Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse：

A Cognitive-functional Account

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Abstract

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This thesis has three main objectives. The first is to propose a new theoretical framework for analyzing modality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective. The second is to explore the types, forms, values and functions of modality in English political speeches both quantitatively and qualitatively. The third is to identify and demonstrate the categories and functions of evidentiality in political discourse, and to discuss its co-occurrence and interaction with modality in the persuasion process.

Drawing on some relevant theories and concepts from Cognitive Linguistics, including Chilton's model of discourse space, image schemas of space, Langacker's epistemic model, as well as Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics, this thesis establishes an analytical framework for studying three types of modality (epistemic,

deontic and volitional modality) in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective. The framework illustrates the functions of modality in political discourse modelled in dimensions of Space, Time and Evidentiality, which interact through deontic distance / epistemic distance / volitional distance, value of modality and strength of evidence.

The framework is applied in a discourse analysis of thirty English political speeches by three politicians: Tony Blair, Barack Obama, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Analysing the data both quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrates how different speakers express stance, reflect ideologies and (de)legitimise assertions or actions with different forms, values and types of modality in political discourse. In addition, on the basis of a new classification of evidentiality with regard to its source and mode of knowing, this thesis illustrates the functions of six types of evidentials in political discourse. It is suggested that the adoption of different sources of evidentials reveals the speakers' corresponding commitments toward their stance and marks subjectivity and intersubjectivity of their stance. Some types of evidentiality reflect the speaker's ideology as they encode presuppositions about authorities, facts or shared knowledge. It is also argued that there are five patterns in the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality at the sentential level: Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a concessive relation; a conditional relation; a coordinative or progressive relation.

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Introduction

> 'Modality' is one of the 'golden oldies' among the basic notions in the semantic analysis of language.
>
> Jan Nuyts (2010:5)

In the field of philosophy, the study of modality can be traced back to the times of Aristotle, whose focus was on 'modal logic[1]'. Contemporary philosophers have also contributed a lot from the perspectives of meaning and value, focusing on topics such as 'epistemic modality' (e.g. Egan 2007; Willer 2013) and 'theories of possible worlds' (e.g. Divers 2002; Arregui 2005).

Modality has also triggered the interest of linguists since the pioneering work of Von Wright (1951) in philosophy. As far as the field of linguistics is concerned, 'modality' has been addressed from various perspectives, covering Semantics (e.g. Ehrman 1966; Palmer 1979, 1986, 2001; Perkins 1983), Typology (e.g. Narrog 2005, 2012), Pragmatics (e.g. Leech 1983; Papafragou 1998, 2000), Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (e.g. Halliday 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Sweetser 1990; Langacker 1991; Talmy 2000a; Chilton 2004; Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, 2005) and Corpus Linguistics (e.g. Stubbs 1996; Baker 2006). However, there is not much work about modality in the field of discourse analysis, particularly in Political Discourse Analysis (PDA).

It is widely accepted in the literature that 'modal items in natural language are context-dependent expressions' (Papafragou 2002:185) and their meanings often arise

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[1] 'Modal logic is the area of logic which specifically focuses on reasoning involving the concepts of necessity and possibility' (Portner 2009:10).

'through interpretation in a context of utterance' (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:1). Therefore, there is no point of studying the meaning or function of modality isolated from the context of discourse. Besides the function of expressing stance, modality also largely contributes to the establishment of speaker's commitment and authority (Kress and Hodge 1979; Fairclough 1995a, 2001), reflects the speaker's ideology and legitimises propositions (cf. Hart 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b) in political discourse, however this is not explicit in previous studies and has not been examined properly. This is also the main reason why I intend to explore modality in the context of political discourse.

Although modality has been approached widely from various perspectives in discourse studies, previous studies of modality in political discourse often focus on epistemic modality (e.g. Simon-Vandenbergen 1997; Hart 2010; van Dijk 2011) and modal verbs (e.g. Chilton 2004; McKenna and Waddell 2007; Wang 2010). As a result, other modal types (e.g. deontic modality or volitional modality) and forms (e.g. semi-modals or modal adjectives) have been relatively neglected in this area.

Purpose in political discourse is closely related to persuasion (Fotheringham 1966: xi; Adrian 2000:35), and other strategic functions such as coercion, resistance, opposition, protest, dissimulation, legitimisation and delegitimisation (see Chilton and Schäffner 1997).

However, there is little work involving modality and evidentiality in studying political speeches from the perspective of persuasion, which will be explored in this study. The functions of evidentiality and its relationship with modality have also largely been ignored in political discourse studies (but see Mushin 2001; Hart 2010, 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b).

Research questions

Against this background, this thesis will answer the following research questions, aiming to analyse modality and evidentiality in political discourse from the perspective of functions with a new systemic analytical framework:

(1) How can modality be approached from a cognitive-functional perspective?

(2) What functions does modality perform in political discourse?

(3) How do different speakers use modality in political discourse?

(4) How does evidentiality function in political discourse and how does it relate to modality?

Research scope

In this section, I will explain the position I take in this thesis so as to delimit the research scope and context.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) often involve a multiperspectival and transdisciplinary approach to text analysis by combining linguistic analysis and social or political themes (Wodak and Meyer 2009; Hart and Cap 2014). The most prevailing themes in PDA are 'Stance', 'Ideology', and 'Legitimisation', and the functions of modality in political discourse are closely related to these themes. However, the boundary among these three terms is not impermeable. As a matter of fact, they are not distinct, but rather interrelated with each other. First of all, modality is traditionally treated as one way of expressing stance in discourse (e.g. Biber and Finegan 1989). The stance taken by speakers reflects their wider worldviews (ideologies) consciously or unconsciously. They also form part of legitimations – attempts on the part of the speaker to convince the audience of something. Therefore, the relation would be that ideology and legitimisation are realised through stance in discourse, including modal stance. More precisely, the function of modality in terms of expressing stance is explicit, while the functions of modality in terms of presenting ideology and legitimising propositions are more or less implicit, and can only be inferred from one's stance in discourse. However, the role of evidentiality relating to

these themes has largely been ignored in previous studies, and therefore deserves attention in this thesis.

On the one hand, I will engage in a detailed analysis of modal and evidential meanings from a linguistic perspective; on the other hand, I will also explore the modal and evidential functions from a political perspective, involving ideology, stance, and legitimisation.

Therefore, this study will address political discourse from both perspectives: the linguistic perspective and the political (social) perspective, thereby avoiding the problems of discussing social (political) issues without linguistic evidence or studying linguistic meanings without relating to social context (van Dijk 2001:363).

Traditionally, political discourse analysis and other types of discourse analysis adopt qualitative research rather than quantitative research. There are several merits of qualitative research in discourse analysis. First, there are fewer restrictions for the forms or amount of data in terms of qualitative research. Second, qualitative research enables us to study the context of the data, which is essential for discourse analysis. Third, qualitative research allows us to study a great variety of data in terms of disparities.

However, qualitative research necessarily deals with a smaller amount of data compared with quantitative research, thus facing the problem of generalizing the findings (Brannen 1992). Similarly, quantitative research also has its advantages and disadvantages. It can surely benefit a lot from its larger amount of data, which allows us to generalize our findings more convincingly (Hammersley 1992). Besides, it is possible for us to deal with the data efficiently and systematically in quantitative research. Nevertheless, it also has its own weaknesses, such as the neglect of context and in-depth analysis.

In order to combine the strengths of each approach, I shall adopt a mixed approach to conduct my research, with quantitative research facilitating qualitative research (see e.g. Bryman 1988, 2004; Brannen 1992, 2005; Koller and Mautner 2004; Hardman 2008). Here quantitative research refers to the corpus linguistic approach I adopt in this study. A corpus linguistic approach will serve as a useful tool to analyze and compare the choices of modality and evidentiality among three politicians, which can provide empirical evidence for this study (see Section 2.4.1 for details).

Above, I explained the specific perspectives I take to set the stage for this thesis. On the one hand, I will study modality in political discourse both from a linguistic perspective and a political perspective. On the other hand, this study will adopt a research approach combining qualitative research and quantitative research.

Thesis structure

The thesis is organized into seven chapters, excluding the introduction and concluding remarks. Chapter One presents a literature review on modality and evidentiality in PDA. The chapter starts with a general introduction to two concepts (modality and evidentiality), highlighting semantic (typological) versus more pragmatic perspectives. It also discusses the relation between modality and evidentiality. It then defines political discourse before discussing political speeches as a genre with reference to its purpose and main features. After that, it reviews the literature on modality and evidentiality in political discourse by focusing on their relations with stance, ideology, and legitimisation. It then introduces the frameworks for studying modality and evidentiality in political discourse, including Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) & Appraisal Theory, and Cognitive Linguistics. Finally, it critiques previous studies and proposes the way forward for the study of modality in this thesis, laying a solid foundation for the thesis.

Chapter Two answers the first research question: how modality can be approached from a cognitive-functional perspective. First of all, drawing on theories or concepts

from Cognitive Linguistics and SFL, I propose a cognitive-functional framework for studying the functions of three modal types in political discourse from the dimensions of space, time and evidentiality. I also elaborate the key concepts in the framework, such as epistemic / deontic / volitional distance, value of modality and strength of evidence. In particular, I discuss the functions of modality in political discourse with regards to stance-taking, ideology, and legitimisation. Second, I introduce the research data for this thesis concerning the criteria of collecting data and their backgrounds. Lastly, I illustrate the method of data analysis for this thesis from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. From the perspective of quantitative analysis, I demonstrate how to identify, annotate and analyze modality and evidentiality by adopting a corpus linguistic approach. In particular, this part defines and classifies modality and evidentiality by taking a data-driven approach. Modality is classified into four main categories: Epistemic Modality, Deontic Modality, Volitional Modality and Dynamic Modality. Evidentiality is classified into six categories based on source of information and mode of knowing. From the perspective of qualitative analysis, I explain the procedures of exploring the functions of modality and evidentiality within the research framework.

Chapters Three to Five are the answers to the second and third research questions: what functions modality performs in political discourse and how different speakers use modality in political discourse. Each chapter focuses on one type of modality respectively, namely epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality. All three chapters take both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. The quantitative sections deal with the comparison of three political speakers in the use of different modal markers from the perspectives of forms, values and top-ten modal markers, followed by discussions and implications of the results. On the other hand, the qualitative sections involve the functions of specific type of modality in terms of stance, ideology and (de)legitimisation by applying the research framework proposed in Chapter Two, illustrated by a number of annotated examples from the three cases in different forms according to three levels of modal value (high, intermediate, and low).

Although these three chapters share similar structures and approaches, their results are distinctive from various perspectives. First, with regard to quantitative analysis, three political speakers present quite different patterns in adopting different types of modality in terms of forms, values and modal markers. Second, three types of modality express three different kinds of stance, including knowledge-based stance, value-based stance, and emotion-based stance. Last but not least, the modal markers in terms of three different values (distance) are certainly of different forms and functions in the context. Despite the differences mentioned above, these three chapters also demonstrate some common features for three types of modality both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Chapters Six and Seven are the answers to the last research question: how evidentiality functions in political discourse and how it relates to modality. Chapter Six starts with the quantitative analysis of evidentiality with regards to its forms, types and top-ten markers among the three cases, followed by discussions and implications of its results. After that, it discusses the functions of evidentiality in political discourse with regard to making commitments, marking (inter)subjectivity and encoding ideology. Lastly, I demonstrate the functions of six types of evidential markers in the context of political discourse. Chapter Seven discusses the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality in political discourse quantitatively and qualitatively, focusing on their relations during the process of persuasion. The chapter first investigates the distributions and comparisons of the co-occurrence of different types of modals and evidentials among the three cases. It then examines the examples of the co-occurrence between modality and evidentiality in the context from various perspectives and discusses their interaction patterns at both sentential and discourse levels.

In short, this thesis proposes a cognitive-functional analytical framework for exploring the functions of modality and evidentiality in English political discourse, from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.

Chapter One: Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will review the literature on modality and evidentiality in PDA. I will first review previous studies about modality and evidentiality in terms of definition, typology, and perspectives in both semantics and pragmatics. Then I will discuss the relationship between modality and evidentiality in previous literature. After that, I will review the literature about modality and evidentiality in political discourse by discussing the definition of political discourse, political speeches as a genre, as well as the role of modality and evidentiality in political discourse. In particular, I will discuss some important frameworks for studying modality and evidentiality in political discourse from the perspectives of SFL & Appraisal Theory and Cognitive Linguistics. Finally, I will critique the issues concerning modality in previous studies and propose possible solutions to them.

1.2 What are Modality and Evidentiality?

Modality and evidentiality are two interrelated concepts which have attracted much attention in previous linguistic studies, particularly for the relations between them. In what follows, I will first provide an overview of these two concepts, followed by a discussion of the relations between modality and evidentiality.

The notion of modality in semantics is not as easily defined as tense or aspect (Bybee et.al. 1994:176), but has been given many diverging definitions. It can be defined in different ways either in a narrow sense or in a broad sense. According to Narrog, there are three main different ways of defining modality in linguistic studies (for details, see Narrog 2005):

> (1) modality as the expression of the attitude of the speaker, or the expression of subjectivity and the speaker's opinions and emotions (e.g. Lyons 1968, 1977; Palmer 1986; Bybee et al. 1994; Nitta 1989, 2000 for Japanese), (2) modality as something including all linguistic expression outside the proposition (e.g. Fillmore 1968; Gerstenkorn 1976), and (3) modality as the expression of realis vs. irrealis or factuality distinctions (e.g. Givón 1995; Palmer 1998, 2001; Dietrich 1992 for German; Narrog 2002; Nomura 2003 for Japanese).   (Narrog 2005:168)

The first way of defining modality is the most popular and practical one for its briefness, though modality has more functions than expressing one's attitude or emotions, especially in political discourse. The second one is too broad to be useful in practice, for one can hardly draw a line between modality and proposition. I agree with the opinion that the third one seems more plausible in demarcating the category of modality (Narrog 2005:182), but it is rather narrow in its meaning for two reasons. On the one hand, this approach excludes the role of the speaker in choosing the expressions of modality. For example, Halliday observes that modality often involves the speaker's evaluation of the probabilities or the obligations of his proposition (1985:75). On the other hand, modality is not only about factuality and non-factuality, but it is also concerned with the concepts of 'probability, necessity, possibility and the related notions of permission, obligation and volition' (see Hoye 1997:149-150; Barbiers 2002:1).

Political discourse analysts often associate modality with power, authority, attitude and commitment, thereby defining modality differently from those in semantic studies. Fairclough, for example, holds the view that modality expresses the degree of

commitment or obligation of the speaker / the writer (1995a:162). Kress and Hodge (1979:122), on the other hand, argue that modality often reflects the level of authority with regard to an utterance. Similar to Kress and Hodge's opinion, Fairclough (2001:105) also associates modality with speaker or writer authority, which encodes 'relational and expressive values in grammar'. These definitions of modality in PDA focus on its pragmatic functions rather than its semantic meaning, when in fact the two complement each other. It would therefore be better if we can take both semantic meanings and pragmatic functions into consideration when defining modality.

The typology of modality has also been the subject of diverse investigations in semantic studies (see e.g. von Wright 1951; Palmer 1979, 1986, 2001; Perkins 1983; Halliday 1994, 2004; Portner 2009; Nuyts 2010; Narrog 2012). There is a variety of approaches concerning the classification of modality. An important traditional way of classifying varieties of modality is into the categories of epistemic and deontic (cf. Portner 2009:2). Epistemic modality is concerned with knowledge, while deontic modality involves moral evaluations concerning right and wrong based on certain rules (Portner 2009:2). For example, '*must*' is epistemic in the example "Tom *must* be in his office", while it is deontic in the example "Tom *must* pay his bills". However, this classification excludes some modal meanings, such as volitions, intentions and capabilities.

Another traditional version is that modality comprises three basic semantic dimensions: dynamic, deontic and epistemic (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 52; Nuyts 2005:2). Dynamic modality, sometimes also called facultative modality or inherent modality, is traditionally featured as 'an ascription of a capacity to the subject-participant of the clause' (Nuyts 2005:7), such as '*can*' in "The boy *can* swim like a fish." or '*be able to*' in "She *is able to* speak four languages". Deontic modality is traditionally defined with the concepts of permission and obligation (see Palmer 1986: 96-7), such as '*should*' in "We *should* exercise more in order to keep fit", or '*may*' in "You *may* leave now". Epistemic modality typically expresses 'the degree of

probability of the state of affairs' (Nuyts 2005:10), as indicated by '*will*' in "Someone is knocking at the door. That *will* be John." or the modal adverb '*maybe*' in "This manuscript is damned hard to read. *Maybe* some more light can help."

However, the modal meanings such as intention and willingness (alternatively often referred to as dynamic modality) (cf. Papafragou 2002:186), are actually not compatible with the category of dynamic modality, because they often express the emotions (such as intentions or determination) of the subjects rather than their capabilities or abilities.

The third prevailing version is the distinction between root and epistemic modality (Papafragou 2002). Root modality is often treated as a cover term for deontic and dynamic modality (see Hofmann 1976; Coates 1983; Papafragou 2002).

Indeed, there are several other prevailing classifications of modality in the field of semantics (e.g. Palmer 2001; Halliday 1985, 2004; Portner 2009; Nuyts 2010; Narrog 2012), as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Classifications of modality in the field of semantics

Classification of modality / References	Categories & Sub-categories of modality			
1. von Wright's mode (1951:1-2)	alethic	epistemic	deontic	existential
2. Traditional mode (cf. Papafragou 2002:186)	epistemic		root	
3. Traditional mode (cf. Nuyts 2005:2)	epistemic		deontic	dynamic
4. Traditional mode (cf. Portner 2009:2)	epistemic		deontic	
5. Palmer's mode (2001:24, 70)	Propositional Modality		Event Modality	
	epistemic	evidential	deontic	dynamic
6. Halliday's mode (2004:147)	Modalization		Modulation	
	probability	usuality	obligation	inclination
7. Portner's mode (2009:2-3)	Sentential Modality		Sub -sentential Modality	Discourse modality
	epistemic / priority / dynamic			
8. Gabrielatos (2010)	Likelihood	Desirability (directed)	Desirability（non-directed）	Propensity
9. Narrog's mode (2012)	Volitional		Non-volitional	
	Speech act- oriented		Event- oriented	

For example, von Wright, a pioneer in his work on modal logic (1951:1-2), proposes four modes of modality: the alethic modes or modes of truth; the epistemic modes or modes of knowing; the deontic modes or modes of obligation; the existential modes or modes of existence. According to von Wright, 'the study of modality is relevant to the study of logical proof and hence also to the foundations of mathematics' (1951:7). In

his mind, these modes of modalities are all related to truth-concepts.

Although von Wright's (1951) approach of modality is more suitable for philosophers and logicians, the terms he proposed such as 'epistemic' and 'deontic' are widely used by linguists (Palmer 2001:8). Following von Wright, previous studies in linguistics often take one of the three traditional modes of classifying modality for practical purposes, as shown in Table 1.1 (No.2-4). However, these three classifications are unfortunate because they either group totally different modal meanings in the same category such as 'root' or 'dynamic' modality, or miss some essential meanings such as in the classification of 'epistemic' and 'deontic' modality (cf. Papafragou 2002:186; Nuyts 2005:2; Portner 2009:2).

Palmer proposes to 'take into account both form and meaning' in dealing with modality, as he realizes the value of both 'semantic basis' to modality and its 'formal features' in his later work (Palmer 1979:2). However, in his early works, his main emphasis was 'on the detailed and systematic subdivisions of modal auxiliary verbs based on formal criteria' (Badran 2002:81).

In his latest account of modality (Palmer 2001), however, Palmer adopts semantic criteria in classifying modality into 'propositional modality' and 'event modality'. According to this classification (shown in Table 1.1), epistemic modality and evidential modality are two main types of propositional modality, which both are concerned with 'the speaker's attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition' (Palmer 2001:24). Palmer claims that epistemic modality and evidential modality are different in the way they influence 'the factual status of the proposition': the former makes judgments about it, whereas the latter provides the evidence for it (2001:24). Deontic modality and dynamic modality are the two main types of 'event modality', which both refer to 'events that are not actualized, events that have not taken place but are merely potential' (Palmer 2001:70). According to Palmer, the basic distinction between deontic modality and dynamic modality is 'the status of the

conditioning factors' to the person indicated as the subject. In terms of deontic modality, they are external when the person is permitted, ordered, etc., to act, while with dynamic modality, they are internal when the person is able, willing, etc., to act (2001:70).

Compared with his former approaches (Palmer 1979, 1986), this classification of modality (Palmer 2001) is more inclusive and useful in practice. His discussion of the interactions between modality and mood, tense, negation shows useful insights for the study of modality. However, epistemic modality, a sub-category of propositional modality in Palmer's classification, can also refer to events that are not actualized or potential (the same as event modality proposed by Palmer). Furthermore, Palmer treats evidentials as evidential modality under the category of propositional modality, which is quite controversial in this field (see the discussion of the relations of modality and evidentiality in this section).

Halliday (1994) classifies modality into two main categories: modalization in propositions (including probability and usuality) and modulation in proposals (including obligation and inclination), as shown in Table 1.1. As his theory of modality will be part of my research framework, I will deal with it in great detail in section 1.4.1.

Portner (2009:1) classifies modality into three types in a broad sense: sentential modality, sub-sentential modality and discourse modality, as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. For Portner (2009:2-3), sentential modality is 'the expression of modal meaning at the level of the whole sentence', and sub-sentential modality is any modal expressions within constituents smaller than a full clause, for example within the predicate (e.g., by verbs) or modifying a noun phrase (e.g., by adjectives), while discourse modality refers to the modal meanings beyond sentential truth conditions.

Table 1.2 Portner's categories of modality

Main Categories of Modality	Sub-categories of modality
Sentential Modality	Modal auxiliaries; Modal verbs; Modal adverbs; Generics, Habituals, and Individual-level predicates; Tense and aspect; Conditionals; Covert modality
Sub-sentential Modality	Modal adjectives and nouns; Propositional attitude verbs and adjectives; Verbal mood, in particular the indicative and subjunctive; Infinitives; Dependent modals; Negative polarity items
Discourse Modality	Evidentiality; Clause types; Performativity of sentential modals; Modality in discourse semantics

Although Portner proposes a super-category of modality, illustrated in Table 1.2, he only discusses the three primary semantic categories of sentential modality: epistemic, priority[2] (include the deontic, bouletic, and teleological modals), and dynamic (include volitional and quantificational modals), which he refers to as 'theories of sentential modality' (for details, see Portner 2009).

Portner's approach to modality is rather inclusive and it provides some useful implications for the classification of modality in this research, especially the concept of volitional modality. However, his theories of sentential modality are still not clear as to the relations between different modal expressions in sentential modality and their semantic meanings. He seems to be more interested in explaining his semantic theories of modality from the perspective of modal logic than from a common linguistic perspective (see Portner 2009).

Gabrielatos (2010) classifies modality into three categories: (1) Likelihood (What I

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[2] For Portner, the idea behind the term 'priority' is that 'such things as rules, desires, and goals all serve to identify some possibility as better than, or as having higher priority than, others. Priority modals have a circumstantial modal base and fairly easy-to-perceive ordering sources which provide the priority ranking' (2009:135).

think the state of affairs is/was/will be); (2) Desirability (What I want the state of affairs to be/have been); (3) Propensity (What inherent properties I see in entities/situations). The category of Likelihood is similar to epistemic modality, which includes the modal meanings such as actuality, factuality, truth, knowledge, belief, possibility and probability. The category of Desirability subsumes directed modal meanings (obligation, permission, promise) and non-directed modal meanings (volition, intention, willingness, desire, need, hope, wish). The category of Propensity includes the modal meanings such as ability, capability, potentiality, aptitude, and feasibility. Overall Gabrielatos' classification would be appropriate if it did not put deontic modal meanings (obligation, permission) under the category of Desirability. That is because deontic modality often indicates the modal judgements based on external values such as obligations or responsibilities, which is totally different from Desirability (often related to the speaker's / the subject's emotions).

Taking a cross-linguistic perspective, Narrog (2012) proposes a two-dimensional classification: (1) Volitive Modality and Non-volitive Modality; (2) Speech act-oriented Modality and Event- oriented Modality. He also classifies modality into nine categories: Epistemic Modality; Deontic Modality; Teleological Modality; Preferential Modality; Boulomaic Modality; Participant-internal Modality; Circumstantial Modality; Existential Modality; Evidential Modality (Narrog 2012:8). Narrog's classification provides much evidence for this research, particularly for the concepts of volitive modality and speech act-oriented modality. However, the criteria of his classification of nine categories of modality are a mixture, integrating semantic categories (such as epistemic modality and deontic modality) with functional categories (such as Teleological Modality and Circumstantial Modality, Evidential Modality). When examining the examples of these categories, one will find some overlapping meanings among them. For instance, the modal '*can*' in the example 'If you take the short cut through the valley, you *can* be there at least ten minutes earlier.' for 'Teleological Modality' is similar to 'Epistemic Modality' and the example for 'Preferential Modality' as in '(In order to stay in shape) You *should* exercise at least

20 minutes a day.' can also be interpreted as 'Deontic Modality' (see Narrog 2012:8-10).

In sum, there has been no consensus as to the classification of modality in semantic studies. However, previous studies show that the categories like epistemic modality and deontic modality are non-controversial, while the notions such as root modality, dynamic modality, and evidential modality are still under debate.

In terms of typology, most researchers in PDA often adopt the traditional modes, as shown in Table 1.1. For example, one of the traditional modes - there are two main aspects of modality: 'one is to do with truth' (viz. epistemic modality) 'the other with obligation' (viz. deontic modality) (Portner 2009:2) is very popular in political discourse (e.g. Fairclough 1995a, 2003; Chilton 2004). However, this classification neglects many modal meanings other than 'truth' and 'obligation', such as 'willingness' or 'capability', which also play important roles in political discourse in terms of persuasion.

Fairclough (2001), however, also classifies modality into relational modality and expressive modality, depending on 'what direction authority is oriented in'. Relational modality here refers to the authority of one participant in relation to others, and expressive modality refers to the speaker or writer's authority with respect to the truth or probability of a representation of reality (Fairclough 2001:105). Fairclough's classification of modality would be more reasonable if modality were only related to authority in political discourse. But he is right in this view that modality is not restricted to its interpersonal meaning but is also concerned with the representation of reality.

Fowler (1991), on the other hand, distinguishes four types of modality from the perspective of making comments, which are to do with (a) truth, (b) obligation, (c) permission, and (d) desirability. Though Fowler's classification is more inclusive and

useful in discourse analysis, it also neglects some modal meanings such as capability and intentionality.

Aiming to group the similar modal meanings into proper categories in political discourse and investigate their functions more thoroughly, modality in this study is classified into four types: Deontic Modality, Epistemic modality, Dynamic Modality and Volitional Modality. The redefining and reclassifying of modality will be discussed in detail in Section 2.4.1.

Like Modality, evidentiality has also been studied widely both in semantics (e.g.De Haan 1999; Palmer 2001; DeLancey 2001; Aikhenvald 2004; Boye & Harder 2009) and discourse studies (e.g. Mushin 2001, 2013; Bednarek 2006a; Hart 2010, 2011; Mar ń-Arrese 2006, 2011a, 2011b) since Boas (1938) first introduces this term to linguistics. It is usually defined in terms of 'sources of information' (e.g. Jakobson 1957; Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; Nuyts 2010). It can also be defined as a functional-conceptual domain indicating the author's cognitive and/or communicative justification for a judgement (Boye and Harder 2009). Based on corpus analysis, Stubbs claims that evidentiality reflects the way how the speakers encode evidence for justifying a factual claim (1996:200). Portner notes that evidentiality involves 'the speaker's assessment' of the evidence which supports her assertion (2009:263). Hart suggests that '[E]videntiality marks the basis of the speaker's knowledge concerning the state of affairs reported in the assertion' and 'evidentials indicate how the speaker has come to know what they are claiming' (2011:758). In this sense, evidentiality can be a useful tool for the investigation of speaker's cognitive/conceptualization process of communication, such as persuasion or manipulation (Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014).

All the above definitions define evidentiality in terms of its sources or functions. It is, however, also necessary to consider evidentiality under the lens of quality or validity, which is more important in political discourse studies. I will therefore redefine

evidentiality in the next chapter (see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two), taking both source and quality (strength) of evidence into account.

Evidentiality has also been the subject of typological research (Hart 2011:758), which has been conducted comprehensively and diversely both in semantics and discourse studies.

Traditionally, evidentiality is differentiated between 'direct evidence' and 'indirect evidence' (Willett 1988:57; also see Palmer 2001:56). Based on Willett's proposal, Hart makes some adaption to it, as shown in Figure 1.1 (reproduced from Figure 2 in Hart 2011:758).

Figure 1.1 The semantic domain of evidentiality

Similarly, Whitt holds the view that perception is the most direct evidence since it can be attested from the speaker's first-hand experience (2010:8). Visual and auditory perceptions are often regarded as the most salient direct evidence, while other perceptions such as touch, taste, and smell are used much less as evidence (Palmer 2001:43). Hearsay, on the other hand, can be seen as the most typical form of indirect evidence (Whitt 2010:9).

Base on the distinction of 'direct' and 'indirect' evidence, Plungian (2001:352) makes a distinction between direct evidence, reflected evidence and mediated evidence according to the parameter 'forms of access to the information'.

Chafe (1986:263), who takes a broader view of evidentiality, categories evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing from three aspects: source of knowledge; mode of knowing; knowledge matched against verbal resources or expectations. Although Chafe's work gives us many inspirations due to its inclusiveness (includes a great variety of evidential markers), its classification of English evidentiality is not satisfactory for several reasons. The major problem is the confusion of its subcategories. In particular, the categories of 'source of knowledge' and 'mode of knowing' are overlapping in this framework. For example, both 'belief' and 'hearsay' (in the category of mode of knowing in Chafe's work) also indicate the evidence coming from indirect sources, as shown in Figure 1.1. On the other hand, the expressions in the category of 'knowledge matched against verbal resources or expectations' can also be treated as indirect sources of knowledge as it often indicates the evidence inferred from unspecific sources (e.g. 'in fact' implies that there is evidence from common knowledge to support the following information as a fact.). Another main problem is that Chafe's model of evidentiality is 'purely knowledge based and does not take into account the multitude of rhetorical reasons people have for making use of this semantic area' (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007:28).

Grammatical evidentiality and lexical evidentiality have also been distinguished and discussed in previous studies (see Lazard 2001; Aikhenvald 2003; Squartini 2008). For example, some languages have a system of grammatical evidentiality to mark the information source such as Tariana, an Arawak language spoken in the multilingual area of the Vaupés in northwest Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004:1). Aikhenvald (2007:211) summarises the recurrent terms of semantic parameters employed in the languages with grammatical evidentiality:

 I. VISUAL covers evidence acquired through seeing.

II. SENSORY covers evidence through hearing, and is typically extended to smell and taste, and sometimes also touch.

III. INFERENCE based on visible or tangible evidence or result.

IV. ASSUMPTION based on evidence other than visible results: this may include logical reasoning, assumption or simply general knowledge.

VI. REPORTED, for reported information with no reference to who it was reported by.

VII. QUOTATIVE, for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted source.

Aikhenvald (2003: 2, 18–20) also proposes the term 'evidentiality strategies' to cover 'a range of meanings characteristic of reported and non-firsthand evidentials: they combine reference to inference and to verbal report' (Aikhenvald 2007: 213). The term of 'evidentiality strategies' is useful in describing those extended evidential meanings which are outside the traditional domain of evidentials (Squartini 2008: 917), even though Aikhenvald uses it to refer to extended grammatical evidentiality such as perfects, resultatives, passives, nominalizations and reported speech (ibid.).

In discourse studies, evidentiality is often categorised by its functions or reliability. For example, from the perspective of epistemological positioning, Bednarek (2006a) identifies four specified bases of knowledge used as evidence in British newspaper reportage: PERCEPTION, PROOF, OBVIOUSNESS and PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. However, 'there is clear semantic overlap between the categories 'perception', 'proof' and 'obviousness', which all invoke forms of experiential access to the evidence' (Marń-Arrese 2011b:792) .

Marń-Arrese (2011b) classifies evidentials into personal evidentiality and mediated evidentiality, evaluating their validity or reliability in terms of epistemic stance. Within the domain of personal evidentiality, Marń-Arrese (2011b:792) helds that validity involves a set of variables:

i) whether the form of access to the information is portrayed as direct (I saw P) or indirect (It seems P);

ii) whether the mode of access to the evidence invokes experiential (I saw P), cognitive (I know P) or communicative events (I say to you P); to this must be added the gradability value of the expression within each mode of access (Clearly > Apparently) (Know > Believe), (Categorically state > Would suggest);

iii) whether the evidential expression indexes subjective (I think P) or intersubjective (We all know P) positioning, and the extent to which the conceptualizer is explicitly invoked (I assume P, We infer P) or implicitly evoked (may P, It seems P, obviously P).

Her distinction of personal evidentiality and mediated evidentiality as well as the variables of assigning validity are quite convincing, though she treats evidentiality as part of epistemic stance which is different from my point of view in this thesis.

Drawing on Chafe's work (1986), Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza (2014:392) adapt the categories of English evidentiality and study their pragmatic functions in political debates during US campaigns, as illustrated in Table 1.3 (reproduced from Table 2 in Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014:392). Their work is inspiring for this study due to the fact that they treat evidentials as a tool of manipulation in political discourse. However, their framework of English evidentiality is not consistent and systematic (the reasons are similar to the classification of Chafe 1986, refer to p. 20).

Table 1.3 Lexical indices of evidential markers in English

Table 2: Lexical indices of evidential markers in English (adapted from Chafe, 1986)

Reliability	(B) certainly, undoubtedly, surely, by definition, exactly, invariably, literally, particularly, specifically (N) basically, essentially, generally, primarily (A) maybe, probably, might, may, possibly, perhaps, in some sense, normally, virtually
Modes of knowing: Belief, Induction, Hearsay, Deduction	
– Markers of belief	– I think, I believe, I guess, I suppose
– Markers of induction	– (B) must, obvious; (A) seem
– Markers of hearsay	– (B) people say, they say, I've been told, X told me, X said; (A) is supposed to, apparently
– Markers of deduction	– (B) should; (N) can, could, would
Source of knowledge: Markers of sensory evidence	(B) see, hear; (A) feel, looks like, sounds like, feels like
Matching knowledge against verbal resources	(A) kind of, about
Matching knowledge against expectations	(B) of course, in fact, actually, at least, even, only, but, however, nevertheless

(B) = boost; (A) = attenuate; (N) = neutral or requires more linguistic context

The most insightful example is from Hart's work (2011), who classifies evidentiality in terms of reliability and the degree of subjectivity, as shown in Figure 1.2 (cited from Hart 2011:760). However, he treats epistemic modals as part of evidentiality, which is different from the position I take in this thesis.

Most reliable

Objective

PERCEPTION
PROOF
OBVIOUSNESS
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE   Intersubjective
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE
EPISTEMIC COMMITMENT

Subjective

Least reliable

Figure 1.2 The reliability of evidence and degree of subjectivity

In sum, the classification of evidentiality in the previous studies often involves source of evidence (knowledge) (e.g. Frawley 1992: 413), or mode of knowing (e.g. Willett

1988), or its validity (e.g. Mar ṅ-Arrese 2011b), but their interplay has been relatively neglected in most classifications (Botne 1997: 523-524; also see Squartini 2008: 918). It is therefore necessary to make a distinction between the source of evidence and the mode of knowing so as to account for the system of lexical evidentiality (Squartini 2008: 917). It would contribute to a better understanding of the domain if we integrate both the source of evidence and mode of knowing as well as the validity of knowledge into the classification of evidentiality.

This study will take a relative broad view of evidentiality, which is not only concerned with 'evidence for making factual claims' (Anderson 1986:273), but also involves truth, certainty, doubt, reliability, authority, confidence, personal experience, validity, inference, reporting factual and imaginative stance, confirmation, surprise, and expectedness (Bednarek 2006a:637; also see Chafe and Nichols1986; Stubbs 1996; Mushin 2001). Based on important previous studies (Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; Plungian 2001; Bednarek 2006a; Hart 2011; Mar ṅ-Arrese 2011b, 2013), I will reclassify evidentiality according to its source and modes of knowing in Chapter Two (see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two).

One of the various issues remaining unresolved about modality is its relationship to evidentiality, particularly for the criteria of distinguishing modal and evidential meanings (Mar ṅ-Arrese 2011b:790).

There are mainly four different views towards this relationship. One view is that evidentiality is a sub-category of modality or epistemic modality. For example, Palmer places evidential modality and epistemic modality under propositional modality (2001:8). McCready and Ogata, also, argues that evidentials are best analysed as 'a special kind of epistemic modal' by showing 'some expressions indicating source of evidence are part of propositional content' (2007:147).

By contrast, Chafe (1986:264-6) includes words that indicate the 'degree of liability'

of a proposition in his discussion of evidentiality in English academic discourse.

However, some researchers also note the meanings in modality and evidentiality are often overlapping as they are inherently connected (Whitt 2010; also see Anderson 1986). This is especially the case regarding inferentials (Whitt 2010:13). Anderson (1986: 308-11), for another example, shows that these two domains 'are connected in the mental domain', and often share 'common historical sources'.

While the more widespread view is that evidentiality is distinct from epistemic modality and ought to be considered a (grammatical) category in its own right, and not a mere subcategory of some type of modality (Aikhenvald 2004:7-8). The point of evidentiality, Aikhenvald claims, is not to indicate some sort of 'morality' (deontic modality) or 'truth' (epistemic modality), but rather 'accuracy', i.e. to indicate the source of information one has for asserting a proposition (2004:344). Similarly, De Haan argues that epistemic modality evaluates the speaker's confidence on the evidence which is in support of his utterance (1999:85).

Nuyts holds a similar view, i.e. evidential expressions and modal expressions are basically independent from each other when involved in the same constructions and in most cases modality is expressed 'without indication of evidentiality' (1992:83-4). Nuyts also argues that evidentiality is at a higher level than modality (1992:91). In line with this position, Hart (2010:172) points out:

> the distinction between them can be captured where epistemic modality expresses an evaluation pertaining to the truth or probability of a proposition and evidentiality concerns the basis upon which that evaluation is made.

I agree with the last point of view that modality and evidentiality differ in essence, because the former is concerned with the speaker's/writer's evaluation towards a proposition, while the latter emphasizes the source and quality of the evidence. However, they share the common ground that both of them deal with attitudinal

evidence, contributing to truth conditions. They are like two sides of the same coin as they are distinct yet closely interrelated in semantic meanings and pragmatic functions. In this research, evidentiality is treated as a distinct notion, but it works together with modality, serving as an indispensable part in (de)legitimizing political actions or proposals.

Besides, the interaction between evidentiality and modality has also been discussed a lot from the perspective of subjectivity, intersubjectivity or objectivity. In this study, drawing on previous studies (e.g. Nuyts 1992, 2001b; Mar ń-Arrese 2011a; Hart 2011), the source and strength of evidentiality will serve as important criteria in evaluating the subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and objectivity of modality (See Section 6.3.1.2 for details).

In sum, there are still several unsolved issues in the field of modality and evidentiality. Firstly, the previous classifications for modality and evidentiality are not satisfactory enough so as to be accepted unanimously. Secondly, the relations between modality and evidentiality still remain unclear, especially when it comes to their co-occurrences or interactions in the context. Thirdly, the criteria for differentiating the subjectivity, intersubjectivity or objectivity of modality are still under debate. To figure out these problems becomes one of the main tasks of this thesis.

1.3 Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse

1.3.1 What is Political Discourse?

Aristotle's (1991) famous definition - 'Man is by nature a political animal' provides evidence that the study of politics has a long tradition. But since then, the question of "what is political language (discourse)?" has remained a problem.

There are mainly three different views towards this issue. The first and most common

view is that political discourse is discourse produced by politicians (van Dijk 1997a:12). For example, Wilson (1990), who takes a linguistic pragmatics view, claims that the terms 'political discourse' or 'political language' should be narrowed down to (what politicians actually say). He also criticizes Geis (1987) for studying political journalism only, because 'what politicians say and what journalists say they say is not the same thing' (Wilson 1990:16). This is true because political journalism is more or less embedded in the stance of journalists, since they look at the same political event or politician from diverse perspectives. It is therefore seen as commentary and secondary.

Political discourse can also be defined as 'purposeful communication about politics' (Gee 1999:27). Like Graber (1981) and McNair (1995), Gee argues that political discourse should not be restricted to 'verbal or written statements' (ibid.). From his point of view, all the elements in political communication may involve the construction of 'a political image or identity' (ibid.).

Another crucial view is that what counts as political discourse is mainly decided by its political contexts and purposes. Chilton and Schäffner (2002:4), for example, believe that 'politics varies according to one's situation and purposes – a political answer in itself.' Similarly, van Dijk (1997a:12) proposes that the definition of political discourse is actually decided by context.

From the above debates, we can see that the definition of political discourse is quite controversial and it is hard to reach a consensus. However, when taking political participants, context, and purpose into account, we find that speeches of politicians are clear examples of political discourse, which is the main reason why I choose this genre as my research data in this thesis.

After delimiting the scope of political discourse for this research, I will move on to discuss political speeches as a genre.

In a discourse activity, the notion of genre often involves its social purpose and context (Eggins and Martin 1997:236; Marń-Arrese 2011a:198). For example, according to Martin and Rose (2003:7), genre refers to 'different types of texts that enact various types of social contexts', making it 'a staged, goal-oriented social process'. From a functional linguistic perspective, Martin and Rose (2008) argue that genre is realized by configurations of register, which is realized by configurations of meaning in language. According to Martin and Rose, register refers to the context of situation of a text, which consists of the tenor, field and mode of a situation (2008:11).

Similarly, Biber and Conrad (2009:253) claim that 'studying registers and genres' is an attempt to 'explain the patterns of linguistic variation' from the perspective of 'the situational context and communicative purpose'. In this sense, when treated as a genre, political speeches have their unique political purposes and patterns of linguistic variation in political contexts.

Indeed, as discussed in the chapter of Introduction, the main purpose of political speeches is persuasion (Chilton and Schäffner 1997). For example, drawing on Swales' (1990) genre theory, Liu (2012) analyses the genre of the American Presidential Inaugural Speech. She identifies three main purposes for political speaking: 'to convince people to take action as the speaker expects, to change radically their attitudes or beliefs or to weaken their current attitudes or beliefs' (Liu 2012:2408). Therefore, the main characteristics of the genre of political speeches can be dealt with from these three respects.

In this vein, reasoning is one of the main genre features of political speeches. It is often realized in the process of argumentation as argumentation is the way to use language 'to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views' (van Eemeren et al. 1997:208). For example, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012:17) propose that political discourse can be featured as 'practical argumentation'.

However, van Dijk is more inclined to equate argumentation with manipulation rather than persuasion (2006). He adopts argumentation as one of the strategies of critical epistemic analysis, which is concerned with modality and evidentiality (van Dijk 2011). From van Dijk's studies, we can get the hint that it is also possible to investigate how politicians manipulate their audience through their specific choices of modals and evidentials in political discourse (Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014; also see Oswald 2011).

The second main genre feature of political speeches is expressing stance, which is employed to persuade the audience through the speaker's stance involving expertise, knowledge, command and authority (Reyes 2014:543). This is therefore concerned with the study of linguistic patterns of variation in stance-taking in political speeches including modality. It is generally accepted that epistemic modality expresses epistemic stance based on the speaker's expertise or knowledge (Dunmire 2005; van Dijk 2011, 2014), and deontic modality encodes stance involving the speaker's moral values and authority (Chilton 2004). For example, following the five categories of modality (including validity, predictability, desirability, obligation, and permission) proposed by Fowler (1985), Lillian (2008) studies how modality can be applied as a tool of persuasion or manipulation in Canadian Conservative Discourse.

Another main genre feature of political speeches is expressing emotions, which is employed to 'display emotional ties and build rapport with the audience' (Reyes 2014:543). This is also connected with modality as volitional modality often expresses the speaker's emotions such as intentions, determination and willingness.

In sum, political speeches are treated as a representative genre of political discourse in this study, with its communicative purpose as persuasion or manipulation and its main genre characteristics as reasoning, expressing stance and expressing emotions. In this sense, studying modality and evidentiality in political speeches is an attempt to investigate how the political speakers persuade or manipulate their audiences through

different choices (patterns) of modal and evidential variations in political contexts.

1.3.2 Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse Analysis

As discussed previously, though typological studies of modality are useful, one still needs to consider the functions of modality in specific contexts. It is generally accepted that the role of modality in political discourse is related to social-cognitive themes such as stance, ideology, and legitimisation. However, evidentiality has been largely neglected in this field with only a few exceptions (e.g. Hart 2010, 2011; Marŕ-Arrese 2011a; van Dijk 2011; Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014). In what follows, I will review the previous literature about modality and evidentiality on stance, ideology, and legitimisation in (political) discourse studies respectively, and then discuss how they can be related to this thesis.

Stance

Stance can be defined as 'all speakers and writers taking up some position in relation to the propositions they make', either 'explicit (also known as overt) or hidden (covert), and either conscious (also known as inscribed) or unconscious' (Bloor & Bloor 2007:33).

Previous studies show that modality is an important way of expressing stance in discourse studies (e.g. Bednarek 2006a, 2006b; Marŕ-Arrese 2011a). For example, Bednarek (2006b) proposes a new framework of evaluation in media discourse to analyse the phenomenon of speaker opinion, also known as *evaluation*, *appraisal* and *stance*. Modality is concerned with 'evaluative parameters' in her study, adopted to evaluate aspects of world as '(not) possible or (not) necessary' and 'reliable' (2006b:1). According to Bednarek (2006b:50), 'the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY deals with what has traditionally been described as deontic or dynamic modality, i.e. with the writer's evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible'. '[E]valuations of RELIABILITY are connected to what is generally described as

epistemic modality, i.e. to matters of reliability, certainty, confidence and likelihood' (2006b:52).

Bednarek's parameters are somewhat confusing when it comes to the distinctions between POSSIBILITY and RELIABILITY. There are two reasons for this confusion. On the one hand, the parameter of POSSIBILITY traditionally relates to epistemic modality rather than deontic modality. On the other hand, these two parameters are closely related in semantic meaning since events that are more possible to be realized tend to be more reliable as well. However, Bednarek's study also gives us the important hint that modality is an essential linguistic device in coding the speaker's stance.

Drawing on Langacker's cognitive linguistic account of evaluation (2007, 2009), Marń-Arrese (2011a) distinguishes between effective versus affective stance-taking acts. She places deontic modality under the categories of effective stance-markers, while treating epistemic modality and evidentiality as categories of epistemic stance-markers. She analyses expressions of each in the discourse of Blair, Obama and Aznar. She found that the use of both effective and affective stance-markers enables the political leaders to persuade their audience by 'claiming true knowledge of the events and claiming to be morally right in the proposed realization of events' (Marń-Arrese 2011a:220). She also claims that stance resources signify the speakers' expression of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, through which the speakers manage their responsibility for their epistemic and deontic estimations (ibid.).

Marń-Arrese's study (2011a) is one of the main inspirations for this thesis. In particular, 'the interaction of two parameters of subjectivity/ intersubjectivity' lay a solid foundation for the study of evidentiality in this thesis: including degree of 'salience and explicitness of the role of the conceptualizer', and 'personal vs. shared responsibility' (Marń-Arrese 2011a). Besides, the thesis will adopt her definition of epistemic stance (See Section 3.3 for details).

Overall, this thesis will treat modality and evidentiality as stance-markers from different perspectives, as they function differently in stance-taking acts. This will be explored in detail in the following chapters.

Ideology

According to Widdowson, the main task of CDA is to 'discover traces of ideological bias in texts' (2007:71). Likewise, the motivation of Critical Linguistics is to explore '*ideology* in language' on the basis of linguistic analysis (Simpson 1993:5). For Critical Linguistics, 'ideology' can be defined as 'a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view', involving 'a systematically organized presentation of reality' (Kress and Hodge 1979:15). According to Simpson, however, an ideology 'derives from the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups' (1993:5).

Ideologies are closely related to power and language (Fairclough 2003:2). In other words, linguistic analysis can be 'a powerful tool for the study of ideological processes which mediate relationships of power and control' (Fowler and Kress 1979:186).

From the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics, Koller defines ideology as 'a (metaphorical) network of beliefs that gives rise to expectations, norms and values about events, ideas and people' (2014:239). She also holds that the function of ideologies is to organize or maintain social relations and this can be realised through their epistemic, deontic and evaluative content (ibid.), that is by 'social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong' (van Dijk 1998:8). In this sense, modality also encodes ideology as it certainly involves epistemic and deontic evaluations. This is also the position I take in this thesis.

According to Haynes (1989:119), 'ideology is made possible by the choices a language allows for representing the same material situation in different ways', which suggests that the different choices of modality should also represent the speaker/ writer's ideology. For example, we often use deontic modality when we think it is moral or right to take certain actions, such as "We should pay taxes." This example clearly illustrates the speaker's belief (as part of his ideology) that 'paying taxes is our duty'.

However, there has been little work relating modality to ideology. For example, Fowler (1991) holds that all linguistic devices convey ideology and he also distinguishes four types of modality in terms of making comments, but he does not explicitly spell out how modality plays a role in encoding ideology. Similarly, Dunmire (2005) discusses rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse through comparative studies in modality, but fails to explain the relationship between modality and ideology. It is, therefore, possible and necessary to explore how different types of modality encode ideology in political discourse in this thesis.

Evidentiality, on the other hand, has never been related to the study of ideology; though I will argue in this thesis that evidentiality also reflects the speaker's ideology (See Section 6.3.1.3 in Chapter Six). This is because ideologies are often treated as 'forms of common sense' (van Dijk 1998:106; Bax 2011:127), and evidentiality is closely related to the speaker's concept of knowledge (including common knowledge) (van Dijk 2014).

Legitimisation

According to Reisigl and Wodak, 'power is legitimised or de-legitimised in discourses' (2009:89). One of the five types of discursive strategies in the Discourse-historical Approach is 'argumentation', with the devices of topoi (formal or more content-related) and fallacies, which serve as tools of legitimisation to justify and question the claims of truth and normative rightness (Reisigl and Wodak 2009:94).

According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), 'legitimation provides the "explanations" and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional tradition'. They have even argued that, effectively, all of language is legitimisation (1966:112). In other words, the study of legitimisation is extremely important, particularly in revealing how power relations and domination are maintained through certain legitimising strategies.

However, in previous studies, though legitimisation has been studied widely and from various angles, few studies addressed modality or evidentiality. That means these studies take a more social and political perspective rather than a linguistic perspective. Therefore it is necessary for us to explore this topic further in terms of linguistic analysis, including through modality and evidentiality. For example, from the perspective that 'discourse is the recontextualization of social practice' (van Leeuwen 2008:3), van Leeuwen claims that 'recontextualization involves not just the transformation of social practices into discourses about social practices, but also the addition of contextually specific legitimations of these social practices' (2008:105). He also distinguishes four main strategies for legitimation (van Leeuwen 2008:105-6):

(i)   Authorization: Legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law and / or persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested.

(ii) Moral Evaluation: Legitimation by reference to value systems.

(iii) Rationalization: Legitimization by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the knowledges that society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity.

(iv) Mythopoesis: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish nonlegitimate actions.

In fact, van Leeuwen's account of legitimation strategies mainly involves the different kinds of sources of evidence the speaker/writer provides to legitimise his/her propositions, all belonging to the domain of evidentiality. However, he fails to relate them to evidentiality (see Hart 2011b).

Rojo and van Dijk (1997) also explore 'the discursive and political strategies of legitimation', by positing 'three levels of legitimation: (a) pragmatic: various strategies of the justification of controversial official actions; (b) semantic: the ways a discourse represents its partisan view of the events or properties of actors as 'true' or as the 'facts'; and (c) socio-political: the way official discourse self-legitimates itself as authoritative and delegitimates alternative discourses' (1997:523). Though Rojo and van Dijk deal with legitimisation strategies at three levels, their perspective is political rather than linguistic. Their study involves only a limited treatment of modality.

Legitimisation in political discourse can be defined as 'enactment of the political speaker's right to be obeyed and the linguistic justification of actions following this obedience' (Cap 2008: 32). For Cap, 'proximization'[3] is 'one of the most effective strategies in accomplishing legitimisation effects in political (interventionist) discourse' (Cap 2011:81). He (Cap 2006, 2008) also develops a tripartite model of 'proximization': 'spatial, temporal and axiological', which illustrates 'the different conceptual relations between the entities localized inside the deictic centre' (cf. Chilton, 2004) of the stage (speaker, addressee, the so-called inside-the-deictic-centre entities) and the alien, outside-the-deictic-centre entities (Cap 2011:81).

Chilton (2004) claims that epistemic and deontic are two basic types of legitimisation in political discourse. The former has to do with 'the speaker's claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the "real" facts'; the latter refers to 'the speaker claims, explicitly or implicitly, to be not only "right" in a cognitive sense, but "right" in a moral sense'(Chilton 2004:114-117). Following Cap (2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2013) and Chilton (2004), Hart (2014) explores the cognitive dimensions of proximization in the context of two case studies from Tony Blair's discourse. In particular, he proposes 'epistemic proximization' for the description of a conceptual

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[3] According to Cap, proximization is 'a pragmatic-cognitive strategy whereby the speaker presents the events on the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, in negative and threatening ways' (2011:81).

relation between temporal and epistemic distance (Hart 2014:179). Hart argues that 'epistemic proximization can be characterized as a conceptual shift along the epistemic axis so that a situation comes to form part of the conceptualizer's epistemic ground' (2014:179). To attain legitimacy and public support, political speakers therefore need to 'establish a conceptualization in which their premises for action are treated as true' (also see Chilton 2004) through the means of epistemic proximization. They can either presuppose 'certain propositions as established fact' or 'ask the audience to place their trust in the speaker's evaluation' (Hart 2014:179).

Cap, Chilton and Hart's theories about legitimisation lay a solid foundation for this study because their research is not only closely related to modality but also based on political contexts from a cognitive linguistic perspective, particularly the concepts 'the deictic centre', 'distance' and 'epistemic proximization'. However, their studies do not involve evidentiality (except for Hart 2014).

Hart (2010, 2011) also proposes that evidentiality and epistemic modality can be used in political discourse to serve 'two different legitimising strategies: "objectification" and "subjectification" respectively', eliciting 'an epistemic evaluation in the text-consumer'. In effect, objectification is concerned with the speaker legitimising a proposition by 'standing back' from the assertion and allowing the evidence to 'speak for itself'. By contrast, subjectification involves the speaker legitimising a proposition 'relying on their own claim to authority and their own experience' (Hart 2010:173). Similarly, Marń-Arrese (2011b) also discusses legitimisation strategies in terms of epistemic modality and evidentiality in political discourse from a cognitive point of view. She argues that by using epistemic positioning strategies the speaker/writer is able to influence the addressee's 'exercise of epistemic vigilance and accept the assertion as true' (Marín-Arrese 2011b:791).

Hart and Marń-Arrese's studies of legitimisation strategies focus on the study of epistemic modality and evidentiality, which lay a solid foundation for this research.

However, it is still necessary to explore further how other modal types function in the process of legitimisation in political discourse, and interact with evidentiality.

Reyes (2011b) proposes five legitimisation strategies for political speeches, including (1) emotions (particularly fear), (2) a hypothetical future, (3) rationality, (4) voices of expertise and (5) altruism (Reyes 2011b:781). Though Reyes' research does not involve the study of modality and evidentiality, the data he uses is very relevant to this thesis (the speeches from George W. Bush and Barack Obama on the topic of 'war on terror'). Besides, we can also relate his findings to this research. The first three strategies can be related to volitional modality (emotions[4]), epistemic modality (hypothetical future) and deontic modality (rationality) respectively, while the third and fourth also have strong connections with evidentiality. Epistemic modality can also express voices of expertise as it often involves the epistemic estimation towards the designated proposition based on the speaker's expertise / knowledge.

Another example is from van Dijk's work in critical epistemic discourse analysis[5]. In his study (van Dijk 2011), he adopts strategies including 'evidentiality' and 'modalities', because van Dijk claims '[D]iscourse is more credible when it is attributed to recognized experts. Hence, most forms of knowledge discourse will be replete with references and other linguistic ways of legitimating arguments through evidence provided by experts' (van Dijk 2011:38). Besides, van Dijk claims that 'events and knowledge about such events may be presented as modalized in several ways, for instance as certain (necessary), probable or possible — depending again on the interests of the authors' (ibid.). With these two notions (evidentiality and modalities), illustrated by the example of 'Tony Blair on Iraq', he is able to demonstrate how speakers use evidentials to show their own credibility or the legitimacy of their opinions, and how the speakers assert the strength of their beliefs

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[4] Although the emotions expressed by volitional modality are different from what Reyes proposed, they can also reflect the speaker's ideology and contribute to the legitimisation process (See Chapter Five for details).

[5] 'Epistemic discourse analysis is meant here as the (multidisciplinary) study of the way knowledge is expressed, implied, suppressed, distributed, etc. in text and talk, for instance in presuppositions, topic-comment and focus structures, levels and details of description, and so on' (van Dijk 2011:35).

in various ways (van Dijk 2011). Van Dijk's study suggests that evidentiality is indispensable in the study of modality, especially in terms of how political speakers legitimise their stance.

Although the previous studies of legitimisation in political discourse serve as a solid foundation, there is little work involving both modality and evidentiality, which therefore needs to be explored further in this thesis.

In sum, the previous studies show that it is possible to study modality and evidentiality in terms of stance, ideology and legitimisation in political discourse, and there are some missing parts which still need further study. On the one hand, although modality can certainly be treated as a stance-marker, it is not clear how stance-taking acts relate to their function of legitimisation. On the other hand, the functions of evidentiality have been largely neglected in political discourse, especially with respect to how it encodes the speaker's ideology and its role in persuading / manipulating addressees.

1.4 Frameworks for modality and evidentiality in Political Discourse Analysis

As we can see from the previous section, studies of modality and evidentiality in political discourse have tended to adopt frameworks either based on systemic functional linguistics or cognitive linguistics. In this section, I therefore review how modality and evidentiality fit within the theoretical frameworks from both functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives.

1.4.1 SFL and Appraisal Theory

Halliday's SFL plays an important role in the area of CDA (and PDA). For example, Fairclough (2003:5) affirms that SFL provides 'a valuable resource for CDA, and

indeed major contributions to CDA have developed out of SFL' (see, e.g., Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1988, 1993; Kress 1985; Kress and van Leeuwen 2001; Lemke 1995; Thibault 1991; van Leeuwen 2005).

Many discourse studies of modality adopt Halliday's SFL (Halliday 1985, 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). For example, drawing on the system of transitivity[6] and modality in SFL, critical linguists have uncovered the ideology encoded in political discourse (e.g. Fowler 1991). For another example, Fowler et al. (1979:185) adopts the theory of interpersonal metafunction (or the grammar of modality in their terms) in studying modality. In addition, Kress and Hodge (1979:122-126) discuss the relationship between modality and power, taking Halliday (1970b) on modality as a major reference.

It is therefore necessary to introduce the theory of modality in SFL, and explain how modality in this research fit within its framework.

According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004:116), modality involves 'likely or unlikely (if a proposition), desirable or undesirable (if a proposal)'. It is known as 'the intermediate degrees between the positive and negative poles' and its work is 'to construe the region of uncertainty that lies between "yes" and "no"' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147). Halliday then classifies modality into two main categories: modalization in propositions and modulation in proposals, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.

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[6] Transitivity is a property of verbs that relates to whether a verb can take direct objects and how many such objects a verb can take. Here 'transitivity' refers to the grammar of transitivity proposed by Halliday (1985). Transitivity has been employed within the critical linguistic tradition to 'uncover how certain meanings are foregrounded while others are suppressed or obfuscated' (Simpson 1993:104).

```
                                    ┌─ Probability
                    ┌─ Modalization ┤
                    │               └─ Usuality
          Modality ─┤
                    │               ┌─ Obligation
                    └─ Modulation ──┤
                                    └─ Inclination
```

Figure 1.3 Halliday's classification of modality

There are two kinds of intermediate possibilities between asserting and denying a proposition: (i) degrees of probability: 'possibly/probably/certainly'; (ii) degrees of usuality: 'sometimes/usually/always'. Likewise, there are also two kinds of intermediate possibility between prescribing and proscribing depending on the speech function in a proposal, whether command or offer: (i) In a command, the intermediate points represent degrees of obligation: 'allowed to/supposed to/ required to'; (ii) in an offer, they present degrees of inclination: 'willing to/ anxious to/ determined to' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147).

Based on the above divisions, Halliday introduces two further variants to more detailed descriptions of modality, as shown in Figure 1.4 (adapted from Fig.4-25 in Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:150). The first is the value of modality, which can be identified as low, median and high. Since modality is an expression of indeterminacy for Halliday, he sets up a systemic paradigm to show a system of three values for modality, for example, 'probability' can be expressed as a low value 'possible', a median value 'probable' and a high value 'certain' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:149). In this case, the three different degrees of 'usuality', 'obligation' and 'inclination' (mentioned above) also correspond respectively to the low, median and high values. The second is what Halliday (1985:336) refers to as the different *orientations* in modality, that is, subjective or objective, explicit or implicit. For

instance, '[T]hese can be either subjective-explicit (e.g. I think Mary knows) or subjective-implicit (e.g. Mary will know) on the one hand, or they could be either objective-explicit (e.g. It is likely that Mary knows) or objective-implicit (e.g. Mary probably knows) on the other' (Badran 2002:133).

Figure 1.4 Halliday's system of value and orientation of modality

Halliday's theory of modality has many advantages so it has been prevailing among CDA (e.g. Hodge and Kress 1993; Kress and van Leeuwen 2001; van Leeuwen 2005). Firstly, different from Palmer's approach (Palmer 1979, 2001), Halliday focuses on the use of language rather than its form. Therefore, it is more useful in discourse studies. Secondly, Halliday's approach is more inclusive, thereby avoiding the trap of assigning one interpretation per modal as other 'monosemantic approaches'[7] (see e.g. Ehrman 1966; Perkins 1983) do. In addition, his proposal of orientation for modality, such as the value system, is useful in describing modality in detail, though different readers may interpret the same modal expression in different ways, as Badran points

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[7] Monosemantic approach to modality refers to the approach to 'adopt a common core for the meaning of each modal, and to use it as a basis for deriving the vast range of possible interpretations which the modals may contextually receive' (Papafragou 1998:45).

out (2002:134).

However, despite of its merits, Halliday's approach also has its shortcomings. On the one hand, he places modality under the category of the interpersonal metafunction. According to his theory of SFL, the ideational metafunction is content-oriented, the interpersonal metafunction is participants-oriented, and the textual metafunction is context-oriented. However, the expression of modality should not be restricted to the relations between the participants, for it is also inseparable from the content and context. Thus, the study of modality should not be restricted to interpersonal meaning, which is also a main standpoint of this research. On the other hand, Halliday includes some modal expressions such as modal adverbs, adjectives and nouns in his classification such as 'possible, possibly, certain, certainly, willingness, and possibility', but he mentions neither non-auxiliary verbal modals nor other modal markers.

Another important framework (based on SFL) for studying modality is Martin and White's Appraisal Theory (Martin and White 2005). Martin and White state that SFL is 'a multi-perspectival model designed to interpret language in use' and their theory developed from 'the general framework' of SFL by focusing on 'the interpersonal metafunction' (2005:7). For instance, drawing on the framework of Appraisal Theory (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005; White 2003), Mar ń-Arrese (2006) elaborates the analysis of the categories of evaluation (emphasizing engagement, writer stance and inter/subjectivity) pertaining to modality in the context of journalistic discourse.

Within the framework of Appraisal Theory, there are three interacting domains – 'attitude' (including 'affect', 'judgement' and 'appreciation'), 'engagement' and 'graduation' (Martin and White 2005:35). Modality is concerned with 'engagement' in this theory, 'entertain[8]' in particular. According to Martin and White:

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[8] **Entertain:** by explicitly presenting the proposition as grounded in its own contingent, individual subjectivity, the authorial voice represents the proposition as but one of a range of possible positions – it thereby **entertains** or

'engagement' counts for those linguistic resources whereby the authorial voice positions itself with respect to other textual voices and alternative positions at stake in a given communicative context.   (2005: 94)

However, concerning the functions of modality, the categories of attitude and engagement are rather slippery and hard to delineate. I hold that both deontic modality and epistemic modality pertain to making judgements. The former can be adopted to make deontic judgements (viz. moral judgements), involving what someone should do or should not do. Similarly, the latter can be used to make epistemic judgements, involving what may or may not be. Therefore, Martin and White's framework does not fit studying modality in expressing stance, though the idea of 'engagement' still makes sense from a functional point of view.

In short, the theory of SFL is especially useful in the linguistic analysis of discourse and it is also useful for studying modality in political discourse, particularly the idea of 'value of modality' will be adopted as a main element of modality for this research. In spite of its merits, however, SFL also receives criticism for 'its limited social theory and non-existent cognitive theory', resulting in its vagueness and arbitrary explanation of detailed linguistic analysis (van Dijk 2008b: 30). Therefore, it is necessary for SFL to take in more cognitive theory, which can be a useful complement to its theoretical foundation as well as its analytical framework for discourse studies.

1.4.2 Cognitive Linguistics

From a cognitive linguistic perspective, modality is often addressed in terms of 'force dynamics' (Talmy 1985, 1988, 2000a; Sweetser 1982, 1984, 1990; Johnson 1987; Langacker 1990), 'mental spaces' (Fauconnier 1994; Sweetser 1996; Dancygier and Sweester 1996; Dancygier and Sweester 2005) 'epistemic model' (Langacker 1987,

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invokes these dialogic alternatives such as '*it seems, the evidence suggests, apparently, I hear, or perhaps, probably, maybe, it's possible, in my view, I suspect that, I believe that, probably, it's almost certain that ..., may/will/must*; some types of 'rhetorical' or 'expository' question' (Martin and White 2005:98).

1991), 'discourse space' (Chilton 2004; 2014), 'epistemic stance' (Dancygier and Sweetser 2000; Evans and Green 2006), or epistemic proximization (Hart 2014).

For example, Talmy (1985, 1988, 2000a) proposes a theory of force-dynamics and applies it to the use of modality. Force-dynamics refers to 'how entities interact with respect to force' and it counts for cause and effect relations in terms of pressure and motion (Talmy 2000:409). The relations included here are 'the exertion of force, resistance to such a force, the overcoming of such a resistance, blockage of the expression of force, removal of such blockage, and the like' (ibid.).

According to Talmy, modals can be viewed as the semantic categories which encode the various ways 'in which entities interact with respect to forces and barriers' (ibid.). For example, '*cannot*' indicates the subject (the Agonist) has a tendency toward the realization of the action, but some factor (force) opposes the tendency (Talmy 2000a:441). '*Must*', for another example, indicates the subject (the Agonist) is forced to stay in place by 'an active social pressure' (Talmy 1988: 79). '*Will/ would not*', on the other hand, indicates the subject (the Agonist) refuses to perform the action imposed by external pressure (Talmy 2000a:441). Talmy also claims that the force-dynamic system can be applied to other modal forms besides traditional modal verbs, such as semi-modals (e.g. have to, be supposed to, be to, etc.) and some lexical verbs (e.g. let, make, have, etc.). In particular, he claims that force-dynamic structures are not restricted to physical forces, but also associated with psychosocial interpretations (ibid.; Chilton 2014:257).

The theory of force-dynamics is applicable in explaining most modals, particularly for deontic modals, which often imply an internal or external force that urge the subject to take or give up the designated actions. However, some of the above descriptions about the forces of modals may be not appropriate in different contexts. For example, instead of indicating the subject (the Agonist) is forced to stay in place by 'an active social pressure', '*must*' is often used to urge the subject to take actions, as illustrated

in the example 'We *must* finish the work before the end of this month'. Also, '*Will/ would not*' can also indicate the subject (the Agonist) refuse to take the action out of his/her own will or determination, as shown in the example 'I will not let you down'. Furthermore, this theory is not fit for studying epistemic modals as they do not indicate any forms of inherent force. Overall, the concept is unable to delimit the domain of modality in a satisfying way (Nuyts 2001:26; Boye 2010:59), though it can still be useful in accounting for some deontic modals or volitional modals in this thesis.

As the research framework of this study will draw on some theories from Cognitive Linguistics including Image Schemas of Space, Langacker's Epistemic Model and Chilton's theory of discourse space, I will now discuss them in detail.

Image Schemas of Space

According to Croft and Cruse (2004:44), an image schema is 'a theoretical construct in cognitive linguistics which imposes a conceptualization of experience', defined as 'schematic versions of images'- 'representations of specific, embodied experiences'. Image schemas are 'construals of experience' (Croft and Cruse 2004:45), used to illustrate the typical mental representation patterns of our embodied experiences. In other words, image schemas are concepts derived from our embodied experience, being the foundations of our conceptual system.

Lakoff proposes that 'radial structure in categories' can be represented 'in terms of CENTRE-PERIPHERY schemas' (1987: 283). He then argues that:

> Like other categories, a radial category is represented structurally as a container, and its subcategories are containers inside it. What distinguishes it is that it is structured by the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema. One subcategory is the centre; the other subcategories are linked to the centre by various types of links. (ibid.)

Drawing on Lakoff's proposal (1987), I will integrate two important image schemas of space (the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and the NEAR-FAR schema) to demonstrate the distance between the centre category and non-centre categories in terms of modality, which is divided into three categories: close, near, and distant, as illustrated in Figure 1.5. Thus, various forms of modality will be positioned in different categories according to their distance to the centre[9] (See Section 2.2 of Chapter Two for details).

Figure 1.5 The integration of CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and NEAR-FAR schema

Langacker's Epistemic Model

Langacker proposes an epistemic model (a kind of idealised cognitive model (ICM)) to elaborate the interaction between tense and modals, including a basic epistemic model and two elaborated epistemic models (Langacker 1991:242). The basic epistemic model is illustrated in Figure 1.6 (borrowed from Figure 18.1. Evans and Green 2006: 627).

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[9] Here 'center' refers to the speaker in terms of person, or 'here' in terms of space, or 'now' in terms of time.

Figure 1.6 Langacker's epistemic model

The large circle in this model indicates 'here and now', viewed as immediate reality, representing the **ground** (including the speech event and the participants). The small shaded circle represents the conceptualizer (the speaker or the language user). The horizontal line running through the centre of the diagram represents TIME, which Langacker (1991: 242) describes as 'the axis along which reality evolves' (Evans and Green 2006: 627).

Epistemic distance, then, is viewed as a type of variation along parameters of distance between reality and irreality based on 'whether they are immediate (close) or non-immediate (distant) relative to the ground' (Evans and Green 2006: 628).

On the basis of the epistemic modal, Langacker observes that modals in their distal form often suggests 'a greater epistemic distance' than their zero form[10]; 'might, for instance, suggests a more tenuous possibility than may' (1991:246). On this account, it is possible for us to address modality in terms of epistemic distance, closely related to time and tense. Importantly, the notion of epistemic distance will be adopted in my framework of modality, which positions epistemic modals in different values according to their distance to the centre (now and certainty).

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[10] Here 'zero form' refers to the base form of modals (such as may and can), so as to distinguish from their past form (such as might and could).

Chilton's Model of Discourse Space

Chilton (2004) proposes a model of three-dimensional 'discourse space' in Political Discourse Analysis: space, time and modality.

In his model, Chilton claims that 'these three dimensions are always "anchored" at the speaking self or in the mind of the speaking self' (2014:12). In other words, during the discourse production process, people tend to position other entities in their discourse 'world' relative to themselves along the three axes: space, time and modality (Chilton, 2004:57). Hence, the deictic centre represents the speaking self (that is, I or we), which is the 'origin' of the three axes, as illustrated in Figure 1.7 (borrowed from Figure 4.1, Chilton 2004:58).

Figure 1.7 Chilton's dimensions of deixis

In this modal, the *s* axis represents space, which locates entities encoding spatial deictic meanings according their geographical distance or metaphorical social distance (e.g. 'near relations', 'close cooperation', 'remote connection') (Chilton 2004:58). In this sense, the speaker represents the here & now and the entities 'indexed by second-person and third-person pronouns are 'situated' along *s*, some nearer to, some more remote from self' (ibid.).

The *t* axis represents time, with the origin as the time of speaking or 'now'. Other entities indicating a time of happening can be located as 'near' or 'distant': 'the revolution is getting closer', 'the time for an agreement has arrived', 'we are a long way from achieving our goals' (Chilton 2004:58). That is because time can be conceptualized in relation to motion through space, relative distance to or from Self, and events (Langacker 1991).

The *m* axis represents modality and its deictic centre represents 'the origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right' (Chilton 2004:59). It is widely accepted that epistemic and deontic modality can be viewed as scales (see e.g. Frawley 1992; Nutys 2010), and 'seems to be also conceptualised in terms of remoteness' (Chilton 2004:59).

Chilton's model of 'discourse space' emphasizes the significance of positioning various entities in the 'discourse world' in relation to the speakers themselves along three axes, space, time and modality. In this type of 'discourse space', the speaker himself represents the centre of 'here', 'now', and 'rightness'. That is to say, Chilton's model of 'discourse space' is established from the perspective of the speaker. This is rather useful for the study of modality because modality is often treated as the position taken by the speaker.

In effect, Chilton's model will serve as the most important theoretical base of my research framework, though I adapt this model and apply it rather differently. In particular, his idea of the deictic centre being 'not only here and now but also the origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right' contributes a lot to my analytical model of modality in political discourse: the STE (Space, Time and Evidentiality) model, which I am going to elaborate in detail in the following chapter. However, modality is only one dimension in Chilton's model and it is hard to evaluate how the speak positions entities in terms of modals. It is therefore necessary to take in 'the

value of modality' from SFL so as to examine the epistemic, deontic and volitional positioning in political discourse.

Undoubtedly, Cognitive Linguistics has several merits in discourse analysis. Firstly, it allows us to analyse the discourse from a new perspective. Secondly, it is possible for us to reveal the potential processes of text production and interpretation when we adopt a cognitive linguistic approach in discourse analysis. That is because for Cognitive Linguistics, language is 'a window to the mind' (Fauconnier 1999:96). Thirdly, some theories from Cognitive Linguistics can be useful tools in analysing discourse, such as the concepts of discourse space, force-dynamics and image schema.

However, though Cognitive Linguistics is distinct in many ways from generative linguistics, its research methods have typically relied on 'introspection' (Talmy 2006), as it derives 'intuitively plausible hypotheses about conceptual structure from patterns in language and on the basis of native speaker knowledge' (Hart 2010:24), and 'there are very few published writings on the methods in Cognitive Linguistics' (Gibbs 2006:7), resulting in 'a big problem of falsifying theories/ ideas from cognitive linguistics' (Gibbs 2006:3). So despite the merits of Cognitive Linguistics, it is still necessary for us to adopt the theory concerning modality from SFL, especially in discourse studies.

1.5 Critique and the Way Forward

Overall, previous studies on modality are abundant and extensive, laying a solid foundation for this research. However, there remain some unsolved or controversial issues with respect to forms, meanings, functions and perspectives of modality. For example, many previous semantic studies (e.g. Narrog 2012) use invented examples isolated from actual contexts, which to a large extent undermines the reliability and validity of their results or theories.

More importantly, many studies deliberately ignore the significance of other modality markers other than modal auxiliaries, or focus on epistemic modality only in terms of modality meanings (types), or neglect other modality functions besides its interpersonal meaning (particularly in expressing stance) for their convenience, which makes it impossible to get the whole picture of modality.

In this section, I will address some specific issues which are of particular interest to this study, and propose the way forward for this study of modality in political discourse.

Forms, Meanings and Functions of Modality

As mentioned above, this study explores the forms, meanings (types) and functions of modality in political discourse, particularly on how politicians persuade their addressees through different choices of modals. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the scope of this study in terms of forms, meanings and functions.

Forms of modality here refer to the markers of modality, involving modal auxiliaries, modal adjectives, modal adverbs, modal nouns and semi-modals, etc. Traditionally, the semantic study of modality has been restricted to modal verbs (modal auxiliaries), but recently, more linguists hold the view that there are other ways of expressing modality besides modal verbs (see, e.g. Stubbs 1996; Barbiers 2002). Barbiers, for instance, claims that '[M]odal verbs are just one way to encode modality in natural language. Among the other means attested are modal particles and adverbs, imperatives and to infinitives' (2002:14). Other modal expression types besides modal verbs, such as semi-modals (e.g., Krug 2000), modal adjectives (e.g., van Linden 2012) and modal adverbs (e.g., Nuyts 2001a, 2002), can also be found in semantic studies (also see Table 1.2), though they often lack a common core: 'they are like scattered pieces of a highly complex puzzle' (Mortelmans 2007:869). However, many discourse studies deliberately ignore the significance of other modality expressions other than modal verbs only for their convenience. In contrast to the previous discourse studies,

this thesis will also include other important modal forms besides modal verbs in a systemic analytical framework in order to avoid the neglect of other interesting modal meanings or functions in political discourse. In addition, modality is also interrelated with tense as modals in their past tense are often of lower value (lower certainty) than their bare forms (see Halliday 1994; Palmer 2001; Langacker 1991). So this thesis will also take tense into consideration within the framework.

It is important to note that there is covert modality, which is either marked by infinitives (Bhatt 1999) or unmarked (cf. Barbiers 2002). However, different researchers may have different views towards this phenomenon. Covert Modality is 'modality which we interpret but which is not associated with any lexical item in the structure that we are interpreting' (Bhatt 1999). According to Bhatt, sentences with infinitivals often involve covert modality (Bhatt 1999:2). For example, "Tim knows [how to solve the problem]" can be interpreted as "Tim knows how one/he could/should solve the problem" (Bhatt 1999:1). Kissine, on the other hand, proposes that 'every asserted proposition which is not under the scope of an explicit modal may be considered as being under the scope of a covert epistemic necessity' (2008:144). It is, therefore, rather controversial and difficult to identify their exact modal meanings. So this thesis is not going to deal with covert modality or zero-marked modality (or zero-marked evidentiality). Moreover, some modal markers can be modified with intensified or mitigated adverbs such as 'nearly', 'almost', 'definitely', 'extremely' and 'absolutely'. These adverbs sometimes are treated as epistemic modals (see e.g. Biber and Finegan 1989) or 'usuality in modalization' (see Figure 1.3, Halliday 1994) in previous studies. This thesis will not treat these adverbs as modals.

Based on the above discussions, this study will address four main categories of modal forms in the data, including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal adverbs.

Meanings of modality refer to the semantic meanings/types of modal markers, which

traditionally can be classified into epistemic modality, deontic modality, and dynamic modality / root modality.

Since von Wright (1951) first proposed his classification of modality, 'epistemic modality' and 'deontic modality' have always been the main categories of modality (see section 1.3.2) and major themes in the studies of modality. As a matter of fact, many political discourse studies of modality are rather restricted to epistemic modality or deontic modality in terms of modal meanings/types (e.g. Hart 2010; Fairclough 1995a, 2003; Chilton 2004) .

However, in addition to epistemic and deontic modality, it is also essential to explore other modal meanings in political discourse, such as volitional modality, which will be proposed in the new classification of modality (see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two for explanations) and will be examined in detail in Chapter Five.

Functions of modality refer to the specific roles modality plays in political discourse, such as 'expressing stance'. Modality has been studied widely in terms of stance from various perspectives, such as 'point of view' (e.g. Simpson 1993), 'evaluation' (e.g. Thompson and Hunston 2000; Bednarek 2006b), 'appraisal' (e.g. Martin and White 2005), or 'epistemic stance' (e.g. Dancygier and Sweetser 2000; Evans and Green 2006) in discourse analysis.

However, in addition to its explicit function of expressing stance, modality has its special functions contributing to the establishment of ideology, and legitimation in political discourse, although they have not been explicitly addressed in previous studies (e.g. Kress and Hodge 1979; Fairclough 2000a, 2001, 2003; Hart 2010, 2011) (see section 1.3.2 for details).

According to Hart (2010), a complete discourse analysis must necessarily address both the production and interpretation of text, which 'entails a cognitive approach to

discourse, accounting for meaning construction at both ends of the discourse process'
(Hart 2010:23). This means the process of discourse analysis can be divided into three
parts: Text Production; Text Itself; Text Interpretation. By analysing the forms of
modality and the evidence given by the contexts in the text, we are able to identify the
functions of modality which the speaker/writer would like to convey through different
forms of modality during the text production stage, namely the intentions or purposes
of the speaker/writer. There is no doubt that every speaker has specific purposes in
making a speech, and the speaker tends to make assumptions (consciously or
unconsciously) that the choices of modality he or she makes can best achieve his or
her purposes, even if the result is unclear. As mentioned previously, the main purpose
of political speeches is persuasion, which is why this thesis will focus on the role of
modality (and evidentiality) in the process of persuasion.

At the same time, it is also possible for the reader/hearer to infer the meanings of
modality from its forms and evidence in given contexts at the stage of text
interpretation. Though, as common readers/ hearers, we may not catch the full
meanings of modality immediately. But based on our common knowledge, we can
make inferences and make sense according to the forms and the evidence given in the
context. The evidence mentioned here is often marked by evidentials. See Figure 1.8
for the forms, meanings and functions of modality during the process of discourse
analysis.

Text Production   Text Itself   Text Interpretation

Figure 1.8 The forms, meanings and functions of modality during the process of

discourse analysis.

Based on this, this thesis will explore the functions of modality (including expressing stance, legitimising propositions, and reflecting ideologies) in political discourse in terms of three semantic types/ meanings (including epistemic, deontic and volitional modality) in four forms (including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal adverbs).

The Integration of Functional and Cognitive Linguistic Perspectives

As discussed previously, this thesis will combine theories both from functional and cognitive linguistics. There are several reasons for the integration of these two perspectives in political discourse analysis. Firstly, it is common for PDA to adopt a variety of methods, which may differ methodologically but share a common conceptual framework and critical perspective (van Dijk 1997b:xi; 2001:353). Gee (2011:ix) also argues that 'anyone engaged in their own discourse analysis must adapt the tools they have taken from a given theory to the needs and demands of their own study'. This is also the position I adopt in this study.

Secondly, it is possible to combine the theories from SFL and Cognitive Linguistics in discourse analysis. For instance, Widdowson (2004:97) and Hart (2005:5) hold the view that CDA can integrate functional linguistics with other borrowed approaches (cognitive linguistics, corpus linguistics, etc.) into a theoretically coherent model. In particular, Functional Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics are complementary in their concerns and it is possible to integrate them (Nuyts 2007:552; Langacker 1994:593).

In sum, linguistic analysis is of great significance for PDA because it can not only help us explain the text itself but also help us reveal the values behind it. SFL provides a useful tool for analysing the structure of political discourse in linguistic aspects, but

it needs cognitive theory to support its description and explain the production of texts in their social cognitive context.

Above all, this research framework of modality in PDA will integrate theories from Halliday's SFL and Cognitive Linguistics, with SFL analysing the text itself and Cognitive Linguistics studying text production and interpretation from a cognitive perspective, which can explore the whole process of discourse from different dimensions and bring new insights to PDA as well as CDA. The whole process of PDA (derived from Fairclough's idea of the process of CDA; Fairclough 1995a[11]; also see Koller 2012) and the two linguistic theories I draw on for each stage are illustrated in Figure 1.9.

Figure 1.9 Three stages of Political Discourse Analysis

Combining both functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives, this study will mainly draw on the 'value of modality' in SFL and the idea of 'the deictic centre' in Chilton's discourse space theory to establish my analytical framework of studying

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[11] According to Fairclough, there are three stages in CDA: Production, Description and Interpretation. Description-stage analysis concerns the text itself (1995a:97).

modality in political discourse.

1.6 Summary

This chapter has provided a general overview of previous studies on modality and evidentiality in political discourse. I first reviewed previous studies on defining and classifying modality and evidentiality both in linguistic studies and discourse studies. Then I discussed the definition and scope of 'political discourse' from different perspectives, particularly on political speeches as a genre. After that, I reviewed the most relevant studies on the functions of modality in political discourse in terms of stance, ideology, and legitimisation. Then I discussed the main frameworks from both functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives in order to show how my analytical research framework which emerges from these theories can be used in the analysis of political speeches in this thesis. Finally, I pointed out the unsolved or neglected problems of previous studies in this research area and put forward my solutions.

Overall this chapter provides a necessary background for why and how I am going to approach modality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective, interacting with evidentiality. In the following chapter, I will introduce the research data, method and analytical framework for the study of modality and evidentiality in political discourse in detail.

Chapter Two: Framework, Data and Method

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I reviewed the most relevant literature on modality and evidentiality in both semantics and discourse studies, particularly focusing on PDA. In this chapter, I will first propose an analytical framework for studying modality in political discourse on the basis of the previous chapter. Then I will introduce the data collection and background. After that, I will discuss the method of data analysis from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. In particular, I will discuss the main functions of modality and illustrate how they relate to each other in political discourse, in order to lay a foundation for the specific functions of each modal type to be addressed in the following chapters. I will also define and classify modality and evidentiality by taking a data-driven approach in the section on research methods.

2.2 An Analytical Framework of Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse

In this section, I will propose an analytical framework of modality and evidentiality to investigate their functions in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective.

The theoretical foundation of the framework is a combination of Cognitive Linguistics and Functional Linguistics, including image schemas of space (Lakoff 1987),

Langacker's epistemic model (Langacker 1991) and Chilton's model of discourse space (Chilton 2004；2014), and the 'value of modality' in SFL (Halliday 1994) which were each discussed in Chapter One.

In this model, modality is classified into three types: epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality (See Section 2.4.1 for the explanations for defining and classifying modality). Each type of modality can be treated with respect to three levels of modal values (high, intermediate, and low) with corresponding three levels of distance (close, near, distant) to the centre of Necessity, Certainty and Willingness. In other words, values of three types of modality are fundamentally conceptualized in terms of space, displayed on a figure combining the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and the NEAR-FAR schema, together with the three dimensions: space, time and evidentiality. The centre circle represents 'Here' in terms of space, 'Now' in terms of time, 'Necessity' in terms of deontic stance, 'Certainty' in terms of epistemic stance, and 'Willingness' in terms of volitional stance. The deictic centre signalled by the shaded circle dot in the centre circle represents the speaker (viz. the speaker's self, 'I' or 'we'). The functions of modality in political discourse will be addressed from three aspects: value of modality, modal distance (deontic distance / epistemic distance / volitional distance), and strength of evidence, with each graded in three levels (see the explanations in Section 2.2.2- 2.2.4)**,** as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 A cognitive-functional analytical framework for analysing modality and evidentiality in political discourse

2.2.1 Dimensions of Space, Time and Evidentiality

The dimension of space in this model is metaphorical, which is different from the geographical space. As Chilton (2004:58) points out that:

> it is not that we can actually measure the 'distance' from Self; rather, the idea is
> that people tend to place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the
> self, using background assumptions and indexical cues.

Put another way, the space dimension provides a scale for us to evaluate different levels of modal values in terms of deontic distance, epistemic distance and volitional distance.

Time can also be conceptualized in terms of distance, as Chilton claims that '[B]oth past and future can be remote' (2004:58). Langacker (1991:246) further convincingly argues that verbs like *will* and *can* encode a stronger degree of obligation or possibility than their distal counterparts like *would* and *could*. That is because the former ones are closer to reality, while the latter ones are more remote. The dimension of time here is represented by tense, which can also 'signal epistemic distance' (Evans and Green 2006:394). From the perspective of mental spaces, Fauconnier (2007:370) claims that:

> 'tenses are used not just to reflect local time relations between neighbouring spaces, but also to reflect epistemic distance, that is, whether a space is hypothetical or counterfactual with respect to its parent space. The coding system remains the same, and a particular tense sequence may reflect both time and epistemic distance'

Here are some examples offered by Sweetser (1996:323):

a. If you have Triple-A, then if you go to a telephone, you can solve your problem.

b. If you had Triple-A, then if you went to a telephone, you could solve your problem.

c. If you had had Triple-A, then if you'd gone to a telephone, you could have solved your problem.

We can interpret the above three conditional constructions in terms of tense. Then the embedded tenses ('*go', 'went', 'had gone',* and *'can solve', 'could solve', 'could have solved'*) reflect the full epistemic and time path from the Base. If we put them on the timeline of my model of modality according to the time these tenses indicated, we will find that the modal closer to the centre (now/ reality) has stronger epistemic stance than those remote ones, viz. *can* solve＞*could* solve＞*could* have solved. It works in the same way with respect to deontic and volitional stance.

Evidentiality is traditionally defined in terms of 'the source of the information' (e.g. Jakobson 1957; Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; Saeed 2003; Nuyts, 2010). It is especially significant in strategic discourse because text-consumers can recognize the force of evidence, 'even if they have no confidence at all in the communicator' (Sperber 2006:184).

Previous studies argue that evidentiality is closely related to epistemic modality (cf. section 1.2 in Chapter One). They are both concerned with the justification and reliability of assertions. Evidentiality affects the speaker's epistemic evaluations and provides justifications (viz. legitimisation) for his/her assertions (Hart 2010, 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011b). That is to say, speakers often make choices of epistemic modality in terms of certainty according to the evidence available to them. The speaker can be more certain when he/she has stronger evidence, or less certain when he/she has weaker evidence (Nuyts 2010).

In this study, I propose that apart from epistemic modality, evidentiality also provides evidence for deontic and volitional evaluations. In the case of deontic modality, the speaker needs to provide various forms of evidence in the support of the modalization of the proposition. He/she tends to use a deontic modal marker of high value with the support of strong evidence such as laws or obligations, and vice versa. In the case of volitional modality, the speaker also needs to explain why someone wants to do something based on the evidence showing the necessity or possibility to do so.

I assume that ideally the speaker tends to use a modal device of higher value when he/she has stronger evidence in support of the proposition. Similarly, if the speaker has weaker evidence, then he/she is supposed to use a modal device of lower value. Therefore, we could check whether the value of modality that the speaker has chosen is consistent with the strength of evidence that he provides in his speech. If they do not match well, then it means the speaker is more likely to manipulate his audience during his process of legitimisation. At the same time, the speaker's choices of

different evidentials as well as modal markers also encode his/her stance and ideology.

In a word, all the three dimensions of space, time and evidentiality pertain to the positioning and analysis of different categories of modality, setting the stage for this model.

2.2.2 Modality as Distance

In this study, the criteria of classifying modal values derive from Halliday's SFL (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147). For example, deontic modality can be divided into three levels of semantic meanings: be required to, be supposed to, be allowed to, with corresponding three levels of modal value (high, intermediate, and low), as shown in Table 2.1. Epistemic modality and volitional modality[12] also have three levels of semantic meanings in terms of modal values: high (be certain), intermediate (be probable), low (be possible); high (be determined to), intermediate (intend to), low (be willing to).

Table 2.1 The classification of modal values

Modal value / Type	High value	Intermediate Value	Low Value
Deontic Modality	be required to	be supposed to	be allowed to
Epistemic Modality	be certain	be probable	be possible
Volitional Modality	be determined to	be intended to	be willing to

Within the framework, different levels of epistemic modal values which encode various degree of certainty can be demonstrated by their distance to the centre of certainty. This distance has been treated as epistemic distance in previous studies. For example, Evans and Green claims that epistemic distance is concerned with 'the

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[12] The criteria of classifying volitional values are adapted from Halliday's semantic criteria for 'degrees of inclination', while those of epistemic modality and deontic modality draw on the criteria for 'degrees of probability' and 'degrees of obligation' respectively (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147).

speaker's metaphorical "distance" from a particular state of affairs: the speaker's "position" or judgment regarding the likelihood of a particular situation coming about' (2006:395).

There is solid evidence for epistemic distance from spatial metaphoric expressions, for example, we can find expressions like 'far from the truth', 'remotely possible', 'close to the truth', and 'approach the truth' for epistemic 'remoteness' (cf. Chilton 2004:59). Besides, conditional constructions are found to be one of the essential forms encoding modality in this research, which can also be explored from the perspective of time dimension as they indicate 'the remote part of the modality scale' (ibid.; also see Gabrielatos 2010).

Similar to epistemic modality, deontic modality can also be addressed in terms of distance as it has 'a proximity-remoteness structure' (Frawley 1992:421-3). Chilton similarly states: 'that which is morally or legally "wrong" is distanced from Self' (2004:60). Nuyts claims that deontic modality may be defined as 'an indication of the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs expressed in the utterance' (2010:9). The notion of 'degree' indicates that:

> [modality] involves a gradual scale going from absolute moral necessity via the intermediary stages of (on the positive side of the scale) desirability, acceptability and (on the negative side of the scale) undesirability, to absolute moral unacceptability. (Nuyts 2010:9)

In other words, deontic modality can indicate the deontic distance of a proposition from the speaker's concept of rightness (necessity). This is reflected in polysemous expressions such as 'he has gone too far', 'outside the norms of convention', and 'within the bounds of decency' (Chilton 2004:60). This provides strong evidence for this model because 'deontic distance' proposed here is positioned on the image schemas of CENTRE-PERIPHERY and NEAR-FAR (Lakoff 1987) (see Section 1.4.2 in Chapter One for explanations).

In this study, the notion of deontic distance is not restricted to the ideological disparities between the political parties. Rather it can refer to the ideological diversity both individually or collectively and nationally or internationally. In this model, the term is adopted to represent the distance between the deontic stance (encoded by three levels of modal values) expressed by the speaker and the centre of necessity / rightness of the speaker. That is because deontic modality can illustrate the distance to legal or moral necessity / rightness, which is mostly ideological. For example, if someone says 'we *should* pay taxes', then the speaker probably holds the belief (a kind of ideology) that 'paying taxes' is legally or morally right. And here the modal auxiliary '*should*' can be positioned in terms of deontic distance in this model. In this case, the deontic stance is positioned near to the centre (necessity) with regard to deontic distance because '*should*' is of intermediate modal value. Therefore, the ideology (political, social, moral values) reflected in this example can be identified as near to the speaker's core values.

Similarly, volitional distance is a new term coined here to indicate the metaphorical distance between the volitional stance (expressed by volitional modals) and the centre of willingness. Volitional distance is also concerned with the metaphorical volitional 'distance' of a particular state of affairs towards the centre of willingness: the speaker's willingness regarding realizing a proposition. That is to say, the different degrees of volitional modal markers can be evaluated in terms of volitional distance. For example, the volitional marker '*be determined to*' can be used to express the degree of stronger willingness / commitment than '*want to*', while '*be willing to*' is weaker than '*want to*' in terms of the degree of willingness / commitment. Therefore, '*be determined to*' is closer to the centre of 'willingness' than '*want to*', whereas '*be willing to*' should be farther than '*want to*' from the perspective of volitional distance.

Volitional modal markers are often adopted based on the necessity or possibility of realizing the propositions indicated. Put another way, stronger willingness /

commitment often indicates a higher necessity or possibility of realizing the proposition.

Overall, all the three types of modality in this study (epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality) can be addressed from the perspective of distance, namely epistemic, deontic and volitional distance. Within the framework, the value of all three types of modality (including high, intermediate and low) is represented by three corresponding levels of distance: close, near, and distant, as shown in Figure 2.1.

2.2.3 Evidentiality as Distance

The term 'strength of evidence' is adopted to evaluate the validity or the persuasive force of evidential markers in the research framework. It refers to the degree of reliability of evidential markers, indicating the differences among various sources of evidence (cf. Hart 2011). It plays an important role in this model because it can not only help us judge the (inter)subjectivity or objectivity of modality, but also assist modality in (de)legitimising propositions or proposals.

In this model, the strength of evidence can also be conceptualized in terms of distance, graded in relation to three levels (strong, intermediate, and weak) with the corresponding distance: close, near and distant (See Section 2.4.1 for detailed classification of evidential markers and Chapter Six for the quantitative and qualitative analysis of evidentials). That means weak evidence indicates 'the remoteness', that is, 'the distance between the reference point and located point is relative large' (Frawley 1992:413). For example, for the category of perceptions, the evidential markers '**I've seen**' is stronger than '**I've heard**' as to strength of evidence, as the former shows the speaker is closer to the certainty or truth (the centre). Similarly, the latter one indicates stronger evidence than that of '**I feel**'. As to the category of outside source (external information), evidentials indicating 'report' is stronger than those of 'hearsay' with respect to strength of evidence (ibid.). In other words, those weaker evidentials are less certain, hence more distant from the centre of

certainty.

2.2.4 Functions of Modality

Based on previous studies and observations in the three case studies, I argue that the modals mainly function as stance-taking acts. However, different types of modals function differently pertaining to expressing stance.

With regard to stance-taking acts, epistemic modality expresses knowledge-based stance and deontic modality encodes value-based stance, while volitional modality marks emotion-based stance, as shown in Table 2.2. This is because these three types of modality are adopted based on the speaker's knowledge, values and emotions respectively (see Sections 3.3.1, 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 for details).

Table 2.2 Functions of modality

Modality / Functions	Epistemic Modality	Deontic Modality	Volitional Modality
Stance-taking acts	Knowledge-based Stance	Value-based Stance	Emotion-based Stance

Furthermore, modality can also be adopted to serve the speaker's purpose of persuasion/ (de)legitimisation during the discourse production process. Stance-taking acts contribute to (de)legitimisation at two different levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Functions of modality at the propositional and discourse levels

The functions of modality with respect to stance-taking acts are explicit and can be identified in the text. However, its functions of reflecting ideology and legitimisation are relatively implicit, and can only be inferred from a cognitive perspective. However, we can infer the ideology of the speaker and his/her (de)legitimisation process through stance-taking acts.

In other words, stance-taking acts can reflect the speaker's ideology in one way or another. As mentioned previously, three different types of modality encode three different kinds of stance, which means they reflect the speaker's ideology from different perspectives. According to van Dijk (1998:18-19), ideologies are the products of judgements based on values or knowledge. Similarly, Verschueren (2012: 8, quoted in Koller 2014:243) notes that modality (both epistemic and deontic forms) serves ideology in that it 'balances description and prescription [and] involves theories of how things are in combination with theories of how things should be'. On the other

hand, emotion can also form part of ideologies for the socially situated nature of ideology means that it involves 'affect and stance' (Verschueren 2012:9). Drawing on Koller's work, ideology here is defined as a (metaphorical) network of beliefs that based on values, knowledge and emotions about events, ideas and people (Koller 2014:239). In this sense, epistemic modality reflects the speaker's ideology based on his/her knowledge pertaining to what is possible or impossible to be realized (cf. van Dijk 2011, 2014) and deontic modality reflects the speaker's ideology based on his/her values concerning what should be done or not, while volitional modality reflects the speaker's ideology based on his/her emotions with regard to what/who is willing or unwilling to take actions.

Stance-taking acts contribute to the function of (de)legitimisation at the propositional level. That is to say, the stance expressed by different types of modality helps (de)legitimise the assertion or action stated in the proposition itself. This thesis will argue that epistemic stance can be used to (de)legitimise assertions (see Hart 2010, 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b), while deontic and volitional stance can (de)legitimise actions (For details, see Sections 3.3.1, 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 respectively). Consider the following example.

Indeed, that Britain *must* be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. **(T. Blair; 15 December 1998)**

The deontic modal marker '*must*' in this example expresses Tony Blair's deontic stance that 'It is necessary for Britain to establish stronger relationship with both the US and Europe'. By using the deontic modal '*must*', he makes demands on which way to take as to this issue. During the process of analysing stance and (de)legitimisation, we can also infer his belief (as part of his ideology) that 'Britain benefits from the good relationships with both sides.'

On the other hand, stance-taking acts also contribute to the function of (de)legitimisation at the discourse level. They help the speaker to (de)legitimise the proposals (or beliefs) indicated in the discourse context, not the assertion or action stated in the proposition itself (for details, see Sections 3.3.2, 4.3.2 and 5.3.2).

In the different contexts, the same modal marker may function differently or differ in its modal stance or force. To illustrate this, I propose that epistemic / deontic / volitional stance usually change from *positive*, *favourable*, *neutral* to *negative*, according to different social or ideological distance between the speaker and different subjects (namely, Speaker-Subject Distance), which can be roughly divided into four groups[13]: the speaker (including the people, institution or country he represents); his friends (people, institutions or countries share similar ideologies or opinions), others (people, institutions, or countries have different ideologies or opinions) and his opponents (people, institutions or countries have conflictive ideologies or opinions), as shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 Interaction between speaker-subject distance vs. stance & value of modality

For example, deontic modality is often adopted to make proposals when the subject is

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[13] This division is similar to Koller's work (2014) of in-group, affiliated group and out-group.

related to the speaker, and used to give suggestions as to his friends or others, but used to give warnings in referring to his enemies. Similarly, epistemic modality is adopted to express expectations when the subject is related to the speaker, and used to explain possibilities concerning his friends or others, but used to make predications of threats in referring to his enemies. Volitional modality is adopted to show one's determination when the subject is the speaker, and used to express wishes as to his friends or others, but used to describe direct threats in referring to his enemies.

At the same time, according to the research framework, three different levels of Speaker-Subject Distance represent three levels of modal value (including high, intermediate, and low[14]). This means that the same modal may express different levels of stance due to different Speaker-Subject Distance, varying from strong, intermediate, to weak, as shown in Figure 2.3.

Overall, modality is context-dependent and the possible interpretations of the same modal marker should not be restricted to those mentioned above, which needs to be examined carefully together with evidentiality in given contexts.

2.3 Data Collection and Background

As mentioned previously, this research will combine quantitative and qualitative research methods to data analysis. That means it is necessary to collect a certain amount of data which will enable me to do corpus linguistic analysis as well as detailed qualitative analysis in contexts. Authentic political speeches by three politicians from different countries (by former British premier Tony Blair, US President Barack Obama, former Iran president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) were collected to do a comparative study. Each case consists of a corpus of ten speeches (around 26,000 words in total) from the same politician, with topics ranging from war, racism, education, economy, election, to foreign relations and climate change.

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[14] The distance of opposite is represented by negative modals (e.g. will not, must not and be unwilling to) and its value is often of high value (negative modals can also be of intermediate or low value).

I chose political speeches by three politicians from three different countries in order to see their similarities and disparities of using modality and evidentiality in different social, political and cultural contexts.

There are mainly three reasons why I chose these three politicians. First and foremost, for the purpose of comparisons and contrasts in terms of ideology and stance, I deliberately chose two politicians from countries which share similar value systems and interests (former British premier Tony Blair and US president Barack Obama), and another politician from a country that has a different value system (Iran's former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). It will be very interesting to see how the speakers with similar or different value systems express their stance, reflect their ideology, and legitimise their propositions through modality and evidentiality.

Secondly, these speakers have been recognized as among the most influential political speakers. Tony Blair was elected as British prime minister three times and Barack Obama has won twice in US presidential elections. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is known for his controversial positions on human rights, 9/11 event, nuclear development and Israel, also won the position of Iranian president twice. It is, therefore, interesting to investigate how these political speakers persuade or manipulate their audiences, including through modality and evidentiality.

Lastly, this research focuses on 'English' in terms of language, which is another important reason why I chose political speakers from English-speaking countries such as Tony Blair and Barack Obama. It is important to point out that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's English speeches in the data are not original, but translated versions. There are mainly two reasons why it is worthwhile to include these translated speeches in the data. First of all, although translation could be a mediating factor in this study, the English texts are the ones presented to the world. When Ahmadinejad made speeches at international meetings, his audience (for those who do not know

Farsi) can only know his ideas through these translated English speeches. In other words, it is the only way through which he can convey his opinions or stance to the people all over the world. Secondly, these English versions are all downloaded from his official website, which means they are authoritative and supposed to be translated by expert translators who master Farsi and English very well. If these translated speeches were not good enough, they would have been criticized and improved as they are available to the public. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to take the political, cultural and language differences into account when discussing and interpreting the results.

In what follows, I will briefly introduce the background to the political speeches from the three politicians. As the focus of this thesis is more on the in-depth linguistic analysis of modal and evidential markers, I am not going to provide much information about the historical contexts of the three speakers.

2.3.1 Tony Blair's Speeches

Tony Blair was the leader of the British Labour Party, who won three general elections as British prime minister, i.e. the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections. Thus, Blair was inevitably an important political figure in the UK. That is the main reason he was chosen as one of the three speakers for the data collection. His main policy is known as 'the third way'. The key elements of 'the third way' are: a belief in the value of community; a commitment to equality of opportunity; an emphasis on responsibility; a belief in accountability[15].

The speeches of Tony Blair in the data cover the years from 1998 to 2009, with 26,354 words in total. The most significant theme of his speeches is 'the war on Iraq' (No. 2 and 7 speeches). Blair was criticized violently and nicknamed as 'Tony Bliar' and "Bush's poodle" because of his foreign policy in 'the War on Terror' (Casey 2009: 12).

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[15] This information was retrieved from the following website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/458626.stm, [accessed on March 16th, 2014].

In particular, to back up the US, Blair persuaded the British Members of Parliament to attack Iraq. But no weapons of mass destruction were found after they destroyed the regime of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, it should be interesting to see how Blair adopts modality and evidentiality to persuade the British parliament members in his speeches. Similarly, Blair, in a speech in Chicago in 1999 (No.3 Speech in the data), claims that the war on Kosovo is 'a just war', which is also controversial. According to 'The Kosovo Report' conducted by *Independent International Commission on Kosovo*, 'the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate'. However, some criticised 'the NATO intervention as a political diversionary tactic' so as to replace the news coverage of 'the Monica Lewinsky scandal', while the Yugoslav government and a number of international pressure groups claimed that NATO had carried out war crimes, notably the bombing of the Serbian TV headquarters in Belgrade on April 23, 1999, where 16 people were killed and 16 more were injured[16].

The second crucial theme of his speeches is about the UK's relationship with Europe and the US. His main belief is that 'Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US' (No. 1 and No. 5 speech).

Asylum and immigration is another important theme in Blair's speeches (No. 8 speech). His main proposal about this is 'to tighten the asylum system further'. Blair's other important speeches about the New Deal, the CBI (the Confederation of British Industry), Common Sense Culture, Climate Change have also been included in the data, as illustrated in Table 2.3.

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[16] This information was retrieved from the following website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War#NATO_bombing_timeline. [accessed on April 26th, 2015].

Table 2.3 Tony Blair's speeches[17]

NO.	Time	Place	Theme/Title	Listeners	Words
1	15/12/1998	London	Foreign Affairs	British People	1506
2	17/12/1998	London	On Iraq	Members of Parliament	2988
3	24/04/1999	Chicago	Doctrine of the International community	Members of Economic Club	5128
4	30/11/2000	London	New Deal	Participants of the New Deal Conference	793
5	17/07/2003	Washington	Speech to U.S. Congress	Members of U.S. Congress	3647
6	18/11/2003	Birmingham	CBI Speech	Participants of CBI Conference	2461
7	20/03/2003	London	War with Iraq	British People	671
8	22/04/2005	London	Asylum and Immigration	British People	4150
9	26/05/2005	London	Common Sense Culture, Not a Compensation Culture	Members of the Institute for Public Policy Research Thinktank	3415
10	13/12/2009	Copenhagen	Climate Change	Participants of the Climate Change Summit	1595
Total number of words					26,354

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[17] All of Tony Blair's speeches listed here can be found at the following two websites:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk. and http://www.theguardian.com/uk, [accessed on April 8th, 2012].

2.3.2 Barack Obama's Speeches

Barack Obama is the current US president and the leader of American Democratic Party, who won the 2008 and 2012 general elections. Because of his unusual family background, his success has come to be seen a typical example of the American dream. In the preface to the 2004 edition of *Dreams from My Father*, Obama (2004) expressed his firm belief that the story of his family 'might speak in some way to the fissures of race that have characterized the American experience, as well as the fluid state of identity…that mark our modern life.'

The Obama Administration has a comprehensive and detailed policy agenda. Among many important domestic and foreign policy objectives, priorities of the Obama Administration include:

a plan to revive the economy; provide affordable, accessible health care to all; strengthen our public education and social security systems; define a clear path to energy independence and tackle climate change; end the war in Iraq responsibly and finish our mission in Afghanistan; work with our allies to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon[18].

The speeches of Barack Obama in the data cover the years from 2002 to 2012, with 26,476 words in total. The initial success of Obama's candidacy for president owed much to an anti-war speech he gave in October 2002 (No. 1 speech in the data), when he was a relatively unknown state senator from Illinois. In this speech, he 'regarded the impending war in Iraq as a politically motivated war designed to distract the attention of the American people from pressing problems at home – social inequality and a looming economic depression' (Pedersen 2009:152). The reason why this speech is of interest to me is that it can be a good source of a comparative study with Blair's pro-war speeches, albeit given from different positions.

The second interesting theme of Obama's speeches is about race (No. 2 speech: 'a

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[18] This information was retrieved from the following website on March 16th, 2014: http://change.gov/agenda/.

more perfect union'). In this speech, Obama addressed the subjects of racial tensions, white privilege, as well as race and inequality in the United States. His speech closed with a plea to move beyond America's 'racial stalemate' and address shared social problems.

As to the theme of Immigration (No. 8 speech), his main belief in this speech is that 'immigration reform is an economic imperative' and 'reform will also help to make America more competitive in the global economy'.

Obama's other important speeches about election victory, the economy, his inauguration, US-China relations, climate change, and immigration have also been included in the data, as illustrated in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Barack Obama's speeches[19]

NO.	Time	Place	Theme/Title	Listeners	Words
1	26/10/2002	Chicago	Against the Iraq War	U.S. People	803
2	18/03/2008	Philadelphia	A More Perfect Union	U.S. People	4916
3	04/11/2008	Grant Park, Illinois	Election Night Victory Speech	U.S. People	1949
4	08/01/2009	George Mason University	On the Economy	U.S. People	2677
5	20/01/2009	The White House	Inaugural Address	U.S. People	2413
6	27/07/2009	The White House	U.S.-China Relations	President Hu of China	2419
7	18/12/2009	Copenhagen	Climate Change	Participants of the Climate Change Summit	963
8	10/05/2011	El Paso	On Immigration	U.S. People	4113
9	08/09/2011	The White House	On Jobs	Members of Congress	4019
10	07/11/2012	Chicago	Election Night Speech	U.S. People	2204
Total number of words					26,476

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[19] All of Barack Obama's speeches listed here can be found at the following two websites:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks. and http://obamaspeeches.com/. [accessed on April 8th, 2012].

2.3.3 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Speeches

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the former president of Iran, who won two presidential elections in 2005 and 2009. He is a populist who is often regarded as a representative of conservatives. His radical remarks about the US, Israel and the Holocaust in his speeches indicate he is a politician with strong views. Just as Pierre Tristam[20] comments:

> His incendiary remarks about Israel, the Holocaust and the West coupled with Iran's continued development of nuclear power and its support of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon make Ahmadinejad the focal point of a seemingly more dangerous Iran with outsized ambitions.

Ahmadinejad believes that it is possible to end US hegemony if Iran works together with other international partners. So Ahmadinejad insists on his assertive foreign policy (e.g. defying the Western big powers) in order to create a more balanced, multipolar system (Warnaar 2013).

The speeches of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the data cover the years from 2005 to 2012, with 25,453 words in total. His opposition to Israel is the most common topic of his speeches. For example, in 2005, at an Islamic Student Associations conference, Ahmadinejad made a speech titled as 'The World without Zionism' (No. 1 speech in the data), in which he said Israel should be "wiped off the map."

Another crucial theme of his speech is racism (No. 4 speech). In this speech, Ahmadinejad associated racism to Zionism and criticized the practice of the U.N. Security Council on this issue. Ahmadinejad's other important speeches about his address to the APA (the Asian Parliamentary Assembly) second general assembly, climate change, before 65th and 66th session of the U.N.G.A. (the United Nations General Assembly), the 1st International Conference on Disarmament and

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[20] This information was retrieved from the following website on March 16th, 2014:
http://middleeast.about.com/od/iran/p/ahmadinejad-profile.htm.

Non-Proliferation, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) and 16th NAM (the Non-Aligned Movement) Summit have also been included in the data, as shown in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speeches[21]

NO.	Time	Place	Theme/Title	Listeners	Number of words
1	26/10/2005	Tehran	The World without Zionism	Participants of an Islamic Student Associations conference	1091
2	29/11/2006	Tehran	Message to American Nation	People of America	2086
3	19/11/2007	Tehran	Address to APA second general assembly	Participants of APA second general assembly	2180
4	21/04/2009	Geneva	U.N. Conference on Racism	Participants of U.N. Conference on Racism	2916
5	17/12/2009	Copenhagen	Climate Change	Participants of the Climate Change Summit	2084
6	17/04/2010	Tehran	the 1st International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation	Participants the 1st International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation	2252
7	23/09/2010	New York	Remarks Before the U.N.G.A.	Participants of the 65th Session of the U.N.G.A.	3494
8	22/09/2011	New York	Remarks Before the U.N.G.A.	Participants of the 66th Session of the U.N.G.A.	2973

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[21] All of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speeches listed here can be found at the following website: http://www.president.ir/en/. [accessed on April 8th, 2012].

9	30/05/2012	New York	NPT of Nuclear weapons	Participants of the Review Conference	3556
10	30/08/2012	Tehran	16th NAM Summit	Participants of the 16th NAM Summit	2821
Total number of words					25,453

2.4 Method of Data Analysis

Traditionally, many researchers in discourse studies have adopted methods of qualitative research (see e.g. Fairclough 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b, 2003; Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1988). There are several advantages to qualitative research in discourse studies. First, there are fewer restrictions for the form or amount of data in qualitative research. Second, qualitative research enables us to study the context of the data, which is essential for discourse analysis. Third, qualitative research allows us to study a great variety of data in terms of differences. However, qualitative research necessarily deals with a smaller amount of data compared with quantitative research, thus facing the problem of generalizing or replicating the findings (Brannen 1992).

Similarly, quantitative research also has its advantages and disadvantages. It can surely benefit a lot from larger amounts of data, which allows us to generalize our findings more convincingly (Hammersley 1992). Besides, quantitative research makes it possible for us to deal with the data efficiently and systematically. Nevertheless, it also has its own weaknesses, such as the neglect of context and the lack of in-depth analysis. It is therefore more descriptive and unable to test research hypotheses (Hardman 2008:45).

Previous studies show that it is possible to mix quantitative research with qualitative research (see e.g. Bryman 1988, 2004; Brannen 1992, 2005; Koller and Mautner 2004). Therefore, I shall adopt a mixed approach to conduct this research, with quantitative research facilitating qualitative research. This means, just as Koller did in

her study (2004), this thesis will do quantitative analysis before qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis will be treated as 'a valuable starting point', providing 'a sound empirical basis' (Koller 2004:43) to support the subsequent qualitative analysis of the functions of modality and evidentiality in particular contexts. Also, I need to find out which modal markers or evidential markers occur most frequently in the data and deserve close attention in the qualitative analysis.

Quantitative research here refers to the quantitative calculations of the distributions and frequencies of different modal and evidential markers in each case study and the comparisons among the three speakers with a corpus linguistic approach. In Section 2.4.1, I will demonstrate the steps of quantitative analysis for this thesis, with a sample of quantitative analysis of modality.

Qualitative research involves close analysis of the functions of modality and evidentiality within the contexts, namely how modals and evidentials are used by politicians to persuade or manipulate their audience. In Section 2.4.2, I will briefly explain the method of studying the functions of modals and evidentials within the analytical framework.

2.4.1 Quantitative Analysis: A Corpus Linguistic Approach

Corpus linguistic approaches seem to be gradually gaining popularity among PDA researchers (see, e.g., Baker 2008; Fairclough 2000b; Flowerdew 1997; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Partington 2003). It helps 'uncover ideologies and evidence for disadvantage' in political texts (Baker 2006:5; see Hunston 2002:109-23 for a summary). Mautner, for example, explores how corpus linguistics can contribute to CDA and how to 'use a reference corpus to support interpretation in CDA' (2009:133).

There are several reasons why a corpus linguistic approach can be a useful tool in discourse studies. One major advantage is that this approach is concerned with empirical data, which 'enable the linguist to make statements which are objective and

based on language as it really is rather than statements which are subjective and based upon the individual's own internalized cognitive perception of the language' (McEnery and Wilson 2001:103; see also Koller and Mautner 2004). Similarly, Baker claims that a corpus linguistic approach enables us 'to place a number of restrictions on our cognitive biases' (2006:12).

A second advantage is that 'corpus analysis clearly provides a vast amount of textual fact' (Widdowson 2004:123). It can serve as the evidence of the distinctiveness about 'the occurrences of the linguistic features, lexical and syntactic, in particular texts, by referring them to a more general norm of usage' (ibid.).

A third advantage is that evidence from 'corpus, concordance and collocation' (Sinclair 1991) can help explain 'class, codes and control' (Bernstein 1990) in discourse studies. This is important because all the linguistic choices of speakers and writers reflect their representations of the world (Stubbs 1996:194). By examining the linguistic frequencies and collocations in the texts, we can see the links between linguistic features and social life, which can help us uncover the ideology encoded in the texts in terms of modality and evidentiality.

Another advantage of corpus analysis is that it can be 'a means of constraining the under-interpretation and over-interpretation of text' through checking the intuition of discourse analysts with corpus evidence (O'Halloran and Coffin 2004). As they argue:

> In assessing how a text positions its target audience, we as analysts have to try to check the prospect of over-interpretation and under-interpretation, and especially so if the target audience does not include us as analysts. Totally removing the values we bring as analysts to the text in question is difficult to achieve if indeed it is possible at all. But if we make no attempt to keep these in check, our analysis runs the risk of being merely narcissistic and would then lack generalizability – that is, we would only be analysing from our own perspective and so could not really claim that we are interpreting text positioning from the perspective of the

general target readership.

(O'Halloran and Coffin 2004:293-4)

There are two basic approaches in corpus study: a corpus-driven approach and a corpus-based approach. A corpus-based approach uses a corpus 'as a source of examples to check researcher intuition or to examine the frequency and/ or plausibility of the language contained within a smaller data set' (Baker 2006:16; also see Tognini-Bonelli 2001). That is to say, in this approach, a corpus is used as a reference corpus to compare its lexical frequencies or collocations with those within the data. Therefore, the corpus alone is not the data in a corpus-based approach. A case in point is in the study of Stubbs (1996), in which he compares the word 'happy' in two texts of Baden-Powell with that of the LOB corpus (a corpus of 1.5 million words of spoken and written English).

However, a corpus-driven analysis takes a more inductive approach – 'the corpus itself is the data and the patterns in it are noted as a way of expressing regularities (and exceptions) in language' (ibid.). For example, Baker claims that most his case studies are examples of corpus-driven analyses, that is, 'each one uses a particular corpus as the main or only source of data' (Baker 2006:16).

Based on previous studies, this research will adopt a data-driven approach[22], in which I will not only treat the three small corpora as the data for deriving the linguistic expressions (expressions of modality and evidentiality in this research), but also do quantitative analysis to compare the three politicians' linguistic choices.

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[22] This approach can be named as corpus linguistic approach, which is different from traditional corpus-based approach or corpus-driven approach. That is because it uses the corpora as the only data and generates examples from them, but at the same time the author uses these examples to check her research framework which is established on the basis of previous literatures.

Procedures of Quantitative Studies

Modality is a very complex domain and there is no agreed definition or typology for it (see van der Auwera and Plungian 1998:80; Nuyts 2010:5). This means I have to define and classify modality before moving on to retrieve the information I need in the data for detailed analysis. Then I have to identify the corresponding forms for each type of modality in political discourse. In addition, because the same modal marker can encode different meanings in different contexts, I will have to code the data manually before starting the quantitative analysis. Based on these principles, I divide the procedures of quantitative data analysis into four steps:

- Defining and classifying modality and evidentiality
- Retrieving forms of modality and evidentiality
- Coding the data and adapting the classifications of modality and evidentiality[23]
- Analysing the data quantitatively

(1) Defining and classifying modality and evidentiality

Traditionally, there are two perspectives with respect to the semantic study of modality. One is 'a top-down perspective' and its main concern is 'one of conceptual clarification of modal categories and modal functions', viz. a 'function-to-form' approach. The other is 'a bottom-up perspective' and its main concern is to 'trace the path from linguistic form to contextually conditioned functions', viz. a 'form-to-function' approach (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:2).

The approach of 'form-to-function' is 'the classical linguistic way of investigating language, viz. to start out from a particular linguistic structure (i.e. the modal auxiliaries) and try to account for its linguistic features' (Nuyts 2001a:24). Most the studies in modality adopt this perspective. For example, Palmer's early works (e.g. 1974) study modal auxiliaries from the perspective of 'form-to-function'. Another

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[23] This step actually has taken place several times during the step of coding the data, though I will not discuss it separately. Instead, it is better to be discussed in the first step in order to support the new classification of modality.

typical example is that almost all the corpus studies on modality take this approach for one obvious reason, that is, the object of study (form of modal expressions) should be chosen before the corpus studies start. Krug (2000), for instance, studies English quasi-modals (viz. semi-modals) from the perspective of grammaticalization. Besides, there are many researchers who study specific modal expressions (e.g. modal adverbs, modal adjectives, perception verbs, etc.) to explore their meaning (viz. function) in different contexts (see, e.g. Paradis 2003; Klinge 2010).

Although those studies with a perspective of 'form-to-function' are 'essential to uncovering central elements to the formulation of more adequately delineated categories' for modality (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:4), this approach 'potentially leads to a biased view of the "matching" problem in language' and needs to 'be systematically complemented by a "function-to-form" approach' (Nuyts 2010:14).

The approach of 'function-to-form' refers to the approach in which 'one takes the perspective of the meaning categories expressed in language and looks at the range of possibilities to realise them formally in the language' (Nuyts 2010:14). It seems to be impossible to conduct a purely function-to-form approach in this research as it is hard to define and delimit the functions of modality.

In sum, it is difficult to adopt either of these two approaches exclusively (see Palmer 1979:1). There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, if we take a purely 'form-to-function' approach, it would confine us to looking for other modal expressions which may be of significance in the study of modality. It is evident that there are many other modal expressions in addition to modal auxiliaries. On the other hand, a purely 'function-to-form' approach is concerned with the problem of defining the term of modality precisely, which as we know is extremely difficult.

Thus, as Palmer (1979:2) suggested, we have to take into account both form and meaning/function, that is, integrating these two perspectives. In fact, the process of

defining and classifying modality and evidentiality is a two-directional process in this study. In the context of political discourse, I have to first define and classify modality and evidentiality based on previous studies before retrieving the forms and tagging them, but I also have to modify their classifications several times during the process of retrieving the forms and tagging the data.

Modality

In this thesis, modality is classified into four types: Deontic Modality, Epistemic Modality, Volitional Modality and Dynamic Modality. It is essential to note that the process of tagging the data is also an effective way to check and modify the classification of modality. Moving between data and theory, the classification presented has been modified several times during this process. However, in contrast to the other three categories, all the modal markers of dynamic modality, such as 'can, be able to, capable', are of intermediate value. This makes it difficult to fit into the research framework of this study. That is because the framework involves three modal values and three corresponding levels of distance, and other three types of modality all have modal markers in three modal values (See Section 2.2.2 in this chapter). Therefore, the category of dynamic modality will not be addressed in detail in this thesis, although it will be discussed when necessary.

There are a number of reasons for having volitional modality as a distinct category. Volitional modality is different from deontic modality or dynamic modality in semantic meaning; it should become a separate category, because it expresses the subject's desires, intentions or willingness to take action. However, in deontic modality the participant (indicated by the subject) is often imposed upon to take actions by the obligations, necessities or permissions conferred by an outside source. In dynamic modality, on the other hand, the participant is often 'the source of the ability' (see Nuyts 2010:13). Dynamic modality, therefore, is not a part of deontic modality, as traditionally dynamic modality is regarded as part of 'root modality' (cf. Papafragou 2002:186) or 'event modality' (cf. Palmer 2001), together with deontic

modality.

As discussed in Section 2.2, this thesis takes a cognitive-functional perspective on modality. Modality is conceptualized in terms of distance (cf. Chilton 2004) and treated as a scalar phenomenon pertaining to modal values (cf. Halliday 1994). The primary function of modality is expressing stance (Biber and Finegan 1989; Marín-Arrese 2011a). The types of modality express epistemic stance, deontic stance, and volitional stance respectively.

Therefore, in this thesis modality is classified according to the scalar force (illocutionary force) of the speaker's epistemic, deontic or volitional stance indicated in the utterance where its force is evaluated in terms of its distance towards the centre of certainty, necessity or willingness. For example, an epistemic modal of high value is close to the centre of certainty, thus it expresses the strongest force of the speaker's epistemic stance. Similarly, a deontic modal of low value is distant from the centre of necessity; therefore it encodes the weakest force of the speaker's deontic stance. Volitional modality is very much similar to the other two types of modality in this respect.

In this way, epistemic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of epistemic stance involving certainty, possibility, or predications indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of epistemic distance towards the centre of certainty. Deontic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of deontic stance involving necessity, obligations, or permission indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of deontic distance towards the centre of necessity/rightness. Volitional modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of volitional stance involving willingness, desirability or intentions indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of volitional distance towards the centre of willingness.

Evidentiality

In contrast to previous studies on the typology of evidentiality (cf. Willett 1988; Palmer 2001; Mar ń-Arrese 2011a), evidentiality in this thesis is treated as persuasion strategies and therefore its classification includes both the most typical evidential categories (e.g. perceptions and hearsay evidentials) and some marginal evidential categories (e.g. evidentials inferred from results or common knowledge). The former is widely acknowledged in the previous studies (see e.g. Chafe 1986:263; Willett 1988:57; Palmer 2001:56; Aikhenvald 2007:211; Mar ń-Arrese 2011a:206; Hart 2011:760), while the latter has also been treated as evidentials from different perspectives, such as OBVIOUSNESS and PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Bednarek 2006a), or beliefs (Chafe 1986:263; equivalent to personal evidentiality in Mar ń-Arrese's study, Marín-Arrese 2011a:206), or results and reasoning (cf. Hart 2011b:758) (See Chapter Six for detailed explanations).

Thus, in this thesis evidentiality is defined as the linguistic marking of source of knowledge (information) used as persuasion strategies. Following Squartini (2008:918), I propose a framework of English evidentiality which integrates source of information and modes of knowing. The linguistic markers (evidentials) indicating sources of information are divided into three categories, depending on whether the locus of information is from an 'outside source', 'shared source' or 'inside source'. The distinction of outside source and inside source lies in whether the information is external or internal with respect to the speaker (Squartini 2008:917-947), while shared source is proposed here to refer to the information known to both the speaker and his addressees (often presupposed by the speaker). They can be further classified into two categories in each source according to different modes of knowing: 'the process leading to the acquisition of the information (directly visual, indirectly through inferences, reports' (Squartini 2008:917).

In this framework, therefore, the evidential markers can be classified into six types, including Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.); Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.);

Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.); Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)[24], as illustrated in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6 An integrated framework of English evidentiality

Outside Source	**1. Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)** (e.g. some reports indicate, the result shows; the figure reveals) **2. Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)** (e.g. some say; it is said that*; some people think)
Shared Source	**3. Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.)** *(1) sensory perception* (e.g. we've seen; you've heard) *(2)Mental perception or inference* (e.g. clearly, it was clear that; obviously, it seems, apparently) **4. Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)** (e.g. in fact; actually; it is evident that; evidently; there's no doubt that; undoubtedly; we know, you know, everyone knows)
Inside Source	**5. Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.)** (e.g. I saw; I heard; I feel) **6. Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)** (e.g. I know; I am convinced; I've learned; I realize; I believe; I think; I suppose; in my opinion; I have no doubt; I am confident)

(2) Retrieving forms of modality and evidentiality

For the second step, I adopted a data-driven approach to retrieve the various forms of modals and evidentials from the data. Based on the previous classification and definitions of modal types, I identified four main categories of modal forms in the data (including Modal Verbs, Semi-Modals, Modal Adjectives and Modal Adverbs),

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[24] These six types of evidentials are identified manually in the data and then will be annotated and analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively in Chapter Six.

encoding three main modal semantic categories mentioned above (Deontic Modality, Epistemic Modality, and Volitional Modality) and three corresponding values (including High, Intermediate, and Low), as illustrated in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7 Categories of modal forms, meanings and values in political discourse

Modal Values / Modal Types		High Value	Intermediate Value	Low Value
Deontic Modality (**necessity**, obligation, permission)	Positive	must, shall have to have got to need to, be to be required to obliged necessary necessarily	should, can be supposed to ought to responsible responsibly	could may might be allowed to
	Negative	must not be not allowed to	shouldn't can't ought not to irresponsible	might not may not could not not have to not need to unnecessary unnecessarily
Epistemic Modality (**certainty**,	Positive	must, will, shall be to be going to certain, sure	would, can, may, should probable,	could might possible

possibility, predictions)		certainly, surely	likely probably, maybe perhaps	possibly
	Negative	must not will not be not going to impossible	would not may not can not improbable unlikely	could not might not uncertain
Volitional Modality (**willingness**, desirability, intentions)	Positive	will shall be to be going to be determined to	would, should, may intend to want to willingly	might be willing to
	Negative	will not be not going to	would not not intend to not want to	be unwilling to

The situation is very complicated, especially for modal verbs. Here I divided each modal form into both positive and negative forms because some modal markers have different modal values when they are negative. For example, '*possible*' is of low value, while its negative form '*impossible*' indicates the opposite meaning of '*certain*', and therefore demonstrates a high value. However, while '*certain*' is of high value, its negative form '*uncertain*' indicates a low value because '*uncertain*' manifests a low possibility of the proposition. Besides, the values of those modals modified with intensified or mitigated adverbs such as 'extremely *unlikely*' or 'definitely *impossible*' will only be decided according to the modals themselves, though there is no doubt that they are intensified when compared with '*unlikely*' or '*impossible*'. Moreover, as some modal markers encode different modal meanings, they appear several times. For example, there are mainly ten modal verbs, including '*must*', '*can*', '*could*', '*will*',

'*would*', '*may*', '*might*', '*shall*' , '*should*' and '*ought (to)*'. Most modals have two different readings such as '*will*' or '*can*', while '*shall*' '*should*' and '*may*' can have all three readings.

I identified the five most frequent semi-modals as '*have (got) to*', '*want to*', '*be to*[25]', '*be going to*', and '*need to*'; and six less frequent semi-modals including '*intend to*', '*be required to*', '*be supposed to*', '*be allowed to*', '*be determined to*' and '*be willing to*' in the data. While '*be to*' can have all the three different modal meanings and '*be going to*' has both epistemic and volitional meanings, other semi-modals have only one reading; '*have (got) to*', '*need to*', '*be required to*', '*be supposed to*' and '*be allowed to*' only have a deontic reading; '*want to*', '*intend to*', '*be determined to*' and '*be willing to*' only have a volitional reading. In addition, each of the modal adjectives and adverbs only encode one specific modal meaning. Overall, it is obvious that we cannot match each category of modal form with one specific semantic meaning, which is also the main reason why we have to analyse modality in its context.

Compared with modals, it is much easier to retrieve the evidential markers in the data as each of them only falls into one category, based on the criteria which are shown in Table 2.6. Note that the evidentials identified in the data are not restricted to those listed in the table. As discussed previously, covert (zero-marked) modals and evidentials will not be taken into account in this thesis because it is impossible to count them as they are almost everywhere.

(3) Coding the Data

After retrieving all the forms of modality from the data, I started to read through all the speeches in the data line by line to identify and decide each modal marker or evidential marker with its relevant types and value in its context. At the same time, I

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[25] '*Be to*' has a number of different meanings. Some have modal readings including deontic, epistemic and volitional readings, but many have no modal meanings. For example, '*be to*' only expresses the result of '*hiring teachers to reduce class size*' in the example of 'Therefore, perversely, hiring teachers to reduce class size is to reduce productivity'. Thus, we only deal with the cases with modal meanings in this research.

coded all the forms, types, values of modal markers; sources and strengths of evidence in the data manually with their abbreviated forms to make it easier for analysing them quantitatively and qualitatively, as shown in brackets in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8 Abbreviations of modal markers and evidential markers

Forms of Modality	Types of Modality	Value of Modality	Sources of Evidentiality	Types of Evidentiality[26]
Modal verbs (M.verb.)	Deontic Modality (D.M.)	High Value (High.)	Outside Source (Outside)	I.R.
				H.E.
Semi-modals (M.semi.)	Epistemic Modality (E.M.)	Intermediate Value (Inter.)	Shared Source (Shared)	S.P.
				S.K.
Modal adjectives (M. adj.)	Volitional Modality (V.M.)	Low Value (Low.)	Inside Source (Inside)	P.P.
				P.K.
Modal adverbs (M. adv.)	/	/	/	/

I will employ a colour coding scheme throughout as follows:

Modal marker < form / type / value >

Evidential marker < source / type >

Consider the following examples taken from the coded data:

[1] We need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > modernise the way we do business in Europe. Otherwise, far from speeding the pace of change, enlargement would <

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[26] Refer to Table 2.6 for the full names of evidential types.

M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > make the system grind to a halt. **(T. Blair; 18 November, 2003)**

[2] But I also believe < Inside / P.K. > America at its best is a powerful force for good in the world; one of a few countries willing < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > and able to stand up for what it believes. **(T. Blair; 15 December 1998)**

[3] We will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High. > be better placed after this military strike than if we had to < M.semi. / D.M / High. > go on dealing with a Saddam Hussein whose military capability had not been weakened and with an UNSCOM increasingly impeded from any serious work. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

In Example [1], the yellow codes < M.semi. / D.M. / High > after the modal marker-need to indicate it is a semi-modal, a deontic modal marker and of high value. Similarly, the yellow codes < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > after the modal marker-would indicate it is an epistemic modal verb of intermediate value.

In Example [2], the blue codes < Inside / P.K. > after the evidential marker-I also believe indicate it is an inside evidential marker inferred from personal knowledge. Besides, the yellow codes < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > after the modal marker-willing (to) show it is a volitional semi-modal of low value.

In Example [3], the yellow codes < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > after the modal marker-will show it is an epistemic modal verb of high value and those codes < M.adv. / E.M. / High. > after the modal marker-certainly indicate it is an epistemic modal adverb of high value. Likewise, the codes < M.semi. / D.M / High. > after the modal marker-had to indicate it is a deontic semi-modal of high value.

(4) Analysing the Data Quantitatively

Quantitative data analysis involves the calculations of the distributions, concordances and collocations of different modal and evidential forms in each case and the comparisons among the three speakers with a corpus linguistic approach.

Based on the previous classifications of modal types, values and forms and the tagged data, I will first calculate the distributions of modal types in the three cases and then make a comparison of their frequencies, followed by the calculations and comparisons of modal values and forms respectively. Then I will explore the distributions and frequencies of the three modal types with regard to values, forms and top-ten modal markers among the three speakers in the following three chapters, respectively. After that, I will investigate the frequencies and distributions of evidentials among the three speakers from the perspectives of sources, types and top-ten evidential markers in Chapter Six. In Chapter 7, I will examine the distributions of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality in the three cases from the perspective of the interaction of three modal types and three sources of evidentials. Following the sections of quantitative analysis in each chapter, there will be a section focusing on the discussion of results and implications.

In what follows, I will give a sample of quantitative data analysis by demonstrating the use of types, values and forms of modality among the three speakers.

(i) Types of Modality

As can be seen in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.4, the distributions of modal types are very similar among the three speakers. Epistemic modality takes the first place among three types of modality in all three cases, taking up approximately half of the total. The frequency of deontic modality ranks second in all three cases, followed by that of volitional modality.

Table 2.9 The Distribution of Types of Modality in the three cases

Speakers / Types of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
E.M.	373	51.66%	479	59.43%	208	51.11%
D.M.	200	27.70%	177	21.96%	140	34.40%
V.M.	149	20.64%	150	18.61%	59	14.49%
Total	722	100%	806	100%	407	100%

Figure 2.4 The distribution of types of modality in the three cases

In order to compare the frequencies of modal types among the three cases, I also worked out the figures of per thousand words (henceforth, ptw) for each modal type and their average figures based on the original size of data[27], as shown in Table 2.10 and Figure 2.5. It is obvious that Obama uses far more epistemic modality with a frequency of 18.09 ptw than the two other speakers with 14.15 ptw (Blair) and 8.17 ptw (Ahmadinejad) respectively. He also ranks first in the use of volitional modality (5.67 ptw). However, Blair (7.59 ptw) uses more deontic modals than the other two speakers. Compared with the two other speakers, Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer

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[27] The total number of words of the data is 78,793 words, with 26, 354 words in Blair's speeches, 26,476 words in Obama's speeches and 25,453 words in Ahmadinejad's speeches respectively. For details, please refer to Section 2.3.

modals in all the three types, with only half of their figures of epistemic modality & volitional modality and two-thirds of that of deontic modality. Overall, the differences of three types of modality among the three speakers are all significant, though statistical analyses shows Blair and Obama[28] have no significant differences in the use of deontic modality and volitional modality.

Table 2.10 A comparison of types of modality in the three cases

Speakers / Types of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-Value	SoD[29]
	No.	ptw[30]	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
E.M.	373	14.15	479	18.09	208	8.17	< 2.2e-16	Yes
D.M.	200	7.59	177	6.69	140	5.50	0.01324	Yes
V.M.	149	5.65	150	5.67	59	2.32	7.083e-10	Yes
Total	722	27.40	806	30.44	407	15.99	< 2.2e-16	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 2.5 A comparison of types of modality in the three cases

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[28] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of deontic modals (P-value: 0.2372) and volitional modals (P-value: 0.968).

[29] 'SoD' is the abbreviation of 'significance of difference'.

[30] 'ptw' is the abbreviation of 'per thousand words'.

(ii) Values of Modality

With respect to the values of modality, the percentages of different modal values present a similar pattern among the three cases. As can be seen in Table 2.11 and Figure 2.6, the numbers of high value and intermediate value are more or less similar in all three cases, occupying almost 90% of the whole. It is interesting to see that there are more modal markers of high values than intermediate values in all three cases. In addition, the percentages of low value are also very similar, with each taking up around 7% in all three cases.

Table 2.11 The distribution of values of modality in the three cases

Speakers / Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
High	359	49.72%	370	45.91%	191	46.93%
Inter.	308	42.66%	367	45.53%	185	45.45%
Low	55	7.62%	69	8.56%	31	7.62%
Total	722	100%	806	100%	407	100%

Figure 2.6 The distribution of values of modality in the three cases

In terms of the frequencies of modal values, Obama takes up the first position in all the categories, as illustrated in Table 2.12 and Figure 2.7. It is surprising that all the figures in the case of Ahmadinejad are about half of the other cases. Although there are significant differences with regard to all the three values of modality among the three cases, the results between Blair and Obama have no significant differences in the use of modals in high and low values[31].

Table 2.12 A comparison of values of modality in the three cases

Speakers / Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-Value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
High	359	13.62	370	13.97	191	7.50	1.749e-13	Yes
Inter.	308	11.69	367	13.86	185	7.27	3.043e-12	Yes
Low	55	2.09	69	2.61	31	1.22	0.001592	Yes
Total	722	27.40	806	30.44	407	15.99	< 2.2e-16	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

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[31] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of modals of high value (P-value: 0.7564) and low value (P-value: 0.253).

Figure 2.7 A comparison of values of modality in the three cases

(iii) Forms of Modality

As can be seen in the Table 2.13 and Figure 2.8, modal verbs take up more than 70% in all the cases. Interestingly, all the speakers use modal forms in a very similar way, with far more semi-modals than the other modal markers, followed by modal adjectives and modal adverbs, though Ahmadinejad uses more modal adjectives than semi-modals and modal adverbs.

Table 2.13 The distribution of forms of modality in the three cases

Speakers / Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
M.verb.	528	73.13%	620	76.92%	324	79.61%
M.semi.	142	19.67%	134	16.63%	36	8.85%
M.adj.	39	5.40%	37	4.59%	44	10.81%
M.adv.	13	1.80%	15	1.86%	3	0.74%
Total	722	100%	806	100%	407	100%

Figure 2.8 The distribution of forms of modality in the three cases

As demonstrated in Table 2.14 and Figure 2.9, Obama uses far more modal verbs than the other speakers, with a striking figure of 23.42 ptw. Blair uses more semi-modals than the other two speakers, with a frequency of 5.39 ptw. It is interesting to note that Ahmadinejad ranks first in the use of modal adjectives (1.73 ptw), although he uses far fewer modal markers in all the other forms. Except for modal adjectives, all the other modal forms have significant differences among the three speakers. However, the differences of modal forms between Blair and Obama are only significant in the category of modal verbs[32].

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[32] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of semi-modals (P-value: 0.6449), modal adjectives (P-value: 0.64490.8927), and modal adverbs (P-value: 0.8597).

Table 2.14 A comparison of forms of modality in the three cases

Speakers / Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-Value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
M.verb.	528	20.03	620	23.42	324	12.73	< 2.2e-16	Yes
M.semi.	142	5.39	134	5.06	36	1.41	1.921e-14	Yes
M.adj.	39	1.48	37	1.40	44	1.73	0.6056	No
M.adv.	13	0.49	15	0.57	3	0.12	0.02294	Yes
Total	722	27.40	806	30.44	407	15.99	< 2.2e-16	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 2.9 A comparison of forms of modality in the three cases

Overall, the distributions of modal types, values and forms in the three cases demonstrate quite a similar pattern. However, it is important to note that Obama ranks first in most categories, particularly for epistemic modality with respect to modal types, intermediate value in terms of modal values, modal verbs as to modal forms, with a strikingly high frequency of total number of modal markers. Blair comes after him, sharing very similar distributions with him in most aspects. However, Blair uses

more semi-modals and modal adjectives than Obama. Compared with the other two speakers, Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal markers in almost every category, although he uses the most modal adjectives.

2.4.2 Qualitative Analysis: A Cognitive-functional Approach

The qualitative analysis in this thesis refers to the analysis of functions of modality and evidentiality in the context of political discourse. Based on the cognitive-functional analytical framework proposed in this chapter (see Section 2.2) and the quantitative results in Section 2 of Chapters 3-7 (viz. Sections 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2), the functions of three types of modality and six types of evidentiality will be addressed in Sections 3 of Chapters 3-6 respectively (viz. Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3). Besides, the co-occurrence patterns of modality and evidentiality will be discussed in Section 7.3.

In the first sub-section of qualitative analysis in Chapters 3-5, the functions of modality will be first examined as stance-taking acts, followed by the investigation of its functions in terms of ideology and legitimisation. The last subsection will be the detailed analysis of the most frequent modal markers of three modal values (high, intermediate and low, corresponding with three levels of distance) among the three cases. Each type of modality encodes its distinctive stance and ideology (see section 2.2.5 for details).

The qualitative analysis of evidentiality is quite different from the study of modality. The functions of evidentiality will be addressed in Section 6.3 from the perspectives of making commitments, marking (inter)subjectivity and encoding ideology in the first subsection. The second subsection will investigate the functions of six types of evidential markers with respect to their sources and modes of knowing.

In Section 7.3, the functions of the interaction of modality and evidentiality at both sentential and discourse levels will be addressed with respect to the co-occurrences of

three modal types and three sources of evidentials, with examples from the three cases.

2.5 Summary

In conclusion, this chapter has proposed a cognitive-functional analytical framework for studying modality (and evidentiality) in political discourse, introduced data collection and background, as well as discussed the method of data analysis from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.

In particular, I have illustrated the research framework of analysing modality in political discourse, explaining some key concepts including the dimensions of time, space and evidentiality, deontic distance, epistemic distance, volitional distance, value of modality and strength of evidence. I have also discussed how the functions of the three types of modality in political discourse can be investigated at both propositional and discourse levels within the research framework. I have defined and classified two key terms (modality and evidentiality) in the section of method of data analysis. Furthermore, I have illustrated the method of quantitative data analysis by analysing the types, values and forms of modality used among the three speakers.

On the basis of the framework, data and methods which have been described in this chapter, the following three chapters will explore the forms, values and functions of three types of modality from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.

Chapter Three: Epistemic Modality in Political Discourse

3.1 Introduction

 'Epistemic stance' has been studied widely in discourse analysis and Cognitive Linguistics where it has been theorised in terms of 'epistemic distance' (e.g. Chilton 2004; Sweetser 1990; Langacker 1991). Epistemic distance is concerned with 'the speaker's metaphorical "distance" from a particular state of affairs: the speaker's "position" or judgment regarding the likelihood of a particular situation coming about' (Evans and Green 2006:395). On the other hand, according to Halliday, modality is regarded as 'the intermediate degrees between the positive and negative poles' and its work is 'to construe the region of uncertainty that lies between "yes" and "no"' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147). In other words, different degrees of epistemic modality indicate its distance from certainty.

As discussed in Chapter Two, epistemic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of epistemic stance, involving possibility, predications or capabilities as indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of epistemic distance towards the centre of certainty. Supported with evidence from various sources and of different strengths, it is also possible for political speakers

to legitimise their own political proposals/actions or delegitimise their opponents' proposals/actions.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate how epistemic modality functions in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. As has been discussed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter Two, this thesis will put quantitative data analysis before qualitative data analysis as the former can provide empirical evidence for claims in the latter (Koller 2004).

3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Epistemic Modality

In this section, I shall calculate and compare the frequencies and distributions of epistemic modality from the perspectives of values and forms in the three cases. In addition, I will compare the top-ten modal markers of epistemic modality in the three cases. After that, I will discuss the results and implications of how different political speakers use epistemic modality in their speeches.

3.2.1 Values of Epistemic Modality

As we can see in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, the distribution of values of epistemic modality in the three cases presents a very similar pattern, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama. Overall the percentage of intermediate value takes the first position, followed by high value and low value in the cases of Blair and Obama, while Ahmadinejad has a higher percentage of high value than that of intermediate value. Compared with the two other speakers, Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer epistemic modal markers (208 counts), less than half of those of Obama (479 counts).

Table 3.1 The distribution of values of epistemic modality in the three cases

Speakers Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
High	154	41.29%	188	39.24%	102	49.04%
Inter.	180	48.26%	239	49.90%	79	37.98%
Low	39	10.46%	52	10.86%	27	12.98%
Total	373	100%	479	100%	208	100%

Figure 3.1 The distribution of values of epistemic modality in the three cases

As can be seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, Obama ranks first in all the categories in terms of epistemic modal values, followed by Blair and Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad uses far fewer epistemic modals than those of the other two speakers in every category. In particular, for epistemic modals of high and intermediate values, Ahmadinejad adopts only half of those of Obama. Overall, the differences of the frequencies of modal values among the three speakers are significant, though there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama with respect to the use of epistemic modals of high and low values[33].

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[33] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in the use of epistemic modals of high value (P-value: 0.08057) and low value (P-value: 0.2161).

Table 3.2 A comparison of values of epistemic modality in the three cases

Speakers / Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-Value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
High	154	5.84	188	7.10	102	4.01	1.491e-05	Yes
Inter.	180	6.83	239	9.03	79	3.10	< 2.2e-16	Yes
Low	39	1.48	52	1.96	27	1.06	0.02938	Yes
Total	373	14.15	479	18.09	208	8.17	< 2.2e-16	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 3.2 A comparison of values of epistemic modality in the three cases

3.2.2 Forms of Epistemic Modality

As can be seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3, the distribution of epistemic modal verbs takes up the first position in all three cases with an average of 87%, followed by modal adjectives, semi-modals and modal adverbs. Surprisingly, although Ahmadinejad uses 13.46% modal adjectives, he uses very few modal adverbs (1.44%) and no semi-modals.

Table 3.3 The distribution of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases

Speakers Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
M.verb.	334	89.54%	432	90.19%	177	85.10%
M.semi.	11	2.95%	12	2.51%	0	0
M.adj.	20	5.36%	24	5.01%	28	13.46%
M.adv.	8	2.14%	11	2.29%	3	1.44%
Total	373	100%	479	100%	208	100%

Figure 3.3 The distribution of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases

In Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4, we can see that all three speakers use far more modal verbs than other forms, which is probably the reason why many previous studies focus on modal verbs only when discussing epistemic modality. It is surprising to see that Obama uses a lot more modal verbs (16.32 ptw) than Blair (12.67 ptw) and Ahmadinejad (6.95 ptw), though he adopts very similar numbers of semi-modals, modal adjectives and adverbs to Blair. Compared with Blair and Obama, Ahmadinejad adopts more modal adjectives, with far fewer modal verbs and modal adverbs, and no semi-modals. Overall, the differences of the frequencies of epistemic modal verbs and semi-modals among the three cases are significant, while comparing the results of

Blair and Obama, only modal verbs are significantly different[34].

Table 3.4 A comparison of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases

Speakers Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
M.verb.	334	12.67	432	16.32	177	6.95	< 2.2e-16	Yes
M.semi.	11	0.42	12	0.45	0	0	0.003806	Yes
M.adj.	20	0.76	24	0.91	28	1.10	0.4387	No
M.adv.	8	0.30	11	0.42	3	0.12	0.1248	No
Total	373	14.15	479	18.09	208	8.17	< 2.2e-16	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 3.4 A comparison of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases

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[34] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of epistemic semi-modals (P-value: 0.9912) modal adjectives (P-value: 0.662) and modal adverbs (P-value: 0.6535).

3.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Epistemic Modality

As can be seen in Table 3.5, the list of the most frequent modal markers among the three cases presents a very similar pattern (See Table A1-A3 in the Appendix for details). Firstly, the three speakers share most of the ten top-modal markers regardless of their ranks, such as '*will*', '*can*', '*would*', '*could*', and '*possible*'. Secondly, epistemic modal markers '*will*', '*can*' and '*would*' take up the first three positions in all three cases.

However, the results show that there are more disparities than similarities. First of all, Blair and Ahmadinejad use far more '*will*' than '*can*' with 123 counts vs. 94 counts and 81 counts vs. 20 counts respectively, while the situation is reversed in the case of Obama (161 counts vs. 167 counts). Second, Obama uses '*can*' (167 counts) and '*will*' (161 counts) far more frequently than Blair and Ahmadinejad (with 94 and 50 counts in the use of '*can*'; 124 and 82 counts in the use of '*will*'). Besides, he adopts more '*could*' (32 counts), '*may*' (20 counts) and '*be going to*' (11 counts) than the other two speakers. Third, Blair uses more '*would*' (62 counts), and '*be to*' (6 counts), compared with Obama and Ahmadinejad (37 and 30 counts in the use of '*would*'; 1 and 0 counts in the use of '*be to*').

Interestingly, Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal verbs than the other two speakers, particularly for '*will*' and '*can*', though he adopts more '*possible*' (22 counts), and '*shall*' (4 counts).

Overall, all three speakers use far more modal verbs in epistemic modality, such as '*will*' , '*can*' , '*would*' and '*could*', though each speaker has different preferences in other modal markers.

Table 3.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of epistemic modality in the three cases

Speakers Top-10 Modal Markers	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.
1	will[35]	124(8)	can	167(31)	will	82(7)
2	can	94(20)	will	161(13)	can	50(8)
3	would	62(4)	would	37(6)	would	30(5)
4	could	22(3)	could	32(4)	possible	22(9)
5	possible	12(1)	may	20(4)	could	12(2)
6	may	11	possible	13(1)	may	5
7	might	6	be going to	11	shall	4
8	be to	6	might	5	certainly	3
9	be going to	5(1)	shall	4	sure	2
10	shall/should	4/4	maybe	4	must/probable/ unlikely	1/1/1

3.2.4 Discussions and Implications

In sum, this section has illustrated and compared the distributions and frequencies of the values and forms of epistemic modality among the three cases. It has also showed ten most frequent epistemic modal markers in each case and discussed their similarities and differences among the three speakers. The most striking results and their implications are as follows:

(i) On the whole, the distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in the three cases present quite a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in

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[35] The numbers in the brackets of Table 3.5 & 3.6 indicate the numbers of the negative forms of corresponding epistemic modal markers, which have been included in the total numbers, e.g. '124' is the total number of epistemic marker '*will*' used by Tony Blair, and '8' is the number of its negative form.

the cases of Blair and Obama. As to the total number of epistemic modal markers, Obama comes first with 479 counts, followed by Blair with 373 counts, while Ahmadinejad uses only about half of their figures (208 counts). This difference could derive from the issue of their distinctive rhetorical styles, or cultural differences or the translation issue (particularly in the case of Ahmadinejad).

(ii) With regard to modal values, Obama uses the most epistemic modals both in total and in all the categories, followed by Blair and Ahmadinejad. The percentages of intermediate value are higher than those of high value in the cases of Blair and Obama, but this is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. That is probably because making assertions in intermediate force allows the speakers to evade the potential responsibility if their epistemic judgments turn out to be wrong (Hart 2014:58).

(iii) Modal verbs take up the first position in all the cases, with over 85%. That means other modal forms account for about 15%. That is probably the reason why previous studies of epistemic modality often focus on modal verbs only. However, there are also some interesting results about other modal forms, such as '*certain/certainly*', and '*possible/ impossible*'.

(iv) The differences among the three cases are significant in all the modal values, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals. As Obama and Blair are similar in the frequencies of most forms and values of epistemic modals[36], it is the results of high and low values as well as semi-modals and modal adjectives in Ahmadinejad's case that make these differences significant. So it gives us a hint that these disparities might be the differences of using epistemic modal markers between English native speakers and foreigners. Therefore, it is important to examine these values and forms of epistemic modals in political discourse in more detail.

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[36] I calculated the P-value of the differences in the use of epistemic modals between Obama and Blair in every category and found no significant differences in high and low values, as well as most modal forms except modal verbs.

(v) Epistemic modals '*will*', '*can*' and '*would*' take up the first three positions in all three cases, although the order of '*will*' and '*can*' is reversed in the case of Obama. One major reason for this fact is that all of them convey several different semantic meanings, which make it easier for the speakers to conceal their real intentions and evade responsibilities.

(vi) Besides the similarities, each speaker also has his own preferences in using epistemic modals. For example, Obama uses far more '*can*' and '*will*' than the other two speakers, while Blair uses more '*would*' & '*be to*' and Ahmadinejad uses more '*possible*' & '*shall*'.

However, before making generalizations about the functions of epistemic modals in political discourse, it is essential to take context into consideration. Therefore, it is necessary to look at how these modal markers used in the context and consider why they may have been chosen to serve specific purposes. In particular, it is important to explore their various functions under different circumstances. For these reasons, in the next section, I am going to address epistemic modality qualitatively with various examples retrieved from the three cases.

3.3 Qualitative Analysis of Epistemic Modality

As mentioned previously in Chapter Two (see Section 2.2.4), modality is treated as a stance-taking act and contributes to the function of (de)legitimisation.

In the first sub-section, I will discuss how epistemic modality functions as knowledge-based stance and reflecting ideology, and then illustrate its contribution to the process of (de)legitimisation at the propositional level. In the second sub-section, I shall explore how different expressions of epistemic modality function in different contexts from the perspectives of epistemic distance, and value of modality through a

detailed qualitative analysis.

3.3.1 Epistemic Modality as Knowledge-based Stance

Previous studies show that modality is an important way of expressing stance. For example, Biber and Finegan treat modals as 'stance markers', which express 'attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message' (1989:93). Following Mar ń-Arrese (2011b:195), epistemic stance here refers to:

> the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the knowledge concerning the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at estimating the likelihood of an event and/or judging the validity of a proposition designating the event.

Indeed, epistemic modality can be adopted to make epistemic judgments and express epistemic stance with reference to knowledge (see van Dijk 1998, 2011, 2014). Put another way, epistemic stance is mainly knowledge-based. That is because epistemic modality is used to express the speaker's stance towards the possibility of the realization of events, based on the knowledge he/she has. This knowledge often depends on the speaker's interest (van Dijk 2011:38) and reflects his beliefs about truth or reality (as part of his ideology). This knowledge can be from different sources (including outside, shared or inside source), which are often marked by evidential markers (see Chapter Six for details). For instance, if the knowledge of Saddam's threat is described as certain with high-value epistemic modals, then attacking Iraq will be the right choice, but not when used with epistemic modals of low value or in their negative forms. The use of epistemic modals, then, can be seen as 'knowledge grading' which is a key strategy of managing knowledge in public discourse (Facchinetti et al. 2003). In other words, the knowledge relating to high-value epistemic modal should be graded as certain knowledge, as it is positioned close to the centre of certainty, while that used with low value should be graded as possible knowledge as it is positioned distant from the centre (see Section 3.3.2 for details).

Epistemic modals are, then, dealt with as encoding different illocutionary force involving the speaker's knowledge (including certainty, possibility, predication) towards the actualization of propositions. Therefore, epistemic stance can be classified into three levels of force corresponding to three levels of modal value, semantic meaning and epistemic distance: High-certain-close; Intermediate-probable-near; Low-possible-distant. It means an epistemic modal marker with a higher value typically expresses a stronger epistemic stance because it is positioned as closer to the centre of certainty, and vice versa. For example, the epistemic modal '*will*' in the example "He *will* come tomorrow." (where *will* is an epistemic modal of high value) expresses much stronger stance than that of "He *may* come tomorrow." (where *may* is an epistemic modal marker of intermediate value), and "He *might* come tomorrow." (where *might* is an epistemic modal marker of low value).

Unlike the function of expressing stance, the function of reflecting ideology in terms of epistemic modality is implicit, though it can be inferred from its stance. Epistemic stance reflects the speaker's ideology based on his/her knowledge concerning what is possible or impossible to be realized. And the epistemic stance made by the speaker usually involve his common sense/ knowledge about what is likely or unlikely to be actualized (cf. van Djik 1998), which often reveals the speaker's beliefs (as part of his ideology) about what is common knowledge in the context of political discourse. This common knowledge is not necessarily shared by others, but held by the speaker himself. Consider the following example:

It is crystal clear that < Shared / S.P. > such a management is to the disadvantage of all nations and even themselves. The continuation of such a management is definitely impossible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >. **(M. Ahmadinejad; August 30, 2012)**

The epistemic modal marker '*impossible*' in this example indicates the speaker's strong negative epistemic stance towards the continuation of the management system

of UN. This epistemic stance is taken based on his knowledge (reflecting his ideology) towards the system. The evidential marker '**it is crystal clear that**' also indicates that Ahmadinejad treats this as a shared fact that can be seen via visual perception.

The three different levels of epistemic stance taken by political speakers can be used to (de)legitimise assertions by saying something is certain, probable and possible to be realized based on the speaker's knowledge or expertise (Reyes 2011b, 2014). The evidentials in the context help the political speaker to explain how far the proposition is from certainty in terms of epistemic distance. This will be further elaborated in detail in Section 3.3.2.

3.3.2 Markers of Epistemic Modality in the three cases

In this section, the functions of epistemic modality will be examined in detail through a variety of epistemic modal expressions from the perspectives of value of modality and epistemic distance. It will also be interesting to see how the speakers' beliefs and opinions are formulated and graded into different levels of force or knowledge (certain, probable, possible or impossible) in terms of epistemic modals during the persuasion process (van Dijk 2011:41).

3.3.2.1 High Value: Close-certain

Within the analytical framework, epistemic modality of high value is often used when the speaker is certain about the status of affairs, which means the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of certainty by the speaker pertaining to epistemic distance. In terms of knowledge grading, epistemic modals of high value are used to indicate strong illocutionary force and *certain knowledge*.

According to Table 3.5, the most frequent epistemic modal markers of high value among the three cases are '*will*' and '*shall*'. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how and why the three speakers use these epistemic modal markers in different contexts.

(1) Will

According to the quantitative analysis, '*will*' is the most popular epistemic marker adopted by all three speakers (Obama: 161 counts; Blair: 124 counts; Ahmadinejad: 82 counts), as shown in Table 3.5. That is mainly because the modal '*will*' is quite vague in terms of its semantic meanings (cf. Klinge 2010), so it can be used to convey either the meaning of volition/intention as volitional modality, or the meaning of high possibility in the future as epistemic modality (it traditionally refers to simple future-time reference[37]), or both of them. However, the meaning of volition/intention can only occur when the subject is a person. So an impersonal subject can only be followed by '*will*' with an epistemic meaning unless in the use of metaphor. Consider the following examples:

[1] I also understand < Inside / P.K. > concern over immigration controls. We will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > put in place strict controls that work. They will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > be part of our first legislative programme if we are re-elected on May 5. These controls will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > include the type of points system used in Australia, for example, to help ensure our economy gets the skills we need. **(T.Blair; 22 April 2005)**

[2] I know < Inside / P.K. > that even a successful war against Iraq will < M.verb. / E.M. / High >require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. **(B. Obama; October 26, 2002)**

[3] Nations and many governments will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High > be on our side on this path. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006)**

[4] Mr Howard says he will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > introduce a quota on both immigrants and asylum seekers. But he won't < M.verb. / E.M. / High > give numbers, though we were promised months ago that there would (past form of will) < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > be numbers for these quotas in their manifesto. **Nor** will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > he say the basis on which either of these

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[37] Because future time reference often implies a potential or possibility of realizing the proposition, 'will' with this reading can be treated as epistemic modality.

quotas will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be calculated. **(T.Blair; 22 April 2005)**

As can be seen in Example [1], while the first '*will*' can be interpreted both as a volitional marker and an epistemic marker, the other two instances of '*will*' can only have the epistemic reading. Blair legitimises his point of view by affirming the assertions with three epistemic modal markers of high value - '*will*'. These firm assertions also help to establish his identity as an authoritative leader (Fairclough 2000a:100) and show his confidence in his expertise on this issue (immigration policy). By using the evidential - "**I also understand**", Blair tries to legitimise his proposal of putting in place strict controls because he believes his knowledge about immigration is certain.

In Example [2], US president Barack Obama expresses his strong epistemic stance through the high value modal verb '*will*' and indicates his source of evidence coming from his personal knowledge through an evidential marker-'**I know**'. Both the modal marker and the evidential reveal his certain knowledge (as part of his ideology) that the war on Iraq will bring a great loss to the US. By doing so, he manages to legitimise his proposal by demonstrating that the consequences/threats of war are close (viz. certain) pertaining to epistemic distance (see Hart 2014).

'*Will*' in Example [3] can also be interpreted both as an epistemic modal marker and a volitional modal marker. In terms of its epistemic meaning, Ahmadinejad expresses his strong epistemic stance to 'the Nations and many governments… be our side on this path' by affirming the assertion. This modal marker also helps to establish solidarity between the speaker and his audience (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353). However, with respect to volitional meaning, it is less convincing in expressing strong volitional stance since the subject is not the speaker himself. In other words, if Ahmadinejad takes this volitional reading, he is presupposing that the Nations and many governments are surely to be on their side. However, it is unclear whether '*will*' in this example takes a volitional reading or an epistemic reading, or both. This

example is typical in reflecting the speaker's ideology based on his knowledge in terms of epistemic modality (van Dijk 2011) or expectations (emotions) in terms of volitional modality.

As we can see in Example [4], Blair uses '*will*' of negative form twice to deny the possibility that Mr Howard will "give numbers of the quota" and "say the basis on which either of these quotas be calculated." By doing so, Blair tries to justify or legitimise his view that Mr Howard's policies aren't practical, which has been illustrated in many other ways in the speech. In other words, Blair manages to delegitimise Mr Howard's policies by denying the possibility in providing the details of his plan.

(2) Shall

'*Shall*' is not very popular in political speeches, as each speaker adopts it just four times. According to the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary(2008)[38], "'*shall*' is used instead of '*will*' when the subject is 'I' or 'we', often used to say that something certainly will or must happen, or that you are determined that something will happen". In this sense, '*shall*' is stronger than '*will*' in stance-taking, conveying three different readings in different contexts, either as 'high possibility' in terms of epistemic modality, or 'strong necessity' in terms of deontic modality, or 'strong determination' in terms of volitional modality. Consider the following examples:

[5] On Sunday, along with other nation's leaders, including President Clinton, I shall < M.verb. / E.M. & V.M. / High. > take part in a discussion of political ideas. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[6] After about one hundred years of domination, the system of capitalism and the existing world order has proved to be unable to provide appropriate solutions to the problems of societies and thus is coming to an end. I shall < M.verb. / V.M. &

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[38] This is cited from Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press), which can be found on this website: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/would_1.

E.M. / High > try to examine the two main causes of this failure and picture some features of the ideal future order. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010)**

[7] We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > help but believe < Shared / Weak. > that the old hatreds shall < M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall < M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall < M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > reveal itself; and that America must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > play its role in ushering in a new era of peace. **(B. Obama; 20 January 2009)**

As can be seen in Examples [5] and [6], '*shall*' can convey both the meanings of 'high possibility' as epistemic modality and 'strong determination' as volitional modality when the subject is 'I'. Example [7] is a case in point with regard to the meaning of 'high possibility' in '*shall*', as it indicates that the event certainly will happen, with the support of definite time and participants.

On the other hand, the meaning of 'strong determination' can best be illustrated in Example [6], because there is no time reference to show it is something planned to do. The most interesting example is, however, Example [7], in which Obama adopts three '*shall*' after impersonal subjects to affirm and legitimise the assertions. Because of the impersonal subjects, '*shall*' in this example can be interpreted as indicating both the meaning of 'strong necessity' and 'high possibility' instead of ''strong determination'. In particular, Obama uses a shared evidential '**we believe**' to presuppose the strong epistemic stance expressed here is shared by the hearers based on common knowledge. This clearly reveals the speaker's ideology about what is believed or what is common knowledge. The three epistemic modals and the evidential marker all contribute to the legitimisation of his proposal of a stronger and more united nation of America in the context.

3.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-probable

Epistemic modality of intermediate value is used when the certainty of the status of affairs is probable and the subject matter is positioned near the centre of certainty by the speaker pertaining to epistemic distance. In terms of knowledge grading, epistemic modals of intermediate value are used to indicate intermediate illocutionary force and *probable knowledge*.

(1) Can

'*Can*' is a modal verb conveying four different semantic meanings here[39]. It encodes two different semantic meanings as epistemic modality. One is its inherent meaning as 'the ability to do something', while the other is the meaning of 'intermediate possibility'. Because of its inherent meaning, it is often treated as dynamic modality[40], or as part of root modality. Actually, '*can*' also has two semantic meanings in terms of deontic modality in the data. One is 'responsibility', equivalent to the deontic marker '*should*'; and the other is 'permission', similar to the meaning of '*be allowed to*'.

Because of its multiple meanings, '*can*' becomes the most popular modal used in the case of Obama with 167 counts. It also takes up the second position in the case of Blair (with 94 counts) and Ahmadinejad (with 50 counts). Interestingly, its negative form has been used far more than other modals, with 31 counts, 20 counts and 8 counts respectively, as shown in Table 3.5. Consider the following examples:

[8] For as much as government can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > do and must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies. **(B. Obama; 20 January 2009)**

[9] The tyranny of the East and the West over the world must should < M.verb. / E.M.

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[39] If 'can' is to be used in a daily conversation, it could convey the meaning of 'request' or 'offer', For example, 'Can you tell me the way to the British Library?' or 'Can I help you?' However, they are not applicable here.

[40] In this study, the meaning of 'ability' is treated as dynamic modality, though it will not be discussed here. See Section 4.1 in Chapter Two for details.

/ High > < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > end, but weak people who can < M.verb. / Dy.M. / Inter. >see only what lies in front of them cannot < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. >believe this. **(M. Ahmadinejad; October 26, 2005)**

[10] There is a simple reason why he can't < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > say which country would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > process UK asylum seekers. There isn't one. **(T.Blair; 22 April 2005)**

In Example [8], '*can*' conveys both meanings of 'ability' and 'probability' with intermediate epistemic stance towards the action. That means, by adopting the epistemic modal '*can*', Obama claims the assertion whether the government has the possibility and ability to take designated action ultimately depends on 'the faith and determination of the American people'. However, '*can*' in Example [9] only has the meaning of 'ability' which can be interpreted as the ability of weak people only 'see what lies in front of them', while the negative form of '*can*' encodes an epistemic reading. The use of the embedded modals '*must should*' in this example is typical in revealing the speaker's ideology. That is, 'to end the tyranny of the East and the West over the world' is not only suggested but also certain to be actualized, which is based on his political value and knowledge (as part of his ideology).

The negative form of '*can*' as shown in Examples [9] and [10], on the other hand, is a negative modal marker, which is often used to deny the assertions and delegitimizing the speaker's unfavourable opinions. In Example [9], Ahmadinejad uses '*cannot*' to deny the possibility of 'weak people… believe this'. In Example [10], Blair adopts '*can't*' to delegitimise Mr. Howard's assertion (Blair's opponent in the election campaign).

(2) Would

'*Would*' has also been used frequently in the data, with 62 counts (Blair), 37 counts (Obama) and Ahmadinejad (30 counts) respectively. '*Would*' is the past form of '*will*', indicating lower possibility and weaker epistemic stance than its original form

because it is farther from the centre of 'now' in terms of time and also farther to the centre of certainty pertaining to epistemic distance (Langacker 1991). '*Would*' mainly conveys three semantic meanings in the data: first, it is used to refer to the past form of epistemic '*will*' (In this sense, '*would*' is of high value); second, it means 'intermediate possibility' as epistemic modality, often indicating a kind of 'hypothetical knowledge where an outcome is predicated contingent on an unrealized condition' (Chafe 1986:269); third, it is used to express the meaning 'intermediate willingness' or 'wish' in volitional modality.

[11] Imam [Khomeini] said Saddam must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > go and he said he would (past form) < M.verb. / E.M. / High > grow weaker than anyone could (past form) < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > imagine. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

[12] The documents are vital because they would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > reveal how many weapons Iraq had and has and where they are or may < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be located. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[13] If it had been in Chicago, there would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > have been more. **(B. Obama; 10 May 2011)**

'*Would*' in Example [11] is a case in point for the past form of '*will*', indicated by 'he said' (the typical phrase used in reported speech). In this sense, '*would*' here is of high value, equals to its original form '*will*' in terms of epistemic stance. That means if this is used in direct speech, '*would*' can be replaced with '*will*'. Example [12], however, manifests how '*would*' can be used to express '*possibility*' as an epistemic modal marker of intermediate force. By adopting '*would*', Blair claims that the documents are likely to 'reveal how many weapons Iraq had and has…' based on probable knowledge, thereby avoiding responsibility for providing evidence (Chafe 1986:269).

'*Would*' in Example [13] is a case in point for indicating 'hypothetical knowledge', which used in a subjunctive mood as it is in an irrealis condition. So the epistemic

stance of '*would*' in this example is much weaker than that of Example [12] as it encodes temporal distance which is correlated with epistemic distance (Chilton 2014). In fact, '*would*' has been used far more frequently in this sense than in the other two meanings in the data. Its use as volitional modality will be discussed in Chapter Five.

3.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-possible

When the speaker is not sure about the status of affairs, an epistemic modality of low value is typically used and the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of certainty by the speaker pertaining to epistemic distance. In terms of knowledge grading, epistemic modals of low value are used to indicate weak illocutionary force and *possible knowledge.*

(1) Could

'*Could*' is the most frequent epistemic modal of low value. Obama ranks first in the use of '*could*' with 32 counts, followed by Blair (22 counts) and Ahmadinejad (12 counts). Similar to '*would*', '*could*' is the past form of '*can*', indicating lower possibility and weaker epistemic stance than '*can*' as it is positioned remoter from the centre of certainty. Like '*can*', the semantic meaning of '*could*' is also varied. It has four different meanings in the data[41]: first, it is used to refer to the past form of epistemic '*can*' (In this sense, '*could*' is of intermediate value); second, it means 'low possibility' in terms of epistemic modality, often used in a subjunctive sense; third, it means 'intermediate necessity' as deontic modality, which is equivalent to '*should*'; fourth, it is used to express the meaning of 'permission' as deontic modality of low value. Consider the following examples:

[14] And how risible would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be the claims that these were wars on Muslims if the world could < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > see these Muslim nations still Muslim, but with some hope for the future, not shackled by brutal

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[41] In daily conversations, 'could' also has the meaning of 'request' or 'suggestion', For example, 'Could you pass me the salt?' or 'You could go there by train.' However, they are not applicable here.

regimes whose principal victims were the very Muslims they pretended to protect?

(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)

[15] One can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > imagine what standing some European countries could < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.   >have had and what global role they could < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.   > have played, if it had not been for this sixty-year old imposition. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006)**

[16] It's the answer told by lines that stretched around schools and churches in numbers this nation has never seen; by people who waited three hours and four hours, many for the very first time in their lives, because they believed < Outside / H.E. > that this time must < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be different; that their voice could < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > be that difference. **(B. Obama, 4 November 2008)**

The first meaning of '*could*' has been demonstrated in Example [11], typically used in reported speech. In this sense, '*could*' in this example is of intermediate value, equal to its original form '*can*' in terms of epistemic stance. In example [14], Blair uses '*could*' in a conditional with weak epistemic stance towards the assertion. By doing so, he speculates that it is distant for them to see the truth.

Similarly, '*could*' in Example [15] is also used in a conditional, but in a subjunctive mood as it is opposite to the truth. Therefore, it seems that '*could*' in this example expresses the weakest epistemic stance among the three examples (Sweetser 1996). That is because the designated situation will never be actualized as it has been past. Because of this, the epistemic modals of low value including '*could*' are often used to play down the possibility, importance, relevance, etc. of those unwelcome opinions or propositions (disapproved by the speaker) (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353). In this sense, this type of epistemic modals can reflect the speaker's belief (as part of his ideology) about what is not welcomed or unfavourable. In this example, the speaker is actually criticizing those European countries on their standing and their global role, which are not appropriate in the speaker's eyes.

'*Could*' in Example [16], however, has the strongest epistemic stance among the three examples here. Its other two meanings in terms of deontic modals will be treated in detail in the next chapter.

(2) Possible

'*Possible*' is the most popular epistemic modal of low value, which is often used to express the weak epistemic stance towards the actualization of a designated proposition. It is used 22 times in the case of Ahmadinejad, followed by Obama and Blair with 13 and 12 counts respectively, as shown in Table 3.5. As a modal adjective, the epistemic stance of possible may vary in different contexts. Consider the following examples:

[17] At the same time, we and the Americans also gave the clearest possible < M.adj. / E.M. / Low. > warning that, should < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > Saddam break his word once more, there would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be no further warnings or diplomatic arguments. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[18] If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. >; who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer. **(B. Obama, 4 November 2008)**

[19] They say < Outside / H.E. > it is **not** possible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >to have a world without the United States and Zionism. But you know < Shared / S.K. > that this is a possible < M.adj. / E.M. / Low > goal and slogan. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

[20] Unless we find a viable way of discussing these risks a mature national conversation on important policy questions like GM science will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > be impossible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >. **(T. Blair; 26 May 2005)**

As can be seen in Example [17], '*possible*' is used after a superlative 'the clearest',

thus together the phrase can be interpreted as 'as clear as possible'. Therefore, here '*possible*' means 'to its largest extent'. That means its epistemic stance is much stronger than those in the other two examples. By doing so, Blair tries to legitimise his proposal of attacking Iraq because they (i.e. 'we and the Americans') have given warnings that were as clear as possible.

However, '*possible*' in Example [18] implies the lowest possibility among all the three examples, therefore indicating a very low epistemic stance. That is because it is almost impossible to actualize the assertion that 'America is a place where all things are possible'. The example supporting this is that Obama, an African American, was elected as the new US president.

Example [19] manifests '*possible*' (the second one) in its intermediate low possibility among three examples. Ahmadinejad tries to legitimise the assertion that there is a possibility that 'have a world without the United States and Zionism' by presupposing it as the truth with a shared evidential '**you know**'. Of course, for other actors, especially for the United States and Israel, it is impossible.

The negative modal adjective '*impossible*' is often used to delegitimise other people's views (see 'negative other-representation' in Chilton 2004: 47), which are opposite to the speaker's own opinion, as shown in Example [20]. It reflects the speaker's knowledge (as part of his ideology) on 'the prerequisites of a mature national conversation on important policy questions like GM science'. '*Impossible*' can be seen as the opposite of certainty in terms of epistemic distance, which has a much stronger illocutionary force than its positive form- '*possible*' (of low value). The first '*possible*' with its negative form in [18] is also of high value, but it is much weaker in its force than that of [19].

(3) Might

'*Might*' is the past form of '*may*', indicating a weaker epistemic stance than its base

form, because it is farther in terms of epistemic distance and time span (Langacker 1991). It has not been used very frequently in the data, with only 11 counts in total (Blair: 6 counts; Obama 5 counts; Ahmadinejad: 0 counts). Consider the following examples:

[21] So our choice is clear: back down and leave Saddam hugely strengthened; or proceed to disarm him by force. Retreat might < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > give us a moment of respite but years of repentance at our weakness would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > I believe < Inside / P.K. > follow.   **(T. Blair; 20 March 2003)**

[22] Now, I understand < Inside / P.K. > that some might < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > be skeptical of this plan. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

In Example [21], Blair adopts an epistemic modal marker of low value -'*might*' to express his speculation for the assertion, thereby showing his weak epistemic stance towards it. It means the possibility is low pertaining to the actualization of the situation indicated. Put another way, Blair legitimises his proposition by using '*might*', which is positioned as distant from the centre of certainty. Similar to Example [15], the use of '*might*' in this example indicates 'retreat' is an unwelcome proposal for the speaker by treating it as a bad choice (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353), and therefore reveals the speaker's true intention (as part of his ideology) that the war on Iraq is a better choice.

Likewise, '*might*' in Example [22] also reflects Obama's own assumption that some people are skeptical of this plan, supported by an evidential marker- '**I understand**'. This evidential implies that the weak epistemic stance expressed by '*might*' is based on his knowledge alone. By doing so, he makes a full commitment to this stance (Marín-Arrese 2011a).

In sum, the qualitative analyses of epistemic modal markers show that different choices of epistemic modals are linked to the speakers' different rhetorical styles

(Marín-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their different ideologies in terms of knowledge grading (certain, probable, possible and impossible knowledge). For example, Blair adopts much more '*would*' than Obama and Ahmadinejad (62 counts vs. 37 counts vs. 30 counts) (see Table 3.5). That implies that he is more prudent in making assertions, which helps him shirk those unfavourable consequences when the assertions are not actualized in the end. Take his speech 'War on Iraq' for example (No. 2 speech in Table 2.3), Blair uses 'would' 13 times to describe his predictions about the possible results of designated actions as well as the past expectations which have not been actualized.

Obama, on the other hand, used far more '*can*' than Blair and Ahmadinejad (167 counts vs. 123 counts vs. 81 counts). Take his speech 'on Immigration' for example (No.8 speech in Table 2.4), he uses 'we *can*' 12 counts. That is probably because it helps him to gain the audience's support by giving them hope and confidence. It also allows him to establish harmonious and intimate relationships with his audience, which might be one of the reasons why he won the general elections twice.

Ahmadinejad uses more '*possible*' than Obama and Blair (22 counts vs. 13 counts vs. 12 counts). Take his speech 'The World without Zionism' for example (No. 1 speech in Table 2.5), he uses '*possible*' 5 times (including its negative form 3 times). That means he might be an iconoclast, who would like to defy the authorities and take chances, such as claiming something as truth while others may totally disagree with him (as shown in Example [19]).

It also manifests that the same modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees of force in different contexts. For example, both 'will' and 'can' have four different semantic meanings.

In addition, negative epistemic modals are usually used to deny or delegitimise their opponents' assertions. By using these epistemic modals, the speaker either wants to

show it is not possible to happen, such as '*will not*' in Example [4], or to manifest that what is impossible is actually what needs to be actualized, such as '*impossible*' in Example [19] and [20]. Therefore, the epistemic modals in the former examples are used to delegitimise the designated assertions, while those in the latter examples are used to criticize the legitimation of the designated assertions.

3.4 Summary

In sum, this chapter demonstrates how different forms and values of epistemic modality express stance, reflect ideology and (de)legitimise assertions in political discourse from the perspective of epistemic distance, and interact with evidentiality.

I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in terms of modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and differences of the top-ten epistemic modal markers used by the three speakers.

I also examined the functions of epistemic modality in political discourse through stance-taking acts in different contexts, with annotated examples from the data. Generally, the epistemic modals of higher value are placed closer to the centre of certainty, therefore indicating higher possibility and stronger epistemic stance or illocutionary force towards the actualization of the actions. The most striking results are as follows:

- Epistemic modals encode ideology and function as stance-taking acts which express three levels of knowledge-based stance corresponding to three values of modality.
- Epistemic modality can also be treated as knowledge grading in terms of four levels: certain, probable, possible, impossible knowledge.
- Stance-taking acts of epistemic modality contribute to the function of (de)legitimisation.

- The distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in the three cases present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama.

- Modal verbs are the most frequent forms in all the cases, of over 85%. But there are also very interesting results about other modal forms in the qualitative analysis.

- The percentages of intermediate value are higher than those of high value in the cases of Blair and Obama, but the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. That is probably because intermediate epistemic modal markers can help the speaker evade the responsibility of the stance-taking acts.

- The differences of epistemic modals among the three cases are significant in high, intermediate and low value, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals, while there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama except for intermediate value and modal verbs.

- Epistemic modals '*will*', '*can*' and '*would*' take up the first three positions in all three cases, though the order of '*will*' and '*can*' is reversed in the case of Obama.

- The three speakers' choices of epistemic modals reflect their distinctive rhetoric styles and ideologies with regard to their different stance towards knowledge.

- The epistemic modals of high value are often used in the legitimisation of the speaker's own views or proposals ('positive self-representation'), while those of low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other's views or proposals ('negative other-representation');

- The same modal marker may indicate different semantic meanings and various degrees of force in different contexts.

In the next chapter, I will examine the forms, values and functions of deontic modality in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Chapter Four: Deontic Modality in Political Discourse

4.1 Introduction

Deontic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of deontic stance involving necessity, obligations or permission indicated in the utterance, and this force is evaluated in terms of deontic distance towards the centre of necessity/rightness. Deontic modality plays an important role in political discourse as it encodes the speaker's ideology concerning his political values.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate how deontic modality functions in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.

4.2 Quantitative Analysis of Deontic Modality

In this section, I shall calculate and compare the distributions of deontic modality from the perspectives of values and forms in the three cases. In particular, I will compare the top-ten modal markers of deontic modality among the three cases.

4.2.1 Values of Deontic Modality

As can be seen in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, the percentage of high value deontic modals outnumbers those of intermediate value in all three cases, followed by that of low value. Interestingly, unlike epistemic modality, Blair adopts more deontic modal markers than Obama (200 counts vs. 177 counts), while Ahmadinejad only uses 70%

of that of Blair (140 counts).

Table 4.1 The distribution of values of deontic modality in the three cases

Speakers / Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
High	116	58%	107	60.45%	72	51.43%
Inter.	70	35%	63	35.59%	64	45.71%
Low	14	7%	7	3.95%	4	2.86%
Total	200	100%	177	100%	140	100%

Figure 4.1 The distribution of values of deontic modality in the three cases

In Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, we can see a similar frequency of intermediate deontic modals among the three speakers, and Blair ranks first in all the three categories. Although Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer deontic modals of high value and low value, he uses more deontic modals with intermediate value than those of Obama. On the whole, there are significant differences in the distributions of deontic modals with high and low value among the three speakers, while the disparities of intermediate are not significant. However, the statistical analyses show no significant differences between the results of Blair and Obama in all the categories[42].

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[42] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in all the categories between Blair and Obama in the use of deontic modal values: high value (P-value: 0.5677), intermediate value (P-value: 0.584) , low

Table 4.2 A comparison of values of deontic modality in the three cases

Speakers Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
High	116	4.40	107	4.04	72	2.83	0.009435	Yes
Inter.	70	2.66	63	2.38	64	2.51	0.8176	No
Low	14	0.53	7	0.26	4	0.16	0.04847	Yes
Total	200	7.59	177	6.69	140	5.50	0.01324	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 4.2 A comparison of values of deontic modality in the three cases

4.2.2 Forms of Deontic Modality

As we can see in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3, modal verbs come first in all three cases, with 62% on average. However, compared with that of epistemic modality (87% on average in the three cases), this figure is much smaller.

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value (P-value: 0.1868) and the total number (0.2372).

It is interesting to note that Blair and Obama present a similar pattern in the distributions of forms, while Ahmadinejad is different in a number of ways. For example, the former two both have the same order of distributions of modal forms, while the latter has a higher percentage of modal adjectives than semi-modals. Furthermore, though modal adverbs are quite rare and rank last in all three cases, it is surprising to see that their percentage is zero in the case of Ahmadinejad.

Table 4.3 The distribution of forms of deontic modality in the three cases

Speakers / Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
M.verb.	100	50%	103	58.19%	109	77.86%
M.semi.	77	38.5%	61	34.46%	15	10.71%
M.adj.	18	9%	11	6.21%	16	11.43%
M.adv.	5	2.5%	2	1.13%	0	0
Total	200	100%	177	100%	140	100%

Figure 4.3 The distribution of forms of deontic modality in the three cases

As can be seen in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4, the three speakers share similar

frequencies of modal verbs in terms of deontic modality, though their use of semi-modals varies greatly from 2.92 ptw (Blair) to 0.59 ptw (Ahmadinejad). In addition, Blair and Ahmadinejad use similar frequencies of modal adjectives, while comparatively Obama uses much fewer modal adjectives. Overall, three speakers show significant differences in the use of deontic semi-modals, whereas these differences are also insignificant between the results of Blair and Obama[43].

Table 4.4 A Comparison of Forms of Deontic Modality in the three cases

Speakers Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
M.verb.	100	3.79	103	3.89	109	4.28	0.648	No
M.semi.	77	2.92	61	2.30	15	0.59	4.116e-09	Yes
M.adj.	18	0.68	11	0.42	16	0.63	0.3995	No
M.adv.	5	0.19	2	0.08	0	0	0.0707	No
Total	200	7.59	177	6.69	140	5.50	0.01324	Yes

 (If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

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[43] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in all the categories between Blair and Obama in the use of deontic modal forms: modal verbs (P-value: 0.9143), semi-modals (P-value: 0.1916) , modal adjectives (P-value: 0.2598) and modal adverbs (0.0.446).

Figure 4.4 A comparison of forms of deontic modality in the three cases

4.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Deontic Modality

Table 4.5 shows that there are some similarities and disparities among the three speakers in their choices of deontic modal markers (See Table A4-A6 in Appendix for details). The first similarity is that the ten top-modal markers are more or less the same in all three cases regardless of their ranks, with only a few exceptions. The second similarity is that '*should*' (with 46, 39 & 44 counts) takes up the first position and '*must*' (with 36, 38 & 39 counts) takes up the second position in all three cases.

Still, there are more differences than similarities. While, the most frequent deontic modals among the three cases are '*should*', '*must*', '*have (got) to*', '*need to*', '*can*', '*necessary*', '*responsible*', and '*be allowed to*'. Their frequencies are quite different in each case. Firstly, Blair uses '*need to*' (35 counts) and '*necessary*'(14 counts) more frequently than the other two speakers (with 24 and 7 counts for the use of '*need to*'; 9 and 7 counts for the use of '*necessary*). Secondly, Obama uses '*can*' for 19 counts, many more compared with the other two speakers (Blair: 16 counts vs. Ahmadinejad: 11 counts). Thirdly, Ahmadinejad uses '*shall*', '*responsible*' and '*be allowed to*' more often than the other speakers, with 7, 7 and 5 counts respectively.

On the whole, we can see that modal verbs such as '*should*' and '*must*' still take up the

first two positions in the three cases, especially in the case of Ahmadinejad. Besides, compared with Ahmadinejad, Blair and Obama use far more semi-modal markers and both have their preferences for particular forms.

Table 4.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of deontic modality in the three cases

Speakers / Top-10 Modal Markers	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.
1	should	46 (7)	should	39(8)	should	44 (6)
2	must	36(2)	must	38(6)	must	39
3	need to	35 (1)	have (got) to	35(1)	can	13 (5)
4	have (got) to	33(4)	need to	24(2)	shall	7
5	can	16(10)	can	19(9)	need to	7
6	necessary	14 (4)	necessary	9(2)	responsible	7
7	responsible	5(1)	shall	3	necessary	7 (1)
8	be allowed to	4	responsible	2	be allowed to	5(3)
9	be to	3	may/be to/necessarily	1/1/1	have (got) to	2
10	responsible/ responsibly	3/3	be allowed to/responsibly/ ought to	1	obliged	2

4.2.4 Discussions and Implications

In sum, I have demonstrated and compared the figures of the values and forms of deontic modality in the three cases. In particular, I demonstrated the top-ten modal markers in deontic modality and compared their similarities and disparities. The most

striking results are as follows:

(i) Obama ranks first in the use of deontic modal markers with 200 counts, followed by Blair (177 counts) and Ahmadinejad (140 counts). Ahmadinejad uses notably fewer semi-modals than the other two speakers. This could be some evidence to support the study of deontic semi-modals in terms of expressing implicit deontic stance or manipulating the audience.

(ii) The study of deontic modality in political discourse should not be restricted to modal verbs. Otherwise, many essential deontic modal meanings would be neglected. This is due to the fact that other modal forms take up around half of the total figure in the cases of Blair and Obama, as shown in Table 4.3. It is clear that other deontic modal forms are rather implicit in stance-taking, but they can still reflect the speaker's deontic stance to some extent.

(iii) Unlike epistemic modality, Blair and Obama use far more deontic modal markers of high value than those of intermediate value. That is mainly because both of them use a large number of semi-modals of high value, such as '*have to*' and '*need to*'. In terms of modal verbs, for example, '*should*' has been used more frequently than '*must*'.

(iv) Implicit deontic markers such as semi-modals are popular in political discourse. Semi-modals such as '*have to*' (outside force) and '*need to*' (inside force) are used very often in all three cases, especially in the cases of Blair and Obama. That is probably because these deontic markers can help the speakers to evade the responsibility of their stance-taking actions.

(v) The differences among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as well as semi-modals and the total figures. According to statistical analyses[44], there are no significant differences in the use of deontic modals between Obama and Blair, so it is the results in Ahmadinejad's case that make these disparities significant. This suggests that these disparities might be the differences of using deontic modal markers between English native speakers and Non-native speakers. Therefore, it is important to examine these values and forms of deontic modals in political discourse in more detail in further study.

(vi) The deontic modals '*should*' and '*must*' take up the first two positions in all three cases, although each speaker has his own preferences in adopting deontic modal markers. For example, Blair uses far more '*need to*' and '*necessary*' than the other speakers, while Obama uses more '*can*' and Ahmadinejad uses more '*be allowed to*', '*responsible*' and '*shall*'.

Overall, the quantitative analysis of deontic modality in the three cases demonstrated both similarities and disparities in terms of values, forms and top-ten modal markers. It is therefore also essential to analyse them qualitatively in order to investigate the functions of these deontic modal markers and look at how these potential functions are realized in different contexts. Therefore, the next section will deal with deontic modality in the three cases from a qualitative perspective.

4.3 Qualitative Analysis of Deontic Modality

This section will take a close look at the functions of deontic modality through a qualitative analysis of the data. I will first introduce how deontic modality plays a role in expressing stance, encoding ideology and legitimisation in political discourse. Then I will demonstrate how different deontic modals with three values can contribute to the realization of these functions in the context.

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[44] I also calculated the P-value of the differences in the use of deontic modals between Obama and Blair in every category and found no significant differences in both values and forms.

4.3.1 Deontic Modality as Value-based Stance

Drawing on Marń-Arrese's (2011:195) definition of epistemic stance, deontic stance refers to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the necessity/rightness concerning the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself.

Deontic modality is a typical way of representing the speaker's deontic stance toward the actions and obligations of the target. Unlike epistemic modality, which indicates the speaker's epistemic stance towards the possibility of propositions, deontic modality often reflects the speaker's deontic stance towards the necessity or rightness of taking political actions. In other words, deontic stance is based on the speaker's values[45] towards whether one should or should not take specific actions. That means deontic modality can reflect the speaker's ideology with regard to his political, moral and social values. In this sense, the stance expressed by deontic modality is mainly value-based, different from epistemic modality which expresses knowledge-based stance (cf. van Dijk 1998, 2011, 2014). As discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three, the use of epistemic modals can be seen as 'knowledge grading' (Facchinetti et al. 2003). The use of deontic modals, then, can be treated as 'value grading'. In other words, a deontic modal of high value indicates the speaker's core value (as part of his ideology) concerning the designated action, which is positioned close to the centre of necessity (rightness), while those of lower value show the speaker's peripheral or marginal values, which are positioned distant from the centre.

Deontic modals are, therefore, seen as encoding different force involving the speaker's values (such as necessity/rightness, obligations, responsibilities) towards the actualization of actions. In this sense, deontic stance can be classified into three levels of illocutionary force, corresponding to three levels of modal value and distance. This

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[45] Here 'value' refers to the speaker's political, social or moral value towards what is right or wrong to take actions.

means the speaker typically expresses a stronger deontic stance when he/she uses a deontic modal marker with a higher value, positioned as close to the centre of necessity/rightness, and vice versa. For example, the deontic stance in the example "We *must* take the actions now" (where *must* is a deontic modal of high value) is much stronger than "We *should* take the actions now" (where *should* is a deontic modal marker of intermediate value), and "We *can/may* take the actions now" (where *can/may* is a deontic modal marker of low value). This will be further elaborated in section 4.3.2.

Compared with epistemic modality, the function of reflecting ideology in terms of deontic modality is more explicit, because deontic modality often reflects the speaker's ideologies based on his values. Deontic modality is often used by the speaker to give instructions, which often implies that its force comes from specific political institutions (e.g. the government or a party). Normally, people give others instructions to take specific action (including demands or suggestions or permissions) only when they believe it is the right thing to do. Similarly, people only forbid others to do something when they think it is not right to do so, either morally, socially, or, here, as politically.

Therefore, deontic modality can reflect the speaker's values (as part of his ideology) about what is right and what is wrong. It also reveals what actions should or should not be taken, and who should or should not take designated action. That is why deontic stance is often value-based as deontic modals more or less reflect the speaker's political, social or moral values. Consider the following example:

And just as the terrorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > unify it around an idea. And that idea is liberty. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

The deontic modal marker '*have to*' in the example indicates the speaker's strong

deontic stance of taking the designated action 'unify it around an idea'. This stance reflects the speaker's ideology of 'humanity' and 'liberty'.

With respect to the function of (de)legitimisation, different from epistemic modality, deontic modality is often used to (de)legitimise actions at the propositional level by placing the propositions on the scale of necessity (rightness). Evidentials can also be used to justify why it is necessary or not necessary to take certain action.

The speaker often uses a deontic modal marker of high value when it is necessary to take actions and the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of necessity pertaining to deontic distance. For example, the deontic modal marker of high value '*have to*' in the example "But we know we *have to* tighten the asylum system further" (T.Blair; 22 April 2005) indicates it is the only solution that we can take if we want to solve the problem. By adopting '*have to*', the speaker legitimises his proposed action as this modal marker is often used when there are no other choices.

Similarly, a deontic modal marker of intermediate value is used when someone is supposed to take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned near the centre of necessity by the speaker in terms of deontic distance. When someone is allowed to take actions, a deontic modal marker of low value is typically used, which means the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of necessity by the speaker with respect to deontic distance. However, negative deontic modals are only used when the subject matter is positioned opposite to the centre of necessity by the speaker concerning deontic distance, thus delegitimising specific actions.

4.3.2 Markers of Deontic Modality in the three cases

In what follows, the functions of deontic modality will be examined in detail through various deontic modal expressions, from the perspective of deontic distance and value of modality. It will also be interesting to see how the speakers' values are presupposed and graded into three levels (core, peripheral, marginal values) in terms of various

deontic modals during the persuasion process, corresponding to three levels of illocutionary force.

4.3.2.1 High Value: Close-required

Within this research framework, deontic modal markers of high value are seen as expressing strong deontic stance towards the designated propositions, which are positioned as close towards the centre of necessity (rightness) from the perspective of deontic distance.

According to Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of high value among the three cases are '*must*', '*need to*', '*have (got) to*' and '*necessary*'. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how and why the three speakers use these deontic modal markers to persuade their addressees in different contexts.

(1) Must

According to Leech (2003), modal verbs of high value such as '*must*' and '*shall*' have decreased by almost 30% and 40% over 30 years in both British English and American English (from 1961 to 1991). However, according to my quantitative analysis in the previous section, '*must*' in political discourse still takes up a prominent position, varying from 39 counts (Ahmadinejad), and 38 counts (Obama), to 36 counts (Blair) in the three cases. Traditionally, '*must*' has often been used to express the strongest modal force imposed by outside obligations or 'active social pressure' (Talmy 1988: 79). In this research, '*must*' is regarded to be close to the centre of rightness (truth) pertaining to deontic distance, therefore it expresses a strong deontic stance and force, leaving no space for arguments. Consider the following examples:

[1] To be a serious partner, Europe must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > take on and defeat the anti-Americanism that sometimes passes for its political discourse. And what America must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > do is show that this is a partnership built

on persuasion, not command. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

[2] I believe < Inside / S.K. > that, among the Arab countries, the view expressed at their meeting in Doha in November, that Saddam must < M.verb. / D.M. /High. > bear the responsibility for what happens, holds good. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[3] Our dear Imam said that the occupying regime must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > be wiped off the map and this was a very wise statement. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

[4] And this change must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > begin in Washington. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

[5] We must **not** < M.verb. / D.M. / High > rest until it is reversed. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

Although the frequency of '*must*' is similar in the three cases, '*must*' can function differently when it comes to different subjects in different contexts. For example, the two instances of '*must*' in Example [1] signal a strong deontic stance in expressing the necessity of taking the proposed actions. However, when '*must*' is used after the speaker's enemy or someone whose ideology is different from the speaker's, it becomes a warning as it often indicates that the threats from whose enemies are very close (also see Cap 2008, 2011; Chilton 2004, 2014; Hart 2014), as shown in Examples [2] and [3]. These two deontic modals ('*must*') reveal the speaker's political values (as part of his ideology) towards the designated actions respectively that it is politically right for Saddam to bear the responsibility for what happens and to remove the occupying regime (Israel). The speaker also tries to justify his strong deontic stance by attributing them to explicit outside sources such as 'the view expressed at their meeting' and 'Our dear Imam said'.

It is interesting to note that '*must*' is used together with passive voice for 20 counts in Ahmadinejad's speeches (half of the total number), which implies that the speaker may deliberately obscure the agency and evade the responsibility of the stance-taking

act (Fowler and Kress 1979; Hart 2014). Just as in Example [3], he does not mention who would wipe the occupying regime off the map by using the passive 'must be wiped off'. Another example is the frequent use of the active voice of an impersonal subject such as 'this change must begin in Washington' or 'this plan must begin today', as shown in Example [4]. As we know that changes or plans will not begin by themselves, it needs someone to take action to make them happen. Thus, these examples probably reveal the attempt of evading personal responsibility for the action. In sum, '*must*' is of the highest value in deontic modal markers, although its illocutionary force can be different in different situations. It is the strongest as a warning when the subject is the speaker's enemy, the second strongest as a demand on oneself, and the weakest as a suggestion when used with one's friends.

However, when Blair uses the negative form of '*must*' in Example [5], he strongly disagrees to stop NATO's military action on Kosovo until the evil of ethnic cleansing is reversed. Here he clearly places this military action close to the centre of rightness, reflecting his political values (as part of his ideology) that the war on Kosovo is 'a just war'[46](Casey 2009). At the same time, he legitimises the war by claiming that 'it is to reverse the evil of ethnic cleansing'.

(2) Need to

According to Table 4.5, '*need to*' is a semi-modal used most often in Blair's speeches (35 counts), followed by Obama (24 counts) and Ahmadinejad (7 counts). Compared with '*must*', '*need to*' implies that the force comes from one's inside needs rather than outside obligations (Sweester 1990; Talmy 2000). That is partly the reason why '*need to*' is used more after the plural person 'we' than '*must*'. By adopting '*need to*', the speaker suggests that the actions he advises his people to carry out are not in accordance with his own will, but their own needs. Consider the following examples:

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[46] The term 'a just war' can be found in the context of the same speech.

[6] That's why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > act boldly and act now to reverse these cycles. That's why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > put money in the pockets of the American people, create new jobs, and invest in our future. That's why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > restart the flow of credit and restore the rules of the road that will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > ensure a crisis like this never happens again. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

[7] The EU and the US need each other and need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > put that relationship above arguments that are ultimately not fundamental. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[8] Dear Friends, the United Nations is the key centre for coordinating the common global management. Its structure needs to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > be reformed in a manner so that all independent States and nations will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be able to participate in the global governance actively and constructively. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010)**

For example, Obama uses '*need to*' three times in example [6] to show it is necessary for his people to take these actions in order to survive or reverse the financial crisis, to draw a vivid picture of urgent demand. That is to say, here '*need to*' implies the close or urgent need of taking action to escape the threat of crisis. Interestingly, Ahmadinejad uses a passive voice of verb after '*need to*' in Example [8], for similar reasons mentioned above.

The adoption of the deontic semi-modal '*need to*' is a useful persuasion/manipulation strategy in the sense that it puts the emphasis on one's inside force instead of the force imposed by an outside source, which makes it more acceptable for the addressees. The speaker's ideology can also be inferred from this type of deontic markers, though it is more implicit than '*must*'. For example, Blair adopts the deontic semi-modal '*need to*' in Example [7] to emphasize that the cooperation between the EU and the US is due to their own needs. Actually this necessity also reveals his political values (as part of his ideology).

(3) Have (got) to

'*Have (got) to*' is another semi-modal used most frequently in Obama's speeches with 35 counts, followed by Blair (33 counts). However, Ahmadinejad uses it only twice. Unlike '*need to*', the use of '*have to*' often implies that the force comes from an external source (Sweester 1990:61). Consider the following examples:

[9] The role of Government likewise has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > adapt. If it can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > **no longer** pick winners, micromanage public services or act unilaterally in foreign affairs, it still has a vital enabling role to play. It has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > set the macro-economic framework; it has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > create the right environment for business; in skills, education, transport and the system of healthcare, its role for good or ill is vital. **(T. Blair; 18 November 2003)**

[10] We have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > make tough choices and smart investments today so that as the economy recovers, the deficits start coming down. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

In my data, '*have to*' is often followed by verbs like 'adapt' (shown in Example [9]), 'accept', 'make tough choices' (shown in Example [10]) and 'live with it', etc. It implies that '*have to*' is often used when one is reluctant to take an action but is obliged to because there is no other choice. Just as Examples [9] and [10] manifest that it needs great efforts when one has to 'adapt' or 'make tough choices', the use of '*have to*' also excludes other options. Both speakers in these two examples legitimise their proposals by regarding their proposals as the only solutions. Therefore, in terms of illocutionary force, '*have (got) to*' is similar to '*must*', but much stronger than '*need to*'. From the perspective of proximisation (Cap 2008, 2011; Chilton 2004, 2014; Hart 2014), '*have to*' also implies that it is the only way to avoid the approaching threats or unfavourable consequences. So it often encodes the speaker's ideology based on their political values.

(4) Necessary

'*Necessary*' is the deontic modal adjective used most often in the three cases, with 14 counts (Blair), 9 counts (Obama) and 7 counts (Ahmadinejad) respectively. Its basic meaning is very similar to '*need to*', which often indicates something is to be done according to one's needs, as shown in Example [11], [12] and [13]. According to the data, '*necessary*' is often used with the theme of economy in the cases of Blair and Obama, but used with the theme of international affairs in the case of Ahmadinejad. We can see from the examples that the illocutionary force of '*necessary*' is weaker than '*have (got) to*' because it implies that while it is a basic condition to realize a goal, it is not the only solution.

[11] First of all, let my argument itself not lose its sense of balance. Health and safety legislation is necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > to protect people at work. Food standards are necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > to protect people from harm. Protections are necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > for children from the danger of predatory adults. **(T. Blair; 26 May 2005)**

[12] To improve the quality of our health care while lowering its cost, we will < M.verb. / V.M. / High > make the immediate investments necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High > to ensure that within five years all of America's medical records are computerized. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

[13] And secondly it is necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High > to restructure the existing international organizations and their respective arrangements. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 21 April 2009)**

Overall, though the modal markers discussed here all indicate a high value of deontic modality, their illocutionary force and connotations are quite different. More importantly, the same modal marker can convey various meanings in different contexts, in particular when used with different kinds of subjects. Lastly, the amount

of high value deontic modal markers is more than two other types of modality, which explains political leaders' authority in demanding their people to follow their instructions.

4.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-supposed

Deontic modal markers of intermediate value are often used to express intermediate deontic stance, positioned as near towards the centre of necessity (rightness) with regard to deontic distance.

According to Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of intermediate value among the three cases are '*should*' and '*can*'. Therefore, in this part I am going to discuss how the three speakers use these modal markers to express stance, reflect ideology and legitimise propositions.

(1) Should

As can be seen in Table 4.5, '*should*' ranks first in the list of top-ten modal markers, especially for Blair (46 counts) and Ahmadinejad (44 counts). It is also the most frequent deontic modal marker in the case of Obama, with 39 counts. From the perspective of force dynamics, '*should*' often indicate the clash between the subject's inner desires and a peripheral part representing the self's sense of responsibility (Talmy 2000a:449). The fact that there are more instances of '*should*' than '*must*' in terms of modal verbs implies that suggestions may be more acceptable for hearers than demands. Consider the following examples:

[14] I am sending this Congress a plan that you should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter.> pass right away. It's called the American Jobs Act. There should < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.> be nothing controversial about this piece of legislation. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

[15] The government of the United States should **not** < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > be a member of the Board of Governors that in addition to the use of atomic bombs in the war with Japan, deployed weapons, during the war in Iraq, with munitions made from weakened uranium. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010)**

[16] We are a tolerant, decent nation. That tolerance should **not** < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > be abused. But neither should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > it be turned on its head. **(T. Blair; 22 April 2005)**

Compared with '*must*' (obligations), '*should*' expresses a weaker force from an outside or shared source (responsibility or reasoning), as shown in Example [14], [15] and [16]. In Example [14], Obama advises Congress to support his plan through a reasoning process; he gave a lot of reasons using conditionals in his speech. However, '*should*' has a stronger illocutionary force when it is used in the negative form, as shown in Example [15] and [16]. Ahmadinejad makes a strong argument in Example [15] to legitimise his proposal by providing facts. Here '*should*' functions more as a criticism than a suggestion. And in Example [16], Blair uses the negative form of '*should*' plus '*neither*' to emphasize his stance on immigration controls, that is, neither too loose nor too tight. As a matter of fact, this may be intended to criticize the immigration policy of his political opponents.

(2) Can

According to the data, '*can*' is used most frequent in Obama's speeches with 19 counts, followed by Blair with 16 counts and Ahmadinejad with 13 counts. Compared with other modal markers, '*can*' has been used more often in its negative forms (Blair: 10 counts; Obama: 9 counts; Ahmadinejad 5 counts). Consider the following examples:

[17] And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders;

nor can < M.verb. / D.M. /Inter. > we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. **(B. Obama; 20 January 2009)**

[18] We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > refuse to participate in global markets if we want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > prosper. We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. >ignore new political ideas in other counties if we want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. >innovate. We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. >turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be secure. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[19] How can < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > such a government be a member of the Board of Governors? **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010)**

As shown in Examples [17] and [18], '*can*' indicates a stronger illocutionary force in its negative form. Similarly, '*can*' is also stronger when used in rhetorical questions such as the one shown in Example [19] as it is then interpreted as '*can't*'. In this example, Ahmadinejad suggests that the United States should not be a member of the Board of Governors because of the crimes it committed. It reveals his political ideology and deontic stance towards the United States.

On the whole, the three speakers are quite similar in the use of deontic modal markers to give suggestions. However, the examples in the case of Ahmadinejad manifest that the same modal markers of intermediate value can also have different meanings in different contexts.

4.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-allowed

Deontic modal markers of low value are often used to express weak deontic stance towards the designated proposition, and are positioned as distant from the centre of necessity (rightness) from the perspective of deontic distance.

As can be seen in Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of low value

among the three cases are '*be allowed to*', '*unnecessary*' and '*not have to*'. These modal markers are all of low value, used to give permission. Compared with other modal markers discussed, these ones express the weakest illocutionary force. Overall, the deontic modal markers of low value are less frequently used in the data.

(1) Be allowed to

'*Be allowed to*' is used most in the case of Ahmadinejad with 5 counts, followed by Blair with 4 counts. It is often used to indicate the authority that allows the participants to have more freedom in making their own choices, as shown in Example [20]. However, in some circumstances, this modal marker can have the meaning of neglecting one's duty, as shown in Example [21]. In fact, Ahmadinejad uses '*be allowed to*' in this example to indicate that the big powers neglect their responsibility in stopping the crimes in occupied Afghanistan, by providing the facts that 'there has been a dramatic increase in the production of illicit drugs there'. Consider the following examples:

[20] In another case, an inspection of the former Headquarters of the Special Security Organisation was eventually allowed to < M.semi. / D.M. / Low. > go ahead, but only after the building had been emptied not only of any relevant material, but also of its furniture and all equipment of any kind. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[21] Hypocrisy and deceit are allowed in order to < M.semi. / D.M. / Low > secure their interests and imperialistic goals. Drug-trafficking and killing of innocent human beings are also allowed < M.semi. / D.M. / Low > in pursuit of such diabolic goals. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 22 September 2011)**

(2) Unnecessary

Since '*necessary*' is something one needs, '*unnecessary*' means something one does not need. Therefore, it often refers to something or to actions which are unfavourable

or negative. For example, we can see in the examples [22] and [23], '*unnecessary*' is followed by 'interference', and 'spending'. The use of '*unnecessary*' clearly reveals the ideology of the speakers because those unnecessary things or actions are those they disapprove of. From the perspective of pragmatics, it is a means of presupposition. By using '*unnecessary*', the speaker presupposes something is bad or unfavourable, therefore persuading the participants avoid it or allowing them not to do it.

In this sense, this deontic modal can be a useful persuasion / manipulation strategy as it can help the speaker to avoid the responsibility of the stance-taking act. It also embeds the speaker's political values (as part of his ideology) with regard to what kind of actions is negative or unnecessary. For example, 'the interference of Europe' in Example [22] and 'the spending' in [23] are both treated as unnecessary, and therefore disapproved by the speakers.

[22] Europe has done itself more damage through what is perceived as unnecessary < M.adj. / D.M. / Low > interference than all the pamphlets by Eurosceptics could < M.verb. / E.M. / Low > ever do. (**T. Blair; 26 May 2005**)

[23] And as I announced yesterday, we will < M.verb. / E.M. / V.M. / High > launch an unprecedented effort to eliminate unwise and unnecessary < M.adj. / D.M. / Low. > spending that has never been more unaffordable for our nation and our children's future than it is right now. (**B. Obama; 8 January 2009**)

(3) Not have to

Compared with its positive form, '*not have to*' implies that the participants have more options, as '*have to*' means there are no other options. It is often used with something unfavourable or negative, as shown in Examples [24] and [25]. In Example [24], Obama tries to convince the American people that they have more choices than realizing their dreams at the expense of others' dreams. Similarly, Blair manifests that

one can do business successfully without bribing or relying on favours from those in power.

[24] It requires all Americans to realize that your dreams do ==not have to== < M.semi. / D.M. / Low. > come at the expense of my dreams; that investing in the health, welfare, and education of black and brown and white children ==will== < M.verb. / E.M. / High > ultimately help all of America prosper. **(B. Obama; 18 March 2008)**

[25] The lesson of the Asian crisis is above all that it is better to invest in countries where you have openness, independent central banks, properly functioning financial systems and independent courts, where you do ==not have to== < M.semi. / D.M. / Low. > bribe or rely on favours from those in power. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

Overall, the use of deontic modal markers of low value is much less than those with high or intermediate values. However, they also have their distinctive meanings and functions. As can be seen from the previous examples, deontic modals of low value are often adopted to express those unwelcome / negative values or proposals (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353).

In sum, the above qualitative analyses manifest that different choices of deontic stance suggest the speakers' different rhetorical styles (Mar ń-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their different ideologies concerning different levels of values (core, peripheral, and marginal values). For example, Blair uses more deontic semi-modals – '*need to*' (35 counts) and modal adjectives –'*necessary*' (14 counts) than the other two speakers (Obama: 24 and 3 counts; Ahmadinejad: 7 and 7 counts, see Table 4.5). These two deontic modals allow the speaker to evoke and reinforce the audience's belief that taking certain actions is in accordance with their internal needs instead of being forced by external powers. Take his speech 'Doctrine of the International community' for example (No.3 speech in Table 2.3), he uses '*need to*' (11 counts) and '*necessary*' (1

counts) to represent his core values such as 'assist the war crimes tribunal in its work to bring to justice those who have committed these appalling crimes', 'find a new way to make the UN and its Security Council work' and 'ensure flexible labour markets, to remove regulatory burdens and to untie the hands of business'.

Obama is very similar in the use of deontic modals to those of Blair, though he tends to use more '*must*' and '*can*'. Take his Speech 'On job bill' for example (No. 9 speech in Table 2.4), Obama uses '*should*' 21 times to legitimise his proposal of 'passing the job bill' by presupposing the designated action as a common practice and urges the audience (Members of Congress) to support him in order to meet their responsibility. At the same time, Obama uses '*have to*' for 13 times to present this action as the only choice they can make.

Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, ranks first in the use of deontic modals such as '*must*' (39 counts), '*shall*' (7 counts), and '*be allowed to*' (5 counts). Take his speech 'Before 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly' for example (No.9 speech in Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses '*must*' in its passive form 8 times (12 times in total) and '*be allowed to*' for three times to mystify the actors and avoid the potential   conflicts. These modals in their passive forms may allow the speaker to delete the actor with regard to which person or what institution should be responsible for giving permissions for specific actions. The use of the passive form of '*must*' suggests the strong necessity of taking designated actions, while the use of '*be allowed to*' implies that those powerful nations who occupied Iraq are committing crimes. That is because what are allowed are actually crimes such as 'hypocrisy, deceit, drug- trafficking and killing of innocent human beings'.

The same modal marker also indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees of force according to different contexts. For example, when used with different kinds of subjects, '*must*' can be either a demand or a warning. In addition, the negative deontic modals usually have stronger illocutionary force, which can be

used to delegitimise the political actions. For example, '*must not*' or 's*houldn't*' are stronger in deontic stance than their original forms '*must*' and '*should*'. By using these negative deontic modals, the speaker either wants to show it is not right to take these actions, or to show what has been forbidden is actually the right thing to do. For example, the negative deontic modals of '*should*' in examples [15] and [16] are used to delegitimise the designated actions, while '*can't*' in examples [17] and [18] are used to criticize the designated actions.

4.4 Summary

Overall, this chapter has demonstrated how different forms and values of deontic modality express stance, reflect ideology, and (de)legitimise actions in political discourse from the perspective of deontic distance.

I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of deontic modality in terms of modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and differences of top-ten deontic modal markers used by three speakers. The quantitative results manifested that the distributions and frequencies of deontic modality in the three cases present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama.

I also examined the functions of deontic modality in political discourse with respect to expressing deontic stance, reflecting ideology and legitimise or delegitimise actions. Generally, the deontic modals of higher value are placed closer to the centre of necessity (rightness), therefore indicating a stronger force towards the realization of the actions. The most striking results are as follows:

● Deontic modals encode value-based ideology and function as stance-taking acts which express three levels of value-based stance corresponding to three values of modality.

- Deontic modality can also be treated as value grading in terms of four levels: core, peripheral, marginal, opposite values.

- Stance-taking acts of deontic modality contribute to the function of (de)legitimisation.

- Deontic modality reflects the speaker's ideology in terms of what is right and what is wrong.

- The study of deontic stance in political discourse should not be restricted to deontic modal verbs because they only account for about half of the total deontic stance markers.

- Deontic semi-modals play an important role in expressing implicit deontic stance, which is very popular in the process of persuading or manipulating addressees.

- Deontic markers of high value rank first among all three cases, followed by those of intermediate and low value.

- The differences of deontic modals among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as well as semi-modals and the total figures, though there are no significant differences between Obama and Blair in all categories.

- The same deontic modal marker can indicate different semantic meanings and various degrees of force in different contexts.

- The deontic modals of high value are often used in the legitimisation of the speaker's own views or proposals ('positive self-representation'), while those of low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other's views or proposals ('negative other-representation');

- The three speakers' choices of deontic modals reflect their distinctive ideologies and rhetorical styles.

In the following chapter, I will conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of volitional modality in political discourse with examples from the three cases.

Chapter Five: Volitional Modality in Political Discourse

5.1 Introduction

Unlike epistemic modality and deontic modality, volitional modality has long been neglected in the previous discourse studies as well as semantic studies. Traditionally, it is treated as a sub-category of deontic modality (see Krug 2000:41) or dynamic modality (see Portner 2009:135). In this study, volitional modality is a paralleling category with deontic and epistemic modality. Volitional modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their force of volitional stance involving willingness, desirability, or intentions indicated in the utterance and this force is evaluated in terms of volitional distance towards the centre of willingness. Volitional modality can be adopted to make commitments and express volitional stance with reference to one's emotions.

Volitional modality also plays a role in legitimising actions in political discourse, because different values of volitional modality make it possible for a political speaker to make commitments in various degrees, such as making promises, making wishes, accepting and refusing requests or offers.

In this chapter, I will illustrate how volitional modality functions in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.

5.2 Quantitative Analysis of Volitional Modality

This section is mainly about the quantitative analysis of volitional modality. First, I will calculate the distributions of volitional modal values and forms in each case. Then I will compare their frequencies in each category between three speakers. Besides, I will make a comparison of top-ten modal markers of volitional modality among the three cases.

5.2.1 Values of Volitional Modality

The distribution of volitional modal values among the three speakers shows much more disparities than that of epistemic and deontic modality, as shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. Firstly, It is interesting to see that the percentage of high value is much higher than that of intermediate value in the cases of Blair and Obama, while the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad (High: 28.81% vs. Intermediate: 71.19%). Secondly, in terms of volitional modals of low value, it takes up 6.67% in the case of Obama, while the figure is only 1.34% in the case of Blair and zero in Ahmadinejad's case. Last but not least, Obama (150 counts) and Blair (149 counts) show great similarity in the use of volitional modal values, while Ahmadinejad uses only half of their figures with 59 counts.

Table 5.1 The distribution of values of volitional modality in the three cases

Speakers / Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
High	89	59.73%	75	50%	17	28.81%
Inter.	58	38.93%	65	43.33%	42	71.19%
Low	2	1.34%	10	6.67%	0	0
Total	149	100%	150	100%	59	100%

Figure 5.1 The distribution of values of volitional modality in the three cases

In Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, we can see that the frequencies of volitional modal values are also very different among the three cases. Blair ranks first in high value, while Obama has the highest frequency in intermediate and low value. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, uses far fewer volitional modals in all the categories than the two other speakers, except for those of intermediate value. In particular, he does not use any volitional modal markers of low value. Overall, the differences of volitional modal values among the three cases are significant except for intermediate value, though the results between Blair and Obama indicate no significant disparities except for volitional modals of low value[47].

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[47] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of volitional modal values except for low value (P-value: 0.04412). (High value, P-value0.2954; Intermediate value, P-value: 0.6059).

Table 5.2 A comparison of values of volitional modality in the three cases

Speakers Values of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
High	89	3.38	75	2.83	17	0.67	1.080e-10	Yes
Inter.	58	2.20	65	2.46	42	1.65	0.1248	No
Low	2	0.08	10	0.38	0	0	0.001096	Yes
Total	149	5.65	150	5.67	59	2.32	7.083e-10	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 5.2 A comparison of values of volitional modality in the three cases

5.2.2 Forms of Volitional Modality

With respect to volitional modal forms, it is interesting to see that the distribution of three cases present a very similar picture in terms of percentage, ranking from modal verbs, semi-modals, to modal adjectives and adverbs, as shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3. In particular, modal verbs and semi-modals take up similar percentages in all three cases, with an average of 61% and 37% respectively. All three speakers use very few modal adjectives and adverbs, particularly for Ahmadinejad, who does not

use any of these two categories.

Table 5.3 The distribution of forms of volitional modality in the three cases

Speakers / Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
M.verb.	94	63.09%	85	56.67%	38	64.41%
M.semi.	54	36.24%	61	40.67%	21	35.59%
M.adj.	1	0.67%	2	1.33%	0	0
M.adv.	0	0	2	1.33%	0	0
Total	149	100%	150	100%	59	100%

Figure 5.3 The distribution of forms of volitional modality in the three cases

Table 5.4 and Figure 5.4 shows us that Blair and Obama use quite similar frequencies of volitional modal markers in all categories, while Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal verbs & semi-modals than them and does not use any modal adjectives or adverbs. Obama ranks first in most categories, including semi-modals, modal adjectives and adverbs, while Blair adopts the most modal verbs. On the whole, the disparities of volitional modal forms among the three cases are not significant except modal verbs and semi-modals, while further statistical analyses show that there are no significant

differences between Blair and Obama in their use of volitional modal forms in all categories[48].

Table 5.4 A comparison of forms of volitional modality in the three cases

Speakers / Forms of Modality	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
M.verb.	94	3.57	85	3.21	38	1.49	1.050e-05	Yes
M.semi.	54	2.05	61	2.30	21	0.83	9.176e-05	Yes
M.adj.	1	0.04	2	0.08	0	0	0.3805	No
M.adv.	0	0	2	0.08	0	0	0.1413	No
Total	149	5.65	150	5.67	59	2.32	7.083e-10	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 5.4 A comparison of forms of volitional modality in the three cases

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[48] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of volitional modal forms in all the categories: modal verbs (P-value: 0.5288), semi-modal (P-value:0.5924); modal adjectives (P-value: 0.9968), and modal adverbs (P-value: 0.4815).

5.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Volitional Modality

As can be seen in Table 5.5, the list of the most frequent volitional modal markers presents a similar pattern among the three cases (See Table A7-A9 in Appendix for details). Firstly, the three cases share six modal markers in the list, including '*will*', '*want to*', '*would*', '*intend to*', '*may*' and '*shall*'. Secondly, volitional modal markers '*will*', '*want to*' and '*would*' take up the first three positions in all three cases. Thirdly, Blair and Obama use nearly the same number of several modal markers, such as '*would*' (both 16 counts) and '*want to*' (37 counts vs. 40 counts).

However, compared with the other two types of modals, there are more differences than similarities among the three speakers in using volitional modal markers. For example, Blair and Obama use far more '*will*' (72 counts vs. 63 counts) than '*want to*' (37 counts vs. 40 counts), while Ahmadinejad uses far fewer in both modal markers (11 counts vs. 15 counts). Besides, Blair uses more '*will*' (72 counts), '*be to*' (5 counts) and '*shall*' (4 counts), while Obama uses more '*want to*' (40 counts), '*be going to*' (10 counts) and '*be willing to*' (7 counts). Compared with the other two speakers, though Ahmadinejad uses far fewer '*will*' and '*want to*', he adopts more '*would*' (19 counts) and '*intend to*' (4 counts).

Overall, all three speakers share some similarities and differences in adopting volitional modal markers.

Table 5.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of volitional modality in the three cases

Speakers Top-10 Modal Markers	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.	Modal Markers	No.
1	will	72 (12)	will	63(9)	would	19(2)
2	want to	37 (1)	want to	40	want to	15 (2)
3	would	16	would	16 (2)	will	11 (1)
4	be to	5	be going to	10	intend to	4 (1)
5	be going to	5 (1)	be willing to	7	may	4
6	shall	4	may	4	shall	4
7	be determined to	3	intend to	3	be determined to	2
8	be willing to	2	willingly	2	/	
9	intend to	2	anxious	2	/	
10	may/should/ anxious	1	shall/ be to /might	1	/	

5.2.4 Discussions and Implications

So far this section has discussed the distributions and frequencies of the values and forms of volitional modality in the three cases. It has also demonstrated and compared the similarities and disparities of the top-ten volitional modal markers among the three speakers. The most striking results are as follows:

(i)   Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of volitional modal markers (with 149 and 150 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses half of their figures (with 59 counts). That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verb '*will*' and semi-modals '*want to*', which both involve the future. It implies

that Ahmadinejad's speeches focus more on past events, while the other two speakers talk about more about the future plans or policies. It could also be the evidence to support the study of his distinctive speech style.

(ii) The study of volitional modality in political discourse should not be restricted to modal verbs. Otherwise, many essential volitional modal meanings would be neglected, especially for semi-modals. That is because modal verbs only account for 60% of the total figure on average, as shown in Table 5.3. It is true that other volitional modal forms are not obvious in stance-taking, but they can reveal the speaker's volitional stance to certain degree.

(iii) Both Blair and Obama use far more volitional modals of high value than those of intermediate value, though the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs such as '*will*', which is a volitional modal of high value. Besides, he also uses more '*would*' and '*intend to*' than the other two speakers, both of which are of intermediate value.

(iv) The differences among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals. However, further statistical analyses show that the differences between Obama and Blair in the use of volitional modals are not significant in most categories except for that of low value. That means these disparities among the three cases are mainly due to the results of Ahmadinejad's case. It implies the possibility of the different use of volitional modal markers between English native speakers and foreigners or the distinctive speech style of Ahmadinejad. Therefore, it needs further investigations in the context of political discourse.

(v) '*Will*', '*want to*' and '*would*' rank top three in the cases of Blair and Obama, but this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad ('*want to*' comes first, followed by '*would*' and '*will*'). That is probably because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer

'*will*' than the other two speakers as he discussed more past events than future plans in his speeches.

(vi) Despite of the similarities, there are also some differences between the speakers in their choices of volitional modal markers. For example, Blair uses more '*will*', '*be to*' & '*shall*' than the other speakers, while Obama uses more '*want to*' & '*be going to*' and Ahmadinejad uses more '*would*' & '*intend to*'.

In sum, the quantitative analysis of volitional modality among the three cases manifested much similarities and disparities in terms of values, forms and top-ten modal markers. Then it is also essential to analyse them qualitatively in order to investigate the functions of these volitional modal markers and look at how these functions are realized in different contexts. Therefore, the next section will address volitional modality qualitatively with examples from the three cases.

5.3 Qualitative Analysis of Volitional Modality

The section of quantitative analysis has illustrated the distributions and frequencies of volitional modality among the three cases in terms of values, forms and top-ten modal markers. In this section, I will focus on the functions of volitional modality and the most frequent expressions of volitional modality through a qualitative analysis of data.

5.3.1 Volitional Modality as Emotion-based Stance

Volitional modality is often used to make commitments by demonstrating one's willingness, determination, promises, desires or intentions to take actions. Through various forms of volitional modal markers, the speaker intends to manifest the force of willingness in doing something, based on various evidences showing why someone is willing to do something. Therefore, volitional modality can be used to express volitional stance based on emotions[49]. As discussed previously, epistemic modals and

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[49] Emotions here refer to determination, intentions, wishes or willingness expressed by volitional modals.

deontic modals can be viewed as 'knowledge grading' (Facchinetti et al. 2003) and 'value grading' respectively. In this sense, volitional modality can also be treated as 'emotion grading'. This means the use of volitional modals reflect the speaker's different levels of emotions with regard to willingness. For instance, a volitional modal of high value is often used to indicate the speaker's strong determination towards the actualization of the designated action as it is close to the centre of willingness within the research framework. However, those volitional modals of lower value often show the speaker's weaker emotions/ intentions as they are more distant from the centre.

Following epistemic stance and deontic stance in the previous chapters, volitional stance refers to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the willingness/commitment concerning the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself. Volitional stance is realized by volitional modality, which can also be addressed in terms of 'volitional distance'. Like deontic distance and epistemic distance, volitional distance is also concerned with 'the speaker's metaphorical "distance" from a particular state of affairs: the speaker's willingness regarding the realization a proposition. That is to say, the different degrees of volitional modal markers can be evaluated in terms of volitional distance.

Volitional modals are, then, treated as encoding different commissive force involving the speaker's or subject's emotions (such as willingness/inclination, intentions, determination, commitments) towards the realization of events (Marín-Arrese 2011:204). Therefore, volitional stance can be classified into three levels of commissive force (illocutionary force), corresponding to three levels of modal value and distance, which means, the speaker typically expresses a stronger volitional stance when he/she uses a volitional modal marker with a higher value, positioned as close to the centre of willingness, and vice versa. Similar to that of epistemic and deontic modals, high value of volitional modals in "I *will* lend him more money." (where *will*

is a volitional modal of high value) often indicates stronger volitional stance than "I *would like* to lend him more money." (where *would like* is a volitional modal marker of intermediate value) and "I *am willing to* lend him more money." (Where *am willing to* is a volitional modal marker of low value). This will be further elaborated in section 5.3.2.

Similar to epistemic modality, the function of reflecting ideology concerning volitional modality is also implicit, though it can be inferred from the stance-taking acts to a certain extent. Volitional stance reflects the speaker's ideology based on his emotions concerning who is willing or unwilling to take actions. Volitional modality is often used by the speaker to make commitments. And the commitments made by the speaker usually involve his emotions about who is expected (or determined, intended, willing) to take actions (cf. Koller 2014), which often reflect the speaker's beliefs about what is right or possible to take actions in the context of political discourse. Consider the following example:

This time we want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > talk about the men and women of every color and creed who serve together, and fight together, and bleed together under the same proud flag. **(B. Obama; 18 March 2008)**

The volitional marker '*want to*' in the example expresses the speaker's volitional stance based on his intention (emotion). This intention of taking action 'talk about the men and women … under the same proud flag' is believed to be right by the speaker. In other words, this volitional stance reflects Obama's ideology of 'race' to a certain degree.

Similar to deontic modality, volitional modality can also be used to (de)legitimise actions at the propositional level by placing the propositions on the scale of willingness. Volitional modal markers of higher value indicate higher willingness of the participants to take actions and those of lower value imply lower willingness.

Evidentiality helps to explain one wants to do something because it is right or possible to do so (or one does not want to do something because it is wrong or impossible to do so).

When someone is determined to take actions, a volitional modal marker of high value is often used, which means the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Similarly, a volitional modal marker of intermediate value is used when someone is intended to take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned near the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. When someone is willing to take actions, a volitional modal marker of low value is typically used, which means the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Negative volitional modals of high value are only used when the subject matter is positioned opposite to the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. By saying someone is willing or not willing to take an action, the speaker is also suggesting either it is right to take this action or it is possible to realize this action. Meanwhile, with the support of evidential markers, it is possible for volitional modality to legitimise actions in political discourse. In this sense, the speaker can legitimise or delegitimise actions by adopting different values of volitional modal markers.

5.3.2 Markers of Volitional Modality in the three cases

In this section, the functions of volitional modality will be examined in detail through a variety of volitional modal expressions, from the perspective of value of modality and volitional distance. It would also be interesting to see how emotions are presented and graded into three levels (determined, intended, and willing) in term of various volitional modals during the persuasion process, with reference to three levels of commissive force.

5.3.2.1 High Value: Close-Determined

A volitional modal marker of high value is often used when someone is determined to take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Volitional modals of high value are used to make promises or express one's resolutions, indicating a strong commissive force (Mar ń-Arrese 2011).

(1) Will

'*Will*'[50] has been used most in the data, with 60 counts (Blair), 54 counts (Obama) and 12 counts (Ahmadinejad) respectively. As I have mentioned in Chapter Three that the modal marker '*will*' can both convey the meaning of volition/intention as volitional modality or the meaning of high possibility in the future. However, the former can only occur when the subject is a person because impersonal subjects can't express their intentions, though different persons or contexts also influence its commissive force and volitional stance. Consider the following examples:

[1] I will < M.verb. / V.M. / High. > pursue this new approach in Europe not because it is in Europe's interests but because it is in Britain's interests. (**T. Blair; 15 December 1998**)

[2] To finally spark the creation of a clean-energy economy, we will < M.verb. / E.M. & V.M. / High > double the production of alternative energy in the next three years. We will < M.verb. / E.M. & V.M. / High > modernize more than 75 percent of federal buildings and improve the energy efficiency of 2 million American homes, saving consumers and taxpayers billions on our energy bills. (**B. Obama; 8 January 2009**)

[3] I am confident < Inside / P.K. > that you, the American people, will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High > play an instrumental role in the establishment of justice and spirituality throughout the world. (**M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006**)

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[50] These figures exclude the counts of its negative form, which will be dealt with in 7.3.2.4.

[4] Alternatively, if Saddam will **not** < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > see reason, then after this military operation is concluded, we will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > work to ensure that Saddam's weakened military capability can**not** < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be rebuilt and that the threat he poses is fully contained. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

In Example [1], Blair uses the volitional marker of high value - '*will*' to express his determination to his audience in taking the action, and explains the reasons why he decides to do so. This determination reveals his ideology that pursuing this new approach in Europe is the right thing to do and it will certainly be actualized.

'*Will*' in Example [2], however, can have both readings. That is to say, these two '*will*' can be interpreted as both 'we promise to take these actions' in terms of volitional modality and 'we are certain to do so' in terms of epistemic modality. As there is a definite time reference (in the next three years), their epistemic meaning is more prominent in this example. Therefore, the volitional stance expressed here is much weaker than that of Example [3].

Example [3], on the other hand, represents the lowest volitional stance among three examples. That is mainly because the volitional stance expressed here is not the speaker's (Ahmadinejad), but only assumed by the speaker based on his own belief through an inside evidential '**I am confident**'.

The negative form of '*will*' in Example [4], on the other hand, places the volitional stance of the subject (Saddam) on the opposite centre of willingness through a conditional clause. This therefore enables the speaker to legitimise his proposal, that is, 'to ensure that Saddam's weakened military capability *cannot* be rebuilt and that the threat he poses is fully contained.' This proposition clearly presupposes the military threat from Saddam as real and gives a warning to the relevant parties. It also reveals Blair's intention (as part of his ideology) that even after this military operation, we

will keep on controlling the military capability of Iraq.

(2) Be determined to

'*Be determined to*' is only used by Blair and Ahmadinejad, with 3 and 2 counts respectively. It is of the strongest volitional stance among all the volitional modals, which often indicates one's strong desire or resolution to do something regardless of any difficulties. Therefore, it is only used when the speaker is very certain about that determination. However, it is not the case when used in the context. Consider the following examples:

[5] Bertie Ahern, the Irish Taoiseach, and I are determined to < M.semi. / V.M. / High. > find a way through. The people will **never** < M.verb. / E.M. / High > forgive the politicians unless we resolve it. (**T. Blair; 24 April 1999**)

[6] The God Almighty has promised that the day when nations are prepared and determined < M.semi. / V.M. / High >, this great cause and goal will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be realized by the promised savior of nations, the real lover of humans and the true administrator of justice, Hazrat Mahdi (May < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > God Hasten His Reappearance) in the accompany of the Jesus Christ (PBUH) and all the other righteous and freedom and justice seekers of the world. (**M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012**)

In Example [5], Blair uses '*be determined to*' to express his strong volitional stance in taking the designated action. By doing so, He also makes a promise that they will make it come true. However, the determination expressed by the same modal marker in Example [6] does not involve the speaker- Ahmadinejad himself, but from the promise of the God. Therefore, there is no doubt that the illocutionary force or volitional stance expressed in this example is much weaker than the previous one.

(3) be going to

'*Be going to*' is the most frequent volitional semi-modal of high value in the data, used only by Obama (10 counts) and Blair (4 counts). It often refers to someone's intention of doing something or something has been planned to take place in the near future. So it can also be used in the sense of 'high possibility' pertaining to epistemic modality. Compared with the previous semi-modal '*be determined to*', '*be going to*' is weaker in terms of illocutionary force. However, it often implies that the speaker has already planned in detail about how to make it happen. In this sense, this modal marker also indicates strong volitional stance towards the actualization of the designated action. Consider the following examples:

[7] We all understand < Shared / S.K. > the need to ensure flexible labour markets, to remove regulatory burdens and to untie the hands of business if we are going to < M.semi. / V.M. / High. > succeed. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[8] So America is going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > continue on this course of action no matter what happens in Copenhagen. **(B. Obama; 18 December 2009)**

[9] So we're going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > keep fighting for the DREAM Act. We're going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > keep up the fight for reform. **(B. Obama; 10 May 2011)**

'*Be going to*' used in Example [7] is the weakest of all in terms of volitional stance among the three examples here. That is because this stance has been hedged by a conditional marker 'if', which leaves much space for the realization of the designated action. Example [8], on the other hand, shows Obama's strong determination in taking the indicated action, because it is not only justified by a causal connective 'so' but also supported by the phrase 'no matter what happens in Copenhagen'. That means he has good reasons to take this action and will spare no efforts to make it happen.

In Example [9], the speaker uses this modal marker repeatedly in a rhetorical way to express his strong volitional stance. By doing so, he legitimises his determination in passing the DREAM Act (the Job Bill) and also reflects his ideology that it is necessary and possible to be actualized. The interesting thing about this example is that the speaker adopts an exclusive 'we' to engage the audience and presuppose them as his supporters.

5.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-Intended

A volitional modal marker of intermediate value is used when someone is intended to take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned near the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance.

(1) want to

'*Want to*' is the most popular semi-modal of volitional modality in the data. Obama comes first in the use of this modal marker with 40 counts, followed by Blair (37 counts) and Ahmadinejad (18 counts). It is often used to express one's intention or plan in taking designated actions, normally used after the first person. Consider the following examples:

[10] I want incomes for middle-class families to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > rise again. (Applause.) I want prosperity in this country to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be widely shared. (Applause.) I want everybody to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be able to reach that American dream. And that's why immigration reform is an economic imperative. **(B.Obama; 10 May 2011)**

[11] Non -interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > jettison too readily. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[12] Recently they [the Israelis] tried a new trick. They want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > show the evacuation from the Gaza strip, which was imposed on them by

Palestinians, as a final victory for the Palestinians and end the issue of Palestine with the excuse of establishing a Palestinian government next to themselves. Today, they want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. >involve Palestinians with mischief and trick them into fighting with one another over political positions so that they would < M.verb. / V.M & E.M. / Inter. > drop the issue of Palestine. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

In Example [10], Obama uses the volitional semi-modal marker – '*want to*' three times to express his intentions about 'the incomes for middle-class families rise again', 'prosperity in this country will be widely shared' and 'everybody is able to reach that American dream'. And all these intentions support or legitimise the action he proposes – 'immigration reform', which he believes is 'an economic imperative'. The illocutionary force or volitional stance expressed here is the strongest among the three examples here, as this force or stance is directly expressed by the speaker himself.

'*Want to*' in Example [11], however, has been hedged by another volitional modal of intermediate value. That is why its volitional stance is much weaker than the previous one. Similarly, the volitional stance indicated in Example [12] is not as strong as that of Example [10]. That is because this stance is only assumed by the speaker as the two subjects of the semi-modals are 'they' instead of the speaker himself (Ahmadinejad). It is also likely that he has some evidence to support his assumptions, though it is not clear in the context.

'*Want to*' also encodes the speaker's ideology in the sense that the speaker's emotions (including willingness, determination, intentions, etc.) often implies his or her values (as part of his ideology) about what should be done or not, or his or her knowledge about what are possible or impossible to be actualized, as shown in Example [10] and [11]. However, if the emotions expressed by '*want to*' belong to the speaker's opponents, the values behind the emotions are normally negative or disapproved by the speaker, such as 'they want to involve Palestinians with mischief and trick them

into fighting with one another over political positions', as shown in Example [12]. This result is consistent to the previous studies of legitimisation and delegitimisation in terms of 'positive self-representation' and 'negative other-representation' respectively (Chilton 2004:46, 47).

(2) would

'*Would*' is the second most frequent volitional modal of intermediate value, used with very similar frequencies among the three speakers (Blair: 16 counts; Obama: 16 counts; Ahmadinejad: 19 counts). '*Would*' is the past form of '*will*', it is therefore weaker in terms of commissive force as it encodes remote temporal distance as well as volitional distance than its bare form (Chilton 2014). In Chapter Five, the semantic meanings of '*would*' have been discussed in terms of epistemic modality. As to its volitional meaning, it often means 'intermediate willingness' or 'wish'. Consider the following examples:

[13] And I'm pretty sure < M.adj. / E.M. / High > I know < Inside / P.K. > what most Americans would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > choose. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

[14] Nearly half the $124 billion US firms spent on foreign acquisitions last year went on British companies. We would **like** < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > it to be even more. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[15] Palestinian mothers, just like Iranian and American mothers, love their children, and are painfully bereaved by the imprisonment, wounding and murder of their children. What mother wouldn't < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter.   >? **(M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006)**

The volitional stance expressed by '*would*' in Example [13] has been supported by an inside evidential '**I know**', which means the speaker (Obama) has expressed his self-commitment to this stance. However, the subject of '*would*' is 'most Americans',

which means Obama assumed most Americans will make the right choice and pass his Job Bill. By doing so, he tries to persuade or influence his audience (the Americans) in making their choices. Therefore, the volitional stance indicated here is not very strong.

'*Would*' in Example [14] is used together with 'like' as a set phrase, which means 'wish' or 'intention', similar to '*intend to*'. It means Blair has the wish that this kind of investment will be more in Britain. By adopting this modal marker, he demonstrates his intermediate volitional stance towards the actualization of the designated action. In this case, his intention (as part of his ideology) is reflected through his knowledge about what is good for British economy. Here he believes that 'Nearly half the $124 billion US firms spent on foreign acquisitions last year went on British companies' is a good tendency for British economy. As '*would like*' has sort of subjunctive meaning, its stance is also weak in terms of the illocutionary force which makes the indicated action happen.

The negative form of '*would*' in Example [15], however, expressed the strongest volitional stance among all the three examples here. That is not only because it has been used in a rhetorical question, which often indicates the emphasis of the stance from the speaker, but also because it has been justified by the evidence in the context (The evidence here refers to the common knowledge shared by everyone, as shown in the previous sentence, though there is no evidential marker in the context.)

(3) intend to

'*Intend to*' is not used as frequently as '*want to*' in the data, which has been used 7 counts (Ahmadinejad), 3 counts (Obama) and 2 counts (Blair) respectively in the data. It typically refers to having a plan or purpose to take designated actions. Consider the following examples:

[16] Whatever disagreements on particular issues, the partnership between us is essential and I intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > ensure it remains positive

and firm. **(T. Blair; 18 November 2003)**

[17] You should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter.> pass it. And I intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > take that message to every corner of this country. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

[18] The US administration has undermined the credibility of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its Security Council. But, I do **not** intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > address all the challenges and calamities in this message. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006)**

In Example [16], Blair uses '*intend to*' to express his intention to ensure a positive and firm partnership with Europe. The volitional stance indicated by this modal marker is intermediate because the illocutionary force of realizing the designated action is not very strong. Similarly, '*intend to*' in Example [17] expresses an intermediate volitional stance towards the indicated action and reveals the speaker's intention (as part of his ideology) that it is the right thing to pass the job bill.

In Example [18], however, Ahmadinejad uses the negative form of '*intend to*' to justify his previous proposition by implying there are too many challenges and calamities that it is impossible to address all of them in this speech. It clearly reflects his volitional stance and ideology towards this issue.

5.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-Willing

When someone is willing to take actions, a volitional modal marker of low value is typically used, which means the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Volitional modals of low value are used to express one's willingness of taking actions, indicating a weak commissive force.

be willing to

'*Be willing to*' is only used by Obama and Blair, with 7 and 2 counts respectively. It

often means one is happy to take indicated actions or accept something needed. Consider the following examples:

[19] We define ourselves as a nation of immigrants — a nation that welcomes those willing to < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > embrace America's ideals and America's precepts. **(B.Obama; 10 May 2011)**

[20] So we must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > show the world that we are willing to < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > step up to these challenges around the world and in our own backyards. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

Example [19] manifests that the immigrants' willingness of "embracing America's ideals and America's precepts" is appreciated by the speaker. By adopting the semi-modal '*willing to*", Obama reveals his ideology that those immigrants are welcome in the USA as long as they can accept the ideals and precepts here, indicating the freedom of not being forced to do so.

'*Be willing to*' used in Example [20], on the other hand, expresses a stronger volitional stance compared with that of Example [19]. That is because the stance indicated here has been reinforced by a deontic marker of high value. By doing so, Blair legitimises the action of 'stepping up to these challenges around the world and in our own backyards'.

In sum, different choices of volitional stance also reflect the speakers' different rhetorical styles (Mar ń-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their different ideologies with regard to emotions. For example, Blair uses more volitional modals of high value than the other two speakers, such as '*will*' (72 counts) '*shall*' (4 counts), and '*be determined to*'(3 counts) to express his strong volitional stance towards the designated action. Take his speech 'War on Iraq' for example (No. 2 speech in Table 2.3), Blair uses volitional modals of high value for 9 counts to express his strong volitional stance and legitimise his proposal of attacking Iraq. They also reveal Blair's ideology of

establishing a self-image as an authoritative leader with determination and strong will (Fairclough 2000a).

Obama, on the other hand, uses more volitional modals of intermediate value than the other two speakers, such as the semi-modal '*want to*' (40 counts, Blair: 37 counts; Ahmadinejad: 15 counts), to express his intentions of taking the designated actions. Take his speech 'The Race Speech' for example (No.2 speech in Table 2.4), Obama uses 'we *want to*' 9 counts to express his intentions or plans and at the same time presupposes what he intends to do is what his addressees want to do. That is probably because he believes that involving the audience into his intentions or plans will arouse the awareness of participation in the audience. It is, therefore, more likely to promote the interpersonal relations with them and win their support.

With respect to volitional modals, Ahmadinejad takes a quite different speech style from the other two speakers. Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs '*will*' and semi-modals '*want to*', which both involve the future. It implies that Ahmadinejad's speeches focus more on past events, while the other two speakers talk about more about the future plans or policies. However, he adopts more '*would*' (19 counts) and '*intend to*' (4 counts). Take his speech 'Before 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly' for example (No.9 speech in Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses a passive form of '*intend to*' to presuppose other people's or institutions' intentions and delete the actor, as shown in the example 'A move that triggered inflation worldwide and was intended to prey on the economic gains of other nations?' from the speech. This may help him in avoiding his self-commitments and potential conflicts, though this style seems not very convincing in argumentation discourse, such as political speeches in this study. That is because it is often hard to prove other people's intentions unless they express explicitly.

It also shows that the same volitional modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees of force according to different contexts. Besides, the

volitional modals of high value can usually be used to delegitimise the political actions. For example, '*will not*' is used to express the speaker's negative volitional stance towards the designated action or to delegitimise it, as shown in Example [4].

5.4 Summary

Overall this chapter illustrates how different forms and values of volitional modality express volitional stance, and (de)legitimise political actions in political discourse, interacted with evidentiality.

I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of volitional modality in terms of modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and differences of top-ten volitional modal markers used by three speakers. The quantitative results manifest that the distributions and frequencies of volitional modality in the three cases present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama.

I also examined the functions of volitional modality in political discourse in terms of expressing volitional stance, reflecting ideology and legitimise or delegitimise actions through different values of volitional modal markers. Generally, the volitional modals of higher value are placed closer to the centre of willingness, therefore indicating a stronger force towards the realization of the actions. The most striking results are as follows:

- Volitional modals encode emotion-based ideology and function as stance-taking acts which express three levels of emotion-based stance corresponding to three values of modality.
- Volitional modality can also be treated as emotion grading in terms of three levels: determined, intended, and willing.

- Blair and Obama adopt similar numbers of volitional modal markers (with 149 and 150 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses fewer than half of their figures, with 59 counts.

- The study of volitional modality in political discourse should not be restricted to modal verbs. That is because modal verbs only account for 60% of the total figure on average.

- Both Blair and Obama use far more volitional modals of high value than those of intermediate value, though the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad.

- The differences in the use of volitional modals among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals, while the differences between Obama and Blair are not significant in most categories except for that of low value.

- '*Will*', '*want to*' and '*would*' rank top three in the cases of Blair and Obama, but this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad ('*would*' comes first, followed by '*want to*' and '*will*').

- The same volitional modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees of force according to different contexts.

- The volitional modals of low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other's views or proposals ('negative other-representation').

- The three speakers' choices of volitional modals often reflect their distinctive ideologies and rhetorical styles.

In the next chapter, I will investigate the sources, types, and functions of evidentiality in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Chapter Six: Evidentiality in Political Discourse

6.1 Introduction

The last three chapters have investigated the three types of modality in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. They revealed interesting results about the frequencies and distributions of these modal markers among three case studies, particularly the functions of different modal types in expressing stance, reflecting ideologies and (de)legitimising actions within the research framework. It is interesting to note that evidentiality, which is closely related to modality, can provide evidence and justifications for the speakers in stance-taking and ideology-coding, particularly in the process of legitimisation in political discourse. So in this chapter I will examine evidentiality in political discourse from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives, aiming to explore how the speakers adopt different sources and types of evidential markers to persuade their addressees and explore the pragmatic functions of evidentials in the contexts of political discourse.

As discussed in Section 2.4.1, evidentiality is defined as the linguistic marking of sources of knowledge as persuasion strategies. Drawing on Squartini's locus of information (2008:917-947), the linguistic markers (evidentials) indicating sources of information are divided into three categories, depending on whether the information is from an 'outside source', 'shared source' or 'inside source'. And each source includes two categories of evidentials from different modes of knowing (cf. Chafe 1986:263; Willett, 1988:57; Aikhenvald 2007:211; Marín-Arrese 2011a:206, 2011b:793; Hart

2011:760; Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014:392). Therefore, there are altogether three sources and six types of evidentials in this study (refer to Table 2.6 for details).

Based on this classification of evidentials, in what follows evidentials will first be examined quantitatively in the three case studies. After that, the functions of evidentiality will be investigated in the context of political discourse, and some representative, highly frequent evidential markers of each type will be analysed qualitatively, with annotated examples from the three cases.

6.2 Quantitative Analysis of Evidentiality

In this section, I will first calculate and compare the frequencies and distributions of evidentials among three case studies in terms of sources of evidentials and types of evidentials. Then I will examine and compare the top-ten evidential markers among the three cases before discussing and summarising the results of the quantitative analysis.

6.2.1 Sources of Evidentials

With respect to the distributions of sources of evidentials, shared evidentials come first in the cases of Ahmadinejad (69.9%) and Blair (44.80%), as illustrated in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2. However, Obama is the only speaker who uses more inside evidentials than outside and shared evidentials, which also ranks first among the three speakers.

Table 6.1 The distribution of sources of evidentials in the three cases

Speakers Sources of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Outside	35	22.73%	25	18.12%	21	20.39%
Shared	69	44.80%	49	35.51%	72	69.90%
Inside	50	32.47%	64	46.38%	10	9.71%
Total	154	100%	138	100%	103	100%

Figure 6.1 The distribution of sources of evidentials in the three cases

As demonstrated in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2, Blair ranks first in terms of the frequencies of evidential sources both in total and in outside source. Following Blair, Obama comes second in the total number of evidentials, but he uses the most inside evidentials among the three speakers (2.42 ptw). It is interesting to see that although Ahmadinejad uses the least evidentials in all the other categories, he adopts more shared evidentials (2.83 ptw) than the other two speakers. Overall, the differences of inside evidentials and the total evidentials among the three speakers are significant, though further statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between the results of Blair and Obama in all the categories[51].

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[51] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of sources of evidentials in all the categories: Outside Source (P-value: 0.2378), Shared Source (P-value: 0.0757);

Table 6.2 A comparison of sources of evidentials in the three cases

Speakers / Sources of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
Outside	35	1.33	25	0.94	21	0.83	0.1750	No
Shared	69	2.62	49	1.85	72	2.83	0.0571	No
Inside	50	1.90	64	2.42	10	0.39	1.453e-08	Yes
Total	154	5.84	138	5.21	103	4.05	0.01393	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 6.2 A comparison of sources of evidentials in the three cases

6.2.2 Types of Evidentials

In terms of the quantitative analysis of evidential types, it can be seen in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 that evidentials of S.K. (Shared Knowledge) take up the first position in the cases of Ahmadinejad (44.66%) and Blair (33.12%). However, in the case of Obama, evidentials of P.K. (Personal Knowledge) ranks first (38.41%), followed by evidentials

Inside Source (P-value: 0.2324), and the total numbers (P-value: 0.35778).

of S.K., H.E. (Hearsay Evidentials) and other categories. Blair also uses more evidentials of P.K. and H.E. than other categories, taking up 27.27% and 13.64% respectively. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, adopts far more evidentials of S.P. (Shared Perceptual evidentials) than other categories. Besides, he does not use any evidentials of P.P. (Personal Perceptual evidentials).

Table 6.3 The distribution of types of evidentials in the three cases

Speakers / Types of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
I.R.	14	9.09%	3	2.17%	3	2.91%
H.E.	21	13.64%	22	16.67%	18	17.48%
S.P.	18	11.69%	16	11.59%	26	34.95%
S.K.	51	33.12%	33	23.91%	46	44.66%
P.P.	8	5.19%	11	7.97%	0	0
P.K.	42	27.27%	53	38.41%	10	9.71%
Total	154	100%	138	100%	103	100%

Figure 6.3 The distribution of types of evidentials in the three cases

As shown in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4, Obama takes up the first position in half of the

categories of evidential types in terms of frequencies, including the evidentials of H.E., P.P., and P.K., while Blair ranks first in the use of I.R. and S.K. evidentials. It is surprising to see that Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer evidentials in most types compared with the other speakers, though he uses the most S.P. evidentials (1.02 ptw). Besides, he also uses more S.K. evidentials than Obama.

Overall, statistical analyses manifest that the differences of most evidential types among the three cases are significant except the categories of H.E., S.P. and S.K. evidentials. However, further statistical analyses show that the differences between Blair and Obama are only significant in the use of I.R. evidentials[52].

Table 6.4 A comparison of types of evidentials in the three cases

Speakers / Types of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
I.R.	14	0.53	3	0.11	3	0.12	0.002701	Yes
H.E.	21	0.80	22	0.83	18	0.71	0.8732	No
S.P.	18	0.38	16	0.60	26	1.02	0.1911	No
S.K.	51	1.94	33	1.25	46	1.81	0.1183	No
P.P.	8	0.30	11	0.42	0	0	0.007307	Yes
P.K.	42	1.59	53	2.0	10	0.39	1.392e-06	Yes
Total	154	5.84	138	5.21	103	4.05	0.01393	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

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[52] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of evidential types in all the categories except for I.R. evidentials (P-value: 0.01488). H.E. evidentials (P-value: 0.988), S.P. evidentials (P-value: 0.8532); S.K. evidentials (P-value: 0.06045), P.P. evidentials (P-value: 0.6535) and P.K. evidentials (P-value: 0.3152).

Figure 6.4 A comparison of types of evidentials in the three cases

6.2.3 Top-10 Evidential Markers

After comparing the distributions and frequencies of evidential sources and types in the three cases, I am going to examine the top-10 evidential markers among the three cases and compare their similarities and disparities (see Table B1-B3 in Appendix for details).

As we can see in Table 6.5, Blair and Obama share more similarities in adopting evidential markers than Ahmadinejad, though they also have their own preferences. For example, both 'I believe' and 'I know' take up the first two positions in the cases of Blair and Obama, but their positions are reversed (18 and 13 counts vs. 13 and 17 counts). Surprisingly, the frequencies of both evidentials are much lower in the case of Ahmadinejad with only 3 and 1 counts. It is interesting that evidentials such as 'It is clear that / clearly' and 'in fact' rank first and second in Ahmadinejad's list. In particular, Blair uses more times of 'I believe' (18 counts), 'It seems' (11 counts), and 'you know' (9 counts), while Obama uses more 'I know'(17 counts), 'we know'(12counts) and 'We've seen' (8 counts), and Ahmadinejad uses more 'It is clear that/ clearly' (14 counts), 'in fact'(9 counts) and 'it is said that'(4 counts).

Table 6.5 A comparison of top-10 evidential markers in the three cases

Speakers / Top-10 Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	Evidentials	No.	Evidentials	No.	Evidentials	No.
1	I believe	18	I know	17	It is clear that/clearly	13
2	I know	12	I believe	13	in fact /as a matter of fact	12
3	(It) seems	11	We know	12	You know	5
4	We know	10	We've seen /saw /seeing	8	We see/ have seen	4
5	You know	9	I have seen/ saw	6	It is (was) said that	4
6	In fact	6	I heard/hear	4	Undoubtedly	4
7	Analysis shows	5	In fact	4	We know	3
8	I heard	4	You know	4	It is evident	3
9	Actually	4	seem	3	I have no doubt	3
10	Reports suggest	4	I'm confident	3	I believe	3

6.2.4 Discussions and Implications

To sum up the quantitative results, it can be seen that the evidentials present a similar pattern among the three cases, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama. However, we can also see some differences in detail. The most salient results can be summarised as follows:

(i) Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of evidential markers (with 154 and 138 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses about two thirds of their figures, with 103 counts. That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses far fewer

Inside evidentials, such as 'I believe', and 'I know'. This could be the result of different rhetorical styles or cultural differences.

(ii) As to sources of evidentials, shared evidentials rank first in the cases of Ahmadinejad and Blair, at 69.90 % and 44.80% respectively, while inside evidentials take up the first position in Obama's case. In addition, Blair adopts more outside evidentials than the other two speakers. Statistic analyses show that there are no significant differences among the three speakers except for the category of inside evidentials. It is due to the fact that Ahmadinejad uses far fewer inside evidentials than the other two speakers.

(iii) With respect to evidential types, evidentials of S.K (Shared Knowledge) take the first position in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad, at 40% on average, while evidentials of P.K (Personal Knowledge) comes first in Obama's case with 38.41%. Besides, Obama uses the most evidentials of H.E., P.P., and P.K., while Blair ranks first in the use of I.R. and S.K. evidentials. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, comes first in the use of S.P. evidentials (1.02 ptw).

(iv) Statistical analyses manifest that the differences among the three cases are significant in Inside Source, I.R. evidentials, P.P. evidentials, P.K. evidentials and total figures, though there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama except for the use of I.R. evidentials. This means Blair and Obama share more similarities than disparities in the use of evidentials, while Ahmadinejad is different in some categories.

(v) Although Blair and Obama have much common in the use of evidential markers, each speaker has his own preferences. For example, Blair uses far more 'I believe', 'it seems', and 'you know' than the other two speakers, while Obama uses more 'I know', 'we know' and 'we've seen', and Ahmadinejad uses more 'it is clear that/ clearly', 'in fact' and 'it is said that'.

Above all, the quantitative analysis of evidential markers among the three cases shows us their distributions and frequencies in the corpus, but the usages and functions of evidentials in specific contexts are still not clear. It is, therefore, also necessary to investigate what role evidentials can play in the context of political discourse. Thus, in the following section, I shall address evidentials qualitatively by examining their functions and expressions, particularly when they interact with modality in the persuasion process.

6.3 Qualitative Analysis of Evidentiality

In this section, I will first explore the functions of evidentiality, focusing on its relations with the speaker's commitment, (inter)subjectivity and ideology in political discourse. After that, I will investigate the most salient evidential expressions in three sources and six types respectively. In particular, the functions of evidential markers as persuasion strategies will be addressed in the context of political discourse.

6.3.1 Evidentiality as Expressing Commitment, (Inter)subjectivity and Ideology

As mentioned previously in Chapter One, Evidentiality can be employed as 'legitimising strategies' (Hart 2011) or 'a form of language manipulation' in political discourse (see Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014).

This section will explore the functions of evidentiality, though not restricted to legitimising strategies or manipulation strategies. In this study evidentiality indicates the linguistic marking of source and strength (validity/reliability) of information, working together with modality to persuade the addressees in political discourse. The functions of evidentiality are embedded in this process.

6.3.1.1 Evidentiality as Making Commitment

Evidentials from inside sources (e.g. I believe) explicitly signal the speaker's sole

responsibility to his/her propositions as a conceptualizer (cf. Mar ń-Arrese 2011a:214). Therefore, they suggest the speaker's strong commitment[53]to his/her stance-taking acts. Those evidentials from shared sources (e.g. we know) presupposed as shared facts or common knowledge can be seen as markers of shared commitment / responsibility among the speaker and the hearers.

With the adoption of evidentials from outside sources (e.g. the figures show), however, the speaker is only implicit as a conceptualizer and less committed to the propositions than the former ones. That means the speaker can avoid the responsibility of his/her stance-taking acts.

In sum, different sources of evidentials indicate the speaker's different degrees of commitment/ responsibility to the propositions, particularly to the stance expressed in the designated context, including epistemic, deontic and volitional stance, as illustrated in Figure 6.7.

Strong Commitment   Shared Commitment   Weak Commitment

Inside Source   Shared Source   Outside Source
(e.g. I believe)   (e.g. We know)   (e.g. The figures show)

Figure 6.5 The scale of speaker's commitment vs. the source of evidence

Consider the following three examples:

[1] I believe < Inside / P.K. > we and you have both been the subject of tyranny. They do not respect your rights and want us also to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > forego

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[53] Here commitments refer to the speaker's involvement in his stance-taking acts by using evidentials. That means whether the speaker takes sole or shared responsibility for his stance or he distances himself from it.

our rights. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006)**

[2] But what we know < Shared / S.K. > -- what we have seen < Shared / S.P. > - is that America can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > change. **(B. Obama; 18 March 2008)**

[3] In May 1997, we pledged that we would (past form of will) < M.verb. / V.M. / High. > get 250,000 young unemployed people off benefit and into work. The figures published today show that < Outside / I.R. > 254,520 young people have gone into work through our New Deal programme. **(T. Blair; 30 November 2000)**

In Example [1], the evidential marker '**I believe**' indicates that the stance expressed in the following sentence is the speaker's own belief, which implies Ahmadinejad's sole commitment to the volitional stance expressed by the modal marker '*want to*'. In Example [2], two evidential markers from shared source manifest that the speaker presupposes the epistemic stance (expressed by the epistemic marker '*can*') is shared by the hearers, which represents a shared commitment between Obama and his audience. From the perspective of strength, the first evidential marker '**we know**' is weaker than the second one '**we have seen**' as the former indicates common knowledge while the latter indicates (metaphorical) visual perception. In Example [3], on the other hand, the evidential marker '**The figures published today show that**' indicates that the evidence is from an outside source, which often implies that the speaker does not have to take the responsibility for his stance, therefore less committed to it.

6.3.1.2 Evidentiality as Marking (Inter)Subjectivity

The relationship between evidentiality and modality or epistemic modality has been discussed a lot from the perspective of (inter)subjectivity or objectivity (e.g. Lyons 1977; Kratzer 1981; Langacker 1990, 1999; Nuyts 1992, 2001b; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004; Traugott 2006; Mar ń-Arrese 2006, 2011a; Portner 2009; Hart 2011). However, so far there has been no consensus on this issue (see Chapter One for more details).

Drawing on Portner (2009:131) and Verhulst et al. (2013:211), subjectivity refers to the speaker's involvement/commitment to stance, and intersubjectivity refers to the shared involvement/commitment of speaker-hearer to stance. More precisely, the distinction between subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity lies in the degree of the speaker's commitment to his/her stance, which can be judged by different sources of evidentials. If the speaker makes a sole commitment to his/her stance (with evidence from inside source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he expressed is subjective. If the speaker shares a commitment with his/her hearers to his/her stance (with evidence from shared source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he expresses is inter-subjective (Nyuts 2001; Mar ń-Arrese 2011a). If the speaker makes no commitment to his/her stance (with evidence from outside source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he expresses is more objective. In this sense, the modals expressing the corresponding stance can be seen as subjective, or inter-subjective or objective modality.

In this sense, this study addresses the distinction of (inter)subjective and objective modality from the perspective of the source of evidence, with can each be positioned on a scale, as demonstrated in Figure 6.8. It is clear in Figure 6.8 that modal markers supported by evidentials from inside source (e.g. **I believe**) are more subjective as the stance expressed by these modal markers is the speaker alone, while modals supported by evidentials from shared source (e.g. **We know**) are inter-subjective because the speaker assumes that the stance expressed by these modal markers is shared by his/her hearers. Similarly, modals justified by evidentials from outside source (e.g. **The figures show**) are more objective since the speaker is only implicit as the conceptualizer of the stance. It is necessary to point out that there is no absolute objective modality as all modals are subjective to a certain degree from the perspective of expressing the speaker's or writer's stance. Thus, the term 'objective modality' in this study is only used to differentiate and compare with subjective and inter-subjective modality.

Subjective Modality	Inter-Subjective Modality	Objective Modality

Inside Source (e.g. I believe)	Shared Source (e.g. We know)	Outside Source (e.g. The figures show)

Figure 6.6 The scale of subjective, inter-subjective and objective modality vs. the source of evidence

Overall, modal markers justified by evidentials from outside sources are more objective than those supported by shared sources and inside sources, and modals justified by strong evidentials are more objective than those supported by intermediate and weak evidentials. However, it is also important to note that sometimes modals are used without any evidentials. These modals can be treated as more subjective than those supported by inside evidentials because the stance expressed by these modals is the speaker alone but merely implicit.

6.3.1.3 Evidentiality as Reflecting Ideology

Some types of evidentials also reflect the speaker's ideology concerning what or who is authoritative, what are facts, what is common knowledge, and what is believed, etc. Nevertheless, different from modal markers, not all evidential markers encode the speaker's ideology. This section will discuss three types of evidentials, including H.E. (Hearsay Evidentials), S.K. (Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge) and P.K. (Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge). Consider the following two examples:

[4] They say < Outside / H.E. > it is **not** possible < M.adj. / E.M. / High > to have a world without the United States and Zionism. But you know < Shared / S.K. > that this is a possible goal and slogan. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

[5] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > any alliance must < M.verb. / D.M. / High.> start

with America and Europe. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

In Example [4], the speaker adopts an outside hearsay evidential 'they say' to delegitimise his opponents' opinion, as the source of this type of evidentials is often implicit and inauthoritative, therefore the information is unreliable. Furthermore, he uses a shared evidential '**you know**' to indicate that the proposition-'this is a possible goal and slogan' is a fact or common knowledge shared by the audience. However most shared knowledge is presupposed by the speaker (van Dijk 2011:37) and reflects the speaker's own belief (as part of his ideology) about this issue. The inside evidential '**I believe**' in Example [5], on the other hand, clearly shows that what follows is the speaker's own belief.

6.3.2 Markers of Evidentiality in the three cases

In this section, evidentiality will be examined in detail in terms of its source and strength, particularly focusing on its functions and its interaction with modality. It means evidentiality will be dealt with from the perspective of its functions in making commitments, encoding ideology and the (inter)subjectivity of modality in the persuasion process.

6.3.2.1 Evidentials from Outside Source

Evidentials from outside source typically signal the lowest commitment from the speaker towards his/her stance, as the speaker is only implicit as a conceptualizer. They can also be used to justify/legitimise the speaker's stance in a more objective way, compared with shared or inside evidentials. In what follows, I will examine the most typical expressions of these two types of evidentials from outside sources, particularly addressing their functions in specific contexts.

(1) Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)

Inferential Evidentials from Results often refer to the linguistic markers indicating the

evidence inferred from results of the reports, analyses, figures or examples. Overall, this type of evidentials is often less reliable than perceptual evidentials as they are indirect evidence inferred from results. However, the credibility of the reports, analyses, figures or examples may vary in different situations according to the authoritativeness or explicitness of the source. Consider the following examples:

[6] Iraq showed < Outside / I.R. > that when, never forget, many European nations supported our action. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

[7] They are also creating paper assets and imposing continuous inflation on all the other nations. They plunder the wealth of other countries without making any efforts. Some reports indicate < Outside / I.R. > that the US government has created paper assets of more than 32,000 billion dollars. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012)**

The evidential marker '[54]**Iraq shows**' in Example [6] is adopted to justify the speaker's view that 'when America and Europe are together, others will work with us' (This view can be found in the context), therefore making it more objective in the stance-taking act. Similarly, the evidential marker '**Some reports indicate**' in Example [7] demonstrates that the source of its following proposition comes from reports and provide evidence for the speaker's stance -'They plunder the wealth of other countries without making any efforts', though it indicates lower credibility or weaker strength compared with the previous one, since it does not mention the source of the reports. The speaker (Ahmadinejad) may deliberately mystify the source of information to avoid the possible conflicts or use it as a persuasion strategy to evade the responsibility of the stance-taking act.

(2) Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)

Hearsay Evidentials often refer to the linguistic markers indicating reportive evidence

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[54] Here 'Iraq' refers to the result of whether to start a war on Iraq.

from implicit sources and unnamed people, which have been regarded as 'the most prominent form of indirect evidentiality' (Whitt 2010:9). This type of evidentials has been seen as the least reliable as the origins of their sources are often unclear for various reasons or have been concealed deliberately by the speaker. According to Table 6.5, the most frequent evidential of this type is '**it is said that**', adopted 4 times by Ahmadinejad. Consider the following examples:

[8] Some in China think that < Outside / H.E. > America will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think that < Outside / H.E. > there is something to fear in a rising China. *I take a different view.*   (**B. Obama; 27 July 2009**)

[9] It is said that < Outside / H.E. > the science around climate change is not as certain < M.adj. / E.M. / High. > as its proponents allege. (**T. Blair; 13 December 2009**)

The evidential markers in Example [8] and [9] are weak evidence because the speaker does not clarify who 'some' are and who 'said that', thereby making them less convincing and more subjective in persuasion process. They indicate that the sources of information have been mystified either by the speaker or by someone else during discourse event. Because of this, it becomes harder for the hearers to verify or check the information against its original source. That is why, from the perspective of outside source, this type of evidential is the less reliable in terms of strength of evidence and the most subjective in stance-taking. It is interesting to note that this type of evidentials can be used as a persuasion strategy to delegitimise other people's view (Chilton2004:47), as illustrated in Example [8] (Obama explicitly said: '*I take a different view'*.) and Example [4].

6.3.2.2 Evidentials from Shared Source

'Many evidentials reflect common ground between discourse participants and act as presupposition triggers' (Hart 2010:95). This is most obvious in evidentials from

shared source, which indicate truth or common knowledge presupposed to be shared by both the speaker and the hearers. Therefore, they typically signal shared commitment between the speaker and the hearers towards the stance expressed by modals. They can be used to justify/legitimise the speaker's stance in an inter-subjective way. In what follows, I will examine the most typical expressions of these two types of evidentials from shared source, particularly addressing their pragmatic functions in specific contexts.

(3) Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.)

Shared Perceptual Evidentials often refer to the linguistic markers indicating facts supported by shared perceptions. Perception is the most direct evidence one can have (Whitt 2010:8), especially for "visual and auditory perceptions" (Palmer 2001:43), and is therefore often seen as more reliable than indirect evidence. Perceptions can be classified into two categories (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 2006a:640):

(1) **Sensory perception** (e.g. we've seen; you've heard)

(2) **Mental perception or inference** (e.g. clearly, it was clear that; obviously, it seems, apparently)

As to sensory perception, '**we've seen**' is stronger pertaining to strength of evidence than '**you've heard**' as the former is more direct than the latter. For the category of mental perception or inference, '**clearly/ It was clear that**', '**obviously**' and '**apparently**' are normally of higher strength than that of '**it seems**'. However, overall this whole category is weaker than sensory perception.

However, different people from different cultures or with different value systems (ideologies) may see the same thing differently. That means a proposition is treated as fact or truth by the speaker may be seen as just opinion or fallacy by others. That is why this type of evidentials can also help reveal the speaker's ideology and way of thinking during the process of discourse production. They can also be used as a powerful tool of persuading or manipulating addressees. Consider the following

examples:

[10] You have certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High > heard < Shared / S.P. > the sad stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons. The US administration attempts to justify them through its proclaimed "war on terror." **(M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006)**

[11] So we've seen < Shared / S.P. > a lot of blame and a lot of politics and a lot of ugly rhetoric around immigration. And we've seen< Shared / S.P. > good faith efforts from leaders of both parties. **(B. Obama; 10 May 2011)**

[12] You know, one thing I've learned < Inside / P.K. >about peace processes: They're always frustrating, they're often agonizing, and occasionally they seem < Shared / S.P. >, hopeless. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

Example [10] is a case in point in terms of shared perception; the evidential marker '**you have certainly heard**' clearly reveals Ahmadinejad's ideology in this issue. That means he treats 'the sad stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons' as facts and he presupposes that his audience must have heard it before. It is interesting to note that this kind of evidentials is often used as mental perceptions rather than sensory perceptions in our data. For example, the two evidential markers '**we've seen**' in Example [11] are actually mental perceptions (metaphorical), presupposing the following propositions as facts (something available to see). It reveals the speaker's ideology with respect to what can be seen as facts or reality and makes this ideology or viewpoint more acceptable for the audience. By doing so, this type of evidentials can be an effective strategy for persuading or manipulating one's addressees. However, their strength is weaker than '**we're seeing**' in the example "**We're seeing** it again right now with gas prices" (**B. Obama; 10 May 2011**). As shown in Example [12], the evidential marker '**seem**' can also be treated as a kind of evidentials inferred from visual perceptions (Aijmer 2009; Whitt 2011), though it is less reliable than other perceptual evidentials such as '**we've seen**', '**we've heard**', and '**clearly**'.

However, as mentioned previously, this type of evidentials are only the linguistic markers used by the speaker to presuppose or manipulate the audience, what have been claimed as facts or truth (including shared perception) should not be treated as real facts or truth automatically. One still needs to differentiate which are real and which are not.

(4) Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)

This type of inferential evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating common knowledge shared both by the speaker and the hearers. They have also been treated as 'OBVIOUSNESS' in Bednarek's (2006a) study of evidence in British newspaper reporting. Consider the following examples:

[13] In fact < Shared / S.K. >, in many cases in practice, the IMF and the World Bank are forced to justify the unilateral and opportunistic policies of certain states. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012)**

[14] British business has always given strong support to our membership of the EU and for good reason. You understand < Shared / S.K. > that being in the EU brings us massive benefits in trade, jobs and prosperity. You know < Shared / S.K.> that the EU is the most effective way that Britain can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > make its voice heard on global issues alongside the US and the growing Asian economies. You know < Shared / S.K. >that to be anti-Europe is to be anti-business. But you also know < Shared / S.K. > - and so do I - that a reform agenda for Europe is also vital. This is an area where we wholeheartedly welcome your engagement. **(T. Blair; 18 November 2003)**

[15] There is no doubt that < shared / S.K. >the cost of this plan will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be considerable. It will certainly < M.verb. / E.M. / High > < M.adv. / E.M. / High > add to the budget deficit in the short term. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

The evidential marker '**in fact**' in Example [13] indicates that the speaker treats the following proposition as a fact (cf. Chafe 1986:271); therefore it is intersubjective (cf. Traugott and Dasher, 2002:155) as it involves the addressees into his judgments.

In Example [14], Blair uses four S.K. evidentials ('**you understand**' has been used for once and '**you know**' for three times) to presuppose what he said are common knowledge shared by his addressees, thereby persuading them to accept his proposal. Therefore, the stance expressed by modal marker '*can*' is inter-subjective, legitimised by the assumed common knowledge. However, it is unknown or hard to verify whether the hearers actually know what he said or not. That is the reason why this type of evidential is not as strong as S.P. evidentials. The evidential '**There is no doubt that**' in Example [15] implies there is solid evidence to prove the designated propositions as truth, but the speaker does not spell it out. Because of the evidential marker indicated here, the epistemic modal '*will*' following it can be seen as intersubjective. Therefore, this type of evidential markers can also be used as a tool of manipulation in persuading the audience to accept them as truth.

6.3.2.3 Evidentials from Inside Source

Inside Evidentials often signal the speaker's sole commitment towards his stance, as the source of the evidence comes from the speaker's own knowledge. They are used to justify/legitimise the speaker's stance in a more subjective way compared with evidentials from outside or shared sources, as this type of evidence is hard to test or check its origin. In what follows, I will examine the most typical expressions of these two types of evidentials from inside source respectively, particularly addressing their pragmatic functions in specific contexts.

(5) Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.)

This type of evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating the direct evidence from the speaker's own perceptions. This type of evidentials is used least of all, although they are direct evidentials and regarded as more reliable when compared

with the other type of inside evidentials. Consider the following examples:

[16] I listened to these people, and what <mark>I heard</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark> was people working tirelessly to make our country and borders secure, but too often frustrated by a system that hampered them when it <mark>should</mark> <mark>< M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. ></mark> have been helping them. It was from them that <mark>I heard</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark>about the problem of asylum seekers destroying their identity documents to prevent removal. **(T. Blair; 22 April 2005)**

[17] I am hopeful tonight because <mark>I have seen</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark> this spirit at work in America. <mark>I've seen</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark> it in the family business whose owners <mark>would</mark> **rather** <mark>< M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. ></mark> cut their own pay than lay off their neighbors and in the workers who <mark>would</mark> **rather** <mark>< M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. ></mark> cut back their hours than see a friend lose a job. <mark>I've seen</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark>it in the soldiers who re-enlist after losing a limb and in those SEALs who charged up the stairs into darkness and danger because they knew there was a buddy behind them watching their back. (Cheers, applause.) <mark>I've seen</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark> it on the shores of New Jersey and New York, where leaders from every party and level of government have swept aside their differences to help a community rebuild from the wreckage of a terrible storm. **(B. Obama; 7 November 2012)**

[18] Members of Congress, <mark>I feel</mark> <mark>< Inside / P.P. ></mark> a most urgent sense of mission about today's world.

In Example [16], Blair uses '**I heard**' twice to make sole commitment to his stance. Generally evidentials indicating visual perception are more reliable than those of audio perception or touch. However, as shown in Example [17], here the four evidentials '**I've seen**' is used in a rhetorical or metaphorical way, with the speaker's own interpretations or opinions embedded into the evidentials. The reason is that one can not see spirit by one's eyes as the word following '**I've seen**' is 'this spirit' (three instances of metaphorical 'it' in the following sentences all refer to this spirit). In this sense, the strength of evidence for these evidentials is equivalent to those evidentials

of mental perception (Greenbaum 1969:205) such as '**clearly**, **It was clear that**; **obviously**'. The perceptual evidential marker '**I feel**' in Example [18], however, is the weakest in this category with respect to the strength of evidence.

(6) Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)

This type of evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating the evidence inferred from the speaker's own knowledge, experiences, beliefs or thoughts. Those evidentials indicating the evidence from one's knowledge (e.g. I know) or experiences (e.g. I realize) are often more reliable than those from beliefs (e.g. I believe) or thoughts (e.g. I think). Consider the following examples:

[19] Now, I realize < Inside / P.K. > there are some in my party who don't think we should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > make any changes at all to Medicare and Medicaid, and I understand their concerns. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

[20] And I know < Inside / P.K. >that every American wants her future to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be just as bright. **(B. Obama; 7 November 2012)**

[21] So how do we decide when and whether to intervene. I think < Inside / P.K. > we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > bear in mind five major considerations. **(T. Blair; 24 April 1999)**

[22] I believe < Inside / P.K. > Britain is now facing important choices. (T. Blair; 30 November 2000)

[23] In my opinion < Inside / P.K. > we should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > find the reasons in the policies and measures of a number arrogant and ambitious power as well as in the inefficacy of NPT and its imbalanced provisions, and hence, I wish to highlight some of these reasons. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010)**

The evidential marker '**I realize**' in Example [19] and '**I know**' in Example [20] often imply there is reliable evidence in the speaker's mind. That is because 'realize' and 'know' often refer to the cognitive process of getting to know the truth. Therefore, they are also very popular among the three speakers in the manipulation process by

presupposing the stance expressed in the context as truth, particularly for '**I know**'. It is interesting to see that Obama uses it 17 times and Blair uses it 12 times, but Ahmadinejad only uses it once. For example, '**I know**' in Example [20] means 'based on my past experience/ knowledge about the people of America', implying the volitional stance (expressed by '*want to*') is based on this knowledge. However, one can not see or testify the speaker's knowledge, so the modal markers '*should*' and '*want to*' can only be seen as subjective modality.

The evidentials such as '**I think**' in Example [21], '**I believe**' in Example [22], and '**In my opinion**' in Example [23] all state clearly that the stance-taking acts in the corresponding propositions are based on the speaker's knowledge concerning his/ her thoughts, beliefs or opinions (Chafe 1986:264). That is why these evidentials are more subjective and less reliable than those in examples [19] and [20]. Therefore, the stance expressed by modal markers '*need to*' and '*should*' are more subjective.

In sum, the qualitative analyses demonstrate that different sources of evidence reveal the speakers' corresponding commitments toward their stance and reflect their different ways of persuasion or manipulation. For example, shared evidence has been used most in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad with over 50% on average, which reveals that it is a popular way of manipulation in political speeches. However, it is often not shared by both sides but presupposed as common knowledge. For instance, Ahmadinejad ranks first in the use of shared evidentials with 72 counts (Blair: 69 counts; Obama: 49 counts). Take his speech 'Message to American people' for example (No. 2 speech in Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses S.P. evidentials for 6 counts to justify his stance, such as '**you have heard**', '**it became clear that**', '**you are witnessing daily**' and '**in fact**'. By adopting these evidentials, he tries to present his opinions to American people as facts or truth.

Adopting more evidentials from inside source often implies that the speaker is more willing to make high commitments to his/her stance or he/she has strong confidence in

his/her own credibility. For example, Obama uses the most inside evidentials (64 counts vs. Blair: 50 counts and Ahmadinejad: 10 counts) among the three speakers. He is the only one who uses more inside evidentials than shared or outside evidentials. Take his speech '2012 Election Night Speech' for example (No. 10 speech in Table 2.4), in which Obama uses inside evidentials 11 times, including '**I have seen**' / '**I saw**' (P.P. evidentials, 5 counts), '**I believe**' (P.K. evidentials, 4 counts) and '**I know**' (P.K. evidentials, 2 counts). This indicates that he is confident in his own credibility and makes a high commitment to his stance-taking acts. In this case, those evidentials help Obama to establish a more intimate relationship with his audience.

By contrast, evidentials from outside source can often reflect the lowest commitments from the speaker towards his/her stance-taking. That means the speaker does not have to take the responsibility for his/her own stance. On the other hand, it also means the speaker takes a more objective and authoritative stance in his speech style. For example, Blair uses more evidentials from outside source (35 counts) than Obama (25 counts) and Ahmadinejad (21 counts). Take his speech 'War on Iraq' for example (No.2 speech in Table 2.3), in which Blair uses outside evidentials 17 times to justify his proposal, such as '**according to the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council**' (I.R. evidentials), '**first reports from last night's operations suggest**' (R.I. evidentials), '**It was expected**' (H.E. evidentials) '**There are suggestions**' (H.E. evidentials), and '**There were some who thought**' (H.E. evidentials). This means he intends to distance himself from the stance-taking acts by providing authoritative quotes, reports or unspecific sources. The evidentials help him in winning the support from UK parliament members to a certain degree. At the same time, he also tries to persuade or manipulate the addressees by his presuppositions about common knowledge (e.g. **we know**, **you know**).

Besides, different sources or strengths of evidence also reflect the (inter)subjectivity of modality. Generally, modal markers supported by evidentials from inside source (e.g. **I believe**) are more subjective as the stance expressed by these modal markers is

the speaker alone, while those modals supported by evidentials from shared source (e.g. **We know**) are inter-subjective because the speaker assumes that the stance expressed by these modal markers is shared by his or her hearers.

Similarly, modals justified by evidentials from outside source (e.g. **The figures show**) are more objective since the speaker is only implicit as the conceptualizer of the stance (expressed by the modal markers). Furthermore, different strengths of evidence also imply the degree of (inter)subjectivity or objectivity of the sources, and the modals legitimised by strong evidentials are more objective than those supported by intermediate and weak evidentials. Those propositions without explicit evidentials in the context can be treated as being supported by zero-marked evidentials, which may be categorized as implicit P.K. evidentials, equivalent to '**I think**' or '**In my opinion**'.

Furthermore, evidentiality can also legitimise the speaker's stance marked by modals. We can see from the qualitative analyses in this chapter that all types of evidentials can be used to legitimise the speaker's stance expressed by deontic, epistemic and volitional modals. Normally, evidentials from outside or shared source can justify the speaker's stance better than those from inside source. Similarly, the stance legitimised by evidentials with stronger strength seems more convincing than those supported by weaker evidentials.

The qualitative analyses also show that the same evidential marker may be varied in terms of reliability or strength in different contexts. That is because the same evidential marker may indicate sources of different credibility in different contexts, such as the P.P. evidential marker- '**I've seen**' in Example [17] has been used in a metaphorical way, which is equivalent to the use of metal perceptions, therefore it is weaker in strength than its use as visual perceptions.

In particular, the study of evidentiality and modality should not be restricted to epistemic modality. That is because the qualitative analyses in this chapter manifest

that deontic modality and volitional modality are also closely linked to evidentials.

6.4 Summary

Overall, this chapter demonstrates how three speakers use different types of evidentiality in persuasion process, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of evidentiality in terms of sources and types in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and disparities of top-ten evidential markers used by three speakers. The quantitative results show that the distributions and frequencies of evidentials in the three cases share more similarities than disparities, particularly for the cases of Blair and Obama. The results between these two speakers show no significant differences in all the categories except for the type of I.R. evidentials.

I also examined the functions of evidentials in political discourse by looking at how the speakers make commitments to their stance, encode ideology, mark the (inter)subjectivity of modality and legitimise their stance through different types of evidential markers. The most striking results are as follows:

- Overall, Blair takes the first position in the use of evidentials with 154 counts, followed by Obama (138 counts) and Ahmadinejad (103 counts).
- Evidentials from outside source can often reflect the lowest commitments from the speaker towards his/her stance-taking. They enable the speaker to distance himself from these stance-taking acts.
- Shared evidence has been used most in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad with over 50% on average, while inside evidentials take up the first position in Obama's case. The qualitative analyses reveal that the use of evidentials from shared source is a popular strategy of manipulation in political speeches as it is often not shared by both sides despite being presupposed as shared knowledge.

- Adopting more evidentials from inside source often implies that the speaker is more willing to make commitments to his/her stance or he/she has strong confidence in his/her own credibility.

- Evidentiality reveals the speakers' conceptualization process of discourse production in terms of how they adopt different types of evidentials to persuade their addressees.

- The adoption of different sources of evidence reveals the speakers' corresponding commitments toward their stance and marks the subjectivity or intersubjectivity of their stance.

- Some types of evidentials reflect the speaker's ideology as they encode his presuppositions of authorities, facts or shared knowledge.

- Hearsay evidentials can often be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other's views or proposals ('negative other-representation').

In the next chapter, I will investigate the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality in the three cases both quantitatively and qualitatively from different perspectives, particularly focusing on their interaction patterns during the process of persuasion or (de)legitimisation.

Chapter Seven: The Co-occurrence of Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse

7.1 Introduction

Numerous studies manifest that evidentiality is closely related to modality both in linguistic studies (e.g. Palmer 2001; Nuyts 1992; Whitt 2010) and discourse studies (e.g. Hart 2010, 2011; Marń-Arrese 2011a, 2011b; van Dijk 2011). There are mainly four different views towards this issue. One view is that evidentiality is a sub-category of modality or epistemic modality (e.g. Palmer 2001; McCready and Ogata 2007). On the contrary, Chafe (1986:264-6) includes words that indicate the 'degree of liability' of a proposition in his discussion of evidentiality in English academic discourse. However, some others may argue that 'the meanings in these domains often overlap' (Whitt 2010:12; Anderson 1986:308-11). However, the more widespread view is that evidentiality is distinct from epistemic modality (e.g. De Haan 1999; Nuyts 1992; Hart 2010) and it ought to be considered a (grammatical) category in its own right, and not a mere subcategory of some type of modality (Aikhenvald 2004:7-8).

Based on the view that evidentiality and (epistemic) modality fall into two different semantic or grammatical domains, this chapter aims to explore the relationships

between modality and evidentiality in the context of political discourse by investigating the co-occurrence of various types of modals and evidentials both quantitatively and qualitatively.

7.2 Quantitative Analysis

This section will calculate and compare the frequencies of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality from different aspects at the sentential level[55] among the three cases: (1) modal types and evidentials; (2) modals and evidential types; (3) epistemic modals and evidential types; (4) deontic modality and evidential types; (5) volitional modals and evidential types.

7.2.1 Co-occurrence of Modal Types and Evidentiality

As can be seen in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1, three cases share the same pattern in the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials. Epistemic modals take up the first position in all the cases with around 60% on average, followed by deontic and volitional modals. Overall, the modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three cases take up 10% on average in their total numbers in the data (Blair: 67 vs. 722 counts, 9.28%; Obama: 87 vs. 806 counts, 10.79%; Ahmadinejad: 46 vs. 407 counts, 11.3%). The percentages of epistemic modals co-occurred with evidentials (in their total numbers in the data) rank first in all three cases (Obama: 39 vs. 373 counts, 12.53%; Ahmadinejad: 26 vs. 208 counts, 12.5%; Blair: 60 vs. 479 counts, 10.46%), followed by those of deontic modality and volitional modality with very similar figures (approximately 8-11%).

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[55] This means the quantitative analysis only focus on the modals and evidentials co-occur in the same sentence for the convenience of calculation. Those co-occurrences of modals and evidentials in the context or at the discourse level will also be discussed in the section of qualitative analysis.

Table 7.1 The distribution of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the three cases

Speakers Modal Types+ Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
E.M. + E.	39	58.21%	60	68.97%	26	56.52%
D.M. + E.	17	25.37%	15	17.24%	13	28.26%
V.M. + E.	11	16.41%	12	13.79%	7	15.22%
Total	67	100%	87	100%	46	100%

Figure 7.1 The distribution of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the three cases

As illustrated in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2, although the co-occurrence of epistemic modals and evidentials ranks first in all three cases, its frequency in the case of Obama is much higher than that of the other two cases. The other two categories (D.M. + E. and V.M. + E.), on the other hand, have no significant differences among the three speakers.

However, further statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in the co-occurrence of modals and evidentials between Blair and Ahmadinejad in all the

categories, while the differences between those of Blair and Obama are only significant in the category of epistemic modality co-occurring with evidentials[56].

Table 7.2 A comparison of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the three cases

Speakers⟍ Modal Types + Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
E.M. + E.	39	1.48	60	2.27	26	1.02	0.001540	Yes
D.M. + E.	17	0.65	15	0.57	13	0.51	0.8141	No
V.M. + E.	11	0.42	12	0.45	7	0.28	0.5496	No
Total	67	2.54	87	3.29	46	1.81	0.003814	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 7.2 A comparison of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the three cases

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[56] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Ahmadinejad in the co-occurrence of modals and evidentials in all the categories: epistemic modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.2162); deontic modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.8141); volitional modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.5496); Total figure (P-value: 0.08938). However, the differences between Blair and Obama in the co-occurrence of modals and evidentials are only significant in the category of epistemic modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.04670).

7.2.2 Co-occurrence of Evidential Types and Modality

Section 7.2.1 has examined and compared the frequencies of different types of modals which co-occur with evidentials in the three cases at the sentential level. However, modals and evidentials do not often co-occur on a one-to-one basis, it is also necessary to investigate the frequencies of different types of evidentials co-occurring with modals.

It can be seen in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 that the co-occurrences of evidential types and modals present a similar pattern in the cases of Blair and Obama, with P.K. evidentials taking up the first position and S.K. & H.E. evidentials ranking the second and third. However, the results in the case of Ahmadinejad are rather different, with S.P., S.K. and P.K. evidentials taking up the first three positions. It is interesting to see that the total frequency of evidentials co-occurring with modals is almost the same with that of modals in Blair's case (67 vs. 66 counts); while the figures of evidentials are much lower than those of modals in the cases of Obama (87 vs. 68 counts) and Ahmadinejad (46 vs. 35 counts).

Overall, the evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average in their total numbers in the data (Blair: 66 vs. 154 counts, 43.5%; Obama: 68 vs. 138 counts, 49.28%; Ahmadinejad: 35 vs. 103 counts, 33.98%). It is interesting to note that P.K. evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases ranks first among all the categories, taking up around 66% on average in their total numbers in the data (Blair: 24 vs. 42 counts, 57.14%; Obama: 33 vs. 53 counts, 62.26%; Ahmadinejad: 8 vs. 10 counts, 80%). H.E., S.K. and I.R. evidentials also co-occur more with modals than other categories in their total numbers in the cases of Blair and Obama, while S.P. evidentials co-occur more with modals in the case of Ahmadinejad. It is not surprising to see that the percentages of P.P. evidentials co-occurring with modals are the lowest of all in the cases of Blair (1 vs. 8 counts, 12.5%) and

Ahmadinejad (0), though it is S.P. evidentials which come last in Obama's case (4 vs. 16 counts, 25%).

Table 7.3 The distribution of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases

Speakers / Evidential Types + Modals	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
I.R. + M.	6	9.09%	1	1.47%	0	0
H.E. + M.	8	12.12%	11	16.18%	6	17.14%
S.P. + M.	5	7.58%	4	5.88%	11	31.43%
S.K. + M.	12	18.18%	15	22.06%	10	28.57%
P.P. + M.	1	1.52%	4	5.88%	0	0
P.K. + M.	24	36.36%	33	48.53%	8	22.86%
Total	66	100%	68	100%	35	100%

Figure 7.3 The distribution of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases

Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 show us that there are no significant differences in the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases except for the categories of I.R., P.K. evidentials and the total figures. However, further statistical analyses indicate that the results of the cases of Blair and Obama show no significant differences in all the categories, particularly in the category of S.P. evidentials + modals (P-value: 0.9945) and total numbers[57] (p-value: 0.9524).

While Obama comes first in most categories, Ahmadinejad has a much higher frequency in the co-occurrence of S.P. evidentials + modals, and Blair also ranks first in that of I.R. evidentials + modals.

Table 7.4 A comparison of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases

speakers / Evidential Types + Modals	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
I.R. + M.	6	0.23	1	0.04	0	0	0.01291	Yes
H.E. + M.	8	0.30	11	0.42	6	0.24	0.5106	No
S.P. + M.	5	0.19	4	0.15	11	0.43	0.096	No
S.K. + M.	12	0.46	15	0.57	10	0.39	0.6526	No
P.P. + M.	1	0.04	4	0.15	0	0	0.07982	No
P.K. + M.	24	0.91	33	1.25	8	0.31	0.0009589	Yes
Total	66	2.50	68	2.57	35	1.38	0.004562	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the

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[57] The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in the co-occurrence of modals and evidentials in all the categories: I.R. + modals (P-value: 0.129); H.E.+ modals (P-value: 0.6535); S.K. + modals (P-value: 0.7092); P.P. + modals (P-value: 0.3738); P.K. + modals (P-value: 0.2971).

three speakers is significant.)

Figure 7.4 A comparison of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases

7.2.3 Co-occurrence of Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality

Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5 demonstrate that Obama ranks first in the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with inside and shared evidentials, while Blair comes first in the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with Outside evidentials. Although Ahmadinejad comes last in every category, he uses more epistemic modals co-occurring with shared evidentials.

The differences of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with evidential sources are not significant among the three speakers except for the inside evidentials. That is because there are far more epistemic modals co-occurring with inside evidentials in the case of Obama than those of Blair and Ahmadinejad.

Table 7.5 A comparison of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals and evidential sources in the three cases

Speakers E.M. + Types of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
E.M.+ Outside E.	15	0.57	9	0.34	6	0.24	0.1385	No
E.M.+ Shared E.	13	0.49	14	0.53	12	0.47	0.9572	No
E. M. + Inside E.	11	0.42	37	1.40	8	0.31	2.011e-06	Yes
Total	39	1.48	60	2.27	26	1.02	0.001540	Yes

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 7.5 A comparison of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals and evidential sources in the three cases

7.2.4 Co-occurrence of Deontic Modality and Evidentiality

As can be seen in Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6, there are no significant differences in the co-occurrence of deontic modals with evidential sources in all the categories among the three speakers. However, Blair adopts the most deontic modals with inside

evidentials, while deontic modals with shared evidentials co-occur most in the cases of Obama and Ahmadinejad.

Table 7.6 A comparison of the co-occurrence of deontic modals and evidential sources in the three cases

Speakers D.M. + Types of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
D.M. + Outside E.	3	0.11	3	0.11	2	0.08	0.9022	No
D. M. + Shared E.	4	0.15	7	0.26	8	0.31	0.4755	No
D. M. + Inside E.	10	0.38	5	0.19	3	0.12	0.1257	No
Total	17	0.65	15	0.57	13	0.51	0.8141	No

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 7.6 A comparison of the co-occurrence of deontic modals and evidential sources in the three cases

7.2.5 Co-occurrence of Volitional Modality and Evidentiality

Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7 show that three cases present a similar pattern in the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources. The co-occurrence of volitional modals with inside evidentials ranks first in all three cases, though their figures are much higher in the cases of Blair and Obama than that of Ahmadinejad. The statistical analyses show that the differences in the co-occurrence of volitional modals with evidential sources are not significant in all the categories among the three speakers.

Table 7.7 A comparison of the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources in the three cases

Speakers V.M. + Types of Evidentials	Tony Blair		Barack Obama		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad		P-value	SoD
	No.	ptw	No.	ptw	No.	ptw		
V.M. + Outside E.	1	0.04	0	0	3	0.12	0.1602	No
V.M. + Shared E.	2	0.08	2	0.08	1	0.04	0.8366	No
V.M. + Inside E.	8	0.30	10	0.38	3	0.12	0.1780	No
Total	11	0.42	12	0.45	7	0.28	0.5496	No

(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the three speakers is significant.)

Figure 7.7 A comparison of the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources in the three cases

7.2.6 Discussions and Implications

Sections 7.2.1-7.2.5 in this chapter investigated the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality at the sentential level in the three cases quantitatively in terms of various modal types and evidential types. The most striking results of these quantitative analyses can be summarised as follows:

(i) Overall, the modals which co-occur with evidentials among the three cases take up 10% on average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average.

(ii) With respect to the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials, epistemic modals rank first in all the cases with around 60% on average, followed by deontic and volitional modals. The result is consistent with the view that evidentiality has a closer relationship with epistemic modality than the other types of modality, though it is surprising to discover that when compared with its total numbers in the data this difference is not obvious.

(iii) As to the co-occurrences of evidential types and modals, P.K., S.K. and H.E.

evidentials take up the first three positions in the cases of Blair and Obama, while S.P., S.K. and P.K. evidentials are the top three categories in the case of Ahmadinejad. The evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average in their total numbers in the data. Evidentials inferred from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. evidentials, with around 66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with modals than those evidentials from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials). It can be concluded from the results that the evidentials (such as P.K. evidentials) of lower reliability (strength) co-occur with modals far more frequently than the evidentials of higher reliability (such as P.P. and S.P. evidentials).

(iv) When it comes to the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with evidential sources, Obama uses most in epistemic modals co-occurring with inside and shared evidentials, while Blair ranks first in the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with outside evidentials. The differences among the three speakers are not significant except for the inside evidentials.

(v) The differences in the co-occurrences of deontic modals with evidential sources among the three speakers are not significant in all the categories. However, inside evidentials co-occur most frequently with deontic modals in the cases of Blair, while shared evidentials co-occur most in the cases of Obama and Ahmadinejad.

(vi) As to the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources, there are no significant differences among the three speakers. The frequency of volitional modals co-occurring with inside evidentials comes first in all three cases.

Overall, the quantitative analyses of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality reveal us some useful patterns about their interactions in political discourse. However, it is still necessary to investigate their interaction patterns and specific functions in the context with detailed qualitative analysis. Therefore, in the following section I will try

to identify the most typical co-occurrence patterns between three types of modals and three sources of evidentials, focusing on their functions in stance-taking, ideology-coding and (de)legitimisation.

7.3 Qualitative Analysis

Modality and evidentiality share the common ground that both of them function as stance-taking acts (See Mar ń-Arrese 2011a), contributing to legitimisation process. However, they differ in essence, because the former is concerned with the speaker's/writer's evaluation/stance towards the evidence, while the latter emphasizes the source and strength (reliability) of the evidence (Hart 2010:172). Therefore, evidentiality is treated as a distinct category, but working together with modality (all types of modality), and serving as an indispensable part in (de)legitimising the speaker's assertions and actions. However, there remain some unsolved issues concerning the relations between modality and evidentiality: such as 'What are the differences between the stance-taking acts by modal markers and evidential markers? How are they related or interacted in different contexts? What are the most typical patterns about their relations or interactions?

Thus, in what follows I will discuss the co-occurrence of three types of modality and three sources of evidentiality both at the sentential level and at the discourse level. In particular, I will investigate their functions in relation to (de)legitimisation or persuasion (manipulation) in the context of political discourse, with annotated examples from the three cases. I will first examine the interaction (co-occurrence) between epistemic modals and three sources of evidentials at the sentential level, following by those of deontic modals and volitional modals. After that, I will summarise the typical patterns of the interactions between modality and evidentiality and address their relationships further at the discourse level (beyond the sentential level).

7.3.1 Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality

(1) Epistemic modals and outside evidentials

As can be seen in Table 7.5, epistemic modals do not often co-occur with outside evidentials. Compared with I.R. evidentials, H.E. evidentials are used more frequently with epistemic modals. Consider the following examples:

[1] It was expected < Outside / H.E. > then that the Special Commission, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, would (Past form of will) < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > complete this process in a few months. *But it was not to be.* What no-one fully foresaw at the time was the huge effort Iraq would (Past form of will) < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > put into blocking it. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[2] I am happy to note that whereas 1,700 companies applied for this benefit in 2001-02, in this financial year it is estimated that < Outside / H.E. > around 3000 claims will < M.verb. / E.M. /High. > be made. **(T. Blair; 18 November 2003)**

[3] As we look to the future, we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.> learn from our past -- *for* history shows < Outside / I.R. > us that both our nations benefit from engagement that is grounded in mutual interest and mutual respect. **(B. Obama; 27 July 2009)**

As the sentential level, the hearsay evidential '**It was expected that**' in Example [1] is the source of the epistemic stance expressed by '*would*' in its following proposition. At the discourse level, both the evidential marker and epistemic modal are used to legitimise the speaker's proposal that starting a war on Iraq is necessary, since the result (carrying out the decision of destroying all Iraq's weapons of mass destruction) did not meet the expectation (it could be inferred from '*But it was not to be.*'). Furthermore, Blair tries to legitimise his action by pointing out it was Iraq that put great efforts in blocking the process.

Similarly, the epistemic stance encoded by modal marker '*will*' in Example [2]

originates from an outside source, indicating by the hearsay evidential '**it is estimated that**' which is of a weak strength. Therefore, the force of this epistemic stance-marker is much weaker than that in its common use as it is only estimated here.

Example [3], on the other hand, shows that outside evidentials like '**history shows**' can also be used to illustrate the epistemic stance (expressed by '*can*'). Here '*can*' could be interpreted both as an epistemic modal and a dynamic modal, which means it is probable for us to learn from our past or we are able to learn from our past.

(2) Epistemic modals and shared evidentials

Compared with the previous category, epistemic modals and evidentials from shared sources co-occur more frequently in the data, and their interactions are more complicated. Consider the following examples:

[4] But what we know < Shared / S.K. > -- what we have seen < Shared / S.P. > - is that America can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > change. What we have already achieved gives us hope - the audacity to hope - for what we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > and must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > achieve tomorrow. (**B. Obama; 18 March 2008**)

[5] You have certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High > heard < Shared / S.P. > the sad stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons. (**M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006**)

[6] You may < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > remember that < Shared / S.K. > how the aerial transport of a cruise missile mistakenly loaded with nuclear warhead from a base inside the US soil to another base in the country posed a serious danger creating anxiety and fear among the American people. (**M. Ahmadinejad; 17 April 2010**)

[7] I know < Inside / P.K. >that political campaigns can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > sometimes seem < Shared / S.P. > small, even silly. (**B. Obama; 7 November 2012**)

[8] The practical challenge of such a plan <mark>may</mark> < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. >be large; *but* <mark>there is no doubt</mark> < Shared / S.K. >what works. (**T. Blair; 13 December 2009**)

In Example [4], two evidentials '**we know**' and '**we have seen**' (indicating shared knowledge and metaphorical visual perception respectively) are used together to provide direct and strong evidence (Whitt 2010:8) for the justification of the epistemic stance expressed by '*can*'. These evidentials and epistemic modals can then be further used to legitimise the speaker's proposal 'the possibility of a more perfect union' in the context as he later said that '*What we have already achieved gives us hope - the audacity to hope - for what we can and must achieve tomorrow*'.

As shown in Example [5], epistemic modals can be part of evidentials and function as an intensifier. We can see that the epistemic stance marker '*certainly*' is used to reinforce the strength of the shared perceptual evidential '**you have heard**'. It reveals the speaker's intention (as part of his ideology) that he wants to make the addressees believe what he said are facts because they have heard it.

The epistemic modals '*may*' in Example [6] and '*can*' in Example [7], on the other hand, are used to weaken the strength of the two evidentials '**remember**' and '**seem**'. Therefore, both epistemic modals function as downtoners, which either demonstrates the speaker's uncertainty about the sources of evidence as in Example [6] or expresses the hearer's assumed disapproval to them as in Example [7].

Example [8], however, shows a concessive relation between the epistemic modal '*may*' and the shared evidential '**there is no doubt**'. This relation is indicated by a marker of concessive adverbial clause - 'but'. The evidential marker reveals the speaker's ideology that his plan is feasible and beneficial and also legitimises it based on shared knowledge.

(3) Epistemic modals and inside evidentials

Table 7.5 shows us that epistemic modals and inside evidentials co-occur much more frequently in the case of Obama than the other two speakers. Besides, their interactions are different from the previous two categories. Consider the following examples:

[9] I know < Inside / P.K. > that even a successful war against Iraq will < M.verb. / E.M. / High >require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. **(B. Obama; 26 October 2002)**

[10] I would **not** < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. >be running for President *if* I didn't believe with all my heart that < Inside / P.K. > this is what the vast majority of Americans want for this country. **(B. Obama; 18 March 2008)**

[11] Now, I don't believe < Inside / P.K. > it's too late to change course, *but* it will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be if we don't take dramatic action as soon as possible. **(B. Obama; 8 January 2009)**

[12] I believe < Inside / P.K. > this is the fundamental cure for the diseases which have plagued the human society for several hundred years; *and* it can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be administered. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012)**

[13] And I'm pretty sure < M.adj. / E.M. / High > I know < Inside / P.K. >what most Americans would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > choose. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

Like Example [4], the evidential marker '**I know**' in Example [9] provides inside source of evidence to the stance expressed by the epistemic modal '*will*'. That means the speaker makes sole commitment to this epistemic stance by stating that the evidence is from his own knowledge.

Example [10] illustrates a conditional relation between the epistemic stance encoded by '*would not*' and the evidential marker '**I didn't believe with all my heart that**'. This relation is indicated by a marker of conditional adverbial clause- 'if'. Here the

evidential functions as the source of the premise of the epistemic stance.

Like Example [8], Example [11] also demonstrates a concessive relation between the source indicating by the evidential marker '**I don't believe**' and the epistemic stance encoded by '*will*' which also functions as the conclusion of a conditional clause 'if we don't take dramatic action as soon as possible'. This reveals the speaker's ideology that 'we should take actions as soon as possible' and therefore legitimises his proposal of carrying out 'American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan'.

Example [12], on the other hand, shows us a coordinative relation or progressive relation between the proposition following the evidential marker '**I believe**' and the epistemic stance expressed by '*can*'. This relation is indicated by a marker of coordinative or progressive clause- 'and'. In this example, the evidential may also provide the source of evidence for the epistemic stance.

Similar to Example [5], the epistemic modal adjective '*sure*' in Example [13] is a part of evidentials and the phrase 'I'm pretty sure' functions as an intensifier. It adds epistemic judgement to the shared evidential '**I know**' and reinforces its strength. It shows that evidentiality is also a gradual semantic category just like modality.

7.3.2 Deontic Modality and Evidentiality

(1) Deontic modals and outside evidentials

Compared with epistemic modals, there are far fewer deontic modals co-occurring with evidentials in the three cases, especially for outside evidentials, which comes last among three sub-categories. So the relations between deontic modals and evidentials are not as complicated as those between epistemic modals and evidentials. Consider the following examples:

[14] There were some who thought < Outside / H.E. >we should < M.verb. / D.M. /

Inter. > have taken military action on 14 November. But, despite our severe doubts, we went that extra mile. **(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)**

[15] Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions - who suggest < Outside / H.E. > that our system cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > tolerate too many big plans. **(B. Obama; 20 January 2009)**

[16] The Secretary-General should **not** < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > come under pressure from powers and/or the country hosting the organization for his stating the truth and administration of justice. It is suggested that < Outside / H.E. > the General Assembly should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. >, within one year and in the framework of an extraordinary session, finalize the reformation of the Organization's structure. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010)**

Just like Examples [1] and [2], the outside evidentials in Examples [14], [15] and [16] indicate the sources of deontic modal stance in respective examples. It is interesting to see that the speaker actually wants to delegitimise the deontic stance by adopting unspecific source of evidentials (with low validity) such as '**There were some who thought**' and '**there are some … who suggest**', as illustrated in Examples [14] and [15]. That is because hearsay evidentials allow the speaker to distance himself/herself from the reported stance and 'provide a signal that alternative or contrary view points may be valid' (White 2006:59). In this sense, the evidentials here function as the unreliable sources of information rather than as sources of evidence.

Example [16], on the other hand, expresses the speaker's own deontic stance, though the speaker distances himself by using an outside evidential '**It is suggested that**'. This can be inferred from the context as this deontic stance is actually a solution to the deontic stance encoded by '*should not*' in the previous proposition. It means this type of evidentials can also be used to mystify the responsibility of the stance-taking act (Marɨn-Arrese 2011b:794).

(2) Deontic modals and shared evidentials

According to Table 7.6, deontic modals co-occurred most with shared evidentials in the cases of Obama and Ahmadinejad. So there are more examples in this sub-section and the relations between deontic modals and shared evidentials could be more diverse than the previous sub-section. Consider the following examples:

[17] But we have seen < Shared / S.P. > its fall during our lives *and* it collapsed in such a way that we have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > refer to libraries because no trace of it is left. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005)**

[18] But we know < Shared / S.K. > we have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > tighten the asylum system further**. (T. Blair; 22 April 2005)**

[19] It is clear that < Shared / S.P. > basics of thought and social interaction should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > change from selfishness and bullying to compassion, affection and an interaction based on justice and respect. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012)**

[20] There can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be a regular review process – in fact < Shared / S.K. >, on any sensible basis there has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > be. **(T. Blair; 13 December 2009)**

Similar to Example [12], Example [17] shows us a progressive relation between the evidential marker '**we have seen**' and the strong deontic stance expressed by '*have to'*. In this example, the evidential also provides strong visual evidence for this deontic stance.

Examples [18], [19] and [20] illustrate that evidentials often provide sources of evidence for deontic stance, while they legitimise them in different ways. In Example [18], the speaker (Blair) tries to legitimise his deontic stance encoded by '*have to*' towards the proposition 'we tighten the asylum system further' by assuming it as common knowledge shared by his addressees, for he uses an S.K. evidential marker '**we know**'.

Example [19], on the other hand, justifies the deontic stance (expressed by '*should*') through the adoption of an S.P. evidential '**It is clear that**' which indicates mental perception or inference (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 2006a:640). That means the speaker (Ahmadinejad) assumes the following proposition as the reality, which can be seen or inferred mentally.

In Example [20], however, the speaker adopts the evidential marker '**in fact**' to legitimise his deontic stance by treating it as a fact (cf. Chafe 1986:271). The deontic stance expressed by semi-modal '*has to*' indicate that the designated action is to be actualized by an external force (Sweester 1990:61).

(3) Deontic modals and inside evidentials

According to Table 7.6, deontic modals co-occur most with inside evidentials in the case of Blair, though it is very rare for the P.P. evidentials to appear with deontic modals in the same sentence. Consider the following examples:

[21] I listened to these people, and what I heard < Inside / P.P. > was people working tirelessly to make our country and borders secure, *but* too often frustrated by a system that hampered them when it should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > have been helping them**. (T. Blair; 22 April 2005)**

[22] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > any alliance must < M.verb. / D.M. / High.> start with America and Europe. **(T. Blair; 17 July 2003)**

[23] I'm also well aware < Inside / P.K. > that there are many Republicans who *don't* believe we should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > raise taxes on those who are most fortunate and can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.> best afford it. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

Similar to Example [8], Example [21] illustrates a concessive relation between the proposition following the evidential '**I heard**' and the deontic stance expressed by

'*should*'. That is to say, the deontic stance expressed here is in opposition to the speaker's expectations. Actually, this is not a part of a story that the speaker had heard about, but the speaker's own deontic evaluation on how an immigration system should be. So the evidential '**I heard**' does not provide evidence for the deontic stance in this example.

In Example [22], the speaker makes sole commitment to his strong deontic stance and his belief (knowledge-based ideology) 'any alliance *must* start with America and Europe' by adopting an inside evidential '**I believe**'. This evidential then indicates the source of evidence for the deontic stance expressed by '*must*'.

In Example [23], however, the speaker acknowledges his awareness of knowing 'many Republicans who don't believe we *should* raise taxes on…', but he does not explicitly commit to the deontic stance expressed by '*should*'. From the context, we can infer that this is actually his stance, though the evidential '**I'm also well aware**' is not the source of evidence for this deontic stance.

7.3.3 Volitional Modality and Evidentiality

(1) Volitional modals and outside evidentials

According to Table 7.7, volitional modals seldom co-occur with outside evidentials in the three cases, particularly there is no occurrence in the case of Obama. Consider the following examples:

[24] And the New Deal shows < Outside / I.R. > the kind of direction this Government will < M.verb. / V.M. / High. > take – and the direction I believe < Inside / P.K. > that the British people want us to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > take. **(T. Blair; 30 November 2000)**

[25] We have observed the regulations of the IAEA more than our commitments, yet, we have never submitted to illegally imposed pressures nor will < M.verb. / V.M.

/ High. > we ever do so. It has been said that < Outside / H.E. > they want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > pressure Iran into a dialogue.   (**M. Ahmadinejad;** 23 September 2010)

These two examples both illustrate that outside evidentials can provide source of evidence to volitional modal stance. The evidential I.R. evidential '**the New Deal shows**' in Example [24] is much stronger with respect to the strength / reliability of evidence than the H.E. evidential '**It has been said that**' in Example [25]. That is because the former evidential has an explicit and reliable source; while the latter remains implicit in term of the source (it is not clear about who said it.). Therefore, the volitional stance expressed in Example [25] is less objective and persuasive than that in Example [24].

(2) Volitional modals and shared evidentials

As can be seen in Table 7.7, it is also very rare for volitional modals to co-occur with shared evidentials in the three cases. Consider the following examples:

[26] Today, a lot of this is reinforced by what arises from Europe. About 50% of regulations with a significant impact on business now emanate from the EU. And it often seems to < Shared / S.P. > want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > regulate too heavily without sufficient cause. (**T. Blair; 26 May 2005**)

[27] But I have asserted a firm conviction - a conviction rooted in my faith in God and my faith in the American people - that working together we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact < Shared / S.K. > we have no choice if we are to < M.semi. / V.M. / High.> continue on the path of a more perfect union. (**B. Obama; 18 March 2008**)

The evidential '**it often seems to**' in Example [26] provides evidence for the volitional stance encoded by '*want to*', though this evidential is much weaker than direct visual perceptions like '**we've seen**' because '**seem**' often indicates a kind of mental

perception which is inferred from visual perception (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 2006a:640). By adopting this evidential, the speaker tries to persuade his audience to accept his stance as true (as if it can be seen mentally by everyone).

Example [27] demonstrates how evidentials can be used to justify a conditional clause. Different from Example [10], however, the volitional stance encoded by '*are to*' functions as the premise of the conditional clause, while the evidential '**in fact**' also provide evidence for the volitional stance. The evidential marker '**in fact**' reflects the speaker's ideology that he treats this sentence 'we have no choice if we *are to* continue on the path of a more perfect union' as a fact shared by his audience, and at the same time legitimises his proposal that 'it is necessary to work together for a more perfect union'. Therefore the volitional stance expressed here is intersubjective as the speaker involves the addressees into his judgments by using the evidential '**in fact**' (Traugott and Dasher 2002:155) and the use of an inclusive 'we'.

(3) Volitional modals and inside evidentials

Volitional modals co-occur most with inside evidentials in all three cases (refer to Table 7.7). Consider the following examples:

[28] I've seen < Inside / P.P. > it in the family business whose owners would **rather** < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > cut their own pay than lay off their neighbors and in the workers who would **rather** < M.verb. / V.M./ Inter. > cut back their hours than see a friend lose a job. **(B. Obama; 7 November 2012)**

[29] And I know < Inside / P.K. > that every American wants her future to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be just as bright. **(B. Obama; 7 November 2012)**

[30] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > the vast majority of wealthy Americans and CEOs are willing to < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > do just that, *if* it helps the economy grow and gets our fiscal house in order. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

The inside evidentials in these three examples all function as the source of evidence

for respective volitional stance. The evidential '**I've seen**' in Example [28] provides the direct visual evidence for the volitional stance expressed by two '*would*', therefore it is the strongest of all in terms of reliability / strength of evidence (Sweetser 1984: 13) among the three examples.

The evidential '**I know**' in Example [29] indicates that the speaker tries to legitimise his volitional stance (expressed by '*want to*') on the basis of his own knowledge.

The evidential marker '**I believe**' in Example [30], on the other hand, shows that his stance-taking act (the volitional stance expressed by '*are willing to*') is based on his own belief, which is the least of all with respect to the strength of evidence. Besides, this volitional stance is also part of the conclusion of a conditional clause.

7.3.4 Discussions and Implications

After the detailed qualitative analyses of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality from various perspectives, I identified five typical patterns about their relations at the sentential level in the examples among the three cases. They can be briefly summarised as follows:

(i) Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal stance

This is the most common phenomenon between the interaction of evidentiality and modality in (de)legitimisation process. Most types of evidentials serve as the source of epistemic /deontic /volitional stance, including most evidentials from outside and inside sources and some shared evidentials, as shown in most examples in the previous sections. However, the situation is different for different sources of evidentials. In particular, the speaker can use hearsay evidentials (with unspecific or unreliable sources) to delegitimise modal stance, as shown in Example [1], [14], and [15]. In this sense, these hearsay evidentials are used to indicate the sources of modal stance but not to provide evidence for it.

(ii) Epistemic modality as PART of evidentials

Epistemic modality can be part of evidentials and function as intensifiers or down-toners, especially in the form of adjectives or adverbs, such as '*certainly*' and '*sure*', as shown in Examples [5] and [13]. Epistemic modals enable the speaker to evaluate the certainty / reliability of the source of evidence. This also provides evidence for the adoption of strength of evidence in this thesis.

(iii) A concessive relation between evidentials and modals

Sometimes, evidentials do not indicate the source of evidence for modal stance when they co-occur in the same sentence but in different clauses, there can be a concessive relation between them. It means evidentials and modals are used in a main clause and a concessive clause respectively which often marked by a conjunctive like 'although' or 'but', as illustrated in Examples [8], [11] and [21]. The concessive relation is actually the relation between the two clauses, but it also indicates an emerging pattern in the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality.

(iv) A conditional relation between evidentials and modals

Similar to a concessive relation, the co-occurrence of evidentials and modals can also demonstrate a conditional relation, when evidentials can be part of the conditional premise or providing evidence for the whole sentence. It means evidentials and modals are used in a main clause and a conditional clause respectively which often marked by a conjunctive like 'if', as shown in Examples [10], [27] and [30].

(v) A coordinative or progressive relation between evidentials and modals

Similarly, there can also be a coordinative or progressive relation between evidentials and modals when they co-occur in the same sentence. It means evidentials and modals are used in two coordinative clauses respectively which often marked by a conjunctive like 'and', as demonstrated in Example [12] and [17].

In this type of relation, evidentials often do not provide the source of evidence for the

modal stance which co-occurred in the same sentence.

The previous section also discussed about the relations between modality and evidentiality beyond the sentential level. As shown in Example [1] and [4], at the discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance in their neighbouring sentences, and work with modals to legitimise the speaker's assertions, actions or proposals in the context. Consider the following examples:

[31] There are suggestions that < Outside / H.E. >the timing of military action is somehow linked to the internal affairs of the United States. *I refute this entirely.* I have no doubt whatsoever that < Inside / P.K. > action is fully justified now. *That is my strong personal view.* I know < Inside / P.K. > that President Clinton reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. Had he acted differently, out of regard to internal matters of U.S. politics, that would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. >have been a dereliction of his duty as President. Instead, not for the first time, he has shown the courage to do the right thing and he has my full support.
(T. Blair; 17 December 1998)

Example [31] is extracted from 'Blair's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq in 1998'. As can be seen in the example that Blair adopts a hearsay evidential '**There are suggestions that**' to indicate the source of a belief that he apparently opposes to (he then said: *"I refute this entirely"*). He then uses two inside evidentials '**I have no doubt whatsoever that**' and '**I know**' to support his stance that 'action is fully justified now' (Here the action refers to 'the war on Iraq'). These three evidentials and the epistemic stance expressed by '*would*' (used in a subjective mood) all contribute to the legitimisation of his following assertion that it is right for President Clinton to start the war on Iraq and he supports him.

[32] Everyone here knows < Shared / S.K. >that small businesses are where most new jobs begin. And you know < Shared / S.K. > that while corporate profits have

come roaring back, smaller companies haven't. So for everyone who speaks so passionately about making life easier for "job creators," this plan is for you.

Pass this jobs bill, and starting tomorrow, small businesses will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > get a tax cut if they hire new workers or raise workers' wages. Pass this jobs bill, and all small business owners will < M.verb. / E.M. / High >also see their payroll taxes cut in half next year. If you have 50 employees making an average salary, That is an $80,000 tax cut. And all businesses will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be able to continue writing off the investments they make in 2012. **(B. Obama; 8 September 2011)**

Example [32] is extracted from 'Obama's speech to Congress on job'. His main aim of this speech is to persuade the Congress to pass the jobs bill. First Obama impresses them that small businesses can help creating jobs. By using two shared evidentials '**Everyone here knows**' and '**you know**', he tries to make them believe these two propositions are common knowledge shared by everyone. But actually there is no solid evidence for them. On the basis of these two propositions, he then tries to persuade the Congress to pass the jobs bill by explaining the benefits those small businesses will get if they pass it. The strong epistemic stance expressed by three epistemic modals of high value -'*will*' also contributes to the justification of his proposal. That is to say, if they want to create more jobs, they need to pass the bill because doing so will bring these benefits for small businesses (and these benefits help create more jobs).

[33] Today we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > see < Shared / S.P. > that old wounds of the world war the second have not been yet healed. Zionist aggression against Palestinian people within Palestinian territories has been going on for more than 60 years. So we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > see < Shared / S.P. > as long as justice is not reestablished peace will **not** < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > return to Palestine.

If justice is reestablished all displaced Palestinians will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > return to their motherland. If justice is reestablished and prevails then occupiers and

aggressors will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > leave Palestinian territory and a Palestinian state will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be created by all Palestinians.

If justice is reestablished, oppressed Iraqi nation will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > taste the sweet flavor of justice and full national sovereignty.

And if justice is reestablished real peace and stability will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > prevail in the region. This has always been emphasized by all our great personalities that, as attested by the human history, peace may **not** < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be established through injustice. The basis of the sustainable peace is justice. **(M. Ahmadinejad; 19 November 2007)**

Example [33] is extracted from 'Ahmadinejad's address to 2007 APA general assembly'. By adopting two shared perceptual evidentials '**we *can* see**', Ahmadinejad treats his belief (as part of his ideology) -'as long as justice is not reestablished peace *will not* return to Palestine' as facts. Then he uses five conditionals to further express his stance towards this issue (the issue of Palestine'). Obviously, the two evidentials and the epistemic stance expressed by five '*will*' in those conditionals also help to legitimise his proposal in the whole speech-'joint efforts for the establishment of justice in the world'.

7.4 Summary

In sum, this chapter first examined the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality at the sentential level in the three cases quantitatively. It then discussed their interactions in terms of three modal types co-occurring with evidential sources and identified five most typical patterns about their relations. The most striking results can be summarised as follows:

- Epistemic modals co-occurring with evidentials rank first in all the cases with around 60% on average, followed by deontic and volitional modals.
- The modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three cases take up 10%

on average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average.

● Evidentials inferred from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. evidentials, with around 66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with modals than those evidentials from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials).

● The differences in the co-occurrences of three types of modals with evidential sources among the three speakers are not significant in all the categories except for the inside evidentials.

● At the sentential level, there are five typical patterns between the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality: Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a concessive relation; a conditional relation; a coordinative or progressive relation.

● At the discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance in the context, and work with modal stance to legitimise the speaker's proposals in the context.

Concluding Remarks

The main objective of this thesis has been to analyse modality and evidentiality in political discourse within a cognitive-functional analytical framework.

This thesis answered the four research questions raised in the introduction chapter by proposing a systemic analytical framework for studying modality and evidentiality in political discourse and applying it in the quantitative and qualitative analyses of three types of modality and six types of evidentiality among the three cases of political speeches (former British premier Tony Blair, US President Barack Obama, former Iran president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). In what follows, I will briefly review how these questions have been addressed in the thesis and then summarise its conceptual, methodological and empirical contributions to the fields of political discourse studies, semantics and pragmatics. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of this thesis and future research following it.

- **How can modality be approached from a cognitive-functional perspective?**

Chapter One highlighted that it is necessary and possible to study modality with a combination of functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives to explore the whole process of discourse from different dimensions and bring new insights to PDA as well as CDA. On the one hand, the functional linguistic perspective (the theory of modal value in SFL) helps us analyse pragmatic functions of the texts. On the other hand, the adoption of theories from Cognitive Linguistics enables us to reveal the speaker's

conceptualization process of discourse production in terms of persuasion or manipulation.

Chapter Two established a systemic cognitive-functional analytical framework for studying modality. Drawing on SFL as well as some relevant theories and concepts from Cognitive Linguistics (including image schemas of space, Langacker's epistemic model and Chilton's model of discourse space), this framework --- the STE Model– can explore functions of modality in political discourse from dimensions of space, time and evidentiality.

In this model, modality is fundamentally conceptualized in terms of space, displayed on a figure combining the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and the NEAR-FAR schema, together with the three dimensions of space, time and evidentiality. The centre circle represents 'Here' in terms of space, 'Now' in terms of time, 'Necessity' in terms of 'deontic stance, 'Certainty' in terms of 'epistemic stance', and 'Willingness' in terms of 'volitional stance'. The shaded circle dot in the centre circle represents the speaker (viz. the speaker's self, 'I' or 'we'). The functions of modality in political discourse are addressed from three aspects: deontic distance / epistemic distance / volitional distance, value of modality and strength of evidence, with each graded on three levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (see P. 60).

● **What functions does modality perform in political discourse?**

In Chapter Two, this thesis introduced the functions of modality with respect to stance, ideology and legitimisation.

Chapters Three, Four and Five discussed the functions of epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality respectively, supported with a large number of examples from the data.

With regard to stance-taking acts, three types of modality encode different types of

stance. For example, epistemic modality functions as expressing knowledge-based (epistemic) stance as it involves 'the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the knowledge concerning the realization of events' (Marín-Arrese 2011:195). Put another way, epistemic stance reveals the speaker's ideology pertaining to the knowledge he/she has. Epistemic stance contributes to the legitimisation process in terms of what is possible or not possible to be actualized.

Different from epistemic modality, deontic modality functions as expressing value-based (deontic) stance as it involves the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the necessity/ rightness (values) concerning the realization of events. It means that deontic stance reveals the speaker's ideology pertaining to the political, social or moral values/beliefs he/she holds. Deontic stance contributes to the legitimisation process in terms of what actions are necessary (right) or not to take.

Volitional modality, on the other hand, functions as expressing emotion-based (volitional) stance as it involves the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the willingness (emotions) concerning the realization of events. That is to say, volitional stance reveals the speaker's ideology pertaining to the emotions (including willingness, determination, intentions) he/she has. Volitional stance contributes to the legitimisation process in terms of who is willing or unwilling to take actions, or what actions they are willing or unwilling to take.

In summary, modality functions as stance-taking acts, which then contribute to the functions of encoding ideology and (de)legitimisation. Different types of modality function differently in terms of stance-taking acts, reflecting ideology and (de)legitimisation, as shown in Table 2.2 (see p. 67) and Figure 2.2 (see P. 68).

- **How do different speakers use modality and evidentiality in political discourse?**

In Chapter Two, I investigated and compared the distributions and frequencies of

modal types, values and forms among the three cases in general. In Chapters Three to Six, I examined the use of modality and evidentiality among three political speakers both quantitatively and qualitatively. The most striking results as follows:

Overall, the results demonstrated that three speakers had a lot in common in terms of the use of modal markers and evidential markers, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama, which indicates these common features might be the main characteristics of using modality and evidentiality in political discourse. First, the number of epistemic modals ranks first in all three cases, followed by those of deontic modals and volitional modals. Second, the three speakers use deontic modals of high value more frequently than those of intermediate value, while there are more epistemic modals of intermediate value and volitional modals of high value in the cases of Blair and Obama. Third, there are far more modal verbs in epistemic modals (around 85%), since '*will*', '*can*' and '*would*' take up the first three positions among the three cases. However, modal verbs only account for about 50% and 60% in deontic and volitional modals respectively. Fourth, semi-modals are used very often in deontic modals, though '*should*' and '*must*' take up the first two positions in all three cases. Fifth, volitional modals '*will*', '*want to*' and '*would*' rank top three in the cases of Blair and Obama, but this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad. Sixth, evidentials from shared sources are preferred in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad, while those from inside sources are more popular in Obama's case. In addition to the similarities, each speaker also has his own preferences, which reflect their different worldviews and rhetorical styles.

Tony Blair ranks second in the use of modal markers, with 722 counts in total. He uses epistemic modals most with 373 counts, followed by deontic modals (200 counts) and volitional modals (149 counts). In terms of epistemic modality, Blair tends to use more modals of intermediate value (such as '*would*' and '*be to*') to emphasize the potential threats or force from his opponents in justifying his own proposal. With regard to deontic modality, Blair uses more semi-modals such as 'need to' to persuade

his addressees that taking the designated actions is not his idea but out of their internal needs. For volitional modality, Blair adopts more modals indicating strong emotions to express his determination, promises, or strong commitments, such as '*will*', '*shall*', and '*be to*'. As to evidential markers, Blair uses more evidential markers (154 counts) than Obama (138 counts) and Ahmadinejad (103 counts), especially with respect to evidentials from outside sources (with 35 counts). In particular, Blair uses more evidentials from outside source than the other two speakers, which allows him to distance himself from the commitments of his stance-taking acts. In sum, the use of modal and evidential markers in the case of Blair shows he often takes a more objective and authoritative stance in his speech style (Fairclough 2000a) and he is skillful in using implicit modal markers to persuade or manipulate his addressees.

Barack Obama uses the most modal markers among the three speakers with 806 counts in total. He uses far more epistemic modals (with 479 counts) than deontic modals (with 177 counts) and volitional modals (with 150 counts). For the use of epistemic modality, '*can*' is the most frequent epistemic modal (with 167 counts) in the case of Obama, which may help him gain the audience's support by giving them hope and confidence. In terms of deontic modals, Obama also uses more deontic modal '*can*' than the other two speakers. As to volitional modals, Obama tends to use more semi-modal '*want to*' and '*be going to*' to express his intentions or plans. With regard to evidentiality, Obama uses more evidentials from inside sources than the other two speakers, which allows him to make high commitment to his stance-taking acts. In sum, Obama's speech style with respect to the use of modals and evidentials is distinctive from Blair. He has been inclined to involve the audience into his speech and establish intimate interpersonal relations with them in order to win their support.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal markers than Blair and Obama, with only half of their figures (407 counts). The number of epistemic modals also ranks first with 208 counts, followed by deontic modals with 140 counts and volitional modals with 59 counts. In terms of epistemic modals, Ahmadinejad uses more

'*possible*' than Blair and Obama. With regard to deontic modals, Ahmadinejad uses more passive deontic modals such as '*be allowed to*' to delete the actors and avoid the potential conflicts. Besides, Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs '*will*' and semi-modals '*want to*', which both involve the future. It implies that Ahmadinejad's speeches focus more on past events, while the other two speakers talk about more about the future plans or policies. Ahmadinejad does not use any volitional modal adjectives and adverbs in his speeches. Ahmadinejad comes last in the total number of evidential markers as well as those in most categories of evidentials, though he uses more shared perceptual evidentials than the other two speakers. This allows him to present or presuppose his opinions as shared perceptions or facts in persuading his addressees. In sum, Ahmadinejad takes a totally different speech style from the other two speakers. For example, he uses more passive modals or modals of intermediate value to avoid his self-commitments and evade responsibilities. In particular, he is not very skillful in using implicit modals such as semi-modals, or modal adverbs. This is probably because of his personal rhetorical style or the fact that his speeches are not original but translated versions.

- **How does evidentiality function in political discourse and how does it relate to modality?**

Chapter Six discussed the functions of evidentiality with regard to Commitments, (Inter)subjectivity and Ideology in the context of political discourse.

Firstly, different sources of evidentials indicate the speaker's different degrees of commitment/ responsibility to the propositions, particularly to the stance expressed in the designated context, such as epistemic, deontic and volitional stance. Evidentials from inside sources indicate the speaker's personal (high) commitment to his/ her propositions and the evidentials from shared sources indicate shared commitment among the speaker and the hearers. The evidentials from outside sources, on the other hand, signal the speaker's low commitment to his stance.

Secondly, different sources of evidentials also mark subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity of the speaker's stance as their distinction lies in the degree of speaker's commitment to his/her stance. If the speaker makes sole commitment to his/her stance (with evidence from inside source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he expressed is subjective. If the speaker shares commitment with his/her hearers to his/her stance (with evidence from shared source), then the stance he expressed is inter-subjective. If the speaker makes no commitment to his/her stance (with evidence from outside source), then the stance he expressed is more objective.

Thirdly, different types of evidentials reflect the speakers' ideology concerning who/what is authoritative (e.g. Inferential evidentials from results), what is truth (e.g. Shared Perceptual evidentials), what is common knowledge (e.g. Evidentials inferred from shared knowledge) and what is believed (e.g. Evidentials inferred from personal beliefs), etc.

Chapter Seven discussed the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality in the persuasion/(de)legitimisation process in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.

First, the chapter examined the frequencies of the co-occurrence of three types of modals and three sources of evidentials and compared their similarities and differences among the three speakers.

Second, it investigated the functions and relations of the co-occurrence of different types of modals and evidentials in the context, and identified several typical patterns for their interactions at both propositional / sentential and discourse levels.

Besides, similar to modality, evidentiality contributes to the process of (de)legitimisation both at propositional and discourse levels.

This thesis made a few contributions to the scholarship of the field of discourse studies, particularly modality and evidentiality in political discourse studies. In what follows, I will briefly summarise them from conceptual, methodological and empirical perspectives.

Conceptual Contributions

The conceptual contributions of this thesis mainly involve the following five aspects:

● *This thesis redefined and reclassified modality*

This thesis redefined modality, taking into account its semantic meanings as well as its distinctive features both from functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives.

This thesis classified modality into four categories: Epistemic Modality, Deontic Modality, Dynamic Modality, and Volitional Modality, though Dynamic Modality is not discussed here. This classification is relatively more inclusive than other studies, making it possible to see a more complete picture of modality. In particular, the category of volitional modality has long been neglected in previous studies.

● *This thesis treated modality as a scalar phenomenon, conceptualized in terms of space.*

In this thesis, three types of modality are treated as scales of possibility, necessity and willingness respectively, with three levels of modal value (high, intermediate, and low) being positioned according to the corresponding distance (close, near, distant) to the centre. In this way, epistemic modality is addressed in terms of epistemic distance, while deontic modality and volitional modality are addressed pertaining to deontic distance and volitional distance respectively.

● *This thesis found modality expressed in a wide range of forms*

The thesis found that modality can be expressed in many different forms in addition to modal verbs. By adopting a data-driven approach, this study identified and

investigated four forms of modality in English political speeches: modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal adverbs. In particular, it is interesting to see that modal verbs only account for around 50% in the quantitative results of deontic modality in all three cases. This means other modal forms other than modal verbs, (especially semi-modals and) should also be taken into account in PDA. More importantly, the qualitative analysis showed that those implicit modal markers such as semi-modals and modal adjectives play an important role in the persuasion or manipulation processes.

- ***This thesis reclassified evidentiality based on sources of evidence and modes of knowing***

The thesis proposed that evidentiality can be reclassified into three main types according to locus of information, depending on whether it is from an *outside source* (the speaker distances himself from the source of information); or from a *shared source* (the speaker presupposes the source of information is shared by addressees), or from an *inside source* (only the speaker is accessible to the source of information). They can be further classified into two categories in each source according to different modes of knowing.

In summary, the evidential markers in this classification are divided into six types, including Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.); Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.); Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.); Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.), as shown in Table 2.6 (see P. 90).

Methodological Contributions

The methodological contributions of this thesis are mainly concerned with the following three perspectives:

- This thesis established an analytical framework for studying modality from a

cognitive-functional perspective.

● This thesis annotated the data with a novel coding system to study modal and evidential markers both quantitatively and qualitatively.

● This thesis adopted a corpus linguistic approach to study modality and evidentiality with examining empirical data of thirty political speeches.

Empirical Contributions

The empirical contributions of this thesis include quantitative and qualitative results of modality and evidentiality from the analyses of three case studies.

The quantitative results show that:

1) On the whole, the distributions and frequencies of modal markers present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms in the cases of Blair and Obama, while Ahmadinejad is different in many aspects.

2) Implicit modal markers such as semi-modals are also used frequently, particularly in deontic modality.

3) Intermediate value is preferred in epistemic modality, while high value is more frequent in deontic and volitional modality.

4) Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of modals and evidential markers, but Ahmadinejad only uses about two thirds of their figures.

5) Shared evidentials rank first in the cases of Ahmadinejad and Blair, while inside evidentials take up the first position in Obama's case.

6) Besides the similarities in top-ten markers of modal and evidentials, each speaker also has his own preferences.

7) The modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three cases take up 10% on average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average.

8) Evidentials inferred from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. evidentials, with around 66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with modals than those evidentials from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials).

The qualitative results show that:

1) The cognitive linguistic perspective of studying modality and evidentiality can help reveal the speaker's conceptualization processes in discourse production, particularly in terms of the three different levels of epistemic, deontic and volitional distance to the centre of certainty, necessity and willingness.

2) The functional linguistic perspective helps investigate the strategic functions of modal markers and evidentials in different contexts through the three levels of modal values.

3) The three speakers' choices of modals and evidentials reflect their distinctive ideology and rhetorical styles.

4) The modals of high value and shared or inside evidentials are often used in the legitimisation of the speaker's own views or proposals ('positive self-representation'), while some modals of low value and hearsay evidentials can often be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other's views or proposals ('negative other-representation').

5) Modality functions as three different types of stance-taking acts and encodes ideology with regard to knowledge, value and emotions respectively.

6) The same modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees of force according to different contexts.

7) The adoption of different sources of evidence reveals the speakers' corresponding commitments/responsibility toward their stance and marks the subjectivity or intersubjectivity of their stance.

8) Some types of evidentials reflect the speaker's ideology as they encode their presuppositions of authorities, facts or shared knowledge.

9) Evidentiality has a closer relationship with epistemic modality than the other types of modality.

10) Five most typical patterns between the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality have been identified at the sentential level: Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a concessive relation; a conditional relation; a coordinative or progressive relation. At the discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance in the context, and work with modal stance to legitimise the speaker's proposals in the context.

In summary, the major contributions of this thesis include: reclassifications of modality and evidentiality; a systemic analytical framework of studying modality; a novel coding system of annotating data, a comparative quantitative study of modality and evidentiality among the three cases; new functions of modality and evidentiality; and the patterns of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality.

Limitations and Future Research

Modality is a very complicated domain, just as Nuyts puts it:

> 'Modality' is one of the 'golden oldies' among the basic notions in the semantic analysis of language. But in spite of this, it also remains one of the most problematic and controversial notions: there is no consensus on how to define and characterize it, let alone on how to apply definitions in the empirical analysis of data.   (Nuyts, 2010:5)

Indeed, due to its complexity and controversy, there are certainly some inevitable limitations in this thesis, which need to be improved in the future research. In what follows, some specific issues relating to modality and evidentiality will be discussed, which might be of interest to the researchers in this field and shed some light on the trends for future studies.

Forms, meanings and functions of modality

This thesis has examined four forms (including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal adverbs), and three functions (including expressing stance, reflecting ideology and (de)legitimising propositions) of three types of modality (including epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality).

Some modal forms and functions have not been taken into account in this thesis. First of all, modality also contributes to the establishment of the speaker's identity, According to Fairclough, 'what people commit themselves to in texts is an important part of how they identify themselves, the texturing of identities' (2003:164). He then argues that '[M]odality is important in the texturing of identities, both personal ('personalities') and social, in the sense that what you commit yourself to is a significant part of what you are - so modality choices in texts can be seen as part of the process of texturing self-identity' (Fairclough 2003:166). For example, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair makes a number of categorical, authoritative assertions in

responding to a question about the European Union and its new currency – the euro (e.g. 'it is essential…not to end up walking away', 'there's no future in that for Britain', 'it would be the biggest failure of leadership imaginable'), in which he establishes his identity of authoritativeness through modality (indicating the degree of assertiveness) (Fairclough 2000a:100). For another example, Stubbs claims that the language of modality functions to 'express group membership' (equivalent to group identity, my emphasis), as 'speakers adopt positions, express agreement and disagreement with others, make personal and social allegiances and contracts' (1996: 202). In addition, Benwell and Stokoe (2006:112) argue that modality has particular relevance for 'representations of identity and interpersonal relationships'. This function of modality is worth investigating further in political discourse in future study.

Secondly, in addition to the four basic forms of modality examined in this thesis, other forms or structures may also encode modal meanings, such as conditionals, propositional attitude verbs and adjectives, infinitives, and covert modality (Portner 2009:2-3).

Last but not least, the functions of some special modal forms or structures have not been explored thoroughly, such as the functions of dynamic modality, negative modals, modals in questions, double modals and modals in conditionals. All of them can be interesting topics in future research.

The interaction between modality and time

This thesis proposed that modality can be studied from three dimensions: space, time and evidentiality. However, its focus is more on the dimensions of space and evidentiality. As a matter of fact, time is also conceptualized in terms of distance (space), particularly for epistemic distance. This is not examined thoroughly in the qualitative analysis of data. For future research, the interaction of modality and time could be further investigated in political discourse analysis. For example, it would be

interesting to do a contrast study between the functions of modal forms of the present tense with their past tense in discourse studies.

Can the analytical framework of studying modality and evidentiality be applied elsewhere?

The analytical framework in this thesis is designed to analyse modality and evidentiality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective. It can also be applied in other discourse genres and materials. The value of modality, distance of modality and strength of evidence may be similar in other types of discourse. However, the functions of modality may vary in different contexts. For example, modals in daily conversations often function as requesting in terms of speech acts. For another example, modals in academic discourse are usually treated as hedgings (Itakura 2013). So it might be interesting to see new functions of modality to be identified in different discourse genres. It would also be interesting to see the results of investigating modality in other languages with the framework or some concepts from it.

Can the classification of evidentiality be used elsewhere?

The classification of evidentiality in this thesis is based on English language. So it is also useful in other types of English discourse, such as media discourse, academic discourse, racial discourse, and many others. In particular, those studies aiming to explore its functions of persuasion or manipulation should be of special interest in this classification. For example, it should be interesting to study the types of evidentiality and their functions in courtroom discourse or religious discourse as both of them involve the purpose of persuasion or manipulation.

For other languages which have similar or different grammar systems, this classification can also shed some light for their studies, especially for the idea of three different sources and the strength of evidence. Besides, it would be significant to do a comparative study of evidentiality between English and other languages.

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Appendix

Table A1 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Blair's speeches

No. Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	must	5	would	58	could	19			
	will	116	should	4	might	6			**297**
	shall	4	can	74					
			may	11					
	be to	6	be able to	5					**15**
	be going to	4							
	certain	2	capable	1	possible	11			**19**
	sure	3	probable	0					
			likely	2					
	Sub-total	**147**		**175**		**36**		**0**	**358**
Negative			wouldn't	4	couldn't	3	will not	8	
			may not	2	might not	0	can't	20	**37**
							be not able to	8	
							be not going to	1	**9**
			improbable	0	uncertain	0	impossi	1	**2**

							ble		
		unlikely	1						
	Sub-total	**0**		**7**		**7**		**38**	**52**
Total	**147**		**182**		**43**		**38**		**410**

Table A2 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Obama's speeches

No. / Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	must	3	would	31	could	28			
	will	148	should	2	might	5			373
	shall	4	can	136					
			may	16					
	be to	1							21
	be going to	11	be able to	9					
	certain	2	capable	1	possible	12			20
	sure	2	probable	0					
			likely	3					
	Sub-total	**175**		**211**		**46**		**0**	**432**
Negative			wouldn't	6	couldn't	4	will not	13	
			may not	4	might not	1	can't	31	**59**
							be not able to	3	**3**
			Improba-ble	2	uncertain	2	Impossi-ble	1	**5**
			unlikely	0					
	Sub-total	**0**		**12**		**7**		**49**	**68**
Total	**175**		**223**		**53**		**49**		**500**

Table A3 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad's speeches

No. / Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	must	1	would	25	could	13			
	will	75	should	0	might	0			
	shall	4	can	42					166
			may	6					
	be to	0							10
	be going to	0	be able to	10					
	certain	0	capable	0	possible	13			16
	sure	2	probable	1					
			likely	0					
	Sub-total	**85**		**89**		**27**		**0**	**201**
Negative			wouldn't	5	couldn't	2	will not	7	
			may not	0	might not	0	can't	8	**22**
							be not able to	7	**7**
			improbable	0	uncertain	0	impossible	9	**10**
			unlikely	1					
	Sub-total	**0**		**6**		**2**		**31**	**39**
Total	**85**		**95**		**29**		**31**		**240**

Table A4 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Blair's speeches

No. Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	must	34	should	39					**78**
	shall	2	can	3					
	have (got) to	29	be supposed to	1	be allowed to	4			**72**
	need to	34							
	be to	3							
	be required to	1							
	obliged	0	responsible	3					**13**
	necessary	10							
	Sub-total	**122**		**60**		**4**		**0**	**186**
Negative			shouldn't	7	couldn't	0	mustn't	2	
			can't	10			can't	3	
			may not	0					**22**
			ought not to	0					
					not have to	4			**5**
					not need to	1			
			irresponsible	1	unnecessary	4			**5**
	Sub-total	**0**		**18**		**10**		**5**	**33**
Total	**122**		**78**		**14**		**5**		**219**

Table A5 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Obama's speeches

No. Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	must	32	should	31					**76**
	shall	3	can	10					
	have (got) to	34	be supposed to	0					**57**
	need to	22							
	be to	1			be allowed to	0			
	be required to	0							
	obliged	0							**9**
	necessary	7	responsible	2					
	Sub-total	**112**		**69**		**0**		**0**	**181**
Negative			shouldn't	8			mustn't	6	**27**
			can't	8			can't	1	
			ought not to	1			may not	1	
							couldn't	2	
					not have to	1	be not allowed to	1	**4**
					not need to	2			
			irresponsible	0	unnecessary	2			**2**
	Sub-total	**0**		**19**		**5**		**11**	**35**
Total	**112**		**88**		**5**		**11**		**216**

Table A6 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad's speeches

No. Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
	must	39	should	38	could	1			**93**
	shall	7	can	8					
	have to	2	be supposed to	0					
	have got to	0							**13**
	need to	7							
Positive	be to	0			be allowed to	3			
	be required to	1							
	obliged	2							**15**
	necessary	6	responsible	7					
	Sub-total	**71**		**67**		**4**		**0**	**142**
			shouldn't	6			couldn't	1	
			can't	5					**12**
			may not	0					
Negative			ought not to	0					
					not have to	0	be not allowed to	6	**6**
					not need to	0			
			irresponsible	0	unnecessary	1			**1**
	Sub-total	**0**		**11**		**1**		**7**	**19**
Total	**71**		**78**		**5**		**7**		**161**

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Table A7 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Blair's speeches

No. / Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	will	60	would	16	might	0			**82**
	shall	4	may	1					
			should	1					
	be to	5	intend to	2	be willing to	2			**52**
	be going to	4	want to	36					
	be determined to	3							
			anxious	1					**1**
	Sub-total	**90**		**60**		**2**		**0**	**152**
Negative			wouldn't	0			will not	12	**12**
			not intend to	0	be unwilling to	0	be not going to	1	**2**
			not want to	1					
	Sub-total	**0**		**1**		**0**		**13**	**14**
Total	**90**		**61**		**2**		**13**		**166**

Table A8 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Obama's speeches

No. Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	will	54	would	14	might	1			
	shall	1	may	4					74
			should	0					
	be to	1			be willing to	7			
	be going to	10	intend to	3					61
	be determined to	0	want to	40					
			anxious	2					2
	Sub-total	**87**		**64**		**13**		**0**	**164**
Negative			wouldn't	2			will not	9	**11**
			not intend to	0	be unwilling to	0			**0**
			not want to	0					
	Sub-total	**0**		**2**		**0**		**9**	**11**
Total	87		66		13		9		175

Table A9 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad's speeches

No. / Forms	High Value	No.	Inter. Value	No.	Low Value	No.	High Value	No.	Total
Positive	will	12	would	16	might	0			35
	shall	3	may	4					
			should	0					
	be to	1			be willing to	0			24
	be going to	0	intend to	6					
	be determined to	2	want to	15					
			anxious	0					0
	Sub-total	**29**		**50**		**0**		**0**	**79**
Negative			wouldn't	2			will not	2	**4**
			not intend to	1	be unwilling to	0			**4**
			not want to	3					
	Sub-total	**0**		**6**		**0**		**2**	**8**
Total	**29**		**56**		**0**		**2**		**87**

Table B1 Distribution of evidentials in Blair's speeches

Sources of Evidentials	Types of evidentials	Evidential Markers		No.
Outside Source	**Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)**	Reports **suggest** results/figures/statistics **show**		4 1/1/ 1
		Analysis/ figures **show**		5/1
		according to the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council		1
		Sub-total		**14**
	Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)	It is said / expected /estimated that		1/ 1/1
		People say/ Some say		2/1
		They say		2
		He thought		1
		There are suggestions		1
		It has been claimed		1
		Other markers		10
		Sub-total		**21**
	Sub-total	**35**		
Shared Source	**Shared Perceptions (S.P.)**	We see/We've seen/ UK has seen	1/1/1	
		It was (has been) clear that/clearly	2/1	
		seems/It seems	8/3	
		heard	1	
		Sub-total	18	

	Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)	actually	4
		in fact	6
		We know	10
		You know	9
		There's no doubt that	1
		We have learned	2
		We believe	1
		Other markers	18
		Sub-total	**51**
	Sub-total	**69**	
Inside Source	**Personal Perceptions (P.P.)**	I see	1
		I heard	4
		I feel	1
		Other markers	2
		Sub-total	**8**
	Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)	I know	12
		I am convinced	1
		I've learned	2
		I am aware that	2
		I have no doubt	2
		I believe	18
		I think	2
		I am confident	2
		In my view	1
		Sub-total	**42**
	Sub-total	**50**	
Total	**154**		

Table B2 Distribution of evidentials in Obama's speeches

Sources of Evidentials	Types of evidentials	Evidential Markers	No.
Outside Source	**Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)**	Reports suggest	2
		Other markers	1
		Sub-total	**3**
	Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)	(S)he knows/ they knew	2/2
		they understood	2
		Some think	2
		Other markers	14
		Sub-total	**22**
	Sub-total	**25**	
Shared Source	**Shared Perceptions (S.P.)**	We've seen/ we saw	4/2
		We are seeing	2
		We've heard	2
		seem	3
		other markers	3
		Sub-total	**16**
	Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)	actually	1
		in fact	4
		We know	12
		You know	4
		Everyone here knows	2
		There's no doubt that	2
		Other markers	8
		Sub-total	**33**

	Sub-total	49	
Inside Source	**Personal Perceptions (P.P.)**	I saw	2
		I have seen	4
		I heard/ hear	2/2
		Other markers	1
		Sub-total	**11**
	Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)	I know	17
		I realized	2
		I learned	1
		I believe	13
		I have no doubt that	1
		I'm confident	3
		I think	2
		I understand	2
		other markers	12
		Sub-total	**53**
	Sub-total	64	
Total	**138**		

Table B3 Distribution of evidentials in Ahmadinejad's speeches

Sources of Evidentials	Types of evidentials	Evidential Markers	No.	
Outside Source	**Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)**	According to article 4 and 6	1	
		Reports suggest	2	
		Sub-total	**3**	
	Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)	It is (was) said that	4	
		They say	1	
		It is proposed/announced /suggested that	2/1/1	
		Other markers	9	
		Sub-total	**18**	
	Sub-total	**21**		
Shared Source	**Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.)**	You see / you can see	1/1	
		We can see/we've seen	3/1	
		You've heard	2	
		You are witnessing	1	
		It is clear that/clearly	6/7	
		Apparently	2	
		other markers	2	
		Sub-total	**26**	
	Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)	in fact /as a matter of fact	9/3	
		We know	3	
		You know /Everyone knows	5/1	
		You are aware of	3	
		undoubtedly	4	

		There's no doubt that	2
		It is evident	3
		you and I believe	1
		Other markers	12
		Sub-total	**46**
	Sub-total	**72**	
Inside Source	**Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.)**		0
		Sub-total	0
	Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)	I know	1
		I have no doubt	3
		I believe	3
		I think/ I guess	1/1
		In my opinion	1
		Sub-total	**10**
	Sub-total	10	
Total	**103**		