Plato's *Republic* and Gray's Value-Pluralism: A False Dichotomy?

By Elliott Johnson[1]

Abstract

One of the most strident dichotomies in political thought is that between Platonic ethical monism and Grayan value-pluralism. The former seems to claim that only one way of life can ever be good, while the latter argues that there are many forms through which one can flourish. I argue, however, that this simplistic account fails fully to account for the nuances within both schemas. I engage philosophically with the two key works of Plato and Gray: the *Republic*[2] and *Two Faces of Liberalism*. After outlining the philosophical background of the conflict between monism and pluralism in Plato and Gray, I identify aspects of the *Republic* which are commonly held to be archetypes of ethical monism, namely the 'Good', the *Kallipolis* and the rule of the philosopher, and attempt to demonstrate their compatibility with the apparently pluralistic aspects of *Two Faces of Liberalism*. The argument I develop suggests that, fundamentally, aspects of value-pluralism remain prominent within Plato, and aspects of ethical monism remain prominent within Gray. I suggest that it is difficult and, perhaps, unhelpful to maintain the dichotomy, and propose instead that we regard the two theories as part of a single philosophical continuum between monism and pluralism.

Introduction

The identification of the good as a Form[3] by Plato in the *Republic*[4] appears to necessitate ethical monism. That is, the Good is singular and homogeneous in nature, at least in its true state. A seemingly natural inference from this is that there can be only one way to live a genuinely 'good' life - one which participates[5] in the Form of the Good. John Gray, on the other hand, grounds his philosophy in value-pluralism. This amounts to the belief that

> There are many forms of life in which humans can thrive. Among these there are some whose worth cannot be compared… The most fundamental value-pluralist claim is that there are many conflicting kinds of human flourishing, some of which cannot be compared in value. Among the many kinds of good lives that humans can live there are some that are neither better nor worse than one another, nor the same in worth, but incommensurably – that is to say,

---

[1] School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK.

[2] When referring to the *Republic*, I use the Grube/Reeve (1997) translation. For references to all other dialogues, I also use those in Cooper, ed. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works*.

[3] For a discussion of the nature of Forms, or 'Ideas', and the Form of the Good in the *Republic*, see the section entitled 'The Platonic Good and Grayan Flourishing'. Also see Penner (2006, 234-262) for a general introduction to Platonic Forms. A more specific discussion of the Good is included in (Irwin 1977, 224-226). For an analysis of the theory in all of Plato's dialogues see Moravcsik (1992, 55-92) and Melling (1987, 96-124).

[4] *Republic* (VI: 505a, 508d-e).

[5] I will discuss Plato's system of 'participation' (μέθεξις) and its impact on Platonic pluralism in sub-section titled 'Participation', but for a general discussion see Moravcsik (1992, 71-74, 130-167).

differently – valuable. Even so, there may be good reasons for preferring some incommensurable goods over others (Gray 2000, 5-6).

He argues that there is no one outstanding value which promotes the greatest level of 'flourishing'[6] amongst all humans in all circumstances. Each individual, or, more usually, group may hold different values; for example, honour, friendship and honesty. However, experience appears to demonstrate that, despite following differing values, these groups can still 'flourish', even if that is achieved in seemingly distinct ways. Therefore, no value can be said abstractly to be the most effective in achieving flourishing in every circumstance or situation. If individuals accept what Gray terms the 'truth of pluralism' there need be no conflict between these peoples. As Gray puts it: 'Where such ways of life are rivals, there is no one of them that is best. People who belong to different ways of life need have no disagreement. They may simply be different' (Gray 2000, 5).

The mere suggestion that Gray and Plato, with such apparently disparate positions on the nature of the good and just, could share some common ground seems, prima facie, unlikely. Indeed, Gray[7] (2000, 4) views value-pluralism as a critique of Platonic monism, claiming that:

> Ancient pluralism found few echoes in Greek philosophy. The founders of European ethical theory were monists. Neither Plato nor Aristotle was in any doubt that one way of life was best for humankind. Whether the good for humans was finally one, as Plato imagined, or many, as Aristotle was sometimes ready to admit, the best kind of life was the same for everyone – even though they never doubted that it could be lived fully only by a few leisured Greek males. In this classical view, conflicting judgements about the human good are symptoms of error. For the founders of European ethical theory, as for the Christians who came after them, conflicts of value were signs of imperfection, not a normal part of ethical life.

This notion is apparently confirmed by the 'other perspective' of Plato, in the *Republic*, with his indisputably high opinion of philosophers:

> Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. (*Rep*. V: 473c-d)

However, in this paper I argue that the society which Plato creates for his utopian city, the *Kallipolis*, is not monistic. I base this view on the fact that not everyone in the polis is a philosopher as not all have the innate ability to philosophise

---

[6] For a discussion of 'flourishing' in Gray see the section entitled 'The Platonic Good and Grayan Flourishing'.

[7] The progenitor of value-pluralism, Isaiah Berlin (1969, 167-172), is similarly dismissive of Plato, claiming that he rejected the idea that groups with different values could co-exist.

and, therefore, rule. In reality, Plato appears perfectly willing to accept Gray's (2000, 6) 'fact of pluralism'. In his utopia, he outlines three classes: the money-making artisans; the spirited auxiliary guardians; and the rational philosopher guardians (*Rep.* IV: 434c). This is roughly a *macrocosmos* to his *microcosmos* of the ideal soul, which is constituted by the appetitive, the spirited and the rational parts. Similarly, I argue that Gray cannot logically hope to present himself as a pure pluralist, so long as he is willing to use such terms as 'flourishing' in the way he does.

With these challenges to the traditional perspectives of both thinkers in mind, I wish to examine Plato's pluralistic tendencies; to demonstrate the manner in which these are encapsulated in the *Kallipolis*; and to show how this ideal system can be perceived as an example of Grayan *modus vivendi*; that is, a system in which individuals or groups with different and sometimes conflicting values, can co-exist. This will also necessitate an examination of Gray, investigating whether he can claim that there is no meta-value of good, if indeed he does so. I shall accomplish the investigation in three ways. Firstly, I will examine the nature of the Good for both Plato and Gray. This will develop into a discussion of the system of interaction between immaterial Forms, and their corresponding material objects; as Plato terms it, 'participation'. Secondly, I will investigate the heterogeneous four virtues of the soul, the way that all are said to contribute to the good, and how they correspond to the city. Finally, I will expound the plurality of the *Kallipolis*, and show, with reference to 'justice', how this system can be utilised as an example of *modus vivendi*. This will be put into context through a discussion of the degenerate forms of government discussed by Plato, in books eight and nine, and why they simply cannot be justified, sustained or regarded as 'good'. Before this, however, I need to make several qualifications.

Firstly, I do not intend to argue that Plato and Gray belong to the same ethical lineage. They are genealogically distinct, as Gray himself emphasises (2000, 4). I simply wish to demonstrate that there are aspects in each schema which are compatible and can be discussed in similar terms. There are also possibilities for both to inform – particularly normative – aspects of the other. Secondly, I focus primarily on Gray as an exemplar of a more 'comprehensive' value-pluralism. While I use 'value-pluralist/m' to refer to Gray's schema, many of the points I make are applicable to the genre of value-pluralism found in such thinkers as Berlin, Raz and Crowder. There are points at which I refer to these other thinkers where Gray is silent on aspects of Plato's theory. I hope that this leads to an opening up, and development of, not only Plato's thought but also that of Gray and other pluralists. Part of the reason for this focus is that I do not wish my analysis to follow the same line of reasoning as that of the likes of Griswold (1999), [8] who attempts to demonstrate not only that Plato saw pluralism as beneficial but also that he propagated liberalism and democracy, apparently implicitly, as the systems best equipped to deal with perfectionism.

---

[8] Similar arguments, though generally more focused on Socrates' dialectical style, are outlined by Smith (2000). Wallach (2001) provides arguments which can be used against both Griswold and Smith.

I agree with Griswold (1999, 105) that much of Plato's schema can be described, 'following Rawls', as 'perfectionism', and indeed this will form the basis for much of my argument; value-pluralism being fundamentally perfectionist. As Griswold (1999, 105) argues, perfectionism, as described by Rawls, is '…a teleological theory, namely, one in which the realization of human excellence is taken as the good'. Here, it is Plato's conflation of the good and the just which determines his perfectionism. He regards justice as the apparent aim of all humans, being a prerequisite for actualising the Good, and the soul's natural state (Vlastos 1978, 66-95). Indeed, there are arguments that Plato considers justice to be not simply a prerequisite of actualising good, but also good in itself.[9] Despite this, I choose Gray as a pluralist who, almost uniquely, believes liberalism to be only one form of *modus vivendi* appropriate only to certain circumstances. Griswold believes that the kind of schema and societal structure proposed by Plato, typified by the *Kallipolis*, are 'objectionable propositions' (Griswold 1999, 109) and that it is impossible to argue that he could have thought that 'a totalitarian, soul-crushing political regime did justice to the human condition' (1999, 109). He seems to think that it is as unjust for the philosophers to be forced to rule, as it would be for the other classes. He also cannot believe that Plato would promote a city in which the majority were not balanced enough to rule themselves and were intrinsically unjust. He openly describes the polis as 'inegalitarian and illiberal' (1999, 115). Griswold's replacement theory hinges on the idea that the *Kallipolis* was never intended by Plato to be a real world system, that the decline of the systems, starting in Book VIII (*Rep*. VIII-X), demonstrates that the *Kallipolis* is unsustainable, and that it was only ever intended to be a 'polis-in-speech' (Griswold 1999, 114). He claims that the 'first best regime is unavailable' (1999, 115) and that the '*second* best regime' could not possibly imitate the 'unobtainable ideal' (1999, 116). Liberalism and democracy, he argues, provide the best possible alternative, citing a Socratic quotation (Griswold 1999, 116) that claims

> Because it contains all kinds of constitutions on account of the license it gives its citizens... it looks as though anyone who wants to put a city in order, as we were doing, should probably go to a democracy. (*Rep*. VIII: 557d)

The allowance for the philosopher to rule, instead of being ruled, and to philosophise even outside of government is argued by Griswold to be a reason to look at liberal democracy as a viable starting point for a *Kallipolis*. While I agree with his conclusion of Platonic perfectionism, and that the self-interest of self-perfection is also conducive to community perfection, I find his argument that Plato sees self rule as the only way to achieve this open to great criticism, some of which I will elucidate in the paper. His flagrant disregard of the *Kallipolis* on the grounds that it could never be fully actualised is similarly problematic, as it is, nevertheless, an embodiment of Plato's ethics.

With these qualifications in mind, I shall now discuss the nature of the 'Good' for both Plato and Gray.

---

[9] See Mabbott (1978, 61-62).

The Platonic 'Good' and Grayan 'Flourishing'

For Plato, unlike many modern philosophers, the Good is an objective, almost tangible 'thing' - a Form. We, or at least Socrates, can therefore make some inferences about its nature. The Forms, for Plato, are not part of our 'sensible world'. Instead they exist in a higher, more 'real' 'intelligible world', perceptible only through dialectic and pure intellection. They are homogeneous, atemporal paradigms or universals.[10] Plato discusses the Forms in the *Phaedo*,[11] a middle dialogue, and *Parmenides*[12], a late dialogue, in which he apparently admits only Forms of mathematical, aesthetic and ethical qualities. However, in the *Republic* (X: 596a-597d), he takes the leap of allowing for all objects and ideas to have a generic, immaterial Form, providing the example of tables and beds. Forms are discussed and described in several dialogues, including those mentioned, in often disparate and even conflicting ways. This has led to a great deal of controversy about which schema Plato really intended. For my purposes, I shall focus on the account in the *Republic*, as this relates most directly to my current concerns.

While the Good is a Form, or at least Form-like, it is separate from the rest, and 'higher' in some way. Its relationship to the other Forms seems almost causal. In the *Republic*, before the allegory of the cave, he uses the Sun[13] as an analogy for the Good. While it is perceptible only to the most perfect philosopher like the rest of the Forms, it seems to exist above them as well. The objects outside the cave represent the 'lesser Forms', while the Sun, that is the Good, causes both their being known and their existence. As Socrates puts it, just as the Sun creates life and allows it to be seen,

> you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge [the Forms] owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power (*Rep.* 509b).

However, while the Form of the Good exists separately from the rest, its characteristics can similarly be perceived within the sensible world, even if that is, instrumentally, as a result of other Forms.

For Gray, ethically, an objective good exists, though perhaps not in such a distinct form. While groups may pursue differing, and perhaps conflicting, values, he still appears to regard 'flourishing' almost as a measuring stick for lives (Gray 2000, 21). If there is no meta-value of 'good' or 'flourishing', there can be no discussion of a particular life as being 'good' or producing 'flourishing'. I contend that there is reason to believe that Gray's schema requires simply that one follow a value which leads one to flourish. Which value this turns out to be depends on environment and circumstance.

---

[10] Whether the Forms are universals or paradigms has proved a great source of controversy with many implications, and I discuss this, briefly, later.

[11] *Phaedo* (74a-75d, 100c-101c).

[12] A description of, together with arguments for and against, participation is present throughout the *Parmenides*.

[13] *Republic* (VI: 507b-509c); (VII: 514a-520a, 532a-532d).

The condition of flourishing is employed vaguely and without explicit definition. In certain places it is granted a functional value, as with 'justice'[14] for Plato. However, in others, it is used to denote success or a psychological condition akin to that of utility. It is often difficult to elicit how Gray understands his claim that different societies are 'flourishing' or 'thriving' (Gray 2000, 21). The most logical possibility is that he equates this to the pertinence of chosen values to 'circumstance',[15] and the individual's/group's subsequent success in their application. In certain cases we may be able to comprehend our circumstances and make informed choices as to which values to adopt. We may, in the case of a conflict between justice and friendship in a relationship, be able to decide upon a course of action which we hope will maximise the good and minimise the bad (Gray 2000, 36). In this way, our judgments on the values we adopt and those we reject are 'practical, not logical' (Gray 2000, 54) nor 'arbitrary'. 'Our histories and circumstances, our needs and goals, may give good reasons for different choices' (Gray 2000, 36). Elsewhere, Gray's explanation of this is generally implicit and, as such, is difficult to pin down. While a 'good' life can seemingly be achieved through adopting values pertinent to circumstance, Gray also cites another form of choice.

In cases where reference to circumstance, whether environmental, cultural or social, is difficult, perhaps with competing pulls, we may be led to 'radical choice'. By this Gray means that we 'choose the kind of life we mean to have' (Gray 2000, 65) though not necessarily the one we will have in reality. Gray associates this second form of choice with modern, pluralist societies, where the competing and contradictory demands of life, and unpredictable contingencies of choice, make initial, practical decisions impractical. These decisions concern both the selection of values and the application of values. That is, individuals will, on occasion, be unable to decide whether to pursue justice or friendship without reference to some arbitrary, subjective prejudice. On other occasions, individuals will be unable to know which action will maximise their chosen value or even recognise that their interest lies in the good of flourishing. In all such cases, choice is bereft of reason or rationality. It is instinctive. Often, radical choice may simply be a point of entry into an unknown circumstance. It is assumed that when knowledge of the circumstance increases, so too does the possibility of practical reason. If our instinctive 'radical' choices do not produce optimal flourishing within a circumstance, we have reason to alter our original choices and adopt different values (Gray 2000, 59-60).

While Plato and Gray may disagree about whether the good can meaningfully be discussed separately from its 'existence' in the 'sensible world', both seem to agree that there is an objective measure by which to evaluate lives. The Good being a Form for Plato, however, necessitates an explanation for how 'goodness' exists within the sensible world. This is 'participation'.

Participation

---

[14] See the section on Platonic justice under the subheading 'virtues'.
[15] Jones refers to this as 'contingencies of time and place' (2006, 198).

The system of 'participation'[16] explains the relationship between material objects and their characteristics and corresponding immaterial Forms. That is, the method by which material things from the 'sensible world' can interact with their archetypes, or universals in the 'intelligible world'.

The system enables the Forms, which are indivisible, immaterial, and above all, singular, to appear in a multiplicity of concepts and material objects, as is clearly necessary in order to explain plurality in the material world. The *Parmenides* contains the most detailed metaphysical examination of participation, and the Forms as a whole, while also casting the most doubt over the theory. Without entering into a detailed discussion of participation, it is sufficient to say that Plato wishes to claim that the Forms can retain their unity, as universals or paradigms, while also explaining their presence in the pluralistic sensible world. He argues that objects show characteristics of Forms by partaking in them, without actually taking some of their essence or the Form existing directly within the object. In the *Republic*, the analogy of the Sun suggests that the Good almost reflects itself and the shadow of the other Forms onto, and into, the sensible world. This highlights the possibility that many things in the material world can participate in one Form. Indeed the system itself requires that no one thing has a monopoly over access to the Forms. The Forms cannot exist directly within an object, as they then cease to be Form-like; that is, indivisible, atemporal, homogeneous and immaterial. This allows for many sensible things to exist which display the same Form characteristics. In the *Symposium*, one theory which emerges from Socrates' discussion with Diotima of Mantinea (201d-212c) is that in order for one to access the generic Form of Beauty, one must perceive them in many material objects, in a quasi-inductive process. There is no explicit reason for 'Good', which is, in fact, usually associated with the Form of Beauty, or 'Value', to be exempt from this. Indeed, even if it were to be argued in monistic style that only the philosopher lives a truly good life, this still could not account for the plurality of good lived by the plurality of philosophers.

This can be expanded onto an even larger scale. The archetypal Forms in themselves, as separate entities, may be singular. However, it necessarily follows that a plurality of Forms exists in order to explain the different aesthetic and ethical qualities present in the sensible world and even within the intelligible world itself. There may only be one Form of the Good but, as Socrates acknowledges, since it is necessarily the case and an integral part of his schema, there are also Forms of Beauty, Large, Tall (*Phaedo* 102e) Unique, Plurality/Multitude (*Parm.* 129b-e) and so on. Indeed the system of participation is specifically designed to cope with the apparent co-existence within material objects of differing Form characteristics. The Form of Plurality may even be said to hold a vital role in this system.

As I have mentioned, I do not intend to defend the merits, or investigate the vagaries of the system of participation. It is only necessary for my argument that Plato believed in a system through which some form of plurality in values is accounted for and accepted. However, there is one area of controversy which needs to be discussed. There has been a long running debate about whether the Forms describe universals, as

---

[16] For a general discussion of Platonic participation see Moravcsik (1992, 71-74, 129-167).

seems to have been intended originally by Socratic 'Ideas', or whether they are paradigms. If they are universals, then participation necessarily entails that the Form characteristics present in the sensible world are identical, in practice, to those of the Forms themselves. For example, if there are many men all participating in the Form of Man, it is difficult to believe that Plato could argue that they didn't all partake equally. In contrast, if the Forms are paradigms, then the system would admit of degree. For example, one could display a characteristic of 'quite tall', while the Form displays simply a perfect Tallness. In relation to the current discussion, if the Forms are regarded as universals then the classes, if properly ordered and partaking in the Good, would display an equal amount of that Good. However, if they are paradigms, with the sensible goodness subject to gradation, then this allows for the classes to be evaluated.

While not providing positive argument for value-pluralist tendencies in the *Republic*, the system of participation does not prohibit plurality. Indeed, it may necessitate it, even within a system which proposes the presence of the objective Good. If he hopes to retain logical credibility, Gray need have no quarrel with the concept of a singular Good.

Value-pluralism is not a form of relativism. As far as Gray is concerned, 'ultimate human values' are not relative or subjective. Rather, they are 'objective but irreducibly diverse' (Gray 1995b, 1) and are the grounding for human life. As Jones (2006, 190) states, value-pluralism is a philosophical model 'rooted in objective human needs and interests' with flourishing as their ultimate desire or appetite. There are certain similarities between this perfectionist aspect of value-pluralism and Millian utilitarianism.[17] Indeed, Gray sees the revision of happiness into flourishing as the logical consequence of the 'potential infinity' of good lives engendered by different values which may, or may not, promote or acknowledge happiness:

> Common experience and the evidences of history show human beings thriving in forms of life that are very different from one another. None can reasonably claim to embody the flourishing that is uniquely human. If there is anything distinctive about the human species, it is that it can thrive in a variety of ways. (Gray 2000, 21)

Gray's theory cannot stand without a concept of a meta-value of good or 'flourishing'. Without this concept, the 'truth', or 'fact', of pluralism would simply disappear. The only method by which Gray can perceive that many societies flourish in many different ways is to evaluate them in terms of this meta-value. This meta-value, however, can be incorporated into life in a number of different ways through dedication to a number of different values. Gray believes that we must accept that the best we can hope for is a good life which seeks to minimise evil and maximise good pragmatically. This requires that we live by values that compliment, rather than

---

[17] It has sometimes been argued that Plato has Utilitarian tendencies (Mabbott 1978, 57-65). Despite received opinion claiming the *Republic* to be eudaimonistic, the reliance on happiness that this necessitates is, in my opinion, too contentious. In the *Kallipolis*, even the philosopher kings are said to require persuasion or even coercion in order to perform their duty (519c-e).

confront, environmental circumstance. The values remain incommensurable, but the goods and level of flourishing they produce differ according to circumstance. Therefore, so long as the frame of reference is identical, it is possible to rank lives against each other according to the pertinence of the values and the level to which they are actualised (Gray 2000, 42).

To illustrate this, Gray (1996, 154) cites the example of 'Asian immigrants in Western liberal cultures, many of whom have done better than their host populations by any standard apart from that which invokes peculiarly Western ideals of autonomy and individuality'. Their values have, in this particular circumstance, led to greater flourishing than the liberal values of Westerners which may have precluded the acquisition of more valuable goods from other sources and engendered evils alien to the migrants. Therefore, while the values involved are incommensurable, the lives are not; one gleans a greater amount of the good from its set of values than the other. However, the values which are pertinent to one environment may be completely alien to, and injurious in, another. Hence, 'It is easy to understand that polygamy might be right and monogamy wrong in the societies from which the Old Testament comes, while monogamy could be right and polygamy wrong in modern times' (Gray 2000, 55-56).

Gray's examples of values are relatively vague. He could never provide a complete, concrete list, as, through experience of societal plurality, there seems to be an indefinite number of them. In Plato, if we were to equate these values to 'value-Forms', a similar outcome may result. Forms, at least in the *Republic*, may logically include all of those discussed by Gray. Friendship, obedience, respect, piety and efficiency all exist within our world, and therefore, at least in the *Republic*, must exist in the intelligible world. It is not these values which are evaluated as being good, bad or indifferent; it is their application in life. Indeed, Plato provides an example of this early in the dialogue. In the nascent stages of the attempt to define Justice, Socrates sums up Cephalus' suggested definition, inspired by Simonides, as 'speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred' (*Rep*. 331c). Socrates' challenge centres on the inherent conflict between certain values. He argues that

> Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn't return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind. (*Rep*. 331c)

What emerges most strikingly from this is not the challenge to this definition of acting justly, but, in fact, a 'value-pluralist' empirical observation. Here, just as in Gray's world, we find values, namely friendship, equity and truthfulness, all of which conflict. Friendship would usually require that one be equitable and truthful with one's friends. However, in the situation posited, circumstance requires that one cannot. Just as for Gray, the values are of incommensurable worth. Both produce goods in distinct circumstances, and it is circumstance which enables evaluation.

For Gray, when deciding which values produce the greatest good, most individuals are on an even playing field. For Plato, however, the philosopher rulers

find this to be an easier task. With their access to the world of the Forms, not only are they able to understand the Good, they also have the capacity to understand which values best suit their environment and, therefore, the way to live the best life according to their circumstance. This would leave other groups at a disadvantage, almost having to guess how to live their 'good' lives. In Gray's terms, the philosopher would always be able to make informed choices, while the other classes might generally have to rely on instinctive decision making with parallels to 'radical choice'. I do not believe that Plato would argue that these choices are necessarily bad, despite the absence of reason. Plato seems sufficiently consequentialist to regard the value of choices to be dependent upon the goods achieved by their implementation.[18] So long as the auxiliaries and money-makers ended up in their appropriate social positions, reason would have no independent value in their choices. However, reason would be of value in maximising the ends appropriate to each aspect of the soul. That is, reason would enable a philosopher to recognise that the value of honour would not be best served by leadership. Here, reason acts as a natural corrective to instinct in those unable to recognise the good.

A similar situation may exist for Gray. In his more culturally diverse world, some still have an advantage. If a Westerner were suddenly to find himself in the Papuan rainforest or the Kalahari Desert, it is likely that he would find it difficult to flourish or thrive as fully as the locals. Initially, at least, it is likely that his ignorance of circumstance would ensure that some decisions were grounded in instinct or prejudice. These radical choices would be bereft of reason. However, over time it is possible that he would have the capacity to develop knowledge of circumstance and be able to adopt new, pertinent, values to suit the new circumstances, perhaps sacrificing possible values of honesty and pacifism. Similarly, if Papuan tribesman or Kalahari Bushmen found themselves in the West, they would be unable to flourish without adaptation and would have to rely on radical choice to survive – whether or not they are able to recognise the good of flourishing. There are cases in which migrants' values are naturally suited to a new circumstance, as in the case of Asian immigrants to the West (Gray 1996, 154). However, contra Plato, this need not mean that they possess immanent faculties of reason above and beyond those of other humans. Rather, it suggests that a group of individuals with fundamentally similar (basic/biological) needs, and a fundamentally similar end (flourishing), have, in part by chance, inherited a series of values appropriate to a particular circumstance.

At first, such emphasis on contingency and radical choice seems to drive a wedge between Plato and Gray. Success in Gray can be bereft of reason whereas, in Plato, it is clear that the philosophers, with their well-ordered souls, encapsulate the best life. The philosophers, as I argued above, have the natural advantage of being able to experience the Forms. They therefore have the 'best natures' (*Rep*. 431c) because they are best able, in their ideal state, to choose a life that produces good from their surroundings. They can therefore maximise their goods, minimise their 'bads' and, perhaps, have the potential to flourish most easily or fully. While Gray appears to reject arguments grounded in immanent differences, there are aspects of his

---

[18] I return to the implications of radical choice for the non-philosopher classes in the section on 'The Dialectical Forms of Government'.

work which suggest socially constructed individual differences in reason. For Gray, there is a sense in which some may be able to flourish more than others through knowledge of the truth of pluralism. In this, the value pluralist - for example Gray - could be equated to a philosopher ruler. Because he has knowledge of the 'truth of pluralism', he is less likely to seek conflict with those who have chosen a different life. While the source of this enlightenment is unclear, it is apparent that immanent differences are rejected. However, the consequence of the differences - immanent or derived - seems similar.

In order for *modus vivendi* to be effective, it may be necessary for value pluralists to demonstrate the truth, and value, of pluralism to those who might otherwise come into conflict. With clear parallels to the activity of the philosophers in the *Kalipolis*, Jones (2006, 96) asks:

> How then should the value-pluralist respond to the possibility that ways of life that he identifies as good may be ways of life that find one another unacceptable? His most obvious option, qua value-pluralist, is to disabuse the bearers of those ways of life of their objections to one another. In other words, his most obvious recourse is to lead them out of their caves and inform or remind them of what the world is really like. Once they are dragged into the external world of value pluralism, they will see that their condemnation of others' forms of life is misplaced. That will solve by dissolving the problem of toleration, or it will if people can be induced to take their corrected conceptions of the world with them when they return to their particular ways of life.

I attempt to give substance to the apparent parallel between the philosophers and the value pluralists in a study of the dialectical forms of government below. Here, however, I shall concentrate on the consequences of revelation.

Jones (2006, 96) highlights the problem that if one were to bring those in conflict to the truth, they might then find their life unliveable. Devout monotheists may find it difficult, if not impossible, to return to worship of a God who, if existent at all, is certainly only one of many. For Gray, these lives may be based on 'illusion'[19] (Jones 2006, 196), but can still contribute to flourishing. That is why Gray believes that the truth of pluralism may have to be hidden, with most believing their life, through self-delusion, to be better than another. As Jones (2006, 196) argues, for Gray, 'a world in which everyone was persuaded of value-pluralism might not be a better world.'[20]

For Plato, a similar problem arises. There is nothing in nature to guarantee that the money-makers and auxiliaries would instinctively follow the philosopher ruler. Indeed, it seems unlikely that they would without systemic, societal or cultural

---

[19] Gray claims that 'Humans cannot live without illusions' and that 'Illusion is our natural condition' (2003, 29, 81).
[20] See Gray (2000, 136-137).

intervention.[21] While Gray might deal with this through a split level view of the world (Jones 2006, 196), with the truth of pluralism acting as a subconscious to the conscious of their own morals, Plato posits a solution of almost reinventing a cultural history to which all would refer. This is the noble falsehood.[22] In this system, not only is each citizen exposed to the truth of pluralism, with a mythical reason not to pursue just the role of the philosopher, but all are also given the guidance they need in order to perform the task to which they are best suited.

Virtue

Metaphysically, the adoption of multiple value-Forms by individuals within Plato, as discussed above, is one way of equating his schema to Gray's. Another area discussed within the *Republic*, and one which allows another potential analogical discussion is that of virtue and its division.

The division of the Soul in the *Republic* and, subsequently, the *Kallipolis'* citizenry, is based on the sub-division of virtue.[23] Plato decides that there are four virtues in total: wisdom, moderation, courage and justice.[24] The first two correspond to the predominant characteristic of two of the classes: wisdom to that of the true guardian philosopher rulers and courage to the spirited guardian auxiliaries. Moderation, while distributed amongst the entire citizenry, seems to affect the money-making artisans most. The last virtue, justice, provides the greatest insight. He claims:

> So what kind of virtue is left, then, that makes the city share even further in virtue? Surely, it's clear that it is justice.… We stated, and often repeated… that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited.… It seems, then, that the power that consists in everyone's doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city… Meddling and exchange between these three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it… And wouldn't you say that the worst thing that someone could do to his city is injustice?... Then, that exchange and meddling is injustice. (*Rep*. IV: 432b-434c)

Justice, then, is necessarily dependent on a pluralistic system. Justice cannot exist as a concept without distinct characteristics to balance. The first three virtues are good values in some sense, in that together they contribute to the meta-value of the Good.[25] One may infer a hierarchy with wisdom at the top. However, this may only be as a result of wisdom being required by the ruling class.[26] Indeed, Plato claims simply that

---

[21] The degenerate forms of government (*Rep.* VIII-X) demonstrate this.

[22] *Republic* (II: 382a ff.); (III: 414d-415c).

[23] The process of virtue analysis takes place throughout Book IV. For more details on virtue in the *Republic* see Irwin (1977, 195-200).

[24] In *Protgaoras* (330b) he adds a fifth, namely, piety/holiness.

[25] See *Republic* (VI 504d-505e) and Irwin (1977, 224).

[26] As I stated earlier, the philosopher king is seemingly in no better position than the others to achieve happiness, as governance necessitates that he cannot satisfy his appetite for knowledge indefinitely (*Rep*. 519c-e).

the philosopher class is the only one that is fit to rule. He does not state that they would be a better soldier or, indeed, money-maker.[27] All of the virtues are necessary, and all perform incommensurable tasks, though perhaps some are more beneficial in the Platonic environment than others. Indeed, while the class which corresponds to wisdom, the philosopher, rules in the *Kallipolis*, it still has to be in balance with the rest. While the guardians would exert control over the others, this is simply because they are the only class which possesses knowledge of the truth and, therefore, the correct way to go about life. As I have previously argued, this may mean that the philosopher kings posses a more concrete knowledge of how to flourish using their value. The other classes, without the help of the philosophers, may have to resort to radical choice.

In his good *polis*, it seems perverse to say that those who cannot philosophise are simply bad. They perform necessary societal functions which, among other things, allow the philosopher kings to philosophise and rule. This is demonstrated by the very existence of a corresponding dominant part of the soul in each group. Plato does not claim that these lives or aspects of the soul are bad. Rather, the different groups are each living good lives because they are being just, if not in a psychological then at least a civil sense;[28] that is, abiding by what they are good at, and leaving those who are fit to, to philosophise. As Plato claims, 'we aren't all born alike… each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to another' (*Rep*. II: 370a). However, despite their necessity, Plato does clearly attempt at least some ranking of virtues. In terms of reason, one could argue that since virtues are used instrumentally to actualise the Good, it is much more likely that this will perform its function, having such a direct correlation to the meta-value. Similarly, for Gray, while such values as friendship and truth may often be incommensurable, one such as peace, which corresponds quite often to flourishing, may be given some primacy. Indeed, as Jones (2006, 191) states 'As a general position, value-pluralism admits of degree. We may recognise that values can be incongruent and incommensurable but hold that they exhibit these properties only rarely.' For Plato, although reason is so often best in terms of actualising the Good in the sensible world, something like honour may be required in order to force the philosophers to return to the cave instead of staying in the world of Forms, which seems perfectly rational in order to pursue their value, wisdom.

The pluralist interpretation of the virtues is given further credence by Plato's analysis of the soul in *Timaeus*. Here, he emphasises the necessity of the jobs that the other, 'less rational', parts of the soul perform. Johansen (2000, 105) argues that the description of the soul in the *Timaeus* differs from that in the *Republic* only in 'emphasis'. He claims that while the parts of the soul are analogous, if not identical, to those in the *Republic*, Plato is here attempting to demonstrate that instead of them 'having desires that contrast with the desire of reason for truth and wisdom [they] rather [have] desires which themselves serve a rational end'. The spirited part cooperates with reason, and carries out its orders, and the appetitive part has

---

[27] He does, however, claim that they can enjoy some of the satisfaction of the other parts of their soul, in a way that the other classes cannot enjoy knowledge (*Rep*. 582a-b).
[28] See Kamtekar (1998) for a thorough discussion of virtue in relation to the non-philosopher.

necessary desires so that the whole may live. Indeed, 'the appetitive part has a perception of rational commands which is mediated through the images projected by the intellect on to the liver.' The appetites for wisdom and for food 'are both rational desires in the sense that they are desires for our real good.' Similarly, he argues that

> the *Republic* by no means always presents the lower parts of the soul as being in conflict with the intellect. The argument to show that the individual will be happy only if all parts of the soul are harmonized under the rule of reason surely presupposes that the lower parts of the soul are fundamentally able to co-operate with ends that have been determined by reason (Johansen 2000, 105-106).

On this model, reason has to be in control, as in the just soul of the *Republic*. This, as I have explained, need not be a stark divergence from Gray. Reason is simply best suited to being in control. However, the soul is necessarily[29] embodied, at least for now, and therefore has to have desires that are necessary to keep the body alive. The less rational parts of the soul are therefore used as an intermediary with the body for this very purpose. Indeed, they absorb affections, desires and perceptions, and the resulting rectilinear motions, to allow the rational part to pursue reason less hindered and to retain 'divine' circular motions.

Up until this point, I have discussed Platonic theory in the *Republic* more as a way of demonstrating the pluralistic tendencies in Plato's metaphysical ethics. Now I shall discuss the value-pluralist application of the *Kallipolis* as a *modus vivendi*.

The 'Kallipolis' as a Grayan 'modus vivendi'

Gray would find great difficulty in accepting the notion of utopian city to suit all societies. This is especially true if, as in the *Kallipolis*, the ideal disregards local environmental circumstance and tradition.[30] Indeed, much of his argument focuses on criticism of the Western liberal belief that people of all cultures can coexist simply because of putatively intrinsic 'shared' values. Liberalism, and its values of autonomy, individuality and freedom, 'embody only one way of life among many', 'are in no sense underwritten by history and have no claim to embody the permanent interests of the species' (Gray 1996, 157, 158). Value-pluralists recognise that 'universal values are realised in a variety of different ways in different cultures' (Raz 1998, 204).

For Gray (1996, 158), the truth of this statement is demonstrated by the persistence of non-liberal orders against the teleological prophesies of Mill and Marx, and the efforts of liberal 'missionaries' to inculcate liberalism in pre-modern regions. Such Enlightenment activists are not merely wrong; they actually harm non-liberals by refusing to accept the plurality of good lives (Gray 1996, 154; 1997, 91-92). Moreover, they demonstrate that their attachment to liberal values is independent 'of their contribution to personal well-being and even – sometimes – in competition with

---

[29] See Johansen (2000) for his discussion of what is entailed by the term 'necessary' in this dialogue.
[30] Plato solves this by replacing old traditions with the noble falsehood.

it' (Gray 1996, 142). Gray argues that the error these individuals make, is to believe that some values are intrinsically more valuable than others when they are, in fact, 'incommensurable; that is, they are not comparable by any rational measure' (Gray 1995b, 1). They each contribute to good lives in different ways, and it is impossible to consider, for example, whether justice is intrinsically more valuable than friendship (Gray 2000, 42).

Despite this, there may be more value to elicit from the *polis*. Although Gray would argue that it cannot be prescribed to all societies, it may be one example of *modus vivendi*. That is, a method of co-existence for people who follow different, and sometimes conflicting, values. It is especially effective, as *modus vivendi*

> entail[s] a population's possessing and recognising common institutions through which they can negotiate compromises between their different values and interests. The more successfully these institutions provide for negotiation and compromise, the better the modus vivendi. (Jones 2006, 192)

In the *Kallipolis*, there are three different classes. During wartime, it could not be guaranteed that the money-making class would be provided with the necessary commodities and trading system in order to produce goods. These raw materials may be required by the auxiliaries for weapons or supplies. Indeed the money-makers may even be forced to abandon production of monetarily valuable goods in order to create the weapons required by the auxiliaries. Both classes are pursuing their goals based on their values, but neither may desire to help the other. In Plato's '*modus vivendi*', this is catered for. The acceptance of the noble falsehood by the populace should mean that all already understand the importance of cooperation. For the safety of the society, the money-makers may need temporarily to divert their efforts away from pursuing their own form of flourishing in order to aid another's, and that of the society as a whole. With rulers able to understand objectively what is better for the society (that is, the option which produces the most good while avoiding the most bad, i.e. the majority losing out on their flourishing) the system is able to continue, progress, and flourish. Similarly, Gray claims that:

> The aim of *modus vivendi* cannot be to still the conflict of values. It is to reconcile individuals and ways of life honouring conflicting values to a life in common. We do not need common values in order to live together in peace. We need common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist. (Gray 2000, 5-6).

Taken in this frame of reference, it is also possible to account for the received opinion of the philosopher rulers living the 'best' life. Gray's value-pluralism, as I have stated, can account for different levels of flourishing, so long as the frame of reference is identical, according to the pertinence of the values and the level to which they are actualised. For example, within the *Kallipolis*, the philosopher may sometimes perform the most important tasks, according to the environmental requirements. In this circumstance, he may be said to have flourished most fully. This may generally be the case within the *Kallipolis* and its necessary requirements. However, while Plato attempts to ensure that the philosophers always perform at their best, and are

intrinsically suited to doing so, it seems likely that there may occasionally be a 'bad' philosopher Indeed he even claims that a 'golden' individual can produce someone of 'silver' character. This seems to show, with Plato's focus on eugenics in mind, that even philosophers may have some imbalanced immanent characteristics that can be passed on. In this situation, the philosopher would somehow not be balanced, and perhaps even pursue the wrong values for his role. It seems perverse that Plato could call this 'unbalanced' philosopher better than a 'perfectly' balanced auxiliary.

For Gray, the *Kallipolis* could only ever be suited to a particular situation - perhaps the one envisaged by Plato in Classical Greece. However, there are value-pluralists, such as Crowder (2002), who do regard certain political settlements as legitimate in every situation. Crowder argues that liberalism is the system best placed to allow and encourage individuals to pursue as many values for the good as possible, while protecting against those which nurture the bad. Here, the desire to encourage pluralism is not accompanied by a plurality of political orders. Indeed, Crowder's societal monism does not necessarily preclude the possibility that philosophers are best placed to define the boundaries of pluralism. If pluralism is good only insofar as it enables individuals to pursue a path to flourishing which is appropriate to their characteristics and circumstances, it follows that reason may be an extremely important aspect of governance. The *Kallipolis*, while perhaps not permitting individuals to follow as many values as Crowdian liberalism, certainly allows individuals to pursue those values which best suit their personal and environmental circumstances. Logically, it may be difficult for Crowder to argue that this does not allow individuals to follow as many values as possible without deleterious effects. As Plato claims:

> can't we confidently assert that those desires of even the money-loving and honour-loving parts that follow knowledge and argument and pursue with their help those pleasures that reason approves will attain the truest pleasures possible for them, because they follow truth, and the ones that are most their own. (*Rep*. 586d-e)

In a communitarian society, such as the *Kallipolis*, harming the society is analogous to harming oneself in a liberal system, and vice versa. In Millian liberalism, the state is obliged to intervene only when individuals harm others and when that harm outweighs the harm of intervention. In Plato's organic society, self-harm is almost as deleterious to others as oneself because it leads to societal disintegration. This societal deterioration forms the basis for much of the latter part of the dialogue, and also provides opportunity to discuss why this may similarly be deleterious for the value-pluralist.

The Dialectical forms of Government

Late in the *Republic*, Plato discusses the various political systems employed by *poleis*. Plato favours aristocracy, as this is the basis for his *Kallipolis*. This denotes a society in which those who are best suited to rule do so. He proceeds to describe the system and corresponding soul type of timocracy/timarchy (that is, a system of class based on honour accruement), which develops into oligarchy which, in turn, is

widened into democracy and, finally, degenerates into tyranny (*Rep*. VIII-X). His apparent ranking of the four systems - all of which are unsustainable - with timocracy at the top, and tyranny at the bottom, seems to demonstrate a fundamental rejection of 'non-ideal' forms of society. This apparent ignorance of diversity of circumstance is the fundamental source of Gray's objection to Platonic thought. However, Gray bases his theory on experience of a modern, pluralist world. Plato, writing from a more monistic historical circumstance, still aimed, along with Gray, to ensure that individuals and societies pursue values and lives most fitting to their circumstance. In Greece philosophy was often viewed as important, and the region acted as the seat of learning for the Western world. Not only this, but, as Plato claims, only the philosophers were seen to possess the necessary knowledge of the truth to be able to lead. Such a belief seems, even attitudinally, extremely similar to Gray's belief that it is only the value-pluralist who is able to intervene in conflict and monist cultures due to his knowledge of the truth of pluralism. However, it may be that circumstance leads value-pluralists to the truth, just as 'ideal' circumstances lead philosophers to rule.

In the *Kallipolis*, the philosophers are in control because circumstances most befit their values and needs; that is, the pursuit of knowledge, bravery and honesty. In the timocracy, however, Plato claims that those who love honour necessarily gain control. In the democracy, decision making power is spread even to those who have no interest in the good of the *polis*, and, in the tyranny, the tyrant has all power, is usually simply physically the strongest, and despises the selflessness of the philosopher. These societies have completely unjust compositions. Those who have no fitness to rule gain power through social discord, and the former philosopher rulers are left to sophistry, poverty and even death, as with Socrates in the Athenian democracy. These societies show the least level of flourishing according to circumstance. Interestingly, the situation that arises from this is one in which not only the philosophers but also the other classes suffer. It is in this that radical choice comes to the fore.

The timocrat, who loves honour, has made a 'radical choice' to fulfil his desire and actualise his value by ruling, rather than, say, by defending those who need it; for example, by becoming an auxiliary. Perhaps he thinks that his new position gives him the greatest possibility for performing acts which accrue honour, or that he might simply force his subjects to give him what he desires. Instead, he becomes hated because of the wealth and possessions he accrues and he loses both respect and power. Circumstance determines his course of life to be different to that which he chose. He does this because he cannot perceive the Good, and the true philosopher is no longer in a position to provide him with guidance. For both Plato and Gray this kind of radical choice, as I have previously stated, is sometimes good and sometimes bad - it is simply unpredictable. For Plato, it is bad when someone makes a decision to become something to which they are not suited. He claims:

> I suppose that when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of vote, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class of soldiers, or one of the unworthy soldiers tries to enter that of the judges and guardians, and these exchange their tools and honors, or when the same person

tries to do all these things at once, then I think you'll agree that these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin. (*Rep*. IV: 434b)

However, that is not to say that they would always do this, with individuals usually choosing professions to which they are best suited. Gray faces a similar problem, but claims that circumstance, and reason which allows individuals to judge this, usually dictates that people abandon their radical choice if it is contradictory to their situation. Indeed, he even states that 'radical choices occur as crises in ethical life, not as normal episodes within it' (2000, 65). Such crises, for Plato, are very often deleterious and should be avoided through the construction of an ideal state governed by reason. Operating in a world in flux, Gray argues that, so long as *modus vivendi* are governed by the truth of pluralism, individuals will be able to work through their crises by interaction with circumstance. For Plato on the other hand, this is only the case if the philosopher, who almost has a monopoly on reason, is able to inform others.

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to demonstrate that while there are fundamental distinctions between the schemata of Plato and Gray, there are many key areas in which ideas are shared. Neither thinker is an unalloyed ethical monist or pluralist. Gray undermines his pluralism by appealing to a monist meta-value or condition of 'flourishing'. Conversely, Plato undermines his monist belief in the ideal state by upholding the necessity for distinct and incommensurable parts of the soul, city and virtue. He does not propose the notion that only philosophers exist in a utopian *polis*, and sees at least some good in the activities of other members of the society. The philosophers do have some sort of advantage. They hold a value which is most likely to lead to flourishing and are able to perceive the Forms and so judge what is good according to their relevant value and circumstance. Gray also discusses immanent aspects of the individual, though less explicitly, and clearly feels that the value-pluralist is less likely to come into conflict with a clear concept of the truth of pluralism. The key distinction seems to lie in the thinkers' respective notions of what is uniquely human. While Gray's concept of human nature is malleable and almost indefinable, though perhaps with some shared fundamental characteristics based on needs, Plato's is clear. What is uniquely human is rationality, though this is not what is entirely human. As Plato accepts, humans still necessarily have other parts - the spirit and the appetite - and these are by no means intrinsically bad.

The *Kallipolis* demonstrates a society which may seem problematic to Gray, with the philosophers able to judge and prescribe how to live good lives. However, it is actually a system in which the majority are able to follow their own values to the maximum allowable extent without major conflict, discord, or civil breakdown. With an agreement, justified through the noble falsehood, that the philosophers should be in control, the truth of pluralism would be enforced even on those who disagreed, with the result that no one should be able to claim outright that their role is the most important or good. While Raz, Berlin and Crowder may have difficulties with such an aristocratic system, they cannot deny that the majority are able to follow their own values with as little hindrance as possible.

Gray and Plato undoubtedly see certain areas of ethics very differently. However, the fact that both are clearly 'situationalists', believe pluralism, in some sense, to be beneficial, and see values instrumentally as a method of actualising the good, demonstrates that the categories of monism and pluralism are not as distinct as Gray, at least, would like to claim.

References

Annas, J. 2002. 'My Station and its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of Virtue'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 102(1), 109-123.

Berlin, I. 1969. 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. In *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crowder, G. 2002. 'Two Value-Pluralist Arguments for Liberalism'. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 37(3), 457-473. London: Routledge. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1036114021000026355>. Accessed 12/5/2009.

Dilman, I. 1979. *Morality and the Inner Life: A Study in Plato's Gorgias*. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Gadamer, H. 1986. *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Gould, J. 1955. *The Development of Plato's Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gray, J. 1995a. *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age*. London: Routledge.

Gray, J. 1995b. *Isaiah Berlin*. London: Fontana.

Gray, J. 1996. *Mill on Liberty: A Defence*, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Gray, J. 1997. *Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought*. Cambridge: Polity.

Gray, J. 2000. *Two Faces of Liberalism*. New York: New Press.

Gray, J. 2002. *False Dawn*, 3rd ed. London: Granta.

Gray, J. 2003. *Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals*. London: Granta.

Gray, J. 2004. *Heresies: Against Progress and Other Illusions*. London: Granta.

Griswold, Jr., C. L. 1999. 'Platonic Liberalism: Self-Perfection as a Foundation of Political Theory'. In J. M. van Ophuijsen, ed., *Plato and Platonism*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

Irwin, T. 1995. *Plato's Ethics*. London: Oxford University Press.

Irwin, T. 1977. *Plato's Moral Theory*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

James, W. 1891. 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life'. *International Journal of Ethics*, 1(3), 330-354. Available from:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1526-
422X%28189104%291%3A3%3C330%3ATMPATM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3.
Accessed on 15/5/2009.

Johansen, T. K. 2000. 'Body, Soul and Tripartition in Plato's Timaeus'. In *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XIX*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Jones, P. N. 2006. 'Toleration, Value Pluralism, and the Fact of Pluralism'. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP)*, 9(2), 189-210. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230600655016>. Accessed 20/6/2009.

Joseph, H. W. B. 1948. *Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic*. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press.

Kamtekar, R. 1998. 'Imperfect Virtue'. *Ancient Philosophy*, 18, 315-339, Pittsburgh PA: Mathesis Publications Inc.

Klosko, G. 1986. *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*. New York & London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

Mabbott, J. D. 1978. 'Is Plato's *Republic* Utilitarian'. In G. Vlastos, ed., *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays: II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion*. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Melling, D. J. 1987. *Understanding Plato*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Moravcsik, J. 1992. *Plato and Platonism*. Cambridge Mass. & Oxford: Blackwell.

Pappas, N. 2003. *Plato and the Republic*, 2nd ed. London & New York: Routledge.

Penner, T. 2006. 'The Forms in the *Republic*'. In G. Santas, ed. *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic*. Malden MA. & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Plato. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works*, J. M. Cooper, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Parmenides' trans. M. L. Gill & P. Ryan. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Phaedo' trans. G. M. A. Grube. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Protagoras' trans. S. Lombardo & K. Bell. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Republic' trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Symposium' trans. A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. 'Timaeus' trans. D. J. Zeyl. In J. M. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Raz, J. 1986. *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, J. 1998. 'Multiculturalism'. *Ratio Juris*, 11(3), 193-205.

Raz, J. 2001. *Value, Respect and Attachment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Raz, J. 2003. *The Practice of Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, S. B. 2000. 'Leo Strauss's Platonic Liberalism'. *Political Theory*, 28(6), 787-809.

Vlastos, G. 1978. 'Justice and Happiness in the *Republic*'. In G. Vlastos, ed., *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays: II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion*. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Wallach, J. R. 2001. 'Smith, Straus, and Platonic Liberalism'. In *Political Theory*, 29(3), 424-429.