



**Mind the queue: Understanding challenges of introducing eGovernment policies for entrepreneurs during Covid-19 in a Latin American country**

Journal:	<i>Information Technology &amp; People</i>
Manuscript ID	ITP-09-2021-0726.R2
Manuscript Type:	Article
Keywords:	E-government < Study setting, Qualitative method < Method, Government policy < Phenomenon, Information workers < People, Developing countries < Study setting, Individual < Level of analysis

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

## **Mind the queue: Understanding challenges of introducing e-government policies for entrepreneurs during Covid-19 in a Latin American country.**

### **Structured abstract**

**Purpose:** This study focuses on understanding the tensions experienced by government officials in introducing e-government policies to support entrepreneurs in a developing Latin American country.

**Design/methodology/approach:** This study relies on an in-depth qualitative approach based on collaborative and analytic autoethnography. We concentrate on tensions experienced by a government official and how they were addressed when introducing eGovernment policies to support entrepreneurs during the Covid-19 pandemic.

**Findings:** The findings reveal that paradoxical tensions occur as changes are demanded, multiple concerns are expressed, and decisions about resources have to be made. The findings reveal sources of tensions from government, business, and external sources. Addressing such tensions revolves around a diverse form of paradoxes dealing with contradictions in terms of speed vs thoroughness and short- vs long-term implications.

**Research implications:** Our study provides several contributions. It advances understanding on the source and management of tensions experienced by government officials introducing e-government policies to support entrepreneurs during the Covid-19 pandemic. It also delineates multiple paradoxes experienced by government officials as new policies and systems were introduced. Finally, it offers a conceptual model explaining how government officials deal with multiple tensions emerging from the introduction of e-government policies in a developing country.

**Originality:** Prior literature has suggested that e-government initiatives would be guided by a prescriptive, tension-free process, driven by the interest to enhance governmental efficiency. This study reveals that developing e-government initiatives for entrepreneurs and existing businesses during the Covid-19 crisis was not immune to contradictions between government officials and the public. A conceptual model, based on multiple sources of tensions (government-related, business-related, and external sources) and their management, is proposed. Implications and opportunities for further research are presented.

**Keywords :** E-government; Paradox theory; Covid-19; Latin America; Entrepreneurs; Crisis

## 1. Introduction

There is a growing interest in capturing richer aspects of e-government (Davison *et al.*, 2005), which broadly relates to the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to support the delivery of public services to citizens, businesses, and public agencies, and thus increase their participation in decisions that affect their communities and society (Malodia *et al.*, 2021). Covid-19 has proved a difficult challenge for governments around the world (Siegel and Guerrero, 2021; Santos *et al.*, 2021), with support for entrepreneurs being limited (Ibáñez *et al.*, 2021). Public policies for entrepreneurs around e-government are designed to satisfy public concerns through decrees and regulations that support the introduction of online tools and services (Melin and Wihlborg, 2018). Government officials, that is, any officer, employee or other individual acting in an official capacity for a government authority, have come under scrutiny (Boin *et al.*, 2020) about how they address multiple demands, public health concerns, and the needs of entrepreneurs during the pandemic (Ratten, 2020). Prior literature in developing economies suggest that government officials have to deal with diverse tensions, such as e-government coordination, tool procurement, skills, technical and legal issues, as well as international pressures (Knox and Janenova, 2019), yet the answer to the question of how they negotiate such tensions when introducing policies in the context of Covid-19 is elusive.

Focusing on how government officials deal with tensions around e-government is relevant for several reasons. First, governments around the world had to enforce policies to deal with the health threat of Covid-19, imposing restrictions for entrepreneurs and business owners who demanded solutions to be developed quickly (Ratten, 2020). Second, devising digital policies to tackle such pressures is extremely complex, and is often considered as being somewhat hit or miss, suggesting diverse tensions that ICTs and public administration

1  
2  
3 perspectives are limited in explaining (Luciano, 2020). Scholars argue for the need of  
4  
5 theoretical perspectives that focus on the competing drivers for action and even contradictory  
6  
7 tensions that government officials experience (Bannister and Connolly, 2015; Stefanovic *et al.*,  
8  
9 2016). Recent studies suggest that a paradox perspective (Schad *et al.*, 2016) may assist  
10  
11 understanding about the experience of government officials in dealing with diverse tensions  
12  
13 (Cherry, 2014; Knox and Janenova, 2019). Finally, there is a general assumption that  
14  
15 introducing e-government policies may be easily replicated around the world, overlooking  
16  
17 differences between Western and international practices, suggesting that further research in  
18  
19 developing countries is needed (Sanabria *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, in this study we focus on:  
20  
21 *How do government officials deal with tensions emerging from the introduction of e-*  
22  
23 *government policies that support entrepreneurs during the Covid-19 crisis in a developing*  
24  
25 *country?*  
26  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 To answer our research question, we look into Honduras, a developing country in Latin  
32  
33 America, where recent studies highlight that entrepreneurs deal with diverse issues related to  
34  
35 government requirements (Arias and Discua Cruz, 2018; Guzmán-Alfonso and  
36  
37 Guzmán-Cuevas, 2012). In Honduras, the business landscape has been affected by the Covid-  
38  
39 19 pandemic (Discua Cruz, 2020), with e-government policies just being introduced (Arias *et*  
40  
41 *al.*, 2014), thus it offers a relevant context to examine tensions experienced by Government  
42  
43 officials. We rely on a collaborative and analytic autoethnography approach (Anderson, 2006;  
44  
45 Chang, 2016) to explore tensions experienced by a government official in charge of introducing  
46  
47 e-government policies (Anderson, 2006; Chang, 2016; Evered and Louis, 1981).  
48  
49  
50

51  
52 Our findings suggest that whilst Covid-19 acted as an accelerator in terms of the  
53  
54 introduction of new policies to support entrepreneurs, the process was far from being tension-  
55  
56 free. The source of such tensions related to dealing with diverse pressures from government,  
57  
58 business, and external sources. The findings reveal paradoxes revolving around speed and  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 thoroughness, belief and doubt of past and expected future experiences, and a long-term vs  
4 short-term view, thus expanding our understanding of e-government (Knox and Janenova,  
5  
6  
7  
8 2019; Cherry, 2014). Finally, our findings provide insight as to the type of tensions  
9  
10 experienced, offering a model that meets the contemporary and future challenges of e-  
11  
12 government in developing economies (Grönlund, 2010).  
13  
14  
15  
16

## 17 **2. Literature review**

### 18 19 *2.1 Covid-19 policy implications for governments in developing economies*

20  
21  
22 Developing countries have responded to the Covid-19 pandemic differently, with  
23  
24 diverse regulatory policies and unique approaches (Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020). The health  
25  
26 pandemic, currently with no foreseeable end date, has dramatically changed society, altered  
27  
28 current business practices, and pushed governments to rethink support for entrepreneurs  
29  
30 (Ratten, 2020). To prevent the spread of Covid-19, governments' policies and actions, such as  
31  
32 lockdowns (e.g. 'stay-at-home' policies) and temporary closure of governmental offices, has  
33  
34 restricted the ability to comply with many governmental procedures (Ashiru *et al.*, 2022). Such  
35  
36 policies have affected the sustainable operations of enterprises (e.g. furlough schemes) and  
37  
38 supply chains (local and international), among others (Papadopoulos *et al.*, 2020).  
39  
40  
41

42  
43 In order to meet the needs of public administration in the information era, a rapid  
44  
45 response, supported by digital solutions that would benefit the government apparatus, the  
46  
47 general citizen, and the private sector was needed (Alsaad and Al-Okaily, 2021). For some  
48  
49 governments, the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) would allow the  
50  
51 provision of some public services to be deployed by digital means (Alcaide-Muñoz *et al.*,  
52  
53 2017; Pazmiño-Sarango *et al.*, 2021), underscoring the importance of what is known as  
54  
55 electronic government, which is discussed next.  
56  
57

### 58 *2.2 e-government*

59  
60

1  
2  
3 While different definitions abound, scholars propose that electronic government (e-  
4 government hereafter) relates to the use of ICT applications to deliver various government  
5 services (Malodia *et al.*, 2021). Earlier studies associated e-government with the use of ICT  
6 “in public administrations, combined with organizational change and new skills in order to  
7 improve public services and democratic processes” (Grönlund and Horan, 2005, p. 719). Such  
8 conceptualization is relevant, as it highlights skills by government officials and unavoidable  
9 change. Such change demanded policies around improvements of the structures and operations  
10 of the government (Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019). Global institutions, such as the World  
11 Bank, have been extensively associated with e-government initiatives through financing the  
12 development, implementation, and monitoring of digital projects that deal with “the use by  
13 government agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet,  
14 and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses,  
15 and other arms of government” (e-Government, 2015).  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32

33 E-government impacts the way that governments interact with their constituencies  
34 (private citizens and companies) (Lindgren *et al.*, 2019), by becoming accountable, as well as  
35 more cost-effective and time-efficient in the creation of public value (Millard *et al.*, 2006).  
36 Some of the advantages of e-government are the improvement of the efficiency and quality of  
37 public service, service provision across organizations, social inclusion, openness, community  
38 well-being, stewardship, transparency, accountability, and improvement of democratic  
39 processes (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Grönlund and Horan, 2005; Lindgren *et al.*, 2019).  
40 These advantages are believed to help government officials fulfill the expectation that  
41 government can address changes demanded by individuals and businesses in a society  
42 (Grönlund and Horan, 2005), as it signals a commitment to improve public governance, citizen  
43 empowerment, and interactions with the private sector (Dada, 2006; ‘e-Government’, 2015).  
44 For the World Bank, implementing e-government translates into “less corruption, increased  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions.” (‘e-Government’,  
4  
5 2015).  
6

7  
8 There are several theoretical arguments in regard to the challenges that introducing e-  
9  
10 government policies for businesses may entail for government officials (Bannister and  
11  
12 Connolly, 2015; Malodia *et al.*, 2021). Such theoretical conversations have focused mostly on  
13  
14 information systems and public administration theories (Heeks and Bailur, 2007). Technology  
15  
16 adoption and diffusion theories would explain that government officials will benefit through  
17  
18 the increased adoption of digital tools to perform tasks (e.g. Carter and Weerakkody, 2008).  
19  
20 Under such perspectives, e-government promises improvements within the government and  
21  
22 with the interactions with its citizens, moving away from traditional ways of doing things  
23  
24 (Carter and Bélanger, 2005). Moreover, due to the ICTs' ability to keep electronic logs and  
25  
26 advances in cybersecurity, e-government is believed to help with transparency and  
27  
28 accountability for business owners and entrepreneurs (Lambrinoudakis *et al.*, 2003).  
29  
30  
31  
32

33 For example, public procedures become time consuming in in-person queues, and they  
34  
35 also tend to take time, as paper trails move from one government office to another. E-  
36  
37 government digital tools can provide access to some of these types of documents through  
38  
39 electronic requests, and provide results swiftly (Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019). An  
40  
41 example can be found in tax reporting: in some countries across the world, government  
42  
43 agencies have created a digital solution to receive tax filings by using only electronic means,  
44  
45 where no interaction between government officials and business owners is involved (e.g.  
46  
47 Internal Revenue Service (USA) or HM Revenue and Customs (UK)).  
48  
49  
50

51 A public administration perspective would explain that ICTs translate into the decline  
52  
53 of command and control bureaucracy, and increased ‘professionalization’, as government  
54  
55 officials are relieved from administrative tasks and increase their value (Bannister and  
56  
57 Connolly, 2015; Yıldız and Saylam, 2013). The value of a public administration could be  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 measured both by how much it fulfils the expectations of citizens and businesses with respect  
4  
5 to public services in an expeditious manner (Moore, 2001), and the impact of the efficacy and  
6  
7 efficiency of the government services on its stakeholders (Castelnovo, 2013). Governmental  
8  
9 services are then improved by allowing government officials, as agents, a faster and more  
10  
11 convenient way to interact with entrepreneurs through online means and streamlining  
12  
13 bureaucratic procedures (Heeks, 2006; Horák *et al.*, 2021). Such benefits relate to  
14  
15 administrative efficiency through better management of public resources, reduced  
16  
17 administration burden, plus reduced bottlenecks and queues in the delivery of services to  
18  
19 citizens (Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019).  
20  
21  
22

23  
24 Notwithstanding the fact that whilst e-government studies, relying on information  
25  
26 technology and public administration perspectives, suggest the relevance of the value of digital  
27  
28 tools and what they offer, they also warn that such processes may be characterized by lengthy  
29  
30 stages addressing the needs of various stakeholders both within the government and outside  
31  
32 (Stefanovic *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, digital tools and services have to be developed following  
33  
34 the introduction of policies regulated by a country's legal framework, requiring customization  
35  
36 often done by third-party providers, within a governmental technology department or a  
37  
38 combination of both, following complex selection and tender processes (Hochstetter *et al.*,  
39  
40 2022).  
41  
42  
43

44  
45 Prior studies suggest that that 35% of e-government initiatives are complete failures,  
46  
47 50% are partial failures, and only 15% of these projects may be considered successful (Heeks,  
48  
49 2003). In developing countries, more than 60% of e-government projects fail to meet the  
50  
51 desired outcomes, often resulting in citizen distrust, reputational loss for involved  
52  
53 governmental officials, resource costs, and setbacks for the incumbent government (Malodia  
54  
55 *et al.*, 2021). To reach the desired benefits, the implementation of digital policies requires the  
56  
57 interaction of several actors, such as government officials, entrepreneurs, software, the Internet,  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 processes, laws and regulations, organizational structures, etc. (Heeks, 2006). Tensions may  
4  
5 arise due to e-government coordination across departments of various agencies, digital tool  
6  
7 procurement, skills and resources needed, technical and legal issues, among others (Savoldelli  
8  
9 *et al.*, 2014). Yet, current theoretical perspectives may be limited in explaining how  
10  
11 government officials deal with such tensions when introducing e-government policies, and call  
12  
13 for further exploration of experiences in the process (Bannister and Connolly, 2015; Bekkers  
14  
15 and Homburg, 2007)  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20

### 21 2.3 The relevance of a paradox perspective

22  
23 To understand complex organizational phenomena that acknowledge the existence of  
24  
25 diverse tensions and how they can be managed simultaneously in organizations, including  
26  
27 government agencies, recent studies point to paradoxical perspectives (Schad *et al.*, 2016;  
28  
29 Smith and Lewis, 2011). Paradoxes refer to *'persistent contradictions between interdependent*  
30  
31 *elements'* (Schad *et al.*, 2016, p. 10) which may *"seem logical in isolation, but absurd and*  
32  
33 *irrational when appearing simultaneously"* (Lewis, 2000, p. 760). For government officials,  
34  
35 tensions may exist only because some of the elements in conflict when introducing e-  
36  
37 government policies are deeply inter-connected and reinforce one another (Cherry, 2014).  
38  
39  
40

41  
42 Paradoxes can persist over time because they cannot be easily resolved, as attempts to  
43  
44 solve one issue may aggravate another, thus tensions may resurface in another form, at a later  
45  
46 time, and in other places, thus often remaining latent until contextual conditions, such as  
47  
48 plurality, scarcity, and change make them resurface (Schad *et al.*, 2016; Smith and Lewis,  
49  
50 2011). For example, paradoxes could emerge through several stakeholders expressing  
51  
52 contradictory perspectives about the relevance of e-government policies over time. Changes in  
53  
54 internal governmental processes due to an alteration in the way officials and the public engage  
55  
56 in e-government efforts can surface conflicting goals and priorities. Moreover, scarcity of  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 resources (e.g. financial, temporal, and human) can place government officials between  
4  
5 contradictory yet co-existing needs in deciding whether to procure or develop e-government  
6  
7 tools or services in-house. Paradox theory explains that managing such contradictions is  
8  
9 challenging, as governmental officials may rely on diverse schemes and contradictory  
10  
11 responses to avoid discomfort associated with juxtaposing opposite demands (Hahn *et al.*,  
12  
13 2014).  
14  
15

16  
17 According to Smith and Lewis (2001), paradoxes emerge when government officials  
18  
19 must decide what they are going to do in terms of introducing e-government policies, how they  
20  
21 are going to do it, who is going to do it, and in what time horizon. By defining how they are  
22  
23 going to operate, government officials define how they are not going to operate, creating  
24  
25 organizing tensions. Who is going to do what highlights conflicting identities, roles, and values,  
26  
27 creating belonging tensions. As government officials consider the time horizon for their actions  
28  
29 in terms of e-government policies, between today and tomorrow, they create learning tensions.  
30  
31 Finally, by defining what they are trying to do, e-government officials define what they are not  
32  
33 trying to do, creating performing tensions. In essence, a paradox perspective is useful for this  
34  
35 study, as it takes a view of e-government as a dynamic and complex system, encompassing a  
36  
37 variety of tensions (Margolis and Walsh, 2003).  
38  
39  
40  
41

42  
43 The presence of e-government paradoxes may limit its potential to improve public  
44  
45 services for the public, including entrepreneurs (Knox and Janenova, 2019; Savoldelli *et al.*,  
46  
47 2014). Reaching consensus as to what digital infrastructure and tools to develop often results  
48  
49 in an e-government paradox, related to a contrast between a high level of investment and low  
50  
51 adoption (Savoldelli *et al.*, 2014). Savoldelli *et al.* (2014) suggest that government officials  
52  
53 may draw tensions such as a digital divide, an absence of a legal framework, lack of  
54  
55 measurement and evaluation, lack of citizens' participation, and lack of trust and transparency.  
56  
57 Moreover, Knox and Janenova (2019) argue that forms of e-government paradoxes can  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 emphasize technological development (e.g. citizens gain time in dealing with government  
4 processes but there is little added value) or digital services, displacing attention from core  
5 public services and isomorphic mimicry (e.g. pressure from international organizations or other  
6 governmental offices in the use of e-government tools). Schad *et al.* (2016) hint that a paradox  
7 perspective affords exploring tensions around e-government through an e-governmental  
8 agency, department or office, and those leading it. Thus, we explore such contexts next.

### 17 **3. Context: Honduras, entrepreneurs and e-government**

19 Honduras, a developing Latin American country of 9.4 million inhabitants, located in  
20 the central American isthmus (INE, 2021), was chosen for our study for several reasons. First,  
21 during the Covid-19 crisis, the GDP of Honduras reported a drop of 9.0% in 2020 compared to  
22 2019. As of March 2021, one year after registering the first cases of Covid-19, the  
23 measurements of the Monthly Index of Economic Activity (IMAE) showed a cumulative  
24 growth of 1.0% in the original series, derived from a recovery of productive activities in the  
25 country, which was driven by entrepreneurs. The activities with a positive contribution to GDP  
26 during the fourth quarter of 2020 were from enterprises in sectors such as commerce, hotels  
27 and restaurants, transportation and storage, and the manufacturing industry, which increased  
28 the collection of net tax.

42 Second, prior to the pandemic, entrepreneurs had to register their ventures through in-  
43 person applications, which often demanded visits to several governmental agencies and long  
44 queues for diverse permits (Arias and Discua Cruz, 2018). In the last five years, nascent  
45 enterprises in Honduras have been formalized through a hybrid approach, where entrepreneurs  
46 register their ventures through an e-governmental digital portal (Mi Empresa en Línea - *My*  
47 *Enterprise Online* <https://www.miempresaenlinea.org>), which provides official documentation  
48 (e.g. a tax code) that can be used to become a member in a local chamber of commerce, and to  
49 complete further procedures in governmental offices. Between 2017 and 2021, 10,153  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 companies were registered on the online platform, of which 5,263 already had a tax and revenue  
4 code. The Income Tax Management Service (SAR: Servicio de Administracion de Rentas)  
5 provides access to an e-government platform (<https://oficinavirtual.sar.gob.hn>) to complete  
6 tax-related procedures: filing taxes, tax-related queries, sales tax invoice management, etc.  
7  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 Finally, recent studies in Latin America highlight that whilst e-government may  
13 improve the delivery of services and enhance efficiency, governments in the region are under  
14 constant pressure to meet citizens' needs with the fewest resources possible (Porrua, 2013;  
15 Sanabria *et al.*, 2014). In Honduras, government actions were needed to increase transparency  
16 and introduce policies that could rebuild the confidence of entrepreneurs and the general  
17 population. In January 2015, the Presidency of the Republic approved the General Government  
18 Coordination Secretariat (SCGG), which, together with input from the National Agency for IT  
19 Industrial Promotion of the Republic of Korea (NIPA), prepared the 'Master Plan for Digital  
20 Government for the Republic of Honduras'. Four strategic axes were suggested, proposing a  
21 set of initiatives to be carried out to introduce a digital agenda, focusing on digital connectivity  
22 with equity, digital government, human talent in ICTs, and the development of an institutional  
23 and regulatory framework. In December 2017, the 'National Plan for Information and  
24 Communication Technologies' (ICTs), prepared for the National Telecommunications  
25 Commission (CONATEL) within the framework of the investment fund for  
26 telecommunications and information technologies (FITT), was completed. From 2018, a focus  
27 on the execution of social policy led to the creation of an information technology office in  
28 charge of software development for e-government tools and services.  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 Yet, e-government digital tools were used only by authorized governmental officers.  
52 With the help of the World Bank, a solution for monitoring and evaluation, called the 'Single  
53 System of Evaluation of Social Public Policy' (*SUEPPS* in Spanish) was created to support  
54 other tracking and reporting systems in use by governmental offices (Arias *et al.*, 2014). It was  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 not until March 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic hit Honduras, that the development of e-  
4 government policies was accelerated. Thus, under conditions in which introducing e-  
5 government policies, tools, and services may cause pressures, understanding *how government*  
6 *officials deal with tensions emerging from the introduction of e-government policies that*  
7 *support entrepreneurs during the Covid-19 crisis in a developing country* is necessary.

#### 14 4. Method

15  
16 The Covid-19 pandemic adversely affected the ability of scholars to conduct research.  
17 Thus, methodologically, answering a question about how government officials dealt with  
18 tensions when introducing e-government policies during the unprecedented times of the Covid-  
19 19 pandemic calls for an in-depth understanding of social reality through novel methods. In  
20 this regard, qualitative research is well positioned to extend understanding about digital  
21 policies, especially about aspects that are hard to measure, such as, for instance, the rationale  
22 and approach (Wastell *et al.*, 2009). Yet, as physical isolation, social distancing and diverse  
23 restrictions were introduced to prevent the spread of the virus, it became problematic for  
24 researchers to use traditional qualitative methods (Tremblay *et al.*, 2021, Roy and Uekusa,  
25 2020). Roy and Uekusa, (2020) argue that to overcome the obstacles and research challenges  
26 during a pandemic (e.g. stay-at-home restrictions, social distancing), the use of  
27 autoethnographic methods could support productive qualitative research.

28  
29 Autoethnography broadly relates to a qualitative approach that helps describe and  
30 systematically analyse (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand and critique  
31 the embedded cultural experience (ethno) (Adams *et al.*, 2014, p. 24). The features of  
32 autoethnography for this study lie in its methodological and theoretical rigor, which illuminates  
33 aspects of a cultural experience (Ellis *et al.*, 2011). Adams *et al.* (2014) hint that key reasons  
34 for researchers to engage in autoethnography may relate to their desire to: critique, make  
35 contributions to and/or extend existing research and theory, disrupt taboos, break silences,  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 reclaim lost and disregarded voices, and finally, make research accessible to multiple  
4 audiences. Autoethnography is a relevant approach to research e-government policies around  
5 entrepreneurship influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic, because it is a tool through which one  
6 individual or a team of researchers can embed themselves into theory and practice based on  
7 personal lived experiences, and explicate a phenomenon under investigation or intervention  
8 (Adams *et al.*, 2014; Holman Jones *et al.*, 2013; Lapadat, 2017).  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15

16  
17 Nevertheless, when studying complex social realities, recent studies call to move  
18 beyond the solo autoethnographic research approach, where the credibility of one person may  
19 be criticized as being too close to a sociocultural milieu to analyse it in a holistic or nuanced  
20 manner, and engage in analytic and collaborative autoethnography – an approach where  
21 multiple autoethnographers collaborate dialogically, as critical peers, to analyse their  
22 interpretation of a social phenomenon (Anderson, 2006; Chang, 2016; Hernandez *et al.*, 2017;  
23 Lapadat, 2017). Analytic autoethnography demands a team approach, where at least one of the  
24 researchers is a complete member of the social world under study (e.g., a government official).  
25 It also requires a narrative visibility of the researcher's self, dialogue with informants beyond  
26 the self, and commitment to theoretical analysis (Anderson, 2006). This approach provides  
27 clear advantages for e-government officials and entrepreneurship researchers, such as multiple  
28 reasons and incentives to spend time in the field, facilitating access to data, vantage points to  
29 access certain types of data, and opportunities to draw upon personal experiences to inform  
30 broader understandings with others.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48

49 Through collaborative autoethnography the expertise of an 'interdisciplinary team'  
50 entails that the analysis of a particular phenomenon can be undertaken by all researchers  
51 involved, or it can be affected partially, where one member engages in collecting the data (e.g.  
52 a government official) and writing the autoethnographic text, while the others help analyse the  
53 data (Chang, 2016). In line with analytic and collaborative autoethnography, we limited the  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 research team size to be between three and five members (Roy and Uekusa, 2020). Our analysis  
4  
5 was driven by a collaborative effort to balance the second author's involvement as a  
6  
7 government official with two academic members: one being a researcher and an entrepreneur,  
8  
9 and the other a computer scientist and researcher who has created and evaluated digital tools  
10  
11 for commercial and governmental use, thus creating an 'insider-outsider' research team  
12  
13 (Evered and Louis, 1981). Using collaborative autoethnography allowed adding a  
14  
15 multidisciplinary lens to inquiry, thereby minimizing the possibility of criticisms about lack of  
16  
17 rigor, narcissism or self-indulgence (Lapadat, 2017).  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22

#### 23 24 *4.1 Data collection, analysis, and representation*

25  
26  
27 Guided by Bourgoin *et al.*, (2019) we started with the process experienced by a  
28  
29 government official in introducing an e-government initiative to support entrepreneurs during  
30  
31 Covid-19. It demanded knowledge and critical reflection on roles occupied, cultural influences,  
32  
33 and how reality is constructed (Spry, 2001). To generate rich data for analysis, the  
34  
35 autoethnographic experiences of the second author were chosen to engage in insider research,  
36  
37 using his insider position as a methodological and interpretive tool (Butz and Besio, 2009). In  
38  
39 this study the 'insider' has been a government official since 2014, becoming the deputy  
40  
41 minister for e-government in Honduras from 2020 until February 2022, having unrestricted  
42  
43 access and insight not available to 'outsiders' (Karra and Phillips, 2008).  
44  
45  
46  
47

48  
49 Data collection demanded the provision of personalized accounts or narratives of the  
50  
51 experience. Autoethnographies benefit from several types of data, such as fieldnotes, official  
52  
53 documents and artifacts, as well as interviews (including memories and narratives) (Anderson  
54  
55 and Glass-Coffin, 2013, p. 65). Of all these data types, personal memories represent the  
56  
57 foundations of autoethnography (Giorgio, 2013, p. 409). Thus, in this study, data were gathered  
58  
59 through memory, including memories of events, conversations, meetings, emotions, as well as  
60

1  
2  
3 other sources such as field notes and official and publicly available data from governmental  
4 sources (Holman Jones *et al.*, 2013; Kouamé and Liu, 2021), collected from March 2020 until  
5  
6 March 2021. Through collaborative autoethnography (Chang, 2016) the analysis was  
7  
8 undertaken by all authors. One member (the government official) engaged in collecting the  
9  
10 data and writing the ethnographic text, while the others helped to analyse the data (Fernando  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15 *et al.*, 2019).

16  
17  
18 Guided by Bourgoin *et al.* (2020), our analysis comprised several steps, framed by a  
19  
20 constant comparative approach between the data and the theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2014).  
21  
22 The first step of analysis was done by the second author during data collection. It resulted in  
23  
24 the production of a chronological narrative of written and digital video accounts describing  
25  
26 events and situations experienced when introducing digital tools during the Covid-19  
27  
28 pandemic. By bringing different areas of expertise, theoretical insights became more  
29  
30 pronounced over time and the empirical grounding stronger, which facilitated creating a  
31  
32 conceptualized narrative and time-framed compositions (Berends and Deken, 2021).  
33  
34 Throughout the initial narrative, several themes surrounding tensions appeared consistently in  
35  
36 a variety of forms: governmental pressures, contradicting demands, and external pressures.  
37  
38 Through analysis of the data, the authors became immersed in the related events and created  
39  
40 opportunities to relive details, leading to a recursive process of meaning-making (Ellis *et al.*,  
41  
42 2011; Kouamé and Liu, 2021), which turned into the writing of seven short autoethnographic  
43  
44 episodes (situations, digital tool projects, etc.), used as analytical bracketing devices (Eriksson  
45  
46  
47  
48 *et al.*, 2008) to delve into tensions experienced. The authors analysed the conditions of these  
49  
50 episodes, as well as the connection among them, to enable readers to situate details and follow  
51  
52 the unfolding of events (Berends *et al.*, 2010).  
53  
54  
55  
56

57  
58 The second step consisted of coding these episodes, using open-coding techniques  
59  
60 (Miles *et al.*, 2013). During multiple online meetings, academic co-authors critically reviewed,

1  
2  
3 validated, and evaluated the government official's notes and recollections. The two academic  
4 authors considered that implementation of e-government tools or services was constantly  
5 affected by recurring tensions from several sources, and those episodes were especially  
6 interesting, as they were influenced by the level of participation of entrepreneurs and the level  
7 of empowerment of government officials. The authors then narrowed down the number of  
8 episodes to three. These were chosen because they illustrated moments in which the  
9 experiences of tensions were most salient, and where the government official had to reflect on  
10 his approach, making it necessary to describe the events in detail. At this stage, triangulation  
11 and theory application related to the broader context of e-government. Moving between the  
12 various sources of data available, the authors thoroughly rewrote these episodes to support  
13 them with additional evidence (e.g. public documents). These initial rounds of coding made  
14 them realise that whilst paradoxes existed, the management of tensions was engaged  
15 throughout. Thus, aspects such as co-created value and the development of technical/legal  
16 infrastructure influenced the continuous adaptation of e-government policies.

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 Finally, during multiple meetings, the third author offered a theoretical take on the  
37 analysis produced so far, based on his experience as a computer scientist and evaluator of  
38 digital tools for e-government. He challenged the existing themes and codes and tested whether  
39 they were supported by the data. He also underlined the need to identify whether the  
40 implementation of e-government tools or services changed following the appointment of the  
41 government official as deputy minister, and whether or not paradoxes were managed. Such an  
42 approach would avoid the pitfall of observing only successful performances, and revealed that  
43 aspects such as delay in e-government implementation, or the selection of third-party providers,  
44 may ensue if tensions are disregarded.

45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58 The data are then represented through a writing style that combines multiple 'voices',  
59 including theory and subjective experience, to increase the authentic quality of the accounts  
60

1  
2  
3 presented (Rambo, 2005). Consistent with our approach, we depersonalize the second author's  
4 accounts by using the name Pablo. In doing so we maintain distance between his position as a  
5 governmental official and main actor in events analysed. We acknowledge the risks of  
6 autoethnographic accounts (Roy and Uekusa, 2020) by letting the data 'speak', often through  
7 the voice of the third author as 'devil's advocate' in virtual meetings, to discuss the issues at  
8 hand (Bishop *et al.*, 2019). Using an analytic and collaborative autoethnographic approach, we  
9 offer a detailed analysis of the tensions experienced by a government official during the  
10 introduction of eGovernment policies to support entrepreneurs in a developing country.  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

## 22 **5. Findings**

23  
24 Data analysis revealed how government officials in a developing country dealt with  
25 tensions during the introduction of e-government policies. Evidence suggested that Covid-19  
26 accelerated e-government policies in Honduras, and that policy makers experienced paradoxes  
27 in doing so. Initial tensions existed due to the prior experiences of officials with digital tools  
28 developed by third parties, a lack of experience in interacting with entrepreneurs, and the  
29 absence of a legal framework and empowerment to operationalize diverse policies. Several  
30 episodes suggested that tensions were managed when the advantages of specific and simple  
31 tools for eGovernment were demonstrated, when policies were co-created with citizens and the  
32 results monitored by international agencies.  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47

### 48 *5.1 Episode 1: 'A wakeup call' – Addressing government officials' related tensions*

49  
50 Data analysis revealed that during the initial months of the pandemic (March-June  
51 2020), tensions emerged in terms of government officials being sceptical of e-government  
52 being used successfully for the functioning of their institutions. For Pablo, this represented a  
53 contradiction to the advantages perceived through his journey as a government official  
54 involved in the implementation of e-government.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Pablo noted that there was a generalized interest in preserving a status quo, and hence  
4 a reluctance by government officials to transform the way things were done. During the first  
5 meetings following the news of government-imposed restrictions in March 2020, data analysis  
6 revealed a contradiction in the action of government officials. Pablo mentioned, *“Government  
7 officials who expressed their interest and support to any digital initiative we would come up  
8 with [prior to the pandemic] quickly showed a rejection in the implementation stage [during  
9 the pandemic]. There was this unfounded assumption that e-government tools would take away  
10 the influence or input they [government officials] would have within their institution over  
11 time... there were arguments supporting that processes could continue to work as in the past,  
12 as advantages were not easy to understand... and that they needed careful thinking.”*

13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26 The pressures emerging from central government underscored the need to rely on ICTs  
27 and digital tools to continue offering their services to entrepreneurs. Pablo noted that policies  
28 had to be implemented swiftly to make the previously in-person processes more efficient, yet  
29 such approaches challenged the way that government officials expected the process to unfold.  
30 Entrepreneurs and business owners were demanding a channel to complete forms required to  
31 start their companies, or to continue operation during restrictions. Whilst officials welcomed  
32 decisions and guidance by Pablo, their concern was that the introduction of digital tools would  
33 be costly, take time to implement, and could fail to address the pressing needs of entrepreneurs.

34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45 Tensions were experienced because of the urgent decisions that had to be made, and  
46 the course of action that should be followed to provide basic services to entrepreneurs during  
47 a crisis. Whilst the interest in introducing digital tools that could expedite processes was  
48 welcomed, as it could reduce bureaucratic burdens, contradictions were found in the perception  
49 that such introductions would demand such a dramatic change that it would exacerbate public  
50 criticism. During subsequent meetings, government officials dealing with entrepreneurs were  
51 preoccupied, as the performance measurements of services provided by their offices or  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 agencies were low, and thus their actions would be questioned. Pablo expressed, “..*changes in*  
4 *the processes or the way things had been traditionally done were needed urgently. Culturally,*  
5 *that represented a natural tendency to resist the changes required by digital*  
6 *transformation...they [government officials] needed a wakeup call and COVID-19 was just*  
7 *that!”*  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13

14 Evidence revealed that talks about modernizing governmental processes for  
15 entrepreneurs had occurred in the past, yet such talks became stagnant, as initiatives were  
16 perceived as not adding any value to the function of government officials, other than  
17 accumulating extra tasks. Pablo noted that resistance was heightened by previous experiences  
18 of not receiving sufficient and periodic information or demonstrations about the advantages  
19 that e-government could offer. Public records of meetings provided suggestions about new  
20 structures, optimization of existing processes, and new personnel linked to e-government  
21 policies. Yet actions were lacking. Government officials were simply sceptical of the  
22 advantages that new digital tools would bring, and decided to minimize the importance of their  
23 implementation.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36

37 Data analysis also revealed that government officials were doubtful of e-government  
38 policies, due to past experiences of digital tools being developed by external consulting firms  
39 (e.g. local IT firms (Mazzoni Pizzati *et al.*, 2018)), building continuous tensions about who  
40 should be involved in developing digital tools during a crisis. Such an approach previously  
41 involved investing large amounts of public funds in IT hardware and software that were often  
42 disconnected from know-how within governmental agencies. A disconnection between  
43 government officials and what entrepreneurs wanted translated into quickly outdated software  
44 and a lack of continuous technical training. Government officials demanded resources to train  
45 people in their institutions who could respond quickly to the needs of citizens and  
46 entrepreneurs, but who could also develop expertise to update such tools in the future.  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Evidence showed that to manage such tensions, Pablo engaged in introducing policies  
4 that could show government officials both short- and long-term benefits. This was done first  
5 through introducing the electronic signature. An electronic signature provided increased  
6 security measures in verifying the identity of a government official for usage of a computer  
7 system to control access or authorize a transaction (Minihan, 2001). The first governmental  
8 office to engage in the electronic signature process was the Foreign Affairs Ministry, in May  
9 2020. As of May 2021, 14 offices within larger governmental institutions that provide official  
10 documentation for entrepreneurs in different sectors have adopted electronic signatures.  
11 Among such governmental offices are the Property Institute, the National Institute of Forest  
12 Conservation and Development, the Police Directorate, the Secretariat of Foreign Relations  
13 and International Cooperation, the National Graphic Arts Company, the Secretariat of  
14 Commerce, the National Electric Power Company, and the Tax and Revenue Office.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

30 Yet, as electronic signatures were introduced, government officials voiced the need to  
31 gradually eliminate dependence on third parties for digital tool development over time.  
32 Government officials believed that in-house development would help the development of tools  
33 based on internal know-how of entrepreneurs' demands and specific information needed. This  
34 would also help across agencies to attain official digitalized documents. Such an approach  
35 could minimize the tensions produced by government officials being unable to manage requests  
36 by entrepreneurs swiftly in times of crisis. Government officials did not want to be dictated to  
37 or provided a prescription on what to do from third party providers distanced from what  
38 entrepreneurs wanted. Yet, such a request would take time to implement and demand scarce  
39 resources (e.g. hardware, specialized training) compared to the use of third-party providers.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

56 *5.2 Episode 2: 'Mind the queue' – tensions around public participation and official monitoring.*  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 During the first months of the government-imposed restrictions, tensions were also  
4 identified around the selection of digital tools that would address the needs of entrepreneurs  
5 and business owners. Data analysis suggests that Pablo experienced tensions when  
6 implementing new initiatives based on unanswered requests made by the public. Such tension  
7 emerged due to the lack of understanding as to which processes needed to be tackled first during  
8 the initial months of the pandemic (March-May). In addition, pressures from the World Bank  
9 and other external parties about the way business was done in Honduras (e.g.  
10 [www.doingbusiness.org](http://www.doingbusiness.org)) were constantly highlighted, as this affected international perception.  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 To manage tensions, the office of the presidency became involved. The office proposed  
23 implementing a social media campaign to ask citizens and entrepreneurs what was the most  
24 time-consuming government procedure in any particular office that could be tackled during the  
25 pandemic. The campaign started in July 2020 and lasted for two months. It motivated citizens  
26 to participate, advertising the conferral of monetary or tangible awards. Such an approach  
27 received attention from the public and allowed government officials to receive input from  
28 citizens quickly. The result was a list of bureaucratic processes that the public demanded to be  
29 addressed. This list was then matched against the official perception of the government,  
30 revealing discrepancies between the government and public opinion. Prizes for the most  
31 insightful responses were awarded in October 2020.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

45 Based on such a list, the process considered most problematic for entrepreneurs was the  
46 official registration of their enterprise in the national registry. It implied long queues in several  
47 governmental offices for more than six weeks, hence a policy that would digitalize such a  
48 process and reduce the registration time was introduced. The e-Gov digital tool developed was  
49 named SIN+FILAS (*No More Queues* in English). In the subsequent months, the registration  
50 process was reduced from six weeks to four days, representing a major breakthrough in the  
51 implementation of an e-government policy to support entrepreneurs during the crisis.  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Using digital tools for entrepreneurs to voice their concerns about how to make  
4 processes more transparent and expeditious became a guiding principle for e-government  
5 policies. Other governmental offices, such as the police department and the Foreign Office,  
6 were contacted to initiate the development of digital tools. The former provides records for  
7 applicants aiming to work in a new enterprise, and the latter offers translation services for  
8 entrepreneurs exporting their products. Tensions emerged when monitoring the outcome of  
9 changes and the evaluation of further governmental processes that needed to be reduced during  
10 the pandemic. Pablo noted that further decisions were taken to address cumbersome processes  
11 identified by international agencies, such as the World Bank and Transparency International.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22

23  
24 From mid-2020, the Office of Management and Public Innovation, in charge of e-  
25 government, approached the issue of the digitalization of procedures to support entrepreneurs  
26 through co-creation, asking the public to participate in the process. In doing so, the results have  
27 reduced the public health risk exposure through long queues, including the following measures:  
28  
29  
30  
31

- 32  
33 (1) Trademark Registration: Application for trademark registration through an  
34 administrative procedure grants its holder the right to exclusive use and exploitation of  
35 a trademark in the Republic of Honduras in accordance with national laws and  
36 international treaties.  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42 (2) Authentic documents and Apostilles: The authenticity of a signature of a  
43 government official can now be certified digitally, specifying the position, office seal,  
44 or stamp used within an official public document.  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49 (3) Registration of Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): The ‘My  
50 Enterprise Online’ platform aims to provide entrepreneurs with a means to register in  
51 the microentrepreneurs market; successful completion of the process generates a  
52 registration record that can be verified on governmental websites.  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58 (4) SSE Registration: Registration of Social Enterprises.  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 (5) Contracts of Adhesion of Individual Merchants or Legal Persons: The electronic  
4 agreement of adhesion for natural or legal persons allows generation of a user profile  
5 in the governmental digital system, to carry out procedures within the Honduran  
6 Customs platform.  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12 (6) SAR SIN + FILAS: The electronic adhesion contract for natural or legal persons  
13 allows a user of the system to be able to carry out procedures within the Honduras Tax  
14 and Customs platform.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19 (7) Solidarity Credit: This initiative promotes a socially inclusive economy through  
20 a program focusing on the microenterprise sector, providing microenterprises with  
21 technical assistance and favorable credit conditions following their registration on the  
22 online SAR platform.  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28 (8) Translation Certificate: This service allows entrepreneurs to review, correct,  
29 and approve the translation of official and private documents for international matters.  
30  
31  
32  
33 (9) Police Records: The Request of Police Records online; these confirm whether  
34 any citizen has committed any offense or crime; they are a requirement for staff in any  
35 governmental or private company.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42 Pablo noted that citizens' expectations about public value creation were improved,  
43 based on the evaluations from using online applications (e.g. the SIN+FILAS platform, online  
44 police and translation records request platforms). Waiting times identified by international  
45 organizations (e.g. the World Bank) dropped dramatically in the second half of 2020. Such a  
46 response signals positive public acceptance of the digital tools developed for the future, yet a  
47 concern remains about what would happen to policies once government restrictions would be  
48 lifted.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 5.3 Episode 3: 'Battling the bureaucracy office by office' tensions around the lack of a legal  
4  
5  
6 *framework.*

7  
8 Since the beginning of the pandemic, Pablo encountered several challenges related to  
9  
10 'constantly battling the bureaucracy'. This related to officials being hesitant about making  
11  
12 decisions without a policy framework from central government. As a deputy minister, he saw  
13  
14 the opportunity to accelerate the introduction of e-government policies because of Covid-19  
15  
16 and noted: "*We [Honduran Government] can no longer be an ink-and-paper government*".  
17  
18 Evidence suggested that current governmental processes were outdated and needed  
19  
20 transformation. Yet, tensions arose when other government officials were hesitant to adopt  
21  
22 digital tools, arguing the lack of a regulatory policy framework. The development of such a  
23  
24 framework would signal a serious commitment to a long-term strategy, rather than responses  
25  
26 that would only address issues in the short term.  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 On May 19, 2020, in response to the need to press on with e-government initiatives, the  
32  
33 office of the president, through the executive decree PCM-044-2020, created the Office of  
34  
35 Presidential Priorities and Public Innovation. Pablo engaged in such a process, being aware  
36  
37 that such an executive decree and newly created office would allow the deployment of efficient  
38  
39 and transparent e-government policies. He noted: "*The support came from the highest national*  
40  
41 *authority, the president, who requested that immediate action was taken... [As a result] there*  
42  
43 *was a willingness to cooperate by the authorities of governmental agencies*". Such  
44  
45 endorsement helped manage tensions related to the lack of a legal framework to guide the  
46  
47 introduction of policies, tools, and services for entrepreneurs.  
48  
49

50  
51 Yet the creation of such an office raised a new set of tensions, as government officials  
52  
53 perceived that e-government policies would imply *increased* bureaucracy, and did not cater for  
54  
55 the issues of ICTs for the public. Strong political support needed to be communicated amongst  
56  
57 mid- and low-level government officials for implementation. As a response, in August 2020,  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Decree PCM-044-2020 was reformed to give greater priority to e-government and public  
4 innovation, and the Office of Management and Public Innovation (OMPI) was created, with  
5 more specific functions to develop policies in relation to information technology,  
6 cybersecurity, and other aspects related to e-government. Pablo became the deputy secretary  
7 of OMPI in August 2020. In the initial meetings, as deputy minister Pablo expressed: “e-  
8 *government initiatives will aid in transparency and corruption prevention because our new*  
9 *systems record every transaction. This is part of the diverse aspects of the legal framework*  
10 *devised by the Government that addresses not only this emergency now, but also the future*  
11 *approaches... yet we needed some room for action, as government officials needed such a*  
12 *framework”*. The office represented the creation of new boundaries for promoting the  
13 advantages of e-government, e.g. security (Lambrinoudakis *et al.*, 2003) among governmental  
14 offices.

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31 Data analysis revealed that when such a legal/technical framework was set up, it  
32 provided a greater scope of action for government officials, as policies would be better  
33 supported by Government officials, raising their level of empowerment. Under such a legal  
34 framework, digital tools and services could then be created through in-house ICT departments  
35 financed through central government. Government officials felt that this would increase the  
36 perception of accountability and transparency in public information management and resources  
37 allocated for ICTs. In doing so, the function of preparing, coordinating, and ensuring  
38 compliance with the policies emanating from OMPI would empower ICT departments of  
39 diverse institutions to deploy alternative channels to deliver their services online.

40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51 Yet, whilst such empowerment generated greater encouragement to introduce e-  
52 government policies for the future, and ensured that tools developed would adhere to the legal  
53 framework created, it also made officials aware of overlapping boundaries set by current legal  
54 frameworks, such as the law of transparency and access to public information. Such laws,  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 administered by another governmental office, could support e-government policies through  
4 informing procedure simplification, public innovation, and digital services geared to provide  
5 access to relevant information to citizens, yet their leaders needed to be involved, otherwise a  
6 new set of tensions might emerge.  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11

12 Finally, data analysis revealed that advances in introducing e-government policies  
13 could experience further tensions should government-imposed restrictions be revoked, or  
14 should a new government take office. Pablo expressed: *“The advantage of these IT systems is*  
15 *that they were born out of a real and urgent need of all stakeholders, and all have been able to*  
16 *appreciate the benefits of using these platforms in a short period of time... but we may go back*  
17 *to paper and ink if officials feel there is no need to consider digital tools in the long term.”* As  
18 more governmental offices are asked to redesign existing processes and make their procedures  
19 available for compliance with e-government guidelines, then concerns of continuity remain,  
20 thus becoming a never-ending source of tensions.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32

## 33 **6. Discussion**

34  
35 In answering our question about how government officials dealt with tensions when  
36 introducing e-government policies for entrepreneurs, our study provides evidence of paradoxes  
37 in a context where Covid-19 was an accelerator and disruptor of government action (Ashiru *et*  
38 *al.*, 2021). In contrast to prior studies focused on developed economies (e.g. Papadopoulos *et*  
39 *al.*, 2020), the findings provide insight on how this occurred in a developing country,  
40 suggesting that acceleration stems from intensive efforts to devise tools that replace in-person  
41 transactions in order to stop the spread of infection (e.g. minimizing agglomeration of  
42 entrepreneurs in long queues demanding public services).  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53

54 How government officials dealt with tensions is related to the form of paradoxes  
55 experienced. Findings revealed that a government official may face organizing tensions by  
56 deciding how the approach to introduce e-government policies is organized (e.g., deciding  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 which cumbersome processes to tackle – first and then subsequently – in a pandemic).  
4  
5 Processes have to be redesigned at an unprecedented speed, demanding the participation of the  
6  
7 public, which streamline the approach of government officials to pinpoint solutions. In  
8  
9 deciding who might be involved in the development of digital tools (e.g. government ICT  
10  
11 departments or external consultants) they face belonging tensions (Cherry, 2014) and the  
12  
13 provision of e-government tools and services, while the new ways in which government  
14  
15 officials perform their work have required a change in existing processes, aimed directly at  
16  
17 providing services to entrepreneurs, but also strategic, tactical, and operational instruments  
18  
19 (e.g. electronic signatures) to support processes performed day-to-day by officials in diverse  
20  
21 government agencies (Gabryelczyk, 2020). As they consider the time horizons to address  
22  
23 several processes identified by the public, they face learning tensions (e.g. immediate and long  
24  
25 term). Performing paradoxes were experienced when dealing with multiple internal and  
26  
27 external demands (e.g. the needs of entrepreneurs, concerns of government officials,  
28  
29 international perceptions). In essence, our findings advance the view of paradoxes  
30  
31 encompassing a variety of tensions that government officials experienced when introducing e-  
32  
33 government policies (Knox and Janenova, 2019).  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39

40 Based on the discussion above, two interrelated paradoxes expand our understanding  
41  
42 of how government officials deal with the introduction of e-government policies in developing  
43  
44 economies (Schad *et al.*, 2016). *Thoroughness vs speed*: ICTs have accelerated the managerial  
45  
46 productivity of government officials, which is crucial in the creation of tools for entrepreneurs.  
47  
48 Because of the abilities of ICTs, government officials are expected to be faster in the  
49  
50 deployment of e-government (Horák *et al.*, 2021). Yet they are also expected to be thorough,  
51  
52 which demands time and resources. *Short term vs long term*: Government officials must at the  
53  
54 same time honour the difference between short- and long-term needs of governmental offices,  
55  
56 and recognize that both time frames may be intertwined (Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019).  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 The findings suggest that tensions are exacerbated when officials try to solve an immediate  
4 issue, not realising that the solution proposed will likely sacrifice or condition the long-term  
5 success of e-government initiatives. A related tension was found in focusing so much on the  
6 long-term implications of a legal e-government framework that decisions about what is needed  
7 during a crisis could be undermined. Tensions to work in accordance with a new and evolving  
8 legal framework using ICTs reveals that both paradoxes are interrelated (e.g. starting with  
9 general support, then progressing to the introduction of decrees, and later to a dedicated  
10 agency).

11  
12 Finally, the findings allow us to suggest a framework that can explain how  
13 government officials deal with tensions when introducing e-government policies (Figure 1).

14  
15 [insert Figure 1 here]

16  
17 The model posits that government-related, business-related, and external sources of  
18 tensions surface when a policy maker experiences plurality, change, and scarcity in order to  
19 meet requirements to introduce e-government initiatives during a crisis (Schad *et al.*, 2016).  
20 Figure 1 illustrates that the quality and type of interaction between policy makers and the public  
21 (e.g. entrepreneurs) can affect the way paradoxes are later handled. When introducing tools  
22 and services that facilitate existing tasks for government officials, then tensions are managed  
23 through the participation of the public by helping to co-create digital tools or services to pursue.  
24 Government officials can then manage tensions related to the development of technical  
25 departments. Such an approach then opens up a path for thinking about future requirements for  
26 the deployment of e-government policies and the ongoing development of a legal framework  
27 that can ensure policy continuity over time. Where tensions are unresolved and persist, the  
28 model speculates that policy makers with unfulfilled motivations or minimal political support  
29 will delay implementation, or allocate e-government projects to external parties. The model  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 suggests that introducing e-government policies will constantly involve tensions that will be  
4  
5 problematic to resolve (Bekkers and Homburg, 2007; Cherry, 2014).  
6

## 7. Conclusions

7  
8  
9  
10 The focus of this paper was to understand how government officials deal with tensions  
11  
12 around the introduction of e-government policies for entrepreneurs during the Covid-19  
13  
14 pandemic. The data and analysis showed that many of the decisions that government officials  
15  
16 make are attempts to deal with paradoxical tensions. Our study contributes theoretically and  
17  
18 empirically in two ways: First, it advances theoretical understanding on the source and  
19  
20 management of tensions experienced by government officials who needed to act urgently and  
21  
22 become innovative as a crisis unfolds. Second, our study delineated multiple paradoxes  
23  
24 experienced by government officials as new policies and systems were introduced. In  
25  
26 proposing a model related to such paradoxes, we have made a connection between the sources  
27  
28 of tensions and the way government officials approach and attempt to manage them. Summing  
29  
30 up our contributions, our study expands understanding around how several of the paradoxes  
31  
32 experienced relate to multiple and often contradicting reactions from government officials  
33  
34 associated to change towards a digital environment, and resources to develop digital tools  
35  
36 appear to be scarce.  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

### 7.1 Implications for policy makers

45  
46 A key interest for policy makers is how to make e-government initiatives succeed  
47  
48 during a crisis. Our findings suggest that this is not straightforward. For policy makers engaged  
49  
50 in tackling paradoxes to implement e-government initiatives, we are offering a good, practical  
51  
52 model: what we see as the best explanation (Calder and Tybout, 2016; Grönlund, 2010) of how  
53  
54 government officials have handled tensions when introducing e-government policies in a  
55  
56 developing country during the Covid-19 pandemic (Figure 1). Our model should be of value to  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 researchers and government officials seeking to understand tensions in the introduction of e-  
4  
5 government policies and services and how they could be managed.  
6  
7

8 Our findings highlight that the use of digital tools can support the long-term impact of  
9  
10 policies to create public but also private value in tandem (Davison *et al.*, 2005). A crisis may  
11  
12 allow policy makers to argue for the importance of e-government and demonstrate its value,  
13  
14 yet this may create further paradoxes. Moreover, for government officials to manage  
15  
16 paradoxes, then policies must answer a clear and evident need from different stakeholders. E-  
17  
18 government initiatives may fail because an elected official starts the project and manages to  
19  
20 put it into action, yet, when succeeded by another official, the tools developed are ignored or a  
21  
22 new application has to be created (Dada, 2006). Thus, without a focus on changing culture  
23  
24 around e-government, such policies may generate diverse tensions.  
25  
26  
27

28 There would be obvious recurring tensions for governmental offices that lack an up-to-  
29  
30 date IT infrastructure, as restrictions in the development of tools to respond to several crises  
31  
32 over time may emerge. Whilst external ICT consultants may provide guidance in e-  
33  
34 government, they may not offer the same level of attention as a dedicated ICT department  
35  
36 within governmental agencies. Dedicated digital innovation teams may provide sustained  
37  
38 solutions to diverse services needed (Hadjielias *et al.*, 2021).  
39  
40  
41

42 Finally, policy makers should not underestimate the importance of government-citizen  
43  
44 interaction and the importance of careful planning. The introduction and development of digital  
45  
46 tools and services that address citizen demands for better interaction and the opportunity to  
47  
48 participate could help minimize tensions and support the continuity of e-government. Failure  
49  
50 to do so may result in the implementation of solutions that are seldom used or criticized and  
51  
52 the wasted of valuable public resources. When an e-government tool is forced onto the public  
53  
54 in times of crisis, then tensions may arise, as the process may lack both a co-constructed  
55  
56 approach (with entrepreneurs) and internal support. In addition to technical training, there is a  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 greater need for policy makers to connect policies with entrepreneurship education, which  
4 needs to be supported through e-government (Siegel and Guerrero, 2021).  
5  
6

## 7 8 *7.2 Limitations and future research* 9


10 This study is not without limitations, particularly in regard to the generalizability of the  
11 results and the method used. This study highlights that policy makers can become actors and  
12 protagonists in a study; they understand the meaning of what they think, feel, and do (Ellis *et*  
13 *al.*, 2011) in terms of their experiences and position as government officials (Anderson, 2006).  
14 We call for further studies that adopt (auto)ethnographic methods in the study of e-government  
15 and its approach to support entrepreneurs. Such studies can extend our understanding of e-  
16 government during the Covid-19 crisis and set new research directions. Video ethnography,  
17 such as event-based (e.g. e-government tool presentations) or participant-led videos and digital  
18 ethnography, may allow the capturing of digital interactions (e.g. Twitter, WhatsApp), which  
19 may help identify dominant and marginal voices in the public sector when introducing e-  
20 government policies (Van Burg *et al.*, 2022).  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34

35 As every country around the world has responded in a different way to the Covid-19  
36 crisis (Santos *et al.*, 2021), our findings suggest that context plays a more central role in theory  
37 development, based on paradoxes encountered (Johns, 2017). The contextualization of our  
38 findings in the Honduran e-government has allowed us to identify and appreciate the tensions  
39 experienced by policy makers in a developing country in Latin America, but also limits our  
40 findings to that specific context. In our study, e-government was legally and politically  
41 restricted to a thin range of public services for entrepreneurs. Regional developments (e.g. the  
42 Andean and Central American regions) demand further scrutiny (Pazmiño-Sarango *et al.*,  
43 2021). For example, we did not explore a cross-country e-government policy plan influenced  
44 by Covid-19. More scholarly work is needed to incorporate cultural variation, and thus we  
45 encourage researchers, particularly those from developing countries, to consider their personal  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 experiences as a point of departure in future studies (Hernandez *et al.*, 2017). Exploring  
4  
5 multiple research methods and contexts could expand our current research knowledge.  
6  
7

8 A paradox lens offers much promise to researchers looking to understand different  
9  
10 types of tensions in e-government (Schad *et al.*, 2016). It provides an alternative approach to  
11  
12 contrast perspectives that dominate e-government literature, offering a natural fit to study  
13  
14 tensions. The administration of e-government and the provision of public services in any  
15  
16 country is complex; many of the tensions experienced are, by their nature, a part of the  
17  
18 managerial function of government officials, yet such complexity may be amplified by a crisis.  
19  
20 How diverse paradoxes in the implementation of e-government are dealt with will shape the  
21  
22 evolution of public governance after the Covid-19 crisis, which merits further attention.  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Figure 1. A paradoxical perspective in e-government policy introduction to support entrepreneurs in a developing country



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

## References

- Adams, T.E., Jones, S.H. and Ellis, C. (2014), *Autoethnography*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.
- Alsaad, A. and Al-Okaily, M. (2021), “Acceptance of protection technology in a time of fear: the case of Covid-19 exposure detection apps”, *Information Technology & People*, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1108/ITP-10-2020-0719>.
- Alcaide–Muñoz, L., Rodríguez–Bolívar, M.P., Cobo, M.J. and Herrera–Viedma, E. (2017), “Analysing the scientific evolution of e-Government using a science mapping approach”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 545–555.
- Anderson, L. (2006), “Analytic Autoethnography”, *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 373–395.
- Anderson, L. and Glass-Coffin, B. (2013), “I learn by going”, in Holman Jones, S.L., Adams, T.E. and Ellis, C. (Eds.), *Handbook of Autoethnography*, Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 57–83.
- Arias, R.A.C. and Discua Cruz, A. (2018), “Rethinking artisan entrepreneurship in a small island: A tale of two chocolatiers in Roatan, Honduras”, *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research*, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 633–651.
- Arias, C.R., Serrano, J.E. and Garcia, J. (2014), “Evaluation of social public policy: Department of social development in Honduras”, *2014 First International Conference on EDemocracy & EGovernment (ICEDEG)*, presented at the 2014 First International Conference on eDemocracy & eGovernment (ICEDEG), IEEE, Quito, Ecuador, pp. 125–130.
- Ashiru, F., Adegbite, E., Nakpodia, F. and Koporcic, N. (2022), “Relational governance mechanisms as enablers of dynamic capabilities in Nigerian SMEs during the COVID-19 crisis”, *Industrial Marketing Management*, Vol. 105, pp. 18–32.
- Bannister, F. and Connolly, R. (2015), “The great theory hunt: Does e-government really have a problem?”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 1–11.
- Berends, H., van Burg, E. and van Raaij, E.M. (2010), “Contacts and Contracts: Cross-Level Network Dynamics in the Development of an Aircraft Material”, *Organization Science*, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 940–960.

- 1  
2  
3 Berends, H. and Deken, F. (2021), “Composing qualitative process research”, *Strategic Organization*,  
4  
5 Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 134–146.  
6  
7 Bekkers, V. and Homburg, V. (2007), “The Myths of E-Government: Looking Beyond the  
8  
9 Assumptions of a New and Better Government”, *The Information Society*, Routledge, Vol. 23  
10  
11 No. 5, pp. 373–382.  
12  
13 Bishop, D., Eury, J.L., Gioia, D., Trevino, L. and Kreiner, G.E. (2019), “In the Heart of a Storm:  
14  
15 Leveraging Personal Relevance Through ‘Inside-Out’ Research”, *Academy of Management*  
16  
17 *Perspectives*, Academy of Management, available at: <https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2018.0089>.  
18  
19 Boin, A., Brock, K., Craft, J., Halligan, J., Hart, P. 't, Roy, J., Tellier, G., et al. (2020), “Beyond  
20  
21 COVID-19: Five commentaries on expert knowledge, executive action, and accountability in  
22  
23 governance and public administration”, *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol. 63 No. 3, pp.  
24  
25 339–368.  
26  
27 Bourgoin, A., Bencherki, N. and Faraj, S. (2019), ““And Who Are You?": A Performative Perspective  
28  
29 on Authority in Organizations”, *Academy of Management Journal*, Academy of Management,  
30  
31 Vol. 63 No. 4, pp. 1134–1165.  
32  
33 Butz, D. and Besio, K. (2009), “Autoethnography”, *Geography Compass*, Vol. 3 No. 5, pp. 1660–  
34  
35 1674.  
36  
37 Calder, B.J. and Tybout, A.M. (2016), “What makes a good theory practical?”, *AMS Review*, Vol. 6  
38  
39 No. 3, pp. 116–124.  
40  
41  
42 Carter, L. and Weerakkody, V. (2008), “E-government adoption: A cultural comparison”, *Information*  
43  
44 *Systems Frontiers*, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 473–482.  
45  
46 Carter, L. and Bélanger, F. (2005), “The utilization of e-government services: citizen trust, innovation  
47  
48 and acceptance factors\*”, *Information Systems Journal*, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 5–25.  
49  
50  
51 Castelnovo, W. (2013), “A Stakeholder Based Approach to Public Value”, *European Conference on*  
52  
53 *E-Government*, Academic Conferences International Limited, Kidmore End, United  
54  
55 Kingdom, pp. 94–IX.  
56  
57 Chang, H. (2016), *Autoethnography as Method*, Routledge.  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Cherry, N. (2014), “Organisational paradoxes of local E-government”, *The Journal of Contemporary*  
4  
5 *Issues in Business and Government*, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 41–57.  
6  
7 Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. (2014), *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for*  
8  
9 *Developing Grounded Theory*, SAGE Publications.  
10  
11 Cordella, A. and Bonina, CM (2012), “A public value perspective for ICT enabled public sector  
12  
13 reforms: A theoretical reflection”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp.  
14  
15 512–520.  
16  
17 Dada, D. (2006), “The failure of E-government in developing countries: A literature review”, *The*  
18  
19 *Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries*, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 1–10.  
20  
21 Davison, R.M., Wagner, C. and Ma, LCK (2005), “From government to e-government: a transition  
22  
23 model”, *Information Technology & People*, Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 280–299.  
24  
25 Discua Cruz, A. (2020), “Rethinking entrepreneurship and family business research in Honduras: a  
26  
27 closer look in times of crisis”, *Innovare: Revista de Ciencia y Tecnología*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp.  
28  
29 28–38.  
30  
31 Donthu, N. and Gustafsson, A. (2020), “Effects of COVID-19 on business and research”, *Journal of*  
32  
33 *Business Research*, Vol. 117, pp. 284–289.  
34  
35 “e-Government”. (2015), World Bank, available at:  
36  
37 <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment/brief/e-government> (accessed 9  
38  
39 March 2021).  
40  
41  
42  
43 Ellis, C., Adams, T.E. and Bochner, A.P. (2011), “Autoethnography: An Overview”, *Historical Social*  
44  
45 *Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, Vol. 36 No. 4 (138), pp. 273–290.  
46  
47 Eriksson, P., Henttonen, E. and Meriläinen, S. (2008), “Managerial work and gender—Ethnography  
48  
49 of cooperative relationships in small software companies”, *Scandinavian Journal of*  
50  
51 *Management*, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 354–363.  
52  
53 Evered, R. and Louis, M.R. (1981), “Alternative Perspectives in the Organizational Sciences: ‘Inquiry  
54  
55 from the Inside’ and ‘Inquiry from the Outside’,” *Academy of Management Review*,  
56  
57 *Academy of Management*, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 385–395.  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Fernando, M., Reveley, J. and Learmonth, M. (2019), "Identity work by a non-white immigrant  
4 business scholar: Autoethnographic vignettes of covering and accenting", *Human Relations*,  
5 p. 0018726719831070.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Gabryelczyk, R. (2020), "Has COVID-19 Accelerated Digital Transformation? Initial Lessons  
11 Learned for Public Administrations", *Information Systems Management*, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp.  
12 303–309.  
13  
14  
15  
16 Giorgio, G. (2013), "Reflections through writing through memory in autoethnography", in Holman  
17 Jones, S.L., Adams, T.E. and Ellis, C. (Eds.), *Handbook of Autoethnography*, Routledge, New  
18 York, NY, pp. 406–424.  
19  
20  
21  
22 Grönlund, Å. (2010), "Ten Years of E-Government: The 'End of History' and New Beginning", in  
23 Wimmer, M.A., Chappelet, J.-L., Janssen, M. and Scholl, H.J. (Eds.), *Electronic Government*,  
24 Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 13–24.  
25  
26  
27  
28 Grönlund, Å. and Horan, T.A. (2005), "Introducing e-Gov: History, Definitions, and Issues",  
29 *Communications of the Association for Information Systems*, Vol. 15, available  
30 at:<https://doi.org/10.17705/1CAIS.01539>.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35 Guzmán-Alfonso, C. and Guzmán-Cuevas, J. (2012), "Entrepreneurial intention models as applied to  
36 Latin America", *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 721–  
37 735.  
38  
39  
40  
41 Hadjielias, E., (Lola) Dada, O., Discua Cruz, A., Zekas, S., Christofi, M. and Sakka, G. (2021), "How  
42 do digital innovation teams function? Understanding the team cognition-process nexus within  
43 the context of digital transformation", *Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 122, pp. 373–386.  
44  
45  
46  
47 Hahn, T., Preuss, L., Pinkse, J. and Figge, F. (2014), "Cognitive Frames in Corporate Sustainability:  
48 Managerial Sensemaking with Paradoxical and Business Case Frames", *Academy of  
49 Management Review*, Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 463–487.  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54 Heeks, R. (2003), "Most eGovernment-for-Development Projects Fail: How Can Risks be Reduced?",  
55 *SSRN Electronic Journal*, available at:<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540052>.  
56  
57  
58  
59 Heeks, R. (2006), *Implementing and Managing E-government an International Text*, SAGE, London.  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Heeks, R. and Bailur, S. (2007), “Analyzing e-government research: Perspectives, philosophies,  
4 theories, methods, and practice”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 243–  
5 265.  
6  
7  
8  
9 Hernandez, K. A. C., Chang, H., & Ngunjiri, F. W. (2017), “Collaborative autoethnography as  
10 multivocal, relational, and democratic research: Opportunities, challenges, and aspirations”,  
11 *a/b: Auto/Biography Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 251-254.  
12  
13  
14  
15 Hochstetter, J., Díaz, J., Diéguez, M., Espinosa, R., Arango-López, J. and Cares, C. (2022),  
16 “Assessing Transparency in eGovernment Electronic Processes”, *IEEE Access*, presented at  
17 the IEEE Access, Vol. 10, pp. 3074–3087.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22 Holman Jones, S.L., Adams, T.E. and Ellis, C. (Eds.). (2013), *Handbook of Autoethnography*,  
23 Routledge, New York, NY.  
24  
25  
26 Horák, J., Bokšová, J. and Bokša, M. (2021), “Implementation of eGovernment from the Perspective  
27 of Public Administration”, *International Advances in Economic Research*, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp.  
28 87–89.  
29  
30  
31  
32 Ibáñez, M.J., Guerrero, M., Yáñez-Valdés, C. and Barros-Celume, S. (2021), “Digital social  
33 entrepreneurship: the N-Helix response to stakeholders’ COVID-19 needs”, *The Journal of*  
34 *Technology Transfer*, available at:<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-021-09855-4>.  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39 INE (2021). Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Honduras <https://www.ine.gob.hn>  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Lambrinouidakis, C., Gritzalis, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G. (2003), “Security requirements for e-  
4 government services: a methodological approach for developing a common PKI-based  
5 security policy”, *Computer Communications*, Vol. 26 No. 16, pp. 1873–1883.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Lapadat, J. C. (2017), “Ethics in autoethnography and collaborative autoethnography”. *Qualitative*  
11 *Inquiry*, Vol. 23 No. 8, pp. 589-603.  
12  
13  
14 Lindgren, I., Madsen, C.Ø., Hofmann, S. and Melin, U. (2019), “Close encounters of the digital kind:  
15 A research agenda for the digitalization of public services”, *Government Information*  
16 *Quarterly*, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 427–436.  
17  
18  
19  
20 Lewis, M.W. (2000), “Exploring Paradox: Toward a More Comprehensive Guide”, *Academy of*  
21 *Management Review*, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 760–776.  
22  
23  
24 Luciano, E.M. (2020), “Information management hits and misses in the COVID19 emergency in  
25 Brazil”, *International Journal of Information Management*, Vol. 55, p. 102194.  
26  
27  
28  
29 Malodia, S., Dhir, A., Mishra, M. and Bhatti, Z.A. (2021), “Future of e-Government: An integrated  
30 conceptual framework”, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, Vol. 173, p. 121102.  
31  
32  
33 Margolis, J.D. and Walsh, J.P. (2003), “Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by  
34 Business”, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 268–305.  
35  
36  
37 Mazzoni Pizzati, N., Arias, C. and Discua Cruz, A. (2018), “Popa Group: The International Presence  
38 of an Information Technology Family Business in Central America”, in Müller, C., Botero, I.,  
39 Discua Cruz, A. and Subramanian, R. (Eds.), *Family Firms in Latin America*, Routledge.  
40  
41  
42  
43 Melin, U. and Wihlborg, E. (2018), “Balanced and integrated e-government implementation –  
44 exploring the crossroad of public policy-making and information systems project  
45 management processes”, *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy*, Emerald  
46 Publishing Limited, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 191–208.  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51 Minihan, J. (2001), “Electronic signature technologies: A tutorial”, *Information Management Journal*,  
52 Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 4–8.  
53  
54  
55  
56 Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M. and Saldana, J. (2013), *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods*  
57 *Sourcebook*, 3rd edition., SAGE Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, California.  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Millard, J., Warren, R., Leitner, C. and Shahin, J. (2006), *Towards the EGovernment Vision for the*  
4  
5 *EU in 2010: Research Policy Challenges*, Technical Report No. EUR 22635 EN, Institute for  
6  
7 Prospective Technological Studies, Luxembourg, available at: [ftp://s-](ftp://s-jrcsvqpx102p.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/eur22635en.pdf)  
8  
9 [jrcsvqpx102p.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/eur22635en.pdf](ftp://s-jrcsvqpx102p.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/eur22635en.pdf) (accessed 17 May 2022).  
10  
11 Moore, M.H. (2001), *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*, Harvard Univ.  
12  
13 Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
14  
15 Papadopoulos, T., Baltas, K.N. and Balta, ME (2020), “The use of digital technologies by small and  
16  
17 medium enterprises during COVID-19: Implications for theory and practice”, *International*  
18  
19 *Journal of Information Management*, Vol. 55, p. 102192.  
20  
21 Pazmiño-Sarango, M., Naranjo-Zolotov, M. and Cruz-Jesus, F. (2021), “Assessing the drivers of the  
22  
23 regional digital divide and their impact on eGovernment services: evidence from a South  
24  
25 American country”, *Information Technology & People*, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-  
26  
27 print, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1108/ITP-09-2020-0628>.  
28  
29 Porrua, M.A. (2013), “E-Government in Latin America: A Review of the Success in Colombia,  
30  
31 Uruguay, and Panama”, in Bilbao-Osorio, B., Dutta, S. and Lanvin, B. (Eds.), *The Global*  
32  
33 *Information Technology Report 2013: Growth and Jobs in a Hyperconnected World*, World  
34  
35 Economic Forum and INSEAD, pp. 127–136.  
36  
37 Ratten, V. (2020), “Coronavirus (covid-19) and entrepreneurship: changing life and work landscape”,  
38  
39 *Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship*, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 503–516.  
40  
41 Rambo, C. (2005), “Impressions of Grandmother: An Autoethnographic Portrait”, *Journal of*  
42  
43 *Contemporary Ethnography*, Vol. 34 No. 5, pp. 560–585.  
44  
45 Roy, R. and Uekusa, S. (2020), “Collaborative autoethnography: ‘self-reflection’ as a timely  
46  
47 alternative research approach during the global pandemic”, *Qualitative Research Journal*,  
48  
49 Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 383–392.  
50  
51 Sanabria, P., Pliscoff, C. and Gomes, R. (2014), “E-Government Practices in South American  
52  
53 Countries: Echoing a Global Trend or Really Improving Governance? The Experiences of  
54  
55 Colombia, Chile, and Brazil”, in Gascó-Hernández, M. (Ed.), *Open Government:*  
56  
57 *Opportunities and Challenges for Public Governance*, Springer, New York, NY, pp. 17–36.  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Santos, E., Oliveira, M., Ratten, V., Tavares, F.O. and Tavares, V.C. (2021), “A reflection on  
4 explanatory factors for COVID-19: A comparative study between countries”, *Thunderbird*  
5 *International Business Review*, Vol. 63 No. 3, pp. 285–301.  
6  
7  
8  
9 Savoldelli, A., Codagnone, C. and Misuraca, G. (2014), “Understanding the e-government paradox:  
10 Learning from literature and practice on barriers to adoption”, *Government Information*  
11 *Quarterly*, Vol. 31, pp. S63–S71.  
12  
13  
14  
15 Schad, J., Lewis, M.W., Raisch, S. and Smith, W.K. (2016), “Paradox Research in Management  
16 Science: Looking Back to Move Forward”, *The Academy of Management Annals*, Vol. 10 No.  
17 1, pp. 5–64.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22 Siegel, D.S. and Guerrero, M. (2021), “The Impact of quarantines, lockdowns, and ‘reopenings’ on  
23 the commercialization of science: Micro and Macro Issues”, *Journal of Management Studies*,  
24 Vol. 58 No. 5, pp. 1389–1394.  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29 Smith, W.K. and Lewis, M.W. (2011), “Toward a theory of paradox: a dynamic equilibrium model of  
30 organizing”, *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 381–403.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 Spry, T. (2001), “Performing Autoethnography: An Embodied Methodological Praxis”, *Qualitative*  
37 *Inquiry*, Vol. 7 No. 6, pp. 706–732.  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60
- Stefanovic, D., Marjanovic, U., Delić, M., Culibrk, D. and Lalic, B. (2016), “Assessing the success of  
e-government systems: An employee perspective”, *Information & Management*, Vol. 53 No.  
6, pp. 717–726.
- Tremblay, S., Castiglione, S., Audet, L. A., Desmarais, M., Horace, M., & Peláez, S. (2021),  
“Conducting qualitative research to respond to COVID-19 challenges: Reflections for the  
present and beyond”, *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, Vol. 20,  
16094069211009679.
- Twizeyimana, J.D. and Andersson, A. (2019), “The public value of E-Government – A literature  
review”, *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 167–178.
- van Burg, E., Cornelissen, J., Stam, W. and Jack, S. (2022), “Advancing qualitative entrepreneurship  
research: Leveraging methodological plurality for achieving scholarly impact”,  
*Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 3-20.

- 1  
2  
3 Wastell, D., White, S. and Broadhurst, K. (2009), “The chiasmus of design: Paradoxical outcomes in  
4  
5 the e-government reform of UK children’s services”, in Dhillon, G., Stahl, B.C. and  
6  
7 Baskerville, R. (Eds.), *Information Systems – Creativity and Innovation in Small and*  
8  
9 *Medium-Sized Enterprises*, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 257–272.  
10  
11 Yıldız, M. and Saylam, A. (2013), “E-government discourses: An inductive analysis”, *Government*  
12  
13 *Information Quarterly*, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 141–153.  
14  
15 Zilber, T.B. and Zanoni, P. (2020), “Templates of ethnographic writing in organization studies:  
16  
17 Beyond the hegemony of the detective story”, *Organizational Research Methods*, p.  
18  
19 1094428120944468.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Figure 1. A paradoxical perspective in e-government policy introduction to support entrepreneurs in a developing country




Figure 1: A paradoxical perspective in e-government policy introduction to support entrepreneurs in a developing country

341x189mm (96 x 96 DPI)