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Bridging the Gap between Theory and Praxis:

An Exploration of International Society's Responsibility towards Instability

in Pakistan, 1947-2020

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by

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Declaration

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.

I declare that the thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

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To my mother, Madhavi Kapur (1958-2016)

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

AJK   Azad Jammu and Kashmir

ANP   Awami National Party

BJP   Bharatiya Janata Party

CBD   Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

CPEC   China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Daesh   Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham

ES   English school

FATA   Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FCR   Frontier Crimes Regulation

GID   General Intelligence Directorate

HoA   Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process

HuJI   Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami

IJK   Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir

IMU   Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IR   International relations

ISAF   International Security Assistance Force

ISI   Inter-Services Intelligence

ISPR   Inter Services Public Relations

ISS   International security studies

J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JuA	Jamaat-ul-Ahrar
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC	Line of Control
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MTT	Muqami Tehreek-e-Taliban
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate of Security
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PJK	Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
PTM	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
QCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

SSP	Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (gas pipeline)
TNFJ	Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh Jafariya
TNSM	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Abstract

Barry Buzan has argued that the English school is "a neglected approach to International Security Studies," while Colin Wight has lamented the tendency for terrorism studies to eschew theories of international relations in favour of sociological and psychological approaches. This thesis seeks to bridge the gaps between the English school and international security studies, and between terrorism studies and international-relations theory. Furthermore, I seek to understand the Pakistani perspective on terrorism in the country and utilise the English school's concept of great-power responsibility to understand, in normative terms, where responsibility lies in the destabilisation of Pakistan. I draw on interviews with diplomats, journalists, refugees, academics, military officers, aid workers, government officials and local people. Additionally, I utilise aesthetic sources such as literature, art, cinema, music and poetry to incorporate neglected perspectives and emotional aspects of the subject matter into my work.

I contend that there has been a decentralisation of power in Pakistan since the downfall of former President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, with terrorist groups constituting one of many social actors that have gained in strength as a consequence of this shift in power away from the state and towards society. I further posit that within Pakistan's regional context, the institutions for a society of states are unexpectedly strong despite the intense triangular hostility

involving Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. My thesis goes on to demonstrate how both regional and global powers have contributed to the spread of violent extremism in Pakistan. Moreover, I emphasise the importance of the Pakistani military's programme to de-radicalise and reintegrate former militants as an essential component of the country's counterterrorism strategy. I conclude that the English-school theory of international relations provides essential insights into the empirical case of terrorism in Pakistan through its historical approach and its concern with social aspects of international relations. Finally, I call for international policymakers to support the Pakistani terrorist-rehabilitation programme, especially in the wake of the US government's withdrawal of security assistance, asserting that the great powers and regional powers have a responsibility towards Pakistan because of their hand in the country's destabilisation.

Introduction

The greatest danger of the current discourse is that we too become terrorists; and that as we demonise, dehumanise and brutalise the enemy "other" it becomes a war *of* terrorisms, rather than a war *on* terrorism.
—Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism*

On 11 September 2001, terrorists belonging to the global terror network Al Qaeda hijacked four passenger aircraft in the United States. The hijackers flew two of the aeroplanes into the World Trade Center in New York and rammed a third aeroplane into the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The attack killed almost three thousand people. The United States responded by garnering international support for a "global war on terror." This "war" has consisted, notably, of invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Hayden 2009, 57-71; Hoffman 2006; Watson 2009, 1).[1] Thus, it has both challenged and upheld the conventional understanding of war as an interstate conflict. Terrorist groups are non-state actors, and this conflicts with the idea of a war on *terrorism*. However, simultaneously, the attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and former President Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq constituted assaults on states and hence adhered to the conventional conception of war as interstate conflict (Pilbeam 2015, 88).

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[1] The US Defense Department emailed staff at the Pentagon in March 2009 asking them to replace the phrase "global war on terror" with the less contentious term "overseas contingency operation" (Burkeman 2009; S. Wilson and Kamen 2009).

US and British forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, bombing Al Qaeda bases and Taliban government installations. "Operation Enduring Freedom" toppled the Taliban regime, following which Hamid Karzai took over as Afghan president, with the support of the United Nations (UN)-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of ISAF (Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force; K. Booth and Dunne 2002, 11; Public Broadcasting Service).

Although *international society* unanimously supported "Operation Enduring Freedom," the UN did not sanction the US-led offensive in Iraq in 2003 to unseat Hussein. After the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain withdrew a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution they had tabled, anticipating its veto, the United States put together a "coalition of the willing," consisting of thirty-eight countries that conducted the operation. Nevertheless, following the invasion, the United States again approached the UN and sought its approval for the maintenance of forces in Iraq (Beehner 2007; Newman 2004; Plunkett 2011; Press-Barnathan 2004, 205-06; Yew 2007). Galia Press-Barnathan (2004, 204-06) argues that the war in Iraq constituted a manifestation of US unilateralism, but it simultaneously revealed the limits of the United States' hegemony. Citizens of the United States and other countries protested against the war, displaying the agency of individuals in the face of action by the globally hegemonic state. Meanwhile, the United States' inability to pressure

the UNSC into granting a resolution was significant, even if it did not prevent the war. Furthermore, the destabilisation of Iraq following the 2003 invasion paved the way for the emergence of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (Daesh). Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (2018, loc. 3374) lists "the degenerated consequences of an Iraqi society preoccupied with and occupied by war for three decades since September 1980" as one of the reasons for the rise of Daesh. He claims that "the two most important events in the historical socio-genesis of IS [were] the torture at Abu Ghraib and the hanging of Saddam Hussein" (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 3483). Hence, he proclaims that "Iraq (2003) led to IS" (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 3538). Daesh's appearance in Iraq and Syria has revealed the United States' failure as international hegemon to ensure international security and promote liberal values through its "war on terror."

These themes of contemporary terrorism and *counterterrorism*, the English-school (ES) theory of international relations (IR), and my case study—Pakistan—are the objects of the literature review I present in this introduction. I will identify problems and gaps in the existing literature, and thus justify my study of how international society might approach terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan. The purpose is to address the central research problem of how international policymakers could respond to the United States' suspension of military aid to Pakistan amid the continuance of terrorist violence in the country.

In the first section of this introduction, I define terrorism and *terrorist groups*. In the second section, I question the use of the adjective "global" to describe the "war on terror," then go on to explore the *globalisation* of terrorism, problematising the conflation of terrorism with Islamist terrorism since 11 September 2001. This is in line with the ES's historicist approach. Colin Wight (2009) maintains that the *de-historicisation* of terrorism studies has led to a neglect of the process of the evolution of the state and the challenge posed to the state's claim to monopoly over the legitimate use of violence by non-state actors ever since the birth of the modern state. Also, the link between globalisation and the growing relevance of non-state actors in international politics is connected to the ES's concept of world society, as Barry Buzan (2004a) has shown. The third section introduces my approach of employing the ES theory of IR to study an empirical problem in international security studies (ISS), which builds on Buzan's (2015, 126) identification of the ES as "a neglected approach to International Security Studies." In the fourth section of this introduction, I provide the rationale for selecting Pakistan as the case study for this research. Finally, in the fifth section, I lay out my research question.

Key Definitions: Terrorism and Terrorist Groups

Terrorism

The difficulty of defining terrorism is exemplified by the inability of UN member states to arrive at a definition, with non-Western states accusing the

West of a colonial attitude that portrays even "legitimate" freedom fighters as terrorists (Romaniuk 2010, 38-39; P. Wilkinson 2011, 165). As Colin Wight (2009) quips, "The cliché that it is a bit like pornography, and you will know it when you see it, has a grain of truth to it."

Bruce Hoffman (2006, 41-42) defines "terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change." He highlights the psychological aspect of terrorism, declaring that it seeks "to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience'" than "the immediate victim or target" of the attack. He further ascribes terrorism to sub-national and non-state groups and underlines terrorists' pursuit of power, leverage and influence through which they seek to bring about political change.

Alex Schmid (2004) employs five different frameworks to conceptualise terrorism, namely, terrorism as a crime, politics, warfare, communication, and religious fundamentalism. Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler (2004, 782) survey articles on terrorism in three academic journals and conclude that there exists a consensus definition of terrorism within academia. This consensus definition considers terrorism to be "a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role."

Colin Wight (2009) makes the crucial point that terrorism "is a form of violent political *communication*" (italics mine). He adds that it is *illegitimate*

violence and targets "non-state actors and institutions," even though the political message tends not to be aimed at the victims.

In this thesis, I draw on these definitions to understand terrorism to have *political* roots, to employ violent means to *communicate*, and to challenge the state's claim of being the only *legitimate* employer of force in a territory. My focus on the political roots of terrorism is informed by Robert Jackson (2005), Arun Kundnani (2016) and Colin Wight's (2009) assertion that the *de-politicisation* of terrorism since 9/11 has caused an overemphasis on the link between religious ideology and terrorism. They hold that this has caused an excessive focus on Islamist violence and a neglect of other types of terrorism. The treatment of terrorism as a form of communication draws on Buzan's (2004) claim that violence is a form of social interaction. Finally, my attention to non-state actors' challenge to states' monopoly over the use of violence stems from my appreciation of Colin Wight (2009), Fred Halliday (1994) and Herbert Wulf's (2007) work on the origins of the modern state and the simultaneous emergence of "terrorist" groups.

Consequently, my understanding challenges the de-politicisation of terrorism that has occurred since 2001, which has been accompanied by an overemphasis on religious ideology as the driver of terrorism to the neglect of political and local factors that drive terrorist violence (Jackson 2005; Kundnani 2016; C. Wight 2015). Moreover, I displace the de-historicisation of terrorism post-2001 by pointing to the challenge that non-state actors have always posed

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to the modern state's claim to be the sole legitimate employer of violence (Jackson 2005; C. Wight 2015; Wulf 2007). I use the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" interchangeably with related terms such as "militant," "militancy," "violent extremist" and "violent extremism" to aid readability and also because extremism is a grey area in the Pakistani social context. For many religious Pakistanis, religious fundamentalism is a signifier of moral uprightness. However, the borders separating fundamentalist groups from violent ones are often fuzzy and difficult to discern, rendering this a politically charged question from a Pakistani perspective. Moreover, some militants—for example, those fighting for Kashmir's liberation—are often perceived as "good," while those Pakistani Taliban attacking the Pakistani state and society are seen as "bad." Again, this good/bad dichotomy makes it politically contentious to call certain fighters "terrorists," from the perspective of some Pakistanis. I have sought to distance myself from this binary opposition to maintain scholarly detachment by varying my use of these terms with an awareness of the context in which they are employed. This may be problematic from an ethical point of view, but it highlights the difficulty of defining terrorism noted above.

Terrorist Groups

Brian Phillips (2014) defines terrorist groups as "subnational political organizations that use terrorism." However, as discussed below, terrorist groups increasingly operate *transnationally*, and this is certainly the case for

many groups operating in Pakistan. Therefore, I understand terrorist groups to be sub-national as well as transnational organisations that employ terrorism. Again, I vary my use of the term "terrorist group" with related terms such as "militant outfit" in the interest of readability. This is also an acknowledgement of the sensitivities surrounding militancy or terrorism in Pakistan and South Asia, and the notion that "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter." Since "terrorism" and derivative terms contain a strong sense of moral judgement, I have tended to use less loaded terms such as "militancy" when addressing sensitive and contentious political issues like Kashmir.

Is the "War on Terror" Global?

Many scholars consider the United States' description of the "war on terror" as global to be problematic. For instance, Helen Dexter (2007) discusses how for some authors, the interventionism of the United States and its Western allies represents post-imperialism. Robert Patman (2006) declares that although the United States dabbled in multilateralism in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, its approach to the "global war on terror" has mostly demonstrated a heightened form of American exceptionalism. Patman (2006, 964) defines American exceptionalism as "the informal ideology that endows Americans with the conviction that their nation is an exemplary one." His argument is underpinned by the United States' disregard for the opposition of most members of the UNSC to the Iraq war. He postulates that this sort of

unilateralism on the part of the United States cannot continue in a globalising world and that greater international cooperation and the support of other countries and multinational institutions are essential ingredients of a successful response to international terrorism. Paul Wilkinson (2011, 170-81) and Peter Romaniuk (2010, 3-4) similarly maintain that the reaction to the globalised terrorist threat has been insufficiently multilateral. Wilkinson (2011, 173) perceives a "huge gulf between the rhetoric and the reality of international cooperation against terrorism," which he attributes to the dominance of the realist paradigm among policymakers. Furthermore, his argument in favour of an international response to terrorism is supported by his contention that terrorism constitutes an "attack on human rights," rendering counterterrorism a duty of the international community (Wilkinson 2011, 181).

Patman (2006), Romaniuk (2010) and Wilkinson's (2011) conceptualisation of contemporary terrorism as a globalised risk underpins their support for a more multilateral approach to terrorism. While their arguments in favour of multilateral counterterrorism will play into this chapter's exploration of the ES's international-society approach to counterterrorism, the following section will focus on the globalisation of terrorism to which their work points.

Globalisation and Terrorism

While scholars have been unable to agree on whether globalisation

exists, this thesis adopts what David Held and Anthony McGrew (2000, 2) refer to as the *globalist* position, in that it considers globalisation to be real and significant. In terms of definition, it draws on Jan Aart Scholte's (2005, 53-59) understanding of globalisation as a proliferation of trans-planetary, supranational connections among people. This also corresponds with Frank Lechner and John Boli's (2015, 2) definition of globalisation as "the processes by which more people across large distances become connected in more and different ways."

Robert Denemark (2010) draws a link between fundamentalism and globalisation, suggesting that globalisation has contributed indirectly to religious fundamentalism because, for him, "globalization is an extension of modernization and post-modernization," which he sees as the antithesis of religious fundamentalism. Denemark (2010) suggests that fundamentalism is a reaction against modernity and post-modernity. However, it is essential to differentiate between terrorism and fundamentalism.

Given that the "global war on terror" rhetoric of former US President George Bush's administration seemed to conflate global terror with Islamist terror, it is worth pointing out that, through history, terrorism has taken on various hues, both secular and religious. David Rapoport (2002) has divided modern history into four waves of terror. These are the *anarchist wave*, which lasted from the 1880s to the 1910s; the *anti-colonial wave*, which took place from the 1920s to the 1950s; the *new left wave*, which extended from the 1960s to the

1990s; and the *religious wave*, which began in the 1970s and continues. During this ongoing religious wave, adherents of several religions, including Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and the New-Age Movement, have been suspected or convicted of having perpetrated religiously motivated terrorist attacks (Ahuja 2014a, 2014b; Gilani 2014; Komireddi 2011; Koppikar 2011; Rapoport 2002).

However, the Islamist groups Al Qaeda (and its franchises Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib) and, more recently, Daesh are significant in the globalisation of terrorism because of their ability to recruit globally (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 1324-2367). Al Qaeda espouses an ideology that favours attacks on the *far enemy*, as will be discussed later in this section (Gerges 2009; Rapoport 2002; Sageman 2008, 42-43). Moreover, Islamist terrorism is directly relevant to the subject matter of this thesis, since it is the form of terrorism that is most prevalent in Pakistan, which is the focus of this thesis. Based on these factors, this section will focus on the globalisation of Islamist terror. However, it is important to note that this approach is not without its problems. For instance, violence within Pakistan by Baloch and Pashtun ethnic secessionists does not fit the stereotype of religiously motivated terrorism. Nor does political violence by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which represents the Mohajir community of Partition refugees. While I am cognisant of these issues and of the dangers of focusing on Islamist extremist violence, I am compelled to do so because of the violence

unleashed *within* Pakistan in the twenty-first century by Islamist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Daesh and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).

Various authors have approached the idea of the globalisation of terrorism in different ways. Olivier Roy (2004, 51) focuses on the recruitment of Al Qaeda militants from among the Muslim diaspora in the West since the 1990s. Thomas Hegghammer (2010/11, 53) traces the path of an Islamist terrorist from the West via combat zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq to membership of transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. His study of "the globalization of jihad"[2] focuses on religiously motivated fighters who travel from their home countries to war zones, whom he distinguishes from international terrorists who target civilians outside these zones. He argues that "foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, because volunteering for war is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy." Thus, he highlights the internationalisation of terrorist training.

Marc Sageman's (2008, 29-31) discussion of "the globalization of jihadi terror" hinges on a distinction he makes between Al Qaeda the organisation and Al Qaeda the social movement. For him, Al Qaeda the organisation, or Al

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[2] I am aware that the term "jihad" and its derivatives are deeply contested within Islamic legal scholarship and political thought (Afsaruddin 2016). Because Islamist militants *see themselves* as being mujahideen, I do not shy away from using the terms "jihad," "*jihadi*" and "mujahideen." As a work of scholarship, it is important that this thesis does not suppress the voices of Islamist terrorists, who are central actors in this thesis—however politically incorrect the use of this terminology may be. Nevertheless, I am acutely sensitive to the fact that this risks the demonisation of a whole religion and its adherents and have therefore sought to minimise my use of these terms, especially given the contemporary political context.

Qaeda Central, has been replaced in importance by a looser, more informal web of militant networks spread across the globe. Sageman (2008, 37-38) traces the origins of the globalisation of Islamist terrorism to a debate that emerged in the 1970s with the dissemination of a pamphlet authored by radical Islamist theorist Muhammad Abdel Salam Faraj. In it, Faraj argued that fighting the *near enemy*, the "apostate" local ruler, was more critical than warring against the far enemy, Israel.[3] In the 1990s, it was argued by a small group of Salafis[4] that the overthrow of the near enemy, the local Middle Eastern "apostate" governments, was dependent on expelling the far enemy or Western powers from the Middle East. According to Sageman, the 11 September 2001 attackers were proponents of this latter approach. For him, it is terrorists whose focus is on the far enemy who constitute global Islamist terrorism.

Sageman (2008, 40-43) also traces Al Qaeda's path towards global terrorism. According to him, after the Soviet Union withdrew its soldiers from Afghanistan in 1989, a few hardcore militants did not return to their home countries but stayed behind in Pakistan, swearing allegiance to Osama bin Laden or one of his senior representatives. Mohamedou (2018, loc. 902-08) recounts:

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[3] Faraj was representative of a faction of Salafis who believed that the local Middle Eastern rulers were apostates as they had adopted Western ways to the extent of having abandoned true Islam (Sageman 2008, 37-38).

[4] Salafism refers to a puritanical movement within Islam that advocates strict adherence to the Quran, the *sunna* (the example of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)) and the consensus of the *salaf* (the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)). Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006, 208) proclaims that there are three major factions within the Salafi movement: "the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis." References to Salafism within this thesis are concerned with the violent faction of Salafis.

Around this time, in the key 1988-9 period, these radical Islamists' "chatter" (as Western counter-terrorism agencies would later call such loose talk among terrorists) started focusing on the creation of a dedicated, larger organisation that would go beyond the operational purpose of Maktab al Khadamat, and indeed beyond the confines of the Afghan-Soviet conflict itself.

Enter Al Qaeda. Referred to in early documents as Al Jaish al Islami (the Islamic Army), Sijil al Qaeda (the base's registry) or Al Qaeda al ʿAskariya (the military base), Al Qaeda was born in Khost, Afghanistan on 11 August 1988.

These conflicting accounts of the origins of Al Qaeda concur regarding its emergence from the debris of the Afghan jihad and its birth in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region (Khost borders Pakistan's North Waziristan district).

According to Sageman (2008, 40-43), as a result of pressure on Pakistan from the group members' home governments, this group shifted base to Sudan. The far-enemy thesis gained traction among some of these militants, including bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and was followed there by 150 of the Sudan-based militants. Three months later, bin Laden issued a "declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places"—referring to Saudi Arabia and Palestine. As Fawaz Gerges (2009, 31) notes, this document contained a call by bin Laden for Muslims to target the far enemy rather than the near enemy, focusing on expelling the United States and Israel from Saudi Arabia and Palestine.

For Gerges (2009, 30-31), this shift from localist to globalist jihad has its roots not only in Faraj's near enemy/far enemy dichotomy and the end of the

Afghan war but also in the Gulf War and the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia. Also consequential was the 1990s defeat of localist Islamist militants and movements in their home countries. He argues that the ideological split between transnational mujahideen focused on the far enemy and religious nationalists who fight the near enemy represents an ongoing schism in the *jihadi* movement (Gerges 2009, 34).

This globalisation of Islamist terrorism, and, in particular, of Al Qaeda, points to a problem for IR theorists: How can theories that focus on relations among states understand violent non-state actors who target states and their citizens? This refers back to a long-standing debate among IR scholars on whether theory ought to be state-centric, a dispute that finds its contemporary manifestation in the debate over globalisation (Hay 2010, 279-80). With globalists having called into question the continuing relevance of realism and neorealism—for long the dominant theories of IR—on account of their complete reliance on state-centrism, it is pertinent to consider how alternative theoretical approaches can contribute to this discussion (Hay 2010, 279-80). The next section will address this issue using the lens of ES theory.

The English School (ES) of International Relations (IR)

The ES represents a theory of IR that sees the *international system*, international society and *world society* as three interlinked concepts that are at play in international politics. As Hedley Bull (2012, 9) explains:

A *system of states* (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole.

Bull (2012, 13) describes an international society as

a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

Finally, "By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built" (Bull 2012, 269).

IR scholars have often perceived the ES to be synonymous with the "international-society approach." Indeed, theorists from the school have traditionally prioritised international society (Buzan 2001, 471; Buzan 2004a, 7; Dunne 2010, 142; Linklater 2005, 84; Linklater and Suganami 2006, 13; Little 2000, 398). However, contemporary ES scholars such as Buzan (2001, 2004), Tim Dunne (2010) and Richard Little (2000) have argued forcefully that the international-system and world-society levels of analysis constitute invaluable contributions to IR theory. They consider one of the critical strengths of the ES to lie in its ability to theorise in the twenty-first-century globalised context wherein transnational identities and forces wield considerable influence on international politics, but states remain relevant.

This positioning of the school within the discourse on globalisation and non-state actors renders it an appropriate theoretical framework for this thesis, with its consideration of terrorist groups as transnational actors in a globalised world context, but with an appreciation of the role of states in counterterrorism. In this thesis, I consider states to remain relevant despite globalisation and the increasing power of transnational forces that transcend the state. In that sense, this thesis falls within the *pluralist* strand of ES thought, as explained further in Chapter 2.

Equally, though, this thesis will test the strength of the ES as a contemporary theory of IR. The unilateralism displayed by the United States in the "global war on terror," as well as the challenge to international society's monopoly over the use of violence posed by global terrorists, constitute tests for international society as a viable concept in today's world (Dunne 2010, 154). The ES traces its history back to the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, which was established in 1959. The committee developed its thinking on international society over subsequent years, culminating in the publication of *Diplomatic Investigations* (Butterfield and Wight 1966). 1977 witnessed the publication of the first edition of Bull's (2012) *Anarchical Society*. In the 1990s, a new generation of ES scholars contributed to *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, edited by Barbara Allen Roberson and published in 1998 (Buzan 2001, 472-74). However, with the dawn of the twenty-first century, Buzan (2001, 471) complained that the ES had

become "an underexploited resource in IR." Therefore, it is pertinent for this thesis to examine whether the ES remains relevant to contemporary IR. The next section will examine in greater depth the ES's ideas on transnational actors and the role of international society in counterterrorism.

World Society and Transnational Actors

Globalisation, according to Parag Khanna (2011, chap. 2), has caused some weak states to become weaker still, while empowering multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, transnational terrorist groups, criminal groups, and drug gangs. Peter Willetts (2011, 328-38) divides political players into five categories—governments, multinational corporations, single-country non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations, and international non-governmental organisations—while also acknowledging the impact of guerrilla and terrorist groups and criminal gangs on the international order. Given this range of influential global players, he criticises the state-centric approach to IR, arguing in favour of a pluralist model wherein the activities of states as well as transnational actors are considered.

As a solution to this "new world disorder [in] which interhuman identities [. . .] have spilled out of state containers" (Buzan 2004a, 137), Buzan (2004a, xiii-137) proposes bringing transnational actors into the ES's analytical framework by placing a greater emphasis on the world-society level of analysis offered by the school. The world-society level transcends the state system,

instead treating individuals, non-state actors and the global population as the focus of analysis. Clubbed with the ES's international-system and international-society concepts, world society allows IR scholars to cope with the changing world dynamics brought about by globalisation. Through the juxtaposition of international and world society, the ES is capable of considering interstate relations and non-state systems simultaneously, thus helping IR as a discipline to make the transition to the evolving world order.

In identifying this potential for the ES's world-society idea to respond to the challenge to IR theory posed by the growing clout of non-state actors, Buzan (2004a) makes a significant contribution to thinking on globalisation and the ES. His book *From International to World Society* directly addresses the question of non-state violent actors in theoretical terms, which is an essential step in developing the concept. Barak Mendelsohn (2005, 46) uses the ES to empirically analyse the risk posed by Al Qaeda to international society. In doing so, he aims to incorporate violent non-state actors more fully into the ES's work by considering how they pose an existential threat to the international system and international society. However, Mendelsohn confines his analysis to the international-system and international-society levels, never venturing into the world-society realm to explore the conceptual opportunities it offers for grappling with the globalisation of terrorism. This is because he is limited by the traditional, international-society approach of the ES and ignores Buzan's (2004) work on utilising the world-society concept to study non-state and

transnational phenomena. Because of this neglect, Mendelsohn's writing remains state-centric and concerned with the security of states, ignoring both the security of human beings and the political and historical reasons for the violence perpetrated by terrorist organisations. Since the referent object for security is the state in Mendelsohn's work, there is no scope for worrying about why terrorists do what they do or what impact the actions of states have on individuals.

This thesis will build on the work of these contemporary ES theorists. It will address the gaps in Mendelsohn's analyses by bringing into focus the security of individuals and by placing terrorism in its historical and political context at the domestic, regional and global levels. Thus, it will employ three levels of analysis—the state, the region and the world—with the state acting as the primary unit of analysis. However, the thesis is informed by the idea of world society and a critical sensibility, and it considers individuals to be the primary referent object of security. This is discussed further in Chapter 2, but for now, suffice it to say that this thesis considers the role of the state to be to secure the human beings living within its frontiers.

The International System, International Society, and Counterterrorism

Mendelsohn (2009a) advances the idea that international society has a *responsibility* to support states where terrorists have established bases when these states do not possess the wherewithal to prevent militants from using

their territory as an operational base. This is because, he argues, terrorism constitutes an existential threat to the international system and international society, so it is incumbent upon stronger states within international society to address this threat within the borders of weaker states if the latter are unable to do so. Mendelsohn insists that international society must uphold the legitimacy of such states and reinforce their ability to fight terrorism. In this thesis, I explore this idea of international society having a responsibility towards states that are unable to counter terrorism adequately using their own resources alone. This entangles my work in the debate between pluralists and *solidarists* in the ES, because of their emphasis on state sovereignty and collective action, respectively. The question of Pakistan's agency and sovereignty is high on the agenda of Pakistanis, and a solidarist approach runs the risk of being insensitive to this concern. My work, therefore, is essentially pluralist, although it contains a robust solidarist element because of its exploration of international society's collective responsibility towards Pakistan. My thesis recognises and respects Pakistan's sensitivity regarding its sovereignty while maintaining that collective international action need not breach state sovereignty. In this sense, my work bridges the pluralism/solidarism divide within the ES.

In a different article, Mendelsohn (2012) presents his states-versus-non-state-actors thesis in a new form, depicting Islamist extremist groups as a religious challenger to the secular Westphalian order, with Al Qaeda and Hizb-ut-Tahrir providing examples of a violent and a non-violent Islamist extremist

group respectively. Employing the ES's conceptual framework, Mendelsohn (2012, 590-606) demonstrates how these groups undermine both the international system and international society and seek to replace them with an alternative, religion-based order. Stressing the need to take this challenge seriously, Mendelsohn (2012, 609-13) argues that scholars have, in any case, been increasingly considering alternatives to the state-based international order, such as world government, suggesting that they do not see the existing set-up as being inviolable. Additionally, he emphasises the growing lethality of weapons, asserting that the level of the threat to the international system and international society is rising.

Mendelsohn's point is more pertinent now than it was when he wrote his article in 2012, because of the emergence of Daesh and its ambition of setting up a caliphate. This is because Daesh's territorial ambitions highlight the threat that terrorist groups pose to the state-based international order. Simultaneously, however, the rise of Daesh brings to the fore the problematic and West-centric nature of Mendelsohn's argument. As Mohamedou (2018) contends, terrorism scholarship has tended to neglect the political and historical context for the emergence of Al Qaeda and Daesh—namely, the Afghan jihad of the 1980s and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He perceives Daesh's extreme violence to be a form of counter-imperialism, of violence being returned to its sender, in the wake of the United States' imperialist war in Iraq since 2003 and the human-rights violations this has entailed. He further problematises the

Eurocentrism of the statist understanding of international order that predominates in terrorism studies, positing that this understanding is ignorant of spatial and temporal realities in Asia, Africa and South America.

This leads to the question of *why* the state-based international system should be defended against threats, and why a religion-based order such as a caliphate should be unthinkable. The question of Daesh's extreme violence is pertinent, although, as Mohamedou (2018) emphasises, the violence of powerful states has *also* been lethal, yet we consider the status-quo international order acceptable.

This leads to a point made by Buzan (1991, 306-08), who holds that *revolutionary-revisionist* forces, which challenge "the organizing principles of the dominant status quo," feel vulnerable in a hostile world. In an international society that upholds the institution of territoriality, a revolutionary-revisionist state such as Pakistan with respect to Kashmir is more likely to be criticised by the international community than a status-quo state such as India that is happy with the status quo of possessing the Kashmir valley. Buzan (1991, 308) claims that the ideological differences between status-quo and revisionist powers amplify mutual fear and hostility.

Applying Buzan's argument to Islamist terrorists, it is possible that states, as the status-quo powers, have exaggerated the threat posed by terrorist groups in the post-9/11 scenario. This suggests that the vast sums of money spent on defeating Islamist terrorists may well be a consequence of this

exaggerated sense of fear and hostility. I aver that paying more attention to soft

counterterrorism would help deflate the tensions that have caused much

human suffering since 2001.

Returning to the pluralist and solidarist positions within the ES, it is

useful to consider Nicholas Wheeler's (2000) exploration of this distinction in

the context of humanitarian interventionism. Wheeler explains that pluralism

privileges the aim of *order* in international life, whereas solidarism privileges

justice. Hence, pluralism gives priority to the rights and duties of states and the

institutions "of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force" (Wheeler

2000, 11). Conversely, for solidarists, individuals have rights that states must

safeguard, and this places a moral responsibility on states "to protect the

security of their own citizens" as well as human beings everywhere (Wheeler

2000, 11-12). From this perspective, the institutions of human rights and

humanitarian intervention are prioritised. Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald's

(2004) explication of the difference between pluralism and solidarism is helpful

here:

> A pluralist conception of international society rests on mutual
> recognition of the component unit's (state's) right to exist. This is
> manifested in the reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty and the
> norm of non-intervention. [. . .] Thus, the emphasis is placed on the
> security of states which, pluralists argue, is protected by sovereignty. In
> contrast, the solidarist conception of international society holds that
> diverse communities can and do reach agreement about substantive
> moral standards and that international society has moral agency to
> uphold those standards. In this society, the boundaries of community

extend beyond the state and the overall purpose of the society is the protection of individual security.

Samuel Makinda (2005b), however, challenges the distinction between pluralism and solidarism. He avows that ES theorists who make this distinction have misunderstood the work of earlier scholars such as Bull and Martin Wight, who comfortably swung between pluralist and solidarist ideas. Furthermore, he claims that the dichotomy between state security and human security is a false one, as all security ought to be people-centred from a democratic perspective.

Makinda's (2005b) perspective is helpful in considering international cooperation to counter terrorism. Islamist terrorist groups have begun to threaten the international system of states, but at the same time are threatened themselves by human-rights violations that have taken place during the "war on terror." Wali Aslam's (2016) work on the ES and Pakistan adopts a pluralist stance in critiquing the United States' drone strikes in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan (which in 2018 were absorbed into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (R. Yusufzai 2018)). In this thesis, I similarly take a pluralist position because of my awareness of the intensity of nationalist sentiment in contemporary Pakistan. However, despite Pakistani sensitivities about sovereignty, there is the broader question of who should be the referent object of security—the state or the individual. While pluralism favours the security of the state, solidarism recognises the individual as the

ultimate referent object of security. Terrorist attacks within Pakistan in reaction to the "war on terror" have targeted both the Pakistani state and civilians in the country. Therefore, I consider both to be the referent objects of security in this thesis, but I maintain a critical scepticism about whether the state system is worth protecting at all.

Striking a less critical note, Makinda (2003) raises the question of how international society ought to confront non-state actors in his analysis of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks. He asks how an international security threat posed not by a state, but by a transnational actor, ought to be tackled. Is military action against a country the best way of controlling such a risk? It is true that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was giving refuge to Al Qaeda, but this can be understood through an appreciation of the norm of hospitality within the Pashtun ethnic group. It is unclear that the Taliban would have strongly resisted an attempt by Western states to target only Al Qaeda without toppling the Taliban regime, especially if we consider former Taliban emir Mullah Mohammad Omar's reported comment that likened bin Laden to a bone that was stuck in his throat (J. Burke 2012; Partlow 2011). Furthermore, the question of whether state-centric military operations, with massive civilian casualties, have increased radicalisation is a serious one. Military counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have displaced many people, while US drone strikes in the country have caused civilian casualties, as will be explored further on in this thesis. Marina Espinoza (2018,

13) quotes a Pakistani photographer as explaining how drone strikes cause hatred towards the United States among people who have witnessed a drone attack. Espinoza (2018, 13) links anti-American sentiment to drone survivors' anger "at the injustice." Meanwhile, Stanford Law School and the NYU School of Law's *Living under Drones* document reports:

> Those we interviewed in Pakistan emphasized their belief that enmity toward the US stems largely from particular US rights-violating post-9/11 policies, and could be reversed if the US changed course. [. . .] A victim of the March 17, 2011 *jirga* strike, for example, stated: "We don't have any revenge or anything else to take from America if they stop the drone attacks" (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012).

In 2012, Pakistani ambassador to the United States Sherry Rehman told *CNN* that drone strikes radicalised "foot soldiers, tribes and entire villages in our region" (Imtiaz 2012). This evidence provides substantial grounds for questioning the overemphasis on military counterterrorism, and for seriously considering the potential of alternative, soft counterterrorism approaches.

Like Mendelsohn (2012), Makinda (2003) understands terrorism to be a threat to the norms and institutions of international society and argues that a collective response from international society is the most appropriate way forward. He argues that "by the end of 2001, the United States was increasingly acting unilaterally, claiming that it did not want to be constrained by international norms, institutions and regimes" (Makinda 2003, 44). Makinda reasons that a consensus within international society would accord greater

legitimacy to counterterrorism efforts and that the UN is the most legitimate body to conduct multilateral counterterrorism operations.

Mendelsohn (2009b, 2-10) disagrees with Makinda's (2003) disparaging assessment of the United States' actions post-11 September 2001. He reasons that, from an ES perspective, "The role of the hegemon or the great powers is not unimportant: they set the agenda, articulate a program to pursue it, and facilitate its execution" (Mendelsohn 2009b, 2). He sees a crucial role for the hegemon in the struggle between international society and *jihadi* groups and claims that hegemony constitutes one of the institutions of international society. Mendelsohn (2009b, 8) defines hegemony "as an actor enjoying a level of power so overwhelming that no single rival can challenge it."

This reveals a tension between the perceptions of different ES theorists regarding the United States' leadership of the "global war on terror." It signals a need for research on whether multilateral counterterrorism initiatives should be undertaken by the hegemon in the international system, by a group of *great powers*, or by an international organisation such as the UN (Bull 2012, 194).

James Plunkett's (2011) reading of Bull suggests that unipolarity is inimical to the proper functioning of international society. Plunkett (2011, 804) attests to unipolarity's encouragement of bilateralism to the detriment of multilateralism and propounds the idea that "bilateral relations would kick the legs from under the shared interests that provide the core of Bull's conception of international society and its institutions." He argues that for Bull, the

preponderance of one state carries with it the risk that this state will violate the norms of international society with impunity and without regard for other states.

Plunkett's (2011) opinion does not concur with Mendelsohn's (2009b) understanding of the role of hegemony in the ES, highlighting the difficulty of arriving at an appropriate mechanism for international society to respond to global terrorism. Bull (2012, 222) himself seems to espouse a nuanced position that is not necessarily at odds with either Plunkett's or Mendelsohn's stance. He states that "one of the means by which the great powers can seek to legitimise their role is by co-opting the major secondary powers, which are by definition their major potential rivals, as junior partners in their system of global management." This is, indeed, what has come to pass in the "war on terror," with the United States cobbling together a "coalition of the willing" when it was unable to obtain the UNSC's legitimisation of its invasion of Iraq in 2003. While recognising the potential for preponderant states to contribute to international order, Bull (2012, 207-21) acknowledges that powerful states cannot be explicit about their unique position, as equal rights and duties for all states in principle form the basis of international society.[5]

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[5] Although Bull refers to great powers rather than to a hegemon, we must bear in mind that he was writing in a different international context and, therefore, in applying his words to the contemporary situation, they must be reinterpreted. Hence, his ideas about the special position of great powers can be applied to the current order in which the United States is the sole superpower, even if this was not precisely the sort of scenario to which he was referring.

As Press-Barnathan (2004, 198) points out, the shift to a unipolar world order with the United States at its helm occurred after Bull's (2012) *Anarchical Society* was first published in 1977, and the book only fleetingly touches upon the issue of a possible unipolar world. She is inclined to think that the US-led unipolar order has mixed implications for the ES approach as propagated by Bull because, although he considers hegemony to challenge the balance of power, he does not rule out the possible existence of a hegemon that plays a constructive role in preserving international order. Press-Barnathan (2004, 204) goes on to analyse the war in Iraq in ES terms, concluding:

> Even though the war in Iraq did highlight the United States' clear military dominance, the road to war and its aftermath actually have brought into sharp relief the limits of US hegemony. They point not to the strengthening of the United States' unilateral drive, but to the importance of shared great-power management of current threats to international order.

Thus, Press-Barnathan's position is that the "war on terror" has revealed the limits of hegemony by showing how challenging it has been for the United States to act unilaterally. Instead, the global hegemon has had to share its responsibility to manage international society with lesser powers to legitimise its actions and, indeed, to bolster its resources.

Buzan (2011b, 4-14) takes this line of reasoning further and contributes to a burgeoning literature on the emergence of a multi-polar world order. He emphasises the weakening of the United States and a movement "towards a world without superpowers" (Buzan 2011b, 14), where there nevertheless exist

several great powers. Along with Press-Barnathan's (2004) conclusion, this adds weight to the possibility of a group of great powers assisting a state battling terrorism. Additionally, Buzan (2011b) predicts an increasingly important place in international politics for regional dynamics in a world where the West is losing clout. As Buzan and George Lawson (2014, 71-72) explain, the power gap between the West and the rest is closing, and "the world is undergoing a shift from globalism centred in the West to a *decentred globalism*" (Buzan and Lawson 2014, 72). According to Buzan and Lawson (2014, 72), the core-periphery international order "is being replaced by a decentred order in which no single power—or cluster of powers—is pre-eminent."

Buzan's (2011, 1) analysis of the "South Asian security complex"[6] fails to spell out what this might mean for Pakistan in concrete terms but opens the way for new research that does so. Placing the Pakistani security conundrum against the backdrop of Buzan's (2011, 14) decentred globalism would help to conceptualise how a genuinely international effort to counter terror in Pakistan might look.

This leads to the question: Why Pakistan? What makes Pakistan a valid case for this study? Gary Thomas (2011, 514) places the subjects of case studies in the social sciences in three categories: the local-knowledge case, the key case, and the outlier case. Pakistan is a local-knowledge case, partly because my

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[6] Buzan (1991, 190) defines a *regional security complex* "as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."

family is originally from Pakistan and migrated to India during the Partition of 1947, which makes Pakistan culturally familiar to me. Furthermore, I developed an expertise in the Pakistani security landscape through my professional experience at Control Risks and International SOS. In addition, Pakistan presents a key case of a state afflicted by terrorism, since it was the training ground for the mujahideen who fought in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, which gave birth to Al Qaeda, which in turn was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

This thesis challenges the dominant security narrative that portrays Pakistan as an unstable state that is providing sanctuary to terrorists and has a dismal security outlook. While this is a familiar view, it is crucial not to ingore the suffering that Pakistani people have endured through repeated episodes of large-scale displacements, violence and political instability. All too often, foreign powers have had a significant hand in causing these upheavals, and this thesis seeks to uncover this under-represented narrative about the reasons for terrorism in the country. In this sense, this thesis is part of the critical tradition of scholarship in IR, which sees an emancipatory role for IR scholarship. The thesis unveils the potential for an ES theoretical approach to provide a framework for emancipatory research, by addressing the central research question of what international society's responsibility is in causing and addressing terrorism-related instability in Pakistan during the 1947-2020 timeframe. To undertake this task, I begin by taking a hard look at the security situation in Pakistan, which is what the following section does.

The Pakistani Security Landscape

Numerous studies have bestowed on Pakistan "the status of 'pivotal state'" (Talbot 2012, 2) in the "global war on terror," for the following reasons. Haider Ali Hussein Mullick (2012, 93) points out that Pakistan is where bin Laden was killed, the mastermind of the September 2001 attacks was captured, and the leaders of the Taliban and Haqqani Network were based. Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason (2008) note that the September 2001 attacks in the United States; bombings on the underground train system in London in July 2005; and terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 were all planned in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. Additionally, Johnson and Mason (2008) argue that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and especially the erstwhile FATA, have turned into a "safe haven" from which militants target ISAF troops in Afghanistan—a term that has caused considerable consternation in Pakistan (Flmer 2018; *Pakistan Today* 2018b).

Against this backdrop, the United States from 2002 to 2008 gifted Pakistan $15 billion in foreign aid, of which less than a third went towards non-military expenses (Joshi 2012). In addition to the "hard" approach of carrying out military offensives against Islamist militants in Pakistan's north-west, successive Pakistani governments have engaged in peace talks with the TTP, despite ceasefires repeatedly being breached (Johnson and Mason 2008; Sethi 2014). This dialogue process and the country's *terrorist-rehabilitation programme*

make up the "soft" counterterrorism measures that the Pakistani government has initiated.

This combination of military offensives and peace talks has been applied over many years. Nevertheless, Islamist militancy remains a challenge for the country (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). Furthermore, Pakistan-US relations have deteriorated amid US cross-border raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan and the United States' unilateral action to kill bin Laden inside Pakistani territory, thereby breaching the international norm or institution of sovereignty (Joshi 2012; Mullick 2012). Muhammad Asif and Ayaz Muhammad (2017, 539) conducted a study of the image of the United States in urban Pakistan. They found that although urban Pakistanis resented the United States' "policies towards Muslim world, the issue of Afghanistan and rising strategic ties with India," the most salient factor causing Pakistanis to view the United States in a negative light was the United States' "violation of Pakistan's sovereignty." According to Saba Noor (2013), there was a groundswell of resentment among Pakistanis over former President Pervez Musharraf's cooperation with the United States in the "global war on terror," which, she says, wrought an upsurge in radicalisation in Pakistan.

Thus, on one hand, the use of traditional counterterrorism approaches— intelligence gathering, policing, military force, and political compromise (Moran 2015, 159-60)—by successive Pakistani governments, both military and civilian, has failed to quell militancy in the country. On the other hand, the

United States may have succeeded in killing bin Laden, but this action and the

United States' drone strikes in north-western Pakistan, along with the January

2011 killing of two men in Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, by Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Raymond Davis, have strained the United

States' relations with Pakistan (Mazzetti 2013). A Pakistani official told me in a

private conversation in 2013 that the two men Davis killed belonged to

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. More recently, US President

Donald Trump's administration has antagonised Pakistan by announcing the

suspension of military aid to the country and by accusing it of providing

sanctuary to terrorists (US Department 2018a, 2018b).

Drones are a crucial issue because of their impact on civilians. According

to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2018), from January 2004 to January

2018, at least 430 drone strikes took place in Pakistan, in which 2,515 to 4,026

people were killed, of whom 424 to 969 were civilians, and 172 to 207 were

children. Additionally, 1,162 to 1,749 people were reportedly injured during

this period. As the report on drone attacks in Pakistan published by Stanford

University and New York University puts it:

> Serious concerns about the efficacy and counter-productive nature of
> drone strikes have been raised. The number of high-level targets killed
> as a percentage of total casualties is extremely low—estimated at just 2%.
> Furthermore, evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated
> recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further
> violent attacks. [. . .] Drone strikes have also soured many Pakistanis on
> cooperation with the US and undermined US-Pakistani relations
> (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford

Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012, vii-viii).

The *New York Times* reports that "drones have replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants; in his 2010 guilty plea, Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, justified targeting civilians by telling the judge, 'When the drones hit, they don't see children'" (Becker and Shane 2012). In 2012, 74 percent of Pakistanis called the United States an enemy, while only 17 percent supported US drone strikes in their country (Pew Research Center 2012a, 2012b).

The next section will consider a non-military approach to counterterrorism that Pakistan has begun to experiment with, namely, terrorist rehabilitation. It will start by reviewing the literature on such programmes initiated elsewhere in the world, before zeroing in on a handful of studies that focus explicitly on Pakistan's effort. Additionally, it will clarify the central concepts of rehabilitation, *de-radicalisation*, and *disengagement*, differentiating between *individual* and *collective* disengagement.

Terrorist-Rehabilitation Programmes

In recent years, some governments have set up rehabilitation programmes for individuals arrested on terrorism charges (Stone 2011, 92). One of the first countries to explore this territory was Saudi Arabia, which in 2004 set up a *munasah* (advice) programme for religious extremists. The Saudi

programme drew inspiration from the caliph Ali bin Abu Talib—the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)—who had asked Abdullah ibn Abbas, also a cousin of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), to persuade religious radicals to turn away from extremism (El-Said and Harrigan 2013, 211-12; Kadri 2011, 17-319). This Saudi initiative has since developed into a comprehensive, three-pronged strategy consisting of *munasah*, care or rehabilitation, and aftercare or reintegration (El-Said and Harrigan 2013, 211-12).

Rohan Gunaratna (2011) has argued strongly in favour of rehabilitation programmes as a counterterrorism strategy. He contends that while military assaults against terrorists temporarily disrupt terrorist operations, they fail to target the conceptual underpinnings of extremist militant groups. His advocacy of rehabilitation programmes is based on three premises: First, terrorists have an ideology that can be countered; secondly, de-radicalisation is a less expensive counterterrorism strategy than military offensives; and finally, rehabilitation programmes reduce the human-rights abuses that tend to take place when terrorists are imprisoned in developing countries. He favours a combination of hard and soft measures to fight terrorism effectively.

John Horgan (2008) refrains from providing any easy answers to the question of whether terrorist-disengagement programmes are a superior strategy to more traditional approaches. However, he does advocate more research into this emerging approach to counterterrorism. Horgan asserts that although states will probably continue to employ military means to counter

terrorism, at its core, terrorism is a social phenomenon that warrants a psychological approach. Thus, he implies that initiatives that employ psychological-counselling techniques, such as rehabilitation programmes, are the crucial missing component in traditional counterterrorism strategies. While his focus is on so-called de-radicalisation programmes, he neglects other initiatives that are cognisant of the psychological dimension of radicalism and terrorism, such as the British government's Prevent strategy, which works with the risk of radicalisation and with people who are vulnerable to becoming radicalised (UK Home Department 2011). However, Prevent has been severely criticised: The Muslim communities within which it seeks to work have viewed it "as a mechanism for the surveillance of Muslim populations" (T. O'Toole, DeHanas, and Modood 2012, 374). Meanwhile, Francesco Ragazzi (2017, 163) argues that programmes such as Prevent

> suggest that Western European states, and the United Kingdom more specifically, are accelerating what can be termed the '*securitisation* of social policy'—namely, the increased submission of social policy actors and their practices to the logics of security and social control (italics mine).

Ragazzi (2017, 166) explains that

> because of its implementation focused primarily on Muslim populations, the PREVENT strategy came under criticism for contradicting the objectives of community cohesion, playing into an Islamophobic narrative about the alleged risk posed by the Muslim population as a whole.

The controversy surrounding Prevent underscores the risk of *securitisation*—defined as the process by which an issue is constructed as a

security issue through discourse—that profiling entails. While this can undermine counter-radicalisation attempts such as Prevent, de-radicalisation and terrorist rehabilitation do not involve profiling, since they work with individuals who have already been detained.

Numerous studies of the de-radicalisation programmes established by various countries have been undertaken in recent years. Apart from research on individual de-radicalisation programmes, several articles and books have considered a range of different programmes. While Horgan and Kurt Braddock (2010) and Sam Mullins (2010) focus specifically on prison-based programmes aimed at effectuating individual disengagement, most of these studies consider a combination of prison-based individual-disengagement programmes, collective-disengagement efforts that involve dialogue with terrorist groups, and other counter-radicalisation initiatives that work at a societal level to prevent and reverse radicalisation (Bjorgo and Horgan 2009; El-Said and Harrigan 2013; Fink and El-Said 2011; Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin 2011; Laiq and Hearne 2010; Morris et al. 2010; Neumann 2010; and Rabasa et al. 2010). Meanwhile, Omar Ashour (2009) uses the collective-disengagement processes of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Group in Egypt as case studies.

Of these comparative studies, Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin's (2011) edited book includes a chapter on Pakistan's de-radicalisation programme by Tariq Parvez (2011). Meanwhile, Tore Bjorgo and Horgan's (2009) edited volume contains a chapter by Shazadi Beg and Laila Bokhari

(2009) that precedes the Pakistani authorities' establishment of a rehabilitation programme and makes a case for setting up a de-radicalisation programme in the country. Several other article-length studies of terrorist rehabilitation in Pakistan also exist (for example, S. Abbasi, n.d.; Azam and Fatima 2017; Noor 2013; Qazi 2013; M. Rana 2011). To my knowledge, no book-length study of Pakistan's rehabilitation programme has been authored. Although de-radicalisation and disengagement are not among the main themes of this thesis, Pakistan's rehabilitation programme for militants is a sub-theme that I explore, thus starting to fill the book-sized hole in the literature on terrorist de-radicalisation and reintegration in Pakistan.

A distinction is generally drawn in the literature between disengagement, which is a behavioural process, and de-radicalisation, which refers to a psychological change (Gunaratna and Rubin 2011, 2-3; Horgan 2008; Horgan 2009, 19-29; Horgan and Braddock 2010; Mullins 2010). Whereas this conceptual delineation was first proposed by Horgan (2008), the most succinct definitions are offered by Gunaratna and Rubin (2011, 3-4). They suggest that disengagement refers to "the cessation of violent activity," while de-radicalisation is "a process of ideological modification whereby an individual no longer believes in, or is involved with, violent activities and radicalization." Likewise, individual disengagement is differentiated from collective disengagement, with the latter signifying a move by a terrorist group as a whole to leave violence, such as took place in the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood

and Islamic Group studied by Ashour (2009). Individual disengagement, as Mullins (2010) explains, could refer to disengagement by an individual either as a result of capture (and possibly participation in a rehabilitation programme) or as a consequence of some permutation of the push and pull factors for disengagement identified by Bjorgo (2009).

My use of these terms in this thesis is informed by the academic literature mentioned above. The terms de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation are sometimes employed interchangeably to add variety and thereby aid readability, but I generally understand rehabilitation to refer to a programme for detained terrorism suspects that aims for disengagement as well as de-radicalisation. I rely on Gunaratna and Rubin's (2011, 3) contention that disengagement and de-radicalisation are two stages in the rehabilitation process. In this sense, my approach is optimistic, because it rejects Horgan (2008; 2009, 19-29) and Horgan and Braddock's (2010) claim that de-radicalisation is an unrealistic objective. Rather, I am persuaded by Gunaratna and Rubin's (2011, 2) assertion that "de-radicalization is possible through effective rehabilitation programs." They argue that when graduates of rehabilitation programmes who continue to hold radical views are released into society, they may well return to terrorism, and that ideal rehabilitation programmes are comprehensive in that they aim for both disengagement and de-radicalisation. They reason that the Singaporean and Saudi rehabilitation programmes, which constitute "the closest thing to models that we have," are

both comprehensive programmes that focus on de-radicalisation away from extremist interpretations of Islam (Gunaratna and Rubin 2011, 3-6). Indeed, the Singaporean and Saudi rehabilitation programmes are widely considered to have proved effective, despite the difficulties inherent in assessing the success of rehabilitation programmes (Boucek 2011, 70-89; El-Said and Harrigan 2013, 220-68; Gunaratna and Hassan 2011, 54; Gunaratna and Rubin 2011, 6; Horgan 2008, 2009, 28-29; Horgan and Braddock 2010).

Research Question

At the risk of falling into the category of "policy-oriented works [that] address the 'problem' of Pakistan, rather than seeking to understand the country and its people in their terms," this chapter presents Pakistan's security conundrum as a research problem with conceptual and practical significance (Talbot 2012, 2).[7] For if years of US military aid, operations by the national army, US drone strikes, and dialogue with militants have not succeeded in wiping out militancy, there is room for research that provides direction to policymakers on what needs to change. Equally, at the conceptual level, such research could throw light on how the different hard and soft measures employed in Pakistan

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[7] Although Wayne Booth, Gregory Colomb, and Joseph Williams (2008, 53-54) differentiate between research problems and practical problems, this thesis relies on Diana Ridley's (2012, 36-37) understanding that a research problem may point to the theoretical as well as the practical significance of a research study. Furthermore, it is informed by Dunne's (2001, 224-25) classification of the ES's research agenda into three types of research issues: historical and comparative; sociological and normative; and, crucially for the study at hand, praxeological.

have played out, and how they compare with the country's fledgeling terrorist-rehabilitation initiative.

This problem provides practical significance to the present research study, for it would benefit policymakers in Pakistan, the United States, and other concerned countries by helping them discern alternative ways of approaching Pakistan's security conundrum. This is timely because of the Trump administration's suspension of military aid to Pakistan in 2018.[8] Furthermore, research on this central research problem will fill two crucial gaps in the existing literature surveyed in this chapter. First, as Buzan (2015, 126) has argued, the ES is "a neglected approach to International Security Studies." Wali Aslam (2013, 2015) is a rare author who has applied the ES empirically to issues in ISS, but this remains an under-utilised theoretical approach to ISS. Secondly, Colin Wight (2009, 103) calls for "a more theoretically grounded approach to terrorism" as opposed to "the importation of psychological models into the field." He contends that "without a set of theoretical frameworks to guide the field it will always tend to drift into a form of journalistic speculation" (C. Wight 2009, 105). This thesis bridges these two gaps between the ES and ISS and between terrorism studies and IR theory. It addresses the following core research question: *What is international society's responsibility in the ongoing*

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[8] After a visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Trump administration in July 2019 announced it was resuming $125 million in support for F-16 fighter jets owned by Pakistan, but insisted that there was no resumption in military aid to Pakistan and the security aid suspension announced in January 2018 still held (Rajghatta and Pandit 2019).

terrorist violence in Pakistan? As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis will employ

the ES's methodological framework of historical interpretivism to understand

how terrorist violence has evolved in Pakistan since the creation of the modern

Pakistani state in 1947. Thus, it will respond to Colin Wight's (2009, 100) appeal

for "a more historically grounded understanding of terrorism as opposed to the

presentism that dominates post-9/11."

The thesis makes the following claims to originality:

1. The thesis contributes to the theoretical literature that uses the English School (ES) to study terrorism by utilising Barry Buzan's conceptualisation of world society as the arena of non-state actors in a globalising world to study terrorism in Pakistan. I employ the concept to argue that Pakistani terrorist groups are social actors. This enables me to understand militants as members of world society who are interacting with other actors through violent means—rather than as "evil," "crazy" people. This opens the way to a historical and structural exploration of why terrorism emerged in modern history and paves the way for paying serious attention to non-military counterterrorism measures, particularly terrorist-rehabilitation programmes. This is a unique contribution as it fills a gap in the ES literature on international terrorism, which includes the work of Buzan (2004a), Mendelsohn (2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2012) and Wali Aslam (2011, 2013, 2016), none of whom specifically uses the world-society concept to comprehend terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, this is a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution.
2. This is the first piece of scholarship that places the Pakistani terrorist-rehabilitation programme in the broader political and security context to understand how it interacts with other counterterrorism measures and the domestic and international politics of Pakistan.
3. I make a praxeological contribution by addressing the United States' suspension of military aid to Pakistan and exploring the policy implications of this for international policymakers. Thus, I provide a normative and, in Bent Flyvbjerg's (2001) terms, *phronetic* analysis of the implications of the US decision. My phronetic and normative approach contributes to ES theory by responding to Richard Little's (2000) claim that the ES's methodological pluralism includes a critical aspect that is concerned with the realisation of human values. This is the first

empirical study on Pakistan that contributes to this critical, value-oriented research project within the ES. Again, this is a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution.

Methodological Framework and Research Methods

In this thesis, I have attempted to understand Pakistani perceptions of where moral responsibility for the spread of violent extremism in the country lies. Thus, my concern is with moral values, people's beliefs and ideas, and the norms or institutions that have shaped international society's interactions with Pakistan. Accordingly, I have chosen to use an interpretivist methodological framework, since my research is reflexive rather than explanatory, and aims at understanding social meanings rather than testing a hypothesis. I have tried to reflect on my own role as a researcher at various points in the thesis, thus revealing my understanding of this research as intersubjective (Lamont 2015, loc. 409-96).

My interpretivist methodological framework has led me to select qualitative research methods over quantitative ones. This is because my objective is to reflect deeply on Pakistan's history and politics and the events that have marked this political history, rather than to interpret data (Lamont 2015, loc. 530). My strategies for collecting qualitative data have included the conduct of interviews, focus groups, archival or document-based research and Internet-based research. Additionally, I have relied on non-textual work (maps and art): I have made ample use of maps in this thesis to help illuminate how

the world has looked to international actors at various points in history (Lamont 2015, loc. 1705). I have also referred to non-textual *and* textual aesthetic sources to reveal the emotional aspects of world politics, referring to art, literary fiction, cinema, music and poetry to unveil "perspectives and people excluded from prevailing purviews, for instance, or the emotional nature and consequences of political events" (Bleiker 2009, 1).

For my documentary research, the types of documents to which I have referred include policy statements, treaties, and official and media reports, in addition to traditional scholarly materials (scholarly journal articles and books). Thus, I have relied on both primary- and secondary-source documents. I have used official documents published or released by the Afghan, British, Indian, Pakistani, Russian and US governments, as well as by international organisations including the Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process (HoA), NATO, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the UN, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the UNSC. The official documents I have utilised consist of interview and speech transcripts and audio and video files, policy statements, research reports, press releases, press briefings, declarations, and international agreements (Lamont 2015, loc. 1725-1889). They include press releases issued by the foreign ministries of states, national militaries, and multilateral organisations; declarations made at and

reports of meetings of multilateral organisations; news reports published by intergovernmental organisations; the text of interstate agreements; records of press briefings by officials; transcripts of official meetings; the text of treaties signed by member states of international organisations; audio files of speeches delivered by officials; the text of official policies; official statements; UN resolutions; and presidential remarks.

In terms of media sources, I have depended upon major global networks and newspapers, as well as on local news sources from Pakistan, South Asia, and other parts of the world. The Pakistani news sources I have used are *Dawn*, the *Express Tribune*, the *News International*, *Pakistan Today*, the *Nation*, *Geo News*, the *Friday Times*, the *Daily Times*, *Dispatch News Desk*, the *Pakistan Press Foundation* and *Samaa* (Lamont 2015, loc. 1759).

I carried out semi-structured and unstructured interviews, in addition to focus groups. The interviews were with diplomats, journalists, refugees, academics, military officers, aid workers, government officials and local residents, and were conducted in English, Hindi-Urdu and Punjabi. I provided interviewees with information sheets on my research and obtained their signed consent, taking into consideration whether they were comfortable with being recorded and with their names being used in my thesis.

My Internet-based research consisted of references to web pages, social network sites, official websites, the websites of international organisations and virtual encyclopaedias. I carried out my qualitative analysis using the technique

of discourse analysis, although I also used the data I collected to obtain factual information and to get a sense of the perspectives of elite interviewees (Lamont 2015, loc. 1793-2004).

In terms of my positionality, my research is novel in that I am an Indian with Pakistani roots writing about Pakistan, which offers me a unique academic vantage point from which to study the country. I have sought to write a constructive thesis and to continually maintain a critical awareness of my subjectivity, in the process unveiling layers of hidden assumptions and biases. My use of aesthetic sources stems from my visceral familiarity with Pakistani culture and seeks to enrich the experience of reading this thesis by giving voice to perspectives that are often left out of academic prose, as well as by adding an aesthetic element to my scholarly work.

I obtained ethical approval for my research from Lancaster University's Ethics Committee. As part of my commitment to the Ethics Committee, I obtained signed consent from each interviewee before conducting the interview. I provided each interviewee with an information sheet outlining my research and offered them the option of remaining anonymous. I further requested permission for recording the interview on a Dictaphone, and where this was refused, I took notes instead.

Research Plan

The remainder of this thesis is organised into six chapters and a conclusion exploring Pakistan's domestic and international political history, followed by its security landscape and the potential role of international society in bolstering security in Pakistan. In Chapter 1, I justify my normative approach to studying terrorism in Pakistan. Chapter 2 explores my reliance on the ES as the theoretical framework for this thesis. It lays out my reasoning for employing the classical ES's approach of focusing on the society of states rather than the international system or world society. It further spells out the three levels of analysis used in this thesis and reflects on "the subject of security" (Walker 1997).

Chapter 3 is a historical sociology of Pakistan that traces the country's history from its independence in 1947 until 2020. Chapter 3 employs Migdal's (1988) state-in-society framework to separate the state from society and analyse shifts in the centralisation and diffusion of power. Furthermore, it draws on the literature on repetition and change in the ES's conception of history to arrange its account of Pakistani history in terms of repeating patterns, while nevertheless discerning the releasing of some old patterns.

Chapter 4 moves on to the international dimension of Pakistani politics. The chapter employs the idea of regional society to consider the power politics that have defined relations within South Asia and particularly between Pakistan and India, while simultaneously assessing the prospects for the

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development of better relations in the subcontinent that could transform it into a regional society. Chapter 5 then considers the global-level interactions between Pakistan and powers such as the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia. It looks at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a significant development in the China-Pakistan relationship; at the United States and Saudi Arabia's role in sponsoring the 1980s jihad in Afghanistan; at the impact of the Saudi-Iranian political rivalry on sectarian violence in Pakistan; and at the effects of the US-led "global war on terror" on Pakistan.

Chapter 6 examines the recent history of Pakistan in the context of the "global war on terror" in greater detail. Thus, this chapter exclusively focuses on the security landscape within which counterterrorism operations have been conducted in the recent past. The chapter also examines the Pakistani terrorist-rehabilitation programme.

In the conclusion, I explore the prospective role of international society. The conclusion considers the relationship between the ES's concept of international society and the concepts of collective security and security communities, as well as exploring whether international society should and how it could support counterterrorism in the form of terrorist rehabilitation in Pakistan. The conclusion draws on the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 of Pakistan's international politics to consider what shape collective security should take.

The conclusion pulls together threads from previous chapters to provide policy recommendations. These address not only the US government, as has been the approach of authors such as Markey (2013), but also the Pakistani government and other states identified in the thesis as having a role to play in contributing to security in Pakistan.

Chapter 1

On Normativity

> Normative analysis is a key feature of English School theory, not just in terms of distinguishing it from other types of IR theory like realism and liberalism, but because of the way that it embraces the necessity, indeed inescapability, of normative theorising in order to understand the human world. It is not a bolt-on extra.
> —John Williams, "Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-defined English School: Accepting Buzan's Challenge"

In July 2019, Trump and Prime Minister Imran Khan jointly addressed the press ahead of a bilateral meeting between the United States and Pakistan. Imran Khan told the media that as "the most powerful country in the world, the United States [could] play the most important role in bringing peace in the [Indian] subcontinent." He called on Trump to push forward the peace process with India, asserting "that only the most powerful state, headed by President Trump, [could] bring the two countries together." Trump responded by expressing his eagerness to act as mediator, stating that the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir "*should* be resolved" (US White House 2019, italics mine). Imran Khan's remarks demonstrate his recognition of the United States having certain special responsibilities towards "bringing peace" to other parts of the world by virtue of it being "the most powerful country in the world." Trump's response suggests that he acknowledges this special duty; he further expresses the normative view that the conflict over Kashmir "*should* be resolved." These statements point to the underlying assumptions about responsibility and

normativity that regularly shape political discourse in the contemporary world. In this chapter, I explore the place of normativity, great-power responsibility, and praxeological or policy-oriented research within the discipline of IR. I systematically study the role of a normative orientation in the social sciences, political theory, IR, the ES, and research on Pakistan (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Exploring normative research at multiple levels

Normativity, Praxeology and Phronesis in the Social Sciences

My approach in this thesis is informed by the work of Flyvbjerg (2001), who draws on Aristotle to argue for a return to *phronesis* in social-scientific research. Aristotle (1976, 1140-45) defines phronesis as being concerned with "things that are good or bad for man." Flyvbjerg (2001, 2-3) suggests that phronesis goes beyond analysis, scientific inquiry, and technical knowledge by

engaging in judgements and decisions. Phronesis is the forte of the social sciences: It is the aspect of intellectual inquiry wherein the social sciences overtake the natural sciences, which have failed to contribute "to the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an enlightened political, economic, and cultural development in any society, and which is at the core of *phronesis*." While Chris Brown (1992, 8-9) points to the 1950s and 1960s as decades when the social sciences were exceptionally hostile to political philosophy and normative analysis, Flyvbjerg (2001, 3-4) argues for the restoration of the social sciences to their classical role of applying the intellect to practical problems in society and thereby "contributing to social and political praxis."

Flyvbjerg (2001, 9-24) problematises the idea that research in the social sciences can be identical to research in the natural sciences. He challenges the notion that social and political research can be "scientific," proceeding to explore the role of intuition in knowledge production alongside rational inquiry. He accuses entire scholarly disciplines of blinding themselves "to context, experience, and intuition, even though these phenomena and ways of being are at least as important and necessary for good results as are analysis, rationality, and rules." Furthermore, he shows that although Western scholarship has deified rationality and analysis, in fact, research on human learning reveals that as human beings' mastery of a skill develops, their

behaviour becomes increasingly arational and intuitive, with analytical rationality declining.

Building on this critique of rational inquiry, Flyvbjerg (2001, 25-30) asks whether the study of human beings can be scientific in the same way that the study of nature is. Should natural-scientific research and social-scientific research be treated as two distinct activities? He argues that interpretation—the core methodology of the ES—is something that occurs implicitly and is a practical skill acquired through participation in scientific activity. He states that methodology cannot be explored theoretically and rationally since "one ends in infinite regress: how does one argue theoretically for the practical skills one uses to formulate a theory? How does one determine scientifically what science is?" Contrary to Thomas Kuhn's work on *scientific revolutions*, the social sciences do not evolve in the linear fashion of the natural sciences: They do not undergo revolutions, but rather experience changes in fashion, as waves of intellectual fashion change from one period to another. Accordingly, the social sciences seem unable to progress in the Kuhnian sense, since human beings—the object of study in the social sciences—talk back! Therefore, it becomes impossible to employ context-independent rules and traditional rationality while studying human beings, especially when the subject and object are one: We as human beings are essentially studying ourselves. While scholars may depict their scientific performances as being traditionally rational when they write their

articles, books and theses, Flyvbjerg (2001, 32-36) implies that there is deception involved in this.

Thus, for Flyvbjerg (2001, 48), while it is unsurprising that researchers in the social sciences "aspire to the normal-scientific ideal, [. . .] the ideal does not work in practice for social science and [. . .] there is nothing which indicates that it ever will." The goal of achieving normal science remains due to a Cartesian anxiety that leads to fears that if "faith in the possibility of theory and epistemology in social science" were abandoned, "the door would become open for scientific relativism and nihilism." However, "the door is already wide open" because positivist theorists have failed to produce theory in the social sciences. These conclusions are then applied to research methodology.

If social-scientific research is unable to provide stable epistemic findings and predictions, what is its role? For Flyvbjerg (2001, 53), the answer to this question is clearly phronesis: "reflexive analysis of goals, values, and interests that is a precondition for an enlightened development in any society." He cites this as being "the most important task of social and political studies" for Aristotle. He further draws attention to contemporary crises in the natural environment and political relations around the world to argue "that social and political development based on instrumental rationality alone is not sustainable."

For Aristotle, phronesis was about "ethics in relation to social and political praxis." Phronesis is about judging the goodness or badness of a social

or political choice in the context of "certain values and interests." It refers to deliberation upon values and ethics "with reference to praxis," and is oriented toward action (Flyvbjerg 2001, 55-57). This is of crucial significance for this thesis, with its praxeological, policy-oriented and normative stance. While Alessandro Ferrara (2019) calls for critical theory to embrace normativity and reflective judgment based on reason, I argue here that the ES provides us with such a theory through its normative and praxeological underpinnings and its concept of responsibility. Indeed, while Flyvbjerg (2001, 59) alleges that modern science has neglected "the concrete, the practical, and the ethical," this is not true of political philosophy and IR theory, as I will explore in subsequent sections. Will Kymlicka (2011, 6-11) refers to a "gap between normative political theorists and empirical sociologists," arguing that whereas political philosophers have articulated highly developed normative theories, many social scientists underestimate normative ideals, considering them to be implausible, naïve and perhaps dangerous. He posits that empirical social scientists have tended to presume that normative theorising is implausible without objectively testing the evidence on policies that are based on idealised theories of justice. He ascribes this to prejudices, a condescending attitude towards normative political philosophy, and a "sense of superiority within certain academic disciplines."

In contrast to this predominant empirical approach to social science, Flyvbjerg (2001, 60-61) calls "for social science with a phronetic approach,"

which, he says, would "carry out analyses and interpretations of the status of values and interests in society aimed at social commentary and social action, i.e. praxis." However, he cautions that there can be no final answer to such questions, since there is "no neutral ground, no 'view from nowhere,' for" phronetic work. Instead, phronetic or normative research is concerned with providing partial answers to ethical and practical questions, which would contribute "to the ongoing social dialogue about the problems and risks we face and how things may be done differently." As a first step, Flyvbjerg advocates for researchers to make it clear whether they are engaging in epistemic, technical or phronetic research. This thesis meets that requirement by stating explicitly that it is engaged in normative, praxeological research and by designing a praxeological research question that engages with what policymakers *ought to do*. As Flyvbjerg (2001, 63) puts it, "The three value-rational questions that define the point of departure for classical phronetic inquiry and for praxis [are]: Where are we going? Is it desirable? What should be done?" Accordingly, this thesis poses the research question of what international society *should do* about Pakistan's security challenges and the United States' waning interest in them. This approach is open to the criticism that public policy ought to be informed less by philosophy and "idealized theories of justice," and more by evidence-based social science (Kymlicka 2011, 7-8).

However, as Flyvbjerg (2001, 112) writes, "The collected works of Foucault have made it more difficult to think unhistorically, nonpolitically, and nonethically about praxis." This insight informs my work in this thesis and underpins my use of historical interpretation as a methodology and my engagement with the ethics of great-power responsibility. It further speaks to the dichotomy of science versus politics: Flyvbjerg's work shows that social-scientific research *cannot* be scientific in the sense of providing scientific theories that predict human behaviour, since such efforts are doomed to failure because of the very nature of social research wherein the subject and object are one and human beings study themselves. Furthermore, when research engages with praxis and with praxeological questions, as this research does, it is inescapably political. However, this is not a problem, because knowledge, truth and power constitute the three corners of Michel Foucault's (1979) understanding of how power operates. Rather than masking social-scientific work in a veneer of objectivity and detachment, Foucault (1979, 27) exhorts us to

> admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Indeed, for Flyvbjerg (2001, 125-39), all truth is political, in the sense that truth is nothing but "the types of discourse which society accepts and allows to

operate as true." In this view, "values, pragmatic considerations, and strategies for action" constitute part of the methodology and do not obstruct understanding. Knowledge and power are inseparable since knowledge produces power and vice versa. The objective of research, then, "is to get close to reality." In other words, phronetic research seeks to provide inputs "to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society, rather than to generate ultimate, unequivocally verified knowledge." The researcher does not assume a privileged position from which to proclaim the unequivocal and final truth. All knowledge presents a perspective, and as more perspectives are allowed to speak to a particular social or political problem, our understanding of it fills out. As Jacques Derrida (2002, 300) argues, although it is tempting for researchers to avoid prescription, prescription "is an imperative of the greatest urgency." Derrida (2002, 296-311) suggests that ethics and politics are inseparable, asserting that "if there must be prescription, if there must be duty in the face of something such as the rights of man, then it demands that all of this be rethought constantly."

This validates my contribution as a researcher in bringing the perspective of an *indigenous outsider* to this research on Pakistan. As Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2014, 18-19) explain in their introduction to *critical indigenous pedagogy*:

> The purpose of research is not the production of new knowledge per se. Rather, the purposes are pedagogical, political, moral, and ethical, involving the enhancement of moral agency, the production of moral

discernment, a commitment to praxis, justice, an ethic of resistance, and a performative pedagogy that resists oppression.

My positionality as an indigenous person of Pakistan draws on the work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) and claims a genealogical and cultural set of experiences that underpins my relationship to the study of Pakistan (McDonough 2013). Following Smith (2012, 12), I claim "a genealogical, cultural and political set of experiences." Smith (2012, 12) speaks of her *whakapapa*—the Maori term for descent lines—coming down both her paternal and maternal lines. I borrow from her work to claim a *whakapapa* that comes down both sides of my family and was especially nurtured by my maternal grandmother, who wrote poetry and fiction in Sindhi that explored her experiences as a Partition refugee and was published and sold in Pakistan, including by the government of Sindh province.

Smith (2012, xi) recognises that in many contexts, it is unsafe for communities to identify as indigenous. In claiming this positionality for myself as a grandchild of Partition refugees, I draw attention to the marginalisation of the voices of the millions of Partition refugees and their families whose past, culture, languages and identities have become "spaces of marginalization" in the postcolonial states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Smith 2012, 4). I draw attention to the fact that I have worked as a simultaneous insider and outsider by working across religious and national boundaries and this has put me in a difficult position as I have navigated the primary research for this thesis (Smith

2012, 5-14). I challenge the colonisation of knowledge by drawing attention to the ways in which the processes of colonisation and de-colonisation led to the Partition of the Indian subcontinent and caused the marginalisation of my voice as an indigenous person of Pakistan, making it impossible for me to carry out a field visit to Pakistan and leading to the marginalisation of my academic voice, exclusion of my scholarly perspective as prejudicial, and denial of my power to speak with authority (Jørgensen 2010).

I situate this research as "*critical indigenous qualitative research*," which by definition seeks "to decolonize Western methodologies" and understands all inquiry as political as well as moral. Critical indigenous qualitative research explicitly pursues social justice and "seeks forms of praxis and inquiry that are emancipatory and empowering." For critical indigenous qualitative researchers, research no longer fits the Western paradigm of producing "objective" knowledge about the dark-skinned Other, but instead, research seeks to benefit the indigenous people who are the object of research (Denzin and Lincoln 2014, 2-12). This ethic underlies this thesis's emphasis on normativity and praxeology.

Flyvbjerg (2001, 156) describes the importance of choosing research problems that are not only academic problems but also practical ones. This speaks to my approach here of selecting a practical research problem that does not merely constitute a gap in the scholarly literature, but is seen as a problem in the wider society, as is evidenced by Imran Khan's efforts to woo Trump and

convince him to resume military aid to Pakistan, and to mediate in the Kashmir dispute (Baloch, Borger, and Ratcliffe 2019; Kapur 2020c). Flyvbjerg (2001, 156) also talks about his own efforts to actively feed his results back to "the political, administrative, and social processes" he studies. This has implications for this thesis's stress on policy recommendations and relevance. Flyvbjerg (2001, 157-58) considers this dialogue between researchers and the world beyond academia to be "at the heart of phronetic social science." In addition to framing my research in praxeological terms, I have actively sought to publish my findings in the news media and on blogs through which it can reach beyond academia, including *Dawn* (Waziri and Kapur 2020), the *National Interest* (Kapur 2020a), the *Conversation* (Kapur 2018e, 2020c), *South Asia @ LSE* (Kapur 2018f, 2019), the Stimson Center's *South Asian Voices* (Kapur 2018a), the *Pakistan & Gulf Economist* (Kapur 2018d), *Business Standard* (Kapur 2018c), and *South Asia Journal*'s blog (Kapur 2020b).

Flyvbjerg (2001, 166) sees this as a way to "arrive at a social science that matters": a way of transforming

> social science from what is fast becoming a sterile academic activity, which is undertaken mostly for its own sake and in increasing isolation from a society on which it has little effect and from which it gets little appreciation, [. . .] to an activity done in public for the public, sometimes to clarify, sometimes to intervene, sometimes to generate new perspectives, and always to serve as eyes and ears in our ongoing efforts at understanding the present and deliberating about the future.

This thesis thus adopts a phronetic approach to social-scientific research that circumvents the problems of "scientism in social science," which Flyvbjerg

(2001, 168) describes as self-defeating, and instead develops the normative, praxeological tradition of theorising that was pursued by a long line of political philosophers, including not only Aristotle, Foucault and Derrida, but also Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx and many others (Hutchings 1998).

Political Philosophy and the "Normative Turn in Political Science"

As Aristotle (1976, 1411) put it, "Political science and prudence [*phronesis*] are the same state of mind." Furthermore, as Kimberly Hutchings (1999, 11) explains, it is impossible to separate ethics from politics. While political philosophy dating back to Aristotle has consistently and explicitly sought to discern the path towards an ideal life and an ideal state, contemporary political science has distanced itself from this normative concern and attempted to imitate the natural-scientific focus on facts and knowledge for its own sake. In fact, John Gerring and Joshua Yesnowitz (2006, 102-13) trace the ethical dimension of political philosophy further back to Socrates' definition of justice as ensuring that each person is given his or her due, as well as Plato and Aristotle's musings on "the characteristics of a good polity." Despite this ancient tradition among political philosophers of focusing on matters of ethics and how states ought to be organised, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 101-03) recognise that contemporary political science has pursued a value-neutral path that seeks to establish political science as a positive science that is distinct from

political philosophy. They point out that political theory has split into two distinct intellectual paths: political science, which is concerned with empirical studies, and political philosophy, which focuses on normative value judgements.

However, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 101-07) call for a normative turn in political science, arguing that this is essential "if political science is to matter to policymakers or citizens, as most political scientists believe it should." They quote Max Weber's (1949, 60) assertion that "an attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific 'objectivity'," and argue that empirical studies in political science are often irrelevant, despite being methodologically, theoretically and empirically solid, because they have little connection to public policy or the concerns of ordinary citizens. At the same time, they posit that empirical work in political science often has implicit normative assumptions.

Building on this critique of contemporary political science, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 108) claim that the distinction between "empirical and normative theory" is a false dichotomy that disguises the fact that normative work "must deal in facts just as empirical work must deal in values." They argue for empirical scholars to make their normative claims explicit so that they might be scrutinised and, indeed, so that authors may become more "fully aware of their own assumptions." Furthermore, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 109) posit that "if political science is to matter to policymakers or citizens, as most political scientists believe it should, authors must be clear about how their

subject ties into some broader telos that others might share." In other words, they must link their studies to matters that "affect the broader public," must "demonstrate this relevance empirically," and must engage with philosophical discussions on ethical aspects of the particular subject they are studying. They contend "that we cannot conceptualize the scholarly significance of a theoretical framework or a particular empirical puzzle without also contemplating its relevance to society, its normative importance."

Accordingly, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 131-33) make a case for scholarship that combines empirical and normative concerns: that is both empirically grounded and "relevant to human concerns." They call for political scientists to embrace political philosophy and a normative orientation that actively chooses topics of research that "matter to a broader public." They challenge the positivist perception that normative scholarship "rest[s] on subjective values" and is therefore not "open to rational debate." They point out that political philosophy does not rest on a scholar's "personal desires, interests, or emotions" insofar as it is concerned with questions of right and wrong, but in fact strives "for an objective [. . .] moral realm." Hence, being explicit about our normative claims opens them up to philosophical analysis. Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006, 132) posit that it is time for political science "to become philosophically self-aware" as this will improve the quality of research in the field and enhance its relevance beyond academia.

Normative IR Scholarship

Within the discipline of IR, the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by an intellectual hostility towards political philosophy and its association with normativity. However, in subsequent decades, there has been a revival of interest in political philosophy and its implications for IR and the normative questions that engulf much of the discipline (Brown 1992, 3-11).

Hutchings (1999, 17) discusses an "enormous growth of normative theory about issues in international politics" during the 1980s and 1990s. She points to normative work on war, human rights, global justice, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and democracy to exemplify the development of IR research through normative studies. Hutchings (1999, 17) and Brown (1992, 3) use identical definitions of normative IR theory as "that body of work which addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the discipline." More generally, Hutchings (1999, 16) defines normative theory as "any theorization of reality which is in some sense evaluative," adding that "normative theories are usually explicitly or implicitly prescriptive, that is they are concerned with how to criticize, change and improve the world as it is." Some of the basic ethical questions addressed by explicitly normative IR include war and violence among states and the issue of international distributive justice. In the 1970s and 1980s, the normative question of the obligations of rich states, societies and people towards poor states, societies and people gained

prominence within IR (Brown 1992, 3-11). This is a question that resonates strongly with my work in this thesis, which asks what the responsibility of rich and powerful states is towards weak states that are struggling with non-state violence.

Indeed, normativity is nothing new for IR theory and is exemplified by the idealist or liberal strand of international theorising, which constituted one of two central approaches to studying IR up to the Second World War. For idealist IR theory, "the world both can and should be changed," and judgement and prescription are vital. Within the discipline of IR, it was the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War that engendered scepticism about normative scholarship and gave rise to a self-conscious preoccupation with scholarship that "was not moral but political, not internationalist or cosmopolitan but state-centric, not ideal but real." However, it is worth noting that this realist turn in IR retained politics as an inescapable part of research in political science. American IR scholarship during the Cold War was ideological and political, as well as being policy-oriented (Hutchings 1998, 20-26).

Within realism, which constitutes the least normative of IR theories, the pursuit of peace remains relevant as a normative agenda. This pursuit takes place through the maintenance of a balance of power, rather than through treaties or international organisations, as it might from an idealist perspective (Hutchings 1998, 30). However, the normative pursuit of peace is inescapable for IR theory. As Brown (1992, 3) puts it, "A very great deal of what is traded

in international relations as non-normative theory is steeped in normative assumptions." Brown (1992, 4) works to undermine the notion that normative theory is distinct from the larger discipline of IR.

The ES combines the realist and idealist moral perspectives by conceptualising institutions of international society that represent the norms whereby states pursue shared interests and values such as world peace. Thus, the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great-power management, and war all find a place as institutions of the society of states, along with several other more recent additions.

Neorealism marked a departure from IR's traditionally normative underpinnings by constructing a binary of "*politics* and *morality* on the one hand, [. . .] and *rationality* or *relations* on the other" (Hutchings 1998, 31). For neorealists, politics, morality, ethics, and normativity are relegated to the domestic realm and the confines of state borders. There is no room for them in IR, which is dominated by rationality, structure, and power. However, neorealism constitutes an outlier in IR theory: a blip in the evolution of IR theory. Its predecessors in the form of political philosophy and classical realism and liberalism; its successors in the form of the ES, critical theory, Marxism, poststructuralism and feminist theory; and its contemporary rival neoliberalism have all engaged with normative dimensions of the international.

While some streams of realist thought have suggested the existence of certain universal moral principles, albeit with a dose of cynicism as to whether

they can be enforced in the international arena, there has also been suspicion within realist circles as to idealist IR scholarship being deployed to pursue particular interests. Furthermore, idealism and moral judgement have sometimes been perceived as the Other of international politics; as something that must remain contained within state boundaries and never breach them. More recent trends in IR scholarship have explicitly questioned the separation of the international from the normative. Not only have new, post-positivist approaches to IR engaged with this question, but there has also been a resurgence of interest in idealist or liberal IR theory, in addition to which some realist scholars have revived the normative strands of realist IR. Some authors have suggested "a genealogical link between moral theory, political theory and normative international theory with moral theory as the source and origin for normative thinking about both domestic and international politics" (Hutchings 1998, 31-37).

An intriguing counterpart to my approach here is the feminist notion of *maternal thinking* in IR. Maternal thinking gives normative priority to human beings, arguing that IR is about human relations. Maternal thinking "is inherently prescriptive and involves a commitment to the practical and political struggle against violence and for peace." It sees theory and politics as inseparable, since theory emerges from practice and therefore cannot neutrally engage with the world (Hutchings 1998, 79). Similarly, this research treats

human beings as the referent object of security, sees prescription as inescapable, and stems from a commitment to peace.

The risk here is of the normative theorist adopting the position of *moral doctor*, applying universal ethical norms to political situations while assuming herself to be separate from the research (Hutchings 1998, 83-84). In this sense, poststructuralism and postmodernism provide a necessary corrective by pointing out that the subject and object are one in social-scientific research, as discussed above. Thus, it becomes evident that "theorists must recognize themselves as patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge" (Hutchings 1998, 84). Indeed, as an indigenous person of Pakistan but simultaneously a national and religious Other, the process of research involved considerable introspection and understanding of myself even as I understood politics and security in Pakistan and South Asia. The social dynamics of requesting interviews, being rejected, and finding it impossible to obtain a visa to travel to Pakistan despite repeated efforts constituted the dynamics that are unique to indigenous researchers who are also Others in the eyes of those they seek to study. As Smith (2012, 5) observes, indigenous researchers who "work across clan, tribe, linguistic, age and gender boundaries" face special difficulties in the form of "ethical, cultural, political and personal issues." Indigenous researchers are often judged on the basis of "their family background, status, politics, age, gender [and] religion" (Smith 2012, 10). The process of research involved repeatedly getting hurt and rejected

and a continual process of questioning my own assumptions about and inherited biases against the Other—the Muslim, the Pakistani. As Smith (2012, 11) recognises, indigenous researches "often get hurt and fail in the process."

The policy prescriptions contained herein do not claim to constitute unequivocal moral truths, but rather offer a fresh perspective that adds to what the academic and policy communities already know. The ES ethic of great-power responsibility corresponds to the poststructuralist ethic of "responsibility towards the 'other'," which resonates with my subjective experience as a researcher. Among other normative questions, this thesis explores the responsibility of India—my home and the Other to Pakistan—towards insecurity in Pakistan and its responsibility as a regional power to help stabilise South Asia (Hutchings 1998, 120). There is thus an aspect of the poststructuralist commitment to responsibility towards the Other within the layers of this thesis. As Hutchings (1998, 89-90) puts it, "Theorists are not simply connected to the world which they investigate, they are that world."

Additionally, this thesis's exploration of world society and human relationships across borders in South Asia—cemented in history, culture, ethnicity, religion, language and spirituality—draws on the poststructuralist insight that sees as normatively wrong the tendency within dominant theories to treat identities based on the modern state "as fixed and beyond question" (Hutchings 1998, 120). In my role as *researcher as moral patient*, I discovered that my conception of my own identity had been ontologically and normatively

mistaken. Hutchings (1998, 121) writes that "the opening up of possibilities for alternative identities to flourish and the opening up of state borders is in accord with the normative status given to the transgression of limits by postmodernists in both theory and practice." The ES's concept of world society allowed me to transgress these limits by drawing attention to transnational identities within South Asia that subvert modern state boundaries and conflictual state-based politics.

Normativity as Fundamental to the English School

Within classical IR scholarship, academia in the United States tended to engage in empirical studies, whereas the United Kingdom was the bastion of normative international theory, where the ES was at the forefront of this approach to studying the world (Brown 1992, 4). Furthermore, Brown (1992, 11) places the idea of an international society of states, as presented by prominent ES scholars such as Bull, at the heart of the re-emergence of normative IR theory in the 1970s and 1980s.

As the genealogy of normative political philosophy and IR above demonstrates, the ES's normative stance does not appear out of the blue, but is based on millennia of philosophical evolution dating back to Socrates in the fifth century BC and continuing throughout the history of political and international theory. Hutchings (1998, 58) explains that, like realism and idealism, the ES is "an explicitly normative theory, designed to offer diagnosis

and prescription in relation to the rights and wrongs of international politics."

Bull considers justice—one of the two central aims of international life—to be a moral concept, and discusses three types of justice: international (to do with the rights and responsibilities of states); human (to do with the rights and responsibilities of human beings); and cosmopolitan (to do with "the good of the world") (Hutchings 1998, 58-59). This thesis situates itself within this moral framework. It is in this context that I undertake my exploration of the great powers' responsibilities towards human beings in Pakistan and towards the Pakistani state.

For the ES, "reality and ideality are always already indistinguishable" (Hutchings 1998, 61). Thus, there is no dichotomy between realist power politics and idealist moral musings. Rather, the implicit norms of international society already bring about order and justice. Thus, for this thesis, great-power responsibility is not something far-fetched, but rather a reasonable expectation in a world where the great powers can and do act to manage international affairs and enhance international security. Powerful states regularly mediate between warring states, act against states that violate human rights, offer refuge to vulnerable populations, and cooperate to mitigate climate change. This thesis uncovers numerous instances of regional and global powers offering to mediate on Kashmir, encouraging Pakistan and India to diplomatically resolve their conflicts, providing aid to Pakistan, and acting through the UN to support vulnerable people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This work is premised on the fact

that the great powers are aware of having certain special duties and consistently engage with the world in ways that demonstrate their cognisance of these normative responsibilities.

This stance is supported by Brown (2004, 9), who points to the permanent members of the UNSC as evidence of the institutionalisation of the recognition that the great powers have a special responsibility to maintain "international peace and security." Bull (1980, 442), too, considers the UNSC to by a "highly formalized instrument for" great-power management of the international system. Brown (2004, 11) challenges the realist view that because all states, including great powers, are self-interested, it makes no sense to think that the great powers would take responsibility for international security. He points to the fact that this view has had little influence on the policies of the global superpower, the United States. Within the United States, debates on foreign policy have universally acknowledged the idea that the United States' great power comes with great moral responsibility. The current Trump regime seems to undermine Brown's argument, seeing as it has signed a deal with the Taliban to withdraw from Afghanistan (Waziri and Kapur 2020). However, the rhetoric of Democratic candidates in the upcoming November 2020 US presidential election is decidedly normative. Joe Biden is talking about recovering "America's standing in the world and our capacity to bring nations together," and of "fighting climate change and promoting democracy." Meanwhile, Bernie Sanders has highlighted the need "to build on our common

humanity, harnessing our technology and enormous wealth to create a better life for all people". Both of these stances explicitly avow an acknowledgement of a US moral responsibility towards international society: a responsibility to bring nations together, to fight climate change, to promote democracy, and "to create a better life for all people," based on the United States' "standing in the world" and its access to "technology and enormous wealth" (*Al Jazeera* 2020a).

These positions bring us back to Brown's (2004, 6) question about the unique situation of there being a single superpower in the post-Cold-War world: "Does 'hyperpower' bring with it hyper-responsibility?" Brown (2004, 5) contends that there has been a general recognition since 1815 that the great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining order and stability in the world, but the United States' rise as the sole superpower creates an unprecedented situation. However, this thesis argues that in the post-War-on-Terror world, as the United States' international status and appetite for international entanglements declines, and as we move towards a multi-polar international order, the ES notion of a concert of great powers is once again relevant. The Trump regime's suspension of aid to Pakistan and signing of a deal with the Taliban are signs that we have entered a post-War-on-Terror era.

And, as Bull (1980, 437) asserts, "The concept of a great power has always had normative [. . .] connotations." The term "great power" is not merely a positive descriptor of military and economic strength but is an assertion of a state's self-image and its perception by other states "as having special rights

and duties." Thus, the concepts of great powers, great-power management, and great-power responsibility, which are fundamental to the ES, are inherently normative.

Andrew Linklater (1998, 7) considers the solidarist branch of the ES to be particularly aligned with the normative research project, on account of solidarism's concern with cooperation among states "to protect agreed moral principles such as basic human rights." Linklater (1998, 7) lays out an ambitious vision for the international society of states wherein it emerges as "the first international society which is not destroyed by conquest and war but transformed peacefully by the normative commitment to extending the moral and political boundaries of community." He further argues that "normative and sociological advances are incomplete without some reflection on practical possibilities," and this assertion underpins my emphasis on praxeology and policy relevance in this thesis (Linklater 1998, 10).

In an important response to Buzan's reformulation of the ES in structural terms, John Williams (2011) argues strongly that we must maintain and nurture the normative dimension of ES theory. Williams draws attention to the close links between political theory and the ES, and hence the crucial significance of moral and ethical questions within the ES (J. Williams 2011, 1237-38). He argues that normative reflection and analytical rigour are not dichotomous, but instead are deeply entangled, even in work such as Buzan's that claims to dissociate from normativity. Williams (2011, 1240-41) sees the ES as political theory and

hence as fundamentally normative and concerned with "the good life and the good state." He proposes that although "philosophical and normative questions" may ultimately be unanswerable, "that is what makes the questions so important and the pursuit of answers such a rewarding, enlightening and stimulating form of intellectual activity." Williams (2011, 1242) points to ongoing ES research that develops the theory's engagement with normative questions and declines Buzan's proposal to create a new ES that is morally agnostic and exclusively focused on structural analysis. Rather, Williams (1242-43) considers normativity to be central to the classical ES and proposes that we search for ways in which to reconcile normative reflection with structural analysis.

This, then, forms the backbone of my defence of the use of a normative approach in this thesis: the fact that normative considerations are basic to the ES. Williams (2011, 1243) asserts that for many scholars, the normative dimension of the ES has always been "its most interesting and attractive aspect." This thesis exemplifies the kind of work Williams (2011, 1239-43) proposes, which combines the classical ES's normative concerns with Buzan's structural analysis and engagement with the forces of globalisation and regionalisation. As Williams (2011, 1249) states, "A normative response [. . .] needs to be more open to the kind of comparative and historical analysis that Buzan aims to deliver whilst nevertheless giving us the kind of 'deep' answers to ethical questions that enable us to advocate for a more just world."

In this thesis, I have engaged seriously and consistently with the work of contemporary ES scholars such as Buzan and Andrew Hurrell on globalisation and regionalisation. Their work informs my understanding of world society, transnational militant groups, and regional society. Simultaneously, I have addressed normative questions about how the great powers, international society, and regional society ought to behave in order to work towards global justice, which is one of the twin aims of political life for the ES. As Williams (2011, 1252) claims, "Normative analysis is as historical and comparative as the kind of social structural analysis that Buzan gives us, but that does not mean that it is without direction."

Normative Research on Pakistan

My research in this thesis builds on the work of Wali Aslam (2011, 2016), who also explores the normative dimension of the ES in order to study security in Pakistan. In a recent article on drone strikes in the erstwhile FATA region, he tackles the normative question of "who bears responsibility for the harm brought to civilians by" terrorists who are displaced because of the drone attacks (W. Aslam 2016, 143). He combines insights from philosophy and political sociology with the Theory of Special Responsibilities, which is based on the ES and constructivism.

Wali Aslam (2016, 143) builds on the work of previous IR scholars who have investigated the idea of great power coming with great responsibility,

particularly the work of classical ES scholars including Bull and Martin Wight. He contributes to the theoretical literature on great-power responsibility by arguing that there is such a thing as *side-effect harm*, and the United States is therefore responsible for the side effects of its drone strikes even if these were unintended consequences (W. Aslam 2016, 144-45). He explicitly states that his main contribution is in using the ES and constructivism to fashion a normative argument about the United States' responsibility towards Pakistani civilians outside the erstwhile FATA who have been harmed by the dislocation of terrorists (W. Aslam 2016, 145).

Wali Aslam's (2016, 145) article parallels my work in this thesis, since he develops the ES concept of great-power responsibility to go beyond interpretive IR scholarship that focuses on the question "what is?", in order "to build a framework that helps one understand how a great power should act ('what should be?')." He draws on the body of work developed by ES scholars over the past three decades on the great powers' responsibilities within international society, including the evolving position that it is "the sovereignty of individuals," and not international order, that is the object of security and the aim of international life (W. Aslam 2016, 147). Accordingly, his analysis focuses on the security of individuals within Pakistan whose lives have been endangered by the dislocation of terrorists from FATA due to the US drone campaign. Based on the United States' capacity, its historical precedent of acting like "a responsible great power," and its own acknowledgement of its

special rights and responsibilities as a guardian of international order, he

argues that the United States has "an obligation to be mindful of" the side

effects of drone strikes and to find "alternative ways to tackle the problems the

drone strikes are meant to solve" (W. Aslam 2016, 154-56). This thesis builds on

his arguments to argue, in normative terms, that Pakistan's terrorist-

rehabilitation programme is an alternative avenue through which the United

States and other great powers should pursue their agenda of counterterrorism.

As he contends, "The US has a long history of involvement in the Afghanistan-

Pakistan (AfPak) region and its managerial activities in that part of the world

link it to the vulnerable civilians in the area in a unique manner, regardless of

the prevalence of drone strikes" (W. Aslam 2016, 157). My chapter on great-

power responsibility develops this argument further by exploring the

involvement of other great powers in this region (particularly Russia, Saudi

Arabia, Iran and China) and arguing that these other powers also have a

normative responsibility vis-à-vis security in Pakistan.

Wali Aslam (2011) also uses the concept of great-power responsibility in

a previous article in which he argues that the United States' use of drones in

FATA is an irresponsible policy. His central question is "of whether the decision

to strike terrorist suspects within Pakistan could be described as the action of a

responsible great power" (W. Aslam 2011, 314). Referring to the work of ES

scholars including Bull, Jackson and Justin Morris, Wali Aslam thus constructs

a normative argument on the ethics of the United States' drone programme in

Pakistan. This thesis is situated within this existent normative literature on security in Pakistan and the great powers' responsibilities from an ES perspective.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have made a case for my adoption in this thesis of a normative approach. I have shown how the discourse of political leaders is often explicitly normative and belies an acknowledgement of the normative idea that the great powers have certain special responsibilities towards international society. I have situated this research within ongoing debates on normative research within the social sciences, political theory, the discipline of IR, the ES theory of IR, and Pakistan Studies.

I have drawn on Flyvbjerg's (2001) argument that social-science research ought to be phronetic in an Aristotelian sense, meaning that it ought to be practical and relevant to policy for it to matter. I have also engaged with Smith's (2012) thought on critical indigenous research and the ways in which indigenous researchers engage in studies that seek to ameliorate political and social conditions. I have shown that political philosophy has focused on questions of ethics for millennia and IR has borrowed from this tradition of thought. I have also referred to work within political science that calls for political research to be more relevant to matters that are of concern to public policy, and to engage more with political philosophy. I have demonstrated that

normativity has been inherent to IR throughout its evolution, as a crucial part of liberalism, the ES, critical theory, feminism, and poststructuralism—and, indeed, of classical realism. Furthermore, I have argued that the normative value of justice is at the crux of classical ES research, which sees order and justice as the twin aims of international life. I have also focused on the ES concept of great-power responsibility and explored how this concept is fundamentally normative. Finally, I have referred to Wali Aslam's (2011, 2016) research on great-power responsibility towards Pakistan and situated this thesis within the same body of work. Thus, I have grounded my normative approach in this thesis in the academic literature that supports this position within the social sciences, the discipline of political science, the sub-discipline of IR, the ES theory of IR, and scholarship on security in Pakistan.

Chapter 2

Studying Terrorism through the English School

> The ES perspective runs close to the notion of multiple possible logics of anarchy applying at the subglobal and regional levels, and reflected in ISS work on security regimes, security communities, the Copenhagen School's regional security complexes, and regional orders. This opens up for synergies between the study of regional international societies and regional security. Such mutual support might be useful, because within both ISS and the ES, study of the regional level has had an uphill struggle against predominantly global framings for international society and international security.
>
> —Barry Buzan, "The English School: A Neglected Approach to International Security Studies"

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, there has been a significant upsurge in research on the phenomenon of terrorism (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 227; C. Wight 2009, 99). This development has represented a challenge for the study of IR, signifying, as it does, a shift away from the focus on relations between states to the relationship between states and violent non-state groups (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 227).

In response to the inability of most traditional theories of IR to theorise on non-state actors, scholars have resorted to an "importation of psychological models into the field" (C. Wight 2009, 103). This, however, has led to a neglect of the political and structural factors contributing to non-state violence, as well as the historical background to the emergence of militant groups as challengers to the state (C. Wight 2009, 103).

This thesis contributes to the widening-deepening discussions within ISS on how terrorism and the "global war on terror" relate to the central place of the state in traditional theorising (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 228). One of the central theoretical propositions of this chapter is to propose that the ES offers a route to bridging the gap between terrorism studies and IR theory. In making this argument, the chapter responds to Colin Wight's (2009, 100) call for "the adoption of a structural approach over the more psychological approaches that currently dominate" the field of terrorism studies, "and a more historically grounded understanding of terrorism as opposed to the presentism that dominates post-9/11." Colin Wight (2009, 103) holds that an overemphasis on psychology neglects the political factors that are so important to understanding the structural causes of terrorism. He contends that interpreting terrorism through a historical and structural framework would uncover "the relationship between the modern state and [. . .] violent reactions to it," which is essentially what terrorism is. This understanding that terrorism has historically "always been a part of the political landscape," he claims, would help counter the tendency in contemporary scholarship to treat terrorism as synonymous with Islamist terrorism.

This chapter lays out the rationale for the thesis's adoption of the classical version of ES theorising, which prioritises the international society of states where shared institutions form the basis of interstate interactions. It argues for the treatment of terrorist groups as social actors in world politics,

drawing on the ES's concept of world society, as articulated by Buzan (2004a), which includes states and non-state actors, and treats violence as a form of social interaction.

The chapter also describes the three levels of analysis (*state*, *region* and *world*) employed in this thesis. At the regional level, it argues against Mohammed Ayoob's (1999) suggestion that Pakistan should be excluded from efforts to generate a regional society in South Asia. It further suggests that Afghanistan constitutes an integral part of the regional dynamics in South Asia and should be considered a part of the region.

Finally, the chapter problematises "the subject of security" (Walker 1997), drawing on Hurrell (2007a) and R. B. J. Walker's (1997) work to subvert the dominant narrative on the "global war on terror" by bringing to the foreground the threat to Pakistan's security, which is often overlooked in analyses of global terrorism.

The English School as the International-Society Approach

As highlighted in the Introduction, there is a tension within the ES between those who construe international society as the core tenet of the theoretical approach espoused by the school, and those who advocate a pluralistic conception of ES theory wherein international system, international society and world society all constitute equally significant facets of the school's work, pulling together alternative realities that together provide for a rich

understanding of IR (Reus-Smit 2002, 487).[9] International society has been a vital concern of the school since its early days. Indeed, much time was spent at the early meetings of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics on deliberating over the nature of international society. Members of the committee pondered over whether shared culture was a precondition for societal interactions among states or shared rules could make up for cultural differences, whether great powers must lead an international society, and whether a societal international structure was preferable to an international order characterised by hegemony or empire (Dunne 1998, 183). However, this traditional focus on international society has been challenged by some contemporary members of the ES, notably Little (2000) and Buzan (2001, 2004).

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[9] Discussions of *methodological pluralism* in the ES do not relate to the pluralism-solidarism debate in the school. Methodological pluralism refers to the three levels of international system, international society and world society and, in Little's (2000) conception, their corresponding methodological approaches. The pluralism-solidarism debate relates to competing conceptions of the role of international society with respect to either upholding order by respecting state sovereignty, or ensuring justice even if that means breaching the norm of sovereignty. Thus, these are distinct uses of the term pluralism (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Different uses of the term "pluralism"

Little (2000, 395-96) argues that although the ES's focus is on the shared institutions of international society, it recognises the power politics of the international system. He draws attention to the ES's recognition of two aims of international life: order and justice. He points out that this concern with justice holds within it the potential for the positive transformation of the international order. Accordingly, he posits that international society is but one aspect of a much broader ES agenda. He proposes that the school encompasses three interlinked methodological perspectives: (1) international system, where patterns of behaviour are analysed using positivist methods; (2) international society, where shared institutions, rules, interests and values are understood through interpretive lenses; and (3) world society, which is concerned with the realisation of human values and calls for a critical methodology. The idea is to

show that the ES holds the potential to transcend the fragmentation of IR into various theories and methodologies, allowing for a return to grand theory.

Buzan (2001, 474-75) builds on Little's argument by referring back to Martin Wight's (1991, 7) three traditions of IR: (1) realism, where international anarchy underlies states' behaviour; (2) rationalism, which emphasises diplomacy and commerce; and (3) revolutionism, which is concerned with the idea of a society of states. Buzan's purpose, like Little's, is to demonstrate how the ES could address the disciplinary fragmentation that plagues IR and provide a way to combine the knowledge produced by different methodological and theoretical frameworks. Although Martin Wight's (1991, 7) terminology and definitions do not concur precisely with Little's (2000, 395-96), Buzan (2001, 474-75) lines them up against one another to arrive at a neat structural framework for ES analysis. As shown in table 1, realism corresponds with the international system and focuses on power politics; rationalism has to do with international society where shared interests and identities among states are institutionalised; and revolutionism is equated with world society, which is peopled by individuals and non-state actors, and holds the promise of surpassing the state system.

Table 1. Methodological pluralism in the English school

International system	Realism	Positivist methodology
International society	Rationalism	Interpretive methodology
World society	Revolutionism	Critical methodology

For Buzan (2001, 480) and Little (2000, 415), the ES's ability to incorporate different ways of perceiving international behaviour is a strength of the school that has the potential to transcend disciplinary fragmentation within IR. Buzan (2001, 480) argues that while "IR already knows how to tell Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotian stories, [it] needs to shift perspective so that it sees these stories not as alternative, mutually exclusive, interpretations, but as a linked set, each illuminating a different facet of reality." This raises the question of what the ontological foundations of ES theory are. As I have argued in an article for the *Lancaster Journal of Philosophy*, the ES has a critical-realist ontology, meaning that it "recognises the potential for social structures to evolve and change, even while seeing them as existing regardless of our understanding of them" (Kapur 2014, 39). This explains the ES's straddling of the gap between power politics and social institutions, since this mature version of realism takes account of social structures but considers them to have an objective existence.

However, not all contemporary adherents of the ES subscribe to Buzan (2001) and Little's (2000) attempt to repackage the school as a multifaceted theoretical agenda. Authors such as Bellamy and McDonald (2004, 307) continue to see the ES as an approach focused on the concept of an international society where states are connected by shared norms and rules. Cornelia Navari (2009, 5) more directly takes on the proposition that international system and world society are as crucial to the ES as international society. She points out that the original theorists of the ES were overwhelmingly concerned with the idea

of a society of states, and that the notion that social relationships underpin IR was the main contribution made by the classical ES authors to IR.

Perhaps Buzan (2001) and Little's (2000) contention is not so much that international system and world society have always been equal to international society for the ES, but that they *could* be treated as such as a way of bypassing the disciplinary fragmentation afflicting IR through a holistic framework of interlinked perspectives. Applied to South Asia, there is a case to be made for such a methodologically pluralistic approach. As Rajesh Basrur (2014, 190-91) points out, realism, liberalism and constructivism can only offer parts of the picture when analysing Pakistan's relationship with India:

> Realism explains the conflictive politics of power and interest on the India-Pakistan relationship, but not the cooperative effects of nuclear weapons. Liberalism, which highlights the interdependence of states (though usually in the economic realm), helps us understand the strategic interdependence and cooperation produced by nuclear weapons, but cannot account for the perseverance of balance of power behaviour such as arms racing. Finally, constructivism explains the persistence of the identity conflict over Kashmir, but cannot explain how it is undermined by nuclear weapons.

However, the broad empirical span of this thesis suggests that a multifaceted theoretical framework would prove too ambitious. Given that this thesis employs three spatial levels of analysis—the state, the region and the world—it would be excessively complicated to simultaneously apply three theoretical levels of analysis (international system, international society and world society). Therefore, I adhere to the traditional ES focus on international society while navigating the spatial levels of country, region and globe. In doing

so, my thesis corresponds with Muhammad Shoaib Pervez's (2013, 4) decision to employ constructivism to study the India-Pakistan relationship. However, I employ the ES framework rather than constructivism: Pervez posits that while the majority of authors has focused on the realist dimension of security interactions between the two countries, his constructivist approach makes a novel contribution by looking to social norms as pertinent to South Asian security dynamics. Similarly, the framing of Pakistan's international relations as social interactions through the ES in this thesis breaks away from the trend of applying a realist framework to the subject set by authors such as Christine Fair (2012), Shashank Joshi (2012), Daniel Markey (2013) and Bruce Riedel (2013). This enables a greater appreciation of the shared interests, values and institutions that could enhance international cooperation.

As explained in the introduction, Buzan's (2004) reinterpretation of world society as the realm of non-state actors in the context of globalisation has significant implications for this thesis because of its focus on terrorism, since terrorist groups are non-state actors. Bull's (2012, 269) *The Anarchical Society* employs the term world society in the context of the role of non-state actors in world politics. However, the book also considers the emergence of a world society as being contingent on a high degree of interaction among human beings as individuals across the globe and a sense among individuals globally of shared interests and values. Applying this classical understanding to contemporary times, Buzan (2004a, 2-4) suggests that according serious

attention to world society as the realm of non-state actors could be a way for IR "to address globalisation as a complex social interplay among state and non-state actors mediated by a set of primary institutions." He goes on to conceptualise violence as a form of social interaction, drawing on the constructivist idea that all human interactions are social, and proposing that enmity and rivalry are "forms of social relationship" (Buzan 2004a, 128-29). On similar lines, Fiona Adamson (2005, 32-45) argues that while the globalisation discourse focuses on the role of transnational actors in creating a global civil society, violent transnational actors constitute a significant feature of globalisation. This is because international terrorist organisations have become a prominent feature of IR since 9/11 and received tremendous attention from the international media. Therefore, the emerging world society may well be an uncivil one.

The implications of an uncivil world society are a rise in transnational animosities and violence. The prospect of this uncivil, globalising world order points to a special duty of the great powers to cooperate to increase understanding among nations and cultures and to defuse tensions. This includes the deflation of tensions between states and violent non-state entities, which suggests the use of non-military means to resolve intra-state conflicts between states and domestic militants, and extra-state conflicts between states and foreign militants (Pilbeam 2015). Hence, the exploration of international

society's responsibility to address instability in Pakistan caused by domestic and foreign militants forms one of the central themes of this thesis.

Buzan (2004a) and Adamson's (2005) inclusion of violent non-state actors as members of world society is helpful for the analysis of terrorist groups in this thesis. Informed by their work, this thesis treats militant groups as members of society at the domestic, regional and global levels. The implications of doing this are that terrorists get transformed from crazy, evil madmen and women whose actions are impossible to comprehend into human beings whose actions are shaped by their social and political circumstances (Devji 2015; Jackson 2005, 5-183). Thus, the structural factors giving rise to terrorism are recognised, and not only terrorists' agency in joining an extremist organisation.

To take advantage of Buzan and Adamson's contribution while still employing the traditional, international-society conception of the ES, this thesis differentiates between the Buzanian and classical understandings of the ES, as illustrated in figures 3 and 4. While the Buzanian understanding considers the international system, international society and world society to constitute three distinct concepts, the classical view sees international society as the overarching concept defining the ES's approach. International system and world society exist within this perspective as supporting concepts that are part of the ES's framework and contribute to the analysis of international society. Hence, figure 3 depicts the international system, international society and world society as three distinct concepts with no overlap. In figure 4, which represents this

thesis's view, the international system and world society constitute parts of the

broader international-society approach to IR.

Figure 3. Buzanian conception of the English school

Figure 4. Classical conception of the English school

Accordingly, this thesis draws on recent work by authors such as Buzan (2004a) to incorporate non-state actors into IR through the ES's world-society concept. However, it makes this move while maintaining the traditional understanding of the ES as coterminous with international society, with world society as a concept included in the ES's broader international-society approach. This formulation of non-state actors as part of world society and hence of international society is informed by Buzan's (2001, 487) earlier work, where he argues that ES theory should recognise that "states are not the only actors generating, and being generated by, international society."

Militant groups operating domestically and internationally are treated as social actors interacting with other state and non-state actors through violent means. The focus at the international level (regional and global) is on an international society of states: the prospects for the emergence of an international society within the South Asian region, and the options for an international-society response to terrorism at the global level. The ES concepts of the international system as the realm of power politics and world society as the arena for non-state interactions offer analytical tools within the thesis's more basic international-society framework. Although this thesis occasionally borrows the regional-security-complex concept from the Copenhagen school of ISS, for the most part, it eschews this conceptual framework in favour of the ES's normative structure (Buzan 2004b, loc. 142). I posit that the ES's normative vocabulary offers insights into ISS that cannot emerge from an ontologically

realist theoretical framework that neglects the social aspects of IR. Therefore, I seek to bridge the gap between the ES and ISS, as one of the chief aims of this thesis.

Levels of Analysis

The existence of an international society that shares norms, values, interests and institutions is assumed as the thesis considers how international society might cooperate to support counterterrorism in Pakistan, and the role of the United States as hegemon in such efforts. In particular, the ES institution of great-power management is explored as the basis for understanding the great powers' responsibility regarding instability in Pakistan caused by terrorist violence.

The regional and domestic politics of Pakistan are considered essential for comprehending the reasons for the existence of terrorist groups, as well as the shape that international support should take. While *collective security* in the form of *security communities* is a central aspect of the ES's approach to security, there have been concerns about intervention constituting a new form of Western imperialism (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 312-13; Wheeler and Dunne 1996, 104; J. Williams 2005, 26).[10] This brings to the fore the potential role

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[10] Collective security refers to the notion that international society should limit the aggressive use of force by states and collectively enforce such limits, though recently there have been discussions of broadening the definition of security around which the concept of collective security has been built. While some authors visualise collective security as being enforced by international society collectively, others consider it more realistically applicable by smaller groups of like-minded or regional states (Hurrell 2007a, 167-68). A security community is "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 30).

of non-Western states in forming security communities with Pakistan. Pervez (2013) has pointed to the potential for the formation of a security community by India and Pakistan, while Ishtiaq Ahmad (2010, 191) has argued for the institution of such a security community by India, Pakistan and Afghanistan with the backing of the United States as well as the rest of international society. However, the drawback of regional security communities is that they can raise fears about interference by neighbours and the undermining of regional balances of power (Parrat 2013, 19-20).

These issues underline the need to analyse Pakistan's regional relations in some depth before broadening the analysis out to the global level. Accordingly, this thesis employs the concepts of international society as well as *regional society*, a term coined by Ayoob (1999, 247), who uses South Asia as a case study to apply the ES concept of international society to the regional level of analysis. Taking the cue from Ayoob (1999, 247), the regional analysis in this thesis studies the potential for South Asia to transform from "a regional system into a regional society" through the promotion of shared institutions. Thus, this thesis updates his analysis, but also shifts the frame of reference from the one he uses to include Pakistan. For Ayoob (1999, 258), the prospects for a regional society in South Asia are bright, provided that Pakistan is excluded from this society. By taking Pakistan as the centre of analysis, this thesis goes beyond the limits of Ayoob's conclusion. Pakistan is critical to regional security: Not only is it a rising power, but the India-Pakistan hostility also defines security

relations in South Asia (Buzan 1986, 9; Riedel 2013, xii). Hence, leaving Pakistan out of the equation is unlikely to provide a meaningful assessment of the prospects for power politics to take a backseat to cooperative societal interactions in South Asia. By using the normative framework of regional society, the regional-level analysis in Chapter 4 will contribute to this thesis's broader aim of linking the ES and ISS by showing how regional security can be enhanced through the strengthening of the institutions of regional society.

The domestic level of analysis is included because of this thesis's concern with a single country. It is necessary to understand the internal forces driving Pakistan's behaviour on the international stage to fully comprehend Pakistan's international relations. Domestic politics shape Pakistan's regional and global relations and vice versa. Furthermore, counterterrorism in the country cannot be understood without considering the security landscape and the history of the emergence and development of militant groups (C. Wight 2009). Indeed, one of the primary contributions of this thesis is in responding to Colin Wight's (2009) call for theorists to perceive the link between terrorism studies and the historical development of both the state and non-state violent groups. I use the ES theory of IR because of its preference for a historicist methodology, demonstrating that IR theory can provide unique insights into terrorism that cannot be gained through agency-centred approaches focused on why individuals join terrorist groups. Theoretically, the decision to include the

domestic level of analysis is grounded in Buzan's (2001, 485) call for more

attention to country studies within ES work.

David Singer (1961, 77-90) identifies levels of analysis as a conceptual

problem in IR, calling on scholars to be more explicit about the utility and

implications of the levels at which they conduct their analyses.[11] The objective

of the preceding discussion was to lay out the reasoning behind the selection of

the three levels employed by this thesis. The subsections that follow will offer

more detailed information on the methodological aspects of the analysis at each

level.

<div align="center">The Domestic Level of Analysis</div>

According to Halliday (1994, 26-78), the state and society are core

concepts for the ES, but the school—and the discipline of IR more generally—

has failed to theorise the state adequately. In his *Anarchical Society*, Bull (2012,

8) introduces the state as the first fundamental concept requiring definition,

calling it "the starting point of international relations." Bull defines states as

"independent political communities each of which possesses a government and

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[11] For Singer (1961), the level-of-analysis problem is primarily comprised of whether to focus on the parts or the whole, i.e., the state or the international system, although he concedes that there could potentially be other levels of analysis. Buzan (1995, 203) perceives some confusion among authors using various levels of analysis on whether their levels are ontological and hence based on units of analysis, or epistemological and therefore concerned with explaining the behaviour of units. The three levels employed in this thesis are, in Buzan's (1995, 204) terms, ontological since they refer to a spatial scale, moving from the domestic level through the regional level to the international level. The schema proposed by Buzan (2001) and Little (2000) of international system, international society and world society is epistemological, as it is spatially concerned with the international whole and focuses, instead, on explanatory variables: the processes of interactions among states, interaction capacity in the sense of the intensity and quality of interaction among states, and structure in terms of the relationship between state and non-state actors in the international order (Buzan 1995, 204-05).

asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population."

For Halliday (1994, 78), this assumption that the state is coterminous with a political community, and includes not only the government, but also territory and the population, is problematic. He contends that such a conception of the state precludes critical reflection on why violent groups target governments. Instead, Halliday (1994, 79) proposes an alternative definition of the state, in which the state is confined to "a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions." This allows for a separation between the state and society, with society defined by Halliday (1994, 81) as "the range of institutions, individuals and practices lying beyond the direct control and financing of this central entity." This separation has major implications in Pakistan's case. The country has been securitised in the international discourse as a haven for terrorist groups. However, it is widely recognised in the literature that the military and the civilian administration form distinct power centres in Pakistan, and it is generally the military that is blamed for supporting militants. For example, Ian Talbot (2015, 8) notes that "in reality the military has been more effective as a state usurper than a state saviour." Talbot (2015, 90) further observes the military's "engagement with *mujahidin* and *jihadist* groups." Separating the state from society helps discern the different centres of power in Pakistan, namely, the military, the civilian government, and social or non-state actors. Furthermore, the separation of the state from society helps absolve

ordinary Pakistanis of responsibility for state support for terrorism, thus countering the securitisation of Pakistan as state *plus* society in the international narrative.

In line with Halliday's thinking, the analysis of Pakistan at the domestic level distinguishes between the state and society, employing Joel Migdal's framework for understanding state-society relations in developing countries. Migdal (1994, 9) differentiates between patterns of "*integrated domination*, in which the state as a whole (or possibly even other social forces) establishes broad power and in which it acts in a coherent fashion," and "*dispersed domination*, in which neither the state (nor any other social force) manages to achieve countrywide domination and in which parts of the state may be pulled in very different directions."

The analysis of patterns of integrated and dispersed domination, or, in other words, the centralisation and diffusion of power, at the domestic level of analysis employs the ES's historical method. Thus, the social forces that have challenged the Pakistani state from the time of its inception in 1947 to the present period are traced. The use of a historical lens has significance for this thesis, not only because it adheres to an ES methodology, but also because of the thesis's concern with terrorism. As noted earlier, Colin Wight (2009, 99-100) calls for an approach to terrorism studies that is embedded in an appreciation of the historical development of the state. For him, a historically grounded interpretation of terrorism implies that terrorism can be understood as a

reaction to the process by which states developed and came to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence (C. Wight 2009, 101). In this thesis, I take into account this historical origin of terrorism alongside the modern state, and therefore take a step towards *de-securitising* terrorism—that is, moving it from the realm of security to the realm of politics—by treating terrorists as social actors who communicate through violence.

Colin Wight's (2009) references to the *modern state* are implicitly based on Max Weber's conception of the state as the sole legitimate employer of force in a territory (Wulf 2007, 3-4). However, as Wulf (2007, 8) demonstrates, some aspects of the Weberian notion of legitimate authority have themselves come to be discarded in the contemporary world. Wulf claims that traditions and charismatic leaders are no longer legitimate authorities and that the ideal form of government in the modern state, as per Western liberal norms and values, is democracy. Wulf's criticism of such an understanding of legitimate statehood as Euro-centric points to the way in which the state in its modern form developed. Most states in the contemporary world are modelled on European states, which, according to Halliday (1994, 82), originated as "instrument[s] of coercion and extraction, both against the populations subjected to states and against rivals." European colonialism followed by decolonisation brought most other parts of the world into this state system (Clapham 2002, 775-78).

While Colin Wight's line of argument refers to terrorism vis-à-vis this modern state, it can be taken further to apply to pre-modern forms of

government and their relationships with non-state groups. While North and South Waziristan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are often in the news these days on account of their status as strongholds of the TTP, Waziristan—and north-western Pakistan more broadly—are home to older traditions of rebellion (Khattak 2014, 210). During the colonial era, Waziristan witnessed a religiously inspired nationalist rebellion aimed at ousting the British (Vertigans 2011, 40; M. Williams 2005, 14). Before that, Sikh rule over Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and its surrounding area in the nineteenth century triggered the rise of Tariqa-yi Muhammadiyya, a movement seeking to liberate the region (A. Siddique 2014, 33; Sultana 2011, 29). This means that the historical origins of terrorism are even older than Colin Wight (2009) claims: Violent opposition to the government dates back further than the modern state. This is a fascinating area for future research within terrorism studies, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The historical interpretation of the state and society and of militancy conducted in this thesis begins with the creation of the modern Pakistani state following decolonisation in 1947. This point in history marks a transition from the colonial era to the post-colonial one, making for a radically new political as well as geographical context, on account of Pakistan's separation from India. Hence, it provides an appropriate starting point for a historical contextualisation of the political and security dynamics influencing terrorism and counterterrorism in contemporary Pakistan.

The historical account of the development of Pakistan's state and society provided in this thesis identifies recurrent patterns or themes: mass migration and consequent social upheaval, anti-government protest movements, military coups, and militancy. Thus, this thesis adopts a "*nomothetic* conception of history as a pattern," as opposed to an "*ideographic* view of history" wherein history is conceived of as comprising contingent particularities that do not form any pattern as such (Parrat 2015, 9; italics mine). Within the ES, there are differences of opinion as to whether the school sees history as ideographic or nomothetic. Martin Wight (1966, 26) considers international politics to be "the realm of recurrence and repetition," but Little (2005, 63) contends that the ES's attention to changes in world history sets it apart from the realist emphasis on continuity and patterns. It is true that the realist assumption of continuity is distinct from the ES's appreciation of the potential for the transformation of the world order, epitomised by its notion of world society. However, Buzan and Little (2000, 29) assert that the ES's recognition of the potential for change does not preclude its awareness of patterns in history. This thesis's history of Pakistan perceives recurrent themes or patterns, but also takes note of change in terms of a shift away from the centralisation of power towards a more diffused structure.[12] While this moderately nomothetic view of history informs the analysis at the domestic level, the discussion at the regional level of analysis

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[12] Conceptually, a pattern is the repeated way in which something happens, whereas change is the act of something becoming different.

is somewhat more ideographic. While historical developments are taken into account at the regional level, the focus is primarily on how they relate to contemporary security concerns, as the next subsection demonstrates.

The Regional Level of Analysis

At the regional level, this thesis applies the classical definition of an international society of states to South Asia. According to Bull (2012, 13):

A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

Bull's (2012, 13) definition includes "the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions of war" as examples of the kinds of institutions that might underpin an international society of states. Buzan (2009, 27) lists "sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, international law, war, balance of power and great-power management" as the classical institutions of the ES. An institution is "a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals" (Bull 2012, 71). Institutions are

an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions—and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration. These institutions serve to symbolise the existence of an international society that is more than the sum of its

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members, to give substance and permanence to their collaboration in carrying out the political functions of international society, and to moderate their tendency to lose sight of common interests (Bull 2012, 71).

Both Buzan (2009) and Hurrell (2007b) have criticised the ES for its overemphasis on global analysis and neglect of regions because of their sense that regional politics is becoming increasingly pertinent amid the globalising world order and the power shift that is underway. Buzan (2009, 30) argues that while international society tends to be thin at the global level, its potential thickness at the regional level is indicated by the strength of the European Union; he advocates studying "the interplay between [the] regional and global levels." For Hurrell (2007b, 130-36), globalisation has been accompanied by regionalisation, and the ES's disregard for regional studies has led to a failure to gain specialist knowledge about specific regions and thereby imbibe diverse perspectives on world politics. Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003, 13-19) concur with Hurrell's assessment that globalisation has strengthened regionalism; they explain this development by positing that in several parts of the world, globalisation is perceived as a threat and a form of US imperialism.

Some scholars, such as Ayoob (1999), Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman (2000), Jacek Czaputowicz (2003), Yuen Foong Khong (2005), Shaun Narine (2006), Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009), Linda Quayle (2012, 2013), Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (2014), and Ales Karmazin et al. (2014), have started to apply the ES's concept of international society to the regional level of analysis. Within this body of work, Ayoob (1999) studies South Asia, which I

explore in Chapter 4 of this thesis. My thesis contributes to the ES literature on regions by updating Ayoob's account of South Asia and modifying it by including Pakistan in its analysis. As noted above, Pakistan is a crucial part of the South Asian regional security complex, which leaves any analysis of regional security that excludes Pakistan meaningless. This is an original contribution I make in this thesis, by applying the concept of regional society to twenty-first-century South Asia, including Pakistan. Moreover, this contributes to the bridging of the gap between the ES and ISS.

Filippo Costa-Buranelli (2014, 26-27) discerns a contradiction between the classical and new definitions of a region within the ES. He posits that while the classical scholars considered a region to constitute

> a specific and well-defined geographical area composed of political units interacting among each other through social institutions (above all trade, diplomacy, and war) underpinned by the sharing of a common culture and historical legacy,

the new ES takes its notion of a region a step further by requiring that a region is defined by "*institutional differentiation* from the global level." He explains institutional differentiation as the condition of states in a region sharing institutions that are distinct from those existing at the global level, interpreting global-level institutions in their distinct way, or refraining from participating in specific global-level institutions.

Both ES definitions presented by Costa-Buranelli centre on the existence of shared institutions in a region. However, the sharing of institutions is a

significant aspect of the international society of states, and hence of regional society. Therefore, this thesis excludes shared institutions from its definition of a region per se, focusing instead on the shared history and culture underpinning a region. The sharing of institutions will, instead, provide the fulcrum for the analysis of South Asia as a potential regional society. This conception of a region is informed by Hurrell's (1995, 38-41) treatment of regions as imaginary communities where inhabitants share a perception of belonging to a single region that has a shared culture, history, religion and so on.

Accordingly, this thesis draws on Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal's (2004, 1-4) discussion of the historical, cultural, religious and geographical factors tying the states of South Asia together to define the boundaries of the regional level of analysis. Pointing to an ancient history extending across five millennia, along with a shared experience of colonialism, Bose and Jalal (2004, 3) justify their separation of the geographical region of South Asia from its neighbours in historical terms. They trace the origins of the word India to "the ancient Persians and Arabs [who] referred to the land beyond the river Sindhu or Indus as Al-Hind or Hindustan and the people inhabiting that land as Hindu" (Sugata Bose and Jalal 2004, 1-2). Explaining that the word India was an English version of the Farsi and Arabic terms, Bose and Jalal (2004, 2-3) provide a historical basis for considering the Indian subcontinent to begin in the west with the Indus valley. They argue that the region extends in the east to the Brahmaputra valley,

in the south to the Indian Ocean and in the north to the Himalaya mountains. Preferring the politically neutral term "South Asia" to the more contentious "Indian subcontinent," Bose and Jalal (2004, 3-4) propose that the region comprises the seven states of Pakistan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan. They posit that the mountains and seas surrounding the subcontinent separate it from other parts of the world. They support their delineation of the borders of South Asia by referring to the region's "shared cultural ambience," despite people's deep attachments to cultural distinctions, as also to the shared Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist religious heritage of the subcontinent. It is argued here that the ethnic and religious identities found within South Asia traverse state boundaries, and this supports both Bose and Jalal's position and the cohesiveness of the region. This cohesiveness is driven by a shared intellectual, historical, cultural, religious, linguistic and spiritual heritage that is millennia old and therefore transcends the state-level animosities of the past century.

Does Afghanistan form part of this shared heritage? Melanie Hanif (2010, 13-16) proposes that Afghanistan could be considered a part of South Asia, highlighting the importance of Afghanistan to the India-Pakistan conflict, which defines security relations in South Asia. Buzan (1991, 196) characterises Afghanistan as an insulator state between the South Asian and Middle Eastern regional security complexes, arguing that it plays a role in both the South Asian and Middle Eastern security complexes, without connecting these two

complexes. In a later work that was published after the US invasion of Afghanistan as part of the "global war on terror," Buzan and Wæver (2003, 41) once again treat Afghanistan as an insulator state at the edge of "larger regional security dynamics." However, Hanif (2010, 13-17) contends that Afghanistan plays a vital role in the Pakistan-India relationship, while its security ties to the Middle East are, for the most part, limited to Iran's concern about the US military presence in Afghanistan. Hanif's proposition is supported by Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein's (2009, 127) view that the India-Pakistan rivalry has spilt over into Afghanistan since as far back as the decolonisation of 1947. Meanwhile, Simbal Khan (2010, 1) perceives a shift in the United States' security perspective towards South Asia; she suggests that Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are increasingly being seen as a seamless region connected by the security threat arising from terrorism.[13]

While these perspectives indicate the interconnectedness of security dynamics in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, Hanif (2010, 17) considers Afghanistan to have more in common culturally with Central Asia than with South Asia. Similarly, Marlene Laruelle, Sebastien Peyrouse, and Vera Axyonova (2013, 5) underscore the "long common history" that Afghanistan

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[13] The threat posed by terrorism to the region refers not only to Islamist terrorism, but also to Hindu terrorism. Suspected Hindu terrorist attacks include a bombing at a Sufi shrine in India in 2007 (*Indian Express* 2017b; Joychen 2017), an explosion on an India-Pakistan train service in 2007 (*Hindustan Times* 2017; Monga 2017), a blast at a mosque in India in 2007 (*Indian Express* 2018; Mahaprashasta 2018), and bomb explosions in the Indian city of Malegaon in 2006 and 2008 (*Firstpost* 2017; *Hindu* 2018; *Indian Express* 2017a; Tripathi 2017; *Wire* 2017b).

shares with Central Asia, though they assert that the shared region came apart between the 18th and 20th centuries as a result of colonialism. However, these accounts ignore the strong historical connections that have also joined Afghanistan to South Asia. Notably, the Mauryan (322-185 BC), Kushan (60-375) and Mughal (1526-1707) empires encompassed significant parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (Kaplan 2012). According to Robert Kaplan (2012), "For the overwhelming majority of history, when one empire did not rule both the entire Indus and the entire Ganges, the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, most of Pakistan, and north-western India were nevertheless all governed as one political unit." Thus, in terms of this thesis's definition of a region based on a shared history and culture, there is a sound historical basis for considering Afghanistan to be a part of South Asia. Furthermore, the Pashtun culture that bridges the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and Islamic heritage that connects Afghanistan to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh provide strong cultural foundations for including Afghanistan in analyses of South Asia (Sugata Bose and Jalal 2004, 4; Johnson and Mason 2008). Moreover, the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan is co-dependent, since the international border between the two states is porous, and insecurity in one country has ramifications in the other. However, this is a complicated point because Afghanistan and Pakistan blame each other for terrorism within their respective frontiers. It is explored further in Chapter 4.

The regional analysis is organised thematically around Pakistan and India's dispute over the province of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K);[14] the war in Afghanistan and the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan security triangle; and transnational terrorism. I argue that the J&K conflict and transnational terrorism are interrelated issues that have shaped Pakistan's regional relations since 1947: The first war over J&K was fought in 1947, soon after the birth of Pakistan and India as modern states. Transnational terrorism has strong links to the Kashmir conflict because of militancy in Kashmir and the transnational aspect of this violent separatism. I contend in Chapter 4 that this has developed into a three-way proxy war being fought by Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, which is what makes the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan security triangle pertinent to the regional-level analysis. Especially amid the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the security situation in Afghanistan has implications for the rest of South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India. Therefore, I interpret the prospects for the shift from a regional system to a regional society through the prism of these three issues. The relevance of this sub-region to Pakistan's

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[14] This thesis refers to the province of J&K in its entirety, i.e. including both the Indian- and the Pakistani-administered sections of the state, as J&K. It refers to the sections administered by India and Pakistan respectively as Indian-administered J&K (IJK) and Pakistani-administered J&K (PJK). Within Pakistan, PJK has been divided administratively into Azad J&K (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan, and this thesis refers to those individual administrative units by their respective names. Within India, the Narendra Modi government in 2019 divided the state of J&K into two union territories—the union territory of J&K, and the union territory of Ladakh (*Hindu* 2019). However, the whole of the princely state of J&K as it was defined in 1947 is a disputed territory and I understand IJK to include both union territories for the purposes of this thesis.

security informs my focus on issues affecting the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan triangle.

The discussion of a potential regional society revolves around Bull's (2012) definition of a society of states; it identifies interests and values that are shared by states in South Asia, as well as rules to which these states jointly adhere. It further considers the shared institutions that these states already collaborate in the working of and the prospects for a broadening of cooperative institutional undertakings. The purpose of this analysis is to illuminate the strength and potential for the consolidation of regional society in South Asia.

This will inform the thesis's assessment of the prospective emergence within South Asia of what Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a, 1998b) refer to as a security community. As discussed below, Adler and Barnett's understanding of a security community is closely related to the ES concept of international society. Therefore, security communities are a helpful way of conceptualising the possibilities for security cooperation within South Asia to address the Pakistani security quagmire.

In Adler and Barnett's (1998a, 30) definition, a security community is "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change." The strength of a security community is assessed based on the level of trust and institutionalisation, as well as whether the region is formally anarchical. The emphasis on institutionalisation in Adler and Barnett's work on security communities

translates easily into the ES's language of shared institutions in an international/regional society. Adler and Barnett (1998a, 41) differentiate between international institutions and organisations, clarifying that while organisations are material entities, institutions are social practices. This understanding sits comfortably with the ES's idea that institutions are constitutive of international society and define such a society's purposes and character: Thus, the ES's institutions are distinct from the multilateral organisations that are referred to as international institutions in common parlance (Buzan 2009, 27; Parrat 2013, 4-5). Nevertheless, Bull (2012, 13) includes "the machinery of [. . .] general international organisation" as one example of an institution, indicating that international organisations could be considered a form of institution, although "institution" is a much broader term. Bellamy and McDonald (2004, 318) suggest that the emergence of security communities is a manifestation of the ES's international-society theory in the arena of security.

Bellamy and McDonald (2004, 321), as well as Adler and Barnett (1998b, 5), distinguish between *pluralistic* and *amalgamated* security communities. While amalgamated security communities require a formal merger wherein states come to share a government, a pluralistic security community exists even as states retain their sovereignty and independence. Adler and Barnett (1998a, 30; 1998b, 5) restrict their discussion to pluralistic security communities, arguing that this is the form of a security community most relevant to contemporary

world politics and IR theory. Meanwhile, Bellamy and McDonald (2004) embed their discussion of security communities in the pluralism-solidarism debate within the ES, which I examined in the introduction. They contend that security communities are an indication of a weak solidarist tendency in international society. It is important to note here that a *pluralistic security community* is conceptually distinct from a *pluralist international society* (see figure 2). This thesis accepts Adler and Barnett's position and limits its discussion to pluralistic security communities, recognising that the tense relationship between India and Pakistan renders a pluralistic community the thickest form that is foreseeable at the regional level. However, the pluralism-solidarism debate nevertheless has significance when discussing security communities at both the regional and the global levels.

As noted earlier, solidarist regional society in the form of a (pluralistic) security community could raise fears about interference in Pakistan by neighbouring India, and of a disturbance of the balance of power between India and Pakistan. This is because of the way in which Pakistan was carved out of India in 1947, and Pakistan's persistent fear that India intends to swallow it back up, which has driven Pakistan's pursuit of a regional balance of power. Therefore, the institutions of sovereignty and non-intervention and the balance of power are essential to the discussion at the regional level of analysis. At the global level, collective security or a security community that seeks to support counterterrorism in Pakistan could be perceived domestically as a form of

Western imperialism (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 312-13; Wheeler and Dunne 1996, 104; J. Williams 2005, 26). This is because of the country's colonial history and, more pertinently, domestic resentment of the United States' breaches of Pakistan's sovereignty amid the "global war on terror." Hence, the institutions of sovereignty and non-intervention and great-power management and the values of order and justice come into play at this level of analysis. The institution of great-power management is open to a similar charge of imperialism, and this is an issue that I tackle in the Conclusion to this thesis. The next subsection, however, explores the global level of analysis.

<center>The Global Level of Analysis</center>

The research question identified in the introduction hinges on an international society of states at the global level that cooperates to address collective challenges such as terrorism. However, as the introduction indicated, there are thicker and thinner forms of international society, with a thick international society representing the solidarist type within ES discourse, whereas a thinner manifestation of international society is pluralist.

A pluralist perspective on international society prioritises the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Wheeler and Dunne 1996, 94). According to Bellamy and McDonald (2004, 313), the implication of such a stance is a focus on the security of the state. Solidarism emphasises solidarity among states in international society, in the form of either "police action" whereby members of international society come together to discipline norm-breaking states, or of

<center>117</center>

states uniting to guard human rights through humanitarian intervention, even if this entails a breach of sovereignty (Wheeler and Dunne 1996, 95). Here, the security of the international system and of individual people is prioritised over the state (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 313).

Bellamy and McDonald (2004, 317) link the dichotomous relationships between pluralism and solidarism, order and justice, and international and world society, suggesting:

> The tension between pluralism and solidarism can be summed up as the following question: should order in *international* society be prioritised by privileging the security of states in the hope that states provide security for peoples (ie permit the accomplishment of the elementary goals of social life), or should concerns of justice in *world* society be privileged through emphasising the security of individuals and viewing states as means to security, rather than ends in themselves?

Williams (2005, 32) perceives this automatic association of solidarism with world society as problematic. He argues that international society might be a more realistic arena for solidarism to be achieved, given its limited number of actors, in comparison with world society with its multitudinous transnational actors alongside states. However, this tension perhaps stems from differing understandings of world society. Williams subscribes to a Buzanian unit-focused conception of world society as comprising non-state and state actors, while Bellamy and McDonald (2004) rely on a classical process-focused interpretation where world society refers to a cosmopolitanism that transcends states (Pella 2013, 65).

In fact, Buzan himself provides an exceptionally lucid account of the pluralism-solidarism debate. Stressing that both pluralism and solidarism refer to international society, and countering attempts to conflate world society with a solidarist international society, Buzan (2001, 478) explains:

> Pluralist conceptions lean towards the realist side of rationalism. They presuppose that sovereignty is about the cultivation of political difference and distinctness. If that is the case, then the scope for international society is fairly minimal, centred on shared concerns about international order under anarchy, and thus largely confined to agreement about sovereignty, diplomacy and non-intervention. Pluralism stresses the instrumental side of international society as a functional counterweight to the threat of excessive disorder in an international anarchy. Solidarist conceptions lean towards the revolutionist side of rationalism. They presuppose that the potential scope for international society is somewhat wider, possibly embracing shared norms about such things as limitations on the use of force, and acceptable "standards of civilization" with regard to the relationship between states and citizens (that is, human rights). In this view, sovereignty can also embrace many degrees of political convergence (as in the EU). Solidarism focuses on the possibility of shared moral norms underpinning a more expansive, and almost inevitably more interventionist, understanding of international order.

The debate on whether solidarist conceptions of international society correspond with world society has little relevance to this thesis, since it focuses on the social relationships between states at the global and regional levels while considering other societal actors at each level of analysis—domestic, regional and global. However, the question of whether order and sovereignty should be prioritised over justice and the potential for political convergence is of great significance when considering the extent to which international society has a

responsibility to support counterterrorism in individual states, and the form that such support should assume.

The analysis at the global level, therefore, centres on the relationship between great-power management and great-power responsibility. It identifies 1979 as a crucial point in the history of Pakistan's international relations. This is because 1979 was the year when the ISI began training mujahideen to fight Soviet troops who had entered Afghanistan, with funding from the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Gulf states, individuals, and Islamic charities. It was also the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which led to the political rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which began to support Shia and Sunni extremists in Pakistan, respectively. Furthermore, 1979 was when former President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq launched his Islamisation programme, which exacerbated tensions between Shias and Sunnis in the country and fed into this sectarian violence.

Hence, the analysis at the global level points to the responsibility of great powers and super-regional powers in contributing to the growth of a militant ecosystem in Pakistan. This normative concern with responsibility addresses the questions of whether international society has a responsibility to support counterterrorism in states where terrorists have established bases, and which of these states deserves the attention of international society. I draw on Jason Ralph and James Souter's (2015) distinction between *special* and *general* responsibilities, and between special responsibilities based on the principles of

reparation and *capability* (see figure 5). Ralph and Souter (2015, 711) define a general responsibility as "a responsibility to other states or individuals borne by the international society of states as a whole," while they define a special responsibility "as one which is held only by certain states towards other states or individuals on account of certain interactions, relationships or connections between them." Ralph and Souter (2015, 712) further explain the principle of reparation as assigning "a special responsibility to protect to those who have harmed, or rendered vulnerable, a given individual or group." Meanwhile, the principle of capability refers to "the argument that states with an effective capability bear a special responsibility to protect the vulnerable" (Ralph and Souter 2015, 710).

Figure 5. Types of responsibility.

This understanding of responsibility informs my approach to great-power responsibility at the regional and global levels of analysis. It underpins my attribution of responsibility to great and regional powers based on their capabilities as well as on the principle of reparation due to the harm and vulnerability they have caused for Pakistan. This leads naturally to the question of whether Pakistan or international society is the referent object of security for this thesis. I address this question in the following section.

Whose Security?

The preceding section provided an overview of the three levels of analysis that frame the research undertaken in this study. Before moving on to the research plan, it is essential to consider an issue raised by Hurrell (2007a, 180-81) in his interrogation of the relationship between collective security and international society. Underlining the socially constructed nature of security and the difficulty of objectively deciding which security issues are "real" issues, Hurrell points to the unequal social power and different values involved in the social construction of security threats. He questions the assumption that only international threats deserve attention, problematising the tendency to perceive non-conventional security threats such as political violence, social unrest and environmental degradation as relevant to international security only when they have an impact or potential impact on outsiders. He frames the growing concern with terrorism partly in terms of its increasing capacity to affect people

living beyond the country where the terrorist group is based, pointing to globalisation and increased flows of weapons, people, and money.

The Introduction to this thesis quoted Mendelsohn's (2012) claim that terrorist outfits jeopardise the international system and society, also reflected in Makinda's (2003) treatment of terrorism as a risk for international society's norms and institutions. The Introduction further drew attention to the depiction of Pakistan as a haven for terrorist groups that pose a threat beyond Pakistan's borders evident in the work of Mullick (2012), Johnson and Mason (2008), and Beg and Bokhari (2009). It also pointed to Mendelsohn's (2009a) argument that states have an obligation towards international society to prevent their territory from being used as a base by terrorist organisations.

However, these scholars' work overlooks the fundamental question of "whose security is to be protected and promoted" (Hurrell 2007a, 180). Hurrell's (2007a, 181) attention "to the political and contested character of security and to the crucial role of unequal power in explaining whose security counts" points to the need to interrogate the dominant narrative that focuses on the transnational security threat arising from terrorist groups based in Pakistan. As Shibashis Chatterjee (2014, 213) points out, north-western Pakistan may have received a great deal of media attention as a "safe haven" for transnational militants, but the country itself has borne the brunt of militancy. In 2016 alone, 956 people were killed and 1,729 injured in terrorist incidents in the country. Since 2000, 15,908 people have died in Pakistan because of

terrorism (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 26). In the context of this thesis, it is critical to recognise that counterterrorism in Pakistan is probably of most significance to the security of individuals and the state within Pakistan (and, of course, Afghanistan), even though it has implications for the international system and society. Moreover, while terrorist rehabilitation as a *counterterrorism strategy* is of concern for the security of the Pakistani state and society, and more broadly internationally, terrorist rehabilitation also has human-security implications for the child militants who are the focus of the Pakistani rehabilitation programmes (Horgan 2015a, 2015b).

Cognisance of this critical concern with "the subject of security" underlies the analysis in the chapters that follow (Walker 1997). Drawing on Walker (1997, 63), the thesis makes a conscious attempt to move beyond the "global war on terror's" security discourse, which has led to military operations that have displaced millions of civilians in Pakistan's north-west and drone strikes in the region that have caused hundreds of civilian casualties (I. Ali 2009; Bureau of Investigative Journalism, n.d.). This attempt underpins the attention to terrorist rehabilitation as an alternative, non-military approach to counterterrorism.

Conclusion

The preceding section has laid out the manner in which this thesis utilises the ES to carry out critically informed emancipatory research. In

addition, this chapter has explained the pluralism-solidarism debate within the ES. In these ways, the chapter has advanced this thesis's contribution to ES theory. Moreover, this chapter conduces to the thesis's project of providing a social perspective on security in South Asia by grounding the decision to treat terrorists as social actors in the relevant ES literature. Furthermore, this chapter has justified my selection of the international-society focus of the classical ES over the pluralist approach forwarded by Buzan (2001, 2004), Little (2000) and Dunne (2010). This furthers the development of a societal (or social) approach to South Asian security. I have introduced Migdal's work, on which the analysis of the shift from centralised to diffused social control within Pakistan in Chapter 3 is based. It is to this social understanding of domestic politics and history in Pakistan that the next chapter turns.

Chapter 3

Hungami Halat: A Historical Sociology of Pakistan

Indeed, when considered as social relations, part of the structural
framework that is necessary for any coherent understanding of terrorism
is precisely the relationship between the modern state and those violent
reactions to it that emerge as a necessary consequence of particular
political configurations.
—Colin Wight, "Theorising Terrorism: The State, Structure and
History"

In March 2007, pro-democracy protests convulsed Pakistan, culminating

in democratic elections in February 2008 and the resignation of Musharraf later

that year (Boone 2013; Mehdi 2013; Perlez and Rohde 2007; Traub 2008; I.

Wilkinson 2007). A popular Pakistani song released in 2007 was titled

"Hungami Halat" (A. Aslam 2007). As the title of the song indicates, times were

tumultuous. The changes that were wrought by the events of 2007-08 proved

significant. Not only did Musharraf hold free and fair elections that brought a

legitimate civilian administration to power, but the country also experienced its

first civilian transfer of power in 2013 (Tudor 2014, 205), and analysts such as

Fair (2014) predict that democracy is here to stay. This chapter will consider

how the state and society have developed in Pakistan from its birth in 1947 to

2018. It will study the tension between the state and society, with some events

supporting the centralisation of power in the state, and others causing a

diffusion of power, so it is shared by different stakeholders in society.

Ultimately, this chapter aims to provide a backdrop to the thesis's consideration

of counterterrorism and terrorist rehabilitation in Pakistan, using the ES's method of historical interpretation.

In keeping with the ES methodology espoused by this thesis, this chapter favours interpretation over analysis. Accordingly, it employs a narrative structure despite its identification of patterns in the history of Pakistan. The identification of patterns adheres to the ES's historical method because it relies on history to reveal repeating patterns, as discussed in Chapter 2. Eschewing the scientific method, this chapter is thus faithful to the ES tradition of interpretivism identified in Chapter 2.

The insights gained from this chapter's historical analysis will throw light on where power lies in Pakistan's domestic politics. These insights will be useful for international policymakers seeking to identify the power centres in Pakistani politics. This is pertinent to this thesis's praxeological objective and to the exploration of international society's role in helping to stabilise Pakistan. The chapter pays special attention to the post-9/11 period, since it is of particular relevance to Pakistan's contemporary domestic and international politics.

A Historical Approach to International Relations and Terrorism Studies

Martin Wight (1966, 32) defends the ES's preference for historical interpretation over positivist methods by arguing that historical work provides as coherent a structure for explaining IR as positivist analysis but does a better

job because it pays "closer attention to the record of international experience."

More recently, Colin Wight (2009, 100-03) has lamented the neglect in academia

of the historical context within which contemporary forms of terrorism have

emerged. Arguing that "all social processes have a history," he contends that

terrorism and the modern state have evolved alongside one another and that

terrorism has historically been a violent political act against state dominance.

He feels that this realisation of the deep roots of terrorism will help counter the

current tendency to equate terrorism with Islamism.

The modern state to which Colin Wight (2009) refers is the form of the

state characterised by territory, sovereignty, legitimacy, and bureaucracy,

which emerged in fifteenth-to-eighteenth-century Europe. This structure of the

state spread to other parts of the world due to colonialism and war, becoming

prevalent across the world as most colonies gained independence by the 1960s

(Drogus and Orvis 2008, chap. 2). The dominance of the state to which Colin

Wight points relates to the manner in which states have been formed through

monopolising the use of violence in a territory by disarming sub-state groups,

as well as by collecting taxes and recruiting soldiers and bureaucrats. Thus,

seeking to defeat sub-state "terrorist" groups has been a central aspect of the

state's establishment of control over a population within a given territory

(Shapiro 2013, 269).

Tracing the development of the modern state, Colin Wight (2009, 100-03)

argues, would enable scholars to perceive the connections between the state's

increasingly confident claim of being the only legitimate employer of force, the fact that this process has involved the appropriation of resources, territory and people, and the emergence of terrorism as a reaction to this modern avatar of the state and its dominant claim to legitimacy. Implicitly, Colin Wight questions Weber's concept of the modern state as the sole legitimate employer of violence in a given territory, a notion that is based on the way in which states developed in Europe and is, in Wulf's (2007, 3-8) view, too Euro-centric and myopic.[15]

Viewing terrorism through a historical perspective, Colin Wight (2009, 100-03) argues, would undermine the "conflation of terrorism with Islamic terrorism" that has emerged in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, and bring into focus the fact that terrorism is a political phenomenon with which the modern state has always had to contend. In making this proposition, Colin Wight echoes Bull's conviction that many contemporary phenomena, ranging from terrorist groups and warlords to multinational corporations, appear less novel when "a sufficiently long historical perspective" is applied (Hurrell 2012, x). Thus, Colin Wight's critical-realist position coincides with the importance the ES accords to history as an interpretive tool.

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[15] Wulf (2007, 8) proposes that ethnic, tribal and religious leaders, and even warlords, can and do provide effective governance in many non-Western societies, even if they do not correspond with the Weberian notion of the state that is dominant in Western discourse.

A Framework for Historical Interpretation

While there are two apparent levels of analysis in IR—the state and the international system—Buzan (1986, 5-6) provides a more nuanced hierarchy consisting of four levels of analysis: the state, the region, the super-region and the globe. However, this is problematic as it neglects the distinction between the state and society at both the domestic and the international level. As the discussion below indicates, there is a case for separating the state from society in analyses of a country's domestic politics. Likewise, as Buzan's (2004) later work on world society demonstrates, globalisation necessitates the incorporation of transnational actors into the study of international politics.

To conduct its analysis of Pakistani domestic history, this chapter will employ two concepts that are central to the ES's work: the state and society (Halliday 1994, 25-26). However, it will take into account Halliday's (1994, 27) criticism of the school's failure to adequately conceptualise these terms. Halliday (1994, 78-79) perceives a disconnect between the definitions of the state that pervade IR literature and those that are put forth in sociological and Marxist work. For IR scholars, such as Bull (2012) and Kenneth Waltz (1979), the state includes society, in that the state consists of territory and government as well as people and society. Thus, the state as a coherent whole comprises one unit in an international system. For sociologists and Marxists, on the other hand, the people in power, i.e. the state, are distinct from society at large (Halliday 1994, 78-79). In Pakistan's case, the state consists of the military,

political and bureaucratic elite. As noted earlier, the military and the civilian government form two distinct powerhouses in Pakistani politics that are often at odds with one another. The pattern of dynastic politics has meant that even democratically elected leaders tend to belong to a political elite that is separate from the population at large.

Making a case for IR to borrow from sociology and better develop its approach to the state and society, Halliday (1994, 82-83), like Colin Wight (2009), highlights the state's historical violent subjugation of opponents in order to establish its supremacy. Furthermore, Halliday (1994, 85-88) underlines the influence that non-state actors (or elements of society) have on the international system, as well as pointing out that changes in society have an impact on the way in which a state functions in the international system.

Accordingly, this chapter separates the state from society to analyse domestic Pakistani history and the emergence of violent radical groups. In this chapter, I borrow from Migdal's (1988, 2001) theoretical work on states and societies, which focuses on non-Western countries and moves beyond the problems that are inherent in the Weberian notion of the state. Migdal (2001, 15-16) defines the state as "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory*, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*." Society, meanwhile, consists of social

organisations such as clans, tribes, and linguistic and ethnic groups (Migdal 1988, 37).

I draw on Migdal's (1988, 34) conception of centralised and diffused societies, which differ in that power is centralised in the state in the former and distributed widely among different social organisations in the latter. I put these concepts to use to track shifts in the power distribution in Pakistani history as a result of various dynamics and to interpret the consequences of these changes. This is a simplification of Migdal's (1988, 35) framework, which measures the social control exercised by states and societies in different parts of the world in terms of their relative strength (see table 2). As shown in table 2, Migdal considers power to be diffused in weak states that have strong societies (in Asia and Africa). He perceives power as centralised or pyramidal in strong states with weak societies (in Western Europe).

Table 2. State-in-society framework

	Strong State	Weak State
Strong Society	—	Diffused
Weak Society	Pyramidal	Anarchical

This thesis rejects the IR understanding of state strength as being a measure of military and economic power in relation to other states in the international system (for a notable example of this sort of work, see Michael Handel's (1981) *Weak States in the International System*). For Migdal (1988, 32-33), the strength of a state is determined by the extent of the social control it can

exercise. He measures social control by a state on the basis of three indicators: the willingness of the population to comply with the state's demands, the state's ability to get the population to participate in institutions that are run or organised by the state, and the legitimacy granted to the state's authority by the population. Thus, compliance, participation and legitimation determine the amount of social control a state enjoys. However, states are not the only actors seeking social control in the form of compliance, participation, and legitimation. Other social organisations (e.g. kinship groups, tribes, and ethnic groups) operate in every society and compete with the state for social control. This relates to Pakistan because Pakistan started off with a strong state— defying the pattern of Asian states identified by Migdal—due to the circumstances surrounding its establishment in 1947. However, since Musharraf's downfall in 2007-08, the centralisation of power in the state has weakened in favour of a diffused power structure. Pakistan is a traditional society in which kinship and ethnic groups, and strongmen such as landlords and religious leaders, wield influence. Nevertheless, I believe that the military has exercised centralised control for much of the country's history because of Pakistan's insecurity vis-à-vis India. The "global war on terror" has undermined the military's position as social actors—religious groups, leftist organisations, and militants—have criticised the state's support for the American war. This challenge to the strong state has enabled a surge in society's strength. Social actors—religious organisations, militant groups, civil-society

platforms, lawyers' associations, press associations, and new opposition parties—have gathered in a cacophony of voices criticising the army as well as the traditional political parties.

For this chapter, the social control exercised by the state and various social organisations at different points in history is an indication of the shifting trends in state-society relations. The challenge by social organisations—in particular, militant groups—to the state is understood in historical context and used to illuminate the reasons for the emergence of violence.

The chapter's investigation of Pakistani history is organised thematically rather than chronologically; the identification of themes that run through the country's history enhances the interpretive value of the chapter's historical work by revealing patterns that are visible when one applies a historical perspective. This relates to the discussion of patterns and change in the ES in Chapter 2. However, a thematic structure necessitates a focus on certain events, to the neglect of others. This selective presentation of history can be justified through reference to Halliday's (1994, 25-26) appreciation of the ES as an attempt to bridge theory and history. As Halliday emphasises, facts "do not speak for themselves," and academic work must assess the significance of given facts and interpret them. On these grounds, the thematic history that follows will draw parallels between different periods and identify centralising and diffusing forces that have repeatedly emerged (and subsided). My method for choosing patterns on which to focus was based on my interpretivist

methodology: I studied primary- and secondary-source data to identify recurrent patterns in Pakistan's history.

Repeating Patterns

A close scrutiny of Pakistan's history reveals some recurrent themes. Army generals have interrupted democratic governance three times. Popular protests that have led to a change of government have also been a repeating pattern; mass movements have placed pressure not only on military dictators but also on elected rulers accused of vote rigging. Mass migration caused social disruption when the country was formed, and again during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the ongoing "global war on terror." Lastly, militancy has been an issue that has repeatedly come to the forefront in Pakistani politics, usually because of external pressures. The following subsections will investigate each of these themes, considering how they have influenced the distribution of social control between the state and society. Appendix A provides a chronological list of Pakistan's heads of state, heads of government and ruling parties.

Mass Migration and Social Upheaval

Migdal (1988, 93-270; 2001, 126) contends that power tends to be centralised in the state in countries that have experienced significant social disruption that has shaken the foundations of existing social structures. This is because of the weakening of society in such countries and their need for a strong

state. One of the most significant forms of such social dislocation that he identifies is mass migration. This subsection will study how successive episodes of mass migration in Pakistan have not only caused social dislodgement but also resulted in a consolidation of power in the state.

The Partition of the Indian Subcontinent

In an interview with *Al Jazeera*, former intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani drew a link between the centrality of the army in the Pakistani state and the Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, which resulted in the birth of Pakistan (interview by Mehdi Hasan, *Head to Head*, April 10, 2015). The Partition displaced 12 to 16 million people, making it the largest migration in 20th-century world history (Butalia 2000, 3; Roland 2010, 387; Talbot 2007, 151-52). While Pakistan had an eastern and a western wing separated by 1,000 miles, the substantially larger migration took place on the western border with India, where 10 million people crossed borders—Muslims making their way to the new country, and non-Muslims leaving for India (Butalia 2000, 3; Tan and Kudaisya 2000, 219).[16] Religious riots accompanied the Partition and resulted in 200,000 to 3 million fatalities, with the worst violence taking place in (undivided) Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Anam 2017; Butalia 2000, 3; Roland 2010, 387; Talbot 2012, 58). Thus, Pakistan "bore the brunt of the 1947

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[16] It is this western wing of the original state that makes up present-day Pakistan; the eastern wing is now Bangladesh.

upheaval" (Talbot 2012, 151-52), since its territory lay at the heart of the most severely affected region of South Asia (Mayer 2010, 23).

During an interview with my great-aunts Shanti Sawhney (2018) and Nirmal Chadha (2018), who were Partition refugees, Sawhney (2018) recounted, "*Phir udhar se hum ne apna ghar Islama—Islamnagar liya. Woh Bhabhiji ne lathi charge kar ke allot karaya.* Evacuee property. Independent. *Ek ghar.*" Roughly translated, this means: "Then from there we got our own house in Islama—Islamnagar. Bhabhiji [her mother] got it allotted by arranging a lathi charge. Evacuee property. Independent. One house." "Lathi charge" is an Indian term referring to a beating with long, thick sticks, usually by the police. "Evacuee property" refers to property that was left behind by Muslims fleeing India and Hindus and Sikhs fleeing Pakistan. I interpreted this statement to mean that Bhabhiji hired thugs to evict a Muslim family from its home in Islamnagar. However, in a subsequent conversation, I asked Sawhney whom the lathi charge had targeted. She responded by contradicting her earlier statement and insisting that no lathi charge had occurred (Shanti Sawhney, conversation with author, March 17, 2018). Figure 6 is a scan of the last page of a prayer book that belonged to my grandparents. I asked Sawhney if this was the address of the property my family had occupied, and she answered affirmatively.

Figure 6. Address of the house my family occupied after migrating from Rawalpindi to Delhi.

This indicates to me a whitewashing of family history that deliberately conceals how ordinary individuals became perpetrators of violence during the extraordinary circumstances of the Partition. The fact that this family history did not surface for more than seventy years is an indication of how families have suppressed disturbing memories. Although it may be a case of overgeneralising from an individual family's experience, I believe Sawhney's admission and subsequent backtracking are indicative of the broader experiences of South Asians who participated in *and* were victims of the Partition violence, and of how the trauma has been brushed under the carpet and hidden from younger generations in an effort to "get on with life," maintain the family's honour and avoid shame, values that are central to South Asian culture. The consequence, I submit, is an international conflict that is exceptionally resistant to resolution, even as the wounds of the Partition

continue to fester behind the cloak of forgetting. (For more on the emotional aspects of the Partition, see my journal article "Violence, Theory and the Subject of International Politics" and my conference paper "Emotions and the English School" (Kapur 2012, 2015)).

The influx of Partition refugees was a significant challenge for the fledgling Pakistani state, and one with implications for the shape that the new state took (Robinson 2010, 68-77). It is estimated that seven million refugees arrived in Pakistan (Shaikh 2009, 47). The state was under considerable pressure to provide housing and other forms of rehabilitation to these displaced people (Robinson 2010, 69-75). In this situation, former Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah decided to personally handle the Evacuation and Refugee Rehabilitation and State and Frontier Regions portfolio, thus setting a precedent for the head of state to be more than a titular head, and setting the stage for a centralised state (Haqqani 2006, 115; Talbot 2012, 60). Jinnah's decision is likely to have been a consequence of his concern about the dire refugee situation that faced the new state.

Figure 7. Partition of India. Map by Wikimedia Commons.

The Partition also entailed the redrawing of national boundaries, a complex and contentious process of which the repercussions are still being felt on the subcontinent today (Schofield 2003, 33-39). Tahmima Anam (2017) explains that the cartographer who drew the new boundaries of India and Pakistan had never visited the subcontinent before he was assigned this task,

and he completed the process—which, as noted above, displaced 12 to 16 million people and killed 200,000 to 3 million (Anam 2017; Butalia 2000, 3; Roland 2010, 387; Talbot 2012, 58)—within the span of 40 days. The dispute over J&K is a notable fallout of the process, as well as being one of the factors that has led to a centralised power structure in Pakistan.

As one of the princely states of pre-Independence India, J&K had a Hindu king, but its population was mostly Muslim. To complicate matters further, its territory was contiguous with both Pakistan and India (Schofield 2003, 28). The rulers of the princely states were given the option of whether to accede to Pakistan or India. J&K's Maharaja Hari Singh signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan at the time of Independence in August 1947 but was still to accede to Pakistan formally. Amid religious violence in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as severe religious rioting in the Jammu region of J&K, armed groups entered J&K from Pakistan in September 1947. On 21 October 1947, thousands of Pashtuns entered J&K from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in response to which the maharaja requested India's military assistance. This was provided on the condition that the state would accede to India and an instrument of accession was duly signed, though on the understanding that it would be ratified by the people once the raiders had been expelled (Sumantra Bose 2003, 30-36; Snedden 2012, 39). The stipulated ratification was never obtained, with UNSC resolutions calling for a plebiscite in J&K remaining unfulfilled (Junaid 2013, 173).

The centralisation of power in Pakistan is partially due to the country's perception of a threat from India in the wake of the J&K conflict (Tan and Kudaisya 2000, 205-19; Talbot 2012, 60). The security concerns that arose from the Partition—Pakistan's anxiety that India would try to reintegrate it and its desire to annex the Kashmir valley—led to a centralised power structure in which the democratically elected government would remain subservient to the military and bureaucracy (Talbot 2012, 60).

Another consequence of the manner in which national boundaries were drawn at the Partition was the unwieldy design of the new country, which consisted of a western and an eastern wing separated by one thousand miles. As Anam (2007, 33) puts it in the novel *A Golden Age*, "What sense did it make to have a country in two halves, poised on either side of India like a pair of horns?" This onerous arrangement bestowed on the army and bureaucracy a central role in ensuring the survival of the new state, contributing further to the centralisation of power away from local leaders in favour of the military and bureaucracy (Tan and Kudaisya 2000, 206-19; Warner 2005, 1101). The two wings of Pakistan flanked India, which remained disgruntled over the creation of Pakistan. This led to the persistent fear that India would try to annex one of the wings of the new state and, therefore, Pakistan needed a strong state with power centralised in the hands of soldiers and bureaucrats.

The Cold War, its Impact on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mass Migration

In April 1978, a group of Afghans trained by the Soviet Union organised a coup in Afghanistan, establishing a socialist state—a move that triggered a civil war in Afghanistan. In response to the breakout of the civil war, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan lasted until 1989, during which time 3.3 million Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan (Dibb 2010; Grare and Maley 2011).

As Omar Noman (1989, 50) explains, the Afghan war broke out at a fortuitous moment for Zia-ul-Haq's government, which, until then, had been shunned by international society. Zia-ul-Haq's military coup and his government's nuclear programme had attracted condemnation from Western powers, but the tide turned with the Soviet incursion into neighbouring Afghanistan. The West calculated that Pakistan had become a geopolitically important country, and, therefore, that Zia-ul-Haq was a useful ally.

$7.2 billion poured into Pakistan in the form of foreign aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia (Johnson and Mason 2008, 70-71). Pakistan was a significant training ground for a jihad in Afghanistan primarily sponsored by the United States and Saudi Arabia, which was aimed at repelling the Soviet forces (Talbot 2012, 138). As Bruce Riedel (2013, 90) explains, Zia-ul-Haq sought Saudi Arabia's assistance in repelling the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in December 1979. According to Riedel, Zia-ul-Haq asked Saudi Arabia for help in strengthening the mujahideen who were fighting Communism in Afghanistan. Riedel reports that Saudi King Fahd acquiesced to Pakistan's

demand, and Pakistan's ISI and the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) started to cooperatively aid the mujahideen, with Saudi funds being transferred to the ISI. Riedel (2013, 91) further notes that the ISI and GID soon had a third partner, the CIA, and the CIA began to also contribute funds to the jihad in Afghanistan. According to a report in Pakistan's *Nation* (2009) newspaper, obtained through Wikileaks, former US ambassador to Pakistan Ronald Spiers, who was the "U.S. envoy in the early 1980's when Washington began supplying weapons to anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen with former president Zia-ul-Haq's military regime," repudiated former President Asif Ali Zardari's claim that the "U.S. had exploited Islamabad in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." This disagreement highlights the tension between the Pakistani and US perceptions of the United States' funding of the 1980s war in Afghanistan.

Funds from the United States, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf went towards training fighters at radical madrasas (N. Ali 2010, 547-49), which, Moniza Khokhar (2007, 356) argues, should be called training camps rather than madrasas. She contends that the "madrasa" label concealed the true identity of these training camps, legitimising their war on religious grounds and enabling them to obtain foreign funds from Islamic sources, and that it was the 1980s war that caused madrasas in Pakistan to become militarised. Nosheen Ali (2010, 547) explains that "madrassas—which literally means 'schools' in Arabic—have a rich and diverse history as centres of Islamic learning in Pakistan, as well as

in the Muslim world in general," and that the depiction of madrasas solely "as 'extremist' and 'fundamentalist'" overlooks this heritage. In this way, Nosheen Ali problematises the uncritical narrative of radical madrasas in the security narrative on Pakistan that undermines the diversity of religious learning in the country and securitises Islam.

Thus, Khokhar (2007, 356) and Nosheen Ali (2010, 547-49) trace the emergence of militarised madrasas in Pakistan to the 1979-88 war in Afghanistan. Both authors emphasise the development of a radical curriculum by the University of Nebraska in the United States for use at these madrasas (N. Ali 2010, 545; Khokhar 2007, 356). Nosheen Ali (2010, 545) recounts that "an explicitly violent curriculum that was to be used in these madrassas was produced by the University of Nebraska, Omaha, and published in both Dari and Pashto through a USAID grant." One fourth-grade arithmetic question from the University of Nebraska textbooks reads as follows:

> The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. [. . .] If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian's head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead (Cutler and Ali 2005).

A report from India's *Tribune* newspaper provides another example of an arithmetic problem from the curriculum: "One group of Mujahed attacks 50 Russian soldiers. In that attack, 20 Russians were killed. How many Russians fled?" The report also refers to another textbook in which a Quranic verse is followed by a description of the mujahideen as "obedient to Allah and willing

to sacrifice their wealth and life to impose Islamic law on the government"

(Bhatia, n.d.). Thus, these textbooks explicitly linked Islam to violence and the

war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Fatima Sajjad (2013, 112-14) interviewed Islamic scholars in Pakistan

about the role of madrasas in the 1980s war in Afghanistan. Maulana Mufti Qari

Muhammad Yousaf, a representative of the Deobandi school of Sunni

jurisprudence, told her:

> At that time (1980s), the Americans needed the *madaris* [madrasas] for
> their interest. Pakistani and American governments used *madaris* to win
> the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets. [. . .] *Madaris* accommodated
> and supported *mujahideen* because they considered it their religious
> obligation. Initially, the *mujahideen* began their struggle against the
> mighty Soviets with meager resources and weapons. It was only later,
> after they had achieved initial successes that the Americans noted that
> they are capable of defeating the Soviets. It was then that they decided
> to support them. Mujahideen accepted this assistance from the US
> because they considered it legitimate to use whatever means are
> available to them for their defence (Sajjad 2013, 113).

Yousaf's statement is interesting because it acknowledges the US assistance

without refuting the religious legitimacy of madrasas supporting the

mujahideen.

Another result of the infusion of funds into radical madrasas, as well as

the influx of millions of refugees, was the erosion of traditional Pashtun social

structures in north-western Pakistan—such as the Pashtunwali social code that

served for centuries as the unwritten law in the north-western region—and the

emergence of warlords who challenged the authority of tribal elders (Johnson

and Mason 2008, 54-71). The influx of millions of refugees as a result of the war

in neighbouring Afghanistan, coupled with the radicalisation policy pursued by the government in the north-west with the backing of the United States and Saudi Arabia, served to destabilise society along the north-western border with Afghanistan. The undermining of social institutions, such as Pashtunwali and the traditional authority of tribal elders, bolstered the control of the central government over the local population. The Zia-ul-Haq administration thus quelled the Pashtun separatist movement through its promotion of religion-based nationalism. In the process, it fundamentally challenged the social order in the Pashtun-majority areas of the country.

As Stephen Vertigans (2011, 40) notes, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA have always presented a challenge for central governments seeking to deepen their level of control over the local population. He points to the aversion in the local culture to surrendering to external forces, underlining the British colonial government's deployment of more troops to Waziristan than to any other part of the Indian subcontinent. In 1977, Zia-ul-Haq was struggling to curb a Pashtun separatist movement. The influx of Afghan refugees into north-western Pakistan, along with the violent radicalisation that took hold in the region due to the Afghan jihad, disrupted the rise of this Pashtun secessionist movement and strengthened the central government's hold over the region (Johnson and Mason 2008, 70; Noman 1989, 50). Thus, the Afghan war of the 1970s and 1980s furthered the trend that commenced with the circumstances

surrounding Independence in 1947 of a centralisation of social control in the state.

Some authors have identified a link between contemporary radicalisation and the continued presence of 4,500 to 6,000 extremist madrasas along the border with Afghanistan (Fair 2007, 109-16; Khokhar 2007, 353-56). However, others point to the fact that few militants whose backgrounds have been studied have been found to have attended madrasas (Fair 2007, 109). Based on a survey of 141 militant households in Pakistan, Fair (2008, 97-102) finds that militants in the country are not preponderantly educated at madrasas and underlines the importance of other avenues of radicalisation.

Thus, the long-term legacy of the Cold War in the context of the emergence of militarised madrasas is complicated. Some militant madrasas continue to train fighters, but other modes of militant recruitment are significant as well (Fair 2008, 102; Khokhar 2007, 357). More fundamentally, Nosheen Ali (2010, 549-52) contends that the focus on madrasas as a driver of terrorism ignores not only the fact that most perpetrators of anti-Western terrorism have had secular educations but also the political motivations for terrorism and the role of US policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in causing radicalisation.

Nosheen Ali's (2010) argument accords with Richard Jackson (2005) and Arun Kundnani's (2016) contention that a de-politicisation of terrorism has occurred in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks. Jackson (2005, 70)

asserts that "one of the primary purposes of" the official discourse of the "war on terror" has been "to so demonise and *dehumanise* the terrorists that the only acceptable course of action is to kill and destroy them; to depoliticise and depersonalise them to such a degree that no one is tempted to find out their actual grievances and demands" (italics mine). He maintains that "destroying the face of the terrorist, removing all traces of their personality or humanity and depoliticising their aims and goals was essential to constructing the massive counter-violence of the 'war on terrorism'" (Jackson 2005, 75). The dehumanisation and de-politicisation of terrorists are responsible for the United States' focus on providing Pakistan with military aid to fight militancy and on its use of drones in the country. This has been to the neglect of alternative counterterrorism approaches, including political negotiations, policing and intelligence gathering, de-radicalisation, and counter-radicalisation. This thesis contends that this is a gross oversight that has undermined the United States' goals in Pakistan, particularly because of the anger generated by drone strikes.

The "Global War on Terror"

The crisis in Afghanistan post-2001 rendered Pakistan a front-line state in an international conflict, as had happened during the Cold War as a result of the Soviet operation in Afghanistan (Talbot 2012, 171). This resulted in

instability in Pakistan as militant groups turned their ire against the state in revenge for its support for the "global war on terror."

Pakistan under Musharraf agreed to assist the US-led "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan by offering logistical and intelligence support, as well as landing and overflight rights. Moreover, Musharraf's government participated actively in the "global war on terror" by launching a military operation against militant groups based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. Another fallout of the "global war on terror" for Pakistan was the United States' use of drones to target militants in FATA (Lieven 2002; Talbot 2012, 172-78).

Mainly due to the army operations in the north-west, but also because of militant attacks and drone strikes, residents began to flee their homes. They moved to other districts in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but also as far as Karachi, the capital of the south-eastern province of Sindh. The displacement of civilians began with a month-long army operation in North Waziristan in October 2007, which caused eighty thousand people to flee (I. Ali 2009, 2; Mohsin 2013, 93-94; Obaid-Chinoy 2009).

Zardari's government, which succeeded Musharraf's military regime, maintained its predecessor's policy of supporting the "global war on terror" (Nelson 2009, 17-20). The crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reached its peak in 2009, when more than two million people were displaced by fighting between the army and militant groups in north-western Pakistan (I. Ali 2009).

Imtiaz Ali (2009) wrote that year that "the crisis in Pakistan [wa]s by most metrics the biggest internal displacement in recent history." Anatol Lieven (2016, 170) explains that the army from 2009 sought to reduce civilian casualties by either encouraging or forcing civilian populations to flee areas ahead of operations. As Lieven (2016, 176) reports:

> By 2012, one in five of the population of FATA had been forced at some stage to leave their homes. By July 2015, an estimated 1.8 million people had been displaced from Fata (most of those displaced in Swat in 2009 had returned home within a year or so). This included a large majority of the populations of North and South Waziristan, many of whom had not returned home by mid-2016.

Once again, mass migration had caused social upheaval in the north-west, where the vast majority of refugees stayed with local host families, rather than in government refugee camps (I. Ali 2009; Mohsin 2013). In a study conducted among 590 IDPs from the Swat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, 57 people tested positive for hepatitis B and C, showing a 9.66 percent prevalence of the infection (Rauf et al. 2011). Another study among IDPs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa found that 20.6 percent of females and 20.5 percent of males suffered from mild depression, 24.7 percent of females and 16 percent of males had mild-to-moderate depression, and 30.2 percent of females and 25.6 percent of males experienced moderate-to-severe depression (Shafique and Tareen 2015). Zil-e-Huma (2010, 101) found that "women experienced rape and forced pregnancy, forced sex work and sexual slavery, often at the hands of 'peacekeepers', police or occupying forces, as occurred during displacement

from Swat, Bajour and other parts." She further reports that IDPs exhibited symptoms of depression, anxiety, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, with seventy percent of children showing symptoms of trauma. A study conducted at the Jalozai camp for IDPs in Nowshera district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa revealed that the level of malnutrition among children below the age of five rose for IDPs (R. Gul and Kiramat 2012). Other research at Jalozia found that health services were being provided to IDPs (Qayum et al. 2011). However, at the Jalalah refugee camp in Mardan district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where Al-Khidmat Foundation, the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association, Merlin, the Peoples Primary Healthcare Initiative and the Rahman Foundation were offering healthcare services, mental-health services and psychiatric medication were unavailable to patients (Irfan et al. 2011). The crisis of IDPs also disturbed the social fabric of Karachi, where the arrival of large numbers of Pashtun refugees aggravated existing ethnic tensions, with local people alleging that the immigrants included militants who posed a threat to the city (Obaid-Chinoy 2009).

As Migdal (1988, 90) explains, "Sudden disruptions in life patterns give people precious little time to adapt their life strategies." Writing about the nineteenth century in non-Western societies, he notes:

> This period was a turning point in their lives, marked by difficulty, insecurity, and movement from one set of survival strategies while searching for new ones. It also included a sudden, radical change in the institutions with which they interacted; those institutions are simply the

established systems of rules and roles within which people deal with one another.

The series of mass migrations that has impacted Pakistani society in the 20th and 21st centuries has similarly disrupted the patterns of life to which people were accustomed, forcing them to devise new survival strategies as the social institutions upon which they had come to rely have undergone profound changes. This has caused the state to take on the responsibility of centralising control in the military as a means of providing stability to society. In Migdal's framework, the significant disruption caused by mass migration has the potential to "create the flexibility necessary to break weak states out of the social and political structures that constrain their development" (Buzan 2007, 100). The migration of millions of people in 1947 and during the Afghan crisis of the 1970s and 1980s helped the Pakistani governments of the time to centralise social control in the state: Jinnah's assumption as the head of state of critical responsibilities; the postponement of the country's first general election for more than twenty years; and the suppression of Pashtun separatism and promotion of Islamic nationalism under Zia-ul-Haq provide evidence of this creation of a strong state. However, the Zardari government was not in a position to capitalise on the crisis of IDPs in a similar way. As the following subsections will show, the combined pressures from militancy, opposition protests and an activist judiciary (referring to the Supreme Court's intervention

when it disagrees with government policies (Shamim 2018)) undermined the Zardari administration.

Opposition and Civil-Society Movements

Mass anti-government protests constitute an event in state-society relations wherein society communicates to the state its displeasure at specific policies implemented by the state. Zardari is one of a series of democratic as well as military rulers in Pakistani history who have had to contend with significant anti-government movements that have severely undermined their regimes. In the Pakistani context, anti-government movements represent a challenge to the concentration of social control in the state and have led to an increase in the social control exercised by indigenous social organisations such as political and religious groups, professional bodies, and civil-society organisations.

Pro-democracy demonstrations plagued the country's first military dictator, former President Ayub Khan, causing his eventual resignation. Small-scale rallies against Ayub Khan's regime took place from 1962 onwards, but turned into a mass movement in 1968, after the police killed three left-wing student protesters. Pro-democracy gatherings swept the country, with protesters in East Pakistan calling for provincial autonomy. On the advice of senior military leaders, Ayub Khan stepped down in 1969, handing power over to another military general, former President Yahya Khan (*Dawn* 2014a).

In the light of the riots that Ayub Khan had faced, Yahya Khan announced elections to a constituent assembly, which were held in December 1970. However, the results came as a shock to West Pakistani politicians, bureaucrats, and army officers, who had until then been dominant: The East Pakistan-based Awami League had swept the polls (Haqqani 2006, 118). Under pressure from the army and a West Pakistan-based political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Yahya Khan postponed the first constituent-assembly meeting that had been scheduled for 3 March 1971, setting off unrest in the East Pakistani city of Dhaka (Vogler 2010, 28). The army stepped in to quell the unrest in East Pakistan on the night of 25-26 March 1971, and the conflict that followed ultimately led to the secession of the eastern wing, which became Bangladesh (Oldenburg 2010, 1-2).

Yahya Khan's successor, former President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was not immune to widespread protests, even though he was a politician rather than a military dictator. Allegations of vote rigging sparked off a flurry of demonstrations against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during his spell as prime minister from 1973 to 1977, which enabled Zia-ul-Haq to orchestrate a coup d'état (Haqqani 2006, 121; Noman 1989, 30).

While the mass rallies against Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were effective in that they instigated transfers of power, the period after the 11 September 2001 attacks has been marked by a resurgent civil society that has sustained pressure on the government to attend to its demands. This is in

contrast to Husain Haqqani's (2006, 114) observation in 2006 that "the army's control of most levers of power ha[d] led to a gradual decline in the influence of political parties and the marginalization of civil society." At the time, Musharraf was still able to maintain a grip on power, but eventually, the opposing pressures from the United States and the domestic population led to his downfall as civil society found its voice. This was a significant shift away from the centralised power structure that had been in existence for much of Pakistan's history, towards more diffused social control where civil-society groups, Islamists, politicians with localised support bases, and the judiciary vied with the military and civilian bureaucracy for legitimation, participation and compliance from the population. This shift was reflected in Durrani's response to a question about whether Pakistan was a failing state: Much in the vein of this chapter, he drew a distinction between the state and society and emphasised the robustness of Pakistan's society, and particularly its civil society (interview by Mehdi Hasan, *Head to Head*, Al Jazeera, April 10, 2015).

The Resurgence of Society amid Pervez Musharraf's Downfall

The beginning of the end for Musharraf came in March 2007, when he fired former chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, triggering large-scale rallies by lawyers across the country, led by Aitzaz Ahsan. In July 2007, the Supreme Court reinstated Chaudhry, in opposition to the president's authority (Traub 2008). This was a marker of the diffusion of power among the branches

of government, and away from a centralisation of power in the executive branch. This is because the activism of the judiciary in disobeying Musharraf's authority and Musharraf's inability to prevent this amid widespread anti-government protests revealed a weakening of the state. The state here is understood as the powerful military and intelligence agencies—Pakistan's so-called "deep state"—that have controlled politics in the country since its inception.

The imposition in November 2007 of a state of emergency, seen as "an effort by General Musharraf to reassert his fading power in the face of growing opposition from the country's Supreme Court, civilian political parties and hard-line Islamists" (Rohde 2007), triggered a fresh round of anti-government demonstrations (Perlez and Rohde 2007). The return to the country of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in October 2007, her participation in the anti-Musharraf rallies, and her assassination in December 2007 contributed to the unstable environment that prevailed as the country went to the polls in February 2008 (Boone 2013; Mehdi 2013; Perlez and Rohde 2007; I. Wilkinson 2007).

The resurgent civil society, opposition and judiciary forced the Musharraf regime to hold elections in 2008 that would bring an authentic political party—and not the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam, which was loyal to Musharraf—to power. Although Benazir Bhutto was killed in 2007,

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her PPP won a majority in the general elections in 2008, and Musharraf resigned later in 2008.

Asif Ali Zardari and the Long March

The February 2008 general elections on which many had pinned their hopes following months of pro-democracy demonstrations brought the PPP to power, with Zardari taking up the mantle of president. The PPP failed to garner an absolute majority but put together a coalition that included several of its rivals, including the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), the MQM, the Awami National Party and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman). However, the coalition was weakened by squabbling between former prime minister Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N and Zardari even before the new administration was sworn in on 17 March 2008 (Nelson 2009, 17).

Not only did Sharif demand concessions for the PML-N, but he also objected to Zardari's neglect of the political issues that had galvanised public opposition to Musharraf. Zardari maintained Musharraf's unpopular policy of cooperating with the United States in the "global war on terror" and allowed the United States to expand its military operations in FATA, which it carried out from its bases in Afghanistan. Furthermore, he refused to reinstate Chaudhry, an issue that had been central to the demonstrations that ousted Musharraf. In fact, both Zardari and Musharraf had vested interests in keeping Chaudhry out of the Supreme Court. Musharraf had been anxious that

Chaudhry would want him to step down as army chief if he continued as president. Similarly, the prospect of Chaudhry's return was worrying for Zardari because of the likelihood that Chaudhry would revive corruption cases against Zardari and his late wife Benazir Bhutto (Nelson 2009, 17-20).

Several factors weakened the Zardari administration and, thus, perpetuated the pattern of diffusing social control that had emerged towards the end of Musharraf's reign. The first blow came with the resignation of the PML-N from the coalition government in August 2008 (Nelson 2009, 20). The loss of Sharif's support was costly to Zardari in a number of ways. Not only did the ruling coalition lose the backing of a major political party, the PML-N also in 2009 led a Long March to the capital Islamabad to demand Chaudhry's reinstatement, evoking memories of the mass movement that caused Musharraf's downfall (Faruqui 2009, 12; Miglani 2009). The march further empowered civil-society groups, whose ability to impact politics had surged during the anti-Musharraf protests.

Another fallout of the Long March was that it brought to the fore tensions between Zardari and his prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani. Although Gilani belonged to Zardari's PPP, he refused to oppose the march. Gilani ordered that Chaudhry be reinstated, hoping that this would defuse the situation (Faruqui 2009, 13). This agency on Gilani's part challenged the president's authority, detracting from the long-standing pattern in Pakistani politics of the head of state monopolising power. Thus, Gilani's act of rebellion

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was more significant than it might seem, since it underlined the diffusion of power that was underway in Pakistan. He was a head of government who dared to challenge the head of state—and a member of an influential political family, no less. Thus, his real challenge was to the tradition of power being centralised in the head of state, which goes back to Jinnah's position as Governor General and has been perpetuated by a series of military dictators. Additionally, Gilani's act of defiance took on the dynastic politics that has reigned in Pakistan, which adds to its significance. Although Gilani himself belongs to an influential family, his challenge to a member of the Bhutto clan implies a dispersion of power away from a few individuals. As we shall see in the subsection below, Imran Khan's emergence as a significant political force is another indicator of this shift away from dynastic politics and diffusion of social control.

Nawaz Sharif versus Imran Khan: A New Political Landscape

The PML-N won an absolute majority at general elections held in May 2013, and for the first time in national history, power was handed over from one democratically elected government to another (Tudor 2014, 105). However, persistent anti-government protests by the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) over alleged vote rigging during the 2013 polls kept the PML-N government on tenterhooks (Ghauri 2014).

Maya Tudor (2014, 106-13) advances the proposition that the rise of the PTI, which has appealed to young, urban, educated voters, signifies the health of Pakistani democracy. PTI leader Imran Khan attacked the corruption and elitism of the political class, as well as criticising US policy towards Pakistan (*Express Tribune* 2014a). In this light, his popular protests can be viewed as a sign of a revitalised society and a diffusion of social control so that new political parties can establish a foothold, and under-represented but popular political viewpoints can find a voice. In the medium term, this could portend the establishment of a more accountable civilian government than the country has seen in the past. On coming to power in July 2018, Imran Khan promised greater accountability for the corrupt political class (*Times of India* 2018). His government went on to launch a drive against *benami* property suspected to be owned by people close to the PPP and PML-N but held under false names (S. Rana 2019; Zafeer 2019). Additionally, the National Accountability Bureau under Imran Khan has carried out high-profile arrests of PPP and PML-N politicians in corruption-related cases (U. Jamal 2019). However, the PTI has been criticised for not turning the spotlight on its own leaders and their assets, starting with Imran Khan himself (Zafeer 2019).

In the years leading up to Imran Khan's election, there was speculation that the military was backing the PTI and PAT in an attempt to reassert itself in national politics (*Express Tribune* 2014b; *Financial Times* 2014; Grare 2013, 989-90). As Fair (2014) suggests, a return to direct military rule is no longer likely

for Pakistan: Support for an electoral system of governance is strong among the populace, while the legal provisions that the army employed on past occasions to come to power are no longer in effect. In this context, it is plausible that the army was seeking to manipulate events so that a pliant civilian leader could be at the helm.

However, the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the discontentment that the Pakistani state's participation in the "global war on terror" through military operations sparked within Pakistani society have undoubtedly caused a decentralisation of power. Social groups such as civil-society movements, lawyers' associations, Islamist political parties, secular opposition parties, and Islamist militant outfits have reasserted themselves in the country's politics, signifying a dispersion of social control. In this new context, any administration requires broad-based support from a variety of social organisations to be viable. As a result, it is increasingly difficult for the military to enthrone a leader who does not enjoy popular support in his or her own right.

Military Coups

According to Samina Ahmed (2014, 55), military rule by its very nature leads to a centralisation of power in the state. This is important for a country like Pakistan that has been ruled directly by the military for a significant

proportion of its history. This subsection studies how decades of military rule have shaped the balance of power between the state and society in Pakistan.

As discussed in the previous subsection, there was conjecture in the local and international media, and even in scholarly publications, about the possibility that the army was seeking to expand its influence in politics through the anti-government protests of the PTI and PAT during the Sharif regime of 2013-17 (*Express Tribune* 2014b; *Financial Times* 2014; Grare 2013, 989-90). If this is true, it represented a continuation of the military's long-standing policy of trying to control national politics. According to Lieven (2011, 209), even more frequent than military coups followed by spells of military rule "have been military attempts to manipulate politics from behind the scenes, to influence and put pressure on journalists, to bring down civilian governments that have fallen out with the military, and to shape the results of elections."

As Husain Haqqani (2006, 114-15) notes, the seeds for the development of a national-security state were planted at the time of Independence, as a result of two factors. First, the fledgling country was anxious that India might seek to undo the Partition through a military takeover, and secondly, the military needed to ensure that it would receive access to a sizeable share of the economic resources of the new state.[17] Therefore, it took over direct control of the national-security policy soon after Independence.

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[17] British India's armed forces were split between India and Pakistan such that Pakistan received 30 percent of the army, 40 percent of the navy and 20 percent of the air force. However, it only received 17 percent of the revenue of British India, leading to concerns about how the Pakistani armed forces would

Spells of direct military rule have entrenched the army's influence on politics. A pattern of alternating democratic and military rule has been apparent for a large part of the country's history. Ayub Khan conducted the first military putsch on 27 October 1958, overthrowing former President Iskander Mirza, who was a major general himself and had announced Pakistan's first general elections. The country was placed under martial law in the lead-up to the polls, and then-army chief Ayub Khan used this as an opportunity to orchestrate his coup. Mirza himself had confided his doubts about the viability of democracy in Pakistan to British high commissioner Sir Alexander Symon on 27 September 1958, indicating that he was planning a military intervention if the election did not yield "desirable" results (Haqqani 2006, 116-17).

Ayub Khan was in power for more than a decade, handing control over to Yahya Khan in March 1969. The December 1970 elections and the secession of Bangladesh made way for a democratically elected PPP government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. However, he was ousted in another military coup in July 1977 led by Zia-ul-Haq (Ahmed 2014, 52; Haqqani 2006, 118). Zia-ul-Haq's reign lasted eleven years, ending with his demise in 1988 (Noman 1989, 28).

As mentioned earlier, Ahmed (2014, 55) considers the centralisation of power to be synonymous with military rule. This was evident when parliament under Zia-ul-Haq passed a constitutional amendment that gave the president

sustain themselves (Haqqani 2006, 114).

the authority to dismiss the legislature. Zia-ul-Haq also gave his backing to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), an Islamist political party (Riedel 2013, 87), in a move that Ahmed (2014, 53-54) alleges was a manoeuvre to sideline mainstream opposition parties. While the bolstering of a single party would be to the detriment of a multiparty system and would, therefore, be evidence of a consolidation of social control in the state, it is not clear that Zia-ul-Haq's support for the JI had such a singularly centralising effect.

The JI opposes feudalism and suffers from a lack of patronage from clan leaders—both aspects of Migdal's *web-like* non-Western societies where social control is distributed widely among a variety of social institutions. However, the JI is also remarkable among Pakistani political parties for being the only party to hold internal elections, and one of two parties to have effective party organisations and active women's wings. In this sense, the party could be seen as a force for the distribution of power among the middle and lower classes, and away from the elitist dynastic politics of other parties (Lieven 2011, 151-53).

Furthermore, as Ahmed (2014, 54) herself points out, widespread opposition protests occurred in the lead-up to Zia-ul-Haq's death, indicating that opposition parties managed to remain robust even under his rule. The PPP won elections held in 1988, and power alternated between the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP and the Sharif-led PML-N from 1988 to 1999. However, neither was permitted to complete a full term in office, with the president (with the

military's backing) prematurely dismissing them two to three years into each term. Musharraf's putsch in 1999 ended this pattern (Haqqani 2006, 119).

Musharraf instituted local-government elections, a move with the potential to devolve power, although the elections were conducted on a non-party basis, attracting speculation that the aim was "to create a tier of local officials supporting the ruling party" (Haqqani 2006, 113). Concurrently, he initiated reforms that enhanced the powers of the president substantially (Jan 2010).

As Ahmed (2014, 57) emphasises, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States were a turning point for Musharraf. Pressure from the United States caused his military regime to withdraw support from the Taliban, cracking down on Islamist militants in return for billions of dollars in foreign aid. However, Musharraf ultimately found himself sandwiched between external pressure from the United States to clamp down on Islamist militants, and domestic pressure from Islamist and civil-society groups, as well as lawyers and the judiciary, to refuse to participate in the "global war on terror" and to hand power over to a democratically elected government (Talbot 2012, 189-90). Musharraf in 2006 told the media that former US assistant secretary of state Richard Armitage had threatened that the United States would bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age" if it did not cooperate with the "war on terror" in Afghanistan (Goldenberg 2006). In 2006, Bush visited Pakistan and praised Musharraf amid unrest in the country over caricatures of the Prophet

Muhammad (SAW) in a European newspaper, with Islamist and secular protesters criticising the Musharraf regime's participation in the "war on terror" (Gall and Bumiller 2006). The security forces broke up a demonstration against Bush's visit in the Punjabi city of Rawalpindi by the PTI (Vandehai and Lancaster 2006). Thus, Musharraf's support for Bush's war galvanised opposition from religious and secular actors in Pakistani society. The "war on terror" served as a centrifugal force in Pakistani politics, causing the diffusion of power away from the military and the civilian privileged class (Grare 2007a, 8).

Musharraf's resignation in August 2008, after nine years in the presidential office, was the culmination of a series of events in 2007-08 that destabilised his government (Saeed Shah 2008). Even as he lost credibility thanks to his support for Bush's "global war on terror," elements of society that had traditionally remained under the control of the military-dominated state started to find their voice. Lawyers rallied to support Supreme Court judges whom Musharraf had fired, and civil-society groups agitated to demand a return to democratic governance. Meanwhile, Islamist militants who had historically been proxies of the state started to turn against it, carrying out attacks targeting government and military installations (Haqqani 2006, 112; Raja 2009, 61-62). This shift provides the rationale for this thesis's focus on the security of the state and society within Pakistan.

Militant Groups

Building on his conceptualisation of world society as the realm of transnational actors (Buzan 2004a, 97), Buzan (2004a, 128) posits "that enemy and rival [a]re as much forms of social relationship as friend." He challenges the idea that coercion and violence represent an absence of society or community. Instead, he contends that "coercion is never far from the surface of discussions about society," drawing attention to Thomas Hobbes's work and to the Marxist view of capitalism. Referring further to the constructivist attitude that all human interactions should be treated as social, he argues for the inclusion of violence and coercion "as forms of society" (Buzan 2004a, 129).

This understanding of society makes room for the inclusion of terrorist groups and other violent non-state actors as social organisations, an understanding that is also apparent in Akhilesh Pillalamarri's (2014) conceptualisation of militant groups as "groups on the margins of society." Applying Buzan's inclusion of violent groups in world society to the domestic level, this thesis sees Pakistan's militant groups as members of society that may act as agents of the state or may pose a threat to the state. This is due to the widely accepted allegation that the "deep state" (the military and ISI) has a long history of supporting militant groups for its own ends, while there has been a growing trend since 2001 of militants targeting the state, including military and intelligence targets. This shift has come about because of the state's policy of aiding the "global war on terror." The following analysis uses this

understanding to examine how the relationship between the state and militant groups as societal organisations has developed historically.

According to Husain Haqqani (2006, 112), the military's alliance with militant groups dates back to the Afghan war of 1979-88 but has persisted because of the militants' utility as proxies in the J&K conflict. Talbot (2015, 44) maintains that

> involvement in militancy was not only state-sanctioned when it involved the Kashmir *jihad*, but had wide social approval. This helps to explain why the *jihadist* culture has proved difficult to challenge post 9/11 and why even today fundraising for militant groups goes on openly and *jihadist* literature is widely available.

At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Zia-ul-Haq regime lacked international legitimacy, as Western powers disapproved of the fact that Zia-ul-Haq's government was undemocratic, as well as its pursuance of a nuclear programme. However, the Soviet Union's entry into Afghanistan changed the stance of its Cold War rival, the United States, towards Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistan (Noman 1989, 50). As noted earlier, the United States and Saudi Arabia contributed $7.2 billion in support of Islamist militant groups resisting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, with north-western Pakistan serving as a training ground for the fighters (Z. Hussain 2007, 16-17; Johnson and Mason 2008, 70-71; Talbot 2012, 138).

Just as international criticism of Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship subsided once he allied with the United States to eject Soviet forces from Afghanistan, international concerns about military rule in Pakistan seemed to

evaporate when Musharraf indicated his support for the "global war on terror."

Not unlike Zia-ul-Haq's regime, the Musharraf administration had been under international pressure to return power to a democratic government, as well as over the issue of nuclear proliferation. However, foreign aid poured in after Musharraf agreed to provide ISAF with logistical and intelligence support, along with landing and overflight rights (Z. Hussain 2007, 40; Talbot 2012, 172-73).

On the other hand, it was not easy for Pakistan to withdraw support from the Taliban. The Pakistani government had been an ally of the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan, and the Taliban had assisted Musharraf in his military campaign against India in Kargil, a city in IJK (Z. Hussain 2007, 37; Raja 2009, 61). Taliban leaders such as Abdul Salam Zaeef (2010, 163-69) perceived Pakistan's volte-face as a betrayal. As the Taliban government's envoy to Pakistan, Zaeef was sent to the US detention camp on Guantanamo Bay after the Pakistani government derecognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in November 2001. In Zaeef's (2010, 169-202) words:

> In fact, no law offered justification for what [the Pakistanis] were doing, but American pressure, the anger of its people and the hope of a lucky break turned them against us. [. . .] Pakistan was known among the prisoners as *Majbooristan*, the land that is obliged to fulfil each of America's demands.

This shows how the Taliban and other Islamists saw Pakistan's participation in the "global war on terror." It explains why Islamist militants have targeted the Pakistani state since 2001. Furthermore, it reveals the conflicting loyalties

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pulling the state in two opposing directions. While pressure from the United States has pushed Pakistan to cooperate with the "war on terror" for its own survival, firstly to protect itself from the ire of the global hegemon, and secondly to secure itself from mounting attacks by terrorist organisations, old loyalties to the Taliban and other Islamist groups continue to exert an influence on the state.

The state has in recent years sought to withdraw support from or regain control of Pakistani militant groups that emerged with its backing. Several of these groups have splintered and begun to act of their own volition, targeting the security forces and the civilian and military leadership, as well as international and sectarian entities (Fair 2008, 94-103). Masood Ashraf Raja (2009, 61-62) attributes the dramatic increase in domestic attacks targeting government and military installations to anger at the administration's military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA as part of its participation in the "global war on terror."

As Chapter 6 will explore, some of the significant Islamist militant organisations with a strong presence in the country are Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), Hizbul Mujahideen, Al Qaeda, the TTP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and LeJ (*Dawn* 2014b; Z. Hussain 2007, 52-90). Hizbul Mujahideen and HuJI are believed to have merged with the TTP. There has been an escalation in attacks within the country since Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban migrated to Pakistan to escape

the NATO war in Afghanistan (Z. Hussain 2007). A combination of factors—

the proxy war against India in Kashmir, the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, and the

influx of fighters following the NATO operation in Afghanistan—has, over the

decades, resulted in the emergence of an "ecosystem of Islamic militancy" in

Pakistan (Small 2015, 81).

As Jean-Pierre Filiu (2014) explains, the 2001 NATO campaign in

Afghanistan drove bin Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders into Pakistan,

while other important members of the organisation moved west to Iraq via Iran.

Following the killing of bin Laden in Pakistan by US forces in September 2011,

the Pakistan-based Al Qaeda faction led by Ayman al-Zawahiri was

overshadowed by the group's Iraqi branch, which in 2011 reinvented itself as

Daesh (Filiu 2014).

The Zardari and Sharif administrations perpetuated Musharraf's policy

of alternating military operations against militants in the north-west with peace

talks (M. Haider 2014; Raza 2011; *Rediff* 2009). However, peace talks offer

militants an opportunity to regroup and rearm, as was evident when in

September 2014, the Punjabi Taliban, consisting of radical Sunni groups such as

JeM, LeJ and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), announced that it was disengaging

from violence within Pakistan and would only carry out attacks on US forces in

Afghanistan (T. Khan 2014; Talbot 2012, 209-11). This announcement came after

the group's leader, Asmatullah Muawiya, in August 2013 praised Sharif for

having repeatedly offered to engage in dialogue with violent extremists in his

capacity as prime minister (*Dawn* 2013). However, the Global Terrorism Index 2017 showed that LeJ was one of the most violent terrorist groups within Pakistan in 2016 (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017). Given that LeJ is the militant wing of SSP, this reversal underlines the limits to negotiations as a "soft" counterterrorism mechanism and follows an entrenched pattern in Pakistani politics of militant groups breaching amnesties and failing to abide by peace deals (Tankel 2013).

Conclusions

The historical sociology of Pakistan conducted in this chapter has revealed several patterns that have tended to repeat themselves during the seven decades of the country's existence. These include the disruption of social structures by mass migration, the interruption of democratic rule by military coups, the fall of governments due to widespread protests, and tension between the state's encouragement of and fight against various militant groups.

The introduction refers to Mendelsohn's (2009a) contention that international society has a responsibility to support counterterrorism in states whose territory is being used by terrorists. Mendelsohn (2009a, 663) argues that "because numerous states are weak, a special effort must be made to bolster states' capacities so that they will be able to realize their obligations to the society of states." Mendelsohn's (2009a, 663) idea of states' "obligations to the society of states" consists of not allowing "terrorists to use their territories to

harm other states." However, his uncritical categorisation of some states as

"weak" is problematic. As Agustina Giraudy (2012, 600) explains, the

construction of a binary opposition between "strong" and "weak" states

> is problematic because most states, with the exception of the European
> states, which are generally regarded as strong, are lumped together in
> one conceptual category. As a result, the label "weak states" denotes a
> variety of empirical cases that, in practice and by relevant scholarly
> standards, differ widely from each other.

This suggests that there is a need for a nuanced analysis of state strength

in Pakistan that goes beyond the strong/weak dichotomy and paints a more

useful picture of where power lies in the country. The need for such a nuanced

analysis is brought into relief by Markey's (2013, 67-68) criticism of

"hyperventilating newspaper headlines and magazine articles that have too

often predicted Pakistan's imminent collapse." Riedel (2013, xii) goes further

when he asserts that "Pakistan is a rising power in its own right, a fact too often

lost on those dazzled by India's rise next door."

In using Migdal's framework to assess the strength of the Pakistani state

and society in terms of the centralisation and diffusion of social control, this

chapter has provided such an in-depth study of where power lies in the

Pakistani domestic context. It has shown that since 2007, power has shifted

away from the military and the political elite in favour of civil society, Islamist

militants, and newly empowered political actors such as the PTI. In this way,

this chapter has contributed to this thesis's social perspective on security in

South Asia by interpreting the patterns of integrated and dispersed social control in Pakistan.

As the Introduction recognises, Makinda's (2003) appreciation of the potential for counterterrorism measures themselves perpetuating terrorism opens the door to research that looks into whether this is the case in Pakistan, both with regard to the army's counterterrorism operations and the United States' drone strikes. This chapter's revelation that the "global war on terror" caused an upsurge in attacks within Pakistan suggests that this has been the case, at least domestically. This underlines the relevance of "soft" counterterrorism approaches such as political dialogue, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation.

The Punjabi Taliban's announcement that it was renouncing violence in the country in response to the authorities' offers of negotiations is significant for the question of the potential held by "soft" counterterrorism approaches, particularly terrorist rehabilitation. LeJ's return to violence after 2014 underlines the temporary nature that such successes have tended to have in the country. This indicates that there is a need for alternatives to the political approach, which has been largely unsuccessful thus far (Tankel 2013).

Additionally, this chapter uncovers the widespread disenchantment with the United States' policies in the region that led to mass rallies against the Musharraf and Zardari administrations and precipitated Musharraf's downfall. Riedel (2013, 159) maintains that the US government under Bush "had lost the

faith of the Pakistani people by supporting a dictator for too long." However, this chapter demonstrates that the converse is equally true: Musharraf lost the faith of his people by supporting a war that many segments of Pakistani society perceive as unjust. Lieven (2011, 444-45) recognises this dynamic when he draws attention to a fact that

> has been widely ignored in the West, probably because it raises a very uncomfortable issue: namely, that Western governments and the Western media believe that they want to promote democracy in Pakistan, but that they have pressed upon Pakistani governments a co-operation with the West in the "war on terror" which most Pakistani voters detest.

This is relevant to the question of the hegemon's potential role in international counterterrorism efforts. The resentment of the US government's proactive role in Afghanistan and Pakistan suggests that broad-based international cooperation to counter terrorism in Pakistan would probably prove more acceptable to local people than counterterrorism spearheaded by the United States.

This chapter responds to the suggestion in Chapter 2 that violent non-state actors be considered members of world society as defined by the ES. That suggestion was based on Buzan's (2004, 128-29) idea that violence is a form of social interaction. This chapter develops Buzan's idea by applying it in concrete terms to the Pakistani context. It does so by applying the notion of violent non-state actors being members of society to the domestic level of analysis and treating terrorist groups as members of society in Migdal's terms. Thus, this

chapter makes an original contribution to the literature by understanding terrorists to be social actors. In this chapter, I have conducted a socially based analysis of state strength in Pakistan and argued that social control has shifted away from the state towards social actors, including terrorist groups.

My understanding of terrorists as members of society draws on Buzan's (2004a, 2004b) work. Another intriguing proposition by Buzan (2011b, 4-14) that is presented in the Introduction to this thesis is his contention that the international system is moving towards decentred globalism wherein a number of great powers exist without any superpowers, and regional politics is of increasing significance. The discussion in the next two chapters of Pakistan's interactions in the international system will consider the country's relations in its region, its super-region and the international system, thus recognising the evolving world order and exploring how international society could support Pakistan's counterterrorism programme in the context of this decentred globalism.

Chapter 4

"Breakfast in Amritsar, Lunch in Lahore and Dinner in Kabul:"
The Prospects for Regional Society in South Asia

> I dream of a day, while retaining our respective national identities, one
> can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul.
> —Manmohan Singh, January 8, 2007

S. M. Burke (1973, 3) observes that any Indian or Pakistani "will tell you
in all sincerity that it is imperative for the security and welfare of both India
and Pakistan that the two neighbours should bury the hatchet and settle down
to a friendly and co-operative relationship." Instead, as several authors have
observed, the obstinately antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan
has marred the prospects not just for bilateral peace, but for regional integration
in South Asia (A. Hussain 2014, 230-31; Mazhar, Goraya, and Kataria 2011, 738;
Mitra 2014, 17). The cancellation of the nineteenth SAARC Summit, which was
to be held in Islamabad in 2016, over a militant attack in IJK is a stark recent
example of the impact of the Pakistan-India antagonism on South Asian
regionalism (*Firstpost* 2016; Panda 2016).

Drawing on Robert Keohane (1988, 380-93), who makes a normative case
for studying "the conditions under which international cooperation can take
place" through research into international institutions, and calls especially for
empirical research that can inform policy, this chapter conducts an analysis of
the institutional landscape of South Asia and the prospects for regional

cooperation. For the broader thesis, this chapter addresses the question of the potential for the formation of a South Asian security community to address regional terrorism. The conclusions of this chapter will contribute to the emergent literature on the potential for a security community in the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan sub-region and the peaceful transformation of South Asia (I. Ahmad 2010; Chakma 2014b; Pervez 2013).

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the ES's understanding of international institutions and how this understanding is applied to the South Asian context. The second section focuses on three themes in contemporary South Asian politics that have security implications for Pakistan. Finally, in the third section, conclusions are drawn as to which institutions prominently regulate international interactions in South Asia, as well as what collaboration South Asian states can offer to Pakistan in the realm of security.

Institutions, the English School and South Asia

In *The Anarchical Society*, Bull (2012, 13) predicates his definition of a society of states on "the working of common institutions," suggesting that states in an international society "co-operate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions of war." Explaining that his understanding of an international institution is

broader than "an organisation or administrative machinery"—such as the UN

or SAARC—Bull (2012, 71) defines an institution as "a set of habits and

practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals." He lists five

"institutions of international society: the balance of power, international law,

the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of the great powers,[18] and

war."

While Bull alerts us to the fact that there are two possible ways of

understanding the term "institution," Keohane (1988, 383) elaborates on this

distinction by pointing out that the term "may refer to a *general pattern or*

categorization of activity or to a *particular* human-constructed arrangement,

formally or informally organized." Keohane refers to Bull's institutions as an

example of the former type of institution.

Buzan (2014, 16-17) develops this distinction further, distinguishing

between *primary* and *secondary* institutions. Buzan (2014, 16-17) suggests that

primary institutions are the ES's institutions as put forth by Bull: "They are

deep and relatively durable social practices in the sense of being evolved more

than designed." Instances of primary institutions include "sovereignty,

territoriality, the balance of power, war, diplomacy, international law and

great-power management, to which could be added nationalism, human

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[18] Great powers are an important concept in ES thinking. The term points to the existence in the international system of "two or more powers that are comparable in status," that are leaders in military capability, and are recognised by other states and their own citizens and leaders to have special rights and responsibilities in managing international society (Bull 2012, 194-96).

equality and, more recently and controversially, the market" (Buzan 2014, 17).

Elsewhere, Buzan and Lawson (2015, 85) also include non-intervention and war

as traditional primary institutions, and "colonialism/imperialism and formal

human inequality" as historical primary institutions that no longer hold sway.

Secondary institutions are intergovernmental arrangements (Buzan 2014, 17);

SAARC, the SCO, the HoA, the UN Military Observer Group in India and

Pakistan, and the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) are prominent

secondary institutions that have been formed to address the political and

security challenges facing the South Asian region and the Asian continent. The

implication of this distinction is that it affords greater attention to international

organisations, which for Bull are a sub-category of diplomacy.

Institutions are the embodiment of the shared culture, values and norms

of a society of states; they act as "impersonal social forces" that influence states

to adjust their behaviour for social validation rather than to maximise their

power (Keohane 1988, 381). In Buzan's (2014, 17) terms, primary institutions are

constitutive—they define what constitutes legitimate state behaviour in an

international society. To the extent that primary institutions are constitutive

forces that define the character of an international society (Buzan and Lawson

2015, 85), they are distinct from secondary institutions, which are "consciously

designed by states to serve specific functional purposes" (Buzan 2014, 17).

For Kilian Spandler (2015, 608-09), however, the distinction between

primary and secondary institutions on the basis of the former being constitutive

and the latter merely *regulative* breaks down when one considers that secondary institutions, too, can be constitutive: They play a part in states' identity formation, and states appeal to the rules of secondary institutions to justify their actions. Nevertheless, Spandler (2015, 609-13) concedes that primary and secondary institutions are indeed distinct, suggesting that both are constitutive of international behaviour, but in different ways, and that the ES's primary institutions are equivalent to the norms and principles of similar strands of international theory, while secondary institutions "can be called rules and decision-making procedures." This implies that primary institutions can be compared to the norms of constructivism.

Spandler's translation proves helpful in addressing the question of whether the ES's institutions, which emerged in the context of a European society of states (Bull 2012, 26-36), remain meaningful when applied to a non-Western environment such as South Asia. Charles Kupchan (2014, 219-21) throws light on this issue by arguing that the great powers at any given point in time export their norms to the rest of the international system, and these norms contribute to the maintenance of order in the system.

Kupchan (2014, 227-42) employs the terminology of norms rather than institutions, but his discussion of how the British colonial era relied on the norms of diplomacy, the balance of power and war offers insight into why these institutions hold such significance for classical ES authors such as Bull (2012). For Kupchan (2014, 219-22), the transfer of hegemonic power from the United

Kingdom to the United States took place amid relative institutional continuity due to cultural similarities between the Western, English-speaking powers, but the advent of a multi-polar order portends the likelihood of alternative normative orders based on the particular cultural, historical, ideological and socio-economic contexts of the new rising powers.

Kupchan provides one way of understanding why the ES's institutions remain relevant even outside the West, due to the export of Western norms and institutions to other parts of the international society. However, Kupchan's explanation is limited by its assumption that Western norms, institutions and rules were merely imposed upon the non-West without any process of negotiation or any agency on the part of non-Western states (Zhang 2014, 680-81). Similar assumptions are evident in Bull's (2012, 36-37) account of how the twentieth century witnessed an expansion of international society to encompass all states of the world, with this expanded international society adopting the culture of the dominant Western states. As Zhang (2014, 678) stresses, however, the expansion of international society did not entail non-Western states' adoption of Western or European culture, but of the institution of the Westphalian state, and "this variable, historically and practically constituted foundational institution was as much an imposition of European international society as it was the product of inter-civilisational negotiations." Zhang (2014, 694) emphasises

the complex processes of communicative actions among all member states, Western and non-Western, liberal and illiberal, through which common norms, values, interests and institutions have been negotiated, diffused, interpreted and accepted in different social embeddings, [as well as] the agencies exercised by non-Western states and peoples in the negotiations for and the production of multiple meanings of democracy and human rights in reaching an intersubjective understanding of those norms and institutions across civilisational boundaries.

Zhang (2014, 682-85) also argues that while non-Western states adopted the institutions of sovereignty, international law and diplomacy to become members of international society, the evolving norms of human equality, human rights and nationalism entailed conversations between the West and non-West that de-legitimised colonialism and led to the emergence of the post-colonial international society. Thus, Zhang's point is that it is simplistic to view the institutional framework of international society as a Western normative imposition on other states; instead, the institutions of international society have evolved through interactions among Western and non-Western states in which the latter have been active participants.[19]

Although Zhang (2014, 693-94) underlines the inter-subjective manner in which the meanings of global institutions have been negotiated, he accedes that Western civilisation's hegemony has meant that Western values have been highly influential in shaping the normative architecture of international society.

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[19] I reject the argument that the ES institutions are based on exclusively Western cultural and philosophical views. Notions of law, sovereignty, diplomacy, human equality and war have existed outside the West too historically and before the modern era. Pakistan is not shaped solely by British norms; it has a much older history dating back all the way to the Indus Valley Civilisation and, more recently, being part of a series of Muslim, Buddhist and Sikh empires, as well as Alexander's empire.

Like Kupchan, Zhang (2014, 695) is led to wonder what impact the shift to multi-polarity will have on the normative, institutional structure of international society. Costa-Buranelli (2015, 499-500) speaks to this question when he argues that the "regionalisation of world politics" has challenged Western normative understandings and resulted in a "multiplication of *interpretations* of global institutions." Costa-Buranelli (2015, 511) contends that although "a global international society" is still in existence, the meanings imposed on the institutions underpinning international society differ. In other words, at the regional level, "Different international societies adopt the same institutions with different meanings and specific normative contents" (Costa-Buranelli 2015, 499). This chapter addresses a gap in the literature by teasing out the institutions that exist in South Asia. The narrative component of this chapter throws light on the meanings and normative contents of the institutions of the ES in the South Asian context.

To the extent that this chapter adds to the ES's understanding of how institutions are interpreted in regional society in South Asia, it contributes to the ES's strength as a theory that is equipped to adapt to the shifting power dynamics of the twenty-first century, responding to Hurrell's (2007b) call for more attention to the regional level of analysis within the ES. Furthermore, it helps resolve the ES's problem of a proliferation of lists of primary institutions put forward by various theorists, a challenge identified by Peter Wilson (2012, 567). Wilson (2012, 568) proposes that the only way to move beyond arbitrary

lists of primary institutions is through empirical research that grounds the ES's institutions by demonstrating both which institutions are recognised by political actors and what meanings are ascribed to them. This chapter provides such an analysis of primary institutions in South Asia and particularly in the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan sub-region, which is of direct relevance to Pakistan's security concerns and militant landscape.

As Wilson (2012) suggests, the analysis adopts the *interpretive/insider* approach of the classical ES, as opposed to the *structuralist/outsider* position employed by new institutionalists such as Laust Schouenberg (2011) and Buzan. It relies on interviews I conducted; interviews, speeches and statements of key political players derived from sources such as the media, think tanks and international organisations; and press reports to get inside the minds of statespersons and other relevant actors, especially those from the case-study country of Pakistan. This approach is faithful to the ES's stress on "imaginative identification with and reconstruction of the roles, choices, outlooks, and predicaments of statespersons" and on "the importance of putting oneself in the statespersons and other significant actors' shoes and trying to see things as they see them" (P. Wilson 2012, 578).

Wilson (2012) and Schouenborg (2011) have conducted surveys of the lists of primary institutions provided by various ES theorists over the years. For analytical clarity, this chapter relies on two lists: the five institutions outlined by Bull (2012, 71) in *The Anarchical Society*, referred to by Wilson (2012, 569) as

"the benchmark institutional list," and the updated list of fourteen primary institutions offered by Buzan (2014, 101-35) in *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*. This is because Bull and Buzan arguably represent the most influential perspectives within the ES's classical and contemporary scholarship respectively. Bull (2012, 97-222) devotes a chapter each to the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers. Buzan (2014, 101-63) provides explanations first of eleven pluralist primary institutions: (1) territoriality; (2) sovereignty/non-intervention; (3) diplomacy; (4) international law; (5) the balance of power; (6) great-power management; (7) war; (8) imperialism/colonialism; (9) human inequality; (10) dynasticism; and (11) nationalism. He then puts forth an updated list of fourteen solidarist primary institutions, along with discussions of each: (1) territoriality; (2) sovereignty/non-intervention; (3) diplomacy; (4) international law; (5) the balance of power; (6) great-power management; (7) war; (8) imperialism/colonialism/development; (9) human inequality; (10) dynasticism; (11) nationalism; (12) the market; (13) democracy; and (14) environmental stewardship. Since this last list of Buzan's solidarist institutions includes all of Bull's institutions as well as all eleven pluralist institutions, the fourteen solidarist institutions constitute the total of the institutions considered in this chapter. Taking its cue from Bull (2012, 159), the chapter treats secondary institutions as a sub-category of diplomacy, thus ensuring that they are taken into account.

Chapter 4 mirrors the structure of Chapter 3 in that it is organised thematically. The discussion of three prominent aspects of Pakistan's security relationships in South Asia leads to conclusions about the institutions that regulate international society in the region, and the meanings imparted to them by South Asian political actors. Rather than using the list of institutions to mould the analysis, the relevant institutions are allowed to emerge from the interpretation of political events relating to the three themes in South Asian politics under study. While this may not uncover all the institutional practices that exist across the entire South Asian region, it provides a starting point for further analysis. It also ensures that the analysis remains pertinent to the broader aims of this thesis.

International Institutions and Regional Cooperation

When one considers Pakistan's main security relationships in South Asia, with India and Afghanistan, the multidimensional and interrelated character of these interactions becomes clear. Pakistan's conflict with India has had a territorial aspect since the birth of Pakistan in 1947, in the form of the dispute over J&K.[20] For the past several decades, India has accused Pakistan of sponsoring separatist violence in IJK, while Pakistan believes India supports a separatist insurgency in Pakistan's south-western province of Balochistan.

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[20] Although it is Kashmir where dissatisfaction with the status quo of being ruled by India is centred—the other parts of J&K seem quite content with the countries they have ended up in—both India and Pakistan officially lay claim to J&K in its entirety (Snedden 2013, 220).

Since attacks in Mumbai in 2008, India's allegations that the Pakistani state is behind terrorist attacks in India have become shriller, while escalating attacks within Pakistan by the TTP during the same period have been accompanied by increasingly vocal Pakistani claims of Indian involvement. Thus, cross-border terrorism has come to be seen as a separate, albeit related, issue from the dispute over J&K. Thirdly, Afghanistan in the aftermath of the NATO invasion has become the site of a competition between India and Pakistan for influence, leading William Dalrymple (2013) to dub the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan security dynamic "a deadly triangle." Pakistan's interactions with its region—its sense of being threatened by India and its desire to maintain influence in Afghanistan as a way of balancing against India—have shaped its policy towards militant groups. Therefore, to understand the local militant landscape, it is imperative to comprehend the main security issues characterising Pakistan's international relations in its region.

Pakistan's interactions with South Asia are defined by three principal themes, at least in terms of issues that are of contemporary relevance to the country's security: NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan; the territorial dispute with India over J&K and an upsurge in unrest in the part of the province administered by India over the past few years; and the issue of cross-border terrorism, including both the possible Indian (and Afghan) support for militancy within Pakistan that is aimed at domestic targets, and the alleged backing provided by the Pakistani security establishment to

militants who target India and Afghanistan, and the impact of this on diplomacy.[21]

The following subsections will enquire into these aspects of South Asian politics, considering the ways in which South Asian states participate in the institutions of international society when addressing these issues, and the potential for the fortification of institutions in these areas of South Asian politics. This latter objective is in line with the normative dimension of ES theorising—its concern with questions of justice as well as order and, as Kevork Oskanian (2013) puts it, with "*what ought to be*" as well as what is. Dunne (2001, 225) identifies praxeological research that is oriented towards policy and looks also at "whether the English School can provide a moral compass to those in high office" as one of three central areas of research on international society. The normative aspect of this content is determined by the solidarist institution of human rights and the threat to those rights from both terrorism and counterterrorism.

This chapter contributes significantly to the contemporary literature on South Asian politics—which has largely neglected the theoretical tools of the ES—by applying the concept of institutions and the school's normative

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[21] The after-effects of the 1971 war that led to Bangladesh's severance from Pakistan continue to be seen in the form of tense diplomatic relations between them, recently heightened over Bangladesh's execution of members of the Bangladeshi wing of the JI for alleged war crimes committed in 1971 (P. Chakravarty 2016; Paul 2016). There have also been suggestions that Pakistani intelligence supports terrorist groups and interferes in politics in Bangladesh (Oldmixon 2016). However, the most pressing international security concerns for Pakistan that emanate from South Asia currently pertain to the Afghan situation, the J&K conflict, and the possible Indian involvement in the activities of the TTP within Pakistan.

dimension to one of the more conflict-ridden parts of the world. It also contributes to this thesis's agenda by providing a praxeological compass with regard to whether the South Asian regional project still holds any promise from Pakistan's perspective, or the country would be better off cutting its losses and pivoting towards allies located elsewhere. It further shows the interaction between South Asian history and politics and the threat posed by terrorism.

The discussion in the following subsections begins with the dispute over J&K, the issue that kick-started Pakistan's security-centric relationship with its larger neighbour in the region. This dispute was largely responsible for the use of terrorist proxies in the Pakistan-India rivalry, an issue that is explored in the second subsection, which also attends to aspects of counterterrorism cooperation in the region that extend beyond the India-Pakistan problem. The tensions between these two states have spilled over into Afghanistan, rendered vulnerable by decades of instability, and it is this evolving situation towards which the third subsection turns its attention.

Jammu, Kashmir and the Question of *Azaadi*[22]

Sheba Chhachi's art installation titled *Cleave/to* (1996, Eicher Gallery, New Delhi) depicts Pakistan and India as Siamese twins. She juxtaposes the definitions of the word "cleave"—divide, split, separate with violence, sunder, cut—with those of "cleave to"—adhere, stick to, cling to, unite—thus encapsulating the complicated relationship that keeps India and Pakistan separated and yet unable to divorce. Conjoined in the disputed province of J&K, the two countries have found it impossible to negotiate a solution to the conflict and remain stubbornly fixated on possessing the picturesque Kashmir valley, where, according to Christopher Snedden (2013, 220), "ironically, most people appear uninterested in joining either nation."

India is the status-quo power that would probably stand to lose if a plebiscite were ever held in the Muslim-majority province (Thakur 1992, 169). Therefore, India has sought to take the J&K dispute off the agenda of bilateral discussions (Hakhoo 2015). Instead, in its interactions with Pakistan, India has framed Kashmir as an internal issue (Iqbal and Haider 2016). As the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference sums it up (paraphrased by Kadayam Subramanian (2016a)): "To global players, India says Kashmir is a bilateral issue

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[22] *Azaadi* means freedom. The movement for Kashmiri freedom contains two distinct streams; one favours complete independence and the establishment of an independent country, whereas the other advocates merger with Pakistan. As Kashmiri political cartoonist Malik Sajad (2015, 210) explains in his graphic novel *Munnu*, "Though the uprising was started by pro-independence groups, it was soon riddled with factions. Many of these groups viewed Islam as a natural bond between Kashmir and Pakistan." *Azaadi* is a loaded term cultivated by politicians in the context of J&K; one portion of the province administered by Pakistan goes by the nomenclature of AJK, while Balraj Puri (2008, 20) has even suggested *azaadi* refers to autonomy for the province within Indian borders.

between India and Pakistan. To Pakistanis, India says Kashmir is an internal matter and to Hurriyat, it says Kashmir is an integral part of India." In October 2019, the hard-line Modi government revoked J&K's status as a state, dividing it into two centrally administered union territories—the union territory of J&K and the union territory of Ladakh. The Modi administration also in August 2019 revoked J&K's constitutional special status (*BBC* 2019; Bhatt 2019; I. Chakravarty 2019; *India Today* 2019). These moves have solidified India's claim that J&K is an "internal matter" and an "integral part of India," shrinking the room for domestic debate as well as international diplomacy.

Pakistan, for its part, has attempted to draw world attention to human-rights abuses in IJK and highlighted the UNSC resolutions that recommend the holding of a plebiscite in J&K (UN Security Council 1948a, 1948b, 1950, 1951). At the seventy-first session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Sharif (2016) repeated this demand "for the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and fair plebiscite," taking the opportunity also to condemn India's refusal to talk to Pakistan about J&K, as well as the Indian security forces' repression of protests against the July 2016 killing of separatist fighter Burhan Wani. Sharif referred to international law, one of the institutions of international society, to substantiate Pakistan's support for "the demand of the Kashmiri people for self-determination," while also calling for greater engagement by India and Pakistan in diplomacy, another of the ES's institutions, when he argued that "talks are in the interest of

both countries. They are essential to resolve our differences, especially in [the] Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and to avert the danger of any escalation."

Pakistan's concern over human-rights violations in IJK suggests that human rights, which Buzan (2014, 159) categorises as an "emergent [. . .] institution of international society" and includes in his discussion of human equality, is an institution that is surfacing in discourse in South Asia. This is likely to be a result of human rights' increased currency in global discourse. Pakistan's then-ambassador to the UN, Maleeha Lodhi, in October 2016 told the UNGA that Pakistan wanted "an independent inquiry into human-rights abuses in occupied Kashmir" (Pakistan Ministry 2016a). This is important because it points to the potential for human rights to become a cause for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, as is suggested by outrage in Indian society over the rape and murder of a Muslim child in IJK by Hindu locals (*Scroll* 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e). This is a significant shift from previous indifference in India to human-rights issues in IJK. The shift is helped by the fact that the army did not perpetrate the crime against the victim, but having taken place, further human-rights abuses in Kashmir—including those perpetrated by the security forces—are likely to receive greater media attention in India. If the Indian electorate can put pressure on the state and central governments to act on human-rights violations in IJK, this would provide common ground for a bilateral dialogue where the concerns of human beings living in J&K rise to prominence. This portends that a strengthening norm of human rights would

shift the balance of power away from the pluralist strand of ES theorising towards the school's solidarist strand, which privileges justice and the rights of individuals. If the combined forces of a free media and a vocal civil-society movement can bring pressure to bear on the Indian government to take the human rights of *individuals* in IJK seriously, this would lay the groundwork for a reconciliation with Pakistan that is sensitive to the needs of local people. This suggests that a merging of the pluralist and solidarist branches of the ES, and of international and world society, could offer a practical way out of the Kashmir deadlock by raising the concerns of *local individuals* above those of the Indian and Pakistani states. Social forces—the media, lawyers, and civil-society movements—have a role to play in pressuring the state into taking action on human-rights violations in IJK.

India's defensiveness over accusations of human-rights abuses in J&K reflects Buzan's (2014, 159) observation that the institution of human rights is "strongly opposed by states that fear erosion of their right to nonintervention:" India in August 2016 refused a request by the UN Commission on Human Rights to visit IJK, with political leaders across parties agreeing that "it could lead to interference in the country's internal matters," and Modi declaring that he would not "allow Pakistan to intrude into India's internal affairs" (Ananya Roy 2016). Human-rights abuses in IJK also support Buzan's (2014, 159) understanding of human rights as still being a nascent institution.

With 600,000 to 700,000 Indian troops stationed in Kashmir since 1989, the conflict has killed 47,000 to 100,000 people, and human-rights abuses have included the custodial disappearance of 8,000 to 10,000 youths, extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and the suppression of protests (Baba 2014, 71; Geelani 2014, 31-38; Mathur 2014, 5; Yusuf and Najam 2009, 1518). In 2014, Gowhar Geelani (2014, 34) wrote about "a new generation of Kashmiris" that had turned to peaceful demonstrations to protest against Indian rule, whose agitations were forcefully suppressed by Indian forces. Things degenerated over the next two years. In the summer of 2016, a brutal crackdown was carried out by the Indian security forces on Kashmiri protesters in which approximately seventeen thousand people were reportedly injured (Waheed 2016). As Kunal Mukherjee (2014, 47) maintains, "If one talks to the locals, it becomes very clear that the military personnel have been causing much of the violence in the region rather than maintaining law and order." In a subsequent article, Mukherjee (2016, 511) notes that

> the Indian army has had a tendency to treat local people with contempt and this has strengthened the sense of marginalization local Kashmiris feel. The Indian Army has often misused and abused the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives them extraordinary power to deal with the situation and supposedly manage the conflict.

Thus, although regional actors have started to incorporate the abstract concept of human rights into their narratives to legitimise their positions, it is not an institution that is strongly upheld in material terms. Nevertheless, this shift implies that human rights as an institution is gaining currency in the

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international discourse in South Asia, which suggests the potential for human-rights organisations and civil-society groups in India and Pakistan to put pressure on both governments to resolve the Kashmir conflict despite both armies' vested interest in keeping the conflict simmering.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's discourse on the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination is an appeal to the institution of nationalism, which has come to underpin the international system of states, with the idea of national self-determination lending meaning and power to the concept of an international society of states (Buzan 2014, 109). However, the question of self-determination for Kashmiris brings up the problematic nature of nationalism in South Asia, which is tied to the process of decolonisation in the Indian subcontinent.

Reece Jones (2016, 110-12) points to the artificial nature of the boundaries of post-colonial "nation states" drawn up in European capitals, which "did not match the tribal, linguistic, or ethnic affiliations of the people." This mirrors Anam's (2017) observation about the hasty manner in which the British drew national boundaries in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, assigning the job to a person who was unfamiliar with the subcontinent, and causing human suffering that continues to fuel political tensions today. Benedict Anderson (2016, 113-14) demonstrates how the post-colonial "nations" were a legacy of imperialism, and although nationalist ideologies spread in the non-West, they mimicked European and American nationalism while overlooking the "arbitrariness of frontiers" and "diverse monoglot populations" of the new

post-colonial states. As Anderson argues, post-colonial "nations" often inherited imperial boundaries, and as Buzan (2014, 111-12) contends, the idea of nationalism has "set up a tension between the status quo of fewer than two hundred territorial states and the potential existence of several thousand cultural nations demanding their own state," with secessionism challenging a number of states.

In spite of powerful nationalist ideologies and rhetoric, India and Pakistan—both amalgams of multiple ethnic nations—are plagued by various secessionist movements based on ethnicity, with Bangladesh's secession constituting one success for nationalist separatist movements in the region. Kashmir's restiveness is yet another example of the weak and problematic nature of nationalism in the region, particularly in India and Pakistan, in spite of considerable efforts by political elites in each country to forge a strong national identity. Kashmiri nationalism challenges the institution of territoriality in South Asia, while India's continued control over Kashmir in spite of decades of unrest underscores the strength of territoriality in the modern state system. As territoriality has become embedded in the institutional framework of international society, "the political map of the world has taken on an increasingly fixed character," making it difficult to bring about either a transfer of power over Kashmir to Pakistan or the creation of an independent state without India's consent (Buzan 2014, 141-42). Even so, continued agitation by disgruntled Kashmiris, along with militant attacks and diplomatic pressure

from Pakistan, act as a persistent challenge to territoriality, undermining India's claim to territorial integrity. Furthermore, a military conflict between India and China along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh in mid-2020 signifies the continuing relevance of war as a means employed by regional states to seek to resolve the Kashmir imbroglio: Several authors have linked the India-China standoff to the 2019 abrogation of J&K's special status and statehood (*Eurasian Times* 2020; Jacob 2020; Notezai 2020; Wahab 2020). Meanwhile, the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir has asserted that the Indian legal action has led to "a tri-lateralisation of the dispute over Kashmir between India, Pakistan and China" (Javaid 2020).

Bull (2012, 122) defines international law "as a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law." In the case of the dispute over J&K, India has suggested that the roots of the conflict lie in Pakistan's breach of international law by sending Pashtun tribesmen into J&K after the Partition of 1947, even though the maharaja of J&K had not acceded to either India or Pakistan. An editorial published by the *Indian Express* argues that "Pakistan launched an invasion of Kashmir despite having signed the [Standstill] Agreement" (Gharekhan 2016), referring to the agreement mentioned in Chapter 3, whereby Pakistan was to manage J&K's postal system and supply essential goods, including food, to J&K; and Pakistan gained control of rail and river transportation through J&K (Sumantra Bose 2003, 33; Schofield 2003, 40).

Snedden (2013, 38), however, has questioned this narrative that ascribes the origin of the conflict over J&K to the Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen's invasion on 22 October 1947 by suggesting that the J&K conflict was initiated by subjects of J&K, and not by Pakistanis. While he concedes that some Pakistanis must have supported the opposition to the Dogra Hindu king in J&K, Snedden (2013, 43) highlights the porousness of the border at that initial stage in the history of modern India and Pakistan, and points to the deep-seated "ethnic, familial, cultural, geographical and economic links" that connected Muslims in Jammu to Punjabis and Pashtuns in the newly formed state of Pakistan. Thus, he shows that it is not surprising that Muslim dissidents in J&K received support from across the border, while there is no clear evidence that senior members of the Pakistani government or military had ordered this assistance (Snedden 2013, 44).

While Snedden's (2013, 65) account casts doubt upon the Indian narrative that portrays Pakistan as having breached international law by "deliberately sen[ding] Muslim Pukhtoon tribesmen into Muslim-majority J&K to physically seize the princely state for Pakistan" by emphasising the role played by residents of J&K themselves in initiating the independence movement, the focus of this section is on the ways in which South Asian states, and especially Pakistan, *have* upheld international law and the other institutions of international society in the case of the dispute over J&K. This is because this chapter explores the institutional foundations in South Asia, especially as they

pertain to Pakistan. Two prominent examples of Pakistan's participation in the institution of international law with regard to J&K are its support for the UN-recommended plebiscite and its signing of the Karachi and Simla agreements (India Ministry 1972; UN 1949).

A series of UN resolutions, adopted by the UNSC (1948a, 1948b, 1950, 1951) as well as UNCIP (1948, 1949), recommended that a plebiscite be held to determine whether J&K should accede to Pakistan or India. The UN resolutions called for the armies of both countries to issue simultaneous ceasefire orders and for Pakistan to withdraw its soldiers, tribesmen and other nationals not normally resident in J&K who had entered solely for the purpose of fighting. They further required that once these groups of Pakistanis had left J&K, India pull out most of its troops. Once these conditions had been met, a free and fair plebiscite could be held.

As it turned out, however, India and Pakistan did not withdraw their soldiers, although the Pashtun tribesmen left J&K "of their own accord" (Snedden 2013, 84). Consequently, a plebiscite was never held, and the status of J&K under international law remains in limbo. Pakistan, for its part, has repeatedly called for the holding of the plebiscite, as Sharif reiterated during his UN speech. In this sense, Pakistan has sought consistently to turn to the institution of international law as a way of resolving the Kashmir dispute, even though its military maintains a presence in PJK.

From a solidarist perspective, the failure of the UN resolutions to enforce a plebiscite in J&K can be seen as a sign of the weakness of international law in South Asia, although Pakistan's repeated references to the resolutions suggest that actors in the region do perceive international law to be a relevant and desirable institution. A former Indian ambassador whom I interviewed on 21 November 2016, who was a staff member at the Indian high commission in Pakistan for three years, blamed Pakistan's failure to withdraw its troops from PJK for the UN resolutions not being acted on, indicating that India, too, lays some store by the UN resolutions. However, the former envoy was also vehement that India's claim to J&K was legitimate because of the maharaja's accession and required no ratification from the people: He portrayed former Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's promises to adhere to the wishes of the people of J&K as a foolish error.[23] This points to a tension between the colonial law whereby the rulers of princely states had the right to choose whether to join India or Pakistan, and the institutions of democracy (as in self-determination) and international law (as in UN resolutions). That being said, the legal standing of UN resolutions is unclear; Bull (2012, 143) draws out the tension between pluralist and solidarist leanings on this point, arguing that while UN resolutions were traditionally seen as recommendations, solidarists have sought to reinvent them as legally binding.

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[23] This interview was confidential; the name of the interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement. Arundhati Roy (2010) provides a comprehensive list of Nehru's statements pledging to eventually allow the people of J&K to determine their own fate.

However, Pakistan has also participated in the institution of international law in the form of signing agreements with India, notably the Karachi and Simla agreements, that pertain to the status of J&K (India Ministry 1972; UN 1949). Under the Karachi Agreement of July 1949, the military representatives of Pakistan and India agreed on the demarcation of a ceasefire line in J&K. Although the agreement was reached "under the auspices of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan," it provides for India and Pakistan to maintain troops on their respective sides of the ceasefire line, thus contradicting the UN resolutions calling for the Pakistani army's complete withdrawal from and Indian forces' reduced presence in J&K (UN 1949). This pragmatism is probably what rendered the Karachi Agreement a success; the agreement clearly lays out its apathy towards political issues.

Another landmark agreement in the history of India-Pakistan relations that pertains to J&K is the Simla Agreement of July 1972. Not only does the agreement declare "that the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them," it also asserts that "in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side" (India Ministry 1972). As Asad Hashim (2014) suggests, it is the Simla Agreement that introduces the idea of the Line of Control (LoC), which

remains the unofficial border between Pakistan and India in J&K. Furthermore, according to Snedden (2013, 101), the Simla Agreement's emphasis on bilateral negotiations "seemingly negated the promised plebiscite" by turning J&K into a bilateral dispute between two parties—India and Pakistan. In theory, this rules out the possibility of the UN or great powers helping to negotiate a political settlement, as well as the potential for the several ethnic and religious groups that belong to J&K to participate in a political process to resolve the conflict. It thus denies agency to local people and invests it in the state.

The establishment of the LoC was the result of the resort to another institution of international society: war. While it may seem counter-intuitive to propose that war, which represents violence rather than peace, is an institution of international society, Bull (2012, 178) rejects this criticism by explaining that war "is a settled pattern of behaviour, shaped towards the promotion of common goals, [and] there cannot be any doubt that it has been in the past such an institution, and remains one." India and Pakistan have fought three wars over J&K: in 1947-48, 1965 and 1999. In 1947-48, the armed Pakistani tribesmen who entered J&K were followed by regular Pakistani troops. The war culminated in the 1949 demarcation of a ceasefire line, and Pakistan retains control over AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. The 1965 war, triggered by border clashes in the Indian state of Gujarat and the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers into IJK, resulted in shifts in the territory controlled by each side. In 1999, the Pakistani army once again crossed over to IJK, sparking off the Kargil war (Hashim 2014).

According to Bull (2012, 180-81), war fulfils several functions in the international order. For individual states, war can be an instrument through which a state can attain certain objectives. For the international system, war determines the shape that the system takes at a given point in time, by demarcating the boundaries between states and eliminating weaker states. Meanwhile, in the international society of states, war serves on the one hand to diminish order, but on the other hand is a way "of enforcing international law, of preserving the balance of power, and, arguably, of promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just."

Seen through this prism, Pakistan's initiation of three wars over J&K can be interpreted as having upheld the norms of international society. The UN's successive resolutions calling for a plebiscite in J&K suggest that the international community of states does not perceive the status-quo situation where Hari Singh acceded to India as just, given J&K's Muslim majority and its geographical location (it is contiguous with both Pakistan and India, and could hence practically be a part of Pakistan). However, the stipulation that Pakistan should end and India should minimise its military presence in J&K is unrealistic and effectively forecloses the possibility of a plebiscite being held under the terms of the UN resolutions, since neither country will want to risk losing hard-won territory by drawing down its troops in the province. Hence, Pakistan's initiation of wars is not only an attempt by the country to achieve its strategic objective of gaining possession of J&K, but it also serves to push for a change in

international law so that justice may prevail. Given the inherent flaw in the UN resolutions, which inadvertently serve to uphold the status quo, war is a way of initiating a change in the ground situation that forces the negotiation of new international laws that might help to resolve the J&K conflict. At another level, war is a means of enforcing the underlying principles of the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite, which seek to give the people of J&K a say in the fate of their state: In the face of India's refusal to budge on its claim to the whole state, war gives Pakistan an instrument through which it can put pressure on India to conduct a referendum, even if soldiers from both countries must remain present. Furthermore, conducting wars over J&K has won Pakistan territory: It is now in control of AJK and of Gilgit-Baltistan. Thus, it has served to improve the balance of power in South Asia, where India is the predominant power; Gilgit-Baltistan, in particular, comprises as much as twenty-five thousand square miles and shares borders with China as well as Afghanistan, rendering it strategically important (Snedden 2013, 146). The fact that CPEC traverses PJK is evidence of the strategic and economic significance of Pakistan's control over PJK. The balance of power is another of Bull's five institutions of international society, and J&K is a key factor in the balance between India and Pakistan, the only country in the region with the wherewithal to balance against India.

In addition to the balance of power, another institution that is at play in the Kashmir conflict is diplomacy. Bull (2012, 156) defines diplomacy as "the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world

politics by official agents and by peaceful means." His definition of diplomacy includes multilateral diplomacy, which refers to "conferences of two or more states, or [. . .] permanent conferences, that is, international organisations" (Bull 2012, 159).

Pakistan's engagement in diplomacy to resolve the Kashmir issue has involved dialogue with India, including under the banner of the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD), as well as efforts to diplomatically draw international attention to human-rights abuses in IJK (I. Haider 2015; *Nation* 2016). The bilateral dialogue process was particularly fruitful in 2007, when Musharraf and former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh were widely reported to be on the verge of a resolution of the dispute; Musharraf's downfall, discussed in Chapter 3, interrupted this process (Snedden 2013, 221). More recently, in December 2015, the Sharif and Modi administrations announced the resumption of the CBD, which had been suspended in 2012, amid a short-lived spell of bilateral bonhomie (I. Haider 2015). Since the CBD covers J&K along with other issues, this spelt hope for Kashmir, but the optimism soon faded, with the former Pakistani high commissioner to India Abdul Basit declaring by April 2016 that he considered the CBD to be suspended (*Indian Express* 2016b; Kumaraswami 2016; S. Roy 2016c). Although official diplomacy has been strained under the hard-line Modi administration in India, a report in September 2016 of back-door diplomacy between Pakistan and India to seek to lower tensions over the interlinked issues of J&K and

terrorism indicated that the institution of diplomacy in the sub-region is resilient, even if it often falters (*Geo News* 2016).

Bull's (2012, 168-70) comments on the decline of diplomacy in IR might throw some light on the apparent difficulty faced by Indian and Pakistani diplomats in resolving disputes. As Bull points out, diplomatic meetings in the contemporary world often involve the two parties addressing not each other, but their respective publics in order to garner their support. As a result, instead of finding common ground, they end up engaging in what Bull calls "political warfare." It could be argued that the intensification of access to the media in the age of the Internet has magnified this process since Bull wrote *The Anarchical Society* in 1977.

A September 2016 statement by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calling "on the Governments of Pakistan and India to address their outstanding issues, including regarding Kashmir, peacefully through diplomacy and dialogue," however, is an indication of the insufficiency of diplomatic engagement between the rivals to address the situation in J&K. While the former Secretary-General offered to mediate if this was acceptable to both sides, Kashmiri academic Noor Ahmad Baba (2014) suggests that multilateral diplomacy through the region's predominant international organisation, SAARC, could play a role in the peace process to resolve the conflict over J&K. Pakistan, for its part, has been in favour of international mediation by a great power such as the United States, but India considers any

international mediation to constitute interference (Snedden 2013, 223). This is because it is in India's interest as the status-quo power to prevent a resolution of the Kashmir matter, whereas Pakistan's interest is in international pressure effectuating a resolution.

Pakistan's openness to mediation by the United States or another power is an example of its support not only for the institution of diplomacy, but also for the institution of great-power management. At a discussion at the Pakistan Mission to the UN in New York, Lodhi called on the United States to play a more zealous part in dissolving Indo-Pakistani tensions and particularly the J&K dispute (*Dispatch News Desk* 2017; *Pakistan Today* 2017). For Bull (2012, 222), "In parts of the world where the political position of the great powers is limited by secondary powers of major importance, the great powers may seek to accommodate these powers as partners in the management of the regional balance concerned." In South Asia, great powers such as the United States and China are already doing as much, in concert with the regional powers—India and Pakistan. Both the United States and China in 2016 called on Pakistan and India to favour dialogue as the tool to work out their dispute over J&K, which indicates their desire for the resolution of the festering conflict and puts pressure on both states to comply (*Hindu* 2016a; S. Roy 2016b). However, as Lodhi said in her January 2017 comments at the Pakistan Mission to the UN, "What we [would] like to see is the United States not coming as a fire brigade to put out a fire but to come in at a time where it can avert any kind of crisis

from brewing and exploding actually" (*Dispatch News Desk* 2017; *Pakistan Today* 2017). An offer by Turkey to mediate between Pakistan and India on J&K highlights the potential for super-regional powers to participate in great-power management of the dispute; Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also underscored the utility of the institutions of diplomacy and international law to resolve the conflict (S. Hussain 2016).

During a discussion at the Stimson Center, a US think tank, PML-N parliamentarian Shezra Mansab Ali Khan Kharal (2016) called on the international community to put pressure on India to negotiate with Pakistan on J&K, signalling her government's preference for great-power mediation to resolve the conflict. This would not, however, go down well with India, which is determined now to treat J&K not just as a bilateral issue, but as an internal matter, and to limit its conversations with Pakistan to the other core issue. It is to this subject that the next section turns.

Cross-Border Terrorism and Regional Cooperation

Afghan vice-president Sarwar Danesh (2016) used his speech at the seventy-first session of the UNGA to suggest that terrorist attacks that took place in his country over the previous several months "were planned and organised from the other side of the Durand Line, inside Pakistani territory." He went on to rhetorically ask:

> Where were the previous leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda residing and where were they killed? And this very moment, where are the

leaders of the Taliban and Haqqani Network located? From where and how are terrorists being trained, equipped and financed during a full-scale war? We have repeatedly asked our neighbouring country, Pakistan, to destroy the known terrorist safe havens, but we, unfortunately, have yet to witness any change in the situation.

Danesh's allegations were echoed more cautiously by then-Indian external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj (2016) in her UNGA speech. While she refrained from directly accusing Pakistan of harbouring terrorists, her oblique references did not leave much room for guesswork.

The narrative put forward by Danesh and Swaraj, however, is in contrast to the perspective presented by *Waar*, the third-highest-grossing film in the history of Pakistani cinema, which portrays two foreign intelligence agents as coordinating an attempted terrorist attack by the TTP in the country (*Express Tribune* 2015; Galaxy Lollywood 2017; Lashari 2013). Although the plot portrays the agents as belonging to two separate countries, both seem stereotypically Indian: The female agent's real name is Lakshmi, while the male agent spends his mornings practising yoga (Lashari 2013). The success of the film indicates, as Faizan Hussain's (2013) review contends, that *Waar* presents "the Pakistani perspective on the menace of terrorism and the involvement of foreign hands in it."

The Pakistani authorities have accused India of supporting the TTP, as well as backing a separatist movement in Balochistan and fuelling ethnic violence in Karachi (M. Khan 2015; *News International* 2015; Stanford University

2012; Zahra-Malik 2015). The spokesperson for the Pakistani foreign-affairs ministry, Mohammed Nafees Zakaria, maintained in a January 2017 statement:

> While claiming to denounce terrorism, India has in fact deployed terrorism as an instrument of state policy, and has itself been involved in perpetrating, sponsoring, supporting, and financing terrorism. Pakistan has been a direct victim of this state sponsored terrorism by India. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav, a RAW agent and serving officer of Indian navy, and his confession about involvement in terrorist activities aimed at destabilizing Pakistan and killing or maiming of Pakistani citizens, is yet another proof of Indian sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. With such duplicitous behaviour and blood on its hands, India has little credibility on counter-terrorism. In the coming days, Pakistan will share with the United Nations and members of the international community additional evidence of Indian involvement in terrorism in Pakistan (Pakistan Ministry 2017a).

In an interview with me, Ishtiaq Ahmad (2015) of the University of Sargodha asserted that claims that India aids the TTP and the MQM—which engages in political violence in Karachi—were credible. Adding weight to these accusations is former Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar's (2015) admission to *Aaj Tak* news channel that "you have to neutralise terrorists through terrorists only," while declining to provide further details publicly, in response to questions about the Modi government's action against terrorism originating from Pakistan. Meanwhile, Avinash Paliwal's (2016, 192) research reveals that Afghanistan also has "some influence over the TTP that operated from its territory." Similarly, Umar Farooq (2014) claims in an article for the *Diplomat* that some of the funding for the TTP has been coming from the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS).

On the other hand, countries in the region have pointed their finger at Pakistan, blaming it for sponsoring terrorism on their territory, as exemplified by Danesh's (2016) UN speech. India blamed LeT, which is reported to have links with the Pakistani security establishment, for the attack on Mumbai in 2008 (Barry and Kumar 2016; J. Burke 2010; Ramesh and Burke 2008; Stanford University 2016). It also insisted that the sophistication of the attack suggested it had some support from Pakistani government agencies (Sengupta 2009). Evidence for this emerged when David Headley, one of the plotters of the attack, told interrogators and a court that the ISI had been involved (Barry and Kumar 2016; J. Burke 2010).

The Indian response to the Mumbai attack forms part of a pattern of Indian complaints against Pakistan-based militant groups that target India, particularly LeT and JeM. In addition to India's assertions that Pakistan does not do enough to prevent these groups from functioning, India has accused Pakistan of promoting Sikh militancy in India (*Press Trust of India* 2010, 2013, 2016). Concerning Afghanistan, Pakistan faces the allegation of providing sanctuary to the Haqqani Network and the Taliban, which carry out attacks in Afghanistan (Faizi 2016; Malhotra 2016; Riedel 2016). This pattern of allegations by India, Pakistan and Afghanistan vis-à-vis state-sponsored terrorism has led to a process of entrenched securitisation in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle, in which narratives constructed by each of these states have securitised the "other" as an existential threat. De-securitisation would entail the shifting

of state-sponsored terrorism by the "other" off the security agenda of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively by treating militancy as a political issue with political motives and causes. (For more on securitisation and de-securitisation in the region, see my journal article "From Copenhagen to Uri and across the Line of Control" (Kapur 2018b)).

As things stand, however, the proxy games played by the security agencies of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are a structural factor that perpetuates militancy in the sub-region (I. Gul and Yousaf 2014). Attempts by India and Pakistan to make headway in peace negotiations are regularly disrupted by terrorist attacks, suggesting that there are vested interests that would be hurt by peace (*Al Jazeera* 2016d; Aneja 2016; *DNA* 2016; Humayun 2016, 1-2; *Kashmir Observer* 2016). According to Mohammad Taqi (2016), "Chances are slim to none that Pakistan's powerful military will allow normalization of relations with India, for it perceives such normalization as a recipe for forgetting the Kashmir problem, which to it is the core issue and 'the unfinished agenda of Partition.'" He continues, "While pledging peace with India, the Pakistani political leadership cannot do much without the blessings of the country's powerful army." Tavleen Singh (2016) concurs, "Instead of dithering between dialogue and hostilities, we [India] should recognise that the military men who control Pakistan's foreign policy have a vested interest in hostilities. Tea parties with Nawaz Sharif will make no difference." Adnan Rafiq (2015) of the US Institute of Peace made a similar point in an interview

with me, suggesting that for the Pakistani army to drop its enmity with India, it would have to be convinced that it would remain relevant even amid subcontinental peace and would have to anticipate some benefit in improved ties. In Afghanistan, installing the Taliban in government would give Pakistan the advantage of *strategic depth* in its conflict with India (Chakma 2014a, 157-64). This is because of the Pakistani "deep state"—the military and ISI—having old ties to the Afghan Taliban.

Despite this structural propensity for regional actors to employ terrorists as proxies, Shehryar Fazli (2012, 113) draws attention to the potential for the institutions of regional society to provide a way out of this deadlock. He argues that the democratically elected civilian governments in Pakistan and India need to keep talking when attacks occur as a way of sidelining the entities that employ terrorism as a means of disrupting dialogue and progress in the peace process. Fazli suggests that there exist opportunities for cooperation in areas such as the sharing of intelligence and evidence among law-enforcement agencies. During Ishtiaq Ahmad's (2015) interview with me, he, too, stressed the need for India to support democratisation in Pakistan by negotiating with the civilian authorities there, regardless of how the military-civilian power equation plays out within Pakistan.

Fazli and Ishtiaq Ahmad's ideas point to the scope of the ES's institution of diplomacy to play a more significant role in managing the instability caused by regional terrorism by increasing the power of Pakistan's democratic

government while simultaneously diminishing the clout of the army and its influence on foreign policy. On the India-Pakistan front, efforts were made by the governments of Sharif and Modi to engage in diplomacy to address the issue of transnational terrorism. Following an attack in the Indian city of Pathankot in January 2016, which disrupted a December 2015 thaw in diplomatic relations, the foreign ministers of the two states met in Nepal. The outcome of the meeting was a visit to India by a Pakistani Joint Investigation Team to collect evidence of the involvement of JeM, which India accused of having perpetrated the assault (*Indian Express* 2016a). Earlier, the national security advisors of the two countries had met in Bangkok in December 2015 and agreed to make contact in the event of a terrorist attack and share information in real time. Soon after the incident in Pathankot, the national security advisors spoke on the telephone several times (Samanta 2016). Also, in 2016, national security advisor Nasser Khan Janjua shared information with his Indian counterpart about a potential attack in Gujarat during the Shivratri festival, an outcome of the Bangkok Mechanism (Swami 2016).

These diplomatic initiatives follow previous attempts such as the establishment of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism in 2004 and the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk in 1990. Like the previous efforts, however, the diplomatic overtures by Pakistan and India in 2015-16 succumbed to the realities of a military relationship characterised by covert warfare conducted through terrorist proxies.

Terrorist incidents often alternate between locations in Indian- and Pakistani-controlled territory, indicating the possibility of tit-for-tat attacks:[24] The gun attack on an air-force base in Pathankot in January 2016 was followed by a bombing in Lahore in March 2016; a blast in the Baloch provincial capital Quetta in August 2016 that was claimed by both Daesh and a TTP faction; an assault on an Indian army base in Uri, a town in IJK, in September 2016; and a suicide-bomb explosion at a police academy in Quetta in October 2016 (*Al Jazeera* 2016c, 2016e; Salfi, Shah, and Perry 2016; Syed Shah 2016; *Times of India* 2016).

Meanwhile, JeM chief Masood Azhar was taken into custody in Pakistan following the Pathankot attack of January 2016. However, *Pakistan Today* in April 2016 quoted an unnamed source as revealing that the Joint Investigation Team had returned to Pakistan complaining of non-cooperation by the Indian authorities, and concluding based on its investigation that the attack had been staged by the Indian administration to malign Pakistan (Abrar 2016; Zahra-Malik and Wilkes 2016). Pakistani ally China in October 2016 blocked an Indian request to have Azhar placed on the UN's list of global terrorists, which would have had the effect of freezing his assets and preventing him from travelling (S. Roy 2016a).

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[24] This is based on my own observations over several years while working at International SOS-Control Risks.

The same week, Pakistan's prestigious *Dawn* newspaper reported a secret meeting between Pakistan's civilian and intelligence leadership. At the meeting, the ruling PML-N party reportedly put pressure on the ISI to allow the administration to take action against militant groups, including JeM, LeT and the Haqqani Network, and Sharif demanded that the investigation into the Pathankot attack and trial of suspects in the Mumbai attack proceed unhindered. The report, which the government denied, stated that the civilian leadership cited the prospect of international isolation and claimed China was privately questioning its veto of the UN ban on Azhar (Almeida 2016; *Dawn* 2016a). Later the same month, the Pakistani authorities froze the bank accounts of approximately 5,100 suspected terrorists, including Azhar (*NDTV* 2016). The suspects belonged predominantly to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (3,078), although the account freeze also included 1,443 suspects from Punjab, 226 from Sindh, 193 from Balochistan, 106 from Gilgit-Baltistan, 27 from Islamabad and 26 from AJK. This indicates that the measure mainly targeted anti-Pakistan groups, although anti-India outfits were affected to a smaller extent. Among the leaders whose accounts were frozen, listed in a Pakistani media source, are the names of leaders of the Pakistan-focused TTP and LeJ; a cleric from the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) against which Musharraf had ordered a fateful military offensive;[25] and Azhar of the India-focused JeM (Gishkori 2016).

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[25] The July 2007 operation against the Lal Masjid set off a backlash against the establishment by Islamist militants (Z. Hussain 2017a).

Thus, diplomatic progress on countering terrorism has occurred in fits and starts in the India-Pakistan context. In Afghanistan, President Ashraf Ghani's assumption of power brought fresh energy to the Pakistan-Afghanistan diplomatic relationship. Unlike his predecessor Karzai, Ghani was keen to engage with Pakistan. In May 2015, a Pakistani delegation led by Sharif visited Kabul and met civilian and military leaders there. The two states agreed to enhance security cooperation, including by conducting joint counterterrorism operations, as well as through intelligence sharing, combined interrogation of terrorism suspects, and the training of Afghan intelligence agents in Pakistan (Panda 2015). By 2016, however, the bonhomie had given way to Afghanistan adopting a tough stance against terrorist "safe havens" in Pakistan, as evidenced by Danesh's address to the UN quoted above. In a July 2016 interview with Pakistani television channel *Geo News*, Ghani complained:

> Twice I was promised peace; before the spring of 2015, I was promised peace, a set of peace agreements. Instead, what did we gain? A vicious wholesale attack on us. In 2016, again, at the highest levels of the government of Pakistan, I was assured that within days, peace process was going to begin in earnest, and another series of attacks.

Referring to the relationship with Pakistan as his country's biggest problem, Ghani demanded that Pakistan give an assurance to Afghanistan that it was "not going to give sanctuary to groups whose aim is overthrow of a legitimate government." Like Danesh (2016), he referred to Pakistan's nurturing of the Taliban and Haqqani Network as "an undeclared war against us," but acknowledged the value of diplomacy for resolving the situation, stating that

"the undeclared war must end, and because of it, the two sides must engage in a systematic and constructive dialogue to bring it to an end."

Subramanian (2016b) and Mussarat Jabeen and Ishtiaq Choudhry (2013, 400) assert that there is a need for multilateral diplomacy to play a role in addressing regional terrorism through the establishment of a regional organisation specifically focused on countering terrorism. In 2010, Pakistan had suggested that SAARC institute an agency modelled on INTERPOL, but this never materialised (Fazli 2012, 112; Jabeen and Choudhry 2013, 400). As discussed above, there are bilateral obstacles to multilateral diplomatic initiatives for regional cooperation to counter terrorism.

In the realm of international law, there exist the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 1987, 2004). The original convention focuses on the extradition of terrorism suspects, but also provides for the sharing of evidence, information and expertise. The additional protocol mainly outlines measures to check the financing of terrorism, but also requires that states take appropriate action against terrorists within their territories. However, Fahd Humayun (2016, 6) declares that the SAARC convention can only work if individual states make the requisite changes to their criminal-procedure codes. He further maintains that bilateral mutual-legal-assistance treaties would facilitate the exchange of information and extradition of suspects

(Humayun 2016, 4-5). On similar lines, Basim Usmani (2009) proposes that regional states sign extradition treaties to expedite terrorism trials in South Asia.

Thus, South Asian states have engaged with the institutions of international law and diplomacy on the issue of terrorism, albeit to a limited extent. In a more fundamental way, the pursuit of a local balance of power has guided state policies that promote terrorism in neighbouring states. In a lecture delivered at British think tank Chatham House in March 2015, former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani contended that Pakistan's desire for parity with India was behind its nurturance of the Taliban. Aparna Pande (2012) applies the same argument more broadly to the nexus between various militant groups and the Pakistani security apparatus, suggesting that "the support for non-state actors [. . .] was undertaken because Pakistan's leaders and strategists believed that conventional military parity with India was becoming difficult to achieve." Rafiq (2015) also raised this issue during his interview with me, linking Pakistan's perceived need for strategic depth in Afghanistan to the disparity between Indian and Pakistani conventional-war capacities.

For Bull (2012, 71), a local balance of power protects states from being absorbed or dominated by a local power, and it provides the foundation on which the other institutions of international society depend. Seen in this light, Pakistan's attempt to gain strategic parity with India through its support for

militant groups has allowed Pakistan to maintain its sovereignty. While Husain Haqqani (2013) argues that India has no interest in absorbing Pakistan or threatening its sovereignty, the national general secretary of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) appeared on *Al Jazeera* in December 2015 espousing his support for the idea of Akhand Bharat, or undivided India (Madhav 2015). Akhand Bharat refers to the idea that the Indian nation includes Pakistan and Bangladesh, which must be reabsorbed. The notion has its roots in the political thought of Kautilya or Chanakya of the third century BC, whose history is explored further in Chapter 5. Kautilya advocated an Akhand Bharat in which Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Tibet were united under a single authority (Parekh 2016). The idea is significant with regard to the history of the BJP, which emerged out of the Bhartiya Jansangh party, which in August 1965 asserted, "Akhand Bharat will be a reality, unifying India and Pakistan once we are able to remove this obstacle (separatist politics)" (Yadav 2016). It is significant to recall that Nathuram Godse of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—the parent organisation of the BJP and the Jansangh—killed Indian independence leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi because Gandhi had allowed the Partition to go ahead.

The former Indian ambassador I interviewed was forthright. At one point during our interview, when he was tiring of my refusal to toe the nationalist line and concede that Pakistan was beyond the pale, he exclaimed, "We should attack Pakistan and destroy it!" I prodded him to elaborate on this

point, and he explained that if this happened, Pakistan would "become a part of India again." The ex-diplomat's utterances along with BJP general secretary Ram Madhav's (2015) media statement underline a perspective within the Indian establishment that favours the reintegration of Pakistan seventy years after its independence.

In this sense, although unconventional warfare through militant proxies has caused insecurity in the region, it upholds the institutions of sovereignty and territoriality that underlie a state-based regional society. Sovereignty and territoriality are Buzan's (2014) first two institutions of international society, and for a regional society to emerge in South Asia, the consolidation of these two institutions is essential. Through its pursuit of a balance of power, not only through unconventional warfare but also through its development of a nuclear programme, Pakistan has protected its sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially in light of India's role in Bangladesh's severance from Pakistan in 1971.

The support for militant proxies by Pakistan, India and Afghanistan has frequently been referred to by analysts, journalists and academics as a "war"— a covert war, a proxy war, an unconventional war, or an undeclared war. Bull (2012, 178), however, employs a rather strict definition of the institution of war, from which he excludes violence that is not "carried out in the name of a political unit," and in which he stresses the "official character" of war, and

requires also that the violence be "directed against another political unit."[26] The fact that regional states have refrained from declaring an official war over cross-border terrorism, but have engaged in covert warfare wherein the standard rules of war do not apply, has weakened regional society due to the lack of transparency and accountability. Thus, Kashmiris in 2020 reportedly celebrated the prospect of an all-out India-China war as a ray of hope for the resolution of the conflict over J&K: As Kashmiri political-science student Younis Ali put it, "I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing" (*Eurasian Times* 2020).

On a more peaceful note, the QCG comprising the United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan offers an example of potential great-power management of the challenge posed by transnational terrorism in South Asia. The QCG was formed with the intention of orchestrating direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. It was hoped that Pakistan would be able to use its sway over the Taliban to bring the group to the negotiating table, with China and the United States playing the role of great powers to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Afghanistan Ministry 2016a; Amiri 2016a; B. Syed 2016c; US Department 2016). However, the group's efforts came to a standstill as the Taliban was unwilling to come to the negotiating table, with

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[26] My interpretation of "political units" to mean states is contestable. For example, Pilbeam (2015, 90) avers that Bull's use of "the broad category of 'political units' [. . .] can include a variety of state and non-state actors." However, my understanding of the term is helpful in the current context, because it brings to the forefront the unofficial nature of the covert warfare being carried out in the Indian subcontinent, and the detrimental effect of this unaccountable, rule-free warfare on regional society.

Danesh (2016) implying in his UN address that Pakistan had not made sufficient efforts to bring this about, and the Afghan administration instead holding secret meetings with the Taliban in Doha (*Khaama Press* 2016b).

In the case of cross-border terrorism originating in Pakistan and affecting Afghanistan, Pakistan has engaged in the institution of great-power management of the issue through its participation in the QCG. The QCG represents an initiative by great powers China and the United States, along with regional power Pakistan, to address the Taliban attacks that have been destabilising Afghanistan. On transnational terrorism and counter-allegations by India and Pakistan, however, the great powers have been reticent. Both China and the United States have consistently issued carefully worded statements on the issue, wary of the extreme sensitivities involved and shying away from actively engaging with India and Pakistan to resolve the problem (Balachandran 2016; Fair 2016; Krishnan 2016). For example, China in September 2017 hoped "that India and Pakistan c[ould] increase dialogue and communication, and properly handle the relevant issue" (*Nation* 2017b). However, as explored in Chapter 5, the great powers have a responsibility to manage international society. In Pakistan's case, the events of 1979 show clearly the responsibility of the United States and, to a smaller extent, China in causing instability in Pakistan through their support for the training of mujahideen in Pakistan to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This indicates a

normative responsibility on the part of the great powers to contribute to the stabilisation of Pakistan.

Thus, there is scope for South Asian states, as well as great powers, to engage more fully with the institutions of international society to address the high number of casualties that terrorism is causing in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even so, some efforts to develop the legal instruments for better cooperation on terrorism, engage diplomatically with neighbours, involve the great powers, and ensure that a balance of power is maintained have been made, as discussed above. Furthermore, India has attempted, very cautiously, to invoke the institution of war through its September 2016 claim of having carried out "surgical strikes" in PJK, in response to the militant attack in IJK (M. Khan 2016).

The September 2016 militant attack in IJK and India's reaction to the attack in the form of "surgical strikes" carried out by the Indian army in PJK underline the interrelated nature of the J&K dispute and cross-border terrorism (Bukhari 2016; Haidar and Bhattacharjee 2016). Meanwhile, PML-N parliamentarian Mushahid Hussain Syed (2016) highlighted the interconnected nature of the tussle over J&K, the resultant problems between Pakistan and India, and the instability in Afghanistan when he commented at the Stimson Center that "the road to peace in Kabul lies in Kashmir." The historical use of Afghanistan as a training base for separatist fighters sent to Kashmir, and the contemporary nature of the triangular blame-game involving Afghanistan,

India and Pakistan underscore the centrality of the India-Pakistan conflict to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan. While the preceding two sections have explored the J&K dispute and regional terrorism, the next section turns to the war in Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan.

The War in Afghanistan

According to Husain Haqqani (2013, loc. 598), the settlement of the questions of J&K and Pashtunistan—"the unfinished business of partition"—constitutes the twin aims of Pakistan's perception of its national interest. While the J&K issue has been discussed at length earlier in this chapter, this section attends to the Pashtun question, which involves Afghanistan (Haqqani 2013, loc. 546).

Diplomacy between Afghanistan and Pakistan started on a bad note in 1947, when Afghanistan refused to support Pakistan's admission to the UN (Haqqani 2013, loc. 573; Paliwal 2016, 194). Disgruntled over the contours of the Durand Line, which separates the regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan inhabited by the Pashtun ethnic group and functions as the border between the two states, Afghanistan contended that the boundary was invalid as it had been negotiated by British India, whereas Pakistan was a new state, and called for a renegotiation of the border (Haqqani 2013, loc. 570). Thus, while in Europe, "Territoriality and property rights emerged strongly during the transition from the many cross-cutting rights of the mediaeval order to the state-centric

Westphalian one," and "territoriality became an underpinning principle of the new anarchic international order," in South Asia, this process was imperfect, and decolonisation left behind a legacy of territorial ambiguity (Buzan 2014, 101).

The Durand Line Agreement of 1893, signed by former Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan and British India's Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, articulated the boundary between British India and Afghanistan (Afghanistan Online 1893). Afghanistan subsequently went to war with the British in 1919, but the outcome of the war was that it was forced to accept the Durand Line (Paliwal 2016, 193). While the ES institutions of international law and war were at work in Afghanistan's historical relationship with British India, these same institutions have failed to play a substantial role in resolving Afghan-Pakistani disagreements, as discussed below.

In British India, as the movement for Independence gathered momentum, Pashtun leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan launched the Khudai Khidmatgar movement in 1930 (Banerjee 1999, 181). Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was close to the Indian National Congress and opposed the All-India Muslim League's call for the Partition of India (Paliwal 2016, 194). When it became clear that Pakistan would be created, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan called for the establishment of a third state of Pashtunistan (Haqqani 2013, loc. 566-73). Although this demand did not come to fruition, Pashtun nationalism has been a source of insecurity for Pakistan and has contributed to tensions with

Afghanistan, which engaged in low-level warfare with Pakistan along the border in the 1950s and 1960s and is still to officially recognise the Durand Line as the international border (Chandran 2016; Haqqani 2013, loc. 580; Paliwal 2016, 194-95). In this case, it is Pakistan that is the status-quo power and Afghanistan that is the revisionist power with an interest in the border shifting southwards.

As Joseph Micallef (2015) explains, Afghanistan has remained disgruntled about the Durand Line Agreement because it divides Pashtun territory. The issue remains contentious for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the successor to British India in the region because,

> For Afghanistan, the loss of half of the traditional Pashtun territories divided its largest tribal grouping. Moreover, the loss of Balochistan left it landlocked, without any access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean except through Pakistani territory. For Pakistan, the issue of the Durand Line is an existential one. The territory in question amounts to some 60% of its present sovereign territory (Micallef 2015).

Strong ethnic allegiances that pay little heed to the border have contributed to the persistence of this dispute. In Jayshree Bajoria's (2009) words:

> The ongoing border frictions are due in large part to tribal allegiances that have never recognized the century-old frontier. Forty percent of Afghanistan's population is made up of Pashtuns; in Pakistan, Pashtuns represent 15 percent to 20 percent of the country's population. Ethnic Balochis also live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border as well as in neighboring Iran.

Pashtuns are the most dominant and sizeable ethnic group in Afghanistan. The continuity of ethnicity, language, religion and social values embodied in the Pashtunwali legal code renders the division of Pashtuns by the

Durand Line problematic in cultural and historical terms (J. Burke et al. 2009; Micallef 2015). As Faridullah Bezhan (2014, 198) explains, the Pashtun areas of Pakistan had been annexed by the British Indian government via the Durand Line Agreement of 1893, and successive Afghan governments have supported either the return of these territories to Afghanistan or the creation of an independent Pashtunistan. Just as Kashmiri nationalism has challenged the institution of territoriality in India's case, Pashtun nationalism has undermined territoriality for Pakistan (Buzan 2014, 142). In Chapter 3, I discussed how Zia-ul-Haq sought to subsume Pashtun nationalism in his Islamist nation-building project for Pakistan. While his Islamist nationalist project was successful in solidifying a national identity, Pashtun calls for a separate state of Pashtunistan continue to call Pakistani nationalism and territoriality into question.

Afghanistan has unsuccessfully attempted to employ the institution of war to resolve the Pashtunistan issue: It sent Pashtun tribesmen into Pakistan in an act of aggression in 1950, and low-level fighting along the border persisted throughout the 1950s. In 1960, Afghanistan dispatched troops to FATA's Bajaur agency, only to be repelled by Pakistani forces (Paliwal 2016, 194-95). Border skirmishes have also occurred in subsequent years, with an upsurge in incidents reported in recent years, over issues such as attempts by Pakistan to construct a fence and a gate at the border (Akbar 2016b; *Dawn* 2007, 2016c; Farooq 2014; A. Gul 2016; T. Khan and Yousaf 2016). Pakistan says it wants to

secure the border to curb cross-border terrorism and smuggling (Akbar 2016b; *Dawn* 2007; A. Gul 2016; T. Khan and Yousaf 2016).

Alamzeb Khan (2016) claims that fighting that erupted at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border crossing at Torkham in FATA's Khyber agency in June 2016 "was the most serious" in fifteen years. In addition to war, Afghanistan and Pakistan have sought to employ diplomacy and legal agreements to resolve the upsurge in tensions over the construction of the gate at Torkham (Afghanistan Ministry 2016b; *Al Jazeera* 2016a; *Economist* 2016; *Heart of Asia* 2016; *Khaama Press* 2016a; B. Syed 2016a; T. Khan 2016). Multilateral diplomacy has also been invoked: A Tripartite Commission consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan and ISAF was charged with stabilising the Afghan-Pakistani border, while another Tripartite Commission composed of Afghanistan, Pakistan and UNHCR oversees the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees (B. Syed 2008; International Security Assistance Force 2008; Nadiri 2014, 148; UN Refugee Agency 2016).

Diplomacy between Pakistan and Afghanistan, however, has been lacklustre in recent years, as outlined in the previous subsection. As Paliwal (2016, 192) recounts, Ghani's election as president of Afghanistan in 2014 brought about a shift in the trajectory of Afghan-Pakistani ties, with Ghani proactively pursuing diplomacy with Pakistan. Ghani's objective was to reach an understanding with Islamabad whereby Pakistan would stop hosting the Taliban and Haqqani Network, while in return, Afghanistan would prevent the

TTP from using its territory to launch attacks in Pakistan and inhibit attempts by India to use its consulates in Afghanistan as bases from which to destabilise Balochistan (Paliwal 2016, 207). Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to deliver on the understanding, however, turned into an obstacle:

> Despite the illusion of control over the faction led by Mullah Mansour and Sirajuddin Haqqani, Pakistan was unable to deliver what Ashraf Ghani had been desperately seeking—a reduction in violence in Afghanistan. All this happened despite Kabul's targeting of those TTP and ISIS elements—Hafeez Sayeed, Gul Zaman, and Shahidullah Shahid—on Pakistan's request (Paliwal 2016, 209-10).

Paliwal (2016, 210) points to a major bomb explosion in Kabul in August 2015 as the trigger for Ghani's subsequent tilt away from Pakistan.

As a BBC Pashto journalist explained to me in an interview conducted on 19 November 2016:[27]

> It's not that Ghani was expecting miracles from Pakistan. He knew down in his heart that it wasn't going to make any difference. But still, because he was a new president leading a new administration, he wanted to give it a chance. Had he not given it a chance completely, he might have had reservations, but he's much clearer in his mind and in his strategy regarding Pakistan now after the response he got from Islamabad. So, he wasn't expecting miracles, but he just wanted to give it a chance. He was very sincere in his approach towards Pakistan. He went there, he met the army chief instead of the political leadership, which was also very, in a way very symbolic and very cynical because he believes that's where the actual power lies in Pakistan. But as I said, nothing happened. There were good gestures, there were speeches, there were statements of sympathy and brotherhood and cooperation and non-interference, but no. We have seen that in the last forty years. And so, he did his best, he gave them a chance, it didn't work, and then there was a 180 degrees' U-turn.

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[27] This interview was confidential; the name of the interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement.

In spite of the uneasy diplomatic relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Taliban's fall, Pakistan has emerged as a key player in international efforts to orchestrate a settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The previous subsection discussed the QCG, which was set up in 2016, but in fact, the United Kingdom suggested that Pakistan play a role in negotiating a settlement in response to a deterioration in the Afghan security situation as far back as 2006 (Carlyle 2008; Paliwal 2016, 201; US Department 2016). Pakistan expressed its keenness to participate in a diplomatic resolution to the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan administration after former US President Barack Obama said in 2010 that his forces would withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014. It is in Pakistan's interest for the Taliban to regain power through the negotiation of a power-sharing settlement in Afghanistan, since the Taliban are old allies of Pakistan.

Progress on this initiative was made in 2012-13, through collusion between the United States and Pakistan, much to Afghanistan's consternation (Nadiri 2014, 150-51). Eventually, a meeting took place in May 2015 in China involving the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a moment of hope that the institutions of diplomacy and great-power management might resolve Afghanistan's security conundrum. The revelation in July 2015 that Mullah Omar had died two years previously, however, caused that initial peace process to fall through (Paliwal 2016, 208).

The establishment of the QCG in January 2016 represented the second endeavour by the United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban. By the group's fifth meeting, however, matters had deteriorated: The Taliban were refusing to attend the talks, and Afghanistan was displaying a lack of enthusiasm for the process, declaring its "unavailability" to attend in April 2016 and causing the meeting to be pushed back to May 2016 (B. Syed 2016c). What is more, Danesh used his UN speech in September 2016 as an opportunity to reprimand Pakistan for what Afghanistan perceived as its failure to bring the Taliban to the table and demanded that Pakistan stop providing sanctuary to the Taliban (Amiri 2016b). Referring to the QCG, Danesh (2016) asserted that it could only have utility provided "the government of Pakistan acts in good faith to meet and fulfil its commitment within the parameters of the QCG's roadmap." During his conversation with me on 19 November 2016, the BBC Pashto journalist attributed Afghanistan's loss of interest in the QCG to the deteriorating security situation there and its desire to engage with the Taliban unilaterally, and not through Pakistani mediation. A new initiative by Pakistan, China, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran and India to negotiate a political settlement in Afghanistan was announced in 2016-17, but no headway seems to have been made (Z. Hussain 2017b; B. Syed 2016b; *Wire* 2017a; Yousaf 2016).

The Afghan government's resentment of Pakistan's alleged support to the Taliban and Haqqani Network has, thus, thwarted Pakistan's desire to play

a diplomatic and managerial role in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region's stabilisation. This support, however, has been driven by Pakistan's interest in sustaining another vital institution: the balance of power. To borrow from Paliwal (2016, 196):

> This drive to support a political and military force in Afghanistan that will not raise the Durand Line issue, at worst, and support Pakistan in its conflicts with India, at best, has resulted in Islamabad's constant support to the Afghan Taliban and other factions like the Haqqani Network throughout 2001 until 2015.

Pakistan's policy of pursuing strategic depth in Afghanistan to balance against India has been driven by Pakistan's territorial insecurity, which is rooted in the insufficient attention paid by the departing British to resolving likely border issues that the new state would face. The status of J&K was bound to be problematic, given its Muslim majority, Hindu king, and pre-existent unrest against his rule. Similarly, Afghanistan was dissatisfied with the Durand Line ever since its demarcation, and this caused Pakistan to be born with another uncertain frontier in the west (Haque 2011, 7). As noted earlier in this thesis, the borders of India and Pakistan were drawn within forty days by a British cartographer who had never visited the subcontinent before (Anam 2017). This underlines the responsibility of great power the United Kingdom in contributing to the territorial insecurity in Pakistan. Jamie Gaskarth (2017, 291) explains "that responsibility implies a moral obligation or duty," and speaks of chains of responsibility wherein "we define relationships between actors, attach identities to them, categorize their material and social power, and suggest what

ethical obligations exist within their social sphere" (Gaskarth 2017, 287). Pakistan's history of British colonial rule points to an ethical obligation because the territorial insecurity engendered by the manner in which the country was created has been a major contributing factor in the emergence of covert warfare as state policy in the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan triangle. And, this covert warfare is behind much terrorist violence in the region and in the proliferation of terrorist groups.

As Raheem ul Haque (2011, 7) points out, India's victory in the war of 1971, which culminated in the breaking away of Bangladesh, heightened Pakistan's territorial insecurity vis-à-vis India, which, in turn, was one of the important factors that eventually drove its quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of the Islamist war in Afghanistan against Soviet rule in the 1980s, with the assistance of the ISI, gave birth to what Haque (2011, 18) refers to as "a huge Jihad industry" that "allowed Pakistan to gain Strategic Depth in Afghanistan and to keep India bogged down in the Kashmir border conflict throughout the 1990s." As the United States and Saudi Arabia withdrew support for fighters in Afghanistan after 1991, the latter country descended into civil war and Pakistan started to direct its assistance towards the Taliban (Haque 2011, 9; Sprung 2009). The policy of "strategic depth" required that the Durand Line remain contested and consequently porous and that a friendly government be in place in Afghanistan. In this way, the "strategic-depth" policy weakened the institution of

territoriality, exacerbating the already ambiguous border situation that the region was left with after decolonisation. Support for Islamist ideology such as that espoused by the Taliban helped curb Pashtun nationalism, which constituted one of the two primary threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity. So, while violence perpetrated by the Taliban has destabilised Afghanistan in recent years, the group's ideology has lent support to the ability of the institutions of state-centred nationalism and territoriality to function.

In addition, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided a sanctuary for militants to be trained who could be used against India (Haque 2011, 9). In Umair Jamal and Yaqoob Khan Bangash's (2015) words, "A pro-Pakistan Taliban regime in Afghanistan enhanced Indian insecurity and its further redirection in Kashmir through a proxy war without the direct involvement of the Pakistani army provided Pakistan with perfect strategic depth."

Former Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani attracted attention in February 2010 when he redefined strategic depth as the quest for "a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan," arguing that "if Afghanistan is peaceful, stable, and friendly we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure. [. . .] You're not looking both ways—as simple as that" (*Dawn* 2010; I. Gul 2010a). For Haque (2011, 18), however, indications that the United States was not serious about staying the course in Afghanistan, coupled with the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, including consulates along the border with Pakistan (which are allegedly used to destabilise Pakistan through militant

proxies), caused Pakistan to continue to seek to secure itself through support to the Taliban. M. K. Bhadrakumar (2016) predicted that a deterioration in India-Pakistan relations under the Modi-Sharif dispensation would only solidify Pakistan's strategy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan, especially as the United States has been unable to reassure Pakistan on its concerns about India's more aggressive presence in Afghanistan. Jamal and Bangash (2015) point out that India, too, is pursuing a policy of "strategic depth in Afghanistan by disallowing Pakistan any foothold there." This manipulation of the instability in Afghanistan by both India and Pakistan undermines regional society in South Asia, since the logic of competing interests overshadows the pursuit of shared interests through participation in common institutions.

To Bull (2012, 97), a balance of power is "what Vattel meant: 'a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others.'" As the weaker power in South Asia, Pakistan has developed a policy over decades of using its strategic influence in Afghanistan to prevent India from becoming the preponderant power in the region. Its continued support for the Taliban, even after the 11 September 2001 attacks and in spite of tremendous US pressure, makes sense when understood in this light, through the prism of regional relations and tensions. Furthermore, the history of the Partition of the subcontinent, and Pakistan's raison d'être as a homeland for South Asian Muslims where they could be independent of Hindu dominance, throw further light on why balancing against India and ensuring it

does not start to act as regional hegemon are so crucial. According to Bull (2012, 102), "The existence of local balances of power has served to protect the independence of states in particular areas from absorption or domination by a locally preponderant power." Haque's (2011) identification of the 1971 war with India and severance of Bangladesh as the point at which Pakistan began to think about strategic depth points to the significance of this fear of absorption by India as driving Pakistan's determination to maintain a balance of power in the subcontinent, and its focus on maintaining influence in Afghanistan in order to ensure this balance.

To the extent that a functioning balance of power represents the existence of a society of states, South Asia can be said to constitute such a society at the regional level. Bull (2012, 71) considers balances of power—whether at the level of the region or the entire international system—to provide the foundation on which the other institutions of international society rest, and hence the basis for the international order. Pakistan's insecurity vis-à-vis India and its consequent, largely successful, quest for a balance of power, therefore, represent signs of the health of regional society in South Asia. Pakistan's survival is evidence of its success in balancing against India through its nuclear programme, its powerful military, and its strategy of covert warfare.

While a balance of power is a vital ingredient of a pluralist regional order, there are also signs in South Asia of tentative efforts to collaboratively seek to address Afghanistan's insecurity through multilateral diplomacy or

secondary institutions. The preceding analysis has included discussion of the QCG and the Russian-led six-party talks. The Russian-led diplomatic initiative exemplifies attempts that have been made to help stabilise Afghanistan via forums that include both Pakistan and India, whose rivalry has vitiated the security prospects of Afghanistan (Dalrymple 2013). Afghanistan was included as a member state of SAARC in 2007 (Price 2015, 2-5).[28] In 2015, the SCO announced it was commencing the process of admitting both Pakistan and India; the same year, China, which is a prominent member of the SCO, proclaimed that it was open to collaborating with India and Pakistan in the interests of Afghan security (*Economic Times* 2015; Shaikh 2015).[29] A third multilateral initiative, the HoA, was instituted in 2011 with the express aim of cooperating to secure Afghanistan; its list of fourteen member countries includes South Asia's key rivals (Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process 2016b).[30]

Afghanistan's membership of SAARC has not yielded any significant gains for the country, and, indeed, the organisation itself appears on shaky ground after India boycotted the nineteenth SAARC Summit, which was to be held in November 2016 in Islamabad, over the militant attack in IJK. Several regional states, including Afghanistan, backed India (*Hindu* 2016b; Razdan

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[28] In addition to Afghanistan, SAARC's members include Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (SAARC 2009).

[29] The SCO member states are Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2008).

[30] As well as Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, the countries participating in the HoA process are Azerbaijan, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates (Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process 2016c).

2016; Sharma 2016). The sixth HoA conference, however, went ahead as planned in December 2016, and Sartaj Aziz, the advisor to the Pakistani prime minister on foreign affairs, travelled to the Indian city of Amritsar to attend (*Dawn* 2016b; *Economic Times* 2016). The Amritsar Declaration, which was the outcome of the event, recognised the importance of "de-radicalization and counter-radicalization strategies involving all the HoA countries" to address violent extremism in the region. Member states agreed on the need for "a concerted and coherent regional approach involving all HOA countries [. . .] to counter radicalization," and resolved to organise two meetings in 2017 for experts and officials respectively to coordinate efforts. Furthermore, the Amritsar Declaration emphasised the significance of the institution of the market to promote regional economic integration and recognised Afghanistan's strategic location in economic terms (Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process 2016a, 5-6).

This is significant, because, according to Buzan (2014, 143), the "rise of the market as a primary institution" has posed a significant challenge to territoriality and pluralist international society, "challenging the state as the core political player in international society." During his interview with me, Ishtiaq Ahmad (2015) posited that "we should give importance not to geopolitics, but to geo-economics," arguing that such a shift would bring about the peaceful transformation of the region by "caus[ing] Pakistan to gain appreciation for being a responsible state and being a bridge between South

and Central Asia." Ishtiaq Ahmad drew attention to the inherent compatibility of such economic projects as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural-gas pipeline, CPEC, the Iran-Pakistan natural-gas pipeline, and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

The Amritsar Declaration made specific mention of a dizzying list of regional economic projects involving Afghanistan, including the TAPI pipeline, the North-South and East-West corridors, the Asian International Railway Corridor, the Central Asia-South Asia and Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity projects, the Five Nation Railway, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway project, the Chinese Silk Road, and the Lapis Lazuli corridor (Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process 2016a, 6-7). What all of this signifies is a tremendous potential for the pluralist logic of geopolitics to indeed be superseded by a more solidarist sensibility wherein economic gains encourage interstate collaboration. Indeed, the declaration talks of working towards removing barriers to trade and plans for a regional economic cooperation conference to be held in late 2017 (Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process 2016a, 7).

The Seventh Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan took place in November 2017 in Ashgabat, while the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the HoA in Baku in December 2017 culminated in the Baku Declaration, which "stress[ed] that economic development w[ould] contribute to achieving lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the

region" (Afghanistan Ministry 2017a; Haidari 2017; RECCA 2017). However, all of this is contingent on the security forces of regional states being able and willing to subdue violent non-state actors that disrupt the prospects for regional peace and integration. This would require the transcendence of the realist logics of power politics and conflicting interests by a rationalist understanding of the benefits of cooperation in mutually beneficial institutions.

Conclusions

The preceding analysis has recognised the operation of ten of Buzan's (2014) fourteen institutions of international society in South Asia: (1) international law, (2) diplomacy, (3) human equality and human rights, (4) nationalism, (5) territoriality, (6) war, (7) the balance of power, (8) great-power management, (9) sovereignty, and (10) the market. While this does not claim to be a comprehensive account of the institutional landscape of South Asia, it does provide insight into the institutional structure of the triangular security relationship of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan in the context of NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan. The four institutions that did not come up in this analysis—imperialism/colonialism/development, dynasticism, democracy, and environmental stewardship—are most likely to have failed to emerge in this case due to the focus of this thesis on security. At face value, all four missing institutions appear to be prevalent in South Asia, including in the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan sub-region. As the heir to the institution of

imperialism/colonialism, the institution of development exists in the post-colonial states of South Asia in the form of their quest for economic development, economic growth and modernisation (Buzan 2014, 154). While aristocratic dynasticism has faded away in the subcontinent (barring Bhutan), the remnants of the institution of dynasticism are visible in the political dynasties of South Asian democracies (Buzan 2014, 157-58). The institution of democracy has gained strength in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal in the twenty-first century (Buzan 2014, 160-61). Finally, environmental stewardship is a weak regional institution in South Asia (Sarker, Rahman, and Giessen 2018).

The analysis in this chapter has painted a mixed picture of institutional strength in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle. Regional states have made consistent and often sincere attempts to employ the institutions of international law, diplomacy, war, the balance of power and great-power management—Bull's classic five—to reduce anarchy in the regional system. However, the problematic and contested nature of nationalism has undermined the institutions of sovereignty and territoriality, while human rights still have only rhetorical power as a regional norm. This rhetorical power derives from the integration of human rights into international normative discursive practice, while the limits to the power of a human-rights-centred discourse in South Asia result from the continuing dominance of nationalism and state-centrism in the territorially insecure region. Finally, the market contains considerable potential to enhance regional cooperation by providing powerful incentives for states

and non-state actors such as corporations to increase transnational collaborations. In particular, the TAPI gas pipeline, which is projected to begin operations by 2020, would provide strong motivation for the three countries studied in this chapter to pay greater attention to geo-economics than to geopolitical belligerence, as it would contribute significantly to fulfilling Afghanistan, Pakistan and India's energy needs (I. Ahmad 2015; Bhutta 2016; *Hindu* 2015; *Press TV* 2016; Vaid and Kar 2016).

Mark Toner, the former deputy spokesperson for the US Department of State (2017), recently observed: "Afghanistan's security, Pakistan's security, indeed India's security, they're all interconnected. And so as much as they can work in tandem or work in a partnership on counterterrorism operations, I think it's for the betterment of the region." Toner's remark underlines this chapter's focus on the India-Afghanistan-Pakistan triangle and links this focus to the thesis's broader concern with counterterrorism cooperation. This chapter has shown that many of the shared institutions that underpin the functioning of a regional society do exist in the sub-region constituting Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. This points to India's responsibility as a regional power to play a leadership role by supporting stabilisation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, the chapter's exploration of the covert warfare in the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan triangle underscores India's responsibility in contributing to insecurity in Pakistan. This further underscores India's

normative responsibility as the regional hegemon in playing a constructive role in the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan security triangle.

However, international society in this region is also undermined by world-society actors—not only religious militant groups, but also nationalist movements that challenge the territoriality and sovereignty of regional states, questioning their claims to be nations in the first place. The foundations on which regional states' claims to being nations are built are shaky, since ethnic nations in the region spill out of state boundaries. Paradoxically, this inherent weakness of *interstate* society, in fact, reveals the underlying strength and resilience of *world* society in the region: The long history of shared cultures discussed in Chapter 2 continues to subvert the modern state system that seeks to contain national identities within state boundaries. This chapter has demonstrated that in spite of the general perception of an acrimonious India-Pakistan equation and a deeply troubled Afghanistan-Pakistan dynamic, the institutional foundation does exist for the stronger security collaboration among these three states being advocated by officials such as Toner and scholars such as Ishtiaq Ahmad. I have demonstrated this through my interpretation of events in the sub-region and my identification of the operation of shared institutions based on shared understandings of the norms of international behaviour in the sub-region.

This chapter has explored India's special responsibility in stabilising and securing Pakistan based on the principles of capability and reparation (Ralph

and Souter 2015). This is because of India's capabilities as the regional hegemon, as well as its culpability in terms of its alleged role in promoting ethnic separatism and religious militancy in Pakistan. Secondly, this chapter has contributed to the thesis's wider project of providing a social understanding of security in South Asia by focusing on social institutions and regional society. Thirdly, this chapter has used the ES for critical, emancipatory research by employing the idea of regional society to explore the prospects for greater security cooperation in South Asia. This is significant because of the state-centric, conflictual and violent nature of international politics in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle. The next chapter will focus on the special responsibility of the great powers in sponsoring security in South Asia, based on the notion of reparation for the ramifications of the wrongs of 1979.

Chapter 5

1979 and Great-Power Responsibility

> The origins of the current spate of sectarian conflict in Pakistan can be traced to the intensification of regional politics after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and start of the Afghan war in 1980 and the Pakistani state's failure to prevent the political forces they unleashed from influencing its domestic politics.
> —Vali R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998"

According to Jackson (2005, 58), a significant consequence of the discourse surrounding the "global war on terror" has been that is has served to de-historicise the events of September 2001 "from the recent past." He suggests that the official US narrative has contextualised the attacks in terms of World War II, the Cold War and the civilisation/barbarism binary, while brushing under the carpet the fact that Al Qaeda and bin Laden are the products of the US-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan of the 1980s. Building on this theme, I hold that while Pakistan has been securitised in the international discourse as a "safe haven" for terrorist groups and a state sponsor of terrorism,[31] this narrative has neglected the massive role of the United States and Saudi Arabia, and the smaller role of China, in financially and organisationally supporting the 1980s jihad in Afghanistan, for which fighters were trained in Pakistan.

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[31] Securitisation theory conceptualises the construction of a threat as occurring through discourse, suggesting that security is subjective (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998).

This chapter sets out to dislodge this de-historicising move by exploring the part played by great powers—defined as powers "whose reach extends [. . .] across more than one region" (Buzan 2011a, 4) —in creating fertile ground for militancy to flourish in Pakistan. In doing so, the chapter contributes to ES theory by further developing its concept of great-power management and adding to its understanding of whether this is an institution that contributes to order and justice—the twin aims of international society in ES thinking. In addition, the chapter makes an empirical contribution by deconstructing the narrative of the Pakistani "safe haven," demonstrating that powerful states in the international system have constructed a "truth" that presents Pakistan as a terrorist "sanctuary" while ignoring their own part in effectuating this state of affairs, assuming themselves to be moral actors (Edkins 1999, 41-56). This has important policy implications: Pakistan reacted sharply to an August 2017 speech by Trump, in which he accused Pakistan of offering "safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror," including "terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond," and providing shelter to "the same organizations that try every single day to kill our people," even as the United States paid "Pakistan billions and billions of dollars." Trump called into question the United States-Pakistan partnership while professing his desire to strengthen his country's strategic partnership with India, including calling on India "to help us more with Afghanistan" (US White House 2017). Trump's remarks caused Pakistan to indefinitely postpone

three meetings with US officials and to pass a parliamentary resolution condemning Trump's comments (Iqbal 2017). The historical perspective provided by this chapter throws light on why the construction of Pakistan as a terrorist "safe haven" by policymakers such as Trump ignores the part played by great powers including the United States in the emergence of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, while failing to build a constructive relationship with Pakistani policymakers that could effectively address the challenge posed by Pakistan-based terrorist groups to the United States as well as to Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, China, the United Kingdom and other states in the international system.

The second part of the chapter explores the potential for Russia and China to help stabilise South Asia, using their influence as great powers to address the insecurity stemming from the ongoing violence in Afghanistan and the unending conflict between India and Pakistan. It relies on Buzan's (2011b, 1) concept of "a decentring world order" to argue that China's investment in Pakistan through CPEC, India and Pakistan's inclusion in the SCO, and Russia and China's involvement in initiatives to negotiate with the Taliban are developments that suggest a strong potential for rising Asian powers China and Russia to play a managerial role in South Asia.

This chapter reframes the international security discourse on Pakistan by challenging the securitisation of Pakistan as a promoter of Islamist terrorism. More implicitly, Chapters 3 and 4 contributed to this same project by showing

how domestic history and regional politics have been reasons for the emergence of an array of Islamist militant groups in Pakistan, thus re-historicising and re-politicising terrorism: Chapters 3 and 4 explored the historical and political context for the rise of terrorist outfits in a specific geographical location, responding to Jackson (2005) and Kundnani's (2016) critiques of the narrative surrounding the "global war on terror." This chapter does the same at the international level of analysis. Furthermore, it contributes to the thesis's analysis of what shape an international effort to address militancy in Pakistan should take, by considering the shifting global power structure and its impact on Pakistan's international alliances.

Pakistan has always placed great value on its relationships with great powers. In its early years as a state, Pakistan experienced considerable fear of being invaded by its massive neighbour India and became convinced that it "needed a powerful friend to support and strengthen [it] against [its] much bigger neighbour" (S. Burke 1973, 60-61). This quest led Pakistan to approach the Commonwealth as well as the Muslim world, by both of which it was spurned. Consequently, Pakistan decided to cultivate a "special relationship" with the United States (S. Burke 1973, 61). Later, after the United States provided military assistance to India during the 1962 China-India war, Pakistan started to move closer to China (S. Burke 1973, 241-42). Thus, Pakistan has constantly sought the support of great powers to defend its sovereignty against the threat of being reintegrated by India. As a result, it is critical to understand

Pakistan's pattern of relationships with the great powers to comprehend its politics.

This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section provides the theoretical context for the chapter by reviewing the literature on the institution of great-power management. The second section draws on the ES's proclivity for historical interpretation to examine the contribution of the great powers to the emergence of a militant ecosystem in Pakistan through their sponsorship of the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Furthermore, the section briefly explores how the political rivalry between Middle Eastern regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia has fuelled sectarian militancy in Pakistan since the 1980s. In the third section, the chapter turns its attention to the future and the implications of CPEC, the SCO and efforts to talk to the Taliban. Finally, a concluding section summarises the findings of the chapter.

Great-Power Management and Great-Power Responsibility

Bull (2012, 196) posits that "great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties." He maintains that great powers

> assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.

Thus, for the ES, the recognition of a state as a great power is an inter-subjective, social process necessitating the acceptance by other states as well as the state's own leaders and people of such a role (Loke 2016, 851). Being a great power may come with special rights, but this special status also burdens these states with exceptional duties. In Shunji Cui and Buzan's (2016, 182) interpretation of this institution, "The key to great-power management as an institution of international society is that the powers concerned attract legitimacy to support their unequal status as leaders by accepting special responsibilities as well as claiming special rights."

Despite this general recognition among theorists of the responsibilities that are appended to great power, Bull (2012, 201) acknowledges that great powers may not always behave responsibly. In fact, he goes so far as to characterise their behaviour as *frequently* promoting "disorder rather than order; [and] seek[ing] to upset the general balance, rather than to preserve it, to foment crises rather than to control them, [and] to win wars rather than to limit them." Bull (2012, 202) even points out that "crises are sometimes deliberately manufactured by the great powers, or deliberately brought closer to the point of war, because the preoccupation of the great power concerned is with securing a diplomatic victory." Thus, Bull is clearly cognisant of what Buzan (2014, 147) characterises as the *weakness* of the institution of great-power management.

Bull (2012, 198) identifies the United States as a great power, noting that the country's official rhetoric ascribes to it certain "special rights and duties," which are also recognised by "the bulk of international society." He further identifies China and the Soviet Union as more tentative great powers whose special status is not explicitly acknowledged. In his more recent introduction to ES theory, Buzan (2014, 146) contends that the United States' legitimacy as a great power of international society has declined following 2001, because of the Bush administration's lack of concern over whether its international policies were acceptable to the rest of international society. Elsewhere, Buzan (2011b, 16) argues that the international system "is undergoing a deep change towards *decentred globalism* based on a world with great and regional powers, but no superpowers."

This chapter draws on Bull and Buzan's work to categorise the United States, China and Russia as great powers, and Saudi Arabia and Iran as *regional powers*. It further relies on Simon Mabon's (2020) understanding that Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought to exert an influence beyond the Middle East, to other parts of the Muslim world, to comprehend these two Middle Eastern regional powers' sway in the South Asian state of Pakistan: Mabon (2020) points to both Iran and Saudi Arabia's reliance on Islam as "a source of legitimacy [. . .] in speaking to the broader *umma*, the worldwide collection of Muslims."

Bull (2012, 207) suggests that great powers sometimes carry out their managerial responsibilities by exercising "their preponderance in particular

areas of the world or among particular groups of states," a point that is of relevance for this thesis's concern with South Asia. Bull lays out three ways in which great powers express their preponderance in this manner: through dominance, primacy or hegemony. His description of dominance as

> the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland, and [. . .] habitual disregard of the universal norms of interstate behaviour that confer rights of sovereignty, equality and independence upon these states

seems to accurately portray the United States' attitude towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, his observation that great powers may accommodate secondary powers in a region "as partners in the management of the regional balance concerned" offers an apt description of the United States' maturing alliance with India, which has crystallised in the United States-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership of 2020 (Bull 2012, 222; US White House 2020).

Wali Aslam (2016) throws further light on the question of responsibility as it pertains to great-power management in Pakistan through his study of US drone strikes in Pakistan. He works at the intersection between international and world society, exploring the responsibility of the United States as a great power towards individuals in Afghanistan and Pakistan; in his words, "The US has a long history of involvement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region and its managerial activities in that part of the world link it to the vulnerable civilians in the area in a unique manner, regardless of the prevalence of drone

strikes" (W. Aslam 2016, 157). Additionally, he questions India's willingness to act "as a responsible great power" (W. Aslam 2016, 148).[32] Drawing on these observations about great-power responsibility and its applicability in the context of Pakistan, the next section will explore the historical role that the great powers have played in managing security in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Great-Power Management in Pakistan in Historical Perspective

Communist soldiers from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's Khalq faction in April 1978 overthrew former Afghan President Daud Khan. This was followed in December 1979 by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (A. Siddique 2014, 40). In Abubakar Siddique's words, "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan transformed Pakistan into a frontline ally of the United States. With Washington's blessing, Islamabad's military rulers had virtually a free hand to shape the Afghan resistance."

According to Husain Haqqani (2013, loc. 4796) and Riedel (2013, 90-91), the CIA between 1981 and 1983 provided the ISI with approximately $60 million per annum to fund the Islamist resistance to Communist rule in Afghanistan; Saudi Arabia matched the amount spent by the United States. From 1984 onwards, the level of funding "increased dramatically" (Haqqani 2013, loc. 4796). When Ronald Reagan's term as US president came to an end in 1989, the United States had given Pakistan $2 billion to sponsor the jihad in

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[32] Wali Aslam (2016) treats India as a great power.

Afghanistan, with Saudi Arabia officially matching the amount and also providing "additional support of an undisclosed amount" (Haqqani 2013, loc. 4886).[33] Riedel (2013, 91) recounts that China, too, supported the Afghan war effort, providing aid amounting to more than $400 million, 300 advisors to train the mujahideen at camps in Pakistan as well as China, and arms.

As Siddique (2014, 41) points out:

Pashtuns were the major victims of this policy, as it radicalised and militarised their homeland. By funding thousands of Islamic madrasas, or seminaries, and arming Islamist organisations, Pakistan underwent an extraordinary metamorphosis that eventually proved a disaster.

Siddique (2014, 42) further points to the influx of religious radicals from across the Muslim world into Pakistan as part of the Afghan war effort, which "changed the orientation, meaning and goals of jihad in the Pashtun borderlands." As both Siddique (2014, 42) and Husain Haqqani (2013, loc. 4886) recall, many Islamist militants from foreign countries remained in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal and collapse, and eventually came to constitute Al Qaeda and other groups linked to it. Interestingly, the establishment of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Dir district in 1989 coincides with the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan (Haqqani 2013, 4912; Sultan-i-Rome 2012, 191).

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[33] These figures do not concur precisely with those presented previously in this thesis. However, due to the difficulty of obtaining primary data on this funding, I have relied on secondary sources whose information may not be accurate. Riedel comes close to being a primary source because of his long career with the CIA, but he admits that his book has been vetted by the agency.

In Sultan-i-Rome's (2012, 193) words:

Swat and the northern part of Pakistan have long been part of Imperialism's Great Game. The long Afghan War (1979 onward) made the people more militant. War-making became a basic part of life, with modern arms and training entering the area. The Pakistani and American intelligence agencies organized and trained jihadi organizations (forerunners of the Taliban) for armed jihad (*qital*) to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. [. . .] The various external parties recruited, trained, and deployed the young people of this region to fight their enemies in the name of religion. [. . .] The Pakistani Taliban emerged out of these experiences.[34]

Thus, there is a strong link between the training of mujahideen in Pakistan to fight against Soviet rule in 1980s Afghanistan, with the staunch backing of great powers the United States and China and Middle Eastern regional power Saudi Arabia, and the ongoing militant violence in Pakistan at the hands of the TTP and other groups. As the following subsection will demonstrate, however, there is an additional way in which foreign powers have fuelled militancy in Pakistan.

The Saudi-Iranian Political Rivalry and Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan

In Shahbano Bilgrami's (2016, 209) moving novel *Those Children*, which explores sectarianism in Sunni-Muslim-majority Pakistan, a memorable conversation between Aftab Mahmud, who is in love with a Shia Muslim woman whom he wishes to marry, and his parents underscores the deep roots of the sectarian divide in Pakistani society. "Sir, no one in our family—trace it

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[34] The TTP is often referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, who are distinct from the Afghan Taliban.

back centuries—has ever married a Shia," Mahmud's father admonishes him on learning of his son's intention. Meanwhile, Mahmud's mother melodramatically calls him an ill-fated *rafzi* (deviant), a derogatory term for Shias, and complains that Shias are "not even Muslim." In Pakistan, where 96.3 percent of the population is Muslim, 10 to 15 percent of citizens are Shia (Pew Research Center 2009).

Although the rift between Shia and Sunni Muslims dates back to the seventh century (Kadri 2011, 26-28), Christophe Jaffrelot (2016a, 8) suggests that the political rivalry between Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority Iran that was triggered by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the same year Saudi Arabia began pumping money into Pakistan for the Afghan jihad, has spilled over into Pakistan. Mabon (2020) argues that religion, politics and security have coalesced since 1979 to create opportunities for Iran as well as Saudi Arabia to expand their involvement in sectarian conflicts across the Muslim world. According to Mabon (2013, 43-44), since 1979, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have "gained legitimacy through religious posturing, often at the expense of the other, reflecting a zero-sum game in operation."

As Jaffrelot (2016a) explains, Saudi Arabia exerts an influence on Pakistan on multiple levels. First, Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of madrasas in Pakistan in the context of the Afghan war and Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation policy has impacted upon the religious beliefs of Pakistani Sunnis. Secondly, the five million Pakistani migrants to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have, in

Jaffrelot's (2016a, 8) words, "brought back to their country a different version of Islam—and sometimes prejudices against Shias." However, the Saudi-Pakistani relationship is constrained by Saudi Arabia's desire to maintain good relations with its trading partner India, and by Pakistan's need to remain on amicable terms with its neighbour Iran.

Even so, according to Sana Haroon (2016, 301), "Pakistan has tilted in favor toward the Arab world and Sunni Islam in spite of the geography, history, and language that link it to Iran." She explains that while Pakistan shares historical cultural relations with Iran and the wider "Persianate cultural world," its religious clergy have traditionally looked to Saudi Arabia for inspiration; however, she argues, "The fault line between Arab Sunnism and Iranian Shiism" has influenced Pakistan's pattern of cultural ties with the Middle East (Haroon 2016, 316-17).

The events of 1979 in Iran, Afghanistan as well as Pakistan resulted in the militarisation of sectarianism in Pakistan, which was directly influenced by the political rivalry between Arab states and Iran in the Middle East. The involvement of Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad turned Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan into "an incubator of a Sunni transnationalism" (Haroon 2016, 321). Simultaneously, in Pakistan, 1979 was when Zia-ul-Haq launched his Islamisation programme. He decided to refer to the Hanafi branch of Sunni jurisprudence's interpretations of the sharia, causing insecurity among Pakistani Shias, who perceived his Islamisation project as a "Sunnifying" move

(Fuchs 2014, 493-94; Grare 2007b, 128; R. Hussain 2005, 146; Vatanka 2012, 8; Zaman 1998, 692-93). A Shia political group known as the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh Jafariya (TNFJ) was established in Pakistan in 1979 to defend Shias against Zia-ul-Haq's "Sunnifying" push (Grare 2007b, 128; Haroon 2016, 321; Zaman 1998, 693-94).

The TNFJ violently resisted the government's attempt to compulsorily collect the *zakat* (Islamic alms tax) from people's bank accounts based on the Hanafi interpretation of the rules surrounding *zakat*. It allegedly received support from the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran. Clashes occurred between Shias and Sunnis in Punjab (Grare 2007b, 128-29; Zaman 1998, 693-94). Alex Vatanka (2012, 7) describes the "period from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s [as] the zenith of the Islamic Republic's championing of Shia militancy in Pakistan," calling it "a period when Tehran was verifiably engaged in supporting Pakistani Shia groups." Indeed, the Iranian constitution contains a provision for supporting oppressed people, especially Shias, around the world (Mabon 2013, 103).

Meanwhile, given that the resistance in Afghanistan was Sunni, mujahideen from the Afghan war began establishing anti-Shia militant organisations in Pakistan (Haroon 2016, 321). According to Haroon (2016, 321), Arab benefactors sponsored the violent Sunni groups that sprung up in Pakistan in the 1980s and the 1990s. She further points to the Sunni militants' selective targeting of members of the Ithna Ashari sub-sect of Shiism as

evidence that the sectarian violence in Pakistan was a spillover from the Saudi-Iranian rivalry (see figure 8).

Figure 8. Main Shia sub-sects in South Asia

Ithna Ashari Shiism has been the state religion in Iran since the sixteenth century, gained additional influence when its scholars acquired political control in the 1979 revolution and represents the religious beliefs of the majority of Iranians (Alix Philippon, October 21, 2019, conversation with author; Mehta 2016; Savory 1986, 407-09). Meanwhile, Pakistan and India have been an important centre for Ismaili Shiism since the ninth century (Savory 1986, 406; Sikand 2003, 101). The militants' targeting of Ithna Ashari Shias in Pakistan, while leaving its Ismaili communities alone, therefore is an indication that the rise of violent sectarianism in Pakistan has a lot to do with the wider political rivalry in the Middle East between regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Sunni extremist militant groups in contemporary Pakistan include LeT, LeJ, JeM and SSP, while Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan is a Shia militant group (*Dawn* 2014b; Haroon 2016, 322). Attacks on Shias remain a regular occurrence, with recent incidents including an April 2017 roadside bombing in the Shia-majority Kurram agency of FATA claimed by TTP splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA); a March 2017 explosion at a mosque in Parachinar, the capital of Kurram agency, also claimed by JuA; a February 2015 grenade attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar; a suicide bomb attack at a Shia mosque in Sindh in January 2015; and a market bombing in Quetta in February 2013 (*CBC News* 2017; *Press TV* 2017; *Times of India* 2015).

Thus, since 1979, great and regional powers have had a detrimental effect on Pakistan's security. The Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and the US-, Saudi- and Chinese-sponsored war in Afghanistan have promoted the development of a militant ecosystem in Pakistan. However, as the next section will consider, the shifting power dynamics in the international system are providing new opportunities for great powers to play a more responsible role in securing Pakistan and, by extension, the regional and international systems of which it is a part.

China, Russia, and the Potential for Responsible Great-Power Management

This section draws on the normative strand of ES thought to ask what potential there is for China and Russia, as rising Asian great powers, to play a

responsible role in addressing the threat posed by terrorism to Pakistan, South Asia and the wider international system. It ponders on the implications of three recent developments—the Chinese investment in Pakistan via CPEC, the QCG's attempts to negotiate with the Taliban, and Pakistan and India's inclusion in the SCO—to consider what scope there is for the institution of great-power management to play a more positive role in securing Pakistan. The section is divided into three subsections, each of which dwells upon one of the aforementioned developments.

The Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Kautilya, a political philosopher who wrote *The Arthashatra* around 300 BC, is thought by some to have been born and studied in Taxila, a city that lies in the portion of Punjab that is part of Pakistan (Boesche 2002, loc. 30; Rangarajan 2016a, loc. 308). He is best known for his mandala theory: "Every neighbouring state is an enemy and the enemy's enemy is a friend" (Rangarajan 2016b, loc. 139). Although Kautilya is generally associated with India's intellectual heritage, his connection to the ancient city of Taxila makes him an equally significant character in Pakistan's sinuous history, and his mandala theory perfectly encapsulates the all-weather friendship that Pakistan has forged with China. Although PJK borders China, pending a settlement of the J&K dispute, Pakistan and China are not official neighbours. China and Pakistan both share borders with India and have, as Chinese vice-premier

Wang Yang (2017) puts it, "forged an all-weather friendship," in spite of a lack of a "sense of cultural affinity or common values" (Small 2015, 2). True to Kautilya's theory, the China-Pakistan amity is "founded on a shared enmity with India," with India offering "the strategic glue that binds the two sides together" (Small 2015, 1-4).

In July 2013, China and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding that provided for the construction of an economic corridor between Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Gwadar in Balochistan, via Gilgit-Baltistan (E. Hussain 2017, 146). The multifarious project covers the 3,200 kilometres between Kashgar and Gwadar with road, railway and pipeline connections, with the Chinese investment in Pakistan's energy, communication and other sectors envisaged under the project amounting to $62 billion (N. Jamal 2017; S. Siddiqui 2017). CPEC is a significant part of China's One Belt One Road project (Butt 2017; Krishnan 2017).

Amid considerable media hype surrounding CPEC, Andrew Small (2015) underplays expectations of an economic turnaround in Pakistan resulting from the corridor. He points to the threat posed by militancy to Chinese workers in the country, while questioning the soundness of the commercial rationales underpinning the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port projects (Small 2015, 4). Furthermore, Small (2015, 96) asserts that actual flows of money often do not bear out grandiose Chinese declarations of

investments in Pakistan. He also underlines lacklustre commercial activity on the Karakoram Highway and at Gwadar (Small 2015, 99-100).

Small (2015, 102-06) concludes that the Gwadar Port and Karakoram Highway are unconvincing as commercial ventures, and that military and geopolitical motives underlie the projects. He draws attention to Gwadar's potential utility as a Chinese naval base, and to the Karakoram Highway's route through PJK, which would "consolidat[e] Sino-Pakistani control over territory that India claims as its own" (Small 2015, 106).

Ishtiaq Ahmad (2015), however, struck a more optimistic note during his interview with me, insisting that "regional economic projects, such as TAPI and another gas pipeline from Iran to India, a road network between Central Asia and India, and the corridor with China from Xinjiang to Gwadar, are inherently compatible," and that "we should give importance not to geopolitics, but to geo-economics." Small (2015, 179) himself recognises China's ambition of causing economic forces to submerge the security logic that drives IR in the Indian subcontinent. He further recognises that the Xinjiang-Gwadar transport corridor is less crucial a component of CPEC than the diverse energy projects scattered across Pakistan, as well as the road and railway networks connecting locations within Pakistan (Small 2015, 191). Small (2015, 192) accedes that "whatever the failures, even a partial success could have transformative effects."

Even so, militancy perpetrated by Baloch separatists and Islamist extremists continues to cast a shadow over the optimism generated by the China-Pakistan economic venture. Two Chinese missionaries were kidnapped in Quetta in May 2017; the following month, Daesh announced that it had killed the duo. *Dawn* (2017a) reported later that year that Chinese nationals had vanished from the streets of Quetta since the kidnapping. Meanwhile, in Gwadar, frequent terrorist attacks have led the Chinese workers resident there to restrict themselves to secure compounds for the most part, and to rely on security escorts. According to Small (2015, 98-99), "Insecurity has not only put paid to plans for some of China's largest investments, but even posed a risk to the economic relationship as a whole," with China on occasion threatening to withdraw all of its workers from Pakistan.

Notwithstanding Small's circumspection as to the Chinese's willingness to work in Pakistan amid the risk posed by militancy, there has been an influx of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, with 30,000 Chinese nationals now resident in the country, and 71,000 having visited the country in 2016 (Hashim 2017). Hashim (2017) reports that "as more Chinese engineers, managers and workers flood into the country, Pakistan has seen a mushrooming of supermarkets, guesthouses and other businesses catering specifically to Chinese needs."

Thus, with the fortification of China's stake in Pakistan, China's interest in the country's stability and security has expanded substantially. There are good reasons to believe that China will want to ensure that Pakistan's trouble

with terrorism is surmounted in the medium-to-long term, not only to ensure Pakistan's survival but also to safeguard Chinese investments and workers in the country. Writing in 2015, Small (2015, 179) observed that despite China's rivalry with India, it was keen for "a stable relationship between Pakistan and India" as a precondition to stability within Pakistan. This was in evidence when Pakistan and India were admitted to the SCO. However, more recent developments such as the Modi government's revocation of J&K's special status and statehood and the subsequent China-India border skirmishes have diluted these developments in 2019-20.

Pakistan, India, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The SCO was founded in June 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The secondary institution was established with the intent of addressing the challenges posed by "international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism," and officially sees itself "as a regional organization for nontraditional security" (Song 2014, 85).

Weiqing Song (2014, 88) explains the creation of the China-led SCO in terms of China's growing interest in Central Asia, which borders China. China's insecurity vis-à-vis the Islamist separatist insurgency in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which lies in western China, and its economic need to meet its burgeoning energy requirements through the import of oil and natural gas

from Central Asia, provide the rationale for China's desire for greater engagement with this region.

Russia's long-standing influence in the region renders it a natural member of the SCO. However, the presence of two great powers with divergent interests in a single regional organisation challenges the SCO's ability to achieve its potential. Apart from Russia's historical interest in Central Asia, its membership of the SCO is a consequence of the developments that led to the formation of the organisation. In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia as a united delegation negotiated with China to settle the demarcation of borders. This process was the precursor to the establishment in 1996 of the Shanghai Five, which consisted of China together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Song 2014, 90). It is the Shanghai Five that eventually evolved into the SCO with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001.

In June 2004, the SCO set up a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent (Song 2014, 92). In 2004 and 2005, the SCO admitted Mongolia, India, Iran, and Pakistan as observer states (Song 2014, 98). Belarus and Sri Lanka became dialogue partners in 2009 (Song 2014, 100). In 2012, Afghanistan was added as an observer state, with Turkey becoming a dialogue partner the same year (Weitz 2015). At present, the organisation's observer states include Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia, while its dialogue partners consist of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey (Aliyeva 2017).

Significantly, in July 2015, the SCO Heads of State Council agreed that Pakistan and India would be admitted as full members. The decision was seen as a compromise between Pakistani ally China and traditional Indian partner Russia (Weitz 2015). Prior to the July 2015 announcement, Zahid Ali Khan (2013, 63) had speculated that "Russia has been said to support Pakistan's membership only if India joins at the same time." Interestingly, Song (2014, 100) had remarked on the subject that "to oppose India's campaign for membership, China may argue that to accept India alone and exclude Pakistan would be unfair, and that to grant membership to both may undermine the solidarity of the organization as it would incite rivalry in the SCO."

In any event, former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced in June 2017 that India and Pakistan had both been admitted as members to the SCO (Bhattacharjee 2017). I interviewed Talmiz Ahmad (2017), a retired Indian ambassador who now lectures at the Symbiosis School of International Studies, and asked him what he thought of the SCO's role in the India-Pakistan-China dynamic. Talmiz Ahmad expressed his "very strong" support for the SCO, arguing "that India's interests lie in Asia," and emphasising the need for India to build stronger relationships with China, Russia, and Iran. He averred that the consolidation of these relationships would indirectly improve the India-Pakistan situation—a significant insight for this thesis. Talmiz Ahmad's remarks reflect the decentring world order referred to

by Buzan and the vital role that Asian powers can play in securing Pakistan, including via the SCO.

The potential of the SCO to transform security relations and, through that, the security landscape in South Asia lies in the presence of Russia and China in the organisation. Although India's relations with China as well as Pakistan remain fraught, it continues to seek strong ties with Russia. Meanwhile, the China-Pakistan friendship has deepened due to CPEC, and Pakistan has been moving closer to Russia too.

Amid the decentring world order and the rise of Russia, China and India, the SCO, with its focus on tackling terrorism, seems perfectly positioned to play a strong role in supporting counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, the attacks carried out by terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India have, to a large extent, become enmeshed with the hostility of the governments and security agencies of these three countries towards one another. Given the alleged covert support provided by security agencies from all three countries to militant groups that target the state apparatus and civilians across borders, an organisation such as the SCO could ease tensions among the three governments—especially the Indian and Pakistani administrations—and thus contribute significantly to a reduction in militant attacks in the region. The SCO could provide an excuse for the political leaders of the rival South Asian states to meet more frequently and thereby enhance mutual understanding and relieve mistrust. Furthermore, China and

Russia are states with the clout to exert significant pressure on both Pakistan and India to interact in a more constructive manner. The developments of 2019-20 with regards to Kashmir and the China-India conflict undermine these earlier moves towards societal cooperation towards shared objectives through the SCO. However, from an ES perspective, both war and multilateral diplomacy through organisations like the SCO constitute a deepening of regional society. War may not be "nice," but it constitutes rule-based, norm-bound behaviour aimed at resolving a conflict, unlike proxy warfare that operates in the shadows and has insidiously challenged security in the region for the past four decades.

Pakistan and India participated in the SCO Afghanistan Contact Group meeting held in Moscow in October 2017 (*Express Tribune* 2017d; India Ministry 2017). At the meeting, Pakistan expressed its continued support for negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan administration (*Express Tribune* 2017d). Afghanistan put forward its desire to become a full member of the SCO, both at the Afghanistan Contact Group meeting and ahead of the meeting in a tête-à-tête with Chinese assistant foreign minister Li Hui (Afghanistan Ministry 2017b; *Pajhwok Afghan News* 2017).

Afghanistan's potential inclusion would bode well for the future stability of the region, given the quadrangular security dynamic shaped by the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-China alliances. Moreover, Russian ambassador at large of the foreign ministry Bakhtiyor Khakimov's statement to

the effect that Iran's possible membership of the SCO was still on the table (Aliyeva 2017) lends weight to Talmiz Ahmad's (2017) view that Iran will eventually be incorporated into the SCO, fortifying the organisation amid the global power shift.

While the SCO Afghanistan Contact Group meeting took place in Moscow in October 2017 (*Bakhtar News* 2017; India Ministry 2017; The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2017), the sixteenth meeting of the SCO Heads of Government Council was held in the Russian city of Sochi in November-December 2017. Another SCO Afghanistan Contact Group meeting, the SCO Industrial and Trade Forum, and the seventeenth SCO Heads of Government Meeting are scheduled to take place in 2018, while the tenth SCO Meeting of Heads of Emergency Prevention and Relief Agencies is due to take place in 2019 (Afghanistan Ministry 2017b; Aliyeva 2017; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2017). Thus, the SCO provides frequent opportunities for regional leaders to interact with one another, enhance their understanding of one another's perspectives, sort out differences of opinion, and arrive at mutually beneficial agreements. In ES terms, this spells hope for an enhanced appreciation of shared interests and the evolution of a society of states in the Asian super-region.

While the SCO shows promise as a secondary institution with the potential to transform interstate relationships and enhance security in Asia, the outcome of the India-China border tensions of 2020 remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the United States has signed a deal with the Afghan Taliban, as discussed in the next subsection (Waziri and Kapur 2020).

Talking to the Taliban

The United States' 2020 deal with the Taliban represents yet another aspect of great-power intervention in the security and politics of South Asia with a direct impact on Pakistan's security. The Trump administration in February 2020 reached an agreement with the Afghan Taliban after nine rounds of talks. The deal paved the way for the United States to draw down its troops from 12,000 to 8,600, which has already happened; the United States is set to withdraw all soldiers from Afghanistan by May 2021 under the terms of the agreement (Council on Foreign Relations 2020b; Reichmann 2020).

The Taliban and US forces have kept to a commitment under the agreement to avoid attacking one another, and the Taliban have joined US and Afghan forces in targeting Daesh. However, violence between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces has escalated since the deal, with an intra-Afghan dialogue involving the two sides still in limbo. Under the terms of the US-Taliban deal, the intra-Afghan talks were to have started by March 2020, but this has not occurred, with the Afghan government's refusal to follow through on the release of Taliban prisoners acting as an impediment. The US-Taliban agreement provides for the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners and 1,000 Afghan

troops, but the Afghan government has stated that it did not agree to this prisoner swap (Council on Foreign Relations 2020b; Reichmann 2020).

Another impediment to the peace process is the weakness of the Afghan administration after disputed elections in 2019, for which results were announced after a delay of months. Ghani's victory was challenged by rival Abdullah Abdullah, who claimed he was setting up his own government (Council on Foreign Relations 2020b). Amid a deadlock between the Taliban and the Ghani administration, violence against ordinary Afghans has continued, including a brutal attack on mothers and infants at a maternity hospital in Kabul in May 2020 (*Hindu* 2020; S. Jones 2020). With the Taliban in control of many districts and earning millions of dollars in revenue from poppy fields, there are serious questions about the viability of a potential power-sharing government and the incentives for the Taliban to share power under a democratic set-up (Council on Foreign Relations 2020b).

From Pakistan's perspective, the Taliban's return to power in some form in neighbouring Afghanistan would be a relief after two decades of Indian-influenced governance in a country that Pakistan considered to be its "strategic depth" (Council on Foreign Relations 2020b). Pakistan was an active member of the QCG, which worked for years to try and negotiate a settlement between the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States (Amir Khan 2017). However, there have been 3,800 attacks in Afghanistan since the deal was inked, and there have been 3,500 civilian casualties in January-June 2020 (*Hindu*

2020; A. Mukhtar 2020). Meanwhile, the 8,600 remaining troops in Afghanistan correspond to the troop level of 8,400 at the end of the Obama administration (*Military Times* 2016; Reichmann 2020). Thus, it remains to be seen whether the diplomatic victory of February 2020 will translate into greater stability and security for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Conclusion

How does the institution of great-power management affect Pakistan's security situation? This is the question that this chapter has attempted to answer. It began by recounting the US, Saudi and Chinese governments' sponsorship of the Afghan jihad and the long-term effect of that jihad on Pakistan in terms of having created a militant ecosystem in the country, particularly along its north-western border with Afghanistan.

Secondly, the chapter explored the consequences of the Saudi Arabia-Iran political rivalry for sectarian militancy within Pakistan. It found that Middle Eastern powers Saudi Arabia and Iran have actively supported sectarian extremist groups within Pakistan, thus exacerbating the security challenges posed by militant violence in the country.

The chapter went on to consider recent developments in the light of whether there is room for optimism about the role of great powers going forward. It studied CPEC, which involves a formidable Chinese economic investment in Pakistan's development, suggesting that this gives China a vital

stake in Pakistan's security. It further looked at the SCO's induction of Pakistan and India as full-fledged members and the SCO's initiative on Afghanistan, suggesting that the SCO holds potential as an ice-breaker between Pakistan and India and as a way for Asian states to get on the same page on the interrelated threats they face from militant groups.

Finally, the chapter commented on the US-Taliban deal of 2020. It noted that although the deal represented a success for international diplomacy, there are questions about the effectiveness of the agreement in bringing an end to the conflict, since violence in Afghanistan remains at a high level despite the ceasefire between US troops and Taliban fighters. Thus, the stability of the AfPak region remains precarious and uncertain.

In conclusion, then, although the great powers have significantly contributed to Pakistan's woes, there are promising signs on the horizon. Economic ventures such as CPEC and diplomatic efforts such as the SCO, the QCG, the US-Taliban deal, and the hoped-for intra-Afghan talks provide potent incentives and mechanisms for states to realise and pursue their shared interests. Challenges persist: The Pakistan-India relationship remains, in Martin Walter's (2017) words, "paranoic;" the China-India relationship has flared up in 2020 along the Line of Actual Control; and the US-Taliban deal has failed to quell violence in Afghanistan or to force the Afghan government to talk to the Taliban.

For Pakistan, all of this has manifold implications. The prospect of a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the democratic Afghan government would mean Pakistan has more say in Afghan affairs, including in shutting down the operations of the TTP, which targets Pakistan from its bases in Afghanistan. China's investment in Pakistan represents a deepening bond between the two states and a powerful potential supporter for Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts. Russia and India's membership of the SCO suggests that they could be brought around to also promoting counterterrorism in Pakistan once sufficient mutual trust is built up: Both Russia and India are threatened by regional militant groups, because of which this would be in both of their interests. Meanwhile, Trump's implicit backtracking on his condemnation of Pakistani "safe havens" through his subsequent willingness to engage Pakistan's help in negotiating with the Taliban, offer to mediate on Kashmir, and release of funds to support Pakistani fighter jets suggests that the long-standing United States-Pakistan security partnership might have roots too deep to be dislodged by a single president (Aamir 2019; T. Ahmad 2017; Rajghatta and Pandit 2019; Roche 2019; Shams 2019).

This chapter has contributed to the literature by considering the responsibility of the great powers in participating in international counterterrorism cooperation. It has done so by drawing on the principle of reparation as a measure of a state's special responsibilities and applying this notion to the case of Pakistan, interrogating the special responsibilities of great

and regional powers in causing terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, this chapter has helped discern where responsibility for counterterrorism cooperation lies.

This chapter has concentrated on the de-politicising and de-historicising effects of the "global-war-on-terror" narrative identified by Jackson (2005, 55-58). In this sense, it has helped bridge the gap between IR theory and terrorism studies by applying the ES's historical framework to a security issue. The next chapter turns to another consequence of the "war-on-terror" discourse that Jackson (2005, 60-76) notices, namely, the dehumanisation of the terrorist "other." The following chapter will address this dehumanisation by drawing attention to soft counterterrorism and efforts to rehabilitate terrorists in the context of the Pakistani security environment.

Chapter 6

Counterterrorism in Pakistan in the Age of Donald Trump

> The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.
>
> —Donald J. Trump, January 1, 2018

The US Department of State (2018a, 2018b) shook the foundations of the United States-Pakistan alliance when it announced on 4 January 2018 that the United States was suspending "security assistance to Pakistan" until the latter country took "decisive action against groups, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network." Put in context, the announcement is less significant than it appears, considering that the United States had already suspended the Foreign Military Financing Fund of $255 million, as well as $350 million of the $700-million Coalition Support Fund, for the 2016 fiscal year, leaving only the remaining $350 million from the latter fund (Iqbal 2018).[35] Even so, taken together, these actions underline this thesis's central premise that the deteriorating United States-Pakistan relationship raises questions about the United States' continuing military assistance to Pakistan, and consequently, about the potential responsibility of other states to promote counterterrorism in Pakistan.

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[35] The remaining $350 million was still to be disbursed at the time of the State Department's announcement. As noted in the Introduction and Chapter 5, the United States in July 2019 released $125 million in technical support for Pakistani fighter jets (Aamir 2019; Rajghatta and Pandit 2019; Roche 2019; Shams 2019).

While the preceding chapters have depicted the domestic and international context within which Pakistan-based militant groups operate, this chapter devotes its attention to these groups themselves, as well as to the country's military and non-military counterterrorism strategy. The first section provides an overview of terrorist violence within Pakistan. The next section focuses on the most violent militant organisations active in the country. In the third section, I examine the army's rehabilitation programme for captured terrorists. Finally, the conclusion considers the destabilising role that great powers have played in Pakistan and their responsibility to support the stabilisation of the country. The chapter draws on interview data, official statements, the news media, think-tank reports, and academic literature to argue that international society has a normative responsibility to ensure the sustainability of Pakistan's counterterrorism programme.

This concern with normativity and responsibility relies, in theoretical terms, on the ES and, more broadly, on critical security studies (Malik 2015). Thus, this chapter demonstrates a link between the ES's ideas and critical security studies, thereby supporting Buzan's (2015, 126) contention that the ES is "a neglected approach to International Security Studies." Indeed, this is a contribution to theory made by this thesis more generally, given its attempt to bridge the gap between ISS and IR theory using the ES, as well as its emphasis on the security of individuals as well as the state, which ties into the broadening agenda of critical security theorists.

In examining the normative responsibility of international society to secure Pakistan, this chapter and this thesis run the risk of denying Pakistan's agency as the decision-maker with regard to its own destiny. Indeed, Pakistan vocally asserted its agency in the "global war on terror" when it pushed back against the Trump administration's characterisation of Pakistan as a "safe haven" for the Taliban and Haqqani Network. It is crucial to remain cognisant of this ultimate decision-making agency of the Pakistani state and society when conducting the analysis herewith, which should help mitigate the risks associated with this thesis's normative orientation.

Terrorist Violence in Pakistan

The Global Terrorism Index 2017 ranked Pakistan as the country fifth-most impacted by terrorism in the world. The country accounted for 3.7 percent of terrorism-related deaths in the world in 2016. However, the report indicated that there had been a 12-percent drop in the number of fatalities resulting from terrorism in the country in 2016, to 956: "the lowest number of deaths since 2006" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 15). The report ascribed this reduction to a decrease in terrorist activity in Sindh, and to the TTP and Daesh's South Asian branch—its Wilayat Khorasan—diverting attention away from Pakistan to Afghanistan. In addition, it lauded the military's Zarb-i-Azb operation, launched in 2014 in North Waziristan, giving the counterterrorism operation partial credit for the fall in terrorist violence in the country. Crucially,

though, while the operation reportedly killed 3,500 TTP fighters, many more have fled to Afghanistan because of Zarb-i-Azb, driving up TTP violence in the latter country (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 4-26). What this means for Pakistan is that these TTP militants could return to conduct attacks in Pakistan from bases in Afghanistan, especially once the army concludes the operation.

While the Zarb-i-Azb operation launched in 2014 was a critical component of Pakistan's domestic war on terrorism, the pattern of military counterterrorism and a backlash from militants has persisted since 2001, when Pakistan launched operations against violent extremist groups in its north-west under US pressure. As Mona Kanwal Sheikh (2016, 4) notes, the decade from 2000 to 2009 marked a dramatic shift in the security landscape in Pakistan:

> The past decade has been full of traumatic events for a country whose prime security concerns used to be linked to either separatist demands (from the Pashtun areas, Baluchistan, or Sindh) or the enduring rivalry with India. These events include the Pakistani army's intrusion into the semi-autonomous tribal areas of Pakistan during 2002-4, the launch of the US drone programme in northwestern Pakistan in 2004, the Pakistani army's operation against the Red Mosque in Islamabad in 2007, the Pakistani Taliban's takeover of the Swat valley and its adjacent areas in 2008-9 as well as the subsequent army raids and refugee crisis, the Taliban attack on the schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai, and the rapid expansion of the Taliban movement from the tribal areas into the urban centres of Punjab and Sindh.

The operation against the Lal Masjid, in particular, set off a spiral of violence targeting the security forces, the government, the intelligence services and civilians, as the next section will recount.

The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Crisis

The Lal Masjid is a mosque complex located in the Aabpara locality of Islamabad, within a mile of Parliament House, the ISI headquarters, the president's estate, government offices, and the diplomatic enclave. The complex includes a mosque and two seminaries—Jamia Hafsa for women, and Jamia Fareedia for men (Saini 2009, 554; Zaidi 2010, 185). Although the Lal Masjid was built in 1965 with state funding, Jamia Hafsa was constructed in 1992 on land encroached from the state that had been intended for a social club and women's library (K. Abbasi 2019; Z. Hussain 2017a; Pardesi 2008, 97; Zaidi 2010, 185). Prior to July 2007, the mosque was frequented by army generals, politicians and ISI officers, perhaps because of its proximity to the ISI headquarters and other government buildings (M. Sheikh 2016, 88; Small 2015, xi; Zaidi 2010, 194). The Lal Masjid seminaries were run by Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi (Zaidi 2010, 116-17).

The arrest of bin Laden's driver, Usman, in Islamabad in 2004 brought the Lal Masjid's possible linkages with militancy to the limelight: Usman was in Islamabad as Abdul Rashid Ghazi's guest, and was in Abdul Rashid Ghazi's car when he was arrested (Q. Siddique 2008, 44; Zaidi 2010, 116-17). Terrorist attacks in London in July 2005 again linked the Lal Masjid to international terrorism when reports emerged of possible connections between Shehzad Tanweer, one of the bombers, and the Red Mosque (M. Sheikh 2016, 87; Zaidi 2010, 187). The police tried to raid the Lal Masjid as part of an investigation into

this potential connection with the London bombings, but baton-wielding female students of Jamia Hafsa blocked their entry (Saini 2009, 554).

In the first half of 2007, Islamabad witnessed a series of incidents involving the students and leadership of the Lal Masjid complex, in which "women and young girls played an exceptionally visible role" (K. Sheikh 2017, 70-71), leading Faisal Devji (2012, 156) to argue that the events leading up to the July 2007 army operation against the mosque constituted civil-society agitations rather than militant activities. In January, the leaders of the mosque called for sharia to be implemented in Pakistan, following which students from Jamia Fareedia and Jamia Hafsa began to implement vigilante justice on the streets of Islamabad. Students from Jamia Fareedia targeted video shops, which they accused of spreading pornography, and burnt DVDs, CDs and books on public streets. Concurrently, women from Jamia Hafsa turned their ire against massage parlours, which were accused of being undercover brothels. The leaders of the Lal Masjid complex were agitated over a government drive to demolish illegally built mosques that stood on encroached land that belonged to the government. Women from Jamia Hafsa occupied a government-run children's library and subsequently attacked television and video stores, burnt CDs, and assaulted cars driven by women. In March, *burqa* (loose garment covering the head, face and body worn by some Muslim women)-clad, baton-wielding students of Jamia Hafsa kidnapped three women from a massage parlour for allegedly running a brothel—Aunty Shamim, her daughter, and her

daughter-in-law, along with Aunty Shamim's six-month-old granddaughter (Pardesi 2008, 99-100; Zaidi 2010, 189).

The *burqa*-clad, baton-wielding women activists of Jamia Hafsa earned the nickname "chicks with sticks," leading Moon Charania (2014, 133-34) to critique the media's representations of these women as "baton-wielding," "fearsome, stick-wielding, burka-clad young women" or the "burqa brigade." To Charania, the discourse in the English-language media of Pakistan, India, the United States and the United Kingdom served to paint a simplified picture of "feminine irrationality, Muslim barbarism, the dangerous Muslim nation" that undermined the women activists' right to be treated as political subjects, as the state and media discourses surrounding these women's activism fetishised their femininity and reduced them "to ideological caricatures such as 'daughter' and 'burqa-brigade'."

In April, Abdul Aziz Ghazi declared that he was establishing a sharia court in the Lal Masjid complex. He threatened to retaliate with suicide bombings if the security forces invaded the complex. Lal Masjid clerics delivered a fatwa against Nilofar Bakhtiyar, who was tourism minister at the time, and who had been photographed hugging a French skydiving instructor. Subsequently, students from the Lal Masjid complex started to kidnap police officers (Pardesi 2008, 99-100; *Reuters* 2007).

The series of agitations in early 2007 culminated in the abduction of seven Chinese massage therapists by female students of Jamia Hafsa on 24 June

2007 on suspicion of doubling as prostitutes. *Burqa*-clad activists carrying sticks entered the massage and acupuncture clinic in the wealthy Sector F-8 of Islamabad, overpowering the guards and beating and abducting the women and their two clients. A spokesperson of the madrassa told the press: "This place was used as a brothel house and despite our warnings the administration failed to take any action, so we decided to take action on our own" (Pardesi 2008, 100; Small 2015, ix; Zaidi 2010, 190).

Under immense pressure from China, and after a gun battle with women students who had stolen weapons and radios from Pakistani Rangers in which nine people were killed, the security forces on 3 July surrounded the mosque complex (Saini 2009, 554; Small 2015, xiv). In total, approximately 20 people were killed and 100 others injured in gun battles on 3 July (Zaidi 2010, 190-91). Politicians from religious parties who were part of the National Assembly began concurrent negotiations with the mosque leadership (Pardesi 2008, 102).

The following day, the authorities imposed a curfew in the vicinity of the mosque and offered five thousand rupees and free education to individuals who exited the mosque unarmed. Women leaving the complex were offered safe passage home. On 5 July, Abdul Aziz Ghazi was captured trying to flee dressed in a *burqa*. Following his arrest, approximately 1,000 students surrendered, while 300 to 400 students remained on the mosque premises (Saini 2009, 554-55). The security forces captured members of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)—the charity wing/front organisation/new name of the LeT—among the

fleeing students. Musharraf announced an amnesty for all except those who were accused of crimes, and the army created a breach in the wall of the Lal Masjid complex to allow students to flee (Pardesi 2008, 103). Abdul Rashid Ghazi asked for safe passage for himself and others who remained within the premises of the mosque—who, according to Manjeet Pardesi (2008, 103), included "several foreign militants from Central Asia"—but the authorities insisted on them surrendering. The security forces on 6 July took over Jamia Fareedia and cut off gas supply to the Lal Masjid. In the days that followed, the military allegedly captured militants from HuJi, JeM and JuD (Pardesi 2008, 103).

On 8 July, the killing of three Chinese workers in Peshawar—apparently by militants linked to the Lal Masjid—precipitated an angry reaction from China (Saini 2009, 555). After the incident, Musharraf delivered a "last warning" to Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his coterie (Pardesi 2008, 100). On 10 July, talks between the mosque leaders and politicians broke down over the former's request for an amnesty, and the army was given orders to force their eviction from the premises (Saini 2009, 555). At four a.m. that morning, the Special Services Group of the Pakistani army stormed the mosque compound (Small 2015, xiv). In the thirty-six-hour operation that followed, Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his mother were killed (Pardesi 2008, 104; K. Sheikh 2017, 82). The operation, known as Operation Silence, reportedly killed at least 103 people,

including many women from Jamia Hafsa and 15 non-Afghan foreigners (Small 2015, xiv).

Khanum Sheikh (2017, 77-82) questions the state's claims of "high-profile foreign terrorists" having been holed up inside the mosque, and of huge stashes of weaponry having been discovered in the complex. She argues that these "unverified claims" served to justify "the army's use of excessive violence on the occupants" of the mosque, which included the spraying of white phosphorous, which is banned under the Geneva Conventions. She posits that Operation Silence served Musharraf's image of being a Muslim leader at war with extremism and an indispensable US ally. She further critiques the posturing by both Musharraf and the mosque leadership that ensued during the crisis, which she argues served to cover over "the ideological congruencies and concrete alliances that have, in fact, characterized relations between state actors and Red Mosque leaders." The latter include a close relationship between Maulana Abdullah (the Ghazi brothers' father) and Zia-ul-Haq, and between contemporary Red Mosque leaders and Ijaz-ul-Haq (Zia-ul-Haq's son and the minister of religious affairs under Musharraf); and alleged connections between the Lal Masjid and the ISI.

The Implications of Operation Silence for Militancy in Pakistan

Operation Silence constituted a turning point for the relationship between militants and the Pakistani security establishment and altered the

trajectory of domestic militancy in Pakistan (M. Sheikh 2016, 84-119; Small 2015, x-xv; Zaidi 2010, 116-97). As Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi (2010, 116-17) puts it, "This was apparently the definitive rift between Jihadi groups and the establishment."

The country witnessed an uptick in terrorism in retaliation for the military operation against the Lal Masjid. Even as Operation Silence was under way, on 4 July, a suicide bombing targeted a military convoy in the district of North Waziristan (Zaidi 2010, 117). On 6 July, gunmen fired at an airplane carrying Musharraf from Rawalpindi to Balochistan (Saini 2009, 555). Furthermore, as noted above, on 8 July, militants killed three Chinese engineers in Peshawar (Small 2015, xiv-xv).

In statistical terms, Pakistan had only witnessed 42 suicide attacks in the period prior to July 2007, but in the remainder of 2007 alone, the country experienced at least 47 more such bombings. The six months preceding Operation Silence, from 1 January to 3 July, had seen only 12 suicide blasts that had killed 75 people. From 4 July to 27 December, suicide attacks took place in densely populated urban centres including Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta and killed 567 people, many of whom belonged to the ISI, the military and the police. At least 1,188 people died and another 3,209 were injured in terrorist incidents in the country in the year following Operation Silence. In the fortnight following the start of Operation Silence alone, 58 people lost their lives in terrorist violence. The number of suicide

attacks in the country rose from 7 in 2006 to 56 in 2007 (Small 2015, xv; Zaidi 2010, 117-95). Indeed, Pakistan saw its "biggest escalation in terrorist violence" in the year 2007 (Zaidi 2010, 196).

The impact of the operation can also be ascertained through the rhetoric of Al Qaeda, which issued statements calling for retaliatory attacks in the wake of Operation Silence. Both bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri called for attacks against the Pakistani establishment in reaction to the siege on the Lal Masjid (Pardesi 2008, 107; Small 2015, xv; Zaidi 2010, 192).

The establishment of the TTP in December 2007, just five months after Operation Silence, can also be understood in terms of the militants' disillusionment with the security establishment and recognition of the need to definitively break away from the military/ISI and unitedly fight Pakistani forces. One of the central demands of the TTP was the release of Abdul Aziz Ghazi (Small 2015, xv; Zaidi 2010, 61-190). Mullah Fazlullah, the deceased leader of the TNSM and TTP, took over the Swat valley in 2007 after the siege on the Red Mosque. He used his radio channel to express support for the Ghazi brothers and declare war on the security forces. The Ghazi Force—named after the Ghazi brothers—was created specifically to avenge Operation Silence and is part of the TTP. It has carried out attacks on the security forces and government installations. Similarly, Janude Hafsa—named after Jamia Hafsa— was also established in reaction to the operation and is affiliated to the Pakistani Taliban (M. Sheikh 2016, 34-85).

From a more critical perspective, Sheikh (2017, 82-88) explains that the men and women trapped inside the Lal Masjid compound perceived the military's attack on a place of worship as evidence of the state's animosity towards Islam and loyalty towards foreign powers. She further writes about the horror felt by many ordinary Pakistanis upon witnessing the bombing of a mosque by their own, supposedly Islamic government and the televised images of women and children being victimised by the army operation. Indeed, an opinion poll conducted in 2007 suggested that the public's sympathy for activists from the Lal Masjid had risen, and their support for Musharraf had fallen, after Operation Silence. Sheikh points to the perceived "female vulnerability" of the female activists, as opposed to the "masculine state power/violence," as a key variable in this rise in public sympathy for the Lal Masjid movement. In similar terms, Maleeha Aslam (2010, 422) explains:

> The seminary students were mostly perceived as ordinary and homeless individuals and the public opinion was largely averse to military action against the Jami'a women, who were perceived as the "daughters" and "sisters" of the nation. Video footage of women fainting or being rushed towards ambulances made ordinary citizens forget the prologue to this chaos, transforming for them this fearsome, vigilante force of militant women into a more socially familiar group of pitiable women crying out for help.

Operation Silence also triggered a new wave of protests by women activists, led by Umm Hasaan, who is the wife of Abdul Aziz Ghazi (M. Sheikh 2016, 85-86). A former student of Jamia Hafsa who suffered a bullet in her stomach during the army operation, and was part of the women's

demonstrations, explained that while she initially only wanted to protect the mosque, she now considered it her duty to wage jihad and enforce sharia in the face of "anti-Islamic forces" (M. Sheikh 2016, 93).

Thus, in a fresh crisis in February 2020, one hundred female students broke into the new Jamia Hafsa building, which had been sealed by the authorities, and occupied it (K. Ali 2020). The original seminary was razed during Operation Silence, but an adjacent madrassa, Jamia Sumya, was renamed Jamia Hafsa and work began to expand the new Jamia Hafsa. In December 2019, the authorities issued a notice to Jamia Hafsa and the Lal Masjid asking them to stop "unauthorised construction" on land belonging to the state that was meant for a children's park (K. Abbasi 2019). After three days of negotiations with Abdul Aziz Ghazi, who had occupied the Lal Masjid in January 2020 claiming that he was its rightful *khateeb* (prayer leader), Abdul Aziz Ghazi agreed to return to his residence on the Jamia Hafsa premises. The female students started to leave, too, and the authorities promised to allot twenty *kanals* (unit of area) of land for the reconstruction of Jamia Hafsa (K. Ali 2020; *Dawn* 2020c). Thus, although the Lal Masjid crisis has died down over the past decade and more, its legacy continues in the form of TTP violence, activism by female madrassa students, and an ongoing tussle between the mosque's erstwhile leadership and the local authorities that still poses the threat of a new spell of violence in the centre of the capital (Ved 2020).

Domestic Militancy in Pakistan

According to the Institute for Economics & Peace (2017, 26), the TTP was behind thirty percent of the terrorism-related killings in Pakistan in 2016. An equal number of people were killed in attacks for which no group claimed responsibility. Furthermore, Wilayat Khorasan—the South Asian branch of Daesh—caused sixteen percent of the terrorist fatalities in the country that year. The Sunni sectarian extremist group LeJ was responsible for eleven percent of the deaths.

A range of militant groups exists in Pakistan, with aims ranging from the eviction of foreign troops from Afghanistan, to the overthrow of the Pakistani administration, to the liberation of Kashmir from Indian rule, to Balochistan's secession from Pakistan, in addition to sectarian Sunni as well as Shia outfits. However, this chapter focuses on the three organisations identified by the Global Terrorism Index 2017—the TTP, Daesh's Wilayat Khorasan, and LeJ— to provide an overview of the most violent extremist groups currently carrying out attacks within the country. This approach is open to criticism: The report holds the Pakistan-based LeT responsible for the fourth-highest number of terrorism-related fatalities in India in 2016 (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 29). Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 4, Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of providing sanctuary to the Taliban—an allegation backed by the US State Department (2018a, 2018b)—and recent estimates from 2018-19 suggest that the Taliban are in control of 12 to 19 percent of Afghanistan's districts (Frud Bezhan

2020; Chughtai 2019; Council on Foreign Relations 2020a; FDD's Long War Journal, n.d.; C. Thomas 2020).

At the US State Department's (2018a) special briefing on the suspension of security assistance to Pakistan, a senior State Department official highlighted the issue of "the allowance of safe havens for the Taliban and the Haqqani Network." The official expressed disagreement with the Pakistani denial of "safe havens," and asserted that there was "significant evidence that leadership of the Haqqani Network resides inside Pakistan and is able to plan and execute from Pakistan attacks inside Afghanistan." In addition to "the issue of sanctuaries for the Haqqani Network and the Taliban," the official voiced "concerns about the ability of anti-India groups like Lashkar-e Tayyiba and Jaish-e Mohammed to fundraise and operate; and Hafiz Saeed, the head of Lashkar-e Tayyiba, who was recently released from house arrest." The State Department's statements on 4 January 2018 followed a tweet by Trump on 1 January 2018, in which he complained that his country had "foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years," while Pakistan had given "safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan" (Twitter post, January 1, 2018 [4:12 a.m.], accessed January 5, 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/947802588174577664).

Although the terrorist violence in India and Afghanistan raises the politically charged question of terrorist "safe havens" in Pakistan, as Chapter 2 asserted, Pakistan itself is a major victim of terrorism. In India, which ranked

8th on the Global Terrorism Index 2017, left-wing Maoists were responsible for 88 percent of fatalities (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 10-29). Meanwhile, the Taliban's leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, relocated from Pakistan to Afghanistan in May 2016, while Pakistan failed to convince the organisation to negotiate with the QCG (Harooni and Ahmad 2017; Zahra-Malik 2016). Along with the expansion of the Taliban's control in Afghanistan, these developments suggest a consolidation of the group's position as an Afghanistan-based and Afghanistan-focused force and a reduction of the Pakistani military establishment's influence over the organisation. The alleged existence of "safe havens" for the Afghanistan-focused Taliban and Haqqani Network and the India-focused LeT and JeM is, undoubtedly, a pertinent concern for international society. However, the analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the nature of the triangular Pakistan-Afghanistan-India security relationship is such that counter-allegations, counter-attacks and proxy warfare have become part of a vicious cycle of terrorist violence in the region, with circumstantial evidence suggesting that all three states are hand in glove with some militants. As stated in Chapter 2, this thesis consciously overturns the dominant security narrative on Pakistan by treating the Pakistani state as well as individuals within Pakistan as its primary referent objects. Therefore, it is fair to concentrate on organisations that target these two referent objects in this chapter.

Consequently, and as a means of keeping its analysis focused and current, the first section of this chapter provides an overview of the TTP, Daesh's Wilayat Khorasan and LeJ as the most active militant organisations targeting the Pakistani state and society. This descriptive section is followed by the analytical core of the chapter in section two, which argues that while the military's operations against militants have succeeded in reducing terrorist violence in the country, the radicalisation that has taken place since 1979 as a result of the Afghan jihad, Zia-ul-Haq's policies, and the Iranian Revolution necessitate a holistic counterterrorism approach that addresses the ideological and psychological roots of militant violence, in conjunction with military operations such as Zarb-i-Azb. The section draws attention to the military's programme to de-radicalise and reintegrate militants across the country. It argues that while the United States has provided substantial aid for hard counterterrorism in the form of military operations, this needs to be accompanied by international aid for soft counterterrorism efforts such as rehabilitation programmes.

These arguments rely on this thesis's treatment of terrorist groups as social actors in world society, provided in the Introduction and based on Buzan's (2004) understanding of violence as a form of social interaction and of non-state actors as members of world society. This ES-informed approach addresses the dehumanisation, demonisation and depersonalising of terrorists identified by Jackson (2005, 70), allowing this chapter to pay attention to

Pakistan's programme to rehabilitate terrorists. Rather than treating terrorists as "evil" individuals who must be annihilated, the chapter draws on Buzan and Jackson's work to consider militants as people with feelings and as social actors expressing their political grievances through violent means. This treatment paves the way for a serious consideration of rehabilitation as a viable soft counterterrorism measure in the face of several failed peace deals between the Pakistani government and militant groups. Indeed, as Bruce Pilbeam (2015, 100) points out, peace settlements do not guarantee lasting peace, which requires that the roots of conflict be addressed. From a peacebuilding perspective, the disarming and reintegration of former combatants is an important measure to ensure sustainable peace (Pilbeam 2015, 102).

What the focus on de-radicalisation and rehabilitation risks is the deflection of

> questions about [terrorists'] political beliefs or grievances because their behaviour can be explained as being motivated by pathology rather than ideology. Their political statements, their grievances, and their programmes can then be dismissed as the product of a diseased mind, not to be taken seriously (Jackson 2005, 63).

Furthermore, de-radicalisation's reliance on religious counselling to convince terrorists to disengage from violence is guilty of constructing the terrorists as "'traitors' to their own religion [who] have 'perverted' its teachings," which is, according to Jackson (2005, 64), a way of "dismissing and suppressing the religious element of the terrorists' political agenda." This chapter recognises these problematic aspects of the psychological and religious counselling that

constitutes a vital part of terrorist-rehabilitation programmes. Even so, the chapter's focus is empirical. In keeping with the praxeological nature of this thesis's research, the chapter concentrates on what *is*—on the military and non-military means of counterterrorism on the table, which are being employed in Pakistan and elsewhere—as a prelude to the concluding chapter's policy recommendations. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider how rehabilitation programmes *ought* to be designed, or how governments *ought* to respond to the political grievances of terrorists, because these are questions that would necessitate whole theses unto themselves.

Militant Groups in Pakistan

In *This House of Clay and Water*, Pakistani high-society ladies Nida and Sasha joke about the widespread prevalence of suicide attacks in the country, humanising the phenomenon by perceiving it as individuals *committing suicide out of despair* rather than madness or hatred (Mansab 2017, 155-56). Faiqa Mansab's literary critique of the dominant discourse on suicide bombing is pertinent and timely, with ninety-three percent of suicide attacks in South and Southeast Asia in 2016 taking place in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 97). According to Imtiaz Gul (2010b, xii), only one suicide attack had taken place inside Pakistan until 2002, underlining the repercussions of the "global war on terror" for Pakistan. Most of the fatalities in Pakistan caused by terrorist attacks in 2016 were a result of suicide bombings.

As noted earlier, the deadliest group, according to the Institute for Economics & Peace (2017, 26), was the TTP. The following subsection provides a description of the group and its activities.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

In 2020, as Pakistan along with the rest of the world faced the coronavirus pandemic, locusts invaded Africa, Arabia and South Asia—including Pakistan—while cyclones battered neighbouring India and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, at the time of writing in June 2020, the United States was ablaze with protests against the killing of an African American man by a police officer. These scenes are salient to the Pakistani Taliban's apocalyptic justifications for their jihad, which they perceive as foreshadowing the appearance of the *mahdi* (messiah) during the last days of the world. The *mahdi* is expected to appear in Khurasan, the historical region encompassing parts of Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan, amid natural disasters, political instability, and efforts by unbelievers, Jews and Christians to destroy Islam. This apocalyptic expectation frames the Taliban's self-understanding of their jihad as being "a path to salvation" during what they perceive to be the final days of the world, when the true believers will be separated from the infidels (M. Sheikh 2016, 50-79).

The TTP is an umbrella organisation of Pakistani Taliban militias mostly located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the erstwhile FATA region of the

province. Although distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the TTP is believed to have links with the Afghan Taliban as well as Al Qaeda. The TTP was established on 15 December 2007, with Baitullah Mehsud, a militant from South Waziristan, as its first leader. The TTP is believed to be a loose federation rather than a tightly controlled organisation (Sisson 2011; Zaidi 2010, 55). This looseness means that the TTP contains diverse groups that are often pursuing different agendas, and is "often fractured, suffering from indiscipline, disagreement, and rebel infighting" (Qazi 2011, 576-81). In the words of Zaidi (2010, 62), "Even though Mr. Mehsud collected many of the splinter Jihadi groups under the auspices of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, he did not entirely succeed to keep some regional and ethnic militant groups united under him."

The TTP is reported to consist of forty distinct militias, with a membership of twenty to thirty-five thousand insurgents, many of whom belong to the Pashtun ethnic group that is predominant in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 948; Qazi 2011, 581-87; Zaidi 2010, 55). The group is influenced by Wahhabism, but its religious ideology is fundamentally an extreme version of Deobandism, which originates from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh and is a branch of the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence (Qazi 2011, 589; Zaidi 2010, 14). However, as Shehzad Qazi (2011, 592) shows, the diverse fighters of the TTP are motivated by multitudinous factors, religious ideology being one of them, and criminal profiteering through drug trafficking and smuggling another.

The TTP arose in the context of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. As Attaullah Waziri, the Press Aide to Karzai, told me in an interview on 15 June 2020, the Pakistani Taliban started off as allies of the Afghan Taliban in the fight against foreign forces in Afghanistan, although the establishment of the TTP in 2007 heralded a new war against the Pakistani army, with Baitullah Mehsud giving speeches against the army, and in 2010 executing "Colonel Imam" or Brigadier Sultan Amir Tarar of the ISI.

However, the roots of the TTP run deeper in terms of radicalisation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. Following its establishment in 2007, the TTP has carried out attacks targeting the government and the security forces. Its demands have included the halting of military operations in North and South Waziristan and Swat and the release from prison of Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, the imam of the Lal Masjid. (He was eventually released in 2009 (K. Ali 2019)). In addition, the TTP has espoused the aim of supporting the jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan (Zaidi 2010, 54-62).

There have been differences within the TTP over the issue of fighting the Pakistani security forces. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who was named the *naib amir* (deputy leader) of the TTP in December 2007 and leads a Taliban faction in North Waziristan, disagreed with Baitullah Mehsud's decision to fight the army (Sulaiman 2009; Zaidi 2010, 63-76). As Waziri (2020) explained to me during our interview, Bahadur was engaged in peace negotiations with the government in 2006-07, which explains his reluctance to fight the security forces. The issue of

whether to fight Pakistani forces also separates the TTP from the Afghan Taliban, with whom the TTP shares ideological inclinations. Rather, the term "Taliban" serves as a brand or franchise signifying a particular ideological and territorial identity, broadly (but not always) including extreme Deobandism and an affinity with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Zaidi 2010, 63-76).

However, the Pakistani Taliban have expanded from being a network of Pashtun groups to including Kashmiri, Punjabi, and other fighters. Zaidi (2010, 171) refers to "the worrying trend of the simultaneous resurgence of Pakistan's proxy warriors—the Kashmiri Mujahideen, who are inclined to either form loose alliances with the TTP, or get subsumed within the umbrella organization," and whose "cadres have been fighting with the Taliban in South Waziristan, Swat, Kohat and other areas of NWFP and Fata in the recent past." In addition to non-Pashtun outfits merging with the TTP, the organisation is also a threat to traditional Pashtun institutions such as *jirgas* (traditional assemblies of leaders that make decisions by consensus and according to the teachings of Pashtunwali) and tribal elders. The Pakistani Taliban have attacked *jirgas* and killed tribal elders, and the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) is a fierce critic of the Taliban, as is the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM); these factors underline the problematic nature of claims that equate the Taliban with Pashtun nationalism (Marino 2019; M. Sheikh 2016, 30). During our interview, Waziri (2020) stressed that the TTP are not Pashtun

nationalists since their actions contradict Pashtunwali; he described the TTP as following an extreme interpretation of Islam. He distinguished between the emphasis within Pashtunwali on the power of tribal leaders and *jirgas*, as opposed to the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban's practice of setting up their own courts and appointing their own judges.

Expressing a similar sentiment, a resident of Swat who wished to remain anonymous told me in an interview on 7 June 2020:

> The TTP is a group with clear objectives, created/exploited by Pindi Boys [the army/ISI]. It has no true roots in the locals of KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. I am a Pakhtun [Pashtun] and permanent resident of Swat; the presence of our forefathers here dates back around five hundred years.

Although my interviewee's remark about the "Pindi Boys" belies the fact that the TTP has expressly targeted the security forces, including the ISI, his comments suggest sensitivities among local Pashtuns about being associated with the militants.

The TTP is the largest Pakistani Taliban organisation. Some of the groups that are included in the TTP are the Dr Ismael Group, Jaishe Islami, Janude Hafsa and Karwane Niamatullah. The TTP has units in most districts of the erstwhile FATA, including Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, North Waziristan, Orakzai and South Waziristan. It also has a strong presence in several other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as Bannu, Buner, Charsadda, Dera Ismail Khan, Dir, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Mardan, Peshawar, Swat and Tank. In addition, the TTP is influential in Karachi, which has a sizeable

Pashtun population (M. Sheikh 2016, 29-41). The TTP is considered to be the deadliest Islamist militant group in Pakistan, accounting for the highest number of terrorism-related deaths in the country in the decade from 2005 to 2015 (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 940).

The Distinction between the TTP and the Pakistani Taliban

"Pakistani Taliban" is a general term used to describe the various militias that have emerged in north-western Pakistan since the army launched operations in FATA in 2002 (Qazi 2011, 577). The TTP is the most prominent cluster of Taliban groups. Another Taliban umbrella organisation is the Muqami Tehreek-e-Taliban (MTT), led by Bahadur in North Waziristan and Bahawal Khan in South Waziristan, which consists of fourteen groups that oppose fighting the Pakistani army (M. Sheikh 2016, 29-36). The formation of the MTT in 2007 also represents tribal conflict within the various Taliban organisations, with the MTT standing for the interests of Wazir tribes in North and South Waziristan, to balance against the influence of the Mehsud tribe that dominates the TTP. In addition, there exist government-backed militias such as the groups of Qari Zainuddin Mehsud in South Waziristan and Haji Turkistan Bhittani in Tank, as well as government-backed *lashkars* (militias) in Swat. Similarly, *lashkars* have formed in Mohmand and Bajaur to resist the insurgents (Qazi 2011, 577). Finally, the term "Punjabi Taliban" refers to non-Pashtun militant groups that have formed alliances with the TTP and other Pakistani

Taliban and have increasingly reoriented their objectives towards global jihad and the targeting of Western symbols and forces. This represents a shift from their previous focus on India and Kashmir. Punjabi Taliban movements include the SSP, LeJ, JeM and LeT (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; M. Sheikh 2016, 37-39). Members of the Punjabi Taliban are not necessarily ethnic Punjabis; Sindhis and Muhajirs are included in this category, which essentially signifies non-Pashtun Pakistanis (M. Sheikh 2016, 37).

The Distinction between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban are inextricably linked to their Afghan counterparts owing to the fact that the Pakistani Taliban have their roots in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, which is when Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including FATA) experienced large-scale radicalisation; the aftermath of the Afghan war saw many mujahideen settling in north-western Pakistan, and the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan similarly pushed many fighters, including the Afghan Taliban, into Pakistan. These ongoing interactions with the conflict in Afghanistan over several decades have played a fundamental role in the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban (Zaidi 2010, 29). As Zaidi (2010, 55) puts it, "The rise of this movement in Pakistan is not just a local disturbance, but the phenomenon of resurgence of Taliban after their setback in Afghanistan, with Mehsud as a protege of Mullah Omar taking charge."

Nevertheless, while some Pakistani Taliban leaders had a deep sense of loyalty to Mullah Omar, he was not universally considered to be the supreme authority by the Pakistani Taliban, and the Quetta Shura or leadership council of the Afghan Taliban does not enjoy administrative control of the Pakistani Taliban (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; M. Sheikh 2016, 29-30). Furthermore, there is a fundamental divergence in the local goals of the two organisations, since the Afghan Taliban are widely believed to enjoy the support of the Pakistani security establishment, whereas the Pakistani Taliban (particularly the TTP) actively fight the Pakistani state (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; Schricker 2017, 16-22). What the two organisations do share is a radical Deobandi religious ideology and dominance by members of the Pashtun ethnic group (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942).

The Origins of the TTP

The TTP in particular, and the Pakistani Taliban more generally, emerged as a direct consequence of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. On one hand, Pakistani Pashtuns participated in the Afghan resistance to the foreign forces, while on the other, Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda members fled to FATA and contributed to the re-emergence of a militant culture there. In addition to these two phenomena, in 2002 the Pakistani army entered FATA and invited retaliation from locals who joined the rebellion against the soldiers. Thus, numerous local rebel groups emerged in FATA and Swat from 2002 to

2006, and members of these groups met in secret in December 2007 and announced the establishment of the TTP umbrella group, which would coordinate the struggles against Western forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; M. Sheikh 2016, 22; Qazi 2011, 579-80).

While the War on Terror was the immediate catalyst for the emergence of the TTP, the origins of militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including FATA, go back further to the Afghan jihad as well as the conflict with India. While the Afghan jihad contributed to the creation of a militant ecosystem in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the conflict with India and the use of militant proxies created an ambivalent attitude towards Islamist militants within the Pakistani security establishment. This ambivalence has impeded the fight against the TTP and the Pakistani Taliban (Zaidi 2010, xii-xiii).

Other factors that have encouraged the expansion of the Pakistani Taliban's influence are the return of Guantanamo detainees with harrowing stories of abuse; relief work carried out by Islamist extremist organisations in the aftermath of a 2005 earthquake in Pakistan's Northern Areas (Pakistan-administered J&K); anger against the military's operation against the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in 2007; and a humanitarian crisis created by the army's offensive in Swat in 2009 (M. Sheikh 2016, 23-26; Zaidi 2010, xiv-190).

The Ideology of the TTP

In the absence of a clearly presented, written manifesto, it has been left to scholars and analysts to deduce the ideological motivations behind the violence of the TTP (M. Sheikh 2016, 8). Various scholars have described the ideological imperatives of the group in terms of religious ideology, sectarianism, tribalism, ethnic nationalism, and class struggle. In this sub-section, I address each of these claims.

There are three central schools of Sunni thought practised in Pakistan: Barelvi (60 percent of the population), Deobandi (15 percent of the population) and Ahl Hadith (4 percent of the population) (M. Sheikh 2016, 42). The Pakistani Taliban are frequently described as a Deobandi movement, but this is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, as Qazi (2011, 577) shows, the Pakistani Taliban are not uniformly Deobandi; for instance, Khyber district is home to a sectarian conflict between the Deobandi Lashkar-e-Islami and the Barelvi Ansarul Islam, both of which collaborate with the MTT (M. Sheikh 2016, 29). Secondly, as Zaidi (2010) and Mona Kanwal Sheikh (2016) argue, the Pakistani Taliban's interpretation of Deobandi thought is not firmly grounded in traditional Deobandi scholarship. As Zaidi (2010, 14) puts it, "The Taliban were to take these beliefs to an extreme which the original Deobandis would never have recognized." He describes "the brand of Deobandism they preach" as "entirely their own invention, utterly bereft of the scholarly pursuit by Deobandi scholars during the past" (Zaidi 2010, 20).

The Deobandi school of thought originated in the Indian town of Deoband and gained popularity in Pakistan during the Zia-ul-Haq era. Sheikh (2016, 44) describes how the new generation of Pakistani Deobandi ulama "had only loose connections with the intellectual Deobandi establishment" and invented "new legitimating ideologies of jihad that had previously not held a significant place in Deobandi religious thought." Deriding the Pakistani Taliban's comprehension of Islamic scholarship as "blurry and incoherent," Sheikh (2016, 44-45) argues that since the Taliban lack "a coherent ideological manifesto or intellectual foundation," we must interpret their ideological inclinations based on their actions and words.

In addition to being influenced by Deobandi tradition, the Pakistani Taliban are also believed to be guided by Saudi sectarian ideology due to the influx of foreign fighters and funds to the region over many decades: "The classical Deoband and Hanafi orientation of the Taliban has been considerably influenced by Salafi sources and Wahhabi literature" (M. Sheikh 2016, 109). Hanafi is one of four classical schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and Deobandism is a primarily Hanafi movement. Wahhabism or Salafism is a puritanical Hanbali Sunni movement allied with the House of Saud.

Furthermore, there is a Sunni/Shia dimension to the TTP's sectarianism (M. Sheikh 2016, 34). Conflict between members of the Shia Turi tribe and the Sunni Bangash tribe in Kurram has both sectarian and tribal dimensions (Qazi 2011, 577). Attacks on Shia mosques in the city of Parachinar in Kurram district

by the TTP are common (*Hindustan Times* 2017). Conflict between Shias and Sunnis is also reported from Orakzai (Qazi 2011, 577). During interviews with Pakistani Taliban activists, Sheikh (2016, 136) noted that Shia Muslims were discursively framed as being infidels, based on the idea that their beliefs constitute disrespect towards the *sahaba* (companions of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)) and cause friction among Muslims.

In tribal terms, the rift between the TTP and the MTT represents tensions between the Wazir and Mehsud tribes among Pashtuns in Waziristan. Similarly, as noted above, there is a tribal dimension to the Shia-Sunni conflict in Kurram, with most Shias belonging to the Turi tribe and Sunnis to the Bangash tribe (Qazi 2011, 577).

Furthermore, the predominantly Pashtun ethnicity of the Taliban on both sides of the border raises the question of whether the militancy is tinged with ethnic nationalism. As noted in the introduction to this section, it is problematic to suggest that all Pashtuns support the Taliban, especially given the Taliban's undermining of traditional Pashtun institutions and its rift with the Pashtun nationalist ANP. Even so, in a quantitative study conducted by Karl Kaltenthaler and William Miller (2015), they find that, notwithstanding the Deobandi rhetoric of the TTP, support for the group is significantly predicated upon ethnicity. They found that "being a Pashtun from KPK [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]" was "the most predictive variable of being positive toward the

TTP." Interestingly, they found that belonging to the Deobandi sect was not a predictor of support for the TTP.

Finally, Qazi (2011, 578-93) identifies "a Maoist/Communist aspect to the militancy." He refers to violence by the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Peasants and Workers Party) over land distribution in the region. More crucially, he draws attention to the Pakistani Taliban's rhetoric against feudalism and large landowners and their promises to redistribute land and kill large landowners. In Khyber, the late militant commander Namdar Khan did, indeed, coerce landowners into returning land they had illegally occupied to the poor peasants who owned it. In contrast, in Swat, militants seized land from landlords but occupied it themselves instead of redistributing it as promised.

In short:

The conflict cannot be classified as being simply tribal or Islamist. At times it's as much sectarian as tribal, as much global as it's local. In places it's driven by criminality but at other times by discipline and a genuine desire to force Pakistani withdrawal. If there is one goal that unites the diverse group of insurgents, it's the expulsion of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan (Qazi 2011, 596).

The Objectives of the TTP

The TTP is a diverse conglomerate of tribal militias with divergent objectives (Qazi 2011, 575-76). Observers have identified a number of different motivations behind the organisation's violence, including: (1) the establishment of sharia in FATA; (2) local political priorities; (3) economic incentives flowing from the smuggling of drugs, arms and other illicit items; (4) evicting foreign

troops from Afghanistan; (5) global jihad; (6) fighting the Pakistani security forces and forcing them out of Pashtun areas; (7) targeting Shias and religious minorities; (8) overthrowing the "apostate" Pakistani government and orchestrating an Islamist takeover; and (9) avenging the operation against the Lal Masjid (Qazi 2011, 574-92; M. Sheikh 2016, 38-194; Sisson 2011; Zaidi 2010, 61-193).

Accounts in the media often emphasise the imposition of sharia in FATA as the primary objective of the TTP (Qazi 2011, 574; Sisson 2011). Zaidi (2010, 147-48) posits that because sectarian attacks by traditionally sectarian outfits such as JeM have fallen, there has emerged a convergence of the political objectives of these groups with those of the TTP in terms of the eviction of the army from the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the imposition of sharia in the region. Zaidi (2010, 148-49) further suggests that the TTP-led insurgency corresponds with the first stage of the global jihad described by Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Mu'sab Al Suri in terms of the use of suicide attacks and the bombing of schools. He argues that the Pakistani state's pursuit of peace deals with the militants, and citizens' acquiescence to this strategy, conforms to the scenario painted by Al Qaeda of the targeted state facing political confusion, security exhaustion and economic challenges. He also asserts that the TTP's attacks on urban centres fall within the ambit of the second stage of Al Suri's plan for global jihad.

Indeed, Muslim Khan, the former spokesman of the TTP's Swat faction, told Sheikh (2016, 69) in an interview that the objective of the TTP (and the TNSM) was "to establish the law of God in this country." In fact, Muslim Khan's argument applies to all of Pakistan rather than just the north-west. He argues that the implementation of sharia "was the reason why this country was established," alluding to the 1947 Partition and the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland (M. Sheikh 2016, 70). Even so, Sheikh (2016, 193-94) suggests that when observers focus on the idea that the TTP's central aim is the establishment of sharia, they overlook the fact that the TTP's violence has essentially been in reaction to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Pakistani military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including FATA).

The TTP has been involved in clashes with Shias, for instance in Kurram, which underlines the sectarian objectives of the group (Sisson 2011; Zaidi 2010, 168-69). The TTP's cooperation with the SSP and LeJ has strengthened its sectarian inclinations (M. Sheikh 2016, 38).

The group's anti-US stance hardened after the killing of its first leader, Baitullah Mehsud, in a US drone strike in August 2009 (Sisson 2011). Baitullah Mehsud himself stated in 2007: "We will continue our struggle until foreign troops are thrown out. Then we will attack them in the US and Britain until they either accept Islam or agree to pay jazia (a tax for non-Muslims living in an Islamic state)." In an interview with *Al Jazeera*, Baitullah Mehsud listed the goals

of the TTP as the destruction of "the White House, New York and London" (Zaidi 2010, 61-72).

Meanwhile, Fazlullah, who was the emir of the TTP from 2013 to 2018, constructed a narrative of a threat from the United States as evidenced by the fact that Bush described the War on Terror as a "crusade." Thus, Fazlullah justified the TTP's hostility towards the United States in terms of the United States' perceived aggression against Islam. In Fazlullah's words, "O Muslims and warriors of Allah's religion, you know that a crusade war is going on. The crusade has been raised, and nearly the whole world is united under it to eliminate Islam and erase the mujahideen and jihad" (M. Sheikh 2016, 134).

Additionally, the TTP's objective of fighting Pakistan's security forces is evidenced by the high number of terrorist attacks in Rawalpindi, the country's military headquarters, since the formation of the TTP in 2007 (Zaidi 2010, 120-21). The TTP's communications often refer to the Pakistani administration and the country's security forces as "crusader slaves" and *kafirs* (infidels). As Fazlullah puts it, "Accept the favour of Allah, thank Him and turn your bones and flesh into weapons and target the kafir government [referring to the Pakistani government]" (M. Sheikh 2016, 134-48).

Finally, Qazi (2011, 587-92) focuses on two oft-neglected objectives of the TTP: local political objectives and economic aims. He draws attention to "the micro-politics of rebellion" by discussing "concentric circles of political priorities [. . .] related to the immediate family, then extended family, clan, sub-

tribe, and tribe." He also describes the economic incentives that drive rebel behaviour in north-western Pakistan, arguing that the lucrative trades in drugs, arms and the smuggling of other illicit items are a strong incentive for the insurgents to desire control of territory. He argues that in Khyber, Bajaur and Orakzai, where the smuggling of arms, narcotics and other contraband items is most prevalent, economic objectives are likely to be predominant. He also points to *lashkars* in Khyber and Mohmand fighting other tribal militias for access to taxes and criminal enterprises, and control of markets. He contrasts this criminally driven militancy in these areas with the more ideological militancy of Waziristan.

Counterterrorism Strategies

The government has employed four central strategies to counter the TTP: negotiations leading to peace deals; military operations; ostensibly permitting the United States to conduct drone strikes; and setting up a terrorist-rehabilitation programme (Qazi 2011, 594-95; M. Sheikh 2016, 7-188; Sisson 2011; Zaidi 2010, xiv-145). While I discuss the rehabilitation programme elsewhere in this chapter and thesis, this sub-section focuses on the other three strategies.

When the TTP first emerged, the authorities were willing to negotiate with it to regain control of the territory the group had occupied (Sisson 2011). In Swat, Fazlullah's militants agreed to a ceasefire brokered by Sufi

Muhammad, the founder of the TNSM. (The TNSM is the militant organisation to which Fazlullah belonged, although he pledged allegiance to Baitullah Mehsud and ultimately became the emir of the TTP) (Zaidi 2010, 97-98). Fazlullah signed a peace deal with the government on 21 May 2008, whereby he agreed that his militants would stop attacking the army and the government and would not shelter foreign militants, and that he would dismantle the TNSM. The government acceded to releasing Swati insurgents from prison, implementing sharia in the region through the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, setting up an Islamic university in Fazlullah's hometown of Imam Dehri in the Swat valley, and withdrawing soldiers from the valley (M. Sheikh 2016, 80). A similar ceasefire was reached in Bajaur (Zaidi 2010, 97-98).

However, the government's talks with Baitullah Mehsud collapsed and the military launched operations in Khyber and arrested TTP fighters in Hangu, resulting in retaliatory threats by the TTP. A pattern emerged of the militants agreeing to a ceasefire and using it as an opportunity to regroup and rearm and then step up attacks. Continuing suicide attacks targeting the security forces pushed the government to ban the TTP in August 2008 (Sisson 2011; Zaidi 2010, 104-08).

The militants' initial willingness to negotiate and strike deals with the authorities could also be read less cynically as a desire to focus on the jihad against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar is reported to have written to the Pakistani Taliban:

> If anybody really wants to wage jihad, he must fight the occupation forces inside Afghanistan. Attacks on the Pakistani security forces and killing of fellow Muslims by the militants in the tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan is bringing a bad name to mujahideen and harming the war against the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan. (Zaidi 2010, 97-98)

Similarly, Baitullah Mehsud has said in public that he is open to ceasefires because he views the Pakistani army as a national institution. An alternative approach that the authorities have sometimes employed is to negotiate with tribal *jirgas* rather than the TTP (Zaidi 2010, 111-22).

The authorities have also seemingly allowed the United States to proceed with its drone campaign in the region, although it is unclear whether Pakistan has officially sanctioned these strikes, which have become highly politicised within Pakistan amid a public backlash. A drone strike on 5 August 2009 killed Baitullah Mehsud (Sisson 2011). The US drone campaign has been criticised as providing a recruitment tool for the militants and as being an ineffective strategy of killing those at the top, which may not be the best approach to tackling a fragmented and decentralised entity such as the TTP (M. Sheikh 2016, 7; Zaidi 2010, 50-51).

Finally, the army has conducted a series of operations in the region since 2002. The operations have been criticised for collateral damage in terms of civilian deaths and displacements, the use of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in FATA based on the idea of collective responsibility for a whole tribe, and the counterproductive effect of increasing recruitment to the

TTP due to public anger (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; Qazi 2011, 577-95; M. Sheikh 2016, 22-188; Zaidi 2010, xiv). (The FCR was scrapped in May 2018 with FATA's merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (*Dawn* 2020d)). In the words of Hakimullah Mehsud, who was the emir of the TTP from 2009 to 2013, "If the goal of the Pakistani Army is to make a helpless people cry, make orphans cry, force the displacement of the population, orphan children, martyr old and young men, humiliate the people, and bomb *madaris* and mosques then it has achieved its target" (Qazi 2011, 595).

The army has also been criticised for not using full force against the TTP in the initial years due to its ambivalence towards Islamist militants, rooted in their historical use as proxies against India (Zaidi 2010, 35-36). Even so, in subsequent years, the military has intensified its campaign against the TTP, with considerable success. In particular, Operation Zarb-i-Azb, which was launched in 2014, has succeeded in pushing many TTP fighters across the border into Afghanistan (Chughtai and Hashim 2015; *Dawn* 2018; Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 39-44; Institute for Economics & Peace 2017; Kakar and Siddique 2018). However, as Waziri (2016) argues:

> The weakness of the operation [. . .] lies in [. . .] Pakistan's lack of interest in coordinating with the government across the border. As a consequence, just as in many previous military operations when militants escaped by fleeing into North Waziristan agency, this time they have sneaked into the relative safety offered by Afghanistan. Now they are hiding in the lawless parts of the country where they are regrouping with the existing Afghan militants who are in direct fight with the Afghan security forces.

Current Situation

Several analysts have pointed to a splintering of the TTP following the death of Hakimullah Mehsud and the appointment of Fazlullah as the group's new emir in 2013. Fazlullah is reported to have been mistrusted because he did not belong to the Mehsud tribe that traditionally dominated the TTP, did not hail from FATA, and set up base in Afghanistan (Akbar 2016a; Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 942; Schricker 2017, 23-24; M. Sheikh 2016, 191). More fundamentally, Zaidi (2010, 63) suggests that "tribal affiliation and traditional animosities in FATA are much too entrenched to disappear even in the presence of the cementing bond of Talibanisation," making factionalism inevitable.

Geographically, the group is reported to have extended its influence beyond FATA into the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as the rest of Pakistan, especially Karachi (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015, 938-39). Its leader, Fazlullah, was killed in a US drone strike in Kunar province of Afghanistan in June 2018, after he and other TTP fighters fled there in 2009 to escape a Pakistani military operation. The TTP accused the Afghan intelligence agency, the NDS, of providing information to the United States about his whereabouts for the drone strike (*Al Jazeera* 2018; Branigin and Salahuddin 2018). An anonymous Afghan official told me in a private conversation in June 2020 that the NDS did so in response to a promise by Pakistan that it would halt attacks by the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan in exchange for Fazlullah's killing, a promise that did not materialise.

This highlights allegations that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India are engaged in a proxy war involving the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's foreign ministry accuses India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of building ties with the TTP leadership based in Afghanistan (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b). Ehsanullah Ehsan, the surrendered TTP spokesman, has said that he fled to Afghanistan after Operation Zarb-i-Azb, and saw TTP leaders there getting funding and assistance from India and RAW (*News International* 2017).

As Zaidi (2010, 81) observes, "It is reasonable to assume [. . .] that state patronage cannot be ruled out in this area replete with proxy wars." Nevertheless, it is important not to overlook other sources of funding for the Pakistani (and Afghan) Taliban, including Islamic charities; the drug trade; taxes on local people; crime; and trade in natural resources such as timber, gemstones and marble. These diversified sources of funding signify that the Taliban are not under the complete control of any state and possess considerable agency.

The TTP is reported to be in control of both North and South Waziristan, but Swat has re-emerged from the two years of Taliban rule from 2007 to 2009. In North Waziristan, the ANP in June 2020 complained that the *maliks* (tribal elders) had handed responsibility for maintaining security in the district to the local Taliban (*Dawn* 2020a). In South Waziristan, the TTP in August 2019 issued an order to residents restricting music, polio vaccination, and women's

movement. These reports support claims by the PTM that the Taliban are once again operating openly in the tribal areas (Marino 2019). However, in the tourist resort of Swat, home of Nobel laureate Malala Yousafzai, in February 2020 things were "close to back to normal," with schools functioning, people out late at night at markets and restaurants, and in the words of local school director Muhammad Faruq, "all signs of the Taliban hav[ing] disappeared" (Bhojani 2020).

Daesh's Wilayat Khorasan

When I interviewed Ishtiaq Ahmad in July 2015, he dismissed expressions of allegiance to Daesh by some Pakistan-based militant factions as an effort to "create[] hype around developments such as the advent of ISIS" in order to perpetuate the conflict. Similarly, Talmiz Ahmad (2017) sought to underplay the emergence of Daesh in South Asia while talking to me. For Ishtiaq Ahmad, the conspiracy to overstate the risk posed by Daesh to Pakistan and Afghanistan fed into the United States' interests in the Middle East and its desire to perpetuate the conflict in the region for its own vested interests. He further opined that there exists "a conflict constituency in Pakistan, which owes its livelihood to the perpetuation of conflict, and so [. . .] deliberately creates hype around developments such as the advent of ISIS." In light of the broader tone of the interview, Ishtiaq Ahmad is likely to have been referring to the national army and its interest in keeping US military assistance for

counterterrorism flowing. In Talmiz Ahmad's case, his response was grounded in his argument that Al Qaeda has a deep support base in Pakistan, making Daesh's position in the country tenuous. Furthermore, he pointed to Daesh's alleged defeat in Syria and Iraq and saw this as an indication that it would be unable to develop a significant presence in Pakistan.

Given this reticence on the part of senior South Asian analysts to acknowledge a threat from Daesh to the region, it is significant that the Institute for Economics & Peace (2017) has identified the Wilayat Khorasan as having caused the second-highest number of fatalities in terrorist incidents in Pakistan in 2016. Even so, the report does not completely discredit Ishtiaq Ahmad and Talmiz Ahmad's comments. As an Australian-based think tank, the Institute for Economics & Peace's perspective is necessarily global rather than local, and its reading of events in Pakistan is likely to be coloured by global phenomena, such as the media frenzy over Daesh's rise in the Middle East. Although Daesh has announced the establishment of its South Asian affiliate, Wilayat Khorasan, its attacks within Pakistan have been carried out through local militant outfits, adding weight to Ishtiaq Ahmad's claim about there being more hype than substance to the talk about Daesh in Pakistan. Furthermore, announcements of the military defeat of Daesh in Iraq and Syria raise credible questions as to its continued viability as a force in South Asia, although continuing Daesh attacks in Afghanistan in the wake of the US-Taliban ceasefire suggest that Daesh-Khorasan has found a home base in Afghanistan's unstable security

environment (*Al Jazeera* 2020b; *Eastern Herald* 2020; Saif 2020). Keeping these caveats in mind, this subsection traces the emergence of a Daesh footprint in Pakistan and analyses the type of security threat it poses.

Indications of Daesh's presence in Pakistan first emerged in 2014, the same year the military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb and the government initiated its National Action Plan against terrorism. According to a Pakistani media report, a Daesh delegation from Syria arrived in Pakistan that year and met local militant leaders in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Mangal Bagh of the Lashkar-e-Islam group refused to join Daesh, fearing that this would incite a backlash from the military even as it carried out its Khyber-1 operation; instead, he maintained his newfound support for the TTP. The TTP, for its part, has asserted its continuing allegiance to the emir of the Afghan Taliban and refuted the possibility of transferring allegiance to Daesh chief Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi. However, 2015 was a difficult year for the TTP as it dealt with the fallout of Fazlullah's appointment in 2013 as TTP emir following Hakimullah Mehsud's killing. This development led to a splintering of the TTP as some members were disgruntled because Fazlullah did not belong to the Mehsud tribe and had set up base in Afghanistan. Additionally, military operations were putting pressure on the TTP, which contributed to the tensions (Akbar 2016a; Alix Philippon, October 21, 2019, conversation with author).

The emergence of splinter groups JuA, Ahrarul Hind and the Khan Syed Group or Mehsud Taliban was a consequence of this friction. Moreover, several

senior TTP commanders from Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Shahidullah Shahid, Hafiz Saeed Khan, Dawlat Khan, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, Abu Bakr and Gul Bali defected to the new Wilayat Khorasan (Akbar 2016a). So did some Afghan Taliban fighters (AFP, Reuters, and Haider 2015).

Daesh in January 2015 announced that Hafiz Saeed Khan would head Wilayat Khorasan, with Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, formerly of the Afghan Taliban, serving as Hafiz Saeed Khan's deputy. Pakistan-based militant organisation Jundullah was among the first to pledge allegiance to Al-Baghdadi (Syed 2015). The IMU, which operates in north-western Pakistan, has also joined the Wilayat Khorasan bandwagon (Comerford 2017). In addition, JuA and the Jamia Hafsa madrasa in Islamabad have pledged their allegiance to Daesh (Shahid 2016a, 2017). Daesh has, moreover, established links with a faction of LeJ (Boone 2017; Shahid 2017).

Daesh and JuA together claimed responsibility for a bombing at a major Sufi shrine in Sehwan, a city in Sindh, that killed eighty-eight people in February 2017 (Boone 2017; Shahid 2017). Daesh's Wilayat Khorasan claimed a subsequent suicide bombing in Quetta targeting the security forces in August 2017, which killed fifteen people (*Nation* 2017a; Shahid 2017). Daesh had said it was behind a previous explosion at the *dargah* (shrine) of Sufi sheikh Shah Noorani in Balochistan's Khuzdar district in which fifty-two people died in November 2016 (*Al Jazeera* 2016b; *BBC* 2016a; Boone 2017; Boone, Ross, and agencies 2016; *Dawn* 2016d). Daesh furthermore stated that its forces

perpetrated a blast at a police academy in Quetta in October 2016, although the authorities blamed Al Alami faction of LeJ; analysts believe there are links between Daesh and LeJ Al Alami (*Al Jazeera* 2016f; *BBC* 2016b; Boone 2017; Boone and Baloch 2016; Hashim and Yousafzai 2016; G. Yusufzai 2016; Zahid 2017). Other major attacks have included an August 2016 suicide bombing at a Quetta hospital claimed by Daesh and JuA that killed seventy-five (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 106; *Reuters* 2016).

With regard to the nomenclature of Daesh's South Asian chapter, Milo Comerford (2017) explains that Khorasan is "a term from Islamic history that encompasses a swathe of South and Central Asia." There are not believed to be operational links between Daesh and its Wilayat Khorasan (AFP, Reuters, and Haider 2015; Shahid 2016b). Following a string of attacks in the country in February 2017, the most lethal of which was the Sehwan Sharif bombing, the security forces launched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad. Radd-ul-Fasaad is different from previous major counterterrorism operations conducted by the security forces since 2007—Operation Rah-i-Haq-I, Operation Rah-i-Haq-II, Operation Sirat-i-Mustaqeem, Operation Sherdil, Operation Rah-i-Haq-III, Operation Black Thunderstorm, Operation Brekhna, Operation Rah-i-Rast, Operation Rah-i-Nijat, and Operation Zarb-i-Azb—because the previous operations took place in the north-western regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. In contrast, Radd-ul-Fasaad is a countrywide operation, with an apparent focus on Punjab, marking a shift in the national security policy as the

military establishment appears to have recognised the need for countering *all* terrorists, including those based in Punjab, who were previously assumed to be loyal to the security establishment (Boone 2017; *Dawn* 2017b; *Express Tribune* 2017c; *Geo News* 2017; Marwat 2017; Pakistan Army 2017; Pakistan Inter Services 2017). Three years after the launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, the army claimed to have thwarted 400 terrorist attacks across the country through 49,000 intelligence-based operations, in addition to fencing the border with Afghanistan, and launching 1,200 counterterrorism operations (*Dawn* 2020b; Marwat 2020; *Nation* 2020; Sarfraz 2020).

Coming as it did in the wake of the Sehwan Sharif attack, Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad underscored the seriousness with which the army took the risk posed by Daesh. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017b) in October 2017 expressed its "concerns regarding the expanding foothold of Daesh inside Afghanistan as it is a threat to regional peace and security." The same month, Pakistani newspaper the *News International* quoted Janjua as supporting the view that the United States was assisting Daesh in Afghanistan (W. Abbasi 2017). On the group's presence in Pakistan, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted in 2015 that there was "no footprint of Daesh in Pakistan," and that the security forces would not tolerate "even a shadow of Daesh [. . .] in Pakistan." The following year, the ministry maintained that "Daesh d[id] not have [an] organized presence in Pakistan" (Pakistan Ministry 2016b).

However, the series of attacks in Pakistan in 2016-17 claimed by Daesh underscores the threat to the country from the transnational group. Despite the success of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, continuing attacks by Daesh across the border in Afghanistan signify the group's consolidation in the region and the risk to Pakistan from cross-border strikes and the cross-pollination of militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region that has been a long-standing pattern since 1979. The UN reported 17 Daesh attacks in Afghanistan in the first 6 months of 2020 and estimated that 2,200 Daesh members were present in Afghanistan in 2020 (*TRT World* 2020).

Daesh's vocabulary of a caliphate, an Islamic *State*, and *wilayats* (provinces) suggests that it nurtures territorial ambitions. According to Mendelsohn (2009c, 295):

> Some actors may have specific grievances that concern regimes, contested territories, and resented policies, but the goals they pursue are much broader: the overthrow of the existing state-based system and its replacement by an alternative organizing principle for world politics. These are systemic threats, and their reference is not restricted to specific states but extends beyond, thus requiring turning to the system level of analysis as well.

Daesh's ideological conflict "with the underlying logic of the current international order" indicates such a systemic threat (Mendelsohn 2009c, 297). This means that the fundamental organising principle of international society is threatened. According to Mendelsohn (2009c, 292), preservation seeking is an important goal of international society, and when international society comes face to face with a systemic threat, states cooperate to preserve the international

order. This challenge to the international system and international society from Daesh is explored further later in the section. First, though, the following subsection will consider a more local threat—that posed by Sunni extremists from LeJ.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeJ is the militant wing of the banned Sunni sectarian SSP. The group's traditional focus has been on targeting Shias, but after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the group started to also target foreign nationals and Christians. LeJ was established in 1996-97 by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq, who broke away from the SSP, in the Punjabi town of Jhang (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 48-162). LeJ was involved in sectarian violence in Punjab during the 1990s (I. Gul 2010b, 200). Even though LeJ splintered off from the SSP, the two organisations remain connected (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 163).

LeJ is led by veterans of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, underscoring the continuing impact that great-power rivalry during the Cold War has had on security in Pakistan (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 166-67). The group developed links with Al Qaeda while Basra and other LeJ members were in Afghanistan in the late 1990s (I. Gul 2010b, 137). This connection endured post-11 September 2001, with LeJ, JeM and HuJI uniting to form Lashkar-e-Omar, Al Qaeda's Pakistani branch. Five Pakistan-based militant outfits—LeJ, LeT, JeM, HuJI and

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi—also formed a coalition called Brigade 313 to fight the NATO operation in Afghanistan (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 163-64). While Gul (2010b, 165) reports that LeJ may have received assistance from the Pakistani security apparatus, Gunaratna and Iqbal (2011, 170) point out that the group has targeted the establishment, including military dictator Musharraf and former prime ministers Sharif and Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

In January 2002, Musharraf under duress banned several militant outfits, including LeJ, to assuage the United States' concerns. Consequently, the group relocated to Kurram, along with other Sunni extremist forces, fuelling Sunni-Shia conflict in the district (I. Gul 2010b, 16-104). Afghan Taliban members who were released from detention in 2003 joined LeJ and began to carry out attacks against Shias in Quetta. LeJ uses suicide bombing as a tactic and, according to Gunaratna and Iqbal (2011, 232-34), has emerged as "the group of choice for hard-core militants" in the post-11 September 2001 era. They highlight the morphing of LeJ from a violent sectarian entity into an anti-Western organisation that aims to transform Pakistan "into a Taliban-style Islamic state."

As noted earlier, the Al-Alami faction of LeJ is believed to have coordinated with Daesh to attack a police academy in Quetta in October 2016. The incident followed a security crackdown on LeJ in 2015, in which Ishaq and thirteen other LeJ leaders were killed. Following the October 2016 incident, an LeJ Al Alami spokesperson told *Reuters*, "We have no direct link with Daesh,

but we have done this attack together" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017, 106; *News International* 2016). It is unclear when exactly the Al-Alami faction splintered off from the main LeJ organisation, but the split seems to have occurred because the Al-Alami group wanted a broader agenda than the anti-Shia one of the main LeJ; LeJ Al Alami's target is the Pakistani establishment. The splinter group has associated with other militant organisations, including the Mehsud Taliban and JuA, to conduct attacks in the recent past. However, following the attack on the shrine of Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, LeJ Al Alami has reportedly distanced itself from Daesh over ideological differences. LeJ Al Alami was banned by the government in November 2016 (Arain 2017; Arfeen 2016; *Telegraph* 2017).

The original LeJ has been behind several high-profile attacks in the country, including the kidnapping and killing of American-Israeli journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 and an attack on Sri Lanka's cricket team in 2003. Unlike the TTP, which has tended to focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan, LeJ has operated across Pakistan since the 1990s (Arain 2017).

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The three terrorist groups analysed in this section represent the three levels of analysis used in the overall thesis, with LeJ representing the domestic level of analysis, the TTP the regional level of analysis, and Daesh the global level of analysis. The emergence of Daesh's South Asian affiliate—its Wilayat Khorasan—underlines the risk to international society from militancy in

Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially given that Daesh sees itself as a caliphate and has territorial ambitions that challenge international society's fundamental institution of sovereign states. While Daesh has been losing ground in its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the attacks in Pakistan claimed by Daesh's central Amaq news agency, and the willingness of some Pakistani militant commanders to pledge *bay'ah* (an oath of allegiance) to Al-Baghdadi, indicate that Daesh continues to threaten the international system through its tactic of setting up *wilayats* in different parts of the world. While international society has been zealously fighting Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the analysis in the introduction of international society's responsibility to protect the international system suggests that international society has a responsibility to counter the organisation's emergence in Pakistan, which has already suffered from decades of militancy as a direct result of the actions of the great powers since 1979.

Although Daesh losing no longer controls territory in Iraq and Syria, the group continues to operate in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan and India (*Arab News* 2020; Daniels 2017; England 2017; Global Coalition 2020; Government of Iraq, Twitter post, December 9, 2017 [4:07 a.m.], accessed December 28, 2017, https://twitter.com/IraqiGovt/status/939466613866287105; Iddon 2020; Jawad 2020; Mahsud 2020; Mashal 2017; I. Mukhtar 2019; Russian President 2017). In Pakistan, September 2017 saw the hoisting of a Daesh flag reading "KHILAFAT IS COMING" on the Islamabad Expressway, which connects the capital city to Rawalpindi, where the army headquarters are

situated (U. Jamal 2017; Tanoli and Altaf 2017). In May 2019, Daesh announced the establishment of a Pakistani branch called "Wilayah of Pakistan," five days after the establishment of "Wilayah of Hind" in neighbouring India. Despite government claims that Daesh does not have an organised presence in Pakistan, the group is reportedly active in the restive province of Balochistan, where it is collaborating with Baloch separatists to target Chinese interests associated with CPEC (Mahsud 2020; I. Mukhtar 2019).

However, as pointed out earlier in this thesis, there is the question of why the state system should be seen as sacrosanct, and why the emergence of a caliphate should be threatening. Brutal violence by non-state actors is undoubtedly terrifying, but Daesh is an extreme example of what a caliphate might look like, besides which, violence carried out by states can be horrific too.

That said, the pre-existing militant networks in Pakistan and their growing tendency to target the Pakistani state itself are indications that Pakistan is vulnerable to a threat from a force such as Daesh to its sovereignty, even though the Pakistani military is exceptionally strong. Pakistan's participation in the "global war on terror," the migration of Al Qaeda terrorists to Pakistan after their eviction from Afghanistan in 2001-02, the consequent influence of Al Qaeda's ideology of targeting "apostate" Muslim rulers on Pakistani militants, and the more recent inspiration from Daesh with its territorial ambitions all mark threats to the Pakistani state.

Given this risk, what obligation does international society have to support Pakistan's counterterrorism programme? As noted, the United States has provided military aid in the past, and the army's military operations, alongside US drone strikes, have seen considerable success. Nevertheless, the large militant network in the country indicates that military operations may not be sufficient, especially given their potential to further victimise and radicalise sections of society. Furthermore, the United States' suspension of military aid may hamper the army's counterterrorism effort, not only by curtailing available resources but also by demoralising troops and causing them to question where their loyalties ought to lie.

Seeking to complement its armed operations, the army has instituted a rehabilitation programme for militants that aims to help them reintegrate into society. The limits to armed counterterrorism mentioned above underscore the pertinence of this soft counterterrorism strategy. It is to this initiative that the next section turns its attention.

From Dehumanisation to De-radicalisation?

As mentioned in the Introduction, Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to establish a terrorist-rehabilitation programme. The Saudi programme was set up as part of a counterterrorism strategy amid violence perpetrated by Al Qaeda within the kingdom that targeted the Saudi authorities (Alsharif 2009; Rahmita n.d., 5; *Reuters* 2017; Riedel 2017). Saudi Arabia's

counterterrorism efforts have also helped secure Saudi ally the United States against Al Qaeda attacks, and the Saudi de-radicalisation centre allows the United States to transfer Saudi and Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees to Saudi Arabia, where they undergo rehabilitation (M. O'Toole 2017). Furthermore, according to Frida Rahmita (n.d., 5), "The well-funded de-radicalization program was part of the [Saudi government's] response to its critics, many of [whom] have claimed that Saudi Arabia with its philosophy of Wahhabism was the breeding ground for Muslim terrorists and radicals."

While Talmiz Ahmad was the Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, former Saudi crown prince Mohamed Bin Naif—the force behind the Mohamed Bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care—boasted in Talmiz Ahmad's presence that the de-radicalisation programme had an eighty-percent success rate (*Al Jazeera* 2017; Brzuszkiewicz 2017; Talmiz Ahmad, October 24, 2017, conversation with author).[36] The success of rehabilitation programmes is usually measured in terms of the rate of recidivism or return to terrorist violence.

Despite the Mohamed Bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care's claim of a high success rate, researchers have bemoaned the difficulty of judging, verifying and comparing data produced by rehabilitation centres (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017, 92; Neumann 2010, 3). Furthermore, Pakistani

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[36] The methodology for arriving at this statistic is unclear.

defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa of SOAS University of London told me she had serious reservations about these programmes, asserting that they rarely managed to de-radicalise the "hard-core" extremists (Ayesha Siddiqa, July 4, 2015, conversation with author).

Nevertheless, Horgan (2015a), one of the world's foremost authorities on de-radicalisation and disengagement, says he has "come to believe that de-radicalization can work. It is not a silver-bullet solution, nor can it ensure 100% success, but there is no doubt that de-radicalization programs can be tremendously effective in countering terrorism."

Horgan (2015a) has been visiting Pakistan to study its rehabilitation programme, and claims to have "witnessed remarkable progress there, especially in the efforts to re-integrate former child militants." Most of the academic literature on de-radicalisation in the country has focused on rehabilitation centres in the Swat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which were established following Operation Rah-i-Rast in 2009; the military operation took back the picturesque Swat valley from fighters belonging to Fazlullah's TNSM, who had occupied territory and challenged the institutions of sovereignty and territoriality (*Al Jazeera* 2009; I. Gul 2010b, 90-91; Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 80-82; Seymour 2011; Walsh 2009). For instance, Muhammad Amir Rana (2011, 4) and Sobia Abbasi (n.d., 116) make mention of Project Sabaoon, Project Mishal and Project Sparlay—the three components of the Swat-based rehabilitation programme. Abbasi (n.d., 117) also refers to vocational training centres

established by the army and "European partners" in Swat, Dera Ismail Khan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Bajaur aimed at reintegrating terrorists into society.

However, Noor (2013, 17) refers to the presence of "de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs all over Pakistan." She writes about rehabilitation centres in the Swat valley, as well as in Punjab (Noor 2013, 17-18). Similarly, when I spoke to Siddiqa, she recalled having visited two de-radicalisation centres in Punjab rather than in the north-west of the country during her bureaucratic career with the Pakistani government (Ayesha Siddiqa, July 4, 2015, conversation with author; Siddiqa 2015). This suggests an expansion of the authorities' rehabilitation initiative beyond north-western Pakistan.

In an interview with me, Horgan (2015b) disclosed that although the first centre had been set up in Swat, there were now "more centres around the country." On further questioning, Horgan revealed that the centres were "everywhere, actually, I mean all around in very, very diverse areas. I don't know if the locations have been disclosed yet, so I have to be a little bit discreet about that." He said there were 4 to 6 centres in the country, adding that the "deradicalisation or rehabilitation programme [. . .] started [. . .] 4 or 5 years ago and is now starting to be looked at as a model for developing more programmes around Pakistan." Horgan (2015b) explained that the programme had been initiated by the army, with the help of local non-governmental organisations, and its aim was "to reintegrate former militants back into society." He

emphasised the TTP's recruitment of "young children and adolescents into terrorism" as a primary motive for the establishment of the programme, stressing that "increasingly the army took the view that, well, we need to do something to save these kids, to give them a second chance." He said that although the programme so far had only worked with children and adolescents, the expansion of the initiative to also include adults was being considered.

Horgan's (2015b) revelation about the spread of the centres to "very diverse areas" indicates the military's growing investment in rehabilitation as a significant part of its counterterrorism strategy. Furthermore, as an academic from the US-based Georgia State University, Horgan's involvement in the Pakistani programme as a de-radicalisation expert may be an indication of the United States' provision of training to staff at the Pakistani centres. His emphasis on the reintegration of "young children and adolescents" and on the army wanting "to save these kids," both during the interview and in an opinion piece he wrote for the *Los Angeles Times*, suggests a desire to gain international sympathy and support for the initiative, especially as these programmes can be viewed by the international public as too soft on terror (Horgan 2015a, 2015b). Overall, Horgan's remarks are indicators of both the Pakistani army's growing confidence in rehabilitation as an integral component of its counterterrorism strategy, and of the United States' tacit support for the programme.

Interestingly, Horgan's insistence that the programme only works with children and teenagers contradicts a video posted by *DW News* (2016), which

shows adults undergoing rehabilitation at the Mishal Centre. This underscores the possibility that there is an effort to gain international sympathy for the programme by portraying it as child-centred. Incidentally, the *DW News* broadcast claims that the Mishal Centre has a ninety-nine percent success rate.

A typical individual disengagement and de-radicalisation programme, according to Peter Neumann (2010, 3), combines "ideological and/or religious re-education with vocational training." Horgan (2015b), however, told me that in Pakistan, "there is religious instruction or religious counselling, but there's also psychotherapy done by cognitive-behavioural therapy, other kinds of therapies, done on a one-to-one basis with the adolescents as well. So, there is this strong mix of psychological therapy also." This suggests the development of a comprehensive programme that addresses not only ideological indoctrination but also the psychological aspects of recruitment to terrorism. It mirrors the Saudi rehabilitation programme, at which detainees can consult psychologists and engage in art therapy (Boucek 2008, 18; Osborne 2016; Porges 2010). As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, Gunaratna and Rubin (2011) argue that ideal rehabilitation programmes comprehensively aim for disengagement *as well as* de-radicalisation. Horgan's revelations about the Pakistani programme suggest it goes further, working at the ideological level on de-radicalisation through religious counselling; at the practical level on disengagement through "rebuilding ties in the community" and vocational training; and at the psychological level on *healing* through psychotherapy. Thus,

it appears that *psychological healing* may be the third component in a comprehensive rehabilitation programme, with disengagement, de-radicalisation and healing forming the three aspects of a well-rounded programme.

The Introduction to this thesis presented the following research problem: If years of US military aid, operations by the national army, US drone strikes and dialogue with militants have not succeeded in wiping out militancy, there is a need for praxeological research providing direction to political and military leaders on what needs to change. It further raised questions about international society's responsibility to support counterterrorism in states where terrorist groups have ensconced themselves, specifically the Pakistani case, and about the role of the United States as international hegemon.

This section has shown that Pakistan's disengagement programme for individual militants has spread further afield than the north-western areas. It has suggested that some amount of international support for the programme does exist. In light of these findings and those of the previous section, the concluding chapter will attempt to answer the research question presented in the Introduction.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the three most violent terrorist groups in Pakistan in 2016: the TTP, Daesh's Wilayat Khorasan, and LeJ. It found that while the TTP operates regionally within South Asia, attacking targets in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Daesh presents a more global challenge since it challenges the territorial norms that underpin international society. Furthermore, with LeJ's decades of experience and its reach across Pakistan, it poses a formidable domestic threat, notably since it has broadened its agenda from Sunni sectarianism to anti-Westernism and opposition to the Pakistani government.

Thus, at the domestic, regional and global levels, militants based in the country threaten the lives of ordinary Pakistanis and foreigners; challenge the state apparatus, including both the military establishment and the civilian leadership; and undermine the institutions that provide the foundation of an international society of states. This suggests that there are substantial motivations for leaders in the country, the region and further afield to invest in countering militancy in the country.

As this and previous chapters have shown, great powers and regional powers have had a substantially detrimental effect on security in the country. They have, in fact, fuelled militancy and radicalisation since 1979. Foreign powers sponsored the war in Afghanistan and the training of fighters in Pakistan, Middle Eastern powers encouraged sectarian extremism in the country, and regional neighbours supported secessionist movements that

threatened the country's territorial integrity. However, as the ES suggests, in fact, great powers have a *responsibility* to help secure international society. Furthermore, as Chapter 4 concluded, there exist substantial institutions in South Asia that could support the creation of a society of states at the regional level, provided the political will exists. The transnational operation of extremist groups within South Asia indicates that regional security cooperation would serve the common interests of South Asian states.

Furthermore, although the army's campaign against militants in the north-west has seen considerable success, terrorist attacks continue to take place across the country, and militant groups still have a significant level of infrastructure in the country. While several authors have raised questions as to the security establishment's covert support for some militant organisations, Gunaratna and Iqbal (2011, 259) sum up the issue in this way:

> There is at times an international perception that Pakistan is unwilling to counter the threat of terrorism even after having contributed beyond its capacity in the international War on Terror. While there should be no reason to doubt Pakistan's willingness to fight against terror, it must be admitted that Pakistan's capability in this area may be lacking. The fact that Pakistan has become the primary victim rather than a perpetrator of terrorism may not be apparent to many, giving rise to unwanted speculation and allegations. Pakistan will continue to suffer the unintended spillover effects of the Afghan war until Afghanistan is stable and the foreign forces are able to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan's armed forces and intelligence agencies ought to be commended for their success in restricting the threat of the Islamist insurgency to the border areas of Pakistan, for apprehending more than one-third of Al Qaeda's top leadership, for wiping out the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban and for sacrificing thousands of their personnel in the war against terror.

They further suggest that "the use of force without any remedial steps to alleviate social and political issues alienates civil society, and the perceived 'tyranny' provides terrorist masterminds with fodder for their propaganda against the government, motivating potential suicide attackers" (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 238). They argue that "a multi-pronged strategy, involving efficient intelligence, precise military operations, public awareness campaigns and a comprehensive de-radicalization programme would be required to counter the threat of suicide terrorism in Pakistan" (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011, 230).

Therefore, there are good reasons for the international community to support counterterrorism in Pakistan in two ways: First, by publicly recognising the army and intelligence agencies' successes in countering militancy, as this would encourage the security forces, which have faced a barrage of negative coverage in the international media and criticism from Western, Indian and Afghan leaders for "not doing enough." Secondly, by contributing to the development of a holistic counterterrorism strategy that includes not only military operations, but also de-radicalisation (and counter-radicalisation) initiatives that would address the ideological and psychological factors influencing individuals to turn to violence. As noted above, the Pakistani rehabilitation programme combines ideological and psychological counselling techniques to reintegrate militants into society, and the international community has a shared interest in promoting this effort through

finances and expertise. During his interview with me, Horgan (2015b) pointed to sustainability or survival as the big challenge for the de-radicalisation programme. While highlighting the strong support for the programme across the military and government, he noted the ongoing need for "funding, support, resources" for all rehabilitation programmes to survive. In light of the United States' withdrawal of military counterterrorism assistance, Horgan's comments underscore the room for international society to support soft counterterrorism—or non-military counterterrorism—through ensuring the financial sustainability of the rehabilitation initiative.

This chapter has made several original contributions to the literatures within which this thesis situates itself. At the policy level, it has thrown light on how international society should respond to the United States' withdrawal of military aid to Pakistan by emphasising the significance of soft counterterrorism and highlighting the Pakistani army's support for the country's de-radicalisation and reintegration programme for former combatants. This responds to the research problem identified in the introduction, which underscored the practical problem of militancy continuing to threaten the country despite military counterterrorism being conducted over many years and indicated the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that includes de-radicalisation and reintegration. Secondly, this chapter has drawn on literary fiction from the subcontinent to underline the humanness of terrorists, thus contributing to this thesis's socially grounded

understanding of security. Finally, at the theoretical level, the chapter has explained how the analysis conducted in this thesis fits into the emancipatory research agenda of critical security studies. In this way, this chapter has contributed to Buzan (2001) and Little's (2000) project of revisioning the ES as a holistic approach to IR that is able to transcend disciplinary fragmentation by combining positivist, interpretive and critical insights into international politics. The concluding chapter will provide a more comprehensive summary of the findings of this thesis, and what they mean for the research problem and question put forward in the Introduction.

Conclusion

> I conclude by arguing for the creation of a common security bond among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, backed by the United States and the rest of the international community—one that goes beyond realizing the Af-Pak strategy's core strategic objective of defeating al-Qaeda and its hardcore allies in the region.
> —Ishtiaq Ahmad, "The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan"

A diplomatic spat over US drone strikes in Pakistan occurred in January 2018 after the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018) on 24 January condemned "a drone strike in Kurram Agency this morning, which targeted an Afghan refugee camp." The US embassy in Islamabad reacted to the ministry's statement by asserting that "the claim in an M.F.A. statement yesterday that U.S. forces struck an Afghan refugee camp in Kurram Agency yesterday is false" (Masood 2018a; N. Siddiqui 2018; Yousaf 2018). In response, the Pakistani military's Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) (2018) media wing on 25 January issued a press release maintaining that "the drone strike on 24 January in Spintal, Hangu district was on individual target who had morphed into Afghan Refugees and not any organised terrorists sanctuary which have been eliminated." The ISPR press release included a map showing an Afghan refugee camp located at the border of Kurram and North Waziristan agencies of FATA and Hangu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which it identified as having been the target of the 24 January strike. Media reports suggested that two or three Haqqani Network militants had been killed in the incident (Masood 2018a,

2018b; N. Siddiqui 2018; N. Siddiqui and Hussain 2018; Yousaf 2018). The ISPR (2018) statement seemed to be backpedalling from the foreign-affairs ministry's condemnation of the United States; the statement focused, instead, on the ease with which terrorists "morph into Afghan Refugees," the resultant need for "their early and dignified return to Afghanistan," and the risk of terrorists exploiting "Pakistan's brotherly hospitality to peaceful Afghan Refugees."

The Introduction to this thesis began with an account of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the United States' launch of a "global war on terror" in reaction to the attacks. As the preceding paragraph has shown, seventeen years later, the "war on terror" had turned into ongoing low-level US military violence in parts of the world that mirrored the original violence of the 11 September 2001 attacks. This extended "war" has had ramifications for individuals, states and international society. This conclusion will summarise the findings of this thesis with regard to the ramifications for one state—Pakistan, including its people and its interactions with international society.

This concluding chapter will explore the three central themes of this thesis: the gap between the ES and ISS, the gap between terrorism studies and IR, and the role of international society in stabilising Pakistan. This conclusion is arranged into five sections. The first section will examine the relationship of the terms collective security, security community and international society, and consider their utility in addressing the research question presented in the

Introduction. The second section will address the research question based on the findings of the preceding chapters. The third section will outline this thesis's original contributions to the literature. It will summarise the thesis's contributions to ES theory and assess the theory's success in tackling the central research problem of this thesis. It will also reflect on the broader theoretical contributions of the thesis and identify avenues for future research. Furthermore, the third section will reflect on the empirical contributions of the thesis. The fourth section will provide policy recommendations. Finally, the fifth section will provide some concluding remarks.

Collective Security, Security Communities and International Society

As noted in Chapter 2, collective security refers to the notion that international society should limit the aggressive use of force by states and collectively enforce such limits. While some authors visualise collective security as being enforced by international society collectively, others consider it more realistically applicable by smaller groups of like-minded or regional states (Hurrell 2007a, 167-68). Collective security employs military force to punish members of the arrangement who violate the agreement not to resort to war. Collective security's emphasis on institutions as a means of promoting security has parallels with the ES's faith in institutions, including international organisations. Like the ES, collective security acknowledges the occurrence of war, but equally values the ability of rules and institutions to manage

international relations and lead to international order (Sucharov and Cha 2008). However, the emergence of non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups, as central players in IR challenges collective security's focus on interstate behaviour (Gleason and Shaihutdinov 2005, 274).

Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter 2, a security community is a transnational region made up of states that intend to bring about the peaceful transformation of the region (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 30). In common with the ES's stress on the institutions of international society, security communities are assessed based on the strength of institutionalisation in the region. Furthermore, Adler and Barnett understand institutions to be the norms underpinning state behaviour, much like the ES. Hence, in Bellamy and McDonald's (2004, 318) eyes, security communities represent the migration of the ES idea of international society from IR to ISS.

As noted in Chapter 2, security communities may be either pluralistic or amalgamated. Pluralistic security communities can exist among states that retain their sovereignty, whereas amalgamated security communities rest on a formal merger and the establishment of a single government (Adler and Barnett 1998b, 5; Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 321). This distinction has parallels with the pluralism-solidarism debate within the ES.

Thus, both collective security and security community are concepts with strong similarities with the ES's idea of an international society that comes into existence when states become aware of their shared interests and values and

start to perceive themselves as being bound by shared rules and party to shared institutions (Bull 2012, 13). In terms of the research question presented in the Introduction, an international society can be said to already exist at the global level of analysis, and the common interest of this international society of states in defeating terrorism—representing, as it does, a threat to the state-based international order by non-state actors—is a strong reason for great powers at the global level to be concerned by the prevalence of a terrorist ecosystem in Pakistan. At the regional level of analysis, the idea of a pluralistic security community finds resonance with Chapter 4's revelation that the institutions of regional society in South Asia are resilient despite the major challenges to their functioning. This points to the potential for regional states to form a pluralistic security community to address the threat posed by regional terrorist organisations that operate transnationally.

Research Question

The Introduction to this thesis put forth the following research question: What is international society's responsibility in the ongoing terrorist violence in Pakistan? This section will attempt to answer this question based on the analysis in the preceding chapters.

Terrorist Strongholds and the Responsibility of International Society

This thesis has shown that international society has played a significant role in the emergence of terrorist strongholds in Pakistan in several ways. First,

the manner in which the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 left Pakistan with insecure borders with both India and Afghanistan. Moreover, the existence of an eastern and western wing on either side of India was impractical and, perhaps, doomed from the start. Furthermore, as the larger state, India posed an ongoing threat to Pakistan, given Indian politicians' reluctant acquiescence to the Partition plan.

Secondly, after Pakistan had worked hard to develop an alliance with the United States, the latter power militarily supported India in its war with China. Furthermore, the United States and China were unwilling to materially assist Pakistan in the Bangladesh war, which led to the dismemberment of the country. Consequently, Pakistan was left feeling it could not rely on the great powers to protect it from India and would have to find alternative means of securing its sovereignty, even if this meant covert support for terrorist groups. The disinclination of the UN and the great powers to force India to hold a referendum in J&K provided further motivation for this policy.

Thirdly, the events of 1979 represented a major turning point for Pakistan vis-à-vis terrorism. The Iranian Revolution and the consequent rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran manifested in those states' support for sectarian militants in Pakistan. More significantly, the United States, Saudi Arabia and China's support for the Afghan jihad militarised north-western Pakistan while destroying the traditional social structures of the area that regulated life. The great powers' loss of interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan once the Soviet Union

had withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989 left Pakistan and Afghanistan to deal with the fallout of the jihad. The return of some mujahideen to Pakistan, and the Pakistani state's use of some of them to fight the Indian security forces in IJK led to the continuance of militancy in Pakistan.

Hence, the great powers have a responsibility, in normative terms, when it comes to Pakistan-based terrorism. This indicates a moral responsibility to help the Pakistani government deal with terrorism, as well as to find creative ways to reassure Pakistan vis-à-vis its sovereignty. The United States' years of military aid have not mitigated Pakistan's insecurity concerning the threat from India and Afghanistan but instead contributed to the militarisation and volatility of the Indian subcontinent.

<center>Counterterrorism Cooperation</center>

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States has played a leading role in assisting the Pakistani government in countering terrorism. This has changed with the Trump administration's 2018 suspension of military aid to Pakistan. Thus, the global hegemon has chosen to suspend its participation in countering Pakistan-based terrorism during the course of the writing of this thesis.

This shift enhances the pertinence of the question of how international society should cooperate to counter terrorism. Although Pakistan is a member of SAARC, the SCO and the HoA, the rivalries between Pakistan and India,

Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India and China hamper the ability of these organisations to counter terrorism effectively. On the other hand, the Pakistani army's military operations against terrorists have been successful, and there is limited publicly available evidence to suggest that its terrorist-rehabilitation programme has a high success rate (*DW News* 2016). This indicates that military aid, financial assistance for de-radicalisation, and the sharing of expertise on de-radicalisation are optimal means of supporting counterterrorism in the country. Drone strikes, on the other hand, have caused public anger and become politicised, suggesting these could be perpetuating radicalisation.

However, military aid has problematic aspects that need to be considered. Its strengthening of an already-powerful military that challenges the authority of the democratic government is a potential cause for concern. Furthermore, it funds the military competition between Pakistan and India, which destabilises South Asia and causes tremendous insecurity for its people.

Although democracy promotion has been questioned as a form of Western imperialism, the insistence of international leaders on dealing with Pakistan's civilian administration—and *not* its military leadership—would empower civilian leaders to play a bigger role in foreign and security policymaking. This is important because of the powerful part that Pakistan's military has played in its history, the fact that it continues to control the country's foreign and security policies, and the allegation—discussed earlier in

this thesis—that the military has a vested interest in perpetuating conflicts so that it can maintain its influential position and its access to resources.

The institutions of great-power management and diplomacy could serve as vital catalysts for trust-building between Pakistan and India. International society should proactively promote diplomacy and international mediation as means to resolve the Pakistan-India conflict and ease tensions in South Asia. These measures would address the roots of militancy in Pakistan and its region, obviating the need for large amounts of military aid. Furthermore, terrorist rehabilitation is a progressive and promising avenue for international assistance in supporting Pakistan's effort to create a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. The easing of India-Pakistan tensions, the strengthening of the civilian administration, and the rehabilitation of terrorists would together address the causes for and repercussions of terrorist strongholds in the country. The military's vested interest in conflict with India, its long-standing ties with militant organisations, and the radicalisation of individuals that has destabilised society are problems that could be addressed through such wide-ranging international efforts.

Addressing Pakistan's Security Conundrum

Pakistan's security conundrum is that despite military operations and political negotiations with militants, attacks by Pakistan-based groups continue to endanger the lives of civilians in Pakistan, Afghanistan and, to a smaller

extent, India and other countries. There are several reasons for this disjuncture. First, military initiatives have focused more on Pakistan-focused groups than on Afghanistan- and India-focused ones. This is because the military has perceived an interest in promoting the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan and in destabilising IJK. Secondly, peace agreements have allowed militant outfits breathing space to revivify themselves. Thirdly, the destabilisation and radicalisation of society in north-western Pakistan that began with the Afghan jihad have not been addressed until the recent launch of the de-radicalisation programme.

These factors suggest that there is considerable scope for international society to better address the Pakistani security conundrum. International pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful means would assuage Pakistan's long-standing grouse over the injustice of J&K's accession to India, breaking a cycle of securitisations in both countries that has prevented the rational resolution of bilateral disputes. The de-securitisation of the relationship with India would deflate Pakistan's desire to maintain control of Afghanistan for "strategic depth." This would take the steam out of support for both India- and Afghanistan-focused militants.

Furthermore, international support for terrorist-rehabilitation centres through funding and training would help reverse the process of radicalisation that has taken root since 1979. The establishment of a counter-radicalisation programme would bolster this effort. In addition, there is a need for

international aid agencies and non-governmental organisations to work with local people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA to restore traditional Pashtun social structures. Assistance to people who have suffered losses because of the Afghan jihad and the "war on terror" would help stabilise society in the north-west and counter radicalisation in the area. According to officials, 6,112 people in FATA have been killed because of the "war on terror" (*Express Tribune* 2018b). The authorities in May 2018 commenced the process of merging FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which, in the medium-to-long term, should bring FATA under the national legal system and increase the government's accountability in the tribal agencies (Begum 2018; Dastageer 2019; *Express Tribune* 2017a, 2017b; D. Hussain 2017; Sikander 2018). China and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in February 2018 agreed to provide $4 million in humanitarian assistance to FATA and Balochistan, which is a positive example of international society cooperating to help people in destabilised parts of the country get back on their feet (*Express Tribune* 2018a; *Pakistan Today* 2018a; *Samaa* 2018).

Original Contributions of this Thesis

This thesis makes three central claims to originality:

1. The thesis contributes to the theoretical literature that uses the ES to study terrorism by utilising Buzan's conceptualisation of world society as the arena of non-state actors in a globalising world to study terrorism in Pakistan. I employ the concept to argue that Pakistani terrorist groups are social actors. This enables me to understand militants as members of world society who are interacting with other actors through violent

means—rather than as "evil," "crazy" people. This opens the way to a historical and structural exploration of why terrorism emerged in modern history and paves the way for paying serious attention to non-military counterterrorism measures, particularly terrorist-rehabilitation programmes. This is a unique contribution as it fills a gap in the ES literature on international terrorism, which includes the work of Buzan, Mendelsohn and Wali Aslam, none of whom specifically uses the world-society concept to comprehend terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, this is a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution.

2. This is the first piece of scholarship that places the Pakistani terrorist-rehabilitation programme in the broader political and security context to understand how it interacts with other counterterrorism measures and the domestic and international politics of Pakistan.

3. I make a praxeological contribution by addressing the United States' suspension of military aid to Pakistan and exploring the policy implications of this for international policymakers. Thus, I provide a normative and, in Flyvbjerg's terms, phronetic analysis of the implications of the US decision. My phronetic and normative approach contributes to ES theory by responding to Little's (2000) claim that the ES's methodological pluralism includes a critical aspect that is concerned with the realisation of human values. This is the first empirical study on Pakistan that contributes to this critical, value-oriented research project within the ES. Again, this is a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution.

Furthermore, the thesis makes several more peripheral contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature with which it engages. The following subsections reflect on the original ideas that have emerged from the research conducted in this thesis and on avenues for future research.

Theoretical Reflections

This thesis has contributed to ES theory in several ways. First, it has used the world-society concept empirically to study terrorist groups. Secondly, it has demonstrated empirically that the ES is a viable theoretical framework for approaching ISS and, more specifically, terrorism studies. Thirdly, it has

applied the concept of international society to the case of South Asia, thus furthering attempts to develop the idea of regional societies.

The attempt to employ the ES to study the case at hand has been largely successful, indicating that the ES remains a viable theory of IR, in spite of the United States' unilateralism in the "global war on terror" undermining the idea of international society. The thesis has shown that in the context of a decentring world order, international society remains highly relevant. Great powers such as China and Russia are rising and challenging the United States' position as global hegemon, rendering international society an increasingly pertinent framework for understanding world affairs. It is interesting to consider how the institutions of international society will change with this ongoing power shift, and this is a fascinating avenue for future research. Furthermore, the concept of world society allows IR theory to make space for non-state actors such as terrorist groups amid the globalising world of new media and hyper-communication.

However, it proved incredibly challenging to apply Buzan's (2004) conceptualisation of world society as the arena of non-state actors to this empirical study. Beyond seeing terrorist groups as social actors, it was difficult to discern how the idea of world society could enhance understanding of the place of terrorist organisations in IR. This is a critical area for future theoretical research by ES scholars. Nevertheless, the treatment of terrorists as social actors was useful beyond the international level of analysis. At the domestic level of

analysis, applying Buzan's idea helped conceive of terrorist organisations as one among many categories of social actors whose power has grown amid a general diffusion of social control since 2007. This unconventional application of the world-society idea to the domestic level in Chapter 3 is a unique contribution made by this thesis. It suggests that even at the domestic level of analysis, non-state actors may be challenging the supremacy of the state, which adds a new angle to Buzan's (2004) argument about globalisation and non-state actors in world society. It indicates that the ES may need a more complex conceptual framework that more fully encompasses the domestic level of analysis in order to more accurately explain international politics. This harks back to a remark by Bull about the importance of country studies to IR.

The institution-based analysis of South Asia was revealing, for it challenged assumptions about the conflict-ridden nature of IR in the region. It was surprising to discover the incredible strength of institutions in the region even as regional states continue to bicker and refuse to cooperate. What would be interesting in future research would be to analyse *why* regional cooperation remains elusive despite the existence of regional institutions. Furthermore, there is scope for research on the particular institutions of South Asia and how these may differ from the generic institutions put forward by ES theorists.

Beyond the English School

Beyond the ES, this thesis has made contributions to ISS and IR. The thesis acts as a bridge between the ES and ISS, and between IR and terrorism studies. In a recent article, Buzan (2015, 126) puts forward the view that the ES is "a neglected approach to international security studies." The empirical study conducted in this thesis has shown that the ES is indeed a flexible theoretical framework for studying ISS that can reveal startling new insights on security. The ES is, furthermore, compatible with popular approaches to security studies such as securitisation theory, as has been shown in this thesis's seamless incorporation of concepts from securitisation theory in Chapter 5 and this conclusion. This thesis has drawn on Walker's (1997) poststructuralist approach, Jackson's (2005) use of discourse analysis, and Migdal's (1988, 1994, 2001) state-society framework to comprehend terrorism in Pakistan and has found these diverse perspectives to unproblematically lend themselves to the overall ES underpinnings of the thesis. It has responded to Colin Wight's (2009) scientific-realist argument that terrorism studies ought to be better grounded in theory and history and found the ES to be an ideal instrument with which to combine history and structure in studying terrorism. Furthermore, Buzan (2001) and Little's (2000) contribution to the ES in terms of emphasising the international-system and world-society concepts, and Buzan's (2004) further development of the world-society concept, have proved ideal for understanding terrorist groups to be significant actors in IR. However, unlike international society with its institutions, world society does not encompass

any patterns of behaviour that an empirical scholar might draw on to interpret the behaviour of non-state actors in IR. This presents an area for further theoretical research.

Furthermore, the United States' withdrawal of military aid to Pakistan in 2018 has major theoretical implications. This thesis started out with the hypothesis that there was a need for work on the broader role of international society in counterterrorism amid the hegemon's decline. The United States' suspension of security assistance is an indication of this bigger shift from a unipolar to a decentred world order. As Press-Barnathan (2004) has argued, the unipolar structure of the world emerged after Bull (2012) first published his tome on the ES's approach to IR in 1977. Unipolarity, which undermines the institution of the balance of power, is not well suited to the functioning of an international society of states. However, the shift to multi-polarity that is underway portends the emergence of a new balance of power and an international society with new contours. This is an exciting time for the ES because, as I have argued in Chapter 4, there is scope for fresh research on the institutions of this new international society. The power shift from the West to the East heralds the advent of different values that will underpin the institutions of this evolving international society. ES scholars will have ample opportunities to consider these emerging values and institutions in the years to come. By focusing on regional society in South Asia, Chapter 4 of this thesis has contributed to the understanding of the regionalising world order. I stopped

short of evaluating emerging institutions in the region, partly because that would have represented a diversion away from the aims of this thesis, and partly because regional society is underdeveloped in South Asia. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive starting point from which to begin to comprehend the institutional architecture of South Asia and especially the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan security triangle.

Moreover, the Pakistani case has considerably developed the normative aspect of the ES's work. The dominance of Buzan's work on the ES in recent years has overshadowed the normative and praxeological aspects of ES thinking in favour of structuralist research. This thesis has broken away from this trend and shown that great-power responsibility is an extremely pertinent aspect of ES theory that has important implications amid the "global war on terror." The use of historical interpretation to study the Pakistani case has thrown light on the role that great powers and lesser powers have played in causing the emergence of terrorist groups in the country and their consequent moral responsibilities. This thesis has, furthermore, centred on an unabashedly policy-oriented research question, thus developing the ES's praxeological research agenda.

By focusing on the *context* within which terrorism has emerged in Pakistan, this thesis has made another contribution. As Colin Wight (2009) points out, terrorism research has tended to focus on psychological and social processes, to the neglect of politics and history. This empirical study has

eschewed this tradition and emphasises the domestic and international political context within which terrorist groups in Pakistan operate. This has thrown up important insights into *why* terrorist groups have emerged and *how* they relate to the state and society domestically. The relationship between regional and international politics and the creation of a terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan has been particularly revealing. The structural factors that have caused militants to become as powerful as they have—the nature of decolonisation, the Cold War, the post-September 2001 world—represent a neglected aspect of terrorism studies that has been addressed in this thesis. Thus, employing the ES empirically has proved Colin Wight's (2009) hypothesis that a structural and historically grounded approach to terrorism studies would be fruitful.

Empirical Reflections

This bridging of theory and history has revealed salient facts at the empirical level of analysis. In Chapter 3, the identification of patterns in the domestic history of the country revealed a shift from a centralised to a diffused power structure. It exposed Musharraf's downfall in 2007-08 to have been perhaps the most significant event in the nation's history. While this may seem hyperbolic, there has undoubtedly been a move away from the centralisation of power in the hands of a few individuals. The Panama Papers scandal in 2016, Sharif's resignation as prime minister in 2017, and continuing opposition agitations, militant attacks targeting the state, and the general elections of 2018,

which marked the country's second consecutive democratic transfer of power, are signs that the diffusion of social control precipitated by Musharraf's labefaction has been lasting. The patterns uncovered in Chapter 3 and this modification in the country's power structure in the direction of diffused social control make it possible to predict the likely course of Pakistani politics in the coming years. Further military coups seem unlikely, despite their prominent position in Pakistani history, as a consequence of the strengthening of civil society and democracy and the diffusion of control. On the other hand, the patterns of anti-government social movements and militancy will gain momentum from this diffusion of control. Migdal's state-in-society framework and the ES's historical-interpretation methodology, including Parrat's (2015) conceptualisation of nomothetic versus ideographic notions of history, were helpful tools in perceiving these patterns as well as shifts.

Chapter 3 also provided an explanation for *why* the military has played such a powerful role in Pakistan's history and why power has been so centralised in past decades. The exploration of the nature of decolonisation and the social disruption engendered by the Partition offered profound insights into the perceived necessity of establishing a state in which power was centralised. The consideration of these subjects furthermore proved valuable in uncovering the social norm of suppressing trauma within South Asia, which is an intangible reason for the apparently unresolvable India-Pakistan conflict. There is tremendous scope for further research in this area, which I started to tap into

with a paper I presented at the International Studies Association's Annual Convention, which stemmed from my work on Chapter 3 (Kapur 2015).

Additionally, the historical approach of Chapter 3 unveiled the way in which the "global war on terror" has *caused* radicalisation in Pakistan, underscoring the need to pay attention to soft counterterrorism strategies. Qua Buzan (2004a), the chapter treated terrorist groups as social actors, which supports the thesis's concern with dehumanisation versus de-radicalisation, explored in depth in Chapter 6.

Chapter 4 explored the shared institutions operating in South Asia and especially in the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan "deadly triangle." It asked how South Asian institutions might function better. The analysis in Chapter 4 revealed further empirical insights, including the existence of a triangular proxy war being carried out by these three states, which has contributed abundantly to the existence of militant groups in the region. The focus on how Afghanistan, India and Pakistan *have* engaged with the institutions of regional society marked an optimistic shift away from the morbid realist-type research that predominates in the literature on security in South Asia. This is a contribution that this thesis makes to the empirical literature on South Asia. Chapter 4 identified as many as ten institutions of international society to be operating in South Asia and specifically in the so-called "deadly triangle" of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Chapter 5 set out to deconstruct the Pakistani "safe haven" by using the ES methodology of historical interpretation to show how great and regional powers have been responsible for the spurt of terrorist groups in Pakistan from 1979. In addition to the institution of great-power management, the chapter attended to the institutions of diplomacy and trade, considering the SCO, the QCG, the six-party talks on Afghanistan, the US-Taliban deal, and CPEC. The central contribution of this chapter was to undermine the construction of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism by showing how historically, starting from the hasty manner in which decolonisation took place in 1947, to the Afghan jihad and Iranian Revolution of 1979, and, finally, the September 2001 attacks and the "war on terror," international politics has *caused* militant groups to set up base in Pakistan. This stress on the structural reasons for terrorism is crucial, but the chapter also pays attention to the agency of powerful states including the United Kingdom, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Iran and India in contributing to the mess and their responsibility in cleaning it up. This is not to deny Pakistan's own agency and its own choices in actively promoting militants. However, it provides a counterpoint to the exceedingly negative perception of Pakistan in several of these states, and these states' assumption of their own moral superiority.

In Chapter 6, a theme that had been building up in previous chapters reached a crescendo: I argued that the manner in which ethnic nations spill "out of state containers" in South Asia *threatens* state sovereignty and therefore

impedes regional states' willingness to engage in multilateralism (Buzan 2004a, 137). This is another key empirical point that I have made in this thesis. I have tried to uncover the shaky foundations of the nation-state in South Asia and the insecure and constructed character of nationalism in the region.

In the realm of security, Chapter 6 noticed a shift in the Pakistani army's outlook evidenced by Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, launched in 2017, which targets militants outside the north-west and in the army's backyard of Punjab. This is a major development that has been neglected by the empirical literature on the country since it signifies the army's targeting of Punjab-based militants, who have traditionally been used as proxies in the conflict with India. Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad also underlines the seriousness with which the army is treating the threat from Daesh, in spite of government statements to the contrary.

Chapter 6 teased out the threat to the country's sovereignty and territoriality posed by Daesh with its territorial ambitions. It raised the ethical question of *why* a caliphate should be unthinkable. While this is a question for future research to answer, Chapter 6 highlighted the normative responsibility of international society to protect the Pakistani state against this threat.

Policy Recommendations

The policy recommendations presented in this section are informed by two considerations. First, it is politically imperative that international efforts to

counter terrorist groups in Pakistan do not challenge the country's sovereignty and agency, as this is likely to cause intense resentment and prove counterproductive. Secondly, it is important that any regional initiatives do not grant India an excessively influential role, as this would raise domestic concerns about India's allegedly "nefarious" designs. In light of these concerns, this thesis proposes the following policy recommendations.

Collective-Security Agreement

As I have argued in Chapter 4, the institutions of international society *do* function in the conflict-ridden triangle of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Drawing on this analysis, it is my recommendation that Pakistan, India and Afghanistan should sign a formal collective-security agreement based on the idea of a pluralistic security community. The aim would be to bring about the peaceful transformation of the "deadly triangle." It would be necessary for the ES institutions of great-power management, diplomacy and international law to enable such a process to occur. Great powers including the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia—which have historically played a role in destabilising the region—have a responsibility to back such an agreement through international pressure, diplomacy and mediation. The transformation of the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan triangle

through collective security must take place through a multilevel approach to be effective.

Building Trust

There is a need for trust-building among the intelligence agencies, militaries and politicians of the three countries. Opportunities for interaction must be provided. These could include joint training exercises, social events, and problem-solving meetings.

Cultural Exchanges

The promotion of cultural exchanges would draw on the shared cultural heritage of the three countries to dispel mistrust among citizens. Regional governments should proactively encourage the organisation of multilateral cultural events and the travel of artists within the region and must deal firmly with extremist political parties and other actors who attempt to disrupt such cultural exchanges.

Softer Borders

The softening of borders is imperative if mutual mistrust and animosity is to be addressed. Visa restrictions bolster the national-security obsession of regional states and prevent human exchanges at the world-society level. Greater people-

to-people interaction would create a conducive political atmosphere for de-securitisation.

Dispute Resolution

The resolution of border disputes is the final vital step in allowing Pakistan to heal its relationships with India and Afghanistan. The disputes over the LoC and the Durand Line will have to be resolved if the peaceful transformation of the region is to be given a chance. This will require immense efforts from international society, given the many decades that have passed without any resolution in sight. Indeed, it is the *responsibility*, in particular, of the United Kingdom as former imperial ruler to actively pursue the resolution of these territorial disputes. This could be achieved through convincing its allies in North America and Europe to help mediate resolutions through diplomatic means. The reluctance of India and Afghanistan to solidify the borders is an obstacle that can only be crossed via international pressure.

International Aid

As I have shown in Chapter 3, the "war on terror" has caused tremendous human suffering in the form of civilian casualties and displacements. It has also been counterproductive in the sense that it has perpetuated radicalisation due to this human suffering. Furthermore, as Chapter 6 contends, the Pakistani terrorist-rehabilitation programme has the support of the military and has been expanded to several parts of the country,

suggesting that the military considers it to have been reasonably effective. Despite the successes of recent military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan, I recommend that international aid to the country be directed not only towards military counterterrorism, but also towards de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation, and humanitarian assistance to parts of the country that have been heavily affected by the "global war on terror." Potential donors include the UN and wealthy allies of Pakistan such as China, Saudi Arabia and the United States. As argued in Chapter 5, these are states with a normative responsibility towards Pakistan because of the role they played in militarising the north-west of the country during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s.

Peacebuilding

As a society that has been plunged into conflict because of the Afghan jihad and the "war on terror," there is a need for international peacebuilding efforts in Pakistan. UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, and aid agencies— such as UNDP, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, and the US Agency for International Development—should focus on reforming madrasas that were radicalised during the Afghan jihad, democratisation, the disengagement and reintegration of former militants, job creation, and poverty alleviation (Pilbeam 2015, 102). This is based on the discussion in Chapter 3 of the militarisation of the north-west. Although democratisation could be accused of being a Western-centric objective, in the Pakistani context, with the power struggle between the military and civilian

administrations, it is a crucial goal, especially in light of allegations about the military's role in sponsoring terrorist organisations. Furthermore, in Karachi, there is a need for peacebuilding efforts aimed at promoting reconciliation among ethnic groups, which would help alleviate militant violence in the city. The social fabric of Karachi was damaged by the large-scale displacements of the Partition and the "war on terror," which has caused violent ethnic frictions in the city. As shown in Chapter 3, social control is being diffused away from the military, and this is a key moment in the country's history and a critical point for international society to support this shift. Also, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, the repeated displacements in the country's history have taken a toll on Karachi in particular, and this is something that has been neglected in empirical studies of the country not informed by Migdal's work.

Concluding Remarks

Fourteenth-century South Asian mystic Hazrat Amir Khusrau wrote, "I am you, you are me. I am the body, you are the life. So, come, so that no one may say in the days to come that you are someone other than me" (Ayaz and Muhammad 2009). His words presciently point to the process of "othering" that has occurred in the Pakistan-India-Afghanistan triangle since 1947, and to the falseness of this self/other dichotomy. The shared values, norms and cultures of individuals in the region predate the predominance of "concepts such as statehood, citizenship, [and] undivided loyalty to one state" (J. Ahmad 2011,

38). While the state, for now, may have "proved stronger than the individual" (J. Ahmad 2011, 38), I hope that this thesis will contribute to the revivification of world society in the region.

Appendix A

List of Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ruling Parties

Years	Head of State	Head of Government	Ruling Party
1947-1947	Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah	Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan	Muslim League
1947-1951	Governor General Khawaja Nazimuddin	Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan	Muslim League
1951-1953	Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad	Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin	Muslim League
1953-1955	Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad	Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra	Muslim League
1955-1956	Governor General Iskander Mirza	Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali	Muslim League
1956-1957	President Iskander Mirza	Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy	Awami League
1957-1957	President Iskander Mirza	Prime Minister Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar	Muslim League
1957-1958	President Iskander Mirza	Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon	Republican Party
1958-1958	President Iskander Mirza	Prime Minister Ayub Khan	
1958-1969	President Ayub Khan		
1969-1971	President Yahya Khan		
1971-1971	President Yahya Khan	Prime Minister Nurul Amin	Pakistan Muslim League

1971-1973	President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto		
1973-1977	President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry	Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	Pakistan Peoples Party
1977-1978	President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry		
1978-1985	President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq		
1985-1988	President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo	Pakistan Muslim League
1988-1990	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto	Pakistan Peoples Party
1990-1990	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi	National Peoples Party
1990-1993	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
1993-1993	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Prime Minister Balakh Sher Mazari	Pakistan Peoples Party
1993-1993	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
1993-1993	President Wasim Sajjad	Prime Minister Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi	
1993-1996	President Farooq Leghari	Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto	Pakistan Peoples Party
1996-1997	President Farooq Leghari	Prime Minister Malik Meraj Khalid	
1997-1998	President Wasim Sajjad	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
1998-1999	President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

1999-2001	President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar		
2001-2002	President Pervez Musharraf		
2002-2004	President Pervez Musharraf	Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
2004-2004	President Pervez Musharraf	Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
2004-2007	President Pervez Musharraf	Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
2007-2008	President Pervez Musharraf	Prime Minister Muhammad Mian Soomro	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
2008-2008	President Pervez Musharraf	Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani	Pakistan Peoples Party
2008-2008	President Muhammad Mian Soomro	Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani	Pakistan Peoples Party
2008-2012	President Asif Ali Zardari	Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani	Pakistan Peoples Party
2012-2013	President Asif Ali Zardari	Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf	Pakistan Peoples Party
2013-2013	President Asif Ali Zardari	Prime Minister Mir Hazar Khan Khoso	
2013-2017	President Mamnoon Hussain	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
2017-2018	President Mamnoon Hussain	Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
2018-	President Arif Alvi	Prime Minister Imran Khan	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

Appendix B

List of Main Characters

Ahmad, Ishtiaq	Adjunct Faculty, Politics and International Relations, University of Sargodha
Ahmad, Talmiz	Indian ambassador, 2000-11
Ahsan, Aitzaz	Leader of the lawyers' campaign against Musharraf
Ali bin Abu Talib	Fourth caliph, 656-61
Azhar, Masood	Founding leader of the JeM
Aziz, Sartaj	Advisor to the prime minister on foreign affairs, 2013-17
Ban Ki-moon	UN Secretary-General, 2007-16
Basit, Abdul	High commissioner to India, 2014-17
Bhutto, Benazir	Prime minister, 1988-90, 1993-96
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali	Prime minister, 1973-77; president, 1971-73
Bin Laden, Osama	Emir of Al Qaeda, 1988-2011
Bush, George	US president, 2001-09
Chaudhry, Iftikhar Muhammad	Chief justice, 2005-07, 2009-13
Danesh, Sarwar	Second vice-president of Afghanistan, 2014-
Davis, Raymond	Former CIA contractor
Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer	Civil servant, British India
Durrani, Asad	Director general of military intelligence, 1988-89; director general of the ISI, 1990-91
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip	Turkish president, 2014-
Faraj, Muhammad Abdel Salam	Founding leader of Islamic Jihad, 1979-82
Ghani, Ashraf	Afghan president, 2014-
Gilani, Yousaf Raza	Prime minister, 2008-12
Haqqani, Husain	Ambassador to the United States, 2008-11
Headley, David	Plotter of the Mumbai attacks of 2008
Hobbes, Thomas	Seventeenth-century political philosopher
Horgan, John	Professor working at the intersection of psychology and terrorism
Hussein, Saddam	Iraqi president, 1979-2003
Ibn Abbas, Abdullah	Cousin of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and religious scholar
Janjua, Nasser Khan	National security advisor, 2015-2018
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali	Governor General, 1947-48
Karzai, Hamid	Afghan president, 2001-14
Kautilya	Political philosopher of the third century BC
Kayani, Ashfaq Parvez	Chief of Army Staff, 2007-13

Khan, Abdur Rahman	Afghan emir, 1880-1901
Khan, Ayub	President, 1958-69
Khan, Daud	Afghan prime minister, 1953-63; Afghan president, 1973-78
Khan, Imran	Chairman of the PTI, 1996-; prime minister, 2018-
Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar	Founder of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement
Khan, Yahya	President, 1969-71
Kharal, Shezra Mansab Ali Khan	PML-N parliamentarian, 2015-18
Lodhi, Maleeha	Permanent representative to the UN, 2015-19
Mirza, Iskander	President, 1956-58; Governor General, 1955-56
Mohammad, Khalid Sheikh	Suspected architect of the September 11 attacks
Modi, Narendra	Indian prime minister, 2014-
Muawiya, Asmatullah	Leader of the Punjabi Taliban
Musharraf, Pervez	President, 2001-08
Nazarbayev, Nursultan	Kazakh president, 1991-2019
Nehru, Jawaharlal	Indian prime minister, 1947-64
Obama, Barack	US president, 2009-17
Omar, Mullah Mohammad	Founding leader of the Afghan Taliban, 1994-2013
Parrikar, Manohar	Indian defence minister, 2014-17
Prophet Muhammad (SAW)	Prophet of Islam
Rafiq, Adnan	Country Representative for Pakistan, US Institute of Peace
Sharif, Nawaz	Prime minister, 1990-93, 1997-99, 2013-17
Singh, Hari	Maharaja of J&K, 1925-52
Singh, Manmohan	Indian prime minister, 2004-14
Swaraj, Sushma	Indian external-affairs minister, 2014-19
Syed, Mushahid Hussain	PML-N parliamentarian, 2018-
Toner, Mark	Deputy spokesperson of the US Department of State, 2015-17
Trump, Donald	US president, 2017-
Walter, Martin	German army officer
Wani, Burhan	Kashmiri separatist
Weber, Max	Political philosopher
Zaeef, Abdul Salam	Afghan ambassador to Pakistan, 2000-01
Zakaria, Mohammed Nafees	Spokesperson of the foreign-affairs ministry, 2016-17
Zardari, Asif Ali	President, 2008-13
Zawahari, Ayman al-	Emir of Al Qaeda, 2011-

Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad   President, 1978-88

Appendix C

Timeline of Events

1947: Birth of Pakistan → 1947: First war with India → 1965: Second war with India → 1971: Third war with India

1971: Secession of Bangladesh → 1979: Start of Soviet-Afghan War → 1989: End of Soviet-Afghan War → 1999: Fourth war with India

2001: Terrorist Attacks in the United States → 2001: Operation Enduring Freedom → 2007: Establishment of Mohamed bin Naif Centre for Counseling and Care in Saudi Arabia → 2007: Siege of Lal Masjid

2007: Suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry → 2007: Lawyers' Movement → 2007: Temporary occupation of Swat district by the Pakistani Taliban → 2008: Resignation of President Pervez Musharraf

2008: Terrorist attacks in Mumbai → 2009: Establishment of Sabaoon Rehabilitation Centre in Swat district → 2011: Killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad → 2013: First democratic transition

2014: Launch of Operation Zarb-i-Azb → 2015: Launch of National Action Plan against terrorism → 2015: Signing of agreement to commence work on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor → 2017: Launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad

2017: India and Pakistan's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation → 2018: United States' suspension of security assistance → 2018: Killing of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Mullah Fazlullah → 2018: Merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

2018: Imran Khan sworn in as prime minister in second democratic transition

Appendix D

List of Interviewees

Serial Number	Name	Profile
1	Ahmad, Ishtiaq	Adjunct Faculty, Politics and International Relations, University of Sargodha
2	Ahmad, Talmiz	Visiting Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
3	Anonymous	Assistant Director, State Bank of Pakistan
4	Anonymous	Editor, BBC Pashto Digital
5	Anonymous	Resident of Swat district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
6	Anonymous	Retired Indian ambassador
7	Chadha, Nirmal	Partition refugee
8	Horgan, John	Professor, College of Arts & Sciences, Georgia State University
9	Rafiq, Adnan	Country Director, Pakistan, United States Institute of Peace
10	Sawhney, Shanti	Partition refugee
11	Siddiqa, Ayesha	Research Associate, SOAS University of London
12	Walter, Martin	Former German deputy military attaché to India
13	Waziri, Attaullah	Press Aide to Hamid Karzai, former President of Afghanistan

Glossary

azaadi. Freedom.

bay'ah. An oath of allegiance.

benami. Assets held under false names.

burqa. Loose garment covering head, face and body worn by some Muslim women.

dargah. Sufi shrine.

halat. Circumstances.

hungami. Chaotic.

jazia. A tax for non-Muslims living in an Islamic state.

jihadi. Islamist militant.

jirga. Traditional assembly of leaders that makes decisions by consensus and according to the teachings of Pashtunwali.

kafir. Infidel.

kanal. Unit of area.

khateeb. Prayer leader.

Lal Masjid. Red Mosque.

lashkar. Militia.

madaris. Madrasas.

mahdi. Messiah.

malik. Tribal elder.

munasah. Advice.

naib amir. Deputy leader.

rafzi. Deviant.

sahaba. Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

salaf. Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

sunna. The example of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

wilayat. Province.

zakat. Islamic alms tax.

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