysis, the relevance of the different positions and conceptualizations of the party and its functions can be assessed and interpreted. In line with these aims, the last chapter 1) summarizes the theoretical and methodological grounding of the research 2) evaluates the findings in detail and 3) assesses the validity of the claims as well as interprets results on the discursive level by taking the wider socio-political context into account as an indispensable component of DHA. In the last part, concluding remarks, shortcomings and ideas for the future research are shared with the reader.

### **9.1. Summary of the theory, questions and methodology**

#### **a) Theoretical Grounding:**

Exploring and defining the political character of the party are central points in the research and problematized at the beginning. In order to investigate discussions about the party's identity, I draw on existing research: To date, there are basically three conceptualizations of the AKP. The first one views the party as an Islamist one and tends to evaluate its policy preferences on the basis of its religious content. According to this view, the party has a secret agenda to transform the country into an Islamist one by undermining laicism. The party is depicted as a reactive/ conservative one which uses democracy as an instrument to achieve its political aim of establishing an Islamist republic based on religious principles. Single policy-making preferences concerning religious content such as increasing the budget of the Turkish directorate of religious affairs, changing the curriculum of high school classes in line with religious doctrine or increasing the taxes on alcohol are seen as signs of the Islamization of society and also as a threat to people's secular lifestyle.

The second definition, which is preferred by the party itself, can be perceived as the antithesis of the first one. This second definition claims that the party neither follows a political Islamist path in its policy preferences nor does it have a problem with the secular state or different lifestyles. Rather, the party sees itself as a continuation of a

liberal tradition which can be traced back to the 1950s and identified with centre-right parties like the Democrat Party. The AKP continuously tries to distinguish itself from the political Islamist tradition and emphasizes that it shares Western values in terms of economic and political liberalization. Every kind of radicalism is condemned and ideology-based politics are criticized for being outdated. Instead, a ‘service-based politics’ irrespective of any ideological stance is presented as the right perspective, which is claimed to be adopted by the party as well.

I claimed that these two seemingly alternative definitions of the party actually form a modern-religious dichotomy in the existing research and hinder understanding of the ‘real’ character of the party, although both views have pertinent evaluations. These two definitions are also voluntarist in the sense that they perceive the party as an omnipotent agent in politics, as if the party could be exempt from multiple power relations and define its aims and political existence irrespective of any global trends in politics and economics. Therefore, I looked for a third conceptualization which is more suited to understand the political evolution and agenda of the party.

This third view defines the AKP as a neo-conservative party which adopts the role to pursue neoliberal transformation of the country in accordance with global capitalism which has started in the early 1980s. The religious traits and practices assigned to the party should not be seen as a burden to neoliberal policymaking but rather as a complementary aspect of providing support and consent to these policies. In other words, the moderate Islamic discourse and identity of the party are actually a shield which a) masks its neoliberal character, b) helps to gain consent for policymaking preferences and c) makes it easier to cope with political criticism and delegitimize the sources of criticism by referring to the religious sensitivities of the population.

Defining the AKP as a neoliberal/ neoconservative party does not only help in understanding the meaning of the evolution of the National View movement<sup>150</sup> and making sense of the increasing political power of the party, but also allows observing the discursive attempts to maintain and extend the political hegemony of the party in an economic era where the marketization of society is prioritized as a global trend. That trend, known as neoliberalism, is also discussed, in depth, in the literature. For instance, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) provide four different but interrelated definitions of

---

<sup>150</sup> See the context chapter for a political evaluation of this movement.

neoliberalism which focus on policymaking, ideological, development model and academic model aspects. The policymaking aspect includes a) liberalization of the economy via the elimination of price controls, deregulating capital markets and lowering trade barriers, b) reduction of the role of the state in the economy via the privatization of state enterprises and c) fiscal austerity and macro-economic stabilization via tight control of the money supply, decreasing budget deficits and the curtailment of government subsidies. The ideological aspect refers to overall normative claims or principles about how a society should be organized. It emphasizes individual liberties and freedom as well as a diminishing role for the state in every sphere of social life.

The development model aspect organizes state-society relationships by re-regulation of the relations between labour unions, private enterprise and the state according to market interests. Finally, the academic aspect depicts individuals as utility and profit-maximizing producers and consumers who act rationally according to signals from the free market. Based on this assumption, unlike normative definitions of the term, this paradigm tries to understand the operational mechanisms of the market in a 'positivist' way (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 144).

Meanwhile Ward and England (2007) provide four different definitions of the term which have some similarities to the aforementioned aspects. These four definitions depict neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project, a policy and a programme, a state form and governmentality.<sup>151</sup> Finally, I conclude that a single conceptualization of the term does not suffice because these seemingly separate aspects are interrelated. That means neoliberalism accommodates micro and macro, intentional and unintentional, sociopolitical and economic aspects within itself, and these aspects are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. As an alternative and comprehensive approach to the term, I look at Springer's (2012) definition of neoliberalism as a circulating discourse which aims to articulate structural interpretations of the term with poststructuralist ones as a starting point, and thus overcomes the tensions between structural/ agential/ discursive interpretations by creating an all-encompassing explanation of the phenomenon (p. 137). Still, I problematize the definition of neoliberalism as a discourse which relies heavily on a post-structural understanding of the term because discourse is proposed as an embracing notion that determines all other aspects of social and economic life.

---

<sup>151</sup> See the review chapter for a detailed definition and discussion of these aspects.

Rather than choosing one of the definitions above, I see them as complementary aspects of neoliberalism and adopt a critical realist position (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 1992; Archer, 1998), which comprises structural and agential aspects of political action (without neglecting the priorities of the material world which have the capacity to shape the limits of agential action). This could well be instrumentalized in the process of understanding and evaluating the third view which sees the AKP as a neoconservative actor trying to implement neoliberal policymaking preferences (agency) in line with global capitalism (structure). It might also be suitable for testing the relevance of such a conceptualization of the party by investigating discursive strategies as hegemonic projects. Thus, following Joseph (2002, 2008), I applied the distinction between structural hegemony and hegemonic projects. Structural hegemony has the function of maintaining social cohesion and ensuring the reproduction of structural processes and relations. Of particular importance is the relation between the state and the economic system. Hegemonic projects or practices show a more conscious, political and manifold character which serves the deeper hegemonic structure. Joseph reminds us that this is the common understanding of the notion of hegemony, but as stated above, this operates as a function of structural hegemony. These two aspects of hegemony are linked and interdependent (Joseph, 2002, p.128).

In my research, structural hegemony is conceptualized as the neoliberal transformation of Turkish society which began in the 1980s and entered a new phase under the rule of the AKP government, as well as the function of the AKP in realizing and advancing these policies. This transformation is not only to be observed in Turkey but is a derivative of the global trends of capital accumulation. In other words, neoliberal trends in the economy are reflected in politics and can be seen as an ideological hegemonic project, as Ward puts it (2007). Thus, the AKP's political and economic agendas cannot be evaluated on the basis of the party's unique capacity but rather on the basis of its compatibility with the overall trend of neoliberal policymaking. This conceptualization helps us to evaluate the challenges to, or opportunities of the AKP government as a political actor. For instance, privatization in the health sector is only possible if structural changes in the healthcare system can be put into practice, like increasing the capacity of hospitals, increasing the contribution margin of patients or promoting general health insurance as a must for all citizens. On the one hand, these policies can only be implemented if they are successfully presented as a common good. On the other, the

government has to deal with opponents of these policies and silence them. Therefore, the AKP's success in this instance depends on its ability both to achieve broad consent and eliminate criticism. In this sense, this research helps to expose and evaluate these attempts in political discourse.

Hegemonic projects are realized as a function of structural hegemony and can be conceptualized as individual policymaking preferences of the party which are represented in discourse. Thus, the attempts to create and maintain a discursive hegemony are part and parcel of a wider political and economic hegemony. This way of extending the notion helps in understanding political discourses as strategies for realizing particular policymaking preferences. In our case, it means a) political discourses of the AKP which systematically represent reality from a particular perspective, b) linguistic tools that are used to create a discursive hegemony and c) ways of dealing with the opposition. An analysis based on these dimensions contributes to an evaluation of the party's identity and agenda. It also becomes possible to see the tensions (for instance dealing with criticism), limits of consent-based hegemony and the perception and representation of overall politics in the discourse of the AKP. For example, the AKP's defence of the increasing use of force by the police in its discourse is a clear sign that hegemonic projects are not put into practice deliberately and that the authoritarian tendencies of the government lead to resistant opposition. So, the political discourse in this case functions both as a threat to opponents of the government who become a target for physical coercion and as legitimation of this coercion in the eyes of the wider population.

#### **b) Research questions and data:**

In line with these aims, I wanted to determine 1) if we can see similar and common discursive strategies for different policy issues, 2) what the main traits of the political discourse which is employed by the AKP are, and 3) how the impact of political history on discourse could be assessed. They are chosen in order to expose the main character of policy proposals, how they are implemented in discourse in a strategic/hegemonic way and how history can affect the implementation of discursive strategies, as well as how history itself becomes a discursive strategy for realizing political aims.

Based on my research agenda and related research questions, I have analyzed three types of political rhetoric. These types refer to different fields of political action and

complement each other in establishing a discursive hegemony. The first two speech types (election rally speeches and party group speeches) were analyzed in full to reveal main discourse topics and how they are represented in relation to each other in order to create a positive self-representation of the government. These texts can be seen as the normative organization of a set of ideas about the self, the other and how politics should be done. They are well-structured and it is impossible to label them according to a single aspect of politics. Both speeches integrate some aspects of polity (general principles about politics), policy (content-based politics) and politics (the determination of political interests and the formation of in- and out-groups). In terms of field of action, they all aim at the formation of public opinion. It is also salient that the textual structure of the genre of party group speeches, which has the primary function of forming intra-party attitudes, is similar to that of election speeches. This means that party group speeches are seen just as another opportunity to address a wider audience and influence it, since they are televised and distributed via the news later in the day. So, the party leader seems to talk to party member MPs, but actually he is targeting the wider population. Ministerial speeches were taken as the third type of speech. They focus on the policy aspect of politics. This implies that they reproduce and distribute the discourse of the first two speech types by focusing on a particular policy. They can also extend the scope of a discourse topic, call for action or problematize an issue to legitimize a policy. That is why only those parts of these speeches which focus on different discourse topics are taken into account and analyzed.

The number of analyzed texts is eleven, because the intention is to see how various policy proposals are re-presented in ministerial speeches as technical issues. Every text deals with a particular issue, which is also elaborated in election rally and party group speeches and tries to legitimize the government's position through discursive strategies. I also wanted to investigate if the presuppositions, perspectives and the world view presented in the speeches of the prime minister overlap with ministerial speeches. It was important to see if the party's premises comply with the general traits of neoliberal policymaking and world view that were discussed earlier in this thesis. The two speeches were randomly selected from a pool of election rally speeches and party group speeches, whereas the ministerial texts were selected according to discourse topics like health, education, economic prosperity, urban transformation, foreign policy and foreign capital, which were also dealt with in the first two speeches. In all the texts, I investigated them

using five discursive strategies proposed by the discourse-historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 2001, 2009), namely predication, nomination, perspectivation, argumentation and mitigation/ intensification, in order to see how the AKP discursively constructs its own identity and presents economic and political success, how it deals with political criticism and political opponents, as well as which policymaking preferences are prioritized.

## **9.2. Results revisited on the discursive level**

The outcomes of the analysis illustrate that economic prosperity is the main focus of the AKP. In all texts, economic success is emphasized before discussing problematic areas of policymaking. For instance, if the Kurdish issue or foreign policies on Syria are discussed, first, the discourse of economic prosperity is mobilized in order to legitimize government action on other policy issues or to delegitimize criticism. In the party group speech of Erdoğan, the first part of the speech is reserved for proof of economic development in the country whereas the second and third parts try to legitimize Turkey's possible intervention in Syria and to deny the government's role in the Uludere strike where civilians were killed by Turkish aircraft. In the election rally speech, developments and their economic meaning in Samsun are emphasized in the first part, whereas the second part problematizes criticism of the AKP and delegitimizes it. In the ministerial speeches, 7 out of 11 texts directly or indirectly relate to the economic success of the AKP, although every text problematizes another policy issue. It means that economic success is presented in the analyzed texts as the prior policy aim, as the icon or even the brand of the party. The discourse of economic prosperity in that sense can be seen as the basic discourse topic, the centre, around which other discourses are organized and elaborated.

However, a particular presentation of the economy and economic success is salient in the analyzed texts. First of all, the economy is presented as a global competition and Turkey is depicted as an actor which has to fulfil some of its requirements in order to be successful. The mission of fulfilling these requirements is the duty of government. The successful economy is presented as being a result of the strong leadership and performance of the actor. While strong leadership refers to the determination of government to make the necessary political reforms in economy in favour of market needs and to eliminate the actors/ factors which might slow down or hinder this reform

process, performance refers to the speed and extent of policymaking practices. Prior aims are set as increasing the growth rate, privatization, increasing the market value of services, and even of cities, as well as securing the continuing foreign investment. Education, health, transportation and housing are seen as problematic areas which are subject to structural changes. Implementing these changes is presented as a service: the government portrays itself as a party of service instead of a party with an ideology. Even in the general election process, these policies are emphasized instead of macro-scale political problems, as if it were a municipal election. So, in terms of the representation of economic success and prior economic goals in the discourse, the AKP's position as a political actor is in line with the policymaking, development model and state form aspects of neoliberalism.<sup>152</sup>

Once the neoliberal character of policymaking is presented, the other results can help us to understand the implementation of this project in the discourse in a hegemonic way. Starting with the economic prosperity discourse which is the constructing discourse in the analyzed speeches, the main argumentation strategies are a *topos of numbers* and *begging the question*. The *topos of numbers* not only comes to the conclusion that current policy-making is right because of increasing numbers, but also fallaciously emphasizes particular indicators to prove its legitimacy. Basically, it is used fallaciously in three ways:

- 1) The selection of indicators is fallacious.

For instance, the increasing growth rate is presented as an indicator of economic success, but the increasing rate of youth unemployment or increasing import rate and current debt are not taken into consideration.

- 2) The calculation principle of the rates is fallacious.

The inflation rate is presented as low, but the inflation rate can vary according to the goods considered. Rarely-used products tend to increase less than frequently-used products, such as essential foodstuffs. Therefore, some other surveys claim higher inflation rates according to the type of goods mostly used by citizens.<sup>153</sup>

- 3) The emphasis on increases in numbers is fallacious.

---

<sup>152</sup> See the review chapter for the content of these aspects.

<sup>153</sup> For an example see: <http://www.kesk.org.tr/content/kamu-emekçilerinin-alım-gücü-düşüyor>.

For example, a certain amount of increase in the level of the minimum wage is presented as an economic success, but this increase fallaciously masks the reality that the overall minimum wage is lower than the starvation limit for a household with four members.<sup>154</sup>

Increases in numbers are not only implemented as macro-economic rates but also used to prove that policymaking in education or health is successful. For instance, merging hospitals is presented as a successful policy because of increasing capacity, but the increasing workload resulting from this preference for health-sector workers as a result of displacements is neglected in the discourse. Likewise, increasing the number of universities is seen as a success, but there is no direct correlation between an increase in numbers and an increase in the quality of university education. Although these are part of the process of privatization and the handover of the public sector to the private sector, they are presented in a one-sided way as a policy success.

Begging the question very much relates to the presumption that neoliberal policymaking is the best policy among others, without any doubt. In argumentation schemes, all the political goals are set according to this presumption. For example, high standards of democracy are related to the stability of money and finance policies; or the economic crisis in Europe is represented as a result of lack of accuracy in the implementation of market-oriented reforms. The political actor has the understanding that politics should serve the marketization of society, but this is not made explicit before evaluating a particular policy. In the end, what is debatable is presumed to be a shared opinion at the beginning, and therefore becomes exempt from questioning.

Neoliberalism as a hegemonic project also has military aspects which are related to the aims of financial hegemony (Dumenil and Levy, 2007). These can include direct or indirect interventions in countries based on economic interests. So, hegemonic discourse is not limited to issues of domestic politics but also includes foreign policy. In that sense, the second aspect of government discourse emphasizes the developments in the Middle East, and especially in Syria. In these parts, an interventionist discourse becomes more salient in the progress of speeches. This discourse starts with an initial interest in developments in the region and narrows this down to the problematizing of the Assad regime in Syria. The government's interest is legitimized through territorial approximation, a topos of history and a topos of humanity. All three strategies call for

---

<sup>154</sup> <http://www.turkis.org.tr/source.cms.docs/turkis.org.tr.ce/docs/file/aclikhaziran12.doc>.

action in the region. The first one focuses on Turkey's borders with Syria, the second on Turkey's cultural and historical ties, and the last one on the moral duty of saving innocent people's lives. This discourse is reproduced in the ministerial speech more extensively by adding a topos of personal experience and a topos of urgency and by appeals to emotions through exclamation, parenthesis, rhetorical questions and hypophora at the micro-level.

Going one step further, one can see that the extension of this interventionist discourse is the possibility of an armed conflict with a false analogy to the Bosnian War. In these parts of the text, the government's willingness for direct intervention becomes clear. This rationalizes itself through apostrophe which is also seen frequently in speeches by the prime minister. The speaker quotes non-existent statements from opposition actors (most of the time from non-present or non-existent actors) which are actually counter-arguments to the foreign policy preferences of the AKP. The orator then falsifies them. This rhetorical figure is called prolepsis. Different from a straw man, the source of the argument is non-existent as part of the discussion. More than that, some arguments are not distorted but rather produced from scratch, as if they are uttered by the opponent. Because the opponent does not exist, the orator does not simply refute the quasi-argument but also elaborates and draws conclusions from such manufactured arguments. This pattern is observed in both the election rally speech and the ministerial speeches.

All in all, the discourse about Syria shows an increasingly interventionist tendency. This policy preference is first represented as being in the national interest in the speech of Erdoğan along with the personification of Turkey as an actor. However, the analysis illustrates that the conciliatory discourse which is in favour of a peaceful transition in Syria overlaps with that of an interventionist one. Although it seems contradictory, it is actually a reflection of the limits of the government as a regional actor in the discourse. It seems that the Turkish government does not have enough capacity to realize a direct interventionist policy preference and therefore it discursively tries to make itself compatible with scenarios of both intervention and non-intervention whilst trying to gain support from the international community for the intervention option.

The discourse topic of the Uludere strike and the government's attitude towards it is another important point that needs to be emphasized because the results of the analysis show how the government approaches the Kurdish issue and how it deals with a de-facto

problem for which the AKP government is criticized. The government appeals first to argumentum ad populum on the basis of national unification so that it can then condemn identity the politics of Kurds and the BDP as their main representative. This discourse is supplemented by ‘body’ and ‘tumour’ metaphors. Instead of appealing to reasonable argumentation and proof to refute the criticism that the government has some responsibility for the attack (only argumentum ad exemplum is used once, fallaciously), it instead labels the source of criticism as being caused by terrorists and adopts a nationalist position. More than that, the CHP is also added to the out-group by relating it to the BDP. This is done by arguments based on non-sequitur where the right premises are connected to false conclusions. In the end, one can observe that instead of taking responsibility, the AKP appeals to *trajectio in alium* to shift the blame to oppositional actors. This offensive position has two rhetorical effects: 1) the government does not answer criticisms 2) the government adopts an oppositional position in the discussion so that oppositional actors find themselves in a position of defence because they are blamed for developments.

Thus, the AKP does not only shift the direction of criticism from itself to the opposition but also tries to appropriate the Kurdish issue by creating a distinction between terrorism and ordinary politics. In the first stage, the traditional representative of Kurds in the region is linked to the PKK (Kurdish terrorist organization) and indirectly labelled as terrorist. In the second stage, the CHP, which questions the role of government in the Uludere strike, is merged with the BDP as one in the discourse and the formation of an out-group is thus complete. In the third stage, the AKP tries to form an in-group with the public on the basis of a national unity discourse and an out-group, identified with the PKK-BDP-CHP and labelled a ‘malign tumour’, is also represented as a burden to be overcome. We might say that this discursive preference shows the AKP’s unwillingness to accept any criticism or responsibility for its policies as well as its determination to eliminate any actor which tries to hinder the policymaking process of the government. In terms of the Kurdish issue, this implies that the party returns to a nationalist/ reactionary position to discredit traditional actors on the issue and positions itself as the only solution in a hegemonic way.

Another important result that derives from the analysis is the government’s willingness to extend the use of force by the police by taking advantage of political protests. This two-staged discursive strategy starts with an election rally speech in which the prime

minister, Erdoğan, frames the limits of criticism/ opposition and makes the legitimacy of any kind of political opposition, other than parliamentary elections, questionable as part of a discourse of *unjust criticism and attacks on the AKP*. After victimizing the party, the out-groups which protest against the government are labelled as bandits and terrorists, whereas the in-groups are constructed as the party, nation and God.

Among other linguistic devices, such as *tricolon crescens*, *rigged questions*, *topos of definition*, *argumentum ad exemplum*, *hasty generalizations and appeals to emotions*, *parrhesia* has a particular significance in the discourse. Parrhesia, which is seen in both speeches frequently, has the function of exposing a covert truth that cannot be said because of fear. Here, Erdoğan takes responsibility and courageously indicates that the level of force by the police is legitimate and necessary. By doing that, he not only defends the position of the government against criticism but also signals extensive continuation of this policy preference. The second stage, which is the ministerial speech, takes this point, elaborates it further and announces a policy preference which will make more extensive use of force by the police force under a discourse topic of *increasing the quality of the security forces*. Especially, the use of the pronoun ‘our’ to refer to the security forces shows an effort on the part of the government to form an in-group with police use of force against any protest resulting from political discontent.

In the end, the government evaluates political protests as a security issue, criminalizes political dissidents and, more importantly, uses a security concern to extend the use of security measures. Thus, the research shows how a political development against the government is problematized as a policy issue and how it is then extended discursively to further policymaking in favour of the government. These results also acknowledge the possibility that the consent-building aspect of discursive strategies is not fully successful in deactivating political opposition and that the government will therefore appeal to political sanctions against those segments of the society that do not show consent and obedience. Interestingly, this non-discursive aspect of prospective power play can also be observed in the discursive preferences of the AKP. In these parts, the likelihood of the use of (physical) power is legitimized through the creation of a nation/others dichotomy and demonizing the other. For instance, this macro-strategy of the division of the society into segments and juxtaposing one against the other is also seen in discourses concerning health, where doctors are targeted as being responsible for the decreasing quality of patients’ treatment. It is likely that this strategy is implemented against organized labour,

like the Turkish Doctors' Union, which resists curtailing its economic and social rights in the process of neoliberal transformation.

The main discursive strategy for dealing with political criticism is to focus on the source of criticism and deligitimize it through ad hominem attacks instead of answering the criticism itself. As a result of this, instead of discussing the content of policy preferences, the political actors which oppose or defend these preferences are discussed in the discourse. In my analysis, I was able to illustrate how this can be done by merging opposition actors into one homogenous actor/group, and by labelling them/it as terrorists, a gang or bandits and thus demonizing them or presenting them as a burden on progress (*topos of burden*).

Besides that, the main political opposition actor, the CHP, is always at the centre of criticism and this criticism is made by using a topos of history. Starting from the single party rule of the CHP between 1923 and 1946, the opposition is depicted as an omnipotent political actor which has continued to control politics up until now, although they have not been in power for more than fifty years. The AKP depicts itself as the representative of people which is fighting against this elitist mentality and it also creates an in-group with the masses by positioning itself too as a victim of this rule.<sup>155</sup> Analogies which refer to poverty, corruption and undemocratic practices are directly related to the single party rule of the CHP, and thus a link between past and present is created to discredit the opposition. All in all, the implementation of a topos of history functions as an institutional ad hominem argument which helps the government to avoid political responsibility by deligitimizing the other's criticism because of its alleged past failures. It also helps to challenge the preservation and improvement of state enterprises and the vested social and economic rights of the people which are championed by the current CHP as a social democrat party. In line with the neoliberal policymaking preferences of the AKP, the CHP and its criticisms against its policymaking preferences are quoted in a twisted way (straw men, ambiguous argumentation and rigged questions) and condemned for being a burden on the development of the country. This burden is depicted in two stages: 1) The burden of the past which prevents the CHP from being a politically successful party, 2) The burden of the CHP itself which tries to hinder the successful policymaking of the AKP. It means that a topos of history becomes an

---

<sup>155</sup> See the context chapter for the historical roots of this view.

initiating discursive strategy which makes mobilisation of a topos of burden and argumentum ad hominem possible.

Although the AKP discursively situates itself as the antithesis of the CHP in terms of being the representative of the people and respecting the people's will and opinion as the ultimate power, the results surprisingly show that Erdoğan also adopts a didactic style in his speeches. This means that he teaches, informs, warns and directs the audience. The use of verbs in the form of directives like 'look, see, bring, tell', discourse markers like 'I want to draw your attention, I underline this, I always told, I am telling it again, I repeat, as known, that is to say' or rhetorical questions like 'do you know, is it right, why, what would police do, do you want me to tell you, did we this' are devices which all presuppose that the audience is uninformed, oblivious and needs to be directed. This authoritarian and didactic register is mostly used by the prime minister and it directly contradicts the depiction of a wise and informed nation, which is also very common in government discourse. Such a contradiction in the discourse was not envisaged at the beginning of the research.

There is also a remarkable relation between ministerial speeches and those of the prime minister. Not only discourse topics, but also discursive strategies and even phrases, analogies and examples overlap. For example, one can see that the legitimization of a possible Syrian intervention is provided by an argument of territorial proximity in both speeches. Likewise, the phrase 'talking through service and work' is used by both the prime minister and ministers later on. Even the verb 'ranting', which is supported with an example by the prime minister to criticize the opposition leader, is used in exactly the same form in a ministerial speech. These intertextual relations illustrate that the process of discourse production and distribution is highly systematic, intentional and coherent throughout the analyzed texts.

Finally, I would like to emphasize the use of religious statements in discourse. Although religious authority is frequently understood as a sign of respect, in phrases like 'with God's permission, thank God, it is God who has the power and authority', it is not used as a source of legitimation of any policy preference. It is used rather as positive self-representation of the political actor for a supposedly religious audience and therefore forms an in-group. Contrary to evaluating policies in terms of religious discourse, religious sensitivities are even neglected in some cases. For example, Hüseyin Çelik

emphasizes the principle of consistency in order to legitimize the increasing number of missionaries in Turkey. He gives the existence of 5,000 mosques all over Europe as an example to normalize the existence of missionary activities in Turkey. That means that far from showing a negative reaction to the missionary activities of foreigners, which would be expected from a member of a religiously oriented party, he, in contrast, labels the ones who show such a reaction as hypocrites. This finding is in line with the initial claim of the research which emphasizes the labelling of the AKP as ‘political Islamist’, which is misleading for understanding the current policies of the AKP. The party’s position is rather pragmatic and religious discourse can be instrumentalized or simply neglected according to different policy issues.

### **9.3. Links between the results and the wider socio-political context**

To summarize, the first view conceptualizes the AKP as an Islamist party and its policy preferences are evaluated on the basis of its religiosity. The party’s political actions and proposals are assessed according to their conservative content. The second view, including the AKP’s self-definition, sees the party as part of a liberal tradition which has struggled against state monopoly and suppression and favoured the individual as well as economic freedoms. This research’s initial claim was that these dichotomic views might not allow a comprehensive analysis of party politics and would in fact mask the neoliberal/ neoconservative character of the AKP. That is why a third position, which sees the religious background of the AKP as a functional feature of realizing neoliberal or neoconservative policymaking, is adopted and evaluated on the basis of critical discourse analysis. Based on the outcomes of the analysis, it is possible to claim that this third way of conceptualizing the party as a neoliberal/ neoconservative actor is more valid than the other two conceptualizations. In my conclusion, I want to indicate some aspects of this policymaking by making use of the current literature which further supports the findings of this research.

Yaşlı (2012) is one of the few scholars who shows some comprehensive links between the discursive and political spheres of hegemony concerning the AKP’s rule which he defines as a new regime based on a liberal-conservative coalition (Yaşlı, 2012). Without doing a detailed discourse analysis, he exposes some of the discursive strategies of the party in relation to the policymaking preferences of the AKP. Some of them, which are discussed in his work, can be listed thus:

- 1) An attempt to create a discursive rule based on some principal notions which are redefined and repetitively uttered with dense propaganda so that all political discussions revolve around these notions. In the end, there is no way to get out of *the discursive prison* of the government. Some of these notions are: national will/nation, status quo, tutelage, demilitarization, Jacobism, bureaucratic mentality, single-party mentality, democratization.
- 2) A particular reading of history which makes it possible to depict an unchanged state ideology lasting for 80 years composed of military and bureaucracy modernizer elites that are alienated from the masses. This narrative masks the role of capital dominance, imperialism or the rule of right-wing parties for 60 years.
- 3) The self-representation of the party as the voice of people which struggles for democratization and demilitarization against military tutelage and the status quo.
- 4) The other-representation of political opponents as Jacobean, elitist, representatives of a single party mentality, having a pro-coup mind set, anti-religious, anti-democratic etc.
- 5) The metonymic merger of oppositional actors into one, although some of these actors are even antithetical.
- 6) The need to depict itself both as an ideology-free, all-encompassing party and a rational one which is compatible with the global trends of the world. The clashes with TÜSİAD<sup>156</sup> or the representation of a classless society are the results of such a need to gain utmost consent for the new regime.
- 7) The constant marginalization of ‘the other’ in terms of thought and numbers as well as the exaggeration of its power in order to depict an ongoing threat to ‘we’ so that support for the new regime can be maintained.
- 8) A discourse which represents the party both as competent and dissident according to political aims and different contexts.
- 9) A hegemonic and apparently dissident discourse which masks the denominational character of the state by representing the neoliberal social policy reforms as necessary measures to get out of the crisis and have economic advancement. (Yaşlı, 2012, pp. 87-114)

---

<sup>156</sup> Turkish Industry and Business Association (Turkish: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği).

These aforementioned discursive aspects of politics are used to claim that the authoritarian and neoliberal traits of the new political hegemony are compatible with the current trends of global capitalism. All the discursive and political manoeuvres of the AKP are used to manage the discrepancy between the continuity of neoliberal capital accumulation and the large segments of society which are negatively affected by this neoliberal transformation process. It is possible to say that the existence of all the aforementioned points is found on the linguistic level.<sup>157</sup> Still, I will refer to some of the non-discursive aspects of the AKP's policymaking preferences in order to see if the conclusions I have come to are compatible with actual policymaking.

In its 2013 health report, the Syndicate of Health and Social Work labourers (SES) indicates that the transformation of a health programme which has been accelerating since 2002 is a World Bank programme and is to be implemented in Turkey over ten years through the IMF and the World Trade Organization. According to the report, the main aim of the programme is exclusion of the 'public' from the process of service, gradual enhancement of the share of private health institutions in the service, and a change in the financial structure of the health sector in order to transfer resources to the capital. The merger of public hospitals and general health insurance were important steps taken in 2012 in this direction.

The report also emphasizes that changes made under the name of 'transformation' affect workers in the health sector negatively. It says that the imposition of employment models and flexible working methods through the enactment of laws destroy the work, wages and location security of workers. The increasing mobbing cases, managerial pressures and physical violence that health personnel face are seen as a result of ongoing policies.<sup>158</sup> This part of the report focuses more on the structural aspects of health policies and their effects on workers in the health sector.

The Turkish Medical Association (TTB) prepared a brochure called 'Dreams, Lies and Realities in Health' in 2011 to falsify the premises of the government concerning health policies. In so doing, the association aims to raise the consciousness of the public about the new healthcare system. This work focuses more on citizens who will find themselves in a disadvantaged position as a result of health reforms. First, a premise of the

---

<sup>157</sup> See the analysis chapters.

<sup>158</sup> <http://www.ilkehaberajansi.com.tr/haber/ses-2013-saglik-raporunu-acikladi.html>.

government is quoted. Then it is falsified by elaborating the real effect of the policy. I summarize some of the points indicated in the brochure below:

Lie: I can get treatment I want in any hospital.

Truth: Yes, not in any hospital, people can get treatment in private healthcare institutions which have an agreement with the Social Security Institution. But there is a small problem, they have to pay a bill for thousands of liras at discharge.

Lie: We have ended the shame of being taken hostage in hospital (because of unpaid bills).

Truth: Yes, hospitals no longer take people hostage for unpaid bills. They make people sign a receipt. Then the debt enforcers come. The ones who cannot pay go to prison in the end.

Lie: We enacted a bill for general health insurance. From now on, everybody has health insurance.

Truth: Unemployed people who cannot benefit from unemployment insurance, undeclared workers, artisans and tradesmen who do not pay their subsidies, farmers who do not pay their subsidies and unemployed women over 18 cannot benefit from general health insurance.

Lie: The state will pay the subsidies of those who cannot pay.

Truth: Every citizen who has a monthly income of more than 1/3 of the minimum wage has to pay the subsidy. As of 1 January 2012, the green cards of the millions of citizens who cannot pass the poverty test will be cancelled.

Lie: Citizens who have general health insurance are equal.

Truth: The Social Security Institution classifies citizens as A, B, C, D, E according to their ability to pay. From now on, everybody will know their class and choose private hospitals according to this. Citizens who do not have the power to make extra payments cannot enter a private hospital, even in an emergency situation.<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup> For the whole brochure see: <http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/yalanlar-2664.html>.

Although they are labelled lies in the brochure, many of the points actually tell part of the truth and mask the rest. However the rest includes the real content of the policy. The study of the Turkish Medical Association exposes and warns people about this hidden content. All in all, these examples show the neoliberal character of policymaking in the health sector and its effects on society, especially in the long term.

A similar process can be observed in the education system. Okçabol (2013) lists some points to emphasize the marketization attempts in education. Some of them are support for private schools, leaving the printing of course books to the private sector, the structure of competitive examinations, the contractual employment of teachers, the low-wage employment of teachers and changes to bills which pave the way for further privatization of the sector (pp. 114-128). Although these attempts are discussed in detail, I will only focus on one point which was also a discourse topic during the analysis,<sup>160</sup> namely the distribution of free books to students and increasing the number of electronic devices used in classrooms. The analysis shows how these policies are represented as a success in Erdoğan's election rally speech.

Okçabol (2013) indicates that the distribution of free books to students was actually a transfer of money from the public to the private sector, in favour of the second one, because the government gave the job to a private firm for 150 million Turkish lira although the cost of printing in state-printing houses was 82 million Turkish lira for the same number of books. When considering that the content of these books has changed during recent years, annually the government has transferred money to the private sector (2013, p. 122). Besides the similar economic aspect of the use of electronic devices in the classroom, potential problems resulting from the radiation levels of these devices, one-sided information flows from an unauthenticated source (in terms of the content of electronic books) and Internet addiction among young students are not taken into consideration (p. 261).

According to Okçabol (2013), the free-market understanding of education sees students as clients and education becomes a commodity which can be bought by people according to the amount of money they have. The AKP government, which aims at the further marketization of education, does not seek any consensus for any of these policy projects and condemns all criticism as ideological, as if their approach to education were not

---

<sup>160</sup> See the analysis chapter of Erdoğan's election rally speech.

ideological (p. 108). It seems that this discursive preference of the government is an attempt to shrink the disagreement space (Schröter, 2013) so that neoliberal policy-making preferences can be pursued by silencing the opposition through discursive strategies, as illustrated in my research. This shrinking disagreement space, which I understand as the discursive violation of a political sphere where opposing interests are represented and taken into account during the policymaking process, leads to anti-democratic practices. The emphasis on moderate Islamism and entrepreneurship in course books, the slandering of collective/ societal interests and the labelling of those who oppose these policies as ‘terrorists’ (Okçabol, p. 109) can be understood as such an attempt in the education sector. Other similar attempts were observed and analyzed in different policy areas in the research.

Foreign policy, and especially the discourse on Syria, is another problematic sphere of AKP politics. Both in ministerial speeches and speeches by the prime minister, my research illustrates the implementation of interventionist tendencies and exposes some tensions in the political discourse. Robins (2013) states that after 2011 Turkey has faced challenges in the region because of the ongoing conflict and brutality in Syria. While expecting a transformed and dependent Syria which would serve Turkey’s interests, the situation got worse and Turkey was pushed by its Western allies to take the initiative in the region without providing the necessary support. In the end, Turkey became vulnerable to attacks from its southern border (Robins, 2013, p. 397). Likewise, Phillips (2012) indicates that the shape and the scope of the ongoing conflict in Syria, which will not end soon, were not coincidental and Turkey’s own false steps and miscalculations led to a ‘quagmire’ that it has found itself being sucked into (p.137). He emphasizes two major implications of this foreign policy, a) an economic hit which has damaged Hatay in particular and the region in general because of border closures and b) extension of the Kurdish problem because of the withdrawal of the Syrian regime from its own Kurdish territories, which has led the PKK’s Syrian arm, the PYD, to fill the vacuum and provide additional support to their comrades (meaning PKK militants) in Turkey. Thus, the Turkish government faces a dilemma between direct intervention which could lead to more destabilization and non-intervention which could create a power vacuum to be filled by Turkey’s enemies (p. 140).

In short, it becomes obvious that Turkish government’s strategy of supporting armed rebels in the region, hoping that the Assad regime will fail in a short space of time,

seems to have failed and led to further destabilization in the region, which has also affected the country politically and economically. In the speeches analyzed, this dilemma between intervention and non-intervention is salient, although the direct intervention option is increasingly emphasized. Like Robins, I view this tension as stemming from a lack of support from Western allies which clashes with the government's own plans to become a regional power. Because of the limited capabilities of Turkey, the government had to adjust its position while still trying to encourage the allies to make a possible intervention. The discursive strategies of argumentation and legitimation concerning Syrian policy were signs of these attempts which seemed to have failed insofar as the government's hegemonic projects diverge from global trends in policymaking.

Housing and property are another policy area which is subject to transformation according to market needs. Although policies implemented in this area are represented as a pro-welfare development in favour of the masses in the discourse, Geray (2009) sees the policy practices as the derivative of a neoliberal understanding which aims to diminish the social state by imposing liberalization. According to him, there are rent-oriented and commoditizing urbanization projects at the core of the policies and the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI) plays a key role in realizing them. By transforming TOKI into a privileged institution which is directly linked to the prime minister, urban transformation projects are directed in a monopolized way without facing any serious controls or sanctions. In the process of AKP rule, the share of cooperative housing has gradually decreased to 7%, while the share of the private sector has increased to 87%. This is a result of a policy which does not give any new land or credit to cooperatives. In the end, the housing policy of the government remains far from answering the housing demands of lower and lower-middle households (pp. 745-750).

Duru (2009) also paints a similar picture and focuses on some of the wider environmental aspects of the urban transformation process. Some of them are opening protected natural areas to private entrepreneurship, like hotels, golf resorts and other touristic businesses, seeing forests as economic resources and changing their legal status so that these places become open to settlement, opening public costs up to private capital (e.g. projects like Galataport, the Haydarpaşa Project, the Karadeniz Coastal Road etc.), making legal arrangements in favour of companies (remission of the Cargill settlement on first-class agricultural land) and opening up meadows to mine and petroleum

activities as well as to settlement. Duru also labels these policy preferences as fundamental arrangements of environmental management and determines the main function of AKP rule as the imposition of the needs of the global economy and the EU membership process on Turkey (pp. 792-798).

The last point I would like to mention as a policy preference, also observed and analyzed in the texts, is the increasing number and influence of the police force. In the analyzed texts, as a coercive part of hegemony, the government's stance to defend and provide further support for the security forces is obvious. This support is legitimized by several discursive strategies, like victimization of the police force, delegitimizing and demonizing opponents, moral evaluation, scapegoating, fear appeals etc. The current legal arrangements show that this tendency is reflected in policymaking as well. As part of the 2014 budget, subsidies for the police force nearly doubled and the subsidies given to the military reached 16.5 billion Turkish lira. During the time of AKP governments, subsidies given to the police quadrupled. The number of police also increased by 90,000 in eleven years.<sup>161</sup> Obviously, this policy preference is as a result of the increasing number of dissidents who have a problem with the discursive and political practices of the government. It reached its peak with the Gezi Protests. While these started as a challenge to the urban development planning of Taksim Gezi Park in the last days of May 2013, they quickly turned into massive protests against the government as a result of the brutal eviction of protestors from the park. According to an Amnesty International Report,<sup>162</sup> five civilians died, over 8,000 people were injured and 4,900 were detained during the protests. The report also indicates that there is strong evidence that three of these deaths were the result of excessive use of force by the police. The report concludes that the excessive reaction of the government to the protests shocked everybody both inside and outside Turkey, which weakens the AKP government's argument of being a responsible government that is respectful of human rights and shows how intolerant it is of dissenting opinions.

---

<sup>161</sup> The whole news story can be found at: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/polis-askeri-yakaladi.htm>.

<sup>162</sup> The report can be found at: <http://www.amnesty.org.tr/ai/system/files/GeziParkiTR.pdf>.

#### 9.4. Concluding Remarks

According to Erdemol (2013), the Gezi Resistance or Uprising exploded as a reaction to the depoliticization and standardization of the country. This resistance or uprising which started in a medium where the AKP blends religious practices with neoliberal policies and restricts every possible way out of them, contributed both to the refusal of current policies and the determination of a roadmap for the future (p. 9). I would also add that the government's reaction to Gezi Park was to punish resisting counter-hegemonic discourse which turned into political action. This counter-hegemonic position which started with the Gezi protests disturbed the hegemonic attempts of the government and still continues in different areas of policymaking. Recent developments, concerning the closure of prep schools<sup>163</sup> and bribery and corruption operations which even reached the sons of some ministers and led to resignations from cabinet,<sup>164</sup> have disturbed the alliance between the AKP and members of the historic bloc,<sup>165</sup> like religious movements or the Turkish Industry and Business Association which supported the government in the past. Although the government uses its political authority to interfere in the course of events and label operations as conspiracies, the number of dissident segments of society and power groups seem to set to increase in the future as a result of ongoing investigations which are a serious threat to the political future of the government.

Any prediction about the prospective political future of the AKP or assessment of the long-term effects of its policies lies beyond the scope of this research. In light of the research findings, one can say that the government's discursive attempts systematically serve a particular form of policymaking and therefore have external coherence in terms of realizing neoliberal policymaking preferences. However, the severity of the implemented policies increasingly affects different and sometimes even clashing segments of society. The AKP's political success relies therefore on its capacity to represent this accelerated neoliberal transformation process as a common good, under

---

<sup>163</sup> Prep schools are one of the biggest economic and ideological sources of the religious movement called the 'Gülen Movement', which is named after the religious leader Fethullah Gülen. The government announced that these schools would be converted to ordinary schools and be subject to state control.

<sup>164</sup> See: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/25/world/europe/turkey-resignations/>.

<sup>165</sup> Here, the term is used in a Neo-gramscian way and refers to supranational class alliances as a result of neoliberal globalization of the economy. Neoliberal globalization is a structural hegemony deriving from an institutional and ideological extension of capital and market forces. This alternative globalization has an effect on state and supranational institutions (Birchfield and Inan, 2005, cited in Gökten, 2013).

the broader umbrella of a moderate Islamic discourse, while silencing the disadvantaged parts /classes of society that are not convinced by this hegemonic discourse. This balance between physical coercion and consent has broken down with the latest domestic as well as regional developments, and the increasingly authoritarian tendency of the party undermines its hegemonic capacity. This tendency, which also harms the legitimacy of the government in terms of violating basic rights and freedoms, could even lead to a reconfiguration of the historic bloc within and without the party. This is because, as Simon underlines (cited in Gökten, 2013, p. 47), in order to establish and sustain a system in line with political and ideological efforts, the hegemonic class must gain the consent of societal forces and other classes. The way of becoming a hegemonic class passes through the unification of popular and democratic demands whilst also realizing its own class interests. If the AKP cannot sustain this function as a result of a political governance crisis, it is likely that political change will become inevitable. The authoritarian, menacing and irreconcilable language used against the opposition, which is exposed in the research, shows that the government is no longer successful in uniting the clashing interests of society. The more it fails to create consent, the more it resorts to physical power to hold on to its own political as well as economic interests, and therefore harms the overall hegemonic project of neoliberal governance. That is why the party's hegemonic power is increasingly subject to criticism.

All in all, this research has mainly illustrated the discursive mechanisms via which these policy preferences are presented and legitimized in detail, as well as exposing the discrepancies between discourses and underlying policy of the political actor. By doing this, it also contributes to already existing research which labels the party as neo-conservative/ neoliberal from a linguistic perspective. The discursive hegemony accompanying the political hegemony, the existence of which is frequently emphasized in the literature concerning the AKP, is supported by linguistic evidence and also a reconceptualized notion of hegemony, as hegemonic projects and structural hegemony have helped to insert linguistic analysis into politics in a theoretically coherent way. In so doing, it has become possible to make sense of the tensions in discourse and how seemingly clashing discourses actually make sense, considering the wider political and economic agenda or developments.

I deliberately did not focus on an evaluation of the manipulative character of the AKP's discourse, mostly because of the difficulty of defining the notion of *manipulation*. Still,

if we take Puzynina's (1992) definition of manipulation (cited in Blass, 2005, p. 170) as an attempt to affect the target in such a way that his/her behaviour/action is an instrument to achieve the goals of the manipulator – although these goals are presented in such a way that the target does not recognise them – it is possible to say that there are manipulative attempts in the discourses analyzed. This is because a) policies are promoted from a single perspective which is in favour of a powerful actor (in this case the government), b) this perspective is presented as a common good, c) potential perspectives or challenging opinions are either neglected or twisted in arguments and d) the social and political outcomes of policymaking do not overlap with the claims in discourse.

There are also some shortcomings which should be emphasized in order to guide future studies. First of all, there are some policy areas which were not the subject of analysis. This was as a result of the selected samples. For instance, AKP's conservative stance towards women is an important policy aspect but because the randomly selected texts did not cover this policy issue, I was not able to analyse and discuss that policy aspect. Instead of cherry-picking the data, I only focused on policy areas which were uttered in the selected texts. Still, the data were enough to prove the main assumptions of this thesis.

Secondly, a particular strategy which is widely used during AKP rule could not be shown in the analyzed texts: masking the 'real agenda'. The party tries to create synthetic micro-agendas, especially when they are close to passing a bill, making an agreement which is debatable or when any corrupt policy is about to be exposed. In these cases, analyzing a text does not help to understand what is at stake because the text in its entirety becomes the means of manipulation. In order to decipher the real function of a text, a synchronic comparison of texts with political developments should be conducted. Time frames become crucial on these occasions.

Thirdly, I did not focus on *non-aesthetic forms*<sup>166</sup> of language use, namely lies and direct contradictions. They make up an important part of political speeches and are widely used. However, their detection is relatively easier than discursive strategies and can be exposed without linguistic analysis. Misrepresenting the number of supporters in the

---

<sup>166</sup> The expression is mine.

election rally speeches or practicing a policy short after its denial<sup>167</sup> can be given as examples of this kind.

Finally, this research does not show how counter-hegemonic attempts are used to ‘disturb’ the AKP’s rule. This was a conscious decision taken in order to concentrate on the function of a powerful actor and its discursive attempts to establish and maintain its political and economic hegemony. Still, in some parts, it is possible to see how oppositional discourse is represented and elaborated for the benefit of the governing actor. These counter-hegemonic discursive attempts could be the subject of future research, especially considering the latest developments like the Gezi protests. For example, political humour as a discursive strategy was used effectively during the protests and is worth investigating. I hope that the number of linguistic studies which critically situate themselves within politics will increase and contribute to the democratization of political discourse<sup>168</sup>. This was my foremost aim in this research.

---

<sup>167</sup> The paid military service bill had passed in 2011, just few months after the proposal was criticized and denied by the government officials.

<sup>168</sup> See the theory chapter for a theoretical discussion of the term.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, I. (2001). *Political Ideology Today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ahmad, F. (1993). *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Akbaş, M. (2007). *A Sociological Analysis on Recent Decentralization Practices in Global and Turkish Contexts*. Middle East Technical University.
- Akdağ, Y. (2007). Sermaye Medyası ve Emekçi Basını. *Özgürlük Dünyası*, 181(1). Retrieved from <http://www.ozgurlukdunyasi.org/arsiv/210-sayi-181/480-sermaye-medyasi-ve-emekci-basini>
- Akdoğan, Y. (2004). Muhafazakar-Demokrat Siyasal Kimliğin Önemi ve Siyasal İslamcılıktan Farkı. In H. Yavuz (Ed.), *AK Parti: Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri* (pp. 59-96). Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.
- AKP. (2002). Party Programme. Retrieved November 8, 2011, from <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum1>
- Aktar, A. (2010). *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Alagözlü, N., & Şahin, S. (2010). Power and Pragmatic Use of Language in Political Discourse. *Türkbilig*, 20(1), 12-36.
- Alpman, N. (2010). Baykal Gitmez. Retrieved November 19, 2011, 2010, from <http://www.internethaber.com/baykal-gitmez-9870y.htm>
- Arat, Y. (2005). *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Archer, M., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T., & Norrie, A. (Eds.). (1998). *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London: Routledge.
- Atacan, F. (2005). Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP. [Article]. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 187-199.
- Atasoy, Y. (2009). *Islam's Marriage with Neo-liberalism: State Transformation in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Ayan, P. (2010). Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies*, 11(2), 197-215.
- Ayata, A. G. (1995). Türkiye'nin Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Ortanın Solu Hareketi. *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi*, 50(3), 79-88.
- Babacan, A. (2012). Ekonomik Büyüme Yüzde 8'i Aşarak Havaya Girdi. Retrieved February 18, 2012, 2012, from <http://www.gazete5.com/haber/ekonomik-buyume-yuzde-8i-asti-187563.htm>

- Badiou, A. (2005). *Metapolitics*. London: Verso.
- Bali, R. (2013). *Anti-semitism and Conspiracy Theories in Turkey*. İstanbul: Libra Kitap.
- Barlas, M. (2011). Derin CHP için rejim esastır ve demokrasi teferruattır. *Sabah*. Retrieved from <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/barlas/2011/08/01/derin-chp-icin-rejim-esastir-ve-demokrasi-teferruattir>
- Bayramoğlu, A. (2010, May 21). İşte CHP'nin Mirası ve Kılıçdaroğlu'nun İş Listesi. *Yeni Şafak*. Retrieved from <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=21.05.2010&i=258430>
- Benhabib, S. (1996). Toward a Deliberative Model of Democracy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (pp. 67-95). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bhaskar, R. (1975). *A Realist Theory of Science*. Hassocks: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
- Blass, R. (2005). Manipulation in the speeches and writings of Hitler and the NSDAP from a relevance theoretic point of view. In L. de Saussure & P. Shulz (Eds.), *Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, Language, Mind*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Blommaert, J. (2008). Book review: Norman Fairclough, Language and Globalization. *Discourse and Society*, 19(2), 257-269.
- Boas, T. C., & Gans-Morse, J. (2009). Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44, 137-161.
- Boratav, K. (2010). AKP'li Yıllarda Türkiye Ekonomisi. In I. Uzgel & B. Duru (Eds.), *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (2 ed., pp. 463-472). Ankara: Phoneix Yayınevi.
- Boyraz, C. (2011). The Justice and Development Party in Turkish Politics: Islam, Democracy and State, *Turkish Studies*, 12:1, 149-164.
- Bulut, S. (2009). 27 Mayıs 1960'tan Günümüze Paylaşılmayan Demokrat Parti Mirası. *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 19, 73-90.
- Can, B. (2011). Vaad Edilmiş Topraklar, Ortak Pazar(AB) ve Siyonizm. *Milli Gazete*. Retrieved from <http://www.milligazete.com.tr/makale/insanligi-ifsad-hareketi-siyonizm--4-218373.htm>
- Cap, P. (2002). *Explorations in Political Discourse: Methodological and Critical Perspectives*. Berlin: Lang.
- Cap, P. (2008). Towards the Proximity Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in Political Discourse. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 40(1), 17-41.

- Carroll, W. (2006). Hegemony, Counter-hegemony, Anti-hegemony. *Socialist Studies*, 2(2), 9-43.
- Chandler, D. (2002). *Semiotics: the basics*. New York: Routledge.
- Chilton, P. (2004). *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Chilton, P. (2005). Manipulation, Memes and Metaphors: The Case of Mein Kampf. In L. De Saussure & P. Schulz (Eds.), *Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century* (pp. 15-45). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Collier, A. (1994). *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy*. London: Verso.
- Crozier, M., & Little, A. (2007). *Disagreeable democracy: Deliberation, conflict and communication in contemporary democratic practice*. Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2007). *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*. London: Tauris.
- Çavdar, A. (2012). Neo-islamcılık Sergüzeşti: Niyet neyse akıbet de o oldu. *Express*, 127, 48-53.
- Çulhaoğlu, M. (2009). AKP'nin Yürüdüğü Yer: Bir Model ve Açıklama Denemesi. In Ç. d. Sümer & F. Yaşlı (Eds.), *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya: AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakar İttifak* (pp. 225-235). Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayınları.
- Doğanay, Ü. (2007). AKP'nin Demokrasi Söylemi ve Muhafazakarlık. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 62(1), 66-88.
- Dumenil, G., & Levy, D. (2007). *Neoliberal Dynamics-Imperial Dynamics*. Paper presented at the The annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Retrieved from [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73381\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73381_index.html)
- Duran, B. (2008). The Justice and Development Party's 'new politics': Steering towards conservative democracy, a revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises? In Ü. Cizre (Ed.), *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party* (pp. 80-105). London: Routledge.
- Duru, B. (2009). AKP'nin Çevre Politikalarına Bir Bakış. In I. Uzgel & B. Duru (Eds.), *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*. Ankara: Phoenix.
- Dönmez, R. Ö. (2011). The Justice and Development Party's Perspective on Social Exclusion: Between Societal Security and Morality. *Middle East Critique*, 20(1), 67-80.
- Ekinci, A. (2011). Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımların Büyüme ve İstihdama Etkisi: Türkiye Uygulaması (1980-2010). *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, 6(2),

71-96.

- Erbakan, N. (2010, November 3). İnanç var, her şey var! Retrieved from <http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/inanc-var-her-sey-var-179348.htm>
- Erdemol, M. K. (2013). *Gezi Parkı Direnişi: Küçük Bahçede Büyük Kıyamet*. İstanbul: Yazılama.
- Ertuğrul, N. İ. (2010). AKP ve Özelleştirme. In. Uzgel & B. Duru (Eds.), *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (2 ed., pp. 522-556). Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.
- Esmer, M. E. (2012). The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of the Welfare Party, *Turkish Studies*, 13:3, 363-378.
- Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis* (2 ed.). London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (2000). *New Labour, new Language?* London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2005). Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism. *Organization Studies*, 26(6), 915-939.
- Fairclough, N. (2006). *Language and Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N., & Fairclough, I. (2012). *Political Discourse Analysis: A method for advanced students*. New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N., Jessop, B., & Sayer, A. (2002). Critical Realism and Semiosis. *Journal of Critical Realism*, 5(1), 1-9.
- Farrelly, M. (2010). Critical Discourse Analysis in Political Studies: an illustrative analysis of the 'empowerment' agenda. *Politics*, 30(2), 98-104.
- Finlayson, A. (2007). From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis. *BJPIR*, 9(4), 545-563.
- Forchtner, B. (2011) Critique, the Discourse–historical approach and the Frankfurt School. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 8(1), pp. 1-14.
- Gaventa, J. (1980). *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geray, C. (2009). AKP ve Konut: Toplumsal Konut Yöneltili Açısından TOKİ Uygulamaları. In I. Uzgel & B. Duru (Eds.), *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (pp. 745-750). Ankara: Phoenix.

- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Gökten, Y. S. (2013). *Hegemonya İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü ve Geleceği: Neo-Gramsci'ci Bir Bakış*. Ankara: NotaBene.
- Habermas, J. (1984). *Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Harvey, D. (2009). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heper, M., & Toktaş, Ş. (2003). Islam, Modernity and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. *The Muslim World*, 93, 157-185.
- Hür, A. (2009). Münferit(!) antisemitizm vak'aları. *Taraf*. Retrieved from <http://www.taraf.com.tr/ayse-hur/makale-munferit-antisemitizm-vakalari.htm>
- Iedema, R., Degeling, P., White, L., & Braithwaite, J. (2004). Analysing Discourse Practices in Organizations. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 4(1), 9-25.
- Ilıcak, N. (2010). Kılıçdaroğlu'nun Zincirleri. November 19, 2011, from <http://www.sonhaberler.gen.tr/kilicdaroglunun-zincirleri-makale,640.html>
- Ives, P. (2004). *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*. London: Pluto Press.
- Jacoby, T. (2004). *Social Power and The Turkish State*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Jessop, B., Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (Eds.). (2008). *Knowledge-based Economy and Higher Education in Europe*. London: Sense.
- Jessop, B., & Sum, N.-L. (2013). *Towards a Cultural Political Economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Joseph, J. (2002). *Hegemony: A realist analysis*. London: Routledge.
- Joseph, J. (2008). Hegemony and structure-agency problem in International Relations: a scientific realist contribution. *Review of International Studies*, 34, 109-128.
- Joseph J. & Roberts, J. M. (2005). Derrida, Foucault and Žižek: Being Realistic about Social Theory. *New Formations*, 56(1), 109-120.
- Kahraman, H. B. (2011). CHP Dönüşmeyi Düşünüyor mu. *Sabah*. Retrieved from <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/kahraman/2011/11/18/chp-donusmeyi-dusunuyor-mu>
- Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2005). *Turkish Dynamics: Bridged Across Troubled Lands*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Karpat, K. (2004). *The Studies on Turkish Politics on Society: Selected Articles and Essays* (Vol. 94). Boston: Brill.

- Kaya, İ. (2004). *Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- KESK. (2012). Kamu Emekçilerinin Alım Gücü Düşüyor. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from <http://www.kesk.org.tr/content/kamu-emek%C3%A7ilerinin-al%C4%B1m-g%C3%BCc%C3%BC-d%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCyor>
- Kienpointner, M. (2013). Review: Fairclough, Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2012). Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 12(2), 295-304.
- Kienpointner, M. (1996). *Vernünftig Argumentieren. Regeln und Techniken der Diskussion*. Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Kılıçdaroğlu, K. (2010). Kılıçdaroğlu: Değişim Eski İnsanlarla Olmaz, Gençler Siyasete Girmeli. Retrieved November 21, 2011, from <http://www.haberler.com/kilicdaroglu-degisim-eski-insanlarla-olmaz-2419380-haberi/>
- Kircher, C. (2009). Hegemony and Discourse Theory: Democracy As Empty Signifier in International Relations Available from <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/147452/hegemony-and-discourse-theory#inside>
- Koçak, C. (1997). Siyasal Tarih: 1923-1950. In S. Akşin (Ed.), *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980* (Vol. 4, pp. 85-154). Istanbul: Cem.
- Köker, L. (2007). *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (10 ed.). Istanbul: İletişim.
- Kubilay, Ç. (2010). The Alternative Citizen Conception in Political Islamist Discourse in the Case of Turban Question. *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 10(2), 135-164.
- Kutter, A. (2013). Totgesagte leben länger: die Fortschreibung ökonomischer Ordnung in der Finanzpresse [Their death was prematurely reported: imaginations of economic formation in the financial press]. In J. Maesse (Ed.), *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Economy, Discourse, and Government* (pp. 95-120). Germany: VS Verlag.
- Küçükali, C. (2014). Discursive strategies of instrumentalizing history in mainstream Turkish political discourse: The case of the negative other presentation of the CHP. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 13(1), pp. 98-119.
- Lakoff, G. (2004). *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate*. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Company.
- Lukes, S. (2005). *Power: A Radical View* (2 ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Lundgren, A. (2007). *The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey's Kurdish Policy*. London: Tauris.
- Marchart, O. (2007). *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*. Boston: Boston University Press.
- Mardin, Ş. (1975). Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, pp. 7-32. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.
- Martínez-Lorente, A. R., & Dewhurst, F. (1998). The Total Quality Management: Origins and Evolution of the Term. *The TQM Magazine*.
- Meeker, M. E. (2001). *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Montessori, N. M. (2011). The design of a theoretical, methodological, analytical framework to analyse hegemony in discourse. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 8(3), 169-181.
- Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? *Social Research*, 66(3), 745-758.
- Musolff, A. (2004). *Metaphor and Political Discourse*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Newman, S. (2005). *Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New theories of the political*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Okulska, U., & Cap, P. (Eds.). (2010). *Perspectives in Politics and Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Okçabol, R. f. (2013). *AKP iktidarında Eğitim: Eğitimin Piyasalaşması ve Gericileşmesi*. Ankara: Ütopya.
- Onaran, Ö. (2013). *The Political Economy of Inequality, Redistribution, and the Protests in Turkey*. Retrieved October 2, 2014, from <http://researchturkey.org/the-political-economy-of-inequality-redistribution-and-the-protests-in-turkey/>
- Onis, Z., & Grigoriadis, I. N. (2010). Europe and The Impasse of Center-Left Politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek Experience. *Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies*, 12(3), 259-274.
- Özbudun, S., & Demirer, T. (2012). *Zamanın Ruhu: AKP, Muhafazakarlık, Milliyetçilik*. Ankara: Ütopya.
- Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode*, 34, 380-404.
- Phillips, C. (2012). Turkey's Syria Problem. *Public Policy Research*, 19(2), 137-140.

- Ranciere, J. (2004). *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. New York: Continuum.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. United States: Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, J. (1996). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Reisigl, M. (2007). *Nationale Rhetorik in Fest- und Gedenkreden: eine diskursanalytische Studie zum 'österreichischen Millennium' in den Jahren 1946 und 1996*. Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
- Reisigl, M. (2008). Rhetoric of Political Speeches. In R. Wodak & V. Koller (Eds.), *Communication in the Public Sphere: Handbook of Applied Linguistics* (Vol. 4, pp. 243-271). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London: Routledge.
- Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (Eds.), *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*. (pp. 87-121). London: Sage (2nd revised edition).
- Reyes, A. (2011). Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. *Discourse and Society*, 22(6), 781-806.
- Robins, P. (2013). Turkey's 'double gravity' predicament: The foreign policy of a newly activist power. *International Affairs*, 89(2), 381-397.
- Sarigil, Z. (2010). Bargaining in institutional settings: The case of Turkish reforms. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(3), 463-483.
- Sayer, A. (1992). *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach* (2 ed.). London: Routledge.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). *The semi-sovereign people*. Hinsdale: Dryden.
- Schröter, M. (2013) *Silence and concealment in political discourse*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Sum, N.-L. (2004). Towards a cultural political economy: discourses, material power and (counter-) hegemony. Retrieved March 6, 2013, from <http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/wp/wpl/disc.php>
- Sum, N.-L. (2009). The production of hegemonic policy discourses: 'competitiveness' as a knowledge brand and its re-contextualizations. *Critical Policy Studies*, 3(2), 184-203.
- Şen, M. (2010). Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 59-84.

- Tanıyıcı, Ş. (2010). Europeanization of Political Elite Discourses in Turkey: A Content Analysis of Parliamentary Debates 1994-2002. *Turkish Studies*, 11(2), 181-195.
- Terkan, B. (2010). Siyasi Partilerin Kadına İlişkin Söylem ve Politikaları (AKP ve CHP Örneği). *Selçuk İletişim Dergisi*, 6(2), 115-136.
- Tok, T. N. (2012). Türkiye'deki Siyasal Partilerin Eğitim Söylemleri ve Siyasaları. *Educational Administration: Theory and Practice*, 18(2), 273-312.
- Toulmin, S. E. (2003). *The uses of argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsakona, V. & Popa, D. E. (Eds.). (2011). *Studies in Political Humour*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Van Dijk, T. (1985). *Discourse and communication : new approaches to the analysis of mass media discourse and communication*. New York: W. de Gruyter.
- van Dijk, T. (1993). Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 4(2), 249-283.
- Van Dijk, T. (2011). Teaching Ethnic Diversity in Journalism School. *GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series*, 7, 1-35.
- van Eemeren, F. (Ed.). (2009). *Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic Maneuvering*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- van Eemeren, F., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Leeuwen, T. (2007). Legitimation in Discourse and Communication. *Discourse & Communication*, 1(1), 91-112.
- van Leeuwen, T. (2008). *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Leeuwen, T., & Wodak, R. (1999). Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse Historical Analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 1(1), 83-118.
- van Leeuwen, T., & Wodak, R. (1999). Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis. *Discourse Studies*, 1(1), 83-118.
- Ward, K., & England, K. (2007). Introduction: Reading Neoliberalization. In K. England & K. Ward (Eds.), *Neoliberalization: States, networks, peoples* (pp. 1-22). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Wodak, R. (1996). *Disorders of Discourse*. London: Longman.
- Wodak, R. (2001). The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 63-94). London: Sage.

- Wodak, R. (2002). Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis. *Redaktion der Zeitschrift für Angewandte Linguistik*, 3, 5-31.
- Wodak, R. (2007). Language and Ideology-Language in Ideology. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 6(1), 1-6.
- Wodak, R. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wodak, R. (2011). *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual*. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.) London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wodak, R. (Ed.). (1989). *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Liebhart, K. (2009). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Vol. 2). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wodak, R., & Fairclough, N. (2010). Recontextualizing European higher education policies: the cases of Austria and Romania. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 7(1), 19-40.
- Wodak, R., Kwon, W., & Clarke, I. (2011). 'Getting people on board': Discursive leadership for consensus building in team meetings. *Discourse and Society*, 22(5), 592-644.
- Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2001). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Wodak, R., Mral, B., & Khosravini, M. (2013). *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Wodak, R., & Richardson, J. E. (2013). European fascism in talk and text. In R. Wodak & J. E. Richardson (Eds.), *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European fascism in talk and text*, pp. 1-17. London: Routledge.
- Wodak, R., & Van Dijk, T. (Eds.). (2000). *Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*. Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag.
- Yaka, Ö. (2010). Çözülen Ne: Otoritarizm mi Demokrasi mi? In Ç. d. Sümer & F. Yaşlı (Eds.), *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya: AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakar İttifak* (pp. 238-261). Ankara: Tan.
- Yalman, G. (2002). Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi? *Praksis*, 5, 7-23.
- Yalvaç, F. (2012). Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of

- Turkey's Position in the World System. *International Relations*, 26(2), 165-180.
- Yavuz, H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yavuz, H. (2009). *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yaşlı, F. (2012). *AKP ve Yeni Rejim*. Ankara: Tan.
- Yetkin, N. (2006). A Pragmatic Analysis of Derogation in the Discourse of Political Criticism. *Modern Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 3(1), 48-59.
- Yetkin, Ç. (1983). *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi: 1930-1945*. Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi.
- Yeşiltuna, D. Ç. (2007). Women in the Discourse of Political Power. *Ege Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 17(1), 153-176.
- Yıldırım, E., İnaç, H., & Özler, H. (2007). A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party: Is It a Political Design or a Political Becoming. *Turkish Studies*, 8(1), 5-24.
- Yıldız, A. (2008). Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From 'welfare' to 'justice and development'. In Ü. Cizre (Ed.), *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of Justice and Development Party* (pp. 41-61). London: Routledge.
- Zürcher, E. J. (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History* (3 ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

## **APPENDICES: THE ANALYZED TEXTS IN TURKISH**

### **The Election Rally Speech of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (03.6.2011)**

Bafra'ya, Canik'e, Çarşamba'ya, Havza'ya, İlkadım'a, Kavak'a, Ladik'e, Salıpazarı'na, Tekkeköy'e, Terme'ye, Vezirköprü'ye, Yakakent'e oralarda yaşayan tüm kardeşlerime selamlarımı, sevgilerimi, saygılarımı yolluyorum.

Bugün başlayan mübarek 3 ayların Samsunlu tüm kardeşlerime, aziz milletimize ve İslam alemine mübarek, hayırlı olmasını diliyorum.

Konuşmamın hemen başında Süper Lig'e yükselen Samsunspor'u, kırmızı şimşekleri yürekten kutluyorum. Samsunspor camiasına, yönetimine, teknik kadrosuna, tüm futbolcularına Süper Lig'de başarılar diliyorum. Süper Lig'e yükselen Samsunspor artık bir süper stadyumu da fazlasıyla hak ediyor. İnşallah Samsun'umuza 30 bin kişilik yeni bir stadyumu kazandırıyoruz. Stadyum Samsun, inşallah Samsunspor'un rakiplerini misafir edeceğiz Samsun'a yakışır bir stat için kolları sıvadık ve Belediyemizle birlikte şu anda plan çalışmalarını yapıyoruz. En kısa sürede bunu yapıp Samsun'a teslim edeceğiz. Şimdiden hayırlı olsun diyorum.

Tabi yetmez, Samsun'un güzel bir kapalı salonu yok. Samsun'u bir spor şehri yapmak için bu altyapı noktasında 7 bin 500 kişilik bir de spor salonunu inşa ediyoruz. Bu salonun yapımına başlandı. Bu salon da tamamlandığında artık Samsun aynı zamanda bir spor şehri olarak da Türkiye'de de, dünyada da yerini alacak. Uluslararası birçok organizasyonlara da inşallah Samsun'umuzda ev sahipliği yapabileceğiz.

Sevgili kardeşlerim; 12 Haziran seçimlerine artık şurada sadece 9 gün kaldı. 9 gün sonra sandık milletimizin önüne gelecek. Son sözü bir kez daha millet söyleyecek, siz söyleyeceksiniz. 12 Haziran seçimlerinin şimdiden ülkemize, milletimize, tüm coğrafyamıza hayırlı olmasını Allah'tan diliyorum. Millet iradesinin tecelli edeceğiz 12 Haziran'ın demokrasimizde bir dönüm noktası olarak tarihe geçmesini diliyorum.

Bakın sevgili Samsunlular; 8,5 yıl boyunca bize, Partimize, Hükümetimize çok ağır eleştiriler yapıldı. 8,5 yıl boyunca bir yandan sizlere hizmet üretmek için çabalarken, bir yandan da bu muhalefetin kırıcı, yıkıcı, tahrip edici eleştirilerine, hakaretlerine göğüs gerdik. Hiçbir zaman bu eleştirilerden korkmadık, hiçbir zaman çekinmedik. Yapıcı eleştiriye her zaman açığımız, zihnimiz de, kalbimiz de açık. Yapıcı eleştirileri her zaman dikkate aldık. Ama bunlarda proje yok, bunlarda öneri yok, bunlarda sadece sırtında boş bir yumurta küfesi, atıyorlar. Biz buna rağmen kendimizi her an geliştirmenin gayreti içinde olduk, her an her fırsatta milletimizin huzuruna çıktık. Milletimizin aynasında kendimizi muhasebeye çektik. İşte bir kez daha sandık

milletin önünde, bugün bir kez daha son sözü millet söylüyor. Son kararı millet veriyor. Türkiye’de bir kez daha sandık yoluyla, millet eliyle ak ile kara Allah’ın izniyle ortaya çıkıyor.

Biz başından itibaren millet dedik, demokrasi dedik, millet iradesi dedik, özgürlük dedik. En başından itibaren demokratik yollardan hiç taviz vermedik, hukuktan taviz vermedik, hem demokrasiyi, hem hukuku daha güçlendirdik. Şiddetin, öfkenin, nefretin dili bizim dilimiz olmadı. Biz kırıp dökenden, tahrip edenlerden hiçbir zaman olmadık. Rakiplerimizle sadece sandıkta yarışırız dedik. Eli sopalı olanlardan olmadık, elinde taş, kaya taşıyanlardan olmadık, molotof kokteyliyle dolaşanlardan olmadık. Eşkıyalarla hiçbir zaman bir arada olmadık. Bugün de bunu yapıyoruz. Aslında Türkiye genelinde biz konuşmuyoruz, bizden ziyade eserlerimiz konuşuyor. Kardeşlerim, CHP’nin nesi konuşuyor Allah aşkına. Soruyorum, MHP’nin nesi konuşuyor Allah aşkına. Sorun bunlara, eseriniz var mı bu ülkede sorun. Dikili ağaçları yok. Geçmişlerinden bu yana “eşek ölür kalır semeri, insan ölür kalır eseri.” Eşekten bile bir semer kalıyor, ama insandan da eser kalacak. Var mı eserleri? Yok.

Sevgili kardeşlerim; bekara karı boşamak kolaydır. Bunlar bol bol atıyor, öyle mi? Bir zamanlar bir tanesi vardı hani. Ne diyordu? Ne veriyorsa ben 5 fazlasını veririm. Bir diğeri ne diyordu? 2 anahtar. Geldi mi konutlar, geldi mi araçlar? Hak getire. Ama bizi işte şu Karadeniz Sahil Yolu anlatıyor. Bizi Samsun-Ankara duble yolu anlatıyor. Samsun’a kazandırdığımız yeni üniversite anlatıyor. Açtığımız derslikler anlatıyor. Gönderdiğimiz bilgisayarlar anlatıyor. Ortak olarak bütün hastanelerin kullanılması anlatıyor. Bizi toplu konutlar anlatıyor. Bizi enerjide, doğalgazda attığımız adımlar anlatıyor. Bizi Samsun’un havaalanı anlatıyor. Çiftçinin, esnafın, emeklinin iyileştirmesini yaptık, bunlar anlatıyor. Kardeşlerim, Samsun nasıl bir dönüşüm yaşıyorsa, Türkiye de aynı dönüşümü yaşıyor.

Biz Türkiye’de eserlerimizle konuşuyoruz. Eserleriyle konuşamayanlar, hizmetleriyle konuşamayanlar ne yazık ki seçim yolunu şiddet taşlarıyla döşemenin gayreti içine giriyorlar. Şu ana kadar Türkiye genelinde 150’den fazla seçim büromuza, seçim aracımıza, il ve ilçe başkanlıklarımıza saldırıda bulunuldu. Seçim konvoylarımıza saldırdılar. Kastamonu’da hemşeriniz Recep Şahin kardeşimizi şehit ettiler. İmam hatipli çocukları dahi hedef aldılar. Cizre’de imam hatipli yavrularımızın 13, 14, 15 yaşında yavrularımızın kaldığı yurdu yaktılar. Kardeşlerim, molotofla çocukların yüzlerini yaktılar. Milletvekillerimize saldırarak bizi sindireceklerini, bizi korkutacaklarını zannettiler. Ne yazık ki şiddet sadece belli bir kesimden de gelmiyor. İşte Hopa’da yaşadığımız CHP ve yandaşları otobüsümüze saldırdılar. Bir polisimiz ağır yaralandı. Ardından durmadılar, Ankara’da, İstanbul’da, Kütahya’da aynı şekilde bunu devam ettirmek istediler. Ama bakın şimdi Kütahya’da halk ayağa kalktı. Niye? Eğer bu böyle devam ederse biz emniyet olarak bütün tedbirlerimizi tabi ki alırız, alacağız. Ancak dikkat edin, polisin panzerinin üzerine tırmanan bir kadın veya kız neyse, oradan keyfini alamıyor, bir de

gidiyor eli kalkanlı duran polisler elinde, güya bayrak, sopayla vurmaya başlıyor. Bu yandaş medya, bu candaş medyaları ne diyor yorumlarında? Polis diyor, bunlara el kaldırmayacak. Ne yapacak? Polis dayak mı yiyecek? Polis niçin var bu ülkede? Polis bu ülkede asayiş sağlamak, teröristlere karşı bu şehirde, şehrin merkezindeki eşkıyaya karşı gerekli tedbiri polis ne yapacak? Alacak, bunun için var. Bütün esnafın, bizlerin can emniyeti, can güvenliği için var. Değerli kardeşlerim, polisimize, güvenlik güçlerimize el kaldıranlar kusura bakmasınlar karşılığını bulurlar. Bu polis eşkıyanın şamar oğlanı değildir. Eğer söyleyecekleri bir şey varsa çıkar meydanda konuşurlar, basın toplantısını yaparlar orada konuşurlar, ama kalkıp da taşla, ellerine ne geliyorsa bunlarla kalkıp sivil vatandaşa saldıramazlar. İşte Hopa’da bize yaptıkları o oldu. Otobüsümüzle gidiyoruz, sabahtan itibaren zaten bizi Hopa’ya sokmamak için her türlü yola başvurdular. Ama bu ülke hiçbir zaman bu tür kendini bilmezlere bırakılmaz, bırakılmayacaktır. Açık söylüyorum, ne tür tedbir gerekiyorsa bunu alacağız ve alıyoruz. Çünkü bizim huzurumuzu ortadan kaldırmaya kimse teşebbüs edemez. Huzur ülkesi Türkiye’yi kimse karıştıramaz. Bunun mücadelesini, bunun tedbirini her alanda almaya devam edeceğiz. Biz tuzağa düşmeyeceğiz, şiddet diline teslim olmayacağız, biz onlar gibi öfkenin, nefretin diline teslim olmayacağız. Biz bugüne kadar hizmetlerimizle, eserlerimizle konuştuk, bundan sonra da aynı şekilde hizmetlerimizle, eserlerimizle konuşacağız. Ama “nush ile uslanmayı etmeli tekdir, tekdir ile uslanmanın hakkı kötektir.” Olay budur.

Şimdi bakın sevgili Samsunlular; biz bu yola sizlerle çıktık, milletimizle çıktık. Biz bu yolda her zaman milletimizle yürüdük, biz gücümüzü çetelerden almadık. Gücümüzü seçkinlerden almadık. Biz gücümüzü millettten aldık, milletin çizdiği istikamette dosdoğru yürüdük. Şunu özellikle ifade ediyorum: Biz manşetlerle gelmedik, medyayla gelmedik, biz manşetlere rağmen geldik, medyaya rağmen geldik. Bu kardeşiniz için ne diyorlardı? Ben Pınarhisar’a giderken, hapse giderken en çok satan gazetelerin attığı başlık şuydu: “Muhtar bile olamaz.” Ne oldu? Kudret, kuvvet sahibi olan Allah, kararı veren millet. Ne oldu? Onu diyenler mahcup oldu, millet kazandı. Çünkü karar milletindi, söz milletindi, yetki milletindi, millet ne dediyse o oldu.

Son günlerde bazı medya kuruluşları, bazı yazarlar adeta ağız birliği etmişçesine bizi, üslubumuzu özellikle de muhalefete, özellikle de BDP’ye karşı tutumuzu eleştiriyorlar. Ben gittim Diyarbakır’da on binlerce Kürt kardeşimle kucaklaştım. Elbette o arada BDP’nin maskesini düşürmek, BDP’nin şiddet politikalarını milletimle paylaşmak istedim. Arkalarından konuşmadım, yüzlerine konuştum, yanlarında konuştum. BDP’nin ve yandaşlarının MHP ve CHP ile işbirliği içinde bize nasıl şiddet uyguladıklarını, Kürt kardeşlerime nasıl şiddet uyguladıklarını, nasıl bir sivil faşizm dağıttıklarını anlattım. Bazı yazarlar bundan çok rahatsız olmuş, çok. Ama bunlar Hakkari’de sabah namazından sonra öldürülen imamdan rahatsız olmadılar. BDP’nin bu imamla ilgili suskunluğundan rahatsız olmadılar. Bunlar Kastamonu’daki, Silopi’deki şehitlerimizden rahatsız olmadılar. BDP’nin suskunluğundan

rahatsız olmadılar. Bunlar AK PARTİ'ye yönelik molotoflu saldırılardan rahatsız olmuyorlar. Ve sıkılmadan, utanmadan Kılıçdaroğlu, Hopa olayından sonra ne diyor biliyor musunuz? Rüzgar eker, fırtına biçer diyor. Ben beklerdim ki zerre kadar nezaketi olsa, zerre kadar siyasi nezaket nedir bilse kalkar bir telefon açar, der ki Sayın Genel Başkan geçmiş olsun, konvoyunuz taşlandı ve korumanız ağır yaralı, şuur kapalı, hastaneye kaldırılmış. Doğrusu ben siyasi genel başkanlardan bunu beklerdim. Bir tanesi telefon açmadı, bir tanesi. Ama biz bu nezaketimizi bugüne kadar hep gösterdik. Başlarına bir şey gelse, bir kaza geçirseler aradık. Bir yakınları ölse aradık, ama bunlarda bu yok. Bunlar çünkü nezaket bahçesine hiç girmediler bugüne kadar. BDP'nin kışkırtıcı, tahrik edici, şiddeti besleyici tavrını görmüyorlar, duymuyorlar, bundan rahatsız olmuyorlar. Nasıl bir muhabbetse BDP'yi pırpışlamaktan, BDP'yi adeta şiddet için teşvik etmekten, BDP'nin sırtını sıvazlamaktan adeta zevk alıyorlar. Siyasete yönelik müdahaleleri de görmezden, duymazdan geliyorlar. İş adamı kılığında siyaset mühendisliği yapanları görmezden, duymazdan geliyorlar. Yurt dışında kurulan komplolara, uluslararası şebekelerin siyasete müdahalesine gözlerini yumuyorlar. Tekrar ediyorum, biz buraya manşetlerle değil, milletin takdiriyle geldik. Şiddeti körükleyen, teşvik eden bu tutumu ben bizi buraya gönderen milletime anlatıyorum. Kardeşlerim, CHP, MHP ve BDP'nin şiddet işbirliğini bazı medya kuruluşlarının bu değirmene taşıdıkları suyu ben sadece size şikayet ediyorum.

Sevgili Samsunlular, değerli kardeşlerim; Samsun huzurun şehri, Samsun kardeşliğin şehri, Samsun kurtuluşun, 19 Mayıs'ın şehri, Samsun Türk gibi kuvvetli sözünü dünyaya gösteren Yaşar Doğu'nun, imam hatip liselerinin açılmasında emeği olan merhum, aynı zamanda hemşerim Tevfik İleri'nin şehri. Samsun, Karadeniz'in ticaret merkezi, sanayi merkezi, lojistik merkezi. Samsun'u daha da büyütmek bizim boynumuzun borcudur. Samsun'a hizmetkâr olmak bizim için gururdur, onurdur. Samsunlu çiftçi kardeşim, Bafra Ovasının, Terme Ovasının, Çarşamba Ovasının çalışkan çiftçisini desteklemek bizim vazifemizdir. Samsun'daki emekli kardeşimin hakkını savunmak, hakkını vermek bizim sorumluluğumuzdur.

Burada özellikle emekli kardeşlerime birkaç hususu hatırlatmak istiyorum. Sevgili emekli kardeşim, Türkiye büyüdükçe, Türkiye'nin imkanları çoğaldıkça bunu sana azami derecede yansıtmanın gayreti içinde biz olduk. Emeklinin kuyruk çilesine biz son verdik, öyle mi? Emekli vatandaşlarımıza talep etmesi durumunda evinde ödeme yapıyoruz, doğru mu? Sağlıkta devrim yaparak 74 milyonla birlikte, en çok da emekli kardeşlerimizin yaşamını kolaylaştırdık. Emeklilerimizin maaşlarında yaptığımız iyileşmeyi, en düşük ücretler üzerinden birkaç örnekle size hatırlatayım.

SSK işçi emeklisi 2002 yılında MHP'nin iktidarı döneminde ne alıyordu biliyor musunuz? 275 lira, MHP'nin iktidarında. Şimdi ne alıyor? 782 lira. 8 yılda artış oranı ne biliyor musunuz? Yüzde 204. Bak ne enflasyona ezdirdik, ne faize ezdirdik. 6 tane sifıra da ezdirmedik, o sıfırları

da attık. BAĞ-KUR esnaf emeklisi ne alıyordu biliyor musunuz Bahçeli zamanında, MHP zamanında? 149 lira. Bugün ne alıyor biliyor musunuz? 634 lira. Artış oranı ne biliyor musun kardeşim? Yüzde 226. Kardeşlerim, BAĞ-KUR tarım emeklisi ne alıyordu biliyor musunuz? Çok çok komik bakın, 66 lira. Şimdi biz ne veriyoruz? 473 lira. Artış oranı ne biliyor musunuz? Yüzde 617. Ah benim emekli kardeşim ah, Emekli Sandığı emeklisi Bahçeli zamanında ne alıyordu biliyor musunuz? 377 lira. Şimdi ne alıyor? 936 lira. Artış oranı ne biliyor musunuz? Yüzde 148. İnşallah Türkiye büyüdükçe, geliştikçe bu imkanlar daha da artacak. İntibaklarını da biz yapacağız. Emekli vatandaşlarımıza zaten yaptığımız biliyorsunuz 26 maddelik Anayasa değişikliğiyle artık toplu sözleşmelerden anında emekliler de ne yapacak? İstifade edecek.

Kardeşlerim; sözleşmeli çalışan kardeşlerimizle ilgili bir çalışma talimatı vermiştik: Biz tabi Sayın Kılıçdaroğlu gibi, Bahçeli gibi kurusıkı atmıyoruz. Biz hep bir çalışmanın neticesinden konuşuyoruz. Ve şimdi bu çalışma inşallah Pazartesi günü, bilemediniz Salı günü Resmi Gazetede yayınlanacak. Ve böylece sözleşmeli personelimizi özlemleriyle buluşturacağız. 4-B kadrosunda olanları 4-A kadrosuna inşallah geçiriyoruz.

Değerli kardeşlerim; Samsun'u Orta Karadeniz'in en önemli merkezi yapmakta kararlıyız. Bunun için ulaştırmadan sağlığa, eğitimden sanayiye kadar her alanda çok önemli projeleri hayata geçiriyoruz. Samsun'u kara ve deniz ulaşımında önemli bir merkez haline dönüştürüyoruz. Samsun'la Sarp arasındaki Karadeniz Sahil Yolunu tamamladık. Samsun-Ankara bölünmüş yolunu da bitirdik. Ankara'da bir müjde vermiştim. Şimdi Samsun'da tekrarlamak istiyorum. Ankara-Samsun arasında yüksek standartlı bir otoyolun inşasına en kısa sürede başlıyoruz. Otoyol alternatif, nasıl? Biz buyuz, biz sözü verdik mi yaparız. Alaçam'a kadar olan bölünmüş yolu da tamamladık. İnşallah yıl sonuna kadar Samsun-Sinop bölünmüş yolunu tümüyle hizmete almış olacağız. Hedefimiz ne biliyor musunuz? Hedefimiz; Samsun'u İstanbul'a kadar bölünmüş yolla bağlamak. Artık Türkiye'nin neresinden gelerseniz gelin bütün yollar nereye çıkacak, nereye? Samsun'a çıkacak Samsun'a. Biliyorsunuz Samsun'da 16 kilometre uzunluğunda bir raylı sistemi geçtiğimiz yıl hizmete aldık. Böylece Belediyemize de çok teşekkür ediyorum. Şehir içi ulaşım sorununu da büyük ölçüde çözmüş olduk.

Samsun'da bir sağlık kampusu kuruyoruz. Bu inşallah şehir hastanesi havasında olacak. Bu kampusun ilk bölümünü oluşturan 570 yataklı Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesini hizmete aldık. 200 yataklı Ruh ve Sinir Hastalıkları Hastanesinin inşaatı devam ediyor. Aynı şekilde, 60 yataklı AMATEM'in inşaatı da sürüyor. Bunlara Göğüs ve Kalp Hastalıkları Hastanesini, Fizik Tedavi ve Rehabilitasyon Hastanesini, Kadın ve Çocuk Hastalıkları Araştırma Hastanesini, Adli Psikiyatri Hastanesini ilave edeceğiz. Böylece Samsun'u bölgenin en önemli sağlık merkezi haline getiriyoruz. Otel ve alışveriş yatırımlarıyla, fuar ve kongre merkezleriyle Samsun'a yeni

bir vizyon kazandırıyoruz. Samsun'u uluslararası organizasyonların merkezi haline dönüştürüyoruz. Samsun ülkemizin önde gelen üniversitelerinden birine sahipti, şimdi Samsun'da yeni bir üniversite daha yükseliyor. Böylece merhum Ali Fuat Başgil'in memleketi olan Samsun'u bir bilim merkezi haline dönüştürüyoruz. Deniz şehri Samsun'u bundan en iyi şekilde faydalanır hale getirmek için çalışıyoruz.

Kardeşlerim; 2002'de Samsun'da 1 tane liman vardı. Bugün Samsun'da 3 limandan yükleme ve boşaltma yapılıyor. Aynı şekilde 2002'de Samsun'da 1 tane organize sanayi bölgesi vardı. Bugün 5 organize sanayi ile üretim yapan bir Samsun var. Biraz önce de ifade ettim, Samsun'u sporun merkezi haline dönüştürmek istiyoruz dedim. 30 bin kişilik stat dedim. İnşallah ülkemizin gururu şampiyon sporcumuz, olimpiyat şampiyonu Yaşar Doğu'nun şehrinde doğru dürüst spor salonu yoktu, 7 bin 500 kişilik spor salonunu da yapıyoruz. Unutmayın değerli kardeşlerim, yapılan her hizmet, başlanan her inşaat, açılan her tesis iş demek, istihdam demek.

Sizin güzel bir sözünüz var. Neydi o? Çocuklar, Samsunluların güzel bir sözü var biliyor musunuz? Söyleyeyim. "Tarlada izi olmayanın, harmanda yüzü olmaz." Tarlada izi olmayanın, harmanda yüzü olmaz. Bizim hamdolsun Türkiye'nin her karışında izimiz var. Bir yandan yaptıklarımızı anlatıyor, diğer yandan Türkiye'yi, Samsun'u 2023'e taşıyacak projeler için kolları sıvıyoruz. Peki biz bugüne kadar Samsun'a neler yaptık, şöyle kısa anlatayım mı size? Anlatayım.

Bakınız, eğitimde Türkiye'de 163 bin derslik yaptık. Samsun'da 2 bin 781 dersliğin hepsini tamamladık. 1 milyon bilgisayar gönderdik. Samsun'a 9 bin 797 bilgisayar gönderdik. Kardeşlerim, acaba 8 yıldan önce Türkiye'de niçin bilgisayar bilişim teknolojisi sınıfları yoktu? Bunu bu MHP'li kardeşlerime anlatın, bu CHP'lilere anlatın. Bilimle bunların işi yok, inanın bunlar mürteci, tam gerici bunlar. Sıraların üzerine kitapları koyduk mu? İlköğretimde, ortaöğretimde koyduk mu? 1 kuruş para aldık mı? Zengin-fakir ayrımı yapmadık. Sosyal güvencesi olmayanlara ilköğretimde erkeğe 30 lira, kız öğrenciye 35 lira verdik. Ortaöğretimde erkek öğrenciye 45 lira verdik, kız öğrenciye 55 lira verdik. Anneye de 150 lira verdik. Bunu biz yaptık. Özürlü evde bakılıyorsa asgari ücret ödedik, ödedik mi? Biz buyuz.

Ama şimdi size ben başka müjde vereceğiz. Bakınız üniversitede MHP döneminde ne veriyorlardı üniversiteli öğrenciye biliyor musunuz burs olarak? 45 liracık. Sayın Bahçeli'nin bu kadar gücü varmış meğerse. Şimdi diyor ki ben şu kadar asgari ücret vereceğim, ahh ahh. Benim milletim sana 5 sene hükümet et dedi, 3,5 sene kaldın, kaçıp gittin. Niye 5 sene durmadın? Bu iş dirayet ister dirayet. İktidardan bahsediyor, ne iktidarı ya? Senin iktidarın diye bir şey yok zaten, geç o işi geç. Şu ana kadar neredeydiler anlamadım. Biz sizlerle gurur duyuyoruz. Kardeşlerim, biz ne veriyoruz? 240 lira. Bak 45 lira Sayın Bahçeli veriyordu, biz 240 lira veriyoruz. Eğer Kredi Yurtlarda kalıyorsa 150 lira da beslenme yardımı veriyoruz. Sonra bizim yurtlarımız ranza

usulü değil, koğuş usulü değil. 1 yataklı, 3 yataklı. Odalar filan hepsi her odada banyosu, tuvaleti var. Neden? Önce insan, önce insan dedik. Devlet insanın nesi olacak? Hizmetkârı olacak. Biz bu millete efendi olmaya değil, hizmetkâr olmaya geldik. Bizim durumumuz bu. Kardeşlerim, bakınız, mastır öğrencilerine 480 lira veriyoruz. Doktora öğrencilerine 720 lira veriyoruz. Biz buyuz.

Ama müjdeye geliyorum şimdi, müjde. Bakınız, artık karatahtaları kaldırıyoruz okullardan. Bunlar size böyle projeler anlattılar mı? Biz ne veriyoruz? Şu anda sınıflarımıza, dersliklerimize akıllı tahta monte edeceğiz, bilgisayar donanımlı, internet ağıyla dünyaya bağlı, buna geçiyoruz. Ve bütün çocuklarımıza birer elektronik kitap vereceğiz. Elektronik kitap, nasıl? Bunları biz sizlere ücretsiz olarak vereceğiz. Zengin-fakir ayrımı yapmayacağız, tüm öğrencilerimize vereceğiz. Ve bütün dersler bunda var. 4 yıl içinde akıllı tahtaları monte edeceğiz, 4 yıl içinde elektronik kitapları da dağıtacağız. Kardeşlerim, her şey hazır, hemen seçimden sonra ihaleyi yapıyoruz ve üretim başlıyor. Ne diyorum biliyor musun, hemşerilerim ne diyorum? Yahu diyorum, Amerika'da George, Edward, Mary, geliyorsun Avrupa'ya Hans, Helga onlar bu imkanlardan istifade ediyor da, benim Samsunlu Ahmet'im, Mehmet'im, Akif'im, Ömer'im, Ayşe'm, Fatma'm, Hatice'm, Betül'üm niçin istifade etmesin diyorum ya, derdim bu. Bunlar olmayacak şey değildi ki, işte biz yaptık, yapıyoruz ve yapacağız. Farkımız bu.

Ama bak kaç gün kaldı? 9 gün kaldı, 9 gün. Kapı kapı dolaşmaya var mıyız? Bütün eş, dost, ahbab aramaya var mıyız? Oy pusulasında 1. sırada kim var? AK PARTi var. Sandıkları inşallah AK PARTi'yle patlatmaya var mıyız?

Gelelim sağlığa. Sağlıkta benim Samsunlu kardeşim, istediğin hastaneye gidiyor musun? İstedığın eczaneden ilacını alıyor musun? Ah benim kardeşlerim, biz Samsun'a ne kadar yatırım yaptık biliyor musunuz sağlıkta? 331 trilyon yatırım yaptık. Ah kardeşlerim, Bay Kemal biliyorsunuz SSK'nın Genel Müdürüydü 90'lı yıllarda. Anamızı ağlattı anamızı. Sayın Bahçeli de 3,5 yıl malum Başbakan Yardımcılığı yaptı. Bunların döneminde ölülerimiz rehine alınıyor muydu? Hastalarımız rehine alınıyor muydu? Değerli kardeşlerim, hastaneleri birleştirdik, CHP bundan rahatsız oldu, Kılıçdaroğlu buna karşı çıktı, hastanelerin birleştirilmesine karşı çıktı. Bak şimdi de ne diyor sıkılmadan, yok şöyleydi, yok böyleydi manevra yapıyor. Çünkü buna bazıları U dedi, ama ben dedim ki bu U değil, bu S. Çünkü yalanlarına yetişmek mümkün değil. Kardeşlerim, o zamanlarda o dönemi yaşayanlar, gençler bunu pek bilmeyebilir, 90'lı yılları yaşayanlar bilir. Hastaneye gittiğimiz zaman SSK'da bizi ne yapıyordu doktor? Muayenehaneye gel, öyle mi? Muayenehaneye gidip ne yapıyordu? Parayı alıyordu, öyle mi? Reçeteyi veriyor, ilacın yarısı var yarısı yok. Ne yapacağım? Git eczaneden al. Bizi böyle sövüşlediler mi? Peki şimdi böyle bir dert var mı? Peki bu Bay Kemal hangi yüzle benim milletimin karşısına geliyor, ben anlamıyorum. Bu CHP'ye gönül veren kardeşlerim nasıl oluyor da bunun bu yalanlarına hala

aldanıyor ya. Kardeşlerim, yapılanlar var ortada. SSK'yı batırdı bu adam. 8 yıl kolay değil, 8 yıl Genel Müdür olacaksın ve o kurumu batıracaksın. Her türlü orada maalesef o dönemde olmayan yanlışlar hiçbir dönemde olmayan. Akrabaları, terörden şuradan buradan olanlardan oraya yağmalar, bunlar hep Meclis'te anlatıldı, yüzüne vuruldu bunlar, yüzüne vuruldu. Ama yüz gerek yüz. Çok pişkin birisi.

Kardeşlerim; bakınız, yapımına bizden önce başlanan bütün hastaneler bitti. Kardeşlerim, ama en çok da önemseydiğim inşallah bu kampus. Ve şu koskoca Samsun'da tomografi cihazı, MR bunların sayısı neydi biliyor musun? Devlet hastanesinde Samsun'da biz geldiğimizde kaç tomografi cihazı vardı biliyor musunuz? 1 tane, koskoca Samsun'da 1 tane. Şimdi 7 tane. MR 1 tane. Şimdi 4 tane. 87 tane koskoca Samsun'da diyaliz cihazı vardı. Şimdi 277 tane. 112 istasyonu Samsun'da ne kadardı biliyor musun? 6 tane. Şimdi 27 tane. Koskoca Samsun'da ambulans ne kadardı biliyor musunuz? Biz geldiğimizde ey Bahçeli 8 tane. Şimdi 38 tane.

Adalette Çarşamba Adalet Sarayını hizmete açtık, Samsun Havza Adalet Sarayının inşaatını tamamladık. Samsun Adalet Sarayının yapımına devam ediyoruz.

Toplu Konutta Samsun'da bugüne kadar 5 bin 546 konut uygulaması başlattık. Bunların 4 bin 158'ini tamamladık, sahiplerine teslim ettik. Sayın Bahçeli diyor ki, TOKİ'nin Başkanını, Başbakanı Yüce Divan'a göndereceğim. Sayın Bahçeli, TOKİ sana bağlıydı 3,5 sene, Kaç tane konut ürettin onu söyle onu, kaç tane konut ürettin? Meyvesi yenen ağaç taşlanır. 500 bin konutu açtık şu anda inşaata, 360 binini sahiplerine teslim ettik, seni bu mu rahatsız ediyor? Ah kardeşlerim ah. Ve 10 yıl, 15 yıl, 20 yıl vadeyle konut dağıtıyoruz. Seni bu mu rahatsız ediyor? Tabi tilki yetişemediği üzümüne koruk dermiş. Kedi ulaşamadığı ciğere mundar dermiş. Maalesef la teşbih durumları bu.

KÖYDES'te Samsun'a 191 trilyon gönderdik. Çünkü yolu olmayan, suyu olmayan köy bırakmayacağız inşallah.

Kardeşlerim; doğalgazı biz ne zaman gönderdik Samsun'a? 2005'te, öyle mi? Ne çileler çektiniz ya. Benim anam da çok çile çekti. 5 kat, 6 kat apartmanın bodrumuna in, sıçanlar oraya cirit atar, öyle mi? Oradan kömürü çıkar, kül, koku hepsi var mı? Var. Bir odayı ısıtırsın, diğerleri durur. Sobanın üzerinde suyu ısıt, öyle mi? Şimdi kombinin düğmesine bas, bütün daire ısınıyor. Kombinin düğmesine bas, istediğin anda evin her yerinde sıcak su, öyle mi? Ben soruyorum, Batı'daki kadınlar bu konfora sahip olacak da, benim Ayşe ablam, Fatma ablam, Hatice ablam niçin bunlara sahip olmasın, neden? İşte şimdi artık biz de doğalgazda evlerimizi insan olduğumuz anladık değil mi? Daha iyi olacak, daha güzel olacak inşallah, hiç merak etmeyin. Bahçeli'nin döneminde Türkiye'de 9 vilayette doğalgaz vardı. Ama şimdi 69 vilayette doğalgaz var. 81'ine ulaştıracamız, 81'de 81.

Kardeşlerim; bakın, şu anda Türkiye'nin bütün illerinde üniversite var. Ve dönemimizde biz geldik 76 üniversite vardı bazı illerde, biz bunun üzerine 89 üniversite ilave ettik. 81 vilayette şimdi üniversite var.

Tarımda 2002'de Bahçeli'nin döneminde Samsun'a verilen destek neydi biliyor musunuz? 24 milyon. Biz 2010'da ne verdik biliyor musunuz? 105 milyon. Bahçeli 22 verdi, biz 105 verdik. 2003'ten 2010'a ne kadar verdik biliyor musunuz? 550 milyon destek verdik Samsun'a. Hayvancılık desteği ne kadar verdik biliyor musunuz? 129 milyon. Yani eski rakamla 129 trilyon.

Ah benim kardeşlerim, Bahçeli'nin döneminde bankalar battı mı? Battı. Ziraat Bankasına görev zararı yazdılar, Halk Bankasına görev zararı yazdılar, milletimizi sövüşlediler. Ziraat Bankası çiftçiye yüzde kaçla kredi verdi? Yüzde 59, yüzde 59 faizle kredi verdi. Biz yüzde 5'le veriyoruz, yüzde 5. Aradaki fark kimin cebinde kalıyor? Çiftçi kardeşimin cebinde kalıyor. Esnaf, sanatkâr Bahçeli'nin döneminde Halk Bankasından yüzde 47 faizle kredi alıyordu. Şimdi yüzde 5. Ah benim esnaf kardeşim, ah benim sanatkâr kardeşim, şu Başbakanın sana yalan mı söylüyor? Şu Bahçeli'ye, şu CHP'ye nasıl gideceksin de oy vereceksin soruyorum. Göreve geldik, Türkiye'nin milli geliri neydi biliyor musunuz? 230 milyar dolardı. Şimdi milli gelirimiz ne biliyor musunuz? 740 milyar dolar. Ahh Bahçeli ahh, ahh MHP, ahh CHP.

Bitmedi. Devletin borçlanma faizi neydi biliyor musunuz? Yüzde 63. Ne kadar vade biliyor musunuz? 9 ay vade, daha fazla alamıyorlardı. Çünkü iktidara güven yoktu. Ama şimdi biz yüzde 7, yüzde 8 faizle borçlanabiliyoruz ve süre noktasında 9 yıl, 10 yıl git gidebildiğin kadar, buradayız. Niye? Güven var iktidara. Şu anda kredibilitesi yüksek bir Türkiye var. Enflasyon neydi? Yüzde 30. Şu anda son gelinen noktayı söylüyorum yüzde 7. Bak nereden nereye düştü. Kimin cebinden çıkıyordu bu? Vatandaşımın cebinden çıkıyordu. Ama şimdi cebinde kalıyor.

Değerli kardeşlerim; Devlet Su İşleri olarak ona gelmeden önce bir şey daha söyleyeyim. IMF'ye borç ne kadardı biliyor musunuz? MHP borçlandı. Bize nasıl devretti biliyor musunuz? 23,5 milyar dolar borçla devretti. Ödedik ödedik ödedik şu anda 5 milyar dolar borç kaldı, 5 milyar dolar. Bunu öderiz problem değil, öderiz. Ama 2013'e kadar süre var. Rahat rahat çok düşük faizle bu geçer.

Merkez Bankası bizim milli bankamız değil mi? Kasada ne vardı biliyor musunuz? 27,5 milyar dolar. Yarıdan fazlası da yurt dışındaki işçilerimizindi. Şimdi kasada ne var biliyor musunuz? 95 milyar dolar var. Ah Bahçeli, ah Kılıçdaroğlu. Şimdi o Merkez Bankasındaki paraya sulanıyor. Nasıl olsa para var diyor, oradan dağıtırım diyor. Sana benim milletim bu fırsatı vermez.

Devlet Su İşleri olarak 579 trilyonluk yatırım yaptık Samsun'a. Samsun'un içme suyu sorununu çözdük hamdolsun. Ve uzun yıllardır inşaatı devam eden Derinöz Barajıyla Vezirköprü Barajı

inşaatını tamamladık. Şimdi de sulama inşaatlarına devam ediyoruz. Bu iki projede bugüne kadar 70 bin dekar tarım alanını sulamaya açtık.

Kardeşlerim; yapacağımız çok iş var, daha iyi olacak, daha güzel olacak, ama bugün rahmetle bir aradayız. Çok sabrettiniz, gecikmeli geldim, Konya'dan selam getirdim, Mevlana diyarından selam getirdim. Ama 9 gün çok çalışalım, hakkınızı bu kardeşinize helal edin. Sandıklardan gümbür gümbür AK PARTi'yi çıkartalım, sandıkları patlatalım. CHP'li komşuna da git anlat, MHP'li komşumuza da git anlat, hepsine anlatalım. İnşallah kalpleri biz kazanalım.

Hazır mıyız? Bayrakları bir göreyim. Şimdi finale geldik. Hazırız değil mi? Burada bayrak yok mu bayrak? Şarkımızı biliyorsunuz, ahdimizi biliyorsunuz. Ama formundan düşmüyoruz. Yarın Adana, İzmir var. Selam götüreceğim sizden.

Berber yürüdük biz bu yollarda. Beraber ıslandık yağın yağmurda. Şimdi dinlediğim tüm şarkılarda bize her şey sizi hatırlatıyor. Bize her şey sizi hatırlatıyor. Bize her şey sizi hatırlatıyor.

Günümüz kutlu olsun. 12 Haziran Türkiye'miz, Samsun'umuz, milletimiz, Samsunlu kardeşlerim için aydınlık yarınlara vesile olsun. İnşallah yeni anayasa, temel hak ve özgürlükler bunlar için bir milat olsun diyorum. Sizleri sevgiyle, saygıyla selamlıyorum. Kalın sağlıcakla diyorum.

### **The Party Group Speech of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (03.01.2012)**

Türkiye'de bizden önceki dönemlerde seçim yılları, maalesef hep kayıp yıllar olmuştur. Biz seçimin ekonomik, siyasi, diplomatik hiçbir belirsizliğe yol açmasına izin vermedik. İstikrarı zedeledikten, güven ortamını sarsmadan, para ve maliye politikalarını bozmadan büyük bir titizlik içinde seçimleri gerçekleştirdik. Türkiye'de demokrasinin standartlarının çitasının ne kadar değiştiğini, hem Türkiye'ye, hem dünyaya ispat etmiş olduk.

Şurası da son derece önemli: Şu anda Avrupa'da hükümetler seçim kaygısıyla, popülist kaygılarla küresel ekonomik krize karşı tedbir almakta zorlanıyor. Bu tedbirleri alamadıkları, güçlü bir liderlik sergileyemedikleri için de krizin derinleşmesine, küresel krizin tahribatının daha yüksek olmasına zemin hazırlıyorlar.

Biz ise 2011 Türkiye'de seçim yılı olmasına rağmen sadece Avrupa'da değil tüm dünyada takdirle izlenen, hayranlıkla izlenen bir performans sergiledik. Bakınız 2011 yılının üçüncü çeyreğinde Türkiye ekonomisi, yüzde 8,2 oranında büyüme kaydetti. Bu oranla Çin'den sonra dünyada en hızlı büyüyen ülke oldu. 2011 yılının ilk 9 ayında ortalama büyüme oranımız yüzde 9,6 gibi çok yüksek bir orana ulaştı. Üç dönemlik milli gelirimiz, 589 milyar dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Geriye dönük dört dönemlik milli gelirimiz ise, 793 milyar dolar oldu. Yani, küresel

kriz öncesi rakamları, 2008 rakamlarını yakaladık ve hatta bu rakamları aşarak 1 trilyon dolar milli gelir sınırına artık çok yaklaştık. 2011 yılında aynı şekilde işsizlikte sevindirici gelişmelere şahit olduk. Eylül döneminde işsizlik yüzde 8,8 gibi gerçekten rekor düzeyde düşük bir seviyeye geriledi. Dün bildiğiniz gibi Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi 2011 yılı ihracat rakamlarını açıkladı. 2011 yılında ihracatımız 2010 yılına göre yüzde 18 oranında artarak 134,6 milyar dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Yani, 135 milyar dolar. İhracatta da kriz öncesi rakamlarını aştığımız gibi, Cumhuriyet tarihimizin yeni bir rekorunu daha elde ettik. Bu vesileyle tüm ihracatçılarımıza, firmalarımıza, şirketlerimize, üreticilere, birliklere bu başarıyı, bu sevinci, bu rekoru bizlere yaşattıkları için milletim adına, Kabinem adına, Hükümetim adına şükranlarımı sunuyorum.

Biz maaşlarda kesintiyi, maaşları dondurmaya aklımızın ucundan bile geçirmiyor, tam tersine çalışanlarımızı enflasyona ezdirmiyor, enflasyon üzerinde ücretlere artış sağlıyoruz. Burada tek bir örnek vermek istiyorum. Asgari ücrette 2012 yılı için biz bütçede yüzde 3+3'lük bir artış öngörmüştük. Buna rağmen şartları zorladık ve 2012 yılında asgari ücrete yüzde 5,9+6 oranında bir artış yaptık. Yani, toplamda 2012 yılının tamamında asgari ücreti yüzde 12,4 oranında artırdık ve ilk altı ay için 701 lira olarak belirledik. Dikkatinizi çekiyorum, 2002 yılında biz görevi devraldığımızda asgari ücret 184 liraydı, bugün 701 lira. Artış oranı yüzde 281. 9 yıl boyunca asgari ücreti enflasyona ezdirmediğimiz gibi, reel olarak, yani enflasyonun üzerinde yüzde 73'lük bir artışı da gerçekleştirmiş olduk.

Yine buradan lisans-lisansüstü olmak üzere bir müjdemizi aktarmak istiyorum. Biliyorsunuz biz göreve geldiğimizde yüksek öğrenimdeki öğrencilerimize aylık 45 lira burs ve kredi veriliyor, bu da 3 aydan 3 aya ödeniyordu. Biz bu miktarı kademe kademe artırdık ve 2011 yılında 240 liraya kadar yükselttik. Ayrıca Kredi Yurtlar Kurumunda kalan öğrenciler için de gıda yardımını yaptık. Burs ve kredileri de biz şimdi üç aydan üç aya değil her ay öğrencilerimize ödedik. Şimdi 2012 yılında öğrencilerimize ödenen burs ve kredi miktarlarını artırıyor, aylık kredi ve burs miktarını 1 Ocak 2012 itibarıyla 260 liraya çıkartıyoruz.

2002 yılına göre kredi ve burs miktarlarında artış oranı, lütfen buna dikkat ediniz, yani geldiğimizden bu yana artış oranı ne biliyor musunuz? Yüzde 478. Öğrencilerimize her ay ödenen beslenme yardımına da geliyorum, aylık 150 liraydı, onu da 180 liraya yükselttik. Kredi Yurtlar Kurumunda kalan öğrencilere aldıkları burs ve kredinin yanında 180 lira da ne ödeyeceğiz, beslenme yardımını.

46Master öğrencilerine 480 lira veriyorduk, 1 Ocak'tan itibaren bunu da 520 liraya çıkarıyoruz burs ve kredi olarak.

Doktora öğrencileri 720 lira alıyordu, doktora öğrencilerinin 720 lira olarak aldıkları bu burs ve krediyi de 780 liraya çıkarıyoruz.

Değerli milletvekili arkadaşlarım, 2011 yılı bölgemizde ve dünyada önemli gelişmelerin yaşandığı bir yıl oldu. Tunus, Libya ki Mısır'da bugün 3. tur seçimler yapılıyor. İlk 2 turun neticelerini takip etmişsinizdir. Ve bugün 3. tur seçimleriyle birlikte işin artık parlamento boyutu belirlenmiş olacak. Tabi buralarda başlayan gösteriler bütün Ortadoğu'ya yayıldı. Ve bölgede değişim arzusu, değişim talebi artık çok güçlü şekilde dile getirildi. 2011 yılında Suriye'de bu kapsamda başlayan olaylar maalesef 2012'ye sarkmış durumda. Şu ana kadar yani 9 aylık süreçte Suriye'de 6 bine yakın insan hayatını kaybetti. Tunus, Libya ve Mısır'da değişimin sancısız şekilde gerçekleşmesi veya az bir sancıyla gerçekleşmiş olması, yöneticilerin halkın taleplerine kulak vermesi için Türkiye olarak biz Suriye'ye de gereken uyarılarımızı yaptık. Rejim değişikliklerinin ardından bu ülkelerde istikrarın yeniden yerleşmesi, geçiş sürecinin tamamlanması, altını çiziyorum, halk iradesinin ve halk idaresinin bu ülkelere egemen olması için de desteğimiz, katkımız devam ediyor. Tabi birilerinin dediği gibi Türkiye bu ülkelerin içişlerine niye karışıyor? Biz, bu ülkelerin içişlerine karışmıyoruz. Ama ortak bir dünyayı paylaşırken, bu ortak dünyayı paylaşan bir ülke olarak sadece sorulduğunda düşüncelerimizi, yaklaşımımızı ortaya koyuyoruz. Hele hele 910 kilometre sınırimız olan, akrabalık ilişkilerimizin olduğu bir Suriye'yle ilgili olarak sessiz kalmamız hiç mümkün değil. Tabi ki orayla ilgili de düşüncelerimizi bugüne kadar söylediğimiz gibi, bundan sonra da söyleyeceğiz ve yaklaşımımızı ortaya koyacağız.

2011 yılının son günlerinde milletçe hepimizi derinden yaralayan, tabi bu gelişmeler neticesinde başta bu konudan sorumlu olan Başbakan Yardımcım Beşir Atalay Bey olmak üzere ilgili bakan arkadaşlarım, özellikle Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanım, bunun yanında diğer bölge bakanlarımız olmak üzere İçişleri Bakanım, bölge milletvekillerimiz gerçekten bütün bu çalışmalarını sürdürürken, ama bakıyorsunuz muhalefetin hala bu sürece ne yazık ki vicdani olmayan yaklaşım türleri var; işte güven oylamaları vesaire gibi yaklaşımlar. Tabi arkadaşlarımız sürekli bölgede, gidiyorlar geliyorlar, gidiyorlar geliyorlar ve onlar da ara sıra, bazı bazı uğruyorlar. Tabi bizim hissiyatımız, bizim hassasiyetimiz farklıdır; biz, sevgili milletim, candanız, onlar ise yandan, aradaki fark bu.

Ana Muhalefet Partisi şöyle der, böyle der, bu da bizi pek ilgilendirmiyor. Sürekli olarak ağızlarında biliyorsunuz bir tekerleme var, AK Parti İktidarı hep Cumhuriyet tarihini eleştiriyor diye. Biz, bir dönemin, bir sürecin takvimini ortaya koyuyoruz ve diyoruz ki, Cumhuriyet döneminde bu iktidarda yapılanlar yapılmamıştır diyoruz, ilk defa bu iktidar bu ülkede bir dönüşümü, bir değişimi gerçekleştirmiştir diyoruz. Bu tespiti yapmak yanlış mı? Eğer sizler tek partili iktidarlarınız döneminde ne yaptığımız ortaya koyacaksınız, zaten çok partili iktidar dönemlerinde kenarından, köşesinden bir yerlere yamandınız, başka bir işe de yaramadınız, bundan sonra da yapacağınız bir şey yok zaten. Tek partili iktidar döneminde hep kimlik kartlarını gösterdik, nüfus kağıtlarını gösterdik, buralarda mühürle nasıl ekmek dağıtıldığını,

nasıl gazyağı dağıtıldığını, bunları hep anlattık. Benzin kuyruklarını, o mühürler nasıl nüfus kağıtlarında vardı bunları gösterdik. Un, şeker, nasıl bunların mühürle dağıtıldıklarını biz babalarımızdan, dedelerimizden hep dinledik. Bunlar CHP'nin iktidar dönemleriydi. Bu millete bu acıları yaşattınız. Ama, AK Parti İktidarı döneminde hamd olsun artık böyle bir şey söz konusu değil ve Allah'ın izniyle de olmayacak. Her geçen gün daha iyi oluyor, daha iyi olacak.

Şimdi burada altını şöyle kalın çizgilerle çizerek bir hususu vurgulamak durumundayım; değerli kardeşlerim, kim ki Uludere'de 35 Kürt öldürüldü diyerek meseleyi etnik zemine taşıyorsa, o, her türlü milli, manevi değeri, her türlü insani ve vicdani değeri ayaklarının altına almış ve çiğnemiş demektir. Biz olaya böyle bakmıyoruz. Biz, Uludere'de 35 insan hayatını kaybetmiştir; biz olaya böyle bakıyoruz, 35 can yitirilmiştir, 35 vatandaşımız, kardeşlerimiz kaybedilmiştir diye bakıyoruz. Ama onlar, maalesef etnik zemini kurcalamak suretiyle ülkemizi hep bölmenin, parçalamanın gayreti içerisinde oldukları için burada da yine o istismarı ortaya koyuyorlar. Hale bakın, cenazeleri bile etnik kökenleriyle tasnif edenler insanlıktan nasibini alamayanlardır.

Siyasi zihniyeti nedir bilemem, ancak mesela orada ölenlerden bir tanesinin ablası da benim şu anda Kadın Kollarında çalışan bir bayan ve orada başkanlık yapan bir bayan; bu da var. Ama bizden bunun istismarını duydunuz mu? Biz böyle bir şeyi yapamayız. Bunların kalpleri kararmış, bunlar vicdanlarını yitirmişler. Irkçılık ve faşizm, küstahça böbürlenmiş, kibirlenmiş iblisin, yani şeytanın açtığı bir yoldur. Cenazeleri bile Türk-Kürt diye ayıranlar, işte iblisin yolunda, şeytanın izinde yürüyenlerdir. İşte İstanbul'da bu acı hadiseyle ilgili olarak yaptıkları basın toplantısının görüntülerini izlediniz değil mi? Kendi milletvekilleri. İzlediniz görüntüleri, güya acı içindeler, ama kameralar önünde kahkahalar atmaktan da çekinmeyecek kadar insafsızlar, vicdansızlar.

Bugün, vesayetçi zihniyetinin şekillendirdiği bir devlet ve hükümet yok. Bugün, milletin iradesiyle şekillenen, adil, şefkatli, özgürlükçü bir devlet ve hükümet var. Bugün, faili meçhullerle, köy yakmalarla, işkencelerle anılan, vatandaşını düşman olarak gören bir devlet yok, tam aksine ileri demokrasiyle, hak ve özgürlüklerle anılan, vatandaşını kucaklayan bir devlet var. Biz önce devlet demiyoruz, az önce söyledim, biz önce millet, önce insan diyoruz.

Bakıyorsunuz daha da ileriye gidiyor. Ben diyor eli silahlı olanlardan korkmadım, Kasımpaşalı Tayyip'ten mi korkacağım? Benim derdim kimseyi korkutmak değil. Ama şunu unutma veya şunu unutmayın: Ben Kasımpaşalı Tayyip olmaktan şeref duyarım. Ve Kasımpaşa'dan çıkan, oranın bir evladı olarak tüm halkımın da bizi bu makamlara getirmesinden dolayı bir hizmetkar olarak millete hizmet etmekten onur duyarım. Eğer bu ülke de yüzde 50 bize oyunu verdiyse ondan sen gocun. Herhalde bu yüzde 50'den daha akıllı değilsin. Kendinizi bir çek edin, kendinizi bir kontrolden geçirin. Acaba biz nerede yanlış yapıyoruz da bu ülkenin yüzde 50'si bu insanlara oy veriyor bunu bir gözden geçirin. Bu ancak adaletle olur, bu ancak dürüstlikle olur,

bu ancak bu milletin hizmetinde olmakla olur. Biz bunu yaptık, bunu yapıyoruz, bunu yapacağız, ama kendi kendinize sorun, biz ne yaptık? Kusura bakmasınlar beyler, bizim istikametimizi her zaman millet çizdi. Bundan sonra da sadece millet çizer. Bunlar gibi bunların taşeron fikirlerini alacak, vicdan kisvesi altındaki fitnelere boyun eğecek değiliz. Biz; devlet, millet kaynaşmasını sağlamaya çalışıyoruz. Bunlarsa, terör örgütünün düşman devlet algısını güçlendirmeye çanak tutuyorlar. Biz milletimizi kucaklamanın, birlik ve bütünlüğü korumanın derdindeyiz. Bunlar kin ve nefret tohumlarının yeşermesine hizmet ediyorlar. Biz her alanda sivilleşme, demokratikleşme hakim olsun diye mücadele ediyoruz. Bunlar, kurumlar birbirine düşsün diye fitne çıkarıyorlar.

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin PKK'nın diliyle, BDP'nin diliyle konuşmasına açıkçası anlam vermekte zorlanıyoruz. CHP'nin üslubunun PKK ve BDP'nin üslubuyla bu kadar örtüşmesi son derece dikkat çekicidir. Gerçi 12 Haziran'dan önce seçim meydanlarında gördüğümüz siyasi ittifakı bugün taziye çadırında görüyoruz. Söylemiştik ya, şimdi de taziye çadırında görüyoruz. CHP gibi bir partinin, BDP'nin değirmenine su taşıması, BDP'nin peşine takılması çok hazindir.

Şehitleri koyun koyuna yatan bu asil millet, her türlü habis uru bünyesinden söküp atacaktır. Her zaman söyledim, bugün bir kez daha söylüyorum, biz bu ülkenin kardeşliği için, birliği için, bütünlüğü için elimizi değil yüreğimizi, bedenimizi taşın altına koyduk. Bedeli her ne olursa olsun biz bu meseleyi çözeceğiz. Demokrasiyle çözeceğiz, kardeşlik hukuku içinde çözeceğiz, kardeşlik hukuku içinde çözeceğiz, bölge halkıyla dayanışma içinde terörle mücadele ederek çözeceğiz. Bütün tahrikleri aşacağız, Allah'ın izniyle bunu başaracağız. Bütün istismar girişimlerini çiğneyip geçeceğiz. Engel olanları, engel çıkartanları, yavaşlatanları tek tek geri bırakıp istikbale hep birlikte yürüyeceğiz.

## **Ministerial Speeches:**

### **Text 1. Ertuğrul Günay**

İzmir'de 'Yapmam, yaptırmam' siyaseti var. Ne yapıyorlar ne yaptırıyorlar. İzmir'in her sorunu hepimizin ortak sorunudur. Ankara'da, İstanbul'da gecekondular kalmadı, ancak Buca'nın, Konak'ın, Karabağlar'ın gecekonduları hala devam ediyor. Biz sosyal dönüşüm, kentsel dönüşüm projeleri yapıyoruz. Evler yapıp vatandaşlara veriyoruz. Ancak İzmir Ankara ile işbirliği yapmakta gecikmiş. Biz bunu telafi etmeye çalışıyoruz. İzmir İzmir'den ibaret değildir. Etrafında Manisa, Uşak gibi iller vardır. Sorunların yerel yönetimler tarafından Ankara'ya taşınması lazım. Ben bana talep getirene parti gözetmeksizin yardım ediyorum. Ancak İzmir'deki yerel yönetimlerin bizden talebi yok. Talepte bulunanların sayısı 3'ü geçmez. İzmir bizim elimizden tuttuğu zaman biz de İzmir'i ayağa kaldıracacağız. Hiç kimsenin kılığıyla kıyafetiyle masasıyla

ilgilenmiyoruz. İsteyen sofrasını kurar şarap içer isteyen sofrasında şerbet içer. Benim derdim onların çocuğunun geleceğidir. İzmir'i Türkiye kenti ve dünya markası yapacağız.

### **Text2. Bülent Arınç**

Türkiye hepsinden daha kolay ekonomik krizden çıktı. Biz akıllı davrandık. Siyasi istikrar ekonomiyi çok iyi yönetti. 'Kriz bizi teğet geçecek' dediği gün Başbakan ile alay etmeye kalkanlar, sonra hakkını teslim ettiler. Çünkü krizi hem iyi yönettik hem de Türkiye'de gelmiş geçmiş hükümetler IMF ile iş yaparken, stand-by anlaşması imzalarken, borç alıp sadece borcu ödemek için çalışırken, 3 yıl önce IMF ile ilişkimizi kestik. Krizin en ağır noktasında 'IMF ile anlaşın, sıcak para alın, büyük sanayiye aktarın' derken, özellikle TUSİAD bu akli veriyordu bize. 'Hayır, biz öz sermayemizi, kendi imkanlarımızı kullanacağız, IMF ile anlaşma yapmaya ihtiyaç duymuyoruz' dedik. IMF de 'Türkiye'nin bize ihtiyacı kalmadı' dedi.

### **Text3. Hüseyin Çelik**

Misyonerlerin Türkiye'de cirit attığı yönünde eleştiriler yapılıyor. Avrupa'da 5 bin cami var, bunların çok büyük bir bölümü de Türkler tarafından yapılmıştır. Sen yapacaksın ama onlar gelip bir İncil dağıttığında karşı çıkacaksın. Bu iki yüzölçümlüktür. Bir de topraklarımızın yabancılara satıldığı yönünde eleştiriler var. Bunların hepsi hayal ürünü. Ülkelerle yapılan karşılıklı anlaşma gereği yapılıyor bu satışlar ve yüzde 10 kota var. Mesela Hatay'da bizim dönemimizde hiç arazi satışı yapılmadı, çünkü kota dolmuştu. Şimdi yabancı sermaye ülkemize geliyor. Bizim yeterli sermaye birikimimiz var mı? Yok. Dünyada dolaşan bir para var, bu para yatırım imkanı nerde iyiye oraya gidiyor. Bizi biz yapan güzelliklere ve değerlere sahip çıkacağız ama tüm dünyaya da açık olacağız. Yozlaşmadan dünyayla uzlaşma gibi bir mükellefiyetimiz var

### **Text4. Taner Yıldız**

Atıp tutmanın sağlığa herhangi bir zararı yok. Ola ki yıllar sonra başa gelirse, hazineye bizim biriktirdiğimiz parayı vatandaşa dağıtacağını söylüyor. Kardeşim sen kimin parasını kime dağıtıyorsun? Yağmacı mısın sen? Böyle mirasyedi gibi davranmakla olmaz. Geleceksin, kaynağını oluşturacaksın, ondan sonra dağıtacaksın. Vatandaşın buna itibar etmediğini görüyoruz. Yalancının mumu seçime kadar yanar. 13 Haziran sabahında kimin mumunun yanıp, kimin ampulünün yandığını hep birlikte göreceğiz.

### **Text5. Bülent Arınç**

Yaptığın iş varsa bana göster. Ben yaptıklarımı gösteriyorum. Hastaneleri iş yapar duruma getirdik. Türkiye'de eserimiz, İzmir'den İstanbul'a otobanlardır, Mudanya'dan İstanbul'a deniz yoludur, eserimiz yüksek hızlı trenlerdir, eserimiz Bursa'ya kazandırdığımız devlet hastaneleridir, barajlar, göletler, tarımsal sulama projeleridir. Bunların hepsi bizim eserimiz.

Yoksullara sadece kömür, gıda, erzak yardımı yapmıyoruz. Neye ihtiyaçları varsa büyük desteklerde bulunuyoruz. Bunlar bizim sosyal devlet olmamızın gereğidir. Bizim iddiamız şudur; biz siyaseti hizmet için yapıyoruz. Siz oy verdiniz tek başımıza iktidara geldik. Ne yapacağız biz? Eskiden hükümetler kendi ceplerini doldururdu. Bizim siyasetimiz millet içindir. Milletin ihtiyaçlarını gidereceğiz, sorunlarını çözeceğiz, hayatı yaşanabilir hale getireceğiz. Siyaseti hizmet için yapıyoruz. Hükümetler halka tepeden bakan, zulmeden değil, halka hizmet edendir. AK Parti, halka hizmet edendir.

#### **Text6. Zafer Çağlayan**

Bir tarafta enerji yatırımlarına karşı çıkan bir grup diğer tarafta da enerji fiyatlarından şikayet eden bir yapıyla karşı karşıyayız. Türkiye bugün elektrik üretiminde yüzde 52 doğal gazla bağımlıdır. Biz petrolü hem bir hammaddede olarak hem de enerji amaçlı ithal ediyoruz. Şu anda petrol fiyatları 110 dolarlar mertebesine gelmiştir. Türkiye'nin şöyle bir yapısı var; Petrol fiyatlarındaki her 10 dolarlık artış cari açığımızı 4 milyar dolar artırıyor, cari açığın en büyük belirleyicisi enerji fiyatlarıdır. Enerji yapımızda değişikliğe gitmemiz gerekiyor. Nükleer santraller için son derece geç kalınmıştır.

#### **Text7. Hüseyin Çelik**

Doktorların rahatsız ve rencide edilmesi söz konusu değil. Bunu asla istemeyiz. Bu aklımıza bile gelmez. Çalışma barışı, o sektörde çalışan insanların mutluluğunu temin etmekten geçer. Bu önemli bir şeydir. Ancak biz kendi insanımızın sağlığını sadece muayenehanedeki hekimlere havale etmek, onların merhametine terk etmek gibi bir duruşa ve konuma sahip değiliz. Bunu da yapmayacağız.

#### **Text8. İdris Naim Şahin**

Toplumun huzurunu bozmaya yönelik, teşebbüs hürriyetini, insanların çalışma hürriyetini, mesken masumiyetini, sokak güvenliğini ihlal etmeye yönelik her türlü kanun dışı etik dışı davranışlarla mücadele bizim hassasiyetimizdir. Bu noktada zaman zaman bir takım olumsuz gelişmeler olmuştur, yine de olabilir. Teşebbüsler de olabilir ama bugün gelinen nokta itibarıyla, hükümetimizin en başarılı olduğu konulardan biri de Türkiye'nin huzurlu bir ülke olma noktasında yakaladığı başarıdır. Bunun daha da ileri bir seviyeye taşınması için çabalar devam edecektir.

İç güvenlik birimlerimiz, polisimiz, jandarmamız, sahil güvenlik teşkilatımız, zabıta hizmetlerini yürüten özel zabıta ve özel güvenlik kurumları ile onların personeli, topyekun birbiriyle entegre bir anlayış içinde ülkemizi her alanda olduğu gibi güvenlik hizmeti alanında da daha ilerilere götürmenin gayreti içinde olacaklar. Ben de bakan olarak bu teşkilatlarımızın önünü açmaya,

onlara moral vermeye, onların ihtiyacı olan mevzuat düzenlemesi konusunda takipte bulunmaya, teknik donanımlar noktasında ihtiyaç duyulan malzemenin tedarikinde ve tabii ki, bütün bunların en iyi şekilde yerinde kullanılması noktasında üzerime düşeni yapacağım. İnaniyorum ki, arkadaşlarımızla birlikte başarılı olacağız.

#### **Text9. Ahmet Davutoğlu**

Dün Suriye'den gelen ve son derece güvenilir bir yetkiliyi dinledim. Gözleri yaşararak "Sayın Bakanım hava bombardımanında çocuğunu kaybetmiş bir baba dışarıya çıkıp çocuğunu gömemediği için kokmasın diye çocuğunu buzdolabına koymuş. Ben bunu bizzat gördüm' dedi. Bu, nasıl bir zulümdür. Geçmişte Suriye'ye dostane tavsiyede bulunduk ama bir şey empoze etmedik. Ancak ne zaman ki bir halka yüklenilmişse işte o zaman değişir.

'Orada ne olursa olun ilgilenmeyin...!' Bak, o olmaz işte. İnsan olarak yapamayız. Bunu ülkenin, bölgenin geleceği için yapamayız. Nasıl Bosna'da sniperler ile mücadele etti günün hükümeti, takdirle anıyorum, biz de bugün belli bir tutum içine girmek durumundayız.

İnsani boyut olarak Suriye'deki kardeşlerimize hiçbir ayırım gözetmeden, etnik ve mezhebi ayırım gözetmeden sahip çıkmaya devam edeceğiz. Bu bizim devlete kültürümüzün bir gereği.

Suriye'de geçiş sürecinin barışçıl ve sağlıklı şekilde bir an önce tamamlanmasını ve bu yolla Suriye'nin güçlü ve istikrarlı bir komşu olarak uluslararası camiaya dönmesini istiyoruz.

#### **Text10. Mehmet Şimşek**

1986 yılından bu yana toplam 45,1 milyar dolar tutarında özelleştirme gerçekleştirildiği göz önünde tutulursa bu alandaki başarımız daha net ortaya çıkacaktır. Ancak şunu da belirtmek isterim, Hükümet olarak biz özelleştirmeyi bir gelir kapısı olarak görmüyoruz. Aksine, orta ve uzun vadede yatırımları, istihdamı ve verimliliği artıran bir olgu olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Zira hükümetlerimiz döneminde ülkemizin büyüme potansiyeli ve kalkınma hızının artmasına, kamunun üzerindeki istihdam ve finansman yükünün azalmasına büyük katkı sağlayan özelleştirme uygulamalarına öncelik verdik. Bundan sonra da bu uygulamalara aynı kararlılıkla devam edeceğiz.

#### **Text11. Ömer Dinçer**

Eğer biz bir amaca odaklanmışsak, Türk eğitiminin kalitesini geliştirmek istiyorsak, çocuklarımızın küresel düzeydeki rekabet gücünü artırmak, ulusal düzeyde piyasaya uyumlu eğitim yapmak, toplumumuzun beklentilerine ve ihtiyaçlarına cevap vermek istiyorsak, çocuklarımıza toplumsal ve ahlaki değerleri kazandırmak, tarih şuuru, millet şuuru vermeye çalışıyorsak, geriye kalanların ne anlamı olabilir ki?

