

***Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in:
A Comparative Study of the Role of Hong Kong, Macao and
Shanghai in Contemporary EU-China Relations***

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Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations

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Abstract

Abstract of the thesis entitled:

BRINGING THE PORTS AND PORT DIPLOMACY BACK-IN:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF HONG KONG, MACAO AND SHANGHAI
IN CONTEMPORARY EU-CHINA RELATIONS

Submitted by CHAN, Wai Shun

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This thesis aims to bring back the prism of port-cities and port diplomacy to understanding the contemporary relationship between the EU and China. By drawing various concepts from international politics, port studies and political geography, the thesis highlights the crucial role played by port-cities as a vector of economic and political power, via their role as an interface between the “port host”, in the thesis China, and port visitors, in the thesis the European Union.

The suggested framework will then be applied to analyse the contemporary EU-China relations through three selected case studies: Hong Kong, where the first European colony was established in 1842; Macao, where the first European settlement was established in 1557; and Shanghai, where the first batch of treaty ports opened by the Europeans without turning Shanghai as a colony of one nation. At the end of the thesis, the thesis will discuss a new academic concept, namely the civilian sea power, and how the academic concept is applicable to contemporary diplomatic studies and international politics.

Keywords:

Civilian Ports, Structural Power, Geopolitics, EU-China relations, Structural Port Diplomacy

Acknowledgement

“It was the best of times. It was the worst of times.”

– Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*

While the above quote was commonly shared in my hometown, Hong Kong, I originally did not have much feeling about it – until I realised my thesis was caught between two defining moments of my hometown: I started my quest to PhD study at Lancaster in January 2015, a few months after the peaceful end of the Umbrella Movement; I submitted my thesis in December 2019, when a few weeks ago my neighbourhood was “tear-gassed” and my working university was turned into a battlefield between the Police Force and the protesters. No one, not just myself but the local community and the international world, could foresee such drastic change of the political environment of my hometown.

Doing a thesis which was partly associated with the changing environment was always a difficult task for me. On the one hand, the changing environment may generate useful quantitative data or interesting qualitative observations, which every researcher might be tempted to include in his/her thesis. On the other hand, as a political being (as Aristotle suggested) as well as a young academic working in tertiary institution, it was equally unrealistic to bypass all political emotions but simply focusing on my thesis writing – especially when you knew some of your friends and fellow students were arrested or injured. Therefore, I was in debt with my thesis supervisor, Dr. Basil Germond, who was extremely patient to my slow progress throughout these 5 years. His valuable academic guidance had broadened my horizons, which allowed me to borrow his expertise in maritime diplomacy to analyse contemporary Sino-European relations. His helpful attitude provided me with strong mental support, especially I was kind of lost when realising my portable device with research data was damaged and could never be recovered. Without his academic advice, extreme patience and mental encouragement, this thesis could never be completed. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude towards the members of my thesis panel, Dr. Chris May and Dr. Ramon Pacheco Pardo, and those members in my confirmation panel, Dr. Neil Manson and Dr. Thomas Mills. Their comments and advice were crucial to improve the whole thesis and valuable to my preparation for the further academic journey. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the PG coordinators of the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Clare and Sheila, who were also supportive to me and helped me to work with the administrative procedures from Day 1 till the end of the submission.

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As a younger son of Sandy, a Macao-born Chinese and raised in Hong Kong, and Bobby, who was born and raised in Hong Kong, my family root was a motivation of this thesis and their support, from financial and mental, was a crucial key for me to complete my Ph.D. study. I

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Finally, I wish to take this tiny little corner to express my love for Iris, the lady who always motivated and inspired me to be a better person. You were, are, and will always be in my heart even though we know our paths may never cross in the future.

This thesis is dedicated to the place I always call home, Hong Kong. May God bless the Pearl of Orient in the best, or maybe the worst, of times.

Wilson Chan

June 2020

List of Acronyms

AAGC	Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
ANT	Actor-Network Theory
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
BDN	Blue Dot Network
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Community Party
CEE	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHINCOM	Chinese Committee
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries
CSCT	Colombo South Container Terminal
CSI	Container Security Initiative
EAR	Ethnic Autonomous Region
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EIC	East Indian Company
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUBIP	European Union Business Information Programme
FMCOPRC	Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
FTZ	Free Trade Zone
GWC	Dutch West India Companies
HKBL	Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region of the People's Republic of China
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
<i>KMT</i>	<i>Kuomintang</i> (Chinese Nationalist Party)
MBL	The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
MSAR	Macao Special Administrative Region
MSR	21 st Century Maritime Silk Road
OCTS	One Country, Two Systems
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLA-N	People's Liberation Army – Navy
PRC	People's Republic of China
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SMC	Shanghai Municipal Council
SOCFCOM	Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
TCA	Trade and Cooperation Agreement
VOC	United East Indian Company

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Chapter 1: The Neglected Port-cities and Port Diplomacy in Contemporary EU-China Relations

Ports have always been the centres of Europe-China relation since the 16th century when the Portuguese fleets arrived China by sea, although diplomatic exchanges between European princes and Chinese imperial court could be traced by to 1246 when John of Plano Carpini served as an envoy of the Roman Catholic Church and secular European rulers seeking for a peace settlement with Mongolians at the Karakorum. With the primary objective of seeking trading privileges and rights to settlement at the Chinese coast, the Portuguese imperial court sent a formal ambassadorial mission accredited to Ming imperial court firstly in 1520. By 1557, the Ming imperial court acknowledged the Portuguese settlement in Macao, in exchange of 500 taels of silver as ground rent to the imperial court (Wills 1998; Fairbank 1969b). Subsequently, Macao became one of the most important hubs in the Portuguese maritime trading network which covered from Nagasaki in Japan, via Canton in China and Malacca in Malayan Peninsula, to Goa in India. Since then, Portuguese and other Europeans tied their commercial and political interests in China, as well as in Asia, with the maritime network built in the region. Constructing maritime trading posts, establishing colonies and treaty ports, and protecting and competing for sea lanes of communication became essential naval and diplomatic moves shared among all European states in China and Asia.

However, either the governance of trading ports or the practice of diplomacy in China was compatible with traditional European practices as well as contemporary standards. Rather than operating under the principles of free trade and fair competition as contemporary international trade standards suggested, the commercial relations between European states and imperial China was once based on the China-led tributary system and differential treatments¹. European merchants were only allowed to trade at Canton, where the government officially recognised as the only trading port for Europeans. In addition, European merchants were only allowed to trade with *Gong Hong* (literally meant public guild), an association formed by a group of specific Chinese merchants who were recognised by the government to conduct international trade on their behalf. The Canton System, on the one hand, put imperial China in a superior position in Europe-China trade relations such that bilateral trade was only allowed at the government's disposal and closely monitored by the government's agents. On the other hand, in order to get access to the right to trade and the right to settlement, European traders were required to pay tributes and ground rent (like the case of Macao mentioned in the last paragraph) to local and central authorities - and sometimes briberies to local officials were needed so as to facilitate transactions or better treatments².

Unsatisfied with the Canton System and limited trading rights in China, European powers (mainly the British) decided to exercise their maritime power and waged war against the Manchurian imperial court, with the excuse of Chinese unilateral trade (and opium) ban in 1839. The First Anglo-Chinese War, or commonly known as the First Opium War, resulted in a severe defeat of the Manchurian army and navy from Canton to Nanking. In 1842, the British court and the Manchurian court agreed on a peace settlement and the first Anglo-Chinese treaty, i.e. the Treaty of Nanking, was signed. Although the Treaty of Nanking was an unequal treaty by contemporary standards in international law, it indeed "modernised" Chinese hierarchical

¹ During the early years of Europe-China trade, most of the European powers practiced mercantilism which limited the exposure of other competitors in the region, and they sometimes fought for the control of trading posts and seaports. However, the situation slowly changed with the introduction of treaty port system.

² According to research conducted by Fairbank and Teng, most of the tributes, custom duties and goods had never flown to the central administration but shared by local authorities of Canton and Heungshan, as well as the procurator of Macao. See Fairbank and Teng (1941) and Fairbank (1969b).

tributary practice by the introduction of Westphalian practice, which the latter assumed sovereign equality and formalistic rules of the exchange. Formal diplomatic rules like diplomatic immunity and diplomatic community were introduced between British and Qing officials (Article 1, 2 and 11 of the Treaty of Nanking). To reflect the concept of “sovereign equality”, the most-favoured-nation clause was introduced in the Treaty of Bogue, a supplementary treaty associated to the Treaty of Nanking, to guarantee that British nationals would enjoy privileges granted by the Qing government to other foreign countries (Article 8 of the Treaty of Bogue).

Accompanied by the introduction of Westphalian diplomatic practice to imperial China, the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue also introduced the colonial and treaty port system to replace the China-led tributary system. Renowned sinologist J. K. Fairbank summarised the difference between the Canton System and the treaty port system by highlighting the characteristics of the treaty port system as “opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, and the most-favoured-nation clause” (Fairbank 1969b:3). Instead of relying on the *Gong Hong* as a faithful broker or a government-recognised administrator of tributary trade between China and Europe at the port or trading post, port governance and commercial relations were defined by bilateral international treaties between the Manchurian imperial court and different European powers. For example, the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue granted the British government to negotiate a fixed tariff with the Manchurian court (Article 10 of the Treaty of Nanking). British merchants were no longer bounded by the *Gong Hong* or being assigned to trade at a specific trading post, but traded freely with various merchants at various ports under the one-off agreed tariff to central authority but not local authorities or *Gong Hong* (Article 5 of the Treaty of Nanking). Extraterritorial rights were granted to British nationals and company representatives such that they could only be brought British court and tried under British legal system regardless where they were being caught within the port or other Chinese territories (Article 6 and Article 9 of the Treaty of Bogue).

The “opening up”³ of Hong Kong and Shanghai as a Crown Colony and a treaty port respectively under the two Sino-British bilateral treaties turned a new page of Europe-China relations. In terms of trading and logistics network, both Europeans and Americans either completely ignored the non-treaty ports in China or viewed them as less significant and secondary to their national interests (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). In terms of the institutionalisation of the treaty port system, 23 open ports were established from Shin King to Hainan in less than 30 years (Dennys 1867). Macao, where the first European settlement was located and created by the Portuguese merchants, was also turned from a tributary port to a treaty port after the ratification of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking in 1887. The end of Macao as a tributary port also signified the end of the tributary system in governing Europe-China diplomatic and trade relations. The new treaty port system, no matter in the form of European colonies or opened ports established by bilateral treaties, occupied the central gravity of Europe-China relations.

The treaty port system continued to govern diplomatic and commercial relations between Europe and China, regardless of the transition of sovereign power from the Manchurian imperial court to the Chinese nationalist government (*Kuomintang* government). It only came to an end when the Allies decided to re-negotiate their diplomatic relations with China in 1943. Extraterritorial rights in China were ceased, sovereign titles of colonies and administrative rights of treaty ports were reverted back to the Chinese Nationalist Government⁴. However, two

³ The term is commonly used to describe British colonization of Hong Kong in elementary school textbook before the handover.

⁴ The relinquishment of these rights was concluded in two bilateral treaties between China and Britain (the Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China), and between

pioneer ports established by Europe, i.e. Hong Kong and Macao, remained as colonies of Britain and Portugal respectively. As a result, although the majority of treaty ports were reverted back to China, the treaty port system somehow continued to exist at the Southeast coast of China after 1943.

Interestingly, the transition of sovereign power seemed to have little effect over European control in Hong Kong and Macao. Shortly after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) drove the Nationalist Government out of Canton, they decided to stop at the boundaries but not attempt to "liberate" Hong Kong and Macao. Instead, it was suggested that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had a secret pact with London as early as 1945 in relation to the future of Hong Kong as a British administered colony, in exchange of CCP legal (but underground) existence in Hong Kong and British early recognition of the regime in 1950. (Yu 2015). For the case of Macao, although the anti-Communist Salazar government did not have formal diplomatic ties nor negotiations with Beijing after 1949, various scholars suggested that Macao was *de facto* controlled by China while *de jure* remained at a Portuguese colony (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 1997:50; Mendes 2013:15). Such perception was further strengthened after the Chinese successful sabotage of Portuguese colonial governance of Macao in 1966. A secret pact was signed between Beijing and Lisbon in 1979 which both parties acknowledged Macao as a "Chinese territory under Portuguese administration" (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498). While the new Chinese state established in 1949 did not give up her claim over the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao, the European presence was deliberately kept for the sake of national interests, or using the then-Premier Zhou Enlai quote on CCP's strategy towards Hong Kong: "long-term consideration, full utilisation".

Beijing's flexibility in granting differential treatments toward local communities and administration was not entirely surprising as there were many similar cases since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). For instance, in dealing with ethnic minorities in China, Beijing established various Ethnic Autonomous Regions (EARs) for "major ethnic minority groups" such as Tibetans, Mongolians, Zhuang, Hui, and Uyghur. In order to implement certain capitalist reforms under socialist governance, Beijing established various special economic zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai. To further liberate international trade and promote foreign investment opportunities, Beijing also introduced various pilot free trade zones (FTZ) in key ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin. Except for EAR which the location was largely determined the natural living location of the ethnic minorities concerned, it was observed that many differential treatment policies at local governance were located at civilian ports or hinterland of those ports. For example, Shenzhen and Zhuhai were picked as the first batch of SEZs could always be attributed to their proximity to Hong Kong and Macao; Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Fujian were selected as the first two batches of Pilot FTZ, and they were coincidentally major trading ports in the past. Of course, Hong Kong and Macao, owing to their colonial history, practiced "One Country, Two Systems" (OCTS) after Beijing resumed their sovereign titles and administrative power in 1997 and 1999 respectively.

While there were ample researches on the important role of coastal cities and ports in Chinese economic modernisation and commercial internationalisation (Yeung and Hu 1992), only a handful of researches had linked such importance of coastal cities and ports to Chinese foreign policy mechanism. Zheng (1994) first applied the concept of "perforated sovereignty" to capture the dynamics between provincial governments and the central government in the area

China and the United States (the Sino-American Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China) on 11 January 1943.

of foreign trade. Unlike Western scholars like Kenneth Lieberthal (1992) or Susan Shirk (2007) who highlighted the fragmentation or fragility of the central government after the decentralisation policy in post-Mao period, Zheng and later scholars such as Chen Zhimin (2017) or Li Mingjiang (2014) appreciated such decentralisation that it might open up new possibilities for an effective Chinese foreign policy to her neighbours who shared international land borders or maritime space. Amongst those handful academic projects which appreciated the role of coastal cities and ports in Chinese foreign policy mechanism, the “geopolitical” characteristics of these coastal cities and ports which received differential treatments from Beijing were underexplored, if not totally ignored. The meaning of “geopolitical” characteristics, the thesis argued, was twofold: first, unlike ordinary cities, ports and port-cities were unique geographical space which connected the territorial space of “the host” to the maritime space where “visitors” came in; second, such geographical uniqueness of ports and port-cities was further “politicalised” by both the host, i.e. Beijing in the context of this thesis, through her differential treatments to the visitors, and the visitors, the European Union in the context of this thesis, through various means such as the utilisation of colonial legacy or the development of new diplomatic programmes.

The mere silence over the role of ports and port-cities might be explained in different perspectives. The first reason is discursive as any differential treatments at ports or port-cities in China could potentially be associated with the old-fashioned treaty port system – a political taboo for both the West and the East. From the Western perspectives, the treaty port system signified the power-lust European empires engaged themselves in severe competition on overseas colonies and sea lanes of communication, and the end-game of such imperial expansion was that two dreadful wars in the early years of the 20th century. The end of World War II not only marked the end of extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the West in China but also demonised colonisation and the establishment of overseas treaty port as a legitimate and viable foreign policy option. Territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and the prohibition of the threat of the use of force became the peremptory norms (*jus cogen*) of post-war international order, and any treaties conflicting with these norms would be automatically voided and terminated⁵. The old-fashioned treaty port system was therefore legally prohibited and morally unacceptable among Western societies. In fact, it could always be contrasted to “international chartered city”, an emerging idea first proposed by Nobel Memorial Prize laureate in Economics Paul Romer (2009) in his TED talk to end poverty in the developing world. His idea, to some extent, was similar to the treaty port system which the developing country outsourced the fate of a city to a developed trustee nation, and also received a similar critique of “politically incorrect” and “neo-colonialism” (Mallaby 2010). In the context of contemporary China, while Beijing was willing to grant differential treatment to local regimes for the sake of economic development and progressive reform, she was also sensitive to the nationalistic red line at a popular level such that Beijing would not turn the orchestrated nationalism as a support to her legitimacy but not a burden (Gries 2004; Wang 2012). In addition, any differential treatment, no matter in the form of FTZ or OCTS, should never challenge the imagination of “One Sovereign” (Tok 2013) and the legitimacy of CCP as the sole sovereign representative of the Chinese nation. As a result, the old-fashioned treaty port system was a historic spectacle to remind the Chinese society against “the Century of Humiliation” (Wang 2012). The colonial legacy of ports and port-cities should be handled with care. For instance, popular discourse satirised the Shanghai FTZ as a kind of “New Concession” (Mei 2013), a term usually referenced to the Shanghai International Settlement, should never be welcomed as a narrative to describe Shanghai’s differential

⁵ Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969. The version of treaty the thesis referred is accessed at the United Nations Treaty Collection ([https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/volume 1155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf)), accessed on 30 Jan 2019.

treatment towards foreign business partners. Colonial legacy of ports and port-cities, was either utilised or muted by Beijing to protect her national interest.

The second perspective of the mere silence over the role of ports and port-cities in Sino-European relations was ontological, as the categorisation of existing literature could not fit in the “geopolitical reality” of Sino-European relations or the “academic normality” of international relations studies and port studies. The geopolitical reality of Sino-European relations was rather straightforward: the lack of direct maritime boundary shared between China and the European Union and the absence of European naval presence in Chinese maritime space. Such geopolitical reality undermined the study of port-cities and port diplomacy in Sino-European relations, albeit the growing European maritime interests from “Suez to Shanghai” (Rogers 2009; Seidler 2014; Simon 2009; 2014a; 2014b). In addition, the conclusion made was rather pessimistic: either the European Union had a minimal role in Asian maritime space owing to the lack of political will and military presence (Seidler 2014), or the European Union required commitment of Member States and/or allies which had a naval presence in the region (Simon 2014a; 2014b). This conclusion was rather normal from the epistemic lens of traditional geostrategy, as the primary focus was about the deployment of hard naval power and naval port system, with the ultimate pursuit of maritime domination (Gray 1995; Rodger 1996; Smith and Pinder 1997). The concept of port-cities and civilian port system, which was a product of extensive trading activities and commercial relations, apparently did not fit in the lens of traditional geopolitics. On the other hand, traditional port studies emphasised on ports’ economic governance and the contribution of the civilian port system in global logistics and transactions (Slack 1993; Oliver and Slack 2006). Compared to traditional geostrategy which focused on “high politics”, i.e. political factors, formal diplomacy and strategic locations, traditional port studies tended to focus on “low politics”, economic factors and business transactions and spatial arrangement (Fleming and Hayuth 1994; Ducruet and Lee 2006; Ducruet 2007). However, ports and port-cities in China to some extent were rather unique in both the past and present. Historically, the modern port system and port-cities were only introduced to the Chinese coast in the form of treaty ports – a “negotiated” outcome of diplomatic actions and political decisions between the West and the East. While the treaty port system in China largely ended after 1943 (except for Hong Kong and Macao), the external influence could never be undermined especially many major commercial ports in China were indeed the successors of former treaty ports or colonies created during the period of “European Scramble for China”, such as Qingdao (former German colony), Lushun (former Russia and Japanese colony), Tianjin (a treaty port opened under the Treaty of Peking). Such colonial or treaty port legacy could potentially become important diplomatic resources for European port diplomacy to China, if not an important aspect to (re-)define Sino-European relations. Nevertheless, since traditional port studies did not deal with “high politics” such as port diplomacy and traditional geostrategy did not deal with civilian ports, these “port resources” were generally put aside in their respective analysis.

However, contemporary thoughts on geopolitics and security studies were more critical to traditional approaches in handling the dichotomy of “high politics” and “low politics” and that of security and economics (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1997; Al-Rodhan 2007; Al-Rodhan 2009; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Germond 2015). Characteristics of new security challenges were multi-level (global, regional, national, transnational) and multi-sectoral (territorial, political, economic, societal), and a recalibration of security threats, national interests, and diplomatic responses was needed for contemporary IR theories and security studies. One implication of such recalibration was that the original no (geo-)security concerns thesis over EU-China relations as a result of no geographical contact was no longer valid. In addition, the rise of new security agenda and global political structure also created new academic opportunities to reconcile maritime studies which was high politics-oriented and gave heavier

weight to political motivations than economics and social forces; and port studies which focused more on low politics and appreciated the importance of economic and social interactions in defining port system and port actions. One example of such organic combination was a recent proposed EU foreign policy initiative “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an EU Strategy” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2018).

The primary objective of the dissertation, therefore, was to explore, and eventually, make a contribution to bridging this research gap in the study of EU-China relations. Through a comparative study on three major port-cities, namely Hong Kong, Macao and Shanghai, which were established by European Powers as colonies or treaty ports during the imperial period of China, the thesis aimed to develop an analytical framework that combined the strength of maritime studies and port studies, and shed light on a neglected part of EU-China relations, i.e. the understudied “port diplomacy” between the European Union and China.

The remaining introductory chapter would be divided into three main sections. The first section would outline the definitions of major elements of the thesis. Three elements would be addressed in this section: the concept of (treaty) ports and port system, the typology of EU-China relations and the definition of port diplomacy. This second section would review the existing literature on international relations and political economy, which led to major research puzzles of this thesis. Two specific areas of literature would be reviewed: 1) the role of sub-state actors in the existing literature of international politics and political economy; 2) the role the European Union as a structural power/normative power. The final section would state the proposed research questions and hypotheses, the methodological setting and the respective limitations of the chosen methodology.

Defining the Key Elements of the Thesis: (Treaty) Port System, EU-China Relations and Port Diplomacy

This section would offer the definitions of major elements involved in the formulation of the academic framework: (treaty) port system, EU-China relations, and port diplomacy.

(Treaty) Port System

The definition of port looked plain enough and seemed to require no further elaboration or refinement for most people. It was commonly understood as a geographical “entity” that was “attached to a sea, ocean or river by connecting waterway” and “equipped infrastructure and technical facilities” for specific purposes and specialised load types (Roa, Pena, Amante and Goretti 2013:1056). Port economist Paul Tourret (2007) defined port as “a set of moles, basins, and docks, which prove to treat all kinds of ships and goods.” (cited in Hlali and Hammami 2017:120) Focusing on the socio-economic functions of civilian ports, port economist Bauchet (1992; 1998) gave three vital functions of a port, namely the shelter of ships, the passage of goods and the transformation of goods (cited in Hlali and Hammami 2017:120). From a spatial perspective, Vigarie (2004; cited in Hlali and Hammami 2017:122) defines port as “a contact area between two organised spaces for the transport of goods and passengers.” The port space therefore was an independent geographical space that serves as the intersection of land space and maritime space, and is continuously modified equipment attached to it, flows of goods and passengers to and from it and impacted by various instruments and policies (ibid.). Built on the ideas of Tourret, Bauchet and Vigarie, Hlali and Hammami (2017:120) concluded that a seaport was “a multidimensional system combined between economical function, infrastructure system, geographical space and trade.”

While the spatial-functional understanding of port was useful and would be further discussed its relevance a few lines later, the thesis also viewed port not only from the spatial-functional

lens but also from the political-legal lens. The Geneva Convention and Statue on the International Regime of Maritime Ports and Protocol of Signature roughly defined maritime ports as “ports which are normally frequented by sea-going vessels and used for foreign trade.” (Article 1 of the Statue on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 1923) Yet, such definition may not fully reflect the legal or institutional complexity of a port. In fact, in modern days ports and port-related activities could be governed and managed under government authority, a public corporation or a public-private partnership⁶. The degree of power enjoyed by various stakeholders of the port, ranging from government departments to foreign vessels called to the port, was varied in accordance with domestic constitution, political culture, policy, and legal practice. Therefore, even though the major functions of a (sea)port may be similar among each other, the difference in geographical spaces that it was connected, the legal framework that it was embedded in and the institutional practice that it enjoyed in the past and present-day, might contribute the difference in the designated role of a port and the diplomatic resources that it could contribute – one of the central arguments of this thesis suggested and wished to put to the analysis of contemporary EU-China relations.

The additional political-legal layer of understanding was especially relevant to ports and port-cities related to China. As mentioned in the last section, many major ports and port-cities in China were former treaty ports established by Western powers during the “Scramble for China” period. While renowned historian and sinologist John K. Fairbank (1969b) highlighted the characteristics of Chinese treaty ports as extraterritorial rights and one-off treaty-fixed tariff, these two elements required further elaboration to fit into the contemporary context. Of course, extraterritorial rights were no longer applicable in contemporary China, yet differential or preferential treatments did exist in some ports and port-cities. These treatments were ranging from negative differential treatments such as levelling off privileges enjoyed by local communities or restrictions imposed to foreign communities, to positive differential treatments such as granting tax holidays to foreign legal personalities or direct consultation with foreign firms or chambers of commerce – and all these treatments were localised within the port boundaries. The second element involved a legalised framework and political commitment to those differential treatments. In the case of treaty ports, the legal framework was the bilateral treaties signed between the respective European power and the imperial Chinese court, while the political commitment included direct foreign governance (the colony) or indirect foreign influence (the treaty ports) allowed in managing the treat ports. In modern days, these commitments could include bilateral declarations on the future governance of a port, domestic legislation to consolidate those differential treatments, and an extensive political consultation network between local authorities and foreign business communities.

In fact, this model of development became increasingly popular among developing countries in Asia as well as less affluent states in Europe, and was partly attributed to China’s recent Belt and Road Initiative. The original Chinese port development model such as the SEZ model in Shenzhen and Guangzhou to the FTZ model in Shanghai was further exported along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. One typical example in Europe was the acquisition of Piraeus, a strategic seaport located between the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea. Since the Chinese state-owned enterprise, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), acquired the

⁶ For instance, the port Hong Kong is owned by the government and any port-related development and ship-related activities are governed under the Marine Department of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In the case of Singapore, the port development and ship-related activities are governed under the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, a public corporation established under the Maritime and Port Authority Act of 1996 and a government sponsored merger of various maritime and port related departments and authorities. For a case of public-private partnership, port Hambantota of Sri Lanka is owned by Sri Lanka Port Authority yet majority of the operation of the port development (about 70% of the port asset) is leased to China Merchants Port Holding for 99 years.

majority of ownership of Port Piraeus, it was reported that the company had utilised the concession agreement as a lobbying weapon against the Greek government, so as to get her approval of the new Piraeus development plan (Georgiopoulos 2018). Another commonly known example of such arrangement was in Sri Lanka, where the Colombo government signed a concession agreement with China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, a partially state-owned enterprise listed in Hong Kong, on the construction and management of Port Hambantota. The agreement, however, was eventually turned to an exclusive lease for 99 years to the company, and the local authorities had granted the company and its partners 15,000 acres of land for an industrial park and tax concessions to develop the port (Aneez and Sirilal 2017; Schultz 2018). Compared to traditional treaty ports established through colonisation, European imperialism, and international law, these newly established ports maintained substantial characteristics of treaty port, which were active incorporation of foreign entities to port governance, extensive foreign influence in economics and port policy-making, and preferential treatment towards foreign entities. The discrepancy was the absence of “an international treaty” to consolidate these characteristics into a single legal document. Rather, these ports were built upon domestic legislation with a strong commitment to communicating to the foreign parties, or in form of business contracts between state-linked entities. Such incomparability, however, was inevitable as the legal context has changed.

To summarise the elaboration above, the thesis wished to highlight that a modernised “treaty” port system was in the making from China to Europe. Instead of a stringent international legal form of a treaty which was out-of-favoured by both the East and the West, the new (treaty) port system developed in China and slowly exported to the rest of the world including the following characteristics:

1. Unique and independent legislation was created as the foundation of the port, regardless it is in the form of national legislation, business contracts or international treaty and declaration;
2. Such legal commitment addressed not only the domestic audience but also the international audience;
3. Such legal commitment would generate preferential rights and/or differential treatments towards foreign entities within a certain place, i.e. the port, compared to the rest of national territory; and
4. Both domestic and foreign authorities, whether they were public or private entities, were committed to honour the legal commitment and politically involved in the creation and maintenance of port institutions.

The major merit of such conceptualisation of the new (treaty) ports and the port system was that it highlighted the political-legal features of ports and port-cities, especially in China and less developed countries. The appreciation of the political-legal features of the contemporary port system, to some extent, opened up a possible discussion of port diplomacy at civilian ports – a concept being caged by traditional geostrategy or the discourse of gunboat diplomacy. In fact, through acknowledging the existence of domestic and foreign political commitment in maintaining the port institutions and legal framework, it also unlocked the possibility of civilian ports in contributing bilateral relations between two political entities, in the context of this thesis the political entities were the European Union and China.

EU-China Relations

The second foundational element to be defined and further elaborated was the operational domain of contemporary EU-China relations. Similar to the (treaty) port system, EU-China relations had changed a lot since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1951, and the PRC, a communist state

founded in 1949. Changes in EU-China relations involved two different dimensions. First, in terms of institutional arrangement, the foreign policy capacity of the European Union had changed a lot since the Treaty of Paris, with more new actors and new levels of interactions were created between the European Union and China. Second, in terms of substantial political changes, the changing domestic and international environment since the end of World War II had continuously shaped the political interests and opportunity sets of Beijing and Brussels, resulting in different expectations and policy objectives throughout the contemporary era. This section would focus on the first dimension and the second dimension would be addressed in the next chapter. Table 1.1 summarised the evolution of EU-China relations from the end of World War II to contemporary days:

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Level of interactions</u>	<u>Main actors involved in the EU</u>	<u>Major types of relations</u>
1949 – 1975	National level	ECSC Member States	Recognition/Non-recognition of the PRC; Independent state-to-state level of political and diplomatic relations
1975 – 1992	European level	European Commission	Collective recognition of the PRC; Economic cooperation
	National level	EC Member States	Independent state-to-state level of political and diplomatic relations
1992 – 2009	European level	European Commission and European Council	Economic and sectoral cooperation; Regional level engagement and summit; Political, human rights and security dialogues
	National level	EU Member States	Europeanised state-to-state level of political and diplomatic relations
2009 –	European level	The European Union	Economic and sectoral cooperation; Regional level engagement and global governance; Political, human rights and security dialogues
	Sub-regional level	Selective group of EU Member States	Regional economic cooperation
	National level	EU Member States	Europeanised state-to-state level of political and diplomatic relations

Table 1.1. The institutional evolution of EU-China relations since 1949

Instead of having stable foreign policy machinery by their Chinese counterpart after 1949, the gradual integration among European states had changed their domestic institutions in foreign policymaking. For instance, compared to centralised foreign policy machinery controlled by the CCP, decision and implementation capacity was dispersed to multiple levels from European collective actions to individual state responses. The first phase of Sino-European relations was largely conducted by state-to-state basis. With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, European states were struggled to recognise, or not to recognise, the new communist regime in China. Instead of a European consensus, ECSC Member States individually developed its state-to-state level of diplomatic recognition and political relations with Beijing. Taking the founding EU trio, i.e. France, Germany, and Italy, as an example, they recognised China and established diplomatic relations in 1964, 1970 and 1972 respectively – and the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries recognised China as early as in 1950s. In fact, except for the management of the custom union and common commercial policy, the ECSC and EC had little impact on nation-states' foreign policy. Apart from the lack of an institutionalised platform, diverse national interests to the old and new China and the impact of Cold War bipolarity were also seen as major reasons of the lack in uniform European foreign policy towards China, leaving the interactions uncoordinated and secondary to European relations with Washington and Moscow (Yahuda 2008; Vogt 2012).

The first recognised European level of Sino-European interactions was established in May 1975 when Christopher Soames, the Vice President and Commissioner for External Relations of the European Commission, visited China and marked the beginning of diplomatic relations between Brussels and Beijing. Indeed, shortly after PRC's succession of the seat of China in the United Nations in 1971, the majority of the EC Member States recognised PRC and established formal diplomatic relations⁷. While the foreign policy arms of the European Community were underdeveloped in 1970s and 1980s, the EC, especially the EEC, served as an independent platform in parallel to the development of state-to-state relations. Two trade agreements were signed in 1978 and 1985 respectively and a joint committee at European level was formed as a result of the 1978 trade agreement. An ambassadorial level of delegation office of the European Commission was opened in Beijing in 1988, which remained as one of the two EU ambassadorial offices in the Chinese territory⁸. The growing EU-China relations came to a haul in 1989 as a collective response from the West to the Tiananmen Incident. Instead, European-wide sanctions were applied to China including arms embargo which was still valid nowadays.

The year 1992 was a remarkable year for the evolution of EU-China relations. At global level, the end of Cold War reconfigured the bipolarity to US-dominant liberal world order. The weakened influence from Moscow, as well as a stronger Western Europe, allowed both Eastern and Western European states to develop their foreign policies out of the shadow of Washington and Moscow. At European level, the Maastricht Treaty defined the Three-Pillar Structure of the newly established European Union, including an intergovernmental pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At bilateral level, the European Union lifted most of its sanctions against China which were imposed after the Tiananmen Incident, and a new bilateral political dialogue was established. Since then, more sectoral cooperation and dialogues have been introduced, such the human rights dialogue (first in 1995), industrial policy dialogue (2003), climate change consultations (2006) between the EU, as a supranational entity, and

⁷ The only exception was the Republic of Ireland which recognised China in 1979, 4 years after EC decided to recognise PRC as a legitimate successor of "China".

⁸ The second ambassadorial office of the European Union in China was the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao, which is, in terms of organizational structure and financial budget, independent from the EU Office of China and Mongolia.

China, as a nation-state. In addition, while at high politics such as diplomatic representation, security policy, and military deployment EU Member States maintained a certain degree of autonomy, individual foreign policies were coordinated under the CFSP framework and became “Europeanised” (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Muller 2013; Agnantopoulos 2010; Wong and Hill 2011; Michalski 2013). The implication of Europeanised foreign policies at Member State level is that the creation of the EU with an intergovernmental CFSP (and the subsequent European Defence and Security Policy) practically gave birth of the blueprint of a European foreign policy, on the other hand methodologically in evaluating EU foreign policy to the third party such as China, foreign actions conducted by the EU and EU Member States could be evaluated simultaneously so as to capture the best representation of European foreign policy.

The most updated phase of EU-China relations, in terms of institutionalisation at various levels, could be seen from 2009. The directions of institutionalisation were in twofold: first, the Treaty of Lisbon unified the original three-pillar structure into a single legal personality, giving the EU as a whole the only international legal entity to represent Europe in both high politics and low politics. The launch of (failed) negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007 and the subsequent upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013 not only reflected Brussels commitment to developing a multifaceted relationship with Beijing, but also a signal of a consolidated European interest and policy towards China. As seen from the recent communication prepared for the new stage of EU strategy towards China, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy bluntly demand a “full unity” of the EU and its Member States in dealing with China, including “all Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019:2). In fact, such demand from the European Commission and the High Representative reflected the second direction of the institutionalisation of EU-China relations, which was the creation of sub-regional regime such as the “16+1 format” mentioned in the joint communication (*ibid.*). The “16+1 format” was a sub-regional initiative proposed by Beijing in 2012 which covered 16 existing and future EU Member States and served as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative to promote Chinese business, economic and social cooperation with Central and East European (CEE) countries (Song 2017; Vangeli 2017; 2018). Since the initiative involved both EU and non-EU Member States, EU central authorities did not have a major role on this Beijing-led platform but an observer to it. Also, rather than a genuine multilateral platform among China and CEE states, the programmes were largely bilateral and the CEE states respond to Chinese programmes and received Chinese investment individually (Grieger 2018). Of course, the state-to-state level of interactions between EU Member States remained, especially after the Euro-debt Crisis as there were an observable disintegration and polarisation of national interests towards China among EU Member States (Fox and Godement 2009; Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015).

The above summary looked good for most of the IR scholars. However, the thesis wished to suggest a neglected level of analysis, i.e. the sub-national level. Since 1992, the European Union had established various local offices in China. A Commission Office in Hong Kong was established in 1993 which represented European Commission presence in Hong Kong and Macao. In addition, an Economic and Trade Office was established at Taipei in 2003 to deal with EU-Taiwan relations. As the naming of the offices already suggested, EU primary interests at the sub-national level were mainly trade and commerce, a policy competence exclusively controlled by the European Commission. Nonetheless, as part of its financial and external relations reform, the EU had upgraded its financial commitment to some of its sub-national offices including that of Hong Kong and Macao in 2006 (Council of the European Union 2006). Compared to the previous budget structure, the new reform approved since 2006 had strengthened the capacity of EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao in terms of administrative

and financial capacity. Apart from being administrative independent from EU Office in Beijing, EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao could initiate and sponsor more independent programmes and projects specifically designed for Hong Kong and Macao, which would be discussed in the chapters of Macao and Hong Kong.

While the reform of this kind was usually put aside by international relations scholars from Europe and China, the inclusion of the sub-national institutions opened up a new dimension of study in EU-China relations and port diplomacy. Discussed in the last section, on one hand many major Chinese ports and port-cities were former colonies or treaty ports established by European powers, such that traces of European legacy remained at these major ports in China. On the other hand, Beijing differential treatments at ports and port-cities had either incorporated some colonial legacy to their governance structure, or aimed to attract foreign direct investment which the European states were definitely their target audience. As a result, commitment (and non-commitment) to these ports and port-cities from Brussels and Beijing also constituted an indispensable part of contemporary EU-China relations – which was commonly undermined by the growing literature of EU-China relations. From the EU perspective, a comprehensive institutional analysis of contemporary EU-China relations should include the following four types of relationship, which was summarised by the Figure 1.1:




Figure 1.1 The institutional typology of EU-China relations from the EU perspective

Type I relation referred to the overarching foreign policy interactions between the European Union, as a collective and supranational actor, and China, as a unitary nation-state. Such initiatives included those legally defined by the EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in 1985, various sectoral dialogues and cooperation frameworks between the Brussels and Beijing, high-level engagements such as the bilateral EU-China Summit and the regional Asia-Europe Summit, people-to-people programmes and technology exchanges administered by the European Commission, etc. Major actors involved in Type I relation were the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the European Parliament which is responsible for approving budget and political scrutiny for the success and failure of EU foreign political actions, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) for policy and operational support to the High Representative of the

Union for Foreign and Security Policy. From the Chinese side, the main actor involved and responded was Beijing, the State Council and its related government organs such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Commerce.

Type II relation referred to the individual state-to-state relations between EU Member States and China. Although the Treaty of Lisbon unified the Three-Pillar structure and further institutionalised external representation of the EU by a semi-permanent President of the European Council and a bureaucratic EEAS arms to support the more powerful High Representative, EU Member States maintained some degree of autonomy in diplomatic and political relations with third-party states. For instance, most of the EU Member States maintained their respective diplomatic office in Beijing and continued to function as a communication channel between Beijing and individual EU Member States. State visits to Beijing, and vice versa, were kept as a kind of usual business for major member states such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. For the newly-joined EU Member States like the CEE states, they were also invited to participate the “16+1” format and conducted bilateral business cooperation with Beijing and/or the state-owned enterprises. Apart from the CEE states, Beijing economic diplomacy, packaged under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also targeted bilateral investment opportunities in Southern European states such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Under this type of relations, major actors involved were the national government of the EU Member State as well as the Beijing government.

Type III relation referred to Brussels initiatives and programmes targeted to some selected Chinese cities and ports. Despite Beijing strong reservation, if not a taboo, against any forms of decentralisation of Chinese foreign policy capacity to provincial and local level as it fundamentally challenged the unitary sovereign state assumption (Ting 1997; Cummings and Tang 1998; Chan 1999; Shen 2010; Wang 2010; Shen 2014; Shen and Chan 2017), there was a growing scholarship challenging such political reality, especially if low-politics, i.e. economic, social and cultural interactions, was taken into an account (Zheng 1994; Cheung and Tang 2001; Chen 2017; Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). In addition to the influence of sub-national cities on Chinese foreign policy, the practice of OCTS in Hong Kong and Macao created two Special Administrative Regions which received independent financial commitment and legal framework from the EU. At least in terms of institutional analysis, this kind of interaction could not be neglected in conceptualisation EU-China relations. Major actors involved in this category of relations, on one hand, included the European institutions from Brussels and their representative to the selected cities, on the other hand, including Beijing and the local government of the selected cities and ports.

Type IV relation referred to individual EU Member State’s engagement to selected Chinese cities. Given the autonomy to establish her own diplomatic representation to third-party states, individual EU Member State could always set up their respective diplomatic office apart from Beijing, insofar it had satisfied the rule of reciprocity. For example, while there was no formal European Union Office, majority of the EU Member States establish their own consulate offices in Shanghai⁹. Under OCTS, Hong Kong, and to some extent Macao, was also a major hub of foreign representatives to China¹⁰, and some of them enjoy extraordinary position in their home country¹¹. Although not all EU Member State developed their consular representation or independent

⁹ The following EU Member States had established their consular missions at Shanghai: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

¹⁰ Except for Portugal which had traditional ties with Macao, consular offices established by EU Member States usually would take their Hong Kong office to provide consul services to their nationals in Macao.

¹¹ For instance, the British Consulate Office in Hong Kong and Macao reported directly to the head of

policies towards Chinese cities, connections under this category could not be neglected especially different European countries had their national ties and history with some Chinese cities and ports. Following the same token of Type III relation, major actors involved in this category of relation were the government and her representatives of individual EU Member States to the selected cities, and from China side Beijing and the local government of the selected cities and ports.

The merit of this re-categorisation of EU-China relations into four different types based on the level of interactions was twofold: first, it gave a more accurate understanding of the potential interactions between the European Union and China. A recent observation from Chen et. al. (2010) suggested that Beijing, on one hand, was cautious about the challenges of provincial international ties against central authority and sovereign unity, on the other hand she also wished to take some sort of advantages from decentralised ties by demanding foreign countries to “develop a multi-layered engagement approach towards China” (ibid:356). An analysis of EU-China relations involving sub-national actors like ports could, therefore, fill up the analytical gap of existing literature in contemporary EU-China relations. The second merit of such re-categorisation was that even though the thesis focused on the supranational-to-sub-national interactions, i.e. the ports in China, these interactions were still under “EU-China relation matrix” with a strong presence of national and supranational actors. Especially in the case of China who always positions herself as a unitary state, the relative autonomy of sub-national actors was always kept at minimum and should never challenge state unity and foreign policy interests of Beijing. From the EU perspective, while the representatives from different EU Member States would have their own services to their national citizens and establish their own programmes and diplomatic image in Hong Kong and Macao, it was understood that the EU Member State Offices and the EU Office will coordinate among themselves and came with a unified position on the major issues in Hong Kong and Macao. It could be said that the sub-national level of interactions was the extension of EU interests in China and was closely connected to the generic supranational interests of the EU foreign policy to Beijing (Type I relation).

Port Diplomacy

The third element to be defined in the chapter was the concept of port diplomacy, which was also the critical idea of the thesis. This element, similar to the idea of ports and port system, looked plain enough, i.e. the diplomatic actions conducted by different actors at the port. In practice, however, the concept was further complicated by the characteristics of ports being included (or excluded) and the characteristics of diplomatic actions and actors being included (or excluded) in a study related to port diplomacy.

Traditional scholarship on port diplomacy commonly associated the role of port to state diplomacy through the academic lens of maritime or naval diplomacy (Harkavy 1982; 1989; 2007). However, such positioning of port diplomacy already implied many definitional and methodological constraints against a study of port diplomacy. In terms of the type of ports being studied under this conceptual lens, maritime or naval scholars mainly focused on naval bases or ports with high degree of military or naval presence. Commercial or civilian ports such as Shanghai in China, Buzan in South Korea or Rotterdam in the Netherlands, compared to Subic Bay in the Philippines, Okinawa in Japan or Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, received less attention in naval studies and maritime strategy. Second, from the lens of geostrategy, the importance of ports was much associated with their strategic and geographical location in

China Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, but not the UK Ambassador in Beijing (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2015), a similar practice shared by Canada and the United States.

relation to the sea lanes of communication. The port geography, the socio-political backdrop and the economic value of the port received little attention from the majority of geo-strategists. Third, the role of ports was instrumental and supplementary. The instrumental side of (naval) port was that ports were essential in assisting maritime actions through the deployment of ships and routine maintenance, and sustaining overseas naval missions through the network of supply and emergent maintenance (Smith and Pinder 1997). The supplementary side of port in naval diplomacy was that the presence (and absence) of naval bases and welcoming ports was viewed as an indicator of relative sea power of a nation, as well as a real-life presentation of the alliance network that a nation could enjoy across the seven seas (Mahan 1911:118 - 131). A specific port call in a disputed maritime region or a friendly port visit by a naval power was usually viewed as a committed demonstration to allies in the region or an occasion to show her naval muscles to competitors or rivalries in the region or even the world. In short, traditional geostrategy treated port diplomacy as a part of naval or maritime diplomacy, and the crucial elements of port diplomacy were naval bases, geostrategic interests, and naval maritime exercises.

Instead of relying sole academic lens of geopolitics, the thesis conceptualised port diplomacy with some refinements contributed from the lens of port studies and critical geography. The first refinement of conceptualisation was the inclusion of commercial and civilian ports, which were indeed the majority in numbers compared to naval ports and bases. In fact, civilian “port call” became more and more important in post-Cold War period. Taking the Sino-German relation as an example, while the first port visit made by PLA-N took place at German naval base of Wilhelmshaven in 2001, the second port visit of PLA-N came to Port of Hamburg, a civilian port of economic importance to Germany (Gady 2005). Duisburg, one of the largest inland civilian ports in the world, was regarded as “Xi Jinping's gateway to Europe” and strategically important to the Belt and Road Initiative (Oltermann 2018). The importance of commercial and civilian ports, therefore, should never be undermined in the study of port diplomacy in contemporary era. The second refinement was the inclusion of non-naval activities and assets in analysing the content of port diplomacy. A conventional textbook on modern diplomacy had coined Chinese economic diplomacy as “port diplomacy” which focused on “centring rapid logistic expansion, accelerated information skill transfer arrangements, intelligence and market access” through the investment of port and related port infrastructure (Barston 2006:73). Overseas visits, business dialogues and subsequent investment made by Chinese delegation consisted of city mayors and provincial officials, chairpersons or representatives from major state-owned enterprises in China, was Beijing main diplomatic tool, but not those the high-profiled leadership visits and bilateral summits (ibid). In addition to Barston’s observation in Chinese economic diplomacy, naval strategist Toshi Yoshihara suggested that Beijing had developed a “sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims” through “employing non-navy assets” (Yoshihara 2013:2). This included the deployment of coastal guards or even fishery vessels instead of formal navies to “patrol” in the disputed maritime space in East China Sea and South China Sea, and the insistence of historic fishing zones for Chinese fishermen in the disputed maritime regions. Beijing's innovation in projecting her sea power through non-traditional means should also be reflected in defining port diplomacy in contemporary era. Port diplomacy was no longer an area monopolised by navy or dominated by naval activities using naval means. Instead, a civilian dimension of port diplomacy, which included civilian ports, civilian activities, and civilian actors, was a useful addition to the existing conception of port diplomacy.

The Role of Civilian Ports: Existing Literature on International Relations, Maritime Diplomacy and EU Structural Power

Compared to everyday examples such as the growing competition on the construction of port

facilities in the Horn of Africa (Styan 2018; van den Berg and Meester 2018) and the “trojan ports” criticism against Chinese investment in Europe (Lee 2018), the discussion on the role of civilian ports remained as an under-explored subject in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. The difficult inclusion of the civilian ports in international relations and foreign policy analysis could be explained in twofold: first, the “methodological nationalism” (Adamson 2016; see also Taylor 2000a; 2000b) and naval thinking had led to the “inattentive blindness” (Chabris and Simon 2010; cited in Acuto 2013) to other levels and types of interactions; second, the incomplete spatial turn of international relations and foreign policy had led to the “inattentive blindness” of the spatial characteristics of civilian ports and their implications of foreign policies.

Paradiplomacy and Global City Thesis as the Starting Point

The study of non-state actors in international relations and foreign policy was not entirely new. For instance, the concept of paradiplomacy was first promoted in mid-1980s when Ivo Duchacek (1984) published his article in *Publius* which challenged the statist assumption of foreign policies and discussed the role of subnational self-government in international politics. In the next decades, there were several projects which aimed to analyse the role of subnational governments in international politics (Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson 1988; Aldecoa and Keating 1999) and the concept became more and more prominent in global politics. There were two types of para-diplomatic activities identified by Duchacek, namely “transborder regionalism” and “global micro-diplomacy” (Duchacek 1984:8 – 9), which the latter concept was more relevant to the discussion on the role of civilian ports in EU foreign policy.

The concept of “global micro-diplomacy” was defined as “the stationing of permanent missions (state offices) in distant corners of the world” and involved following activities (Duchacek 1984:13 – 14):

1. Sending short-term fact-finding missions aboard;
2. Overseas trips for promoting subnational interests;
3. Hosting foreign dignitaries and trade representatives;
4. Trade and investment exhibitions;
5. Government-sponsored publicity campaign in overseas media;
6. Specific commercial and financial zones; and
7. Institutionalised relationships with overseas territorial communities

Although the discussion of paradiplomacy was mainly associated with regional governments, the application of such concept did not limit to regional governments. As the linguistic original of the term suggested, the concept of paradiplomacy was referred to any diplomatic activities “parallel to” national diplomacy (Acuto 2013; Kuzentov 2015). Therefore, in theory, the concept not only covered subnational diplomacy but also supranational diplomacy such as the European Union foreign policy. Indeed, even before the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Treaty on the European Union, the European Communities had established permanent offices overseas such as its office in China and Hong Kong. The formalisation of CFSP and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) further strengthened EU capacity as a viable paradiplomatic actor alongside with the EU Member States. In fact, the EU Office overseas had frequently committed to some of the activities mentioned above, for example organising various trade, investment or even cultural programmes to promote EU interests overseas.

The framework of “paradiplomacy”, however, was just one theoretical starting point of the thesis. In fact, the concept may be good to capture the potential actorness of the European Union and civilian ports, it was never adequate to capture the special role of civilian ports in international politics, especially when contemporary civilian ports were serving the nodes of

civilian activities conducted by local, national and foreign actors. Such inadequacy could be compensated by the “actor-network theory” (ANT) and the idea of global city in urban studies and sociology (Sassen 1991; R. G. Smith 2003; Acuto 2013).

The concept of global city was first developed by Sassen (1991) who tried to distinguish global cities from traditional “world cities” suggested by Hall (1966) and Friedmann (1986). Sassen (1991; 2005) defined the concept of “global cities” as the “command 29eterts” of control with a global significance in economic globalisation and flows of capital. One essential characteristic of global cities was that the cities would gradually detach from their geographical region and became independent and globalised entities in global political economy, for instance the influence of New York and London were far-reaching than the physical boundaries of the United States and the United Kingdom. Following Sassen’s idea, Calder and Freytas proposed the concept of “global political city” as “a metropolitan area that serves as a policy hub, major political diplomatic community, and strategic information complex of global import” (Calder and Freytas 2009:94), and applied this concept to analyse the global impact and relevancy of Washington DC. By applying the Actor-Network Theory, urban researcher Michele Acuto (2013) proposed the three main role of a global city in international politics: networking actants, networking actors and networking networks. From Acuto’s perspective, the global city not just served as “the *locus* of multiple agencies” and “the *determinant* of networked relations” (ibid:71, italic as origin), but also node of different various actor-networks.

Compared to the paradiplomacy thesis which focuses on the active agency of subnational actor, the global city thesis focused on both the active, passive, and spatial contributions of global cities in international politics. The politicisation and spatialization of city space allowed a critical view on how the urban space had linked up the local political and spatial practice with international politics and global economy. Civilian ports, which were commonly embedded in the global political and economic system and the nodes of economic and cultural transactions, could always fit in Sassen’s definition of global cities. The global port framework suggested by Calder and Freytas (2009) and Michele Acuto (2013), therefore, served as another theoretical starting point of the thesis. However, as a special type of geographical entity, the thesis would depart from the global city framework by taking the port geography of the port seriously, which will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

The Civilian Dimensions of Sea Power: From Naval Diplomacy to Seaport Diplomacy
In fact, neither inclusion of substate actor in international politics nor the civilian dimension was entirely new to international politics and foreign policy. However, similar to the discussion on the role of substate actors in international politics, the civilian dimension of sea power also demanded more explanation. Traditional exercise of sea power fell into the category of “hard maritime diplomacy” (Le Miere 2014:8), which focused on the state’s dominance of the sea and secured naval victories over other global competitors, if not enemies (Till 1987: cited in Germond 2015). As a result, the number of overseas bases, civilian vessels, foreign civilian ports were understood as indicators of one’s absolute and relative strength in the maritime space. The role of civilian ports was rather instrumental and served as a kind of maritime asset readily to support naval operations and overseas expeditions. Although Mahon (1987) regarded the civilian maritime network, and the attitudes of the civil society in supporting the exercise of sea power as the foundational conditions of being a successful sea power, the eventual evaluation of one’s sea power was the naval capacity in projecting national interests overseas, or securing national security against external threats coming from the sea.

However, the utilisation of civilian resources, or “soft maritime diplomacy” as Le Miere suggested (2014:8), became more and more important in projecting and securing one’s maritime interests. Apart from the non-naval strategies mentioned by Yoshihara (2013; see also

Le Miere 2014) in projecting Beijing's control over the disputed East China Sea and South China Sea, "seaport diplomacy" was a brand new strategy introduced by China to enhance her maritime control in Indian Ocean and Middle East (Sun and Zoubir 2017; Sun 2018). As Sun Degang, a renowned Chinese expert in Middle East studies in China, concluded, Beijing's seaport diplomacy was an integrated diplomacy which integrated the resources from private companies, state-owned enterprises and different ministerial agencies ranging from foreign affairs to transportation, in serving the China's external maritime power projection (Sun 2018). The implementation of China's seaport diplomacy not only had enriched her diplomatic "toolbox" and institutional innovation, but also envisioned the potential of the traditional agrarian nation to "become a strong maritime power" (Sun 2018:45 – 47).

Despite its traditional reliance on maritime dominance, there had been little research or interests in conceptualising the role of overseas civilian ports in enhancing maritime power of the United States and Europe. Instead of power projection, civilian seaport was commonly regarded as "an object to secure" (Germond 2015). Literature on port and maritime policy had always centred in an important theme, i.e. how to balance the commercial benefits and the cost on national security in managing civilian ports (Frittelli et. al. 2003; Haveman and Shatz 2006). Under this perspective, the role of overseas civilian ports perhaps was best illustrated by the introduction of Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002, a cooperation between US and foreign container ports in enhancing American maritime security. In short, both domestic and overseas civilian ports were "securitised" rather than a potential asset for power projection.

The general ignorance on the role of overseas civilian ports was twofold. Apart from the inattentive blindness of traditional naval studies over the role of civilian ports, there was also another inattentive blindness in the spatial characteristics of Asian civilian ports and its linkage between Europe. Without doubt, the European countries had gradually retreated from their former colonies in Asia and Africa after WWII, and never returned to the region as an active naval power or investor in civilian port construction. Nonetheless, many Asian civilian ports were indeed built from the geographical site of former colonies, and borrowed the colonial legacy left behind by the Europeans. For instance, the institutional practice of the Port of Singapore and the Port of Hong Kong was largely influenced by its Anglo-Saxon culture such as the common law system. On the other hand, the Port of Macao had been assigned as a Chinese headquarter to connect the Lusophone community. Even though the European countries did not actively construct the civilian port in Asia as China did in Southeast Asia and Indian subcontinent, European countries had "softly contributed" to the construction of Asian civilian ports through their colonial legacy. Building upon Sun's idea of seaport diplomacy, any connection and utilisation of the soft asset embedded in the Asian civilian ports by foreign actors, in this thesis the European Union, could also be viewed as a kind of seaport diplomacy and an exercise of the civilian dimension of sea power.

Reconceptualising the Structural Power of the European Union: From a Holistic Approach to a Differentiated Approach

There were literally thousands of articles, book chapters and edited works on the nature of the European Union as an international actor and the characteristics of its foreign policies. However, major narrations on the nature of the European Union commonly rested on three different but interlinked power: the EU as a civilian power, a normative power, and a structural power (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b; K. E. Smith 2003; 2005; Stavridis 2001; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Keukeleire 2003; Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Holden 2009; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015; Hocking and Smith 2016).

These terms might be different amongst themselves in terms of subtle social meaning to third-party states and the ultimate objectives the European foreign policy wished to achieve, they shared two foundational features in constructing EU international presence: the predominant use of non-military instruments and the projection of European ideals to third-party states. For instance, Maull (1990:92 - 93) defined the characteristics of civilian power as “the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals” and “a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.” Ian Manners, one of the important proponents of “normative power Europe” thesis, defined the concept of normative power as “the ability to shape conception of what is “normal” in international relations” (Manners 2002:239), and the “normal” was rooted in various articles of the founding treaties of the European Union, or international declaration and regional charter that the European Union anchored to (ibid:241). The projection of such “normal” was essential to EU everyday international politics and served as the foundational character of the EU external presence, i.e. being normative and acting in a normative way (Whiteman 2011:6). Keukeleire’s idea of structural power and structural diplomacy, which he and his colleagues primarily used to define EU diplomacy to the world, suggested that the objective of EU diplomacy was to pursue and support “long-term structural changes” and transfer various founding principles of the EU via economic-financial instruments and political dialogues (Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009). Although scholars might disagree among themselves on the true nature of power that the European Union belonged to, they all primarily agreed that the EU was aspired to bring its ideals of world order to the rest of the world through non-military means and diplomacy.

Despite the slight difference in terms of objectives and means, the conceptualisation on nature of the characteristics of EU power did not address the local social and spatial difference of the third-party state. The micro-policy difference at local level and spatial-cultural difference among local communities within the third-party state was never addressed in the existing literature on EU normative power and structural foreign policy. For instance, while Keukeleire’s idea of structural power and structural diplomacy focused on the long-term structural changes of the third-party state, his idea did not differentiate the respective structures at state level and those at local level, as well as how the local-level structures could potentially make impact towards the state-level structures. While the realisation of multiple realities within the European Union was a common critique against the lack of effectiveness in the European foreign policy from within, the application of normative/structural power and structural foreign policy was never sensitive to the possible multiple realities in the third-party state at policy and spatial level, which was challenged empirically by the EU-China relations *per se*. In fact, there was also noticeable difference over the perception of the European Union between mainland Chinese community and Hong Kong community (Dai and Zhang 2007; Chan and Lai 2007). As a result, the effectiveness of EU normative or structural power would face always different challenges and opportunities at state and local level respectively. In fact, the existence of colonial legacy in various Chinese ports could on one hand provided valuable assets to the European Union, on the other hand generated undeniable threats to Chinese political, social and cultural security. The inattentional blindness of the existing literature on the state-local difference was a kind of theoretical gap to be filled in, which the overall design of the thesis aimed to achieve.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

After outlining the definition of some key elements in formulating the thesis, this section would discuss the key research questions the thesis wished to answer, the hypotheses made in the thesis and the analytical framework proposed in the thesis.

Formulating Research Questions

While there were noticeable efforts in the field of human rights dialogue, climate change and economic governance, the overall evaluation of EU normative power was less than satisfactory (Balducci 2010; Kavalski 2013; 2014; Michalski and Nilsson 2019; Ferenczy 2019). For example, Yuan and Orbie (2015) suggested that EU normative power was relatively effective in the field of social dimensions such as social security. The reasons for such lack of effectiveness were explained by various scholars. Jørgensen's (2004) research on EU foreign policy suggested that the EU aspiration could always be countered by two other variables: legitimacy and interests. Youngs (2004) suggested that the normative identity of the European Union was only for strategic and security interests, and the practice of normative power was always constrained by national as well as European interests to third-party states and global order.

In the case of China, Michael Yahuda (2008) further identified two spatial-policy difficulties in EU engagement to China, namely “the tyranny of distance” and “the primacy of trade”. The first variable suggested that since the European Union and China shared the two ends of the huge Eurasian continent, the two regimes were separated by physical distance and did not have any direct territorial or even maritime contact. Geopolitical concerns, therefore, played a much minimal role in shaping EU-China relations. However, the “tyranny of distance” was more than physical but the mental gap. Both European and Chinese scholars suggested that both the European and Chinese leaders were bounded by general ignorance and stereotypes of each other (Griffith 1981; Möller 2002; Men 2008; Schilling 2012). The lack of geopolitical engagement, therefore, was attributed to the lack of “correct” knowledge and incentives for EU leaders, rather than the actual physical distance between the two regions. The second variable identified by Yahuda (2008) was the “primacy of trade”. Both the EU and its Member States were literally trapped into trade and economic interests in China (Piening 1997; Casarini 2006). At the European level, the structural (in)competence of European foreign policy only allowed the European Union to leverage any normative objectives through the exercise of either positive or negative conditionality. The strategy was usually embedded in pre-Accession treaties of the future EU Member States, development aid or technological transfer programmes to the countries in need, or trade agreements with global partners. In the case of China, the main tool was always—the last one - the upgraded EU-China PCA negotiation could be viewed as the best illustration of the strategy that the European Union wished to deploy. At the Member State level, EU Member States either continued to be fantasied by the potentials of the Chinese market which they had been looking for since the imperial period of China, or increasingly relied on Chinese foreign direct investment for her economy which is hammered since global financial crisis in 2008 and EURO debt crisis in 2009 (Fox and Godement 2009; Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015). As a result, the European Union was more divided on the Chinese issues and caught between the continuous exercise of normative or structural power to China, or silenced against China’s lack of improvement on human rights or social reform for the sake of a better trade and investment deal or market access (Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015).

Interestingly, the overall objectives of EU engagement to China thus the two variables identified by Yahuda were nothing new to Europe. Since the arrival of Portuguese maritime expedition to China in 16th century, European policy towards China was centred at two main objectives: trading rights and promotion of European values. The difference was merely about the content: it was about the (exclusive) trading rights of luxurious goods produced by China such as silk, tea leaves and porcelain, and the promotion of Christianity to the Chinese imperial court and her subjects. On the contrary, contemporary Sino-European relations focused on affordable commodities and free entry of tertiary industry such as professional services and

capital market, and the promotion of the “European normal” to the rising communist China. Despite observable temporal gap between imperial Sino-European relations and contemporary EU-China relations, the main objectives of European foreign policy against China were largely the same – and so did the obstacles. While the advancement of technology and transportation network might bridge the physical “tyranny of distance” between Europe and China, the mental “tyranny of distance” remained an important obstacle to deal with. On the contrary, the rise of China had widened the expectation gap between European and Chinese leaders. From Beijing’s perspective, the rising global status and successful economic reform of PRC should be well-respected by the West, such that Beijing expected a more balanced treatment from the European leaders as well as a recognition of the market economy status (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2014; 2018). From Brussels’ perspective, the rise of China in economy and global status should also be accompanied with a progressive socio-political reform in Chinese society, yet the result was never satisfactory in the eyes of the European Union (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019). As a result, both the European Union and China were haunted by the mental “tyranny of distance” between them. Last but not least, European leaders, no matter in the past or present, tended to adopt a common position towards China in the aspect of trade and market access, though they might have different considerations in aspects like human rights and social reform. As a result, this common position was always fragile and continuously being challenged by individual state-to-state policy between European states and China. Therefore, it might be tempted to conclude the fundamental policy context between Europe and China did not change much from the imperial period to contemporary days.

In the past, in order to fulfil the objectives and overcome the obstacles in Sino-European relations, European rulers forcefully introduced a political solution: establishing a “coordinated” treaty port system through the blended use of military exercises and diplomatic negotiation. This early and brutal form of port diplomacy gave the European leaders an upper hand in securing their business interests in China and established localised bridgeheads at the coast of China for further diplomatic and commercial actions. The establishment of treaty ports and European colonies in China thus simultaneously solved the problem of “tyranny of distance” and protected “the primacy of trade”. A localised European settlement in China provided an ideal place for the Church to continue its religious missions and promote the teaching of the God. Without doubt, the traditional treaty port system was already out-of-questioned as it was no longer legitimate and legal in international politics. Nonetheless, as discussed in last section, major ports and port-cities in China were indeed former treaty ports created by the European powers, and Beijing’s differential treatments to these ports and port-cities, to some extent, preserved some characteristics of treaty port system. Considering the similarities of Sino-European relations in the past and the present, the thesis proposed the first-level research questions (RQs):

RQ₁: What was the role of ports and port-cities in contemporary EU-China relations?

RQ_{1.1}: Was there any role difference among those ports and port-cities? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the difference?

In addition, given the strong presence of European colonial and treaty port legacy in the majority of Chinese ports and port-cities, the thesis proposed the second-level research questions, which focused on port diplomacy, as follows:

RQ₂: Was European port diplomacy constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy in China? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship between European port diplomacy and its colonial and treaty port legacy?

RQ₃ Was Chinese response also constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy introduced by Europe? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship between Chinese port response and its colonial and treaty port legacy?

To answer these two levels of research questions, the thesis proposed the following hypotheses:

H₁: Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic interests of the EU and its Member States.

H_{1.1}: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and “intermediacy”.

H₂: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could deploy at the port.

H₃: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China could deploy at the port.

Explaining the Hypotheses

Prior to the methodological discussion of the thesis, this section would outline the analytical framework used in the thesis in formulating the above hypotheses. Instead of solely based on traditional IR theories or geopolitics, the thesis adopted a multi-disciplinary approach that borrowed some concepts from port studies and spatial politics. As a result, some clarifications were required for the sake of understanding the rationale behind the analytical framework.

Port as a Negotiated Space and the Relevance of Spatial Politics

The first element to be discussed was the spatial characteristics of ports and port-cities. While political geographers acknowledged that policy instruments and political interactions would bring impact to the meaning and the operation of space, the argument should be put into the context of ports and port-cities which the thesis argued that it was a unique kind of political space. Henri Lefebvre, one of the renowned Marxist critics against modernity, suggested that “the production of the city was the end, the objective and the meaning of industrial production.” (Lefebvre 1971:195; cited in Elden 2007:103) From Lefebvre’s perspective, the construction of contemporary urban space and city was never a result of natural progression but a planned project of industrial production (Lefebvre 1971; 1991). Space by default must be political and a product of social and political forces from different levels, namely the local-rural, the local-urban, the regional and the global (Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2007).

If the production of a city, which might be located inland or near the coast, was heavily influenced by external forces and global trends, the production of a port was more vulnerable to external influence and outsiders’ actions. In fact, the initial selection of a suitable port site might involve lots of geographical factors such as whether the location provided an excellent shelter to ships in different sizes or whether the coastal line and climate were suitable for maritime travel and trade. Nevertheless, the continuous existence and development of a port must be relied on the continuous and growing usage of ports and port facilities. linking the mobilities of goods, people and capital from one place to another. Therefore, port space must be social thus political. It was a place where “the Self” (the inland community lived in the land

space) meets “the Others” (the maritime community from aboard). Second, a vivid port space must be mutually “agreed” and co-established by the inland community and the maritime community. A unilateral port call might be successful through the exercise of gunboat diplomacy, but sustainable port calls required the political and policy commitment for both inland community and maritime community. As a result, port space must be a negotiated space between the inland and maritime community, making it a political space embedded with power relations and interests. Such political relation between the inland and maritime community could be visualised through international treaties (in traditional treaty ports) or domestic legislation of the inland community (in those chartered ports and port-cities). In other words, if both the inland community and maritime community were committed to maintain the port status, the port space must, at least, had some instrumental values to their respective interests so that they were willing to commit to the maintenance of port space. Therefore, the thesis suggested a hypothesis on the potential role of ports and port-cities that they served as localised European port space that help the EU to balance the desire to project normative power to China and the demand of advancing economic interests.

A spatial perspective on ports and port-cities as a negotiated space had another merit as it helped to conceptualise the changing port geography at the port. Lefebvre’s theory of space had already implied that the “definition” of space was fluid and continuously shaped by perceived spatial practice, conceived spatial meaning and lived social relations and interactions (Lefebvre 1991:42 - 43). In the context of ports and port diplomacy, the perceived spatial practice was visualised by the international treaties (treaty port) or domestic legislation (chartered port) concerned. On the other hand, the conceived spatial meaning could be understood as the assigned role and meaning of this port by the inland and maritime community and port diplomacy was part of the lived social relations and interactions that embedded in the port space. From Lefebvre’s understanding, the conceived spatial meaning was always in contest and shaped by spatial practices of the actors in the space. Individual actor, through the contestation of spatial meaning and practices, would always try to seek advantage from spatial practices and turn the conceived spatial meaning to its favour. In the case of European port diplomacy to China discussed in the thesis, such an understanding of spatial politics assumed that major diplomatic actors, namely Brussels and Beijing, would contest for the role played by the port and port-city concerned through their spatial practices.

As a result, port diplomacy not only served the generic diplomatic motives of the inland (China) or maritime community (the European Union), but also aimed to stabilise, if not extend, the role of the port assigned by the inland and maritime communities. However, port actions and responses should always fall within the limits of perceived and agreed spatial practice as moving beyond the agreed limits could possibly lead to the total destruction of the port space, which might not be desirable for both inland and maritime communities¹². As a result, the port space also served a constraint against port diplomacy that limited the opportunity sets and appropriate actions of the inland and maritime communities, i.e. China and the European Union respectively.

Port Geography and The Revised Centrality-Intermediacy Nexus

One criticism against spatial theories was that the theory of this kind was difficult to operationalise. Spatial concepts, such as those proposed by Henri Lefebvre, yielded little empirical relevance but a mere social critic against modernity and capitalism. Instead of

¹² Indeed, it was sometimes possible for the total destruction if either the inland or maritime community find the port space was crucial to their interests. A typical example of this was the maritime ban or sea ban imposed during mid-Ming Dynasty as a response to piracy and domestic social stability. For the sake of simplicity, however, the thesis temporarily ruled out such possibility in EU-China relations and European port diplomacy to China.

discussing the validity of such criticism, the thesis had borrowed an analytical framework developed in traditional port studies and logistics management, i.e. the port-city paradigm, so as to compensate for the lack of apparent empirical relevance of spatial theory.

In their pioneer work on the “spatial characteristics of transportation hubs”, Fleming and Hayuth (1994) proposed the ideas of “centrality” and “intermediacy” as the two pertinent measurements of the spatial relationship of transportation hubs (ibid:4). According to Fleming and Hayuth (1994:4 - 5), centrality was defined as “a market centre performing vital economic functions or political centre painting the national or imperial power”, while intermediacy referred to “locations between important origins and destinations... chosen as waystops, route junctions, break-in-bulk points, gateways, etc.” Based on the idea proposed by Fleming and Hayuth, Cesar Ducruet and his colleagues (Ducruet 2007; Ducruet and Lee 2006) further refined the ideas of centrality and intermediacy and applied to the classification of ports and port-cities. According to their refinement, centrality was essentially “an urban functional measure” (Ducruet and Lee 2006:108) and defined as “a local/regional trade generation power (endogenous)” (Ducruet 2007:160), whereas intermediacy was “an essentially maritime-based measure” (Ducruet and Lee 2006:108) and defined as “external player’s election of a place for serving their networks (exogenous)” (Ducruet 2007:160).

While the major orientation of the mentioned works was closely associated to port studies and international political economy (IPE) - such as the economic role and economic functions of the port being studied, the ideas of centrality and intermediacy could also be applicable to the research related to international politics and foreign policy analysis (FPA). Table 1.2 summarised the potential refinement proposed by the thesis:

	Port Geography under IPE	Port Geography under FPA (proposed by the thesis)
Centrality	The endogenous economic interests and trade generation power	The endogenous <u>political interests and institutions generation power</u>
Intermediacy	External player’s election of a place for serving their networks of economic interests and trade	External player’s election of a place for serving their networks of <u>political interests and institutions</u>

Table 1.2 Definitions of centrality and intermediacy under the IPE and FPA (proposed by the thesis)

From the above table, the main modification proposed by the thesis was the emphasis of the “political dimension” of port geography in FPA. For instance, if traditional IPE focused more on how commercial activities and economic interests were related to port geography and port institutions, FPA would focus more on how diplomatic activities and political interests interacted with port geography and institutions. In addition, traditional port studies assumed port-cities to have some degree of domestic trade generation power. The thesis proposed that, in addition to endogenous trade generation power, ports and port-cities should also possess a certain degree of endogenous institution generation power. The capacity to generate political interests and institutions, therefore, was the key element to understand the concept of centrality under port diplomacy. Following the same token, the concept of intermediacy also received some refinement by emphasising the political dimension of the network. Last but not least, the endogeneity and exogeneity embedded in the concepts of centrality and intermediacy could always be translated to familiar terminologies in social constructivism, i.e. the concept of “Self” and “Others”. As a result, the political interests and institutions generated under the ports and port-cities should also reflect the socio-economic common good and national myth (Gellner 1983). On the other hand, the concept of intermediacy could be associated to the external challenges against the national myths through the mobilities of peoples, goods and ideas (Urry

2007; Clayton 2009). This implication of this concept would be further discussed in Chapter 2 when the thesis continued to illustrate the analytical framework.

Methodology, Methods and Limitations

With the outline of research questions and proposed hypotheses in last section, this section would discuss the research design of the thesis, which included the overall methodological setting, the research methods and the limitations of the proposed design.

Grounded Theory and Small-N Qualitative Comparative Study

The dual-nature of research questions and hypotheses was one of the essential characteristics, if not a problem, of designing social science inquiry. On one hand, the research questions and hypotheses might be tangled with both descriptive and explanatory component. On the other hand, the research questions and hypotheses might simultaneously need to address the empirical realities as well as reflect upon the conceptual ideal. As a result, a social science research design may need to address both categorical and ordinal variables, as well as quantitative and qualitative data.

Because of such dual-nature characteristics of social science, the thesis made reference on various methodological models and tried to take an integrative and flexible approach to develop the best strategy to tap the relationship among ports, port diplomacy and EU-China relations. In fact, the thesis positioned itself as an interpretivist project which its design was rooted at grounded theory proposed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; 1998; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1994; 1997; 1998). To compensate for the criticism usually made against the grounded theory approach, the thesis introduced small-N qualitative comparative study as the main research framework to “test” the hypotheses.

Grounded Theory as an Overall Methodological Strategy

The rationale of picking grounded theory as a guiding methodological framework was twofold: first, most of the research data, such as historical archives, contemporary policy papers, communications about EU programmes, diplomatic speech acts, norms and ideas generated by from port diplomatic actions, were largely qualitative although there might be some statistics or figures to quantify the trade generating power and commercial transactions of a civilian port. As a result, a methodology which could give better qualitative research environment was more appropriate and applicable for the research design of the thesis. Second, the existing literature on the role of port in diplomatic actions were rather scattered into two extremes, i.e. either from the perspective of high politics such as military and geostrategy, or from the perspective of low politics such as logistics studies or port operation. Under this academic context, the thesis aimed to provide a medium-range theory which bridge the analytical gap on the role of commercial ports in international politics. While the thesis borrowed many related concepts from existing theories such as the idea of spatial politics, port studies and geostrategy, a methodological framework rooted at a bottom-up inductive and interpretivist approach was more appropriate and applicable than that rooted at a top-down deductive and predictive approach.

One merit of grounded theory was that this it allowed researchers to develop “theory that is grounded in data systemically gathered and analysed.” (Strauss and Corbin 1994:273) From grounded theory perspective, the researcher would use the data systematically collected to check against and modify existing theories, so that a new theory was generated at the same time as carrying social research (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; Strauss and Corbin 1994). Similar to other qualitative research methodology, the grounded theory looked at the qualitative data generated by archives, interviews, field observations, etc., and the data collected would be analysed and interpreted by the researcher (Strauss and Corbin 1994:274). A new theory was grounded at existing literature, data collected and checked against the existing theories for

discrepancies, and researcher's reflective interpretation on such discrepancies.

Another crucial feature of grounded theory was that the application of such methodological strategy would focus the researcher to constantly compare the data with existing theories and other observations made when the research progresses. Generative or concept-relating questions would be asked continuously throughout the research process. The researcher also needed to sample appropriate theories, develop appropriate coding procedures against the collection and interpretation of qualitative data collected, and provided guidelines for conceptual integration (Strauss and Corbin 1994:274 - 275). Although grounded theory was commonly used in sociological investigation, the methodology might also apply to international relations theory building and diplomacy studies. Given the recent turn of the grounded theory, researchers were required to appreciate the conditions "from international through national, community, organisational and institutional, suborganisational and subinstitutional, group, individual, and collective to action pertaining to a phenomenon." (ibid.: 275) This kind of cross-level analysis indeed fit well to the characteristics of European foreign policy, which its action involves supranational decision to localised programmes, and it aimed to make structural changes of the targeted society while gaining political and economic interests. Based on the merits discussed above, grounded theory appeared to be an appropriate guiding methodology for this thesis.

Small-N Qualitative Comparative Study as the Operational Strategy

As earlier mentioned, one feature of using grounded theory as a guiding methodology was that the researcher was required to make constant comparison with the existing theoretical and empirical realities. While many researchers had worked with their own operational strategy to conduct grounded theory research, the methodology was also opened to any kind of comparative methods, insofar the basic rationale of comparison and procedures were well-observed and consistent. As a result, in terms of operational strategy, the thesis would employ the framework of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and applied to a small-N case study.

The central feature of qualitative comparative case study was "a synthetic strategy" (Ragin 1987:74; Schlosser et. al. 2009:6) to combine the strength of qualitative case-oriented approach and quantitative variable-driven approach in conducting comparative study (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schlosser et. al. 2009; Halperin and Heath 2012). Under the QCA approach, the researcher identified major variables across the selected cases and made in-depth observations of the variables. Another merit of QCA approach as a comparative framework was that it was more context-sensitive and allowed the connection between various levels of analysis (Schlosser et. al. 2009:6), giving a medium-range theory in addressing the issue. It should be noted that under the QCA framework, variables might not just vary in quantitative manner such as the fluctuation of absolute value or yielding specific kind of statistics outcome. Instead, the variables might vary qualitatively like the changing behaviours of an actor or creation of new meaning of a social action. The application of QCA, therefore, allowed the thesis to address both the quantitative and qualitative data that potentially generated by the civilian ports the thesis studied and compared.

To setup the comparative framework, the thesis proposed a small-N case study on three ports in China to "test" the hypotheses. Although in the field of International Relations study, a case was commonly equal to a single country or a single set of foreign policies (George and Bennett 2005; Klotz 2008a; 2008b), or "a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable." (Eckstein 1975; cited in Bennett 2004) However, Klotz (2008a; 2008b) also acknowledged that sometimes a state or a country might not be the best unit of analysis. It was equally impossible to single out a particular variable for a social phenomenon or using a single dimension of measurement in measuring the independent and

dependent variables (Bennett 2004). To operationalise an appropriate case study approach, George (1979b) and Bennett (2004) proposed the definition of a case in the field of International Relations is “an instance of a class of events of interests to the investigator” (Bennett 2004:21). Also, instead of representing a single variable, the case was dealt in a “*holistic perspective*” which was being “considered as a complex combination of properties, a specific “whole” that should not be lost or obscured in the course of the analysis.” (Schlosser et. al. 2009:6, italic as origin)

By this definition, the research design would focus on three “cases”, which were former colonies or treaty ports established by European powers during the imperial period of China, and remained a kind of “chartered ports” by China nowadays. These three cases were Macao, a Portuguese settlement established in 1557 was “formally colonised” in 1887, Hong Kong, a British colony established in 1842, and Shanghai, a treaty port established in 1843 and turned to an International Settlement in 1854. The portfolio of the selected cases, with two independent variables namely centrality and intermediacy, was summarised in Table 1.3 as follows:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Background condition			
Ports and colonies established by European powers Ports and port-cities received differential treatments by Beijing			
Independent Variable 1: Centrality			
Institutional capacity (China)	OCTS and a Special Administrative Region	OCTS and a Special Administrative Region	A direct-controlled municipality and a Pilot FTZ
Institutional capacity (Europe)	Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration EU-Macao TCA	Sino-British Joint Declaration	N/A
Historical relations with Europe	A former Portuguese settlement (1557 – 1887) A former Portuguese colony (1887 – 1999)	A former British colony (1842 – 1997)	A treaty port (1843 – 1943) An International Settlement established by British and American merchants (1854 – 1941) A minor French concession next to the International Settlement (1862 – 1941)
Political and social culture presence	Portuguese and Latin European culture Chinese culture	Anglo-Saxon culture Chinese culture	Chinese culture Traces of European culture in different areas of the city
Economic power	Weak economic contribution to Chinese and European economy	Strong economic contribution to Chinese and European economy	Centre of Chinese national economy and European business in China
Independent Variable 2: Intermediacy			
Major cultural network connected	Cantonese-speaking and Lusophone community	Cantonese-speaking and Anglo-Saxon community	Chinese-speaking community
Economic network connected	Greater Bay Area International tourist and recreational centre	Greater Bay Area International financial and logistics centre	Pan-Yangtze River Delta economic region International logistics centre
Political network connected	Chinese order taker The presence of Portuguese political institutions	Liberal international order taker Strong Anglo-Saxon political institutions	Chinese order promoter Little foreign political institutions

Table 1.3 A summary of cases to be studied with two independent variables concerned

As shown in the above table, the centrality-intermediacy nexus of port geography was further operationalised into different dimensions, with a clear indicator of the characteristics under each dimension. In short, the concept of centrality would be evaluated by the institutional capacity, historical relations and socio-political culture of the port, while the concept of intermediacy would be evaluated by the economic, culture and socio-political network that the port was embedded in. Not shown in the table, the “dependent variable” of the research design was the European port diplomacy, which was operationalised in terms of port actions conducted by the European Union and China, as well as the norms and institutions projected from the port actions.

The data collection timeframe would cover 2006 – 2018, and both qualitative data such as EU policy papers, speeches, communications, programme information, etc., and quantitative data such as statistics and figures related to the ports would be collected and analysed. Apart from first-hand documents and archives, secondary data already studied by the academic would also be consulted. Finally, active participation of programmes organised by the European Union from 2015 – 2018 would serve as an additional information for researcher. However, unless the private information from the programmes was critical and the researcher was given the consent by the organiser, the researcher would only use publicly-available information in analysing the diplomatic actions conducted by the European Union and China. Given the shorter period of participation timeframe than the data collection timeframe, the information learnt from those programmes would serve for researcher’s self-reflection to adjust the theoretical position, which was an essential step in conducting grounded theory research.

Research Limitations

A choice of a specific methodological strategy and research methods would always accompany with their research limitations. Given the thesis was rooted in grounded theory with small-N qualitative comparative study, it also acknowledged the methodological limitations they brought, as well as cases or areas that the thesis could not cover. One major criticism on the grounded theory research was the problem of interpretation, whatever it was over-emphasised or underrated of particular data or observation. To overcome this problem, any observation and data collected would be checked meticulously against publicly-available documents, such as official policy papers, official communication channels such as press releases, websites and social media, as well as secondary data such as academic journals, second-handed interviews. This method on one hand allowed the researcher to check against the integrity of data and information gathered, on the other hand minimised the risk of over-interpretation or under-interpretation.

The Selection and Non-Selection of “Cases”

Any small-N comparative research would also draw the selection problems, i.e. the selection and non-selection of cases and variables. According to China Ports, a national-wide association endorsed by the Central Government, there were, including those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, 87 coastal ports in China (China Ports and Harbours Association 2015). Therefore, a selection of 3 out of 87 may, intuitively, not be representative enough to show European port diplomacy against China.

While the thesis acknowledged the criticism and the potential issues in representativeness, the selection strategy of these 3 cases were largely followed what Lijphart suggested as a “kind of “hypothesis-generating case studies” (Lijphart 1971:692), which aimed to develop “more general theoretical propositions” (Levy 2008:5). Given the lack of theoretical discussion on the impact of spatial difference among substate actors in EU structural power and port diplomacy, a comparative research focusing on a handful of cases allowed the thesis to explore the “casual-process observations” (Brady et. al. 2004:12) within each selected case, for instance the

development of the port geography of the selected cases perceived by Beijing and Brussels in different period of time, and how these perceptions were linked to their strategies at the port, to induce or fence off long-term structural changes or maximise their political or economic interests. Such process-tracing technique required the researchers to conduct continuous observations guided by vague theoretical propositions such the application of ANT suggested by Acuto (2013) or the concept of seaport diplomacy suggested by Sun (2018). Through the construction of continuous dialogues between the evidence presented in the cases and the vague theoretical propositions, the thesis could develop a more specific theoretical framework that focused on spatial-cultural characteristics of local entities against the exercise of EU structural power towards the third-party state, so as to remove the “inattentional blindness” of the existing literature of EU normative/structural power and structural foreign policy suggested by various scholastic works mentioned above.

In order to provide enough methodological remedy of a small-N research, the design of the case selection process was further guided by the “configurational comparative method” in qualitative comparative analysis (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009; Rihoux and Lobe 2012). As Rihoux and Lobe (2012:230 – 231; see also Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009:24 – 25) argued, any case selected in qualitative comparative analysis must be “selected purposefully” which could display “some common background features” and “some variations on some aspects”. In order to focus on meaningful variations, the selection of cases and non-selection of cases should be firstly driven by a clearly defined outcome of interests (Rihoux and Lobe 2012:232; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009:20 – 21). Given the objective of the thesis was to investigate how the centrality and intermediacy of former treaty ports (and current “chartered ports”) could contribute to European port diplomacy towards China and the Chinese responses, the selection process firstly put aside any non-former treaty ports or ports with little colonial history. Such selection strategy aimed to “control” the background conditions of the cases (as shown in Table 1.3) such that the comparison could focus on the qualitative change of centrality and intermediacy of the selected ports. Under this first-tier selection strategy, the thesis had narrowed down its potential case pool to the 23 ports identified under Dennys (1867) for further considerations.

As mentioned above, the key outcome was to link the variation of centrality and intermediacy to European port diplomacy and Chinese responses, a good selection practice should reflect the variations across the key configurations, in this thesis it was referred to centrality and intermediacy. These variations of these configurations, as partially shown in Table 1.3, were further operationalised to the institutional capacity, quality of colonial legacy in terms of political, social and cultural dimension, and the economic power and network of the civilian ports. Table 1.4 further summarised the variations presented in the selected case under the strategy mentioned above:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Configuration 1: Centrality			
Institutional capacity (China)	One Country, Two Systems		Direct-controlled municipality and a Pilot FTZ
Institutional capacity (Europe)	Bilateral declaration and EU agreement	Bilateral declaration only	N/A
Historical relations with Europe	Continental European colony	Anglo-Saxon colony	Mixed (both Anglo-Saxon and continental European settlement)
Social and cultural quality	Co-existence of continental and Chinese culture	Co-existence of Anglo-Saxon and Chinese culture	Pre-dominant Chinese culture
Political culture	Strong Chinese political culture weak Portuguese influence	Strong Anglo-Saxon political culture with moderate Chinese influence	Uncontested Chinese political culture
Economic power	Weak to China and Europe	Strong to both China and Europe	Very strong to China and Europe
Configuration 2: Intermediacy			
Coverage of economic network and interests	Regional	Regional, national and international	
Coverage of cultural network and interests	Regional and Lusophone community	Regional and Anglo-Saxon community	Regional and national community
Coverage of political network and interests	Chinese order taker	Liberal world order taker	Chinese order promoter

Table 1.4 Summary of the variations of two configurations of the selected cases

As shown above, the selected cases contributed meaningful variations across major conditions under each configuration. For example, while the case of Shanghai signified strong presence of Chinese institutions compared to those in Hong Kong and Macao, Macao could be further differentiated from Hong Kong by the presence of EU-level agreement even though both Special Administrative Regions were governed by “One Country Two Systems” and bilateral declaration between China and the colonial host. On the other hand, while both Macao and Shanghai were connected to Chinese order when Hong Kong was perceived as a liberal world order taker, the coverage of interests and network of Shanghai was much extensive and important than that of Macao – which was commonly perceived as a small city located in Southern China. Despite the relatively small number of cases were drawn from the pool of potential cases, the selected cases indeed presented a more favourable research environment for the thesis to focus on linkage between key configurations (centrality and intermediacy) and the outcome (the European foreign policy and Chinese response), thus help building a “typological theory” (George 1979a; Bennett 2004) of European port diplomacy in China.

Of course, there were some other cases which could be meaningful and potentially replaced the above selected cases such as Canton, Xiamen or Fuzhou. However, as Rihoux and Lobe (2012) and Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (2009) both suggested, a good practice of case selection should also concern about the “empirical intimacy” of the selected cases, i.e. the knowledge of the selected cases. The selection of Shanghai (the engine of China’s economy), Hong Kong (a

well-known international financial centre) and Macao (a well-known international recreational centre) allowed the thesis to take advantage of the ample data and secondary research already published, as well as the personal background of the author. As a result, the selection of the three cases was further justified by the importance of “empirical intimacy” in QCA research design.

The Selection of Time-frame

The selection of timeframe for data collection may also attract criticisms. While the selection of timeframe could always be arbitrary and constrained by non-academic factors, the proposed timeframe had several characteristics. First of all, the year 2006 marked a fundamental shift of EU-China relations which highlighted the idea of “responsibilities” in the policy communication drafted by the European Commission (European Commission 2006a; Shambaugh 2007a; Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). Second, in terms of financial commitment, the year 2006 also marked the transition to a new funding cycle (2007 – 2013), such that new funding proposals and initiative would be proposed starting from 2006. Following the same token, the year 2018 was picked because it served as the conclusion of the midterm evaluation of the latest funding cycle (2014 – 2020). Given the time and resources constraints, the thesis acknowledged the criticism that the selected timeframe and cases might not be comprehensive enough to reveal the whole picture of contemporary EU-China relations and European port diplomacy to China.

Organisation of the Thesis

The chapter served as an introduction to the whole thesis by outlining the background of the research, the definitions of major elements concerned, the proposed research questions and hypotheses, and the methodological issues of the research design.

The remaining chapters would be divided into two main parts. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 would continue the discussion on the analytical framework, through an extensive review of existing literature on port studies and EU-China relations. Chapter 2 would discuss major academic theories on port diplomacy and port system, aiming to shed light on how ports and port-cities could potentially make impact to international relations and foreign policy. Chapter 3 would discuss the evolution of European foreign policy and the EU-China relations and highlight the characteristics of contemporary EU-China relations that port diplomacy could potentially bridge.

After the theoretical discussion, the thesis would move to the empirical part which consisted of three case studies: Chapter 4 would first discuss the overall Sino-European relations during the imperial period of Europe and that of China, a context which led to the creation of Macao as the first European settlement in China. Followed by the historical discussion, Chapter 4 would continue its discussion on Macao and its role in EU-China relations. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 would respectively focus on historical and contemporary context of Hong Kong and Shanghai, and their respective role in contemporary EU-China relations.

The thesis would conclude itself at Chapter 7 by revisiting the research questions and hypotheses and checking against the empirical data discussed in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6. After that, the thesis would proposed two theoretical propositions drawn from the empirical analysis and how these propositions contribute to the existing literature on EU structural power and the role of civilian ports in international relations and foreign policy, and suggested the future research agenda.

Chapter 2: Ports, Port System and Port Diplomacy in Different Perspectives

The previous chapter outlined the overall theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. This chapter, and the next chapter, would further develop major elements of the theoretical framework. Given the importance of ports and port system in formulation the thesis, this chapter would first explore the existing literature on port system and port diplomacy, and the next chapter would focus on the evolution of European foreign policy and the possibility of European port diplomacy.

This chapter would be structured in three sections. The first section would provide a review on two mainstream theoretical frameworks in studying port and port system, i.e. the geopolitical lens and socio-economic lens, and how these frameworks were linked to the concept of port diplomacy. would outline the port system developed in Europe and Asia, aiming to shed lights on the important features of Asian ports and how European port diplomacy in the past shaped the Asian maritime order. Following that, the second section would outline the port system developed in Europe and Asia, aiming to shed lights on the important features of Asian ports and how European port diplomacy in the past shaped the Asian maritime order. The third section would link up the academic discussion of ports and port diplomacy to the features of Asian port system, so as to explore the relationship between (treaty) port system, the impact of European port diplomacy in the past, and its relevancy to contemporary EU-China relations.

The Role of Ports in International Relations: An Everlasting Geopolitical Battlefield or An Integrative Socio-Economic Hub?

A textbook-liked definition of a port was referred to an area “attached to a sea, ocean or river by connecting waterway” that “equipped with infrastructure and technical facilities” for the sake of managing specific load type that it is assigned to do so (Roa, Pena, Amante and Goretti 2013:1056). From a functionalist and logistics perspective, the primacy function of a port, regardless of its location, was to “to provide shelter to a different extent to ships” and to allow “the transfer of goods from one means of transport to another.” (ibid) In addition, port was always regarded as an essential transportation node linking the land space and maritime space (ibid:1057).

The above conceptualisation of port looked good to common people, as it highlighted the infrastructural layouts and major functions which were visible in our daily life. However, the above definition was rather location-neutral, i.e. the location of a port was irrelevant to its functions and infrastructural layouts. Given the fact that a port was a geographical space that plugged one’s sovereign territory to the maritime space which was largely an internationalised space and the freedom of navigation prevailed, the importance of a port was more than a facilitator of business transactions and a shelter. The socio-political characteristics of the sovereign territory the port located, the characteristics of the maritime space the port served, the absolute and relative geographical position of the port in the global maritime network and the type of infrastructure installed at the port etc., not only contributed to the value and importance of a port in logistics and commercial activities, but also defined the character of a port and its role in international relations. In fact, the thesis argued that this unique characteristic of port, and relative importance of port in social, economic and political aspect, was an essential foundation to understand how the foreign states exercised their port diplomacy against the host of the port.

The role of ports in international relations was commonly analysed from two different perspectives. The first perspective focused on the strategic position of a port, using a naval port, in one’s diplomacy, and the second perspective focused on how a port, usually a civilian port

connected the local community to the world, and vice versa.

Port as a Geopolitical Asset and Battlefield to One's Diplomacy

Although the thesis did not include naval ports and facilities in its case study, the thesis still needed to include a short review on the role of ports from a naval and geopolitical perspective. After all, the importance of port and port diplomacy was first addressed by geostrategists under the name of sea power and naval diplomacy. A review on the geopolitical and naval lens was still useful in capturing the potential role of ports in contemporary EU-China relations.

It might not be necessary to repeat the importance of "command of the sea" suggested by Mahan in maintaining, or challenging, global hegemonic status of a state. Maritime dominance, albeit in different forms, was a guiding principle shared among European empires and the United States. Despite the lack of maritime presence in Asia after the World War II, there was a growing European concern over the maritime security in the region, especially the increasing tension of South China Sea among China, the ASEAN and the United States (Duchatel 2016; Stanzel 2016; Pejsova 2019) The usual conclusion from these reports, however, was pessimistic owing to the lack of collective "military resources" at EU level. As a result, the European Union was rather passive in dealing the situation, and it had to rely on Member States' individual efforts or the commitment from the United States.

Conclusions of this kind were rather natural. In evaluating one's maritime presence in a region, the most traditional, also the most straightforward, way was evaluating one's naval capacity that was readily to be deployed in the region. Compared to air forces and land troops, naval forces could be deployed in a flexible (compared to land troops which are limited by natural and sovereign borders) and sustainable manner (compared to air forces which are cost more in everyday maintenance and overseas operation). The naval muscle of a state, in the eyes of naval strategists and IR experts, was always readily to be "translated" into diplomatic resources and messages (Le Mière 2014). To turn the naval missions and naval diplomacy more effective, the naval should be well-supported by an extensive network of naval bases and/or civilian seaports that occupied the key sea lanes of communication in the region. The role of ports, at first glance, was instrumental to naval diplomacy, which could be further analysed in three different aspects: systematic, operational and discursive.

The systematic level was proposed by scholars like Immanuel Wallenstein (1984) and George Modelski (1987), which emphasised the dominance in global port system as an integral part of global hegemony. Wallenstein and Modelski might disagree among themselves over the impact of global capitalism and the fate of a global hegemony, their theories shared similar beliefs that global hegemony from the Spanish Empire to the United States had dominated, if not dictated, the technological build-ups and the commercial network – which included the dominance in ship-building capacity and maritime network. For instance, Modelski (1987) suggested that the number of capital/commercial ships and warships possessed by a state was a good indicator of one's maritime strength, in both naval and civilian terms, compared to her competitors. In addition to outnumbering her competitors in terms of vessels and personnel, William R. Thompson (2001) observed that different hegemonic states shared a set of commercial maritime characteristics such as the possession of certain commercial ports, naval bases or *points d'appui* for the sake of the projection of maritime power or protecting overseas maritime trade network (Harkavy 2007:24). The "passing the torch" thesis suggested by Thompson (2001) confirmed the view that some ports or maritime chokepoints were critical in geopolitics and maintenance of one's hegemonic position. The changing possession of these ports, for example Port Jaffna (from the Portuguese Empire to the Dutch Empire) and Port Colombo (from the Portuguese Empire to the Dutch Empire then the British Empire), also reflected the transition of global hegemon from one state to another. Following the same token, the continuous maritime

presence at these ports and chokepoints such as Port Aden, Port Cape Town, Port Singapore and to some extent Port Hong Kong, by the United States and her allies had allowed the United States to control major sea lanes of communication in the region, or major hubs of regional maritime trading network. Summarised by Basil Germond (2015), sea power was essentially a means for the hegemonic to maintain her desired global system, which currently in the form of Anglo-American liberal world order, as well as a product of it. Hegemonic state could afford powerful navies owing to the control of global capital through trade or exploitation, and powerful navies supported further exploitation and control over overseas resources. From this perspective, controlling major civilian ports was essential for a global hegemony to maintain its position. As a good civilian port, by definition, was always the hub of regional and/or global civilian activities, it allowed the global hegemony to dictate the civilian maritime network and control the flows of global capital, resources and even important ideas. In fact, various naval strategists and scholars agreed that sea power and the construction of maritime empire was won and lost not by successive maritime warfare or destruction of fleets, but through the loss and acquisition of key naval bases or geographical chokepoints (Brodie 1941; Kennedy 1983; Graham 1965). Despite not being explicitly mentioned, the same rule did apply to the control over key civilian ports and maritime commercial hubs as well.

At the operational level, naval bases and civilian ports were essential for naval and civilian maritime missions. Despite the advancement in technology and efficient supplies management, a navy could never sustain in maritime missions if it was not well-supported by an extensive network of bases (Grygiel 2012). The distinction between navy and coastal, as Grygiel (2012) argued, was that naval forces were required to go for missions that usually faraway and beyond one's territorial waters, while the latter usually covered the territorial sea or at most the exclusive economic zones. For instance, the expected maritime sites of a naval operation included strategic sea lanes of communication or tactical chokepoints at international waters, or maritime space in dispute. In addition, the expected objectives of naval missions varied from protection of state and civilian vessels to pre-emptive deterrence against competitors through continuous naval presence in the region. Given the characteristics and objectives of naval operations, Blechman and Weinland (1977) explained the four vital functions to support the naval missions: the replenishment of normal and specialized "consumables" that are vital for naval missions; the provision of intelligence and communication support; repairing broken parts of the warships outside the home ports and supporting direct combat in case of armed conflicts. The importance of ports and related maritime infrastructure might sometimes define the victor of naval warfare (Kipp 2009; Grygiel 2012). Although civilian ports and vessels were mostly ruled out from direct participation of naval missions – except in extreme situations like Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk in 1940, civilian maritime facilities remained crucial in supporting naval operations and developed one's sea power. An extensive civilian port network could allow effective replenishment of normal and specialised "consumables" through an effective and extensive purchase and logistic network of the required "consumables" all around the world. A good civilian port, as a natural hub of regional and global flows of people, goods and capital, was also a natural spot to collect intelligence and maintain good communication with allies in the region. The profit generated from maritime trade was always essential to support powerful navies. But most importantly, an extensive and well-functioned civilian port system always implied that both the government and the population were committed to take the oceans and maritime activities seriously, which was an essential condition to build one's sea power according to Mahan.

The third level of the importance of ports was the discursive level, i.e. the meaning of an extensive and effective port/base system and the messages being sent out to the rest of the world. Geostrategists commonly agreed that the "political use of sea power" (Luttwak 1974; Le Mière 2014) was grounded at an extensive port/base system which helped to translate "naval

capabilities to political influence.” (Grygiel 2012:29) For example, a message of friendship and alliance could be constructed through goodwill visits to civilian ports, regular naval port calls and exercises, or even a land lease to an ally for building a naval base in her sovereign territory. On the contrary, the construction of specific naval bases with nuclear missiles, artillery facilities or submarines that could support direct naval and aerial combat in the region, could also be regarded a warning to any potential competitor in the region. Bluntly put by Grygiel (2012:29), states were “reluctant to ally themselves with, and open ports to, a power that has limited ability to provide naval protection.” An extensive network of overseas naval bases provided an image of strong naval capacity and enduring naval presence to the rest of the world, and such an image could become a critical push factor for a state in picking her future ally for better security or economic cooperation (Grygiel 2012; Harkavy 2007).

The construction of civilian ports might be perceived less political and diplomatic sensitive, yet these overseas projects were still a good indicator of one’s diplomatic strength and its relationship with third-party states. The extreme form of overseas civilian port construction, i.e. through direct colonisation or forced treaties, was no more than a naked message to the world about its naval capacity and military strength. During the age of European imperialism, overseas colonies were both economic assets for homeland economic development and political bargaining chips for political gains or diplomatic trade-off. The rise and fall of one’s possession of colonies in Latin America, Africa and China served as an indicator of the rise and fall of its power status in Europe, and vice versa. On the other hand, taking the recent BRI as an example, it was viewed as a new kind of “economic diplomacy” (Barston 2006) to exert influence over developing countries and a civilian blue-water strategy without direct confrontation with the status-quo maritime power, i.e. the United States (Marantidou 2014; Zhou 2014; Singh 2015). Indian strategist Abhijit Singh (2015), by citing the docking of Chinese submarines at Colombo South Container Terminal (CSCT), argued that commercial facilities invested and owned by Chinese state-owned enterprises were readily to become a military base through four steps: 1) huge loans were awarded to smaller coastal and islands states; (2) waited for the beneficiary for its loan defection; (3) offered waiver or relief in exchange of the right to a few berths or facilities and (4) establish territorial infrastructure and replenishment centres at those commercial berths (Singh 2015:295). Civilian ports, therefore, remained strategically important in contemporary international politics. In fact, many states had followed Beijing’s BRI and formulated their own version of civilian port investment, such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor jointly suggested by Japan and India, or the Connecting Europe and Asia initiative suggested by the European Union. Civilian ports, similar to naval bases, became both geopolitical assets and battlefield in contemporary international politics.

Port as an Economic-Cultural Challenge to One’s Sovereignty

While the geopolitical and strategic perspective viewed the domination of port system as an indispensable part of one’s hegemonic domination and a battlefield of maritime control in a region, another perspective, rooted in traditional port studies and social theory, viewed port as an economic and cultural hub that benefited and challenged state development and sovereignty. After all, both naval bases and civilian ports, despite in different mechanisms, could serve as main sites of interactions between local communities and foreigners. In the case of naval bases, a recent paper published by American Security Project (Wallin 2015) reminded the government that overseas ports and bases were the frontiers where US officers interacted with local populations. While port calls or home-porting was an essential part of military public diplomacy, the white paper also highlighted that the military should address localised concerns and craft an appropriate message so that an enduring relationship could be built between the bases, representing the image of the US, and local communities (ibid.).

In the case of civilian ports, the impact was more subtle as the embedded multidimensional interactions with foreign communities might change the social characters of a civilian port, turning the port socially different from its sovereign host. In fact, one kind of critics against Beijing's BRI was that the economic investment allowed Beijing to build "places with Chinese characteristics" (Marantidou 2014:9) in those BRI-related countries. Especially for those developing countries in Asia and Africa, or Southern and Eastern European countries suffered from the debt crisis and EU-IMF austerity plan, Chinese hot money seemed to be a viable source of foreign direct investment to solve their financial problems or fund their infrastructural projects (ibid:20 - 21). By active promotion of the BRI investment, either in forms of official developmental aids or "private" capital projects initiated by state-owned enterprises, Beijing could leverage on her economic strength to expand her influence and improve her images in those countries concerned.

The mechanism suggested above looked nothing new, as it was exactly the logic of structural European foreign policy (Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015) or the thesis of civilian and normative power Europe (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b). It did not have any geographical implication nor spatial sensitivity. However, the recent BRI projects and the responses made by other states highlighted the neglected, if not ignored, spatial sensitivity of this kind of investment. In fact, the spatial characteristics, the socio-cultural hybridity embedded, and the economic importance of civilian ports made them an ideal site to perform structural foreign policy or exercise civilian/normative power.

While the rapid development of high-speed railway and aerial transportation had increased the connectivity of inland cities to the rest of the world, ports and coastal cities were always the nodes between sovereign territory and the outside world. They were also made to receive "the Others", no matter in forms of goods, capital, people or even knowledge, in a rather everyday and permanent manner. To make a (good) civilian port, the "Self" was obliged to receive and adapt the existence of "the Others" in the port. In other words, the unobstructed flows of foreign goods, people capital and knowledge could be easily "offloaded" at the port, and the local community was "forced" to deal with these foreign objects and socialise with foreign ideas. The spatial character of civilian ports, therefore, provided an excellent platform for foreign actors to exert influence to local community or even the central government. The mechanism was twofold: by the creation of socio-cultural hybridity at ports that challenged the sovereign narration, and by the economic leverage that lured the central government to accept foreign rules and institutions.

Nation-states might be differed among themselves in terms of political institutions, regulatory regimes or political culture, yet they all shared two political concepts, namely "sovereignty" and "nations", as well as the perceived importance of state-building and nation-building in their everyday politics. As Grillo (1998) pointed out, the key concept of nation-state was the idea of homogeneity and uniformity, which aimed to rule out any possibility of having "a nation within a nation" (ibid:125). Even for states which embraced multiculturalism and ethnic diversity such as Canada or Australia, there were always some fundamental rules and values which were shared among the members of the nation, defined as the founding virtue of the nation, observed and implemented by the government through its policies. Taking Canada as an example, the (pan-)Canadian nationalism was defined two cultural-political ideas: the bi-cultural model that linked the French-Canadian and English-Canadian communities, and the liberal individualist ideology in political and economic activities, regardless of which political parties were in power, (Ives 2018). In countries that embraced a "melting pot" strategy such as France, locally-born ethnic minorities or immigrants were supposed to abandon their traditional social values, beliefs and obligations in public space, so as to become an "essential" subject of the nation. Despite

the criticism of cultural and religious discrimination, the French legislation against any religious symbols from schools was regarded as a means to promote secularity, an important element of contemporary French nationalism. Instead of a Weberian understanding of sovereignty which focused on the monopolisation of the legitimate use of physical violence, sovereignty could also be understood as a kind of Foucauldian Power-Knowledge concept which sovereign was a kind of power to dominate the narration of state apparatus and nationality. Cathryn Clayton (2009) further defined this narration as a kind of “story of sovereignty” that telling “themselves about themselves in relation to others.” (Ibid:8) This “story” usually included the interpretation of national past, political values and social culture. From Clayton’s perspective, legitimacy crisis of one state and the failure of sovereign power could arise not just when people start to imagine a different sovereign but a different story of sovereignty (Ibid:12). As a result, sovereign state would try her best to dominate the “story of sovereignty”, usually through controlling the socialisation process of the community against the “story”. The domination included the exhibition of “authentic” national history, the standardisation of value education at every stage of schooling, and the suppression of “alternated” or “subjugated” knowledge against the nation and nationality.

The spatial character of civilian ports, which bridged the sovereign territory to foreign maritime space, therefore fundamentally contradicted to sovereign states’ insistence of homogeneity and uniformity in nation-building and state-building. Not only were the ports connected to the maritime “space of flows”, but also served as “hubs in dense network of maritime connections through which people, goods, ideas and meaning flowed.” (Driessen 2005:129 – 130) Compared to non-port cities or non-coastal territory of a nation-state, ports, especially civilian ports, were embedded to the world system owing to the frequent transactions of local and foreign goods/capital, multi-directional movement of local people and foreigners and unfettered interactions between local and foreign ideas. As a result, unidirectional and top-down flows of influence by the state on the story or imagination of the nation were a kind of luxury at port space, as it was consistently exposed to the foreland and maritime space attached to the ports. Given the tension between the nature of sovereign state, which always demanded homogeneity and uniformity in “the Self”, and the sociocultural characteristics of (good) civilian ports, which must be continuously affected by “the Others”, civilian ports were always a kind of contested political space and both local and foreign diplomatic actors. The nature of civilian ports as a designated socio-cultural hybrid, therefore, had opened up the possibility of non-naval and non-military port diplomacy, which allowed foreign diplomatic actors to challenge the “story of sovereignty” through daily and routine economic and cultural exchange. The everyday socialisation in ports involved both local knowledge as well as foreign institutions. Members of the nation on one hand was exposed to top-down socialisation prepared by the state on the story of “the Self”, on the other hand exposed to the story of “the Others” which could possibly challenge the “official” story of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1992). Especially if the discrepancy of practice or institutions between “the Self” and “the Others” was huge or even incompatible, the “cultural shock” received by the members of port community could always become a threat to the “story of sovereignty”, especially in terms of the narration of worldview and relations to “the Others”. The threat could turn to an extreme case when the port communities created a different narration about the nation or identified themselves as a new nation. The nightmare of “a nation within a nation” became a reality and the sovereign government would be exposed to a fundamental legitimacy crisis within the members of the port community concerned (Grillo 1998:125; see also Clayton 2009:12).

Apart from the socio-cultural challenges against the “story of sovereignty”, a good civilian port was also a double-edged sword against one’s economic stability thus sovereign autonomy. While good civilian ports could always bring the sovereign host with massive economic benefits in terms of foreign commodities, direct investment, or expatriates in key industries or

services, the extensive and semi-permanent presence of these materialistic factors also provided adequate economic incentives for foreign states to leverage against the sovereign host through civilian ports. Compared to inland cities or cities with lesser degree of foreign exposure, civilian ports were well embedded in the global economic system, and the life and death of port economy was highly dependent on the continuous usage of the port facilities and the extended services. As a result, foreign nation-states, major foreign chambers of commerce, or even individual conglomerates would always perceive themselves, sometimes even being recognised by the sovereign host of the civilian ports, as major stakeholders in political and economic development of the ports. This position, or feeling, of being a stakeholder in port politics and economy, might naturally be spill-over to regional or even national level of political and economic development, especially if the foreign states had extensive economic interests at the ports concerned. When the sovereign host of the ports was in good terms with foreign states, the extensive and semi-permanent network could generate commercial synergy and mutual cultural enrichment that benefited both parties. However, when the sovereign host was in bad terms with foreign states, the deep-rooted foreign network and substantial materialistic interests could always be a diplomatic weapon to challenge the economic security of the sovereign host. Given the high sensitivity of port economy in relation to global economy, commodity transactions and direct foreign investment, citizens at civilian port were highly vulnerable to foreign commercial boycott and fluctuations in national and global economy. In this case, the economic leverage embedded in civilian ports could be “weaponised” as a challenge against state’s legitimacy which was rooted in effective state capacity and bringing economic prosperity.

In fact, the maritime space was long regarded as a “security” threat in Europe and China. For instance, the Vikings and Japanese pirates (*wako*) were never welcomed by the continental European states and the imperial China respectively. However, the main threats being mostly discussed were about territorial invasions from the seas and induced unrests at the coastal regions. Given the two dimensions of security challenges stated above, it seemed that a possession of good civilian ports was always risky and brought more harm than good to state’s nation-building and state-building process. Nonetheless, it should also be emphasised that these threats and challenges could always turn to opportunities as well for the sovereign host of civilian ports. The extensive economic interests, the semi-permanent existence of foreign communities, and the socio-cultural exchange at civilian ports could also be utilised by the sovereign host to impact foreign states which were embedded in the civilian ports. For example, the sovereign host could also take advantage of the massive economic interests at ports to lure the chambers of commerce or individual conglomerates against their sovereign government. Civilian ports, therefore, could serve as an important place to initiate the “boomerang pattern” (Keck and Sikkink 1999:93) of transnational advocacy, as both the sovereign host and foreign actors, after all, were already forced to interact with each other owing to the spatial character of a civilian port. In addition to economic interdependence, the sovereign host of a civilian port could also present her “soft power” directly to foreign audience through extensive socio-cultural interactions between the local port community and the foreign community. The closer proximity with foreigners at port could provide the sovereign government a feasible, well-established and direct communication channel, and the sovereign host could give the foreign communities at port a lively experience of her cultural and institutional attractiveness. In addition, Kokot (2009:10) reminded us that port cities had always “triggered a wide range of imaginations and projections, blending fantasies of freedom and faraway places with images of danger and moral decay.” The socio-cultural hybridity might on one hand challenge the narrations of sovereignty, the “images of danger and moral decay” might also trigger crisis-driven nationalism and stereotypes over foreign influence, turning the societal security threats to opportunities to strengthen the “story of sovereignty”. Brining back to the spatial perspective

of port, a civilian port started with an absolute space of where sovereign territory connected with maritime space, a social space of where the locals connected with the foreigners, and an abstract space of which both local and foreign authorities contested for materialistic gain and ideational influence. The nature of port as an economic-cultural hub provided a double-edged sword for domestic and foreign diplomatic actors to leverage their diplomatic influence and foreign policy objectives against each other, giving the theoretical backdrop of the thesis.

Ports as both Active and Passive Agency in Global Political Economy: From Global Cities Thesis to The Potential Role of Civilian Port

If the first approach treated civilian ports as instrumental asset to one's naval power and the second approach treated civilian ports as threats to one's economic and social security, the third approach mentioned here treated ports as active and passive agents in international politics and global political economy. Despite the difference, the first and the second approach treated ports as a static concept which did not contribute any form of agency or shaping the actions of the actors. Such conceptualisation on the role of port in international relations and global political economy was rather inevitable, given the general inattentive blindness on space and non-state actors in traditional scholarship of international relations.

The study of non-state actors in international relations and foreign policy was not entirely new. For instance, the idea of paradiplomacy was first introduced in mid-1980s and became a growing discipline in the study of international politics and foreign policy (Duchacek 1984; Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson 1988; Keating 1997; Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Kuzentov 2015). While the framework of "paradiplomacy" may offer a helping hand in capture the potential actorness of the European Union and civilian ports, it was never adequate to capture the special role of civilian ports in international politics, especially when contemporary civilian ports were serving the nodes of civilian activities conducted by local, national and foreign actors. Such inadequacy could be compensated by the "actor-network theory" (ANT) and the idea of global city in urban studies and sociology (Sassen 1991; R. G. Smith 2003; Acuto 2013).

The concept of global city was both an old and a new subject in urban studies. A similar concept, the world city, was first introduced by Peter Hall (1966). From Hall's perspective, a world city is an amalgam of various centres: it was the political centre encompassing major national, international, transnational and multinational institutions; it was the trade centre encompassing both imports and exports through maritime, land and aerial routes; a leading banking, financial and professional service centre encompassing the production, accumulation and transition of monetary and human capital; a consumption and entertainment centre encompassing the production, preservation and consumption of material goods and cultural heritage (Hall 1966:7 – 8). Hall's idea of world city had already implied the importance of "world city" in international relations and global political economy, as it was a place that "channelled international forces and interests towards national interest" (Brenner and Keil 2006:20). Hall's idea was further developed and differentiated by Saskia Sassen (1991:2005) who promoted the concept of "a global city" instead of simply "a world city". From Sassen's perspective, one essential characteristic of a global city was that the city would gradually detach from its geographical region and become an independent and globalised entity in global political economy, for instance the influence of New York and London were far-reaching than the physical boundaries of the United States and the United Kingdom. Following Sassen's idea, Calder and Freytas proposed the concept of "global political city" as "a metropolitan area that serves as a policy hub, major political diplomatic community, and strategic information complex of global import" (Calder and Freytas 2009:94).

The most sophisticated and comprehensive evaluation of the role of global cities in international relations and global political economy was perhaps conducted by Michele Acuto (2013). In his

“progressive agenda” (ibid:13) to link global cities and world politics, Acuto (2013) defined the potential roles of a global city in international political economy: as a networking actant that passively glued various tangible and intangible (infra-)structures and different levels of governance under the spatial and political domain of a the global city; as a networking actor; as a networking actor that actively utilised its internal capacity and took proactive actions to link up different actors from NGOs to IGOs, for the sake of its domestic and global agenda; as a networking network that brought different actor-networks together and developed global influence through positive synergy and spill-over effect among global cities and the actors-networks created and developed by each global city. From Acuto’s perspective (2013; see also Acuto and Rayner 2016), the key influence of global city in international politics and global political economy was the power of network-making and the potential transformation of “political action to concrete socio-technical structures ‘on the ground’” (Acuto and Rayner 2016:1163; Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013).

Although Acuto’s primary focus was “city” instead of “port”, his thesis on the role of the global city in international politics and global political economy was relevant for our evaluation and conceptualisation of the role of ports in international relations and global political economy. In fact, ports, especially civilian ports, were natural network-makers as in geographical sense, they bridged the land and the seas; in economic sense, they connected the economic hinterland and economic foreland, in cultural sense, they negotiated “the Self” and “the Others”, and in political sense, the national and the international. As a result, the three potential roles suggested for global cities could naturally fit in the analysis of the role of ports, in particular civilian ports, in international politics and global political economy. A civilian port, based on this theoretical framework, served as a networking actant, a networking actor and a networking network in international relations and foreign policies.

Interestingly, the application of Acuto’s thesis to civilian ports was indeed a kind of remedy of Acuto’s thesis. Potential criticisms of Acuto’s thesis were the lack of comparability of global cities and the clear measurement of city capacity to turn political narration to concrete social-technical structures. Even Acuto and his colleague agreed that a better understanding of city diplomacy could be achieved through the application systematic qualitative comparative analysis (Acuto and Rayner 2016:1165). In the field of port studies, however, such criticisms were perhaps well-answered as civilian ports were always evaluated by their capacity to generate economic and commercial interests as well as their connectivity to local, regional and national economic and political entities. For instance, the port-city interface (Ducruet and Lee 2006; Ducruet 2007) reviewed in Chapter 1 had provided a plausible answer to the above puzzle, through the creation of two independent variables, i.e. the concept of centrality (interests and institutions generating power) and intermediacy (networking capacity and potentials). The organic synthesis of Acuto’s thesis and Ducruet typology, therefore, became the theoretical foundation of the thesis in conceptualising the role of civilian port in international politics and foreign policies. The theoretical relevancy to EU normative/structural power and port diplomacy would be further discussed in next chapter.

Ports and Port System in Europe and Asia: The Implications of the Difference

The previous section summarised the potential role of ports in international politics and diplomacy from the geopolitical lens and economic-cultural lens: 1) the domination of naval and civilian port system was an essential step to attain global hegemony; 2) the high degree of interdependence in port economy gave both the sovereign host of a civilian port and foreign stakeholders to leverage against each other; and 3) the semi-permanent presence of “the Others as both a threat and opportunity to all diplomatic actors to achieve their goals. However, these characteristics did not automatically translate to diplomatic resources or political spill-over effect. Rather, since the hybrid nature of civilian ports also implied the persistence of socio-

cultural characteristics of both local and foreign communities. The role of civilian ports and port diplomacy, in addition to “actor-dependence”, should also be “geography-dependence”. While the individual level of port geography would be addressed by empirical cases in later chapters, this section would focus on the systematic level of port geography in Europe and Asia, as well as the respective concept of sea power.

European Port System and the Concept of Sea Power

While some scholars had drawn analogy between Asian maritime system and European maritime system such as the Asian Mediterranean thesis suggested by Francois Gipouloux (2011), it was commonly believed that the European maritime system was built around two maritime ecological system: the Mediterranean system which was dominated by the Republic of Venice and the Republic of Genova in 13th century and the Baltic and North Sea system that was tightly controlled by the Hanseatic League in 14th century. Although the two maritime systems were different in terms of geographical position and the ways of domination, there were one common feature shared between these two maritime systems, i.e. the intertwined nature of naval and civilian dimension of ports. The Hanseatic League, for instance, was an economic-military alliance of free imperial port-cities, which each member of the league indeed waged her own mercenaries and navies to protect her political and business interests in the region. The very first motivation of raising her own armies and navies at ports might be a response against piracy at seas or raids from the hinterland, yet the powerful navies and mercenaries at port-cities became essential diplomatic resources in the expansion of Hanseatic League in 14th and 15th century. The victory in the Second Danish-Hanseatic War and the Hanseatic League and the resulted Treaty of Stralsund which gave the League a monopoly of free fish trade in the Baltic region, could be viewed as an example of how the strong navy translate to civilian domination of the maritime trade. As a result, the Hanseatic port system indeed was a port system of which every port-city of the League was both a naval base where the navies and mercenaries were stationed and prepared for potential hostilities, and a civilian port where commodities produced from different hinterlands were traded at the port market. The Hanseatic port system was therefore both naval and civilian. A similar port system was also found in the domination of Mediterranean region by the Republic of Venice, which nearly possessed exclusive control over the Adriatic Sea and the larger Mediterranean region (Lane 1973). According to Lane (1973) and Harkavy (2007), the Venetian port system outside the Adriatic Sea was developed after the 13th century, built along the two main Venetian trading routes of Venetian, i.e. the “Romania” route and the “Beyond-the-Sea” route (Harkavy 2007:35). As discussed by Peter Padfield (1979:4), the Venetian port system indeed was a combination of the functions of naval bases and entrepots. “Colonies” like Constantinople and Acre had “considerable industrial and commercial infrastructure”, and in Crete and Romania the Venetians got merchandize like grains, oil, wine, raw silk, alum, wax, etc (Harkavy 2007:35 – 36).

The inseparable nature of naval bases and commercial ports, to some extent, was due to the nature of maritime security and naval technology in Medieval Europe. First of all, before the birth of the doctrine of “freedom of navigation” and “freedom at high seas” proposed by Hugo Grotius, it was rather difficult to differentiate naval activities from civilian activities. For instance, commercial raiding and “state-sponsored” pirate acts over enemies’ commercial ships were accepted as a “normal” practice during the Medieval Age. There was literally no distinction between commercial fleets and naval ships as every fleet was designed to carry both goods for trade and cannons for combat. As a result, a good civilian port would be well-equipped with mercenaries for “naval” services, shipyards and dry docks for shipbuilding and maintenance, and arsenals for weapons production and installation to “civilian” fleets. The second reason for the inseparable nature of naval bases and commercial ports in Medieval

Europe was that the technological limitation of the galley-based fleets commonly used in Medieval Europe. As John Guilmartin (1974) suggested in his work *Gunpowder and Galleys*, the “full command of the sea” maritime control suggested by Mahan was never an achievable stage in the earlier Mediterranean maritime system, as the speed of the fleets, the high demand of manpower and storage spaces for crew’s need limited the effectiveness of far-edged power projection. The maritime competition at seas in the Mediterranean region, Guilmartin so argued, was a mere “symbolic relationship between the seaside fortress, more particularly the fortified port, and the war galley.” (Guilmartin 1974:96; cited in Harkavy 2007:41) At diplomatic front, the ownership and the contestation of the Mediterranean ports reflected the polarity of European politics, which had switched from the competition between Venice and Genoa, to the competition between the Spanish and Ottoman Empire in later time. The technological limitations steered early development of European port system into a combination of military bases and commercial ports. The lack of mobility and the heavy demand of logistics and manpower support in blue-sea expedition also left the states with no choice but to station forward-based fleets over its overseas colonies, in order to maintain control over the particular maritime space and trading posts.

The intertwined relation between military and economic functions of a port was furthered carried by Portugal, the first global maritime empire, in her overseas port system development. While Zheng He, the envoy representing the Ming court to Indian Ocean, had made huge power projection in Southeast Asia, Indian subcontinent and the East coast of Africa, it was the Portuguese who successfully maintained a rather permanent presence in the region through overseas port colonies and stationed fleets. The Portuguese Empire might be benefited from the lack of willingness and incentives of Ming court to continue her maritime domination in the region, yet the role of Portuguese port system, which was modelled from the Venetian system, should never be neglected in her way to global maritime domination. Instead of travelling back and forth to Lisbon, the Portuguese merchants developed overseas shipbuilding sites in Goa and Malacca such that ships could be built and repaired directly in overseas ports (Glete 2000; Padfield 1979; Harkavy 2007). This arrangement indeed built a solid foundation to strength Portugal’s capacity for long-range naval power projection. In terms of the characteristics of the Portuguese port colonies, economic activities indeed prevailed in overseas ports. For instance, many trading posts and colonies in Brazil, East Africa and India were Portuguese *feitoria* (factories), and entrepots in West Africa were slavery trading stations for European countries. Commercial activities and economic incentives, rather than exclusive naval domination, became an important motor of Portuguese maritime expansion. In the case of East Asia trading network, the Portuguese Empire made diplomatic treaties with the Ming court and Japanese Shogunate for exclusive trading and settlement rights, rather than direct colonisation of the port concerned (Macao and Nagasaki). In fact, naval historians like Boxer (1969) and Padfield (1979) suggested that in Portuguese maritime expansion, the use of naval forces played a limited role in overseas port acquisition and expansion of trading network.

If the Portuguese port system was characterised as a global network of overseas production houses and trading hubs which were acquired through primary diplomatic means, her Spanish counterpart was characterised as a global maritime network of military domination and trade routes. The main difference between Portugal and Spain was twofold. First, Portugal did not compete for maritime domination in the Mediterranean region but whereas the Spanish Empire had fought with the Ottoman Empire for the control over the Mediterranean Sea and bases, so naval power was crucial for the Spanish Empire to maintain her maritime control in Mediterranean Sea. Second, the expansion of Portuguese seaborne empire had to face the resistance from Arabs, Indian and Chinese communities, whereas for the Spanish the resistance came from culture-rich yet military-inferior Inca, Aztec and Mayan Empire (Parry 1949; cited in Harkavy 2007:48). The difference in terms of resistance resulted in a huge landmass was

occupied by Spanish in Latin America and Philippines, where natural resources and luxury precious metals were in abundance. As Harkavy put it, “in Spain’s case, convoying of the silver *flota* was the be-all and end-all of its navy’s functions.” (Harkavy 2007:49) From this perspective, warships and civilian ships became more differentiable as the Spanish Empire could now afford naval ships which were specialised for combat and protecting the civilian ships, while the civilian ships were also specialised to carry maximum tonnage of natural resources and precious metal extracted from South America and Philippines. The Spanish overseas civilian ports might still keep the dual function of serving commercial fleets and naval ships, but they were no longer production houses for commodities. Instead, their primary function was to serve as nodal points connecting monopolised trade routes with adequate logistics support.

Proposed by Wallenstein (1984), the Dutch seaborne empire was the first (second according to Modelski and Thompson) global hegemony. However, the port system was slightly different from both the Portuguese system, which focused on overseas production houses and shipbuilding at port, and the Spanish system, which focused on the trade routes across the Atlantic Ocean. Except for Java and Malacca, the two major Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch permanent presence was rather limited at port especially in Africa, a continent critical to the maritime routes connecting Europe and Asia. Rather, the advanced shipbuilding technology (the *Fluyt*) had given the Dutch comparative advantages, and massive naval and commercial fleets were produced. The effectiveness of the *Fluyt* in terms of capacity and the lesser demand on manpower also allowed the Dutch merchants to opt for transoceanic trade, with fewer supports along the East African coastal outposts. The main innovation of the Dutch seaborne empire, therefore, was the management of overseas ports and maritime power. While Portugal and Spain relied on bureaucratic support and administrative personnel such as the creation of colonial governors in Brazil or Caribbean islands, the Dutch imperial court delegated such administrative power and duties to state-chartered companies, i.e. the United East Indian Company (VOC) and the Dutch West India Companies (GWC). It was not new to Europe to “empower” civilians or private sectors for the sake of maritime security and sea power project, for example the contribution from the private navies at Cinque Ports to English sea power and maritime trade during the 13th century was well-studied by Roskill (1962). However, the VOC was the first European company empowered as with a “quasi-state” status, from the recruitment of mercenaries and building forts to protect the trading posts, to waging wars against foreign invaders and concluding treaties with local rulers. With the establishment of VOC, and the subsequent GWC, as the white gloves of the Dutch Royal Family, the port system in Asia and that in the Caribbean were separately managed by “private companies” which overseas presence was maintained in a minimal public spending. The VOC and its European successors, become the first generation of civilian sea power which relied on the monopoly of commodity trade and trade routes for its survival.

With the outbreak of First Anglo-Dutch War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Westminster, the domination of Dutch sea power was slowly transferred to the British which eventually created a long reign of maritime hegemony until the First World War. The British Empire was also the first European state to “confirm” the Mahanian proposition of the importance of the “command of sea” in building a global empire, as the technology enjoyed by British fleets and naval infrastructure built by London and the East Indian Company allowed a rather permanent presence of British naval power in the world. Following Thompson’s idea of system leader lineage (Thompson 2001), the British port system and her overseas network incorporated the merits of Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands: the British Empire inherited strategic ports in India and Southeast Asia from the Dutch and the Portuguese, while expanded her control to inland territories such as the establishment of the British Raj and British Malaya; while the British merchants gained huge wealth from Asia-Europe trade, commodities were also

produced and exported in landmass colonies like India (for example the tea and cotton industry); the EIC, though established earlier than VOC, acquired the “quasi-state” status in late 17th century which was eventually being perceived as a threat to London; the British acquisition of colonies combined the direct use of forces and “gunboat diplomacy”, and the subsequent management of the ports combined both British direct rule (the Crown Colony) and indirect rule (India).

As the last European maritime empire, the British Empire contributed to the development of port system and the perception of sea power in following aspects. Firstly, the port choice/colony choice was no longer defined by its economic potentials but mainly its strategic values, i.e. the protection of sea lines of communication. Most of the Crown Colonies like Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, Aden and Gibraltar, were located at the strategic nodes of British sea lines of communication, which and some of them continued to shine nowadays. The very naval mind set in port choice, especially in the case of China, could be best reflected by picking Hong Kong rather than Zhoushan as the first British port in China. Secondly, the economic and military functions were no longer intertwined but specialised naval facilities were established such as permanent coaling stations along important maritime routes. Though some of the ports like Hong Kong and Singapore were equipped with naval facilities and dockyards, the continuous professionalisation of navy and naval facilities made naval fleets and their construction and repair being separated from commercial fleets. The naval presence, supported by those strategic nodes and extensive coaling stations, served as the protection and performance of gunboat diplomacy, but not for economic activities. Thirdly, and perhaps the most important one, the British Empire had introduced the European-styled treaty port system in Asia, in order to facilitate free-trade thus British economic gains in East Asia. The treaty port system on one hand served as the diplomatic success of British Empire in opening up the Chinese soil, on the other hand, the treaty port system introduced European concepts like free-trade and extraterritoriality in the Asian region, to some extent destruct the original tributary system.

Hobson and Kristiansen (2012) summarised the characteristics of European waters as follows: the European waters are rich in resources and were once vital for many coastal states in terms of fishery and domestic and intra-European trade; the intra-European trade routes were also vital for supporting transoceanic voyage and growing colonial powers; the European waters were confined in terms of actual maritime space and surrounded by small countries, secondary and great powers (Hobson and Kristiansen 2012:9 – 10). As a result, before the WWII, the European waters were characterised as a closed-system which small maritime states were trapped into the international structure of which great powers competed for the domination at land and/or sea, for example Spain versus Ottoman Empire, France versus Austria/Germany, Britain versus Spain/the Netherlands/France/Austria/Germany (Ibid:10). Smaller maritime states were having no choice but either forming politico-military alliance to balance the influence of great powers, or pursuing international laws to protect the vital maritime interests. The former strategy was well-represented by the initiation of the two League of Armed Neutrality by Catherine II of Russia during the American War of Independence and Paul I of Russia during the Napoleonic War, which both of them aimed to balance against British naval wartime policy. The latter strategy was represented by the establishment of international maritime laws whose primary objective was to protect their neutral rights and freedom of navigation against the exercise of belligerent rights by the great powers. Examples of such included the conclusion of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, the two peace conferences held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and the London Conference in 1908/1909. Although during wartime European great powers had always challenged the maritime laws and opted for violent naval strategy against civilian ships, a rather ordered maritime system with international laws was established in European waters. Compared to other maritime space like that in Asian, the European port system was highly engaged to two different yet interlinked discourses in

international politics: the balance of (political) power and the respect of institutionalised international law. These two characteristics, unsurprisingly, were exported to the Asian waters through overseas expedition and colonisation, and further stabilised by the British and American hegemony.

The outbreak of WWII not only dethroned European leadership in the world but also fundamentally reshaped contemporary European geopolitics. European states, after two successive devastating wars, could never go for global leadership again, and opted for economic cooperation rather than military competition. The European Coal and Steel Community, and its successor the European Union, created the single market for commodities and services. The removal of transportation barriers literally made the whole European continent as one hinterland for European ports. Such a geo-economic change, as different research works suggested (Ducruet and Jeong 2005; Lee, Song and Ducruet 2008), differentiated the European port system from the rest of the world. For example, ports situated along the European coastal lines were genuine “European port” rather than “ports of a nation”, as all of them were literally serving the European market rather than specific national economies. Owing to a massive inland European market, port functions were specialised in Europe, usually serving as the gateway of inland European megalopolis. The clear separation between inland market (economic and commercial activities) and coastal ports (port service activities and port community) defined hinterland-port-foreland relations which the hinterland was less depended on specific ports but heavily focused on hinterland-port transportation, thus limited the diversification of urban functions in coastal cities. (Lee, Song and Ducruet 2008:374).

Putting into the context of port diplomacy, the characteristics of European waters and port system partially explained the form of port diplomacy in the past and present day. In the past, owing to the extensive balance of power and the respect of maritime institutions, individual and pin-pointed port diplomacy was seldom an option. Any diplomatic action at port could potentially trigger a series of (uncontrollable) counteraction under the practice of the balance of power. Maritime environment thus port diplomacy was therefore governed at European level such as the formation of European soft rules through multilateral negotiation. As a result, the European waters formed a close-system which could only be exported to the rest of the world, but not changed by individual European state or any outsider through port and maritime diplomacy. In present days, however, the decline of European dominance allowed non-naval port diplomacy to enter the European waters, for instance the BRI investment in Greece and Italy. The strengthened economic integration at European level also provided a valuable opportunity for a diplomatic gamble: the weakened economic leverage effect at individual port level versus the strengthened economic leverage effect at European level if port diplomacy could succeed and make an impact to an EU Member State. On the other hand, in the eyes of Brussels, the European maritime diplomacy began to take shape and export its model of maritime governance from near Mediterranean to the rest of the world, through naval and non-naval means (Germond 2015). Port diplomacy, as an integral part of maritime diplomacy, could always be a potential option for the European Union to achieve its diplomatic objective.

Asian Port System and the Perception of Sea Power

Despite the narration of the Asian Mediterranean, Asian waters and Asian port system were different from the European counterpart, at least before the arrival of European colonisers. The South China Sea, despite its huge volume of maritime traffics and severe competition of resources and naval control, had little similarities with Mediterranean Sea. The two characteristics of European waters, i.e. the balance of (political) power and the respect of institutionalised international law, were lacking the Asian waters. Therefore, this section would offer a short review on the characteristics of Asian waters and Asian port system – or to be

precise the Sino-centric maritime system.

In fact, the term Asian waters had always been a contested concept owing to the huge landmass of the Eurasian continent. Geographically speaking, the “Asian” waters should cover from the Sea of Okhotsk to Arabic Sea. Nonetheless, in terms of geopolitics, the maritime Asia was commonly referred to “the eastern coast of the Eurasian continent” (Hamashita 2003:17). Based on such definition, the Asian waters covered Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East and South China Sea, and then is separated into two sub-branches: on the east the chain extends from Sulu Sea to Celebes, Arafura, Coral and ends at Tasman; on the west the maritime chain connect the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean through Java Sea and the Strait of Mal-cca (Ibid:17 - 18). Following the same token, the Asian port system only covered ports located in the East Asia and Southeast Asia, but did not extend to South Asia (the Indian Ocean) and Middle East (the Arabic Sea), which belonged to another important maritime region in geopolitics and maritime studies. The segregation of the Asian maritime space might be arbitrary, yet the political implication was huge. Under this definition of Asian waters, the Asian port system was essentially Sino-centric, which the imperial China had dominated both naval and civilian aspects of the maritime system prior to the arrival of European navies (Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden 2003:8). While the thesis acknowledged the political implication behind this definition of Asian waters, the concept was largely useful as the primary focus of the thesis concerned about European port diplomacy against China in the past and present.

By adopting this definition, there were already two crucial differences between the Asian maritime system and that in Europe: the lack of balance of (political) power in Asian waters in the past, and the lack of institutionalised consensus in present days. Compared to the European maritime system which consisted of both bipolar (the balance of (political) power) and multipolar (the international maritime law) element, the Asian waters were a unipolar system which was dominated by the imperial China, and became multipolar after the arrival of European navies and the scattered colonisation in the region¹³. Unlike their counterparts in the European waters, Asian coastal states did not trap into an enduring bipolar international system and had with little intention to balance against the “Chinese Empire”. Rather, the coastal kingdoms were used to bandwagon with the imperial China, under the maritime-tributary system and forming separate maritime commercial zones (Hamashita 2003:19). On the contrary, while the European maritime system and its governance became more unified owing to the establishment of Single European Market and the European Union (Germond 2015), the Asian maritime system did not dominate by the rising China, but an “organised anarchy” with different stakeholders competing for the command of (a segment of) the sea: China versus Japan on the ownership of East China Sea, Japan versus Russia on the ownership of Sea of Okhotsk, China versus the ASEAN states on the ownership of South China Sea. In addition, the rise of China naval capacity and the economic leverage to her neighbours under the BRI became a worrying trend in the eyes of the United States and Europe. On top of scattered competition over a segment of Asian maritime space, there was an increasing bipolar, if not multipolar, competition of Asian maritime system, for example the Indo-Japanese proposal on building the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), or the Blue Dot Network (BDN) recently proposed by the United States.

The second difference between Asian maritime system and that in Europe was the means of

¹³ In the case of Southeast Asia, the ownership of civilian ports changed from Portugal to the Netherlands and then the Britain in Malay Peninsula. Given the relative domination of British Empire in the region, France and the Netherlands remained their strong maritime presence in Southeast Asia through their colonies in Vietnam and Indonesia respectively. In the case of East Asia, the “Scramble for China” (Bickers 2012) consensus among European powers gave rise of the treaty port system that shared by major European powers.

domination. Compared to European maritime order which the maritime hegemon dominated both the naval and civilian dimensions of maritime system, the Asian order was largely built on the extensive maritime trade and commercial activities. Renowned historian and sinologist John K. Fairbank had once made a comment that navy was “so foreign to Chinese ways” in explaining the failure of naval reform during the late Qing Dynasty (Dewenter 1972:739). However, the (apparent) lack of naval capacity did not hinder imperial China’s domination of the Asian seas. Before the arrival of European navies and civilian vessels, the “Chinese Empire” was an undisputed maritime power in the region (Elleman 2009; Lo 2012; Lorge 2002). The contradicting perception towards the strength of Chinese navies and maritime power was in twofold: first, the deployment of navy was seldom targeted against enemies “overseas” but enemies in close range, so that the demand of overseas naval bases were rather limited. For instance, even though the technology and weaponry used by Southern Song court were much superior to those produced in Europe (Needham 1986; Fairbank and Goldman 2006; Lo 2012), the primary objective of naval deployment was to defend the Song court from the invasion of Jins and Mongols (Tao 2002; Lo 2012). A similar case was observed in Ming Dynasty which the naval forces were deployment against Japanese pirates along the Chinese coastline. Except for expedition of Zheng He which combined both the civilian fleets and navies and reached Southeast Asia and Indian subcontinent, Chinese naval power did not project outward but served as a kind of defence against territorial invasion from the north. As a result, semi-permanent presence of naval power was lacking and the Chinese navies were being viewed as a kind of “coastal guard” instead of true blue-water navy.

The second reason for this contradiction perception was that Chinese domination of the maritime order was built on the tributary system, which was centred at a Sino-centric commercial and diplomatic network. Naval resources, therefore, were kept at minimal for the sake of commercial and diplomatic gains. For instance, the security threats from the north during the Southern Song forced the imperial court to rely on maritime trade to support her expenditure, as the tribute-cum-trade missions from land were cut to zero (Lo 2012). Naval resources, as previously mentioned, were deployed against the invasion of steppe tribes from the north. As a result, much of the maritime effort was placed to the administration of incoming maritime trade rather than overseas maritime power projection. For example, the Southern Song court had introduced an official position, the Superintendency of Merchant Ships, at Guangzhou (Canton) to handle affairs related to foreign and local merchant ships, inspect ships and levy duties on import. Subsequently, this practice was extended to cover newly opened ports such as Hangzhou, Mingzhou (Ningbo), Quanzhou, Pan-ch’iao (Jiaozhou) and Hua-ting (Shanghai) (Ibid:192 - 194). Instead of navy building, the government subsidised civilian ship building, harbour improvement and sea-canal warehouse facilities so as to facilitate the flows of goods between China and the rest of the world (Sivin 1995; Wang 2000; Lo 2012). While the Mongols borrowed the naval technology and experience directly from the Southern Song personnel, the Mongols had little interests to develop the naval capacity (Lo 2012:212). Instead, the extensive territorial coverage of Mongolian Empire became an asset to build an economic empire and civilian maritime network without a proper navy. The *Pax Mongolica* had converted “Chinese China” into “Eurasian China” and built organic linkages between land routes and sea routes such as the “Eurasia-Indian Ocean trade network” (Yokkaichi 2008:75; Sun 2000). Similar to the case of Southern Song court, maritime trade was important yet instrumental, serving the purpose of supporting land troops in terms of transportation and resources. Therefore, overseas naval power projection was also kept at minimal. To facilitate trade and generate government revenue, an extensive and efficient network of civilian ports and commercial trading posts were more crucial than building naval capacity – especially when the continent was already dominated by the Mongols. The civilian ports and trading posts were perceived to be well-protected by land troops and little threats were experienced from the maritime fronts. Therefore,

no matter in the era of Southern Song or Mongolian Empire, overseas naval bases were either not affordable (in the case of Southern Song) or unnecessary (in the case of Mongolian Empire). This gave an impression to many naval historians that the imperial China lacked of sea power projection, which the definition of sea power was measured by the naval presence and naval capacity.

In fact, in Asian maritime system the lack of overseas naval projection did not imply the lack of maritime power. Instead, the civilian dimension of sea power had expanded at citizens' level. For example, the Fujian merchants had created "colonies" at Sondo (Kaesong) in North Korea, at Lung-ya-men near the present-day Singapore, at Palembang in Sumatra, etc (Lo 2012:202). These Chinese merchants, without the government mandate, actively negotiated with the native government for the establishment of trading posts and settlement zones along the coastal areas. This organic and civilian maritime expansion was eventually acknowledged by the imperial government, who wished to be benefited apart from maritime tributary trade. A strategic alliance was formed between the imperial government and active Chinese merchants, and more civilian ports and trading posts were built along with the Mongolian expansion. While these Chinese "colonies" or overseas ports were built largely for the sake of maritime trade or settlement, in the end they also served as places of Chinese refugees who wished to evade from warfare or for better livelihood (Lo 2012; Elleman 2014). As a result, the Sino-centric port system was essentially a civilian port system without strong naval support, which could hardly match the conception of sea power suggested by naval historians or naval strategists. It, therefore, also explained why the expedition of Zheng He was viewed as the peak of China's sea power as it rang the bell of traditional understanding of naval power projection. The maritime network enjoyed by the Ming court had covered more than the territory she could enjoy under her sovereign belt, and large maritime expeditions were waged for the sake of maritime trade and maritime diplomacy (Armstrong 2007; Lo 2012; Dreyer 1974). Similar to the Spanish Galleon and Dutch Fluyt, the Treasure ships supported both naval and economic functions, despite peaceful diplomacy was also recognised in today's Chinese narratives of the voyage (Lo 2012). Indeed, the Treasure Ships did engage in naval warfare in several occasions (Armstrong 2007; Dreyer 1974), contributing to the forward projection of Ming naval power. The Ming court converted her maritime power into maritime diplomacy, which effectively combined the tributary system to maritime trade networks, i.e. the establishment of different maritime zones and the Maritime Silk Road (Hamashita 2003:20; Lo 2012).

The Manchurians, after defeating the Ming court and becoming the owner of the "Chinese Empire" and Asian maritime order, originally followed Ming's tributary system and naval system (Sieren, 2007). However, the Manchurian court was rather defensive and sceptical against the succeeded Asian maritime order and maritime trading network: first, the Manchurian court, similar to the Ming court, were continuously exposed to the nuisance and security threats generated from the Japanese pirate (*wako*); second, she was also afraid of the potential collaboration between the Chinese refugees in Southeast Asia and the Chinese remained at the Chinese coastal areas. As a result, the Manchurian court partially gave up her ownership of Asian maritime order by introducing the Frontier Shift which aimed to evacuate Chinese from the coastal areas and only a handful of sea ports were opened to foreign trade after 1684. Apart from limiting the overseas projection of maritime power through civilian networking and trade, foreign traders were under strict surveillance under the Canton System, i.e. the introduction of *Gong Hong* as the only legitimate middleman to conduct foreign trade between foreign traders at Canton and other Chinese inland producers (Shi 2009). As Shi (2009) and Fairbank (1953) suggested, the experience of Macao, the first European settlement established by the Portuguese during the Ming Dynasty, had always haunted the Manchurians. The Manchurian government was always sceptical against uncontrolled foreign trade, which could possibly lead to another settlement on the coast, or spying out the strengths and

weaknesses of the imperial court.

Compared to the Asian maritime order built from the Southern Song to the expedition of Zheng He, the maritime system built by the Manchurian court consisted by three characteristics: first, the importance of coastal areas where land and sea intersected; second, the integrated sea-rim zones composed of the coastal areas and the trading networks; third, the crucial role played by port-cities in linking different maritime zones and trading networks (Hamashita 2003:19). Under the new maritime trade system, trade routes were well-defined and the maritime zones intersected at the port-cities, for instance the Pusan-Nagasaki-Fukuoka trading network linking Japan and Korea, the Fuzhou-Keelung routes linking the Southeast China to Taiwan, and the Aceh-Malacca-Guangzhou network like the Southeast Asia to China (Ibid). Chinese key ports like Canton and Fuzhou served as the main maritime sites for China to engage with the Asia seas, performing the functions of tributary trade and private trade on behalf of the state. Interestingly, this characteristic of port system, i.e. focusing on the port-cities as multi-functional nodes serving for the national economy, became a characteristic of Asian port system in contemporary days (Ducruet and Jeong 2005; Lee, Song and Ducruet 2008). In terms of the overseas maritime power projection, especially the overseas “colonies” and trading posts built by Chinese citizens in Southeast Asia, the official imperial policy was to handicap rather than assist the Chinese merchants overseas who previously operated the tributary trade between China and Southeast Asia (Fairbank 1953:52). The overwhelmed security concern over an united front among anti-Qing tribes and Han Chinese in Southeast Asia was the driving force behind the stricter ban in 1717, when Emperor Kangxi decided to shut down the routes to the Southern Ocean. (Shi 2009) The continuous oppression towards the overseas Chinese merchants and the shutdown of tributary trade had left them with no choice but disconnected from the mainland forever. The broken linkage at the civilian level and the self-imposed restrictive policy to go abroad had slowly eroded the sea lanes of communication and the trade surplus from the maritime trade, and resulted in an inevitable fall of China’s sea power. The power vacuum was filled by the arrival of European navies and civilian vessels, and the Asian maritime order was challenged and shaped by the European maritime order.

An “Eurasian” Port System? The Treaty Port System in Asia and the Early Version of European Port Diplomacy

Although in last section it concluded that the arrival of European naval and civilian vessels had fundamentally shaped the Asian maritime order, the impact was never spontaneous as the earliest documented arrival of European ships could be dated back to 16th century when the Ming court still owned the Asian maritime order. The then-Portuguese settlements in Macao and Nagasaki were largely followed the Asian maritime order as it was never established as a colony or a treaty port under a bilateral treaty. For instance, in the case of Macao which would be discussed in details in Chapter 4, the Portuguese merchants had to pay for a ground rent of 500 silver taels and provided certain defence service for the Ming government. In fact, even though the Manchurians took over the Chinese Empire, the Sino-centric model of diplomacy and tributary system was observed in conceptualising Chinese foreign relations with the rest of the world – which could always be signified by the “kowtow” request and subsequent interactions between Qianlong, the then-Manchurian Emperor, and Lord McCartney, the British envoy to China (Fairbank and Teng 1941; Fairbank 1942). The Canton System was also observed among the European communities who arrived to China from 17th century onwards. It was only the early 19th century when the Manchurian court failed to exercise her control over the edges of the empire owing to weakened state capacity, that the Europeans and the Americans took advantages to conclude unequal treaty relations with China and other East Asian countries. By 1842, the Sino-European relationship experienced the a paradigmatic shift when the first Anglo-Chinese treaty was signed at Nanking after First Opium War (the Anglo-

Chinese War), and Hong Kong was ceased perpetually to the United Kingdom as the Crown Colony and a “treaty port”. The treaty port system had also extended to Japan in 1854 when Perry expedition resulted in the consolidation of the Convention of Kanagawa between the United States and Japan and the latter was forced to open port of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels.

The reality, however, was more complicated. As suggested by Takeshi Hamashita (2003), the European maritime system was entrenched in Asia not only in terms of the number of ports the Asian countries ceased to European powers, but in form of the extension of “European diplomatic norms and treaty negotiation into Asia” (ibid:23). Nonetheless, the extension of norms and treaty negotiation did not completely break the tributary trade system and the Asian maritime order. On the contrary, the treaty port system had strengthened the role of port-cities like Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai in connecting the maritime zones. In addition, the gradual decline of Manchurian court as the centre of tributary trade was replaced by private trading networks merchants in southern China, who utilised the civilian maritime network connecting former vassal states in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Coastal port-cities like Fuzhou and Canton become the *de facto* centres of commerce and tribute-trade system, instead of the capital located at in the inland and northern part of China (ibid). Interestingly, the treaty port system was also borrowed by the Manchurian court to govern her relations with vassal states. For example, the conclusion of 1882 Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects was viewed as an “equal” treaty based on the assumption of Korean as a vassal state of Manchurian imperial government (Ibid:28 – 32).

Therefore, the introduction of international law and diplomacy, which was a characteristic of European maritime order, had strengthened the role of (treaty) port-cities and their relations among each other. Although the treaty negotiation was always conducted in bilateral fashion like the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, the Sino-Portuguese Treaty on the status of Macao, the Sino-French Treaty of Whampoa and the separately negotiated Convention of Peking with Britain, France and Russia, the inter-state relations of the Western world and the “most-favourable-nation” clause had made the access of treaty ports eventually become multilateral and opened to both Chinese and foreign merchants located at the treaty-port. As a result, not only the foreigners could gain access to treaty ports that were established by their Western “allies”, but also the Chinese merchants, who had been doing business at those ports, could now utilise the free port nature of the treaty ports overseas. With the “assistance” of treaty port system, the private trade network among different treaty ports in East Asia was consolidated independently from the official tributary trade system, thus strengthened the nodal positions of treaty ports in the maritime zones. The frontier trade among the treaty ports were recognised and became a subject matter during the negotiation, showing that the treaty port network developed since the early 19th century gained its weight in shaping the bilateral relations between China and the rest of Asian states. An early version of European port diplomacy was, therefore, in practice and governed the relationship between China and individual European state.

To sum up, the European maritime system, in form of international treaties, had impacted the Asian maritime order in twofold. First, as highlighted by Lee, Song and Ducruet (2008), the Asian port-city interface was heavily influenced by European colonial experience. With reference to their proposed “Asian Consolidation Model” (Ibid 2008:378), the 5-stage development of Asian port-city included an inevitable part of “colonial port” and “entrepot port”. The former stage assumed the process of adjustment to Western shipping standards, allowing pendulum services and exploitation of close hinterland by foreign merchants, and the latter assumed the continuation of Western influence in improving port facilities and the establishment of simple urban-building for the sake of industrial and commercial activities

(Ibid:378 – 379). The external influence from the West during the colonial period, together with the Chinese social context in which merchants and economic activities were usually located at coastal region, created a unique socio-economic space in China coastal port: a multi-functional node for economic and political activities, an economic city serving for the national economy and merchants' personal gain, and a network hub for migration and human exchange across the region.

Second, the introduction of treaty port system did have an effect on Chinese diplomacy to the rest of the world. The European diplomatic norms and port administration was borrowed by the Manchurian court and her vassal states in constructing the relationship among each other, forming a diplomatic relations and custom system. As Rhoads Murphey (1970) suggested, the injection of “modernity” at the treaty port had eventually become the force of Chinese internal modernisation in late Qing Dynasty, though most of the programmes failed eventually or did not continue after the regime change. It was, however, self-evident that the European influence to Chinese domestic modernisation and diplomatic relations went through the European port diplomacy and the treaty port system. The questions were: 1) whether this kind of influence continued at those ports or port-cities; 2) how could the European Union, as a supranational representative of Europe, make use of these legacy in ports and port-cities to achieve its diplomatic objectives; and 3) how did the CCP regime make her response to the legacy or the continuous existence of European port diplomacy. These were also the research questions that this thesis wished to answer.

Chapter Summary and Preview

The chapter had first reviewed the role of ports and port system in international politics under two conceptual lenses, namely the geopolitical lens and the economic-cultural lens. From the geopolitical perspective, ports and port diplomacy, mainly in form of naval capacity, were essential to one's maritime power projection and global hegemonic status. A secured maritime network with overseas naval bases and civilian ports was the foundation of state's domination over the commercial network and major sea lanes of communication, which in return provided a strong support to overseas naval operation and diplomatic actions. As a result, states would contest for the ownership of key ports and more importantly the port system, turning both naval bases and civilian ports as geopolitical battlefields.

From the economic-cultural perspective, the nature of ports as a hub of transnational economic and cultural exchange made civilian ports well-embedded in the world system compared to the non-port cities. The high degree of economic interdependence of port economy and the semi-permanent presence of “the Others” in the port's eternality provided potential diplomatic resources for both the sovereign host of the port and foreign diplomatic actors to leverage against the counter-part. Ports, especially civilian ports, became a contested space for various stakeholders to act on and achieve their diplomatic objectives.

Departing from the naval and economic-cultural perspective, the actor-network theory approach gave the third account on the role of ports in international relations and global political economy. Borrowing the global city thesis developed from Hall (1966) to Acuto (2013), there were three potential roles of ports in international politics and foreign policies: networking actants, networking actors and networking networks. The thesis argued, through the organic synthesis of Acuto's global city thesis and Ducruet's port-city interface, it could sharpen the global city thesis and create a comparative framework to evaluate the role of civilian ports in EU normative/structural power and port diplomacy, which would be further addressed in next chapter.

Following the review of the role of ports, the chapter provide a short comparison between the European port system and Asian port system, aiming to shed light on the regional difference as

well as how the European maritime system interacted with the Asian port system in mid-19th century. As discussed in this chapter, the arrival of the European maritime system had made substantial impact to Asian maritime system as well as Chinese diplomatic behaviours, showing that European port diplomacy did make impact in changing state's behaviours. These observations provided a legitimate follow-up by the thesis, i.e. whether the influence and practice continued between the European Union and China, albeit the treaty port system in China was legally ended after 1943. However, even with the legacy of success European port diplomacy, a revival of it could only be realised if there were good incentives, available institutions and appropriate policy tools provided for the European Union. The answers to the availability of these elements would be provided in next chapter.

Chapter 3: An Audit of Contemporary EU-China Relations and the Potentials of Sino-European Port Diplomacy

Before proceeding to the empirical dimension of European port diplomacy towards the selected ports, this chapter would review the evolution of EU-China relations. There was no lack of academic research on EU-China relations conducted by both Western and Chinese scholars, with various topics and diverse methodological setting (Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou 2008; Peruzzi, Poletti and Zhang 2007; Kerr and Liu 2008; Pan 2012; Burnay, Hivonnet and Raure 2014; Men 2014; Reiterer 2014; Eckhardt 2015; Farnell and Crooke 2016; Zhang 2016; Gabriel and Schmeicher 2018). The continuous growth of literature reflected the inevitable result of the growing importance of China, the European Union and the EU-China relations in the post-Cold War order. As a result, any review on the topic could never be comprehensive but must be purposive in nature.

The purpose of this chapter aimed to reveal the key features of European foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy, which included the multi-layered structure as well as the interests and perceptions behind. These elements would be discussed in the first two sections of this chapter. After revealing the key features of foreign policies of the EU and China, this chapter would be concluded by introducing the possible role of ports, which was discussed in last chapter, in helping EU-China relations, so as to give a complete theoretical framework of the thesis to analysing the empirical data collected from the three selected cases.

The Multi-layered Governance of EU-China Relations: Could a Port-level Diplomacy be Possible (and Meaningful)?

Although leaders of the European Union and ministers of EU Member States had actively constructed the “official” image of “Europe speaking in one voice” or an “United Europe” (Barroso 2010; European Commission 2011; European Commission and High Representative of Union Foreign and Security Policy 2016; 2019; Poggetti 2017; Juncker 2018; 2019), the “who speaks for Europe” problem (Allen 1998; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Miks 2010) remained and the “multiple realities” discourse (Jørgensen 1998:96 – 97) was still influential in both academic and laymen’s conceptualisation of European foreign policy. In fact, such characteristic was more than obvious in EU-China relations and was considered as one reason that the EU failed to cope with Chinese diplomatic strategy (Fox and Godement 2009; Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). A recent example was the failure of adopting a common response to Beijing’s BRI. While the Franco-German motor showed reservations against the BRI and the growing Chinese investment of strategic industrial sectors in Europe, Italian government, following the footsteps of Greece and Portugal, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing for future economic and investment cooperation. The lack of coherent European foreign policy could be attributed by two inter-related factors: first, there were multiple policy instruments initiated and implemented by different European actors over a single policy or political issue; second, there was no single European interest to govern the formation of European foreign policy.

The Lack of Coherent Policy Instruments: A Reality and A Blessing to the European Union?

While the Treaty of Lisbon had unified the Maastricht Three-Pillar Structure into a single entity and gave the EU an unified legal personality in international law, the general division of labour established under the Maastricht Treaty did not go in vain. Rather, the early categorisation on EU policies was highly useful in understanding the multi-layered feature of European foreign

policy (Krahmann 2003; White 2004a; 2004b; Stumbaum 2009; Germond 2015). Table 3.1 to Table 3.4 summarised how the division of labour was implemented in major policy areas of EU external relations and foreign policy, which included trade, development aid, security cooperation and global representation:

	Supranational decision-making body at the EU (European Commission)	Intergovernmental decision-making body at the EU (European Council and the EU Council)	Individual EU Member States (EU Member State's Government)
Trade Relations	<p>Open negotiation of any international agreement with the mandate from the Council</p> <p>Enjoy exclusive competence in relation to trade-only agreements</p> <p>Negotiate mixed agreement with the mandate from the Council</p> <p>Approve EU Member States to conduct negotiations on bilateral investment agreements with third-party states</p>	<p>Decide the opening of the negotiation, the conclusion and the signature of trade-related agreements</p> <p>Provide negotiation directions and other advice to the European Commission in the related matters</p> <p>Adopt the final decision to conclude trade-only agreements upon receiving the consent from the European Parliament</p> <p>Adopt the final decision to conclude mixed agreements upon receiving the mandate from EU Member States</p>	<p>Negotiate new or amend existing bilateral investment agreements upon receiving the consent from the European Commission</p> <p>Decide the ratification of mixed agreements in accordance to national procedures</p>

Table 3.1 The EU division of labour in external trade relations

	Supranational decision-making body at the EU (European Commission)	Intergovernmental decision-making body at the EU (European Council and the EU Council)	Individual EU Member States (EU Member State's Government)
Developmental aid, human rights and legal cooperation	<p>Share competence with EU Member States over developmental and humanitarian aids</p> <p>Approve related budget over developmental funds and aid programmes</p>	<p>Provide advice to the European Commission on the related matters</p> <p>Approve related budget over developmental funds and aid programmes</p>	<p>Share competence with the European Union over the developmental and humanitarian aids</p> <p>Enjoy exclusive competence over bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian aids to non-EU countries and entities</p>

Table 3.2 The EU division of labour in developmental aid, human rights and legal cooperation

	Supranational decision-making body at the EU (European Commission)	Intergovernmental decision-making body at the EU (European Council and the EU Council)	Individual EU Member States (EU Member State's Government)
Security Cooperation	<p>Share competence with the EU Member States over issues related to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice</p> <p>Participate issues covered by Community laws suggested as environmental security, pandemic control, etc.</p> <p>Provide administrative support to the Council under the framework of CFSP and ESDP</p>	<p>Steer the agenda of CFSP and ESDP through the meetings or summit organised by the European Council</p> <p>Define foreign and security cooperation through the Foreign Affairs Council</p> <p>Decide the foreign policy and security cooperation such as the establishment of PESCO</p>	<p>Decide the security and foreign policy cooperation with non-EU countries and entities</p> <p>Maintain formal army and navy for national defence</p> <p>Engage in PESCO for procurement, joint missions and operations</p>

Table 3.3 The EU division of labour in security cooperation

	Supranational decision-making body at the EU (European Commission)	Intergovernmental decision-making body at the EU (European Council and the EU Council)	Individual EU Member States (EU Member State's Government)
Global exposure and foreign representation	<p>Joint political leadership representation at International fora (President of the European Commission and President of the European Council)</p> <p>Joint ministerial representation at international fora (High Representative of the Union Foreign Security Policy (HR) and the ex-officio membership of HR in European Commission, and the European Commissioner in the related portfolio)</p> <p>European External Action Service as the diplomatic arms of the European Union</p> <p>EU Office abroad as an institutionalised exposure to non-EU states</p>		<p>Head of state and/or Head of government of EU Member States as an independent representation of the EU Member States in international fora</p> <p>National diplomats as the ministerial representation International fora</p> <p>Individual EU Member States overseas offices and foreign representation were remained</p>

Table 3.4 The EU division of labour in global representation

As the above tables summarised, the distinction between European level and EU Member State level of actions remained important especially in the field of security cooperation and global representation. Although the EU had slowly developed “a more consistent, cross-sectoral, and comprehensive approach” (Germond 2015:101) to foreign policy and security, traditional capacity in the field of high politics was still in the hands of EU Member States. For instance, despite the increase in power such as the right to speak and to submit proposals and amendments at the General Assembly of the United Nations, the European Union remained as a permanent observer and did not enjoy the right to vote and being formally represented in—the Security Council - where France and the United Kingdom enjoy their permanent seats. Declaration 13 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon also explicitly stated that the reformed provisions and the creation of EEAS would not affect the existing rights of the EU Member States in formulation their foreign policy nor overseas representation to third-party states (EU Member States 2007). Using Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughton famous quote, the European foreign policy is “single by name, dual by regime, multiple by nature” (Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008:66).

The maritime diplomacy, which formally included the naval version of port diplomacy, of the European Union could not escape from such “multiple realities”. The complicated realities could be understood in two different ways. In terms of policy idea, the maritime dimension of EU’s security not only involved the traditional naval dimension - which was an integral part of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but also included “military, civilian, police, economic and normative subdimensions” and went far beyond the Integrated Maritime Policy (Germond 2015:101; see also Germond 2011). In terms of policy implementation, EU maritime policy, similar to other EU policies, had undergone “agentification” (Germond 2015:114 - 115) and many decentralised agencies had been created, such as the FRONTEX, European Defence Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency. These decentralised agencies, together with the Council who was in charge of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the

European Commission who was in charge of the coordination of the Integrated Maritime Policy, and the EU Member States who had her own navy and overseas naval bases, created a network of actors in EU maritime policy, and arguably maritime diplomacy. Taking the EU Arctic Policy, a policy initiative proposed in November 2008 under the context of EU's Integrated Maritime Policy development, as an example, the formulation of the policy combined the following actors and dynamics (Wegge 2012):

1. The policy entrepreneurship of the European Commission (mainly from the DG Relex and DG Mare);
2. The political battles and compromises among EU Arctic Member States (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), between EU Arctic Member States and non-Arctic Member States, and between the EU and non-EU Arctic Member States; and
3. Decentralised agencies and experts on fishery and environment.

It should also be noted that such network of actors, or using Keleman (2002) jargon “Eurocratic” structure, on one hand allowed the European Union to rely on the existing national administrative resources to “perform the tasks on their behalf”, on the other hand allowed the Member States to preserve their existing national autonomy and certain degree of control, even though the formal policy competence was slowly moved away from their hands (Keleman 2002:112; also cited in Germond 2015:115).

The concept of “agentification” indeed gave two implications which were useful in conceptualising EU port diplomacy, under the context of “multiple realities” of European foreign policy. First, the port could serve as an “agent” that served the general interests of EU-China relations and linked up Type I and Type II relations with the Type III relations suggested in Chapter 1. Although there were always intrinsic values for the EU and its Member States to conduct her diplomacy to civilian ports, i.e. Type III and Type IV relations, there was also an undeniable dimension of EU port diplomacy that it was instrumental to EU and its Member States’ interests to the sovereign host of the civilian ports. As a result, Chinese civilian ports could be identified as a “decentralised” agency utilised by the European Union for the sake of a macro diplomatic strategy in EU-China relations. Second, the concept of “agentification” allowed an innovative inclusion of actors and resources in EU port diplomacy, which included the diplomatic resources of EU Member States to the port (Type IV relations), and some “delegated” civilian parties such as the chamber of commerce, academic institutes or civil groups named under the flag of “European” and supported by European institutions. While the thesis primarily focused on Type III relations, i.e. the supranational to sub-state level of interactions, and evaluated their impact to EU-China relations, the thesis also acknowledged the fruitful resources from Type IV relations (state to sub-state level) which could be possibly borrowed to Type III relations. In addition, the European Union would be readily to create non-official and non-diplomatic organisations or agencies if there was no available or appropriate means presented in the civilian ports. In fact, the supranational Europe created in 1951 only recognised PRC in 1975, established its formal office in 1988 and became an independent and holistic actor in 2009. Prior to the arrival of the supranational Europe, many EU Member States had already developed her own diplomatic ties with China as early as 16th century. As a result, the existence of “multiple realities” with the process of “agentification” was rather a natural development of EU-China relations and EU port diplomacy to China. In fact, from the Member States’ perspective, the process of “agentification”, especially the selective creation of European-level of agencies at various Chinese ports, allowed them to play the dual-card game in EU-China relations, i.e. the selection delegation of power and negotiation to the EU level for the sake of interest maximisation, or maintenance of state-to-state level for national interests and image/power projection. Given such diplomatic context, European port diplomacy at civilian ports, even without being formally named, was already in practice.

The Unspoken Decentralisation of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reality and A Gamble to Beijing?

Compared to the well-acknowledged “multiple realities” of European foreign policy, the multi-layered governance of Chinese foreign policy was less discussed. Overwhelmed by the neo-realist image of Beijing, it was widely believed that Beijing insistence of sovereignty would make her neglect the role of sub-national actors in foreign policy. In this case, Beijing should turn a blind eye to the potential contribution of an appropriate port response at her civilian ports in foreign policy, or just remained extreme cautious to the security implications of civilian ports. No meaningful difference, therefore, should be observed across the selected cases or all civilian ports in general. The reality, however, was more complicated than a simple response of Beijing obsession towards sovereignty and China as a unitary state.

The dominant discourse remained largely true especially in the field of “foreign policy” and “high politics” (Chan 1999; Gill 2007; Wang 2010; Zhang 2011; Vangeli 2013; Sutter 2012; 2013; J. Zhang 2015). Nonetheless, with the gradual opening up of China especially in the field of “low politics”, more and more scholastic works showed that there had been a growing trend of decentralisation of Chinese external relations to the provincial level (Zheng 1994; Chen 2017; Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). The best illustration of such multi-layered feature of Chinese diplomacy at low politics was the creation of OCTS which created a formal sub-national capacity in Chinese diplomacy (Shen 2016; Shen and Chan 2017). The innovative OCTS initiative to govern Hong Kong and Macao not only preserved the “treaty port” characteristics at domestic level, but also introduced a “quasi-state” experiment to Chinese foreign policy (Mushkat 1987; Tang 1993; Weng 1997; Shen 2008; 2011; 2016; Mendes 2014). The respective Chapter VII in the Basic Law of Hong Kong and that of Macao stipulated the domain of autonomy that Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed in external relations. For instance, Article 152 of HKBL (Article 137 of MBL) suggested that the Special Administrative Regions could join organisations or conferences as independent members if the organisations or conferences are not exclusive to sovereign state; Article 150 of HKBL (Article 135 of MBL) allowed representatives from Hong Kong and Macao to join national delegation if the organisations or conferences are exclusive to nation-states only.

The decentralisation of Chinese foreign policy was more salient at operational terms as many Western countries had granted special treatments to Hong Kong and Macao, and vice versa. These treatments, for example, included:

1. Formal legislative acts like Hong Kong Policy Act and EU-Macao Trade and Cooperation Agreement sponsored by the United States and the European Union respectively;
2. Diplomatic treatment such as granting the ambassadorial level of representation or giving diplomatic immunity to the representatives of Hong Kong and Macao Economic and Trade Office (ETOs) in accordance to Vienna Convention; and
3. Differentiated visa requirements between HKSAR passport holders and PRC passport holders.

Apart from formal differentiation between Beijing and her sub-national counterparts by the external parties like the United States and the European Union, China had also actively delegated administrative power of “low-level politics” to important cities like Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and Hainan, through the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Pilot Free Trade Zones (Pilot FTZ) and Free Port. Although Shanghai was not a free port proposed in the latest 5-year plan, port facilities management had already decentralised to city government of Shanghai (Wang 2004). In fact, as the empirical chapter of Shanghai revealed, Beijing and Shanghai government were always subjected to external partners’ lobbying on the

free trade zone reform. Under the proposed Greater Bay Area initiative, Beijing also recognised the values of “internationalised” Hong Kong and “Portuguese” Macao in domestic development and foreign policy objectives (State Council, the People’s Republic of China 2019). In fact, compared to the European Union, the Chinese government was more aware of the potential contribution of civilian ports in foreign policy especially in Asia and Africa. Apart from turning her civilian ports for strategic uses, i.e. the philosophy of “Long-term Consideration, Full Utilisation” which was used to describe Beijing position to Hong Kong, the concept of port diplomacy was indeed first used to describe Chinese diplomatic actions in the region through the utilisation of economic power and civilian actors for political leverage (Barston 2006). Moreover, as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road represented the contemporary form of port diplomacy, which focused on building port infrastructure and the discourse of connectivity, and eventually induced similar initiatives from the EU and the United States.

In fact, the concept of “agentification” could also be applied to Beijing’s foreign policy and external relations, yet the division of labour was clear-cut and the tasks were well-assigned by Beijing. Compared to the relative autonomy enjoyed by the European Union and its Member States in formulating their individual responses to China, the autonomy enjoyed by the sub-national actors were either formally controlled by the legislation or implicitly by party bureaucratic control. Beijing might be willing to delegate economic powers to strategic and economic-important cities or ports Guangdong, Shanghai and Tianjin, but never the political power and full degree of autonomy like constituting unit of federalism (Chan 2015a). For example, only trustworthy CCP members could be appointed to lead those cities and ports¹⁴. In the case of OCTS, Hong Kong and Macao might be granted with greater power in external relations in accordance to their respective Basic Law, the exercise of such power was always limited and closely monitored by Beijing. For instance, the scope of autonomy in foreign policy was defined in Article 13 of HKBL and the same article in MBL, which read:

*“The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the Hong Kong (Macao) Special Administrative Region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China shall establish an office in Hong Kong (Macao) to deal with foreign affairs. The Central People’s Government authorises the Hong Kong (Macao) Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs on its own in accordance with this Law.”*¹⁵

Together with Article 14 which stipulated the role of Central People’s Government in defence, Beijing clearly monopolised the power of “high politics” as well as the naval dimension of port diplomacy, such as naval port call and port visits by third-party navies. For example, Beijing was highly selective in her acceptance or refusal of port call to Hong Kong by U.S. navy in Asia-Pacific region amid of trade tension or South China Sea issues, a move accompanying with the cancellation of high-level Sino-American naval meeting in 2018 (Youssef and Lubold 2018; Chan 2018). It should also be noted that the PLA-N had maintained a small flotilla of ships (squadron 38081) of the South Sea Fleet in Hong Kong, although the majority of naval activities conducted were outside Hong Kong. Interestingly, the PLA-N would arrange goodwill port calls to Hong Kong - a typical activity in port diplomacy to impress the visited

¹⁴ For instance, the party secretary of Shanghai (currently the position is held by Li Qiang) would always be a member of Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China. In addition, many party members who had experienced in governing Shanghai would be eventually promoted to lead the country such as Jiang Zemin (the President of China from 1993 to 2003), Zhu Rongji (the Premier of China from 1998 to 2003) and Han Zheng (current Vice-Premier of China). The current President Xi Jinping also assumed office in Shanghai from March 2007 to October 2007.

¹⁵ Brackets were added by the author to reflect the content of Article 13 of the Basic Law of Macao Special Administrative Region.

community (Ministry of National Defence, People's Republic of China 2019; Huang and Chan 2017). As a result, in terms of high politics, Beijing did realise the role of port and the importance of port actions to advance her national interests and images. Ironically, one of the target audience of such goodwill visits was the citizens of her civilian ports.

The restrictive position in high ports adopted by Beijing in her civilian ports, however, did not imply the lack of diplomatic agenda at civilian level of port actions. Quite a contrary, as shown by various research in relation to provincial involvement in Chinese foreign policy, this kind of civilian network, no matter it was generated by the port or inner city, could potentially a kind of asset or a threat to Beijing national interests (Zheng 1994; Cheung and Tang 2001; Chen 2017; Shen 2008; Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). Compared to those restriction and awareness in high politics, Beijing did not control the civilian actions through stringent institutions. Instead, Beijing always looked for opportunities to advance her national interests through these established civilian networks and actions. Indeed, even though most of these civilian port actions like foreign economic investment and sociocultural exchange were categorised into “external relations” which on papers the local authority could make decision at operational level or even policy level, true autonomy would only be granted to ports only if Beijing found the leader of the port regime trustworthy (Shen and Chan 2017). Therefore, analysing Chinese response to external civilian port actions was a good indicator to reflect her perception and relationship towards the foreign communities at port – in this thesis it meant the European Union, and her projection of image and interests to the rest of the world.

The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in EU-China Relations: Conflicting Interests and Identities within the EU?

The last section focused on the possibility of a meaningful EU port diplomacy and Chinese response. Such possibility, however, could only be potentially realised if there were sufficient incentives and motivations to leverage on these port interactions. This section would review the multi-layered interests and identities behind the EU-China relations. After all, diplomatic actions were either driven by actor's interests as traditional IR theories like realism or liberalism argue, and/or actors' perceptions and identities as new and critical IR theories like constructivism or English School suggested. An overview of these two components in EU-China relations could provide a solid backdrop in understanding the emergence of EU port diplomacy to China.

The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in EU Foreign Policy to China

As earlier mentioned, the concept of “multiple realities” involved both the policy dimensions and actors' interests and identities. The last section, borrowing the concept of “agentification”, discussed the policy dimension and the possibility of European port diplomacy and Chinese port responses. This section would discuss another dimension of “multiple realities”, i.e. the multi-layered interests and identities of EU foreign policy actors especially in contemporary EU-China relations.

Despite a growing “Europeanisation/EU-isation” of Member States' foreign policies and national interests (Tonra 2001; Bulmer 2007; Wong 2005; 2006; Thomas 2011; Gross 2009; Wong and Hill, 2011), it was rather doubtful to claim that there were holistic and undisputed European interests and images presented in European foreign policies. Discrepancies in terms of interests and projected images were observed and sometimes shadowed the effectiveness of European foreign policy (Hill 1993; 1998; Zielonka 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Ekengren and Sundelius 2004; Ekengren 2004; Jørgensen 2004; Cameron 2007; Thomas 2011; European Council on Foreign Relations 2012; 2013; 2014). Such discrepancies were salient when there were already established conflicts among geopolitical, economic and ideational issues – which all elements could be found in contemporary EU-China relations (Fox and Godement 2009;

Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). Quoting the comment made by Fox and Godement (2009) in their early research on EU-China relations, European foreign policy to China had always been “trapped in a diplomatic vicious cycle” (Fox and Godement 2009:30) that the European Union fails to persuade its Member States to take the EU as “an effective guarantor of their national interests” (ibid.). In addition, at the Member State level, their attitudes towards the rising Chinese economic and political might diverge among themselves and the division continued to strengthen after the EURO crisis (Godement et. al. 2011). As a result, some EU Member States were motivated “to pursue their relationship with China independently” (Fox and Godement 2009:30). Nonetheless, apart from the most updated EU paper on its China Policy (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019), many prominent European leaders and foreign policy experts had increasingly called for an united front against the rising or even “rival” China (Gill 2018; Dempsey 2019; Morvan and Pacroel 2019; Verhofstadt 2019). The growing concern in speaking with one voice, not only in terms of foreign policy position but also interests, towards China therefore required a closer look, through the academic lens of “aspiration, legitimacy and interests” suggested by Jørgensen (2004).

Aspiration of EU Foreign Policy towards China: From Unconditional Engagement to Reciprocal Strategic Partnership

Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Brussels in 1975, the bilateral relationship had changed from a “derivable relationship” (Shambaugh 1997:45, cited in Vogt 2012), shadowed by the United States and Soviet Union, to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016) with multidimensional cooperation ranging from global climate change to international trade regime reform. While there were always ups and downs in EU-China relations and frequently being reviewed by many scholars (Casarini 2006; Dai 2006; Men 2008; Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou 2008; Yahuda 2008; Song 2009; Stumbaum 2009; Song 2012; Vogt 2012; Austermann, Vangeli and Wang edited 2013), European foreign policy was centred at an aspiration towards China developed since the imperial period, i.e. engaging the Chinese government and market. However, there was observable difference in terms of the type of engagement and the degree of commitment the EU wished to project to China.

The first stage of aspiration was characterised as “constructive engagement” (European Commission 1995; Sandschneider 2002:33; Casarini 2006:7; Men 2008:13) or “unconditional engagement” which was contrast to US constructive engagement policy to China (Fox and Godement 2009:19). The normalisation of EU-China relations in 1975 created a new trade impetus between Europe and Asia especially after 1978 when China gradually opened her market to foreign countries. To manage the trade relations, a trade agreement was signed between Brussels and Beijing in 1978 and such agreement, while still focusing on trade, extended to Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in 1985. Although sanctions were placed during 1989 after the Tiananmen Incident, most of the Western European countries remained faithful to China’s gradual human rights and economic reforms. By 1991 most of the EC sanctions were lifted except the arms embargo and the liberal world, led by the United States and the European Union, was confident that Beijing would be gradually “normalised” and followed the pathway of Eastern European Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Men 2008; Pan 2012). From EU perspective, the gradual success of European integration in maintaining peace and prosperity against Communism made EU Member States confident on its “ethical” or “civilian” power (Whiteman 1998; Larsen 2002; Aggestam 2008). It was widely believed that the European experience had much to offer to China on market reforms and socio-political development, and would transform Beijing to “normal” regime through EU active engagement (Pan 2012:43). In addition, the end of Cold War also shifted its

focus from Europe to Asia so as to maintain the developmental momentum of European economies. A new Asia strategy was developed in 1994 (European Commission 1994), and a long-term China policy became an integral part of Europe's external relations (European Commission 1995; Casarini 2006:10).

The experience of the "triumph of capitalism" and the gradual reform of Eastern European countries, therefore, led the Western European countries to think Beijing would eventually gradual political and social reforms alongside with her adaptation to global capitalism and domestic economic reform. This strategic thinking, to some extent, turned to an "unconditional engagement" towards China, even though the EC and its successor the EU had already introduced the tool of "political conditionality" and "human right clause" as an essential principle in its trade agreements to third-party states since 1991 – making EU-China trade relations largely "unconditional" (Fox and Godement 2009:20). Instead of updating the 1985 EC-China TCA and introducing human right clause and political conditions similar to other agreements with developing countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, "a long-term relationship" (European Commission 1995) between the EU and China was built with no formal conditionality attached. To further support the relationship, the EU had introduced various sectoral dialogues and programmes on top of the TCA.

The "constructive engagement" proceeded to a "comprehensive partnership" in 1998 (European Commission 1998) and peaked itself in 2003 when both the European Union referred its relationship with China as a "maturing partnership" (European Commission 2003). As Smith and Xie (2010) argued, the 2003 Communication published by the European Commission aims to upgrade the relationship to a "European level" relationship (Smith and Xie 2010:438; Fox and Godement 2009:33) and developed a strategic dimension of the EU-China relations. However, the European Union remained "unconditional" to its engagement to China by paying attention to create more sectoral programmes and dialogues, including the Galileo Programme and the Industrial Policy dialogues in 2003 and the Tourism Agreement signed in 2004. As criticised by Ba-ysch et. al. (2005:8 - 9; cited in Smith and Xie 2010:439), the programmes and dialogues of this kind might create "the danger of loss of focus and strategic vision" and the objectives did not "serve the EU's overall objectives as defined in its strategic papers." However, under the general discourse of "shared interests" and "constructive engagement", the EU Communication just outlined the benchmarks for further reform but not turned them into the pre-conditions for improving EU-China relations – a common strategy for EU to exercise its structural and normative power.

The aspiration of "Europeanising" China through constructive/unconditional engagement did not receive favourable responses from Beijing. The difference in ideological backgrounds, developmental pathways made the two entities focus on different set of rights and freedoms. As Men (2008:7) suggested, the lack of political and social reform, as well as the growing trade deficit with China's limitation against EU market access, became a major disappointment issue in changing the discourse on EU-China relationship (Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). This could be best reflected by the "give-give" principle suggested by Peter Mandelson, the then-Commissioner on Trade (Mandelson 2005; cited in Dai 2006:13). Instead of a simple "win-win" principle, the "give-give" principle demanded "a prudent understanding of the concerns and requirements of the other partner, as well as a healthy and natural respect on each side for the other's interests." (ibid) Unlike the previous unconditional engagement strategy, the European Union started to demand Beijing's understanding of European interests and requirements in the EU-China relationship. The demand of reciprocity and Chinese commitment to European interests became more salient when the European Commission published its new communication on EU-China relations, which was titled "Closer Partnership, Growing

Responsibilities” (European Commission 2006a) and a specific policy paper on EU-China trade and investment relations (European Commission 2006b).

The 2006 Communication could be considered as a major shift of EU aspiration on EU-China relations because it was the first document that highlighted “responsibilities” and put EU-China partnership and EU-China competition in equal footing (European Commission 2006a; Shambaugh 2007a; Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). Compared to the previous communications and strategy, the 2006 Communication made several “requests” (Shambaugh 2007a:1) of China ranging from the full implementation of WTO obligations to better protection of human rights. These requests were accompanied with “sticks” such as a potential use of WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the continuous refusal of granting China Market Economy Status if there is no significant change of European access to Chinese market (European Commission 2006a; European Commission 2006b; Smith and Xie 2009; 2010). Although in the 2006 Communication, the European Union was committed to upgrade/update the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement framework to a comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and developed “the full scope of the bilateral relationship” (European Commission 2006a:9), such upgrade was a double-edged sword as the full-fledged partnership. From EU perspective, a comprehensive PCA must involve both economic and political dimensions. Discussed by various scholars and practitioners, many non-economic issues such as human rights, sustainable development and Taiwan issues were introduced during the negotiations, which was contrast to the wishful thinking of Beijing (Weske 2007; Crossick 2009; Fox and Godement 2009; Wortmann-Kool 2009; Smith and Xie 2010). Fox and Godement (2009:12) even suggested that the agreement should be based on “reciprocal engagement” which demanded a commitment from Beijing on a range of sensitive issue. In fact, conditionality, no matter it was implemented positively or negatively, was an essential feature of PCAs signed between the EU and its partners (Chan 2009). Taking the recently concluded EU-Singapore PCA as an example, Article 44 of the proposed PCA stipulated the non-executive clause which allowed the EU to suspend the execution “in cases of systematic and serious violation of essential elements, including democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights” (European Parliament 2019). However, it was never available to check whether the eventual PCA between the EU and China had such conditionality clause as the negotiation was no longer in the agenda between the EU and China. Instead, a Strategic Agenda for Cooperation was introduced in 2013 and a partnership instrument was created to finance related initiatives in China (European External Action Service 2013; European Commission 2014).

Unlike the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement stated above, the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation did not produce any upgrade of bilateral treaty framework, or explicitly put in the concept of conditionality in EU-China relations. However, the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, and two policy communications produced in 2016 and 2019, continued to strength the concept of responsibility and reciprocity. For instance, in the foreword of the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, the EU highlighted the idea of “shared responsibility” in the context of “a multipolar world”, and stressed that the partnership was “based on the principles of equality, respect and trust.” (European External Action Service 2013:2) The 2016 Joint Communication even explicitly asked for “reciprocity ... across all areas of cooperation” and engaged China “in its reform process in practical ways” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016:2). Compared to previous narratives, it was rather obvious that the European Union no longer treated China as a developing country that justified special treatments from EU unconditional engagement. Instead, as reflected by the latest strategic paper published in 2019, the EU considered that “the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted.” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

2019:1). The EU would formulate its policy to China from a more “realistic, assertive and multi-faceted approach”, and the concept of “a systemic rival” first appeared in any EU policy towards China (ibid.) In short, even though the European Union might not consider China as an international rivalry as the United States did, it could be seen that the aspiration of the EU was fundamentally shifted from the early unconditional engagement to reciprocal engagement. Policy re-orientation and new approach were therefore necessary for such turn, and a multi-faceted approach could mean more than policies solely on Brussels-Beijing relations, but covers other levels of government.

Legitimacy of European Foreign Policy to China: From Civilian Power Discourse to Normative Power with Structural Changes

The shift of EU narratives towards EU-China relations also reflected the changing EU international identity and self-conception. As Jørgensen (2004) argued, the legitimacy of EU foreign policy could be understood in twofold. The first understanding is that EU foreign policy must be a legitimate measure in the eyes of major stakeholders, i.e. the supranational bureaucrats and Member States leaders. Although the majority of the competence in foreign policy was at the hand of national leaders seated in the European Council and operated by the High Representative, these leaders were “well-supported” by European bureaucrats in the EEAS and respective commissioners when the initiative covered their portfolio, for instance humanitarian aid and external trade agreement with the third countries. The European bureaucrats maintained high level of influence such as agenda setting and the supply of information for decision-making. On the other hand, given the consensual feature of EU foreign policy decision framework, a handful of EU Member States could veto a foreign policy initiative if they found it illegitimate or against their national interests. The second understanding of the idea of legitimacy was that EU foreign policy served as a tool to enhance EU legitimacy domestically and internationally through its identity expression. In fact, one important role of “foreign policy” was to mediate the relationship between a state and –the rest of the world - foreign policy *per se* “as a performance of identity” (Ifversen and Kølvråa 2007:5), although legitimacy could also be boosted by materialistic outcome and administrative efficiency. (Smith 1994; Risse 2005; Kritzinger 2005) Through the creation of foreign policy and its performance, the EU on one hand could be “identified” and became a visible actor in global affairs; on the other hand through the narration of the “Others” the EU could find its own “Self” thus became a legitimate actor to represent the Europeans at international level.

In conceptualising EU presence in international politics, many scholars identify the EU as either a “civilian power”, a “normative power” or a “structural power” (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Stavridis 2001; Manners 2002; 2006a; 2006b; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Diez 2005; Sjurjen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009). First formulated by François Duchêne (1972; 1973), Maull (1990:92 – 93) suggested that a civilian power should embrace the characteristics of “the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interactions.” Manners (2002) argued that the civilian power Europe consisted of three distinctive features: “the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress” (Manners 2002:236 - 237). For normative power, it was firstly introduced on the distinction between economic power, political power and power over opinion and presented itself away from the empirical and material impact. The concept of normative power focused on the ideational and cognitive process with “both substantive and symbolic components” (Manners, 2002:239; see also Carr 2001). While Diez (2005) suggested that the normative power was being part of the civilian power, Manners differentiated it by defining normative power as “the ability to shape

conception of “normal” in international relations” (Manners 2002:239) and “non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and attraction.” (Manners 2006b:176) Rather than based on diplomatic solution, economic power and legally-binding supranational structures (Manners 2000; 2002), the normative power of the European Union was based on the “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitutionalism” (Manners 2002:240 – 241). Manners argued that the normative power was the identity of the European Union as well as the everyday practice of European foreign policy and capabilities, i.e. being normative and acting in a normative way (Whiteman 2011:6). From Whiteman’s perspective, normative power Europe should be studied based on different level of international society, ranging from individual level to structural level, from European level and non-European level (Whiteman 2011:7). Turning to the policy-level analysis and the EU self-asserted position in international politics, Stephen Keukeleire (2003; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009) suggested that the European foreign policy should be understood as a “structural foreign policy” that in a long run sought “to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, economic, social, security and other structures which can be situated at various relevant levels (individual, society, state, regional, global...) in a given space” (Metais and Thépaut 2013:6). The European Union was perceived as a “structural power” which aimed to influence or shape the structures of the third party through its foreign policy, for example the application of the abovementioned concept of conditionality to CEE states during the enlargement exercise (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 2005; Schimmelfennig 2008), and the subsequent borrowing of the enlargement experience to export values and norms to the European Neighbourhood (Lavenex 2004; Kelley 2006; Pace 2006; Baracani 2007; Sasse 2008; Whiteman and Wolff 2010; Raik 2011; Balfour 2012; Metais, Thépaut and Keukeleire 2013). Moving further from the conditionality clause, Richard Youngs (2010) defined the concept of structural power as moving “from narrowly conceived conditionality to broader means of exerting political leverage” (Youngs 2010:1). This included using “smart sanctions” and engaging the local stakeholders to press for democratic reforms from within (Youngs 2010:9 – 11).

Two implications could be drawn from the above understanding of the legitimacy of the European foreign policy. The first one was rather generic: any kind of debate on EU actorness or the kind of power the EU represented indeed reflected the lack of solid international identity of the EU in both domestic and international audience. The fluid nature of EU identity/identities on one hand was the source of EU normative power, as such “fluid, complex, multiple and relational aspects of the self-other contestations” define EU normative power (Manners 2006b:178). On the other hand, it created the security problem for EU as a post-national polity. Diez (2005) also commented that the normative power Europe was a kind of “discursive model” for EU external presence, “a new sense of collective purpose” and “a new rhetoric... for the EU on its future global goal” (Aggestam 2008:1; Mayer 2008:61; Bickerton 2011:25). The failure of delivery of such model not only created a legitimacy crisis of EU foreign policy *per se*, but also generated a kind of societal security concerns challenging the EU as a regional security complex. Rather than traditional security challenges covered military and territorial security, societal security concerned “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom” (Buzan 1991:19 – 20; see also Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993). In this case, being normative and acting in a normative way was a “security-driven choice” of the European Union, and the normative facet of the EU and the security concerns of the EU constituted “parameters for each other” (Youngs 2004:431).

The second one was more specific on the EU-China relations. As we compared the rhetoric of “civilian power”, “normative power” and “structural power”, we could see the shifting from a pure “civilian power” with unconditional engagement, to a “normative power” which opted for

structural changes in China through the deployment of civilian operation. As demonstrated by the 2013 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation and the 2016 Joint Communication, the EU always asked for multiple areas of reform from economic to environment, through various of “dialogues” and initiatives (European External Action Service 2013; European Commission and High Representative for Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016). More importantly, the promotion of “global public goods, sustainable development and international security” became an important objective for EU foreign policy towards China, and expected China to balance both responsibilities and benefits drawn from the liberal world order (European Commission and High Representative for Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016). Instead of a unilateral commitment and engagement practiced for a decade, the EU turned itself as “a partner in China’s reform” and helped China to manage the “structural transition” through sharing EU experience and innovation (ibid: 5 - 6). The changing narrations of EU-China relations was indeed a reflection of the “strategic adjustment” made to mediate the changing domestic systems and international systems. Given the highly volatile and conditional nature of legitimacy in contemporary days, the EU was required to make active changes not only in terms of policy papers’ rhetoric but also EU programmes at different policy aspects. In this case, port diplomacy through civilian port could always serve a kind of policy innovation in EU-China relations, especially if it could fit the interests of the EU and its Member States.

Interests in European Foreign Policy in China: Economic Gain versus Ideational Expression
Mentioned in last chapter, Michael Yahuda (2008) identified two elements that governed the contemporary EU-China relations, i.e. “the tyranny of distance” and “the primacy of trade”. The two concepts were introduced by many scholars and experts in EU-China relations before even Yahuda’s conceptualisation. For instance, Griffith (1981) had highlighted that the physical distance was not the main reason for the geographical disengagement between Europe and China. Instead, the general ignorance and stereotypes in the past had made Europe to turn a blind eye to Beijing in their decision-making mind map, and the same situation happened to Beijing against Brussels as well (Möller 2002; Men 2008; Schilling 2012). For the second element, some scholars suggested that it was owing to the structural characteristics of European foreign policy, which was limited by the competence enjoyed by the European Union and was more visible in the field of trade relations (Piening 1997). In addition, the Member States’ governments were fantasised by the potential of Chinese domestic market since the imperial period (Casarini 2006), and the inflow of Chinese hot money after the financial crisis (Godement et. al. 2011). From Beijing’s perspective, she also needed to explore the European Single Market for her exports as well as imported technology for her domestic development (Casarini 2006). The European market was also a kind of good investment for both Chinese public and private sector to dilute their financial risks and over-reliance on US market. However, the changing context of international political economy, the improvement in technology and transportation, and the closer alignment of economic interests in EU-China relations did not change the respective foreign policy priority of the EU and China towards each other, which remained to be secondary to its relations with United States (Vogt 2012).

In fact, the two elements identified by Yahuda (2008) had their respective relevancy to port diplomacy. First, the “primacy of trade” not only described the importance of material transactions between Europe and China, but also the role of these transactions to the European Union. As discussed in last section, contemporary security issues were far more than traditional territorial security but involved different sectors of security from economic security to societal security (Buzan 1991; Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993), with the ultimate concern on maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. While neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmental differed themselves in explaining European integration, they shared the similar ideas on the legitimacy of the supranational regime, i.e. the importance of economic

performance and functional efficiency (Haas 1964; 1968; Moravcsik 1999; Risse 2003; 2005; Kritzinger 2005). Neofunctionalism suggested that a loyalty transfer from one's national regime to a supranational organisation was always possible if people perceived that the supranational organization was far more effective in answering citizens' demands and provision of public good (Haas 1964; 1968; Risse 2005). On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism regarded economic performance and functional efficiency as the prerequisite of nation-states to participate in European integration and collective policy (Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1999). The division of Member States' position over EU-China relations was the best illustration of the liberal intergovernmentalist argument (Fox and Godement 2009; Godement et. al. 2011). As a result, economic performance became an important parameter in defining the achievement of European foreign policy, as it could either positively contribute to the legitimacy of the supranational regime, or negatively contribute to the hesitation of Member States' further commitment. In fact, a similar concern also suited for contemporary China either, which demanded nationalism and economic performance as the key of Chinese stability (Shirk 2007). Given the main feature of civilian ports as a facilitator of global transactions as well as a motor for economic prosperity, civilian ports had naturally a position in contemporary EU-China relations and port actions at civilian ports could be critical to both the EU and China in protecting and promoting their commercial interests and economic agenda.

In addition, "the tyranny of distance", which covered both geographical distance and mental distance, was a double-edged sword to EU normative power. On one hand, the lack of physical contact lowered the cost of adopting "hard-line" identity politics against China, as any direct retaliation or military threat was required to overcome the geographical distance between Brussels and Beijing. For instance, it was rather scarce for East Asian and Southeast Asian states to receive political dissents such as Dalai Lama from Tibet, Rebiya Kadeer from Xinjiang or even Joshua Wong from Hong Kong, or to make comment against the socio-political situation within China owing to the huge immediate threat posed by China in terms of military and economic dominance in the region. On the contrary, it was rather normal for the European Union and its Member States to receive people from similar background even some of them had close economic ties with Beijing, ranging from nominating and awarding Liu Xiaobo for Nobel Peace Prize to receiving political activist Joshua Wong for public hearing on Hong Kong democratisation process. On the other hand, the lack of social contact and the historical context of European imperialism in late Qing Dynasty and communist China discourse made the exercise of normative power directly to the centre of the regime far more difficult. The "cognitive dissonance" (Shambaugh:2008) between China and Europe in terms of perceptions and expectations of the relations between themselves or in other areas was too large to be overcome (Cameron 2009; Smith and Xie 2010; Schilling 2012), and China held different perceptions towards individual EU member states (Möller 2002). In addition, though Europe might not be the first tier of expression of Chinese nationalism, she was indeed the core actor in Chinese "century of humiliation" thus gaining some weight in nationalistic discourse, especially when the two regions disagreed with each other (Grant 1995; Men 2008). In this case, the penetration of ideas and norms would be less effective without a suitable portal to enter Chinese leadership and society, as the Chinese leadership would be extremely aware of such sharing of minds. Civilian port, which served as a natural geographical space for people-to-people interactions and exchange of ideas, could be an ideal place to bridge such "cognitive dissonance".

The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in Chinese Foreign Policy to the EU

Compared to her European counterpart, Beijing did not have the problem of "multiple realities" in terms of defining national interests and objectives in her foreign policy. However, the role of interests and identities remained crucial to understand Chinese foreign policy to the EU,

which also defined the boundaries of port responses at civilian ports.

Beijing primary position to the EU was rather instrumental, and constructed with reference to the new Sino-American bipolarity and the Confucius strategic culture of co-opting one group of barbarians to control another group of barbarians (Shambaugh 1996). The concept of “Western learning for practical purposes and Chinese learning for the fundamentals” (Yahuda 2008:18) had framed the cooperation between Europe and China as a key initiative against the projected imperialism of United States. While the so-called “new diplomacy” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003) formed since the Jiang’s era might deviate from the tradition realist perception of Chinese foreign policy, Beijing commitment to multilateralism was indeed combined with “multipolarism” and the primary objective was to “accord China greater leverage and influence” (Wu and Lansdowne 2008:7 – 8). As a result, Beijing engagement to the European Union and her active participation in Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was viewed as a counterweight of US hegemonic influence in global and regional order, and such strategic thinking was decisive in shaping contemporary EU-China relations. Also, the rather instrumental value of the European Union allowed Beijing to play different mind-games and pragmatic strategies against the EU, for instance the divide-and-rule strategy (Vangeli 2013). In fact, the less successful exercise of normative power Europe against China could attribute to the internal fragmentation of the EU (Fox and Godement 2009; Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). For instance, the “scorecard” published by European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a think-tank focusing on the analysis of European foreign policy, showed that EU member states were quite divergent in issues like human rights and governance, economic disputes with China and attitude of cooperation towards China in solving the EURO crisis (European Council on Foreign Relations 2012; 2013; 2014).

The impact of identities and values in Beijing foreign policy to the EU was more subtle, and the historical background of EU-China relations mattered in shaping the ideational framework of contemporary EU-China relations. Wang (2012) discussed the four main pathways of historical memory in shaping contemporary Chinese foreign policy as follows:

1. It defined the norms and shared framework among senior officials;
2. It served as a point of reference when making a decision;
3. It affected the interpretations, perceptions and understanding of phenomena; and
4. It shaped the priority of interests and actions to be taken.

Another EU-China relation expert Reuben Wong (2013) suggested that the changing role of China in the international system had forced Beijing continuously reevaluate her identity and self-image, and the historical interactions between imperial China and the rest of the world became an important pool of ideational resources. Through selective remembering and forgetting of her past symbols and representation, Beijing aimed to create an image that could successfully resemble the glory of imperial China and the “century of humiliation”, for the sake of the regime stability. An illustrative example regarded this idea was the BRI, which consisted of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The naming of the key initiatives involved in BRI not only resembled the glorious past of China as an undisputed centre of Asian commercial network under the tributary trade system, on the other hand it aimed to counteract the Western-sponsored “String of Pearls” discourse by highlighting the nature of Silk Road – which had always been a cultural signifier of Chinese commercial attraction in the past and a legacy “defined” nowadays Chinese economic cooperation. By linking Chinese new economic diplomacy with these culture-rich narrations, Beijing not only constructed a revival of Chinese glory which echoed the nationalistic “China’s Dream” narration proposed by Xi, but also an image of “peaceful development” by downplaying the anxiety of military intention in the project.

Putting the above analysis of the role of interests and identities into the analysis of potential Chinese port responses, two lessons could be drawn. First, differential treatments could always be justified, either through the pragmatism behind Chinese foreign policy or the difference of perception. The pragmatic argument was twofold. On one hand, insofar the ultimate objective, i.e. promoting economic prosperity and maintaining internal and external stability, differential treatments could be introduced and challenges could be tolerated. A typical example of such toleration was the flexible arrangement of OCTS which delegated a high degree of autonomy to two Special Administrative Regions. On the other hand, differential treatments could be justified as Beijing could hold different perceptions and interests to each foreign community at civilian ports. The benefits generated to Beijing through her interactions at different ports with different foreign communities, in this thesis the European communities, might make impact to Chinese port responses at specific civilian ports or specific group of European communities.

The second lesson drawn from the above analysis was that Chinese historical interactions and perceptions about foreign communities as well as the maritime space in general could possibly make impact to contemporary Chinese port responses. The impact might be understood in two different but interlinked perspectives. First, the maritime space was generally perceived as a threat in traditional Chinese culture, especially after the mid-Ming Dynasty. In analysing the imperial Chinese international “personality”, Fairbank (1969a) concluded that Chinese power was largely land-based and bureaucratic, which he contrasted to maritime and commercial. A conservative and inward-looking attitude towards Chinese maritime space turned Beijing adopt a rather responsive approach towards maritime opportunities and threats. Rather than taking advantages, Chinese government was sceptical towards the maritime space and the arrival of European powers further strengthened the perception (Fairbank 1969a; Wang 2004; Chang 2006). If national security was the top concern of realist China since 1949, security challenges from maritime space might occupy a crucial position in this top concern. These challenges included the direct security challenges such as turning the civilian ports as a potential base for revolution, to indirect ideational and economic challenges that impacted the societal and economic security of contemporary China. The second conceptual pathway to conceptualise the importance of historical interactions was the history of the civilian ports *per se*. The history of a civilian port, for instance, the major foreign communities present in the past and their relations with China, or the historic institutions and interactions created in civilian ports, might shape Chinese port responses at these civilian ports. Unlike the perception over its maritime space which was mainly negative, this kind of historical interactions could be either positive or negative depended on the nature of interactions and who did China interacted with. As a result, the history of a civilian port could be a potential asset, as well as a kind of liability, for Chinese foreign policy thus port responses.

A Typology of Ports and its Potential Role in EU-China Relations

The bifurcation of the European foreign policy towards China, together with the mental distance between the Europeans and the Chinese on the idea of “normal”, created the “normative dead ends” in Europe-China relations (Vangeli 2013:25). From the EU’s point of view, a strategic partnership should fulfil both the economic and strategic demand of the European Commission, representing the supranational level, and the member states, as well as projecting the EU as “a force for good” (Smith and Xie 2010). While the economic and strategic logic might be easily for Beijing to make concession, she would always prefer separate the normative and political issues from economic cooperation as it was always a kind of security threat to her. The dilemma of responding to the economic demand at member-state level and the ideational demand at the European level, therefore, required a tactful diplomacy for the EU in facing China’s rising international status. From the above discussion, using civilian ports and port diplomacy as the leverage seemed to be a way-out for the European Union.

The idea of “agentification” of European maritime policy established the possibility to turn a civilian port as an agent to serve the greater good of European foreign policy. The remaining question was how a possible mechanism could be constructed. The concept of port geography and the typology of ports might provide an answer to this question.

In defining the port geography of a civilian port, Fleming and Hayuth (1994) gave two dimensions of port geography, namely the dimensions of centrality and intermediacy. Following the framework of Fleming and Hayuth (1994), Ducruet provided a meta-geographical matrix of the typology of civilian ports as follows (Figure 3.1):




Figure 3.1 A typology of civilian ports under the centrality-intermediacy nexus (Ducruet 2007:159)

While the above categorisation was designed for IPE instead of international relations, the thesis borrowed this model in framing the role of civilian ports in EU-China relations. Mentioned in the introduction, the thesis revised the dimension of centrality as the capacity for a diplomatic actor to generate socio-economic common goods and soft institutions, while the concept of intermediacy as the socio-political quality of the maritime network a civilian port possessed and served. The dimension of centrality included both the institutional capacity owned by the actors concerned, the political and cultural presence at the civilian ports and the historical linkage between the actors and the ports concerned, and categorised in accordance to

the level set by Ducruet (2007), i.e. from low to medium and then high. On the other hand, the dimension of intermediacy included the political, economic and cultural network that the civilian ports connected to, and also categorised in accordance to the level set by Ducruet (2007), i.e. from low to medium and then high. The thesis, therefore, had used the same typology suggested by Ducruet (2007) in defining role of civilian ports in European foreign policy.

In traditional IPE and port studies, the port geography of a civilian port was a crucial factor in determining actor's port choice to ship and offload their cargoes and goods to a specific country, especially if the country had more than one civilian ports. Notteboom (2009:746 – 747) had summarised the typical factors of port choice according to the demand, supply and market profile of a civilian port as follows:

1. The demand profile included “the flow orientation of the port towards the foreland and hinterland, the scale and growth of the port, and the connectivity of port within wider maritime networks”.
2. The supply profile included “the availability, cost, quality and reliability of the nautical access, container terminals, and hinterland access”.
3. The market profile included “the cargo-control characteristics, the structure of the terminal-operating business within the port, and presence of logistics activities in the port, the logistic focus of the port, and the port reputation”.

In addition to Notteboom's profiling of a civilian port and the implications to port choice, Lam and Dai (2012) had reviewed three major methods that governed the port selection problem. The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method focused on the ranking of both services enjoyed and cost embedded during the selection process, thus it was a multi-objective, multi-criteria theory which allowed the shippers and carriers to make rational decisions on port preferences based on a set of detailed, comprehensive and ranked criteria. The discrete choice model (DCM), on the other hand, assumed that shippers and carriers might not necessarily know the details of port infrastructure and service provided. Service factors were internalized during the decision process such that the cost criteria such as charges, traveling distance and efficiency of handling shipment had been more prominent in decision-making process. Finally, the data envelopment analysis (DEA) focused on the relative efficiency of using different ports through the relative productivity the container port enjoyed. While the decision-making model might be different in some criteria, Lam and Dai (2012:514) suggested that “location, port charges, port infrastructure, ship calls, container traffic and water depth (indicating the size of vessel that can enter the port)” were critical to the port selection process. The above discussion on port choice might be distant to the core concern of the thesis. However, the analytical gap would be much smaller if the concept of structural power and structural foreign policy was taken into an account.

The Exercise of EU Structural Power and the Inattentional Blindness of the Spatial Difference within a Given Geographical Space

It was not entirely new to conceptualise the EU as a normative power or a structural power which aimed to promote normative changes and structural changes of the third-party state (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b; K. E. Smith 2003; 2005; Stavridis 2001; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Keukeleire 2003; Diez 2005 ; Sjursen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Holden 2009; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015; Hocking and Smith 2016). The two prominent discourses on the characteristics of EU power were the normative power formulated by Ian Manners (2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b) and the concept of structural power and structural foreign policy promoted by Stephan Keukeleire and his colleagues (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015). While the normative power discourse placed more focus on the non-military

nature of the European Union and its foreign policy, the concept of structural power and structural foreign policy deserved a closer look. The concept of structural power, as one of its founder Stephan Keukeleire suggested, aimed to pursue and support “long-term structural changes, both in the internal situation of the countries concerned and in the inter-state relations and general situation of these regions” (Keukeleire 2003:47). To achieve so, Keukeleire argued that the EU external relations were a kind of “structural foreign policy” which were designed to transfer “various ideological and governing principles” of the EU to the third-party state (ibid.). Structural diplomacy, therefore, involved “the process of dialogue and negotiation by which actors in the international system seek to influence or shape sustainable external political, legal, economic, social and security structures at different relevant levels in a *given geographic space*” (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009:146, *emphasis added by the author*). From the perspective of Keukeleire and his colleagues, the idea of structural was indeed twofold: 1) the objective of the policy to shape structures and 2) the expected long-term and sustainable effects towards the targeted structures in the given geographic space (ibid.; see also Metais and Thepaut 2013).

Given the expected long-term effects and sustainability of structural foreign policy, Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert (2009) had identified several, but non-exhaustive as the authors highlighted, factors contributed to the effectiveness of structural foreign policy at the state level. The factors included:

- 1) Intensity and the quality of the dialogues that could successfully turn political declaration into operations;
- 2) A long-term strategy that aimed to formally or informally institutionalise the continuous dialogue and negotiation;
- 3) A comprehensive approach to develop a close relationship with various levels of partners and actors, and to cover various levels of relevant structures;
- 4) The degree of embeddedness of structural power in other forms of diplomatic actions and external relations conducted by the actor itself and its diplomatic allies;
- 5) The idea of legitimacy in the eyes of the third-party state and an appropriate provision of “carrot and sticks” to the state concerned.

The theoretical framework of structural power and structural foreign policy attracted lots of evaluation on its content and effectiveness. For instance, an edited work on EU neighbourhood policy highlighted the pros and cons of EU structural foreign policy in promoting rule of law in the neighbourhood region (Metais, Thepaut and Keukeleire 2013), or an evaluation of the characteristics and effectiveness of EU aid policy in advancing EU structural power to the world (Holden 2009). In terms of challenges at global level, Keukeleire and Delreux (2015) pointed out that the presence of Russia and Islamic community at EU’s eastern and southern borders was an important factor contributing the failure of EU structural power in the region, while Li (2017) suggested that the rise of China in Africa as a viable alternative to development aid had undermined EU conditionality – a typical component of EU structural foreign policy – in Africa.

Despite the emphasis on multi-level engagement suggested by Keukeleire and his colleagues in exercising structural power, literature on EU structural power was never sensitive to the spatial difference within “a given geographic space”. While the collective essays on the promotion of the rule of law to EU neighbourhood did analyse the effect of EU structural power to different neighbouring states or the micro-policies that targeted different actors, those essays did not take the spatial characteristics into a serious consideration. One could possibly project the difference, in terms of impact and obstacles, if the EU micro-policies were implemented at

the national capital or central business district vis-à-vis a medium-sized town in suburb region or a small village in rural area. On the other hand, one could also project the difference, in terms of implementation strategy and operational tactics, when the EU wished to introduce its micro-structural policy to the national capital vis-à-vis a village located at the very periphery of the national political and economic system. As reviewed in the last section of this chapter, the concept of multiple realities was not limited to the European Union but also, in the thesis, China. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of EU structural power and structural foreign policy to China should also take the spatial difference within China seriously.

Apart from the importance to acknowledge the spatial difference within China in evaluating EU foreign policies towards China, the role of subnational entities, in this thesis the civilian ports, should be taken into the account as well. As reviewed in Chapter 2, civilian ports were undeniable actor-networks in international politics and global political economy. The three vital roles suggested by Acuto (2013) were critical to EU structural policies towards China. First of all, the role as a networking actant of a civilian port placed various targeted structures and potential local resources within the port space, and such a concentration of structures could potentially facilitate (or hinder) the exercise of EU structural power and structural foreign policy towards the port per se as well as Chinese responses. On the other hand, the role as a networking actor of a civilian port connected actors at various levels in the EU and China, from formal diplomatic actors like the EU Office or Chinese central government's representative at the port concerned, to informal actors like commercial chambers or municipal authorities. These actors were "caged" by the port space, "forced" to utilise the diplomatic resources available to them at the port, to protect and project their own structural foreign policy agenda. Finally, the role as a networking network of a civilian port determined the extensity of the influence of EU structural foreign policies and Chinese responses in terms of the potential spill-over effect from local, regional to national. The role of networking network also determined the possibility of future step-in from external allies, the availability of additional resources in supporting the exercise of EU structural power or Chinese defence from it.

Therefore, the economic rationality in explaining a commercial actor in picking a suitable civilian port might be analogical to the political rationality for a diplomatic actor to pick a suitable civilian port to offload its "diplomatic goods" and advance its structural power in the region. In traditional port studies, the economic rationality and the capacity of a port to handle economic goods could be evaluated by two variables namely centrality and intermediacy. In fact, the idea of centrality, i.e. "the endogenous economic interests and trade generation power", could also be understood as "the endogenous political interests and institutions generation power" if the concept was "politicised" and readily applicable to foreign policy analysis. On the other hand, the concept of intermediacy, i.e. "external player's election of a place for serving their networks of economic interests and trade", could also be understood as "external player's election of a place for serving their networks of political interests and institutions". Table 3.5 proposed a potential thematic matrix to link up the concepts of centrality and intermediacy to the respective roles of civilian ports under the modified global city thesis suggested by Acuto (2013):

	Networking actant	Networking actors	Networking network
Centrality	The availability of various structures and resources within the port space	The capacity to glue various actors within the port space	The spill-over capacity from one structure to another structure within the port space
Intermediacy	The degree of connectivity of various structures between local port space and national geographic space	The capacity to glue various actors between local port space and national geographic space	The leverage effect of shaping structures in local port space to national structural change

Table 3.5 The relationship matrix between the role of civilian ports & centrality-intermediacy analysis

From the table above, it could also show the potential linkage among the concept of structural power, centrality-intermediacy analysis, and the roles of civilian ports. The concept of centrality indeed reflected the opportunities and constraints of the exercise of structural power and structural foreign policies at port, while the concept of intermediacy reflected the opportunities and constraints to leverage structural power at port to regional or even national level.

By acknowledging the importance of centrality and intermediacy in the role of civilian ports and structural power, the thesis, through a comparative study of Hong Kong, Macao and Shanghai which possessed different levels of centrality and intermediacy, aimed to visualise EU “structural port diplomacy” to China and the responses from Beijing to EU structural port diplomacy. The proposed analytical framework, on one hand, filled in the existing literature gap of EU structural power which was inattention to the spatial difference within the state in evaluating the structural foreign policies. On the other hand, it strengthened the discussion of the role of substate entities, in particular civilian ports, in EU-China relations and a broader audience of international politics and global political economy.

Chapter Summary and Preview

This chapter served as a bridge between the theoretical discussion of the previous two chapters and the empirical chapters on Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai. The chapter had firstly introduced the “multiple realities”, in terms of actorness and policy instruments, of both the EU and China, so as to establish the feasibility of European port diplomacy and Chinese port responses. After that, the chapter continued to discuss the multi-layered interests and identities in contemporary EU-China relations from the perspective of Brussels and Beijing, highlighting the motivation and constraints behind European foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy, Beijing, and how interactions within a civilian port could contribute to their respective concerns in interests and identities. The chapter concluded itself by introducing an academic mechanism to define and discuss the linkage among the role of civilian ports, the centrality-intermediacy analysis and the concept of structural power. The innovative adaption of the port-city interface suggested by Ducruet and his colleagues (Ducruet and Lee 2006; 2007), the global city thesis presented by Acuto (2013), and the discussion of structural power by Keukeleire and his colleagues (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015) became the cornerstone of the analytical framework of the thesis. This vague framework would then be applied to the selected ports in China, namely Macao (Chapter 4), Hong Kong (Chapter 5) and Shanghai (Chapter 6).

Chapter 4: Macao as a Sino-European Condominium – The Role of Macao in Sino-European Port Diplomacy

Although it was the first European settlement created in China, Macao, among the selected three civilian ports studied in the thesis, received less attention in international relations study. Compared to Hong Kong, a well-known financial centre and logistics hub, and Shanghai, the busiest civilian ports in the world and the motor of Chinese economy, Macao was known as its “Las Vegas of Asia” in gambling and tourism. However, it was not the case in 16th and 17th century when the Europeans firstly arrived China from maritime routes. Followed by the first Luso-Chinese trade agreement concluded between the Portuguese traders and Canton authorities, the Portuguese traders were allowed to turn Macao into an official “warehouse” in 1557. Since then, Macao had occupied a crucial role in Portuguese trade routes from Goa to Nagasaki, until mid-17th century when tides of political issues happened in Europe and Asia both turned against Portuguese domination. The role of Macao changed from serving the sole Portuguese interest to a more generic European interest. Nonetheless, the role of Macao received its final blow when Hong Kong was established as a British colony and international treaty port after 1842.

The rise and fall of Portuguese Macao were researched by many scholars (Fernandes 1997; 2008; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003), but little attention was placed to the changing port geography of Macao during the period. Given the lack of international attention, academics also showed less interests in conceptualising the role of Macao in shaping historic and contemporary EU-China relations. In fact, as the first European settlement in China as well as the only Chinese civilian port that concluded a bilateral trade agreement with the European Union, the case of Macao provided valuable insights and resources to study the role of civilian port in Sino-European relations.

As the first empirical chapter of the thesis, this chapter would first outline the changing port geography of Macao from the creation of Portuguese settlement in 1557 to the creation of British Hong Kong in 1842, which effectively ended Macao’s crucial role in Sino-European trade relations. Followed by that, the chapter would discuss how Macao was turned to a diplomatic condominium by the CCP and Lisbon and its impact to Macao port geography after the handover of sovereignty to Beijing in 1999. The chapter would conclude itself by discussing of EU port actions under the EU-Macao TCA, Chinese port responses in Macao, and the lessons and implications drawn from these interactions.

The Creation of Legacy: The Early Role of Macao in Sino-Portuguese Relations and Sino-European Relations (1557 – 1842)

Although the formal “diplomatic” contact between Europe and China could always be dated back to the mission lead John of Plano Carpini to Karakorum which aimed to negotiate a peace settlement with Mongols, such contact did not institutionalise into formal diplomatic ties and civilian exchanges between the Europe and China. Quite a contrary, European princes and merchants were blocked from land access to China by the Mongolian Empire and then the Ottoman Empire. To bypass the powerful land power of Mongols and Arabs, European captains, sponsored by Portuguese and Spaniard courts, began their voyage in order to restore their contact to China through maritime routes. As shown by a set of instructions issued by King Manuel ¹ of Portugal dated 13th February 1508, one objective of the voyage to Asia was to “inquire about the Chijins (Chinese)”, such as the socio-economic characteristics, their voyage patterns, their religious beliefs, etc. (Chang 1969:33) In 1511, the Portuguese fleets successfully made contact with Chinese fleets at Malacca when the Chinese captains sought help from Portuguese against the King of Malacca (Souza 1986:15 – 16). Although no substantial help was given by the Portuguese, it was said that the Chinese merchants were pleased and carried

with them a favourable report of character and their prowess. (Chang 1969:34) Subsequently in 1514 and 1516, two voyages were led by Jorge Alvares, who came to Tunmen (Tamao) and established a memorial monument of stone, and Rafael Perestrello, who arrived in Canton and brought back to the Portuguese court profitable goods and information about the commercial potentials of Sino-Portuguese trade. In 1517, on behalf of the Portuguese court, diplomat Fernao Peres de Andrade arrived Canton and met with local officials, aiming to establish formal diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Ming court in China. While members of the Portuguese fleets were initially allowed to reside onshore and traded with the Chinese locals at Canton and from surrounding ports, the Portuguese court failed to establish a formal embassy in Beijing partly owing to the general scepticism towards foreigners and the actual misbehaviours of some Portuguese captains in Malacca and Tuen Mun (Chang 1969:53 – 54). The above reasons, together with the unfortunate death of Emperor Zhengde who received the Portuguese envoy in 1520, eruptively ended the negotiation between China and Portugal in 1521 (Souza 1986:16 – 17). In fact, all foreigners were banned to stay in Canton and to trade with Chinese merchants officially from 1521 (ibid; Chang 1969). Not until 1557 when the Portuguese merchants and Chinese local officials decided to turn Macao as a Portuguese settlement, Europeans (mainly Portuguese) were officially barred from Chinese trade even when the Chinese government reopened Canton for foreign trade in 1530 (Souza 1986:16 – 17).

A Coastal Town in Sino-Portuguese Relations: The Early Role of Macao in Portuguese Port Diplomacy to China

Despite the early historical record which showed as early as 1535 Macao was one of the official places for Chinese customs authority to collect dues after the Ming court decided to resume foreign trade, it was less known to the foreigners as a trading port nor a developed city for Chinese merchants to reside before 1557 (Chang 1969; Souza 1986). The excellence geographical position of Macao, which was located at the Western side of Pearl River estuary connecting the South China Sea, did not transform Macao as a trading hub owing to the general scepticism of the Ming court against maritime trade and her defensive attitude towards the Japanese piracy along the Chinese coast. Ironically, it was also part of the reason why Macao was chosen by the Ming court as the Portuguese "warehouse" in China. As Chang (1969:87) suggested in his analysis on Sino-Portuguese trade relations, the Cantonese authorities on one hand loved to resume foreign trade at Canton so as to collect more customs dues (and perhaps personal bribes) from trading with Europeans. On the other hand, they were rather cautious about the "re-arrival" of the Portuguese merchants whose bad reputation as "*Folangji* pirates"¹⁶ was widely circulated among the Chinese community since 1521. As a result, while the authorities legalised Portuguese merchants to trade at Canton, they also wished to keep the Portuguese merchants away from the populous city. The geographical location of Macao, which provided an accessible maritime route to Chinese main trading post but could be easily contained and isolated by land troops, apparently fit in Chinese concern over foreign maritime trade. From the Portuguese perspective, prior to the establishment of Macao as a semi-permanent settlement, the Portuguese traders were not allowed to trade in China (Souza 1986) or only temporarily settled at outlying islands near Macao such as Lampacao and Shangchuan. A rather permanent settlement in Macao, which was closer to Canton and physically connected to the Chinese landmass, was always more preferred.

Therefore, the mutual consent of making Macao as a semi-permanent settlement for Portuguese traders was never related to how "good" the quality of centrality and intermediacy. From the

¹⁶ The term *Folangji* was borrowed from the Persian term *Farangi*, which could briefly be translated as the Franks. It was a common name shared among South and Southeast Asian communities during 15th century when they first arrived in the region. The Chinese communities may be introduced to the name by the Muslim traders when they traded with their vassal states in Southeast Asia (Zhang 1934).

Chinese perspective, Macao had little value in generating economic profits or political institutions as it was just an underdeveloped place and remained active only for the sake of collecting duties; in terms of intermediacy, it was always secondary to Canton, the main trading post of China authorised by the Ming court and Macao was never embedded itself to the economic, political and cultural network of foreign communities. It was exactly the opposite that the limited accessibility of Macao (especially by land routes) that favoured Chinese port choice to host the growing Portuguese community. From the perspective of Portuguese traders, they always wished to settle as close to Canton, if not in Canton, as possible. The concern over weak maritime infrastructure and economic generating capacity in Macao was outweighed by a closer geographical position than outlying islands, which were a kind of “non-port” with no economic generating capacity and distant from the Chinese mainland. Based on the typology suggested in Chapter 3, Macao could be classified as a kind of coastal town, which had low level of centrality and intermediacy. Interestingly, to choose a coastal town as a main site of interactions, the geographical advantage, instead of the capacity and the network owned by the civilian port, might be the key factor to be considered by the diplomatic actors: the port choice of Macao, from Chinese perspective, was owing to the ease to selectively engage and contain the communities of Macao; from Portuguese perspective, it was just a kind of better-than-nothing deal and served as a bridgehead of future Sino-Portuguese engagement. Prior to the conclusion of the first Sino-Portuguese Agreement in 1554, both parties did not consider Macao seriously as a developed civilian port for facilitating the transactions or promoting of political values.

With the conclusion of the Sino-Portuguese Agreement in 1554, Macao became a Portuguese settlement in 1557. However, such agreement did not generate the same “treaty port” status as with the ports Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1842 under the Treaty of Nanjing signed between the British government and the Manchurian court. In fact, compared to the status of Hong Kong which was ceased as a crown colony, the status of port Macao –as always in dispute - especially whether the Chinese imperial court had ceased the sovereign rights over Macao to the Portuguese crown. Despite various sources of diplomatic records, the general understanding was that the Portuguese community was granted to live in Macao in exchange for their service to defend Chinese coast from robbery and piracy, and for a 500-tael of silver ground rent per year to the Cantonese authority (Chang 1969; Wu 1997; Haberzettl and Ptak 1991; Chan 2003). Given the political culture of imperial China which only the Chinese emperor could forfeit his ownership over the Chinese soil, an agreement firstly concluded between a local official and Portuguese captain-major could never involve clauses related to sovereignty transfer from the China to Portugal. In fact, neither the Cantonese authority had questioned its legal rights over Macao internal affairs as well as the Chinese subjects living the Macao, nor the Portuguese community in Macao had doubted the legality of their rights granted by the Chinese authority, apart from their inborn rights as a Portuguese subject. Instead of a unilateral concession of both sovereign rights and administrative rights of port Macao, the Chinese authorities after the official recognition of Portuguese settlement in Macao maintained a minimal administration over the port and the port communities, such as the control of supplies from the mainland and the flow of Portuguese personnel to the mainland through the Barrier Gate (*Portas de Cerco*). In fact, as Chinese scholar Wu (1997) and Portuguese scholar De Pina-Cabral (2002) both suggested, much of the activities of Portuguese was confined to Macao, with limited exposure in Canton. For instance, Portuguese missionaries were only allowed to go inland until 1581 (Wu 1997:38). Trading rights and privileges were sometimes at the discretion of Chinese officials, especially when they failed to receive bribery from the Portuguese missions. (ibid:39) Compared to modern diplomacy based on sovereign equality and honour system, the Portuguese community had to pay tribute as well as bribery for a “normalised” diplomatic and trade relations. The confinement of Portuguese community and the rest of foreigners at Macao was on one hand motivated by the selfishness of local Chinese authorities as they did not want

the “golden goose” to be shared among other ports outside Canton; on the other hand, the conflicts between Portuguese merchants and Chinese community remained a taboo such that any further penetration of Portuguese or other foreign communities to the core cities of China would be harmful to local stability.

All in all, from the Chinese perspective, the changing status of Macao as a semi-permanent Portuguese settlement did not change her position and policy to Macao. The Portuguese community should be isolated and closely monitored, and only be permitted to travel inland through special licenses granted by local authorities. Therefore, rather than expanding the “centrality” of Macao, Chinese officials adopted a “negotiated separation” strategy to manage the Portuguese community at Macao (De Pina-Cabral 2002:22). The “negotiated separation”, from Chinese perspective, could be conceptualised as a “negotiated separation” between Macao, as the only-recognised Portuguese settlement at Chinese soil, and the rest of the Chinese territory. Apart from sending customs officials to collect tributes (and perhaps bribes), Chinese authorities would interfere with local affairs at Macao only upon the request from the Portuguese community, or when the incidents were severe enough and related to Chinese community (De Pina-Cabral 2002; Chang 1969; Porter 1996). Despite the changing status of Macao from a Chinese coastal town to a coastal town shared by both the Chinese and Portuguese communities, the Chinese authority had never invested more resources to upgrade the centrality and intermediacy possessed by Macao. Rather, the Chinese government aimed to maintain her small but intact level of centrality at Macao, and created a “negotiated separation” through the installation of the Barrier Gate and official policies, so as to limit Macao’s penetration to Chinese mainland community. The apparent stability of the “official” coastal town discourse, which would be further discussed in later section, could be attributed to the stability of interests and identity towards foreign communities and maritime trade among Chinese officials, which perceived them as an opportunity as well as a threat to Chinese community.

From the Portuguese perspective, however, the “negotiated separation” was visualised in another way: a negotiated separation between the Portuguese community who were living inside the Catholic citadel, and those Chinese who were living outside the walls of the citadel. In fact, the negotiated separation may not be the will of Portuguese merchants, given the fact that the Portuguese community was highly depended on food and water supplies from the mainland, as well as the official recognition from both local and central authority. The position of Portuguese merchants at Macao was therefore rather passive, as “the Chinese mandarins... only had to close these doors when they were dissatisfied with Portuguese activities.” (De Pina-Cabral 2002:2; see also Chang 1969) Instead of competing for full domination over Macao, the Portuguese community on one hand committed mostly to the Chinese official/officials’ demands such as paying tributes (and bribes) to local authorities, on the other hand they formed a self-governing regime consisted of Portuguese and Macanese community, i.e. the local Creole community who identified themselves as a free subject under the Portuguese crown instead of Chinese emperor rules. The *Senado Municipal* (later being bestowed as *Leal Senado*) was indirectly elected by the Portuguese community resided or born in Macao and responsible for local administration such as urban affairs or public transports and jurisdiction (Gomes 1996). Although the spread of Catholicism to China might be an important motivation for the Portuguese community to expand its influence towards China, the centrality, i.e. the norms generating power of Portuguese government in Macao was limited within the citadel and closely checked by the local authorities as well as central government in Beijing. As a result, the Portuguese community could only maintain a low but intact level of centrality in Macao.

The discussion on Macao’s intermediacy, was more complicated as it involved the Chinese community from the mainland, the Portuguese community in Asia and Southeast Asia and other

European communities who soon arrived to China from Europe. Reviewed in previous paragraphs, the “negotiated separation” imposed apparent restriction on Macao’s intermediacy especially towards the Chinese community in mainland. Not only the installation of the Barrier Gate that served as a regular check against Portuguese traders and missionaries to enter the mainland China through Macao, but also the introduction of maritime ban that blocked Portuguese community from legally connecting with other Chinese ports or coastal communities¹⁷. In practice, however, the Chinese officials took advantages of the presence of Portuguese community for the sake of government revenues (through levies and customs duties) and personal gains. As Chinese historian K.C. Fok conceptualised the essence of “Macao formula” as a reconciliation of two contradictory objectives: maintain Chinese coastal security against any form of foreign maritime aggression, and benefit economically from the foreign trade (Fok 1978; 2003; 2006; Mendes 2003). Local Chinese officials soon realised the benefits of having a “foreign” community on Chinese soil because they could trade with foreign traders at Macao without breaking the maritime ban (Chang 1969; Wei 1992; Wu 1997; Coates 2009a; 2009b). The triangulation of Chinese foreign trade operated as follows: first, the direct bilateral trade conducted between Chinese merchants and Portuguese merchants that the Chinese merchants provided essential supplies to Portuguese settlement and galleons at Macao, in exchange of Portuguese goods demanded by local communities; second, the Portuguese community served as a middleman between Chinese and other foreign merchants such that they could get access to others’ goods and markets without breaking the maritime ban –ule (Coates 2009b:36 - 38). As Wei (1992) and Wu (1997) suggested, Macao always played a special function which was differed from Chinese mainstream foreign policy position and a role different from other Chinese ports. To some extent, during the maritime ban period, Macao was “blessed” to develop exclusive maritime network and enjoyed privileges such as lower tax and convenient dockship in Canton and Macao (Chang 1969:102 – 103; Wu 1997:41 – 42). In addition to Portuguese service in trade, the Chinese government also relied on the Portuguese community to “supervise” Western traders’ activities along the Chinese coast and to defend the Chinese coast from the Japanese pirates (Mendes 2003:45).

Because of this, Macao’s intermediacy, which was defined as the maritime connection of a civilian port, was much fluid than its official image. Macao’s intermediacy was implicitly boosted by local Chinese authorities, notwithstanding the isolationist official foreign policy of imperial China. Therefore, instead of having a stable port geography, Macao’s intermediacy was always subjected to the discretion of local Chinese authorities: when the Chinese authorities, at both central and local level, perceived that the benefits from foreign trade outweighed the security concerns or personal nuisance, the Chinese officials would welcome an extension of Macao’s intermediacy to cover the Southeast coast of China; when the security concerns or personal nuisance was never compensated by the additional gain from foreign trade, the Chinese officials would simply shut the gate and contain Macao’s intermediacy. As a result, Macao was positioned between a kind of **outport** to China which possessed low level of centrality and intermediate level of intermediacy, and a kind of **coastal town** which both the level of centrality and that of intermediacy remained low. Also, from the above analysis, the perception of material gains through transactions and networking was an important factor to adjust Chinese position towards Macao.

From the Portuguese perspective, while Macao’s connectivity to the Chinese market was

¹⁷ The maritime ban was a law introduced to bar Chinese subjects to go aboard so as to stop the coastal community to join or provide supplies to Japanese pirates. In addition, only Canton and later Yueh-kang (a port near Fujian which was originally served a port for smuggling and unauthorised trade) were opened to tributary trade. Only licensed Chinese merchants could be allowed to travel along the coast of China and they were required to be identified carefully by customs officers.

critical in evaluating Macao's intermediacy, the evaluation must also include its relation to other Asian ports and other European communities in the region. Unlike nowadays that the European states generally enjoyed friendly relations with each other and coordinate among themselves under the umbrella of the European Union, European empires had always been competing among themselves in terms of global expansion, in particular the access to Chinese market. Rather than sharing their privileged trading rights in China to the rest of the European merchants, the Portuguese community in Macao always wished to defend their exclusive rights through diplomatic bargain or the use of force. For instance, when Spain and Portugal were unified under the personal union of Phillip II of Spain (Philip I of Portugal) after 1581, the Portuguese community at Macao was in deep concern that the unification would extend to the region of Southeast Asia and East Asia, turning themselves from Portuguese subjects to Spanish subjects and Macao would therefore be forced to open to Spanish merchants, who already had their strong base in Manila to protect their commercial interests and partially traded with Fujianese merchants from China (Chang 1969; Souza 1986; Coates 2009b). On the other hand, Spanish merchants located in Manila also wished to take advantage of Portuguese access to the Chinese market. As Chang (1969) suggested, the Portuguese residents in Macao took advantage of their (relatively) close relations with local authorities and the general fear of foreigners in Chinese soil, such as framing the Spanish (and later the Dutch) as pirates and evil-doers and hiding from Chinese authority so as to maintain her semi-independent status and monopoly over Chinese trade. It was also suggested that the Portuguese community "implicitly" surrendered part of the legal autonomy in Macao in exchange for Chinese protection against other European aggression (Chang 1969; Souza 1986; Coates 2009a;2009b). Although Chinese authority may not really welcome Portuguese monopoly over her foreign trade to other European countries and remained open to newcomers to trade near Canton, it did not actively intervene or create another settlement other than the Portuguese merchant (Chang 1969:101 – 102). Accompanied with the diplomatic bargain with the Chinese authorities, the Portuguese Macao authority also made strong appeal against their own imperial court on the competition of trading rights with the Spanish subject in Manila. By 1594, the Spanish king issued a decree to remove Spanish trading rights with China at Manila and passed the rights exclusively to his Portuguese subjects at Macao, Macao enjoyed its peak in terms of intermediacy with the the Portuguese community in Macao developing exclusive link from Japan, through China and India, to Portugal, and monopolised the European trading network in South China Sea from Canton to Manila and Malacca. From the Portuguese perspective, the extensive network built at Macao turned Macao as an ideal **hub** for her commercial empire and business interests in Europe and China.

On the contrary, other Europeans could never utilise such high level of intermediacy nor successfully established themselves in Macao. Not only the Spanish merchants were forced to surrender their trading rights to Chinese (Fujian) merchants in Spanish Manila, the Dutch and the British were also barred from sharing the trading rights enjoyed by Portuguese merchants. For instance, in order to fence off the Dutch and the British communities, the Portuguese Macao authority decided to build gun foundry and fortify Macao through building walls and cannons since early 17th century (Garrett 2010). Therefore, from other European perspective, Macao was a port that could never be used without Portuguese discretion until the mid-17th century, when the Dutch and the British navies successfully established their trading posts and colonies in Southeast Asia and challenged Portuguese monopoly over the sea lanes of communication from Goa to Nagasaki. Prior to that, other European communities could never establish their "centrality" at Macao nor enjoyed a share of Chinese trade or other Asian trade through Macao's network. Macao was therefore a mere **non-port** Chinese city, which the Europeans did not possess any form of generating power and could not utilise the network for their own diplomatic or economic agenda. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarised the separate port

geography of Macao in 1557 and that in early-17th century:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low	Nil
Level of intermediacy	Low	Low	Nil
Type of port	Coastal town	Coastal town	Non-port

Table 4.1 The port geography of Macao in 1557

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low	Nil
Level of intermediacy	Low (economic gain < security threats)	High	Nil
	Medium (economic gain > security threats)		
Type of port	Coastal town (economic gain < security threats)	Hub	Non-port
	Outport (economic gain > security threats)		

Table 4.2 The port geography of Macao in early-17th century

The “Fall” of Macao as a Portuguese Hub and a European Outport: European Port Diplomacy against a European port established in China

The decree issued by the Spanish King, who was also the King of Portugal, in 1594 ceased the Spanish trading rights with China at Manila. Since then, Portuguese Macao began to dictate the Sino-European trade and Japanese-European trade. Although the Protestant European empires such as the Dutch and the British Empire wished to challenge the dominant position of the Iberian Empire in Southeast and East Asia, they were never successful during the early years of the 17th century. In the case of Macao, for instance, the Portuguese Macao authority had successfully defended against various armed raids from the Dutch since –601 (Coates 2009b:55 - 56). The armed raids ended when the Truce of Antwerp was concluded in 1609, and the Dutch businessmen were allowed to carry on their business in the Southeast and East Asia except for those ports and places controlled by the Spanish reign, which also included the Portuguese ports outside Europe owing to the personal union between Portuguese and Spanish Empire (Chang 1969.; Coates 2009b). The Truce, while giving other European empires an access to the region, also protected Portuguese monopoly of the sea lanes of communication from Japan via Macao to Malacca, enjoying its golden era of trade and commercial network in the region (Souza 1986; Coates 2009). The door of Macao remained closed to other Europeans despite the concession made by the Spanish crown to liberalise trade in the region. To some extent, the concession resulted in the inevitable decline of Macao several decades later. The decline of Macao, on one hand, led to the change of Chinese diplomacy towards Macao, as the Asian maritime space was opened by Europeans from both the Catholic Church and Protestant Church, resulting in both greater security concerns and greater economic prosperity to trade with other foreign communities. On the other hand, the Portuguese authority in Macao was forced to respond to the changing diplomatic environment at both the Chinese and European fronts.

At the Chinese front, the arrival of other Europeans, in particular the Protestant rivals, triggered

the anxiety of both Portuguese Macao authority and the Chinese imperial court. As mentioned above, the Portuguese community at Macao decided to strengthen Macao's defence through fortification and building gun foundry (Garrett 2010), which was an act never welcomed by the Chinese authorities. The planned fortification and weaponry facilities of Macao, which could be viewed as boosting Portuguese "centrality" of the port through military installations, had echoed the security concern of Chinese government over the presence of foreign communities in China. As discussed in the last section, Macao could only serve as an **outport** to China if and only if both the local and central authority perceived the security threats could be compensated by the economic gain such that the restriction against Macao's intermediacy would be lifted. However, the newly installed military and naval facilities, together with inhuman acts like public execution of Dutch "sailors" after the victory made Chinese local authorities to rethink the perceived benefits and threats of having a foreign settlement at Chinese soil (Chang 1969; Coates 2009a; 2009b). In fact, there were rumours circulated in the Chinese community against the Portuguese intention to fortify and militarise Macao, which was perceived as an aggression to seize Chinese throne rather than a defence against Protestant Europeans, were widely circulated among the Chinese officials and communities (Coates 2009b:56). Even though the rumours were discharged by Chinese military after investigation, the Chinese authorities decided to step in and increased their control over the city, such as cutting off food and water supply to Portuguese community through official and civilian means (Chang 1969:123 - 124; Coates 2009b:71). The Barrier Gate was shut down, new customs control and heavier duties were introduced to Portuguese merchant ships, fines were imposed to Portuguese Macao authority against its failure to block "barbarians" (the British ship London) or Japanese to enter or stay in the port. New permit and license requirements were introduced against buildings built or ships docked in Macao (Chang 1969:119 - 120; Coates 2009b:71). Such policies not only weakened Portuguese centrality in Macao as the generating capacity was limited by a more stringent control of vital supplies from the Chinese mainland, but also curtailed Macao's connectivity to other Chinese markets.

Even though the Portuguese merchants wished to restore their friendly relationship with Chinese traders by introducing a partnered association to regulate imports and exports at Macao, the civilian partnership did not work well but turning the Chinese communities more hostile to their Portuguese counterparts (Chang 1969; Coates 2009). The heavier control from Chinese authorities, on the other hand, induced more smuggling activities that harmed Chinese centrality enjoyed at Macao as this kind of activities reduced the formal capacity for local authorities to generate revenues through levies and duties as well as personal benefits – but only created nuisance as the local authorities were obliged to tackle the problem of smuggling to protect the official revenues. As a result, the perceived gap between security threats and economic gain became larger and further upset Chinese local authorities. The deteriorating relationship between Chinese authorities and Portuguese Macao authority resulted in the termination of all commercial privileges of Portuguese merchants at Canton and the commercial door was shut again against Portuguese traders. Since then, the Portuguese merchants at Macao became out-of-favour from Chinese authorities' and merchants' perspectives, thus they actively shut down Macao's land and maritime linkage to the rest of the Chinese territory. The eventual shutdown of Portuguese Macao trading network with Chinese inland traders at Canton not only reflected Chinese scepticism against Portuguese motives in Macao, but also practically transformed Macao as a **non-port** to Chinese community. While the Chinese government maintained low to medium level of centrality owing to the increased policy and political pressure from Beijing to Macao, the complete shutdown of Macao's connectivity to Chinese mainland had removed Macao as a possible port choice of Chinese authority to further its trade to Portuguese community.

The decline of Macao's role as a Portuguese hub to administer Southeast Asia-China-Japan

trade was further curtailed by the changing geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia and East Asia. The continuous invasions (and defeats) of Dutch navy in early 17th century did not result in a total retreat of Dutch interests in the region, rather the Dutch began to collude with local pirates and eventually settled at Formosa (Taiwan) after 1625. The Dutch growing influence in Southeast Asia and Formosa allowed them to prey on Portuguese ships in the regions and to obstruct the sea lanes of communications between Malacca and Macao. Although the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa signed a convention with British companies which allowed well-armed British ships to take Portuguese passage to China, such diplomatic act failed to protect Portuguese sea lanes of communication from Malacca to Macao (Coates 2009b:70). Instead, the eventual arrival of British merchant ship *London* not only triggered a tightened control of Chinese authorities as mentioned above, but also rendered Portuguese Macao more vulnerable to other European influences. Europeans other than the Portuguese could finally get access to Macao's water and trading network through the convention concluded between Portugal and Britain. With the collapse of Malacca in 1641, the Portuguese traders were cut off from their Southeast Asia stronghold and the intermediacy of Macao could no longer maintain at its Western front.

At the eastern front, Portuguese trading rights in Japan received successive blows as the Tokugawa Shogun adopted various measures to confine the spread of Christianity in the territory, for example the re-enactment of anti-Christianity edict in 1616 and a total ban of Christianity in 1620. Missionaries were formally banned from entering Japan and a Japanese official agent was sent to Macao, asking the overseas Japanese community to return and cut off their connections with Portuguese and other European trades at Macao (Souza 1986; Coates 2009a; 2009b). The exclusive trading right received its fatal blow when the third Tokugawa Shogun, Iemitsu, issued the Sakoku edict (close-country order) in 1635, cutting off all European trade in Nagasaki and expelling them to Deshima, a small artificial islet for foreign trade (ibid). The remaining Portuguese and European traders, except for the Dutch who assisted the Shogunate military actions during the Shimabara Rebellion, were expelled from Japan after the alleged connections between the rebellion forces and Portuguese traders. The end of Japanese-Portuguese trading network had effectively cut off Macao's intermediacy from its East front, with the network being surrendered to the Dutch traders.

The changing political situation in Asia had already put Portuguese Macao at the verge of collapse as the maritime network and the sea lanes of communication from Goa to Nagasaki were eroded by the arrival of Protestant Europe and the close-door policy of Chinese and Japanese government. As a result, the level of centrality, i.e. the capacity to generate economic gain and spread political values was heavily hammered as the exclusive trading rights in China and Japan was no longer available to the Portuguese community (Souza 1986; Coates 2009a; 2009b). Nonetheless, Portuguese Macao remained to be an **outport** for Portuguese community as they could still utilise the Spanish network in Asia and Southeast Asia to promote her economic benefits. Even though the Portuguese community in Macao did not make good terms with the Spanish community in Manila when both parties competed for the trading rights in China (Chang 1969), the Malacca-Macao-Manila trade remained an important component of Portuguese Asian trading network. Especially when the Japanese trading network was shut down after 1635, the Portuguese traders in Macao could only rely on their linkage with Spanish Manila, Malacca and Goa (Coates 2009b). However, when the Portuguese royal house decided to revolt against the Spanish crown in Europe and supported by her fellow traders in Asia, Portuguese traders had expelled the entire Spanish community and the network it represented from Macao, effectively cutting off the trading route between Macao and Manila (ibid.). As a result, when Malacca was also fallen to the hand of the Dutch in 1641, the Portuguese Macao suddenly found themselves isolated from the original Goa-Malacca-Macao passage, with only small islets in Southeast Asia to support the lone Portuguese city in Chinese soil (Souza 1986;

Coates 2009a; 97eterr. The lack of maritime network possessed by Portuguese Macao not just further reduced the level of intermediacy of Portuguese Macao, but also hammered the level of centrality as Portuguese Macao was no longer economically profitable or socio-politically attractive to the surrounding states or governments. As a result, even though the Portuguese Macao government maintained minimal yet effective control over the city under the due influence of Chinese authorities, the trading network developed was withered and the golden age of Macao as a Portuguese **hub** ended after 1641. With reference to the typology suggested in Chapter 3, the withered intermediacy and weakened centrality had turned Macao from a Portuguese **hub** back to the **coastal town** position, and the Portuguese community in Macao could only utilise the geographical advantage of Macao to connect with China and the world, for instance smuggling through the maritime routes between Macao and the Chinese mainland (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). From the European perspective, the decline of Portuguese maritime dominance, in terms of the loss of trading rights in China and the eroded sea lanes of communication from Goa to Nagasaki, had opened up the maritime space in the region. Other Europeans, especially the Dutch and the British, had gained access to the sea lanes of communication in Asia and eventually China (Chang 1969; Coates 2009). For instance, the convention concluded between the Spanish Empire and British Empire was a first attempt by other Europeans to gain access to Macao's centrality and took advantage of its limited supplies and a temporary settlement. As a result, other Europeans started to take Macao as a coastal town that could possibly support their voyage to China, which was eventually realised in the 18th century, when China re-opened its foreign trade with Europeans. Table 4.3 summarised the port geography of Macao perceived by different diplomatic actors from mid-17th century (after the fall of Malacca):

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low	Low
Level of intermediacy	Nil	Low	Low
Type of port	Non-port	Coastal town	Coastal town

Table 4.3 The port geography of Macao in mid-17th century

The changing policy position of China and Japan towards the Portuguese traders, the tense relationship between Portugal and Spain, and the fall of Malacca to the Dutch navies, brought an end to Macao's short golden period of regional trade. After 1641, the Portuguese community in Macao found themselves losing control over the sea lanes of communication from Indian Ocean to the Sea of Japan, and they were isolated by the Japanese shogunate, the Chinese imperial court and Malayan sultans. For the next 60 years, Macao was running in chaos with the lack of supplies from the Chinese authorities and the lack of support from the local community to open up the trade routes with other European countries. (Coates 2009:81) With the lack of intermediacy, Macao remained a coastal town, if not a non-port, in the eyes of Chinese, Portuguese and Europeans, until the 18th century when the geopolitical context had changed in China.

The change could be conceptualised in two different but inter-linked ways: first, the gradual accommodation of the presence of other Europeans by the Chinese and Portuguese community; second, the gradual opening up of Chinese trade again under the new Manchurian court (Coates 2009a; 2009b). Although the new imperial Manchurian court and local Chinese communities remained sceptical against the presence of foreign communities (Fairbank 1969a; 1969b), Canton was re-opened to foreign trade with a newly installed Canton system – and to both Catholic and Protestant Europe (ibid.). However, the Protestant Europeans, similar to the Catholic Europeans, were also required to leave Canton after the end of the trading season and

they were restricted to bring women with them when they were in China (Coates 2009a; Porter 1996; De Pina-Cabral 2002). As a result, the Protestant Europeans demanded a place for settlement at Chinese coast where they could normally reside during the off-season. Macao, being as the “most European” place located in the Chinese soil and historically connected to China through maritime and land network, seemed to be the most convenient place for both Catholic and Protestant communities to reside. However, the difference in religious and social practice between the Catholic and Protestant community, which remained important to define the political cleavage among European states, had limited the acceptance of the Protestant European community in Macao. On the one hand, the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, who was appointed to oversee Portuguese limited interests in Asia, saw the Protestant European community at Macao as a threat to Portuguese interests and identity in Asia (Souza 1986; Coates 2009a; 2009b). The Portuguese authority in Goa maintained the old standards in governing foreign residence in Macao, for example they should speak Portuguese, registered with a Portuguese name and behaved like a Catholic, which the demands were unrealistic to other Europeans. On the other hand, the Portuguese in Macao, who perceived themselves as the de facto defender of Portuguese interests in Asia, found the existence of the reluctant Catholic Church (in the form of Bishop sent to Macao since 1691) and the imperial court (in the form of the Governor and outdated rules) had prevented them from attaining the full potential of the benefits brought by other Europeans (*ibid.*). As a result, the local Senate always lobbied for a more relax and liberal approach to govern Europeans other than Portuguese. As a result, the Bishop was removed in 1757 and so did the restrictive rules (Coates 2009a; 2009b).

In fact, the shifting of power balance between Catholic states and Protestant states, in both Europe and Asia, had already limited Portuguese strong governance to other European communities: first, the Sino-European trade was already dominated by the British merchants, such that local Portuguese community depended on “European” trade rather than “Portuguese” trade. Second, the political unrest in Lisbon was viewed as a challenge of “true” Portuguese interests in Asia, such that any full-fledged Portuguese governance in Macao was both resisted by the Portuguese and Macanese community living in Macao (Coates 2009; De Pina-Cabral 2002). As a result, local Portuguese and Macanese communities sometimes side-lined the religious difference and helped the British to pacify their tension with Chinese authorities, or even accommodated the presence of British community in Macao against the threats from Spanish Manila (*ibid.*:87 – 90). As Coates (2009:83) commented, the British community “behaved virtually as if the Portuguese did not exist, and the Americans and others were not much better.” While the European communities maintained a relatively small size population compared to the Portuguese and the Macanese community in Macao, the Portuguese governance structure could never govern these non-Catholic communities effectively.

Although Macao was re-plugged into the sea lanes of communication from Indian Ocean to South China Sea, it was at the expense of losing her capacity, at central level, to govern the rest of the European communities and her control over the local communities. Instead, the governing capacity was further diffused to the local Senate in Macao. Except for radical movements such as the toleration of British “occupation” in 1808 against the potential threat from Spanish Manila, the Portuguese authority largely maintained its weak centrality, in terms of governing the local Portuguese and Macanese community, as well as a revival of economic generating capacity through accommodating other Europeans in the port. In evaluating the intermediacy, Macao was once reconnected to major sea lanes of communication as well as the maritime network in the region. However, compared to the glorious years Macao enjoyed in the past, the maritime network and connections were no longer owned by the Portuguese but other Protestant Europeans such as the Dutch and the British. Therefore, the reason of which Macao was selected was never related its economic connections or cultural attractiveness, but the geographical advantage of Macao as well as the established Portuguese network in China

and the rest of Asia. Coincidentally coined by Coates (2009b:83), after the removal of the Bishop as well as the restrictive rules against other Europeans, Macao was then turned to be the “outpost of all Europe” and once again became “the centre and fulcrum of foreign relations with China.” The old Portuguese network was absorbed and integrated to other European maritime network, for example the peaceful settlement between the British navies and Chinese authorities in 1808, or the opium smuggling case of Thomas Beale (ibid: 87 – 90). While it was impossible for Macao to return its glorious past as a Portuguese **hub**, the level of intermediacy was partially revived through its reconnection with the sea lanes of communication owned by other Europeans. As a result, the role of Macao had changed from a Portuguese hub to an **outport**, serving for both Portuguese and European communities.

From the European perspective, despite the growing influence in Macao in terms of political institutions and economic dominance, the European communities were still under the rule of Portuguese authority in Macao. In addition, the reopening of Canton for foreign trade was also accompanied with the introduction of Canton System so as to govern the foreign communities (Fairbank 1942; Fairbank and Teng 1941). Owing to severe competition in sea lanes of communication and trading rights in Asia, the maritime networks enjoyed by each European state were never unified. As a result, rather than position Macao as a **hub** that was dedicated for “the” European interests, European authorities took Macao as an **outport** for their own sake and connected to the network of their own. The selection or the eventual non-selection of Macao as the civilian port for pursuing the European interests, therefore, was primarily based on the perception economic interests gained through Macao’s intermediacy, or the ownership of greater centrality in other civilian ports. Finally, as reviewed above, the position of Chinese authority remained largely unchanged except the re-opening of Canton for foreign trade. The Confucius strategic culture, a land-based mind-set and bureaucratic administration, remained the crucial elements in formulating Manchurian foreign policy (Fairbank 1969a). As a result, the mere re-opening of Canton and its reconnection to foreign trade only led the Manchurian court to return her position to Macao during the Ming Dynasty, i.e. the **coastal town** discourse. Table 4.4 summarised the port geography of Macao in 1757, the year when the local Senate successfully removed the Bishop and the restrictive rules introduced by the Portuguese imperial court:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low	Low
Level of intermediacy	Low	Medium	Medium
Type of port	Coastal town	Outport	Outport

Table 4.4 The port geography of Macao in 1757

From 1757 onwards, the status quo was largely maintained except some radical incident such as the British “occupation” in 1808. Despite the ups and downs of Sino-European relations, Macao continued to serve as an undisputed **outport** that connected Europe and Asia, as well as a nodal point of major sea lanes of communication in the region. However, the situation had changed fundamentally after the outbreak of the 1st Anglo-Chinese War, or commonly known as the Opium War. Documented by Coates (2009b), the British originally offered the local Portuguese government in Macao a deal to upgrade British commitment in Macao in exchange of the protection of European subjects who were resembled in Macao after the opium ban initiated by the Manchurian imperial court. British also wished to rebuild the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and took Macao as the bridgehead to protect the European (British) trading rights in China. The diplomatic pact, however, was rejected by the Portuguese authority in Macao and Macao remained neutral throughout the Opium War (Coates 2009b; Wu 1997). The decision

was no unsurprising as the Portuguese Macao relied on the prosperity of Sino-European trade on one hand, the food and water supplies from the Chinese mainland on the other hand (Coates 2009b; Wu 1997; De Pina-Cabral 2002). As a result, a good Anglo-Portuguese relation might bring more fortune to the Portuguese community in Macao by an enhanced trade relation with the dominant British Empire, but a bad Sino-Portuguese relation would cause life-and-death problems to the local communities in Macao.

The move was rational, but the price to pay was huge to Macao, especially in terms of its port status in European trade. The Opium War was won by the British navy and the Manchurian court was forced to cease Hong Kong, an underdeveloped port a few hundred miles away from Macao, as a British colony and four more international treaty port including Shanghai. The creation of treaty ports and British Hong Kong gave Europeans and Americans extraterritorial rights and they were no longer subjected to Chinese legal rules and political influence. The majority of European and American merchants, even for those Portuguese merchants used to reside at Macao, decided to move their headquarters, capital and maritime network from Macao to Hong Kong (Coates 2009a; Ho 2012; van Dyke 2012). Macao was eventually abandoned as an **outport** for all Europeans as either the level of centrality or intermediacy was no longer competitive: the British maritime network was then centred at Hong Kong while the institutional capacity enjoyed by Europeans was well-protected by international treaties. The Portuguese community was no longer active at Macao but maintained a minimal level of political and economic influence. The Protestant European communities found themselves more comfortable residing in British Hong Kong. The original maritime network established by Portuguese and European communities were slowly shifted to Hong Kong, along with the migration of Portuguese and European merchants from Macao to Hong Kong. Even for the Chinese traders themselves, the treaty port system established in Hong Kong and Shanghai was more favourable to them as they were no longer subjected to Chinese official controls. The role of Macao, therefore, was secondary to the role of Hong Kong, in the eyes of Chinese, Portuguese and European communities. It was turned to a mere coastal town which the main functions were supportive to the official trade in Hong Kong, such as illegal opium and human trafficking, a neutral gold trade, or a place for European or Chinese merchants in Hong Kong for entertainment (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). The value of Macao, in this case, was purely geographical and readily to be replaced if the diplomatic actors found a more suitable place to handle the “dirty works”. Table 4.5 summarised the port geography of Macao after 1842, when the British Hong Kong was established under the international treaty port system:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low	Low
Level of intermediacy	Low	Low	Low
Type of port	Coastal town	Coastal town	Coastal town

Table 4.5 The port geography of Macao after 1842

The Revival of Macao as a Chinese Cityport? The Role of Macao before the Handover of Sovereignty

Although the Sino- the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking concluded in 1887 also turned Macao into a Portuguese colony that enjoyed a similar status as British Hong Kong, Macao could never come back as an **outport** of Europe¹⁸. On one hand, damages were already done to Macao’s

¹⁸ Portugal and China have signed the Treaty of Amity and Trade in Tianjin in 1862 but the treaty was not formally ratified by both parties owing to the last-minute change of clauses after the signatures. As a result, the treaty was void in 1864 and the status of Macao as a Portuguese colony and a free port was only confirmed by 1887.

intermediacy since the establishment of British Hong Kong had taken away most of the Sino-European trading network which was well-supported by by unchallenged British naval domination from Indian Ocean (through British India) to Strait of Malacca (through British Malaya). On the other hand, the Portuguese government in formulating her treaty with the Manchurian imperial court, took Macao as a strategic asset to balance between China and Europe (Goncalves 2003). For instance, the administrative boundaries of the colonial Macao, not only the territorial boundaries but also the maritime boundaries, were not clearly defined. In fact, the treaty also deliberately barred any transfer of territorial title or administrative rights without the consent of the imperial Chinese authority (Goncalves 2003:58). While there were several attempts made to purchase Macao during the late Qing period and became part of the bargaining chips of the complicated *jeu diplomatique* of major European nations, the Portuguese government generally maintained her promise to the Qing court and remained as the sole *de facto* sovereign administrator of this coastal town, even though by 1880s Lisbon had already found it difficult to assert herself in Macao and in global competition with other European powers (Vasconcelos de Saldanha 1996; cited in Ptak 1998:392 – 394). From the view of other European powers, the importance of Macao was never its socio-political institutions nor commercial networks built in China or Southeast Asia. Rather, its importance was owing to the strategic location between Fort Bayard (currently known as Zhanjiang), a French colony in China, and British Hong Kong. The geographical position of Macao, therefore, created a spatial separation between French geopolitical interest in China, which had already connected the South-western part of China through the French Indochina, and British geopolitical interest in China, i.e. the British domination of maritime trading network which covered the South-eastern part of China, from Canton to Shanghai (Coates 2009b).

The key geographical, but not geopolitical, position of port Macao could also be reflected from the lack of interests of “Macao Issue” after World War I peace negotiation. Discussed in Vasconcelos de Saldanha’s work (1995) on Portuguese foreign policy in early 20th century, Lisbon wished to take advantage of the post-war context to rebuild her influence in China and solved the Macao Issue as “the victors” of World War I. Prior to the Washington Conference, the Kingdom of Portugal had made several attempts to modernise Macao’s natural port facilities, including the Loureiro Project suggested in 1884, the Branco Project and the Miranda Guedes Project between 1907 – 1909, but none of these projects materialised owing to Portuguese calculation against the potential opposition from the Manchurian court and the British government in changing the status quo of Macao (Haberzetti and Ptak 1991). Even though the Manchurian court was replaced by the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China after the 1911 Revolution, Lisbon’s attempts to upgrade the port facilities of Porto Interior of Macao and tried to construct the Porto Exterior from 1919 were still not welcomed by her Chinese counterpart (Vasconcelos de Saldanha 1995:171 – 172; Haberzetti and Ptak 1991:301 – 303). During the Washington Conference, the Portuguese delegates also found that their demand of discussing Macao Issue was side-lined by the agenda of the conference, and they were asked to “remain in strict agreement with the British Delegates” (Vasconcelos de Saldanha, 1996). In addition, the Portuguese diplomats also worried about the increasing Chinese nationalist sentiment against Portuguese suzerainty in Macao would eventually harm the economic position, which by the time was a coastal town for (illegal) opium trade, gambling and prostitution, as the Military Government in Guangdong wished to prohibit any gambling industry in Macao in exchange of the negotiation of the border issues (*ibid.*). As a result, even though the Portuguese authority wished to change the port geography of Macao by boosting its economic and political generating capacity, she was required to balance the diplomatic position of the leading European state, i.e. the Britain, and the Chinese position. The coastal town status of Macao was a kind of consensus agreed by most of the stakeholders in the region. After the Washington Conference, the role of Macao had been stabilised as a secondary coastal town to

support Hong Kong and European interests in China, as well as a political-neutral platform to provide entertainment, opium trade and labour trade.

Building a European Port with Chinese Characteristics: From an Informal Political Condominium to a Formal Political Condominium

The second Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist Party (*KMT*) and Chinese Community Party (CCP) resulted in two ideologically different regimes governing different parts of China, and made Portuguese Macao once again being caught into new diplomatic context: historically, the Colonial Government of Macao formulated her regional agreement with the Military Government of Guangdong which, broadly speaking, was part of the *KMT* government; ideologically, the anti-Communist Salazar regime was a natural ally of the capitalist bloc and NATO; geographically, Portuguese Macao was attached to mainland China governed by the CCP after 1949. Compared to Hong Kong whose colonial government was heavily backed by London against the potential communist infiltration, neither Portuguese status in Macao was heavily threatened by the new state nor the Macao government was heavily backed by Lisbon and supported the Nationalist regime in Taipei (Fernandes 1997; 2002; 2008; Goncalves 2003). While this illustrated again the lack of geopolitical interests of China and Europe over Macao, the key geographical position of Macao was indeed re-utilised as a potential breakthrough for the communist China against the Western blockage.

Discussed in Fernandes' works (1997; 2008) on Maoist policy to Macao, Beijing always favoured the status quo and continued the "informal political condominium" (Fernandes 1997:47) so as to utilise the commercial and personnel network of Macao (as well as Hong Kong). From Beijing's point of view, the policy of maintaining the status quo, compared to the policy consisting in taking back Macao (as well as Hong Kong) in terms of sovereign and administrative title, was always preferred, unless any provocative actions in Macao (and Hong Kong) had threatened the legitimacy and security of the newly established state. In fact, compared to the British government who was being perceived as cunning and acumen and a major ally of the United States, Beijing considered Lisbon a friendlier Western country with more local support from the Chinese community in Macao (Yahuda 1993; Leung 1999; Chan 2003). could also be reflected from the comment from the British Governor to Hong Kong Alexander Grantham, who stated that Macao always had "better liaison or side-door contacts with the Chinese authorities", despite the fact that the Lisbon did not acknowledge Beijing as the legitimate regime and was still in contact with Taipei after 1949 (Grantham, 1965[2012]; also cited in Fernandes 1997). The low but intact level of centrality in Macao, from Chinese perspective, was a natural heaven for Beijing importation of "strategic materials" from the outside world, especially when Hong Kong was under enormous pressure from London and Washington to curtail smuggling to mainland China, as well as for Chinese to export their goods through the stamp of "made in Macao" and earning foreign reserves and hard currency like gold through underground transactions (Jain 1976:230 – 242; Edmonds 1989:xxiii – xxiv).

To ensure the level of centrality at Macao remained intact yet without formally taken-over by either the capitalist or communist bloc, Beijing had committed to a two-way strategy: on the one hand, Beijing continuously applied "pressure", though official and people's diplomacy, to Macao and thus Portugal to maintain Macao status as a "Chinese territory under Portuguese administration" (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 1997:50), and any change of status – no matter the implementation of a strengthened embargo regime in 1952 or the 4th centenary celebration of Portuguese occupation of Macao in 1955, was not welcomed by Beijing (Fernandes 2008; Chan 2003). On the other hand, Beijing also resisted the pressure from Moscow to turn Macao as a site for ideological confrontation and a political settlement will only be negotiated "when the conditions are ripe" (Fernandes 2008:249). By establishing the Nam Kwong Trading Company, the *de facto* representative of

the PRC in Macao, Beijing's agenda in Macao was rather obvious: 1) as a "shadow government" in Macao to facilitate the importation of "strategic materials"; 2) as a contact point to meet "red capitalist patriots" and stabilise the Southeast China area, where was the traditional KMT political and economic stronghold; 3) as a bargaining chip to influence Western diplomacy through Lisbon (Fernandes 2008).

From the European perspective, the role of Macao during the early years of the People's Republic of China was maintained at the secondary level which served as a diplomatic bargaining chip. The port functions of Macao, i.e. a European **coastal town**, was never a concern for the Western world, and the development to support the port of Macao remained minimal. It could be best reflected by various actions taken by the West after the embargo was proposed against China after the Korean War. While Britain was a founding member of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and an active coordinator of the Chinese Committee (CHINCOM), the Salazar government was not invited at the first place¹⁹. It was only by 1952 when the capitalist bloc found it necessary to include Macao for an effective embargo against China, that British government decided to include Portugal in the two international committees (Fernandes 2008:237). However, when Portugal's commitment to strengthen the regulatory regime resulted in Chinese para-military responses at the border of Macao, the European world showed little help to Macao and Portugal. For instance, the Portuguese government had first proposed an exemption regime to be set up in Macao, which allowed some goods to be traded between China and the outside world, after the border conflicts in July 1952, but the CHINCOM members found the proposal unworkable and turned down Portuguese request. Revealed by one of the Portuguese delegates, Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, the British delegates in the COCOM were "overall more persistent and tough" towards Macao violations against the embargo. However, when London wished to ease her trade relations with Moscow two years later, she then pressured Washington to negotiate with Lisbon for an exemption regime in Macao, which in return turned down by Macao government and the Overseas Office in Lisbon, even with the persistence of Foreign Office of Portugal to conclude the deal (Fernandes 2008:235 – 238). Such a change in attitude towards Macao from Britain, and perhaps the rest of COCOM members which included the United States and major Western European countries, reflected the fact that Macao's commercial networks with China, compared to that of Hong Kong, was at minimum for any standalone consideration but for the grand diplomatic and commercial considerations of great power politics. In the view of other Europeans other than the Portuguese, a **coastal town** called Macao, which was geographically important but geopolitical trivial, was always ready to be sacrificed for a better diplomatic cause.

From the Portuguese perspective, therefore, the pro-status quo policy from Beijing and the lack of European commitment to support Portugal had limited Portuguese diplomatic options. As revealed by Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Portuguese primary interests in Macao and China were limited to "the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty and the well-being of the colony of Macao" (Fernandes 1997:45). It was done by the selective realism and pragmatism towards Chinese official diplomacy and back-door demands. For instance, while Lisbon showed apparent weakness during the border disputes initiated by Beijing in 1952 and the cancellation of the 4th centenary celebration in 1955, the Salazar government did change the status of Macao from "Overseas Colony" to "Overseas Province" and formally included Macao as the part of the Portuguese Republic (Yang 1998:157; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 2008:243). Several economic plans were drafted to enhance Macao economic well-being such as, the proposal to create an exemption regime in Macao to facilitate the trade between Macao and China, the creation of Portuguese Economic Space, various plans for further industrialisation and

¹⁹ This position might be owing to Salazar's rouge state strategy and growing scepticism against the United Nations, so that Portugal was isolated in the UN by the Western world (Reis 2013).

economic diversification, promoted trade relations between Macao and Portuguese Africa, rather than relying solely on gambling and entertainment industry (Sit, Wong and Cremer 1991; Fernandes 1997). Domestically, the Portuguese government adopted a kind of synarchism to incorporate Chinese business elites from Macao Commercial Association (an unofficial representative of Beijing in Macao), local Macanese communities and Portuguese bureaucrats, so as to balance the interests of Beijing, Macao and Lisbon (Goncalves 2003:58).

In evaluating the port geography and network management during the period, the original motivation of Portuguese government was to take advantage of the complicated diplomatic backdrop to rebuild Macao as a **cityport** from the **coastal town** it has been, through strengthening the centrality via formal incorporation to the Portuguese Overseas Empire and second generation of industrialisation, as well as boosting intermediacy via formal incorporation to the Portuguese Economic Space and commercial ties with other Portuguese Overseas Provinces in Africa in addition to the established linkage with Hong Kong. These plans, however, were not fully utilised owing to two reasons. From the European perspective, any upgrade of Macao port functions would directly challenge the maritime dominance of British Hong Kong, so that the British would try to exert pressure against any plan that might bring up Macao's competitiveness (Fernandes 1997; 2008; Leung 1999; Chan 2003). From the Chinese perspective, local Chinese business elites in Macao always favoured underground and unchecked commercial ties with Beijing, rather than a formalised exemption regime which might alter the status quo (Fernandes 2008). As a result, even though the Portuguese government had developed plans to upgrade the port geography of the informal condominium, the Sino-European disinterest to these plans had limited any meaningful change of the **coastal town**. Both China and Europe enjoyed the "division of labour" between Hong Kong and Macao, which the role of Macao was a secondary **coastal town** supporting the **cityport** Hong Kong. The geographical advantage, the established illegal maritime trade network since the late Qing dynasty, and the politically-neutral position of Macao had made Macao as an ideal **coastal town** for diplomatic trade-off and underground activities: from Beijing perspective, Macao was always a good smuggling port to break through the Western trade embargo; from other European perspective, Macao was a diplomatic bargaining chip that allowed selective engagement and containment against China. As a result, the proposed reform of port infrastructure by Lisbon was not fully realised and the upgrade of Macao's centrality and intermediacy was suppressed. Table 4.6 summarised the port geography after 1949:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Medium (proposed)	Low
		Low (reality)	
Level of intermediacy	Low	Medium (proposed)	Low
		Low (reality)	
Type of port	Coastal town	Cityport (proposed)	Coastal town
		Coastal town (reality)	

Table 4.6 The port geography of Macao after 1949

The implicit co-governance system became more salient when the Cultural Revolution in mainland China had its spill-over in Macao in December 1966. The local unrests and the threat to cut off supplies to Macanese and Portuguese population resulted in a humiliating public

apology by the Portuguese governor in Macao and a secret pact was concluded between Beijing and Lisbon on the promise to fully cooperate with Beijing demands in exchange of Portuguese continuous administration in Macao (Tam 1994:245 – 254; Huang 1991:237 – 239; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 1997:50). Since then, the synarchism was tilted in favour of Beijing and the informal condominium was at its peak, i.e. a European port with high Chinese (political) characteristics. Indeed, many scholars argued that the Portuguese colonial rule ended after 1967, but not 1999 when the sovereignty was formally transferred to Beijing and the Macao Special Administration Region (MSAR) was in operation (Tam 1994; Chan 2003; Leung 1999). From Beijing perspective, the political “centrality” of Macao was further secured by the secret pact although on surface Macao was still ruled by the Portugal.

The status quo was further upset by Portuguese decolonisation strategy after 1974, when the newly established Portuguese government decided to retreat from Macao as part of the global decolonisation commitment. Prior to Portuguese unilateral move, Macao (like Hong Kong) was removed from the international list of dependent territory such that the two Chinese territories were not subjected to self-determination like other European colonies in Africa and Southeast Asia. Shortly after the *coup d'état* on 25th April 1974, delegates from the provisional government were sent to Macao to ensure the status quo remained and Portugal had no intention to seize the territory (Gonclaves 2003:58). A remark was made by Almeida Santos, then Minister for Inter-territorial Coordination, which also hinted that universal rules, i.e. self-determination and referendum, shall not be applied to the “special case” of Macao and the decolonisation process should be determined with the objective to resolve problems and relieve tensions (*ibid.*). However, the Portuguese authority also revealed the desire to retreat from Macao, but such offer was rejected by Beijing (Bruce 1975:138). A series of informal negotiations were held from 1976 on the Sino-Portuguese relations as well as the future of Macao. By 1979, the two countries reached a secret understanding that Macao was “a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration” (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498). The formal acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty in Macao paved the way for a planned retrocession of Macao to China in the near future. As discussed by Chan (2003:498 – 499), the secrecy of the future retrocession arrangement of Macao as well as the lack of firm commitment to recover Macao in 1979 reflected that Beijing’s diplomatic position to Macao was always secondary to two “unification” issues: the national unification between mainland China and Taiwan, and the recovery of sovereign title of British Hong Kong (see also Edmonds 1993; Fernandes 1997; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Leung 1999; Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 2002). The formal yet underground condominium was finally revealed in January 1987 when the Lisbon-Beijing negotiation on the future of Macao was nearly finalized, and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration was signed on 13th April 1987, making the co-governance system on Macao fully on the surface and ruling the final years of Macao as a Portuguese administered Chinese territory.

The conclusion of Macao’s future in 1987 triggered a new round of port diplomacy and port geography re-engineering at Macao. From the Portuguese perspective, the primary objective in Macao was rather simple: an honourable exit without abandoning the people in Macao, and trying to maintain the Latin culture in Macao which could be a potential tie for Portugal to utilise in the future Sino-Portuguese relations (Edmonds and Yee 1999:802 – 803). These interests might possibly be achieved through accumulating Portuguese political, economic and cultural “centrality” and/or strengthening Macao international presence and “intermediacy” during the last years of colonial period. In short, upgrading Macao port geography from a **coastal town** to **cityport** or even a **gateway** would also be in the best interests of Portuguese “honourable exit” strategy. However, it should also be noted that the structure of formal condominium also limited Portuguese plan to build up too many political and economic muscles in Macao, as after all any Portuguese plans should never challenge “Chinese effective

control or sovereignty over the territory” (Edmonds and Yee 1999:803). The Chinese perspective on reengineering Macao port geography was rather complex compared to that of Portugal, and such complexity was largely due to 1) the lack of local knowledge on Macao populace; 2) the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; 3) the handover issues of Hong Kong and Macao (Edmonds and Yee 1999:807 – 808). At the beginning of the negotiation, Beijing did not differentiate the socio-political situation of Hong Kong and Macao. Therefore, Beijing policy towards Macao was largely modelled from that towards Hong Kong, even though pro-Beijing loyalists were, compared to those in Hong Kong, politically dominant in Macao after 1966. As a result, Beijing had tried their very best to accommodate Macao populace, including the Macanese community and the Macao-born Chinese community. In addition, Beijing also assumed that the “close” Anglo-Portuguese relations would serve as a bridge to communicate Chinese attitudes towards European colonialism in Hong Kong and Macao, such that Beijing position on the validity of those unequal treaties was well acknowledged by both Lisbon, whose the undergrounded negotiation had already started since 1979, and London, whose the official negotiation started in 1982. As a result, Beijing was caught in an “unwelcomed surprise” when she realised that London would not follow the position of Lisbon in giving up the sovereign titles of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula (Chan 2003:499).

After realising all the differences in the case of Hong Kong and Macao, Beijing changed their strategies towards Macao and took Macao and Sino-Portuguese cooperation as a diplomatic bargaining chip against the confrontational Sino-British relations and the handover issue of Hong Kong, especially after the outburst of Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Compared to strong criticisms against any kind of infrastructural projects in Hong Kong during the last 5 years of British colonial rules, Beijing turned a blind eye over Portuguese utilization of public funds to support infrastructural and cultural projects, even though the legality of some projects were in doubt (Leung 1999; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999). Official representatives from Beijing and Macao seldom complained or even made enquiry on Macao public administration on the surface, although it was said that Beijing were rather discontent about the lack of efficiency, the slow localization of Macao public administration and the legal reform (Edmonds 1993; Yee and Lo 1991; Leung 1999; Chan 2003). From the Chinese perspective, the smooth handover of Macao as well as the privileges given to Macao on one hand was a political demonstration to both British and Hong Kong communities, on the other hand was a kind of appeasement policy towards Lisbon as Beijing always afraid of pre-mature departure and a sudden end of Portuguese colonial rules in Macao, which in return hammered the confidence of Hong Kong community and, ultimately the Taiwanese community, on “One Country, Two Systems” (Edmonds and Yee 1999:807 – 808; Chan 2003:503).

The importance to maintain such political confidence was best reflected by the changing attitude towards the Macao handover process and poor administration after 1997, when the sovereign and administrative titles of Hong Kong were successfully reunited at Beijing hands. For example, while the direct stationery of PLA in Macao was not included in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, Beijing, under the name of helping the future MSAR to maintain order, unilaterally announced the plan to build garrison and stationed troops in Macao in 1998 (Edmond Yee 1998; Chan 2003). This move might be symbolic and indeed welcomed by the pro-Beijing camp in Macao, yet from Lisbon perspective she was caught in a surprise as the arrangement to station troops in Macao was never included in the Joint Declaration or the MBL, was contradicted to the mutual understanding between Beijing and Lisbon, and was never practiced by Lisbon since 1960s (Edmonds and Yee 1998:808). The unilateral change of policy after 1997 could only be explained by the de-coupling of the handover issue of Hong Kong and that of Macao.

All in all, as Hooks and Neves (2002) and Henders (2001) separately argued, the overall

strategy for Beijing in dealing with Hong Kong and Macao was a controlled internationalisation: on one hand Beijing required an international endorsement on “One Country, Two Systems” as a viable solution for Hong Kong, Macao and the eventual Taiwan; on the other hand, Beijing always avoided “over-internationalisation” against the handover issues of Hong Kong and Macao. In the case of Macao, Henders further argued that the relative “less internationally visible and less threatening” Macao potentially allowed Beijing to “experiment with local autonomy” (Lam 1999; cited in Henders 2001:348). While Willy Lam did not explicitly argue that such experiment concerns on domestic fronts or international fronts, one official made explicit comment that Macao participation in different international governmental organizations (IGO) reflected different needs, different positions and different interests (Henders 2001:348). Indeed, Beijing had actively sponsored Macao international position through various means since the eve of Portuguese colonial rules, and the policy continued nowadays such as the introduction of Macao Forum which will be briefly covered in the next section.

In short, the formal condominium on one hand further strengthened Beijing political “centrality” over Macao as she was now formally incorporated into the future planning of Macao and would eventually take back Macao administrative title in 1999; on the other hand Beijing would maintain the strategy to utilize Macao “intermediacy” as a leverage towards Europe – not just Portugal but the United Kingdom or even the European Union – and tried different “intermediacy” experiment in Macao so as to assist Beijing future diplomatic needs (Fernandes 1997; Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 2002; Mendes 2011; 2014). However, it should be noted that Beijing always wished to maintain her absolute control over former European colonies like Hong Kong and Macao, such that the political “centrality” was always prevailed in planning the future port geography of Macao as well as Hong Kong. Table 4.7 summarised the expected port geography of Macao after 1999, the handover of sovereignty of Macao from Lisbon back to Beijing:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High
Type of port	Cityport	Gateway

Table 4.7 The expected port geography of Macao after 1999

The Chinese and Portuguese respective expectations on the port geography and port role of Macao resulted in many policy cooperation and conflicts between Beijing and Lisbon during the final stage of the transition period. In terms of cooperation, both Lisbon and Beijing had actively sponsored Macao international personality and active engagement in economic IGOs and international agreements (Hender 2001); both Lisbon and Beijing decided to promote a hybrid cultural identity of Macao and selectively leaving traces of Portuguese colonial history and Latin culture in Macao (Edmonds 1993; Yee and Lo 1991; Lam 2010); strengthening Macao economic “centrality”, i.e. connecting to mainland Chinese urban space such as Zhuhai, through railway projects and “intermediacy”, i.e. connecting Macao to the maritime space, through the construction of new deep-water port at Taipa and Coloane (Edmonds 1993; Fernandes 1997). In terms of conflicts, the slow localisation process and the overemphasis of Portuguese heritage and history in Macao, and the efforts to incorporate Macao civil service under Portuguese bureaucratic system, were perceived as a way for Portuguese to extend their influence towards the future Macao Special Administrative Region – an act always condemned by Beijing (Yee and Lo 1991; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003). However, the overall consensus in upgrading the port role and port functions from a coastal town prevailed during the negotiation process, despite the difference in terms of final role. From Beijing perspective, Macao could serve as a Chinese cityport with Latin European

characteristics, so as to demonstrate both the commitment to modernise the coastal town Macao and maintain its cultural connection to Lusophone world. From the Portuguese perspective, Lisbon could take Beijing modernisation strategy in Macao as a way to strengthen its economic and cultural generating power in Macao, so that she could claim a glorious retreat. A further wishful thinking from Lisbon was that the inclusion of Macao in Chinese future development plan in Southern China, together with the connection with the Lusophone countries and the European Union, could serve as a gateway for Lisbon to connect the Chinese market and the European market.

European Port Diplomacy prior to the Handover: A Passive Inclusion and a Back-up Plan to Sustain EU Interests in China

As the above table suggested, the original reform of port geography did not include the position of the European Communities or its successor the European Union. Albeit both Britain and Portugal were a member of the EC (and later the EU) since 1973 and 1986 respectively, pan-European responses were rather silent against the issues of Hong Kong and Macao. Such benign neglect of these European colonies in China is explained as follows: in terms of institutional capacity, the EC did not have the institutional practice to develop collective responses towards Member States' diplomatic business or major international issues; in terms of political culture, London, and to some extent Lisbon as well, reluctance to "communitize" the Hong Kong question further strengthened EC perception that the issues of Hong Kong and Macao were bilateral business and other European states should stay away from the process (Hook and Neves 2002:127). From Beijing perspective, these considerations were more than welcome as Beijing was used to state-to-state bilateral negotiation. As a result, while the EC imposed trade embargo against China after 1989 and slowly developed collective response over humanitarian issues, it remained silent over Macao transition and did not formulate collective responses other than diplomatic statements from the European Council (*ibid.*).

The status quo, however, was slightly altered in 1992 when Portugal was designated to hold the rotating the Presidency Country of the Council of the European Communities, and a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter named as EC-Macao TCA) was signed between the European Communities and Macao. It was the very first agreement signed between Europe and China after the Tiananmen Incident, as well as the very first agreement signed between the European Communities and a European "colony" in China and a non-state government. However, the reason behind such diplomatic breakthrough was not driven by major changes of EC collective interests in Macao. Quite a contrary, Macao was never an ideal place for European investment owing to its small economic size, a gradual disintegration with its economic hinterland, i.e. the Pan-Pearl River Delta region, and poor local governance (Hook and Neves 2002). Rather, the change was largely driven by a diplomatic strategy played by Lisbon to further secure her interests in Macao, i.e. establishing a commercial linkage between the European market and the Chinese market through Macao, under the growing concerns of the European states on Chinese socio-political conditions (Fernandes 1997; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Hook and Neves 2002). First of all, Lisbon wished to maintain her "good understanding and cooperation" with Beijing. The Macao issue, therefore, was a good and practical excuse for Lisbon to maintain the formal diplomatic contact without breaking the collective European position of isolating China after the Tiananmen Incident (Fernandes 1997:53). Second, the Portuguese government also wished to drag the European Communities into the transition period and became the back-up forces in supporting Portuguese decolonisation strategy, whose primary objective was to exit with honour, leaving Macao with Latin cultural heritage and protecting the Macanese (and some Macao-born Chinese) interests in Macao (Fernandes 1997; Edmonds and Yee; 1999). To achieve the objectives mentioned above, creating a separate Macao identity within the European political circle was a necessary step for Lisbon, such that

the Macao transition process could be de-linked from that of Hong Kong, which was overshadowed by difficult Sino-British relations and London reluctance against any European diplomatic involvement in the issue (Hook and Neves 2002:127). As a result, Lisbon, by making use of her agenda setting power as the EC presidency country, actively lobbied for a recognition of an independent international identity of Macao differed from that of PRC. The major achievement, from Lisbon perspective, was the conclusion of an independent agreement between the European Union and Macao, which was later agreed by China of its continuation under the MSAR (EEAS 2017; Henders 2001).

Apart from Lisbon's diplomatic strategy to formally include Macao in EU future diplomatic agenda, there was also a growing concern within the European political circle about the socio-political conditions of China, given the massive crackdown of popular dissents at Tiananmen and the lack of promising political reforms of the authoritarian communist regime. The handover of Hong Kong and Macao, two colonies governed by the "free-world", to authoritarian China was seen as a kind of betrayal such that the European states considered to provide more outside support to Macao (and Hong Kong). While various measures were done bilaterally in the Anglo-Saxon world to support Hong Kong, the (continental) European states, under the "leadership" of Portuguese Presidency, decided to handle the issue collectively under the framework of the European Communities, through signing the "third-generation" trade agreement with Macao (Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 2002). The "third-generation" trade agreement, according to EEAS official remarks, was a multi-dimensional agreement covering "not only economic and industrial aspects, but also culture, environment, training, drug abuse control, tourism, etc.", and the cooperation was based on "observance of democratic principles and human rights" (EEAS 2017). This "basis for cooperation" was stipulated explicitly in the Preamble as well as the Article 1 of the Agreement (Preamble and Article 1 of the EC-Macao TCA; see European Communities 1992) and it was supposed to be renewed annually after the fixed 5-year contracting period (Article 19 of the EC-Macao TCA; *ibid.*). At institutional level, a Joint Committee was set up between Brussels and Macao in governing the functioning of the TCA and it was designated to meet annually to "study the development of trade and cooperation" as well as to "exchange opinions and make suggestions on any issues of common interests within the fields covered" by the TCA (Article 16 of the EC-Macao TCA; *ibid.*).

The EU-Macao TCA had therefore created a rather permanent mechanism for the European Communities and its successor the European Union to intervene in Macao socio-political development since 1992. The mechanism was also agreed by Beijing even though the EU-Macao TCA has an explicit statement on respecting democratic principles and human rights. Apart from the economic, industrial and technological cooperation, the EC-Macao TCA included other fields of cooperation (Article 4 of the EC-Macao TCA; *ibid.*) which some of them could be considered as "soft-power" cooperation such as "information, communication and culture" (Article 9 of the EU-Macao TCA; *ibid.*), "training" (Article 10 of the EU-Macao TCA; *ibid.*), and social development (Article 12 of the EC-Macao TCA; *ibid.*). To some extent, the EC-Macao TCA may be considered as an efficient projection of diplomatic interests demonstrating the "structural power" of the EU, which tried to use economic and technological transfer to lure China to adopt other structural changes, and governing the process through a common institution as well as conditionality (Chan 2009). Macao, at its best, could always be the back-up plan for the European Union to maintain its interests in China, and become a continental European model established in South China for China's reform (Hook and Neves 2002:133).

Considering the port geography and port function of Macao, the European Union might also be tempted to turn Macao from a **coastal town** to a European **gateway** to China, serving as an "intermediate" to bring European influence to South China at minimum or the rest of China at

maximum, through maintaining the Latin European influence in Macao. While the EC-Macao TCA and various “soft-power” cooperation could be considered as a rather strong European “centrality” in Macao through permanent mechanisms of intervention, Beijing has always been aware of the overwhelmed and uncontrolled Latin European linkage of Macao, for instance blocking Macao associate observer status in the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) and the application of membership in the Latin Union (Henders 2001:358). At domestic level, the perceived strong “centrality” was countered by a strong presence of Chinese interests at local community level in parallel with a weak Portuguese colonial government, while the “intermediacy” effect was always limited by the lack of economic impact of Macao on the European Union, China, or even the South China region (Hook and Neves 2002:132). Because of this, even though Brussels enjoyed a permanent contractual relationship independently with Macao to boost up her presence and linkage, the established dominance of Beijing in Macao had imposed *de facto* restrictions on the exercise of EU presence and linkage. The **gateway** dream of both Lisbon and Brussels, therefore, could never be realised and the **cityport** status was a more realistic option from the side of the European Union and Portugal. Interestingly, the cityport status became a kind of “consensus” governing the future port role and port functions of Macao after the handover of sovereignty. Table 4.8 summarised the port geography and port role of Macao after the handover of sovereignty back to Beijing:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium (proposed)	Medium
		Medium (reality)	
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High (proposed)	High (proposed)
		Medium (reality)	Medium (reality)
Type of port	Cityport	Gateway (proposed)	Cityport
		Cityport (reality)	

Table 4.8 The port geography of Macao after 1999 (with the EU included)

The Sino-European Port Diplomacy after the Handover: A Cityport with A Group of Designated Audience

With the resumption of sovereign of Macao on 20th December 1999, the status of Macao changed from a Portuguese enclave in China to a Special Administration Region under the framework of OCTS. In its first communication setting the policy agenda to Macao, the European Commission defined the role of Macao as “a bridge between Asia and Europe”, in particular in the areas of 1) “democracy, human rights, individual freedoms and related issues”; 2) Economic and trade issues, including WTO”; 3) cultural issues, as a regional hub for training and exchange” (European Commission 1999). It was also stated that a residential “EC-Macao Cooperation Officer” would be appointed to oversee the cooperation between the European Union and Macao, yet in 2014 the appointment was yet to be finalized and had not been mentioned in subsequent reports²⁰.

²⁰ The last available public source to discuss about the appointment was made in 2014 which was written as such: “In addition, both sides noted the progress made over the appointment of a Technical Co-operation Officer for Macao and discussed Macao’s request for a legal co-operation assistance programme.” See International Business Publications, Macao Electoral, Political Parties Laws and

Similar to that of Hong Kong (which would be reviewed in next chapter), the external relation competence of Macao was defined by the Basic Law of Macao (MBL), and the degree of autonomy was also similar to that in Hong Kong (Neves 2002; Mendes 2011; 2014). However, compared to the “Asia’s World City” discourse which focused on the all-rounded characteristics of Hong Kong external networks and vibrant commercial and financial activities, the early years of Macao external relations were focused on becoming a gateway between Europe and China. Quoting Edmund Ho, the first Chief Executive of the MSAR, “Macao has conditions to link Europe and China, especially the Pearl River Delta, and the SAR Government has taken much effort in this direction” (Ho 2001; also cited in Neves 2002:66). This role was also highly praised by senior Chinese officials and being recommended by various European institutions, academics and professionals (European Commission 1999; The Eminent Persons Group on Macau 1999; Neves 2002:66). Indeed, such differentiation between the two SARs was more visible in the comparative audit of European port diplomatic to the two SARs, even though there was a lack of differentiation in terms of the EU representative office, the programme nomenclature and the institutional setup.

Utilising the Cityport Status: European Port Action in Macao

Prior to the discussion of EU port action in Macao, it would be better to audit the “official” programmes conducted and acknowledged by the EU-Macao Joint Committee. Table 4.9 had summarised the programmes conducted after 1999 with their nature of the cooperation (EU-Macao Joint Committee 2018):

Year of Implementation	Programme	Nature of the Programme²¹
1999 – 2001	Training for the Tourism Industry	Training; Tourism
1999 – 2001	European Studies Programme	Training; Information, Communication and Cultures
1999 – 2001	Services Development Programme	Training; Industrial
2001 and 2002	Asia-Invest Programme	Investment
2002 – 2007	EU-Macao Legal Cooperation Programme	Training
2006 – 2007	MIGRAMACAU	Training; Social Services
2009 – 2012	European Union Business Information Programme (EUBIP)	Trade; Investment; Information, Communication and Cultures
2010 – 2013	The 2 nd EU-Macao Cooperation Programme in Legal Field	Training
2010 – 2014	Training Programme in Translation and Interpretation in Chinese and Portuguese	Training
2012 – 2016	The European Union Academic Programme (EUAP-Macao)	Training; Information, Communication and Cultures
2013 – 2016	Learning Programme in Translation and Interpretation in Chinese and Portuguese	Training
2016 – 2019	The 3 rd Macao SAR-EU Cooperation Programme in Legal Field	Training
2016 – 2020	Training Programme in Translation and Interpretation in Chinese and Portuguese	Training
2016 – 2020	Horizon 202	Science and Technology

Table 4.9 The list of EU programmes offered under the EU-Macao TCA (1999 – 2018)

Shown in the above table, while the official position of EU commitment to Macao was to “diversify its economy, improve the sustainability of its economic development, and promote bilateral trade and investments²²” (EEAS 2018:7), the programmes offered by the EU under the TCA were concentrated in the field of training, especially cooperation in legal field and translation and interpretation. In fact, only a handful of programmes were designed with a specific focus on promoting trade, investment or industrial cooperation. These functions were indeed outsourced to the two chambers of commerce in the two SARs, namely the European Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, and the relatively new and established under the

²¹ The nature of the programme is compiled by the author, based on the category of cooperation stated in the EC-Macao TCA in 1992. A programme might cover more than one area of cooperation.

²² Similar commitments were made in nearly all the EU-Macao Annual Report, the version adopted here was in 2018 report when the thesis collected its primary data from the archive.

encouragement from the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao, the Macao European Chamber of Commerce – and their contributions were well-recognised by the EU-Macao Annual Report (EEAS 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018). Within the limited cases related to industrial and commercial cooperation, these programmes were never focused at Macao but a greater audience such as the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, when the EU was named as the “Official Partner” of Macao’s annual Global Economic Tourism Forum in 2018, it was never a move initiated by the EU but by the MSAR government, and it was serving the greater discourse of EU-China Tourism Year 2018 initiative (EEAS 2018:7). Moreover, compared to other investors in the region, the European companies found it less attractive to invest directly in Macao and bidding for the projects like transportation, construction and energy initiatives, and the EU already enjoyed a relatively large trade surplus since 2009 by the sales of luxury goods serving for the gambling and tourism industry (EEAS 2018). Therefore, in formulating its port actions towards Macao, EU economic interests were rather trivial despite the emphasis placed in the annual reports.

Instead of strengthening Macao’s economic centrality (through more direct investment to strengthen EU market share in Macao) and intermediacy (through Macao as a stepping stone to establish commercial network in China and Asia), the EU opted for a strategy to utilise the existing resources to strengthen her institutional “centrality” and political “intermediacy” in the region. Referred to Table 4.9 again, most of the EU-Macao cooperation programmes were training programmes in the field of legal cooperation, translation and knowledge about EU institutions and cultures. Indeed, the European Union took the first two categories of programme as “flagship projects of EU-Macao cooperation” (EEAS 2018:7) and cooperation on “legal and regulatory affairs, research and innovation, and continuing cooperation on trafficking in human beings” were a priority of EU-Macao cooperation (EEAS 2016:10; 2017:10). In terms of academic cooperation, while the EU developed similar initiatives and strategies in Hong Kong and Macao, such as utilising social media for educational purpose or organising “Model EU” conferences for the tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and Macao, the annual reports of Macao always highlighted those culture-oriented and communication-based initiatives such as photo exhibition titled “Bridging Time” (EEAS 2014), “short-film challenges” (EEAS 2015; 2016) and a regular radio programme on EU-related topics was introduced since 2015 (EEAS 2016; EEAS 2017; EEAS 2018). As highlighted by Ms. Maria Castillo, the then-Head of the European Union Office, in the agreement signing ceremony in 2012, the EU-Macao Academic Programme was “a bridge deepening relations between Macao and the EU in wide range of fields, from law, culture to social sciences” and consolidated “Macao’s status as an Asian City with rich European heritage” (University of Macao 2012). The statement partially showed that EU ambition in these programmes was to promote Latin European culture to reach a regional audience instead of just Macao’s community.

The above EU port actions could be explained by the priority of European objectives and a careful selection of means that not to upset Beijing. In terms of objectives, it was always in priority for Lisbon and Brussels to strengthen the continental legal system and Portuguese languages in Macao (Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Henders 2002; EEAS 2010; 2013; 2017). From Portuguese perspective, the well-functioned continental legal system would be an important signifier of Portugal’s glorious retreat. From EU perspective, a well-functioned continental legal system was seen as a kind of improvement of Macao’s capacity in rule of law and public administration (EEAS 2013; 2017; 2018), which could further protect EU’s interest in the city. In fact, the European Union had actively assisted Macao legal reform to internalise the continental system since 2001 by providing training to legal experts, judges as well as civil servants which were responsible for drafting and translating legislations, i.e. the birth of the legal cooperation programme (European Commission 2001; 2002). The knowledge transfer of this kind not only protected EU’s interests through an enhanced legal system in Macao, on the

other hand strengthened EU's institutional centrality by subtle influence on the sense of the rule of law in Macao through these legal cooperation programmes. In fact, one objective of these programmes was to make sure that the Macao legislation and practice could be in line with the EU practice in different areas (European Commission 2004). The objective of those translation training programmes was straightforward, i.e. the continuation of Portuguese as an official language in daily administration and legislation, given the fact that there were always in need of bi-lingual experts in Macao. In terms of the means, the workshop-type cooperation in judicial and Latin European culture had softened the image of foreign intervention to Macao domestic politics, which was always sensitive in the eyes of Beijing since the transition period (Yee and Lo 1991; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003). Even though a weak conditionality concept was hinted in some EU-Macao annual reports (EEAS 2017), the EU preferred to exercise its "structural power" through organising practical workshops and cultural programmes which emphasised Macao's European "heritage" (instead of adding new things to Macao), or through local academic partnership such as the University of Macao in EUAP-Macao, so as to evade from Beijing's criticism.

To sum up, the lack of economic interests and the small size of Macao economy was never a motivation for the EU to develop its port diplomacy and port action towards Macao. Instead, through various programmes in the fields of legal cooperation to cultural heritage representation, the European Union continued Portuguese decolonisation strategy in Macao by highlighting the (Latin) European components embedded in Macao's social and cultural system. Compared to the case of Hong Kong (which would be discussed in next chapter), both Macao and Beijing were ready to accept this role. In fact, the first official overseas visit of two Chief Executives, Edmund Ho and Fernando Chui, was Portugal, and they also visited Brussels during their second year of office. In addition, the orientation of these programmes not only addressed the local audience but also the regional audience such as those in South China region, for example the proposed Greater Bay Area. In the case, Macao was a kind of normative **cityport**: the institution generating power (centrality) was maintained, if not enhanced, through continuous training programmes in the field of legal cooperation and cultural exchange; and the intermediacy, from EU perspective, was protected through a softened image of EU presence in Macao in order to avoid Beijing's criticism.

Chinese Port Responses to EU Port Action: Taking Advantages of EU Programmes for Her Own Agenda

The last section discussed the EU port action and its utilisation of Macao **cityport** status. It somehow concluded that the EU port diplomacy in Macao was viable if not effective, as both Macao and Beijing appeared to welcome EU initiatives in the port. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, in the case of Macao, the **cityport** status seemed to be a kind of consensus shared among Beijing, Lisbon and Brussels. This section would further elaborate how such consensus was consolidated by the strategic moves of Beijing and how Beijing utilise the **cityport** status of Macao for her own diplomatic agenda.

While the relationship between Macao and the European Union was always highlighted in the Yearbook edited by the MSAR Government, its relative importance had decreased since 2003, and more references were made to Portuguese-speaking countries. Compared to issues published in 2002 (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2002:205 – 206), the 2003 issue lengthened the description of Macao's relations to Portuguese-speaking countries, by highlighting Macao as "an ideal location for business communication of Portuguese-speaking countries and mainland China to initiate and conduct economic and business negotiations" (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2003:199). A "new" policy objective had also been included since 2003, namely "to transform Macao into an economic and cultural conduit between mainland China and Portuguese-speaking countries" (ibid.), which did not appear in

the 2002 issue. Eventually, the policy objective dropped the “economic and cultural conduit” and replaced it by the phrase “a business and trade cooperation and services platform between/for²³ China and Portuguese-speaking countries”, a role that Beijing had attached “importance” to it (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2004:177; Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2018:177). On the contrary, the 2003 Yearbook had lengthy description on various projects and visits conducted between Macao and the European Union in that year (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2003: 193 – 195), but such lengthy discussion was dropped from the “Macao and the European Union” section since 2004. (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2004:175 – 176). The changes in description could always be explained by the editorial choice of the editorial committee, yet such changes could also be a kind of reflection in MSAR changing position in external relations. The change of Macao’s position could also be seen from the different interpretation on the first two official visits by two Chief Executives of MSAR²⁴. For instance, the first visit of Ho was under the context of the criticism of Macao handling of Falun Gong, a religious group that was outlawed by Beijing. Ho’s visit was perceived as “an effort to consolidate relations with the EU” (Europa Publications 2003:365). The second visit of Ho and the first visit of Chui to Portugal, however, not only emphasised the Macao-Portugal relations, but also added a component stating the role of Macao as a platform for cooperation between China and Portuguese speaking countries (Macauhub 2006; MacaoMagazine 2010).

Based on the official documents and media report, it was widely perceived that, at least within Chinese and Macanese community, Macao had changed her focus of external relations from Portugal and the EU, to Portugal and Portuguese-speaking countries. Discussed by Mendes et. al. (2011), the changing role of Macao in Chinese foreign policy could be understood by Beijing changing strategy in foreign policy, which included the development of “multilevel and sophisticated diplomacy” since the mid-1990s and the “charm offensive” approach from the 2000s onwards (Mendes et. al. 2011:4 – 5). The “Macao Forum”, formally known as Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, was one of such “sophisticated” mechanism (ibid:9 – 12). Analysed by another paper from Mendes (2014), the “Macao Forum” was never a multilateral institution nor a potential international organisation, but an “institutionalisation of China’s bilateral relations with the other member states” (Mendes 2014:238). Compared to other formal cooperative regional regimes like BRICS, ASEM, ASEAN, the Macao Forum lacked consensus in expectations, a coherent decision-making logic, a balanced institutional framework among all participants (ibid:239). Moreover, the diversity of Portuguese-speaking countries was larger than people could expect, from geographical position to the command of Portuguese language by the citizen. In viewing such complicated, if not messy, characteristics of the Lusophone world, Macao, “a unique enclave and the meeting point of Lusophone cultures within China, with a hybrid legal framework in foreign relations”, was the only place available to China that could comfortably control and have the ability to hold such forum (ibid:239). To achieve so, Beijing needed Macao to demonstrate “its (Lusophone) cultural and linguistic legacy” without any “negative connotation of colonial memories” (ibid:239).

This strategic position, accidentally, met the EU port action in strengthening Macao’s Portuguese institutions and cultural heritage. The consensus to turn Macao as a normative

²³ The “for” phrase in describing the platform first appeared in Yearbook 2018. However, since it was a lone case, the thesis could not prove whether it was a kind of grammatical change or substantial change of meaning.

²⁴ Edmund Ho made his first official overseas visit with the destination of Portugal in May 2000 and to the European Union in June 2001 and a second visit to Europe in June 2006. Fernando Chui made his first official overseas, also with the destination of Portugal, in July 2010 and to the European Union in January 2011.

cityport that produced and circulated the Lusophone institutions and culture, to different audience though, made Beijing and Macao welcome EU's initiative to strengthen Macao's institution generating power. In addition, insofar the programmes or criticisms did not fundamentally challenge Beijing's control over Macao, they were largely tolerated so that the intermediacy of Macao would not be cut off as if the Portuguese Macao during mid-17th century. For instance, Beijing expressed more tolerant towards some EU prioritised human right issues such as anti-human trafficking and anti-corruption, but not political sensitive issues like the recommendations from UN Committee Against Torture, anti-discrimination legislation and freedom of association and collective bargaining (EEAS 2018:3). In terms of Chinese response to European port diplomacy, Beijing took the normative **cityport** as a kind of normative entrepot. By allowing the EU to fill Macao's centrality with Latin European normative goods, Beijing carefully internalised these normative goods for her own centrality, and then shipped back to the Lusophone world through the established Portuguese network, i.e. the intermediacy of Macao since she was built as a European settlement.

Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Response in the Future

Prior to the discussion of the implications to EU structural power and Chinese responses, the thesis would like to recall the port geography of contemporary Macao in the eyes of the European Union and China:

	Beijing	Brussels
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium
Level of intermediacy	Medium	Medium
Type of ports	Cityport	Cityport

Table 4.10 The centrality-intermediacy analysis of Port Macao in contemporary days

Keukeleire et. al. (2009) proposed five factors contributed to the effectiveness of the exercise of structural power, which was summarised in Chapter 3:

- 1) Intensity and the quality of the dialogues that could successfully turn political declaration into operations;
- 2) A long-term strategy that aimed to formally or informally institutionalise the continuous dialogue and negotiation;
- 3) A comprehensive approach to develop a close relationship with various levels of partners and actors, and to cover various levels of relevant structures;
- 4) The degree of embeddedness of structural power in other forms of diplomatic actions and external relations conducted by the actor itself and its diplomatic allies;
- 5) The idea of legitimacy in the eyes of the third-party state and an appropriate provision of "carrot and sticks" to the state concerned.

While Keukeleire et. al. (2009) did not proposed any negative factors hindering the effective implementation of soft power, one could, based on the above factors, draft a list of potential negative factors as follows:

- 1) The resistance to turn political declaration into operations;
- 2) The possibility to interrupt the continuous dialogues and further structural diplomacy;
- 3) The lack of spill-over effects across various levels of relevant structures and different actors;
- 4) The degree of isolation from other forms of diplomatic actions and external relations

conducted by the foreign actor;

5) The idea of legitimacy to reject further structural power implementation and the cost implied of such action.

To further consolidate the factors mentioned above, the thesis proposed three specific considerations to evaluate the effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether there was a **consensus** on the expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of **resources** available to them to implement their respective structural port diplomacy and responses; 3) the **relative strength** in centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the port. In the case of Macao, there was an obvious consensus between Beijing and Brussels which continued Port Macao as the Sino-European condominium developed since 1949. Therefore, it was easier for both parties to accept continuous presence of each other at the port, such that the EU could continuously make impact to the legal and cultural structural of Macao through various programme and institutionalised dialogues under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. However, owing to the limitation of resources available to the EU vis-à-vis those available to China, as well as the limited network of Port Macao in reaching the regional and national level, the EU structural power was limited to Port Macao only with little expectation to make impact to the rest of China. This attitude could be shown by the nature of programmes and cooperation organised by the EU, which focused on consolidating the continuous presence of continental characteristics of Macao in the field of legal institutions and cultural practices. Table 4.11 visualised the breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels respectively:

	Beijing	Brussels
Economic resources and capacity	High	High
Cultural resources and capacity	Medium	Medium
Political resources and capacity	Low	Medium
Institutional resources and capacity	High	Low

Table 4.11 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Macao

On the other hand, given the domination in terms of resources available and the relative strength (especially in political capacity) enjoyed by Beijing, Beijing acknowledged the EU structural port diplomacy and turned it for her own use. Instead of fencing EU structural power off, Beijing responded to it by turning the content of EU structural power, i.e. the continuation of Portuguese colonial legacy and continental European culture at Macao, to an asset that strengthened Macao's role in connecting the Lusophone community. This win-win situation further strengthened the consensus on the expected port functions of Macao by both parties, which led to a harmonious atmosphere when Macao was compared to the next case, Hong Kong.

Chapter Summary and Preview

This chapter extended the theoretical discussion of the previous three chapters by introducing the first case study of Macao, which was the first European settlement on Chinese soil. Table 4.12 summarised the development of the role of Macao from different stakeholders' perspectives:

	Chinese authority	Portuguese authority	European authority
Macao at 1557	Coastal town	Coastal town	Non-port
Macao at early 17th century	Coastal town / Outport	Hub	Non-port
Macao at mid-17th century	Non-port	Coastal town	Coastal town
Macao at 1757	Coastal town	Outport	Outport
Macao after 1842	Coastal town	Coastal town	Coastal town
Macao after 1949	Coastal town	Cityport / Coastal town	Coastal town
Macao after 1999	Cityport	Cityport	Cityport

Table 4.12 The port role of Macao in different period

By discussing various stages of Macao from a Portuguese settlement to a Special Administrative Region, this chapter outlined how the port geography of Macao had changed in accordance with the expectation of Chinese, Portuguese and European authorities. As the earliest European settlement in Macao, the enduring European heritage allowed both Portugal and the European Union to apply some normative influence to the city, strengthening their respective “centrality” throughout history and eventually becoming one of the front-liners of EU normative and structural powers. However, the relatively small size of Macao in political and economic sphere limited the potential of shipping EU normative and cultural content to Macao and being spilled-over to the rest of China. It should also be noted that European involvement in the case of Macao was originally an active strategy made by Portuguese authority, such that the European Union could rely on the EC-Macao TCA in formulating and implementing the policy initiatives in Macao. Such a mechanism was lacking in the case of Hong Kong, a case to be covered in the next chapter.

On the other hand, European port diplomacy in Macao, to some extent, was welcomed by Beijing. The *de facto* decolonisation of Macao in 1966 gave Beijing a rather autonomous space to test its external relations initiatives in Macao owing to the embedded “centrality” towards Beijing, in geographical sense and political sense. The international personality of Macao was orchestrated and supported by Beijing and Lisbon, and such support continued in the case of European port diplomacy in Macao, for instance various legal cooperation, cultural programmes and translation training. The bottom line was always that such programmes never challenge Beijing authority in Macao and incited any humiliation in relation to the colonial history of Macao. Indeed, as discussed in the last section, the European heritage built by Portugal and nurtured by the European port action turned to be a valuable asset for Beijing to re-divert these normative shipping to other strategic partners – in the case of Macao it was the Lusophone world. The **cityport** status of Macao, which was built by the consensus of major stakeholders, was fully utilised for their own diplomatic agenda.

However, the relative harmony in Macao was a rare occasion in Hong Kong. Rather than a Sino-European condominium that allowed both parties to take advantage of Macao’s centrality and intermediacy, the case of Hong Kong went opposite, i.e. a contested space where both Beijing and Brussels struggle to contain each other. Especially the OCTS was the only framework that governed the differential treatments, the OCTS would be reviewed in detailed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Hong Kong as a Contested Port Metropolis – The Role of Hong Kong in Sino-European Port Diplomacy²⁵

The previous chapter opened the first empirical discussion on the role of port in Sino-European diplomacy. While Portuguese Macao was the first European settlement on Chinese soil, it received less diplomatic attention compared to British Hong Kong which was established as a Crown Colony and free port. The “treaty port model” later became a dominant paradigm governing diplomatic relations between European states and the Manchurian imperial court. Different European states began to take their share in China by either establishing a colony through bilateral treaty or renting a place in China for settlement. The British Hong Kong eventually took away the intermediacy of Macao and became the centre of foreign trade and commercial activities for Europeans (Coates 2009; van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012) The importance of the role of Hong Kong in serving the British interests were well-protected to the extent that British wished to keep Hong Kong after the end of World War II despite the international consensus to end the extraterritorial rights in China.

While the importance of Hong Kong in international politics was a well-researched topic (Tang 1998; Ting 1998; Shen 2016; Shen and Chan 2017), the port features and the port geography of Hong Kong was an underexplored dimension. In fact, the concept of OCTS on one hand continued the treaty port legacy of British Hong Kong created since 1842, on the other hand it also institutionalised the concept of centrality and intermediacy through the Basic Law of Hong Kong (HKBL). As a result, revisiting the institutional framework of HKSAR would be an important showcase on how communist China and the capitalist European world battle with each other through the self-created treaty port. It also helped us to understand how an institutionalised **port metropolis** affected the Sino-European relations and the respective port actions.

Similar to last chapter, this chapter would be structured into three main sections. The first section reviewed the historical role of Hong Kong in Sino-European relations through its port geography. It was then followed by a discussion of the contemporary institutional framework of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and how the framework institutionalised the port legacy of British Hong Kong. The last section discussed the policy perspective made by the European Union and China in Hong Kong against each other, so as to conceptualise the implications of Sino-European port diplomacy in Hong Kong.

The Creation of Legacy: The Treaty Port System and a European Cityport

Contrary to most of the narrations about the importance of Hong Kong in international political economy, the historical role of Hong Kong was not comparable to Macao and Shanghai during the imperial period ruled by Ming court and the Manchurian court – until 1842 when Hong Kong was declared as a British colony. As reviewed in last chapter, Macao was a Portuguese **hub** / European **outport**, and served as a nodal point of the sea lanes of communication from Goa to Nagasaki from the mid-16th century to early 17th century. Shanghai, which would be reviewed in next chapter, was an important **urban port** and eventual a **cityport** for internal

²⁵ Early versions of this chapter had been presented at three difference conferences: 1) Chan, Wilson 2015. “The “Revival” of European Port Diplomacy: the Role of Hong Kong in Contemporary Europe-China Relations.” *Presentation at IAPSS World Congress 2015*, 14 – 18 April. London.; 2) Chan, Wilson. 2015. “Paradiplomacy and its Constraints in Quasi-Federal System – A Case Study of Hong Kong SAR and its Implications to Chinese Foreign Policy.” *Presentation at ICPP Milan 2015 Conference*, 1 – 4 July. Milan.; 3) Chan, Wilson. 2017. “Making Use of the Port Metropolis – The Renewed European Port Diplomacy and the Role of Hong Kong in Sino-European Relations.” *Presentation at Ports and Port Cities in Indian Ocean Connections: 2017 Annual Conference of the Centre of Global Asia, NYU Shanghai*, 22 August. Shanghai.

market and tributary trade. However, early naval documentation compiled by James Horsburgh (1811; 1826) and Alexander Dalrymple (1806) suggested that the main function of “Hong Kong”, or precisely Tytam Harbour, was to provide water or food supply to ships travelling through the “Macao route” to Canton. Along the Chinese coastal line from Macao to Shanghai, Hong Kong was never regarded as a developed commercial port like Canton and Amoy, or safe enough for maritime transport like port Macao. Therefore, when Macao became the **outport** for Europe since 1757, Hong Kong was a **coastal town** supporting the economic functions and the livelihood of the European communities in Macao, owing to the geographical proximity to the European **outport**. The European traders had little interests and economic generation capacity attached to the “fishing village”, and the “fishing village” by that time was never occupied a critical role along the major sea lanes of communication in the region. In fact, from the Chinese perspective, Hong Kong was a kind of **non-port** town owing to the maritime ban issued by the Ming court. Table 5.1 summarised the port geography of Hong Kong prior to the arrival of British navy in 1841, the outbreak of first Anglo-Chinese War:

	Chinese authority	European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Low
Level of intermediacy	Nil	Low
Type of port	Non-port	Coastal town

Table 5.1 The port geography of Hong Kong prior to 1841

The Creation of British Gateway through the Treaty Port System: Early Form of European Port Diplomacy to China

Discussed in the last chapter as well as the previous section, prior to the establishment of British Hong Kong as a Crown Colony and a treaty port, European traders were mostly based in Macao during the off-season and Canton when the trade season began. Hong Kong, as a coastal town near the “Macao route”, provided a passive and assisting role to European traders arriving in China. As Fairbank and Teng (1941; also Fairbank 1963) suggested, interactions between Chinese imperial court and European merchants were limited by the traditional tenet of Chinese diplomacy, with only the envoys from tributary states allowed to contact the imperial court in Beijing. European merchants, who never submitted themselves as a tributary state, were required to conduct their business through the “Canton System.” (ibid) Under the Canton System, all the European activities, no matter economic activities like trading with Chinese merchants or living issues such as hospitality and social contacts with Chinese community, were handled and supervised by the *Gong Hong*, a guild formed by Chinese merchants in Canton backed by the local authorities. Rent-seeking behaviours, such as bribery, extra ground rents or customs, were normal under such monopolisation of trading prices and volumes (Henders 2007; Carroll 2007b). With the increasing business transactions between China and Europe from the late 18th century, the European traders demanded a fairer and direct trade relations, while the Manchurian imperial court and local authorities were hesitant to breach the Chinese norms. The reason behind, according to Fairbank and Teng (1941), was twofold: from the local officials’ perspective, the Canton System created extra economic incentives to their offices such that they could benefit from the customs duties collected through foreign trade as well as direct bribery from the European merchants; from the imperial court perspective, the Manchurian court depended on the Han Chinese officials who always perceived foreigners as a threat rather than opportunity, and they always found themselves superior to the barbarian states. As a result, the Manchurian court rejected further liberalisation of trade and balanced diplomatic relations with Europeans.

Such a mismatch of mindset between Europe and China, particularly Britain, became more salient in early 19th century when Canton authorities decided to take down illegal opium trade in Whampoa. Prior to the conflict, the British envoys in Canton had called for a trading post to

be established as close as possible to Beijing, preferably on the eastern coast of China instead of the south-eastern coast where Macao, Hong Kong and Canton were located. However, after the conflict in Whampoa, some British officials and traders in China had changed their mind against setting up a trading post on the eastern coast. Instead, many reports and lobbying activities were made to London, suggesting that the British Empire should consider to capture Hong Kong and turned it into a free port (Carroll 2007b:20 – 21; Eitel 1895; Le Pichon 2006). Ernest John Eitel, a German Protestant missionary to China who later joined the British colonial government in Hong Kong, declared that the “lion’s paw” should put down on Hong Kong and as a free port Hong Kong would be “the most considerable mart east of the Cape” (Eitel 1895; Cited in Carroll 2007b:21). Such economic interests, trading rights and diplomatic representation eventually turned to the first Anglo-Chinese War, commonly known as the Opium War. The war was temporarily stopped with the victorious British naval forces capturing Hong Kong Island in 1841 through the Convention of Chuenpi, a convention never signed by both authorities. Since both contracting parties were disagreeing with the content of the Convention of Chuenpi, the war finally came to an end in 1842, with the result that the Manchurian imperial court was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking which ceased the Hong Kong Island “in perpetuity” to Britain. The Treaty of Nanking thus created a Crown Colony and a free treaty port at the south-eastern coast of China. With the subsequent treaties signed in 1860 and 1898, the territory of this free port covered what it is now known now as Hong Kong²⁶.

By turning Hong Kong into a Crown Colony under British direct rule, it also implied that the treaty port system was firstly introduced to the Chinese soil. The treaty port system took the assumptions of the Westphalian system of formal sovereign equality and diplomacy. The hierarchical tributary system was void and new commercial and diplomatic agreements were based on “voluntarist” negotiations with each party sitting on equal footing, although the Manchurian imperial court would find itself being forced to enter such contractual relations with European powers. Compared to the Chinese-led Canton system, the treaty port system was characterised by “opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, and the most-favoured-nation clause” (Fairbank, J. K. 1969b:3). Taking the Treaty of Nanking as the example, the treaty granted the right of British government to negotiate a fixed treaty tariff with the Qing government (Article 10). The Canton system and the role of *gong hong* were abolished and British merchants were free to trade at various trading posts and with different merchants (Article 5) under the agreed one-off tariff paid to the Qing government. Western diplomatic norms like diplomatic protection and rules of communication between British and Qing officials (Article 1, 2 and 11) were introduced. The Treaty of Bogue, a supplement of the Treaty of Nanking, gave the British nationals and company’s representatives the status of extraterritoriality, such that wherever they were being caught within the ports or other places in Chinese territories they could only be brought to British court and had trial under the British legal system (Article 6 and Article 9 of the Treaty of Bogue). This supplementary treaty also guaranteed British nationals the right to privileges granted to other foreign countries by the Manchurian government (Article 8 of the Treaty of Bogue).

From the British perspective, the establishment of a British Crown Colony, instead of settlement like Macao or later Shanghai, gave the British a nearly unchallenged political centrality in Hong Kong: the British legal system was introduced, the British nationals enjoyed extraterritorial rights, and the colonial government, which was appointed directly by London, would be able to govern¹²¹territrit at their discretion. In addition, since Hong Kong was now a Crown Colony ruled by a fellow European state, other European countries and the United

²⁶ The Kowloon Peninsula was ceased in perpetuity after the second Anglo-Chinese war in 1860 through the Treaty of Peking. The New Territories was leased to Britain in 1898 for 99 years under the Convention between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory.

States either completely ignored or viewed the non-treaty ports as less significant for their national interests (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). The establishment of the free port of Hong Kong soon became the centre of European economic and political interests. Both legal and illegal transactions had shifted away from the non-treaty ports like Macao, Whampoa and Lintin. Less than 30 years after the First Opium War, 23 open ports were established, covering from Shin King to Hainan. (Dennys 1867) Although in terms of economic centrality Hong Kong remained relatively underdeveloped by the time it was turned to a treaty port, the maritime space enjoyed by British Hong Kong, i.e. the intermediacy of British Hong Kong, was well-connected to the sea lanes of communication created by the European powers. From the European perspective, British Hong Kong became a port that functioned in accordance to Western standards of commercial activities and social habits, although the Europeans never fully owned the port. In the case of China, while the creation of the Crown Colony meant a blow to her sovereign control over Hong Kong, the treaty port status of Hong Kong also allowed the Chinese merchants to get access to the European maritime space to trade with European powers outside the Canton System, such that they would regard the intermediacy of Hong Kong as valuable to their economic activities. Table 5.2. summarised the port geography of British Hong Kong in various perspectives:

	Chinese authority	British authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	Medium	Low
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High	High
Type of port	Outport	Gateway	Hub

Table 5.2 The port geography of Hong Kong from 1842

Utilising the British Port Metropolis to Achieve Diplomatic Interests: The Post-war Era Sino-European Port Diplomacy from the British and European Lens

Although the Europeans and Americans ended the treaty port system in China and abrogated their extra-territorial rights in China after the Second World War, the British government refused to concede her sovereign right over Hong Kong (Chan 1973; Chan 1977). The insistence of the British government could be explained as follows: on the one hand the British government believed that the concession of Hong Kong would be portrayed as British weakness against communism; on the other hand the government tied British economy to the continued existence of British Empire and Hong Kong was an essential component of the lion's paw (Bullock 1984; Feng 1994; Clayton 1997). In fact, the natural economic growth of Hong Kong as a British **gateway** had slowly evolved to a British **port metropolis** after the end of World War II. From a British point of view, keeping Hong Kong under the British belt as a Crown Colony maintained a favourable trade deficit and export to China, such that the new Chinese government would keep sterling to buy British goods. In addition, Hong Kong was a member of the Sterling Area and a free market in Far East, which allowed London to settle dollar debts outside the central reserves and became a source of dollar securities for London bankers (Schenk 1994a; 1994b). The relative cheapness to run Hong Kong compared to the economic benefits received by London made her try to maintain the colonial and free port status of Hong Kong. The high level of centrality in terms of both economic generating capacity and political capacity, as well as the established maritime network which could be eventually useful during the Cold War period, proved that British was right not to give up the first **port metropolis** on Chinese soil.

In the view of British private sector and her European counterparts, the free port status of Hong Kong became the most important trading **hub** between semi-closed China and the rest of the world. British and European firms took advantages of the relative unchecked business

transactions in colonial Hong Kong to trade with communist Chinese government, which had restructured its foreign trade relations shortly after it took power from the *KMT* regime. For instance, as revealed by Frank King, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Cooperation had been “heavily involved in financing China’s trade through the Bank of China’s Hong Kong office, and indeed facilitated the export of key commodities throughout the Korean War period” (King 1991; Cited in Clayton 1997:99). The overwhelming British mercantile interests of engaging China through Hong Kong was, however, counter-balanced by British diplomatic interests, especially the Anglo-American relations and the overall Cold War framework. While the British and also the French opted for a *modus vivendi* between them and communist China and were the first to recognise the regime shortly after its establishment, any political settlement in the Far East region between the free world and the communist world was out of question from an American perspective (Clayton 1997). Hong Kong, therefore, was caught in the contradictions of British foreign policy with China and the United States. The British government on the one hand was willing to sacrifice Hong Kong economic and political stability so as to align with the American containment policy against China, as evidenced by the implementation of the trade embargo during the Korean War, or after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. On the other hand, the post-war British government always tried to use Hong Kong to leverage American foreign policy and took it as to project her imperial image in Asia and the world. As noted by David Clayton (1997:205 – 207), the British government considered that revising British policy towards China not only meant Britain lost her face to fellow Americans, but also lost opportunities to influence American foreign policy towards China by luring her commitment to protect the only viable outpost of the capitalist bloc at the South-eastern coast of mainland China. Such rationale indeed met Chinese interests over Hong Kong as the place to acquire important supplies and foreign investment from the West. As a result, even though the communist Beijing was formally cut off from the access of the centrality and intermediacy of the British Hong Kong, the Chinese communities could still access a fraction of the centrality and intermediacy of the civilian port, turning it as an important **outport** for Chinese economy and social survival. Citing David Clayton again, China was “reverting to the Canton system of trade” as a controlled means of contacts with the West (Clayton 1997:100), but this time it Hong Kong collectively played the role of *gong hong* in this reinvented Canton system. On the other hand, the implicit leeway made available by the British government also made Hong Kong a true **port metropolis**, and a European **gateway** by connecting the communist China on one hand, the Hong Kong model became an important institutional model of future Chinese reform on the other hand. Table 5.3 summarised the port geography of Hong Kong during the Cold War period:

	Chinese authority	British authority	Other European authorities
Level of centrality	Low	High	Medium
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High	High
Type of port	Outport	Port Metropolis	Gateway

Table 5.3 The port geography of Hong Kong during the Cold War

One highlight, in relation to European port diplomacy, should be made before the discussion of the post-handover situation of Hong Kong. Compared to relatively mature foreign policy capacity nowadays, the European Communities, the ancestor of the European Union, was never an influential foreign policy actor in international world. Before the formal conclusion of the EU-China TCA, the bilateral negotiation between Beijing and London was completed and the joint declaration was announced. Therefore, it might be tempted to say the European Union was indeed a free-rider to British diplomacy towards China. The thesis did not address this issue here but the lack of presence of the European Union was critical to the European

port diplomacy and Chinese port responses in the future. In fact, it was also the intention of London not to “Europeanise” the Hong Kong issue, as compared to the position of Lisbon discussed in Chapter 4.

Institutionalising the Legacy: The Sino-British Negotiation and the One Country Two Systems in Port Perspective

Compared to a growing literature on EU-China relations which was discussed in Chapter 3, the role of Hong Kong, was once studied during the early years of their handover of sovereignty. A special issue about the contemporary EU-China relations has a specific article discussing the role of Hong Kong and Macao (Hook and Neves 2002). In this pioneer contribution, Hook and Neves suggested that the role of Hong Kong and Macao could be categorized by two main issues: those brought by “the complex legacy of extra-territoriality” and those brought by their institutional roles as “Special Administrative Regions within the Chinese state” (Hook and Neves 2002:113). Hook and Neves identified three types of issues emerged in Hong Kong and Macao which might affect the Sino-European relations:

1. The socio-political turmoil stirred up by the Cross-Strait tension, political developments, Church and nationality;
2. The political-economic issues in relation to the triangulation of trade between the European Union and China; and
3. The legal protection of EU products and residents in Hong Kong and Macao.

While Hook and Neves acknowledged the impact of extraterritoriality in shaping the Europe-China relations, they did not state the mechanism in details but turned their discussion to other issues such as Taiwan undecided sovereign status and the impact of United States foreign policy (Hook and Neves 2002:133-134). The thesis argued that, from the port perspective and port geography, the OCTS was indeed a macro port settlement agreed by 1) British and Chinese authorities and 2) the capitalist world, including the European states and the communist China. One important signifier of the second settlement was that on one hand the Western world endorsed the innovation of OCTS, on the other hand conducted regular checks against the implementation of the OCTS in Hong Kong (as well as in Macao), making themselves as a kind of stakeholders in the post-handover Hong Kong. In addition, compared to the case of Macao, the OCTS was the only institutional feature that linked the European Union external relations to Hong Kong. Therefore, a closer look of the features of OCTS under the lens of port geography, might shed lights on the overall setting of European port diplomacy in the post-handover period.

Institutionalising the Colonial Centrality and its Modification from Beijing: The Constitutional Structure of HKSAR Government

The status and the autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region under “One Country, Two Systems” was always in dispute between the pro-democratic camp and the pro-establishment camp and, between local community and Beijing authority. In addition, the legal foundation of “One Country, Two Systems” had its domestic and international source which further complicated the status of Hong Kong in international politics. The “domestic” source of “One Country, Two Systems” could always refer to the Chinese constitution revised in 1982, followed by Deng’s announcement of the “One Country, Two Systems” initiative in 1978. According to Article 31, Beijing could “establish Special Administrative Region when necessary” and the establishment of such Special Administrative Region” shall be “prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions” (Central People’s Government 2004).

In fact, devolving power to regional and local level of government was not new to Beijing. Since her first constitution the concept of ethnic minority autonomous regions was stipulated under Article 3 of the 1954 Constitution (Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution) which stated that “regional autonomy (applied) in areas where a minority nationality live in a compact community’ and ‘all national autonomous areas (were) inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China” (Central People’s Government 1954). Subsequently, five autonomous regions were established at Inner Mongolia (Mongols), Xinjiang (Uyghur), Guangxi (Zhuang), Ningxia (Hui) and Tibet (Tibetan). According to Zhuang (2012), there are 155 ethnic autonomous areas among the regional, prefectural and county levels, which allow 44 ethnic minorities in China to enjoy a certain degree of self-governing and autonomy. Nonetheless, the implementation of self-governing in Hong Kong was not based on ethnic equality, as most of the Hong Kong population were ethnic Han, but rather on a strategic move for future unification between mainland China and Taiwan. The innovation of “One Country, Two Systems” suggested by Deng was targeted at Taiwan’s population and the *KMT* government in Taiwan (Yuen 2014). The subsequent implementation in Hong Kong and Macao was merely a showcase for Taiwan people, which was also an important mission for Hong Kong in contributing to Chinese “foreign” policy.

Such guaranteed features were later translated to various articles in the HKBL, the so-called “mini-constitution” of Hong Kong (Central People’s Government 2015). The perceived characteristics of Basic Law as a “mini-constitution”, a rather distinctive international identity from China, and the autonomy enjoyed in domestic politics compared to that of the autonomous regions, might tempt us to conclude that Hong Kong is operated under a quasi-federal system like Zanzibar in Tanzania or the delegative system like Aland in Finland (Shen 2013). However, Beijing always insisted that China was not practising federal system as other countries like United States, nor the Basic Law had the constitutional feature that give balanced rights and obligations between Beijing and Hong Kong (“Lian Xisheng: Fan Jibenfa Erdong Jieguo Jiushi Zainan” 2015). From Beijing perspective, the HKBL was a legal document that empowered the HKSAR government to govern the “domestic affairs”. The sources of power and the legality of the HKBL, was delegated from the National People’s Congress and always came from Beijing devolution (Horlemann 2003; “Lian Xisheng: Fan Jibenfa Erdong Jieguo Jiushi Zainan” 2015). Key ideas like resumption of sovereignty and authorisation of autonomy from Beijing have been spread within the text of the Basic Law (Horlemann 2003). The Chinese constitution and the Basic Law provided enough safeguard for Beijing to potentially step into the legislations and decisions of Hong Kong. For instance, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress could annul “local regulations or decisions that contravene(d) the constitution” (Article 67, no. 8), the State Council could also alter “inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of state administration at different levels” (Article 89, no. 14) (Central People’s Government 2004). Under the Basic Law, the ultimate power of interpretation and amendment was vested in the hand of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (Article 158 and 159 of the HKBL), and no amendment could contravene the basic policies regarding Hong Kong (Article 159 of HKBL). Finally, Beijing could intervene directly to Hong Kong by declaring the state of emergency (Article 18 of HKBL).

The above legal issues might at first glance irrelevant to the port geography of HKSAR. However, given the lack of formal presence until 1984 when Beijing and London formally agreed on the future of British Hong Kong, Beijing was required to borrow the colonial legacy of Hong Kong to enhance her centrality, such that the overall constitutional design was to retain the key features of the colonial system (Ma 2007; Gittings 2016). For instance, Article 5 of HKBL promised the capitalist system would be maintained and the socialist system of PRC would not be implemented for 50 years; Article 8 of the HKBL also kept the common law system and the basic legal practice would continue after the handover. The kind of

constitutional promise made by Beijing to local audience as well as international stakeholders on one hand wished to pacify the confidence crisis during the transition period, on the other hand it actually retained British centrality at Hong Kong and utilised by Beijing. As Ma (2007) argued, Beijing leaders always found the colonial system, which was highly efficient, apolitical with limited democratisation, as a workable system for the future HKSAR under Beijing authoritarian rules. Nevertheless, in order to secure Beijing centrality in the **port metropolis**, the legal articles mentioned above provided the Beijing a constitutional safeguard towards her “borrowed” centrality. As Holerman (2003) suggested, the lack of controlling mechanism and lack of constitutionalism in China made the autonomy of Hong Kong rather arbitrary and subjected to Beijing’s discretion. As a result, Beijing developed a strong institution generating capacity in Hong Kong through borrowing the autocratic features of colonial Hong Kong, yet the liberal substance was replaced by Beijing institutional culture.

Institutionalising the Colonial Intermediacy and its Modification from Beijing: The Granted Autonomy and International Identity of HKSAR

Apart from the direct borrowing of the British legacy in strengthening Beijing centrality in Hong Kong, the OCTS also institutionalised the *de facto* international character and maritime network, i.e. the intermediacy of Hong Kong, enjoyed in the colonial period through various articles in the HKBL. In terms of the division of labour, Article 13 of the HKBL defined the scope of responsibility of Beijing and that of Hong Kong. For instance, Beijing was responsible for handling matters in relation to foreign affairs and national defence of Hong Kong, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would set up an office, i.e. the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (FMCOPRC), for handling such matter. On the other hand, Article 13 also authorised “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs on its own in accordance with this Law”. In addition to the generic division of labour, Chapter VII of the HKBL further stipulated the power and autonomy enjoyed by the HKSARG, its officials and its relations to external parties. The Basic Law framework allowed Hong Kong to develop relations with other international entities, concluded international agreements and participates in international organisations in appropriate field, under the name “Hong Kong, China” (Article 151 and Article 152 of HKBL). Former agreements to which Beijing was not a party but being implemented in Hong Kong continued to be valid (Article 153 of the HKBL). Hong Kong could issue its own passports, concluded visa abolition agreements with foreign states, applied immigration controls against persons from foreign states and regions, and established official and semi-official economic and trade offices overseas (Article 154, 155 and Article 156 of HKBL).

In terms of external representation, Beijing reserved most of the power related to sovereignty and diplomacy, for instance government officials could only serve as the members of delegation of Beijing in attending diplomatic negotiation (Article 150 and 152 of HKBL). The application of international agreements that China was a party and the establishment of foreign consular and official and semi-official missions in Hong Kong had to be decided and approved by Beijing, although those formal ties between Hong Kong and rest of the world were maintained (Article 157 of HKBL). Though not being included in the Chapter VII, the international economic and financial characteristics of Hong Kong, such as the status of free port (Article 114 of the HKBL), a separable custom territory (Article 116 of the HKBL), independent shipping and civil aviation policy (Article 124 to Article 135 of the HKBL) – which all were in the interests of foreign states and companies, had been maintained. These articles not only strengthened the argument made in the last section that Beijing wished to borrow the well-established economic centrality of Hong Kong as a **port metropolis**, but also the economic network, political affiliation and international identity, i.e. the defining features of one’s

intermediacy, of British Hong Kong. Combining the two arguments made above, Beijing very first port strategy was to absorb the high level of centrality and intermediacy established by the Britain before the handover. Table 5.4 summarised the change of port geography, from the Chinese perspective, before and after the handover:

	British Hong Kong	HKSAR
Level of centrality	Low	High
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High
Type of port	Outport	Port metropolis

Table 5.4 Chinese perspective on the port geography of Hong Kong before and after the handover

Explaining the European Port Actions before the Handover: An Accidental Consensus on the Port Role of Hong Kong

As shown in Table 5.4, it might be tempted to say that Beijing would largely follow the British practice, at least in the aspects of economic and social system, established before the handover of the sovereignty from London to Beijing. The status of **port metropolis** was important for Beijing further economic liberalisation and internationalisation. As a result, after the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the international communities had largely endorsed the innovation of OCTS. From the perspective of Britain and other European states, the Sino-British Joint Declaration had laid down the fundamental principles in the future governance of Hong Kong after 1997, and such declaration was assumed to have international legal effect, albeit both London and Beijing did not explicitly say so (Tsoi 2014; “Tanzhiyuan: Lianhe Shengmeng yi Wancheng Lishi Renwu” 2014). Therefore, the remaining task of the Western world was to make sure that the OCTS would be implemented in accordance to their understanding, i.e. preserving the status of Hong Kong as an opened and free port after 1997. The end of British administration undoubtedly weakened the centrality of Britain in her **port metropolis**, such that both London and Brussels could only rely on the “international legal effect” of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, or developed their own institutional framework to monitor the implementation of OCTS which affected the port geography of Hong Kong after the handover.

As a result, the Western world had developed their own mechanism to monitor the port geography of Hong Kong after the handover. For instance, the Hong Kong Policy Act was passed by the US Congress in 1992, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office was required to prepare half-year reports in evaluating the situation of Hong Kong, and the reports were required to be submitted to the UK Parliament for debate. Within Brussels, the European Commission Office (the EU Office after the Treaty of Lisbon was enforced) in Hong Kong and Macao was required to produce an annual report of the two SARs to Brussels. In case of some serious political events such as the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the European Parliament would organise public hearings and invite politicians or social activists to come and give verdict on the political development of Hong Kong. Nonetheless, these reports and actions would always be criticised by Beijing. In fact, in his early assessment of the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”, Jean-Philippe Béja suggested Beijing dilemma on the situation of Hong Kong was that on the one hand Beijing wished the “One Country, Two Systems” formula to be well-recognised by the international community, on the other hand she was extremely cautious of “over-internationalisation” of Hong Kong affairs (Béja 2008). The **port metropolis** status of Hong Kong, from Beijing perspective, was both an asset and liability.

To sum up the European port diplomacy before the handover, given the expected preservation of the original **port metropolis** status, both London and Brussels would perceive the port geography of British Hong Kong would largely maintain. As a result, Hong Kong was served as a **gateway** for both London and Brussels, and there was always a wishful thinking that Hong

Kong could be the normative role model to facilitate the liberalisation of China in the near future. Table 5.5 summarised the port geography of Hong Kong after the handover:

	Chinese authority	British authority	European authority
Level of centrality	High	Medium	
Level of intermediacy	High	High	
Type of port	Port metropolis	Gateway	

Table 5.5 The port geography of Hong Kong after the handover

Sino-European Port Diplomacy in Hong Kong after the Handover: Protecting and Utilising the Gateway for Normative Power Europe

The strategic importance of maintaining such port status of Hong Kong was well acknowledged by European leaders. During his first visit to Hong Kong and Macao in 2005, European Commission President Barroso deliberately commented on the Commission's strategy towards Hong Kong and Macao, by stating that the "European Commission should develop, broaden and deepen cooperation" with Hong Kong and Macao (European Commission 2006:2), which resulted in a policy change towards Hong Kong and Macao. Indeed, one consultant for EU-China trade relations did suggest that the European Union was morally liable to Hong Kong and should have stepped up to monitor the implementation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law (van der Geest 2007).

As a result, the European Union had reshaped her policy towards Hong Kong after the visit from President Barroso in 2005. A new Commission communication, namely "The European Union, Hong Kong and Macao: Possibilities for Cooperation 2007-2013", was proposed to the Council and the European Parliament (European Commission 2006). While the communication continued to emphasise the economic benefit from a good EU-Hong Kong relation, the Commission paper kicked off its recommendation to closer cooperation by a rather interesting notion:

"Increasingly, mainland Chinese companies are using Hong Kong as a base and a source of knowledge – a **gateway** for business opportunities in Europe." (ibid:5; emphasis added by author)

It was not unsurprising that Chinese business and political leaders took the relative free environment of Hong Kong as their business headquarters and their channel of information about the Western world, a political role assumed since the Cold War period (Shen 2016). However, it was interesting for the European Union to see it as an opportunity for "greater engagement" (ibid). In fact, when the Commission summarised their proposal, the instrumental role of Hong Kong (and Macao) for "deepening cooperation with mainland China" was emphasised as the indirect mutual interests (ibid:2). Such interests may refer to the indirect investment through Hong Kong to China, as emphasised in the 2013 annual report (European External Action Service 2013), but also the public diplomacy and epistemic influence suggested by the Communication proposal. In fact, in response to the change of policy, two new programmes were launched: EUBIP and the EU Academic Programme. While the first one aimed to provide business information and investment opportunities for Chinese and European companies, the target audience of the EU Academic Programme was solely on the Chinese community in Hong Kong as well as in mainland China. Therefore, the EU Academic Programme was inclined to be the EU port action direct to China, which the thesis should closely examine.

Strengthening EU Centrality in Hong Kong: EU Academic Programme as a kind of Structural Power

While the establishment of European Union Centres could be dated back to 1988 in the United States and Canada, such unified European studies-oriented centre did not appear in Hong Kong until 2012 (EU Academic Programme 2012). Prior to the establishment of the Programme, as identified by the Call for Proposal in 2011, “only a few academic programmes on European Studies (were) available” and “the lack of expertise in European Studies” limited the EU visibility in Hong Kong (European Commission 2011). In fact, apart from the European Documentation Centre in the Hong Kong Baptist University, there was no EU-specific centre in Hong Kong before 2012. The European Commission, in response to the “Possibilities for Cooperation 2007-2013” communication, decided to fund a unified centre from 2012. It was worth noting that the Call for Proposals document expressed the Programme’s relation to China: the universities in Hong Kong had hosted “an important (and increasing) group of mainland Chinese students with a non-negligible dissemination and spill-over effect” (ibid:3). Therefore, the “wider public” which the Programme aimed to address might not only included those academic and professionals in Hong Kong, but also those mainland students and entrepreneurs happened to be in Hong Kong but joining programme’s activities. Apart from topic-specific seminars and students-outreach activities, two types of programmes were organised by the EU Academic Programme: the intellectual property rights related activities and cultural diplomacy. While the first part was always the problem between EU-China trade dialogue, the latter one combines the cultural focus in previous European Studies programme with political objectives.

In fact, while the above programmes and seminars looked to be distant from the discussion of port status and port diplomacy, the effort to strengthen the EU presence in Hong Kong indeed was a diplomatic action to strengthen the centrality, i.e. institution generating capacity of the EU after the handover. One of the major objectives, which contributed 35% - 45% of the overall budget, required the bidder to promote greater understanding of the European Union, by providing “information workshops and training modules targeting groups such as journalists from local, regional and national media” and publicising “articles in the main Hong Kong’s national and regional newspapers” (ibid:8). The term “national”, in this context, could only mean mainland China-based journalists and mainland China-linked newspapers, rather than simply Hong Kong-focused media. It was also worth to note the latest series of programmes suggested by the EU Academic Programme, the “歐风-look” (sound of “outlook”) gave a soft promotion of European culture and lifestyle, for instance biking, green city or European Citizens’ Initiatives.

Though the EU Academic Programme positioned itself as “a teaching/learning platform about EUROPE for everyone” (EU Academic Programme 2013), the use of cultural attraction indeed echoed Joseph Nye’s idea of soft power (Nye 1990; 2004; 2008). The status of a European **gateway** and Chinese **port metropolis**, became a platform for the European Union to ship its European values to China through the high institution generating capacity and broader reach of Hong Kong maritime network in China, especially compared to that of Macao. In fact, the last dimension added to the EU Academic Programme was the idea of “green” and “smart city” on urbanisation, a critical problem China need to face in the coming decades. It was indeed quite interesting to see workshops on urbanisation being hosted in Hong Kong, a renowned cosmopolitan city which had nearly completed its urbanisation process. The workshops of this kind to be hosted in Hong Kong could only be explained to two elements: 1) the relatively free and internationalised atmosphere in Hong Kong attracted international scholars to share their experience and expertise in the related subjects; 2) the high level of intermediacy allowed the workshops to reach both the local and national audience, i.e. the policy experts and academics in mainland China. By mixing the European culture attraction into the solution of urbanisation,

those Hong Kong workshops could provide an epistemic influence over Chinese knowledge on the idea of urban and rural division, projecting the European society as an ideal solution for the future China. By projecting the EU experience as a kind of solution to local and national problems of China, the EU could maintain its strong centrality over the port even though the Western powers were formally being driven out from the governance of the HKSAR. A study conducted by Kenneth Chan focused on the public opinion in Hong Kong on the image of the European Union, suggesting that the positive but lacking of knowledge attitude in Hong Kong towards the European Union supported a more extroverted European Union (Chan 2007). In addition, these programmes also bridged Europe and China through Hong Kong and made Hong Kong as part of the normative power platform for the EU to promote its values to Beijing in a more indirect manner. As Chan (2007) suggested, it was in EU interests to make sure that Beijing governed Hong Kong according to “One Country, Two Systems” (Chan 2007). As mentioned in last section, the preservation of OCTS was indeed the preservation of the port geography of Hong Kong, i.e. a viable European gateway to China.

Defending Her Centrality through Curtailing Intermediacy: Beijing Port Responses in Hong Kong after the Handover

The above section focused on how the EU had utilised the port status of Hong Kong to ship its normative values to China. As Béja (2008) suggested, the port status of Hong Kong was always an asset as well as a liability to Beijing. The liability part was that an (over-)internationalised Hong Kong could always be a loophole to be explored by the Western world so as to intervene Chinese domestic politics. In fact, the geopolitical characteristics of Hong Kong, in relation to Chinese mainland, were aware by the British colonial government from the very beginning. John Carroll (2007a), a renowned historian on the history of Hong Kong, suggested that the port role of Hong Kong was indeed a combination of military base and hub for people and capital exchange. For instance, the Stonecutter’s Island was the last British naval base in Asia and always served as the port for the British and American navies for supply. Intelligence services were allowed for Britain and her allies but the colonial government always wished to curtail China’s influence, especially after CCP formally took power after 1949. As the result, rather than a free flow of people and capital, colonial Hong Kong indeed had imposed strict control over the flow of people and capital directly from mainland, reflecting the geopolitical and security concerns of British government in relation to CCP China (Grantham 2012).

After the handover, Beijing also shared this attitude, but the direction of influence was reversed. Since the reveal of “Document 9”, Western analysts suggested that the primary security concerns of Beijing were no longer tangible attacks but cultural and ideational influence from the West, thus setting a new and top-ranked National Security Commission to tackle the risks arising from Western ideas (Panda 2013). As a port metropolis with strong Western presence, the domestic political culture of Hong Kong was a kind of threats to Beijing authoritarianism. In fact, major institutional characteristics of Hong Kong communities, including the desire for Western constitutional democracy, embracing universal values, vibrant civil society, economic and political neoliberalism, practising West’s idea of journalism and the recent historical nihilism against Chinese official history, were on one hand constituted European centrality, and port diplomacy objectives, in Hong Kong; on the other hand a direct challenge of Beijing “sovereign story” (Lam 2018). Suspected by Lam (2013), the inclusion of Hong Kong to National Security Council meant that Beijing had adopted a hard-line approach towards Hong Kong, using the excuse of national security to intervene in Hong Kong. The “securitisation” of Hong Kong not only curtailed the freedom enjoyed by local communities, but also a possible move that weakened EU structural power in Hong Kong, thus the centrality that the EU could enjoy. This securitisation not only in form of putting Hong Kong under the national security agenda, but also a direct action by building a naval base in Central, the CBD of Hong Kong and

connected them with the existing PLA facilities in Central. Reviewed in Chapter 2, a common form of port diplomacy was a naval port call or port visit, which helped a state to project her naval power so as to scare off potential enemies or represent a better friendship between allies. While it was politically incorrect to position PLA-N port or visit to Hong Kong as a kind of “maritime diplomacy”, the meaning of such maritime action was indeed well-perceived by pro-Beijing politicians (Zheng 2014). No matter the objective of such naval visits was to strengthen the image of Beijing or deter further foreign intervention from the Western world, the securitisation strategy could be considered as a move to respond to the growing normative challenges from local community as well as the international communities. In fact, the latest National Security Act deliberately mentioned that Hong Kong (and Macao) had the “shared duties” to preserve the national security and the “responsibility” to ensure the National Security Act was observed (National People’s Congress Standing Committee 2015).

A Battle of Port Geography? The Implications of European Port Actions and the Chinese Responses

Robert Cox, one of the founders of critical theory of IR, once used the idea of “war of position” in defining the strategy to strengthen the social foundations of a new state through creation of new intellectual and institutional resources to the existing society (Cox 1983). This term might also be useful to understand the potential role of Hong Kong in Sino-European port diplomacy. The discussion of the respective EU port actions and Beijing responses revealed that both diplomatic actors wished to strengthen their position in the civilian ports, through strengthening their centrality in the **port metropolis**. The European Union, through its cultural flagship branded under an academic programme, aimed to project its structural power to Hong Kong and mainland China, in particular the next generation of Hong Kong and Chinese communities. As acknowledged by the Commission paper (2006), the mainland students and entrepreneurs in Hong Kong might serve as an engine for the spill-over effect, making Hong Kong as the most suitable place for educating and promoting EU values to China.

On the other hand, Beijing continued her cautious approach towards Hong Kong port status of a Chinese **port metropolis** and a European **gateway**. On one hand, it was rather difficult, and also not beneficial, to shut down the linkage between Hong Kong and the rest of the world, as these links were still essential for China’s internationalization and economic development. On the other hand, the liberal Hong Kong which was well embedded in the liberal world order dominated by the United States, and to some extent Europe, had triggered Beijing’s concern over her security. For instance, Beijing always worried that the potential spill-over effect of the Hong Kong model, no matter in form of governance model or revolution model, back to mainland China. Owing to such security concern, Beijing began to “securitise” the port status of Hong Kong as a kind of threat to national security, so as to justify her hardliner approach to Hong Kong. However, the further securitisation of port status by Beijing, either in form of strengthening her centrality at the expense of European centrality, or curtailing Hong Kong intermediacy, would always be harmful to EU interests in her **gateway** to China.

However, if we separated Britain from the European Union, the situation was more complicated. For instance, compared to the public hearings done by the United States (2014), the United Kingdom (2015) and the European Parliament (2015) on the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, the public hearings from Strasburg received the least coverage among three. In addition, any comment from US Consul General or UK Member of Parliament would receive instant criticism by Beijing’s representatives in Hong Kong or pro-Beijing media (FMCOPRC 2013; Philip, Ng and Watt 2014). Therefore, Beijing cautious approach might not be directly against the “European” port actions but against her traditional Anglo-Saxon rivalries. Nonetheless, the potential negative spill-over effect might still harmful to EU centrality in Hong Kong, making the structural foreign policy less effective.

Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Responses in the Future

To begin with, the thesis would like to recall the three specific considerations to evaluate the effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether there was a **consensus** on the expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of **resources** available to them to implement their respective structural port diplomacy and responses; 3) the **relative strength** in centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the port. From the analysis above, the thesis showed that there were discrepancies on the role of Hong Kong in terms of expected role functions and the type. While Beijing wished to maintain the port metropolis status of Hong Kong after the handover such that Beijing could take the capacity and network developed in Hong Kong since 1842, such approach also attracted the exercise of EU structural power especially when the EU decided to upgrade its presence and centrality in Hong Kong. While Beijing was in upper hand in terms of centrality owing to the fact that the EU had no other legal or institutional framework except the soft international “agreement”²⁷ between Beijing and London – and the Britain would have left the European Union by 2020, the British colonial legacy allowed the European Union to take an upper hand in some areas of resources and capacity. Table 5.6 deconstructed the centrality enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels respectively:

	Beijing	Brussels
Economic resources and capacity	High	High
Cultural resources and capacity	Medium	Medium
Political resources and capacity	Low	Medium
Institutional resources and capacity	High	Low

Table 5.6 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Hong Kong

As shown in the above table, the European Union, borrowing the British colonial legacy, enjoyed relative strength and resources in the aspect of political values, while Beijing enjoyed her upper hand in formal institutional capacity. As the result, many programmes organised by the EUAP and EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao were a blend of economic resources, cultural resources and political values, for instance seminars on intellectual property rights, human rights, green urbanisation or smart city, and cultural programmes like 歐-look or Speak Dating Event. However, given the high degree of intermediacy enjoyed by the European Union in Hong Kong, not only the call for proposal and the actual programmes organised by the EUAP and the EU Office targeted audiences from both local and national. As a result, the seminars organised in Hong Kong were much in line with Beijing overall development agenda and EU business interests in mainland China, for instance the protection of intellectual property right was always a concern of EU business in entering the Chinese market.

While the above content of EU structural port diplomacy may be welcomed by Beijing, Beijing was always sensitive of the potential “structural changes” that could possibly have spill-over effects to mainland China, given the high degree of intermediacy of Hong Kong to mainland China as well. As a result, while Beijing was generally silent towards the presence of the EU and its soft structural diplomatic programmes like those seminars on intellectual property rights or green cities, she would always ready to utilise her institutional resources and capacity to curtail the potential spill-over effects of EU structural influence to political and institutional structures – especially when the United States and United Kingdom were involved. The top-

²⁷ While it was generally perceived in the West that the Sino-British Joint Declaration was a kind of international agreement with legal effect, the Chinese government rejected such claim and regarded it as a historical document.

down introduction of the National Security Act in Hong Kong by the National People's Congress in May 2020 could be the best illustration on how Beijing perceived the potential risks against her national security when Hong Kong was continuously exposed to foreign structural power. Although it was never the European Union as the first-tier of victims, the collateral damage towards EU structural foreign policy and structural power would be an inevitable outcome in the future.

Chapter Summary and Preview

This chapter continued the empirical study of Sino-European port diplomacy by focusing Hong Kong, the first treaty port established by Europe. Table 5.7 summarised the change of port role of Hong Kong from imperial period to 1997 when the sovereign title was formally transferred back to Beijing:

	Chinese authority	British authority	European authorities
Hong Kong in imperial period	Non-port	Coastal town	Coastal town
Hong Kong in 1842	Outport	Gateway	Hub
Hong Kong during Cold War	Outport	Port metropolis	Gateway
Hong Kong after the handover	Port metropolis	Gateway	Gateway

Table 5.7 The changing port geography of Hong Kong in different period

Compared to the case of Macao, the port role of Hong Kong was more straightforward as British, the dominant maritime power from 19th century to the early 20th century, had colonised Hong Kong through the Anglo-Chinese War and the arrangement was made through international treaties. As a result, British, as well as the Europeans, upheld a high level of centrality (intermediate level for other Europeans) and intermediacy in Hong Kong. Even though British dominance was dropped and replaced by the United States, the port status of Hong Kong was actively maintained by London as a bargaining chip to U.S. as well as an image-building exercise. On the other hand, Beijing also benefited from such **port metropolis** status of Hong Kong, and utilised the port status of Hong Kong for her national interests. In fact, the benefits received from Beijing in Hong Kong also made her to institutionalise the colonial legacy under the framework of OCTS. By borrowing the colonial legacy in terms of centrality and intermediacy, Beijing successfully turned Hong Kong as a Chinese **port metropolis** after the handover. The Western world, given the promise made by Beijing through the Joint Declaration and the subsequent HKBL, adopted the OCTS as an institution to defend the port geography and their respective port role in Hong Kong. In defending the port geography and port status, major political entities in the Western world had also developed their mechanism to monitor the port status and port geography of Hong Kong after the handover.

The turn of EU port diplomacy after 2005, therefore, could be viewed as an extension of such defensive mechanism to a proactive approach to strengthen the centrality of EU enjoyed in Hong Kong. Through developing cultural flagship programme under the name of academic exchange, the EU had shipped its normative objectives to Hong Kong as well as China, by utilising the **gateway** status of Hong Kong in linking up the mainland China. On the other hand, the growing concern over foreign intervention made Beijing to develop her securitisation strategy against Hong Kong. While the main audience might not be the European Union, the securitisation strategy could also damage the port role of Hong Kong previously enjoyed by the Western world. An implicit battle over the port geography could be foreseen.

The next chapter would discuss the last empirical case, i.e. Shanghai, which combined the

characteristics of Macao, as an international settlement, and Hong Kong, as a treaty port established by the British Empire. It was also the first port to be returned to China and experienced the regime change from *KMT* to *CCP*. The port geography of Shanghai would be in the past and the present would be studied, aiming to shed light on how the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement impact on the current por geography of Shanghai Municipality. The chapter would also discuss how the institutional legacy had contributed, as well as limited, the port diplomatic option available to the EU and China.

Chapter 6: Shanghai as pan-European Settlement in China – The Role of Shanghai in Sino-European Port Diplomacy

Following the discussion of Macao, the first European settlement in China, and Hong Kong, the first European colony in China, this chapter would turn to the final case to be studied in the thesis. Unlike Hong Kong and Macao, Shanghai was not colonised by a single Western Power like Portugal in Macao or Britain in Hong Kong. Instead, most of the European states took advantage of Sino-British bilateral treaty and formed their own concessions in Shanghai. Except for the French Empire which withdrew herself from the Shanghai International Settlement, most of the Western powers, as well as some Chinese merchants, agreed to participate in the co-governance regime, i.e. the Shanghai Municipal Council. In addition, while Hong Kong and Macao were barely mentioned as an important port in early Chinese history, Shanghai was embedded into the Chinese trading system although it was not designated for foreign trade at the very beginning. The level of centrality and intermediacy was different from that of Hong Kong and Macao respectively.

Apart from the different level of development, Shanghai was also the first port to be returned to China among the three cases the thesis studied. The *de jure* possession of sovereignty over Shanghai was transferred back to the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, under two separate bilateral agreements with Britain and the United States in 1943. Followed by the defeat of Imperial Japan in 1945, both the *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty of the whole of Shanghai, including the settlements established by Imperial Japan, was also taken back by the Nationalist Government. Since then, Shanghai became one of the most important ports for Chinese economic development, no matter in the hands of Nationalist Government or the Communist Government, and the Western world continued their interests over Shanghai when it was re-opened as a major port under Communist Government.

Similar to previous two chapters, this chapter would be structured into three main sections: the first section outlined the port geography of Shanghai created during the International Settlement period, which laid down the legacy of port geography of Shanghai in the contemporary era. The second section turned to the contemporary port institutions of Shanghai after 1985 when China decided to open her door again to the Western world. A particular focus would be put on the recent Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. The third section focused on the European Union's policy and political actions in Shanghai and how Beijing authority responded so as to maximise her interests. The chapter concluded by summarising the lesson and implications learnt through research findings on contemporary EU-China relations, notably the interaction between the uniqueness of Shanghai port status and the effectiveness and limitations of European port diplomacy in Shanghai.

The Creation of Legacy: From an Outport of China to a Treaty Port Metropolis of the West

It might be self-evident nowadays to recognise Shanghai as an important economic motor of contemporary Chinese economic development, especially given the fact that Shanghai was the busiest port in the world, bypassing other internationally renowned ports like Singapore and Hong Kong. However, Shanghai was not a designated port for foreign trade during Ming and Qing Dynasty. As Bergere (2009:22) put it, "Shanghai seemed the most modest and least attractive of five new treaty ports." Nonetheless, Shanghai occupied a rather unique role compared to Hong Kong and Macao, which was an **urban port** for tributary and intra-regional trade for China.

From an Urban Port to Cityport of China: The Role of Shanghai Prior to the Arrival of the West

The comment from Bergere (2009) on the position of Shanghai in Chinese economic development required some discussion. Indeed, prior to the arrival of the British and the turning of Shanghai into a treaty port, Shanghai never occupied an important role for foreign trade and commercial activities. As shown in the chapter on Macao, Canton was the main trading centre dedicated to European trade since the Ming Dynasty, and the position of the provincial capital monopolising European trade continued under the Manchurian imperial court. Geographically speaking, Shanghai did not produce a good shelter as Amoy and Ningbo did, which were also opened as treaty ports after 1842. Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de La Gravière, a renowned French admiral, once mocked the geographical position of Shanghai “as low as that of democracy.” (Bergere 2009:23) As the comment was made during the imperial period, it implied that Shanghai may be a good agricultural land, but never an excellent seaport for navy and commercial ships.

However, the lack of good geographical position did not imply that Shanghai was a “fishing village” like Hong Kong or a “smuggling centre” like Macao, and that it had no economic importance to China. Instead, Shanghai was a market town for local and internal trade, especially serving as a facilitator for the North-South trade through the Great Canal. While the town planning of Shanghai was not as systematic as those political and economic cities in northern China, implying that the socio-economic development of Shanghai was rather distant from official administration, Shanghai nevertheless served as a facilitating hub to support the economic development of surrounding regions. Since Ming Dynasty, Shanghai had benefited from the production of cotton and other agricultural products from the fertile Jiangnan region. The development of local craftsmanship allowed Shanghai to export woven fabrics and other textiles to other part of China, in exchange of rice, tea and other merchandises and then re-export to the northern part of China. With the gradual lift of maritime trade ban, Shanghai also benefited from tributary trade with Ryukyu, Japan and the West, although the main commercial activities remained at Ningbo and Canton respectively (Bergere 2009). In terms of port geography, the vibrant internal market and participation of internal and tributary trade turned Shanghai into a traditional type of urban port, which had a medium level of centrality due to its vibrant economic activities and low level of intermediacy as its participation in external maritime network was limited.

The role of Shanghai in foreign and maritime trade was boosted in late 18th century when the navigation of the Great Canal was blocked by floods and rebellions. Tribute was required to be rerouted and Shanghai became the starting point of this new tributary trading network, and the new economic position of the city attracted cross-regional capital investment such as ship-building and banking industry. As a result of rapid economic development, the Manchurian government had eventually upgraded Shanghai from a district capital to a capital of a circuit (*dao*) with a permanent official (*daotai*) residing inside the city, responsible for the management of maritime and river trade as well as the related levies from it (Bergere 2009). However, the upgrade of administration did not necessarily tighten the control over the city or increased public investment. Instead, the economic and social governance of the city was rather bottom-up, with native-place associations and professional guilds formed by merchants from different regions in China serving as middlemen between imperial officials and port society. The economic and social dynamism enjoyed in Shanghai was one of the essential reasons why Shanghai was picked as one of Chinese ports to be opened – at least in the eyes of William Jardine who put up the proposal to British government (Nield 2015). Compared to the **urban port** period in Ming Dynasty that focused on internal trade, the maritime network fundamentally shifted to an inter-regional trade focus. From a maritime perspective, such

change was a boost to the port's intermediacy as it was now connected with both internal markets, despite the relative drop of traffic due to floods and rebellions, as well as regional maritime trading network. An upgrade of administration also consolidated the political institutions, which could support the new economic activities and position. With reference to the theoretical framework, Shanghai indeed was a **cityport** which enjoyed a medium level of centrality and intermediacy even before the arrival of European powers in the 19th century. Table 6.1 summarised the port geography of Shanghai before the arrival of the European powers:

	Chinese authority (Ming court)	Chinese authority (Manchurian court)
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium
Level of intermediacy	Low	Medium
Type of port	Urban port	Cityport

Table 6.1 The port geography of Shanghai under the Ming court and the Manchurian court

Establishing a European Hub at Chinese Cityport: The Impact of the Treaty Port System in Shanghai

The Treaty of Nanking included Shanghai as one of the five ports to be opened for foreign trade. With the notifications from British Consul Captain George Balfour and a symbolic agreement with local merchant leaders, the British merchants began to settle inside the walled city. It should be noted that such agreement fundamentally differentiated the treatment of Shanghai from Hong Kong, where the latter was a Crown Colony with the sovereign rights of Hong Kong transferred to Britain in perpetuity, but the sovereign right of Shanghai, at least under the treaty text, remained in the hands of the Manchurian imperial court (Tai 1976; Nield 2015; Jackson 2016). The Treaty of Nanking, as well as the establishment of “concessions” and “municipal government”, created extraterritoriality arrangement between the Manchurian court and European states, despite a premium paid to central and local authorities to obtain some rights like land purchase and house ownership (Tai 1976; Jackson 2016). In fact, the Chinese term of “concessions” was referred to “*zujie*” which could be directly translated as “leased places”. Contrast to the idea of “settlement” which was commonly used in conceptualising the situation in Macao where a nominal ground rent was paid by the foreign communities, the concept of “*zujie*” was understood as places “where foreigners might live and deal directly with individual Chinese owners in buying or leasing land” (Clifford 1991:17, cited in Jackson 2016:4).

The concept of “concessions” was a Chinese initiative to keep her “centrality” in Shanghai while keeping the treaty text respected. After the consolidation of the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue in 1842 and 1843 respectively the Chinese local authority actively constructed a British settlement through the Land Regulations in 1845 (Tai 1976). Under the Land Regulations of 1845, the British community was granted specific living zones outside the walled city where they could enjoy their own languages, religion and their own legal system. On the contrary, no Chinese merchants could have right to acquire land or establish building inside the “British settlement”, yet the Chinese merchants maintained an overriding property rights through the collection of “rent” from foreign merc–ant (Bergere 2009:28 - 29). Foreign merchants, if they wished to obtain permanent rights to live, were required to pay adequate compensation to Chinese original owners. Despite the fact that the negotiation of settlement arrangement was conducted between British Consul and the Chinese local authority, the Land Regulation did not bar any non-British foreign merchants and diplomats from residing within the settlement. In this case, the Chinese authority intended to adopt a classical Confucian strategy in managing “barbarians”, namely segregation, collective responsibility and partial integration –*ibid*:30; Tai 1976:10 - 11). The settlement, therefore, was intended to be open to all foreign merchants, including the later comer French and American merchants.

The strategy was both successful and unsuccessful. On one hand, the British community found itself slowly incorporated into the local business culture, for example the establishment of the British Guild to collectively negotiate with the British Consul and the local Chinese authority. In addition, a Committee of Roads and Jetties was formed by all “rent-payers”, regardless of their nationality, to coordinate public works within the settlement. On the other hand, the lack of proper conflict resolution mechanism within the settlement resulted in more concessions built outside the walled city. As Tai (1976) and Jackson (2016) suggested, the British Consul always found himself as the legitimate authority to exert jurisdiction over cases related to buy and rent land or property inside the settlement. However, the assertion of authority was not agreed by non-British Consul as they could never accept British exclusive jurisdiction over their national subjects. The clashes over jurisdiction, together with an increasing business interests over Shanghai, forced the European Powers and the Americans to look for new settlements in Shanghai. The French Consul decided to negotiate a separate concession and a new concession, *Concession Française de Changhaï*, was created in 1849, where the French merchants began to enjoy their exclusive extraterritorial rights within the settlement. On the contrary, while the Americans were initially granted an exclusive right to buy land for public hygiene and missionary use under the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844, the American Consul did not exercise their exclusive rights but *de facto* created a socially-American area in Shanghai (Tai 1976). This area was subsequently combined with the British concession to form the Shanghai International Settlement in 1863.

The gradual development of Shanghai since 1843 thus created “a town with two faces”, where the Chinese merchants and locals lived behind the walled city and the foreigners in the settlement next to it (Bergere 2009:32). From the Chinese perspective, except for “leasing” land outside the walled city of Shanghai, the political order and economic activities were largely maintained. The Treaty of Nanking, despite forcing Shanghai to be a treaty port to all foreigners, allowed Shanghai to be connected to the maritime network established by the dominant British Empire from the Indian Ocean to East China Sea. From the British perspective, the newly created British settlement allowed the British to enjoy extraterritorial rights and semi-permanent place for settlement in Shanghai, despite the fact that the right to permanent settlement was subject to Chinese merchants (and authorities). This new settlement was eventually becoming a model settlement for the rest of Europe, which could provide them with a place of their own in Shanghai. The vibrant economic market in Shanghai since the Ming Dynasty also allowed the Europeans to get access to Chinese internal market and resources through Shanghai, thus connected to the Chinese hinterland even though they were indeed formally settled outside the walled city. Together with the maritime network that had already been established by the Europeans, Shanghai turned into a **hub** for all Europeans, i.e. a low but intact level of centrality of each concession within a high level of intermediacy covering both the internal Chinese market and the regional trading network - except for the British whose centrality was further protected by international treaties. Table 6.2 summarised the port geography of Shanghai after the Land Regulation of 1845:

	Chinese authority	British authority	European authorities
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium	Low
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High	High
Type of port	Cityport	Gateway	Hub

Table 6.2 The port geography of Shanghai in 1845

Constructing a European Gateway: Early European Port Diplomacy to China

Isabella Jackson, a scholar who researched on the treaty port period of Shanghai, once

commented on the importance of Shanghai's role in shaping port governance and port diplomacy between China and Europe (Jackson 2016:43). In fact, Shanghai was always regarded as a model treaty port and wished to be promoted to rest of the treaty ports "borrowed" by foreign communities. The creation of Shanghai International Settlement with a new governing body Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) had always been undermined as a diplomatic solution not only for China and Europe, but also as a pragmatic power sharing solution between Britain, the dominant European power in China, and the rest of European states²⁸. The importance of SMC was undermined and never investigated under the lens of port diplomacy and port geography.

As discussed in the last section, the primary objective for the Chinese authority to create concession in Shanghai was to turn the foreign communities into something contained and governable, so that Shanghai could on the one hand become a free port in accordance to the treaty demands, on the other hand the Chinese local authority could maintain its political order while allowing economic contacts with foreign community. From other European perspective, the governance of Shanghai Settlement created by the Land Regulation of 1845 was dominated by the British Consul and merchants. Many foreign communities therefore decided to create their own concessions, through negotiation with the local authority or grew "naturally" across the original border since 1845. The new concessions created by France and the United States in 1849 and 1848 respectively were examples of such expansion of the Shanghai Settlement (Tai 1976). However, the successive armed rebellions initiated by the Small Sword Society and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had occupied the Shanghai walled city where most of the Chinese residents in Shanghai lived. The implications of these rebellions were twofold: first, the original local authority established by the Manchurian imperial court could no longer govern Shanghai as well as protect the foreign concessions established around the walled city; second, the influx of refugees created tremendous pressure for each concession in terms of effective governance and business network maintenance. In 1854, major foreign stakeholders in Shanghai created the SMC to coordinate the governance of different foreign concessions. A para-military patrol was also set up so as to protect the foreign concessions from the armed conflicts initiated by the Chinese communities during the civil war between the Manchurian imperial court and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (Jackson 2016). In 1862, France decided to drop herself from the SMC in order to maintain the independence of her own concession outside the British and American concessions. A year later, the British concession and American concession combined together to form the Shanghai International Settlement (Tai 1976; Nield 2015; Jackson 2016). Therefore, the creation of Shanghai International Settlement and the SMC was firstly a response to European crisis of centrality which was threatened by armed raids in Shanghai. While the creation of the SMC might have been initiated as a solution to unexpected crisis, the governance model of SMC was highly diplomatic and reflected how diplomatic objective could be translated to co-governance. Jackson (2016) has summarised the SMC model into three different features.

First of all, the role of national government was limited in SMC. Although the opening up of Shanghai as a free port was a result of intergovernmental treaty between China and Britain, the role of government in daily governance of Shanghai International Settlement was highly limited. In theory, the Chinese local authority and diplomatic representatives of the respective foreign community were nominally accountable and provided diplomatic protection to any foreign residents in China. In practice, however, the SMC was responsible to all residents living and officials working within the Shanghai International Settlement (Jackson 2016). The role of

²⁸ It would be more interesting if we took the Chinese translation into the account, which was directly translated as Shanghai Public Concession. From Chinese perspective, the Shanghai Settlement was not for "international" but just for "public" which blurs the difference in nationality.

Chinese government and foreign diplomatic representatives was highly limited and the idea of “publicness” indeed prevailed in SMC. For instance, the SMC was elected by the rent-payers who rented or owned property within the International Settlement. Members of the SMC were in theory held politically accountable to their “constituencies” – which meant the national communities and companies they represented rather than the consular offices in the International Settlement. However, in reality electoral competition was rare and both the qualifications of being a candidate or a voter were – stringently defined – only 3% of the residents living in the International Settlement were eligible to run the offices (Brickers 2003; Jackson 2016). This echoed the earlier views that the International Settlement was said to be common to all, or managed like the later motto of SMC, *omnia juncta in uno* (all joined in one), despite the fact that half of the qualified voters were British (ibid).

Second, the SMC was highly depoliticised in name but political in reflecting the actual geopolitical context in China and Asia. While the International Settlement reflected the idea of publicness in its Chinese translation, the SMC was named “a council responsible for public works”. Of course, one of the major functions of the SMC was to oversee administrative issues aroused in the community such as public hygiene or transportation. Yet, the SMC was also responsible for political works such as maintaining public order and education inside the International Settlement (Jackson 2016). While the naming of SMC in English was close to nowadays understanding of city council which bared the administrative and political responsibility, the Chinese name did not reflect such a notion. In formulating the SMC, although reservations were always made to specific nationalities as a tacit consent agreed amongst all national communities in Shanghai, the reservations were made to reflect the changing geopolitical context in China and Asia such that both business interests and diplomatic interests were addressed in the SMC. According to the research conducted by Jackson (2016), the pattern of election results was similar to the changing domination of European powers in China and Asia. For instance, between 1873 and 1914 the SMC was typically formed by 7 Britons, 1 American and 1 German. The German representative was replaced by a Russian representative when the First World War broke out in 1914, and a Japanese representative was also elected to reflect the rising Japanese interests in Shanghai as well as the rising power status in Asian regional politics after the triumph of Russo-Japanese War. The decline of Tsarist Russia and the reorientation of Soviet diplomacy were also reflected in the composition of SMC by the drop of Russian representative, and to reflect the new regional strategic balance an extra representative was added from the side of United States in 1919 and Japan in 1928 respectively. Foreign representation remained stable (5 Britons, 2 Americans and 2 Japanese) until 1941 when wartime tensions between China and Japan, or Allied and Axis Powers in general, were escalated under Japanese occupation of Shanghai, leading to the void of electoral system and a new Provisional Council was established. The newly appointed system which the representatives were nominated by consular-generals, i.e. foreign government representatives resided in China, the Provisional Council also reflected the changing geopolitical balance worldwide and in Asia, by introducing new Swiss and Dutch membership as well as the coming back of German representative to the new Provisional Council, and a certain degree of internationalism was maintained in order to promote the genuine neutrality of Shanghai International Settlement, which perhaps also served at the best interests of European powers and Japan. While Bickers (2003) argued that before the emergence of total war between the Allied and Axis Powers shortly after the Pearl Harbour Attack in December 1941, good relations were maintained amongst nationals from both sides in daily management of Shanghai International Settlement, reflecting “the ongoing strength of the rhetoric of internationalism”, such internationalism may actually represent more than a genuine rhetoric, but a diplomatic and strategic choice or compromise. (Jackson 2016) As a result, even though the British voter population could in theory turn the SMC under British sole control, the British never dictated

the political or policy agenda, but reluctantly made concessions and compromise towards other nations' demands, including those from Chinese merchants and authorities. Even though business interests, rather than political interests and representation, were the key to formulate the co-governance system, the SMC indeed reflected.

However, the internationalist logic in SMC was also a consequence of nationalist agenda, which was perceived by Jackson as the third feature of SMC. From Jackson's perspective, the most noticeable example was the invitation of Chinese representatives to the Conseil municipal, the governing body of French sole concession, and the SMC. The inclusion of Chinese element in the International Settlement was indeed an agreed term when the International Settlement was established in 1863, yet the proposal was not fully implemented, except a largely symbolic consultation with the *Daotai* when the decisions of the SMC may affect the Chinese residents in the International Settlement. The reluctance to share power remained even when the Chinese guilds offered help to secure local order in 1905, in exchange of representation in SMC. When the extension of the boundaries was required, European Powers, starting from French to British who were dominated in the respective French Concession and Shanghai International Settlement, were willing to share powers with Chinese, in the name of responding to "public opinion" (Goodman 2002). Symbolic representation was granted not because the European Powers really embraced internationalism but for their specific agenda. For example, the SMC internationalism was used to contain the rising Japanese influence in Shanghai after the Russo-Japanese War and the World War I. Since 1930 when the last extra Japanese representative and 5 Chinese representatives were added to the SMC, the formation of SMC remained largely stable even though the imperial Japan became more and more influential in the Asian maritime order. Successive demands were made by the Japanese merchants in Shanghai yet the British rent-payers, with the support from London and European merchants in Shanghai, turned down the request by playing with the regulations (Jackson 2016). As a result, the national composition of SMC remained unchanged against the changing context, and a balance of power through internationalism in SMC became the strategy for Britain to maintain her domination of the management of SMC. Indeed, as viewed from the case of education resources distribution, even though there may be genuine power sharing and cooperation among different national representatives, "the Council and its committees divided along the national lines where interests conflicted." (ibid:51) Various displays and organizations such as Shanghai Volunteer Corps combined internationalism with nationalism and business interests. Rather than being regarded as a monolithic power with a single diplomatic and political domination such as British in the case of colonial Hong Kong or Portuguese in the case of Macao, Shanghai was actually run by "a body of people with increasing reach into the daily lives of the residents", and this body of people were elected by civilian interests, supported by diplomatic and national interests, and able to co-govern the International Settlement with other national representatives. The creation of SMC, from the perspectives of non-British Europeans, allowed them to build up their own capacity within the Shanghai International Settlement, through the co-governance system and internal lobbying under the framework of SMC. Compared to the early days in Shanghai, the institution generating capacity of other Europeans was boosted within the Shanghai International Settlement. On the other hand, Britain, despite the power-sharing nature of SMC, remained a dominant party and took advantage of other European efforts in maintaining Shanghai as a viable port for foreign trade. From this perspective, British did not trade off her control over Shanghai but maintained a strong presence in the port. As a result, the co-governance system under the SMC framework on one hand helped to stabilise British position in Shanghai, but also upgraded the port role of Shanghai from **hub** to a European **gateway**.

The Chinese counterpart also took advantage of such internationalism with nationalist characteristics, through the introduction of Chinese representatives who had a cosmopolitan background yet also linked closely with the Manchurian imperial court. In fact, in order to assert

their parity to the foreign communities in Shanghai, the Chinese merchants and residents in Shanghai had modelled the management of representative election towards the foreign system (Jackson 2016). Notable Chinese representatives in the SMC were high-educated business elites with overseas study experience or working closely with foreign traders, making them comfortable to speak in the languages, literally or politically, of European powers in Shanghai, yet they were also having close ties with local community or even worked for the government before. This unique background of Chinese representatives allowed them to simultaneously represent Chinese business interests within Shanghai International Settlement, but also bridging the imperial court's interests – which was in principle barred from the Shanghai International Settlement after 1843, to the management of the SMC. To some extent, the Chinese business and political sector used the SMC as a way to maintain Chinese governance over the lost territory. Through the SMC co-governance system, the Chinese authority maintained a certain degree of “centrality” in Shanghai International Settlement, such that the Chinese community could still take advantage of Shanghai as a **hub** to conduct business activities. Table 6.3 summarised the port geography of the SMC period:

	Chinese authority	British authority	European authorities
Level of centrality	Medium	Medium	
Level of intermediacy	Medium	High	
Type of port	Cityport	Gateway	

Table 6.3 The port geography of Shanghai under the SMC co-governance system

Constructing the Legacy under Chinese Control: The Shanghai Municipality and the “Revival” of Shanghai Treaty Port

The end of World War II resulted in the end of most of the extraterritorial rights of European states in Chinese soil, except for Britain and Portugal which maintained their respective control over Hong Kong and Macao. The sovereign control of Shanghai was therefore returned to the *KMT* government, which, after 1949, was transferred to the CCP who was the victor of second Chinese civil war.

The “liberation” of Shanghai by the Chinese Community Party did not return Shanghai to its dominant economic position – a **cityport** which contributed nearly half of China's annual foreign trade in 1930s (MacPherson 2002). On the contrary, the socialist and anti-imperialist government decided to expunge Shanghai “imperialist” history through the nationalisation of its economic resources. The door to foreign trade was closed and economic growth was suppressed. As Kerrie L. MacPherson suggested, between 1949 and 1987, the central government was estimated to have taken 87 percent of total local revenue from Shanghai, leaving Shanghai vulnerable in economic development terms compared to other urban units with similar size (MacPherson 2002:39). MacPherson also found that the trade volume of Hong Kong, which was hit by the anti-Chinese sanctions imposed by the Western world in 1958, was still higher than the foreign trade volume of Shanghai, showing that the maritime network of Shanghai was severely damaged if not suppressed (ibid). It was not until later in the 1970s that Shanghai regained its economic momentum and achieved a rapid and sustainable growth, when China started to open herself to international trade. While Shanghai was not the first batch of ports and cities that opened to “market-socialism” reform and open-door policy, Beijing attached important economic goals to Shanghai since it was opened for foreign direct investment in 1984. As Keller et. al. (2012) suggested, the primary economic objective of Shanghai “was to attract capital investments and technology transfers from foreign countries, as well as to help spur growth of the region, by means of tax and profit incentives” (Keller et. al. 2012:11). The result of the reform was rather salient: Shanghai became the world busiest

port since 2010, bypassing renowned container ports such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Busan. According to the latest statistics provided by the World Shipping Council, Port of Shanghai handled more than 42-million TEUs in 2018 - more than a double of the volume handled by Port of Hong Kong that handled 19.6 million TEUs in the same year (World Shipping Council 2019). Shanghai. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, Shanghai was also made into one of the Pilot Free Trade Zone by Beijing to attract foreign capital and investment and the stock market of Shanghai was one of the most active market in mainland China which connected to Hong Kong stock market. Judging from the economic performance, Shanghai became a **port metropolis** if we judged by traditional port studies and port economy. Nonetheless, in the case of Sino-European port diplomacy, the role of Shanghai had more to reveal.

Mentioned in the last section, Shanghai slowly developed as a major Chinese **cityport** and European **gateway** since 1843, and a co-governance system was developed by European (and subsequent American and Japanese) merchants and Chinese community in Shanghai. The continuous growth of Shanghai was ended by World War II and the second Chinese civil war. While it was unrealistic (as well as politically incorrect) to say that the contemporary Shanghai carries all the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement, both Beijing and the European states, to some extent, interacted with each other in a similar way to the pattern developed since mid-19th century. In fact, by turning Shanghai as a Pilot Free Trade Zone, Beijing established a unique area where the European merchants could enjoy greater economic freedom and commercial autonomy than in other places within China. Such arrangement could be analogical to the Shanghai International Settlement where the Europeans could enjoy special economic (and political) rights in China. The only difference, but a critical one, was that the rule is now set by Beijing but not protected by bilateral international treaty.

Geographical Construction of the Legacy: A Spatial Representation of Chinese Port Responses to Early European Port Diplomacy

It should be noted that even though the place carried the same name Shanghai, the geographical coverage of current Shanghai Municipality was more than that of the Shanghai International Settlement. The Shanghai International Settlement, which was originally located at the west bank of the Huangpu River, constitutes of 4 out of the 18 districts of contemporary Shanghai Municipality, namely Huangpu District, Jing'an District, Hongkou District and Yangpu District, and all of them were named as "core districts" of Shanghai Municipality, in relation to "outlying districts" such as Pudong New Area, Minhang and Baoshan, which had recently been developed and dedicated to specific development (Yang 2002). Table 6.4 summarised major economic activities of Shanghai Municipality according to Yang (2002):

District ²⁹	Major Economic Activities
Huangpu*	Commerce and tourism
Jing'an*	Commerce, real estate, food and beverages, finance and securities, tourism, and other social services
Hongkou*	Commerce, recreation services, suitcases, clothing, lamps and lanterns, auto parts, jewellery making
Yangpu*	Machine tool, diesel engine, power station and supplementary products, electric cable, waterworks, commerce
Pudong New Area	Automobile, communications and information equipment (including computer), steel products, petrochemical and sophisticated chemical products (including biological and modern medicine), power station complete-set equipment and large mechanical and electronic equipment, household electronic appliances, finance and insurance, commerce, tourism, and agriculture
Minhang	Electrical equipment, clothing, chemical materials and products, metal and plastic products, trade, and real estate
Baoshan	Steel manufacturing, port (i.e. storage and transportation)

Table 6.4 Major economic activities in each district of Shanghai Municipality

From the above table, we could deduce that the original “functions” of Shanghai International Settlement disappeared. The civilian port “functions” were removed from the original 4 districts and the new port functions were located to the outlying districts like Pudong New Area. Instead, the original Shanghai International Settlement was turned into the places for core economic activities of Shanghai which signified the “centrality” of Shanghai. The intermediacy-related activities, for instance telecommunication, tourism or export processing zone, were all located in the Pudong New Area, an economic zone developed under the CCP instructions. In fact, under the socialist model of city development, the spatial-functional distribution already constituted a response from Beijing towards the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement, i.e. the early form of European port diplomacy, and how Shanghai could be used to connect the rest of the world including European states. As economists Wei, Leung and Luo (2006) suggested, Shanghai indeed did not have much autonomy in encouraging foreign direct investment compared to Canton and Fujian (see also Wei and Leung 2005). The centrality of Shanghai should be well-protected as the political and economic importance attached to it was huge, ranging from subsidising other special economic zones to an important signifier of Chinese nationalism and economic success. As a result, Shanghai on the one hand needed to remain connected to its legacy as a historic free port so as to create symbolic attraction to European merchants, on the other hand the European legacy should never overshadow the efforts of new Chinese government in reviving Shanghai (and Chinese) economy.

With such strategic thinking in mind, the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement was created with new spatial-functional meaning. For instance, Arkaraprasertkul, an anthropologist as well as an architect, suggested that the urban planning of Lujiazui, an outlying district

²⁹ The district marked with * covered the original area of Shanghai International Settlement.

focused on international finance and trade, was indeed a negotiated result of Chinese nationalism and globalisation, with “a strong visual connection to the old *Puxi*”, i.e. the old Shanghai city and Shanghai International Settlement (Arkaraprasertkul 2010:251). Yusuf and Wu (2002; see also Yusuf 2001; Arkaraprasertkul 2010) on the other hand suggested that the spatial-functional distribution of Shanghai Municipality reflected the geographical narration of “pragmatic nationalism”, such that the old Shanghai city depended on the connectivity and economic development of the new outlying districts—like Pudong New Area - which were planned by the CCP but not the Western legacy. To sum up, Beijing did borrow the legacy of the Shanghai International Settlement, but internalised it as a kind of centrality of Shanghai Municipality, i.e. the economic generating power as well as institution, in terms of (pragmatic) nationalism, generating power, through spatial-functional rearrangement as well as geographical narration. Therefore, the high level of centrality in **port metropolis** Shanghai was more than its economic functions but an ideational one.

In addition to borrowing the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement to strengthen Chinese centrality of Shanghai, the legacy of treaty port was borrowed to rebuild the intermediacy of Shanghai. In fact, many researches on economic development in China suggested that treaty port history was one of the factors that contributed to rapid economic and social development of the city or region, especially on economic growth and sector diversification, social freedom and gravity of foreign investment (Keller et. al. 2012; Jia 2014). For instance, by examining the long-term development of China’s treaty port and comparing them with China’s normal cities, Jia (2014) found that the legacy of treaty port encouraged population growth as well as per capita economic well-being. The research also suggested that the service and commerce sector, that developed since the treaty port period and continued after the open-door policy, was one of the main drivers for rapid economic growth and population growth. As in Shanghai, the treaty port legacy became obvious in determining its economic activities as well as the pattern of trade and investment.

In fact, Wang and Ducruet (2012) suggested that Shanghai continued to play the role of **outport** of China even when China did not open herself to external trade. Shanghai, before the Open-door Policy, had already established its intermediacy through serving the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region. Statistics showed that Shanghai handled more than 70% of the YRD’s traffic, maintaining its previous position as the most important port of the region of even in China. Even though Shanghai was not the first batch of Special Economic Zones created for foreign investment and trade, it has launched experimental shipping exercises in 1974 and 1977, through accommodating foreign bulk cargo ship to US ports and upgraded their trailers and forklifts from Japanese providers, becoming the first Chinese port to handle international standard containers (ibid; Yang– Luo and Ji 2016:357 - 361). By the time when Open-door Policy was announced, Shanghai was ready to handle trading routes from Japan and Australia. With the gradual development of port facilities and increasing trade in China, Shanghai extended its internal maritime network from the close YRD to a larger Yangtze River Basin (YRB) and even Beijing, and gradually connected to the world but not simply as an import port for China (Wang and Ducruet 2012; Wan et. al. 2014).

From an investment perspective, the original districts forming Shanghai International Settlement attracted most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) during the early stage of Open-door Policy (1979 – 1984) and subsequently these investments moved to the new port area, i.e. the Pudong New Area and the free trade zones (Wei, Leung and Luo 2006). In fact, since 1991, the new area accumulated approximately 40% of the FDI to Shanghai (ibid.). It should also be noted that compared to rest of the provinces opened to foreign investment like Guangdong, the composition of FDI in Shanghai was much more internationalized or diversified. While Hong Kong contributed in the largest proportion to FDI in Shanghai and Guangdong, the relative

proportion was much smaller in Shanghai. Taking the accumulated statistics from 1979 to 2000, i.e. one year before China's entry to WTO, as an example, Shanghai attracted 58% of FDI from non-Hong Kong sources while that in Guangdong contributes for only 28% (ibid:238). In terms of composition, majority of the non-Hong Kong sources of investment come from Japan, the United States, Taiwan and Singapore (ibid:238 - 239).

Focused on the legacy of treaty era to contemporary Shanghai trade pattern, Keller, Li and Shiue developed the gravity model to examine the pattern of trade during the treaty port era and compare the pattern with contemporary pattern of Shanghai (Keller et. al. 2012:27 - 31). Their conclusion confirmed that while Shanghai and China as a whole changed a lot from an imperial regime to a Communist regime, trade patterns conducted in Shanghai during the two different periods of time were largely remained similar and contemporary bilateral trade between Shanghai and foreign countries followed its historical pattern (ibid.). Besides, their research also showed that the past foreign presence, in terms of FDI and foreign population, contributed to a distinct legacy on contemporary export and its pattern. In fact, academic works on Shanghai economic reform suggested that many policies initiated by Zhu Rongji, the mayor of Shanghai from 1988 to 1991 and the chief policy architect of the creation of Pudong New Area, were an extension of the treaty port system and bias to foreign investors, so as to attract support around the world. For example tax holidays or future rights to invest in public facilities were granted to foreign investors who were serving the area, foreign companies were allowed to set up banks and provide financial services in Shanghai (Yang 2002; Wan et. al. 2014). To further upgrade the port software of Shanghai and its capacity to attract foreign capital to China, the State Council set various targets on financial liberalisation and logistics reforms in 2009 and eventually established the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ), the first special customs zone that covered the original "bonded zones" in Pudong New Area and upgraded the area in alignment with international logistics and financial practices (ibid.) As Wan et. al. (2014:4) observed, the Shanghai FTZ was introduced against the context of rising China's manufacturing costs with weak global demand, and the unnecessary complicated regulatory process was viewed as one of the reasons to deter further foreign capital and domestic investment. Again, Beijing not only borrowed the legacy of the Shanghai International Settlement to strengthen its centrality in Shanghai, but also took it as a foundation to strengthen its intermediacy, forming the first true **port metropolis** in China. Table 6.5 summarised the contemporary port geography of Shanghai Municipality from Chinese perspective:

	Chinese authority
Level of centrality	High
Level of intermediacy	High
Type of port	Port Metropolis

Table 6.5 The port geography of Shanghai from Chinese perspective

The SMC Legacy to Europe: A Weakened Co-governance System through the Chamber of Commerce

If the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement was well-utilised by Beijing to construct her new port diplomacy to the world including Europe, the same construction of legacy might also be observed in the case of the European Union. Without doubt, the era of extraterritoriality and treaty port ended after World War II, and the SMC could never be repeated in contemporary Chinese governance. However, some of the features on treaty port governance remained in managing and influencing the development of Shanghai. Compared to the situation in Hong Kong and Macao where the European Union had its independent External Action Service Office, the European Union had established one and only one Delegation Office in Beijing, serving as the ambassadorial representation of the European Union to mainland China. It should be noted that, however, when describing the functions of the EU delegation, the EU office gave

a rather reserved, if not reluctant, image of their works in China. According to the official website of the Delegation of the European Union to China, the functions of the Delegation include conducting “official relations between China and the European Union”, as well as “a natural point of contact between the EU and the Chinese authorities as well as others in China” (Delegation of the European Union to China 2016). However, the website also emphasised the “intergovernmental” nature of EU representation in China, which was not shown in the description on the EU Office to Hong Kong and Macao. For instance, the description shown in the Delegation Office highlighted that “in all matters pertaining to the European Union, the Delegation work(ed) closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member states, particularly the one representing the EU presidency, which change(ed) every six months” (ibid.) In addition, the Delegation also highlighted their limitations of duties, such as they were not the office “dealing with trade promotion, consular matters, or other issues which (had) traditionally been handled by the Member State embassies, consulates or national tourism offices (ibid.). The intergovernmental nature of European representation was salient in the case of Shanghai. While there were 22 EU Member States which established their consular offices in Shanghai, the European Union had no representation office in Shanghai but only in Hong Kong (European Union External Action 2015). It was understood that in diplomatic norms the establishment of office was based on reciprocity which the European Union might find it difficult to offer to China in exchange of a new representation office in Shanghai, such rules were always flexible. For instance, EU had its working offices in some disputed areas such as West Bank in Israel, Kosovo in Serbia and Taipei in China, and these offices were never matched under the rule of reciprocity (ibid.).

On the contrary, compared to the “European” Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong which regarded itself as “a “Chamber of Chambers” with its membership comprising 15 European Chambers based in Hong Kong and 1 in Macau (European Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong n.d.), the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China was established in 2000 with the aim to establish “a common voice for the various business sectors of the European Union and European businesses operating in China” (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China n.d.). While both Chambers targeted to represent EU business interests in the territory, the recognition of status was different among two “European Chambers” in China. Rather than a “Chamber of Chambers” serving for the collective interests of EU Member States’ chambers in China, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China was a company-based chamber whose primary membership was companies operating in China. Originally formed in Beijing by 51 companies as an “independent, members-driven, non-profit, fee-based organisation”, the European Union Chamber of Commerce expanded to 1,600 member companies and 7 chapters in different cities or regions in China (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2017). In addition, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China received both official recognition from Brussels and Beijing. For instance, its voice was recognised by the European Commission as “the official voice of European business in China”, and a similar recognition was made by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (ibid). As an advocacy organisation, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China produced various working papers and position papers with the propose of “relaying the concerns of European business directly to the Chinese Government”, as well as “keeping European Union authorities and Member State governments abreast of developments in the Chinese business environment (ibid:1).

The Shanghai Chapter was one of the local chapters established by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Established in April 2002, the Shanghai Chapter was the largest chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, consisting of almost 600 companies (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China 2016:2). In terms of its advocacy structure, the Shanghai Chapter, similar to other chapters, was composed of different

sectoral working group policy desks and fora, bridging the national and regional authorities in China to European companies in Shanghai. Apart from contributing to the annual position paper of the Chamber and other advocacy initiatives at national level, the Shanghai Chapter also actively drove local advocacy efforts to influence local and regional development, for instance in 2014 the Shanghai Chapter had published its own position paper, which was the first position paper published at local level (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2015:1-2). Following the pathway of Shanghai Chapter, many local chapters published their own position papers that focus on their respective cities and regions.

One of the important foci of the Shanghai Chapter was to make European contribution towards the establishment and further reforms of the Shanghai FTZ. Being invited by the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce (SOCFCOM), The Shanghai Chapter was consulted for the future measures being introduced in the Shanghai FTZ prior to its official opening. (ibid:28) Subsequent consultation was also arranged for issues like the construction of the Negative List³⁰ or other drafted legislations (ibid.:28 – 29; European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016:25 - 29). The exchange of ideas had extended from the SOCFCOM to higher level of government organisations such as the Shanghai FTZ Administration and the Shanghai Development and Reform Commission (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016). The Shanghai Chapter, similar to those merchants' associations during the SMC period, regarded itself as a vocal stakeholder of the Shanghai FTZ. For instance, in the position paper, the Shanghai Chapter demanded at least 8-week consultation period for the Chapter to provide oral or written comments on any drafted regulations on the operation of Shanghai FTZ (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2015; 2016). The Shanghai Chapter also asked for a bold reform on government functions and administration in Shanghai FTZ, and publicly voiced the lack of substantial reforms in the FTZ for 3 years, especially on financial liberalisation and inter-border flow of foreign capital (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016:29; Ren 2017). With the primary objective to defend the European interests in Shanghai, the Shanghai chapter asked for further reforms including greater tax incentives or the advancement to free port initiative as the future roadmap, so as to “re-establish foreign companies' confidence in the project” (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016:29). Mainland journalist expert suggested that it was rather a “rare display of frustration”, which suggested that the advocacy from the Shanghai Chapter was rather significant in shaping Chinese perception over the opinion from Brussels (Ren 2017). Indeed, while different European chambers had submitted their proposals over the Shanghai FTZ, little reports were made on individual chamber commitment except the Shanghai Chapter.

This kind of advocacy actions and consultations with Chinese officials should never be overemphasised nor underestimated. Rather, the thesis suggested, the European Union was following the footsteps made by the European companies during the SMC period, although the power structure between China and Europe was reversed under the Shanghai Municipality. Without a formal and official representation in Shanghai, the European Union had to rely on the European companies at Shanghai to exert influence over the management of the civilian port, a move that had been practiced since the SMC was created. It was also interesting to see, given the context of the inter-governmental nature of European interests in Shanghai (and China), the Shanghai Chapter as a kind of “transnational non-state actor” that represented the supranational ideal of the European Union in Shanghai. Nonetheless, owing to the reverse of power structure after the CCP took over the sovereign title and administrative right, the role of Shanghai Chapter was passive and weak under the consultation process. As a result, the European Union could never project a strong centrality to reconstruct the whole legacy of Shanghai International Settlement at their own hand. Instead, just like the Chinese merchants

³⁰ The Negative List was a list of industries which foreign investment was either prohibited or under greater restriction or scrutiny.

in the SMC period, the weak representation of the EU in the new co-governance structure was to remain relevant and protect the access of the Shanghai port metropolis, i.e. the access to the intermediacy of contemporary Shanghai, so that the new Shanghai civilian port could be a **hub** for protecting EU economic interests in China. Table 6.6 summarised the port geography of Shanghai from European perspective:

	European authority
Level of centrality	Low
Level of intermediacy	High
Type of port	Hub

Table 6.6 The port geography of Shanghai from EU perspective

The Shanghai Legacy: Contemporary EU Port Diplomacy and its Implications to EU-China Relations

As mentioned in the introduction, it was not practical to duplicate the whole treaty port structure and management owing to the changing international political context after WWII, as the concept of forced extraterritoriality became impossible in contemporary politics. However, preferential treatment against foreign investment was always possible especially for developing countries, through selective relaxation of regulations in certain cities or regions. The Shanghai FTZ was an example of this kind which the Chinese government wished to make use of the geo-economic position of Shanghai to foster her economic and political objectives. The foreign countries, in this thesis the European Union and its Member States, also took advantage on such self-imposed “extraterritoriality” to advance their economic and political interests.

In fact, by reviewing the Chinese and European Union commitment in developing the Shanghai FTZ, the thesis argued that both parties know the limits of their commitment and the potential cost and benefit of turning Shanghai into a true “free treaty port”, i.e. the free port status is guaranteed by domestic regulations with international commitment and recognition. Compared to the previous cases of Hong Kong and Macao, Shanghai “free treaty port” status was never guaranteed to its foreign audiences by bilateral declaration (the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration), international commitment (the WTO membership and the EU-Macao Trade and Cooperation Agreement), or strong institutional framework (One Country, Two Systems). Rather than hard domestic regulations or international commitment, the Shanghai FTZ administration incorporated foreign ideas and demands through soft coordination, which in the case of Shanghai was through selective consultation exercises.

As mentioned in the earlier section, Beijing did realise the potential economic and political impact of the liberalization of Shanghai: on the one hand, the geo-economic privilege naturally enjoyed by Shanghai, including a well-established seaport linked with various hinterlands in East Asia and the historical reputation of Shanghai as a city of fortune and economic prosperity, was a valuable asset for Chinese development and in attracting foreign investments to China; on the other hand the attractiveness and the history of Shanghai also inevitably led to protests at local level and the rise of local protectionism, as well as potential economic and political backfire at central level (Lee 1998; Wan et. al. 2014; Wei, Leung and Luo 2015; Ren 2018). As discussed in the previous two sections, the socialist philosophy of city development and the discourse of “pragmatic nationalism” required Beijing to strike a balance between borrowing the legacy of the Shanghai International Settlement for her economic stake and the impact of embracing too much of the Western legacy in Shanghai. Indeed, when considering whether Shanghai could take more aggressive reform and turn the FTZ into a genuine free port, one of the concerns from Beijing was that whether the uncontrolled flow of foreign capital would create financial crisis in Beijing, given that the stability of Renminbi was always the top priority of Beijing financial policy (Wei, Leung and Luo 2015; Ren 2018). Although Beijing aimed to

make Shanghai a true global port city, i.e. the 4th generation port suggested by Wan et. al. (2014), the high level of intermediacy would also expose China's vulnerability and anxiety of foreign intervention, as demonstrated in the case of Hong Kong.

The difficulty in choosing developmental pathway of Shanghai by Beijing could possibly become a way for the European Union to exert its influence over the decision-making process, or even taking the spill-over effect to impact on the rest of China. Indeed, it was rather obvious from the EU perspective that the Shanghai FTZ was not simply a project influencing the port geography of Shanghai but an example for national economic reform. The establishment of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, as mentioned in earlier section, was mobilised as an advocacy as well as a monitoring organisation on Beijing commitment towards economic liberalisation, and such objective was undoubtedly shared by the Shanghai Chapter. Repeatedly mentioned in the position paper and media briefing sessions, the Shanghai Chapter considered the Shanghai FTZ as a role model for further economic liberalisation in China, rather than a simple industrial park or development zone that was readily duplicated in other Chinese cities. The free port initiative, for example, was strongly supported by the Shanghai chapter as a "bold reform" that the European companies are looking for. Undoubtedly, the final decision remained at the hand of Beijing, and Shanghai administration, and the European Union (and its Member States) could never return to its dominant position enjoyed during the treaty port era that dominated the policy-making and decision-making process. Yet, such advocacy could, at least from the recent development of Shanghai FTZ, turned Shanghai into a more open place for foreign investment and allowed the European companies to slowly penetrate some business areas which had originally been under the Negative List.

The European Union position, based on the analysis of the advocacy made by the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, was twofold. The first EU position was always economic-driven, especially in Shanghai where the Member States had more presence and history compared to Brussels. Brussels always wished to Shanghai as a well-developed economic **hub** for European business interests though advocating a free centrality, i.e. the liberal economic reform in Shanghai economic generation capacity, and open intermediacy, i.e. an unrestricted economic connection to domestic industries and market, regardless of any sophisticated change in central administration or Sino-European relations. The second position, which was a step forward, was to tie European values of market economy and liberalisation of trade and investment in Shanghai with the institutional reform within Shanghai, so that the Shanghai FTZ could be a role model of the rest of the China that embraced economic liberal and institutional liberal reform. However, to achieve such objective, the EU was required to upgrade its centrality in Shanghai, i.e. turning the economic **hub** to a soft-power **gateway**. An upgrade of such institution generating power, however, meant more EU active influence, if not intervention, to Chinese economic policy and social reform. As reviewed in Chapter 3, the red-line for any differential treatment offered by Beijing was sovereign integrity and policy autonomy in domestic affairs. Any foreign moves which aimed at changing the pace of Chinese reform, no matter in economic aspect or social aspect, would be heavily criticised by Beijing. As a result, the second position of the EU could never be realised and the role of Shanghai remained as an economic **hub** for EU business interests, but never a soft-power **gateway** to transfer EU structural power to China. After all, the Shanghai Chapter might be a heavy-weighted advocacy organisation in Shanghai, but never an official arm equipped with diplomatic resources and bargaining power. The slightly mismatch of Beijing and Brussels position in economic development in Shanghai and China could be best illustrated by how the Shanghai FTZ was recently developed. While the European companies continued to complain for the lack of progressive reform in Shanghai FTZ and decided to leave, Beijing maintained her position and evaluation of Shanghai FTZ as a successful initiative to attract foreign direct investment under her control. The widened expectation gap indeed was also a good reflection

on how the European Union and China view each other, and Shanghai became a lively illustration of such a gap in practical manner.

Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Responses in the Future

Similar to the previous chapters, the thesis would apply the three specific considerations to evaluate the effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether there was a **consensus** on the expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of **resources** available to them to implement their respective structural port diplomacy and responses; 3) the **relative strength** in centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the port. Table 6.7 deconstructed the centrality enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels in Shanghai respectively:

	Beijing	Brussels
Economic resources and capacity	High	High
Cultural resources and capacity	High	Low
Political resources and capacity	Extremely high	Extremely low
Institutional resources and capacity	Extremely high	Extremely low

Table 6.7 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Shanghai

Compared to Macao and Hong Kong, Shanghai could be perceived as a kind of “deviant case” as the EU did not possess other capacity and resources apart from its economic investment in Shanghai. Unlike the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao which was supported by independent personnel and budget line from the EEAS, there was no official or direct EU representatives in Shanghai. The European Union could only rely on non-official resources like the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Given the lack of official resources and capacity, the Shanghai Chapter could only leverage on its economic presence and lobby for a better institutional arrangement of Shanghai FTZ, so as to produce a model FTZ for the rest of China (by leveraging the high intermediacy of Shanghai) on one hand, on the other hand protect the remained capacity, resources and interests shared by the EU and its Member States in Shanghai.

On the contrary, given the dominance of literally everything in Shanghai, Beijing did not consider the lobbying from the Shanghai Chapter as a threat to any local or national structures. In fact, as shown in the geographical reconstruction of Shanghai since the Open Door Policy, Beijing had reconstructed the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement for the sake of her cultural propaganda and economic development. In addition, Beijing also used Shanghai as one of the testing cases for any liberal or capitalist economic reform such as the Pilot FTZ and its subsequent reform in regulations. Rather than a kind of responses to EU structural port diplomacy, Beijing’s port actions in Shanghai was driven by solely her internal needs. The economic presence of the European Union was just an asset for Beijing to justify her success in economic reform since the Open Door Policy.

Chapter Summary and Preview

This chapter served as the last chapter of the three case studies offered in the thesis. Table 6.8 summarised the change of port role of Shanghai from imperial period to contemporary days:

	Chinese authority	European authority
Shanghai in Ming Dynasty	Urban port	Non-port
Shanghai in early Qing Dynasty	Cityport	Non-port
Shanghai after 1845	Cityport	Hub (Gateway for Britain)
Shanghai under SMC period	Cityport	Gateway
Shanghai after the Open-door Policy	Port metropolis	Hub (Gateway as the next step)

Table 6.8 The port role of Shanghai in different period

By discussing the economic and political characteristics established during the Shanghai treaty port era, this chapter suggested that the legacy of its treaty era war largely remained and contributed to the development of Shanghai in contemporary era. Given the irreversible change of contemporary international politics, the concept of extraterritoriality was no longer viable, and the EU influence in Shanghai was limited and only represented by the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, a model that the European states developed since the SMC period. From Beijing perspective, the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement was both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the colonial legacy was a kind of economic asset to Beijing in attracting foreign investment and commodity trade. On the other hand, it might stir up unnecessary political instability or nationalistic discourse. As a result, Beijing, in considering the development pathway of Shanghai, had to balance between the economic openness of Shanghai and the potential foreign invention from, for instance the structural power of the EU. From the perspective of the European Union, the wishful thinking was always turned Shanghai from an economic **hub** to a soft-power **gateway**, which aimed to leverage the economic centrality and its high degree of intermediacy, for the sake of promoting institutional liberalisation in Shanghai and the rest of China. Nonetheless, the Shanghai Chapter, an unofficial diplomatic agent of the EU, could never fulfil such role nor such spill-over was allowed by Beijing. As a result, the Shanghai Chapter could only defend the EU interests and tried to maintain Shanghai at least an economic **hub** for the EU and its Member States to pursue their economic interests in China.

After the discussion of three empirical cases, the thesis would state its conclusion in the next chapter. Lessons would be drawn from the empirical studies and used to re-evaluate the theoretical framework suggested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. After the evaluation, it would also discuss some of the foreseeable changes in Sino-European relations and its impact towards the Sino-European port diplomacy.

Chapter 7: Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back to International Politics

Port diplomacy was at the same time an old and a new subject of international relations as well as Sino-European relations. It was an old subject in international relations because the importance of maritime domination and the diplomatic use of sea power had been well-discussed since late the 19th century and remained influential in the 21st century (Widen 2011; Le Miere 2014; Germond 2015; Stavridis 2017). It was a new subject in international relations because the end of Cold War had fundamentally changed the definition of security. While traditional state-to-state naval warfare was, to some extent, unimaginable nowadays, the post-Cold War global environment gave rise to a new security agenda (Buzan 1991; Krause and Williams 1996; Buzan Waever and de Wilde 1997; Germond 2010; 2015) Two interlinked trends in globalisation territorialization and deterritorialisation, had redefined our conception of security and what constituted a security issue nowadays (Germond 2010; 2015). The re-orientation of new security agenda also demanded new diplomatic initiatives on the high seas or new protocol in global civilian port management. For instance, after the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001, the United States introduced Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002 to strengthen shipping and container cargo security against her homeland ports and ports of her business partners (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2019). Port diplomacy, under such a post-Cold War security agenda, had inevitably extended from naval ports to civilian ports.

Port diplomacy was also at the same time an old and new subject of Sino-European relations. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the establishment of the Portuguese settlement at Macao in 1557 formally opened up the direct maritime contact between European states and China, and the establishment of British Hong Kong and Shanghai as a Crown Colony and a treaty port respectively in 1842 and 1843 turned a new page of Sino-European relations. Maritime trade and port diplomacy were two essential features of Sino-European relations until 1943 when most of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the West were terminated by international agreements. Still, Hong Kong and Macao were only returned to Chinese sovereign control in 1997 and 1999, effectively ended European colonial presence in China. On the other hand, since President Xi announced his ambition to create a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in 2013, Beijing had aggressively invested in port infrastructure located from South China Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. In the case of the Mediterranean Sea, Beijing committed herself on a “Five Ports” initiative: Chinese state-owned enterprise would invest and modernise the port infrastructure of Venice, Ravenna and Trieste of Italy, Capodistria of Slovenia and Fiume in Croatia (Zeneli 2019). Together with Piraeus of Greece which was already owned by China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company since 2016, Beijing would soon establish a strong maritime network in Europe through her extensive investment in civilian ports. Port diplomacy again became the centre of Sino-European relations, although more attention was given to Beijing proactive investment in port facilities in Europe, but not the vice versa.

Against this geopolitical context, the thesis wished to investigate Sino-European port diplomacy on Chinese soil. Grounded as a comparative study on three European settlement and treaty ports, namely Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai, the thesis aimed to shed light on how port diplomacy at former European treaty ports could potentially impact on contemporary Sino-European diplomacy. Through this comparative study, the thesis also aimed to develop a systematic framework to conceptualise the role of civilian port in diplomacy and its relevancy to the exercise of EU structural power to China. The revised port-city paradigm, the thesis argued, was helpful to understand the opportunities and limitations of Sino-European port diplomacy.

This concluding chapter was structured into two main sections. The first section would

summarise major findings of the thesis and the implications of the findings. The second section would, based on the result of the empirical analysis, propose two lessons drawn from the empirical analysis, and how these theoretical propositions furthered our understanding on EU structural power and the role of civilian ports in international relations and foreign policy.

Summary of the Research Findings

To begin with, this section would like to refresh readers' memory on the research questions the thesis wished to answer. The first-level research question, which focused on the ports and port system *per se*, were as follows:

RQ₁: What was the role of ports and port-cities in contemporary EU-China relations?

RQ_{1.1}: Was there any role difference among those ports and port-cities? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the difference?

In an attempt to answer the above conceptual questions, the thesis proposed the below hypotheses:

H₁: Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic interests of the EU and its Member States.

H_{1.1}: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely "centrality" and "intermediacy".

Furthering on the role differentiation and role difference in Sino-European port diplomacy, the thesis proposed the following second level research questions and hypotheses:

RQ₂: Was European port diplomacy constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy in China? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship between European port diplomacy and its colonial and treaty port legacy?

RQ₃: Was Chinese response also constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy introduced by Europe? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship between Chinese port response and its colonial and treaty port legacy?

H₂: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could deploy at the port.

H₃: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China could deploy at the port.

In order to test the above hypotheses, the thesis examined three treaty ports that were created by the European states during the imperial period of China and retained some characteristics of a "treaty port" nowadays. The first two cases, Macao and Hong Kong, retained part of the characteristics of a treaty port in two way; internationally, the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration were diplomatic commitments agreed between Beijing and respective European states that the socio-economic features enjoyed by Hong Kong and Macao community during the treaty port period would be continued after the resumption

of sovereign control by Beijing; domestically, the introduction of “One Country, Two Systems” created differential treatments to foreign communities and companies in Hong Kong and Macao, compared to those foreign communities and companies located in a normal Chinese city. The main difference between Hong Kong and Macao, from the European perspective, was that the EU had signed the EU-Macao TCA as a bilateral legal agreement governing their relationship, while the EU could only rely on a soft monitoring mechanism in governing its relationship with Hong Kong.

On the contrary, Shanghai did not practice “One Country Two Systems” as the port was indeed never turned into a colony of a specific European state but an international settlement from 1863 to 1937. Shanghai was also the first treaty port among the three selected cases on which China could resume her sovereign control. However, Beijing gave differential treatment to foreign communities and companies through the Pilot Free Trade Zone initiative, turning Shanghai to one of the places that embraced “free trade” to foreign companies under the direct rule of Beijing. As a result, even though formal treaty port system was no longer viable in contemporary China, China and Europe could continuously interact with each other through some civilian ports where differential treatments were granted. In fact, Beijing has recently announced the creation of free trade port in Hainan in 2018, and introduced legal and administrative reform over the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (State Council, People’s Republic of China 2018; 2019). Establishing “chartered ports”, i.e. ports that created different treatment to the foreign community through domestic legislation or international public/private agreement, not only became Chinese foreign policies over developing countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, but as a way to enhance Chinese domestic economic reform.

Role Differentiation in EU Port Diplomacy: Centrality and Intermediacy as an Enabler and Obstacle of Port Diplomacy

Discussed in Chapter 2, traditional geopolitical analysis placed little interests in civilian ports and civilian port actions, despite the well-acknowledged importance of commercial network in supporting naval power projection (Mahan 1890; Widen 2011; Le Miere 2014; Germond 2015). Given the new security agenda, civilian ports, on the one hand, could be more useful in achieving diplomatic objectives such as image and alliance building. On the other hand, the socio-economic features of civilian ports could also produce security threats to nation-states. As a result, the thesis proposed an organic combination of port studies, port geography and international relations theory, as the foundation of the theoretical framework to analyse Sino-European relations at civilian ports. With reference to the revised definition of “centrality” and “intermediacy”, the contemporary port role of the selected cases, from the perspective of Beijing and Brussels, was outlined in Table 7.1:

	Chinese authority	European authorities
Port role of Macao	Cityport	Cityport
Port role of Hong Kong	Port metropolis	Gateway
Port role of Shanghai	Port metropolis	Hub

Table 7.1 Contemporary port status of the selected cases

Through comparing the three cases and the respective port actions that the European Union (or its representative on the ground) implemented, the thesis proposed that the role differentiation could be further conceptualised by 1) the port geography of the port; 2) the acceptance or not about the colonial legacy; 3) the nature of the relations between Beijing and major stakeholders in the ports.

Centrality as the Diplomatic Resources that Could be Deployed by an Actor at the Port

In Chapter 1, the thesis revised the economic-driven definition of “centrality”, by adding political interests and institutions as another dimension of centrality, i.e. “endogenous political

interests and institutions generation power”. With the revised definition, the concept of centrality not only focused on the economic interests generating power, which could always be quantified by economic activities and interests embedded in the port economy, but also the capacity to generate political interests and socio-political norms and institutions. In other words, the level of centrality of a civilian port implied the level of resources that a diplomatic actor could to deploy in port diplomacy: the higher the level of centrality of the civilian port enjoyed, the more resources a diplomatic actor could deploy in its port diplomacy against the third party. Therefore, the thesis argued that instead of being a neutral vehicle, the port geography of a civilian port could determine what port actions were possible and appropriate for a diplomatic actor in carrying its port diplomacy, through the embedded diplomatic resources defined by the centrality of a civilian port.

This argument could partially help us to understand the port actions conducted by the European Union in Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai. With the new definition, the centrality of a port could be deconstructed to various dimensions according to the definition, i.e. the economic, political and institutional generating capacity. Given the concept of institution could be further divided into hard institutions such as constitutional or legal arrangement, and soft institutions such as culture, four sub-dimensions of centrality could be constructed and Table 7.2 summarised the centrality of the selected civilian ports, from the EU perspective, as follows:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Economic centrality	Low	High	High
Cultural centrality	Medium	Medium	Low
Political centrality	Low	Medium	Extremely low
Institutional centrality	Medium	Low	Extremely low

Table 7.2 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by the EU in the selected ports

From the above table, it appeared that the EU had experienced different strengths and obstacles across three different civilian ports, which limited its foreign policy options. For instance, the extreme lack of institutional centrality, i.e. no formal diplomatic representatives of the European Union, in Shanghai and the absence of any form of EU-China legal documents to govern the relationship, left the EU with no viable diplomatic resources but economic power. As a result, the traditional business lobbying model might be the best model for EU port diplomacy with China in Shanghai. By heavily relying on the non-state business organisation, i.e. the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, the European Union could leverage on the remaining intact resources for potential spill-over to other centralities. Alternatively, the European Union could actively show its presence in economic centrality, defending the only viable diplomatic resources in the port of Shanghai. This kind of rationale could be best reflected by the discussion in Chapter 6, which the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce positioning itself as a monitoring organisation of European Union business interests in China, making bold proposal to the Shanghai government in reforming the Pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai.

In comparison, the EU in Macao had a more advantageous institutional centrality (the EU-Macao TCA) and cultural centrality, but lacked economic interests generating power owing to the relatively weak economic diversity and development in Macao. As a result, discussed in Chapter 4, the EU had actively utilised the institutional capacity to negotiate with the MSAR government and introduced programmes and activities that could utilise the cultural centrality of the European Union enjoyed in Macao, such as training programmes in legal field and interpretation, and cultural and information sharing programme for investment and industrial training. Similar to the case in Shanghai, EU port diplomacy actions could on the one hand opt for a potential spill-over effect from cultural centrality to economic centrality so that the EU

could potentially take Macao as a stepping stone to invest in the South-eastern part of China, but on the other hand the EU could continue and even strengthen its presence in their stronger aspects of centrality in Macao, i.e. institutional centrality.

This argument about centrality therefore explained why the European Union had developed more progressive seminars and programmes under the European Union Academic Programme in Hong Kong. Given the relatively high level of economic centrality and moderate level of cultural and political centrality, Hong Kong was a resourceful port for EU to promote its foreign policy agenda which included the protection of intellectual property rights, universal values and even urbanisation or smart city as a new policy agenda in Europe and China. The well-developed presence of the European Union in economic investment, cultural connectivity and value affinity gave the European Union, among all three ports, the largest autonomy to develop its structural port diplomacy, modelled from the idea of “structural diplomacy” suggested by Keukeleire (2003; see also Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015). As stated in the various policy papers and annual reports (European Commission 2006; 2011; European External Action Service 2013), the primary objective of the EU was clearly to serve as a knowledge **gateway** in Hong Kong for the sake of shipping normative goods to China.

To sum up, the comparative study among three ports showed the opportunities and obstacles of the European Union in formulating its port diploma^y. The EU “representation”, no matter it was formally represented like the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao or informally represented like the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, had made reference to the potential resources that the EU could enjoy at the port. From the case of Macao and Shanghai, it also implied that EU economic centrality was an object to be secured as well as an objective to promote: the reliance of the business lobbying model in Shanghai might be attributed to the lack of formal institutions in Shanghai, but it could also be (partially) understood as the best form to protect business interests through a group of European companies in China, which was formally practised during the era of Shanghai International Settlement. On the contrary, the improvement of economic centrality was also a major objective of EU port diplomacy in Macao, through the potential spill-over from other aspects of centrality. However, once the economic centrality was more secured like the case of Hong Kong, EU representative at port would shift to the supranational agenda of EU foreign policy, i.e. to become a structural diplomatic actor and normative power Europe.

As a result, the proposed first-level hypotheses H_1 ,

H_1 : Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic interests of the EU and its Member States.

were verified through the comparative study. For the sub-hypothesis $H_{1,1}$,

$H_{1,1}$: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and “intermediacy”.

it was also partially verified as the difference in centrality of a port also implied the diplomatic resources available for the EU to carry its diplomatic agenda, implying the role differentiation across different ports in China.

Intermediacy as the Quality and Quantity of a Diplomatic Network Covered for an Actor

Apart from the revised definition of centrality, in Chapter 1 the thesis also proposed an adaption of the concept of intermediacy, which was the degree of acceptance for a civilian port “serving

their networks of interests and institutions”. In traditional port studies, the idea of intermediacy could be quantified as the intensity of maritime routes that used a civilian port, or the trade volume a civilian port handled per a certain period of time. However, in the case of port diplomacy, the concept of intermediacy could be both quantitative and qualitative: in terms of quantitative measurement, the intermediacy of a civilian port could largely follow the logic of traditional port studies such as the degree of embeddedness of a civilian port into maritime network and economic transaction; in terms of qualitative measurement, the level of acceptance is a relational concept, which depends on the degree of penetration into the sovereign host, as well as the quality of the maritime network than a civilian port possessed. With reference to the above modification, Table 7.3 summarised the intermediacy of the three selected ports:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Quantity of intermediacy	Low	High	High
Quality of intermediacy	Local, and sub-state regional	Local, sub-state regional, national and international	Local, sub-state regional, national and international

Table 7.3 Different dimensions of intermediacy in the selected ports

From the above table, the level of intermediacy contributed to European port diplomacy in two different manners. The quantity of the intermediacy and the quality of intermediacy defined the effectiveness of port diplomacy that a diplomatic actor could possibly enjoy. This argument could be observed by the expectation management of EU representation in Macao and Shanghai. As discussed in Chapter 4, although the description of EU programmes and policy were always coined with the ambition to turn Macao into “an Asian city with rich European heritage” (University of Macao 2012), the content of programmes and seminars were rather to serve for local, or at most sub-state regional needs such as the Pan Pearl River Delta region (Ho 2001; Neves 2002; Hook and Neves 2002). In the case of Shanghai, the Shanghai Chapter always found itself more than serving the Shanghai Municipality. One mission of the Shanghai Chapter was to assist the national advocacy conducted by the European Union Chamber of Commerce, by building her local and regional influence in Shanghai as well as contributing to the annual position paper of the Chamber. The Shanghai Chapter indeed served as an important advocacy model followed by other regional chapters of the Chamber, thus strengthening the overall advocacy system enjoyed by the European Union, its Member States and European private companies. A similar position was also observed in the case of Hong Kong, which was highlighted by the programmes and seminars initiated by the European Union Office in Hong Kong (and Macao) that were all aimed at promoting EU presence at local, regional and national level (European Commission 2006). As a result, the level of intermediacy possessed by a civilian port would also affect EU port diplomacy choices as the expectation of acceptance always depended on the effectiveness of the network - which could be measured by the quantity of economic and cultural activities as well as the embedded quality of the maritime network. Combining the discussion on the role of centrality in port diplomacy, the sub-hypothesis H_{1.1}:

H_{1.1}: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and “intermediacy”.

was verified through the comparative studies, as the difference in terms of expected objectives of port diplomacy was associated to the quantity and the quality of the intermediacy a civilian port enjoyed.

Similar to the European Union, Beijing also enjoyed different level of centrality and intermediacy across the three selected ports. Based on the established first-tier hypothesis and

sub-hypothesis, H₁ and H_{1.1}, Beijing responses to European port diplomacy were also empowered or limited by the level of centrality and intermediacy she enjoyed at the civilian port concerned. However, when bringing in the Beijing response to analyse European port diplomacy, which was the main focus of the second-tier hypotheses, the agreement and the disagreement over the port legacy, as well as the nature of relationship with major stakeholders

Responses Differentiation in Beijing: Centrality, Intermediacy and the Degree of Acceptance

Mentioned in the last section, the centrality and intermediacy of a civilian port enjoyed by Beijing also served as an enabler and obstacle of her diplomatic responses at the port. In fact, compared to traditional port studies which took the concept of “centrality” and “intermediacy” as objective and static, in the field of geopolitics and port diplomacy it was also subjective and fluid. On the one hand, the concepts of centrality and intermediacy had their static and objective components such as the level of connectivity as measured by trade volume or the intensity of trade routes or foreign investments. On the other hand, given that the definition of centrality is related to the notion of “power” and the definition of intermediacy involves the notion of “acceptance”, centrality and intermediacy were also essentially relational. (Baldwin 1989; Dahl 1991; Guerreo and Anderson 2011; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950) As a result, port actions and port responses were both governed by the resources actors could find and deploy within the port geography, and the relationship between the diplomatic actors involved, in this thesis, it was the Sino-European relation.

However, in reality, the geopolitical context was more complicated given the nature of multiple realities of the European Union, as well as the colonial history of the selected ports (Allen 1998; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Miks 2010; Jørgensen 1998). The problem of multiple realities of the EU meant that both EU and its Member States could have their individual presence or collective presence at a civilian port. The presence of strong individual EU member states, for instance in the case of Hong Kong (British presence) or Macao (Portuguese presence), on one hand would change the quantity of the resources that the EU could enjoy and deploy at a civilian port, on the other hand the strong presence would also affect the degree of acceptance as Beijing was more sensitive to state-to-state level of diplomacy rather than state-to-supranational organisation level of diplomacy. The strong individual EU member state presence, and its relationship with Beijing, defined the acceptance of the colonial legacy thus the European port diplomacy leveraged from it.

Colonial Legacy in China: Qualifying the “Usefulness” of the Legacy and the Degree of Acceptance

Discussed in Chapter 1, port space was a negotiated space and a product of social and political forces (Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2007). These forces included an agreed social and political practice within the port space, the flows of material and ideational factors, and new political and social actions initiated by new political/social actors. Two implications could be drawn here: first, the port geography consisted of agreed practice that defined the nature or the quality of the port space; second, new political actors could alter port space at their will but it would take time to reshape the port space, as well as a certain degree of authority, to turn a new practice into an agreed practice. As a result, the legacy of the port, which had been a consistent and agreed practice developed since its formation, defined the nature and the quality of port geography of a civilian port, which then further assisted or limited the port actions of the political actors.

The observations might be witnessed from a comparative study of Macao and Hong Kong, which shared the similar institutional arrangement under One Country Two Systems, and between Hong Kong and Shanghai, which shared a similar British background as an initiator

of the port system but different in institutional arrangement. In the case of Macao and Hong Kong, the main European presence at ports was Portuguese and British respectively, owing to the long history of colonial past. As a result, on the one hand the European Union office at Hong Kong and Macao took different initiatives in projecting their presence in Hong Kong and Macao, on the other hand Beijing reacted to the programmes and policies differently. For instance, Beijing was more open-minded to EU programmes in Macao on legal aspects and cultural promotion, as the thesis showed in Chapter 4 in regard to the typology of the programme that the EU, Macao and China agreed. Instead, the Chinese also took reference to such kind of cultural and social programmes as a way to re-define Macao's intermediacy as a Chinese centre of the Lusophone community, even though most of the local Macau Chinese barely spoke Portuguese as their native language. From Beijing's calculation, the Latin or continental European nature and quality of Macao's intermediacy could potentially become an asset of Beijing to connect to the Lusophone community including those strategic partners such as Portugal and Brazil for leveraging the European and Latin American politics, or to access potential markets such as Angola and Mozambique in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Even though some of the programmes may touch on the issues of legal aspects such as the EU-Macao Cooperation Programme in Legal Field, Beijing took them as an opportunity but not a threat to her governance in Macao.

On the contrary, EU programmes seldomly touched on the continental legal system as it was never a colonial legacy left by the Britain. In terms of cultural programmes, the EU also organised various cultural programmes such as the EU Day of Languages, a.k.a. Speak Dating, to promote European cultural diversity as a whole. However, these programmes usually overshadowed by Member States' initiatives such as the French May organised by the French representatives in Hong Kong, or the programmes organised by the British Council. The diversity in representation was partly attributed to the colonial legacy developed since 1842 when most of the European merchants left Macao and re-established their network at Hong Kong. Albeit there were many cultural practices and visible cultural activities in Hong Kong, the long colonial past, the use of language and the political culture, made Hong Kong as a member of Anglo-Saxon community, which the leaders of this community, i.e. the UK and the US, were an object of the rising Chinese nationalism. The nationalistic discourse against the "Century of Humiliation" and the rising Sino-American rivalry in the 21st century, had pre-empted Beijing to take an open-minded response to the "Western world", in particular the Anglo-Saxon political and social ideals (Kaufman 2011; Wang 2012; Weiss 2014; 2019). That could be best illustrated by Chinese netizens' teaser of Shanghai FTZ as a "new concession". In fact, as discussed in Chapter 6, Beijing was extremely cautious about the colonial past of Shanghai International Settlement and its relation to contemporary development of Shanghai Municipality. The philosophy of "pragmatic nationalism" in urban planning and the geographical distribution of the centrality functions and intermediacy network functions reflected the awareness of Beijing in utilising the colonial legacy of Shanghai and the nationalistic narration of its centrality and intermediacy.

Engagement or Containment? A Power Politics that Drives Beijing Responses

Apart from the acceptance of colonial legacy, the final factor identified by the thesis was the power politics between the EU and China. Similar to the treatment made in Table 7.2, Table 7.4 summarised the level of centrality enjoyed by Beijing in the selected ports:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Economic centrality	Low	High	High
Cultural centrality	Medium	Medium	High
Political centrality	High	Low	Extremely high
Institutional centrality	High	High	Extremely high

Table 7.4 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by Beijing in the selected ports

For the sake of comparison, the thesis recalled Table 7.2 here:

	Macao	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Economic centrality	Low	High	High
Cultural centrality	Medium	Medium	Low
Political centrality	Low	Medium	Extremely low
Institutional centrality	Medium	Low	Extremely low

Table 7.2 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by the EU in the selected ports

By putting the tables side-by-side, we could observe the power struggle between the European Union and China at the selected ports. Across the three selected ports, Beijing had utmost control of nearly every aspect in Shanghai. It was because Shanghai was always being placed as an economic and political important city in China. The party member who lead Shanghai government would usually be appointed as a member of Politburo of the Chinese Community Party, and some of them may even took leadership position of Beijing, such as Zhu Rongji as an ex-Premier or Jiang Zemen as an ex-President of China. The relative strong power against the European counter-part allowed Beijing to adopt a bold response to European port diplomacy such as business lobbying from the European firms, for instance incorporation of the Shanghai Chapter as a consultative partner during the legislative process or routine administration of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. However, Beijing strong hands at Shanghai also allowed her to reject any unfavourable lobbying or initiatives suggested by the Shanghai Chapter. As a result, the European representatives at Shanghai could only take a rather passive position in conducting the port diplomacy.

In the case of Macao, the existence of Portuguese cultural legacy and the EU-Macao TCA might provide a possible leverage for the European Union to extend its structural influence into China. However, the strong political presence of Chinese network and the high institutional control over Macao politics, under the period of political condominium since 1949 and formally taken-over in 1999, allowed Beijing to control the political values propagandised in Macao such that the political structure of Macao society was not easily influenced by EU port diplomacy. Moreover, Beijing conceived the Portuguese culture as a kind of diplomatic asset to her foreign policy, as well as a more friendly Sino-Portuguese relations developed from the past to presence, also served as an enabler for Beijing to take an open position over EU port actions at Macao.

Finally, the difficult position of Beijing to take full control of the centrality of Hong Kong justified the strategy of securitisation of the port Hong Kong, as it was a kind of threat against Chinese national security. Given the strong economic presence of the European Union in Hong Kong, as well as the strong colonial legacy of Britain in the field of political values, Beijing had to rely on the securitisation strategy to either increase her institutional power, to control the potential spill-over effect of EU structural power through its port diplomacy. As a result, Beijing was very sensitive to any actions taken to modify the institutional framework of Hong Kong under One Country Two Systems, as it would be a fundamental challenge to her centrality at Hong Kong. The securitisation of Hong Kong was a kind of effective way to protect Beijing's interests in Hong Kong, if not to fundamentally detached Hong Kong from the Anglo-Saxon

intermediacy. Through the process of securitisation, Beijing could also mobilise her resources at the ports to face the resources available for Europe in conducting its port diplomacy, for example a common narration of foreign intervention to disrupt Hong Kong stability and prosperity was always found when the European Union or other European states brought up the issues of democratisation of Hong Kong.

Judging from the above findings and discussion, the second level of the hypotheses proposed by the thesis:

H₂: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could deploy at the port.

H₃: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China Could deploy at the port.

were verified. The nature of power struggle between the European Union would define the “meaning” of the colonial legacy and prompted the responses from Beijing. From the EU perspective, the nature of relationship between Beijing and the creator of the legacy, would also limit the degree of acceptance by Beijing, thus constrained the viable options that the EU could deploy at a civilian port.

Implications to EU Structural Power and the Role of Civilian Port: An Overall Audit of the Theoretical Framework

Stated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the thesis aimed to fill in the gap of existing literature on EU structural power and the role of civilian ports in international politics and global political economy. Given the successful verification of the hypotheses, it was tempted to suggest that the ambition was largely successful in terms of empirical analysis. However, what had we learn from the empirical analysis and contribute to the theoretical discussion? This section will outline two theoretical propositions that the thesis contributed to the existing literature on EU structural power and the role of civilian ports in global politics and foreign policy analysis.

Proposition 1: The Form and Effectiveness of the EU Structural Power and Structural Foreign Policy could be Spatial-sensitive

From the comparative case studies, it was observed that the effectiveness of the EU structural power and structural foreign policy was spatial-sensitive. While traditional literature on the EU structural power and structural foreign policy did not address the “multiple realities” within the recipient state, the thesis showed that EU structural port diplomacy did respond to the spatial difference among different ports, so did the responses come from the recipient state. For instance, the lack of centrality of the EU in Shanghai forced the EU to give up its structural port diplomacy model in Macao and Hong Kong, but relied on chamber of commerce in China to push its agenda in economic structural changes. As shown in the recent survey conducted by the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, EU structural power was obviously not effective in Shanghai under this model, and the European companies began to lose faith towards both China and the EU in maintaining a favourable business environment for them (Ren 2017). However, even if the EU acknowledged the problem of the Shanghai model, without proper resources and capacity at the port had limited its choice of structural port diplomacy, thus hammering the effectiveness of EU structural power to turn Shanghai as a future role model of free trade zones established in the rest of Chinese territories.

The spatial sensitivity of the form and effectiveness of was also observed when the case of Macao and Hong Kong were compared. Even though both ports were exposed to long colonial history, governed by One Country, Two Systems and possessed undeniable colonial legacy within their societies, the micro-port actions proposed by the European Union were different. For instance, those micro-actions conducted in Macao had always focused on local, or at most sub-regional, level such as the promotion of Macao's continental culture or strengthening Macao's rule of law. Even there might be some programmes with larger ambitions, those programmes were not initiated by the EU but the MSAR government, or the EU was just leveraged on Macao facilities to larger audiences such as countries in Asia-Pacific region. Macao was never a port that the EU wished to leverage on to promote its structural power towards China. On the contrary, the micro-port actions conducted in Hong Kong had an obvious structural agenda that targeted both local and, most importantly, national audiences. The difference in orientation, as reviewed in the last section, could be answered by the different levels of centrality and intermediacy between Macao and Hong Kong.

In fact, Beijing also responded to EU structural power and structural port diplomacy according to the spatial difference among the ports. For instance, Beijing did not consider the presence of EU (limited) structural power as a threat to any local or national structures. Instead, Beijing actively shaped the port geography of Shanghai for the sake of her own cultural propaganda and economic development. On the other hand, given the consensus on the expected functions and the port geography in Macao, Beijing took advantage on EU structural power, which aimed to sustain Macao's continental culture and European civil law system, for her own foreign policies agenda by turning Macao as the Chinese hub of Lusophone communities around the world. On the contrary, given the strong presence of political resources available to the European Union, Beijing took an extreme cautious approach against any potential structural changes or leverage effect from economic and cultural micro-port actions, through the exercise of her institutional dominance over the port Hong Kong. Therefore, it could conclude that both the form and effectiveness of EU structural power and structural foreign policy, at least to China, were spatial-sensitive – a kind of inattentional blindness in the existing literature on EU structural power and structural foreign policy.

Proposition 2: The Role of Civilian Ports could be Power-dependent

If the first lesson the thesis drawn to the literature on EU structural power and structural foreign policy was the spatial sensitivity of both concepts, the second lesson drawn from the thesis was that the role of civilian ports was power-dependent. Recalling the characteristics of global cities suggested by Sassen (1991; 2005), a global city would gradually detach from its geographical region and became an independent entity in global political economy. Although Sassen did not aim to apply this concept to international politics and foreign policy, this definition implied that the global city was free from the influence of the nation host of the city or foreign diplomatic actors. A similar observation could be obtained when Calder and Freytas (2009) conceptualised a “global political city” as “a metropolitan area that serves as a policy hub, major political diplomatic community, and strategic information complex of global import” (Calder and Freytas 2009:94). In both definitions, the characteristics of the national host and foreign actors were missing.

Focusing on the idea of city-networking, Acuto (2013) global city thesis highlighted the role of global cities as “networking actants”, “networking actors”, and “networking networks”. In subsequent research conducted by C40 and ARUP, two prominent city-networks in climate change issues, concluded that the power level of a city was independent from the level of actions of a city could take (C40 and ARUP 2015; Acuto 2017). However, such a conclusion did not reflect the complete picture of the story. For instance, C40 and ARUP (2015) defined the power level of a city in terms of its administrative, regulatory, infrastructural and financial power.

However, if the central idea on the role of global cities was the power to connect, the key indicator of power should relate to the capacity to attract and glue different structures, actors and networks within the city, as well as the capacity to connect and leverage on different structures, actors and networks. i.e. the idea of centrality and intermediacy in traditional port studies that the thesis proposed an adaptation in Chapter 3. In addition, one should not conflate the level of actions to the type of actions as well as the effectiveness of actions, as the former one counted the quantity of actions while the latter ones counted the quality and consequence of the action.

As stated in proposition 1, the centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the EU and China respectively shaped the form and the effectiveness of EU structural power to China and Beijing's response. However, it was also observed that the consensus on port geography and expected functions, the resources available to them, and the relative strength in controlling various structures and resources, also contributed the dynamics of EU structural port diplomacy and Chinese responses. Behind all these components, as reviewed in the last section, was the power politics between the EU and China at civilian ports. For example, whether a specific kind of resources was allowed to be utilised was largely determined the level of dominance in that field. For instance, given the excessive dominance of Beijing in Shanghai, there was technical no other way for the EU to utilise Shanghai for its structural port diplomacy but the very weak and soft form of quasi-official lobbying. On the contrary, when the European Union enjoyed a freer hand in Hong Kong and Macao, the EU could implement various micro-port actions especially in the field of economic and cultural exchanges – or even programmes that could potentially alter the legal institutions in Macao. On the other hand, as documented in the empirical chapters on the selected cases, the evolution of port geography thus expected functions involved a series of negotiation and continuous interactions, which also implied the existence of power politics. Therefore, it could conclude that the role of civilian port could be differentiated by the power politics involved at every state in the formation of port geography and consensus. In short, the role of civilian ports was power-dependent - a kind of inattentional blindness in the existing literature on the role of cities in international politics and foreign policy.

Further Research Agenda

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the announcement of the BRI in 2013 resulted in various regional initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific Strategy suggested by Japan and India, the recent Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy suggested by the European Union, and the newly proposed Blue Dot Network Strategy by the United States. These regional initiatives not only focus on the economic investments or cultural exchanges, but also took the maritime space and the civilian ports seriously in formulating foreign policy.

The theoretical framework of the thesis allowed both academic and professionals to evaluate the impact of these initiatives in a systematic manner. However, the framework required more empirical tests for its validity, as one criticism against grounded theory as a research strategy was the problem of specificity, i.e. the observations are contextual and specific to certain casual mechanisms proposed by the researchers. Even within the Sino-European relations, there were more port cases that could be tested against the theoretical framework, such as those ports had little colonial legacy such as Shenzhen, or Hainan. In addition, the implementation of the above regional initiatives could also be the next set of cases to be observed and tested against.

Apart from continuous testing by various empirical port cases, another direction for research would be to redefine and modify the framework through quantitative data. While the degree of centrality and intermediacy was largely qualitative in this thesis, the theoretical framework could also be opened to quantitative modelling such as the use of geographical information system to visualise the intensity of intermediacy or value survey to further comparison of the

political and cultural value embedded in the port community. Owing to the lack of resources and time constrain, the thesis did not make use of these potential tools in quantifying and visualising the independent variables.

For decades, civilian port and civilian port diplomacy had been put aside as an important factor contributing the maritime power of a state, as well as an important concern in foreign policy. Nonetheless, the end of Cold War and the rise of post-Cold War security agenda opened up a new space for civilian port to contribute in the formulation of one's sea power. After all, contemporary security threats were tilted towards the exercise of soft power under the globalised network. Civilian ports, as economic hubs, cultural hybrids and the front-liners of globalisation, would only become more important for a political entity to achieve its diplomatic goal through an effective "shipping" of her structural power from her place to another. The thesis opened a new discussion on an academic concept of civilian sea power, i.e. "civilian power exercised by state and her related civilian actors through civilised activities at civilian port" (Chan 2019). Compared to the traditional concept of sea power which focused on the naval power projection, the idea of civilian sea power focused on the civilian dimension of sea power, which included the combination of economic hard power and normative soft power – a kind of "smart power" in foreign policy (Nossel 2012). This concept also took note on the new security agenda which the concept of security evolved from traditional military and territorial security to economic and societal security. As a result, the power politics should not limit to naval activities but also "civilised activities", which formulated another cornerstone of the idea of civilian sea power. Finally the post-Cold War system allowed both traditional actors like nation-states, or civilian actors such as state-sponsored multinational companies or transactional associations such as the chambers of commerce, sub-state actors such as Hong Kong or Macao, or supranational actors like the EU, to be a kind of agent that pursued diplomatic objectives and formulated their own diplomacy (or external relations). By including these actors in conceptualising the political use of sea power, the structural port diplomacy and civilian sea power, which could be conceptualised as defined as the capacity of a political entity to make use of its civilian actors, its civilian assets and civilian activities at commercial and civilian ports, for the sake of projecting civilian power and delivering diplomatic objectives against the third party, could be a useful dimension to evaluate one's maritime influence in the era of globalisation.

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Chapter 1

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