ICBH Witness Seminar Programme

# British Diplomacy in Latin America at the Turn of the 21st Century: Witness Seminar

Edited by Michael Kandiah & Thomas Mills

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# British Diplomacy in Latin America At the Turn of the 21st Century: Witness Seminar

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Canning House, London
15.30-16.45

ICBH Witness Seminar Programme
Programme Director:
Dr Michael Kandiah, King's College London

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# What is a Witness Seminar?

Michael D Kandiah

- It is an exercise in oral history that may be best described as a group interview or a guided discussion.
- Key participants meet around the seminar table to discuss and debate the issues relating to the chosen topic as they remember them. As a group interview, the discussion:
    - is guided and, where necessary, limited by the Chair, who is usually but not always an academic; and
    - will be shaped the 'group dynamic': individual speakers will respond to each other, to the Chair and the presence of the audience.
- Some academics are keen on observing and analysing this group effect, which has been identified as 'a kind of "chaining" or "cascading" effect; talk links to, or tumbles out of, the topics and expressions preceding it'.[1]
- It shares certain similarities with a focus group, insofar as they are both considered group discussions or interviews. However, this is where the similarity ends. Participants in witness seminars are chosen for their role in, or ability to comment about, the subject of the witness seminar and they are not anonymous—indeed it is essential to know who they are to properly understand and analyse their testimony. Additionally, individuals in the group generally know each other, which makes the 'group dynamic' effect particularly interesting and important. Furthermore, this allows the testimony of participants to be checked, challenged and defended.
- A witness seminar is taped and transcribed. Participants are allowed to redact the transcript principally to improve readability and to clarify meaning. An agreed version is published and archived for the use of researchers.
- The aim of a witness seminar is to bring together participants or 'witnesses'—to re-examine and reassess key aspects of, and events in, recent history; to comment, examine and assess developments in the recent past.
- A further aim of a witness seminar is to capture nuances of individual and group experiences that cannot be found in, or are absent from, documents or written material.

Since its founding in 1986, the Institute of Contemporary British History (ICBH) has been uniquely associated with the production of witness seminars on events or developments that have taken place within the bounds of living memory. The ICBH Witness Seminar Programme has been copied by other institutions, both in Britain and abroad, and the ICBH regularly collaborates with scholars from other institutions in planning and hosting witness seminars of particular relevance to their work.

[1] TR Lindlof and BC Taylor, *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), p.182.

# Introduction

Dr TC Mills, University of Lancaster
and
Dr MD Kandiah, ICBH, King's College London

This witness seminar examined British diplomacy in Latin America from the 1990s to the present day by drawing on the testimonies and perspectives of those who served in key diplomatic postings in the region during this period.

In November 2010 the British Foreign Secretary William Hague pledged to 'halt the decline in Britain's diplomatic presence in Latin America'. In its place he promised that Britain would pursue 'intensified and equal partnerships with countries in Latin America'.[2] With this statement Hague acknowledged both the steep decline in Britain's status in Latin America over the course of the twentieth century and a new determination to reverse this process at the opening of the twenty-first.

Britain certainly has experienced a loss of power and influence in Latin America in recent times. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the onset of the First World War Britain was the leading external power in Latin America, securing important export markets, establishing itself as the chief customer for many of the region's primary raw materials and investing heavily in public utilities like telecommunications and railways. From this point onwards, however, Britain's economic interests and its political influence in Latin America dwindled. This decline in influence occurred for a number of reasons. As Britain's economic power in the world lessened generally, investments in Latin America became unprofitable and British exporters were unable to compete with rivals such as Germany and the United States.[3].

In the political realm Latin America was viewed for much of the second half of the twentieth century as an area dominated by the influence of the United States. More generally, Latin America was often viewed as a region of secondary importance to Britain's global interests in the late twentieth century.[4] The neglect of Latin America in British foreign policy has been mirrored in the lack of attention paid to British diplomacy in this region by scholars. The most recent era to be examined in scholarly works on this subject the Thatcher government's policy towards Latin America in the 1980s.[5]

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[2] William Hague, 'Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners', speech by William Hague, Canning House, London, 9 November 2010: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-and-latin-america-historic-friends-future-partners [Accessed 5 Nov. 2015].
[3] Rory Miller, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Longman, 1993).
[3] David Thomas, 'The United States Factor in British Relations with Latin America', in Victor Bulmer-Thomas ed., *Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 69-82.
[4] Leslie Bethel, 'Britain and Latin America in Historical Perspective', in Bulmer-Thomas ed., *Britain and Latin America*, pp.21-2.
[5] James Ferguson and Jenny Pearce (eds.), *The Thatcher Years: Britain and Latin America* (London: The Latin American Bureau, 1988); William D. Rogers, 'The "Unspecial Relationship" in Latin America', in Roger Louis and Bull Hedley (eds), *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). Sally Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). See also Bulmer-Thomas ed., *Britain and Latin America*.

Recent years have, however, seen many of the trends which led British officials to shun Latin America showing signs of change. Following the financial crisis of 2007-8 there is a renewed determination in Britain to rebalance the country's economy by boosting overseas trade and investment. At the same time, Latin America is emerging from beneath the shadow of the United States as a region of the world of increasing economic and political importance. Three of the G20 economies are now located in Latin America and Mexico and Brazil, in particular, are playing an increasingly prominent role in international diplomacy.

These developments have led to a new focus on Latin America in British foreign policy. Following Hague's speech in 2010 the Foreign Office opened a new Embassy in Paraguay and a new consulate in Recife, Brazil. There have also been a number of recent high profile visits to Latin America by British ministers, including a trip to Brazil by the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne in 2014. Alongside these political efforts British business has begun to show a renewed interest in Latin America, with companies such as Balfour Beatty and Rolls Royce among those to launch new ventures in the region in recent years. British 'soft power' has also been exerted in Latin America with visits to the region by Prince Harry and the inauguration of various cultural exchange programmes taking place.

But notwithstanding these renewed efforts, diplomacy in Latin America still raises significant challenges for Britain. British commerce is dwarfed by leading powers in the region like the USA – as well as new powers like China – and continues to face stiff competition from other European countries. . Political developments in Latin America – like the emergence of the so-called 'pink tide' governments– pose new challenges for Britain. And old issues of contention – like the continued dispute with Argentina over the status of the Falkland Islands – remain. As such British diplomacy in Latin America at the turn of the twenty-first century faces both challenges and opportunities.

Since 1986 the ICBH Witness Seminar Programme has conducted nearly 100 witness seminars on a variety of subjects. These witness seminars have been well received by the academic community, who have increasingly come to see that it is important to examine and analyse how Embassies and High Commissions have worked historically in the promotion of British policy overseas. The significance of history and the importance of gathering and utilising oral history interviews have also been identified in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government (published 29 April 2011). In oral evidence Foreign Secretary William Hague stated: 'history is vitally important in knowledge and practice of foreign policy'. He further stated, 'One of the things that I have asked to be worked up is a better approach to how we use the alumni of the Foreign Office, [and] … continue to connect them more systematically to the Foreign Office.' This Witness Seminar provides an opportunity to achieve these goals by exploring British diplomacy in Latin America from the 1990s to the present day.

# Issues for Discussion

The following list is indicative of the broad areas we hoped would be commented upon by participants during the witness seminar.

1. Britain's primary interests in Latin America (economic / political) and how these have changed over time.

2. The impact of Britain's declining economic and political status in Latin America on diplomacy in the region.

3. The issue of human rights in Latin America and the fallout from authoritarian regimes of the region in the 1970s-80s, including those in:
   - Brazil
   - Chile
   - Argentina

4. The rise to power of left-wing governments in Latin America, including those in
   - Venezuela (Hugo Chávez, 199902-13; Nicolás Maduro (2013-present)
   - Brazil (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 2003–11; Dilma Rousseff, 2011–present)
   - Bolivia (Evo Morales, 2006–present)
   - Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega, 2007–present)
   - Argentina (Néstor Kirchner, 2003–2007; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 2007–present)
   - Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez, 2005–2010, 2015-present; José Mujica, 2010–2015)

5. The ongoing dispute between Britain and Argentina over the status of the Falkland Islands.

6. Relations between Britain and other external powers with interests in Latin America, including:
   - USA
   - China
   - The European Union and individual European countries

7. Relations between Britain and regional bodies in Latin America, including:
   - The Organisation of American States (OAS)
   - Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
   - Caribbean Community (Caricom)
   - Union of South American Nations (UNISAR)
   - Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)
   - Mercosur

8. The impact of broader global developments on Britain's role in Latin America, including:
   - The end of the Cold War
   - The War on Terror
   - The global financial crisis

9. The increasing importance of Latin America in the global economy and attempts to increase British trade and investment in the region.

10. The impact of the rising political influence of Latin American countries (particularly Mexico and Brazil) in global affairs.

# Brief Chronology[6]

NOTE: The following was provided to all participants before the witness seminar and was not meant to provide an exhaustive chronology of Latin America since 1990. It was intended to help refresh people's memories by covering major events and milestones in the history of the region, with reference, where relevant, to the UK and to significant world events.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1990 | Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) lost election to Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua.<br>Democratic civilian government replaced rule by Augusto Pinochet in Chile.<br>Diplomatic relations restored between UK and Argentina. |
| 1991 | Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion to form Mercosur.[7]<br>The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved, bringing an end to the Cold War. |
| 1992 | Chapultepec Peace Accords ended civil war in El Salvador.[8]<br>Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party won election in Guyana. |
| 1994 | The USA, Mexico and Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).[9]<br>The Zapatista revolt erupted in Chiapas, Mexico. |
| 1995 | Cenapa War between Ecuador and Peru. |
| 1996 | Peace agreement bought to an end Guatemalan Civil War. |
| 1998 | Hugo Chávez elected President of Venezuela.<br>Augusto Pinochet arrested in UK on charges of human rights violations. |
| 2000 | Ricardo Lagos elected President of Chile. |

[6] Compiled by Thomas Mills using a variety of open access online sources, which have been acknowledged where appropriate.
[7] http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp [Accessed 7 Jan. 2015].
[8] http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SV_920116_ChapultepecAgreement.pdf [Accessed 7 Jan. 2015].
[9] http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta [Accessed 7 Jan. 2015].

| | |
|---|---|
| | Vincente Fox elected President of Mexico. |
| 2001 | US President George W Bush launched war on terror in response to terrorist attacks on USA.<br>Riots in Argentina fuelled by economic crisis lead to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa. |
| 2002 | Attempted military coup failed to remove Hugo Chávez from power in Venezuela. |
| 2003 | Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva elected President of Brazil.<br>Néstor Kirchner elected President of Argentina.<br>Brazilian government issued Brasilia Declaration with India and South Africa.[10] |
| 2004 | CAFTA-DR trade agreement signed between the USA, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.[11]<br>Brazil launched first rocket into space |
| 2006 | Evo Morales elected President of Bolivia.<br>Michelle Bachelet elected President of Chile.<br>Fidel Castro effectively handed over power to Vice President of Cuba Raúl Castro due to ill health.<br>Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 Olympic Games. |
| 2007 | Daniel Ortega elected President of Nicaragua.<br>Cristina Fernández de Kirchner elected President of Argentina. |
| 2008 | Global financial crisis began. |
| 2009 | Same-sex marriage legalised in Mexico City. |
| 2010 | Dilma Rousseff elected President of Brazil.<br>Major rescue operation mounted to save 33 Chilean miners from cave-in of mine.<br>EU-Mercosur Free Trade agreement negotiations began. |

[10] http://ibsa.nic.in/brasil_declaration.htm [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015].
[11] http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015].

| | |
|---|---|
| 2012 | Venezuela admitted to Mercosur.<br>Peace talks began between the Colombian Government and FARC. |
| 2013 | Hugo Chávez died of cancer and was succeeded by Vice President Nicolás Maduro.<br>Large scale protests over public services occur throughout Brazil.<br>Cannabis legalised in Uruguay.<br>Falklands Islands sovereignty referendum held.[12] |
| 2014 | Brazil hosted the football World Cup.<br>HRH Prince Harry of Wales visited Chile and Brazil.[13]<br>Anti-government protests occurred in Venezuela.<br>Mexican government arrested 'drug-lord' Vicente Carrillo Fuentes.<br>Work began by Hong Kong-based company on the Nicaragua Canal to link the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. |

[12] http://www.falklands.gov.fk/home/referendum-2013/ [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015].
[13] http://www.princehenryofwales.org/news-and-diary/brazil-and-chile-royal-visit-day-six [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015].

# Participants

## *Chair*

| | |
|---|---|
| BARONESS HOOPER | Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary British-Latin America Group. Chairman, All-Party Parliamentary Group for Latin America, 2009-. President, Canning House, 1997-2002. |

## *Witnesses:*

| | |
|---|---|
| GEORGINA BUTLER | HM Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2002-6; HM Ambassador to Nicaragua, 2004-6) |
| DR PETER S COLLECOTT, CMG | HM Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2002-6; HM Ambassador to Nicaragua, 2004-6) |
| TIMOTHY GILES PAXMAN, CMG, LVO | HM Ambassador to Brazil, 2004-8 |
| NIGEL ROBERT HAYWOOD, CVO | HM Ambassador to Mexico, 2005-9; HM Ambassador to Spain, 2009-13 |
| DONALD LAMONT | HM Ambassador to Venezuela, 2003-6; Governor of Falklands Islands, 1999-2002; HM Ambassador to Uruguay, 1991-4 |

## *Audience Participants*

| | |
|---|---|
| JACQUES ARNOLD | Conservative MP for Gravesend, 1987-97 |
| MICHAEL CANNON | |
| OLIVER FLETCHER | University of Oxford |
| PROFESSOR ALAN KNIGHT | Professor of the History of Latin America, University of Oxford, 1992-2013, Emeritus-; Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford, 1992-2013, Emeritus- |
| DANIEL REY | Future Foreign Policy |
| DR CELIA SZUSTERMAN: | Director, Institute for Statecraft |
| JAIME TORALES-GONZALEZ | University of Oxford |

## *Organiser-Participants*

| | |
|---|---|
| ROBERT CAPURRO | Director, Canning House |
| DR THOMAS MILLS | Lancaster University |

# British Diplomacy in Latin America
# At the Turn of the 21st Century

Edited by
MD Kandiah, ICBH, King's College London
and
TC Mills, University of Lancaster

**ROBERT CAPURRO** Just a very brief welcome from me to all of you. Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished Ambassadors, former Governors, welcome to Canning House. It is a great pleasure and an honour for us to have such a distinguished panel and audience today for this Latin American Diplomacy Witness Seminar. As you know, this is very much part of what we love to do in promoting Canning House. It is good to see you all here in our new Canning House, although many of you will not have been here before. We are up and running, and back to business. We are growing and doing more and more, so thank you very much for your support. I will not say any more and I will not steal Baroness Hooper's thunder. I would like to hand you over briefly to Tom Mills. Thank you very much indeed.

**DR THOMAS MILLS:** [ICBH] Witness seminars have been running for almost 30 years now and have explored various historical events of importance by bringing together practitioners involved in those events to reflect on and analyse them. Today, we are exploring British diplomacy in Latin America at the turn of the twenty-first century, so, over the next hour or so, we shall hear from our panel. I will allow them to introduce themselves, but we are very lucky to have five diplomats who have served in a variety of key posts throughout Latin America over the course of the past 25 years.

Without any further ado, I will hand over to our Chair for today, Baroness Hooper. Thanks very much.

**BARONESS HOOPER** Thank you. I also extend a very warm welcome to everybody here. Canning House is the place that brings Latin America and the United Kingdom together, and I think this is going to be another example of that. I am going to ask the panel to introduce themselves, and perhaps I should start by introducing myself. I am Gloria Hooper. I am a Vice President currently of Canning House, but I was President some years ago. I am Chairman at the

moment of the All-Party Latin American Group in Parliament, which is composed of both Houses of Parliament and people from all parties. I first went to Latin America, dare I say it, 50 years ago with a postgraduate fellowship, which took me to Ecuador and enabled me to travel around in the region. I have had a very strong ongoing interest in all things Latin American ever since. I might start at the end of the table and ask Donald Lamont to say what he thinks is most relevant to today's proceedings about his background.

**DONALD LAMONT** Thank you very much, Gloria. I will touch on three elements of my career that may have been relevant. I tend to say in after-dinner speeches that, at a certain point in my career, in 1991, the Foreign Office looked at my CV and saw that I spoke French, German and Russian – no Spanish – and I had never dealt with a country with which we had diplomatic relations either in London or overseas. Why the Foreign Office thought such an incompetent… should be sent to Uruguay – Uruguay had done no wrong – I do not know, but, in 1991, I was sent out with, quickly learned Spanish and spent three very happy years in Uruguay. There was no drama in those three years, so the one feature perhaps worth mentioning that is relevant here is that we were fortunate at that time – thanks largely to the efforts of the Foreign Office Minister Tristan Garel-Jones,[14] who knew Latin America very well – in having quite a number of British ministerial visits.

The next relevant posting is the Falkland Islands between 1999 and 2002. That, at least, was a sort of logical posting, as I had dealt with Argentina from London as a Desk Officer and Deputy Head of Department immediately after the conflict, so I knew something about that. I went off in 1999. I hate to make Nigel [Haywood] jealous, but it was a very positive period of relations between Argentina and the Falklands. The then Foreign Minister of Argentina[15] had spent something like 10 years trying to gain the confidence of the islanders, and he succeeded in that and we had an agreement in 1999, which we spent a couple of years implementing. I can wax eloquent about that, given half a chance, before it flattened out and went downhill rapidly.

From the Falklands, I went to Venezuela in 2003 for three years. Hugo Chávez[16] was the President, so there was not a dull moment. We had a pretty constructive relationship, however, all things being considered, in part because he had twice been invited to the UK before I arrived, and that had certainly influenced his views.

These, then, are the three areas of responsibility I have

[14] Tristan Garel-Jones (Lord Garel-Jones), Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 1990-3.
[15] Guido di Tella (1931-2001), Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, 1991-9.
[16] Hugo Chávez (1954-2013), President of Venezuela, 1999-2013.

had which justify my presence today.

**GEORGINA BULTER**

I am here mainly because I was Ambassador in Costa Rica. I was posted in 2002 and was there until 2006. In the middle, you may remember the Labour Government at the time decided to close three posts in Central America and one in South America, in Paraguay. They closed Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. They were originally going to give all three of those to be dealt with by the Embassy in Guatemala, but I realised that that made Costa Rica vulnerable, because it could possibly be the next on this list if they carried on with this policy, and that it made more sense, anyway, since Costa Rica has a border with Nicaragua and there are half a million Nicaraguans living in Costa Rica, that Nicaragua should be dealt with by the Ambassador in Costa Rica. I fought and won to get Nicaragua assigned as my responsibility, and I became non-resident Ambassador in 2004.

There was a problem with this, though, because the Department for International Development (DFID) Central America Office was based in Managua with quite a lot of money to hand out. I had very little money, as the Heads of Mission Gift Scheme allocation was very small. The Head of the DFID office was there *in situ* and I was sitting in Costa Rica. I can talk more later about how one manages that sort of difficulty.

My other official duties connected with Latin America include being Deputy Head of the Latin America Department in London from 1999 to 2001 before I was accredited as Ambassador. I also briefly spent some time in Cuba in 1971 as a diplomatic spouse. I was not formally employed by the Foreign Office then because I was one of those women diplomats who had to resign on marriage – that ban was lifted in 1972. It is hard for many young women diplomats these days to believe but, in those days, I hasten to say, rather longer back than I want to remember, I had to resign from my post as Third Secretary in the Paris Embassy. My husband[17] had been posted to Cuba, so I joined him there and spent my time writing papers for our Research Department to keep myself and my brain going.

The only thing I would add at this stage is that, during the long period of the Labour Government[18] – those years that we are looking at – Ministers did realise that they needed to do more in terms of ministerial visits to Latin America. But because it is a long way to go, it is difficult to get Ministers to agree to travel. I was, therefore, deputed to travel with Lord Levy[19] as the Prime Minister's Special Representative for three weeks around Latin America in November 2000, and I can tell you more about that, if you like.

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[17] Sir Stephen Wright, Third Secretary at British Embassy in Havana, 1969-71.
[18] The Labour Governments, 1997-2010.
[19] Lord Levy (Michael Levy), Personal Envoy for Prime Minister to Middle East, 1999-2007.

**NIGEL HAYWOOD** I am slightly out of my element here because, while I am surrounded by people who speak Spanish and Portuguese, my equivalents are Hungarian and Estonian. I have spent most of my time in Central and Eastern Europe, but I suppose my knowledge of a broader look at South America is from my time in Human Resources, where I visited most of the Embassies, for one reason or another – not to close them down, I hasten to add – with the notable exception of Buenos Aires. I think the reason I am here is that I was Governor of the Falkland Islands from 2010 until February last year.

**GILES PAXMAN** I would not claim to be an expert on Latin America either. I started learning Spanish when I was 13. I had just read *King Solomon's Mines*[20] and decided that I wanted to go to Colombia. I needed to know a bit of Spanish in order to do that and took it up through school and university, and then had absolutely nothing to do with anything Hispanic throughout a long Foreign Office career until I was posted to Mexico in 2005. I spent four years in Mexico during which I witnessed an interesting transition of government from the Fox[21] Presidency to the Calderón[22] Presidency, when the centre of Mexico City was more or less brought to a standstill by the left-of-centre party that refused to accept the results of the elections.

The time of the political transition was a time of economic stability and growth. Mexico had recovered from the Tequila Crisis[23] and was growing pretty solidly, at 3 to 4 per cent a year. Public finances were under control and the country was generally doing pretty well. The government made some timid attempts at reform but did not really get very far in terms of the big issues around pensions and oil.

They also started off a 'war on drugs', which, of course, is what everyone immediately tends to think about when they think about Mexico these days. When I arrived in Mexico, there was clearly a big drugs problem and I agree that Calderón had to do something about it. I think 'steady state' was not a solution, but it did result in drugs-related deaths going up from about 1,000 a year to nearly 10,000 a year during my time there.

It was also a time when Mexico was trying to develop a global identity, and to work out what its relationship with North America should be. The immigration issue was right at the top of that agenda. The government was also trying to think through its relationship with the rest of Latin America. There were all sorts of efforts to form groupings of one sort or another, and Mexico

[20] Sir H. Rider Haggard, *King Solomon's Mines* (first published in 1895).
[21] Vincente Fox, President of Mexico, 2000-06.
[22] Felipe Calderón, President of Mexico, 2006-12.
[23] The Tequila Crisis (also known as Mexican Peso Crisis) occurred during Dec. 1994.

was very keen to make sure it had the right relationship with those groupings.

It was also a time, finally, when Britain was waking up to emerging economies and when, contrary to Georgina [Butler]'s experience, I found myself having my resources increased and having both people and money sent to me in Mexico to promote trade and investment and develop cooperation on the wider issues on the global agenda around climate change, sustainable development and good governance.

**HOOPER** You then went on to Madrid.

**PAXMAN** I then went on to Madrid, which, of course, is important in Latin American terms. I spent four years in Madrid but I cannot claim to have had much to do with Latin America while I was there; I was much more involved in trade and investment and European economic issues, and dealing with recurrent problems over Gibraltar.

**DR PETER S. COLLECOTT** I feel I am the real cuckoo in this particular nest, insofar as I certainly was not a Latin Americanist, which, for reasons I can go into, was part of the reason why I was posted to Brazil. I was there as Ambassador from 2004 until the end of 2008, which was half of the first period of Lula's[24] Presidency and half of the second period of Lula's presidency. I think I shall end there.

**HOOPER** A couple of things have been left out. Since this is a discussion on diplomacy, Donald [Lamont] was also a Director of Wilton Park,[25] which is the Foreign Office conference centre, and so he covered many regions of the world. Peter is, of course, also a Trustee of Canning House.

Looking at this audience, you are all very well-informed, so I do not need to go into any detail to emphasise the importance of the markets of Latin American countries to this country, and the importance of our bilateral relationship with each country: the historic links, which go back 200 years to the support that the British gave to the various independence movements; the founding of the Chilean and Brazilian navies by Admiral Lord Cochrane;[26] and, of course, the investment that happened 100 years ago, before the outbreak of the First World

[24] Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, 2003–11.

[25] Wilton Park, an executive branch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'is a forum for global change.' https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/ [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

[26] Admiral Lord Cochrane (Admiral, 10th Earl of Dundonald, 1st Marquess of Maranhão, 1775-1860), Vice Admiral of Chile, 1818-22.

War, when Britain was the leading external country in its relationships with Latin America, and we were involved in infrastructure, railways and so on.

It is rather sad that, when I went 50 years ago, there were still major British companies involved in Latin America visible there and all the British banks, pretty much, were represented there; now, I think it is only in Brazil and Mexico that you can find HSBC.[27] There has been a dwindling of interest and activity. We went through the period when Embassies were being closed, which Georgina [Butler] referred to. If they were not closed, they were downsized. Commercial departments, which I thought were thriving at the time, were closed down. The British Council seemed to disappear from many countries in Latin America, and that was very sad. The situation has been reversed now: we have reopened Embassies and we are reactivating our links, and that is all to the good.

Since our panel here were all serving diplomats during that period of closure and change, I would like to start the dialogue by posing a few questions and then opening it up to the floor. I would like to ask the panel whether, in their experience, what they went through at that time was perhaps a necessary evil. Maybe they have had to rethink the role of a diplomat in Latin America and, therefore, is it a question of 'out of evil, there springs forth good.' Would anybody like to pick that one up?

**BUTLER**

Since I was directly involved in Central America with the closure of three of our Posts there, shall I start? It was, to begin with, very difficult to persuade those countries that it was not a demonstration of our lack of interest in them. It is a really hard sell since you have clearly decided your priorities are elsewhere. One had to work very hard to make it clear to them that we were doing the best we could with reduced resources. The way I dealt with it in Nicaragua is I planned a visit once every two months, and I always made sure that we had at least three Ministerial visits set up. In fact, that worked very well. I often thought that, for those Ambassadors sitting in Managua, it was perhaps harder for them to get access in the way that I did to Ministers, because I was unusual. They did not see me very much and they did not bump into me at parties. You might have a quick conversation but you do not sit down and go through an agenda, which is what I did, and I covered quite a lot of ground like that. After a while, I think people heard that that was what I was doing and it healed the rift a bit.

I did have this particular problem of having a large DFID office sitting in Managua, run by a woman who had lots of money to give away, so it was quite difficult for me to have the same appeal and credibility. As Ambassador, of course, you have very

[27] HSBC is a multinational banking group, founded in 1991 by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. www.hsbc.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

little money to spend. You had your Heads of Mission allowances etc., but you cannot do very much with them. That, then, needed managing, particularly as I did not agree with the policy that DFID was adopting at that particular time, which was promoting Budget Support. This means handing over a large sum of money to the national Government to spend. I always thought that it was difficult to imagine that, the way things were in Nicaragua at that time, you could have sufficient conditions to protect that money from being spent corruptly. In the end, in fact, the proposals did not progress and the DFID office was closed down in 2007. Now, things have evolved in such a way that most of the money the UK gives is either through non-governmental organisations or through the EU.

Increasingly, I think it is through our relationship with our colleagues in the EU[28] that we carried on having good relations with these countries, because you do rely on the EU Ambassadors who are resident there to help you out. In particular, of course, in Central America, where relations between these countries' Governments and the United States is of paramount importance, making sure that you keep in touch with the US Embassy is the way that you get a lot of the information that you need.

I would like to add one more thing: as the DFID office was dealing with the Nicaraguan Government in Managua, with a programme that was big money for a mega project, I decided to concentrate on going to the Mosquito Coast and the autonomous zones of Nicaragua on most visits, which, as many of you will know, make up about 50 per cent of Nicaraguan territory. I did small but significant things there in ways that were not being done by the aid office. That worked very well, because I think they had been neglected over the years. As this region was a British Protectorate for several hundred years, it seemed to me that we owed them a little something. We did some useful work both in terms of trying to alleviate the problems of the ghastly prisons in Bluefields,[29] and changing the impression that people there had of being rather deserted and left behind. We opened a museum for them in Bluefields University;[30] we set up competitions with the schools for them to write stories about life on the coast, so that the youngsters felt that they had a history that was worth remembering. Those little things got the attention of the press and we had a good reaction in Nicaragua from doing that.

Good things, then, do come from what, apparently, is a bit of a disaster diplomatically and, in the end, I think it has worked very well. Now, we have a diplomatic couple living in San

[28] The European Union: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[29] Bluefields is a city and municipality on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua.
[30] Bluefields Indian and Caribbean University (BICU). www.bicu.edu.ni [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

José – a husband-and-wife team. The husband is the Ambassador to Nicaragua;[31] the wife is the Ambassador to Costa Rica.[32]

**HOOPER** It is a fantastic solution. I can vouch for the fact that, when I went with the Parliamentary mission to Costa Rica and Nicaragua during Georgina [Butler]'s time in charge, she was very much on top of things and able to cope.

**COLLECOTT** You have put your finger on a couple of difficulties, which I think we need to expose. First of all, there is not and was not, essentially, a British policy towards Latin America. I think the evidence of that is really that the experience of Georgina [Butler] and others in the smaller countries of Spanish Latin America was very different from that of Giles [Paxman] and me in the two large countries of Latin America, if, indeed, the Brazilians allow us to call Brazil part of Latin America, which Leslie Bethell[33] would say only happened about 20 years ago.[34] Up until then, Latin America was Spanish America, as far as the Brazilians were concerned.

As Giles has hinted, I certainly did not feel that I was sent there as part of a Latin American strategy; if anything, it was a strategy towards Brazil and a strategy that we had to work out for ourselves. It was also, as Giles has also hinted, much more about the large emerging economies, what we were going to do with them and how we were going to deal with and try to protect British interests in an era when the emerging economies were clearly looking beyond their regions and becoming key global players, economically and politically.

It seemed to me that that was the strategy that, between ourselves, the Embassies, and London, we had to try to work out and to put some rationality together. That is what I thought I was doing for most of my time: how to incorporate those big emerging powers, and to manage their transition to be more important global players in such a way that British interests were preserved to the degree that they could be. One of those interests would be the economic interest of being able to trade more with them, as their economies grew, but there was also a very wide and very big political interest.

In turn, that divergence between attitudes to the big emerging powers and the smaller Latin American countries led to this very difficult situation as far as Government/FCO resources in the whole Latin American area was concerned, and I speak as somebody who, immediately prior to going to Brazil as

[31] CJ Campbell, British Non-Resident Ambassador to Nicaragua.
[32] Sharon Campbell, British Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2011-.
[33] Professor Leslie Bethell, Director, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, 1997-2007.
[34] See Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil and "Latin America",' *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 42 No. 3 (2010), pp.457-85.

Ambassador, was head of the FCO Administration and, prior to that, the Director of Resources in the FCO. This is something that we had had to struggle with for a long time.

Essentially, I and Giles [Paxman]'s colleagues in Mexico were seeking, and being given, increasing resources at a time when the whole pot for Latin America was shrinking, and the consequence of that was that others were suffering quite difficult shrinkages of their administrative budget, for their people, and of their budget for programmes. Part of the result of that was these Embassy closures that have been talked about. I just wanted to give a somewhat more optimistic slant to what we were doing, rather than what Gloria [Hooper] was saying, which was that this was a depressing period and whether anything good came out of it. Certainly, for me in Brazil, it was a very exciting period. It was a very exciting time when Brazil was developing and our relations developed hugely throughout that period.

Also, to pick up another element which Giles [Paxman] mentioned, of those things I spent my time on, the one that I spent the largest proportion on was nothing to do with politics or economics, but climate change, by quite a long way; after that, probably science and technology and helping large commercial firms to do things. An envelope to that was the bigger strategic picture of what we were trying to do in terms of building our relationships for a future in which Brazil would be a more important player as far as we were concerned, but also a more important player on the global economic and political scene, and would be brought in progressively, as it has been, into instances of global governance – so far, economic, and not political, but that will happen.

**HOOPER** Those were two very good examples of how our diplomats coped.

**PAXMAN** My experience was, in many ways, very similar to Peter [Collecott]'s. I share Peter's difficulty over developing a holistic view of Latin America. I think the Foreign Office has always had this problem: how do you develop a policy towards Latin America when you are dealing with a continent, which, although conveniently packaged geographically, has such huge diversity of wealth, economic performance, governance and political regimes – and, being frank, importance to Britain? We grappled with this in the Foreign Office, and I remember – and I think Georgina [Butler] and Peter [Collecott] may too – a wide-ranging study of why Latin America mattered to Britain and what we should try to do about it. Insofar as I can recall the conclusions, they were pretty much, 'Let us carry on doing the same thing and see what happens.' It was not world-shattering.

There were, however, a number of things going on at this

point – a number of underlying trends that did condition our policy: the reorganising world following the fall of the Berlin Wall; the decline of *blocs* and the rise of multi-polarity; the growing importance of the international system, which made having policies towards individual countries in Latin America more important. Votes in the United Nations, I think, became more important.

Globalisation was happening and, with it, the benefits that came from increased trade. Jim O'Neill[35] invented the term BRICs[36] in 2001. Mexico always resented not being a BRIC. They would have loved there to be an M in there somewhere, and they were told that, in fact, O'Neill had wanted to put one in but 'BRIC' sounded much better than 'MBRIC' or whatever. Anyway, they thought that they were one, and London thought that they were one. Mexico was about the world's ninth largest economy in terms of GDP in 2001. Brazil was about the same at that point.

**COLLECOTT** Brazil was seventh and is now sixth.

**PAXMAN** These, then, were important countries in their own terms. But we were also working hard on the 'global-issues' agenda: issues like climate change and sustainable development. I was given some money to spend on developing cooperation on these issues and we were running a programme worth just over £2 million, with projects all over the country, with three specific themes. One was the reform of the justice system, which was pretty dysfunctional in Mexico and which needed to be made to work better; particularly, by sharing traditions of oral justice from the UK. The second area was climate change, where we were supporting a wide variety of projects. The third area was sustainable development.

This was quite a happy coincidence of circumstances in many ways, because, as I said earlier, this was a time when Mexico was looking to find a way of projecting itself onto the international stage and developing an international identity. Issues like climate change and sustainable development, where Mexico's record was pretty good, were good vehicles for doing that in a non-sensitive way that was not going to annoy anyone. I, as Ambassador, spent a lot of time dealing with those issues. In terms of time, I guess it was about 50/50 between dealing with

[35] Jim O'Neill, a British economist, coined the term 'BRICs' in a 2001 paper entitled *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*, *Global Economics Paper No. 66*, for Goldman Sachs & Co. http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[36] Brazil, Russia, India and China.

those global issues and promoting trade and investment.

I should say, on trade and investment, that UKTI[37] reviewed its strategy in 2006, and selected ten countries in the world that it thought were the most important priority countries into which resources should be put. Brazil was one and Mexico another, so that was another reason for increased resources flowing my way, for which I was very grateful.

**HOOPER**

It was, of course, the famous William Hague[38] Canning Lecture[39] which pointed to an attempt at having a plan or a strategy for Latin America and, certainly, perhaps changed the direction of some of the things that we have been doing.

I would like to move on to another question on the increasing importance of Latin America in the global economy, and the attempts to increase British trade and investment in the region. In fact, we had a debate in the House of Lords this morning on British exports, and I was able to talk about Latin America, because it is a very changing place now in the sense that most countries are regarded as middle-income countries. There is a burgeoning middle class and, therefore, the expectations of people in those countries are changing. There was a splendid lecture about a week ago, which was addressed by former President Lagos[40] of Chile, where he said that South America is entering a new economic cycle. Having looked back with the first question, perhaps we can look forward now and ask the panel if they would like to give us an idea of their thoughts on the future.

**LAMONT**

I am always hesitant about trying to foretell the future, but taking two elements in your question, my first response is, in a way, a continuation of what Giles was saying about the difficulty of wrapping something up as a packaged policy towards Latin America. From London, I think Venezuela was seen as mattering because of oil, and it was a very important market for Scotch whisky, for which I did my utmost.

One of the difficulties London had in placing Venezuela into a context of anything like a policy towards Latin America was that Venezuela was seen as an Andean country, so I would be invited to Heads of Mission conferences for the Andes countries. I might have something to say there about Colombia, but where Venezuela was also likely to affect our interests, of course, was in the Caribbean, where we have a lot of complex interests, and Venezuela was heavily represented there, so it was about 'What was it doing?' Venezuela was developing relations

[37] UK Trade and Investment. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-trade-investment [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[38] William Hague, Foreign Secretary, 2010-14.
[39] See footnote 2.
[40] Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile, 2000-6.

with China, certainly, as well as Iran, and it seemed to me that that was something that the Foreign Office found it rather difficult to deal with. I suggested that one day, the Americans are going to be asking you what you think of that development; you had better think about it. It was an area of complexity.

From the point of view of trade and investment, we did not do badly on the whisky front, and Chávez issued a decree at one point which had the effect of putting Scotch whisky in the same category as essential medicines – a principle that should be much more widely adopted. Otherwise, it was a pretty difficult place from the investment point of view: clearly, our major investments were in the oil and, potentially, gas sector, and they fared pretty badly. People in the oil industry are a pretty pragmatic and flexible lot – they are used to working in difficult environments – but I recall vividly that, at my last meeting with them, they were very gloomy because it was exceptionally difficult to conduct business successfully and predictably, because of the way in which the politics intervened.

I was in Berlin when the Wall came down, so that is deeply part of my psyche, and many of the participants in Venezuelan politics saw the world in a way that I thought had changed in 1989, but they did not, so it was, economically, in terms of investment prospects, a bit of a throwback. You did ask me to look ahead, but it has not improved since I left.

**HOOPER** I know Giles [Paxman] touched on the issues of trade and so on.

**BUTLER** Both Giles and Peter [Collecott] said how much, during that time, FCO policy was to focus support and help on the big countries (Brazil and Mexico). In Costa Rica, it was very frustrating, because I had little help or chance of getting trade visits out there. At that moment, UK Trade and Investment decided that trade and investment support would be given to the two priority countries, and that was it. What we did in Costa Rica was just react to private industry and private enterprise when they came out. Jaguar[41] arrived, which was terrific, and we helped them put on a show. We did the same when the BBC World[42] came out. But it was always pretty frustrating because we did not have the resources to do a big presentation.

I think most of the countries of Central America have increasingly realised that they have the potential to be a great market. They have some 50 million people and they are increasing their economic growth by about 4 per cent on average

[41] Jaguar cars are a brand of the British car company, Jaguar Land Rover, which since 2008 has been owned by the Indian multinational company, Tata Motors. http://www.jaguar.co.uk/jaguar-range/index.html?gclid=CLLLzuzL5cMCFWOc2wodQh0AZQ [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

[42] British Broadcasting Corporation World News.

every year. There was a wonderful conference last year, which I think you, Lady Hooper, were instrumental in setting up, at Lancaster House focused on Central American countries to underline what the opportunities are there.[43] It is gradually becoming a place where the individual countries know they need to integrate in order to attract investment from overseas, in order to improve their infrastructure and in order to improve their financial and contract systems sufficiently to really be a market where people from the West want to put their money.

What has been most important over the years, particularly since I was there, is the negotiation of the Association Agreement with the EU, the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the knock-on relationship with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) through the Dominican Republic and Belize. This is now linking all this area together and it has become a much more attractive place to do business. It is the sort of place now where we are going to get support, as we got support for setting up that particular conference last year. Through integration, I think these countries will, in the future, show that there is a great future for Central America.

**HOOPER**

To underline that, and it came up in the debate this morning, it was demonstrated by the conference last year that Georgina [Butler] referred to for business opportunities in Central America that, to increase the number of British exporters and investors overseas, we need to encourage small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) to start down the path. Being small companies, they very often need to have a lot of help and support, which is where our Embassies come in and are very valuable. In terms of Central America, since they are smaller countries and it looks less complicated to start off with, that is a very good starting point.

**PAXMAN**

Just one personal reflection: our exports to Mexico rose by 56 per cent in the period 1999-2008, when the crash came. Most of that, I am pleased to say, was during my period there. Despite that increase, we still represented, at the end of it, less than 1 per cent of the total of Mexican imports, and we were still being outperformed by Spain – obviously, because of historic links – as well as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Why was that, particularly for a country that, at one point early after Mexican independence, accounted for about half of Mexican imports? What I found was that it was just very difficult to get British companies to focus on going that far away from home. I do not know whether it is still the same now, but companies were worried about their competitive position at home. They were

[43] Conference held on 5 Mar. 2014. http://www.caribbean-council.org/central-america-conference [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

worried about protecting and developing what markets they might have in Europe, because most first exporters tend to go towards continental Europe. They worried about China and India, and whether they were missing out on the huge prospects there. Mexico was just too far down the line.

When it did come over the horizon and we were able to get to companies and say to them, 'Come out and have a look', we found that, almost invariably, they realised that there were terrific opportunities. Some came from Mexico itself as a rapidly developing country, and some came from the links up to the US through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This created all sorts of opportunities for trade into Mexico. But there was a mental block that you had to get over to get companies – and particularly SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises] – thinking beyond: 'We have our UK market. We are trying to develop in Europe. We worry about China and India. Can we really take on more at the moment?'

**HOOPER** As I said at the outset, there is so much goodwill in Latin American countries for the British, and we ought to build on that, instead of competing in China, where the whole of the rest of the world is seeking to improve its markets.

**COLLECOTT** The situation in Brazil was very similar to the one that Giles has described for Mexico. I think there is a slight difference between trade and investment. On the trade side, there were a number of large British companies that were doing pretty well, but they were big and did not need much help from us. Some of them have been there for 100 or 150 years and are very well-established. They have brands, they manufacture locally, and nobody knows any longer that they are British, which is great, as long as the profits keep flowing back. On the trade side, that seems to go pretty well. As in Mexico, where we plough along and try to help and encourage SMEs, but did not get that much success out of it, the story is very similar in Brazil. British exports have increased but they are still a pitifully small amount of a huge market.

On the investment side, it is a slightly different story, because there are some very large investments. BG[44] is the largest foreign investor in Brazil, because of its investment of something like $20 billion up to 2020 in the offshore oilfields. There are other significant investors; for instance, Shell,[45] with $5 billion going into biofuels in conjunction with a Brazilian company. The big guys, then, are doing it and know that they have to be invested in this huge market. There are a lot of other major

[44] BG Group plc is a British 'international exploration and production and LNG company.' http://www.bg-group.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[45] Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo–Dutch multinational oil and gas company: http://www.shell.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

British companies and potential investors who know that, in the long run, ignoring the ups and downs of the Brazilian economy – and they are going through a down at the moment; when I was there, they were going through a huge up – they have to be invested more in Brazil as it becomes more important in the global economy.

There is, however, the same kind of hesitation and, 'Not yet. Maybe there are better opportunities to invest in China and India. Maybe it is a bit difficult. We do not understand the language.' They are, however, wrong, because, as a place to do business, while Brazil may be frustrating, it is nowhere near as complicated, frustrating or difficult as either China or India. The experiences of those who do business are good, whereas the experience of many in China and India is not. It is a learning process that they will have to go through. In terms of receptivity, Brazilians are an outgrowth of Europe, in large part. They are more comfortable dealing with Europeans than with Americans, and are not culturally completely different in the same way that the Chinese and Indians are, which makes doing business quite complicated at times. The potential is there but I am not sure that we are exploiting it as much as we should do.

**HOOPER**

Moving from the economic side to the political side, I think we all rejoice in the fact that twelve countries in Latin America had elections last year and successfully re-established a democratic system each time. That is wonderful. If the panel wishes to comment on the general point of political stability and how democracy is working in Latin America, that would be welcome, but there is one particular fly in the ointment in terms of the relations between this country and Latin America, which is, of course, the Falkland Islands. Since we have two former governors here with us, perhaps this is the moment to have some comments on that particular issue. Please remember – I feel a bit like *Any Questions?*[46]– to have your questions ready for when we open up to the floor for a wider dialogue. Shall we start with Nigel [Haywood]?

**HAYWOOD**

My starting point is that it should not be a fly in the ointment or a pebble in the shoe, or whatever metaphor you would like to choose. From William Hague's Canning Speech – the 2010 version[47] – I think engagement with Latin America became very clear and became very welcomed, including in the Falkland Islands. Up until that point, there had been solid cross-party support for the Falkland Islanders, and the islanders themselves

[46] A BBC Radio4 programme: 'Topical discussion in which a panel of personalities from the worlds of politics, media and elsewhere are posed questions by the audience.' http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qgvj [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[47] See footnote 2.

saw that as a good thing. When I got there, however, there was a degree of disillusionment about. The idea was that Britain would not say anything internationally on the Falkland Islands, in case it created difficulties with Latin America.

What the islanders would have argued was that having good embassy relations with Latin America gave you a forum for putting the case of the Falkland Islanders, because what was clear was we had not been saying much, for whatever reason, and there was an information space that was filled with whatever particular argument the Kirchners[48] decided to put out there. Not only, therefore, was there the usual lack of understanding about the Falkland Islands, because not many people have been there, but there was also a huge amount of misconception.

It seemed to us on the islands that we needed to do two things: the first one – and I am trying not to use the word 'paradox' in every sentence, but some of these are paradoxical – was really to counter the propaganda war that the Kirchners had begun. The second one was to build a longer-term view of the Islands and also South Georgia, which is part of the Governor's responsibilities, as not a source of friction between Britain and Latin America or anybody, but as something very special and important in its own right. We have talked about climate change and environmental change in connection with Latin American countries, but these are absolutely vital issues in the South Atlantic islands. Part of the longer-term vision is that these islands should be seen as a place for research and science, and as a place that is important, with a future, in their own right.[49]

There was a degree of unease about amongst Ambassadorial colleagues in Latin America at the task that they might have to go into Chanceries and make the case for the Falkland Islands. Of course, it is difficult. It is alright for Argentina: you go in, bang on a door and say, 'I am here to tell you it is iniquitous that the British are in the Falkland Islands.' It is more difficult to knock on a door and say, 'Hello, I am here to tell you the Falkland Islands are a British Overseas Territory, and that is good.' That is not a story, so what do you do? What we did was run, from the Islands, a very large-scale public diplomacy campaign of bringing journalists and politicians to the Islands, where their Governments would allow them to travel. We got them to see for themselves and, similarly, we sent islanders around Latin America.

Two things emerged from this: first, as Ambassadors had to go in and talk about the Falkland Islands with their Foreign Ministries, it did not have an effect on trade relations, as far as anybody could see. It did not have an effect on defence relations. All those countries had relations with Britain because it was

[48] Néstor Carlos Kirchner (1950-2010), President of Argentina, 2003-7. His wife is Cristina Kirchner, President of Argentina, 2007-.

[49] See: http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/partnersinscience/2015/01/21/falklands-symposium-qa-with-dr-steven-campana-canada [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

important to do so. You can compartmentalise an area of disagreement and move on with the main thrust of things.

Another thing was also clear. We had a wonderful couple of journalists from Uruguay who came down and did a glorious colour spread on the Falkland Islands and how British it was. Rather misguidedly, they headed it 'The Falkland Islands', which meant that they very quickly got a visit from the Argentine Embassy. The information started to get out there, however, and it grew. There are now a number of links between the Islands and Latin America which have sprung up as a result of these campaigns. Of course, the referendum gave us a very good excuse to go and knock on people's doors and say, 'Hello, there has been a referendum. This is the result.'[50]

You may wonder why we ever had a referendum when the outcome was totally inevitable. It was a Foreign Secretary of a very large and important country who said to us, 'How do you know the Falkland Islanders want to remain British?' and we felt that, if this is the level of lack of understanding out there, we really have to do something about it.

I am afraid that the Argentine position thrives on ignorance elsewhere in the world, and the one thing we have had to do is put it right. My contention is that the Islands are so important, with such an important future, that they should not be an inconvenience or a fly in the ointment, but they should be part of a broad relationship themselves with the continent of South America and part of British-Latin American relations, as a positive. That is a big ask, as they say in cricket.

**HOOPER** Thank you very much. We do have the pleasure of the company of the Ambassador of Uruguay.[51] I will not ask him to comment instantly but, if he wishes to make any remarks, he will be most welcome. Donald [Lamont] is another former Governor of the Falklands, but in a slightly different era.

**LAMONT** Seasoned Latin American hands might be disposed to chide me by reminding me that Guido di Tella[52] was a most unique Foreign Minister of Argentina, and I must not overestimate the prospect of what he achieved being in some way repeated. What he did achieve, however, shows that a more harmonious relationship is, indeed, possible. Guido di Tella worked, as I said, for about 10 years to establish confidence with the islanders and to try to understand their aspirations and their fears. It was a difficult task

[50] Falkland Islands sovereignty referendum, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21750909 [Accessed 16 June 2015].
[51] Fernando López-Fabregat.
[52] See footnote 15.

but he achieved it. He applied a bit of pressure as well by getting the Chileans, at a certain point, to stop the LAN Chile[53] flights to and from the Islands.

The product was, in July 1999, a hastily-put-together agreement between the UK and Argentina, to which Falkland Island Councillors were witnesses and which they signed, so they were very much engaged in the process. That agreement was a couple of months after I arrived and had been preceded by an oil agreement between the UK and Argentina. In about 1998, there was drilling to the north-west of the Falklands. I think six holes were drilled by companies from various parts of the world. It would have been possible for the Argentine oil company YPF[54] to participate, and they attempted to do so; unfortunately, they chose the wrong partner, to London's dismay, and so they did not get a slice of that action.

That whole activity proceeded in a peaceable, non-controversial manner. Following the 1999 agreement, a number of things happened. It meant that Argentines could visit the Falklands on an Argentine passport, which had not been possible before. LAN Chile flights were restored. All sorts of steps were taken to build confidence, using diplomatic parlance, and it worked pretty well. Among the other things, the Embassy in Buenos Aires and Government House in Stanley were reading off the same page in the hymn sheet, which has not been the case throughout history.

Guido di Tella in fact visited the Falkland Islands – not as Foreign Minister, which would have been a tad difficult for him – about a year after, he was no longer in office and he was well received. To my horror, he phoned me one morning to say that he had gone to a pub the previous evening. It was an alarming prospect but he had been treated, in fact, very civilly. He was given a sherry, he chatted to people and he left. Everyone knew exactly who he was.

One of the determinations of the islanders was that, if they were party to an agreement, they would fulfil it. They would not be found wanting. I used to be a real bore at Wilton Park – maybe I am being a real bore now – if ever I saw some young diplomat from the Embassy in Buenos Aires, I would pin him or her up against the wall and ask them if they knew about a particular episode in the dealings with the Falklands, and they did not. One of the remarkable things, however, was the islanders' agreement to the construction of a permanent memorial to the Argentine dead. That was achieved – I will not go into all the detail – over about six months. It was an Argentine design, approved by the islanders and, after I had gone, it was put up.

I cannot think of any parallel in the world where the population of a territory that has been at the wrong end of an

[53] LAN Airlines is based in Chile. http://www.lan.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[54] YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) is the Argentine state-owned oil and gas company. http://www.ypf.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

invasion has erected a permanent memorial to the troops of the invading country which still maintains the claim and many of whose military say, 'We are coming back.' It was an extraordinary gesture and achievement. Sadly, after the Menem government[55] – and after, of course, Guido di Tella was replaced – President Néstor Kirchner[56] took a different view of the situation and it became much more difficult to implement that agreement to move forward.

Implementation then went a bit flat and we began to see that the cooperation envisaged in fisheries was not working as it should, which began an unravelling of all that had been very carefully built up over many years. I am no expert, frankly, on the current scene, but it looks pretty bleak in terms of that relationship. For anyone to persuade the elected representatives of the Falkland Islands people that they should now engage in good faith with Argentina is a pretty big ask.

**HOOPER**

Of course, on the issue of dialogue, I think the British Government response has always been, 'We are very happy to have dialogue on the subject, provided representatives of the Falkland Island Government could be present', and that has always been refused. Since you raised, Donald [Lamont], the name of our beloved Guido di Tella, I raised this at a meeting with Canciller Timerman,[57] when I was with a Parliamentary Group in Argentina last year, and he said, 'It did no good. It is ridiculous.'

My point was, 'If you carry on being so horrible to the people of the Falkland Islands – and we say it is for the people of the Falklands to decide on their future – they are not going to be very happy with you.' He said, 'It did not work when Guido di Tella tried his rapprochement', but that was at a very different time, as I tried to point out to him. That was within very short living memory – 10 years – of people having foreign troops coming into their gardens and houses, and the shock and horror of that was still very much felt. It is a generational thing, and it needs more time, so they ought to try to be a bit nicer again, it seems to me.

**COLLECOTT**

I just wanted to comment on the effect of the Falkland situation on the diplomacy that the rest of us were trying to do in South America in particular. I just remember that those of us who were Ambassadors of the Southern Cone countries in South America used to meet just about annually with the Governor of the Falkland Islands – and I am sure they still do. The view from most of the Ambassadors was that the Falkland conflict was the

[55] Argentine Government of Carlos Saúl Menem, 1989-99.
[56] See footnote 48.
[57] Héctor Timerman, Foreign Minister of Argentina, 2010-.

elephant in the room every time they talked to their corresponding Government; to others, it was, to put it crudely, a large pile of dung sitting in the room, which they would rather was not there.

For me, I have to say it was not like that at all. It was a slight smell in the nostrils which you sometimes noticed, but throughout my time the Brazilians were very adept at having a rather nice dual policy, one arm of which was to sign up, sometimes with good grace and sometimes not with good grace, to all the declarations that the Argentines insisted were made at every international meeting on the need for negotiations on sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The Brazilians would do that. One has to say – in parentheses – that their relationships – both personal and political – with Argentina are never very warm or very strong, and it goes both ways.

At the same time as having that policy, however, they were perfectly prepared to have a private policy which was much more accommodating to the British on practical things: to allow diversionary flights of RAF planes to Brazilian airfields, and to allow Royal Navy ships to dock in Brazilian ports on their way to or from patrolling in the Southern Ocean or in the Falklands. During my time, I had only one clash of arms with the Brazilians over the Falklands, which was symptomatic too of the foreign policy-making machinery that they had, and the rather different nature of the foreign policy towards the rest of South America, which was dominated by two people – one the Deputy Foreign Minister[58] and one the Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President[59] – who were somewhat more left-wing, radical and anti-imperialist and, therefore, slightly anti-British.

This passage of arms was the result of a visit that President Lula had made to Buenos Aires at the time of Mrs Kirchner, who waved at him some photographs of a British ship sailing out of Rio de Janeiro on its way to the Falklands and rejoicing at the good time that they had had in Rio and the fact that they were now going to go and patrol in southern waters. I was summoned and presented with these things, told that this was not acceptable, and asked what I was going to do about it. The person who presented them to me was one of these two characters, otherwise known in Brasilia as the alternative Ambassador of Argentina, even though he was the Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry[60] at the time.

Interestingly, we were able, by using channels that I had built up, to appeal over his head to the Foreign Minister[61] and to use the lever of the bilateral relationship that we had built up assiduously over the previous three or four years, to say, 'You do

[58] Samuel Guimaraes, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, 2003-9.
[59] Unconfirmed by the speaker but assumed to be referring to Marco Aurélio Garcia, Special Foreign Policy Advisor to Brazilian President, 2007-.
[60] Samuel Guimaraes, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, 2003-9.
[61] Celso Amorim, Foreign Minister of Brazil, 1993-5 and 2003-11.

not really want to make a fuss about this. This has been going on quite quietly and you are quite happy for the practical cooperation to continue, not least because, were there to be oil exploration around the Falklands, you are hopeful that you will get some business for Brazilian ports and Brazilian companies there.' In a sense, we won that. We pulled on the lever of bilateral relations and it proved strong enough to calm that down.

I think the situation has moved on since then, in a negative sense. We are now not allowed to have Royal Navy visits if those ships are going to or from the Falklands. I think that is still true, and it is a pity. It is a retrograde step from the Brazilians but I suspect that, in the long term, it is not immutable and there probably are, in the longer term, ways of trying to restore a somewhat more pragmatic attitude which is very Brazilian and very helpful. It is possible that there is a distinction between the public position and what happens in practice.

**HAYWOOD** It is true that South American countries have, essentially, closed their ports to Royal Navy vessels going to or coming back from the Falkland Islands, although there is, of course, considerable interest in Royal Navy vessels, and particularly in the Type 45s.[62] Mysteriously, therefore, the bans do not exclude joint exercises at sea, where they catch up with vessels on the way up or down. There are many ways of getting around the practicalities of those questions, but it is true to say that Argentina is doing its level best to stop any form of cooperation along those lines.

**HOOPER** I think the moment has arrived to open up for questions from the floor. There are a number of other issues that I would like to deal with but it is good to have a bit of audience participation.

**JACQUES ARNOLD** What came across to me quite strongly is that, in this day and age, and perhaps going back 10 or 15 years, we seem to have lost a cadre of people inside the diplomatic service who have lifelong, in-depth experience of Latin America. Peter [Collecott] in particular hinted that his appointment was enhanced because he did not have that experience. Why is that the case? I would have thought that that was the very reverse of what we need.

**COLLECOTT** It is really a very Brazilian thing. It was an advantage, if I can put it no more pejoratively than that, that I was not what a lot of other countries were seen by the Brazilians to have: a re-tread of an Ambassador who had started earlier in his career in Spanish-

[62] 'Britain's 6 Type 45 destroyers are the most advanced warships the nation has ever built.' http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/destroyers/type-45-destroyer [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

speaking Latin America and eventually, towards the end of his career, had ended up in the biggest country in Latin America – namely, Brazil – speaking 'Portugol', as they used to say; in other words, Portuguese with Spanish inflections. They liked the fact that I was not that, that I had learned Portuguese in order to go there, and did not speak any Spanish at all, and that there was also some substance behind it.

Given the point at which I was appointed, and what we were talking about earlier, which was the way that, in particular, the Foreign Office and then Government more widely were interested in treating Brazil in particular, but also Mexico, as somewhat different and as an emerging power, and dealing with Brazil not as the largest country in Latin America or in South America but as an emerging power that was going to be one of the dozen most influential countries in the world, it was very advantageous to be able to present myself, therefore, as someone who was not seeing Brazil as part of Latin America but in a global perspective, and as somebody who had those different perspectives.

They responded extremely well to that; in other words, an interlocutor who they thought would not only be able to talk to them about Latin American issues from a deep knowledge of their and Latin American history, but who was treating them as a serious player on the world stage with something to say on the issues that that raised for them and for us.

**MILLS** I am interested in relations between the United States and Great Britain in Latin America. Could anybody provide any more insight into how they felt British representation was viewed in Latin America or, indeed, in the Falkland Islands by the United States, and how relations were with American Ambassadors and diplomats in that country: how much cooperation and rivalry there was, or whether there was that contact?

**PAXMAN** Mexico, as you know, has a very close and somewhat troubled relationship with the US, but the US does still take nearly 80 per cent of Mexican exports and provides well over 50 per cent of foreign direct investment coming into Mexico, so it is a relationship that has to be kept going. When I was there, my relationship with the US Ambassador was absolutely crucial. It helped me gain an understanding of what was going on in the Mexico-US bilateral relationship and the issues around the border relating to immigration and the Mexican drugs cartels arms purchases in the southern states of the US, which was a big bone of contention for the Mexicans. I had to have very close contact with the Americans; not just the Ambassador, but the agencies that were working there, and particularly the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on drugs issues. That was absolutely

crucial.

There is no doubt that the Americans knew a lot more about what was going on Mexico-wide than we did, because they had much greater resources. The American Embassy is huge. They have big Consulates in Monterrey and a lot of places along the border, so they had a depth of understanding that we did not. Our direct access to the Mexican Government was very good and we could go and talk to just about anyone we wanted to about just about anything. Nevertheless it was always useful to have the American angle on it, because, of course, they came at it from a different angle, and that provided us with more perspective. It was, then, a really close relationship.

**LAMONT**

I am reminded that, before I went out to Caracas in 1999, someone who knows Latin America – not from the Foreign Office but from the media – said, 'You are not going to have much fun. You are going to be cold-shouldered because you will be seen as alongside the Americans, because of Iraq.' That was untrue. For whatever reason, but including the fact that he had been invited twice to the UK, Chávez did not lump us together but treated us on our own merits. I would meet with the US Ambassador[63] pretty frequently. We had very similar analyses of the situation and very different ways of how we thought we should deal with it. They are the great power; we are not.

As two Ambassadors, however, you are feeding off similar contacts and reading very similar intelligence reporting, so you have a lot in common. Because of the bad state of relations between the US and Venezuela at the time, however, one likes to think, he would get something from us. It was not just at ambassadorial level; it happened at all levels in the Embassy. We had contacts and discussions with Government that the Americans could not have, in areas, for example, like counternarcotics, where they benefited from speaking to us.

**BUTLER**

In Central America, it is crucial to keep in close contact with the American Ambassador, because 50 per cent of the trade is between Costa Rica and the United States. They have a great deal of influence over the Costa Ricans. In fact, Costa Rica, despite the fact that it is a pacific country with no military forces, initially signed up for the Coalition in the Iraq War in 2003. But this caused big debates in the National Assembly which eventually decided it was against the Costa Rican Constitution and the Government had to withdraw its support.

In both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, I kept in close touch with the Americans. The Ambassador in Costa Rica is a political

[63] US Ambassadors to Venezuela: John Francis Maisto (1997-9) and Donna Hrinak (2000-2).

appointment and the appointment is regarded as a plum job. The first one I was close to was a friend of President Bush[64] and he went on to be the Ambassador in Brazil: John Danilovich.[65] He was very well plugged-in, so it was really useful to keep in touch with him and I got a lot of help from him. We reciprocated when we could through our own connections.

**COLLECOTT** In Brazil, we had extraordinarily close and friendly contacts with both US Ambassadors during my time. I am tempted to say I think we were influenced slightly by the fact that, as in Central America, the two American Ambassadors[66] who I coincided with were both political appointees and were both, therefore, concentrating pretty much on the commercial side rather than being too involved on the political and strategic side. They were succeeded, just after my time, by a career diplomat,[67] who probably had a slightly different attitude and, therefore, a slightly different relationship. However, the relations were very friendly, although not fantastically substantive.

**HAYWOOD** Our relations with America over the Falklands are interesting in that they view their position as one of studied neutrality. Our job is really to convince them that their neutral position is anything other than neutral, for the simple reason that, if you call for negotiations or discussions now, you are not sitting around a table with Guido di Tella talking about sending *Pingu*[68] tapes and how wonderful it is to build up warm relations. You are talking about when you are going to hand over the Falkland Islands to Argentina, because that is what negotiations mean to them. They changed their Constitution so that that can be the only thing that they mean, which is why we devoted a lot of time to getting Congressional visits, where we could. We had two Congressional visits. I called on the State Department. We have an Ambassador in Washington[69] who is extremely clued-up on the Falkland Islands, so our relationship, politically, is one of trying to get the Americans to understand that having Hillary Clinton[70] call for dialogue is not a neutral position.

Meanwhile, as the world revolves, we have an American company engaged in oil exploration in the Falkland Islands, which means that they are now starting to have an economic dog in the fight and it will be interesting to see how that pans out in the long run.

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[64] George W. Bush, President of United States, 2001-9.
[65] John Danilovich, US Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2001-4; to Brazil, 2004-5.
[66] US Ambassadors to Brazil: John Danilovich (2004-8) and Clifford Sobel (2006-9).
[67] Thomas A. Shannon, Jr, US Ambassador to Brazil, 2009-13.
[68] *Pingu* was a Swiss animation series shown on UK television and elsewhere between 1986 and 2000.
[69] Sir Peter Westmacott, British Ambassador to United States, 2012-.
[70] US Secretary of State, 2009-13.

**HOOPER**

There are, of course, other external powers with interests in Latin America; namely, China and the EU, of which we are part. It may be interesting to look at those relationships.

**DR CELIA SZUSTERMAN**

I find it rather pleasing that Guido di Tella's name was mentioned in such a positive light in this context, but it was not always like this. Guido di Tella was very often misunderstood both here and certainly always in Argentina. I remember his unceasing efforts throughout his decade at the head of the Argentine Foreign Ministry to get the Foreign Office to agree to talk, and I remember telling the Foreign Office, 'This is the most Anglophile Argentine Foreign Minister you will ever have. This is the time to get things going and to get things really rolling.' The July 1999 agreement came too late (there was a change of government at the end of the year). Guido di Tella understood dialogue as that: 'Let us talk. Let us see what comes out of it.' He knew he had to build the trust of the islanders after what had happened following the invasion in 1982, but he understood what dialogue was.

Gloria [Hooper]'s comment about Timerman's comment – 'Guido Di Tella achieved nothing' – is very telling, because, in terms of what Timerman was saying – and this is what the Kirchner administration was saying, which is why Néstor Kirchner abandoned the oil conversations that were going on – he did not really achieve anything. For them to achieve anything was to have a date for the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Argentina. When the Kirchner administration talk about dialogue and negotiations, it is only about fixing a chronogram for the handing over of the islands. That is why, for them, Guido di Tella had not achieved anything. Because establishing friendly links with the inhabitants of the Islands in an effort at confidence-building counted as 'nothing' because the Islands were not handed over. This is why, currently, every time Mrs Kirchner goes to the United Nations, or her representative in residence just at the other side of Belgrave Square[71] from where we are has the opportunity, they say, 'What is wrong with dialogue? Why is the UK opposed to dialogue?' It is because the British government understand that what the current Argentine government mean by 'dialogue', is not really a dialogue but an agreement on the date to hand the Islands over to Argentina.

**JAIME TORALES-GONZALEZ**

I am studying Diplomatic Studies at Oxford University and I have a quick comment. It seems to me that there is a stress from the UK to improve trade and investment rather than cooperation and aid in the last couple of years. Because of that, there has not been too much aid received from the UK in comparison to

[71] The Argentine Ambassador's Residence is 49 Belgrave Square, London. Canning House is located at 8 Belgrave Square.

regions such as Africa or Asia. If this is the case, why is there that shift? If there is still some cooperation, in what areas would that be?

**PAXMAN**

As you probably know, there was a big shift in policy on overseas development during 2003-05, to focus our spending on the poorest countries. At that point, a lot of other countries fell out of the UK aid programme. We never had much of an aid programme in Mexico, which is a more developed country. The reason why the focus was so much on Africa and some Asian countries was that these were the poorest countries, and it was felt that this was where our money could have the biggest impact.

It is not necessarily right, however, to think purely in terms of financial transfers. What we were doing a lot of – certainly in Mexico and, I think, in a lot of the other countries in Latin America – was transfer of best practice and knowledge. We are working a lot on issues around justice, governance and the principles of sustainable development, which, hopefully, are helping countries to become self-sufficient and prosperous.

In a way, I would argue that the fact that the amount of British pure aid, in financial terms, going to Latin America dropped is a good sign. It is a sign that those countries have reached a stage in their political and economic development where they have become stable countries where governance has improved and where you can work through dialogue, through assistance and through transfer of technology, knowledge, experience and best practice, rather than simply through financial tools.

**COLLECOTT**

Just to add to that, the story in Brazil is very similar to the one in Mexico that Giles [Paxman] has described. At about the same time, the DFID programme, such as it had been up until 2003-04, was reduced, and we did some very similar things to that which Giles has described in Mexico.

The other added element which was very interesting and quite important was that there began to be so-called 'triangular' cooperation; in other words, DFID, the British Council and others started cooperating with the Brazilians in efforts to provide aid or technical assistance to various African countries, which was very consonant with the kind of Africa policy which Brazil had under President Lula. That was, in a number of instances, extremely successful, and it is probably continuing now.

Part of it was helping to transfer Brazilian expertise in things like conditional cash transfers to various African countries: some transfers of technologies – both agricultural and industrial – around issues like biofuels; transferring knowledge and experience gained with the rather successful vaccination and

inoculation programmes that the Brazilians had to African countries; and their very successful programme of AIDS[72] treatments to suffering African countries. I think that added – and I am sure it has developed since; I am not aware of the details – a different dimension to what it did. As Giles [Paxman] was implying, that kind of cooperation does not cost very much in money transfer.

**LAMONT** I will say a word about Uruguay and a word about Venezuela. Before I arrived in Montevideo, London shifted its policy and was going to be engaged in an aid programme in every country in Latin America. The problem in Uruguay was that, while we had a formal agreement, which was good, the amount of money available was pretty limited, and the support and engagement of British expertise was such that, I have to say, my Deputy and I concluded that this was actually damaging to the bilateral relationship rather than positive for it.

In Venezuela, where there was no British aid programme, we were doing stuff that has been alluded to. We were beneficiaries, if you like, of an experiment that Robin Cook[73] launched to have human rights experts in different Embassies around the world, and we had one in Caracas. That meant that we were able to put on programmes about human rights. Human rights and the police was an area of emphasis, as were areas of good government, which had potential impact and benefit. We even got a team of British Special Forces to help train the counter-narcotics folk in Venezuela. We did these things, then, not aid, and I think they helped more than aid would have.

**BUTLER** I have already told you that the Central American DFID office in Managua was closed down, and thereafter aid money was not allocated by country. As the others have said, developmental support is now delivered in a more sophisticated way – by themes. So we assist in areas that we are good at, for example expertise in the fields of human rights or biodiversity. In Costa Rica, we sent out police experts on child abuse etc. One of the areas where we did really well was with our Chevening[74] scholarships. I was pretty cheesed off with the numbers that were given to Brazil and Mexico because, particularly in my time, yet again we were thrown the crumbs, and the big boys got the big numbers! But even with the small number of scholarships we

[72] Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.

[73] Robin Cook (1946-2005), Foreign Secretary, 1997-2001.

[74] 'Chevening Scholarships are the UK government's global scholarship programme, funded by the Foreign Office and partner organisations. The programme makes awards to outstanding scholars with leadership potential from around the world to study postgraduate courses at UK universities.' www.chevening.org [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

were allocated, we were very successful in choosing some wonderful young men and women – I wonder whether the young man who asked the question received a Chevening scholarship?

**TORALES-GONZALEZ** I was a Chevening scholar.

**BUTLER** We chose some remarkable young men who have risen to become presidents, heads of political parties and senior members in economic ministries, who were Chevening scholars. I really think this is part of our aid programme that should be expanded.

**PAXMAN** Very briefly, I should have mentioned that it is important also to realise that there are quite large amounts of UK aid going to Latin America through the EU. In many ways, it can make sense to deliver your aid through the EU, if you can get the right sort of coordination, programmes, monitoring and evaluation.

**COLLECOTT** As well as through the World Bank[75] and the IMF[76].

**BUTLER** Yes, I should have stressed straightaway the significant amounts of aid we deliver through the EU. In fact, the EU in Central America has been instrumental in pushing forward the regional integration agenda which is so important for the future development of the region. I think the Central America-EU Association Agreement[77] is the EU's first inter-regional association agreement, which has now been signed and is operational since 2013.The aid in this area has been very valuable.

**HOOPER** I was going to make the point about EU funding, but I would also like to emphasise that we are one of the few countries in the world that hits the 0.7 per cent target for overseas aid. I think, in fact, because Latin American countries are judged to be middle-income countries, you should take that as a compliment, because it shows that the direct funding is going only to the poorest of the poor countries, which, at the moment, seem to be largely in

[75] 'The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world': http://www.worldbank.org/ [Accessed 22 Apr. 2015].
[76] The International Monetary Fund's 'primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system': http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm [Accessed 22 Apr. 2015].
[77] For text of the agreement, see: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689 [Accessed 22 Apr. 2015].

Africa.

Could people who are students or here for study purposes put up their hands so that we can have an idea?
*[Show of hands]*

**OLIVER FLETCHER**

I am a Latin American Studies Masters student at Oxford. I am afraid I have quite an unfashionable question for you but, as veterans of British diplomacy, I feel like I should seize my opportunity. Dare I say, as a young person such as myself potentially interested in a career in the Foreign Service, what advice would you proffer?

**COLLECOTT**

It is a question that quite a number of people of your age, or perhaps a little younger, have asked me – friends, relatives etc. I always say think about it carefully, but there are fantastic advantages if you decide that that is the kind of life that you want to live. There are disadvantages to that life as well: you live your life in little boxes of three or four years, moving around the world, and you have to be able to cope with that. I would also say to them talk to people who do it to see if that is the kind of area, transactional diplomacy, that you would like to be involved in, because it is very different doing that.

I think we are all here probably because we like doing it. We like that kind of transactional stuff and we like dealing with people and the intellectual stimulus that goes with it, because you are dealing with intelligent people and dealing with issues that are mostly both interesting and important. Some people like that and others do not. Some people would rather keep their academic distance and be able to become an expert in a particular region. It is slightly horses for courses, but, I would finally say, if you decide that you can pass those hurdles, do it and you most certainly will not regret it.

**PAXMAN**

I agree with Peter [Collecott]. I think that there is no greater privilege than being sent abroad to represent your country. There is also nothing more enjoyable, as far as I am concerned, than going to another country with a remit to find out what makes that country tick and who the key people are who pull the levers and who can deliver things that you want for your country. It is absolutely fascinating. It is a hugely varied career. In my career, I have dealt with the former Soviet Union and with Europe; I have done trade work; and I have been involved in consular work in Spain. It is massively varied. It is hugely intellectually challenging and there are some really great people. That is the upside.

In terms of the downside, the pay is pretty bad. The Ferrero Rocher lifestyle,[78] if it ever existed, certainly does not exist anymore now. Diplomats do not get up in the morning thinking, 'Great, I am going to a cocktail party tonight.' Quite the contrary – the receptions that you go to are very much tools of the trade. You go in and spot who you want to talk to, do your business and get out. Otherwise, you do not have a life at all. And it does put enormous strains on individuals, as Peter [Collecott] said, having to change every three or four years to a different job in a different country. You go to your first event, look around the room, know absolutely nobody there and think, 'Here we go. I have to start all over again, building up the contacts, the networks and the influence.'

The job can be particularly demanding, I think, on families in terms of what you do about children's education and the like. I have seen, so many times, couples where one half clearly wants to be going around the world and finding out what makes countries tick, and the other would probably rather be at home with friends and family or looking after aged relatives, not sitting at home supporting a diplomatic spouse. If you are in a relationship, you need to be able to take these sorts of decisions as a couple, rather than as an individual.

**HAYWOOD**

Gather information and be very clear about what you are going in for, as Giles [Paxman] said. You really do have to be able to operate as a team when you are abroad. It is unfashionable. You are not marked on it; in fact, you cannot be, because you cannot expect a spouse to operate. If you have a spouse with you, you are on show, and your spouse is on show, all round the clock, all the time you are there. You have to be comfortable with being in that sort of goldfish bowl.

Upsides are considerable, in that you have an unparalleled opportunity to form your own specialism, really, to get engaged in the country that you are in or going to, and to find out how it works. It is great, and you have unparalleled access to everything and everybody when you are there, not just as an Ambassador but even from being First Secretary onwards. You have total opportunity to enjoy yourself.

You enter in a group of about 20 or so, and everybody is interested in different things. If everybody wanted to go to Paris and Washington, there would be a lot of very unhappy and disappointed people around. They do not. You can form your own specialisation quite happily. I was probably the Foreign Office's foremost Finno-Ugric specialist, largely by default, but it fascinated me, because I was a comparative philologist at university, so I was able, eventually, to spend two years learning

[78] Referring to an advertisement for Ferrero Rocher, a chocolate and nut sweet, 'At the Ambassador's Reception.' See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P-nZZkQqTc [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

Hungarian and then Estonian. The Office will support you. Before going to the Falklands, I had a year to do an MSc in Environmental Biology and Conservation Biology, because it was important for the job. You will, then, get the support and the training to do these things.

Within that, I should say it is not like people used to characterise it, as in you go where you are sent. Technically, you are obliged to go where you are sent, but you have huge control over how your career is shaped. You are the person who shapes your career. You have to compete against people for jobs within it, but you can shape that career. If you want fame and riches, it is probably the wrong job because, if you get them, you probably should be in prison, but it is just enormous fun.

**BUTLER**

Of course, I agree with what they have said so far. It is an enormous privilege and you have enormous fun. It is, though, quite difficult for a woman. I do not know whether you can really be a good diplomat, a good wife and a good mother. Something in those three has to give. Things have got much better for women. When I got married to another member of the Service, I had to resign – married women diplomats were not accepted in the fast stream in those days. The rules only changed in 1972. After that the Office introduced 'special unpaid leave' so that, when they posted one of you, the other one could go on leave. Of course, in the sort of era I am talking about, it seemed to me as a woman, if you were going to have children, why mess up two careers? He, then, would have first choice and I would come along afterwards.

Those sorts of problems have been sorted out these days, and the Foreign Office is much more accommodating to women in terms of trying to keep them on their books. They also have many more married couples within the Service these days, so it is possible. But women should think very hard about it as a career, however, because, on personal relationships, it is very hard.

**LAMONT**

On the personal front, I am reminded that, when I arrived in Moscow in 1980, aged 33, the wife of the Ambassador,[79] asked me, 'Mr Lamont, what is a man of your age doing not being married then?' Some months later I had a fiancée and she asked, 'Mr Lamont, what do you have to say for yourself today?' I said, 'I have found someone who can put up with the life.' She is still my wife – I had better add that – and she has put up with the life and with me.

Why I joined the service, I suppose, boils down to variety. I was in the motor industry and I saw a kind of sameness; in the Diplomatic Service, I saw variety. Moscow commercial work; the

[79] Margaret, Lady Keeble (1924-2014), wife of Sir Curtis Keeble, British ambassador to Moscow, 1976-82.

Falklands Governor at a time of good relations with Argentina; dealing with Hugo Chávez; being in Berlin when the Wall came down and responding to that, etc. There was tremendous variety there.

On a personal level, being driven by a Royal Marine around icebergs in South Georgia, up the river that is a branch of the Orinoco in a canoe driven by someone else who was not a Royal Marine, flying in a helicopter around the Berlin Wall when it was still there – all of these things were great fun and exciting. But also the feeling that you are, without being too pompous, doing an important job.

**HOOPER**

My only additional comment would be that the pay may not be very good, but very often the Residence is rather nice. After my fellowship year, when I was travelling around Latin America as a poor student, I would have given my eye teeth to be invited by the Ambassador to stay in the Residence. Now that I am old and capable of financing myself in a hotel, I am always invited by the Ambassador, so that is a bit perverse. Thank you for that question – it has provoked a lot of interest.

**PROFESSOR ALAN KNIGHT**

I am a Professor of Latin American History at Oxford. I was struck by all those answers, until the very last sentence, that they seemed to be rather self-referential about how this is interesting, you go to interesting countries, you meet interesting people, you go up trips up the Orinoco – fine. I am not sure that is a good answer to someone who might be entering the diplomatic service, until the very last sentence, although it was a slightly throwaway line, where you said you made a difference. Listening to all the discussions, which have been very interesting, I am left slightly in doubt as to where you did make a difference.

I admit, as a historian, I have spent a lot of time reading lots of ambassadorial and other reports going back 150 years, and there is no question that, over 100 years, British Ambassadors had a lot of influence and leverage in Latin America, which they often used for the wrong reason but they had that. My sense from your descriptions of what you have done is that, while I am not saying that we should not have Ambassadors or Embassies, there are arguments about how much the hardworking British taxpayer should spend and whether Embassies should be expanded or closed. I am entirely supportive of initiatives such as Chevening.

If you take the economic front in particular, however, which, in Latin America, is by far the most important – the strategic interest, aside from perhaps the Falklands, is not very big – as Giles Paxman said, our British trade performance in Latin America over the past 50 years has been very bad. That is not your fault, but probably the fault of those would-be exporters that do not export or do not produce the right widgets to export.

I am left wondering: what is the value-added? Nobody said, 'Here was something I did that was really useful and beneficial.' Perhaps you are too modest to blow your own horn like that. I got some generalities – Chevening was mentioned etc. – but I am still left a little in the dark about the role of a British Ambassador in Latin America today.

**COLLECOTT**

I am not quite sure which end to start at. The first point is something that we did say at the beginning, which is that, fundamentally, there was not – and has not been for a long time – a British policy or strategy towards Latin America. I think that that has probably become somewhat less the case, but I am not sure that it has been reversed, having seen the recent papers on Latin America. The point about that, however, is that the people who have an overview of what the country is, how the country works, and how we can best, as the UK, try to influence that country and work with that country, is not somebody sitting here in London. The only people who have the overview of that are the people sitting there and, in particular, the Ambassador.

I saw it as my responsibility – and I am sure my colleagues did – to define for Whitehall, and try to convince them, where we should be going with a particular country. In my case, it was Brazil, at a time when we needed to define how we were going to interact with and try to influence that country as, as I said earlier, it became more important and began to integrate itself into the fora of global governance. I think that is precisely what we did, and the instruments of that were the usual ones.

I wrote the policy paper on what our future policy towards Brazil should be over the next few years in the lead-up to a Lula State Visit here, and it ended up being endorsed across Government, including by Tony Blair[80] as the Prime Minister. I was probably the only person who could do that, and I used to be the one who came back and would chair Whitehall committees, or committees of people from all the Whitehall departments who were engaged in Brazil, to try to make sure that there was a coherence to what we were doing, and I am sure Giles [Paxman] did the same with Mexico. That is fundamentally what we did.

If you want an instance of something which might be slightly more useful in the short term, I said earlier that the subject that took up more of my time than anything else was climate change. We spent a lot of money doing that and I spent a lot of effort doing that, but what we managed to do was, in the run-up to the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), we did manage to change the Brazilian position and Brazilian attitudes.

That is what we had intended to do in the three years prior to that, and we did that by a number of things: by

[80] Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 1997-2007.

traditional diplomacy – in other words, talking to people; in particular, drip-feeding to Brazilian ministers, both by myself and by visiting British Ministers, why it was in their interests that something needed to be done, why it was in their interests to ensure that the Amazon was not destroyed anymore, and why they could feel comfortable with any climate change agreement on targets which came out. By reducing deforestation in the Amazon, they could meet any reduction target for decreased emissions that was ever likely to be agreed, because 75 per cent of their emissions were from that. They were very large and they have reduced them.

It was partly through that kind of classical diplomacy – talking and persuading people, including at the top. It was also partly by getting together all the senior Brazilian climate, agricultural and water specialists, scientists and, with some funding from the British Government, getting them, over a period of about 18 months, to write the equivalent of a *Stern Report*[81] on the economics of climate change in Brazil. That is what we did. The Foreign Ministry did not like it. They thought we were trying to influence opinion and to change their minds, which we were, but eventually they had to come on-board because all the Brazilian experts were engaged in this and thought it was worth doing.

The result, as I said, was that, in the run-up to Copenhagen, the official Brazilian negotiators wished to maintain a rather tough position on the adoption of targets but were overruled by their Minister. He said, 'The penny has dropped. I have understood that agriculture in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina is dependent on rainfall, which is generated in the Amazon. Without it, we would lose 60-70 per cent of our rainfall. We would not have agriculture, and that would screw our economy. I understand this and we are going to be much more accommodating.' We were not the only ones doing this kind of stuff but we had significant influence, I believe, on that change of position. In a sense, I am banging my own drum, but that is what we did. That is the kind of thing that we do, but we probably do not tell the world that we are doing it.

**PAXMAN** I agree with all of that, but I think Alan has a point. One of the difficulties of a diplomatic career is that, on the really big issues, you very rarely see the beginning, the middle and the end. It is very rarely the same person who has the idea, who does all the legwork and preparation, who negotiates the deal and who sees the final outcome. So it is often difficult to measure an individual's contribution to a major success.

[81] The Economist Sir Nicholas Stern produced a *Review on the Economics of Climate Change* on 30 Oct. 2006. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+ /http: /www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/executive_summary.pdf [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

Second, we work as teams. An individual Ambassador working alone can achieve a certain amount, and you get wonderful kicks when you do. If you go in and manage to persuade your host government to support a British position at the UN or if you go and talk to a Minister and say, 'This British Company is having a lot of difficulties in this particular area. Would you agree to see them and talk to them to see if you can see a way around the problem?' In the Consular area, you can often achieve things through your individual efforts, and so too in multilateral diplomacy, if you are negotiating a particular piece of legislation in Brussels, for example. If you can see the negotiation through to an end when you have defined your objectives and your strategy, you have built your alliances, you have your points out on the table, you have won the arguments, you have the right wording at the end of it. For a lot of what an Ambassador does, however, the aims are long term and strategic, have to be tackled by teamwork and outlive the individual.

Relationships between countries tend to be fairly glacial and, when they change, they change often because of outside events. I said that, during my period in Mexico, our exports to Mexico increased by probably 35 per cent. I am not sure how much of the credit I can take for that. I was simply leading a team. In any case, one of the big problems that you find with dealing with trade is that so much depends on factors that you cannot influence such as exchange-rate movements. If the exchange rate moves in the right sort of way, your exports start to go up and you are quids in. There is, then, a big difficulty in terms of measuring how you achieve and what you achieve. Quite often, you can set out with specific objectives and not achieve them, but achieve something else that is equally worthwhile.

I had the same sort of experience as Peter [Collecott] dealing with climate change. One of my key objectives was to get Mexico into a position where they were acting as a sort of bridge between the developed and the developing world on climate change, because Mexico, after we had talked to them for an awfully long time, got it. They did understand the issue and they were prepared, because they had a vested interest – and we were able to persuade them that they did have a vested interest – to become protagonists in the negotiations, for example by organising meetings in Monterrey, proposing themselves for the Cancún COP[82] etc. I do not think that that would have happened without our effort in country. My effort contributed but I had a strong and hard-working team. We had people in London. We had Ministers working on this and all sorts of other people. So, Alan, you do have a point, and it is quite difficult in our business to measure with any degree of accuracy what you have achieved.

[82] Cancún Climate Change Conference, Nov. 2010. http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/ meeting/6266.php [Accessed 27 May 2015].

**HOOPER** It is the issue of soft power: you cannot define it or quantify it very easily.

**BUTLER** Overseas we have to draft business plans every year, which tie what you do in with what the Foreign Office wants to do, so it is much more structured than it used to be. You choose from the list of FCO priorities areas where you think you can make a difference in the country where you are accredited. In Costa Rica, it was on the human rights side. I suppose the project I am most proud of is in the Supreme Court: as part of a project funded by the Embassy the Court now has a video-evidence room which records a child giving evidence about child abuse which can be used in Court. There is a second room where the police and judges can be trained in how to interview children on such a difficult and sensitive subject.

When I arrived in Costa Rica, they would not even talk about sex tourism, which was clearly a big issue, and I made it one of the things that I worked hard on. In the end, there are now five different places around the country where they can take evidence and where people are now trained. They have a little plaque up – and they gave me a little plaque too – for the work I did on this. As Giles [Paxman] said, though, you are part of a team and you cannot do that sort of thing on your own. Good projects take time. Usually, you do not see the end result. I was lucky that I did in that particular case.

The other thing I concentrated on was making use of the British community in Costa Rica. In some countries, you have a lot of Brits who do not participate in putting forward a coherent view of the country, and yet they can be wonderfully helpful to the Embassy and good ambassadors for Britain if they are engaged. Over my time in San Jose, we did some great things together, whereby we collected money for Costa Rican schools in need; and the British community enjoyed being involved and appreciated. I think that the charity events we started still go on, as far as I know, which promote Britishness in all its different forms and attracted Costa Rican Ministers to attend.

**MICHAEL CANNON** Could I add a postscript to that? I was one of the people who lived in Costa Rica when Georgina [Butler] was the Ambassador. When she stepped down, there was a serious attempt to have her made an honorary citizen of Costa Rica, which just shows you how much she was admired and loved.

**LAMONT** There was a lovely headline in the Uruguayan press when I was

there, and I would have liked to take sole credit for that. It said, 'Improvement in agricultural arrangements under GATT[83] thanks to British commitment.' It made the French Ambassador physically ill, I am sure, and of course it was not due to me, but you are part of it. You are talking to the press and dealing with the Foreign Minister and people in London and Brussels who understand the issue, and you do have a certain degree of influence. In Venezuela, it would have been the whisky agreement that I mentioned, which was £20 million a year for Diageo.[84] Later, three television journalists were released from prison; one of them came and said, 'I do not know what you did but you must have done something.' It was the way you deal with the President, whose decision it was to release them.

It is easier to claim credit for the small, self-contained things; in terms of the broader issues, you have to be realistic that you are a cog in the machine. The extent to which you can influence will vary. In the Falklands, as Governor, how you play it with the Councillors or, indeed, with the Argentine press, who loved the fact that there was a Spanish-speaking Governor – not every Falkland Islander did but the Argentines did – will affect things to a greater or lesser degree. You can quietly take credit for the self-contained; you are but part of the broader picture for the larger.

**HOOPER** Congratulations to all of you on your achievements, and thank you, the questioner, for having caused them to confess their achievements.

**DANIEL REY** What does the panel think the UK can do can to mitigate the effects in Latin America of the transnational trade in narcotics?

**HOOPER** There are a few topics that we could have dealt with, and this is clearly one of them that is important. I am afraid that Central America is, again, a bit of a trafficking corridor, as is Mexico.

**PAXMAN** I would start off by confessing that I do not think we did very much when I was in Mexico, partly because Britain and British interests were not directly affected. There was a huge drugs problem in Mexico, but it was essentially a problem of transit of

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[83] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT. www.gatt.org [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

[84] 'Diageo is a global leader in beverage alcohol with an outstanding collection of brands across spirits, beer and wine categories. These brands include Johnnie Walker, Crown Royal, J&B, Buchanan's, Windsor and Bushmills whiskies, Smirnoff, Cîroc and Ketel One vodkas, Captain Morgan, Baileys, Don Julio, Tanqueray and Guinness.' www.diageo.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].

drugs from Latin America – and particularly cocaine from Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia – coming through Mexico and getting into the [United] States. There was a problem of cannabis production, which there always had been, but again moving up to the States. There was also a problem with synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine being produced in Mexico and going up to the States, but not coming to Britain. I am afraid that I have to admit what we did was to keep a very close eye on what was going on and to look for ways in which British interests might be directly affected. Compared with the resources that the Americans could throw, and were throwing, at this problem, however, we were very much bit players and we felt that our resources were better used elsewhere.

**LAMONT**

I had two very different experiences. Uruguay, of course, has taken a very different view from prevailing opinion – although not a unique view – that a different path needs to be followed. Years and years ago, I was in our United Nations Department[85] and we dealt with narcotics. A very bright desk officer engaged intellectually in this issue and prepared a paper that said, 'The UK is going to spend huge amounts of money unsuccessfully. We should change tack.' The paper got nowhere because it was not an issue that people wished to address on that basis. Credit to Uruguay that it is addressing it and saying, 'This international effort is not working, with vast amounts of money committed and criminalisation of the trade.'

In Venezuela, our problem got worse because it was increasingly a transit country and stuff was coming across from Colombia. With drugs come weapons, and they were going to Trinidad & Tobago and into the Caribbean. We had a team operating from the Embassy and any judgment from London would say they were operating effectively and had a good relationship with the Venezuelans. We got the Special Forces[86] in to help train the Venezuelans etc., but I think we were on a hiding to nothing.

**HOOPER**

I would point out that, in 1990, we held a drugs summit[87] in London which, for the first time, brought together the people on the health side – the consequences of drug addiction – and those involved in policing and preventing the movement of drugs. It is not just policy in countries that are drug producers or where drug trafficking goes on which is an issue; it is the consumer countries. That has to be the European countries and, of course, North

[85] First Secretary, UNIDO/IAEA, Vienna, 1977.
[86] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-marines/special-boat-service/special-boat-service [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015].
[87] The World Ministerial Summit to Reduce Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, London, 9-11 Apr. 1990.

America and the United States in particular. The aim of that particular conference was to get those two sides together and to get some action going, and certain things came out of it but the problem has grown and grown. Maybe it is time we had another drugs summit.

**CAPURRO** On a point of information, later this year we will have a Canning House drugs conference. We have had confirmation from ex-President Gaviria[88] that he will speak, and hopefully one or two other very senior Latin American politicians. As you know, they are driving a different agenda more along the lines of Uruguay, so keep in touch with Canning House and come along.

**HOOPER** I would like to thank everybody for being here. I would like to thank those who have raised questions and those who will come again to Canning House, I hope, if you are first-timers. I particularly wish to thank our panel; they have all been very frank and open about what they have done and aspired to do. We are most grateful to them for giving their time this afternoon. I would also like to congratulate Tom Mills for having been the mastermind behind this particular event. On the programme, we talk about Canning House, so thanks to them, as well as King's College London and Lancaster University. Thank you very much for organising this and I hope everybody will now join us for refreshments. Thanks again to the panel.

[88] César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo, President of Colombia, 1990-4.

# General economic indicators for Latin America, 2013[89]

| | Population (thousands) | GDP (million current US$) | Share in world total imports (%) | Share in world total exports (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Argentina** | 41,446 | 611,755 | 0.39 | 0.43 |
| **Bolivia** | 10,671 | 30,601 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| **Brazil** | 200,362 | 2,245,673 | 1.33 | 1.29 |
| **Chile** | 17,620 | 277,199 | 0.42 | 0.41 |
| **Colombia** | 48,321 | 378,148 | 0.31 | 0.31 |
| **Costa Rica** | 4,872 | 49,621 | 0.10 | 0.06 |
| **Cuba** | 11,266 | 68,234 | 0.08 | 0.03 |
| **Ecuador** | 15,738 | 90,023 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| **El Salvador** | 6,340 | 24.259 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| **Guatemala** | 15,468 | 53,797 | 0.09 | 0.05 |
| **Honduras** | 8,098 | 18,550 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| **Mexico** | 122,332 | 1,260,915 | 2.07 | 2.02 |
| **Nicaragua** | 6,080 | 11,256 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| **Panama** | 3,864 | 42,648 | 0.12 | 0.08 |
| **Paraguay** | 6,802 | 29,949 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| **Peru** | 30,376 | 202,296 | 0.23 | 0.22 |
| **Uruguay** | 3,407 | 55,708 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| **Venezuela** | 30,405 | 438,284 | 0.28 | 0.47 |

[89] Compiled by Thomas Mills using *WTO Trade Profiles by Country, 2014*, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/trade_profiles14_e.htm [Accessed 2 June, 2015].

# Latin American imports: market shares, 2012 (%)[90]

| | China | United States | United Kingdom | Germany | France |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Argentina** | 14.8 | 12.6 | 0.9 | 5.4 | 2.4 |
| **Bolivia** | 11.7 | 10.2 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 |
| **Brazil** | 15.0 | 14.2 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 2.7 |
| **Chile** | 18.3 | 22.8 | 1.3 | 4.5 | 2.0 |
| **Colombia** | 16.6 | 24.7 | 1.0 | 4 | 2.1 |
| **Costa Rica** | 7.8 | 51.2 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
| **Cuba** | 18.4 | 7.6 | 0.7 | 3.8 | 4.6 |
| **Ecuador** | 11.2 | 26.7 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 0.7 |
| **El Salvador** | 6.0 | 36.0 | 0.3 | 4.1 | 0.4 |
| **Guatemala** | 7.8 | 37.2 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
| **Honduras** | 8.3 | 44.2 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 0.4 |
| **Mexico** | 16.9 | 46.7 | 0.7 | 4.2 | 1.1 |
| **Nicaragua** | 9.4 | 17.0 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.5 |
| **Panama** | 35.2 | 7.3 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| **Paraguay** | 27.8 | 8.4 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 0.8 |
| **Peru** | 18.2 | 18.7 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 0.8 |
| **Uruguay** | 14.1 | 7.3 | 0.9 | 2.6 | 1.8 |
| **Venezuela** | 19.4 | 19.5 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 1.3 |

[90] Compiled by Thomas Mills from the 'The Observatory of Economic Complexity', available at: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en [Accessed 2 June 2015].

# Latin American exports: destinations, 2012 (%)[91]

| | China | United States | United Kingdom | Germany | France |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Argentina** | 6.3 | 5.4 | 1.2 | 2.6 | 0.5 |
| **Bolivia** | 2.9 | 15.8 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| **Brazil** | 16.7 | 11.1 | 1.9 | 3.9 | 1.9 |
| **Chile** | 23.1 | 12.2 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| **Colombia** | 5.3 | 35.3 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
| **Costa Rica** | 5.0 | 39.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
| **Cuba** | 30.3 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 2.6 |
| **Ecuador** | 1.7 | 40.5 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 1.2 |
| **El Salvador** | 0.2 | 46.2 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 0.2 |
| **Guatemala** | 0.4 | 43.6 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.3 |
| **Honduras** | 3.1 | 56.3 | 1.4 | 5.6 | 0.9 |
| **Mexico** | 2.0 | 70.2 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 0.5 |
| **Nicaragua** | 2.9 | 36.9 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| **Panama** | 0.9 | 4.8 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| **Paraguay** | 0.8 | 5.1 | 0.2 | 8.0 | 0.3 |
| **Peru** | 16.7 | 13.8 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 0.7 |
| **Uruguay** | 10.5 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 0.8 |
| **Venezuela** | 31.8 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.8 |

[91] Compiled by Thomas Mills from the 'The Observatory of Economic Complexity', available at: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en [Accessed 2 June 2015].