

Ecological Civilisation:

Identity, Power and Status

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PhD in International Relations

February 2020

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere. The work presented here has been produced by myself except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.

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Word Count: 89,832

An extension to the word count, to 90,000 words, was granted by Professor Sharon Huttly, Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Education), on the 24th May 2019.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisors: Dr Basil Germond, for his never-ending encouragement, belief and kindness in supporting me to reach this point; Prof. Astrid Nordin, for her genius, guidance and opportunities to build my confidence as a China Scholar; and, Dr Andrew Chubb, who went above-and-beyond having ever so kindly agreed to join my supervision team so late in the day. Without each of you, this thesis would never have been completed, thank you.

To Ali Seyedraghazi, Meysam Tayebipour, Jianchengshi and Yunxia Wu I would like to say a special thank you for your friendship, support, passionate discussions and delicious cuisine that has powered me through over the years! The Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion is a far more colourful and friendly place for having had you there as students. It has been a great honour to study alongside you all.

Financial contributions from: the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences; the Newton Fund of the British Council and Chinese Scholarship Council; as well as, the Institute for Social Futures, has been truly appreciated. Without their support and funding, this thesis would never have been possible. The opportunities you have provided have allowed me to grow not only academically, but also culturally and professionally.

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my family, my mother Louise, my father Michael, my brother Matthew and our beloved cat, Zoe. Your loving support, understanding, patience, cuddles and fur kept me going when I was ready to give up. I'd also like to give special thanks to the LGGs girls: Rachel, Lizzie, Ellie, Lauren, Amy, Hannah, Laura and Annetta for all the walks, cups of tea and just generally trying to get your head around my moaning over the years! To Lya and Natalia, thank you for making life in Beijing, and beyond, so fun, informative and loving. And, finally, to Dr Sebastian Robins and Christian Georgiou for not only supporting me, but also offering your time to proof read versions of this thesis.

I would like to recognise the invaluable assistance that you have all provided me.

Abstract

How does the Communist Party of China (CPC) use emotion in its environmental governance rhetoric? This thesis explores the application of emotion in the CPC's rhetoric on ecological civilisation (*Shengtai Wenming*, 生态文明); identifies patterns in the CPC's use of emotion within that rhetoric; and analyses the relationship between these patterns and the CPC's strategic objectives regarding environmental governance, their domestic political agenda, and their wider international ambitions. This thesis contributes to emotion research within International Relations (IR) by developing an intuitive, thematic, Emotions Discourse Analysis (EDA). The constructed EDA builds upon Koschut, Hall, Wolf, Solomon, Hutchison and Bleiker's (2017) EDA, to identify, contextualise and interpret the use of emotion in the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. The thematic approach is closely based upon Galtung's (1996a and 2001) Chosenness-Myth-Trauma Complex, in which myths and memories substantiate emotions of chosenness, glory and trauma in political rhetoric.

By approaching the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric via this new and intuitive framework, this thesis concludes that the CPC's use of emotion helps to continue their nation building through: constructing identity; asserting party power; and vying for increased global status for the PRC. Ecological civilisation is a discursive tool created by the CPC to: encourage the citizens of the PRC to engage with their environmental governance; justify their leadership and assert themselves as the authority (of environmentalism) within the PRC, and to an extent globally; and to elevate the strategic importance of the PRC, as a "big responsible country", by presenting ecological civilisation as a Chinese-led environmental governance, for mankind.

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Table of Useful Acronyms

| Abbreviation | Explanation |
|--------------|---|
| AQI | Air Quality Index |
| CBDR | Common but Differentiated Responsibilities |
| CCICED | Chinese Council on International Cooperation on Environment and Development |
| CGT | Chosenness, Glories, Traumas. |
| CMT | Chosenness-Myths-Traumas |
| CPC | Communist Party of China |
| EDA | Emotion Discourse Analysis |
| EPL | Environment Protection Law |
| FYP | Five-Year-Plan |
| MEE | Ministry of Ecology and Environment |
| MEP | Ministry of Environmental Protection |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NEPA | National Environmental Protection Agency |
| NPC | National People's Congress |
| NPEC | National Patriotic Education Campaign |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| SEPA | State Environmental Protection Agency |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNSC | United Nation Security Council |
| U.S. | United States of America |
| USSR | Soviet Union |

Introduction

The planet today is facing huge environmental challenges. A combination of dramatic economic expansion following the Industrial Revolution alongside an exponentially increasing population has placed enormous pressure on the natural environment. The past fifty years has seen mass extinctions of animal species, overfishing has led to the collapse of approximately thirty percent of fisheries worldwide, severe drought and degradation is being experienced on over eighty percent of agricultural land in the world's more arid regions and eighty percent of the planet's forests are threatened by deforestation (World Bank, 2014). These developments have had a deleterious impact on global ecosystems and also carry severe and negative implications for human societies. Waste products, hazardous materials and heavy metals, which are the byproducts of mass production and consumption processes, are seeping into surface soils and waterways, triggering irreversible damage to living environments. Each year thousands of people die worldwide from industrial pollution (World Bank, 2014).

The severity of environmental degradation requires cooperation across numerous boundaries: spatial, national, temporal, ontological and epistemological (Geall and Ely, 2018; Hulme, 2010; and Urry, 2011). The transboundary nature of environmental degradation exposes deeper ecological, social and political concerns, which are themselves complex and uncertain (Geall, 2014). Consequently, the "politics of the earth" is becoming an increasingly important item on the international agenda and is central to many debates and disputes (Dryzek, 2013; and Geall and Ely, 2018). Our current understanding, both of the processes of environmental degradation and the most effective means of environmental protection and ecological modernisation, is limited. Despite this lack of knowledge, a consensus has emerged focused on a singular, universal approach to these ecological, social and political concerns. This approach is currently labeled "sustainable development" and is frequently found as a catchall phrase within environmental policy, such as in, the United Nations' (UN's) 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (Jasanoff, 2010).

However, the Communist Party of China (CPC), since 2007, has been constructing a Chinese complement, which they have labeled "ecological civilisation"

(*Shengtai Wenming*, 生態文明). Under the premiership of Hu Jintao and now Xi Jinping, ecological civilisation has become a key political slogan (Geall, 2012; Geall and Hilton, 2014; Goron, 2018; Hansen, Li and Svarverud, 2018; Marinelli, 2018; and Wang, He and Fan, 2014). Initially introduced as a prominent element of working towards becoming a “moderately prosperous society” (*Xiaokang shehui*, 小康社会; referred to as *Xiaokang* throughout this thesis); since 2012, ecological civilisation has become the CPC’s dominant frame for their environmental governance. To what extent ecological civilisation actually offers an alternative to sustainable development is widely debated. By examining how the CPC uses emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric, this thesis furthers these debates, by unpacking and empirically presenting how the ecological civilisation slogan is a new discursive tool constructing identity, power and status whilst being embedded within environmental governance. Appendix 2 consists of a timeline documenting the key political and environmental events leading up to, and then following on from, the introduction of ecological civilisation; this acts as a reminder of the broader political context surrounding the implementation and then use of ecological civilisation throughout this thesis.

While the World Bank (2014) analysis cited above provides a global perspective on current ecological crises, the PRC’s experience of environmental problems is particularly acute (Wang, et al., 2014). The PRC accounts for twenty percent of the world’s population, whilst having access to only seven percent of fresh water globally and below ten percent of the world’s arable land (Geall and Ely, 2018). In 2014, the CPC found that over sixty-two percent of groundwater they investigated was rated “extremely bad” or “bad” and thirty percent of the PRC’s main river-ways were also polluted (China Water Risk, 2015). Forty percent of the arable land available to the PRC was reported as degraded by state media (Patton, 2014). In 2016, Air in 145 out of 161 cities monitored by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) had unacceptable air-quality standards (MEP Report, 2016). These statistics show how the PRC has been facing potential water shortages, choking air and toxic produce from degraded land (Zhang, Wang, Yang, He and Liu, 2009; and Wang, et al., 2014).

The PRC’s large population and continuing economic growth, albeit decelerated, contribute to rising resource and energy requirements that place a huge strain on the PRC’s, already limited, natural environment (Pan, 2006a). The environmental

degradation experienced, and the pressures this creates, demands for a more effective environmental policy, especially if continued development is to be achieved. How the CPC addresses these demands will be central not only to developing *Xiaokang*: a vision of a stable, safe, clean, green and beautiful environment throughout the PRC; but also to achieving internationally set standards, such as the greenhouse gas emission reductions agreed in Paris at the UN's Climate Change Conference (COP21) (Geall and Ely, 2018; Tyfield, Ely, Urban, Geall, Zuev and Urry, 2014; Urban, Benders and Moll, 2009; Urban and Geall 2014; and Wang and Watson 2009).

With the PRC's domestic and international national interests at stake through worsening environmental conditions, it is not surprising that the CPC have begun to deploy a new slogan entrenched within these environmental, political, social and economic concerns. That the CPC would look to utilise emotion within their rhetoric to disseminate how they intend to meet these challenges is a natural development. Perry (2015) has shown how mobilising emotions has been a core methodology of the CPC since the Party was founded; this thesis shows that the emotions deployed through the ecological civilisation rhetoric do much more than exist as a go-to methodology. Both Callahan's (2012) work on "pessoptimism" within CPC politics, and Wang's (2014) work on historical memory and the CPC's humiliation narrative, show how emotion – or what Callahan (2012) calls a "structure of feeling" – is a key component within the CPC's development narratives. This thesis highlights how by focusing on the emotional elements of a political text, strong political messages can be identified and unpacked; within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, emotion is used to forge both national and international interests, especially through identity construction, asserting the CPC's leadership and power, and vying to improve the PRC's global status.

The CPC's ecological civilisation slogan appears frequently throughout the PRC as posters, advertisements and banners (Geall, 2014). Accompanying the slogans is a raft of ambitious policy directives setting out what an ecological civilisation is and how it is to be achieved. Table 1 shows some examples of the ambitious policies set out within the 12th Five-Year-Plan (FYP) (table adapted from Maske, (2011:3); see also, Geall and Pellissery, 2012; and Hilton, Geall, Boyd, Copsey, Liu, Hu, Feng, Yang, Ellis and Shin, 2011). Given the nature and scope of these policies, scholars have endeavoured to ascertain not only the likelihood of the CPC committing to this ambitious transformation,

and what kind of PRC we will see if they do follow their directives, but also the extent to which ecological civilisation differs practically from sustainable development. The conclusions made regarding the CPC's ecological civilisation in these literatures are based on theoretical debates of what an ecological civilisation is and empirical studies of whether the CPC's latest set of environmental policies produce different results to sustainable development policies. Some of these debates will be outlined in Chapter 1.

| Target | | 2010 | 2015 | Change over 5 years (%) |
|---|------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------------|
| Farmland reserves (billion mu) | | 1.818 | 1.818 | 0 |
| Decrease in water consumption per unit of value-added industrial output (%) | | | | 30 |
| Increase of water efficiency coefficient in agricultural irrigation | | 0.5 | 0.53 | 0.03 |
| Increase of non-fossil fuel usage in primary energy consumption (%) | | 8.3 | 11.4 | 3.1 |
| Decrease in energy consumption per unit of GDP (%) | | | | 16 |
| Decrease in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | | | | 17 |
| Total decrease in emissions of major pollutants (%) | Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) | | | 8 |
| | Sulphur Dioxide (SO ₂) | | | 8 |
| | Ammonia Nitrogen | | | 10 |
| | Nitrous Oxides | | | 10 |
| Forest Increase | Forest coverage rate (%) | 20.36 | 21.66 | 1.3 |
| | Forest stock (m ³) | 137 | 143 | 6 |

Table 1: Table to Show Examples of Policy Directives Set out in the 12th Five Year Plan

Source: Table adapted from Maske (2011:3).

However, rather than examining possible environmental outcomes attributed to ecological civilisation and/or sustainable development, this study explores how emotion, as a discursive tool, carries political messages throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric. As discussed, environmental conditions within the PRC are interconnected within a nexus of social, political and economic development. Therefore, by studying emotion, the deeper political motives behind the CPC's current environmental governance and ecological civilisation slogan will be the focus of enquiry, as opposed to

the political and environmental results, thus approaching the analysis of ecological civilisation from a different perspective.

The CPC recognises that the degeneration of the PRC's natural environment has consequences for national development. They are becoming increasingly sensitive to the opinions of Chinese citizens with respect to their poor environmental record. While the CPC began introducing the concept of ecological civilisation in 2007, since 2012, the slogan has become far more prominent under Xi Jinping (Goron 2018; see Figure 1). Studies conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2013) correspondingly point to a sharp rise in environmental concerns among Chinese citizens since Xi's increased uptake of the slogan: in 2013, forty-seven percent considered air pollution a "very big problem", up from thirty-six percent in 2012; and thirty-eight percent considered food safety was now a major concern, a twenty-six percent increase on data from 2008.




Figure 1: Number of English-Language News Articles Published with "Ecological Civilization" or "Ecological Civilisation" in the Text.
Source: Data gathered from Access World News Database.

In addition to these domestic events, President Donald Trump announced on the 1st of June 2017 that he would withdraw the United States of America (U.S.) from the

Paris Agreement (Geall and Ely, 2018; and Goron, 2018). This has dramatically altered the international context in which the PRC pursues its environmental governance. Not only did President Trump's decision spark widespread criticism from big businesses and governments worldwide (Ward, 2017; and Watts and Connolly, 2017), it also raised questions about how the PRC would respond as the largest greenhouse-gas emitter. Xi Jinping, responded at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018, calling the UN climate accord a "hard-won achievement" that "signatories should stick to" (Shankleman, 2017:1). Xi received "almost universal" praise (Geall and Ely, 2018:4). To many, Trump's decision created an easy diplomatic victory for the PRC. Klare (2017:1), for instance, argued Trump had "opened the door for China to emerge both as the world's leader in green technology (while creating millions of new jobs for Chinese workers) and in international efforts to slow global warming." Similarly, Green (2017:1) suggested we ought to "expect China to strengthen its commitments under the Paris Agreement, expand its dominance in clean energy, and hence strengthen its international claims to climate leadership over the medium term, at least." Commentators increasingly turned their attention to the CPC to consider whether they would use environmental governance as a vehicle to assert global leadership (see Figure 1).

However, there were also those who expressed skepticism about Xi Jinping's announcement. Hilton (2017:1), for example, claimed that the PRC were being thrust into this leadership role "prematurely and by default", adding, the CPC are "unlikely to welcome the scrutiny that global leadership entails". Likewise, Economy (2017) contended that the PRC neither merit nor desire the leadership role being thrust upon them, citing as evidence the PRC's over-reliance on coal. Elsewhere, Xi's announcement was criticised as "purely face. It's talk" (Vanderklippe, 2017:1). By focusing on the use of emotion within the CPC's political rhetoric, this thesis highlights how the ecological civilisation concept speaks directly to such concerns over the PRC's leadership ability within (global) environmental governance; the PRC's identity, power and status are systematically constructed, via emotion, throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Thus it can be seen how there is disagreement amongst commentators about the extent to which the PRC is likely to succeed in reaching its environmental goals or step-up into the role of global environmental leadership. Answers to these disagreements are

unlikely to emerge in the near future. However, in looking at the CPC's use of emotion, deeper understandings in the importance of Xi Jinping's "talk", in earlier CPC environmental rhetoric, as well as in their political sympathies and declared directions begin to provide answers as to the political intentions emotionally embedded within the ecological civilisation concept.

Geall and Ely (2018), in discussing the importance of ecological civilisation, argue that a discursive shift can be seen in the CPC's statements, especially after 2016, which have tended to create a more proactive rhetoric with regards to environmental reform domestically and international environmental diplomacy. They note, however, that a *discursive* shift need not result in practical policy and activity. Geall and Ely (2018) explain how inaction may be the desired outcome. This thesis, in focusing on emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, explores how ecological civilisation is a discursive tool, for both action and inaction, for the CPC's desired environmental governance. The ecological civilisation rhetoric is embedded within, and is an extension of, a number of the CPC's political narratives – in particular, narratives of Chinese identity, the party's authority, and the PRC's global status – thus providing complementary understandings of the CPC's broader political intentions.

Influencing Perceptions: Sovereignty, Authority and Principles

The rapid economic growth and development experienced by the PRC since "reform and opening up" from 1978 onwards produced monumental ecological burdens on the PRC's natural environments (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998). These ecological burdens are not contained within the PRC's State borders; ecological destruction suffered in the PRC has an impact globally (Shapiro, 2012). For example, the construction of dams along the Mekong River directly impacts the local economies and environments in Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia (Urban, Siciliano and Nordensvard, 2017). Similarly, the air quality over the PRC's cities, such as the "Asian Dust" dispersing to Korea and Mongolia, affects all people regardless of State boundaries or nationalities (Park, 2019). The PRC's environmental issues are interconnected with those of the rest of the world and to this extent the development pathway adopted by the CPC influences

the environment both domestically and internationally (Economy, 2010; and Ma, 2007).

Likewise, international actors and their actions also have an impact on the PRC and CPC's decisions domestically. One example is the pressure placed on the CPC by the international community in the run up to the 2008 Olympics (Heurtebise, 2017; and Sze, 2014). In the weeks before the games began, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing started to release hourly updates monitoring the levels of air pollution within its vicinity. According to the Embassy, the updates were intended to inform American visitors attending the Olympics of the dangers presented by Beijing's air quality. The Embassy decided to publish its data via Twitter. Since 2008, the U.S. Embassy's publication of particulate data has repeatedly elicited strong reactions from the CPC.

In 2012, the MEP demanded the U.S. Embassy to stop publishing their air pollution data on Twitter, stating (Global Times, 2012; and Schmitt, 2016:9):

The data released to the public by the American Embassy is only related to the air quality in the vicinity of the Embassy. Moreover, it is not a professional monitoring system, its "lack of rigor and standards" is certainly a fact. To conduct air quality monitoring and release relevant data is definitely the public authority of the Chinese government. Standing on valid legal principles, the Ministry of Environmental Protection demands that the American Embassy stop releasing this data.

In this statement, we see an emotion-laden assertion of Chinese authority over the management of the environment within the PRC. An "Us" versus "Them" is created, where the U.S., as the "Them", is belittled as lacking and not rigorous. The short statement informs Chinese citizens not to trust the U.S. data, insisting that the Embassy's equipment is inaccurate, that these actions infringe Chinese sovereignty, and that the only legitimate authority on environmental matters within the PRC is the CPC. The CPC appears eager to stamp their own authority and power on the PRC's environmental approach and conditions.

By the 12th of January 2013, the U.S. Embassy recorded their highest air pollution reading to date for Beijing. The PM2.5 readings measured a record-breaking

755 on the Air Quality Index (AQI), far in excess of the upper limit even of the MEP's relatively conservative AQI (Wong, 2013). The PRC's AQI has six levels, indicating increasing severity in pollution: a PM_{2.5} density of 1-50 is "excellent" and is represented by green; 51-100 is "good" and yellow; 101-150 is "lightly polluted" and orange; 151-200 is "moderately polluted" and red; 201-300 is "heavily polluted" and purple; finally, 300-500 is "severely polluted" and a deep crimson. The WHO considers as dangerous – denoting potential ill-effects for human health – any AQI of 70 and above; within the PRC, AQI readings with ill-effects on human health sits with "good". How the CPC classifies and frames air pollution levels – the "lightly polluted" levels are in excess of twice the WHO's safety limit – perhaps preconditions the Chinese public into accepting poorer qualities of their air. The CPC's AQI readings are framed to distract the PRC from how unsafe their air is. However, the CPC's AQI readings have since catastrophically surpassed the U.S. Embassy's data from 2012, producing an AQI reading of 755 for PM_{2.5}. The 755 recorded on the 12th of January 2013 became known as the "Airpocalypse" (*kongqi mori*, 空气末日) and created a cyber-storm of comments domestically and internationally (Wang, et al., 2014). Following this incident, the CPC blocked access to the U.S. Embassy's data altogether.

The use of emotional language found within the CPC's response begins to show how an identity, one of authority, is being constructed; the response reiterates the CPC's power claims on leadership and authority, especially when concerning the sovereignty of the PRC's environment, and positioned the PRC as superior to the U.S. with regards to their professionalism, monitoring capabilities, rigour, standards, validity, legality and principles, ultimately positioning the PRC's environmental governance status above that of the U.S.. By July 2013, six months after Airpocalypse, there was a significant increase in the number of essays being written by numerous CPC departments on the topics of the "mass line" (*qunzhong luxian*, 群众路线) and ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation had become a well-established subject in public discourse, elevating the role of the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric within their environmental governance, thus simultaneously also highlighting the importance of research unpacking the concept (Geall and Ely, 2018; and Goron, 2018).

Most studies of the CPC's environmental politics and the environmental challenges within the PRC have focused on the negative implications of pollution

economically, socially and politically, as well as on the increasing levels of public engagement (especially domestic protests) with environmental issues (i.e. Economy, 2010; Orlik, 2012; Shapiro, 2012; Xie, 2009; and Zhang and Barr, 2013). How the CPC frame their environmental governance – with regards to identity, power and status, as seen above – and what these framings reveal, has received far less attention. The next section will look further into some of the reasons for the importance of ecological civilisation as a new central slogan of the CPC and therefore as a new focal area for academic research.

The “Awakening” of Ecological Civilisation

Hu Jintao initially introduced ecological civilisation as a CPC concept in his 17th National Congress report in 2007 (Oswald, 2014). Since then, Xi Jinping elevated ecological civilisation to the position of a “paramount objective” in 2012, and again to a “constitutional principle of the PRC” in 2018 (Goran, 2018). With each elevation in importance, additional rhetoric has been developed, producing a narrative of the spaces and futures of Chinese environmental governance. Geall and Ely (2018) have argued how under Xi Jinping, there appears to be both an ideological shift, changing the course of the CPC’s environmental governance, and an increase in the amount of ecological civilisation rhetoric being produced.

On the 22nd of July 2013, six months after the “Airlpocalypse”, ecological civilisation made its debut on the front page of the *People’s Daily*. The article, by “Ren Zhongping,”¹ was titled *The Chinese Awakening of an Ecological Civilisation*. The title alone suggests a sense of the PRC’s special, selected or preferred responsibility: the chosenness of the Chinese to be the creators and guardians of this ecological civilisation. There is also a degree of unintended irony, inasmuch as critics of the CPC, especially in the context of heated public exchanges such as those following the U.S. Embassy’s publication of its AQI data, could, justifiably, reframe the title as *An*

¹Of note is how “Ren Zhongping” is not a person, but is a pseudonym for the People’s Daily’s commentary department. Ren Zhongping is a homophone for “People’s Daily Important

International Awakening for a Chinese Ecological Civilisation. Notwithstanding the implications of its title, the article contained a clear message: that ecological civilisation is central to every element of CPC policy; that there was to be shared responsibility between the CPC and the Chinese people for realising an ecological civilisation; but that such a realisation would be under the guidance of the canon's ideology with the CPC as the authority.

In the article, "Ren" (2013) eschews any suggestion of a causal relationship between the PRC's *miraculous* economic drive, the core theory of economic growth underpinning it, or any of the policies of previous CPC canons and the levels of pollution and environmental degradation across the PRC. Instead, the commentator suggests that the "backward development concept of a few leading cadres [emphasis added]" is responsible for the PRC's environmental degradation. Likewise, "Ren" (2013:1) handled delicately the relationship between environmental protest in the PRC and the evolution of ecological civilisation, observing that the concept was driven by an "awareness of the need for an ecological environmental protection among the Masses". While passing over domestic and international criticism of the CPC's environmental governance to date, "Ren" nonetheless acknowledges the collective environmental traumas experienced by both the CPC and "the Masses". "Ren" (2013) insists, however, that it is not the CPC who are to be blamed for these collective environmental traumas. The article reveres the unity of "the Masses", glorifies the CPC's environmental governance, and acknowledges the PRC's shared environmental traumas.

This brief analysis of the debut of ecological civilisation by the People's Daily is a prime example of what this thesis will show. Written into the ecological civilisation rhetoric are strong political messages with regards to why and how the CPC's elevation in environmental governance carries important political intentions: "Ren" explicitly and implicitly highlights the importance of: togetherness and unity in environmental governance; the correct leadership of the CPC and their guiding authority on environmental governance; and subtly places the PRC within the broader context of a global environmental crisis thus suggesting how the CPC alone are not responsible for environmental degradation.

The importance of the ecological civilisation rhetoric increased further with the momentous change in the CPC's strategic direction following Xi's inclusion of the

concept within the new principal contradiction, at the 18th CPC Congress in 2017. Since the 1970's, development has been the CPC's priority. Until 2017 this meant, expressly, economic development, with the CPC stressing the PRC's developing country status. Prior to 2017 the CPC subordinated its environmental governance and diplomacy to the needs of economic development, insisting that, as a developing country, the PRC was unable to carry the burden of global climate action. This argument had been advanced as far back as 1972, at the UN Conference on the Human Environment, when the PRC delegate said, "we must not give up eating for fear of choking, nor refrain from building our own industry for fear of pollution and damage to the environment" (cited in Sternfeld, 2017:1). Xi's reformulation of the principal contradiction facing the PRC as "the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life" has brought ecological civilisation to the forefront, not only of CPC rhetoric, but of their future governance more broadly (Xinhua, 2017a:1). Environmental protection is now understood as necessary for continued economic development, not as something that stands in opposition to it. Furthermore, there appears to be a notable shift away from the (over)reliance on emphasising the PRC to be a developing country.

The tension between environmental protection and (economic) development, however, is not easily resolved. Xi's speech promised "a moderately prosperous society" (*Xiaokang*, 小康) by 2021, and a "modernized socialist strong country [sic]" by 2049. The difficulty therefore exists in the CPC's ability to promote environmental protection without being suspected of jeopardising or impeding economic growth. There is a balance to be found, an idea that echoes Callahan's (2012) concept of pessopitism, the dualism of something positive alongside something negative, throughout the CPC's politics. Controlling perceptions is not new, neither is an attempt to direct peoples' perception(s) by injecting emotion into rhetoric (Koschut, et al., 2017). What is new, however, is a study that explicitly explores how CPC is applying this technique within their environmental governance rhetoric: this thesis therefore adds to our understanding of ecological civilisation by exploring how the CPC uses of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric.

In the work of Andrews (2008), and Ghanem and Zhang (2014), they identified how the CPC had used positive emotion within their environmental rhetoric to cover up

air-pollution catastrophes. The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric is replete with glorifying elements and positive, future-orientated ideals, as highlighted by Andrews (2008), Geall and Ely (2018), Ghanem and Zhang (2014) and Marinelli (2018). In using such techniques as metaphor and a "green-washing" of everything from economic growth, production and consumerism, the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric creates a directional understanding of the environment and one in which the PRC's environmental degradation is often understated (Schmitt, 2016).

This thesis contends that there are deeper reasons for this positively framed rhetoric that need to be explored. The CPC's political rhetoric is well documented on how it is designed to unite the PRC via a constructed (and an often imagined) sense of shared pride, such as that found in "Ren's" essay on the "mass line" and the CPC's broader concept of a singular civilised State (*Wenming Guojia*, 文明郭家). Ecological civilisation, as a continuation of the CPC's civilising discourse, can be seen as discourse aimed at constructing a State with a shared, timeless and uniquely Chinese understanding of environmentalism (Marinelli, 2018). Cartier (2013:1) argues, "the language used in these slogans harks back to the Spiritual Civilisation campaigns of the 1980s," where all of the keywords used within the slogans stipulate ideas on the role of the individual in striving to build their vision of a singular civilised State. Cartier (2013:1) goes on to add how this kind of Mao-era 'red' practice "is a central, and highly visible, feature of party-led socialist modernisation", which brings us back to how ecological civilisation was initially introduced by the CPC as a means to reach *Xiaokang*.

One of the key ways in which a sense of pride and unity is achieved in political rhetoric, is through the use of emotion to frame the rhetoric (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; and Wang, 2014). The National Patriotic Education Campaign (NPEC) and its narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation woven throughout CPC discourse, especially since the early 1990s, has been widely studied and acts as a good example of the CPC injecting emotion into their political discourse (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). This thesis believes that a similar deployment of emotion will also be seen in the ecological civilisation rhetoric and as more than a tool to glorify and cover-up air-pollution catastrophes; this introduction has already begun to demonstrate that it does. The natural next step is therefore to consider the most appropriate methodology and research design to explore the use of emotion within the CPC's ecological

civilisation rhetoric.

Developing a Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis For International Relations

Beyond the PRC, current events from around the world are highlighting the significance of emotion in and through political discourse. Across the U.S. and Europe, a variety of actors are playing with fear and shaping political discourse. Within Europe, the arrival of Syrian refugees and migrants elicited sympathy from some and resentment from others, creating new, emotionally charged political fault-lines (Koschut, et al., 2017). Similarly, invocations of fear and nostalgia underpinned public discourse in the United Kingdom (UK) during the Brexit campaigns and general elections (Iakhnis, Rathbun, Reifler and Scotto, 2018). Elsewhere, in literature exploring emotion and climate change, Norgaard (2011:400) argues that emotion is used in political discourse to manipulate and to avoid “emotions of fear, guilt, and helplessness, [and to] follow cultural norms, and maintain positive conceptions of individual and national identity.” There is scope therefore, for the study of emotion, in and through political discourse; to help IR scholars better understand contemporary political and discursive landscapes.

Accordingly, since the 1980s, the discipline of IR has been developing an array of methodologies for investigating the many ways emotions work in and through discourse (for recent developments, see: Ahmed, 2015; Bially-Mattern, 2011; De Rivera, 1992; Edkins, 2003; Elias, 1985; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Hall, 2015; Hutchison, 2010; Koschut, et al., 2017; Leep, 2010; Risse and Ropp, 2013; Ross, 2014; and Solomon 2014). Both academic research and political events demonstrate the centrality of emotions in conflicts and the decision-making process; emotions are central to both the doing and making of politics (Galtung, 1996a and 2001). At the heart of this so-called “emotional turn” are two main questions: why and how we should study emotions through discourse. With regards to *why*, Koschut, et al., (2017:2) provide the simple answer, “because emotions matter”. The aforementioned examples further justify why it is increasingly important to be studying emotions through discourse; the use of emotion in political discourse is repeatedly at the forefront of daily political issues, impacting

public opinion and political decision-making. The question of *how* has yielded an array of methodological approaches for analysing emotions in and through discourse with a particular focus on verbal and textual rhetoric, which provides an empirically accessible platform for emotions to be studied within IR and a good starting point for this thesis.

Both questions require further consideration and, in particular, require greater amounts of empirical evidence to substantiate the importance of Emotions Discourse Analysis (EDA). This thesis will empirically demonstrate, within the context of the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, why emotions matter whilst developing a methodological approach for studying them. By developing an EDA, the ways in which the rhetoric advanced by the CPC engages emotion, and the role of emotion in furthering and realising their proposed environmental governance, can be explored (Koschut, et al., 2017). The EDA will be developed within a constructivist methodology. The social constructivist perspective places emphasis on the importance of the intersubjective and social as well as the historical and cultural characteristics behind emotions, without denying their phenomenological expression and physical perception (Averill 1980; and Harré 1986). This approach not only informs the methodology of this thesis, but also the broader field of emotion research within IR (for example, see Campbell, 1998; Der-Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Epstein, 2008; Hansen, 2006; and Milliken, 1999). For the sake of analytical clarity and rigour, this thesis focuses on the textual dimension of the CPC's political rhetoric, in the form of transcribed CPC speeches (those officially translated into English by the CPC), and is referred to throughout as the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. Therefore, it is also pertinent to add that this thesis takes the concept of emotion, as socio-cultural phenomena within discourse, that transcend individuals and groups. The social constructivist perspective of emotion, which is discussed at length within Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design, takes emotion to be certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which are purposefully constructed and written into discourse to achieve certain understandings and categorisations; Hutchison and Bleiker (2017) argue emotion is discourse is used to foster support for specific understandings and categories of values and ideals, whilst concealing and degrading others. This thesis will not be considering the phenomenological or physical experience of emotions, the reasons for which will be discussed in Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design.

Beyond the acknowledgement of an emotional turn within IR, there has been little agreement, yet, regarding theoretical approaches to the study of emotion within IR, other than a general focus on an analysis of emotion in and through discourse (Koschut, et al., 2017). Generally, it has been agreed that appropriate methods and criteria for studying emotion discourses should focus upon words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) (Koschut, et al., 2017). There are, however, critical agreements on what should *not* be done in future research. These are as follows.

Solomon (2014), Koschut (2017) and Koschut, et al. (2017:483) have argued that a considerable proportion of contemporary research into emotion within IR “take[s] affective dynamics for granted within making them explicit”. That is to say, researchers make causal relationships explicit between discourse(s) and resulting actioned affects within their discourse analyses. Harré (1986:4) argued that emotions constitute an “ontological illusion,” whereby there is a misleading notion that “there is an abstract and detachable ‘it’ upon which research can be directed.” IR scholars have come to accept the importance of affect from emotion in political discourse and any resulting actions or other effects, but there has been an underlying ontological assumption with regards to which words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives merit study and are relevant versus those that are erroneously given meaning. Moreover, a lack of clarity in definition with regards to what emotions warrant meaningful study within IR has also been problematic. Finally, it is agreed that there has been a lack of empirical data thus far within the field; in making affects explicit, researchers have not always empirically supported their arguments.

This raises the question of how IR researchers might theorise and analytically extract emotion from discourse, and the emotionalising effect(s) achieved through political discourse, without succumbing to ontological illusions. Koschut, et al. (2017) suggest that the study of emotion in and through discourse is best designed around an EDA of three parts: 1) theory (what is an emotion?); 2) expression (how are emotions communicated?); and 3) effects (what do emotions do?) These ideas are discussed in Chapter 2. Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA has been applied to speech acts within their emotionality research showing reliability, repeatability and accuracy in this approach. Only one analysis of CPC discourse has been conducted using Koschut, et al.’s (2017)

EDA to date, and this was conducted by Hall (2017) on the Sino-Japanese *Zhuhai* incident.

Hall's (2017) research applied three approaches to analyse the emotional discourse that resulted from a multiple-day orgy, where a Japanese tourist group, staying at a five-star hotel in Zhuhai, hired several hundred local prostitutes in mid-September, 2004. The timing of the incident overlapped with the 18th September anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and invoked allusions to the behaviours of the Japanese Imperial Army sixty years prior. The incident caused public outrage, to the extent that the Foreign Minister of the PRC, Li Zhaoxing, requested the Japanese ambassador to convey back to Japan "the Chinese public's strong indignation (愤慨)" (cited in Hall, 2017:487). The three ways Hall (2017) analysed the emotion in the discourse resulting from this incident, included the notions that: 1) discourse can be indicative of emotion by offering insight and evidence of the emotional state of the author; 2) discourse can be provocative of emotion, through the use of: narratives, symbols and themes; and 3) discourse can be invocative of emotion. However, despite Hall's (2017) informative analysis demonstrating the importance of conducting an EDA on discourse within the PRC, these three approaches rely on further phenomenological understandings and biological expressions of emotion to be able to conduct such an analysis and present the risk of making causal relationships between discourse and actioned effects as discussed by Koschut, et al. (2017).

The EDA adapted and applied within this thesis will also apply a three-tiered analysis: 1) identifying the emotion: that is identifying emotion words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives within a speech; 2) contextualising the emotion: finding patterns whereby words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives of emotion repeat throughout the data set across a number of speeches; and 3) interpreting the emotion: applying social constructivism to consider what this use of emotion may be doing within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Wang Gungwu (2007:65) claims the CPC "have always been keen to use historical analogies in their policy analyses... Chinese practice shows that their "timeless" approach, which sought the most helpful and relevant examples to support their current cause or guide their choice of policy, has been used with care, and often with practiced skill." Wang's (2007) claim highlights the importance of interpreting how

the CPC use emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric from the perspective of social constructivism. Both historical and cultural analogies are likely to frequently occur within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Analogies are understood here as socially shared categories and experiences of the world, which in turn engender deeper meanings that exist within the CPC's use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric; for example, myths and memories of Chinese history and culture written into rhetoric in the form of analogies create a sense of unity and pride. The EDA is designed to unpack such socially constructed emotional categories found within rhetoric and will therefore develop a unique understanding of the ecological civilisation concept.

The EDA utilised within the thesis will also apply Johan Galtung's (1996a and 2001) Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) Complex as a means of systematically approaching the identification, contextualisation and interpretation of emotion, through the three themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma (CGT). Galtung's (1996a and 2001) chosenness refers to a collective group's sharing of social and historical experiences; Myth refers to the myths of a glorious past, present and future; and traumas refer to shared historical memories of traumatic experiences, which in turn bring people together and support the myth-building of shared glories.

Initially developed within the field of peace-studies, Galtung (1996a and 2001) identified the three elements of Chosenness, Myth and Trauma of his CMT-Complex theory as the necessary components of political narratives when intending to stimulate political change. Laced with emotion, Galtung (1996a and 2001) identifies the themes of chosenness, glories and trauma to be present in political narratives from Nazi Germany, The American Civil War and Ghandi's Independence Movement. Moreover, the application of Galtung's CMT-Complex to the CPC's rejuvenation from humiliation development narrative by Wang (2014) provides rare empirical data on the application and presence of these themes in CPC discourse, as well as acting as a useful demonstration of how emotion may be identified and analysed within CPC rhetoric. The three themes of CGT will direct the identification of emotion within the rhetoric in order to mitigate researcher-bias in selecting which emotion should be focused upon.

This thesis, therefore, deploys Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA in conjunction with a thematic framework drawing upon the works of Galtung (1996a and 2001) to advance a

rigorous analytical approach to demonstrating why emotions matter and how to study the use of emotion within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Research Question and Thesis Roadmap

This thesis considers the following research question: How does the CPC use emotion in its ecological civilisation rhetoric? To answer this question this thesis will: 1) identify emotion present in the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric; 2) discover patterns in the CPC's use of emotion within that rhetoric; and 3) analyse the relationship between these patterns and the CPC's strategic objectives regarding environmental governance, their domestic political agenda, and their wider international ambitions. In the process, this thesis aims to contribute to emotion research within IR by developing an intuitive thematic EDA.

The analysis is confined to the uses of emotion expressed in and effected through CPC speech acts. While emotion can be expressed through a number of mediums, the most advanced methods for data collection and analysis, producing accurate, reliable and repeatable results, lie firmly within the area of EDA. Furthermore, Koschut, et al. (2017) argue that speech acts represent one of the best forms of available empirical data for the study of governments' uses of emotion. For this reason, this thesis focuses on the rhetoric produced by the CPC's top leaders, MEP and the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China (FMPRC) in the form of transcribed (and, where relevant, translated) speeches. For the CPC to construct the concept of an ecological civilisation they must deploy rhetoric. Not only is the development of rhetoric integral to the articulation of ecological civilisation, there exists an abundance of suitable data for study.

Following this Introduction is a Literature Review, which explores in greater detail research conducted so far on the ecological civilisation concept. The Literature Review reconstructs the debates that have come to define ecological civilisation, establishes a timeline relating to the CPC's political ecologies, and finally, assesses the PRC's ability to become an ecological civilisation. Chapter 2 explains in detail the methodological underpinnings of this thesis, outlining the EDA and thematic analysis employed in this

research. Chapter 3 presents the data, the key themes and patterns, and begins to analyse them having identified and contextualised the uses of emotion in and through the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Chapter 4 considers the notion of a spirit of ecological civilisation, exploring how emotion is used in the rhetoric to create a national identity of Chinese environmentalism, through creating a uniquely Chinese response to environmental governance. Chapter 5 interprets how characteristics of mythology can be found throughout the rhetoric, and examines how the rhetoric construes the CPC as heroic leaders taking the PRC on a journey to betterment, where ecological civilisation is (symbolically, ideally and actually) the place of betterment. This chapter reflects on the CPC's constructions of power relations between the CPC, Chinese citizens and governments worldwide. Chapter 6 explores how emotions are also used to support the CPC's changeable notions of responsibility, which are entwined within their construction of the PRC's status and place in the world. The conclusion considers the implications of the thesis's findings, and suggests further avenues of research.

This thesis can thus be understood as contributing to the discipline's wider understanding in three respects. First, inasmuch as ecological civilisation is a concept with far-reaching international consequences, the CPC's use of rhetoric should give us a sense of how they intend to present the PRC on the world stage. Analysing the ecological civilisation rhetoric can serve as a proxy or an index for how the CPC are choosing to articulate and explain the future of the PRC's environmental governance. Second, the changing way that the CPC use language to describe and explain ecological civilisation provides insight into how they propose, strategically, to deal with their own ecological crisis in the coming years, which in the PRC's particular case represents a major obstacle to its national development. The way that the CPC use language reveals both their vision regarding the PRC's environmental management and how they are likely to go about realising that vision, even if concrete programmes are yet to be implemented. Third, since ecological civilisation is something of a flagship concept for the current CPC leadership, the way that concept is developed and communicated reveals how the CPC is coming to position the PRC as a thought leader on what they regard as one of the most pressing issues of the early twenty-first century. The articulation of ecological civilisation is part of a wider effort to delineate the CPC's

alternative to the liberal intellectual-economic order, to assert the PRC's status as a leader in contemporary moral and political thinking. Overall, this thesis therefore aims to unpack the emotional messages carried within the ecological civilisation rhetoric of the CPC's construction of identity, CPC-power and global status creation via their latest slogan for environmental governance: ecological civilisation.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

There are many meanings and definitions behind the concept of an ecological civilisation, especially when comparing theoretical ecological civilisation(s) to the CPC's concept of an ecological civilisation. This literature review will first consider existing English-language works addressing what an ecological civilisation is, what ecological civilisation is not and how ecological civilisation will come to exist. Chinese scholarship and ecological civilisation within the context of the PRC will then be explored, providing a chronology of how ecological civilisation rose to prominence within the CPC's political ecologies. The remainder of the literature review considers Ahearne's Gramscian critique of whether the PRC can become an ecological civilisation and what this suggests about possible environmental governance.

This literature review shows that there are two very different ontologies and epistemologies of ecological civilisation: those who consider ecological civilisation as a new political ecology versus those who see ecological civilisation as continuation of sustainable development, or sustainable development with "Chinese characteristics". The two separate ontologies look to different evidence bases to come to their conclusions about ecological civilisation: philosophical and ecological theory versus policy decision-making and legislature. The former sees ecological civilisation as something to be developed with time, a long-term goal, whilst the latter sees ecological civilisation as unable to deliver its promise of a new development paradigm.

Within the context of a Chinese ecological civilisation the concept is argued as being based within Chinese wisdom and culture, and as able to overcome the conflict between humanity and nature found in Western practices of environmental governance. Chinese scholarship questions previous political ecologies and resulting environmental governance purported by the CPC, as well as the ideologies on capitalism, anthropocentric worldviews, Western modernity and sustainable development. However, the literature also argues how for the CPC's ecological civilisation to overcome these tensions between humanity and nature that they would have to change their direction of governance away from the prioritising of economic growth; otherwise what is labelled ecological civilisation would be akin to the sustainable development already in practice.

The literature highlights a clear correlation between prioritising economic growth within the CPC's previous political ecologies and the resulting failings from these understandings within their environmental governance. Despite environmental protection receiving an increasingly higher position in both CPC rhetoric and through the gradual promotion of the administrative body responsible, new environmental laws and regulations, ultimately what remained unchanged was the attitude towards economic growth. However, Xi's update to the principal contradiction represents a shift in thinking and to what extent this will help in creating a new pathway for ecological civilisation to emerge as a new development paradigm is yet to be understood. Applying a Gramscian critique, the literature argued the transformation of the PRC from the current leading global hegemony of capitalism to an alternative hegemony of ecological civilisation is theoretically possible, although will be a timely and complex process. However, it is unclear to what extent the CPC are practically creating ecological civilisation as an *alternative* hegemony and this challenge of turning theory into practice remains.

Introducing, Defining and Positioning Ecological Civilisation

English-language literature exploring ecological civilisation spans many disciplines, the most relevant being: China Studies, Environmental Studies, Philosophy and IR. Broadly, these works have addressed three questions: what an ecological civilisation is, what ecological civilisation is not and how an ecological civilisation may come to exist. First a broad understanding of ecological civilisation will be presented, before then working towards a more specific understanding of ecological civilisation within the Chinese literature and finally within the CPC's use via their chronology of political ecologies.

What is Ecological Civilisation?

The phrase "ecological civilisation" first appeared in an English publication in Morrison's (1995) *Ecological Democracy*. Morrison (1995:11) described ecological

civilisation as a civilisation based on “diverse lifeways sustaining linked natural and social ecologies”; thus ecological civilisation, in the Anglophone literature, began as a political ecology capturing the relationship between the social and natural. Following on from Morrison, Gare (2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2014 and 2017) has created a considerable collection of works ruminating on ecological civilisation and describes ecological civilisation as a new political ecology, where a political ecology is defined as a synthesis of the political (economic and social) and environmental, which in turn leads to reforms in environmental governance. Gare extrapolates his notions of ecological civilisation from both contemporary and historical, Eastern and Western philosophical thinking to provide us with an understanding of what ecological civilisation is and how it will come to exist.

To define ecological civilisation Gare (2017) divides the concept into two parts: ecology and civilisation. He defines ecology as the study of biotic communities and the collective transformations by these biotic communities in creating habitats, augmenting their environments and adjusting to the conditions of their existence(s) (Gare, 2017:141, see also, Magdoff, 2011). Gare (2017) then identifies civilisation as a noun of process, which implies an on-going process of civilising. He stipulates how civilisation has come to be defined as a dichotomy between the notions of barbarity and decadence (Gare, 2010b): barbarity describing peoples not yet civilised and decadence standing for the corruption or decay of civilisation. Gare (2017) argues that decadence is worse than barbarity as peoples who are decadent have become void of all virtues other than the manipulation of their habitats and environments for their own benefit, whereas barbarians can be lauded as still possessing environmentally aware virtues, through living a life still embedded within the natural world (Gare, 2017). Finally, Gare (2014) reunites the two parts, adding that the notion of ecological civilisation requires ecology, that is all biotic communities, to be considered equal and to strive for harmonious co-existence; in doing so we should replace current ideals of human decadence, hence no longer considering human communities as above other biotic communities and thus advance as an alternative *ecological* civilisation.

Kovel (2011:4), an eco-socialist, instead writes: “the phrase, “ecological civilization,” means civilization restored to sanity in its relations with nature [sic].” Kovel (2011:9) describes ecology as the ecological relations that are manifested and take

place, between humans and non-humans, living and non-living elements; ecology is thus based on the interrelation of all things within nature: nature must be regarded as the integral whole of all ecosystems. Kovel (2011:4) stresses the importance of understanding that although humanity is part of nature, we have become “radically estranged”, thus destabilising our ecosystems. Often expressed as pollution, extinction, environmental degradation and climate change, these ecological crises signify the greatest challenge to humankind and require creative resolutions based on social transformation towards ecological integrity (Kovel, 2007). Whereas Gare approaches ecological civilisation with a hopefulness of a solution to the current ecological crises, Kovel approaches the concept as a necessary end-result of bad environmental governance.

The works of eco-socialists (such as Kovel, 2007 and 2011; and Lakoff, 2004) can trace their inspiration back to the works of: Carson’s (1962) *Silent Spring*, which describes a world devoid of butterflies, bees and birds resulting from large-scale application of pesticides and chemicals; and Boulding’s (1966) suggestion of the earth being like a spacecraft with finite resources constrained within its boundaries. Eco-socialism merges the ideas from green politics, ecology and anti-globalisation with socialism (Kovel and Löwy, 2001). Accumulating through the 1970’s as ecological Marxism, the domination of nature through science and technology of the capitalist system was considered the root cause of the current ecological crises (Pan, 2015). Building on these ideas are two of the most prominent eco-socialists, John Bellamy Foster (2000) and Paul Burkett (1999), who describe Karl Marx as “a main originator of the ecological world view” (Kovel, 2014:8).

Burkett and Foster highlight the importance of Marx’s “irreparable rift”, or as Foster (2000) coined, the “metabolic rift”, between man and nature, citing Marx as saying how “private ownership of the globe by single individuals will appear quite absurd as private ownership of one man by another” (Marx, 1894:757). Foster (1999) argues the concept of a metabolic rift offers “a more solid—and scientific—way in which to depict the complex, dynamic interchange between human beings and nature, resulting from human labor [sic].” Eco-socialists therefore argue that the current experiences of environmental degradation are a product of the global expansion of the capitalist system, globalisation and imperialism, which have been instrumented by repressive States and

transnational bodies (Kovel and Löwy, 2001). Eco-socialists are often referred to as “Red Greens”, due to their adherence to Green politics embedded within anti-capitalist views that tends to draw upon Marxism.

According to Burkett (2014) and Foster (2014), Marx (1887:638) highlighted how: capitalism undermines “the original sources of all wealth – the soil and the worker”; humans are themselves a part of nature; and socialism as a rational regulation of the metabolism between humanity and nature (Marx and Engels, 1988). Building on these works, Kovel (2011:7) argues ecological civilisation is the eco-socialist answer to neoliberal capitalism, by arguing that capitalism has dissolved time and space, manipulating humans as “slaves of quantity and cold calculation...addicted to sensation, narcissistic, isolated, and disconnected from nature.”

In perspectives from IR and China Studies, Pan Jiahua (2015) summarises that ecological civilisation is a new development paradigm, offering a new political ecology and a style of governance directed by environmental priorities; ecological civilisation is thus not a negation of industrial civilisation or neoliberal capitalism (these ideas will be revisited in the Gramscian (1971) critique below). According to Ahearne (2013:318), ecological civilisation is an alternative vision to the “narcissistic and nihilistic consumer capitalist ‘civilization’ we are currently caught in [sic].” In following ecological civilisation as a new political ecology, where equilibrium is achieved between all biotic communities, some scholars argue that a transformation will depart humanity from the current ideological hegemony of neoliberal capitalism to become an ecological civilisation (Gare, 2010; Magdoff, 2011; and Zhang, li and An, 2011). Thus overcoming the domination and exploitation experienced under the confines of the neoliberal capitalist hegemony. Continuing on from this argument Sanbonmatsu (2004) contends ecological civilisation resembles the concept of *metahumanism*, deepening the understanding that our realities are an unquantifiable field of relational bodies, always in constitutive and changing relationships with one another.

Marinelli (2018) argues that the concept of ecological civilisation is intertwined within the Anthropocene debates that discredit the current development model based on prioritising economic growth despite the impacts it has on the environment. The Anthropocene relates to the current geological period defined by the human effect on global eco-systems (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, 2007). Crutzen and Stoermer

(2000:17) define the Anthropocene as the: “human dominance of biological, chemical and geological processes on Earth”, arguing the process began with the Industrial Revolution during the late eighteenth century in Europe. The ideological and ontological standpoint of the Anthropocene debate considers: the role of human activities and our impact on the planet, as well as the impacts from economic growth and the relationship between knowledge, culture and politics. The Anthropocene debates capture how human activity is changing the planet: Marinelli (2018) argues this is also at the heart of the debate on what the CPC mean by their ecological civilisation concept.

Hence, ecological civilisation is broadly argued to be an ideology creating a civilisation where the fundamentals of ecology are not misunderstood and equilibrium is achieved with a balance between human progress and the progress of all biotic communities creating a sound ecological environment.

What Ecological Civilisation Is Not

Having identified ecological civilisation as a new political ecology, generally applied as a critique of neoliberal capitalism, many scholars then consider to what extent ecological civilisation negates sustainable development. Sustainable development within the ecological civilisation literature is often summarised as the current globally dominant discourse on environmentalism embedded within the confines of neoliberal capitalist ideology (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). Geall and Ely (2018) argue that the vast majority of literary and policy retorts to ecological destruction have predominantly focused on the notion of sustainable development, therefore it is natural to consider to what extent ecological civilisation differs from this globally embedded approach. In defining sustainable development, Redclift (1987) observed, perhaps cynically, that the term ‘sustainable’ implies a notion of “holding out” or “making do”, until relief or a better alternative is attainable. Whereas, development generally implies improvement (Gare, 2017), although this is often assumed *a priori* to any assessment of whether the change is an improvement. Development, even with negative effects, such as resource depletion, tends to be assumed positive when economic growth is achieved (Gare, 2017). Thus sustainable development is rather ambiguous: holding out and yet

simultaneously changing, assumedly to something better. Yet, what is frequently referenced as the official definition of sustainable development is found in the Brundtland (1987:43) report *Our Common Future* and is unsurprisingly of stark contrast: “[D]evelopment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Noticeably, there is no mention, in either definition of sustainable development, of the concepts of ecology or a reduced decadence within human existence.

Ho and Ulanowicz (2005) argue that the decadence and barbarism of human existence are cancers in the current global ecosystem representative of our present industrial civilisation state. Ho and Ulanowicz (2005:47) criticise our current ideological state of neoliberal capitalism as: removing all barriers to trade, finance and procurement thus destroying the neoliberal capitalist system’s intricate space-time structure; over-exploiting the poor, especially in developing countries, thus impoverishing the whole economic system; using natural resources at unsustainable rates, thus preventing the global ecosystem from regenerating; and diminishing the available input into the economic system resulting in an increasingly large harvest of resources, thus creating a vicious cycle that is simultaneously destroying the ecosystem and global economy.

Luxemberg (1968:369) argued how economic capital would never achieve equilibrium and would have to constantly expand, thus fighting “a battle of annihilation [against the] natural economy.” Continuing the war metaphor, Salleh (2008:126) discusses how “poverty” and “development” have become weapons in the ideological armoury of global capital accumulation and its financial institutions. Coffman and Mikulecky (2012) argue that the current industrial civilisation has a fundamentally misconstrued understanding of ecology and consequently operates with defective models of nature and the place of humanity within nature. Kovel (2007) neatly captures such critiques documenting the failings and shortcomings of sustainable developmental as a “greening” of neoliberal capitalism.

Gare (2017) concurs with Kovel (2007) arguing that sustainable development distracts people from the true audacity faced by humanity, preventing necessary transformations in economic, social and political organisation needed to change the ways of living and interacting within our environments; also undermining ecosystems and framing debates on ecological destruction placing them second to continued

economic development (see also, Lakoff, 2004). Kovel (2011) writes that our current status of ecological crises cannot be resolved merely through the administrative, legislative or technological means of sustainable development. Our ecological crises are not an economic problem, but rather a “kind of cancer on the earth” led by our current civilisation ideology creating a pathological economy; to continue under the guidance of neoliberal capitalism or its sustainable development, is to “go along with a manifestly suicidal status quo” (Kovel, 2011:5; see also the Gramscian critique at the end of this chapter).

Built into sustainable development is a bifurcation, whereby the development of the economy is the priority; the biotic communities of ecology, including human communities, are sustainable if they manage to adapt to the continued development of the economy (Gare, 2017). Thus, in the context of a growing economy nothing is sustainable. The literature, which considers ecological civilisation as different to sustainable development, does so by demonstrating the inability of sustainable development to develop sound ecology due to its inherent continuation of neoliberal capitalism. This literature supports the notion that ecological civilisation will no longer prioritise economic growth and thus presents as a new development paradigm (Pan, 2015).

Norgaard (2009:1) writes: “Historically, there were many cultures and hence many life stories. The stories were always evolving, cross-breeding with other life stories, or dying out with the people they sometimes led astray. Now we have one dominant story – the development story of economic growth without limits, the story of unending happiness from the possession of more and more things.” Norgaard (2009) argues how industrial civilisation is spreading to become a global civilisation, which can be seen echoed through the work of Gare (2010). However, for Gare (2010 and 2017) the CPC’s ecological civilisation is a potential alternative “life story” or “narrative of identity”, and to what extent the CPC’s ecological civilisation differs from sustainable development will be discussed shortly having first considered how ecological civilisation may come to be.

How Ecological Civilisation May Come to Exist

In accepting ecological civilisation as a new political ecology or development ideology, scholars including Gare (2014) and Marinelli (2018) face a dilemma in thinking about how ecological civilisation can come to exist. In particular is how to make ecological civilisation attractive and achievable to the populace. Gare (2014) states most people in developed economies are unlikely to revert to simple agrarian subsistence farming, which Gare (2014) amongst others, such as Wen, Lau, Cheng, He and Qiu (2012), refer to as a potential ecological civilisation set-up. Gare (2010) argues scholars and politicians alike are struggling to redefine development in a way that considers ecology alongside post-mechanistic sciences whilst still being attractive to the populace: ecological civilisation is considered backwards or unattractive. Salleh (2008) highlights how we are presented a choice between free market globalisation, economic growth and the possession of things *or* environmental protection.

However, developed economies – with their possessions and things – are not the only economies impacted by climate change or environmental degradation. Ecological civilisation needs to span developed, developing and underdeveloped economies in a way that succeeds and combines traditional subsistence agrarian civilisation, industrial civilisation and ecological civilisation in an appealing manner (Pan, 2006c). Wen, et al. (2012) consider how there appears to be a general pattern where the greater the reliance on agriculture for employment, the poorer the country tends to be. However, they argue that such a causal relationship creates false impressions: the real cost of industrialisation and modernisation has not been considered, especially not environmental costs. Within the context of the PRC, Wen, et al. (2012) argue how the pressure to accumulate capital, to self-propel and participate within global competition, creates a resource deficit, whereby land, labour and money is taken from the agricultural and rural areas, leaving behind an aging population and women raising children, which creates an economic vacuum. Wen, et al. (2012) state how this historical pattern of modernisation is destroying both nature and community, but most importantly, it destroys the diverse array of specialised indigenous and traditional knowledge on how best to utilise local resources (see also Liang Shuming's arguments on modernisation that avoids dehumanisation; Zhang, 2016). Wen Tiejun and Liang Shuming, both stipulate

that indigenous and traditional knowledge is essential for best practice with regards to environmental governance: essential for the construction of ecological civilisation.

Returning to Gare's (2010) notion of civilisation as a noun of process, in considering the CPC's ecological civilisation concept, he proposes a method for how to transition to an ecological civilisation. Firstly, Gare (2010) also identifies the overlapping indigenous and traditional knowledge of European civilisations (such as, Greek, Roman, Medieval and Modern civilisations) and characterises them as in opposition to that of Chinese civilisations (in which Gare includes the numerous different dynasties, as well as the more recent differences between the economic, political, spiritual and material civilisations heralded by the CPC (also see Goron, 2018)). For Gare (2010) these differing civilisations provide us with an array of unique "narratives of identity" with different assumptions of the world and the place of humanity within nature. Gare (2010) argues that through co-extensive contribution making across the array of narratives of identity, we will reach an ultimate end worth striving for: where ecology and harmony between nature and man will permeate across all domains of culture, practices and institutions and thus transform society into an ecological civilisation.

Gare (2010) furthers that this all-encompassing narrative of identity will take a significantly long time to be produced. However, Gare (2010) does state that this process is currently taking place, but with the ideals of the European industrial civilisation thus transforming all civilisations throughout the world into an industrial civilisation via neoliberal capitalism (see also, Ahearne, 2013; and Norgaard, 2009). Gare (2017) contends that the conversion into a neoliberal capitalist order is necessary and needed before being able to progress to ecological civilisation (see also, Pan, 2006c). Gare (2010) argues a global ecological civilisation can only come into existence from a world-order united through industrial civilisation first with a shared level of development before transcending to become an ecological civilisation, which is pertinent for the PRC.

This notion of liminal or dialectical progression is also supported in the Chinese literature on development, especially by Pan Yue (2007) and Wu Shaoxia; Wu contends that ecological civilisation is an inevitable process of progress and will be "seen as [an] irreversible global trend, as much as it was with the transition to agricultural civilization, and industrial civilization of human society [sic]" (cited in Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzhieva, 2016:3). Pan (2006c) argued that the world has gone through three

phases of civilisation so far: primitive, agricultural and industrial; he stresses that the global ecological crises demonstrates the necessity to move onto a new civilisation mode and that ecological civilisation represents that transcendence beyond industrial civilisation to a more advanced human state. Goron (2018) similarly argues that the CPC have specifically chosen to promote ecological civilisation with liminality in mind, playing on the political meaning behind “civilising” in the CPC’s rhetoric, such as in Deng’s spiritual civilisation (*Jingshen wenming*, 精神文明) and material civilisation (*Wuzhi wenming*, 物质文明) and the aforementioned *Wenming guojia* concept of constructing a “singular civilised State” (Cartier, 2013).

Gare (2010:12) argues ecological civilisation will be founded on a transformation of aspirations, deep assumptions, the reorganisation of society, ways of thinking and ways of living, “and yet it will preserve and sometimes revive all that was best in these and other civilizations, allowing for diversity and difference and the preservation of the identities of previous civilizations [sic].” Kovel (2011) argues that Marx had opened this pathway, but rather than develop an eco-socialism, Marx focused on the process of labour. Kovel (2011) thus suggests the prefiguration for transforming into an ecological civilisation is to break the “chains of generalized commodity production [sic]”: to reduce our want of things. Kovel (2011) furthers that ecological civilisation would have to represent an alternative ideology where instead of capital, nature is the integral; rather than valuing nature for how we can manipulate it for human use, nature should be “valued for its ‘suchness’” (Kovel, 2011:14).

Similarly, Zhang and Wang (2013) contend that the construction of ecological civilisation must conform to nature, but in doing so must also support civilised development, pursue social reproduction via ecological economics, protect natural ecosystems and gradually change the traditional high-carbon and linear production mode of industrialisation into a low-carbon circular economy via scientific development (also see, Pan, 2015). To do so Zhang and Wang (2013) argue that human labour, as a productive force is the key to these changes. Alternatively, in a much more simplistic sense, Zhang and Wang (2013) also identify protecting and restoring clean water and healthy forests as key starting points of natural ecosystems to transform into an ecological civilisation. However, there is still no clarity as to whether the ecological civilisation described by Wang and Zhang (2013) differs from sustainable development.

Ecological principles and the collaboration between narratives of identity have been identified as the means for a shared and liminal progression towards ecological civilisation: a political ecology where an alternative relationship between nature and humanity, between individuals and all biotic communities and the overall nature of civilisation is encapsulated (Gare, 2017; Kovel, 2011; and Zhang and Wang, 2013). Yet there appears to still be a lack of a concrete understanding on how to adopt ecological civilisation as a new political ecology, ideology and approach. Rhetoric and emotion is therefore crucial, as any attempt to create a change in direction towards environmental governance captured within the political ecology of an ecological civilisation is still only taking place within the political discourse, as opposed to in practice. How the CPC's production, and use, of emotion within their rhetoric is instrumental in attempting to create this change and therefore understand the CPC's own interpretation of an ecological civilisation.

Chinese Concept(s) of Ecological Civilisation

Many have attributed the coining of ecological civilisation to Lipitsky (1984) an environmental expert in the former Soviet Union (USSR) who published an article on "ecological culture" (экологической культуры) this article was then translated into Chinese as "ecological civilisation" by Wong a year later in the *Guangming Daily* (Goron, 2018; Huan, 2008; Marinelli, 2018; and Morrison, 1995). Alternatively, Pan Jiahua (2015:54) attributes the concept of ecological civilisation to the Chinese scholar Ye Qianji (1984). Pan (2015) argues that Ye's concept was based on the ancient Chinese philosophy of "nature and man as one" (*Tianren heyi*, 天人合一; referred to as *Tianren heyi* throughout the remainder of this thesis), and defined ecological civilisation as a philosophy on the relationship between nature and humanity.

Ye's (1982) conception of ecological civilisation related to sustainable agriculture and was developed in his dissertation: *Ecological Agriculture – A Green Revolution in my Country's Agriculture*. Important to note is Ye's opening speech from 1987 at the National Conference on Eco-Agriculture, where he called for "vigorously promoting the construction of eco-civilization [sic]" throughout the PRC (Marinelli, 2018). Ye (1984)

conceptualised that an ecological civilisation would be a civilisation where both nature and society would benefit through harmony as a form of environmental protection. Ye (1988) also aspired for the twenty-first century to be the century of ecological civilisation construction. Although Ye has made a multitude of contributions to the Chinese conception of ecological civilisation, not all can be discussed here.

However, a noteworthy contribution from Ye is his ecological catastrophe theory, which was presented (aged 90) at the Beijing Xiangshan Scientific Conference in 1999. His theory proclaims that modern economics was leading to environmental turmoil, arguing we now exist as a human ecosystem, rather than a natural ecosystem; human activities have upset the natural “fluctuation” of natural ecologies leading us towards a collapse of nature; and human activities are causing a “death zone” in destroying natural forest, through farmland, desertification and thus depleting the land entirely (Marinelli, 2018). These ideas can be seen in the later works of Kovel (2007 and 2011) discussed above. Ye summarised by claiming ecology is the science of survival, with the answers to prevent the anthropogenic destruction of all eco-systems through creating the harmonious development of ecological civilisation or *Tianren heyi*: harmony between man and nature.

Pan (2015) maintains traditional Chinese philosophies are the crux of the Chinese ecological civilisation and refers to the seminal works of Laozi, the founder of Taoism 2500 years ago, and the influential philosopher Zhuang Zhou. Laozi argued in *Tao Te Ching* that the people live in accordance with the ways of the land and everything must follow the laws of nature. Zhuang Zhou further developed the philosophical thoughts of “nature and man as one”, which has been described by Ji Xianlin as a friendship between humanity and nature (Pan, 2015). For Pan (2015) these traditional Chinese philosophical beginnings elevate ecological civilisation as a new development paradigm for the CPC’s environmental governance. Somewhat similar is the influential work by Liang Shuming, who tried to revitalise historical Chinese philosophical traditions, especially that of self-cultivation, in order to find parallels in Western styles of academic learning (Zhang, 2016). Liang believed the PRC was best advised to follow a route of “Westernisation”, but needed to avoid the risk of dehumanisation. Zhang (2016) argues that in Liang’s view the PRC need a development

model that draws upon the individuality and social organisation of the West, alongside the Chinese tradition of self-cultivation of their life's purpose.

Pan Yue (2006c) argued that every dynasty from Chinese history had environmental protection laws, arguing this is because ecological conservation is an indispensable part of Chinese culture. Pan Yue (2001:1) summarises how "From the Taoist view of Tao respecting nature, to the Confucian idea of humans and nature becoming one, to the Buddhist belief that all living things are equal", Chinese culture provides the necessary spirit to solve the current ecological crises and construct an ecological civilisation. Both Pan Yue and Pan Jiahua focus on how traditional Chinese culture holds the answers to contemporary environmental problems. From this, Heurtebise (2017) argues that the CPC's ecological civilisation discourse cultivates a "cultural chauvinism" based on such traditional Chinese philosophical thinking and it is this that captures the Chinese definition of an ecological civilisation (Goron, 2018:40).

Yet, Kovel (2011) discusses how every traditional culture shares a recognition and wonder of the natural world and humanity's place within nature. Kovel (2011) contends all contemporary societies now assume humanity is above nature, rendering ecological civilisation necessary. However, Kovel (2011:15) does also argue that Taoist principles are key to ecological civilisation. Salleh (2008) similarly argues that the humanity-nature dialectic found in traditional Taoist philosophy is at the centre of ecological civilisation. Salleh (2008) discusses how a holistic ecological ideology grounded in the "internal relations" of Taoist belief could provide a fresh intellectual leadership for future environmental governance. Thus we see in the context of a Chinese ecological civilisation that the concept is argued as based within the wisdom of Chinese characteristics of their philosophies and culture.

However, traditional Chinese philosophies had been treated as "smelling dreadfully musty" since the May Fourth movement of 1919 (also referred to as "China's First Enlightenment") (Wang, et al., 2014:54). A nihilistic attitude abandoned traditional concepts of respecting heaven, having awe of the Dao, believing in the oneness of humanity and nature, as well as traditions of thrift and the wisdom of cherishing all living things (Wang, et al., 2014:54). According to Pan Jiahua (2015) harmony between humanity and nature, which had successfully governed China's great historical civilisation(s), could not prevent the takeover of the industrial civilisation with advanced

science and productivity levels. Pan (2015) describes the Great Leap Forward of the 1950's and the reckless agricultural campaigns of the 1970's as the beginnings of the PRC's environmental devastation.

Huan (2009:3) argues how: "The crux of China's environmental problem is the one-dimensional economic ideology of modernization development [sic]": arguing how the PRC is a political and social servant of economic growth logic and capital. Both the CPC and the populace have embraced environmentally damaging economic growth and vastly strayed away from ideas of human-nature oneness. For example, although environmentalists protested, for almost a decade, against the building of dams on the Nu River, many indigenous residents supported the project to see their region develop and benefit from the economic growth the dams would bring (Orlik, 2012; and Wang, et al., 2014:40). Wang, et al. (2014:41) similarly contend that the PRC has become "deeply influence by Western modernity, China has predominantly accepted an anthropocentric world view and values" regarding humans as separate from nature, which has become a world of objects for our manipulation. The departure from traditional Chinese values seen in the popular folk ballads that emanated from Mao's regime, instilled anti-nature principles: "In heaven there is no jade emperor [the supreme deity of Daoism], On earth there is no dragon king [the rain god in Chinese mythology], I am the jade emperor, I am the dragon king. Let the mountains make way, I am coming" (Wang et al., 2014:41).

However, scholars such as Zheng Zhen, try to question how the PRC could be suffering from such terrible environmental destruction arguing it is the capitalist approach of the West that is to blame for ecological crises. Zheng (2013) argues that the PRC, as a socialist country, should not suffer maladies of environmental degradation as he insists the PRC is not a capitalist country. Despite Zheng's attempts, even Pan Yue (2007:1), whilst working extensively on eco-socialism (*Shengtai shehuizhuyi*, 生态社会主义) has argued that the development mode of the CPC had become non-socialist and that environmental disasters had been "because our mode of economic modernization has been copied from western, developed nations [sic]." Wen, et al. (2012) purport how the political and ideological exports of global capitalism have caused a century of conflicts manifested within chronic over-accumulation, going on to add that such conflicts are evident at both the global level and in the PRC itself.

Pan (2007) contends that development under ecological civilisation should be sustained by focusing on environmental protection and social justice, not economic growth (Ansfield, 2013; Geall and Ely, 2018; Huan, 2008; and Yu, 2010). Pan's (2007:1) focus on social justice was important, he argued, because "in theory, socialism is more suited to the realisation of sustainable development than capitalism". Although Pan's (2007) argument agrees with those of Zheng in socialism being a more suitable approach for environmentalism, Pan (2007) accepts that the CPC had not been pursuing a socialist environmental approach.

These arguments thus purport that sustainable development, as an approach embedded within a neo-liberal mind-set, is destined to fail, due it emanating from the same ideology causing the environmental destruction. Pan Yue (2006c) contends that only Chinese culture is able to highlight the flaws in capitalist development and provide answers for more harmonious and socialist development: allowing the PRC to use Western logic in their modernisation as Chinese understanding can be applied to modernise and update Western ideas (see also Liang Shuming). Pan (2006c:19) argues it is necessary for the PRC to look inwards at Chinese culture again for "correct guideline[s]" and ecological wisdom to prevent the serious conflict between humanity and nature experienced from following the capitalist development mode. Pan (2006c) emphasises the complementary nature of Chinese culture and eco-socialism, arguing that the West have missed their opportunity to develop a new civilisation; according to Pan (2006c:18) this is the PRC's opportunity to "realize a leap-forward in this regard [sic]."

The notion here of Western logic mixing with Chinese culture signifies Gare's (2010) ideas on the merging of differing "narratives of identity", but for Pan (2006c) it is the superiority of Chinese culture that allows the Chinese to use Western logic and decipher it differently to the PRC's advantage. Kovel (2011) in his discussion of Marx as a precursor to ideas of an ecological civilisation identifies how Marx's early eco-socialist ideas represent a merging of his Western thought on capital with Buddhist philosophy². Hence, ecological civilisation is again considered as different to the Western capitalist

² This followed Marx's receiving of a two-volume biography of Buddha, which he called "an important work" (Sheasby, 2004:55).

principles; ecological civilisation provides the “correct” guidelines from Chinese culture highlighting flaws in Western logic.

In considering how the PRC is to become an ecological civilisation Pan Jiahua (2015) argues for green, healthy and rational ways of life, rather than extravagance, possession and waste. Pan (2015) contends that this will be done through the CPC’s construction of an ecological civilisation that will represent harmony between humanity and nature by applying modern scientific knowledge and technological innovation gained through the industrial civilisation and regulated through the traditional Chinese philosophies on nature. To Pan (2015) the central elements of ecological civilisation, as a new development paradigm, are: harmony, cultural development, justice and efficiency. Harmony is the mutual benefit and tolerance between humanity and nature, and is the external reflection of ecological civilisation. Cultural development means high quality of life, and is the ultimate objective. Justice is safeguarding the rights of humanity and nature, and is the foundation of ecological civilisation. Efficiency is equilibrium between input and output of resources, and is the realisation of ecological civilisation (Pan, 2015). Yet, Pan (2015) still stresses that an ecological civilisation does not lead to the dwindling of society or economy, but rather it supports economic prosperity and social stability. Whereas with Gare, and the eco-socialist movement, ecological civilisation focuses on diminishing human decadence and concentrates on ecological equilibrium, here the Chinese conception of ecological civilisation furthers economic prosperity raises the question of its variance from sustainable development.

Alternatively, Zhang and Wang (2013:184-185) contend that education and mass propaganda by the CPC is “crucially important” to educate children on the new ideological paradigm. They further that new consumption activities must be “guided by the scientific point of view in accordance with eco-economic laws, and low-carbon and circular development must be promoted” (Zhang and Wang, 2013:190). Yet conversely, Wang, et al., (2014) insist that environmental law in the PRC has failed to protect the environment since the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) was passed in 1979. Wang Canfa (2014), a distinguished environmental lawyer, highlights how many new environmental laws have been passed since the EPL, including: nine environmental protection laws (e.g. the Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the Water Pollution Prevention Law and the Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law);

seventeen resource efficiency laws (e.g. the Cleaner Production Promotion Law and the Renewable Energy Law); fifty administrative laws and regulations as well as 660 local government regulations and 800 national standards have also been enacted (Wang, et al., 2014). There is no lack of environmental protection laws in the PRC suggesting that enacting environmental laws alone cannot construct an ecological civilisation (Wang, 2010; and Wang, et al., 2014). To an extent, this also questions how affective historical environmental laws were in protecting China's environment. Yet, Pan Yua (2006a) and Pan Jiahua (2015) use historical analogies of the past successes of environmental protection laws in China as evidences of Chinese wisdom and culture as previously successfully protecting the environment.

Alternatively, Zhang and Wang (2013) focus on a trinity of solutions: low carbon development (conservation of fossil fuels, protecting and creating forests and general reduction of carbon within the atmosphere); circular development (reduction, reusing and recycling of resources); and the scientific point of view (technological innovation, market dynamism and government policies) (see also, Pan, 2015). Zhang and Wang (2013) also argue that ecological civilisation is a higher stage of human evolution than the current industrial civilisation due to ecological civilisation respecting the natural environment that humans rely upon. However, other than labelling ecological civilisation as a Chinese approach to environmental protection, especially in using Chinese wisdom and culture to stipulate the difference of Chineseness to the West and in claiming historical analogies of successful environmental laws as demonstrating past successes, there is no clear indication as to how, or even if, ecological civilisation departs from sustainable development.

The literature exploring the Chinese concept of ecological civilisation can be seen as providing a means through which “the Chinese people revalue their own traditional ecological wisdom”; it questions previous political ecologies and environmental governance, as well as the entire set of ideologies on capitalism, anthropocentric worldviews, Western modernity and sustainable development (Foster, 2002; Geall and Ely, 2018; Pan, 2006c; Wang, He and Fan, 2014:54; Wang, et al., 2015; and Zhou, 2006). However, the biggest obstacle highlighted from this literature has been whether ecological civilisation will help re-focus the PRC's ideals of development away from the

reliance on economic growth (Wang, et al., 2014); and thus from the concept and practice of (Western) sustainable development.

Prioritising Economic Growth: An Obstacle to Ecological Civilisation

Salleh (2008) argues that ecological civilisation is not always interpreted throughout the PRC in an eco-socialist way, furthering that some see a new opportunity for economic growth under the rubric of a “socialist” ecological civilisation. Lu, Dong and Lian (2016:32) summarise the goals of the CPC’s construction of an ecological civilisation as being to reverse environmental deterioration, create a liveable environment, lay the foundations of an “ecologically sustainable development of China” and to contribute to global ecological enhancement. However, Lu, et al. (2016) stress that whereas in post-industrial countries (developed economies) ecological civilisation is akin to environmental protection and conservation practices, in the PRC (which they class as a developing economy) ecological civilisation is a means to achieve greater economic development without compromising the environment (further).

Thus, if what Lu, et al. (2016) argues is true, ecological civilisation is akin to sustainable development within the PRC due to the continued focus on economic development as a necessity before environmental protection. Lu, et al. (2016) conclude that going on to develop a socialist ecological civilisation would be better for the CPC, arguing the PRC just need to reach higher levels of development first. Similarly, Goron (2018), in her analysis of the layers of political and theoretical meaning(s) invested in the ecological civilisation discourse by scholars and politicians alike, argues that this process has limited the scope of ecological civilisation, reducing its ability to critically engage with capitalism, democracy and green political theories and instead focuses on being a contribution to the global scientific endeavour of sustainable development. Gare (2010) argues the same by stipulating that a certain (shared) level of development would need to be reached (via industrial civilisation) before advancing to become an ecological civilisation. Kovel (2011) similarly questioned to what extent the CPC’s ecological civilisation is anything more than continued sustainable development within the context of a developing nation. There therefore appears to be a discrepancy in what an

ecological civilisation can be, how it begins and that this is dependent upon the level of development already attained.

Huan (2008) meticulously considered what an ecological civilisation may look like and how it may arise when interwoven within the CPC's goals for economic growth. Huan (2008) argues that the real environmental threat facing the PRC was the CPC's increasing dependence on economic growth with the only solution to prevent economic *and* environmental collapse being the construction of a socialist ecological civilisation. Huan (2008) distinguishes a growing economy (developing nation) from a growth economy (developed nation), where a growing economy may undergo rapid stages of economic growth, but that this is aligned with development progression, it is socially controlled and can be reversed. A growth economy, however, is growth-orientated and growth-dependent and continues to pursue economic growth regardless of developmental requirements, it is market controlled and is difficult to reverse. During the late twentieth century the PRC's development and ability to meet the basic needs of the people (such as food, housing, healthcare, etc.) initially relied upon an emerging and growing economy. However, during the early twenty-first century the economy has been increasingly subject to maximising profits and proliferating capital opposed to meeting basic needs (Cutler and Doyle, 2019; Huan, 2008; and Raiklin, 2013).

Huan (2008) acknowledges that a "clear-cut" distinction between the two economies can be hard to distinguish, however, he argues that when an economy switches from pursuing people's basic needs to people's wants that the transition to become a growth economy has begun. Huan (2008) argues that in many ways the PRC has started to become a growth economy, and that although not all of the citizens' basic needs have yet been met, a vast majority of urban dwelling citizens are now enjoying a life supported by a growth economy attempting to supply and meet the demand of wants.

The CPC are standing at a political crossroad: one direction chases continued economic growth regardless of the environment; the second pursues economic growth in line with sustainable development creating notions of greener economic growth; and the third offers an alternative; a socialist ecological civilisation where economic growth is no longer a priority (Gare, 2012 and 2014; Huan, 2008; and Goron, 2018). Huan (2008) illustrates how the CPC over a period of four decades have pursued economic growth

under the guise of environmental policies: transforming the PRC into a growth economy. This could not be clearer than when Qu Geping (2005), the former head of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) said: “The fundamental reason why economic indicators can be easily achieved every year while environmental protection indicators can not is that economic development is still dominated by the conventional model of development characterized as “high investment, high consumption, high pollution”, and the decisions for many large-scale developing projects are made through unscientific and undemocratic procedures [sic].” Kovel (2011) writes how Marx had argued that capital’s dominion had a clear priority: the accumulation of wealth over all other values, thus sacrificing humanity and nature to gain profit. Qu’s statement echoes the concern of Marx whereby economic growth dominates all other values.

When considering the CPC’s desire of creating an ecological civilisation alongside the PRC’s features of an emerging growth economy it highlights the high likelihood of continued ecological destruction in favour of continued economic growth (Huan, 2008). Huan (2008) clearly states that the main challenge facing the PRC regarding ecological destruction comes back to which path the CPC choose to take at their metaphorical crossroad: the challenge is not the creation of pollution, but rather the increasing dependence upon economic growth (Sarkar, 1999). Economic growth is impossible without the exploitation and consumption of natural resources, which in turn becomes responsible for the environmental degradation regardless of any high-tech innovation or green technology (Gare, 2012 and 2014; and Huan, 2008).

A “greening” of industry and consumerism, although potentially reducing the level or type of ecological destruction, is an illogical path to take if intending to create an ecological civilisation as defined above as a new development paradigm. Other growth economies, such as Western European States, have only achieved economic growth and environmental protection by transferring a majority of their poisonous wastes and dirty economic sectors to other growing economies, thus it has been achieved at the expense of others (Huan, 2008). Huan’s (2008) analysis therefore suggests the CPC would have to change their direction of governance away from the priority of economic growth in order to pursue a transition to become an ecological civilisation, otherwise what is labelled ecological civilisation would be akin to the sustainable development already in practice. Despite Huan’s (2008) study being over a decade old, the arguments

are still pertinent when considering how the CPC prioritises economic growth and to what extent their ecological civilisation differs from prior political ecologies in this regard. If a glorification of economic growth is found within the ecological civilisation rhetoric then it would seem the imagined future for the PRC is unlikely to be one of a green, clean and beautiful ecological civilisation after all.

The literature review will now present the CPC's changing political ecologies, chronologically, starting with Deng Xiaoping's Environmental Protection National Policy. This literature will be explored in order to ascertain what, if anything, appears to be different within the current political ecology of the CPC's concept of an ecological civilisation.

The Communist Party of China's Political Ecologies, 1983-2007

According to the State Council, starting in the 1980's, the CPC have produced three major political ecologies; ecological civilisation is understood within this thesis to now be the fourth as the State Council White Paper was published in 2006. The State Council identified these political ecologies by describing a political ecology and resulting environmental governance as being the successfully proposed, formulated and dominating political thinking of the CPC responding to the growing environmental problems experienced within the PRC (White Paper on China's Environmental Protection, 1996 and 2006). First was Deng Xiaoping's Environmental Protection National Policy (1983-1991); second, was Jiang Zemin's Sustainable Development Strategy (1992-2001); and third, Hu Jintao's Scientific Development (2002-2012). This thesis recognises ecological civilisation as the fourth of the CPC's political ecologies (2007-present) (Huan, 2008). Each of these eras has been well documented within the literature; the key elements from each will be presented below.

However, before noting the key elements of each of the four political ecologies adopted by the CPC to date, as both Chinese and non-Chinese authors have observed, Mao's leadership also merits a brief comment. Far from the ancient Chinese philosophical concepts such as harmony between man and nature, the beginning of the CPC and Mao's era saw a plethora of slogans with very anti-environmental ideals. Mao's

“man must conquer nature” (*ren ding sheng tian*, 人定胜天), is in many ways a direct opposite of “nature and man as one” (*Tianren heyi*) (Pan, 2015; Wang, et al., 2014). Mao’s political ecology was thus one of proactive environmental destruction in favour of nation building. For Shapiro (2001) the slogans of Mao’s period reflected a militarised discourse, with the hallmarks of “utopian urgency” and “dogmatic uniformity”, seen in the large-scale reclamation and relocation projects. Nothing demonstrates this anti-nature disposition of Mao’s leadership more clearly than the images created by Jung Chang (1991) in her (auto)biography *Wild Swans* with her memories of schools closing so that the pupils could tear out the grass to prevent it from growing.

This extreme anti-environment stance – where destruction was promoted down to the individual level – which left vast scars on the PRC’s landscape thankfully began to come to an end as Deng’s leadership developed an increasingly environmentally aware political ecology. The somewhat more environmentally friendly steps that began to take place under the pretext of the Environmental Protection National Policy will now be presented below. It is unsurprising that the State Council’s White Papers (1996 and 2006) fail to include Mao’s environmental record within their list of the successfully proposed, formulated and dominating political thinking of the CPC in responding to the growing environmental problems of the PRC; rather than responding to environmental destruction, Mao was responsible for it (Shapiro, 2001).

Deng Xiaoping’s Environmental Protection National Policy (1983 – 1991)

The CPC’s beginnings of an environmentally friendly political ecology are attributed to have begun in the 1970s: Geall and Ely (2018) highlight three important events of 1972 that allow them to identify this year as a turning point in the CPC’s environmental governance, narratives and actions. Firstly, due in part to the U.S.-China rapprochement, the PRC now occupied a seat in the United Nations and thus the PRC participated in the influential 1972 Stockholm conference on Human Development (Edmonds, 2011). Concurrently, the PRC suffered a red tide or toxic algal bloom, which caused a devastating die-off of shellfish in Dalian, and thirdly, in Beijing it was discovered that fish being sold in the markets had high levels of toxins and chemicals

poisoning those eating the fish (Geall and Ely, 2018; and Muldavin, 2008). Seemingly as a result the State Council decided to establish the first Investigation and Treatment Committee on Environmental Issues, which was headed by the Premier, Zhou Enlai (Geall and Ely, 2018).

1973 saw the PRC's first national conference on environmental protection, which was held in Beijing (Muldavin, 2008). The conference called for the "overall and rational planning, reduction of harm, a reliance on the masses and both the protection of the environment and the enriching of the people" (Geall and Ely, 2018:7) and created a series of "end-of-pipe" pollution control targets and regulatory decrees (Weng, Dong, Wu and Ying, 2015:7). The CPC also produced its first environmental publication: *Environmental Protection (Huanjing Baohu, 环境保护)* (Chinese Council on International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), 2013; and Geall and Ely, 2018). The rhetoric that came from this first environmental protection conference became the benchmark of the CPC's environmental governance and has barely changed in five decades.

This environmental awareness (of sorts) and the CPC's first political ecology did not gain national policy status until 1983 and when it did, the Environmental Protection National Policy came into existence as a reaction to Deng's Reform and Opening Up from 1978 (Huan, 2008). According to Huan (2008), since the founding of the PRC in 1949 environmental degradation and pollution had not been greatly acknowledged as a problem to be on the agenda of a socialist regime. Huan (2008) earmarks the PRC's participation in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Development as a result of the political insight of Zhou Enlai, rather than an overall awareness of environmental politics throughout the CPC. Despite these apparent momentous changes in the CPC's environmental governance throughout the 1970's and 1980's little happened to protect the PRC's environment. In 1986, three years after the introduction of the Environmental Protection National Policy, Deng updated the constitution and principal contradiction creating a political shift away from Marxism and class struggle and towards understanding the PRC's backwards production mode and thus beginning the CPC's "worship" and "addiction" of economic development and growth (Wang, et al., 2014:39-40).

With the impetus of the Environmental Protection National Policy originating alongside the political shift towards economic growth a national administrative and legal system was eventually developed for environmental protection. This process culminated in the production of the EPL, passed by the National People's Congress in 1989. The administrative system responsible for constructing the EPL was also enhanced from the National Environmental Protection Bureau (affiliated with the Ministry for City and Country Construction) to the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), which was now directly accountable to the State Council (Huan, 2008). However, the fundamental objective of the Environmental Protection National Policy was that economic modernisation was to be the priority. Ultimately, it was hoped that the goal of environmental protection would be achieved whilst furthering economic development; environmental protection had officially been made second, politically and legally, to economic growth (Huan, 2008).

It was Deng's Reform and Opening Up that started the process of transferring the PRC from a centralised planning system to a market-orientated system, resulting in a decade-long period of high-speed growth (Huan, 2008). At this stage in the PRC's development Huan (2008) clearly classifies the PRC as a growing economy. Huan (2008) argues a reasonable explanation for this dominance of economic modernisation is that the PRC was in the early stages of initiation and development; accordingly, the basic needs of the people were not yet being met. Similarly, environmental pollution and degradation was not yet as severe as the levels experienced today: compared to the levels of noticeable poverty, the levels of negative environmental outcomes for the upsurge in economic development most likely seemed "bearable and/or forgivable" (Huan, 2008:1).

Jiang Zemin's Sustainable Development Strategy (1992- 2001)

In 1992 the PRC participated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. What is frequently cited as one of the most influential outcomes of this conference is the popularity it attached to the phrase "sustainable development". Working on Brundtland's (1987:43) sustainable development

definition, the Rio conference adapted the definition so that sustainable development would become: “the capability of maintaining over indefinite periods of time specified values of human wellbeing, social equity and environmental quality” (Leach, Scoones and Stirling, 2010:xiv). Concomitantly, Jiang Zemin had begun to initiate the second of the CPC’s political ecologies: the Sustainable Development Strategy (1992-2002). *Our Common Future* (1987) influenced, to some extent, the development of Jiang’s Sustainable Development Strategy, which had predominantly been developed to participate in the Rio Summit in 1992, and went on to receive high popularity and public support (Huan, 2008).

The CPC’s translation was “development that can be sustained” (*kechixu fazhan*, 可持续发展); there was no suggestion of environmental protection undermining economic development (Goron, 2018). The changing dynamics of sustainable development experienced at Rio, of “human wellbeing, social equity and environmental quality” did not upstage the CPC’s priority on economic growth (Leach, et al. 2010:18. Hence, the CPC’s Sustainable Development Strategy continued supporting economic development opposed to developing a means of improving and protecting environmental and social conditions (Huan, 2008). Throughout the 1990’s, sustainable development became a key phrase in the CPC’s environmental literature, but specifically for furthering economic growth (Meng, 2012).

In 1994, the CPC broke new ground by becoming one of the first governments to write a national strategic sustainable development plan: *China’s Agenda 21* (Weng, Dong, Wu and Qin, 2015). Moreover, the Ninth Five Year Plan (FYP) written in 1996 for the period up until 2000 was the first FYP to include environmental governance (Edmonds, 2011). 1997 also saw the CPC’s first National Sustainable Development Report published, as well as the 15th Party Congress, where the “huge environmental and resource pressures caused by population growth and economic development” were identified as major difficulties faced throughout the PRC (Geall and Ely, 2018:8; and Meng, 2012). The report summarised the foremost achievements, as well as challenges, within environmental protection over the past and coming decades.

Under the guise of the Sustainable Development Strategy a number of policy realisations were attained: work towards international treaties on global environmental degradation issues caused by greenhouse gas emissions, as well as greater protection

for bio-diversity were achieved (Huan, 2008). Consequently, in 1998 the NEPA was again elevated to become the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The SEPA now had increased governmental status working towards furthering environmental protection across the PRC demonstrating intent towards increasing the importance of environmental policy within the PRC (Huan, 2008). The importance attached to the environment for political means is clear to see, however, the environment was still being used as a tool to ensure sustainable economic development.

Five years later, in 2002, Jiang Zemin made an important step to officially include sustainable development as a part of *Xiaokang*; a “moderately prosperous” society that characterised Jiang’s leadership (Tilt, 2010:11). Jiang called for: “The continual strengthening of sustainable development ability, improvement of the environment, clear increases in resource efficiency, the promotion of harmony between humanity and nature and putting society as a whole onto a development path of production, wealth and environmental-friendliness” (Meng, 2012:1). Here Jiang started to introduce the rhetoric associated with ecological civilisation; we specifically see the introduction of “harmony between humanity and nature”, but we also see the contradiction of prioritised production and wealth coming before environmental-friendliness (Huan, 2008; and Ye, 1984).

The deteriorating ecological reality being lived was far different from the propagated political ecology of the CPC (Huan, 2008). There was – and still is – a clear-cut gap between the rhetorical green fantasies of the CPC and the daily-lived experience of the citizens of the PRC (Schmitt, 2016). However, again, as with Deng’s Environmental Protection National Policy, the aim of the Sustainable Development Strategy was to ensure continued economic development with the recognition of environmental protection needs (Huan, 2009). Ultimately, following a paradigm of sustainable development could, at best, introduce new dimensions of environmental awareness into economic growth. However, continued prioritisation of economic growth degenerated the status of the environment into a tool for creating maintainable economic growth (Huan, 2009).

The CPC slogan “development is the top priority” (*fa zhan shi ying dao li*, 发展是硬道理) highlights how the Sustainable Development Strategy continued the diminishing of the environment in favour of economic development. As with Deng’s Environmental

Protection National Policy, many explanations can be considered as to why the CPC continued to promote economic growth over environmental protection; the PRC was still a growing economy meeting the basic needs of most citizens. This weak version of sustainable development did very little to curb the environmental degradation experienced within the PRC (Huan, 2008).

Hu Jintao's Scientific Development (2002 – 2012)

2002 saw Hu Jintao take over the leadership of the CPC, and with Hu came the “scientific view of development” (*kexue de fazhan guan*, 科学发展观), or scientific development. Hu intended for this political ecology to approach development in a way that helped to conserve resources and be more environmentally-friendly (Geall and Ely, 2018). Although Hu did not officially introduce the phrase until 2004, the ideas and changes in conception can be seen in the CPC's 16th National Congress in 2002 (Huan, 2008). Fundamentally, scientific development represented an alternative attempt to re-conceptualise the relationship between environmental protection and economic development (Huan, 2008). This re-conceptualisation became necessary as a product of the three-decades long high economic growth that was beginning to change the development status of the PRC: the PRC was increasingly transforming into a growth economy rather than existing solely as a growing economy meeting the basic needs of all citizens (Huan, 2009).

The PRC's economy had grown to be the third largest economy globally, however, the PRC's competitive rates were very low. This low competitiveness prevented the CPC and PRC from being, or feeling, powerful on the world stage (Huan, 2008). Moreover, the continued high rates of growth had become unmanageable and unsustainable, especially with regards to the environment and natural resources. Thus, a rational decision had to be made that would consider how to systematically transform the concept of development within the PRC without preventing a continued high-rate of development: Hu's response was scientific development, with the three key features of: competitiveness, quality and environmentally-friendliness (Huan, 2008; and Pan, 2007).

Huan (2008) argues how in some regards, Hu's scientific development can be seen as an improvement on Jiang's Sustainable Development Strategy. Scientific development, for the first time, highlighted that there was more than one way of pursuing development. Scientific development acknowledged the limitations of development through environmental exploitation and destruction labelling this behaviour as "un-scientific" and unsustainable; Hu ultimately recognised the need of a healthy environment for further growth (Huan, 2008). However, it is here that scientific development again falls short of environmental protection: continued economic growth (for increased competitiveness) was still the priority regardless of the realisation that this was not sustainable.

The approaches to achieve scientific development were described as more resource efficient and environmentally friendly, but economic growth was still the CPC's political priority. Scientific development, as a political ecology, was unable to provide a new development paradigm any more than the Environmental Protection National Policy or the Sustainable Development Strategy: they all fall into the same environmental protection faux pas of championing economic growth. Moreover, Huan (2008) argues how the addition of scientific method to regulation and policy allowed for the manipulation of reasoning and justifications of unsustainable and environmentally unfriendly practice by polluting industries.

The defining characteristics of competitiveness, quality and environmentally-friendliness have been compared with, and found to be very similar to, the concept of ecological modernisation, a theory more popular across the growth economies of Western Europe (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). Both scientific development and ecological modernisation are aware of the environmental issues caused by urbanisation and industrialisation. However, neither compromise on economic growth, both arguing that economic growth can be achieved and maintained through environmentally-friendly approaches, such as developing a healthy market system, partaking in insightful technological investments and making "piecemeal" adjustments to the economic structure. Both approaches see a "win-win" resolution whereby there is continued economic growth without further environmental degradation (He, 2007; and Huan, 2008:1 and 2009). The literature above demonstrated how sustainable development is inept with regards to environmental protection; there is no shift from what

can be understood as a capitalist ideology. Unsurprisingly, Hu's Scientific Development was therefore short lived as a standalone political ecology; it was soon to be absorbed into the CPC's next political ecology: ecological civilisation.

Ecological Civilisation: The CPC's Current Political Ecology (2007 –)

Ecological civilisation made its CPC debut in 2003, in an official policy document on reforestation (Huan, 2007). However, it was not until Hu introduced the phrase at the 17th National Congress that ecological civilisation began to emerge politically (Goron, 2018). Hu stated how: "The construction of an ecological civilization will be given a prominent place and included in all aspects and processes in economic, political, cultural and social development [sic]" (cited in Meng, 2012:1). However, the main focus of Hu's 17th National Congress report when regarding environmental governance was the sanctification of his scientific development by adding it to the constitution (Goron, 2018), further to this, Marinelli (2018) highlights how although the report was delivered by Hu Jintao, that it was allegedly prepared by Premier Wen Jiabao suggesting that Hu's focus was not on transferring towards ecological civilisation.

Following the Congress, *China Daily* (2007:1) published an editorial further defining ecological civilisation, they wrote how: "It [ecological civilisation] is not a term the Party has coined just to fill a theoretical vacancy in its socialism with Chinese characteristics, but rather a future-orientated guiding principle based on the perception of the extremely high price we have paid for our economic miracle." During Hu's final five years of leadership, ecological civilisation sat alongside scientific development, thus the goals, aims and methods of becoming an ecological civilisation remained hazy with scientific development remaining Hu's leading political ecology (Oswald, 2014). Ecological civilisation existed as a "site for negotiation among different actors, institutions and discourses" and was not codified or implementable. Despite the *China Daily* article, ecological civilisation was open to fill any political, social or ecological "space" the CPC saw fit (Geall and Ely, 2018:10).

However, towards the end of Hu's leadership he began to embrace the concept of ecological civilisation. In Hu's report at the 18th National Congress, ecological

civilisation was repeated sixteen times and now appeared as an emblematic title: *Making Great Efforts to Advance Ecological Civilisation*; symbolising the passing of the environmental governance baton from Hu to Xi with the enduring task of building an ecological civilisation (Marinelli, 2018). As Hu's leadership transitioned to Xi, ecological civilisation became embedded within Xi's metanarrative of his Chinese Dream (*Zhong Guomeng*, 中国梦) of national rejuvenation (Marinelli, 2018). Marinelli (2018:378) argues that "Advance Ecological Civilization and Build a Beautiful China [sic]" became a mantra. Irrespective of this shift in rhetoric trope towards supporting the construction of ecological civilisation, Marinelli (2018) highlights that this did not necessarily mean a substantial uptake of effective environmental protection policies.

As ecological civilisation became increasingly embedded within Xi's Chinese Dream trope, Marinelli (2018:230) highlights how Xi showed increasing concern of the people's needs by outlining the CPC's responsibilities: "We must take a responsible attitude towards our people and future generations, be resolute in controlling environmental pollution, strive to usher in a new era of ecological progress and improve the environment for our people to live and work in." However, the most stark contrast between the previous political ecologies and ecological civilisation is found in Xi's rhetoric when he makes direct claims about environmental governance at the global level, such as: "Protecting the environment, addressing climate change and securing energy and resources is a common challenge for the whole world" (Marinelli, 2018:379).

Geall and Ely (2018) also argue that a change is noticeable in the ecological civilisation rhetoric produced by Xi, highlighting how ecological civilisation became prominent in the CPC's rhetoric from 2016 onwards. Geall and Ely (2018) argue this resulted in the slogan being codified and increasingly implementable. Xi can be seen promoting ecological civilisation as an alternative development theory, capable of revolutionising not just the PRC, but also the whole global economic order to bring about a global ecological transformation (Foster, 2017; Gare, 2016; Goron, 2018; and Pan, 2016). Geall and Ely (2018:10) argue that Xi had closed down "a period of debate and negotiation in order to articulate a slogan as an implementable narrative" and that this "presents a novel insight into processes of environmental decision-making and governance" within the CPC. They argue Xi did this by "greening" institutions of the CPC, creating the first CPC task force for the "Promotion of Economic Development and

Ecological Civilisation” in 2013, publishing the landmark “Central Opinion Document on Ecological Civilisation Construction” in 2015; and the “Ecological Civilisation Construction Action Plan” in 2016 (Goron, 2018:41).

Furthermore, Xi stated that: “Ecological civilisation was key to China’s overall development strategy, and government at all levels should remember that “clear waters and green mountains” are invaluable assets” (Xinhua, 2017b:1). Li Keqiang furthered that ecological civilisation would have a key role in achieving sustainable growth, and that the country will continue to optimise its industrial structure, cut excess capacity, reduce pollution and improve air, water and soil quality (China Daily, 2017). However, what could be seen in Li’s statements, and in the 2013 task force, is a level of confusion where ecological civilisation still appears to be prioritising economic development and growth.

2017 saw ecological civilisation increase its prominence in both Xi’s and Li’s 19th National Congress reports, and in 2018 the prominence of ecological civilisation was secured by including it in the constitution (Goron, 2018). From Hu’s conclusion of the 17th National Congress to Xi’s conclusion at the 19th National Congress, the significance and production of ecological civilisation as the latest political ecology had increased substantially (Geall and Ely, 2018). Xi’s concluding message was strong and clear; the CPC had entered a new era and central to this was a new principal contradiction, where ecological civilisation was now playing an important part. Xinhua (2017c:1) outlined Xi’s proclamation, that the PRC had entered a new era, demonstrates a shift, which “affects the whole landscape”; the landscape metaphor not only referred to a change in development path, but also the direct importance of improving the environment.

Xi’s new principal contradiction marked the CPC’s fourth principal contradiction. The first two had been introduced by Mao, and were: 1) the people versus imperialism, feudalism and the remnants of the Kuomintang; and 2) the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie (Xinhua, 2017c). Deng’s leadership introduced the third principal contradiction: the increasing material and cultural needs of the PRC citizens versus backward social production. However, the PRC of today no longer has backward social production – from computer chips to high-speed trains – the CPC has transformed the PRC from being the world’s factory to also being the world’s laboratory and marketplace:

the era of backward social production had become no more (Huan, 2008). In his concluding report to the 19th National Congress, Xi (2017:3) professed: "What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life."

Huan (2008) argued that for the CPC to be able to transition to an ecological civilisation, the priority on economic growth had to change. Xi (2017) went on to say: "The needs to be met for the people to live a better life are increasingly broad. Not only have their material and cultural needs grown; their demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are increasing." Despite the environment's position at the end of this list, it is undeniable that the CPC have identified the environment as a crucial element in improving the lives of their citizens. According to Xi, only a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful PRC will be ready to advance to the next stage of socialism. Despite economy being the first concern, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful do follow as three important elements involved in constructing the CPC's concept of an ecological civilisation. However, whether they are just tokenistic additions existing merely within the rhetoric are yet to be seen.

Summary of the CPC's Political Ecologies

A clear correlation between the prioritising of economic growth and the failings of the CPC's previous political ecologies to protect the environment is apparent. The Environmental Protection National Policy, Sustainable Development Strategy and scientific development have all been very weak approaches to environmental protection through their prioritising of economic growth and the lack of restraints or barriers to environmental destruction. Despite environmental protection increasingly receiving a higher position in both CPC rhetoric and through the continual promotion of the administrative body responsible, as well as the new environmental laws and regulations, ultimately what remained unchanged was the attitude towards economic growth. However, Xi's update to the principal contradiction represents a shift in thinking about

how to improve the living conditions of the people through other means, including environmental protection.

The CPC have supported a “growth ideology”, which has always portrayed economic growth as necessary for societal development and has resulted in the PRC beginning to transform from a growing economy into a growth economy, where the environment plays a supporting role to continued economic development (Fotopoulos, 2005; and Huan, 2008). This unquestioned and unchanged “growth ideology” has dominated all previous political ecologies preventing any real environmental protection within the PRC. For the CPC to transform the PRC into an ecological civilisation, a change from a capital-focused ideology to an ecology-focused ideology is required. To what extent Xi’s update to the principal contradiction provides this shift towards an ecological ideology cannot yet be known. However, with such a momentous change to the principal contradiction, both dedicated rhetoric and a new political narrative from the CPC is to be expected. By conducting a thematic EDA on the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric it will allow for new interpretations of ecological civilisation producing new understandings of the spaces and future(s) of the CPC’s latest environmental governance. However, before moving on to discuss the methodology and research design of the thematic EDA, a final debate found in the literature, one concerning a Gramscian critique of whether it is possible for the CPC to transition to become an ecological civilisation, will be considered.

Gramscian Critique: Can the PRC Become an Ecological Civilisation?

Ahearne (2013), Gare (2012 and 2017), Huan (2008) and Kovel (2011) all discuss how the CPC are, or are not, transitioning towards becoming an ecological civilisation. What has been common throughout the literature is the idea that ecological civilisation theoretically represents, in varying degrees, a different way of doing (environmental) politics. Amongst the different critiques of ecological civilisation and whether the CPC are taking the necessary steps to transform the PRC into an ecological civilisation is the critique developed by Ahearne (2013), which applies ecological civilisation to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Ahearne (2013:17) argues that ecological

civilisation could offer the “foundation for the moral leadership required in a war of position to genuinely overcome and replace existing socio-economic forms” (these concepts will be considered below). There is a clear divide between scholars who see potential in the CPC’s ecological civilisation to become an alternative hegemony placing ecological equilibrium at the centre, and scholars who doubt the CPC’s ecological concept is anything but sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics”.

Ahearne (2013), Gare (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2017), Huan (2008) and Kovel (2007 and 2011) all conclude that the hegemonic ideology behind neoliberal capitalism is to blame for the environmental destruction faced today and that a new hegemonic ideology is required to advance beyond neoliberal capitalism and re-introduce equilibrium in nature. Gramsci’s (1971) work on hegemony provides a theory for assessing the ability of an ideology to overthrow the current hegemony. Hence, Ahearne (2013) considers how Gramsci’s theory could be used to ascertain the likely relationships between neoliberal capitalism, sustainable development and ecological civilisation.

Gramsci developed his theory as he became increasingly disillusioned with the USSR, whose alternatives began to mirror the ways of thinking, practices and organisations they were said to be opposing in the capitalist approach utilised elsewhere (Ahearne, 2013). In this sense, the Soviet’s ideology had become an *opposing* ideology to the capitalist hegemony. Gramsci argued that an *alternative* hegemony was needed with entirely alternative ways of thinking, practices and organisations; indeed, as Albert Einstein said, “we can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” Sustainable development is referred to as an *opposing* hegemony to neoliberal capitalism and ecological civilisation is hoped to be a new *alternative* hegemony. What is understood thus far from the literature is how the CPC’s latest political ecology tends to clash and contradict, falling between ideas and practices of a new alternative ideology of ecological civilisation and the opposing ideology of sustainable development. Gramsci’s theory is based upon three concepts: 1) hegemony, 2) conception of the world, and 3) war of position; each will be discussed in turn.

Hegemony: Can the CPC Create Ecological Civilisation as an Alternative Hegemony?

Gramsci's "hegemony" is a concept built around an attempt to theorise how the ruling class maintains a dominant ideology within a society (Ahearne, 2013). Hegemony operates at numerous levels, which are accounted for by Gramsci's distinction between the State and civil society as separate "terrains". Gramsci made direct references between his own ruling class concept and Marx's concept of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeoisie or the State maintains dominance and legitimacy through such structures as legislation, the judiciary, police and military (Aheane, 2013). Gramsci argued that the civil society reproduced the State's hegemony through cultural practices, due to the inherent presentation of the order as "natural" by the State; thus perpetually (re)endorsing the State's dominance (Gramsci, 1971). The CPC can disseminate their choice of ideology, through both dominance and legitimacy through legislation, judiciary, police and military and via cultural practices; presenting the ideology as the natural order of things and thus have the means to produce a new hegemony. The nature of the CPC existing within a One Party State with State run media provides the CPC with a political monopoly.

However, to produce a successful hegemony, Gramsci's concept requires more than an overarching ideology reflecting the preferences of the State. First the CPC must establish ethical and moral leadership and from here present ecological civilisation as a new concept not only to the PRC, but also to the world. This is no simple task, but a large proportion of the literature exploring the CPC's ecological civilisation concept supports this as the intended purpose of the CPC constructing their ecological civilisation concept (Ahearne, 2013; Gare, 2017; Heurtebise, 2017; Marinelli, 2018; and Pan, 2015). However, to complicate the concept of hegemony further, Gramsci (1971:57-58) also insisted that leadership must be won prior to taking government and then disseminating the new ideology, he warned that: "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning government power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to lead as well."

Gramsci argued that the leader must have the personal traits of dominance in order to go on to produce a successful campaign for a new ideology. Within the context of the CPC, this requirement of leadership prior to winning governmental leadership currently concerns Xi Jinping. Unsurprisingly, there are numerous examples across the IR literature demonstrating Xi's strong track record of leadership in various positions throughout his earlier ranks within the CPC (Auslin, 2018; Callahan, 2013; Shambaugh, 2018; and Wang, 2018; see also Chapter 5 where Xi's leadership is mythologised as heroic). Likewise, often citing his seven years agricultural service in Shaanxi province, Xi repeatedly argues in favour of the natural environment, equality in access to services as well as heralding the merits of ancient Chinese philosophy, including Daoism, which appears inherent in the CPC's definition of ecological civilisation (Pan, 2006c; and Pan, 2015). Thus there is some agreement that Xi Jinping provides the strong leadership required, with the access to disseminate his choice of ideology, for the CPC to create ecological civilisation as an alternative hegemony.

Conception of the World: Can the CPC Construct Ecological Civilisation as a new Conception of Environmental Governance?

With a strong leader advocating for an alternative hegemony, the CPC are said to be in a position to begin considering how to move towards creating a new conception of the world, Gramsci's second theoretical concept (Ahearne, 2013). As a Marxist and dialectician, Gramsci perceived history as an on-going rational process that dialectically unfolds (Ahearne, 2013). Pusey (1991:33) describes the process in the following way: "[T]he society that exists (society 1) calls up a negating image of the better alternative (society 2) and if the contradiction is sufficiently fundamental, there is the possibility of a synthesis (society 3), in which humankind advances one step further in a history that leads to the rational self-fulfillment of the species." This explanation also demonstrates why Gramsci specifically refers to an *alternative* hegemony rather than an *opposing* hegemony and echoes the arguments of Gare (2010), Pan (2006c) and Wu Shaoxia who all argue for a liminal process of development via a synthesis of Chinese culture and Western logic in pursuing development within the PRC.

The distinction between opposing hegemony and alternative hegemony is important for creating a new conception of the world and highlights the distinctions between sustainable development and ecological civilisation as potential hegemonies. An opposing hegemony finds itself adopting a strategy directly shaped by the framework of the original hegemony: sustainable development is the “ecologicalisation” or “greening” of neoliberal capitalism. Slowing down the production of factories to limit the emissions does not change the substances being emitted nor solve their issues of pollution. Encouraging the growth of artificial intelligence to encourage more productive farming practices does not curb the demand for unnecessary and overindulgent diets of increasingly prosperous citizens. Industry is not the effective cause per se, but rather an instrumental means of manipulating and ruining nature (Kovel, 2011). The concept of sustainable development does not bring new ideological assumptions to the conception of the world (Gare, 2010; 2012 and 2017).

Gramsci (1971:109) spoke of “transcendence” in conception of the world in order to produce an alternative hegemony. Gramsci (1971:232) specifically refers to the innate failure of an opposing hegemony when he argues that: “in political struggles one should not ape the methods of the ruling classes, or one will fall into easy ambushes.” Gramsci (1971) believed that an opposing hegemony would never be strong enough to overrule the ways of thinking, practices and organisation of the existing hegemony. Ahearne (2013:320) furthers Gramsci’s argument in saying that the opposing hegemony “does not merely display back to the hegemonic power an image of itself, rather it *reflects* that image, a distortion, a corruption of the actually existing conditions. This new corrupted image now replaces any prefigured vision and should the oppositional force prevail, it is doomed to realise its corrupted vision [*italics in the original*].”

If the negating image for the opposing hegemony is just a corrupted version of the existing society (society 1), then the opposing hegemony is merely a deformed copy (society 2), the contradictory message to lived experiences can still produce a synthesis (society 3), but society 3 becomes one that is doomed to catastrophe and future failings (Ahearne, 2013). This is pertinent when considering the concept of sustainable development as an oppositional hegemony in contrast to ecological civilisation as an assumed alternative hegemony; sustainable development is doomed, whereas ecological civilisation is (intended as) a new image. If ecological civilisation represents a

new alternative ideology then it must depart from the current conception of the world, which fosters (neoliberal) capitalism and the opposing hegemony of sustainable development.

With regards to the CPC's political ecologies, Deng's Environmental Protection National Policy, Jiang's Sustainable Development Strategy and Hu's scientific development, all were aligned within the ways of thinking, practices and organisations of economic growth, with environmental protection helping to sustain growth. Whereas, ecological civilisation, with the new principal contradiction, has been argued to be moving away from the old standalone priority of economic growth (Gare, 2017; and Goron, 2018). However, simultaneously, Lu, et al. (2016) argued how, in developing economies, ecological civilisation is a way of continuing and sustaining economic development: indeed, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have both spoken about the need to continue promoting wealth and development. Thus ecological civilisation is also argued to repeat elements of the same corrupted image, it is potentially no different from the rubric of sustainable development.

Even if it is accepted that there is the advocacy for ecological civilisation as an alternative hegemony - with Xi, as a strong leader, a proven leadership record and the beginnings of the dissemination of this alternative conception of the world - this still does not provide a complete answer on how the alternative hegemony can be formed (Ahearne, 2013). According to Gramsci the "principal condition for overthrowing the hegemony of the politics of privilege and replacing it with the new politics of inclusiveness is the diffusion of a homogeneous mode of thinking from a homogeneous, or organic, center... Those who spread the new conception of the world must understand the society in which they work in all its diversity and complexity..." (Gramsci, cited in Germino, 1990:249). This centrality of a singular clear vision for the purposes of transforming a society is undeniably problematic, however the CPC do appear to try and do this, as previously discussed within the CPC's concept of forming a singular civilised State (*Wenming guojia*, 文明郭家; Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013; also see Chapter 4 on the Spirit of Ecological Civilisation). Furthermore, Gramsci's hegemony and conception of world rely on unity between the civil society and the State (Gramsci, 1977). If the PRC is to transition to an ecological civilisation a unified conception of the world is vital (Ahearne, 2013).

Ecological civilisation then cannot be realised by the CPC, or anybody else, whilst there is a multiplicity of competing conceptions of the world, regardless of how valid each conception is to their respective holders (Gramsci, 1971); what we have seen thus far from the literature is how ecological civilisation and sustainable development have the potential to be competing hegemonies or to be representing two versions of opposing hegemony. Yet, this brings the argument back to the role of the dialectic unfolding of history: conceptions of the world evolve dialectically, through negation and being negated (Ahearne, 2013). Ultimately, only one conception of the world can be hegemonic at a given time. The CPC negate sustainable development as failed Western logic and ecological civilisation is championed as an alternative approach based on Chinese culture and wisdom. Thus, ecological civilisation still theoretically has the potential to develop as a new conception of the world if it comes to replace sustainable development.

War of Position: Can the CPC Transform Ecological Civilisation from Theory into Practice?

War of position refers to the approaches of resisting against the domination of the original hegemony, through the means of culture, or soft power, rather than physical might and violence (Gramsci, 2007). Cox (1983) furthers Gramsci's concept by describing a war of position as a process by which the strength of social foundations are slowly built up, by creating alternative institutions and intellectual resources within the existing society. The centrality of culture within Gramsci's war of position concept is due to his assumptions that culture lies at the heart of any revolutionary project, "it shapes their [any persons] ability to imagine how it [the hegemony] might be changed, and whether they see such changes as feasible or desirable" (Crehan, 2002:71).

Gramsci argued that (cited in Germino, 1990:249-250): "The work of infusing society with the vision of a new politics will not be easy. Very rarely do changes in modes of thinking, in beliefs, in opinions come about rapidly through cultural explosions that affect the whole society at once. Patient, detailed work over a long period of time is needed to win the war of position." It is thus inconceivable to expect Xi Jinping's uptake

of an ecological civilisation as a central leadership slogan to result in an alternative hegemony within his leadership timeframe across the whole of the CPC, PRC and the world (Gare, 2012 and 2014). However, what is conceivable is to see the beginnings of the formation and propagation of an alternative hegemony and conception of the world, which must be based on lived experiences, and then disseminated through political discourse (Ahearne, 2013).

With regards to the context of the PRC, public concern with the environment is often borne out of the lived experiences of pollution, which in turn produce public protests (Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016; Orlik, 2012; and Pew, 2013). An example, which occurred towards the end of October 2012, involved thousands of Ningbo's residents coming out to the streets to protest against the expansion of a petrochemical plant. This demonstration resulted in the local government delaying the project and introducing a change in local environment protection laws (Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016). Here lived experiences resulted in a war of position creating new legal practices; Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva (2016) argue that only when war of position is supported by an organic combination of morality and law will the transition of the PRC to an ecological civilisation be achievable. The Ningbo protests example does demonstrate that when a war of position is intrinsically embedded with an emerging alternative ecological conception of the world, it is possible to disseminate this alternative conception of the world throughout society, thus theoretically allowing an alternative hegemony to emerge: "[t]he new political subject is thus armed with its praxis" (Ahearne, 2013:323; and Gramsci, 1971).

This section has argued that a transformation of the PRC, one that negates the current leading global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism to an alternative hegemony of ecological civilisation is theoretically possible, although is a timely and complex process. To what extent the CPC are creating ecological civilisation, as an *alternative* hegemony, is not yet known. The CPC, through Xi Jinping's leadership, is demonstrating domestically and globally the necessity for such a transformation and if properly applied over time *can* be feasible. However, the challenge of turning theory into practice remains. Many of the leadership, educational and lived experiences required are already in place within the PRC to help negate neoliberal capitalism in favour of an alternative hegemony, as well as a shared alternative conception of the world (disseminated, for

example, through rhetoric) and the institutions and actors necessary (such as the MEE, as well as the 2013 task force for the “Promotion of Economic Development and Ecological Civilisation”, the Central Opinion Document on Ecological Civilisation Construction (2015) and Ecological Civilisation Construction Action Plan (2016)) to successfully conduct a war of position. This renders the spaces and futures attainable through ecological civilisation, as the CPC’s latest political ecology informing their environmental governance, as limitless: the CPC are free to construct their vision of an ecological civilisation and what this may come to be is, at this point, largely unknown. It is the intention of this thesis to analyse the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric so as to unpack their political intentions in constructing an alternative hegemony and what this may mean for the future and spaces of environmental governance.

Conclusion

This literature review has shown how there is an uncertainty, or even skepticism, over the future direction of the CPC’s ecological civilisation (Goron, 2018). There are two very different ontologies and epistemologies of ecological civilisation: those who consider ecological civilisation as a new political ecology (such as Gare, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2017; Kovel, 2011; Lakoff, 2004; Pan Jiahua, 2015 and 2016; and Pan Yue, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c) versus those who see ecological civilisation as continuation of sustainable development, or sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics” (Chen, 2012; Economy, 2017; Goron, 2018; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). The two separate ontologies are looking at different evidence to come to their conclusions about ecological civilisation: philosophical and ecological theory versus policy decision-making and legislature. The former sees ecological civilisation as a long-term goal and the latter sees ecological civilisation as currently failing to deliver a new development paradigm.

Geall and Ely (2018) and Marinelli (2018) argue that the CPC’s ecological civilisation is a narrative skilfully tapping into the CPC’s institutional strengths to promote a transition in development style. Heurtebise (2017) argues that the CPC’s ecological civilisation discourse engenders a “cultural chauvinism”, which contradicts with the atrocities of international environmental destruction. Heurtebise (2017) insists this

attitude makes global collaboration incompatible (Goron, 2018). However, others argue that the CPC's ecological civilisation is the same as the globally dominant discourses of sustainable development, thus operates as a continuation of these principles within the context of the PRC (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord 2018).

With ecological civilisation, as a product of the CPC's latest political ecology, environmental governance has gone from embodying the crisis of the PRC's environmental destruction through their development model under Deng, Jiang and Hu into a confident narrative of ecological rejuvenation under Xi's current leadership (Goron, 2018; and Marinelli, 2018). Xi is proposing a conceptual basis for a new course of development for the PRC. Xi Jinping Thought, as of the 19th national congress, has been enshrined within the constitution (Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016; and Goron, 2018). What is clear is how Xi's rhetoric suggests the CPC's new course of development will be increasingly based around solving environmental pollution issues and achieving social harmony (Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016).

The literature suggests that Xi's use of the ecological civilisation slogan is partially intended to direct, or codify, the thoughts of the populace and of the CPC's towards his intentions and policy directions. However, there is still no singular agreement on what ecological civilisation is or does. Ecological civilisation may just be another CPC slogan or ideograph with no clear meaning (Lu, 1999). There is also confusion within the broadly defined explanations of ecological civilisation over the (re)emergence of Chinese philosophy as directing the desire for an ecologically orientated society; the narratives appear to be equally influenced by Western anthropocentrism views on development as well as the revival of traditional Chinese cultural ideals (Balchindorzheiva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016).

The very nature of ecological civilisation and what makes it appealing to the CPC (as a pathway for rejuvenation), is the idea of harmony between man and nature, which depends upon a fundamental rethinking of policy approaches and creates an alternative image for the future of environmental governance. This appeal demands time, energy and unity: to "inspire people and provide the cultural foundations for the cultural, social and economic transformations necessary to create a new world order, a world order in which humans augment rather than undermine the ecosystems of which they are part"; this is a task that cannot be completed within a single leadership campaign (Gare,

2017:130). By developing a thematic EDA, to analyse the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, the unpacked aims and intentions for their future environmental governance should bring clarity to the confusion, contradictions and uncertainties presented throughout the literature.

Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design: Constructing the Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis

This chapter will present the methodological, ontological and theoretical conceptualisations of the emotion research that has informed the construction of the thematic EDA applied within this thesis. In doing so, this chapter explains how the researcher has adapted Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA and Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex, to produce the thematic EDA, which: captures the most relevant and frequent uses of emotion by the CPC within their ecological civilisation rhetoric; avoids systematically generating knowledge on emotions to maintain as authentic an account of the use of emotion by the CPC as possible; avoids reproducing Anglo-European perspectives and understandings of the emotion used by the CPC; and avoids unrealistically homogenising the categorisation, understanding and interpretation of the use of emotion (Clément and Sangar, 2017). After presenting these methodological considerations, the chapter outlines the research design, which considers the steps taken to conduct this research.

The Introduction and Literature Review have highlighted how politicians and scholars alike have been intrigued to know what ecological civilisation is and how it will come to be. Despite this interest, understanding(s) of ecological civilisation remain contested. Regardless of whether ecological civilisation is to become a new development paradigm, creating a shift towards a new alternative hegemony - or indeed whether ecological civilisation is to remain confined to the parameters of sustainable development - as the latest political ecology guiding the CPC's environmental governance, abundant rhetoric on the concept has been created. This thesis therefore focuses on this abundant resource for further study to clarify and deepen our understandings of the CPC's ecological civilisation concept.

To instill favour for and justify this new environmental governance the CPC's rhetoric is likely to: reflect their governance motives domestically and internationally; show recognition of the audience's needs, as a means of better connecting with the Chinese citizens; construct a power relationship to make a claim over leadership; and stimulate a desired understanding of the future of the CPC's environmental governance. Each of these listed features relies on the use of emotion within rhetoric (Koschut,

2017b). This chapter will therefore also consider methodological literature across IR, where discursive uses of emotion have been understood to be an expression of identity, power and status through rhetoric. The methodology utilised within this thesis builds upon this emotion research to further our understanding of the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Thus, to ascertain whether the CPC are deploying emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, and if so, what possible effects this deployment has on their latest approach to environmental governance, a research method devoted to the analysis of rhetoric is required. A thematic EDA, which identifies, contextualises and interprets emotion, has been identified as the most appropriate approach. Analysing the ecological civilisation rhetoric with a thematic EDA will forge a better understanding of ecological civilisation by providing a critical analysis of the CPC's rhetoric, highlighting new interpretations of the discursive messages deployed via emotion; the details of why and how will be discussed below.

Koschut (2017b) claims the study of emotion in IR is an emerging field with gaps to be filled and explains how IR scholars have begun to theorise how the socially embedded and discursive nature of emotions intersects with political power; there is an increasing number of constructivists focusing on the social contextualisation of emotion and language within IR (see, e.g., Bially Mattern, 2011; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Crawford, 2000; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Fierke, 2013; Hall, 2015, 2017; Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017; Koschut, 2017; Ross, 2006 and 2014; Solomon, 2017; and Wolf, 2017). As this thesis is concerned with how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, focusing on the inter-subjective and sociocultural construction of emotion in and through speech acts, via a social constructivist lens, provides the most appropriate methodology for such an analysis; and simultaneously works towards bridging the gap between EDA and emotion research in IR.

This thesis does not attempt to make claims on the phenomenological expression and biological experience of emotions via rhetoric by the CPC or their audience(s). The phenomenological and biological experiences of the individual do not need to be considered; this instead would answer questions of how individuals react to and interact with the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. By identifying, contextualising and interpreting emotion in the ecological civilisation rhetoric this thesis will demonstrate how

the inclusion of a socio-emotional analysis will further our understanding of ecological civilisation; the framework constructed will provide an intuitive and interdisciplinary approach for analysing emotion in speech acts.

The primary aim of this thesis is to further our understanding of the CPC's ecological civilisation concept, via the study of emotion within their rhetoric; furthering empirical emotion research within the field of IR becomes a natural secondary aim. A comprehensive overview will now be provided of where the theoretical conceptualisation of emotion currently stands within IR, before specifying how this research is relevant for EDA specifically within IR, and then particularly within this thesis. The chapter then ends with an outline of how the methodology was put into practice to answer the research question and considers the obstacles and limitations faced in designing a new EDA framework.

Social Constructivism and Emotion In Discourse

Social constructivism allows this thesis to investigate the socio-emotional foundations in the CPC's current political ecology, providing alternative interpretations and understandings of ecological civilisation (Koschut, 2017b). By working with what Diez (2001) called the discourse analytical variant of constructivism, this thesis looks at different interpretations of the CPC's intended political governance throughout their rhetoric. This thesis approaches political rhetoric and the social effects (i.e. the expression of identity, power and status) from the understanding that emotion can amplify and even make possible the effects. As highlighted by Koschut (2017b:1), "emotions contribute significantly to the discursive construction of social identities and power relations in international relations." Social constructivism has predominantly worked ontologically on the emotional foundations of status and identity in politics, especially with regards to the link between language and power. However, Koschut (2017b) states how the theoretical conceptualisation of emotional foundations in IR has received comparatively little attention. The social constructivist conceptualisation of emotion can be predominantly found in the works of Foucault and Laclau, who argue

that discourse constitutes emotions and vice versa; their ideas have heavily influenced the social constructivist perspectives of emotion in IR.

Foucault (1977) argued that political rhetoric does not emerge from nothingness: cultural, historical and social factors shape politics through the discourse transmitting them. Hall (2001), in developing Foucault's ideas, argues that discourse can be considered as an "invisible hand" influencing the thoughts, speech and behaviour of an audience. Foucault (1980:194) described this process by defining discourse as a "technology of power" (a means of exercising power). Alongside this, Foucault (1985) identified emotions as "strategic formations" (linguistic categories), where emotions define a set way of interpreting discourse. For example, Foucault (1985) identified the emotions of 'honour' and 'shame' as "strategic formations" in discourse on patriotism and nationalism. Ascribing the emotions of honour and shame to nationalist discourse, directs the audience as to what they ought to feel positively about and what they are to feel negatively towards. Thus creating social parameters through speech acts and exercising a means of power by directing how people interpret linguistic categories.

For Foucault (1980) the social perception of discourse enables a discursive exertion of power. Therefore emotion can be understood as an inter-subjective means of codifying and transmitting our perceptions in a way that draws upon shared categories and understandings (Koschut, 2017b). Hall (1997) summarised Foucault's work on discourse as a system of representation, shaping and constraining the production of knowledge on power relations. An example of this can be seen in the Introduction chapter, where the use of emotion in the CPC's rhetoric regarding the U.S. Embassy's publication of PM2.5 readings was discussed: the CPC shaped their power relationship by dismissing the U.S. Embassy's understanding and rigour, and bolstered their own approach as valid, asserting the CPC's authority.

Laclau (2004:326) furthers the analytical distinction between discursive and affective processes of emotion and distinguishes discursive structures as a "form" of emotion and affective structures as a "force" of emotion. For Laclau (2004), the affective "force" of emotion through discourse is how power can be exercised through language. According to Laclau (2018) emotion is an anchor that provides categories and differentiation through discourse that allows for identity formation; without the prescribed emotional categories identity would not be fully explained or understood. "Without this

intensity or force (that is without (affective) investment) there would be no discursive structure in the first place... The complexes which we call “discursive or hegemonic formations”... would be unintelligible without the affective component” (Laclau, 2018:111). Laclau argues emotion as a “form” can create a discursive power structure through the “force” of emotional stimulation: emotion becomes an exercise of power, because emotion can prescribe value and action to discourse amplifying and enabling affective acts (Koschut, 2017b). Hielscher (2003) argues that the emotional foundations of discourse can help identify why certain discourses resonate with, or are understood by, an audience, whilst others fail.

Foucault’s (1977, 1980 and 1985) and Laclau’s (2004 and 2018) theoretical considerations project emotion as the interpretive link between discursively constructed identities and the power and status differentiations enacted through discourse (Koschut, 2017b). Following on from this interrelated conception of emotion and language – where emotion can communicate knowledge (via categories) about the world and our conception of the world – emotion has been seen to contribute to identity, power and status formation in political rhetoric and will be discussed in greater detail next. Accordingly, this thesis understands emotion in rhetoric to be discursively created “strategic formations” that produce socially shared understandings and categories of the world, thus disseminating messages of identity, power and status through discourse.

Social Constructivism and Emotion Studies in International Relations

Emotion studies within IR distinguish discourse as a social construct of a perceived reality, carrying structures of meaning for understanding social relationships, such as whether a State is dominant or marginal (Milliken, 1999). From a constructivist perspective, emotion in IR involves value judgments, which allow people to participate in politics, via access to socially created and accepted meaning structures, and from here the ontological links between emotion and identity, power and status have been predominately discussed (Koschut, 2017b). There is a wide application within the IR literature of the social constructivist conceptualisation of emotion on at least one aspect of this nexus between socially constructed understandings and their affective dynamics.

With regards to socially constructing an identity through the use of emotion, Hutchison (2010) argues how, events that destroy a community may later create social cohesion again. Representing a traumatic event discursively invites the audience to access shared memories and experiences, thus creating a space for people to reconnect and to re-define their identity. Likewise, Bially Mattern (2005:32) highlights how social identity includes emotional bonds, arguing that through language social “suffering” (such as the loss of social status) can be inflicted upon an agent, where this agent may become a “victim”, maintaining this social identity via a non-physical power mechanism. Bially Mattern (2005) argues that this discursive identity construction suggests an affective dimension for emotion through language.

Risse and Ropp (2013) examine verbally shaming pariah States, thus look into how power-relationships are created (through categories of “Us” and “Them” or in-groups and out-groups) to reaffirm particular State identities (i.e. developed-developing, Western-Eastern, civilised-barbaric or even decadent-barbaric and sustainable development-ecological civilisation). Elias (1985) similarly considered how established powers create a positive self-image in their discourses by using emotion to reflect a “charisma” that defines them against a non-established power, or those powers on the “global periphery” (first world-third world, developed-developing). Members of a “superior” group with established attributes “tend to view their identity as morally ‘better’ whereas outsiders or marginalized groups are classified as inferior because they are missing similar group attributes and standards [sic]” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Koschut, 2017b:13; and Tajfel, 1978).

The creation of a status-based sense of identity within a group has been linked to the emotions of pride and confidence in self-esteem. Leep (2010:335) refers to these emotions as the “proud Self” versus the “disgusting Other”, where feelings of inferiority, failure and contempt are discursively created against outsiders. A prominent example is the social construction of an Arian identity in Nazi Germany (Koschut, 2017b). Nazi discourse both institutionalised and ritualised the emotions of confidence and pride in the German *Herrenvolk* alongside the emotional projections of disgust and contempt towards the Other: the Jewish, the Roma, the Disabled (Kertzer, 1988:122; and Koschut, 2017b). Belonging to an established group – and sharing their identity – evokes emotions of satisfaction, glory and, as Ahmed (2015:6-12) argued, they “invest” feelings

of pride within the group, but externally, emotions of disapproval and contempt are placed onto the Other(s). Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008) argue emotion categories of pride and shame are rooted within a group's ontological security and in-turn ontological security is linked with an actor's self-identity and status (Koschut, 2017b).

Koschut (2017b:19) argues that emotional discourse that looks to threaten ontological security creates a conflict with identity, which may arouse a "very strong emotional reaction." The loss or reduction of status may elicit a loss of confidence amongst an audience about the group's future (Barbalet 2001; and Hymans 2006:). According to De Rivera (1992) a fear of losing status or the general threat to ontological security promotes isolation and the deterioration of trust in the world; ultimately it can lead to the denial of an alternative perception of the world, the denial of rights to an out-group, a disproportionate display of pride and an arrogance through contempt (Elias, 1985; and Koschut, 2017b).

Another layer of social constructivism in emotion research within IR is the discursive use of group-specific symbols, expressions and narratives in discourse (Kaufman, 2001; and Koschut, 2017b). Discussed in the literature review was the importance of the Taoist expression of harmony between man and nature and the specific Chinese identity this has come to symbolise within the Chinese constructions and definition of ecological civilisation. The phrase incites a superiority (cultural chauvinism) of Chinese wisdom and culture in environmental awareness and protection, thus carrying categories of positive emotion towards the 'in-group' of the PRC. The limitations, or complexities, that arise through Taoism and the cultural chauvinism it carries will be expanded upon at the end of this chapter. Koschut (2017b:16-17) argues the use of symbols, expressions and narratives in discourse can also be used to highlight the "injustice of the status quo and, via collective acknowledgement, enable marginalized groups to transform passive emotions like shame and humiliation into anger and resentment to sustain active resistance against the established group [sic]" (see also, Barbalet, 2001; Fierke, 2013; and Summers-Effler, 2002).

Thus, emotion, as a socially constructed concept, is a prevailing tool for the construction of identity, power and status in discourse. Emotion has been seen to create: active engagement through shared experiences and categories of being; social bonds reinforcing social categories; status differentiation and the notion of an "Us' versus

“Them”; charisma and the expression of superiority; and, ontological security for who and how an audience perceive themselves to be. Emotion in discourse can be understood as a categorising system, simplifying the complexity of world and providing an identity through which to engage with politics (Koschut, 2017b).

Further work by Bially Mattern (2005), Diez (2001), Epstein (2008), Hansen (2006), Weldes and Saco (1996) and Zehfuss (2002) have also produced convincing accounts of a discursive nature in the identity-power-status nexus within IR. However, Koschut (2017b) argues how this emotion research tacitly implies emotion, rather than empirically demonstrating it. Despite this critique, the ontological developments on the links between emotion and the creation of identity, power and status found within this IR literature will be fundamental in contextualising and interpreting the empirical data soon to be analysed within this thesis. Koschut (2017b) asks for further studies making use of this empirical potential in the study of emotion in IR. This thesis builds this bridge by constructing an original and intuitive EDA to analyse empirical data in the form of the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric. Social constructivism highlights the importance of emotion in discourse in IR, thus this thesis will add an analytical facet in creating a thematic EDA for empirically analysing this relationship within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Social Constructivism and Emotion Discourse Analysis

Emotion in discourse has been defined as a lens through which the world is perceived as meaningful and comprehensive, creating a platform for engagement within politics; as well as a tool for identity, power and status construction (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). For Foucault (1991), discourse specifically determines limitations to what can be thought, written and spoken and emotions frame what can be thought, written and spoken about in socially understood ways. Discourse captures our practises of knowing and perceiving; emotion is one of the ways in which this is expressed, categorised and understood. Each society may control their production, selection, organisation and dissemination of discourse; political groups (including States) are able to control discourse for their own political means (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017).

Discourse can help individuals comprehend what is valid, questionable or false (Bleiker, 2003). There are clear and compelling links between the concept of rhetoric and the use of emotions in rhetoric with affect as forces that are able to frame actions and thoughts for a political purpose (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; and Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017).

Understanding political discourse thus requires an analysis of the emotion in order to identify, contextualise and interpret how emotion in rhetoric may carry potential intentions for governance. By doing so the underlying and potentially concealed affective politics can be identified and an understanding developed of the ways in which emotion in discourse is affecting political thinking and policy (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). This relationship between emotional language and the exercise of power, identity and status creation means the CPC's rhetoric can be considered critical and therefore a strand of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is needed that specifically focuses on emotion in text: EDA can be understood as the most appropriate method for accessing these socially constructed elements of emotion within the CPC's rhetoric.

EDA, as a strand of CDA, is equipped as an interdisciplinary approach to highlight the use of emotion via words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives as implicating power asymmetries, exploitation, manipulation or inequalities, and presents the best approach for conducting such an analysis (Fairclough, 2013). Fairclough's (1995) CDA framework combines a social analysis with a linguistic analysis in order to uncover the "interpersonal" functions of discourse. That is to say Fairclough's (1995) CDA analyses the knowledge construction, beliefs and ideologies, identities, cultural values and social relationships embedded within a text. EDA loosely follows Fairclough's (1995) CDA framework, but focuses on the emotional structures within a text.

By far the most detailed account of an EDA designed for the analysis of discourse within IR is that developed by Koschut, et al. (2017). Having briefly introduced their EDA in the Introduction chapter, the next three sections will now outline Koschut, et al.'s (2017) theoretical considerations, with regards to the theory, expression and effects of emotion, in the construction of their three-tiered EDA framework. How their framework is adapted to conduct the thematic analysis used in this thesis will be discussed in the following section on Research Design.

Theory: What is Emotion?

Koschut (2017a and 2017b) has repeatedly argued that the theoretical conception and empirical evidence of emotion research in IR remains lacking. Therefore it is unsurprising that the first stage in Koschut, et al.'s (2017) theoretical conceptualisation of their EDA tackles the theory of emotion in IR. Koschut, et al. (2017) first ask "What is an emotion?" and argue the answers are usually riddled with ontological assumptions; stating again how in IR emotion is often referred to without acknowledging or exploring what is meant by emotion, leading to theoretical and ontological confusion. When a definition is provided emotion is often defined as a conscious manifestation of a physical feeling (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). Yet, this micro-level focus of physiological responses applies overwhelmingly to emotion as an individual's phenomenological experience (rather than describing emotion as a group experience, or category, as understood from a social constructivist perspective).

In Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA, they discuss Matsumoto's (2009:179) definition: emotion is "a transient, neurophysiological response to a stimulus that excites a coordinated system of bodily and mental responses that inform us about our relationship to the stimulus and prepare us to deal with it in some way." Apart from the obvious individual focus, defining emotion in this way implies a somatic experience involving cognition, which informs the individual about their surrounding environment and situation. That emotions prepare an individual to react implies an action tendency, which Koschut, et al. (2017) argue distinguishes emotion from other forms of cognition. Yet, as with other forms of cognition, emotions are intrinsically embedded within an individual's and group's social environment and the social, cultural and political context thus rendering this definition constrained within its own biological boundaries (Crawford, 2014).

Nonetheless, following Matsumoto's (2009) definition many scholars have drawn a distinction between emotions and affect. Massumi (2002) argues that affective dynamics connect and transcend individuals, where emotion(s) frame our thoughts and actions in ways that go beyond our cognitive ability to assess them. These arguments are linked to Damasio's (2008) Somatic Marker Hypothesis. Damasio (2008) defines emotion more broadly as changes in the body and brain in response to stimuli. Damasio

(2008) argues, over time, physiological reactions and the corresponding emotions become associated with particular situations and past outcomes, which he refers to as “somatic markers”; this process bypasses conscious cognitive processing the more embedded the somatic marker becomes.

Damasio (2008) further argues that somatic markers, and the corresponding emotional response, can consciously and unconsciously influence decision-making behaviour through past experiences and learned reactions, as well as increase the normality or expectations of such decisions with the audience on which the decision impacts. Such an argument relies on the notion that emotions are not always an individual experience. Social emotions relate less to a specific individual and their individual experiences and rather to a shared identity within a group (Smith and Mackie, 2008). In this way, emotions are socio-cultural phenomena that transcend individuals and groups to foster support for specific understandings and categories of values and ideals, whilst concealing and degrading others (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). Emotions thus not only permeate politics, but impact how the politics is received (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). Consequently, a group (including a State or political Party) may intend certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives to arouse commonly shared emotions – that have been constructed with a commonly understood identity, power and status – and provide a shared understanding and categorisation of a stimulus.

Koschut, et al. (2017), take their theoretical conceptualisation of emotion further in considering how Damasio’s “somatic markers” may become embedded within discourse. For example, the slogans and concepts within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric (such as the “Beautiful China” trope or “green”) could be considered as somatic markers: the CPC repeat their slogans so fervently, embedded within the same phrasing, same reasoning and outcomes, that their audience(s) are in a position to potentially become primed to the broader understanding intended (Lu, 1999).

Matsumoto’s (2009) restrained physiological approach presents IR researchers with a greater number of “ontological illusions” whereby certainty is required with regards to an action tendency within the individuals and the emotions they are experiencing to ascertain the causal relationship between the affect and effect of emotion in discourse. Whereas, with social constructivism, discourse is instead approached systematically,

where themes and patterns are sought in the emotional features of a text (i.e. words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives). Empirical examples of the themes and patterns can be collected to ascertain links between potential effects from the affect of emotion in the discourse, regardless of action or inaction. The specific emotions felt by an individual (e.g. happiness, sadness, glory or shame) are not necessary to identify the presence of emotion within the discourse, nor to empirically highlight theoretical effect from emotion, thereby reducing the number of ontological assumptions placed on the research by the researcher.

Social constructivism can therefore help to resolve the issue of subjective ontology. Needless to say, a positive emotion, such as pride in a political result, may be experienced by an individual who supports such a result, whilst simultaneously causing a negative emotion in an individual who is not a supporter; the use of a word, phrase, metaphor, analogy, saying or narrative to convey pride in the political result is still present within the discourse, regardless of emotion(s) individually experienced by the audience.

What is important for this thesis is the understanding that emotion(s) in rhetoric represents an understanding or categorisation of politics regardless of the intricate cognitive and physiological reactions of an individual that may follow. The social constructivist perspective of emotion therefore argues that emotion in discourse exists as certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives, which are purposefully constructed and written into the discourse, to achieve certain understandings and categorisations. Whether a physiological reaction accompanies the CPC's rhetoric is beyond the remit of this thesis in analysing how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. The focus therefore remains on understanding what words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives are written into the rhetoric and what socially constructed – and presumably shared – categories of meaning they bring to the concept of ecological civilisation.

Expression: How is Emotion Communicated?

Koschut, et al.'s (2017) second element of theoretical conceptualisation considers the expression of emotion, which deliberates how emotions are communicated. As this thesis is focused on rhetoric in the form of speech acts, the following section will concentrate on Koschut, et al.'s (2017) discussion of expression in transcribed speech acts only.

Koschut, et al. (2017) argue that an EDA requires a framework that operates on at least two dimensions of textual features to fully comprehend how emotion is communicated or expressed. Their first dimension refers to the development of what they call interpretative approaches (but can be understood as the identification of emotion and will be discussed as such throughout this thesis). Koschut, et al. (2017) contend that identification should first be centered on the microstructures of a text. By microstructures Koschut, et al. (2017) refer to the linguistic features of: words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives (see also; Milliken, 1991). Their second dimension is contextualising, where contextualising aims to uncover the reoccurring themes (or patterns) at the macro-level of a text: where the micro-level features are found to repeat within and across numerous texts. Koschut, et al.'s (2017) reasoning behind having an identifying (micro) and contextualising (macro) approach to emotion in discourse is to find what emotional meanings are linked to, or expressed through, which textual structure(s) (Koschut, et al., 2017).

The micro-macro identification and contextualisation provides a systemic approach for the analysis of emotion in rhetoric, removing ontological assumptions over which features of emotion should be analysed. Rather than ascribing importance to only the “eye-catching” micro-features, the macro-level contextualisation realigns the focus of analysis on the most frequently reoccurring micro-features of emotion within the rhetoric (Clément and Sangar, 2018). This thesis will not ignore “eye-catching” features per se, however, the reoccurring themes and patterns of emotion will provide the basis of the interpretations of the emotion used within the CPC's rhetoric. If applicable, “eye-catching” features will be used to support analytical claims.

Koschut, et al. (2017) further discuss that how emotions are perceived, and how discourse is intended to be perceived, has a major impact on the expression of emotion

in discourse. Despite the work of Jervis (2017) on perception and misperception, and the potential for both constructivism (and post-structuralism) to develop ideas on perception within IR, there is (as of yet) no solid foundation for how emotion is perceived within IR. Koschut, et al. (2017) thus look to the work of Gibson (1986), an environmental psychologist, to further extrapolate on how emotion may be perceived. Gibson's (1986) work considers how a person's experience within the natural environment impacts how they perceive the environment. Gibson (1986) labels a person's unique experience within the environment as an "affordance". For example, the ocean provides a different affordance to fish than to humans, whereas the ocean provides a place for fish to swim and breathe, for humans it affords the experience of swimming. Gibson (1986:127) writes that affordances are what the environment "provides or furnishes, either for good or ill", furthering that although it can be hard to determine which affordances are good and which are ill that "if their meanings are pinned down to biological and behavioral facts the danger of confusion can be minimized [sic]" (Gibson, 1986:137).

Although Gibson's (1986) work is more closely related to the physiological understanding of emotion, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) consider affordance from a non-physiological perspective and argue that how the environment and affordances are perceived is culturally mediated. The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric has a role to play in how their audience(s) perceive their environment and its' affordances. During personal visits to Beijing, a number of Chinese friends communicated that PM2.5 at an AQI of 150 was "okay" or even "good". This rests on their previous affordances, such as Airpocalypse, with an AQI beyond 750. Similarly, the MEP's (now the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE)) AQI labeling system, where 51-100 is "good" and 101-150 is only "lightly polluted", helps frame an AQI reading of 150 as "okay". This is further supported by the CPC's rhetoric, such as when the MEP claims to be the authority (standing on valid legal principles) over the PRC's environment culturally, socially and politically, mediating positive reactions to what physiologically ought to be perceived as an ill affordance.

This comparative nature of environmental perceptions ought not to be limited to physiological nor phenomenological experience of moving through the environment. We constantly receive information and images about the environment that extends far beyond our immediate experience of the environment around us, impacting our

perceptions of the world both near and far. The World Bank (2014) data, presented at the very beginning of this thesis, is an example of data received; in comparison to the most extreme examples of environmental degradation currently suffered across the planet, the immediate environment around us may be perceived as okay.

This thesis maintains that environmental perceptions are built not only from physiological and phenomenological comparisons of our experiences of the environmental affordances around us, but also from rhetoric that can culturally guide our evaluations of affordances. Duranti (2015) claimed that Gibson's (1986) affordances are culturally disseminated and different symbols (words, metaphors or themes) "afford" us different meanings. Emotive features within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric may be used to create and control such framings and perceptions of the CPC, PRC and their environment.

The CPC's phrase "beautiful China" can be analysed in this way (especially as an emotion-phrase that exists at the macro-level throughout the CPC's broader discourse): The CPC repeatedly argue ecological civilisation will create a beautiful China; "beautiful" is an emotion-word and carries culturally embedded understandings and categories on what a "beautiful" China will be. "Beautiful China" is also designed to create a positive vision of the future environment of the PRC. However, if we consider the Blue Lagoon, a pool formed at Harpur Hill quarry near Buxton in the UK, the local government had to take action to dye the water black to discourage the public from swimming there. The water had looked aesthetically beautiful; the affordance of bright blue water was very inviting for a swim. However, the blue colour was due to the pool having a pH of 11.3 from caustic chemicals in the quarry stone (bleach has a pH around 12.3). Despite warning signs cautioning that entering the water would likely lead to skin and stomach complaints many people still entered the water (BBC, 2013). There is no distinction with "beautiful China" whether a beautiful environment will afford a safe and ecologically sound environment: beautiful in whose affordance, beautiful in whose perception?

For the purpose of this thesis the most important aspects of Koschut, et al.'s (2017) theoretical conceptualisation of expression is the understanding that emotions can be expressed in texts, highlighting the most commonly occurring instances of emotion, so as to avoid ontological assumptions in identifying only the "eye-catching" examples of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Effects: What Does Emotion Do?

So far, the theory and expression elements of Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA has looked to theoretically conceptualise emotion and its existence in political rhetoric. Effects, their third element, is designed to interpret the socially shared understandings, categories and the culturally embedded affordance(s) found within discursive emotion in empirical data (Hall, 2017). This element is not intended to imply a causal relationship, but instead it considers what the implications of analysing emotions in discourse may reveal and/or what significance the emotion may carry beyond its existence (Koschut, 2017). The effects of emotional expressions within discourse can arguably represent the connections between the discursively constructed identity or status and the intentions behind the power exerted through discourse (Foucault, 1985; and Laclau, 2004). However, at this stage this is merely a theoretical assumption and requires empirical data to support Koschut et al.'s (2017) claims.

Koschut, et al.'s (2017) element of effects is heavily based on actions despite their assertion that their EDA does not make causal claims. This brings us back to the physiological understanding of emotion and the ontological assumptions based in not knowing individuals' feelings. Koschut, et al. (2017) describe their notion of action tendency as based within the work of Giddens (1979). Giddens (1979) defined an action as "a stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the on going process of events-in-the-world". A criticism of Giddens' (1979) work is how he places undue emphasis on the intentionality of actions. However, Giddens (1979) does also refer to a *contemplation* of action, which does not necessarily assume an action will be made; Geall and Ely (2018) make similar assertions regarding the CPC's ecological civilisation discourse; action may not be intended.

However, the crux of the problem is actually in the assumption that an action, be it contemplated or acted upon, will be a result of emotion within discourse. In trying to capture the perceptions and actions of an audience - and trying to distinctly separate them as direct causal effects from certain elements of emotion within discourse - echoes the issue of making ontological assumptions about the unknown experience of an individual. Therefore to avoid this ontological assumption this thesis sees intention of action by an individual, as a response to emotion within rhetoric, as an unnecessary

consideration. Interpreting the emotion identified and contextualised in the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric to provide alternative understandings of the CPC's latest concept in environmental governance does not require a discussion of any individual phenomenological experiences of emotion. Any physical response is redundant to the research question under examination within this thesis.

Summary of Koschut et al.'s (2017) Three-Tiered EDA

Koschut et al.'s (2017) three tiers of theory, expression and effect have been used to theoretically inform the EDA designed within this thesis. This thesis also allows for a three-tiered approach to an EDA, however the tiers are instead: 1) the identification of micro-level features of emotion (understood as words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives); 2) the contextualisation of macro-level features of emotion, which is understood as the themes and patterns across texts of the micro-level features; and, 3) the interpretation of emotion found at both the micro and macro level of the texts, via a social constructivist lens on emotion.

Having considered the theoretical conceptions behind Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA, the next section considers Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex and discusses the theoretical conceptualisation behind the three themes of CGT that inform the thematic approach to be utilised.

Galtung's CMT-Complex: The Themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma

A thematic analysis is "a method for systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set [sic]" (Braun and Clarke, 2012:57). The themes informing the thematic analysis in this thesis draw upon Galtung's (1996a and 2001) Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) Complex. This section will consider the theoretical underpinnings of Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex to help define the three themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma (CGT) embedded

within Galtung's (1996a and 2001) theory and explain why and how utilising the themes of CGT compliments and improves the three-tiered EDA for the analysis within this thesis.

Whereas Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA was specifically designed to analyse emotion in political rhetoric, Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex arose from his work debunking political narrative to demonstrate how the foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) process can be irrational (where irrationality assumes that decisions guided by emotion are irrational, regardless of how rational the response may be to the emotion expressed and experienced). The discussion above highlighted the greatest flaw in EDA research is researcher bias through making emotion explicit. Therefore, Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex will be adapted to provide a thematic approach to identifying emotion.

Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex was borne out of an application of psychoanalytical theory of the personal level at the State level: the theory is designed to take psychoanalytical theory considering how individuals understand categories and are influenced emotionally in their decision-making, especially with regards to group identity, status and power, and applies this work at the level of the State. For instance, Galtung (1996a) argues that where narcissism, paranoia or machismos are recognised at an individual level these are categorised as patriotism at the level of the State. Galtung (1996a:3) reasoned that States, as well as people, have "histories of trauma, glory, and plain routine, deposited in the memory, available to the conscious level or sedimented in the subconscious." Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues how memories impact decision-making by individuals and also decision-making at the State level through a shared collective State memory. Galtung (1996b) posits that these mechanisms impact decision-making through the construction, dissemination and consumption of emotive narratives constructed from socially shared myths and memories.

Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues that political narratives, when designed to incite change, contain the emotions of chosenness, glory and trauma. Ecological civilisation, as a continuation of the CPC's development narrative, may also be designed to incite change. Therefore, Galtung's three themes of CGT, provides a suitable thematic approach in conducting the EDA to ascertain if, and if so how, the CPC uses emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Galtung (1996a and 2001) describes chosenness as something in a State's history or religion (transpersonal forces) that makes the State feel especially selected. Myths refer to stories of a past or future grandeur, with an apprehension of glory to be imminently (re)-realised. Trauma refers to horrors experienced in the past that continue to cast shadows onto the present and future. Galtung (1996a and 2001) furthers that the CMT-Complex can only impact decision-making when there is synergy between the three elements and that the CMT-Complex impacts decision-making by becoming an ideology accepted and reinforced by the collective group's subconscious, in turn informing that group's identity. According to Galtung (1996b) CMT becomes a framework of accepted emotions and volitions held within the State. This notion of a shared collective memory stems from the idea that all parties are familiar with the chosen myths of grandeur and are savvy to the chosen traumas experienced by themselves and their ancestors (Galtung, 1996b).

Within the IR literature, Volkan's (1997) work, on "chosen trauma" and "chosen glory" as forces behind group violence, argues they bond a group together through a shared understanding and a shared cause, thus supporting Galtung's (1996a) claims. Van der Dennen's (2000:39) work, on in-group and out-group differentiation, analyses Galtung's CMT-Complex labeling it a "collective megalomania-paranoia syndrome." Van der Dennen (2000:39) elaborates on Galtung's (1996a and 1996b) definitions of his CMT-Complex, describing: chosenness as when a group feels chosen by "transcendental forces (the gods), above all others, endowed, even anointed, to be a light unto others, with the right and even duty to govern them"; myths specifically refers to a glorious past, which is to be recreated and thus suspends the present between glorious visions of the past and future; and traumas represent "the idea of people being hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, intent on hitting again" (Van der Dennen, 2000:36).

Both Van der Dennen (2000) and Volkan (1997) express the importance of group narratives as being constructed through *chosen* myths and memories, of glory and trauma, which are socio-culturally constructed and socially shared. Van der Dennen (2000) stresses the importance of a self-fulfilling cycle of each element: the group continues to be chosen, a glorious future is unremittingly expected from a glorious past, and traumas are continually expected to be committed against the group. This cyclical

element again supports Galtung's (1996a, 1996b and 2001) claims. Van der Dennen (2000) further supports Galtung's (1996a) argument claiming that groups incorporate a mental representation of their chosenness, glories and traumas into their shared identity. Van der Dennen (2000:40) calls this the "intergenerational transmission of historical enmity" and stresses how the historical truth of a chosen trauma or glory does not matter once it has been transmitted as a shared identity (see also Volkan, 1997).

Van der Dennen (2000) also argues that when a group meets all three aspects of the CMT-Complex they regard their group as superior over other groups. Galtung (2001) and Wang (2012 and 2014) have considered this assumed superiority within the CMT-Complex as linked to the emotions of pride and confidence creating a positive self-image, as was discussed above by Elias (1985); thus demonstrating compatibility between the theoretical understandings of emotion in Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA and Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex.

Applying his theory to the U.S., Galtung (1996a) suggests that the CMT-Complex is able to govern the collective conscious of the State. That is to say, a reinforcement of a myth will induce happiness, similarly so will the weakening of a trauma. In contrast, negative feelings are present if a myth is weakened and instead a trauma is reinforced. Galtung (1996a) goes on to add that these negative feelings can stir a sense of responsibility in upholding the "rights" and "duties" of the chosen. However, Galtung (1996a:10) is ardent that the CMT-Complex "does not engender violence" citing examples from history, such as Ghandi or the Quakers, whom he believes met all three elements of the CMT-Complex. Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues in these cases the CMT-Complex incited great things although still there were incidents of megalomania and paranoia.

This thesis does not claim that ecological civilisation is a narrative constructed as a CMT-Complex, but intends to use the themes of CGT to systematically guide the analysis of emotion demonstrated to be embedded within political discourse inciting change (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; and Wang, 2014). However, of significant importance is the understanding that the emotions of CGT are constructed through *chosen* myths and memories; the use of any historical metaphors, analogies or narratives by the CPC within their ecological civilisation rhetoric are specifically chosen to convey an emotionally shared and socially constructed message (similar arguments are made in

the work of Wang, 2007). At times this may come across within the analysis as a monolithic or unchanging notion of Chineseness; this may be the CPC's intended purpose to construct and disseminate – what can be understood as – an essentialist discourse, or – what could be alternatively considered as – a message of a strong and united PRC (which brings us back to the concept of *Wenming guojia*). By utilising the methodological approach of social constructivism the importance of how the CPC use *chosen* emotional myths and memories to construct their ecological civilisation concept can be acknowledged.

However, the primary reason for adapting Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex is to find suitable themes to conduct the EDA as a thematic analysis. The thematic element of this analysis has been utilised as a means of avoiding further ontological bias in making meaning implicit in the emotion injected throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. The themes of CGT will be used to thematically organise the data collated, as they represent categories of emotion already identified and analysed as common within political discourse (Galtung, 2001). The number of instances of emotion throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation is currently unknown. However, this thematic EDA allows for an unbiased and systematic organisation of the data for interpretation and analysis, thus avoiding researcher bias in relation to which emotional elements are analysed.

Galtung (1996a) ends his distinctive chapter introducing his CMT-Complex by urging for scholars to apply the framework to other States and to debunk other national narratives. The most notable application of the CMT-Complex to an alternative State, for this thesis, is that by Wang (2014) and his use of CMT to analyse the narrative of “national humiliation” in CPC politics, which will now be discussed.

Wang's (2014) Use of CMT on the CPC's Rejuvenation from Humiliation Narrative

The following section looks at Wang's (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to the CPC's rejuvenation from humiliation narrative, to consider how the three themes of CGT may be present within the CPC rhetoric's and see what can be learned for the thematic EDA within this thesis. By briefly highlighting the key elements of China and the

PRC's CMT-Complex, Wang (2014) begins to provide a contextualisation of the emotions of CGT used in the humiliation narrative at the centre of his analysis. For Wang, the CMT-Complex helps to build shared identity through the emotions of powerful large-group markers captured by the categories of glories and traumas. Wang (2014) writes how when a group has experienced defeat, losses and severe humiliations that these can become part of the group's identity, binding the members closer together (Bially Mattern, 2005; and Hutchison, 2010). Success and triumph can bring a group together, playing an important part in creating a group's identity (Volkan, 1997). Callahan (2012:14) similarly argues: "Exploring the discourse of national pride and humiliation... is a good way of answering the question "Who is China?," especially since this pessoptimist dynamic continues to frame how Chinese people understand their role in the world."

Wang (2014) argues that the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) has heavily shaped contemporary Chinese thinking and politics (see also, Callahan, 2012; and Gries, 2004). However, as Wang (2014:41) writes: "It is impossible to fully understand the Chinese people's chosen traumas without a thorough understanding of their chosen glories." The CPC's traumas tie together the pre-revolutionary events of foreign invasion, massacres, military occupations, economic extractions and unequal treaties, whilst ignoring such events as the famine during the Great Leap Forward and the "ten lost years" during the Cultural Revolution (Callahan, 2012). The three elements of CGT socially reinforce one another (Callahan, 2012; and Galtung, 1996b). The successes of the PRC appear grander when reminded of the humiliations also suffered, specifically at the hands of others. As Callahan (2012 and 2013) explores, there is a duality in contemporary CPC politics, a pessoptimism, which he argues to be utilised in constructing a "structure of feeling" in PRC politics.

Wang (2014) argues that by understanding the PRC's CMT-Complex a more comprehensive perspective can be achieved of how the CPC perceives the PRC and their status within the world. In the words of Callahan (2012:14), the CPC's national humiliation narrative continually informs "China's [perceived] rightful place on the world stage", which in turn impacts their analysis and deployment of foreign policy. The most pertinent point Wang (2014:41) raises is that in considering the CMT-Complex of the PRC, it is not "recounting history", but instead it highlights how the Chinese are

remembering and (re)creating their own history, identity and status through *chosen* myths and memories. The CPC's decision to implement memories of trauma from the Century of Humiliation ought not be considered as an emotional, irrational and illogical stance, but rather as an emotional, logical and rational choice influencing the PRC's politics via the political, cultural and historical narratives that these emotions are embedded within (Callahan, 2012; and Galtung, 1996a).

Wang's (2014) analysis of China and the PRC's CMT-Complex was limited to the CPC's rejuvenation from humiliation narrative. This is but one of the CPC's political narratives, however, it is one where all three elements of Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex are present and has been recognised as a meta-narrative of contemporary CPC politics (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Wang's (2014) analysis provides an example of how the three emotional themes of CGT have already been presented in one of the CPC's principal development narratives. As discussed in the previous chapter, ecological civilisation appears to be a CPC strategy to further the PRC's development and therefore rejuvenation through environmental governance. Thus, the CGT themes in the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative highlighted by Wang (2014) are expected to be useful in the contextualisation and interpretation of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.

According to Wang (2014) the Chinese category of chosenness is ingrained within their language and names for their country. For example, "Middle Kingdom" (*Zhongguo*, 中国), demonstrates the belief that the Chinese lived at the middle of the world. "Realm under heaven" (*tianxia*, 天下), describes the Middle Kingdom as the heavenly protected, or guided, realm. According to Chiang Kai-shek, the name Middle Kingdom is not merely describing the geographical location of China, but rather it is loaded with cultural and political meaning as central to everything and everyone (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014). Moreover, it was understood that whoever controlled the Middle Kingdom was also the legitimate ruler of *tianxia* or "heaven" (Chiang, cited in Wang, 2014). China has also been known as *Zhonghua*, where *hua* meant "splendid" or "prosperous"; the ancient Chinese would refer to themselves as *hua*. Whereas outsiders, ethnically and geographically, were referred to as *yi* "barbarians" (Liu, 2006; Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014).

All of these names create an identity of centrality, importance, decadence and deity; the Kingdom appointed by heaven (Wang, 2014). Ancient Chinese culture placed the Chinese as those living on a sacred land, at the centre of the world, geographically and culturally: proud of their achievements aesthetically, architecturally and philosophically (Wang, 2014). However, one of the most interesting elements of the PRC's identity of chosenness is found in their belief that the *yi*, the "barbarians" or outsiders, could embrace Chinese culture and become civilised (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014); their culture and wisdom could save anyone who assimilated into it. China was universal and superior and would appeal to anyone who wished to be civilised. Overall what can be seen is a long-standing tradition in China and the PRC to consider the Chinese as a special or chosen group. The Chinese consider themselves to be distinctive and have elements of perceived superiority. Even the fossilised remains of the "Peking Man" have been used to forge unique beginnings of the "Yellow" or *Han* race being debated as an entirely different species from that of *Homo Sapiens* (Callahan, 2013). It is therefore possible that chosenness may be present and an important element in the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric where Chinese identity is useful to the CPC in the creation or interpretation of their ecological civilisation concept.

The pride the Chinese have in their artistic, philosophical and technical accomplishments also feature strongly in the chosen myths of glory (Wang, 2014). According to Wade (2005) the importance of shared glories, regardless of whether they are real, recent or mythologised is that they bind a group together. The PRC is no exception when it comes to myths of glory forming their shared identity; from school textbooks, to popular arts and films the PRC has countless narratives about their "glamorous past and recent achievements" (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014:43). In particular, Wang (2014) highlights five four-character "idioms" (*Chengyu*, 成语) that are frequently used to showcase China's myths of glory: "a civilized ancient nation" (*Wenming gu guo*, 文明古国); "a nation of ritual and etiquette" (*Li yi zhi bang*, 礼仪之邦); "the vast land and bountiful goods" (*Di da wu bo*, 地大物博); "the four great inventions of ancient China" (*Si da fa ming*, 四大发明) and "a splendid civilisation" (*Can lan Wenming*, 灿烂文明).

Wang (2014) argues that these idioms are key to the PRC's identity to the extent that they were specifically showcased during the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony in

2008. Wang (2014:44) stated that the opening ceremony “portrayed an official narrative of China’s myths and glories.” For the Chinese, the ceremony demonstrated how the Silk Road, Voyages by Zheng He and Chinese culture had been open-minded and all embracing. However, Zheng He’s voyages for example were extremely violent to local populations at times and highlight how the CMT-Complex is engaged with “selective remembering” and “selective forgetting”, creating a carefully constructed identity (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014). The PRC as a “peace loving country” is a glorified myth often portrayed in political rhetoric, frequently appearing in school textbooks and official documents (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Wang (2014) argues that the CPC predominantly relies on myths of glory that focus on the PRC’s superiority as a more culturally advanced and civilised nation.

Finally, with regards to traumas, many scholars have identified the importance of the humiliation discourse in Chinese identity politics (Wang, 2014). Callahan (2012 and 2015) argues humiliation to be a key element of modern subjectivity in CPC politics and refers to humiliation as the “master narrative” of contemporary Chinese history. Gries (2004) argues that the legacy of the Century of Humiliation has left the Chinese sensitive to perceived slights against Chinese dignity. The Century of Humiliation refers to the period of 1839-1949 and included the following wars: First Opium War (1839-1842); Second Opium War (1856-1860); Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); Invasion of Allied Forces of Eight Countries (1900); Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931); and the anti-Japanese War (1937-1945). As this list demonstrates China suffered great losses through numerous invasions. However, perhaps more importantly is how China had to admit that they were now “backwards” compared to the barbaric *yi* from their repeated invasions: their ontological security, their identity and sense of chosenness, their myths of glory, were all under threat and being questioned (Wang, 2014:40).

A group’s chosen traumas consists of experiences that “symbolise the group’s deepest threats and fears through feelings of hopelessness and victimisation” (Volkan, 1997:48). As with the glories, there are also idioms for traumas suffered: “to lose every battle” (*Lü zhan lü bai*, 屡战屡败); “to cede territory and pay indemnities” (*Ge di pie kuan*, 割地赔款), and “to surrender sovereign rights and bring humiliation to the country” (*Sang quan ru guo*, 丧权辱国) (Wang, 2014:48). Despite these idioms heavily reflecting China’s

involvement within war, they also carry the subtler message of inferiority, weakness and backwardness.

Summary of Galtung's CMT-Complex

Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex has been identified as a means of thematically guiding an EDA through the themes of CGT. Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex was theoretically designed as an analytical tool for identifying decision-making and narrative building by groups that wish to pursue change through the use of emotion in discourse (see also, Van der Dennen, 2000; and Volkan, 1997). Wang (2014) has contextualised the elements of Chosenness, Myth (Glory) and Trauma in the CPC's meta-narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation. Ecological civilisation, as a means of furthering development and rejuvenating the PRC, may also therefore utilise emotional elements built into the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative. Wang's (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to the context of the PRC demonstrated how the three themes of CGT are heavily emotional, feeding into what Callahan (2012) refers to as the PRC's "structure of feeling", and have been involved in the construction of identity, power and status elsewhere within the CPC's discourse.

Research Design

Thus far this chapter has introduced the methodological, ontological and theoretical conceptualisations within IR on emotion and emotion within rhetoric. Of particular importance was Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA and Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex. To mitigate researcher bias and arbitrariness in unpacking the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, the thesis is structured as a thematic EDA. The thematic EDA consists of three stages of analysis, the identification, contextualisation and interpretation of emotion adapted from Koschut, et al.'s (2017) three-tiered EDA. Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex has been adapted to identify the three

themes of CGT, to direct a thematic approach to the EDA. How the thematic EDA will be conducted is presented in table 2 below.

| | | |
|---------|------------------------------|---|
| Stage 1 | Identification of Emotion | <p>Micro-level Analysis:</p> <p>Looks at how emotion is communicated within a speech, through textual features of emotion, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Words • Phrases • Metaphors • Analogies • Sayings • Narratives |
| Stage 2 | Contextualisation of Emotion | <p>Macro-level Analysis:</p> <p>Looks at how emotion is communicated across speeches, by identifying where textual features of emotion repeat, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patterns and categories of words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives; • Through the themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma. |
| Stage 3 | Interpretation of Emotion | <p>Critical Analysis:</p> <p>Looks at how social-cultural-historical interpretations of the emotion in and through rhetoric may result in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constructions of identity, power and status; • A reflection of governance motives; • Recognition of needs; • Categorisations of the environment and environmental governance. |

Table 2: Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis Framework

Stage 1, the identification of emotion, adapts Koschut, et al.'s (2017) "Expression" of emotion to identify micro-structures of emotion: words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives. Stage 2 continues to adapt the

“Expression” of emotion and looks to contextualise the emotion by finding the macro-structures of emotion expressed across speeches as patterns, and is guided by the themes of CGT. Stage 3 adapts Koschut, et al.’s (2017) “Effects” and looks to interpret the emotion, guided by social constructivism. This stage will consider the extent to which the CPC are developing identity, power or status through emotion, as well as considering the extent to which the CPC have used emotion to: disseminate their governance motives; show recognition of the audience’s needs; construct a power relationship; or to stimulate a certain categorisation of the CPC, PRC or environment. The thematic EDA will analyse how the CPC frames their ecological civilisation rhetoric via emotion to disseminate certain perceptions, understandings and expectations of the CPC’s environmental governance.

The dataset analysed within this thesis consists of elite political speeches given by the CPC leaders and key ministers on environmental governance, from October 2007 to May 2018. Chairman Hu Jintao and Chairman Xi Jinping, the Premier Li Keqiang and inaugural Minister of the MEP, Zhou Shengxian, gave most of the speeches included within the dataset. The speeches were delivered to both domestic and international audiences. A complete list of speeches analysed can be found in Appendix 1.

Koschut, et al. (2017) argued that verbal instances of emotion provide an empirically accessible platform for emotion research in IR. Thus the selection of elite political speeches by the CPC on environmental governance provides an empirical data set to conduct a thematic EDA. In collecting the speeches that form the dataset, five standards of qualitative sampling were applied (Miles and Huberman, 1994):

1. The texts (speeches) had to be archived on one of the CPC’s government websites.
2. The texts have been translated by the CPC.
3. The texts had to specifically be a speech: not a written report, newspaper article, press conference or interview (as the EDA has been built on previous research working with speech acts only and has therefore not theoretically considered the extent to which the discursive tools of emotion in discourse may differ in other forms of “text”).

4. The speech had to contain at least two of the following search terms linked to the CPC's environmental governance: "eco", "ecological", "civilisation", "civilization", "ecological civilisation", "ecological civilization", "green", "environment", "ecology", "environmental", "environmental protection", "sustainable", "sustainable development", "conservation culture" and "scientific development".
5. The speeches had to have been given between the initial introduction of ecological civilisation by Hu Jintao in his 17th National Congress Report in October 2007 and May 2018, as the data collection took place in the week commencing the 4th of June 2018.

In total 67 speeches have been analysed. Many more texts were initially downloaded, but on closer inspection they did not meet the five standards for qualitative sampling outlined above. These texts were therefore not included in the final dataset.

Excerpts from the CPC leaders' speeches are frequently embedded within the narrative of the thesis' analysis chapters. This has been important to the researcher throughout the three stages of analysis outlined above, in order to identify, contextualise and interpret the use of emotion by the CPC within their rhetoric. It is equally important to allow the reader to also become immersed so that they are able to form their own understandings on the CPC's use of emotion. Therefore, the chapters that follow include the frequent presentation of data, in form of quotations from the CPC leaders' speeches. For this reason, this thesis has been granted a word count increase to 90,000 words, to allow for the CPC's rhetoric to be presented, where appropriate, within the following four chapters.

Limitations and Future Research

The thematic EDA is designed to look for consistencies in the patterns and themes – that is the overall message delivered by the CPC – that emerge in the use of emotion throughout the CPC's rhetoric. Highlighting differences and inconsistencies in the use of emotion by individual members of the CPC, although interesting in understanding the broader use of the concept between individuals, would not answer the

research question under examination. This thesis aims to unpack consistencies in the CPC's messages, through the use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, to disseminate their political intentions and endeavours captured within the capacity of environmental governance. An obvious space for future research is to conduct the thematic EDA to explore divergences and alternative themes and patterns that emerge within CPC ecological civilisation discourse.

Emotion research is riddled with limitations that cannot go ignored. Although emotion research in IR has begun to address the methodological concerns more systematically, overall there is still a lack of consolidated discussion on the ontological, epistemological and theoretical debates (Clément and Sangar, 2017). Clément and Sangar (2017:4) argue the lack of clarity is due to emotions having been denied "the status of a legitimate research object in IR." However, this is mostly due to the inherent risk carried within emotion as an analytical concept; definitions of emotion are contested and remain "fuzzy at times" (Clément and Sangar, 2017:5). Generally agreed is how emotions are socially, culturally and historically contingent, however, the selection or design of research method still largely remains a choice of "personal preference" rather than it being based on specifically agreed conceptualisations of emotion within the discipline of IR (Hutchison and Blieker, 2014). Theoretical work on the concept of emotion is also needed.

This has led to the original design of a thematic EDA within this thesis. Although this has clear advantages in being designed specifically to answer the research question under investigation, it can at times be subject to the following limitations: 1) the risk of systematically generating knowledge on emotions rather than producing an authentic account; 2) relying on borrowing and repurposing the method of EDA, which originally originated outside the discipline of IR; 3) not being able to capture all uses of emotion within a political discourse, therefore potentially losing depth of analyses on emotional phenomena that exist over a defined period, and across social and cultural space; 4) imposing Anglo-European perspectives on the Chinese conceptualisation, production and communication of emotions; and, 5) homogenising understandings, categorisations and interpretations of emotions throughout the CPC and PRC (Clément and Sangar, 2017). The discussion above has tried to outline as clearly as possible the methodological, ontological and theoretical conceptualisations guiding this thesis to

acknowledge and alleviate where possible these limitations. With regards to further research, there is huge scope to apply the thematic EDA designed within this thesis to a variety of other political discourses, as well as the scope to apply other forms of emotionally informed methods, such as an emotion content analysis, on the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric to ascertain what further knowledge can be produced on their use of emotion.

A further limitation faced by an Anglophone researcher studying CPC rhetoric is that this thesis has relied on the CPC's publication, and archiving, of speeches translated into English. However, on the one hand, these English-language texts under analysis can be assumed as having been constructed with both domestic and global audiences intended. On the other hand, since translations of leaders' speeches emerge through a process of careful selection and meticulous labour, the translated speeches are likely to be among the most politically important. The CPC's English language rhetoric can therefore still be expected to convey important messages, which a thematic EDA will help unpack. However, again, this leaves further research opportunities whereby the use of the thematic EDA on the CPC's Chinese language rhetoric could be conducted, with any differences that arise compared and discussed.

The contested case of the translation of *Tianren heyi* (天人合一) demonstrates some of the considerations that should be borne in mind when using CPC translations. The individual characters translate as "heaven", "man", "combined", "as one". The phrase has two generally understood meanings, the first being "heaven and man are the same" or "heaven-human-oneness", which is attributed as being an older understanding of the phrase (Wang, 2007). The second, and a more recent understanding, is the idea of "man is an integral part of nature" and it is this second meaning the CPC choose to carry forward into their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Heurtebise (2017:9) discusses how *Tian* (天) can be translated and understood in English as either "heaven", "nature", "sky" or "destiny", arguing that attributing an environmentalist meaning may actually be an over-interpretation of ancient philosophical texts.

Zhang and Barr (2013:6), highlight how in the popular translation of "unity of man and nature" that there is a contemporary shift away from a focus on "heaven" to a focus on "nature". Yet, and quite importantly, the CPC's choice of translation found in their ecological civilisation rhetoric differs from that of both Heurtebise (2017) and Zhang and

Barr (2013); the CPC specifically use the phrase “harmony between man and nature”. The CPC’s reinterpretation, or choice, of “harmony” over “unity” is explicitly relevant to interactions between nature and humanity: harmony is not unity, perhaps suggesting coexistence rather than “oneness” between humanity and nature (see Callahan, 2013; and Nordin, 2016 for further discussions on the CPC’s use of “harmony”).

Although the same general message can be understood between each of the three translations into English, the slight word play of CPC’s “harmony between man and nature” also allows ecological civilisation to flow on from Hu’s leadership slogans on harmony, harmonious development and harmonious society, thus demonstrating an intended level of continuity between the CPC’s slogan developments and theoretical approaches from Hu to Xi. Furthermore, as ecological civilisation can be understood as one of the CPC’s recent moves towards slogans purposefully developed for both a Chinese and non-Chinese audience, the concept of an ecological civilisation is not merely intended to exist within the borders of the PRC or therefore solely in Mandarin. Thus, slight nuanced changes in their translations, and therefore also the connotations understood in the concepts used by the CPC, are increasingly important. The CPC wants (or needs) their rhetorical messages to be as clear in English (and other languages) as in Mandarin. Hence using CPC translations of speeches is not necessarily always a disadvantage.

Finally, the CPC’s use of *Tianren heyi*, embeds Taoism as a unique, culturally chauvinistic, indicator of Chinese identity. However, there are a number of interesting elements to be unpacked that would need to be carried out as further research. Taoism can be understood as one of the more complicated Chinese philosophies, especially with regards to implementing top-down objectives; the belief in a balance between natural contradictions found within Taoism raises questions over how far the CPC will be able to manipulate Taoist concepts to serve their characteristically monolithic rhetoric in constructing ecological civilisation. The implementation of Taoism, especially via the concept of *Tianren heyi* becomes even more complicated with the CPC’s chosen translation of “harmony between man and nature”. Unpacking harmony, within the context of ecological civilisation, could draw interesting parallels, or add further to the debate, surrounding the CPC’s use of (and the PRC’s interaction with) the concept. For instance, the cynicism found with regards to repression in harmonious coexistence, the

irony of censorship in harmonious Internet forums and the unscientific harmony of monocrop reforestation. Taosim, especially *Tianren heyi*, although used and stipulated by the CPC as a culturally chauvanistic signifier of Chineseness, is indeed much more and deserves further consideration beyond the remit of this thematic EDA (Geall, 2020).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodological stance of this thesis, which is founded within the social constructivist understanding of emotion. This methodological approach has been used to intuitively design a thematic EDA broadly based on the work of Koschut, et al. (2017) and Galtung (1996a and 2001). This framework inherits the ideas of Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985) and Laclau (2004 and 2018) on emotion and how emotion within discourse can construct understandings and categories of identity, power and status. Wang's (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to the CPC's rejuvenation from humiliation narrative further highlighted the importance of CGT emotions within CPC's rhetoric, as well as the compatibility between Koschut, et al.'s (2017) EDA and Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex.

Further research into emotion within ecological civilisation has been identified as a clear niche, especially research that can empirically analyse the CPC's claims. The unique (re)interpretation of the CPC's ecological civilisation by conducting the thematic EDA outlined above will introduce new and interesting interpretations for the CPC's environmental governance. Despite doubts over the CPC's current ability to become an ecological civilisation there can be no doubt that the political rhetoric and importance of creating new environmental regulations across the PRC means the ecological civilisation slogan holds great significance within IR. The following chapters will identify, contextualise and interpret the empirical findings of emotion within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric to introduce new considerations for understanding their ecological civilisation concept.

Chapter 3: Identifying and Contextualising Emotion in the CPC's Ecological Civilisation Rhetoric

This chapter presents the key findings that have emerged from the data having conducted stages 1 and 2 of the thematic EDA; that is the identification and contextualisation of the themes and patterns of emotion (understood as emotion words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives) within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. The aim of this chapter is to organise the data in a systematic and meaningful way, using the three themes of CGT. The chapter is organised so the contextualisation of emotions linked to chosenness are discussed first, then those of glory and finally trauma. Within each section the discussion is ordered so that emotion from speeches given by Hu Jintao are discussed first, then Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhou Shengxian and finally the MEP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The aim of contextualising the data within this chapter is to present to the reader how and where the key patterns formed throughout the dataset.

Chosenness Emotions

As outlined in the previous chapter, chosenness emotions within the CPC's rhetoric are understood as the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) linked to a collective group's sharing of social and historical experiences. Having systematically identified emotions of chosenness in the rhetoric, this section contextualises the main patterns in chosenness emotions across the dataset.

Chosenness Emotions in Hu Jintao's Rhetoric

The most significant use of chosenness emotions across Hu's rhetoric is the notion of a shared spirit across the PRC and within the CPC. What will be shown

throughout these sections is that how the CPC uses chosenness emotions in their ecological civilisation rhetoric touches upon the notion of constructing a singular civilised State, as well as Ahearne's (2013) adaptation of Gramsci's shared conception of the world. Both of these concepts are being utilised to construct an idea of having a shared identity throughout the PRC and are captured by the word "spirit". This is predominantly constructed through the careful selection of historical analogies (Wang, 2007), similar to Galtung's (1996a and 2001) notions of *chosen* myths and *chosen* memories.

As Hu Jintao (2007) renewed his leadership for a second term he first introduced the concept of an ecological civilisation during his report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC. Ironically, within the same year the PRC became globally recognised as the world's second-largest greenhouse gas emitter (Albert and Xu, 2016). Whilst introducing ecological civilisation, Hu (2007:6), also within his report to the 17th National Congress, referred to an "indomitable enterprising spirit". Hu describes this enterprising and indomitable spirit of the Chinese as a product of their Chinese wisdom and culture.

Similarly, Hu (2011b:7) described a "pioneering spirit" at the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC. Interestingly, Hu's 90th Anniversary speech, which took place in 2011, coincided with the PRC formally overtaking Japan to become officially recognised as the world's second-largest economy; this offered an ideal backdrop for Hu's request for an increased "indomitable enterprising spirit" (BBC, 2019; and Hu, 2011b:7). Spirit, therefore, can be seen as a chosenness emotion-term, symbolising "something important" (Kaufman, 2001), that something being Chinese traditions, wisdom and culture. How Hu used emotions of chosenness to conceive the notion of a shared spirit is aligned with an identity of constant innovation and overcoming trials through hard work; Hu uses the emotions embedded within shared references to historical memories and myths to highlight the importance of utilising this Chinese spirit to his Chinese audience.

In his report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, as Hu began to step-down as the General Secretary, Hu (2012:6) continued to build upon this sense of identity, repeatedly referring to how CPC policy embodies the "superiority and vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics [and] has enhanced the pride and cohesiveness of the Chinese people and nation." Ahmed (2015) discussed how emotion words, like superiority, are used to create an in-group's identity through rhetoric; Hu is cementing

his construction of a Chinese in-group, using emotion to direct the group towards feelings of pride and superiority, and to encourage cohesion. Leep's (2010) work on constructing a "proud-Self" category is also relevant.

Hu's (2007:6) construction of a "proud-Self" identity of superiority was also present in his report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC, in referring to the Chinese nation as "spectacular". Thus, notions from Elias' (1985) work on constructing a "Charisma" can be seen: Hu is creating charisma through positive self-imagery. These provide examples of what Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985) described as emotions that categorise a group and direct their emotions through a discursive exertion of power. Similarly, Laclau's (2004) argument of emotion through form and force, where the form of spirit as an ideal of superiority can affect, through force, the feelings, understandings or engagement of the in-group in feeling proud towards actions made by the group: in this case, towards ecological civilisation.

Ahmed's (2015) work on creating an "Us" in political rhetoric as an investment is also especially relevant. Hu's rhetoric calls for cohesive cooperation to support the CPC's environmental governance policies by evoking pride in their ancient philosophical thoughts on nature and the relationship between humanity and nature, claiming ecological civilisation is a Chinese approach to the Chinese situation. How Hu uses the chosenness emotions embedded within the historical analogies, chosen memories and chosen myths built into the dictum of *Tianren heyi* furthers the identity being constructed of superior Chinese wisdom and culture.

Despite the complexities highlighted in Chapter 2 regarding the hidden and multifaceted meanings within concepts such as *Tianren heyi* and *harmony*, the CPC still use the dictum to construct notions of togetherness and unity. Hu's rhetoric starts a process of investing emotion words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives to construct a new identity: an identity of Chinese environmental governance, and is a constant theme in the CPC's State-led ecological civilisation rhetoric. This identity through spirit is categorising and directing what it means to be environmentally friendly as a Chinese citizen, creating pathways for categorising and understanding the CPC's environmental governance as unique, new (albeit developed from the ancient/old) and Chinese (Koschut, 2017b).

In his 18th National Congress report, Hu (2012:7-8) claimed the CPC needs the “whole of society”, to support and pursue ecological civilisation. If the “Chinese nation is to become a “beautiful country” then the “whole of society” is needed to rally behind the CPC (Hu, 2012:7-8). Not only does “beautiful” entice people by creating strong emotional imagery, but it creates an identity, a sense and image of who the Chinese are becoming through re-engaging with their wisdom and culture: it is Chinese wisdom and culture that, collectively as a spectacular and cohesive group, will lead to successes in environmental governance.

At the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Hu also constructs this shared identity through complimenting the Chinese people. For instance, Hu (2011b:21) states the “people are the real heroes.” An EDA is unable to verify such considerations, however, the irony in whether this speech was intending to point towards the PRC officially overtaking Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy would not be lost on a number of Chinese citizens or China scholars. Hero mythology is widely embedded in all societies and carries distinct notions and understandings of what it means to be heroic (Campbell, 2008). Calling the Chinese people heroes overtly reminds them of the humiliations and resulting trials and tribulations their nation has collectively faced – especially at the hands of the Imperial Japanese – from which the PRC has returned triumphant (see similar discussions by Campbell, 2008; Galtung, 1996a and 2001, van der Denner, 2001; Volkan, 1997; and Wang, 2014). Constructing spirit through utilising hero mythology also implicitly indicates that the CPC expect future trials and tribulations on their journey towards ecological civilisation, whereby the cohesive wisdom and hard work of the Chinese people will again be required in order to be triumphant. Hu’s rhetoric suggests that the Chinese people will need to utilise their identity, their wisdom and culture, to overcome the trials and tribulations of becoming a Beautiful China and an ecological civilisation.

Chosenness Emotions in Xi Jinping’s Rhetoric

Xi’s ecological civilisation rhetoric continues to create an identity captured through the word spirit; providing further examples of how the emotion research (from

Ahmed (2015), Elias (1985), Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985), Koschut (2017b), Laclau (2004 and 2018) and Leep (2010)) is applicable and helps to unpack the use of emotion within CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric.

At the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit, Xi talked about the Chinese "spirit of partnership" (Xi, 2016b:1), and "the spirit of driving the nail" (Xi, 2016a:2); at the United Nations Office in 2017, Xi discussed the Chinese "spirit of humanity" (Xi, 2017b:4); at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Xi suggested that the PRC works with a "spirit of peace and cooperation" and a "spirit of mutual respect" (Xi, 2017c:2); and finally at the Closing Meeting of the 13th National People's Congress in 2018, Xi stated that "The Chinese people are people with great spirit of pursuing dreams" (Xi, 2018b:3-4), "The Chinese people are people with great spirit of struggle" (Xi, 2018b:2) and that the Chinese people work with the "great spirit of cherishing unity" (Xi, 2018b:3). Xi builds on the identity initiated in Hu's rhetoric which focused on hard work (through form of emotion, Laclau, 2004 and 2018); Xi requests that the Chinese draw upon their talent and ability again (as force of emotion; Laclau, 2004 and 2018), which is captured through words and phrases, such as, "struggle", "driving the nail" and "pursuing dreams". The global political background regarding environmental governance throughout these speeches given by Xi, began in 2016 with cooperation between the PRC and the U.S. in jointly agreeing to ratify the Paris agreement (BBC, 2016), and by the end of 2017, President Donald Trump had announced his intentions to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Trump, 2017). Xi's use of unity, in speeches both within the PRC and internationally, carry intentions of leadership beyond the borders of the PRC, thus how the CPC uses emotion seems to be elevating the identity of the Chinese to one of increasing global leadership within environmental governance.

In combining the prevalence of spirit across both Hu's and Xi's speeches, it becomes increasingly apparent that spirit represents a collective in-group and their sharing of social and historical experiences. That is to say, how Xi also uses chosenness emotions within his ecological civilisation rhetoric is also supporting the notion of a singular civilised State through the ideals of superior Chinese wisdom and culture creating ecological civilisation; it also furthers the notions of chosen memories and chosen myths – or chosen historical analogies – helping to construct a singular shared

conception of the world being disseminated through the identity embedded throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric (see Ahearne, 2013; Cartier, 2013; and Wang 2007 on discussion over how the CPC use ecological civilisation to construct a shared conception of the world, and the importance of historical analogy).

There is a great array in the uses of spirit within Xi's rhetoric. For example, the term spirit consistently symbolises Chinese identity, through their wisdom and culture, and is described by Xi as being respectful, peaceful and cooperative. Xi associates Chinese wisdom and culture with a variety of character traits that are flexibly adapted, depending on how the CPC wish the Chinese to engage with this identity. Xi's presentation of this identity, and how the Chinese are to engage and perceive the environment, has vastly changed from Mao's "fourth enlightenment"; whereby Chinese culture was decimated along with the environment. The CPC are now proactively directing the Chinese people to once again embrace their past and to re-engage with ancient philosophical thought, such as variations of *Tianren heyi* (Wang, 2007).

Xi presents *Tianren heyi* as the "status quo" of Chinese environmentalism (see Kaufman, 2001; and Koschut, 2017b, on discussion of creating identity through a status quo). Xi's variations in his use of the dictum included: "to seek harmony and coexistence is in the genes of the Chinese nation", which Xi stated during the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit (Xi, 2016a:9); as well as, "Man and nature form a community of life" and "harmonious coexistence between man and nature", which were important statements regarding ecological civilisation in his report to the 19th National Congress (Xi, 2017e:48). Xi is presenting harmony between man and nature not only as the status quo of Chinese wisdom, but also that it is inevitable; *Tianren heyi* is their Chinese identity: it is culturally, socially and biologically shared amongst the Chinese people. *Tianren heyi* embodies the spirit of ecological civilisation and symbolically represents the Chinese superior wisdom and culture of environmental governance; again *Tianren heyi* is Xi's chosen dictum, adapted alongside chosen memories and chosen myths, and historical analogies to construct the shared identity of superior Chinese wisdom and culture.

Xi's spirit also fosters an identity of togetherness, which can be seen through words like "unity" and "partnership". Xi uses form of emotion through words such as "unity" to apply the symbol of spirit, as a force of emotion, where Chinese wisdom and culture becomes about actions and understandings of togetherness (Laclau, 2004). A

sense of shared togetherness appears frequently in Xi's (2017e:48) rhetoric, for example, in his report to the 19th National Congress, Xi states: "we will get everyone involved in improving the environment". Xi uses the emotions within the notions of coexistence and harmony being in the genes of the Chinese people, to create an understanding of why everyone must be involved; not due to the dire conditions of the environment, but because it is quintessentially Chinese to create conditions of harmony and coexistence: it is the predisposed Chinese way, their mandate under heaven.

The identity being constructed by Xi incorporates togetherness and unity, alongside the idea of there being a quintessentially way of being Chinese, fostering notions of a singular civilised State, supported by a shared conception of how to be Chinese within their constructed shared conception of the world. Togetherness is also present in Xi's (2017a:8) keynote speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum, where in his use of "victory" he elucidates how victory will only come when everyone unites together; this speech followed Xi's announcement of developing a cap-and-trade system (See Appendix 2). During the Closing Meeting of the 13th National People's Congress, Xi (2018b:3) recounts how the "great spirit of cherishing unity" has allowed the Chinese to have "stuck together through thick and thin" in order to now be "striving with one heart" (Xi, 2018b:31). These discursive techniques in identity making have been discussed by: Ahmed (2015), Elias (1985), Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985), Koschut (2017b), Laclau, (2004 and 2018), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008). How Xi uses chosenness emotions, via these previously discussed techniques, further cements how the ecological civilisation rhetoric is being utilised to foster, or create, a singular civilised State with a shared conception of Chineseness, and of the world, via Chinese superiority in wisdom and culture. Xi's use of "striving with one heart" also came at the time where Xi Jinping Thought was enshrined within the constitution and his second term of leadership as the General Secretary of the CPC began (see Appendix 2); his use of chosenness emotion incites strong support to continue rallying behind his ideals and thoughts, as a singular unified nation.

Xi's rhetoric also includes examples of chosenness emotions that exemplify the works of Bially Mattern (2005), De Rivera (1992) and Hutchison (2010), whereby the use of emotion utilises shared traumatic experience(s) of an in-group, creating a heightened sense of pride in who they are, where they are from and who they are becoming. For

example, through force of emotion, Xi (2017e:49), in his report to the 19th National Congress, states that unity “will get everyone involved...to make our skies blue again” and “It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation [sic]” (2017e:10). Xi’s chosenness emotions are constructing a spirit of togetherness to create an ecological civilisation, a Beautiful China, and bring harmony and coexistence between humanity and nature through proudly utilising Chinese wisdom and culture, rejuvenating the PRC and improving environmental governance globally. At the Closing Meeting of the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:1) utilises the narrative of how “together we have stood up, grown rich and become strong”. Here the meta-narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation, built upon historical analogies using chosen memories and chosen myths, is embedded within Xi’s ecological civilisation rhetoric (Bially Mattern 2005; Callahan, 2012; Hutchison, 2010; and Wang, 2014); imploring such strong emotions, through the use of the “stood up, grown rich and become strong” narrative, coincided with Xi’s momentous changes to CPC legislature to remove the two-term limit on Presidency, alongside the major reorganisation of the CPC’s ministries, perhaps signifying the level of control Xi Jinping appears to have over realising his leadership intentions and the rhetoric produced to disseminate them (see Appendix 2).

Finally, Xi’s identity construction of a shared spirit also works by complimenting the Chinese on their wisdom and culture. In his report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi (2017e:10) also calls the Chinese people “heroes”, creating a narrative whereby “ecological civilization offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind [sic].” At the Closing Meeting of the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi takes this narrative further, complimenting their tenacity, in being “hard working”, “brave” and coming together (Xi, 2018b:4). Xi (2018b:4) claims that Chinese “wisdom” offers a solution to solve the problems of mankind furthering the “in-group”, strengthening the ontological security of who the Chinese are and the “proud-Self” identity (Ahmed, 2015; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2006; and Steele, 2008). The CPC’s rhetoric encourages the Chinese people to utilise this identity, to come together, to work hard and support the concept of ecological civilisation. Hence, Xi’s use of chosenness emotions can also be seen to be attempting to create a sense of superiority, or a charisma, of the PRC in-group (Elias, 1985).

Xi (2017h:2), at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties meeting, refers to ecological civilisation as their “destiny”, and as a “magnificent epic” at the 13th National People’s Congress (Xi, 2018b:3). Xi’s rhetoric defines ecological civilisation as a journey to be embarked upon together, directed by their Chinese wisdom and culture, now that the PRC’s identity is returning to that of a united, rich and strong country (both culturally and economically). Xi (2017e:10) labels ecological civilisation as a part of the PRC’s “new era” during the 19th National Congress and furthers how it will be a movement towards a better future, as a gift from the PRC to mankind, for future generations (Xi, 2017e:50).

Chosenness Emotions in Li Keqiang’s Rhetoric

Li’s use of chosenness emotions differed slightly from Hu and Xi in that the word “spirit” was not present. Instead, Li used words, such as: “wisdom” (Li, 2014a:8) and “power” (Li, 2014a:8) in his 12th National People’s Congress delivery; as well as “creativity” (Li, 2015a:2); and “passion” (Li, 2015a:2) at the OECD Headquarters. These emotion-words further construct a Chinese identity of hard work and innovation, as well as an identity of Chinese wisdom as an identity to be proud of, and one of togetherness. This identity construction is seen throughout Li Keqiang’s rhetoric (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985; Koschut, 2017b; Mitzen, 2006; and Steele, 2008).

During his 12th National People’s Congress speech, Li (2014a:22) claims, “The people are the foundation of a nation, and a nation can enjoy peace only when its foundation is strong. The fundamental goal of a government’s work is to ensure that everyone lives a good life.” Li (2014a:8) also said: “As the saying goes, great vision that makes a country prosper is but the result of collective wisdom. In other words, wisdom comes from the people. In the same line, the massive entrepreneurship and innovation by all, as I emphasized earlier, will generate enormous power... To use a Chinese idiom, the fire will burn higher when everyone adds wood to it [sic]”; and that the “People’s creativity and entrepreneurial passion has given us confidence to overcome the challenges” (Li, 2014a:2). At the 18th China-ASEAN Summit, Li (2015c:2) stated, “China is a huge country. It has a long history, a splendid culture and enchanting natural

scenery.” Li’s rhetoric uses emotion that is supportive of the Chinese people sharing a strong charisma as an in-group, working together, jointly using their wisdom and culture, to confidently overcome future challenges when working towards building a society based within the CPC’s notion of an ecological civilisation. Again, Li’s use of emotion within his rhetoric supports the insinuation of constructing a singular civilised state, it suggests the Chinese people are working towards having a shared conception of the world and there is, again, a selectiveness in the character traits being emphasised.

Chosenness Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric

Zhou Shengxian, the inaugural Minister of Environmental Protection (March 2008 – February 2015), repeats and embellishes the rhetoric of Hu and Xi. In his ministerial position, Zhou was entirely focused on environmental protection; thus, the amount of speeches dedicated explicitly to ecological civilisation far surpasses that of Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. It is unsurprising that the same patterns in contextualising chosenness also emerge within Zhou’s rhetoric; “spirit” represents a superiority of Chinese wisdom and culture, as well as togetherness and victory through unity. Zhou’s use of chosenness emotions constructs the notion of spirit as shared amongst the PRC – it is constructed through historical analogies (Wang, 2007), chosen memories and chosen myths (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Volkan, 1997; van der Dennen, 2001; and Wang, 2014), disseminated by Zhou through the use of emotion within his ecological civilisation rhetoric. Again, this use of emotion paints a picture of working towards a singular civilised State (Cartier, 2013), one with a shared conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013), made possible through superior Chinese wisdom and culture.

During Zhou’s (2014c:5) speech at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, he stated: “The spirit in the important speeches made by General Secretary Xi Jinping charts the course for actively exploring a new path to environmental protection and enriches its contents” and that in being “[g]uided by the important instructions made by the top leaders, we should carry forward the spirit of local creativity and actively explore the new approaches and new models of building ecological civilization, which are compatible with national and provincial reality and have local

characteristics [sic]" (Zhou, 2014c:18). Here Zhou unambiguously links spirit to Chinese wisdom and creativity, down to the local level but guided by the CPC, in order to create an ecological civilisation. A further example is seen at the Fourth National Working Meeting on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regulation, where Zhou (2011a:1) states that the CPC and PRC "will keep pace with times with pioneering spirit and strive for a new situation of environmental protection".

However, during Zhou's (2011b:28) speech at the 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, ecological civilisation itself also creates spirit: "We will equip ourselves with the latest Party theory and cultivate a strong spirit powered by building ecological civilization and exploration to a new path to environmental protection [sic]". Thus, spirit becomes a feedback loop, where spirit will create ecological civilisation, but ecological civilisation will also improve the spirit of the Chinese.

For Zhou (2009b:2), at the Thirteenth World Lake Conference, the spirit of ecological civilisation is a "higher-level" of environmental governance, stipulating at the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection 2013, that it is adapted to the PRC's unique situation and bears "distinct characteristics" (Zhou, 2013c:1-2). This can be understood as an echo of Hu's rhetoric, where a charisma through positive self-imagery and a distinction between an "Us" and "Them" was discursively created (Elias, 1985; and Risse and Ropp, 2013).

An important phrase found in Zhou's (2007:3) rhetoric is "splendid Chinese culture", which appears as early as 2007 – in Zhou's first speech within the data set – at the Annual General Meeting of the MEP, and throughout to his final speech at the closing the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation in 2014. As discussed by Wang (2014), *hua* or splendid, creates a specific identity of superiority in Chinese culture, distinguishing civilised from barbarian, and is discursively constructed through carefully selected historical analogies, chosen memories and chosen myths (Callahan, 2012; Leep, 2010; and Risse and Ropp, 2013). The use of splendid echoes notions of superiority within the in-group, and disapproval for anything non-Chinese, creating a category of understanding for how the Chinese are to critique the environmental approaches of *yi*, the out-group(s) (Ahmed, 2015).

Examples of splendid Chinese culture within Zhou's rhetoric also focus heavily on the adapted dictum of harmony between man and nature, or *Tianren heyi*. For example,

in Zhou's (2009a:1-2) *Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological Civilization*, he states that ecological civilisation will help to: "realize harmonious co-existence between man and nature, among human beings, and between man and society based on the carrying capacity of environment [sic]"; "seek balance and harmony between man and nature...true harmony between man and nature" (Zhou, 2009a:5); and that "Active effort to promote ecological civilization and harmony between man and nature is a historic duty of utmost importance bestowed upon environmental workers [sic]" (Zhou, 2009a:2).

Zhou's use of *Tianren heyi* is represented as a matter of fact, they are a discursive exertion of power, categorising what to feel positively about, and are adapted to fit the element of environmental protection Zhou is undertaking, such as "harmony between man and water environment" (Zhou, 2009b:5; at the Thirteenth World Lake Conference). In Zhou's (2014d:3) *A Major Strategy to Open up a New Situation for Harmonious Development of Man and Nature – Thoroughly Learning and Implementing the Important Statement of Comrade Xi Jinping on Building Ecological Civilization* speech, he lists historic examples of the Chinese living the principles and responsibilities of harmony between man and nature, to demonstrate how it is possible to create ecological civilisation. Having experienced "Airpocalypse" and 7500 dead pigs being found in the Huangpu River in 2013 (Albert and Xu, 2016; Jin, Anderson and Zhang, 2016; and Zuo, 2013; see Appendix 2), historical analogies and ancient dictums shifts the focus away from current environmental disasters. Zhou seemingly attempts to redirect the audience to consider instead carefully selected historical analogies and chosen memories, regardless of the fact that the historical analogies are almost unverifiable and are a product of a very different China to the PRC of today.

For Zhou, *Tianren heyi* is not just a symbol of Chinese wisdom and culture; it is a practical means of delivering CPC policy, the emotion embedded within the concept "codifies" ecological civilisation (see Geall and Ely, 2018 for discussion on ecological civilisation becoming codified; and Koschut, 2017b). This is seen in Zhou's (2013c:1-2) speech at the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, where he claims that, "Ecological civilization represents the material, spiritual and institutional achievements of [the] human race in protecting and developing a good environment and a kind of social

form where man and nature, environment and economic development and man and society coexist harmoniously [sic].”

Zhou’s (2010d:1) 2010 World Environment Day speech refers to how the non-Chinese civilisation(s) (the out-group(s)), create “hostilities between man and nature”. This was also seen earlier in Zhou’s (2009b:2) Thirteenth World Lake Conference speech, where he stated; “Traditional civilization leads to the conflicts between man and nature [sic].” Zhou implicitly suggests that bad environmental conditions are a result of straying away from Chinese wisdom and culture, or “blindly following” the West. Zhou establishes a deeper contrast between the in-group of “Us” versus the out-group of “Them”, creating a strong identity of Chinese superiority in their approach to environmental governance (understood as a discursive technique of emotion in the works of Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985; Koschut, 2017b; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2008; Risse and Ropp, 2013; and Steele, 2008).

Zhou Shengxian also frequently uses the concept of a “beautiful China”, for example, in his *Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation* Zhou states (2012d:1), “A beautiful China reflects the beauty of the times, our society, people's life, the masses and our environment. This beautiful China is a harmonious society offering equal opportunity for people and a sound, liveable environment. Building a beautiful China is a systematic project which requires top-down design, clear direction, objectives and tasks and effective measures to advance the work step by step.” The environment is not becoming beautiful per se; the concept represents everything that is already beautiful, has been beautiful in the PRC, and is becoming increasingly beautiful with the CPC directing the restoration of identity, power and status; Zhou’s beautiful China trope also works towards codifying ecological civilisation. *Tianren heyi* is utilised as the directions of how to become beautiful whilst creating a strong charisma of Chinese superiority (similar arguments are found in the works of Ahmed, 2015; and Elias, 1985).

Finally, Zhou also creates togetherness throughout the rhetoric in phrases, such as: “unified thought” at the National Conference on Environmental Protection 2010 (Zhou, 2010b:12); “stand together through storm and stress, share in weal or woe”, which he stated at the Meeting in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of China National Environment Centre (Zhou, 2010e:1); and “with participation of the whole nation”, which was stated at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and

Promotion Association (Zhou, 2011g:1); and signifies notions of a singular civilised state, as well as sharing a united conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013). The increased use of togetherness emotion-words in 2010 sits alongside the PRC hosting the 2010 Global UN Climate Talks, perhaps influencing the greater uptake in these emotive ideals (CNN, 2010; see Appendix 2). Similar is how Zhou (2012d:2), in *Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation*, uses metaphor to highlight the importance of togetherness: “Once all the masses grasp the strategic thought of building a beautiful China, the idea will spawn tremendous material and spiritual force. As the seeds of ecological civilization have been planted across the nation, the seeds of building a beautiful China are being sowed in every corner of our motherland, bearing rich fruits in the near future [sic].” Zhou’s use of chosenness emotions portray ecological civilisation as something everyone must be involved in, through their Chinese wisdom and culture, which will create a splendid beautiful future for all Chinese people. The idea of inevitability is also represented; fruits are expected to grow following the sowing of seeds, so long as the plants are tended to: now the CPC have sown the seeds of an ecological civilisation it is up to the Chinese to tend to these ideas in order for a beautiful PRC to bloom, again demonstrating the discursive exertion of power and showing the form and force of emotions in Zhou’s rhetoric (Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).

Chosenness Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA

Chosenness emotions were rarely present or utilised in speeches by the MEP. However, Wu Xiaoqing (2013:6), in his *Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection System* speech, requested the MEP to spread the spirit of creating an ecological civilisation. Wu Xiaoqing’s speech followed on from the internationally acknowledged environmental catastrophe of “Airpocalypse” at the start of 2013; it is therefore unsurprising that in addressing the MEP that he would request the staff to work together on preventing future catastrophes and global embarrassments.

Whereas, chosenness emotions within the MFA rhetoric carried a strong message about how the PRC – having grown rich and strong, and drawing upon their own wisdom and culture – is now becoming a beautiful ecological civilisation. These emotions again represent the findings from the works of Ahmed (2015), De Rivera (1992), Elias (1985), Koschut (2017b), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008). The MFA's chosenness rhetoric invites the world to learn from the CPC's ecological civilisation. For example, Liu Xiaoming (2017:7), Ambassador to the UK, in his *New Era, New Opportunity, New Future* speech, stated: "I think what this Congress brings to the world, including Britain, are China's wisdom, China's concepts and China's opportunities." This confident identity of Chinese wisdom, culture and traditional environmental philosophies, is being presented to the world, furthering the charisma and positive self-imagery of the Chinese in-group versus an inferior out-group. Once again, this CPC rhetoric uses chosenness emotions to signify a superior singular civilised State, via Chinese splendid culture and wisdom, embedded within the shared conception of the world of striving together to become an ecological civilisation, versus the barbaric Other(s).

Liu Jieyi (2017:2), the PRC's then permanent representative to the UN, in his *Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Agenda* speech, stated how the Paris Agreement merely agreed with what the CPC had already set out to achieve prior to international cooperation: "The vision of global green and low-carbon development envisaged by the Paris Agreement corresponds with China's strategic choice of building an ecological civilization [sic]." Liu Jieyi and Liu Xiaoming's rhetoric builds a narrative, which portrays ecological civilisation as a path led by the CPC, based on the Chinese situation, utilising Chinese wisdom and culture to provide solutions. Liu Jieyi (2017:7) also stipulates that to reach ecological civilisation constant exploration and innovation, collectively, is required.

Liu Jieyi (2017:7) also stated how Ecological civilisation "with its own features" is "China's wisdom and solution" to environmental degradation; "[o]ther countries are free to find out more about China's development experience and draw on strength or reference as they see fit. They should explore a development path and social system that suits their own history and culture. This is, in essence, the biggest contribution of China's path of socialism with Chinese characteristics to all humanity." Thus

demonstrating how ecological civilisation embodies a new identity of Chinese unity, strength and wisdom, both domestically and as a new presentation of the PRC on the world stage.

Summary of the Use of Chosenness Emotions

Chosenness emotions were repeatedly used throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric; creating an in-group identity of Chinese environmentalism, drawing upon the concept of harmony between man and nature, embedded within Chinese wisdom and culture. Numerous examples of emotion words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which referred symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) linked to a the collective in-group's sharing of social and historical experiences, drew upon ideas found in the works of Ahmed (2015), Bially Mattern (2005), De Rivera (1992), Elias (1985), Hutchison (2010), Koschut (2017b), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006); Risse and Ropp (2013) and Steele (2008).

The CPC's rhetoric suggests the PRC should be proud of their identity, built through positive self-imagery and charisma, and are frequently told that everyone must harness this identity together. Through harnessing the spirit of ecological civilisation, the CPC proclaim that the PRC will be victorious in becoming an ecological civilisation and a beautiful China. To be victorious, the Chinese citizens are told to unite – with tenacity and hard work – to create ecological civilisation, which they can offer to the world as an improved form of environmental governance. The chosenness emotions could be seen to create a distinction between the civilised Chinese “Us” and a barbaric “Them” (this argument draws upon the work of Risse and Ropp, 2013). How the CPC use chosenness emotions within their ecological civilisation rhetoric have been seen to be constructing and disseminating a progression towards becoming a singular civilised State (Cartier, 2013). The use of chosenness emotions builds up a shared conception of the world, which professes the superiority of Chinese wisdom and culture, and is able to improve not just the PRC, but also the world. This is done through carefully selecting historical analogies – via the implementation of chosen myths and chosen memories – to construct a shared identity of unity, progression and hard work.

Emotions of Glory

Glory emotions signify the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) linked to myths and memories of a glorious past, present and future. Glory emotions are overtly positive. This section will now highlight the main patterns in glory emotions throughout the dataset.

Glory Emotions in Hu Jintao's Rhetoric

The most significant pattern in the use of glory emotions in Hu's rhetoric can be understood as the glorifying of the CPC's leadership and understanding of governance; a power relationship emerges, categorising the CPC as the leaders, or heroes, guiding the citizens of the PRC. It must be noted that this claim of strong leadership does not only apply to environmental governance within Hu's rhetoric; it is a strong message repeatedly made, where Hu praises the achievements of the CPC and stipulates all achievements have been a result of the CPC's thought-leadership and hard work. However, that ecological civilisation is a new idea of the CPC's – one that will create a better life for the people and a sound ecological environment – is repeatedly made and glorified.

During Hu's 18th National Congress report, numerous glory words were used in the two sections of the speech on environmental governance, such as: "cherish" (Hu, 2012:11); "enrich" (Hu, 2012:11); "treasure" (Hu, 2012:36); "unspoilt" and "beautiful" (Hu, 2012:34). There is a positivity towards the environment where "cherish", "enrich" and "treasure" direct the audience in how they should feel and behave towards the PRC's environment; "unspoilt" and "beautiful" creates an ideal type of environment, which requires specific actions, or more specifically a lack of detrimental actions, to ensure the environment is unharmed, preventing further pollution. Hu is using glory emotions as a force to stipulate, or to lead, how the people should categorise and understand the environment to help create ecological civilisation. This is an example of what Foucault (1985) described as a strategic formation, where emotion words direct people to

interpret the object of the discourse in a specified way: the environment is being emotionally described as something fragile that needs to be looked after by the PRC.

Hu creates a narrative of power with the CPC as the leader or hero; in his 17th National congress report, at the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, and concluding with his 18th National congress report, Hu claimed that “the CPC has bravely... sacrificed their lives” (Hu, 2007:49), to secure “Victory” (Hu, 2011b:14 and Hu, 2012:2) in environmental governance. Elias’s (1985) charisma building is again relevant; bravely securing victory glorifies the CPC as heroic leaders. Hu’s (2009:2) *Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change* speech, also describes the CPC’s environmental governance as a responsibility they owe to their people and the world. Indeed, such a pledge to the people coincides with an international pledge made in the same year by Wen Jiabao, at The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15); Wen proposed that the PRC would reduce 40 to 45 percent of their 2005 emissions by 2020 (Floracruz, 2009; see Appendix 2). As leaders the CPC accept the responsibility of creating a “beautiful homeland with green fields, clean water and a blue sky” (Hu Jintao, 2012:35; 18th National Congress report). This trilogy of green fields, clean water and blue sky creates a – carefully chosen – glorified image through categories, bursting with the colours of a healthy and beautiful environment; it utilises glory emotions based on the ideals of what people want, what they stipulate the PRC once knew, and asserts the CPC as the leaders who can deliver this, through selected analogies, chosen memories and chosen myths.

In his 17th National Congress report, Hu (2007:7) stated the CPC’s new environmental governance will be “a great new revolution carried on by the people under the Party’s leadership in a new era... and [the CPC will] ensure that it is always in the forefront of the times.” The glory emotions provide a direction and instruction of how to become an ecological civilisation; most important is how the CPC will be the leaders. Glorifying the CPC’s leadership in this way distracts from the PRC having just become the largest emitter of greenhouse gasses globally, or that the Food and Drug Agency Chief was executed for taking bribes following international fears that these bribes had made Chinese exports unsafe for consumption (Albert and Xu, 2016; and BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2).

This advances the construction of a power relationship by utilising glorified emotion-words embedded within the idea of a new revolution, where the people have the most to gain in being supportive, or perhaps, subservient (Koschut, 2017b). Hu (2007:2) furthers this power relationship between the CPC and the people when making statements such as: “The great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the banner guiding development and progress in contemporary China and rallying the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups in the country in our common endeavour.” Hu (2007:18) promotes the achievements of building a moderately prosperous society, and insinuates the CPC will accomplish this, stating: “It will be a country whose people are better off and enjoy markedly improved quality of life and a good environment.”

Hu’s use of glory is present in a number of metaphors that imply a journey towards betterment. During his speech at the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Hu (2011b:7) describes how ecological civilisation is an idea, which will “blaze new trails” and how the CPC will “forge ahead in a pioneering spirit”. Similarly, in his 18th National Congress report, Hu (2012:2) goes on to say “we have marched boldly” showing a speed and confidence in their direction during his leadership, as the CPC continues to “launch a revolution”. Each metaphor demonstrates how the CPC are leading the PRC in a new direction, with a pioneering spirit, which sounds overtly positive and promising (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985 and Leep, 2010). The glorifying myths, memories, or perhaps wishes, of the Chinese citizens for a clean and green future environment, are utilised by the CPC to present ecological civilisation as a revolution and new form of thought-leadership in environmental governance and nation building.

Glory Emotions in Xi Jinping’s Rhetoric

Glory emotion-words in Xi’s (2017e:10) 19th National Congress report, in the sections on environmental governance, created ecological civilisation as a concept, which “embraces the brilliant”, is “full of vitality” and is “flying high and proud for all to see”. As in Hu’s rhetoric, Xi uses emotion-words to show the glory, strength and correctness of the CPC, such as: the CPC have “devoted serious energy”. Xi (2017e:5)

glorifies the CPC's approach to environmental governance through their "high intensity" and the "encouraging" of "accelerated" policies, making "smooth progress" that has "significantly strengthened" the PRC. During his Keynote Address at the APEC CEO Summit, Xi (2017f:9-10) describes the CPC's leadership approach, stating: "Once we set a target, we will not stop our efforts until it is met!". This claim, utilising glory emotions, also came after President Donald Trump's announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement. Although EDA cannot verify such claims, it is feasible to think that Xi Jinping's statement here is claiming to the world that the PRC is reliable and will continue to observe the agreed international standards, unlike the U.S. (see Appendix 2). Xi describes the CPC as having an unremitting effort, working towards a positive end goal, highlighting the strength and virtuousness of the CPC. Thus also creating a charisma of strong and successful leadership, and an in-group with a "proud-Self" (Elias, 1985; and Leep, 2010).

Xi's glory emotions portray the CPC as leaders, with the responsibility of developing a better approach to all-around development; thus ecological civilisation is created as a symbolic, real and ideal pathway to a place of betterment. Xi states how the PRC, under the CPC's direction, is doing "miraculous" things: through using Chinese wisdom, to help the world. Within his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:49) stated "We [the CPC] will establish an environmental governance system in which government takes the lead, enterprises assume main responsibility, and social organizations and the public also participate [sic]". Xi thus depicts a clear hierarchy of leadership and responsibilities, with the CPC as the leaders, echoing Ahearne's (2013) application of Gramsci's hegemony, conception of the world and war of position.

Xi furthers this power relationship by adding an international dynamic, again in his Keynote Address at the APEC CEO Summit, Xi (2017f:3) stated: "This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the future." Xi's (2017b) 2017 speech to the United Nations Office, insists all Chinese people must first come together to support the endeavour, to then share this approach with mankind. Xi thus elevates the PRC, aggrandising their ecological civilisation initiative; in doing so, Xi creates an identity of openness, inclusivity and a country that shares with others their developments.

This glorification of CPC leadership can be seen when Xi (2017b:5) stated, again, within his speech to the United Nations Office, how the CPC are: “Guided by the principle of peace, sovereignty, inclusiveness and shared governance”, going on to add “we should turn the deep sea, the polar regions, the outer space and the Internet into new frontiers for cooperation rather than a wrestling ground for competition.” Xi suggests the Chinese way, via the Chinese wisdom and culture of ecological civilisation, is different from the current conventions, such as the UN’s sustainable development concept – guided by the principles of capitalism – that has led to wrestling rather than cooperation. The use of this metaphor glorifies the CPC as civilised, describing developed states as barbaric in their wrestling with one-another, creating another dualism of in-group civility versus out-group barbarity. Moreover, the CPC can be seen as leading the way to a place of global betterment (Ahmed, 2015; Callahan, 2012; Elias, 1985; Koschut, 2017b; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; and Wang, 2014).

As with Hu’s rhetoric, Xi uses glory emotions creating ecological civilisation as a destination or a place of betterment. During the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit, Xi (2016a:4) stated, “green mountains and clear water are as good as mountains of gold and silver.” Xi’s use of this analogy in 2016 coincided with what had been the PRC’s slowest year of economic growth (only 6.7%) since 1990, thus perhaps Xi’s use of glorifying the value of nature could be seen to minimise any criticism over the lack of economic growth (BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2). Similarly, during his *Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind* speech, delivered to the UN in 2017, Xi (2017b:21) claimed, “[w]e [the world] must realize that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets and act on this understanding, implement our fundamental national policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment, and cherish the environment as we cherish our own lives [sic].” These examples describe ecological civilisation as a desirable destination with physical and real elements. Colours are repeatedly used to create positive images, such as through blue skies and green mountains (a discursive technique discussed by Koschut, 2017b).

Xi (2017a:10) also uses journey metaphors, for example, during his Keynote Speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, where he said: “We [the PRC] will open our arms to the people of other countries and welcome them aboard the express train of China’s development”. In 2017 during his *Work*

Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind speech, delivered at the UN, Xi (2017b:2) claimed: “We [the world’s governments] need to respond to the people’s call, take up the baton of history and forge ahead on the marathon track toward peace and development.” Moreover, in his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:5) claimed the PRC are “[t]aking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to Climate Change”, because “China has become... [a] torchbearer in the global endeavour for ecological civilisation.” Once again, this remark made by Xi Jinping followed Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2). These journey metaphors glorify how the CPC’s leadership is fast paced and interesting, leading global environmental governance, sharing their concept of ecological civilisation with the world.

During the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:8) stated: “China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine on a community with a shared future for humanity [and] illuminate the world! [sic]” The emotion here carries the message that sharing the Chinese wisdom and culture, built up through emotions of chosenness, and correctly directed by the CPC, will bring the world into a state of shared light and shared prosperity benefiting all.

Xi’s glory emotions depict a journey to betterment, under the CPC’s firm leadership, benefiting mankind in creating a better life through a clean, green and beautiful environment. Xi’s glory emotions place Xi as the ultimate charismatic leader creating a platform to exercise power through his rhetoric (Elias, 1985; Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).

Glory Emotions in Li Keqiang’s Rhetoric

Li Keqiang’s glory emotion-words also positively describe the CPC’s environmental governance and leadership style, for example, during his 12th National People’s Congress report, Li used: “strengthen” (Li, 2014a:16); “sped up” (Li, 2014a:16); “increase” (Li, 2014a:16); “work harder” (Li, 2014a:16); “improve” (Li, 2014a:16);

“vigorously” (Li, 2014a:17), (Li, 2014a:3); “strong” (Li, 2014a:25); “beautiful” (Li, 2014a:25); “reform” (Li, 2014a:25); “sound” (Li, 2014a:25); “launch” (Li, 2014a:25); “speed up” (Li, 2014a:25); “dynamic” (Li, 2014a:25) “move forward” (Li, 2014a:25); “endeavor [sic]” (Li, 2014a:29); and “harmonious” (Li, 2014a:29). Similarly, Li’s glory emotion-phrases include: “we will strengthen” and “we will push forward” (Li, 2014a:17). These emotion words and phrases demonstrate how Li positively represented the CPC as strong leaders confidently, quickly and convincingly leading the way (further Elias’ (1985) concept of charisma).

A sense of excitement, or even pride, is found in Li’s (2016a:3) rhetoric, in his speech at the First World Conference on Tourism for Development Li manages to glorify the CPC’s environmental governance leadership through statements, such as: “We will champion the vision of green development for the country and the people”. Similar glorifying remarks were made during his speech at the 71st session of UN General Assembly, where Li (2016c:1-2) stated: “The UN Sustainable Development Summit held last year adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, opening a new vision for global development. At the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech entitled “Toward Win-win Partnership for Sustainable Development” to expound on China’s principles and position as well as its readiness to advance the agenda for sustainable development”. At the 20th ASEAN Plus China, Japan and the Republic Of Korea Summit, Li (2017e:3) also remarked how “China is ready” for greater global environmental governance; as noted above, this speech by Li followed President Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement, thus creating space politically for the PRC to appear more environmentally committed globally, whilst not taking on any new responsibilities (Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2).

Li’s glory emotions create an identity of the PRC cooperating with the world. For instance: “China will join hands with other countries to achieve enduring peace, common development and prosperity of the human race” (Li, 2014a:29). In his 12th National People’s Congress speech, Li (2014a:7) stated that: “The world needs China, China needs the world”. Li is investing in creating a strong sense of self, where CPC leadership is ready to deliver this new environmental governance to the world (Ahmed, 2015; and Elias, 1985). But, to do so, Li (2014a:29) also uses glory emotions to describe how the

citizens of the PRC trust the CPC, thus furthering the power relationship between the Party and the people:

The people have placed great trust in us, and we will work hard to create the future. Let us rally closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary, hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and work together as one. Let us endeavor to break new ground and make solid progress, and strive to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious. With all these efforts, we can surely realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [sic]!

During the 12th China-EU Business Summit, Li (2017b:6) presented the CPC as trustworthy to the international community in saying, “China always stands by its words”, arguing that environmental governance “is also our unshirkable duty as a responsible major country [sic]”; and in stipulating how the strong CPC leadership looks to “work with other countries to effectively address global climate change” (Li, 2014a:6-7). A final similarity in Li’s (2014a:2) rhetoric is seen in his 12th National People’s Congress report, in how he uses glory emotion, through journey metaphors, describing the CPC’s strong leadership in their new environmental governance approach: “We have stayed the course and pursued a proactive approach”. Li’s rhetoric can thus be seen to further support a glorification of CPC leadership; especially with regards to presenting the PRC as a reliable and friendly nation.

Glory Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric

Zhou Shengxian uses glory emotion-words to describe ecological civilisation as a positive aspiration, demonstrating how the CPC’s leadership has been, is and will be, inherently good. For instance, at the Forum on World Environment Day, Zhou (3009a:1)

described the CPC and their ecological civilisation as “outstanding” (Zhou, 2009a:1), and at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:1 and 10) called the CPC’s environmental governance “remarkable” and ecological civilisation a “major breakthrough”. Zhou (2010d:3), during his 2010 speech for World Environment Day, described this environmental leadership role shouldered by the CPC as a “herculean task”. In particular, Zhou (2011a:1) repeated the glorifying word “uplifting”, used during his New Year Speech 2011 and is repeated in his 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection speech as “uplifting ecological civilisation” (Zhou, 2011b:17). Uplifting ecological civilisation suggests that the wisdom and culture behind ecological civilisation already existed; it is CPC’s correct thoughts and leadership that are revitalising these ideals.

The greatest use of glory emotions by Zhou is also in creating a power relationship, with the CPC as great leaders or heroes. During his speech at the 30th Anniversary of China National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:6) claimed: “Our cause is noble and sacred, our vision is bright and beautiful, and our responsibility is significant and glorious.” Emotion-words such as “noble” and “sacred” creates the CPC’s ecological civilisation as a divine concept; a “bright” and “beautiful” vision creates the notion of a celestial understanding of the world and future; and “significant” and “glorious” responsibility suggests deific levels of obligation and accountability. Zhou’s use of emotion describes the CPC as leaders, creating a distinct power relationship with the CPC as ubiquitous, above and beyond everyone else in environmental governance (Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; Koschut, 2017b; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).

Zhou (2013b:2, 3 and then 20) furthers this creation of a power relationship through glorifying statements, such as in his speech at the MEP’s 2013 Spring Festival Gathering and Recognition Meeting, where he claimed: “We will be a brave leader, promoter and enforcer of ecological civilization and make greater contributions to building a modern China with ecological progress [sic]”; the CPC are “brave to be the leader, promoter and enforcer to promote the building of ecological civilization [sic]”; and the CPC will “be the leader, promoter and enforcer promoting the building of ecological civilization and a beautiful China [sic]”. Being the “leader”, “promoter” and “enforcer” creates an understanding that the CPC are everything when it comes to becoming an ecological civilisation, they know everything, understand everything and will direct

everything; and they have the courage to be brave enough to lead everyone there. Such arguments had already been disseminated in Zhou's rhetoric from the 2011 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2011f:1) claimed: "The set of major strategic thoughts and tasks on ecological civilization is a testament to our rational understanding of the trend of human civilization, our correct adherence to the rule of social development, a distillation of the concept of scientific development and major advance in the theory of building a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. It is of great significance for furthering the basic state policy of environmental protection and moving toward a path featuring booming production, comfortable life and sound eco environment for everyone [sic]." Zhou's use of emotion stresses how the CPC understand and have a solution to give everyone a better life through a sound environment (Koschut, 2017b).

In his 2011 New Year's address, Zhou (2011a:2) stated how the CPC will "bravely innovate, bravely solve difficult problems with good practice. Innovation is the gene of development". As mentioned above, requests and statements furthering innovation coincide internationally with the PRC officially overtaking Japan to become the world's second-largest economy (BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2). Zhou brings in the notion of unity and shared ability amongst the Chinese citizens, to help support the CPC in their quest to reach ecological civilisation, as another quality that is inherently, culturally and biologically, Chinese. Zhou's (2009a:9) glory emotions repeatedly make direct requests to the people, such as at the 2009 World Environment Day Forum, where he stated, "let's stay firm and join hands to make constant exploration of the new path to environmental protection with Chinese characteristics under the guidance of ecological civilization [sic]". Again, at the 2010 World Environment Day Forum, Zhou (2010d:3) stated how, a "joint effort will promise a beautiful landscape with blue sky, clear water and green mountains". Zhou's messages imply that the CPC cannot make ecological civilisation a reality on their own, no matter how brilliant it is: they need the support of the people and use glory emotions to ask for this support (Koschut, 2017b). How the CPC are using glory emotion within their rhetoric suggests they are reliant on the notion of everybody working towards building a singular civilised state, and having a shared conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013).

Zhou can also be seen using glory emotion to stipulate that the CPC are taking the PRC on a journey towards betterment. There are references to this throughout Zhou's speeches, such as the phrases: "new path" (Zhou, 2010c:1 and Zhou, 2013c:13); "new era" (Zhou, 2014c:1-2) and "historical position" (Zhou, 2010a:3 and Zhou, 2012a:2). Zhou (2011g:2) described ecological civilisation as a place with "positive and benign development". Zhou (2009a:2) stated: "Ecological civilization is an ideal state as well as a realistic objective [sic]."

Zhou injects journey metaphors consistently throughout his rhetoric, which are used to further this notion of being on a journey to betterment. In his *Prepared for the Deciding Battle: Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection* speech, Zhou (2010b:13) claims: "a great voyage beckons for enhanced effort of building ecological civilization [sic]". During his 2011 Spring Festival address, Zhou (2011c:2) similarly stated: "Now the wind direction is appropriate, we should set sail. There is [an] onerous task before us, we should accelerate our speed!" Likewise, in his speech at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (Zhou, 2011g:2) asserted, "we need to ride on the tides, make great efforts and see the effects as soon as possible." A final example is from his 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, where Zhou (2013c:20) stipulated the CPC have been "[f]ormulating the road map and timetable for reform and innovation in environmental protection". All of these metaphors imply everyone should make haste, for the direction and destination is known by the CPC; thus supporting the use of glorified rhetoric to portray the CPC as leaders, taking the PRC and the world, to a place of environmental betterment.

Glory Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA

The use of glory emotion by the MEP was greater than with chosenness emotions. Wu Xiaoqing (2009:14), in his *Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development* speech, used both the emotion-word "beautiful" and emotion-phrase "Blue sky, clean water, green land" in emotionally categorising the state of rejuvenated environment to be achieved. The idea of the PRC sharing their success and

knowledge on environmental protection with the world was also present (Wu Xiaoqing, 2009:6). Wu Xiaoqing (2009:1) also glorified the CPC, in claiming how the CPC had “always attached great importance to environmental protection work”. Finally, the notion of a “new era” was also mentioned (Wu, 2009:1). Similarly, in his 2013 *Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection System* speech, Wu Xiaoqing (2013:4) glorifies the correctness of the CPC’s approach to environmental governance in claiming how: “A number of issues were identified and set right and the role of environmental protection optimizing economic growth was well exerted [sic]”.

The glory emotions present across the MFA’s rhetoric also created a strong level of support for Xi Jinping, particularly as a leader with big and new ideas for a better future. For example, Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:4) *New Era, New Opportunity, New Future* speech, given to UK’s Business Community, claimed that: “Now, the new CPC leadership is closely rallied around General Secretary Xi Jinping. This new central leadership is giving the Chinese people great confidence. They are committed to leading the Chinese people into a new era. They are uniting the whole nation in a concerted effort to realise the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Liu Xiaoming (2017:4) went on to say: “A great cause calls for strong and firm guidance. History tells us that in a massive country like China, development and progress would be impossible without a strong leadership. Over the past five years, the achievements we made and the changes taking place in China have been phenomenal. These must be attributed to the strong and firm leadership of the Party. At the first session of the 19th Central Committee, Xi Jinping was once again elected General Secretary. This reflects the common aspiration of the people”.

Liu Xiaoming (2017:4) also specifically glorifies the importance of ecological civilisation and Xi’s understanding of its importance, by highlighting, in Xi’s Congress report from the 19th National Congress how, ““ecological civilization” appeared twelve times, “beautiful China” eight times and “green” fifteen times [sic].” Moreover, that “China will strive for green growth” and that “Eco-environmental conservation was given considerable priority at the Congress” are both distinguished as evidence of the CPC’s good environmental leadership. Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:8) speech identifies that: “A great modern socialist country should be prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced,

harmonious, and beautiful” and directs how “For the first time, building a “beautiful China” becomes a key dimension of a great modern socialist country. And for the first time, “ensuring harmony between man and nature” becomes a basic policy that underpins socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era.” Liu echoes ideals of the CPC’s good governance, correct leadership and understanding of how to solve the world’s environmental problems via the CPC’s concept of ecological civilisation. Thus presenting the PRC as a strong and successful country under the firm leadership of Xi Jinping and the CPC.

Finally, reproductions of the glory emotion through emotion-analogies are also deployed by Liu Xiaoming (2017:5), for example, “General Secretary Xi says, “Clear waters and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver.” These plain words carry profound ideas. Ecological civilization is vital to sustain the development of the Chinese nation. Environment will be protected the same way as we cherish life [sic]”. Liu glorifies Xi’s ideas by calling them profound, adding an extra layer of glory emotion supporting Xi Jinping and his leadership of the PRC, and beyond.

Summary of the Use of Glory Emotions

The use of glory emotions throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric can be seen to have created understandings of and categorises ecological civilisation as a place of betterment that the CPC are (heroically) leading the PRC, and at times the world, towards (Koschut, 2017b). This sense of a shared destination furthers the notion of working to become a singular civilised state, with a shared conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013). Glory emotions specifically created a charisma of the CPC as strong leaders, or brave heroes, and in particular demonstrated support for Xi Jinping. This leadership position created a power relationship between the government and the people. Glorified versions of an ideal environment have been used in what Foucault (1985) called “strategic formations”, to exert power through rhetoric, and are similar to Laclau’s (2004 and 2018) notions of form and force of emotion (Koschut, 2017b). The CPC offers the Chinese citizens the promise of an environment they want, in return for their support, on the journey towards (a global) ecological

civilisation. Glory emotions were also present in speeches by Hu, Li, Xi and Zhou where major global events bolstered the CPC's previous decisions and future pathways for global environmental governance; the main two examples were that of the PRC overtaking Japan as the world second-largest economy, and President Donald Trump withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (BBC, 2019; and Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2).

Trauma

Trauma emotions signify the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which refer to shared historical memories of traumatic or negative experiences, which in turn bring people together and support the myth-building of shared glories. This section will discuss the main patterns in trauma emotions present across the rhetoric.

Trauma Emotions in Hu Jintao's Rhetoric

In many of Hu's speeches glory was followed by trauma (reminiscent of Callahan's (2012) pessoptimism). Hu's most common use of trauma emotion was in discussing how difficult the route to become an ecological civilisation will be. In his 18th National Congress report, Hu described the work necessary as "arduous" (Hu, 2012:5) or as an "arduous struggle" that lies ahead (Hu, 2012:11). Hu directs his audience to brace themselves (Hu, 2012:21) for the "severe tests" that wait (Hu, 2012:6). The arduous struggle to be faced can also be seen in the following excerpt (Hu, 2012:5):

We must be keenly aware that there is still much room for improvement in our work and there are a lot of difficulties and problems on our road ahead. They include the following: Unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development remains a big problem. The capacity for

scientific and technological innovation is weak. The industrial structure is unbalanced. Agricultural infrastructure remains weak. Resource and environmental constraints have become more serious. Many systemic barriers stand in the way of promoting development in a scientific way. The tasks of deepening reform and opening up and changing the growth model remain arduous. The development gap between urban and rural areas and between regions is still large, and so are income disparities. Social problems have increased markedly.

Hu's message is strong and clear: the current situation is not good enough; the environmental conditions create a status of the PRC as a failing and weak State (see De Rivera (1992), for the use of emotion and perceived failures). Hu (2011a:4-5), despite having made many "remarkable achievements", which he presented in his speech at the Opening Plenary of Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference, still repeatedly states: "China has a long way to go". Hu argued that the road to ecological civilisation is "vital" (Hu, 2012:34), due to the "deteriorating" condition of the environment (Hu, 2012:34). The PRC must "vigorously push forward" (Hu, 2007:18-19) and "follow a path with Chinese characteristics" (Hu, 2012:18) for "survival" (Hu, 2012:21).

One of the strongest uses of traumas found in Hu's rhetoric utilises the meta-narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation. During his speech, commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Hu (2011b:21) stated: "China was a poor and backward country and its people were leading a miserable life"; the memories Hu is drawing upon from the PRC's past, as a weakened nation, provides a base line for understanding how far the CPC has already helped the PRC on their pathway to rejuvenation. The contrast, between the humiliations of having been a weak and failing country and the glorified successes under CPC's leadership, creates social parameters of what the PRC once was and what the CPC are leading the PRC to become (Foucault, 1985). The notion of the CPC as a strong and noble leader promising a good quality life, in the green, clean and beautiful environment of their ecological civilisation, is supported by both emotions of glory and trauma. How Hu uses both glory emotion and trauma emotion is reliant on the careful selection of historical analogies, of chosen memories

and chosen myths to construct the CPC's vision of a singular civilised state, via the notion of an ecological civilisation.

Trauma Emotions in Xi Jinping's Rhetoric

Xi Jinping's rhetoric is, on the whole, far more positively framed than that of Hu Jintao's. However, there are still trauma emotions present. In his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:48) used trauma emotion to justify the necessity of striving to become an ecological civilisation: "Man and nature form a community of life; we, as human beings, must respect nature, follow its ways, and protect it. Only by observing the laws of nature can mankind avoid costly blunders in its exploitation. Any harm we inflict on nature will eventually return to haunt us. This is a reality we have to face." Interestingly, Xi never uses trauma emotions to blame the current environmental conditions on the poor decisions of previous CPC leaders; instead he uses trauma emotion to consider how bad the future could be if the collective do not act now and follow his leadership to become a united ecological civilisation (see Hutchison's (2010) work on the use of negative emotion in rhetoric). This directs the focus away from the PRC and towards the larger collective of mankind and can clearly be seen in Xi's (2017h:4) *Working Together to Build a Better Future* speech: "We should protect the earth, our irreplaceable home, heal wounds inflicted on the ecosystem and environment, and build a harmonious and liveable home for mankind. This will enable the natural ecosystem to recover and regenerate itself and everyone to live in a good environment with lucid waters and lush mountains". Once again, both of these speeches follow on from President Donald Trump's announcement that he would withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2).

Xi also uses trauma emotion in recognition of the hard work and suffering of the CPC and the Chinese people. In Xi's (2018a:3-4) 2018 New Year Speech, he reassures the Chinese citizens that: "You have reaped the harvest from your hard work. You have also encountered quite some frustrations. There is still much room for improvement with regard to our work in relation to the people's livelihood. So we should strengthen our sense of mission and responsibility, and do practical and fruitful work for the sake of the

people's welfare...and create conditions for them to live a better and happier life." However, the use of emotion here makes it very apparent that Xi expects far more to be done by the CPC, regardless of achievements attained thus far. There is a lack of sympathy, rather this hard work is expected, as their "mission of responsibility".

With regards to the people, Xi (2018b:3), at the 13th National People's Congress, also claimed: "What the Chinese people have achieved stems from ingenuity and expertise, hard work, and enormous sacrifices. I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great struggling spirit, we will definitely fulfill the great goal of creating a better life [sic]." Xi (2018b:2) directs the people to remain united behind the CPC, he draws upon the notion of the "great spirit of struggle" shared between the CPC and the Chinese people to try and unite everyone behind his vision for an improved future, drawing upon shared memories within the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative (such uses of emotion in rhetoric are discussed by Ahmed, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2005; and Hutchison, 2010). Indeed, a third example of trauma emotion in Xi's rhetoric relates to the narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation; it distinguishes the PRC as existing in a special and unique situation, but that Chinese wisdom and culture – guided by the CPC – will come to solve all problems.

Metaphors in particular help craft this emotional message, for example, within his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:9) stated how, "The Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East". Xi incorporates these chosen memories of trauma, which contrast with the glories achieved within this first leadership period; as Xi begins his second period as General Secretary how he uses emotion within his speeches exemplifies what he deems as successes within this first term (see Appendix 2). Similarly, during his Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit speech, Xi (2016a:1) described the PRC's nation building by saying: "China must pursue its own path of development. What we have done is, as a Chinese saying puts it, "crossing the river by feeling for stones." Another metaphor suggestive of trauma was used during Xi's (2017c:6) Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation speech, where he claimed that, "For a country, opening up is like the struggle of a chrysalis breaking free from its cocoon. There will be short-term pains, but such pains will create a new life." A final example was given during Xi's (2018b:9) 13th National People's Congress report, where he described how "[a]fter nearly seven decades of hard

work under the leadership of the CPC, our people's republic has been growing vigorously, and with an entirely new posture, it now stands tall and firm in the East" (see Appendix 2).

These metaphors all refer to a difficult past, but suggest hope for an improved future, a new era, perhaps, with regards to the cocoon metaphor, even a fresh start. There is a subtle reference to health, and that the PRC as a country now has improved health, which again contrasts with the sometimes very unhealthy condition of the environment. The 'Sick man of Asia' phrase, referring to the PRC now standing tall and firm, also utilised selected memories and selected myths of how China and the PRC have suffered at the hands of others, but have risen, much like a phoenix, to become a newly rejuvenated and unified State. However, compared to the suffering remembered from the Century of Humiliation, the current environmental conditions that the CPC have allowed (and have often created) are preferred for continued nation building (reminiscent of Gibson's (1986) affordances; and Huan, 2008 and 2009). Moreover, Hutchison's (2010) work on shared traumatic experiences creating social cohesion and identity is clearly apparent in Xi's use of trauma emotions.

This combination of metaphors across Xi's speeches creates the picture that the PRC is recovering, or has recovered, from a weakness; but more importantly is the idea that the CPC's leadership is what united the PRC and allowed the country to break free from their past memories of humiliations, by rebuilding the nation to be strong, tall and firm (see De Rivera (1992) on the use of emotion for nation building). Ecological civilisation is the next stage on this journey. That ecological civilisation will be carried out in a "Chinese way" is of great importance to the rhetoric. All of Xi's metaphors that deploy trauma emotions act as a reminder that the PRC still has a long way to go, to reach *Xiaokang* or rejuvenation. The force of emotion present encourages the people to continue to support and "rally" behind the latest environmental governance of ecological civilisation, by utilising their Chinese wisdom and culture, and through calling ecological civilisation a Chinese aspiration and mission.

Li's use of trauma emotions revealed a similar pattern in negative emotion-words and emotion-phrases, in describing the necessity of hard work ahead to become an ecological civilisation. Examples, from his speech at the Second Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress, included: "arduous" (Li, 2014a:1), (Li, 2014a:7); "more difficult" (Li, 2014a:7); "severe" (Li, 2014a:7); "vital" (Li, 2014a:24); "nature's red-light warning" (Li, 2014a:24); "forceful measures" (Li, 2014a:24); and "challenging" (Li, 2014a:24). However, Li's use of trauma emotions can be understood as presenting a different priority; there is a great focus in Li's (2014a:7) rhetoric on the necessity of continuing economic growth: "we must be keenly aware of the many difficulties and problems on our road ahead. The main ones are: The foundation for sustaining steady economic growth is not yet firm, and the internal impetus driving growth needs to be increased. Risks and hidden dangers still exist in public finance and banking; some industries are heavily burdened by excess production capacity; and the exercise of macro-controls has become more difficult. Increasing agricultural output and rural incomes is becoming more difficult. Air, water and soil pollution is severe in some places, and the task of conserving energy and reducing emissions remains arduous."

Interestingly, 2014 had seen the PRC's economic growth fall to the lowest levels for twenty years (7.4 percent), leading the CPC to revise and reduce growth targets (BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2); despite this, although noticeable in Li's references to the need to pursue economic growth within his speeches, Li did still identify declaring war on pollution as one of his nine key tasks when he opened the annual meeting of parliament that year. This marked a clear change in the way that environmental protection was being elevated whilst growth targets were being reduced (Albert and Xu, 2016; BBC 2019; and Reuters, 2014; see Appendix 2).

In addressing the negatives of the current environmental conditions throughout the PRC, Li (2014a:8) argued how: "Some of these problems have arisen in the course of development and others have occurred because we have not done our work well enough. The government must first examine itself to identify the causes of these problems and work out ways to resolve them. It must follow people's wishes in exercising governance. We must firmly bear in mind our duties and mission, increase our

sense of vigilance against potential dangers, be eager to take on challenges, work tirelessly and effectively to solve problems, and truly live up to people's expectations." Statements that place the blame for the PRC's poor environmental conditions on the CPC's leadership and governance are incredibly rare within their rhetoric. Of importance is to highlight how, alongside the rhetoric creating space to criticise the CPC's leadership, Li also uses negatively framed, or trauma, emotion-words and emotion-phrases to support the CPC's rightful claim as leaders. Despite some errors, Li argues that in supporting ecological civilisation as their mission – despite it being a mission that is wrought with future trials and tribulations – the CPC exhibit their rightful claim to leadership.

However, blame and responsibility is not limited to the CPC, Li (2014a:26) in his speech at the Second Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress, stated: "Ecological conservation and environmental protection benefit future generations. Governments at all levels and the whole society should act more vigorously to protect the land our lives depend on." Li clearly states it is the responsibility of everyone, regardless of position, to work towards protecting the environment. This statement is notable, because it clearly contradicts a plethora of statements made, not only by Li, but also throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric as a whole. A very strong argument is made, using trauma emotions, to support the PRC as currently existing within the status of a developing nation. This is in contrast to the chosenness and glory emotions elsewhere within the rhetoric, which purports positive images of a singular civilised State, coming together via their superior wisdom and culture, and shared conception of the world, disseminated via ecological civilisation.

Li's (2014a:9) statements, that claim developing nation status, range from: "China is still a developing country in the primary stage of socialism, and development remains the key to solving all our country's problems."; to "China is still a developing country. We must give top priority to economic development. Only development will deliver progress. Ultimately, it is only development that will resolve all the problems in China. We cannot advance without changing the growth model, nor can we advance without adequate development" (Li, 2014a:4-5); and "China remains the biggest developing country in the world. Development is of overriding importance. It holds the key to resolving all issues in China. What we aim for is development that is scientific,

quality-based, efficient and sustainable”, which was stated by Li (2015b:4) at the 9th Annual Meeting of the New Champions. All of these statements made by Li follow on from the international recognition that the PRC had overtaken Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world (BBC 2019; see Appendix 2).

Li’s rhetoric also used trauma-based emotion-metaphors to describe how the CPC are tackling their environmental governance domestically. For example, Li (2014a:25) stated: “We will declare war against pollution and fight it with the same determination we battled poverty.” Li elevates the fight against pollution to the previous war on poverty, which is also seen in Zhou’s rhetoric. Overall, Li’s statements vary from harnessing glory emotion in describing the PRC’s achievements, to trauma emotions to defend the claim of developing country status; both of which are utilised to support the CPC’s claim to leadership for continuing the nation building process throughout the PRC.

Trauma Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric

Zhou’s rhetoric used trauma emotions to depict the dreadful state of environmental conditions within the PRC, for example, Zhou used the word “grave” during the Thirteenth World Lake Conference (Zhou, 2009:1 and 9), within his *Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection* speech, at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection (Zhou, 2011b:11-12 and 19), in his *Strive for Innovation and Actively Explore New Path to Environmental Protection* speech, for the 2011 New Year Address (Zhou, 2011a:1), and during the 2011 National Conference on environmental Protection (Zhou, 2011b:16). Other frequently utilised trauma emotion-words and emotion-phrases included: “daunting” (Zhou, 2010b:19 and 2012c:3); “onerous” (Zhou, 2011b:15); “thorny problems” (Zhou, 2011b:20); and “arduous” (Zhou, 2009a:3 and 2009b:3).

Zhou (2011g:3), during his *Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion Association* speech, implored how, “The prospect for developing ecological civilization is colorful, but the process towards it is full of hardship. I hope that we could be tenacious, full of passion and sense of responsibility,

guide the awareness and behaviors of the society with your wisdom and painstaking efforts, and make new and greater contributions to the balanced economic and social development and the harmonious co-existence between man and nature [sic]”. Similar is when Zhou (2014c:17) stated that “[t]here is no end for development, and neither is the building of ecological civilization [sic]” straightforward during his speech at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation.

In a number of speeches Zhou devoted considerable attention to listing the negative reality of the PRC’s current environmental situation. For example, from the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:11-12) lists:

While recognizing our achievements, we should also be clearly aware of the grave situation of environmental protection beset by many difficulties and challenges. First, environmental pollution remains serious. In spite of improvement of environmental quality in some areas, the overall trend of worsening environment has not been fundamentally contained. Second, the pressure of pollution reduction keeps mounting rather than easing. As the economy shows stronger momentum of recovery, more production capacity will be released, generating more pollution and even leading to a comeback of eliminated production capacity, equipment and companies. Third, potential environmental problems keep on emerging. The long-standing pollution from heavy metal and persistent organic pollutants loomed large and new pollution like haze in big cities and city clusters begin to stand out. Environmental accidents shoot up with higher occurrence of major environmental events. Fourth, environmental capacity building lagged behind. Improvement is needed in the development and implementation of the three systems for pollution reduction, so it is with capacity building in environmental supervision which still can not meet the need of the environmental tasks. Fifth, we should enhance the implementing capacity of staff. Some colleagues are flippant and lack sense of responsibility, creativity and pushingness. We must pay high attention to these problems and solve them through careful study [sic].

The overall effect of this section is one of no hope without serious dedication and hard work. It is hard to see a solution to such a negative outlook on the PRC's environmental future. The contrast between the negatives of the environmental situation and glorified promises of what the CPC claim to be able to deliver through their ecological civilisation is stark.

Zhou also uses trauma emotions to appease the public by addressing the concerns in their health as a top priority, for instance, Zhou (2014a:4), during the 2014 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, directed the MEP to consider how: "The top priority of our environmental work should be focused on solving prominent problems harmful to people's health, such as air, water and soil pollution." Recognising the trilogy of pollution concerns – air, water and soil – can be considered especially poignant due to the PRC's internationally acknowledged environmental disasters in the previous year, such as the "Airlpocalypse" and the 7500 pig carcasses found within the Huangpu River (Albert and Xu, 2016; Jin, Anderson and Zhang, 2016; and Zuo, 2013; see Appendix 2). At times, in Zhou's (2014c:1-2) rhetoric, the sole basis for working towards ecological civilisation is a means of showing respect to the Chinese citizens, to try and meet their needs, as can be seen in the following excerpt from his speech at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation: "Building ecological civilization concerns the well-being of the people and the future of the nation... We must keep sober-minded in recognizing the importance and necessity of strengthening the building of ecological civilization and make up our mind to control pollution and create a better environment with a great sense of responsibility for the people and our future generations [sic]."

Zhou, similar to Li Keqiang, also used trauma emotions to create a status differentiation between the PRC and developed countries. Zhou (2011b:18-19) at the 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, argued the CPC must follow a uniquely Chinese way to achieve their future environmental governance: "China cannot follow and cannot afford following the old development path of western countries featuring "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the cost of the environment" and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment". In his 2012 speech for World Environment Day, Zhou (2012c:1) also stated: "We will definitely not take the old path of developed

countries by giving priority to economic development and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will actively explore new path for environmental protection in China which is characterized by optimizing the economic development through the protection of the environment [sic]”. Making statements about not following the approach of others seems especially cogent on World Environment Day.

Finally, Zhou uses an extensive number of war metaphors, both within the text of his speeches, but also within his titles too. The extent of war metaphors used strongly implicated how seriously Zhou considered the levels of pollution and the kind of response necessary to appease the situation. Of interest is how the CPC’s use of emotion through references to war within the dataset was never to incite glory; the use of war metaphors, as can be seen in Table 3 below, are embedded within trauma emotions to highlight how much hard work will be needed for the PRC to become an ecological civilisation.

| War Metaphor | Source |
|---|---|
| “Instead of being sluggish, we are gearing up for a fight.” | Zhou (2007:3) <i>Focusing on Pollution Reduction and Rehabilitating Rivers and Lakes</i> . Speech at the 2007 Annual General Meeting. |
| “Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection” [Speech Title]. | Zhou (2010b:1) <i>Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection</i> . Speech at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection. |
| “The building of ecological civilization is the soul and orientation of environmental protection, which in turn serves as the major battlefield and fundamental step [sic].” | Zhou (2010b:13) <i>Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection</i> . Speech at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection. |
| “Only with perseverance can we win the battle. Therefore, we must make more effort in pollution reduction this year, offsetting the newly generated emissions and strive for a complete victory.” | Zhou (2010b:21) <i>Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection</i> . Speech at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection. |
| “First, we must fight bravely in the deciding battle of pollution reduction and facilitate economic restructuring through counterforce mechanism.” | Zhou (2010d:2) <i>Explore a New Path to Environmental Protection and Promote Green Development</i> . Speech for World Environment Day. |
| “We are also soberly aware that China's | Zhou (2013c:12) <i>Speech at 2013 National</i> |

| | |
|---|---|
| environment is still in serious conditions. We should have not only the sense of urgency to fight a tenacious battle, but also the full mental preparation for a protracted war.” | <i>Work Meeting on Environmental Protection.</i> |
| “We should get prepared for a tenacious battle as well as a protracted war. To fight a tenacious battle is to follow the three-step requirements and do a good job in monitoring and releasing information of PM2.5. To fight a protracted war is to promote the air pollution control and effectively improve the quality of the environment by focusing on PM2.5. The control of PM2.5 is a systematic project which requires the coordination of relevant departments and the whole society to act together to form a broad “green united front”.” | Zhou (2013c:12) <i>Speech at 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection.</i> |
| “Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War against Pollution.” [Speech title]. | Zhou (2014b:1) <i>Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War Against Pollution.</i> Public Address on Environmental Protection Work. |
| “This year’s work report of the government states that we will declare war against pollution as what we did to poverty.” | Zhou (2014b:1) <i>Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War Against Pollution.</i> Public Address on Environmental Protection Work. |
| “To resolutely declare war against pollution is an inevitable choice if we are to overcome the environmental problems in China.” | Zhou (2014b:1) <i>Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War Against Pollution.</i> Public Address on Environmental Protection Work. |
| “All the staff of the national environmental system are the main force of the war against pollution. We must fight each battle with tough spirit and show the people the resolution of the government so they will raise their hope for the settlement of environmental problems.” | Zhou (2014b:1) <i>Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War Against Pollution.</i> Public Address on Environmental Protection Work. |
| “To resolutely declare war against pollution is a forceful demonstration of China’s image as a big and responsible country.” | Zhou (2014b:1) <i>Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring War Against Pollution.</i> Public Address on Environmental Protection Work. |
| “The fourth is to create a work system to improve environmental quality by taking the three | Zhou (2014c:10) <i>Open up a New Situation for Demonstration Zone of Building Ecological Civilization under the Guidance of Important Instructions of Central</i> |

| | |
|--|--|
| successful battles against air, water and soil pollution as the priorities. This is the main battlefield of promoting ecological civilization progress... We should get prepared for a tough battle as well as a protracted war... we should adopt “iron discipline” and “iron hand” [sic].” | <i>Leaders. Speech at National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation.</i> |
| “The above said four systems also serve as the guide to action, powerful weapon, organizational guarantee and important measures for fighting pollution. Our declaration of war on pollution reflects the wills of our Party, our State and our People. The promotion of ecological civilization building and the declaration of war on pollution are intrinsically consistent with each other and unite in the great practice of building a beautiful China and ushering in a new era of socialist ecological progress... In order to promote ecological progress and create a sound working and living environment for the people, we must declare war on pollution; only by declaring war on pollution can we overcome resource and environmental bottlenecks in our economic and social development, and thereby effectively promote the process of ecological civilization building [sic]” (2014c:11-12). | Zhou (2014c:10) <i>Open up a New Situation for Demonstration Zone of Building Ecological Civilization under the Guidance of Important Instructions of Central Leaders. Speech at National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation.</i> |

Table 3: Table of examples of war metaphors in Zhou Shengxian’s ecological civilisation rhetoric

Zhou’s use of trauma emotion through war metaphors echoes the humiliation idioms discussed by Wang (2014); they draw upon memories of war and suffering throughout the Century of Humiliation (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Volkan, 1997; van der Dennen, 2001; and Wang, 2007). However, this time, the CPC are the ones to be declaring war, war on pollution and environmental degradation. The CPC are calling the shots and taking the lead, the shared traumas of war can be used to harness a strong emotional response to support the CPC and their ecological civilisation concept (Elias, 1985). Again, war metaphors utilise the emotion categories of unity and fighting together

for a just cause. For Zhou (2012d:1), throughout his ecological civilisation rhetoric, and as seen here in his *Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation* speech, there is a strong sense of urgency; it is now or never, for the sake of survival: “It is the right time to roll up our sleeves to build a beautiful China.”

Trauma Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA

The use of trauma emotions by ministers within the MEP occurred more frequently than did chosenness emotions or a glorifying of the CPC. Perhaps as a ripple effect from the overt use of negative emotion by Zhou Shengxian and his manifestation of war metaphors, the MEP’s Vice Ministers also repeated the word “grave” (Wu Xiaoqing, 2009; and Zhou Jian, 2018). For example, Zhou Jian (2018:2), in his speech at the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental Protection, stated “we are sober-minded that the overall situation still remains grave”.

Other statements by the MEP that captured this inherently negative mood included Wu Xiaoqing’s (2009:1 and 3) *Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development* speech, where he said: “At present, human beings are facing increasingly severe environmental problems with the deepening of industrialization and urbanization. Global climate change profoundly influences the survival and development of human beings and is a grave challenge confronting all countries in the world [sic]”; going on to add, “It can be seen that the resource and environment cost we have paid is huge and heavy... If the consumption amount of resources and energy as well as pollution emissions double, the consequences will be very serious and not tolerable”.

Contextualising the MFA’s rhetoric showed little overall use of trauma emotions. Liu Xiaoming (2017:6), Chinese ambassador to the UK, referred to the environmental conditions as being “daunting” and also argued in favour of the PRC needing to develop their own approach to environmental protection rather than following the status quo. The MFA also addressed status differentiation. Li Baodong (2016:1) labelled the PRC the “Largest developing country” and also favoured “The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” established by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement”, arguing that they “must be upheld. All parties must step up efforts to fulfil their

commitments, and developed countries need to make good their pledge of annual contribution of USD100 billion by 2020, thus laying a solid foundation of mutual trust for the implementation of the Paris Agreement” (Liu Jieyi, 2017:1).

Summary of Trauma Emotions

Contextualising the trauma emotions throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric revealed a pattern of negative emotion being used to create a (flexible) status differentiation for the PRC. Memories of trauma from the Century of Humiliation were utilised to create a contrast, or social parameters, between the humiliation of traumas suffered in the past, as a weak and failing State, to the glories promised under continued supported CPC rule and their ecological civilisation concept set to further rejuvenate the PRC (similar uses of rhetoric are discussed by; Bially Mattern (2005); De Rivera (1992); Hutchison (2010); and Milliken (1999)). Trauma emotions were also used to highlight the severity of the PRC’s current environmental conditions, to show sympathy, acknowledgement and understanding by the CPC. Trauma emotions also helped to create a contrast between the traumas of following the “status quo” of environmentalism and the inherently superior approach of ecological civilisation, as well as highlighting the extent of hard work yet to come to transform the PRC into an ecological civilisation.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the identification and contextualisation of the most frequently reoccurring themes and patterns of chosenness, glory and trauma emotions in the ecological civilisation rhetoric. In doing so, the consistencies in emotionally constructed messages throughout the CPC’s rhetoric have begun to emerge. A number of interesting interpretations of ecological civilisation are beginning to develop that warrant further examination. Contextualising chosenness highlighted the frequent use of the concept of a shared spirit, creating a shared identity through Chinese wisdom and culture. The use of glory emotions evoke ideas of the CPC as heroic leaders, creating a

power relationship between the government and the people; as well as depicting ecological civilisation as a miracle and a place of betterment. Finally, trauma emotions created a contrast between the memories of humiliations and weakness and the strength and glory the CPC's promise in their improved global status via ecological civilisation.

Overall, how the CPC is using emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric appears to furthering their concept of constructing a singular civilised State, especially through the use of carefully selected historical analogies, built upon chosen memories and chosen myths. The following three chapters will now explore these emerging interpretations in greater depth.

Chapter 4: The Spirit of Ecological Civilisation: Constructing National Identity

This chapter provides the first of three interpretations on how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. The interpretation is based on the contextualised themes and patterns highlighted within the previous chapter. This first interpretation considers how the CPC are discursively creating a national identity. Chapter 2 highlighted how identity creation via discursive emotion has been observed in a range of contexts, in particular how discursive emotion creates a shared identity within an in-group, an “Us” versus “Them” (Ahmed, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2005; De Rivera, 1992; Elias, 1985; Hutchison, 2010; Koschut, 2017b; Leep, 2010; Milliken, 1999; Mitzen, 2006; Risse and Ropp, 2013; and Steele, 2008). The contextualisation in Chapter 3 identified the term “spirit” as intrinsically linked to ideas of tenacious hard-work, superior Chinese wisdom and shared uniquely-Chinese experiences; constructing a Chinese in-group or national identity, formed through the CPC’s discursive construction of their latest take on environmental governance.

With regards to identity and the PRC, there are many scholars within IR discussing how the CPC are constructing and grappling with new, confused or contradictory identities (Gries, 2004; Joniak-Lüthi, 2015; Liu, 2012; Lu and Gao, 2018; and Perry, 2015). The interpretation in this chapter draws upon the work of Wu (2012), who has argued that globalisation is a process whereby States vie for positions of recognised power; and with this recognition of power comes the ability to exert influence, economically, politically and militarily (or indeed, environmentally) on underdeveloped countries. Wu (2012) furthers that globalisation is thus a process of power and manipulation where the dominant cultural practises of the most powerfully recognised State forms a template that others strive towards. Wu (2012:2) argues this process has had a momentous impact on “identifying with the self” in the PRC and CPC’s politics: “The nexus between the self and the other has accompanied the entire process of constructing modern Chinese national-cultural identity.” This chapter, in considering the spirit of ecological civilisation, touches upon the notion of a “strong sense of self” in the PRC’s culture and politics, and the idea of a “strong sense of self” in other CPC political

narratives has received abundant attention within the literature (see; Callahan, 2012; Huang and Liu, 2018; Pye, 1967; and Wang, 2014).

This chapter begins to consider how the CPC's use of emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric discursively creates national identity through "identifying with the self" by focusing on Chinese wisdom, culture and shared experiences. This national identity is being designed in such a way that a new approach and understanding of environmental governance allows for further nation building and pride in the PRC as a State that is strong, progressive and singular; again, the rhetoric here is inferring notions of *Wenming Guojia* and Gramsci's shared conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013). It will be seen how the term "spirit" is intertwined with feelings of pride and charisma to support the CPC's latest approach for domestic and global environmental governance. As with Callahan's (2012:10) "structure of feeling", (which acknowledges the interdependence of emotion with knowledge, personal experiences and institutional structures) a nexus of wisdom and Chinese philosophy, culture and character traits, as well as shared experiences of, and the institutions within, the PRC (and China), are also important in this new national identity construction within the ecological civilisation rhetoric and will be discussed below.

This chapter follows Wu's (2012) definition of identity as a process of recognition, distinction or comparison between an "Us" and "Them". Wang's (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to the PRC highlighted the importance of "Us" versus "Them" in the construction of Chinese identity in the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative: the selective choosing in the "Us" of *hua*, the splendid Han Chinese, versus the "Them" of *yi*, the barbarian "Others" (see also, Callahan, 2012 and 2013). The recognition of an "Us" provides a sense of self (Wu, 2012). Hegel's (1977) *Phenomenology of Spirit* similarly argues the emergence of an "Other" is intertwined with the formation of the "Self". The CPC's notion of "spirit" was contextualised as being embedded within chosenness emotions as a symbol of identity, built on Chinese wisdom and culture, an innate and inevitable form of Chinese environmentalism and a product of the Chinese philosophies, in particular the Taoist dictum of *Tianren heyi*, implicitly highlighting the importance of the collective "Us" in the CPC's rhetoric.

This chapter is dedicated to exploring how the CPC's use of emotion, in constructing the notion of a shared "spirit", creates a national identity of

environmentalism to further their nation building process and distinguish ecological civilisation as uniquely Chinese; and in doing so considers how sustainable development, at times, has come to represent the “Other” of environmental governance.

Identifying with the Self

This section demonstrates how the spirit of ecological civilisation creates an identity for Chinese environmentalism with a global outlook. The CPC emotionally constructs spirit through references to shared Chinese wisdom, character traits and experiences. Hutchison (2010) argues identity construction provides a government with a tool for public engagement, so in constructing a desired identity the CPC can attempt to discursively “force” power to control and direct the creation and dissemination of their ecological civilisation (Foucault, 1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018). Hansen, Li and Svarverud (2018:196) have argued that the CPC’s ecological civilisation “constitutes the most significant Chinese state-initiated imaginary of our global future”: emotion, as a tool in the CPC’s language-based social construction, draws attention to their intentions for future global environmental governance and what role they perceive the PRC and Chinese citizens playing in creating ecological civilisation. The importance of national identity to the CPC’s imagined future – based on the implementation of carefully chosen examples and analogies – of Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences, becomes apparent. How the shared spirit of ecological civilisation comes to embody a national identity through environmental governance can be seen throughout the following extracts.

The Spirit of Chinese Wisdom For a New Environmental Governance

Xi (2017e:10), in his speech closing the 19th National Congress, stated, “ecological civilization offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind [sic].” In this short extract we see Xi implying three emotive

propositions: Chinese wisdom is good and should be shared; a Chinese approach to solving problems is necessary and is being developed; and Chinese wisdom developing a Chinese approach will help mankind. This not only suggests that the CPC's environmental governance is intended for global outreach and that ecological civilisation is embedded within an identity of Chinese wisdom and culture, but also there is a sense of pride to be had in being Chinese, in Chinese wisdom and Chinese culture. The message is that everyone Chinese – through simply being Chinese and sharing Chinese wisdom and culture – is to be engaged with becoming an ecological civilisation. This is the underlying message carried throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric in constructing a new national identity of Chinese competence in providing a better alternative environmental governance.

The most frequently reoccurring example of Chinese wisdom chosen in constructing both ecological civilisation and national identity is *Tianren heyi*. Hu Jintao (2007:6) in his closing speech at the 17th National Congress describes this Chinese wisdom as “spectacular”. Similarly, Xi Jinping (2018b:4), at the closing meeting of the 13th National People's Congress; Li Keqiang (2014a:8) during the 12th National People's Congress; and Zhou Shengxian (2007:3), at the Annual General Meeting of the MEP, each refer to *Tianren heyi* as an example of the “splendid Chinese culture” and the general “wisdom” of the Chinese. Again, the CPC are drawing attention to Chinese wisdom and directing feelings of pride towards this specifically chosen example of ancient Chinese philosophical understandings of environmental governance.

Zhou Shengxian (2009b:2), at the 13th World Lake Conference, described ecological civilisation as a “higher-level” of environmental protection due to their understanding of “harmony between man and nature”. Furthermore, during his speech at the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2013c:1-2) implies *Tianren heyi* embodies the “distinct characteristics” that distinguishes the Chinese approach to environmentalism from the approaches of developed States, “Them”, the Other(s). *Tianren heyi* is woven throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric to create a structure of feeling in being proud of Chinese wisdom and Chinese environmental understandings, distinguishing ecological civilisation as a Chinese alternative to environmental governance. Hansen, et al. (2018) argue *Tianren heyi* is used by the CPC to constitute a broader moral guide, a shared symbol, instilling the appropriate

understanding and acknowledgement of civil behaviour and attitudes towards being an environmentally friendly PRC in a “Chinese way”.

Zhou Shengxian (2011f:1), at the 2011 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, stated: “To promote ecological civilization and harmony between man and nature is a great responsibility granted to environmental work by the overall situation of social and economic development in the new time and is the soul of environmental cause in this era [sic].” Zhou’s statement elevates Chinese wisdom as the means of promoting ecological civilisation through their understandings of harmony between man and nature. Zhou claims utilising this Chinese wisdom is to be seen as a “great responsibility” and is creating a new era of Chinese-led environmentalism. The identity construction takes *Tianren heyi* and promotes it as the soul of this new era based upon superior Chinese knowledge of environmental governance; the Chinese wisdom behind the CPC’s latest environmental initiative is the great responsibility of the PRC and is elevating the PRC in a new era of environmental governance. *Tianren heyi* is used to create the PRC’s national identity as an environmentally friendly and harmonious State (inciting notions of becoming *Wenming Guojia* via a singular shared conception of the world, in particular of environmental governance) leading a new era via environmental governance.

Similarly, at the 2009 forum on World Environment Day, Zhou (2009a:1) had stated: “As a form of human civilization, ecological civilization is established under the premise of our knowledge of the rule of nature, respect and conservation of nature. It aims to realize harmonious co-existence between man and nature, among human beings, and between man and society based on the carrying capacity of environment [sic].” Zhou’s rhetoric makes explicit how the Chinese wisdom of harmony between man and nature is the foundation of the identity within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric and that now is the right time to redeploy this knowledge, understanding and approach to governance. Zhou Shengxian, as the inaugural minister of the MEP (under both Hu Jintao’s and Xi Jinping’s leadership), demonstrates a consistency in the ecological civilisation rhetoric, especially in his 2009 and 2013 speeches quoted above; the CPC’s message is clear and consistent, ecological civilisation is based on Chinese wisdom, and Chinese wisdom is helping to construct a national identity of superior environmental governance, which will help mankind.

Implicitly embedded throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, such as within the former extracts from Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian, are insinuations that bring to mind the traditional thought of *Huaxia* (华夏), the belief that "foreigners have different minds" (Wu, 2012:3). This is inferred through the repeated references to an "Us" versus "Them" relationship where the Chinese wisdom, such as that of *Tianren heyi*, of ecological civilisation constitutes a new Chinese alternative to environmental understanding and governance. Although Sino-centric in creation, especially with regards to Chinese wisdom, as Xi's extract above demonstrated, ecological civilisation is outward-focused in implementation. Ecological civilisation is a means of presenting and disseminating to the global stage this Chinese alternative to environmental governance. The "Chineseness" of ecological civilisation, as opposed to "Otherness" in the origin of sustainable development, is frequently embedded within the CPC's rhetoric and will be discussed later within this chapter.

This is distinctly included within Xi Jinping's (2018b:8) closing speech, at the 13th National People's Congress, where he stated: "China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity." Similarly, during Zhou Shengxian's (2013c:1) 2013 speech, from the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, he stated: "Ecological civilization is a great contribution of the Party in promoting the progress of human civilization. This is accomplished by fully absorbing the traditional culture and wisdom of the Chinese nation and reflecting on the defects of industrial industrialization and current development model. It is the distillation and expansion of sustainable development as a result of the Party's deep understanding toward the new global trend of going green and low carbon [sic]." Both of these extracts distinguish ecological civilisation as a new alternative, especially due to the foundation of the concept in Chinese wisdom. Xi and Zhou both continue to express a sense of pride in Chinese wisdom providing an alternative understanding and approach to environmental governance. Moreover, Zhou's extract highlights how the approach of the "Other", sustainable development and the defective industrialisation circulated by developed nations, is inferior: claiming that the CPC's ecological civilisation distils and expands upon the concept. Therefore furthering

the national identity of Chinese superiority in environmental understanding and future governance.

The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric is harnessing the spirit of Chinese wisdom to pursue continued nation building by claiming that ecological civilisation, as a global approach, will improve environmental governance. Li Keqiang (2014a:8) also conveys this argument, at the 12th National People's Congress, when stating: "As the saying goes, great vision that makes a country prosper is but the result of collective wisdom. In other words, wisdom comes from the people. In the same line, the massive entrepreneurship and innovation by all, as I emphasized earlier, will generate enormous power... To use a Chinese idiom, the fire will burn higher when everyone adds wood to it [sic]." Li Keqiang suggests that when the CPC's direction utilising shared Chinese wisdom (entrepreneurship and innovation) is collectively supported and followed by the people, it will amass in great power. The metaphor of a fire suggests the PRC's future will be bright, hot, ferocious, all-encompassing, unstoppable, intense and a blazing force, if: the PRC comes together; follows the CPC leadership in constructing ecological civilisation; and utilises their shared Chinese wisdom and culture for strength, progress and unity.

The Spirit of Chinese Culture and the Chinese Characteristics of Unity and Tenacity

The CPC's discursive construction of spirit creates an identity of an integrated unit through shared experiences working towards a common goal. This approach is reminiscent of Hall's (2001) discussion of the invisible hand in Foucault's theories on emotion and discourse (see Chapter 2) and has been used by the CPC for decades (Perry, 2015). As early as Mao's Mass Line, unity amongst the people through selected shared experiences has been relied upon by the CPC as an organisational method (Dickson, 2016; and Perry, 2015). Elements of unity and shared experience continued to be used throughout the CPC's rhetoric, and Dickson (2016) argues, in particular, that Xi Jinping is reviving the Mass Line within the concept of ecological civilisation. For example, during the 13th National People's Congress, Xi Jinping (2018b:1-2) spoke of "national spirit"; and at the 2016 APEC CEO Summit (Xi, 2016b:1) a "spirit of

partnership". These embody an identity (or structure of feeling) of tenacity through working together as a single united collective, reminiscent of previous Mass Line discourse (Callahan, 2012 and 2013).

However, before Xi Jinping's leadership, Hu Jintao (2007:6) also harnessed a spirit of unity and hard work; in Hu's speech, closing the 17th National Congress, he compounds the ideas of Chinese unity, superiority and pride in stating how: "the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people have, in an indomitable enterprising spirit and with their spectacular practice of innovation, composed a new epic recounting the Chinese nation's ceaseless efforts to make progress and become stronger, and historic changes have taken place in the visages of the Chinese people, socialist China and the CPC." Hu is utilising the spirit of Chinese wisdom and culture to warrant the CPC's desire to further progress and strengthen the nation building process; a national identity of ceaseless progress, through collective wisdom and enterprising hard work.

Xi Jinping expounds what chosen elements of Chinese wisdom and culture informs the spirit of ecological civilisation. Xi describes the Chinese spirit as peaceful, cooperative and respectful. He describes the shared spirit of the Chinese as hard working, talented and able, through emotive phrases, such as: "the spirit of driving the nail" at the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit (Xi, 2016a:2), as well as a "spirit of struggle" (Xi, 2018b:2) and "spirit of pursuing dreams" (Xi, 2018b:3-4) at the 13th National People's Congress. With regards to furthering unity and togetherness, Xi also uses phrases, such as: the "spirit of humanity" in a 2017 speech at the United Nations Office (Xi, 2017b:4); the "spirit of peace and cooperation" and the "spirit of mutual respect" at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (Xi, 2017c:2); and "I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force", which Xi stated at the 13th National People's Congress (Xi, 2018b:3). How Xi describes the Chinese spirit is appropriate to the audience (be that domestic or international) that the speech is being delivered to; domestically Xi describes the spirit of struggle and dreams; two distinctively Chinese concepts or tropes, whereas internationally Xi describes the Chinese spirit as peaceful, cooperative and respectful, which is a more appropriate choice of spirit to present internationally.

Xi's use of spirit repeatedly tells the Chinese citizens that they are hard working, innovative and implies a necessity of unity. Xi discursively directs the Chinese to be proud of their long history and culture (of environmental protection practises), to harness a new identity of pro-environmentalism, to support the CPC's environmental governance for domestic development and improved reputation on the world stage. For instance, at the B20 summit in Hangzhou, Xi (2016a:9) claimed: "To seek harmony and coexistence is in the genes of the Chinese nation throughout history. It represents the very essence of Eastern civilization. China is committed to the path of peaceful development"; this not only furthers the collective identity through the shared "ancient civilization [sic]" (also referred to by Hu Jintao (2007:18) at the 17th National Congress), but also expresses the innate inevitability of furthering peaceful development through their shared culture and genetic heritage. Li Keqiang (2014a:21), at the 12th National People's Congress, had also discursively embedded how this shared symbol of appropriate Chinese environmentalism is an example of how "Culture is the lifeblood of a nation." The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, by carefully choosing memories and analogies of the Chinese past, can be seen to be telling the PRC what it means to be "Us", Chinese.

Callahan (2012:195) argued that the National Patriotic Education Campaign was not just an "act of State censorship... [it] productively generates a particular type of patriotism by outlining, in detail, who Chinese can be – and who they can not be." The CPC appear to be utilising the same discursive methods within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. For example, Xi Jinping (2018b:1-2), at the 13th National People's Congress, stated: "The character and talent of the Chinese people have fostered the Chinese civilization with a history of thousands of years. It has also exerted a far reaching influence on the development of China and on the ethos of the Chinese people nowadays. The great national spirit, fostered, passed down and developed by the Chinese people during their long-term struggle, has offered a strong impetus for the development of China and the human civilization [sic]." Xi's rhetoric embraces how Chinese history and culture over thousands of years has created the PRC of today; he is embedding this identity firmly within Chinese culture and within the sense of place that has become the PRC. Moreover, Xi explicitly includes that the Chinese people have triumphed over a long-term struggle, a chosen trauma to solidify and unify the people together against thousands of years of hardship. Thus tying the PRC to their Chinese

heritage, their geographical place and their historical culture to create unity and togetherness, a strong collective, able to begin exerting their ideas globally, to help human civilisation.

Xi (2018b:2-3) goes on to add:

The Chinese people are people with great spirit of struggle. Over the past thousands of years, the Chinese people have been discarding the old and introducing the new. Our pursuit of progress has never paused. We have developed and built an immense and beautiful country, and explored vast expanse of territorial seas. We have opened up extensive and productive cropland, reined in numerous rampant rivers, and overcome countless natural disasters. We have constructed towns and villages scattered all over the country and developed a complete range of industries. Varied and colorful lives have taken shape. The Chinese people have been aware since ancient times that we cannot sit idle and enjoy the fruits of others' work, and happiness can only be achieved through great endeavor. What the Chinese people have achieved stems from ingenuity and expertise, hard work, and enormous sacrifices. I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great struggling spirit, we will definitely fulfill the great goal of creating a better life [sic].

Xi refers to a strong impetus for: development, innovation, ingenuity and tenacious hard work; in overcoming struggles and sacrifice as the national characteristics of the Chinese in their pursuit of nation building. Xi utilises these carefully chosen character traits in creating this national identity of a united, strong and progressing country; the ecological civilisation rhetoric builds on and furthers this national identity as the CPC's intended approach for furthering nation building and creating a better life.

This national identity can be understood as a set of instructions from the CPC on how to be Chinese in the "new era" of CPC led (environmental) governance (Hu Baolin, 2011; Hansen, et al., 2018; and Xi Jinping, 2017e:10 in his 19th National Congress report). When Xi (2017c:2) describes, at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road

Forum for International Cooperation, the Chinese character traits as “peaceful,” “cooperative” and “respectful”, as well as “hard working” and “brave”, at the 13th National People’s Congress (Xi, 2018b:4), these words are loaded compliments, they are a force of emotion, and come with expectations of how to be Chinese to enable ecological civilisation to become reality. Regardless of how his international audience engages with this description, it is also how Xi wishes the PRC to be perceived, especially ahead of any associated contracts connected to the Belt and Road Initiative.

These instructions vary from the form of emotion, found in Hu Jintao’s conception of spirit as aligned with an identity of constant innovation, and “creativity” described by Li Keqiang (2015a:2) in his speech at the OECD Headquarters in 2015, as well as the overcoming of trials through hard work; to the force of emotion seen in the MFA’s claims for specific actions, such as working towards “global green and low carbon development” by Liu Jieyi (2017:2) speaking as the Chinese Mission to the UN in 2015. Zhou Shengxian (2013c:1-2) combines form and force, when, at the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, he stated: “The way to achieve ecological civilization relies on our effort to promote green development, low carbon technology and circular economy. It is a long-term and arduous process aiming at building a beautiful country [sic].” Zhou suggests the Chinese character traits of tenacity, hard work, ingenuity and innovation will provide the necessary strength, wisdom and unrelenting hard work needed to undergo the long-term and arduous process of transforming the PRC into an ecological civilisation; a State built on a social-cultural identity, driving the CPC’s desire for their Chinese State-led global future (Hansen, et al., 2018).

Similarly, in his National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation speech, Zhou (2014c:18) stated: “Guided by the important instructions made by the top leaders, we should carry forward the spirit of local creativity and actively explore the new approaches and new models of building ecological civilization, which are compatible with national and provincial reality and have local characteristics [sic].” Zhou’s statement demonstrates how the CPC’s rhetoric is designed to guide the people’s engagement with the CPC’s environmental governance, which in turn is uniquely embedded within local Chinese creativity, wisdom and culture. The emotional language of togetherness, unity and creativity, this chosenness within spirit, discursively constructs an identity to

provide an image of who the Chinese are and carries the message that the CPC will be offering important instruction on what is to be done all-over the PRC, and beyond.

This identity of superior togetherness is an important aspect of how the PRC will become an ecological civilisation; Hu Jintao (2012:7-8) in his 18th National Congress report, claimed that the CPC need cohesive co-operation from the people to support their “powerful theoretical weapon” for future environmental governance. Xi Jinping (2017e:48), at the 19th National Congress, adds: “With this [the CPC’s theoretical understanding], we can restore the serenity, harmony, and beauty of nature.” At the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:3) claimed: “I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force” and that “Today, the creativity of the Chinese people is being unleashed to an extent like never before, which has been enabling our country to develop rapidly and stride forward at the forefront of the world. I am confident that as long as the over 1.3 billion Chinese people keep on developing such great creativity, we will definitely create miracles one after another!” (Xi, 2018b:2). Finally, in his 19th National Congress Report, Xi (2017e:10) stated, “It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind”. These extracts clearly disseminate that together, with shared characteristics of innovation and hard work, combined with their wisdom and culture, is creating a national identity of superior environmental governance and the CPC intends to deploy this Chinese wisdom to “better mankind”.

The Spirit of Shared Experiences Through Chinese History

The CPC’s rhetoric incorporates numerous references from a back-catalogue of chosen shared experiences through Chinese wisdom and culture over the millennia. These actions are linked to the physical place of China and Chinese history of environmental awareness. This lengthy example is from Zhou Shengxian, closing the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation (2014d:3), where he used a number of historical analogies:

The Chinese civilization has been passed down for more than 5000 years and accumulated rich ecological wisdom. In ancient China, there was strict seasonal limit on such activities as fishing fish and turtles and logging trees and reeds and offenders were subject to punishment (The Rites of Zhou). In The Huainanzi, there was the warning against draining the pond to catch fish and burning forest to hunt animals... As a result, there were flocks of cows and horses in the grassland, grains were sold at low price, no one picked up the lost articles on the street and the society was in peace and prosperity. From applying rehabilitation for economic purpose to using it for environmental protection, the strategy has been gradually evolved and enriched. Since reform and opening up, China has practiced a lot of measures to conserve nature such as converting farmland to forest, controlling grazing for rangeland restoration, fishing closure and prohibition and restricted logging of forests. These measures have produced good results... It will usher new development opportunities for China's environmental protection [sic].

As well as listing a number of chosen historical analogies to exemplify the CPC's chosen understanding of shared Chinese wisdom and practice, there are a number of further emotional messages to be considered in Zhou's extract. Zhou argues these good environmental protection practises show that Chinese innovation was not used to exhaust the environment, but rather to regulate and monitor human use of resources implying the good nature of the Chinese. This is another example of Laclau's (2004) form and force of emotion, as it provides a good example, or prompt, for the importance of innovation in the CPC's imagined pathway to the PRC's future. Zhou is also arguing that good governance, when followed by the people (through a unity of agreed shared experience; a shared conception of the world leading on to create *Wenming Guojia*), even in times of austerity, created a flourishing and healthy environment where the Chinese people lived in harmony and eventual prosperity.

Zhou not only suggests an identity of obedience, but also provides images of a peaceful and good quality life through Chinese environmental practise. Zhou finishes by arguing that the CPC is equally trying to promote good environmental governance and

has been, since the beginning of the reform and opening up period, subtly suggesting that the Chinese should again unite, agree with and support the CPC's environmental governance now. Through Zhou's use of chosen historical analogies, the excerpt fosters an identity of creativity, unity and pride in Chinese environmentalism, which over the millennia has founded a successful China. In harnessing this identity of Chinese wisdom and culture the CPC's spirit of ecological civilisation is promoting a pathway to a rejuvenated and successful PRC in the future.

Zhou Shengxian's (2012d:1) focus on how national identity through ecological civilisation is rejuvenating the PRC is also seen in his earlier speech *Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation*. Zhou (2012d:1) uses emotive language that is based on praising the PRC as a physical place, such as: "A beautiful China reflects the beauty of the times, our society, people's life, the masses and our environment. This beautiful China is a harmonious society offering equal opportunity for people and sound and livable environment. Building a beautiful China is a systematic project which requires top-down design, clear direction, objectives and tasks and effective measures to advance the work step by step [sic]." "Beautiful China" embeds the PRC's national identity into the history, culture and physical place of the PRC. Zhou's rhetoric is again seen to direct the PRC on how to be Chinese in the twenty-first century, complimenting the Chinese people, Chinese culture and wisdom and describes the place that the PRC is set to become in following the CPC's top-down nation building guidance.

Xi Jinping's (2016b:6) B20 Summit speech and his closing report at the 19th National Congress (2017e:6, 7, 10 and 21); Li Keqiang's (2016a:3) speech at the First World Conference on Tourism for Development; Zhou Shengxian's (2012d:1-2) *Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation* speech and his 2013 National Work Meeting statement (2013c4:20); and Liu Xioaming's (2017:5) *New Era, New Opportunity, New Future* speech to the UK Business Community, all focus on how the creation of a "beautiful China", through ecological civilisation, is based on Chinese wisdom and culture. The phrase "beautiful China" furthers the structure of feeling in being proud not only of being Chinese but also of the locality that is the PRC and its lengthy history as an ancient civilisation. In Wang's (2014) construction of the PRC's CMT-Complex, the idioms of glory and historic names for the PRC (Middle Kingdom, Kingdom Under Heaven)

demonstrated how important the physical geography of China is to the CPC's broader discursive creation of identity.

The PRC's natural environment has been a crucial element of the CPC's identity making within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Li Keqiang (2016a:2), at the First World Conference on Tourism for Development, for example, stated: "China is a huge country. It has a long history, a splendid culture and enchanting natural scenery". It is, therefore, unsurprising that the shared spirit of ecological civilisation is also reuniting and recreating a Chinese identity that is linked back to the physical landscape, geographical environment and cultural history of the PRC. It is the Chinese wisdom and culture, embedded within the physical place that is the PRC, or the Kingdom Under Heaven, that distinguishes ecological civilisation from sustainable development; ecological civilisation "is a path based on China's realities" (Xi 2017:9:8, speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017), because "China is quite different from developed countries in national conditions, development stages, development objectives and tasks and problems to be solved. Therefore, it cannot repeat the denounced environmental history of the West" (Zhou, 2010b:13, 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection speech). The "Othering" of sustainable development and developed countries can be seen to strengthen the national identity of ecological civilisation as a Chinese approach to Chinese realities.

An alternative use of the shared experiences throughout the PRC touches upon the work of Hutchison (2010), who writes about how shared traumas can be utilised to create an identity for political cohesiveness and unity and this appears to be what Xi is doing in his rhetoric. Xi Jinping, throughout his rhetoric, creates a separation between "Us" the strong and united Chinese and "Them", the foreign aggressors. The importance and necessity of constructing spirit as a shared identity for continued nation building draws upon the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative, which in turn carries countless emotive connotations (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Within Xi Jinping's (2018b:3) keynote speech at the 13th National People's Congress, he makes direct appeals to the PRC for their support in the CPC's nation building by using emotion focused on describing the PRC's shared experiences, for example:

The Chinese people are people with great spirit of cherishing unity. Over the past thousands of years, the Chinese people have been united and stuck together through thick and thin. We have built a united country with various nationalities, developed harmonious relationships between 56 diverse, interwoven ethnic groups, formed a big Chinese family where they keep watch for and help defend each other. Especially since modern times, in face of critical and grave foreign invasion, all ethnic groups stood hand in hand and fought heroically and painfully to defeat all extremely vicious invaders and safeguard the national independence and freedom, jointly drawing a magnificent epic of defending the Chinese nation against foreign aggression. Today, China, with all ethnic groups striving with one heart, has achieved extraordinary accomplishments. The Chinese people have learned from our own experience that only when we are united can we be strong and march forward, and a divided country will not progress. I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force!

How the CPC exploits an identity through creating the “Us” versus “Them”, which draws upon carefully chosen myths and memories from the narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation, in constructing ecological civilisation, for a new environmental governance will be discussed in the next section in greater detail. However, what is seen here is how the spirit of unity, through shared glories and traumas, captures the CPC’s intent on domestic development, in their rejuvenation from humiliation, but also begins to position the PRC for global (environmental) governance. National identity of unity, hard work and shared glories and traumas are unsurprisingly also embedded within the CPC’s latest development narrative in becoming an ecological civilisation.

Summary of the CPC's Discursive National Identity Construction

Agnew (2012) and Marinelli (2018) highlighted how there is a complexity in trying to understand the PRC as a single entity with a single identity: the diversity in geography, culture, ethnicity, economics and a vast array of social differences clearly creates a multiplicity of identities competing at any given time within the PRC (Nordin, 2016). Regardless of this reality, what is predominantly seen in the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric is an attempt to portray the PRC as a singular civilised State (*Wenming Guojia*, 文明郭家); a State with a shared, timeless and uniquely Chinese understanding of environmentalism (Marinelli, 2018), and a State whose wisdom will help mankind. This thesis recognises that there is no single reality, identity or history of China or the PRC; however, this is not what the CPC attempt to reflect within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Instead, the CPC are self-positioning the PRC, via their choice of (re)writing history in order to (re)create an imagined identity of pro-environmentalism, an identity through the "Chinese Self" (Wu, 2012), of strength, progression and unity in the construction of a shared Chinese spirit for ecological civilisation.

Hansen, et al. (2018:197) argue that the CPC's ecological civilisation is a "means of social control combined with the populations heightened environmental consciousness" necessary for the CPC to reach their imagined future of greater global environmental governance, thus creating a new identity as to who the Chinese are in the twenty-first century. As Callahan (2012:208) argued, the PRC's future is a future based upon Chinese knowledge production and sharing this knowledge to influence the world.

We have seen how the identity of a spirit of ecological civilisation is heavily studied with Laclau's (2004 and 2018) form of emotion and Foucault's (1977, 1980 and 1985) "invisible hand" through strategic formations as a discursive exertion of power (Hall, 2001), to disseminate the CPC's chosen construction of Chinese wisdom and culture throughout their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Force of emotion is also present where Chinese character traits are highlighted for how the Chinese ought to act, in sharing the spirit of ecological civilisation that is in their genes (Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).

Hutchison (2010) argues how ecological civilisation is not only a message to the PRC, but also a message to the world. The basic tenant of the CPC's spirit of ecological civilisation is that Chinese traditions, wisdom and culture – Chinese characteristics of tenacity, innovation and hard work – makes ecological civilisation different and able to help mankind. The CPC's use of emotion, in harnessing the notion of a spirit of ecological civilisation, begins to self-position the PRC as heroic savours: their Chinese wisdom and culture will help mankind. The next section will consider how this national identity, in particular the construction of an "Us" versus "Them" of ecological civilisation and sustainable development, dismisses what Agnew (2012) has called a "timespace" identity crisis in the CPC's environmental politics.

Negotiating The "Us" of Ecological Civilisation Versus The "Them" of Sustainable Development

How the CPC discursively represent ecological civilisation and sustainable development plays an important role within their national identity construction throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Agnew (2012) suggests the CPC are drawing upon ideas from abroad in their latest environmental governance, which has raised questions over whether ecological civilisation and sustainable development are two concepts of differing political ecologies, or whether ecological civilisation is just the Chinese label for sustainable development, or sustainable development with "Chinese characteristics" (Goron, 2018). However, what the remainder of this chapter demonstrates is that, regardless of any similarities within practical environmental policy implementation, the ability for the CPC to discursively highlight and foster "Chineseness" within their own environmental governance concept is of great importance. The strategic importance of the CPC referring to both ecological civilisation and sustainable development throughout their rhetoric affords the CPC to "Other" sustainable development, which in turn allows the CPC to further their national identity of superiority in strength, progression and unity through the Chinese wisdom and culture of ecological civilisation.

Agnew (2012:302) argued that the CPC faces an uncertain position, which "erase[s] the significance of China's past for the country's leaders and population as they

come to terms with their new place in the world.” Furthering, that the CPC’s (aforementioned) metaphorical crossroad is a product of the reform and opening up policies, suggesting “China’s opening to the world represents a “timespace crisis” in the sense that China can no longer be set in an eternally present and geographically contained world but must be increasingly externally oriented and dynamic, drawing ideas both from abroad but also from what had been “lost” with the official disavowal of the past China from before the 1949 Revolution” (Agnew, 2012:302). However, what the chosenness emotions contextualised and analysed above highlight is the continued importance of not only Chinese wisdom, culture and geographical place, but especially Chinese history in the in CPC’s careful selecting of glories and traumas within their discursive construction of national identity.

Agnew (2012) suggested that the PRC currently exists in a situation of unknown, uncertain and changing identity, with no clear understanding of what future the PRC is heading towards. This line of argument is often applied to ecological civilisation, dismissing the concept as “purely face. It’s talk” (Goron, 2018; and Vanderklippe, 2017:1). Although the PRC is transitioning, the CPC addresses uncertainty in identity through emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric, expressing the importance of history, traditional thought and the geographical space of the PRC to the CPC. Although the PRC does currently exist within a place of global political uncertainty, this has created an opportunity for the CPC to undergo “a fundamental redefinition” of who the PRC is, what their position in the world is and therefore what it also means to be Chinese (Agnew, 2012). With regards to (global) environmental governance, this increasingly means to follow the CPC’s concept of ecological civilisation rather than “blindly following” the internationally constructed concept of sustainable development.

This section considers how the CPC’s rhetoric uses emotion to deal with the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the idea of a uniquely Chinese ecological civilisation, and on the other hand, the broader international discourse of sustainable development. This argument is founded on the notion that ecological civilisation represents the in-group or the “Us” of the Chinese approach to environmental governance, whereas sustainable development represents the out-group of “Them” the developed nations.

Wu (2012) argued China's self-superiority and self-proclaimed hierarchy, where the Middle Kingdom was pinnacle, came to an abrupt end at the start of the Century of Humiliation. China was forced to become part of the worldwide modernisation drive, and as part of this process, was presented with a much stronger "Other": the Imperial powers (Callahan, 2012; Gries, 2014; Wang, 2014; and Wu, 2012). This stronger "Other" has continued to exert influence over the PRC through international treaties, organisations and tariffs throughout the twentieth and now early twenty-first centuries (Wu, 2012). Sustainable development is the Western initiated, imposed and led approach to global environmental governance, and is discursively used by the CPC, at times, to represent the unfair environmental traumas faced by the PRC that have helped create their reduced status on the world stage. Ecological civilisation is a statement of the PRC's environmental rejuvenation and method of recovering status, the CPC are constructing a Chinese response that reflects the PRC's "realities" rather than utilising the approach of the West. Although sustainable development exists within the rhetoric in a number of ways, this flexibility in approach to, and the use of, sustainable development ought not be considered as an example of the CPC facing an "identity crisis" in their approach to environmental governance (Agnew, 2012; and Marinelli, 2018). There are five key reasons for this.

Firstly, ecological civilisation is a relatively new concept of environmental governance having only been introduced by Hu Jintao in 2007; it builds on earlier CPC leaders' efforts to embed sustainable development in China's environmental discourse: ecological civilisation only became the CPC's leading political ecology in 2012. Secondly, Jiang Zemin introduced his political ecology – Sustainable Development Strategy – having borrowed and built upon the concept of sustainable development as a pre-existing internationally accepted term and approach to environmental governance. The phrase "sustainable development" has therefore existed within the CPC's environmental governance discourse since 1992. Thirdly, both ecological civilisation and sustainable development coexist within the CPC's rhetoric, but as two distinctly different political ecologies and approaches; ecological civilisation is a new and uniquely Chinese approach whereas sustainable development is utilised as an approach with internationally agreed standards and targets. Fourth, sustainable development is deployed within the ecological civilisation rhetoric as an approach that is denounced,

which further glorifies and supports ecological civilisation as a Chinese approach to environmental governance. Finally, sustainable development is also, at times, glorified as a means of developing “friendship” and cooperation on the world stage in environmental governance.

The use of both ecological civilisation and sustainable development within the CPC’s rhetoric can be seen to have a number of strategic uses and does not represent an identity crisis. How the CPC negates ecological civilisation and sustainable development in their national identity construction will now be discussed further.

Sustainable Development: The “Denounced” Approach of “Them”

Contextualising the use of emotion throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric highlighted patterns where sustainable development is considered unsuitable for the PRC’s unique modernisation experiences, “denounced” as an inferior approach and does not speak to the national identity under construction as it does not utilise Chinese culture, wisdom or experiences. Presenting sustainable development in this way draws upon the argument of “destructive Western industrial civilisation” (*Gongye Wenming*, 工业文明) and presents ecological civilisation as a utopian, but achievable, alternative (Hansen, et al., 2018; and Pan, 2003).

The process of “Othering” sustainable development, as an approach that has fallen short in addressing the environmental issues across the PRC, was initiated by Hu Jintao in the earliest speech within the dataset: his 17th National Congress Report. Hu, starts the CPC’s transition away from sustainable development, as a borrowed international approach, and argues a move towards an ideologically and ethically different approach is required. Ideological and ethical are captured within the CPC’s construction of ecological civilisation through being a Chinese alternative to environmental governance discursively based on Chinese wisdom and culture. Hu Jintao (2007:5-6) uses negative emotion terms to describe how the environmental approach taken thus far by the CPC, the approaches of the Sustainable Development Strategy and Scientific Development, which were guided by the internationally agreed principles

of sustainable development, are implicitly said to have caused a high-cost to the environment and created imbalances in development:

While recognizing our achievements, we must be well aware that they still fall short of the expectations of the people and that there are still quite a few difficulties and problems on our way forward. The outstanding ones include the following: Our economic growth is realized at an excessively high cost of resources and the environment. There remains an imbalance in development between urban and rural areas, among regions, and between the economy and society. It has become more difficult to bring about a steady growth of agriculture and continued increase in farmers' incomes... More efforts are needed to promote ideological and ethical progress [sic].

Hu's rhetoric not only sympathises with the Chinese people by recognising the degraded state of, and inequality faced through, the PRC's environment, but also admits that there are difficulties and problems left unanswered with regards to the PRC's environmental conditions. Regardless of how ineffective the CPC's attempts of environmental governance had been, rather than admit poor effort, the CPC are utilising the traumas of shared environmental experience to create a platform of national identity construction through ecological civilisation. One way this is achieved is by blaming environmental failures on the pre-existing approaches, those linked to sustainable development. Hu does this by explicitly directing the PRC to recognise the achievements made thus far by the CPC. Hu then lists the shared environmental difficulties and traumas experienced, and finally Hu suggests the CPC's intentions of developing ecological civilisation as an alternative approach, one that promotes more ethical and ideological progress.

The phrase "ecological civilisation" is not explicitly used within this extract; however, it is presented later within the 17th National Congress Report, where the concept of an ecological civilisation is first officially introduced within CPC rhetoric. Hu Jintao goes on to present ecological civilisation as the new ethical and ideological approach to environmental governance, initiating the national identity construction seen

through the Chinese spirit of culture and wisdom, referring to the superior ideology and morals of the chosen historical dictum of harmony between man and nature.

Hu Jintao first distinguishes ecological civilisation as an ethical and ideological alternative to sustainable development, the construction of “Us” versus “Them”; however, it is in Zhou’s rhetoric where sustainable development comes to be denounced as unsuitable for the PRC. Perhaps the clearest example of this can be seen in the following extract from Zhou Shengxian’s *Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection* speech, given at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection. Zhou (2010b:13) claims: “China is quite different from developed countries in national conditions, development stages, development objectives and tasks and problems to be solved. Therefore, *it cannot repeat the denounced environmental history of the West* that redressing the environment after pollution and seeking economic growth at the expense of environment. *What we need to do is to find a new way out* and keep on making innovations in a bid to explore a new path that combines environmental protection with economic development [emphasis added].” Zhou Shengxian denounces sustainable development, the environmental governance produced from the West’s environmental history, and argues an alternative approach must be sought.

In the following year, at the 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou Shengxian (2011b:18-19) further extrapolated how: “China *cannot follow and cannot afford following the old development path of western countries* featuring “treatment after pollution”, “economic growth at the cost of the environment” and “focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment” [emphasis added]”, which draws upon his 2010 speech *Explore a New Path to Environmental Protection and Promote Green Development* for world Environment Day, where he stated how the: “Escalating hostilities between man and nature imposes unprecedented obstacle[s] to development, which provokes human awareness of environmental issues and explorations to a new path to development” (Zhou, 2010d:1). Zhou’s rhetoric implies that the denounced environmental history of the West, in following their concept of sustainable development, has led to escalating hostilities between man and nature in the PRC; Zhou argues these hostilities have provoked the CPC’s awareness of the unsuitability of sustainable development for continued nation building, thus, to improve environmental conditions the

CPC's quest of exploring for a new path for future development has led them to develop ecological civilisation.

In Zhou's (2012c:1) 2012 World Environment Day speech, he maintains: "*We [the PRC] will definitely not take the old path of developed countries* by giving priority to economic development and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, *we will actively explore new path for environmental protection in China* which is characterized by optimizing the economic development through the protection of the environment [sic] [emphasis added]." In Zhou's 2012 speech, the new path of environmental protection, that of ecological civilisation, is explicitly outlined to be a nation building objective for furthering development of the PRC. Although clearly dismissing the "old path of developed countries", Zhou's attempt to define the PRC's "new path" as optimising economic growth through protecting the environment is barely distinguishable from the official Brundtland Report's (1987) definition of sustainable development. Zhou's rhetoric does little to instil confidence in the CPC's alternative approach, however, what it does create is a discursive space to distinguish the "Us" of ecological civilisation as a "new path" from the "Other" of sustainable development as the "old path". Sustainable development, as the old pathway, is distinguished as a pre-existing concept, developed outside of the PRC, and is blamed for the current experiences of environmental degradation. The rhetoric highlights this new path, their path of ecological civilisation, which builds on sustainable development, as a superior approach, suitable to the PRC's unique experience of development.

By 2013, Zhou (2013c:1), at the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, stated: "Ecological civilization is a great contribution of the Party in promoting the progress of human civilization. This is accomplished by fully absorbing the traditional culture and wisdom of the Chinese nation and reflecting on the defects of industrial industrialization and current development model. It is the distillation and expansion of sustainable development as a result of the Party's deep understanding toward the new global trend of going green and low carbon [sic]." Zhou begins to claim explicitly that ecological civilisation has distilled and expanded upon the defects of the current development model and sustainable development, thus creating a great contribution of understanding environmentalism through Chinese culture and wisdom. Sustainable development represents the international norms of environmental governance, whereas

ecological civilisation represents the CPC's search for environmental governance that goes beyond the distorted and corrupted images of (neoliberal) capitalism; it is an ethically and ideologically superior approach. The CPC's ecological civilisation is presented as providing a blueprint for a new image of environmental governance, one that is uniquely Chinese (Ahearne, 2013; and Gramsci, 1971).

The CPC's rhetoric can thus be understood as developing an argument whereby labelling their own style of environmental governance with the same name of the approach "blindly followed" by developed nations is not appropriate. Sustainable development as a concept does not carry the national identity built into ecological civilisation by the CPC of Chinese strength, wisdom, progression and unity. This was explicitly seen in Zhou's (2009b:2) speech at the 13th World Lake Conference, where he argues that: "Adhering to the idea of sustainable development, ecological civilization seeks for coordinated environment and socio-economic development and higher-level harmony between man and nature, environment and economy, individual and society. Industrial civilization leads to the conflicts between man and nature. Ecological civilization firstly will redevelop the harmony between man and nature, which is voluntary, scientific, long-term and at higher level, different from that of agricultural civilization [sic]." Similar is how Xi Jinping refers to sustainable development as the "status quo" of environmentalism. Xi (2018b:5), at the 13th National People's Congress, proclaimed: "We must not be satisfied with the status quo, indulge ourselves in ease and comfort, or let delight dispel worries. We must stay true to our original aspiration, hold on to our mission, strive to accomplish, so as to make outstanding achievement in the new era." Both Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian are furthering the process of "Othering".

However, Zhou does not entirely discredit sustainable development; he openly admits that ecological civilisation adheres to the initial ideas of sustainable development regarding coordinating the environment and socio-economic growth. However, he also argues that where sustainable development leads to conflict, ecological civilisation aims to redevelop harmony between man and nature. Using eye-catching words and phrases, such as, harmony between man and nature – with their roots in Chinese philosophies – distinguishes and promotes ecological civilisation as a better approach whilst furthering the identity of a Chinese environmentalism (Gare, 2010, 2012 and 2017; and Hu, 2011). Xi dismisses the status quo as unsatisfactory, directing the PRC to remain focused on

pursuing their new Chinese approach of environmental governance, guided by the spirit of ecological civilisation.

Pan Yue's (2003 and 2006c) scholarly works also explicitly make these arguments, in advocating that ecological civilisation, which is embedded within Chinese wisdom and culture, is eco-centric by endorsing harmony between man and nature. Whereas, according to Pan (2003 and 2006c), sustainable development, as the Western understanding of environmentalism, is "black" and anthropocentric. Pan (2006c) claims the Western approach of sustainable development is the root cause of the environmental crises faced globally today. Thus what this section has begun to show is how the coexistence of sustainable development and ecological civilisation within the CPC's rhetoric creates a platform for the CPC to discursively distinguish ecological civilisation as the new path for Chinese development, and to dismiss sustainable development as the old path of the West. What will be discussed in the next section is (what initially appears to be) a contradiction in how sustainable development is also labelled an experience with "sobering lessons" from which to learn. What this rhetoric does is inform the PRC that ecological civilisation will be different from the "Western black modernisation"; sustainable development can teach the CPC and PRC what not to be.

Simultaneously Learning From whilst "Othering" Sustainable Development

The above section highlighted a negative framing of sustainable development, where Zhou Shengxian referred to the concept as the "denounced" product of the environmental history of the West. Despite this, there is also a positive framing of sustainable development. What is supported through this positive framing is a means of cooperating internationally; the CPC purport how the ideas from "Them" on development, with the CPC's guidance, can help the PRC tackle their unique development situation. What is important, however, is the frequent reassurance that the CPC's State-led initiative of ecological civilisation is an improvement and distillation of the thoughts from developed nations. Sustainable development is embraced alongside Chinese wisdom and culture to suit the PRC's unique experience of the environment and development; and that cooperation with international norms provides a platform to

increase global status (Chapter 6 will consider the role of global status and responsibility in more depth).

Callahan (2012), drawing upon the work of Shambaugh (2008a and 2008b), argues how the PRC is not “a land of contradictions” that suffers from “national schizophrenia”, but instead, is a State where the CPC balances glories and traumas, rejuvenations and humiliations, and interweaves them as a structure of feeling, which is constructing the PRC’s national aesthetic. The CPC, as dialectical materialists, manage these contradictions, whereby sustainable development is both negatively and positively framed. These framings are weaved through the ecological civilisation rhetoric, aiding the construction of a national identity of superiority through Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences.

One of the ways in which sustainable development is positively framed echoes ideas from the New Culture Movement. Hu Shi (1981:345), a promoter of the “New Culture Movement”, counselled, “If we still want to rectify this state [China], if we still hope that this nation take a stand in the world - there is only one way out, that is, we admit of our own faults: we must confess that we are inferior to others in every aspect, namely, we are inferior on material machineries and political systems, and, what's more, we are inferior on morality, literature, music, art and physical health”. Similarly, Chen Xujing (2004:8) argues: “(1) European modern culture is really more advanced than ours. (2) Whether we like it or not, Western modern culture is where contemporary world is heading toward”. These statements, made during China’s Century of Humiliation, highlight how China faced a brutal re-positioning on the world stage. These ideas founded within the New Culture Movement provide a stronger claim for Agnew’s (2012) concept of a “timespace” identity crisis.

As Callahan (2012) and Wang (2014) have highlighted, the CPC often refers to traumas suffered at the hands of the Imperial powers as a method of justifying and legitimising their development pathway and offer an explanation as to why the PRC may feel weak or backwards. Within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, these traumas are present and there are extracts that propose learning from the developed nations in such a way that subtly links back to thoughts from the New Culture Movement, thus placing the blame on “Us”, the CPC, as opposed to on “Them”, the Others. For instance, Hu Jintao (2012:18), at the 18th National Congress, stated: “We should follow a path of

making innovation with Chinese features and take steps to promote innovation to catch up with global advances.” Although Hu remains true to developing an environmentalism with Chinese features, he still purports that the PRC are in a position of trying to catch up to “Them”, the Others.

Zhou Shengxian (2009a:5), in his 2009 World Environment Day speech *Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological Civilization*, similarly promotes the approach of developed countries in stating: “Proved experience of developed countries tells us that full-fledged policies and standards, complete infrastructures and optimized industrial structure constitute the three pillars for environmental improvement. Hence, it is of paramount importance for us to set up and improve environmental policies, legislations and standards that conform to current stage of social economic development and environmental decisions [sic].” Although Zhou also initially suggests the PRC have lessons to be learned from the developed nations, he likewise goes on to state that the improvements the CPC make must be aligned with the “current stage” of development and environmental conditions in the PRC. Thus, although approaching the western concept of environmentalism in a more friendly tone, the message of an “Us” versus “Them” in experience and approach still remains. There is no confession of inferiority; the opposite is present, where the CPC highlight explicitly the inferiority of sustainable development instead.

Zhou Jian (2018:4), the director of the Department of Policy Planning of Foreign Affairs, in his speech at the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental Protection, claimed: “As a developing country, China needs to enhance international cooperation to learn from other countries of their top-notch concepts, experience and technologies. At the same time, China is also willing to jointly promote the realization of the biodiversity conservation goals based on international cooperation and exchange to exert its constructive role of a big and responsible nation [sic].” Zhou Jian echoes the New Culture movement in referencing the advanced technologies and concepts of developed States, however, his following sentence doubles back to contradict this approach through complimenting the PRC as constructive and responsible. Again, this does not support Agnew’s (2012) “timespace” identity crisis theory. Although Hu Jintao, Zhou Shengxian and Zhou Jian positively frame the approach of the “Other” as an

approach the PRC can learn from, at no point is there a negative framing of the “Us” of ecological civilisation. A statement that bolsters and reaffirms the CPC’s approach follows each example of positive framing of sustainable development. The CPC present learning from sustainable development as an example of the CPC’s openness and forward thinking; through applying their Chinese wisdom, they improve on sustainable development thus forging ecological civilisation.

Potential confusion arises where it becomes unclear as to which approach is being endorsed and pursued by the CPC. Geall and Ely (2018) claimed that 2016 marked a change in ecological civilisation whereby Xi had “coded” the concept for implementation. Yet, despite this change in CPC rhetoric, where ecological civilisation is increasingly present, the CPC simultaneously pursue the implementation for the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which positively frames sustainable development. In his 2016 Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development speech, Li Baodong (2016:1) endorses sustainable development as the PRC’s basic national policy: “China is the largest developing country in the world, with development as its top priority and sustainable development as a basic national policy.” Xi (2017a:8), at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017, also claims: “It is important to protect the environment while pursuing economic and social progress so as to achieve harmony between man and nature and between man and society. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development should be implemented to realize balanced development across the world [sic].”

Xi, in implicitly referring to harmony between man and nature, draws upon the national identity construction based on Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences. However, Xi then directly names the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as the approach to be implemented to reach this balanced development. Although speaking at an international Summit, where the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was a key concept under discussion, Xi weakens their national identity under construction by directly linking harmony between man and nature as something achievable through the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. However, Xi’s speech followed the announcement by President Donald Trump to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement; it is therefore easy to assume Xi’s speech has been carefully

constructed to present the PRC as reliable, cooperative and peaceful in upholding international standards and agreements (Trump, 2017).

During the APEC CEO Summit in 2016, Xi (2016b:6) stated “As a Chinese saying goes, clear rivers and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver. We will continue to pursue the strategy of sustainable development, promote green, low-carbon and circular development, and build a beautiful China with blue skies, green land and clear rivers so that our people can live in a sound environment created by development.” As with Li Baodong above, Xi refers to the strategy of sustainable development to achieve the forces of emotion elsewhere explicitly expressed as elements of the spirit of ecological civilisation. Sustainable development and ecological civilisation appear therefore to exist in tandem within the rhetoric, both being implemented to achieve the same goals of environmental development.

However, rather than embracing sustainable development per se, perhaps what is seen here is instead a warmth towards other countries. This works in two ways; it is a practical and discursive continuation of Deng’s reform and opening up, but it is also a step towards the formation of “friendships” through which to project their own concept of ecological civilisation. This more positively framed rhetoric supports the notion of the PRC coming together with other global leaders to formulate a new approach for global environmental governance and reflects Zhou Jian’s remarks above that the CPC need to enhance their international cooperation. Sustainable development, as an internationally agreed term, is different to the concept of developing sustainably (as was identified at the start of this chapter page 172).

Xi Jinping (2017h:7-8), in his *Working Together to Build a Better Future* keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting, stated: “We [the CPC] are eager to draw on the achievements of other cultures and apply them in the Chinese context. Indeed, Marxism is the scientific truth we have learned from other countries”, going on to add: “The CPC will embrace and approach the achievements of other cultures with an open mind and a broad perspective. We stay committed to engaging in dialogue, exchanges and cooperation with the people and political parties of other countries and supporting cultural and people-to-people exchanges between countries.” During his *Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth* keynote speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic

Forum Annual Meeting, Xi (2017a:10) again professed the CPC would “open our arms” to the exchange of foreign ideas and practise. Xi positively frames engaging in the approach(s) of the “Other(s)” as a means of fostering international cooperation. A final example includes Xi’s (2017f:2) speech, at the APEC CEO Summit, where he said: “The vision of innovative, coordinated, green and open development for all is gaining increasing public support. To achieve more comprehensive, higher quality and more sustainable development has become the shared goal of the international community. To implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and adapt to climate change and other challenges of a global nature has become an important international consensus.” All of Xi’s international speeches, within this dataset, given since President Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement have utilised this space to present the cooperative, reliable and trustworthy spirit of the Chinese on the international stage in upholding and pursuing environmental agreements.

International cooperation, via global environmental governance is also seen in Li’s (2016c:2-3) statement, at the General Debate of 71st session of UN General Assembly: “Difficult moments call for stronger confidence. I believe mankind has the wisdom and capability to find a way out of difficulty. For that to happen, there must be cooperation and a spirit of working together to tide over difficulties. It is time that the international community take on a new perspective. It should see itself as a community of shared future in which all are stakeholders, and should make concerted efforts to jointly tackle global challenges.” However, reasons behind cooperation were explicitly given by Li (2016c:1-2) earlier in the same speech, when he claimed: “The UN Sustainable Development Summit held last year adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, opening a new vision for global development. At the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech entitled “Toward Win-win Partnership for Sustainable Development” to expound on China’s principles and position as well as its readiness to advance the agenda for sustainable development.”

Before the CPC can consider projecting ecological civilisation as the future of global environmental governance, they first have to demonstrate their understanding of environmental governance and the ability to cooperate on the global stage. This positive framing, of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, allows the CPC to embrace

sustainable development as a means of recognising and supporting the international trend for environmental governance. For instance, in Wu Xiaoqiang's (2009:1) *Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development* speech for the MEP, he claimed: "Sustainable development is the eternal theme of the development of human society." Accepted as an eternal theme on the world stage, the CPC have strategically embraced the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, as Xi (2017d:4) stated: "China sets great store by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We have developed a national program to implement the Agenda and set up innovation demonstration zones on sustainable development. Thanks to these efforts, we have attained early harvests on economic, social, environmental and many other fronts." However, it is important to highlight how integral to the CPC's national programme for implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda is their environmental governance concept of ecological civilisation. Sustainable development is only positively framed when it allows for the CPC to construct the national identity of the PRC as friendly, cooperative and progressive on the international stage.

Internationally, sustainable development provides an accessible platform to the current practises of global environmental governance. Domestically, ecological civilisation creates a national identity designed to create pride in the Chinese sense-of-self in becoming a strong, progressive and a united PRC. Whereas some scholars see the CPC's mixed messages as linked to the PRC's transition from a developing nation to a developed State, or from being a revolutionary power to becoming a responsible status quo power (Carlson, 2005; and Johnston, 2008), Callahan (2012:12) instead argues that the supposed contradictions in CPC political discourse are linked to the positive and negative duality in CPC politics.

Callahan (2012) goes on to argue that being aware of the emotion (or structure of feeling) discursively embedded within the CPC's discourse highlights how at the heart of the PRC's foreign policy is an identity dilemma. However, as this chapter has shown, the seemingly interchangeability between sustainable development and ecological civilisation ignores the strategic differences, found within the CPC's use of emotion, to "Other" sustainable development, which creates a strong national identity: one that draws upon Chinese wisdom, culture and shared experiences to create pride in becoming a strong, progressive and singular civilised State. Within the interchangeability

between sustainable development and ecological civilisation, which appear to exist as competing approaches to environmental governance, is instead a *leadership* dilemma, one tied to the PRC's vying for increased global status as thought leaders in environmental governance. How the ecological civilisation rhetoric considers the CPC's leadership and status will be explored in Chapters 5 and 6 respectfully. The supposed contradiction and uncertainty in the CPC's use of both ecological civilisation and sustainable development, rather than existing as a "timespace" identity crisis, appears to be more closely aligned with a crisis in leadership with the CPC being uncertain of how to approach projecting their intentions of becoming thought leaders for global environmental governance. However, what is consistent is the use of emotions, chosenness, glories and traumas, to bolster ecological civilisation as a new, superior and Chinese approach to environmental governance.

Conclusion

This Chapter has shown how the CPC's use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric constructs a national identity of Chinese wisdom and culture for superior environmental governance. The use of emotion creates rhetoric where ecological civilisation represents the new approach of "Us" of the PRC versus the old "denounced" approach of "Them", the developed nations. The CPC are discursively constructing a national identity of a strong, progressive and united PRC through Chinese wisdom and culture on environmental understandings and practise. Whereas scholars such as Agnew (2012) and Callahan (2012) have suggested that the PRC are undergoing an identity crisis, especially through what appears to be contradictions that Shambaugh (2008a) described as a "national schizophrenia", which could be seen in the ecological civilisation rhetoric as a potential site of inconsistency within the "Us" versus "Them" of sustainable development in the CPC's current environmental governance. This chapter has argued instead that this inter-changeability and adaptability is crucial in furthering the CPC's discursive national identity construction and instead refutes this argument of an identity crisis. If a crisis is present, however, then it is a crisis of

leadership through the CPC's evolving aspirations to become more globally involved in governance, which will be explored in greater detail in the following two chapters.

This chapter has provided the first interpretation of how the CPC uses emotion and it has been seen to utilise what Agnew (2012) described as the PRC being caught at a crossroad, a time of rapid transition between developing and developed (see also, Huan, 2008). This period of transition is creating two competing narratives, one narrative is focused on China's past, and the second is focused on the PRC's present and future; thus creating a site of a juxtaposition where competing identities may arise (see also, Huan, 2008). Wang's (2014) discussion of the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative also presented this same duality, where humiliation represents incidences from China's past and rejuvenation captures the future orientated glories to be achieved. Agnew (2012), Huan (2008) and Wang (2014) all suggest the PRC are going through a period of transition. However, this chapter has demonstrated that there is no juxtaposition of competing identities, no identity crisis, within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. The CPC's State-led identity creation is very consistent, with ecological civilisation representing a new national identity based upon Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences, of strength, progression and unity, for environmental governance.

The notion of the PRC needing a uniquely Chinese approach for their uniquely Chinese problems was ever-present throughout the rhetoric: ecological civilisation has become a trope synonymous with this need. Sustainable development, however, was seen to exist in tandem with the development of ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation is inherently good, based on Chinese wisdom and culture. Sustainable development, although sometimes an approach that the Chinese can learn from – through cooperation and knowledge exchange – is more often discussed as a denounced approach, albeit something necessary through existing as the current global status quo. This negative framing of sustainable development is used to elevate the CPC's intended environmental governance of an ecological civilisation.

Sustainable development is becoming symbolic of Western mistakes, the reason for the PRC's current environmental degradation and creating the imbalances experienced in development. The CPC argue that they recognise how an environmentalism that ignores the intricate balance of harmony between man and nature and separates economic growth from ecological value, is an environmentalism destined

to fail. Ecological civilisation, albeit discursively for now, theoretically represents a reinvigoration of the understanding of humanities' place in nature, via Chinese wisdom and culture, in particular *Tianren heyi*: a move away from the European Enlightenment of individualism at the foundation of the current environmental crises (Desai, 2020).

This chapter has also supported the findings of Hansen, et al. (2018:201) who argue ecological civilisation has been “adopted by the highest political leadership as an ideology conveniently planted in a nationalist interpretation of the philosophical past.” The emotions used in creating the spirit of ecological civilisation utilises pride in Chinese wisdom and culture, creates a togetherness for engagement with the CPC's latest political trope and begins to self-position the PRC through their spirit of increased strength, hard-work, cooperation and responsibility. This identity is constructed to support the CPC in their wider claim for global environmental governance internationally, and domestically it is designed to further nation building in pursuing further development of the PRC (Goron, 2018; Hansen et al., 2018; and Marinelli, 2018).

Chapter 5: Mythologising Ecological Civilisation: Glorifying CPC Leadership

In interpreting the repeating patterns and themes presented in Chapter 3, a number of similarities are noticeable between the identified linguistic traits of emotion and mythology (see, Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and Magoulick, 2015). This chapter seeks to explore how the CPC's use of emotion can be understood, at times, to be mythologising ecological civilisation. This interpretation highlights how the emotion themes of the CGT framework are also principal elements in mythology, especially the dichotomy of glories versus traumas (Magoulick, 2015). Ecological civilisation ought not to be considered as a new myth per se, but the interpretation in this chapter highlights how the CPC uses emotion in ways that shares the emotional connotations conveyed through mythology. Chapter 4 interpreted how the CPC's use of emotive rhetoric is constructing a national identity; this chapter explores how the use of emotion addresses insecurities relating to party power and the CPC's leadership.

Guided by the themes of CGT, patterns were found whereby the use of emotion within the rhetoric: furthered national identity; verified that the PRC is facing a series of trials and tribulations; reassured the PRC that the CPC is leading the PRC through said trials and tribulations, and with glorified results; and justified the trials and tribulations faced as shared traumas caused by others. These features – unity, trials and tribulations, glorified outcomes and suffering at the hands of others – are common traits of mythology (Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and Magoulick, 2015). There is a meeting between the emotion found through the themes of CGT and common features of myths. Myths are designed to speak to a common group of peoples; a group of peoples with shared geography, culture and struggles. Myths also very specifically glorify triumphs of knowledge or action. Finally, myths are also full of traumas either to justify the need for action or to explain why a group of peoples are facing specific struggles, trials and tribulations (Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and Magoulick, 2015).

Myth can be defined in the following three ways: 1) as a code with a certain set of symbols and signals, where the code provides some form of instruction for life; 2) as a story to erase anxieties, where the stories place people in accord with the inevitabilities

of their life, helping them to see the positive values of the negatives and vice versa; and, 3) as the edge of what is known and what is unknown, creating a bridge between what is and what can be (Campbell, 2008). Emotions in myth reflect the struggles faced by a group and the policies, theories or ideologies developed to combat the impending struggle(s). Myths are culturally, temporally and spatially specific and therefore the social constructivist lens, directing the thematic EDA, is an appropriate tool to develop an understanding of the mythologised elements through the use of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.

There are instances of all three definitions of myth within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Ecological civilisation provides instruction on how to become, for example, a “beautiful China”. The mythologised emotion tries to erase anxieties over the current struggles faced within the PRC’s environment and the CPC’s environmental governance. The rhetoric depicts how the CPC see what the PRC is and what it hopes the PRC will become when they reach their desired betterment. Finally, the emotion also placates the PRC through shared traumas by sometimes placing the blame unto others.

This chapter will focus, more specifically, on the themes of glory and trauma. Glories will be seen through the CPC’s revelation for a place of betterment, and traumas will be seen through the sacrifices required. These overlapping features are most often associated with heroism and what Campbell (2008) identifies as the hero journey. Campbell (2008) describes the hero journey as a process where a hero undergoes a transformation, which inspires them to guide a group of people to make improvements to their society. Heroism within the ecological civilisation rhetoric symbolises the CPC, and at times specifically the General Secretary, as heroes. The hero journey refers to the CPC taking the PRC on a journey to betterment, where ecological civilisation simultaneously represents a symbolic, ideal and real place.

This chapter will begin by delving deeper into this interpretation of the CPC as heroic leaders on their hero journey in creating ecological civilisation as a symbolic, ideal or real place of betterment.

The CPC's Hero Journey: Creating an Ecological Civilisation

A “hero journey” is where an individual or group try to deliver betterment for a group of people (Campbell, 2008). The process involves either a metaphorical or physical journey, with a departure, realisation, return and fulfilment. The hero goes through a period of being and then becoming, where a realisation provides them with the means or vision for betterment, which the hero then delivers to the people (Campbell, 2008). Links here to a mythologising of the ecological civilisation rhetoric are straightforward: the CPC, as the government of the PRC, are responsible for the PRC's betterment. Through their leadership they are intent on guiding the PRC to fulfil their vision of betterment, built on the collective wisdom over 60 years in government. The ecological civilisation rhetoric is “mythologised” by depicting the CPC (and General Secretary) as hero(es); ecological civilisation is their revelation for betterment.

Suggestions of the CPC's heroic nature range from subtle hints, such as: “Ever since its founding in July 1921, the CPC has bravely dedicated itself to the historical mission of leading the Chinese people in striving for a happy life and for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which Hu Jintao (2007:49) claimed in his 17th National Congress Report. The adverb “bravely” associates the CPC with the characteristics of heroes. Another subtle insinuation was seen during Hu's (2011b:4) 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC speech, where he said: “History has also fully shown that the CPC truly deserves to be called a great, glorious and correct Marxist political party and the core force leading the Chinese people in breaking new ground in development.” Soliciting that the CPC is great, glorious and the correct core force demonstrates support for not only the strength of the CPC's governance, but the ways in which they govern to deliver betterment to the PRC. Both of these statements also hint of a journey towards betterment, where it is the CPC guiding the PRC in striving for a happy life, great rejuvenation and breaking new ground in development.

Hu Jintao (2011b:13) then went on to make a more direct claim of heroic leadership and the necessity of CPC governance to reach betterment, stating: “Since the very day of its founding, the CPC has heroically shouldered the historic mission of uniting with and leading the people in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Here it is hard to ignore the direct use of “heroically” and once again a journey

towards betterment is suggested in the leading towards, and achievement of, rejuvenation. Hu Jintao (2011b:7) also stated: "Looking back at China's development and progress over the past 90 years, we have naturally come to this basic conclusion: Success in China hinges on the Party." This statement is not only very confident and forthright, but directly places the CPC as heroes, or leaders, that have delivered the PRC's development progress thus far.

Similar is Zhou Shengxian's (2007:2) rhetoric, such as during the MEP's 2007 Annual General Meeting, Zhou bolsters the CPC as heroic, saying: "These achievements were hard earned and they also showed that the policies and measures of the Chinese government were absolutely right." Zhou tends to refer to the correctness of the CPC in delivering environmental governance and describes the CPC in glorified ways. During his speech at the Meeting in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of China National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:6), when describing the CPC's New Path for Environmental Protection, stated: "Our cause is noble and sacred, our vision is bright and beautiful, and our responsibility is significant and glorious". Both of Zhou's statements instil ideas of the greatness, triumph and glory of the CPC, which are traits associated with heroism, and again the CPC's revelation for and direction of leadership is resulting in a betterment of the PRC. Both Hu Jintao and Zhou Shengxian are creating a power relationship where the CPC are the strong and correct leaders, quelling any reason for insecurities over their (environmental) governance of the PRC.

In Liu Xiaoming's (2017:4) speech, to the UK Business Community following the 19th National Congress, he explicitly advocates strong support for Xi Jinping as the correct leader of the CPC:

A great cause calls for strong and firm guidance. History tells us that in a massive country like China, development and progress would be impossible without a strong leadership. Over the past five years, the achievements we made and the changes taking place in China have been phenomenal. These must be attributed to the strong and firm leadership of the Party. At the first session of the 19th Central Committee, Xi Jinping was once again elected General Secretary. This reflects the common aspiration of the people.

Not only is Xi repeatedly described as offering strong, firm and successful leadership, driving the “phenomenal” results of the CPC, Ambassador Liu proclaims Xi has the support of the people and that the people commonly aspire to his vision of betterment. Campbell (2008) argued that a hero who understands the people and is supported by the people is the most powerful of heroes. Ambassador Liu (2017:4) further depicts Xi as a heroic leader of the CPC, by going on to say: “Now, the new CPC leadership is closely rallied around General Secretary Xi Jinping. This new central leadership is giving the Chinese people great confidence. They are committed to leading the Chinese people into a new era. They are uniting the whole nation in a concerted effort to realise the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Both of Liu’s excerpts uses emotion in a way that mythologises Xi as the latest hero, guiding the CPC with strong, firm and successful leadership on a pathway to, seemingly unquestioned, betterment.

Campbell’s (2008) seminal work *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*, argues that the hero figure evolves as the culture evolves, that the myth adapts to fit the times. The phrase “to keep with the times” or to keep with modern “trends” can be seen throughout the CPC’s speeches. We saw in the previous chapter exploring the spirit of ecological civilisation how it has been important for the CPC to demonstrate how ecological civilisation is uniquely Chinese and adapted to answer uniquely Chinese problems. Myths usually develop in response to a contemporary struggle faced by a group of peoples (Campbell, 2008); in this way, the idea of keeping with the times and trends highlight how the CPC’s leadership is up-to-date and aware of contemporary (environmental) issues facing the PRC. Suggesting again there should be no insecurities over their ability to deal with the PRC’s contemporary and unique struggles. Ecological civilisation is a revelation on how to deliver betterment regarding the PRC’s current environmental degradation and pollution, a contemporary struggle throughout the PRC that has seen ample civilian protest over the past decade (Lu and Chan, 2016).

Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian, all claim ecological civilisation to be keeping up with modern trends and fitting in with the times. During his 17th National Congress Report, Hu Jintao (2007:9) argued “[k]eeping up with the times is the most prominent hallmark of the new period... and enabled the Chinese nation to catch up with the trend of the times in great strides and see the bright future of national rejuvenation.”

Xi Jinping (2017f:8), at the APEC CEO Summit, introduced ecological civilisation by saying, “this is a new journey of moving with the times and exploring new model of development.” Again, Xi not only stipulates how ecological civilisation is “moving with the times”, but is also a new journey. Zhou Shengxian’s excerpts are interspersed with a greater extent of emotion terms, especially metaphors, to rally the people behind the journey to be taken. For instance, in his *Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection* speech at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:13) claimed: “Exploration of the new path to environmental protection proves to be a course of vigorous development loaded with boldness in reform and innovation and constantly seeking the truth. The baton is passed to one and another, which leads the new journey to advance with the times”.

Zhou Shengxian’s closing statement of “to advance with the times” denies the audience an interpretation whereby the CPC are struggling to keep up with the times, to an understanding whereby the CPC are leading this advancement. Zhou glorifies the idea of change and the new journey; it is not a statement that argues that the old journey was wrong, but that the new journey is vigorous, bold and innovative to ensure the PRC advances. Zhou Shengxian’s (2011a:1) *Strive for Innovation and Actively Explore New Path to Environmental Protection* New Year Address, also draws upon the emotion embedded within the notion of a shared spirit of ecological civilisation, by stating: “we will keep pace with times with pioneering spirit and strive for a new situation of environmental protection.” These extracts demonstrate some of the ways in which the CPC claims a heroic position, creating a statement of power as the correct leaders of the PRC, appropriately leading the PRC’s journey towards betterment in accordance with their correct understanding of the PRC’s current situation.

Glory emotion has been used within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric to construct a message of heroic leadership, by choosing to ignore the environmental failures of the CPC and instead focuses on the potential of improvements found in a revelation for betterment, which is adapted to the PRC’s current reality. This brings us to consider what this revelation of a place of betterment is: whether ecological civilisation represents symbolic, ideal or real betterment. Zhou Shengxian’s (2009a:2) *Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under*

the Guidance of Ecological Civilization speech, conveyed that: “Ecological civilization is an ideal state as well as a realistic objective [sic].” Ecological civilisation is referred to in a number of ways that demonstrates the concept as a theoretical or idealistic state, a symbolic place as well as sometimes a real and intended destination of betterment for the PRC. This section has demonstrated how there is scope to deepen the analysis of the mythologising features of heroism and the hero journey within the rhetoric to provide an alternative interpretation of the ecological civilisation concept. The next section will now consider how ecological civilisation is mythologised as a place creating future spaces of the CPC’s imagined environmental governance.

Symbolic, Ideal, Real: Ecological Civilisation as the Hero Journey’s Place of Betterment

A common feature of hero mythology is where the hero mentions a place they have to find. For example, in Buddhist mythology the place is Nirvana, or in Christian mythology the place is Heaven (Campbell, 2008). One of China’s popular hero myths, *Xiyou Ji* “The Journey to the West”, the title alone stipulates that a journey to a place is the focus of the tale. Already discussed is how some scholars have disregarded ecological civilisation as merely rhetoric, whereby it represents a symbol or an ideal, but only as words (Bandurski, 2017; Economy, 2017; Geall and Hilton, 2014; Hilton, 2017; LaForgia, 2017; Su, Heshmati, Geng and Yu, 2013; and Vanderklippe, 2017). However, this section endeavours to demonstrate how within the CPC’s rhetoric there are a number of occasions where ecological civilisation is discursively created as a symbolic place, an ideal state and a real intended destination. There tends to be a conglomeration of all three. This section explores how ecological civilisation represents an extension of *Xiaokang*, rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese characteristics as ideals and symbols of betterment, as well as intended destination(s) to further convey this message of heroic leadership towards the PRC’s betterment.

Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric discusses ecological civilisation as a place of betterment most frequently. In his 2009 World Environment Day speech, Zhou (2009a:5) described ecological civilisation as a symbolic place with “balance and harmony between

man and nature.” At the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (2011g:2) described ecological civilisation as an ideal place that fosters “positive and benign development.” And, during his speech at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, Zhou (2014c:1-2) described ecological civilisation as a real place with “clear water and green mountains as well as economic development”.

For Zhou Shengxian (2009a:1-2), ecological civilisation is a place with a “sustainable industrial structure, production and consumption mode and starts with the guidance toward a sustainable and harmonious development course. It highlights man's consciousness and self-discipline and the mutually dependent and complementary relationship between man and nature. This will be a long-standing and formidable process, neither accomplished overnight, nor guaranteed once and for all.” Zhou describes ecological civilisation as a place, which: 1) symbolises the PRC's constant struggle for, and the journey towards, superior enlightenment and betterment; 2) embodies the ideals found within the Chinese wisdom and culture of harmony within *Tianren heyi*; and, 3) exists as a real place where the PRC exhibits sustainable and harmonious development, represented through changes to the PRC's industry, production and consumption. Guidelines on how to become an ecological civilisation can be found in policy documents, such as the: *Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council Toward Development of Ecological Civilization*, which was adopted on the 25th of April, 2015.

Another way in which Zhou's rhetoric constructs ecological civilisation as a place is through this emphasis on the notion of a journey; Zhou describes the CPC as progressing the PRC and rejuvenating the country through their concept of ecological civilisation. In his speech, at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (2011g:2) argued that the PRC have gone from “the primitive civilization, agricultural civilization, and industrial civilization [sic]” and the CPC are now leading the “transitional period from the industrial civilization to ecological civilization [sic].” Here, ecological civilisation is dialectically presented as the natural next destination or state of existence for the PRC, following the CPC's understanding of development. The previous civilisational states, listed by Zhou, each

represented previous symbolic, ideal, as well as real places, which existed through the enactment of the understood ideals of the time.

To reach ecological civilisation, Zhou (2009a:5), again, within his 2009 World Environment Day speech, proclaimed that the PRC should “rely on technological advance and uphold independent innovation with a view to developing a high-tech, cost-effective pattern for environmental treatment.” To further this, his speech at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (2011g:2) appeased that “abandoning the development and the pursuit of material life and going back to the primitive lifestyle” is not necessary, but what is necessary, is “improving the resource efficiency, changing the production mode and lifestyle, and achieving the harmony between man and nature, environment and economy, man and society at a higher level.” Thus, Zhou offers very real means by which the PRC can journey towards betterment under the guidance and leadership of the CPC. Ecological civilisation is described as a realistic objective with real policy directives to follow; as argued by Geall and Ely (2018), ecological civilisation is being codified for implementation.

Finally, Zhou Shengxian (2013c:1), during his 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection speech, furthers that to reach ecological civilisation the PRC needs to fully absorb “the traditional culture and wisdom of the Chinese nation” and reflect “on the defects of industrial industrialization and current [Western/global] development model [sic]”. Zhou is stressing the need to understand and engage with the symbolic and ideal elements of the CPC’s heroic revelation of ecological civilisation to arrive at the place of betterment. Thus, we see that ecological civilisation is a place built on Chinese wisdom, using Chinese innovation and technological advancements: the spirit of ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation is clear and green, with harmony between man and nature. Ecological civilisation is an ideal state, a symbolic place, but is also a realistic objective. Ecological civilisation is an alternative state of being from that of the traditional industrialisation, inflicted globally, by the developed Western nations and international institutions. The CPC wants everyone to believe ecological civilisation is achievable by supporting their heroic governance and following their alternative, Chinese, journey to betterment.

There are endless reference to, and metaphors of, a journey in the ecological civilisation rhetoric. This is a pattern that has existed in the CPC rhetoric for decades; ecological civilisation is a new extension, a new destination. *Xiaokang*, rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese characteristics are all implicated within this journey; ecological civilisation is the next destination of betterment. *Xiaokang* refers to a moderately prosperous society in all respects (Alvaro, 2013). Rejuvenation represents a return to the glories associated with the ancient Chinese civilisation, a return to the glories before the Century of Humiliation (Wang, 2012 and 2014). Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the latest theoretical approach endorsed by Xi and the CPC of superior political understanding (Peters, 2017). To keep these ideals and symbolic places relevant to current times and modern trends the CPC have added an environmental element: the symbolic, ideal and real place of a green, clean and beautiful China, their ecological civilisation.

The following excerpts provide examples of certain set phrases repeated throughout the CPC's speeches, demonstrating the continuation of the journey that the CPC have been leading the PRC on. This first example lists *Xiaokang* as the place being built by following Socialism with Chinese characteristics: "hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development, continue to emancipate the mind, persist in reform and opening up, pursue development in a scientific way, promote social harmony, and strive for new victories in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects" (Hu Jintao, 2007:1-2, during his 17th National Congress Report). Xi Jinping's speeches continue this theme in stating how: "The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal of national rejuvenation" (Xi, 2017e:1, from his 19th National Congress Report).

Hu Jintao's set phrase is perforated with verbs, such as, follow, pursue and strive, which all suggest movement and can easily be related to the idea of being on a journey; a journey to *Xiaokang*, a destination in the CPC's vision for betterment. Hu lists the CPC's journey towards betterment via a chronology of the various CPC political

theories that have directed the PRC on the path to betterment since Deng's leadership. Similarly, Xi Jinping, with his reference to "striving with endless energy" – another journey verb – explicitly states that the goal of rejuvenation is a place of betterment. The importance of ecological civilisation as something to be strived for is further strengthened by linking the concept to the cause of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. With Xi Jinping, as the current protagonist of the hero journey, it is his "Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" that symbolise one of the current pathways for the journey to the PRC's betterment.

Zhou Shengxian (2011f:1) in his speech at the 2011 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, stated: "The set of major strategic thoughts and tasks on ecological civilization is a testament to our rational understanding of the trend of human civilization, our correct adherence to the rule of social development, a distillation of the concept of scientific development and major advance in the theory of building a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. It is of great significance for furthering the basic state policy of environmental protection and moving toward a path featuring booming production, comfortable life and sound eco environment [sic]." The CPC, in their mythologising process, attempt to provide a set of strategic thoughts, a roadmap, for the tasks to take the PRC towards ecological civilisation; the CPC eases anxieties by promising booming production, a comfortable life and a clean and beautiful China formed by a sound ecological environment. Zhou makes this point with a flourishing of emotion terms: "correct adherence" and "major advance", which furthers the heroic achievements of the CPC, especially on their latest theoretical advancement of adding ecological civilisation as one of their current destinations of betterment.

Zhou Shengxian's (2013c:1) speech at the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, reinforced ecological civilisation "[a]s the latest theoretic result of the Party in providing innovative solution to the relationship among economic development, resources and environment, building ecological civilization charts the course for achieving harmonious development between man and nature [sic]." Whether this charted course is clear to follow, or will be completed, is yet to be seen. However, the CPC are clear in their rhetoric that ecological civilisation exists not only as this next place of betterment, which is symbolic, ideal and real, but also as a revelation on how to reach betterment. The CPC portray their chartered course as a demonstration that there

should be no insecurities over their ability to deliver on their revelations for environmental governance and place of betterment, no insecurities in their understanding of how they lead the PRC; no insecurities of their *rightful* place as the leaders of the PRC as seen in speeches by Hu, Zhou, Xi and Liu.

As early as 2009 Zhou Shengxian (2009a:6), in his *Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological Civilization* speech, stated: “to explore a new path to environmental protection, we need to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, fully implement Scientific Outlook on Development, follow the guidance of ecological civilization and accelerate historic transformation of environmental protection [sic].” Thus, in Zhou’s rhetoric, we see how the CPC’s leadership towards ecological civilisation went from an exploration on the new path to ecological civilisation in 2009, to their chartered course on the new path to ecological civilisation in 2013.

The CPC’s chartered course to reach this place of betterment, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, repeatedly lists two dates: 2035 and 2049. By 2035, Xi believes that the CPC will have built the foundations of *Xiaokang*; here the reference to building foundations creates an image of a real place to be built and achieved. By 2035 Xi (2017e:25-26), in his 19th National Congress Report, argues that there will be “a fundamental improvement in the environment; the goal of building a Beautiful China is basically attained.” Here, ecological civilisation is the ideal of betterment that will make the PRC beautiful and will be basically attained by 2035. Xi (2017e:26) furthers this by then stating by the second stage, 2049, the PRC will be “a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful” where “[n]ew heights are reached in every dimension of material, political, cultural and ethical, social, and ecological advancement.” It is clear in these excerpts that ideals of beautiful and ecological advancement have been added to the end of set phrases to update and extend Socialism with Chinese characteristics, rejuvenation and *Xiaokang* to speak to the current trials and tribulations of environmental degradation.

These extensions (which can also be understood as examples of Death and Resurrection events and will be discussed from page 207 onwards) bring the CPC’s ideals in line with current trends of needing improved environmental governance and outline the heroic revelation of the CPC to take the PRC towards this understanding of

betterment. Moreover, Xi Jinping explicitly states that this real place of betterment will be gradually reached over the next three decades, thus quelling concern over the CPC's ability to lead and address the contemporary concerns of the Chinese people.

Zhou Shengxian's clarifications and expansions of Hu Jintao's and Xi Jinping's speeches provide the most in-depth understandings of ecological civilisation as an extension of rejuvenation and *Xiaokang*. Zhou (2014c:1), in his *Open up a New Situation for Demonstration Zone of Building Ecological Civilization under the Guidance of Important Instructions of Central Leaders* speech, stipulated: "As General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that to move towards a new era with ecological progress and build a beautiful China is an important part to realize the Dream of China with great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [sic]." Thus, Zhou identifies ecological civilisation as a new part of rejuvenation: taking the PRC towards a new era, the place of betterment.

In his 2014 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection speech, Zhou (2014a:1) similarly highlights how "[u]shering in a new era of ecological progress and building a beautiful China are both the important manifestations of our Party's improved governing capacity and crucial parts of achieving the Dream of China for a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. To promote ecological progress, it is necessary to establish ecological awareness, develop ecological economy, maintain eco-safety, optimize eco-environment and improve the ecological civilization system [sic]." Zhou confirms that ecological civilisation is not only an extension, but is an improvement of the CPC's governing capacity; ecological civilisation represents a new revelation, or "improved governing capacity", on the PRC's long journey towards betterment. Zhou suggests that the CPC expect to lead the PRC towards betterment, by developing the economy, safety measures, environmental conditions and Party systems, in an ecological way. These measures further the narrative of heroic, or correct leadership, by the CPC of the PRC on a journey to ecological betterment.

Obstacles on the Journey to Ecological Betterment

Zhou Shengxian describes ecological civilisation as crucial for rejuvenation to be met; ecological civilisation is keeping rejuvenation up with the times and modern trends.

In Zhou's speeches he often takes the set phrase of either Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping and expounds them with a sentence of instruction on how to achieve it, or how it is already being achieved by the CPC; predominantly embedded with glory emotion words, phrases and metaphors. Ecological civilisation is discursively created as an improvement; it demonstrates the CPC's continuous talent of improving the PRC and striving for something better. However, this very idea of ecological civilisation being an extension to betterment highlights areas for concern, creating insecurities over the CPC's ability to ever deliver national rejuvenation. Both *Xiaokang* and rejuvenation, in their pre-ecological civilisation extension, are repeatedly discussed as ideal states and symbolic places in a way that rallies the PRC to work hard to get there. However, they are always somewhere off in the distance: 2035, 2049. As soon as the CPC meets one target of rejuvenation or *Xiaokang*, the concepts are extended and require further work (Callahan, 2012).

The addition of ecological civilisation begs the question therefore of whether the PRC will ever reach their destination of betterment, whether ecological civilisation will ever come to be, or whether another diversion will be added in due course forever evolving and extending betterment: perhaps ecological civilisation will come to exist merely as rhetoric after all (Bandurski, 2017; Economy, 2017; Geall and Hilton, 2014; Hilton, 2017; LaForgia, 2017; and Su, et al., 2013). In some respects the following extract from Xi Jinping (2017f:7), at the APEC CEO Summit, offers his own thoughts on this dilemma:

China's development is an evolving historical process. Last month, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was successfully convened in Beijing. Responding to our people's desire for a better life, the Congress formulated a guide to action and a development blueprint for China in the new era. It is envisaged that by 2020, China will turn itself into a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and by 2035, China will basically realize socialist modernization. By the middle of this century, China will become a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally-advanced, harmonious and beautiful. Under the leadership of

the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people will embark on a new journey [sic].

Xi refers to ecological civilisation as a response to the people's desire for a better life. As the PRC progresses towards betterment, the people demand yet better lives. The people currently demand better, safer, cleaner, greener environments (Lu and Chan, 2016). This also demonstrates the tendency for the CPC to have new "revelations" or to embark on a new journey to an alternative destination, in order to keep with the times.

The CPC's journey to betterment is said to deliver: prosperity, strength, democracy, advanced culture, harmony and beauty. Although the CPC's focus on economic development can be argued to have helped create prosperity, especially along the Eastern coastlines of the PRC, this prosperity is far from universal throughout the PRC. Reports increasingly show that environmentally damaging industries have been domestically exported away from the wealthy Eastern Coastal cities to the western and central Provinces, creating disparities not only in wealth, but in the levels of pollution experienced (Zhang, Liu, Feng, Hubacek, Wang, Liu, Jiang, Jiang, Liu, Zhang, Zhou and Bi, 2018). With regards to strength, it can be argued that the PRC has certainly developed beyond the "Sick Man of Asia" that was a result of the Century of Humiliation (Wang, 2014). However, the extent to which the PRC are becoming democratic, culturally-advanced, harmonious or beautiful is much more open to debate. The outrage across international media regarding the emergence of internment camps for Muslims in Xinjiang province began en-masse in 2017 (Sudworth, 2018), raising questions over the CPC's definition of harmony (Finley, 2019). The attention given to the emergence of "Ghost-cities", leaving scars across the PRC's landscape, question how beautiful the PRC's future development really is (Sorace and Hurst, 2015; Woodworth and Wallace, 2017; and Yu, 2014). The CPC's use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric tries to divert attention away from these struggles in describing and justifying the CPC's approach to, and understanding of, betterment, thus continuing to depict them as correct and heroic leaders.

Xi's (2017f) APEC statement continues to place the CPC as leaders guiding the PRC on this journey to a simultaneously codified, and therefore questionably attainable, destination of betterment. However, it is also explicit in describing the PRC's

development as an evolving historical process. Evolution is a constant process: there will be no end to the PRC's development. Zhou Shengxian (2014c:17), at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, also claimed: "There is no end for development, and neither is [there for] the building of ecological civilization [sic]." Whereas this can be positively framed to demonstrate how the CPC, as the heroes, will continuously fight for a better future for the PRC, it also carries the message that there is no certainty in the ideals of ecological civilisation ever being reached.

Despite these obvious flaws in the CPC's rhetoric that question the pragmatism in ecological civilisation, or the CPC's track record and ability to enact their vision of betterment, the reassurances in Zhou Shengxian's rhetoric that ecological civilisation is a realistic objective are still there: ecological civilisation is still currently depicted within the rhetoric as a place that the PRC will reach, perhaps in 2035, or 2049. Wu Xiaoqing (2013:8), the MEP's Vice Minister, in his speech *Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection System*, argued: "[t]he 18th National Congress of the CPC highlighted the construction of ecological civilization, making it part of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and imposed concrete, comprehensive, higher requirements on environmental protection [sic]." The mythologising of ecological civilisation, by the CPC's use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, contends that there are clear guidelines on how to become and reach ecological civilisation and that it does not exist merely as rhetoric. The PRC intend on becoming an ecological civilisation, regardless of diversions, length of time required, or the next ideal for betterment in the CPC's on-going quest to reach rejuvenation.

Summary of the CPC's Hero Journey to Betterment

To the CPC, ecological civilisation is a realistic objective, something and somewhere to be achieved (and will be achieved if the heroes of the CPC are supported as discussed in chapter 3). Galtung (2001) argues that the emotions found in the CMT-Complex build political narratives that inspire political mobilisation. Whereas, Campbell (2008) argues that a myth provides a notion of betterment, with instruction on how to get

to there, erasing the anxieties of the struggles faced. The thematic EDA identified and contextualised these repeating elements of mythology thus demonstrating how the CPC mythologise ecological civilisation through rhetoric, which depicts the CPC as heroic and worthy leaders, complete with revelations for a future of betterment. Their revelation is to become an ecological civilisation, which exists in the rhetoric as a symbolic, ideal and real place and speaks to contemporary environmental struggles faced across the PRC. The CPC also provide instruction on how to get there, such as through innovation and technological advancement. Thus the CPC try to erase anxieties, all in the hope that one day the PRC will reach this desired place of betterment. The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric is designed to create confidence, through reflecting the people's current needs, in their intentions of leading via environmental governance. Having identified and contextualised the CPC's mythologising of their heroic leadership and the revelations of the place of betterment the remainder of this chapter will now consider how emotions of glory and trauma are used to bolster the CPC as heroes on their journey towards betterment.

Glorifying the CPC's Leadership

Glorified actions are integral within mythology (Campbell, 2008); they are also integral to the ecological civilisation rhetoric. A majority of the glorified rhetoric supports the notion of the CPC as leading heroic endeavours; each glorification represents success on their hero journey. The glories can be seen within the mythologising process as justifications for the CPC's leadership and their "heroic revelations" and actions; intended as proof of the CPC being correct. With each glorification of their ecological civilisation the CPC aim to diminish the opportunity for insecurities to arise in their approach to, and understanding of, environmental governance. The CPC can be understood as using emotion to cement their claim of power via environmental governance.

Zhou Shengxian is, unsurprisingly, responsible for the greatest number of glorifications within his speeches; as the inaugural minister of the MEP this was somewhat expected. In Zhou's (2010b:13) 2010 National Conference on Environmental

Protection speech, he argued, “[a]ny achievement in environmental protection constitutes positive contributions to the development of ecological civilization [sic].” However, this is not strictly true; to argue that any achievement constitutes “positive contributions” is again a glorification over-exaggerating the progress made towards ecological civilisation and demonstrates how the rhetoric as a whole is positively framed. Although it would perhaps be unfair to criticise Zhou for his enthusiasm towards furthering environmental protection, ultimately if achievements were hard-won or lacklustre in outcome, then considering what more needs to be done or what can be learned to ensure furthering contributions is better than labelling all actions as positive contributions. For example, Zhou Shengxian discusses how a number of successful policies have been enacted, such as tree planting as part of reforestation plans, as positive contributions. However, the scientific community questions these policies as creating dangerous monocultures displacing natural forests (Hua, Wang, Fisher, Zheng, Wang, Yu, Zhu and Wilcove, 2018).

In Zhou’s (2011a:1) 2011 New Year Address, he can be seen to list a number of achievements in environmental protection work, where each achievement is followed by a positive, such as, “promoted”, “ensured”, “strengthened” or “breakthrough”:

The task of emission reduction has been finished ahead of schedule, prevention and control of pollution of key river basins has been further promoted; safety of drinking water has been ensured; rural environmental protection and ecological conservation have been strengthened; more efforts in supervision on environmental law enforcement have been made; nuclear and radiation safety is basically under control, environmental management system & institution and policy measures have been under continuous innovation; environmental quality has enjoyed steady improvement and environmental protection work has achieved breakthrough [sic].

Zhou’s list creates an idea of the CPC being in control on their journey towards betterment. However, again, each achievement can be found in scholarly debate regarding to what extent the CPC are doing enough, questioning the success and

implementation of their environmental governance (see Hua, et al., 2018 for reforestation; Wang, Li and Liu, 2018 regarding the water-energy-emission nexus; Economy, 2017; and Myllyvirta; and Shen, 2018 regarding the use of coal; and Narberhaus and von Mitschke-Collande, 2017; and Stanislaus, 2018 for circular economy). Zhou Shengxian's rhetoric clearly attempts to glorify the CPC's ecological civilisation, reiterating the notion of the CPC as leaders, or heroes, correctly taking the PRC on a journey of ecological betterment.

Of importance, however, is how glory emotion throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric is not solely focused on the CPC's environmental governance leadership domestically within the borders of the PRC. Zhou Shengxian and Xi Jinping, both stress within their speeches the importance of the CPC as prime contributors to international environmental governance. Zhou Shengxian (2011b:10), in his 2011 speech at the National Conference on Environmental Protection, stated how the CPC have made "[r]emarkable achievements in international environmental cooperation", whereas Xi Jinping's (2017e:5) 19th National Congress Report, claimed how the CPC, in "[t]aking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization [sic]." The glorification goes beyond the idea of the PRC taking a driving seat, to expound the notion that ecological civilisation, a Chinese approach to Chinese challenges, is globally accepted and pursued. Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian both glorify the CPC's ecological civilisation approach, and depict the CPC and PRC as global leaders in environmental governance, expanding the CPC's claim to power within the international field; with regards to Xi Jinping's rhetoric, this is somewhat expected in the wake of President Donald Trump announcing his intended withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Economy, 2018; Geall and Ely, 2018; and Trump, 2017).

Glorification is also present when Xi Jinping (2017b:10), in his *Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind* speech at the United Nations Office in 2017, presented that the PRC had "gained endorsement from the International Union for Conservation of Nature for over a dozen applications for world natural heritage sites as well as world cultural and natural heritage sites. All this has presented Chinese splendor to the world [sic]." Xi Jinping chooses to explain this achievement, not as a much-needed step towards further global environmental protection, but as evidence of

showcasing Chinese splendour. A statement on showing the best of the PRC to the world, reiterating Chinese splendour, was chosen over details on the PRC's actions towards these successful examples of conservation.

Wu Xiaoqing (2009:1), Vice Minister of the MEP, in his *Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development* speech, also glorifies the CPC, in stating that:

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to environmental protection work. It takes environmental protection as one of basic national policies and sustainable development as a national strategy. The Chinese Government has taken a series of measures to make more efforts in preventing & controlling pollution and environmental protection with active achievements. In particular under the background of international financial crisis, China has taken the important measures for "enhancement of the development of ecological environment" as an important measure for expanding domestic need and maintain steady & fast economic growth and taken vigorous development of circular economy as an important means for energy saving and emission reduction in the new era [sic].

Again, it is a little farfetched to say the CPC have *always* taken environmental protection seriously: this is a glorification of the CPC's prior approaches to environmental governance, as discussed in Chapters 1, 3 and 4. Vice Minister Wu Xiaoqing lists the CPC's actions, such as the development of circular economy, as a glorified proof of achievement on the journey towards ecological civilisation. However, when considering how the principal contradiction – "the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people versus backward social production" – a maxim that had stood for thirty-six years until 2017, had always placed economic growth as the priority, regardless of environmental conditions (Xinhua, 2017:1). This demonstrates clearly how the CPC have certainly *not* always taken environmental protection seriously.

If the CPC had always taken environmental protection seriously, then it raises the question of why the CPC are now proclaiming the necessity of ecological civilisation as a

new approach. A contradiction arises through the use of glory emotion: Vice Minister Wu glorifies the CPC as a government that has always attached great importance to ecological civilisation, whereas Zhou Shengxian glorifies ecological civilisation as a uniquely new revelation of the CPC. Ecological civilisation naturally highlights the shortcomings of the CPC's prior approaches to environmental protection. Zhou Shengxian, when talking about Hu's 18th National Congress Report, highlights the importance of how, for the first time, an entire chapter was devoted to environmental protection; it was within this chapter that ecological civilisation was first introduced by Hu.

Although the CPC has never completely ignored environmental protection it is certainly a glorification to argue that the CPC have *always* taken environmental protection seriously. The CPC appear to at least be attempting to do so now, but as the interpretations within this thesis highlight, that is not necessarily with ecological soundness in mind. Whereas ecological civilisation does arguably represent a realistic objective with a clear roadmap to reach this real destination, simultaneously, the rhetoric not only speaks to national identity creation (as seen in chapter 4), but also mythologises the CPC as heroic leaders, with a revelation for betterment. The rhetoric is creating not only a new take on national identity, but also a power dynamic, attempting to build trust in, and support for, the CPC as leaders through environmental governance.

The CPC are using glory emotion to address potential insecurities with the CPC's leadership and their approach to environmental governance. Two traits characteristic of mythology will now be discussed to further exemplify the use of glory emotion to positively frame CPC leadership: death and resurrection and blame.

Death and Resurrection: The CPC's Constant Pursuit of Revelations for Betterment

With regards to hero mythology, "death" symbolises the ultimate sacrifice of the hero in their efforts to provide betterment; "resurrection" symbolises a new ability and hope to reach betterment (Campbell, 2008). The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric has extensive examples of "death and resurrection" (one of which was briefly mentioned as such on page 198). With each successor to the CPC's General Secretary position

comes a symbolic death and resurrection. The old approaches of the predecessor give way to the revelations of new approaches of the successor: the symbolic “death” of Hu Jintao’s leadership, the sacrifices made during his premiership, are followed by a “resurrection”, the coming of Xi Jinping, with his revelations. With the ecological civilisation rhetoric there is no literal death or resurrection, merely the notion of old giving way to new. With each symbolic resurrection, there is a revelation, and the glorification of this new understanding and approach. However, the “death” of the old is never dismissed as too little, not good enough or wrong; the old is glorified too. The whole death and resurrection process is glorified, placing emphasis on the dedication devoted by the CPC: the correct and core leaders of the PRC.

Two of the most frequently reoccurring examples of death and resurrection in the ecological civilisation rhetoric include: the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative and the chronological lists of the CPC’s theoretical approaches over the past seven decades. Rejuvenation represents the resurrection of the PRC following the death events of humiliation. Each new political theory, approach and slogan of a new successor to CPC leadership represents the resurrection of the Party following the death event of moving forwards from the predecessor’s old ideas: the Environmental Protection National Policy gave way to the Sustainable Development Strategy, which in turn gave way to Scientific Development, finally bringing us to the most recent resurrection, the revelation of Ecological Civilisation. Each death and resurrection becomes a landmark on the journey towards betterment; the new direction and instructions are portrayed as being where wisdom has been developed and where experiences were forged to “keep with the times”. Each death represents commitment and sacrifice where the CPC must now continue to complete what it has begun. Ecological civilisation, interpreted through death and resurrection, demonstrates the CPC’s sacrifices for betterment, their wisdom, progress and increased ability to deliver. Ecological civilisation embodies the glory of revelations for reaching rejuvenation.

Thus, having considered above how ecological civilisation represents a symbolic, ideal and real place, keeping with the current modern trends on the heroes’ journey to betterment. Ecological civilisation is also understood as a resurrection, the revelation of how to reach betterment following on from the symbolic death of China after decades of humiliations at the hands of foreign aggressors. Again, ecological civilisation as a hero

journey can be understood as a tangible extension to the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative (see, Wang, 2014); the CPC's heroic endeavours are helping the PRC to regain strength having been the "sick man of Asia", to enter a "new era" of clean, green and beautiful: both are associated with positivity and glory.

Xi Jinping (2018b:9), closing the 13th National People's Congress, said: "As an old Chinese poem goes, "When I glance at the visage of vernal breeze, I know that a thousand flowers of purple and red set spring aglow." After nearly seven decades of hard work under the leadership of the CPC, our people's republic has been growing vigorously, and with an entirely new posture, it now stands tall and firm in the East." Here, Xi devotes an emotion-stirring poem, focused on a beautiful landscape, to the PRC's rejuvenation and reaching of betterment: no longer the "sick man of Asia", the beauty of the natural landscape glorifies this resurrection of the PRC. Rather than a poem about economic prowess through unprecedented economic growth allowing the PRC to stand tall, Xi associates the wellbeing of the PRC with visions of ecological beauty. Despite the choked waterways, smoggy skies and toxic soils that many Chinese experience on a daily basis, Xi depicts a very pleasant, beautiful PRC. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the chosen memories of trauma, associated with the phrase "sick man of Asia", also work to further enhance the glories captured within Xi's phrase of "stands tall and firm in the East."

With regards to the political theorems, listed chronologically, each new political approach symbolises the resurrection of new ideas that have developed following the "death" of or building upon the previous approach. The "death" of a previous theory does not mean the CPC abandon or reject these earlier thoughts, but rather they are able to cherry-pick which elements of the prior theory should be preserved and thus merged with the new theory, now better adapted to current trends and modern times. This glorification process can be seen in the following extract from Zhou Shengxian (2013c:1), in his 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection speech:

The 18th National Congress of the CPC took place at a critical moment when China was to enter a decisive stage of building an all-rounded moderately prosperous society. It held high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, carried forward our cause and

lifted our spirits. A historic decision and contribution of the Congress was that it identified Scientific Outlook on Development, together with Ma[r]xism and Leninism, Mao Zedong Thoughts, Deng Xiaoping Theory and Three Represents, as the guidance the Party must follow for a long time to come, marking one more progress in the Party's guiding principle. An attraction of the Congress was that it put ecological civilization at a strategic position as important as economic, political, cultural and social development and made it one of the five overall arrangements for pursuing the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. A separate chapter was devoted to the topic for the first time, making it one more innovation the Party has made in the concept and practice of governance [sic].

Each symbolic resurrection event, of a new theoretical approach, signifies a resurgence of hope and strength through a reinvigoration in new understanding: each is a new revelation in approach to reach betterment. Zhou's extract continues to place the CPC in a heroic position guiding the PRC to betterment through their innovations on guiding principles. Zhou Shengxian presents ecological civilisation as the latest revelation in the continued process of resurrection during the CPC's progressive leadership.

With each General Secretary there has been the rise of a new political slogan backed by their favoured political theory. With each new approach there is an element of "chest-thumping" (China Daily, 2007; or "breast-beating" Pye, 1967:169) where the theory is to be held high as a metaphorical banner, announcing to the world that there is a new and improved governing theory. As a resurrection, the CPC's latest approach requires a level of glorification to disseminate the necessity of, and the improvements to be found through, the new approach; to rally support behind the latest direction in governance. What can be seen within the ecological civilisation rhetoric is a veneration of certain elements of the old theories, which are then added to and merged with new thoughts. The new theory must be held high, as ultimately it is there to guide the PRC on their journey to betterment.

Blame: “Buck-Passing” Environmental Traumas onto the Developed West

Blame is another key element of the hero journey, and centres on finding a reason or explanation for the struggle a group is facing. Campbell (2008) refers to this as “buck-passing” and provides the example of when the snake was blamed in the Garden of Eden in Christian mythology. For the CPC to justify ecological civilisation, as an important and heroic revelation for bettering their environmental governance, there must be an environmental struggle being faced by the PRC. What is more, to describe themselves as the heroes in this struggle, the struggle is most likely to be outlined as the result of an “Other”. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the CPC use blame as a shared trauma whereby the environmental degradation faced by the PRC has been the product of the mistakes of Western development, through their “denounced” approach of sustainable development, which the CPC had rapidly and blindly followed.

The CPC are “buck-passing” the responsibility for the environmental degradation suffered throughout the PRC onto the developed nations. Pye (1967:72) observed how “[a]ccording to the political mythology that they have sought to build up, the Chinese have invariably suffered unjustly at the hands of all nations”. There are many emotions involved in the CPC’s blaming rhetoric, including: anger, disgust, shame and embarrassment. In the literature, a “victim mentality” is referred to (Callahan, 2015; Gries, 2004; Magnier, 2008; Wang, 2014; and Woo, 2012). However, through this mythologising of ecological civilisation, the CPC incorporate blame into the glorification of their understanding of and approach to environmental governance.

For example, in Zhou Shengxian’s (2009a:1) *Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological Civilization* speech, he argued how: “[p]romoting ecological civilization is a justification for implementing Scientific Outlook on Development, a crucial decision for avoiding the roundabout course of “pollution first, treatment afterwards”, as taken by developed countries, and a necessity of benign development featuring robust economic growth, comfortable life and sound eco environment [sic].” This extract demonstrates a glorification of ecological civilisation as the means to avoid repeating the mistakes of developed nations. The blame for the struggle is passed onto the developed countries; “pollute now, treat later” is buck-passed onto the Developed West and they are blamed

for coining and spreading this approach. Ecological civilisation, as the answer for how to reach betterment, is entirely a result of the CPC's glorious, heroic revelation for improved environmental governance. The CPC draw upon the emotions of hatred and disgust of the developed nations through their "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the cost of the environment" and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment" mentality, which the CPC blame as responsible for creating the PRC's current level of environmental degradation, claimed by Zhou (2011b:18-19) during his *Meet New Requirements of the Theme and Main Line and Open a New Situation of Environmental Protection Work* speech.

The CPC build an argument for pursuing continued development, via ecological civilisation, whilst ignoring their own responsibilities in the destruction of the PRC's environment. This is seen in the following excerpt from Zhou Shengxian (2011d:3) during his *Uplifting Ecological Civilisation* speech to the MEP: "Over the past 30 odd years, some regions of our country... follow the old path of "treatment after pollution" and pay too big environment cost. It is our way out to follow [the] new path to environmental protection that is small in cost, good in benefits, low in emission and sustainable in development based on basic national conditions and centering on the theme of scientific development, main line of shifting economic development mode and new requirement for uplifting ecological civilization [sic]." Zhou labels the approach taken by "some regions" of the PRC as the old path of "treatment after pollution".

Although not directly labelled this way within the extract, in Zhou's speeches, the "old pathway" is that established by the developed nations; hence Zhou goes on to distinguish "our way" as a new path to environmental governance, meaning the way of the CPC. What this does is push the blame of bad environmental practices throughout the PRC onto having followed the approach of developed nations. The CPC are not accepting responsibility for allowing poor environmental practices to take place within the PRC; and in not stating in which regions these poor practices were followed the CPC further remove themselves from any environmental consequences. Once again, the argument for how ecological civilisation is better is glorified as being a Chinese response.

Pye (1967:58) identified that "[i]n so identifying their collective problem the Chinese have translated their difficulties with modernization into a problem of authority

[sic].” In many ways this observation by Pye (1967) highlights why the elements of mythology found within the ecological civilisation rhetoric convey such a powerful message. The political culture in both China and the PRC has been to have one dominant omnipotent authority figure, from Emperors in China’s past to the single Party rule of the PRC’s present. This single authority setup has created an obvious route for tracing the root of any political difficulty back to the single authority figure (Pye, 1967). Currently, this is the CPC and such a collective mentality is somewhat expected in Chinese politics resulting in political slogans and ideologies built to carry answers of an alternative authority figure to blame. Just as in China’s past, the “barbarians” were to be blamed for their inferiority in approach (Callahan, 2012); now it is the “denounced” West with their inferior approach to environmental governance, who have much to gain from the CPC’s leadership sharing the Chinese wisdom of ecological civilisation with the world; reminiscent, again, of *Huaxia* where “foreigners have different minds” (Wu, 2012:3).

Blame is also built into the ecological civilisation rhetoric by playing on the PRC’s status as a “developing nation” as a result of the Century of Humiliation. Hu Jintao, reinforces the CPC’s credibility, not only by “buck-passing” the blame away to excuse the CPC’s own responsibility, but also differentiates the PRC as existing as a “developing nation”. Hu Jintao (2012:14) in his 18th National Congress Report, proclaimed: “China’s international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed. We must bear in mind under any circumstances the paramount reality that China remains in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so and base ourselves on this reality in pursuing all of our endeavors of reform and development [sic].” Not only does this give the CPC leeway on the success of their ecological governance endeavours, but it suggests the CPC ought to be excused for as long as the PRC can be considered to be a developing nation: the rhetoric suggests that CPC can only do so much, so long as the PRC are still developing. The CPC distinguishes the PRC from the developed “Other” as a developing “Us”.

During the 17th National Congress Report, Hu Jintao (2009:1) also argued how: “It is imperative to give full consideration to the development stage and basic needs of developing countries while we address climate change. The international community should pay close attention to the difficulties facing the developing countries, especially

the small island states, the least developed countries, landlocked countries and African countries.” Hu’s approach protects the PRC from harsh and devoted responsibilities, whilst appearing heroic. Hu considers the needs of others, as well as the PRC. Hu discursively takes on the role of a hero who stands-up for the small island states, African countries and those that are least developed.

However, despite the emotional language written into the ecological civilisation speeches on the environmental traumas suffered at the hands of the polluting West, the West is still not seen as the only source of the CPC’s difficulties with modernisation. The attempt to glorify the CPC by blaming the developed nations only carries so far. Indeed, Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of presenting the CPC’s identity, which described the PRC as a forward-thinking, reliable and friendly State, and showed how ideals of harmony and friendship are important within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Pye (1967:58) went on to write that “[i]n looking for the source of their difficulties the Chinese are quick to trace them to the political arena.” Despite Zhou Shengxian’s (2011b:18-19) efforts to place the blame squarely on developed nations, the following excerpt, from the 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, highlights how the failed attempts of past CPC administrations cannot be ignored:

China cannot follow and cannot afford following the old development path of western countries featuring "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the cost of the environment" and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment"... [S]ome provinces or autonomous regions separate environmental protection with economic development; they had narrow vision on environmental protection and pollution control. Their path of environmental protection became narrower and narrower with no big achievements over the past 30 years since 1979. However, if we make overall consideration of environmental protection and economic & social development, the path of environmental protection becomes wider and wider [sic].

Although Zhou begins by placing the blame on the developed nations in the first sentence, he goes on to suggest that some provinces have been “narrow” in their

environmental policy vision, in “following” the denounced approach of the developed nations, they have made no big achievements.

Although not completely negative in accusation, there is an element of inward blame present, an acknowledgement that some provinces chose to follow this erroneous pathway. However, this is comparatively rare across the rhetoric and completely ignorant of the pressures the CPC placed on these provinces through the “opening up and reform” policies (Ying, 2017). Overall, the ecological civilisation rhetoric continues the glorification process of the post-1978 reform narrative, where revolutionary ideologies of “only the CPC can save China” are developed into the pragmatic confidence of “only the CPC can develop China” (Ying, 2017). The social and development situation is again given as the reason for the CPC’s blind following of the denounced western approach, which buck-passes the blame away to account for the CPC not acting otherwise. This reinforces the glorification of the CPC, as the true leaders able to develop the PRC, through their constantly evolving and developing thoughts, which now offers as their latest conceptualisation of betterment, ecological civilisation. Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric suggests that the CPC have worked tirelessly on developing the PRC and have now reached a stage where the latest revelation allows for ecological improvements on their pathway towards betterment.

Having considered some of the ways through which the CPC glorify their approach to, understanding of and actions towards ecological civilisation, the next section will move on to identify the negatives associated with shared traumas within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.

Traumas of Trials and Tribulations Yet to Face

According to Campbell (2008), trials and tribulations lead to a period of enlightenment and recognition by the hero, followed by the hero’s return, to take the group on their enlightened journey to betterment. The hero journey recognises difficulties are collectively shared and that a hero with a revelation for betterment can turn these traumas into glories. However, shared traumas can also become new humiliations, and this gives rise to uncertainties of the heroes’ ability to deliver betterment. The CPC’s

rhetoric highlights environmental trials and tribulations suffered by the PRC, which justify the necessity in their revelation of betterment through delivering ecological civilisation. Their use of traumas highlights their enlightenment and recognition of environmental importance, thus also further justifying their leadership. The use of trauma emotions continues to place the blame of the developed nations, and exacerbates the necessity for the CPC to lead the PRC out of poverty, environmental destruction and a perceived position of inferiority (Gare, 2017; and Huan, 2008).

Throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric the CPC repeatedly refer to three main trials and tribulations: the PRC's developing nation status; the PRC's position in reaching the beginning of becoming a Socialist country with Chinese characteristics; and that the PRC has a natural lack of resources compared to other nations. Below are two extracts, one by Zhou Shengxian, the second by Wu Xiaoqing, which present each trial and tribulation respectfully. Zhou Shengxian (2011i:2), at the Fourth National Working Meeting on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regulation, discussed the predicament of being a developing nation in the early stages of Socialism:

It has always been a difficult issue to correctly deal with the relation between environmental protection and economic development and to balance both. To protect the environment without considerations to economic development is something like climbing a tree to catch a fish, while to pursue economic development without protecting the environment is something like draining a pond to get the fish in it. To only pursue economic development is simple, so is to only protect the environment. The problem is that we need the both. On the one hand, China is a developing country where underdevelopment is still a prominent problem, so the first priority should always be given to development. On the other hand, there is also a transformation problem concerning development in China. The conflicts caused by unbalanced and unsustainable development remain very grave. So we need to protect the environment during the development course and seek development through environmental protection efforts.

Zhou stipulates that the dilemma between pursuing development and understanding what development is most needed, without further environmental degradation, is very complicated. Moreover, Zhou acknowledged that the CPC's negation of this conflict has caused unbalanced and unsustainable development, and will remain grave for quite some time.

Regarding the PRC's natural lack of resources. Wu Xiaoqing (2009:2), in his *Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development* speech, explains how:

China still belongs to a developing country and is at the process of accelerated modernization, industrialization and urbanization, steady and fast economic growth will impose relatively big pressure on resources and environmental protection. In terms of resource endowment, the per capita fresh water resource of China is only one fourth of the world average, per capita arable land less than 40% of the world average, per capita forest one fifth of the world average and per capita of 45 kinds of main mineral resources less than the world average. From environmental status, the surface water pollution across China is still very serious. In 2008, the overall quality of 7 big river systems is under intermediate pollution with prominent eutrophication problems in lakes and reservoirs. The overall urban air quality is good, but air pollution of some cities is still very serious [sic].

In emphasising the trials and tribulations faced by the PRC, the CPC are able to acknowledge suffering, creating a visage of awareness and understanding. The victim mentality, embedded within the humiliations of the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative, is utilised to explain the PRC's environmental suffering. The use of traumas in the ecological civilisation rhetoric, speaks to two further aspects commonly found in hero journey mythology: a sacrifice and a forbidden thing. The experience of shared traumas acts as a way of the CPC directing the people; specifically telling them how they will have to behave and what they will have to (not) do, what to sacrifice and what is forbidden, in order for the CPC to carry out their revelation for betterment.

Sacrifice: Environmental Protection or Economic Growth and the Tenacity of the Chinese People

In Campbell's (2008) description of hero journey mythology, he describes the process of sacrifice. Sacrifice usually takes the form of either the hero sacrificing themselves for the sake of the betterment of the people, or as a sacrifice to be made by the people outlined by the hero in order to reach betterment. For example, in Christian mythology, Jesus sacrificed himself to save the people and the people must repent in order to reach Heaven (Campbell, 2008). Sacrifice is present within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, however, rather than the CPC as the hero being the sacrifice for betterment instead what we see is how the environment itself has been sacrificed through the prioritisation of economic growth. The ecological civilisation rhetoric highlights the sacrifice of the environment as a shared trauma.

This argument is made by Zhou Shengxian (2012c:1) within his *Optimizing the Economic Development through Protection of the Environment* speech: "China has made world renowned achievements in economic and social dimensions since the reform and opening-up, but paid excessive resources and environment costs for them." The environment was sacrificed for the PRC's record-breaking economic growth. However, Zhou (2012c:1) goes on to say:

The development mode that jeopardizes resources and environment has not only brought about all sorts of social conflicts including environmental problems, but also worked against the sustained economic growth. For example, water pollution cuts down the fishery efficiency, and soil salinization, desertification, and loss of soil fertility result in poor harvest. We must awaken to the voluntary protection of the resources and environment, being highly responsible for the survival and development of our future generations. We will definitely not take the old path of developed countries by giving priority to economic development and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will actively explore new path for environmental protection in China which is

characterized by optimizing the economic development through the protection of the environment [sic].

Zhou Shengxian lists the shared traumas, of the trials and tribulations that have manifested through sacrificing the environment for economic development. The blame for these trials and tribulations is still placed on the “old path of developed countries”, as discussed above. Zhou Shengxian defends the CPC and glorifies their actions as they are “highly responsible for the survival and development” of future generations and will find a “new path”. However, Zhou’s excerpt shows the changing attitude that accompanies ecological civilisation as the CPC’s revelation for betterment: environmental governance ought to be prioritised; economic growth will continue, but in a more sustainable way.

The second example of sacrifice within the ecological civilisation rhetoric is the sacrifice that the people must make to reach ecological civilisation. This sacrifice emerges in the frequent use of war metaphors and requires the spirit of ecological civilisation of the Chinese strength, hard work and unity. War metaphors repeat throughout the rhetoric and symbolise the sacrifice of the people in their dedication to the cause and requirement of relentless hard work to follow the CPC’s environmental governance and command (see Table 3 in Chapter 3). For example, Zhou Shengxian (2013c:12), in his National Working Meeting on Environmental Protection speech, stated: “We are also soberly aware that China’s environment is still in serious conditions. We should have not only the sense of urgency to fight a tenacious battle, but also the full mental preparation for a protracted war.” The sacrifice expected is the hard work and willingness of the people of the PRC to follow the CPC’s orders to find an alternative means of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. The use of a war metaphor carries the serious nature of the extent of environmental damage and represents not only the length of time required to find an alternative pathway to development, but implies the citizens of the PRC will be conscripted to fight to bring about this change.

Xi Jinping (2017e:50), during the 19th National Congress, calls for commitment from the people when he contends: “What we are doing today to build an ecological civilization will benefit generations to come. We should have a strong commitment to socialist ecological civilization and work to develop a new model of modernization with

humans developing in harmony with nature. We must do our generation's share to protect the environment [sic]." As did Hu Jintao (2012:12) before Xi, during the 18th National Congress, where he claimed: "Developing socialism with Chinese characteristics is a long-term arduous task of historic importance, and we must be prepared to carry out a great struggle with many new historical features. We must unswervingly adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics, develop it as required by the times, constantly enrich it in both practice and theory and enhance its distinctive national features in keeping up with the times." The Chinese people are told to expect a struggle, to offer strong commitment and to fight, they themselves are the sacrifice needed to reach ecological civilisation and to make the CPC's vision of betterment a reality.

The emotion term "arduous" captures these shared traumas of the struggle and hard work, the sacrifice the people must make, in order for the PRC to reach ecological civilisation. Zhou Shengxian's (2011b:15) 2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection speech, claimed: "our task is very onerous". The tone is negative; a change from the many glorifications found within the rhetoric when referring to the work done by the CPC; however this trauma emotion again works to enhance the glory of the leadership of the CPC to deliver this arduous and onerous betterment. When referring to the future work that will have to be done by the people there is no glamour or glory: the seriousness of the challenge to be faced is not abated. The spirit of ecological civilisation is built not only from Chinese wisdom and experience, but also from their hard work, "working tirelessly" and being "indomitable" (Hu, 2007:6 and 2011b:7).

Xi Jinping (2018b:3-4), in his closing speech at the 13th National People's Congress, argued: "With the spirit of fighting the enemy to the last minute, the resolve of recovering the lost on the basis of self-reliance, and the ability of rising up among the community of nations, the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 170 years to fulfil the great dreams." The trauma of sacrifice is furthered with the reminder of the humiliations suffered throughout the Century of Humiliation thus rendering the hard work necessary and just. The Chinese have for too long been the victim, their hard work is now bringing them their rejuvenation and place of betterment: ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation is a protracted war, not only against pollution, but also part of the PRC's rejuvenation from humiliation(s). The identity

constructed by the CPC and carried through their rhetoric captured by the term spirit, is needed to bring the Chinese together, with their wisdom and culture, to face the future traumas before reaching the place of betterment and future glories.

Xi Jinping (2018a:2), in his New Year Speech, emphasised this sacrifice of hard work expected by the people, in stating: "2018 marks the beginning of China putting into action the guiding principles of the 19th CPC National Congress, which designed a blueprint for the country's development for the next three decades. "A nine-storey tower begins with a pile of earth." To translate the blueprint into reality, we must neither rush upon fantasy nor be guided by the sound of falsehood. We shall work steadily and in a down-to-earth manner." Imagery created by the pile of earth as the start towards the nine-storey tower suggests how far the PRC has to go and how much the people have to give. No fantasy or falsehood justifies the necessity of hard work to be expected, there is no sugar coating the sacrifice that has to be made by the people to enact the guiding principles and reach ecological civilisation. Xi indicates there is a need to work steadily, but to remain down-to-earth and realistic in their objective for an ecological civilisation. The sacrifice expected to be made by everyone of the PRC is a new shared trauma, a new series of trials and tribulations to be faced before the glory of the CPC's rejuvenation through betterment, ecological civilisation, can be reached.

A Forbidden Thing or Action: Climbing a Tree or Draining the Pond to Catch a Fish

Another common feature within the hero journey, present within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, is the notion of something forbidden. A well-known example from Christian myth is how the apple from the tree of knowledge was forbidden (Campbell, 2008). Within the CPC's early ecological civilisation speeches the forbidden action was to allow economic growth to slow down. On numerous occasions the CPC repeat that in order to become a socialist country, to be moderately prosperous in all respects and to reach rejuvenation, that economic growth must continue as the top priority. Hu Jintao's (2011b:14), speech at the meeting commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, stated: "In the past 30 plus years of reform and opening up, we have

pursued economic development as the top priority and developed the productive forces at an unprecedented speed.”

Similarly, Zhou Shengxian’s (2010b:18) *Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection* speech, stated: “In the primary stage of socialism, it is impossible to stop the development of economy for the sake of the environment. However, this stage will definitely not tolerate pollution. Economic development has to proceed along with resource conservation and environmental protection.” The CPC are arguing that the PRC cannot have a safe and sound environment until a certain level of economic prowess is achieved. This justifies previous CPC policies, which harmed the environment, because economic growth must come first for a developing nation. Again, in his *Optimizing the Economic Development through Protection of the Environment* speech, Zhou (2012c:2) claimed, “China is and will be in the preliminary stage of socialism for a long period of time to come, and development is the skeleton key to all sorts of questions, so we can never afford to address environmental problems by putting a stop to economic development.”

Thus the CPC can be seen to argue that the PRC need economic growth more than the clean and beautiful environment of ecological civilisation. These arguments were considered in the Literature Review where scholars such as Gare (2017), Huan (2008) and Wu Shaoxia (cited in Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzhieva, 2016) argued a certain level of development must first be reached before progression towards an ecological civilisation can be achieved. In making economic decline the forbidden thing the CPC protect themselves from insecurities regarding their approach to environmental governance; economic growth “in this stage” had to be the priority.

Zhou Shengxian tries to deal with this contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection in a number of speeches. At the Meeting in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of China National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:2) prioritises economic growth, thus placing ecological civilisation second:

Environmental problems are in nature problems concerning the economic structure, production mode, consumption mode, and development path. Correct economic policies lead to correct

environmental policies and vice versa. To discuss environmental protection without economic development is as much as climbing a tree to catch a fish, and to discuss economic development without environmental protection is as much as draining the pond to get the fish in it. China is and will be in the preliminary stage of socialism in the long run. To protect the environment during this stage is the hardest when most complicated problems will be met. We will by no means protect the environment by suspending development during this stage and will neither allow pollution. Development is the first priority while environment is an important support.

Economic growth stopping, as the forbidden thing, highlights how ecological civilisation is perhaps, as some have argued, more likely just a symbol of betterment, merely rhetoric. Not the change in direction of supporting policies and action for environmental governance professed in much of the glorified rhetoric already discussed. The CPC's revelation here is simply that economic growth, and therefore development, cannot continue if the environment is in disarray. Zhou Shengxian (2010b:15), at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, said, "[t]he concept of historic transformation of environmental protection ushered us to a new stage in which environmental protection will optimize economic growth [sic]."

The CPC have struggled in their governance of the environment given their preoccupation with economic growth (Huan, 2008). Zhou (2011h:4) at the 2011 AGM of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, stated, "To correctly deal with the relationship between environmental protection and economic development is always a hard nut to crack in the construction process of socialistic modernization in China. These two factors are mutually restrictive and supportive. To protect environment without economic development looks like to fish in the air, to develop economy without environmental protection looks like to drain the pond to catch all fish [sic]." His statement clearly explains why economic growth cannot continue without environmental protection; there will be no fish left. Whereas his statement on why environmental protection cannot go ahead without economic growth makes less sense; it suggests that this is something that is not possible and senseless in

trying. As an analogy it does not make sense; as long as the CPC continue to present economic decline, as the forbidden thing, ecological civilisation is clearly never to be.

However, with the change in leadership direction as Xi Jinping took over as General Secretary, there has been a change in the forbidden thing found within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Culminating in the change to the principal contradiction by Xi in October 2017, to, “What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”, this reduced emphasis on economic growth has been echoed within Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric since Xi took over as Chairman in 2012 (Xinhua, 2017). For example, at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, Zhou (2014c:2) explained: “General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that never should we sacrifice the environment for temporary economic growth.” The change in rhetoric is clear to see, although economic growth is not entirely forbidden, Zhou is now arguing against prioritising and praising economic growth: Zhou goes on to state “[n]o longer should we praise any places simply by GDP growth.” Zhou Shengxian began to argue more in favour of the environmental protection and the ecological modernisation expected from an Environment Minister.

Environmental protection cannot be a support for economic growth; they have to be mutually supportive. In changing the principal contradiction, Xi began to change the priorities and potential of what can be achieved through ecological civilisation. Xi Jinping (2017e:11), during the 19th National Congress, said:

We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society represents a historic shift that affects the whole landscape and that creates many new demands for the work of the Party and the country. Building on continued efforts to sustain development, we must devote great energy to addressing development’s imbalances and inadequacies, and push hard to improve the quality and effect of development. With this, we will be better placed to meet the ever-growing economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological needs of our people, and to promote well-rounded human development and all-round social progress.

Xi's decision to update the principal contradiction represented another crucial revelation made by the hero. Xi's revelation to change the principal contradiction has started to give ecological civilisation the chance to become reality by diminishing the level of priority placed on economic growth. Arguably, updating the principal contradiction represents the most important revelation any Leader has had in creating a pathway for the PRC's betterment through ecological civilisation. Economic growth was preventing environmental protection and ecological modernisation. The new principal contradiction provides more support to the notion of becoming an ecological civilisation; no longer must economic growth be the priority above all else. However, these new demands will require relentless war-like effort from the Chinese people in following their commander, their hero, Xi Jinping. Despite this update being one of the most important and powerful 'revelations' had by the CPC to date, this alone will not help materialise their concept of an ecological civilisation.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the emotions contextualised through the ecological civilisation rhetoric glorifies the CPC as heroic leaders. Interpreting the use of emotion by the CPC within their ecological civilisation rhetoric has shown how the latest concept for environmental governance is the latest edition to CPC's journey towards *Xiaokang*, rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese characteristics. The use of emotion highlights how ecological civilisation is discursively created as a place of betterment, which is symbolic, ideal and real. Reaching this place is the fulfilment of the heroes' journey and will bring the PRC one step closer to national rejuvenation. In mythologising ecological civilisation the CPC uses glory emotion to positively frame each new direction in their environmental governance as a resurrection: a revelation in good governance on how to take the PRC towards betterment. Glories also helped in "buck-passing" the blame of the PRC's environmental sufferings onto the denounced approach of the West. This renders the CPC's ecological civilisation as a heroic revelation to right the wrongs of the developed nations.

Interpreting the use of emotion through this perspective of mythology also highlighted how the CPC incorporated traumas into the ecological civilisation rhetoric; traumas were used to emphasise the sacrifices needed by the Chinese people to help the CPC to fight the protracted war against pollution and move towards ecological betterment. This furthered the CPC's suggestion of the PRC having been victims of the pollution and bad environmental governance of the developed West. Traumas were also used to highlight a change in the forbidden thing typically found within a hero journey; Xi's change to the principal contradiction sees a transformation away from solely prioritising economic growth. Xi's heroic and strong leadership and his revelation of updating the principal contradiction has given more support and strength to their concept of an ecological civilisation, placing the concept, more than ever, as able to exist as a real future of environmental governance.

This chapter also began to highlight how the CPC have intentions of environmental governance beyond the remit of the PRC; their thought-leadership on how ecological civilisation can produce ecological betterment, as a product of Chinese wisdom and culture, is a gift to be shared with mankind; a product of their heroic leadership. The next chapter will provide a third interpretation and considers the global implications of ecological civilisation.

Chapter 6: Responsibility and Ecological Civilisation: An Evolution in the PRC's Global Status

This chapter explores how the CPC's use of emotion in the ecological civilisation rhetoric discursively constructs status with responding levels of responsibility (*Zeren*, 责任) concerning environmental governance, both domestically and internationally. Responsibility, as a political concept, will broadly be discussed as concerning power, status and leadership. Chapter 3 noted how the CPC uses emotion to create and support status differentiations that suit the CPC's perceived realities and imagined futures of the PRC's position on the world stage. In particular were the two statuses "developing nation" and "big responsible country" (sometimes also given as: "responsible major country", "responsible major power" and "responsible great power" (Yeophantong, 2013)). This chapter explores how the CPC are pursuing different levels of status for the PRC in order to command their proposed levels of appropriate responsibility. Also demonstrated is how these differences allow for consistency within the PRC's actions, highlighting the flexibility written into ecological civilisation; in order to continue domestic development, which is in line with earlier discussions regarding the transitioning from a growing economy into a growth economy (Huan, 2008).

Traditional roots of responsibility in China will be considered first, before demonstrating how such thoughts are present within the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric. The chapter then moves on to explore the duality between the statuses of developing nation and big responsible nation and considers why and how these two statuses appear throughout the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric and what this means regarding the CPC's interpretation of responsible global (environmental) governance.

The construction of preferred status is not unique to the ecological civilisation rhetoric. IR literature discusses how in the same way that an individual may be concerned with impression management, a State may also wish to manage their reputation and image (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Jervis, 2017; and Wang, 2006). Wang (2006) argues the perceived reputation of a State may impact their working relationships and the political processes and outcomes. Ding (2011) has suggested that the CPC's status creation is a means of impression management for the global arena via the

perceived expectations they create through the responsibilities they profess. The CPC, throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric and their broader political discourse, claim many statuses for the PRC, including: “peace-loving country, victim of foreign aggression, socialist country, bastion of revolution, anti-hegemonic force, developing country, major power, international cooperator, and autonomous actor” (Wang, 2003:52). However, this chapter predominantly focuses on the duality between that of “developing nation” versus “big responsible country” as they were the two most frequently reoccurring statuses within the data.

Yeophantong’s (2013) detailed work on status and responsibility discusses how responsibility impacts, and is impacted by, Chinese statecraft. Yeophantong (2013) demonstrates how responsibility has influenced Chinese political thought throughout history, and argues that the CPC’s understanding of their responsibility provides significant insights into the CPC’s evolving engagement within global governance today. Yet, within the ecological civilisation literature there has been little discussion on how the CPC’s perceived responsibilities and status impacts their environmental governance. Yeophantong (2013) argued that how the CPC perceives their global responsibility has begun to change. The CPC no longer avert global responsibility; the CPC is increasingly announcing their intentions to shoulder more responsibility and manage world affairs, as would be expected with the status of a big responsible country (Ahearne, 2013; and Gare, 2017). This sits alongside earlier arguments explored by Huan (2008) of the transitioning from a growing economy to a growth economy and how this is important for the concept of an ecological civilisation (Gare, 2014).

This chapter demonstrates how the debate on the status of “developing nation” versus “big responsible power” – and the ascribed responsibilities implied – is central to the ecological civilisation rhetoric and understanding the CPC’s intended environmental governance. Contrary to mainstream portrayals within IR literature whereby a certain GDP, for instance, attaches obligatory global duties (see Bull, 2002; Wight, 1949; Zimmern, 1939; Zoellick, 2005), the CPC are instead taking control and constructing their own identity, leadership and status as a(n environmentally) responsible country through their ecological civilisation concept. Thus, the CPC are favouring discourse power (*Huayuquan*, 话语权) as a means of carrying their diplomatic ambitions and pathways, to disseminate and propagate an increased Chinese influence globally,

through soft power strategy, and specifically through the non-traditional security threat of environmental governance as they insert the PRC into a position for potential global leadership (Al-Rodhan, 2007; Bandurski, 2015; Blanchard and Lu, 2012; Breslin, 2010; Cao, 2014; Chen, 2009; Cunningham, 2012; Deng, 2008 and 2009; Ding, 2006, 2008 and 2011; Edney, 2012; Geall and Ely, 2018; Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2007; Li, 2009; Pang, 2009; Suzuki, 2009; and Zhao, 2009).

The CPC uses emotion to control the knowledge production over whether the PRC is ready to take on the mantle of a big responsible country, what it means for the PRC to be a big responsible country and therefore what they should do as a big responsible country through their environmental governance. Rather than simply accepting or objecting to any externally imposed duties, the CPC is increasingly stepping up and taking control of how they wish to be perceived, as a global actor in environmental governance, and their ecological civilisation rhetoric frames the future they intend to create, spaces they intend to fill and how they intend to do this. Accordingly, the ecological civilisation rhetoric discursively presents the CPC's self-positioning, which interplays with the identity-power-status nexus the CPC construct.

Thus an interpretation of ecological civilisation that allows us to better understand the CPC's positioning of the PRC's status and corresponding responsibilities is important for IR. This interpretation does not make normative claims on whether the CPC are fulfilling their proclaimed responsibilities or whether they are the most appropriate responsibilities for the CPC to uphold; in most cases it is unclear whether the claims made will be upheld and result in action (Geall and Ely, 2018). However, the chapter presents and discusses the CPC's own framings of their status and perceived responsibilities to offer this third interpretation of their ecological civilisation concept, to further ascertain what imagined futures and spaces the CPC are currently discursively creating.

Responsibility and Chinese Governance

Economy (2017), Hilton (2017) and Vanderklippe (2017), have argued that the PRC is only becoming a "responsible power" through external infliction. Pressure from

international actors, such as through the U.S. Embassy's AQI data publications, which has been argued as "reawakening" the PRC's ecological civilisation, supports the argument that the CPC's latest political ecology is a reaction to external expectations. However, Yeophantong (2013) argued instead, that the concept of responsibility and responsible governance has deep roots in Chinese culture, traditions of statecraft and their corresponding visions of the world order; producing a shared collective understanding, or chosenness, of responsibility.

The PRC is both a subject in and an agent of global governance; although the PRC is subject to a number of global governance agendas advanced by other actors, the CPC can also be seen as actively pursuing their own style of responsible governance. For instance, the UN entreats the PRC to increasingly engage with the responsibilities of peacekeeping missions and follow their protocol on human rights. In 2005, Robert Zoellick (2005:1) gave a speech imploring the PRC to become a "responsible stakeholder", similarly the U.S.'s 2010 National Security Strategy Report emphasised how the PRC should follow "responsible leadership", driven by President Obama's calls for the PRC to be more proactive in international affairs (Yeophantong, 2013). Simultaneously, however, the CPC were pushing for the International Monetary Fund to distribute voting rights amongst emerging States more equally thus redistributing responsibility amongst developing and developed nations (Yeophantong, 2013). The PRC is both a subject in and an agent of global governance.

The CPC are placing high expectations for improved global governance via the responsibilities and status they claim for the PRC. In 1997 Jiang Zemin began to reintroduce the language of responsibility back into Chinese political discourse: during his speech to the Russian State Duma, Jiang described the PRC as a "big responsible country" (*fuzeren de daguo*, 负责任的大国) (cited in Yeophantong, 2013). Jiang stated: "Both being major powers of influence and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia shoulder an important responsibility for safeguarding world peace and stability" (Beijing Review, 1997:11). Yeophantong (2013) argued that strategically, Jiang adopted normative language, as tying the concept of responsibility to a State's level of development enabled the CPC to distance themselves from traditional expectations whilst oratorically becoming involved in global affairs. As a developing nation the CPC could "cherry-pick" when the PRC would act as a bastion of

responsibility or when to take a backseat and demand special consideration; when to be a subject in, or when to be an agent of, global governance.

Yeophantong (2013) further argues that the CPC were distancing the PRC from the China Threat theory popular at the time; identifying as a responsible, albeit limited, country the PRC illustrated commitment to the outstanding international order whilst maintaining an inability to carry out vigorous expectations. Yeophantong (2013) summarised that this development in the CPC's political rhetoric suggested a convergence in both the PRC's domestic and global interests and between Chinese and global values. In recognising how the PRC called for developed nations to apportion greater responsibility for global pollution by taking the initiative to cut carbon emissions and provide greater financial and technological assistance to developing nations in their mitigation efforts further demonstrate the CPC's increased role as an agent of global governance (Chan, 2013; Gao, 2013; Harris, 2011; Honkonen, 2009; Hoo, 2013; Yeophantong, 2013; and Zhang, 2013). Indeed, in 2011, Xie Zhenhua, the Vice Chair of the National Development and Reform Commission, announced that the CPC would not allow for the PRC's CO₂ emissions, per person, to rise to the same levels as in the U.S., going on to assert this would be a "disaster for the world" (Black, 2011:1; Appendix 2).

However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the CPC's concept of a *spirit of ecological civilisation* directly questions the CPC's intentions to converge with current global environmental values. The effectiveness of previous non-Chinese approaches to global environmental governance were claimed to be failed Western approaches; instead, the spirit of Chinese wisdom and culture offers a Chinese alternative in constructing a national identity of superiority and difference. Similarly, Chapter 5 considered how the CPC portray their ecological civilisation as a bastion of heroic CPC-led leadership. Therefore, thus far, this thesis does not support Yeophantong's (2013) arguments for a convergence with global values within the CPC's intended environmental governance.

As the PRC has been transitioning from a growing economy to a growth economy (Huan, 2008), there has been an increasing tendency for the CPC to forge their own identity of domestic and international responsibility with greater scrutiny upon its international decisions and actions. Yeophantong (2013:330) contends there is now an increasing amount of "value-laden imperatives framed in terms of a 'moral duty' or

'special obligation' to the global community" placed upon the PRC amongst the CPC's calls for the PRC to become a big responsible country by taking on a constructive leading role in global governance; seen thus far is how the CPC are drawing upon the strength, progress and unity, of the PRC via their Chinese wisdom and culture.

Yet, responsibility is an amorphous idea, with multiple or competing interpretations (Yeophantong, 2013). Trying to interpret how the CPC are defining responsibility is a subjective process, with variations through changing times, spaces and contexts. Given the frequency of emotion terms identified and contextualised showing patterns in constructing status and responsibility, the concept clearly has an important role to play in understanding the CPC's ecological civilisation concept. The remainder of this section will explore responsibility as developed throughout Chinese history and will be explored with regards to how this has impacted the CPC's worldview and thus ideals of responsible (environmental) statecraft (Yeophantong, 2013).

Responsibility and Responsible Governance within Chinese Classics

Wang Gungwu (2007:65) argued the CPC "have always been keen to use historical analogies in their policy analyses... Chinese practice shows that their "timeless" approach, which sought the most helpful and relevant examples to support their current cause or guide their choice of policy, has been used with care, and often with practiced skill." This includes historical analogies of responsibility. During Xi Jinping's (2017a:8) keynote speech, at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, he said: "A Chinese adage reads, "Victory is ensured when people pool their strength; success is secured when people put their heads together." As long as we keep to the goal of building a community of shared future for mankind and work hand in hand to fulfill our responsibilities and overcome difficulties, we will be able to create a better world and deliver better lives for our peoples [sic]." Here Xi, in referring to a Chinese adage, which stipulates the qualities of unity and wisdom create responsible governance; these were also utilised in the creation of the spirit of ecological civilisation and the mythologised heroic leadership by the CPC. To understand how the

CPC's use of emotion utilises the Chinese conception of responsibility, consulting the socio-historical comprehensions of the concept is essential (Wang, 2007).

The "Five Relationships" and the Ecological Civilisation Rhetoric

Within the Chinese classics, five dominant, or official, sociocultural values form the basis of responsibility, these are: "benevolence" (*ren*, 仁), "righteousness" (*yi*, 义), "propriety" (*li*, 礼), "intelligence" (*zhi*, 智) and "trustfulness" (*xin*, 信); otherwise known as the "Five Relationships" (*Wu chang*, 五常), these form the core principals of Confucianism, still an important element within contemporary Chinese society (Feng, 2016). How each is defined and present within the ecological civilisation rhetoric will now be discussed.

Benevolence was described, within the Chinese classics and translated by Legge (1861:4), as an "overflow in love to all... [to] cultivate the friendship of the good." When applied to statecraft, benevolence represents a concern for not only the fate of the nation, but of the people too. Likewise benevolence requires that other countries and their people be treated equally through the understanding that a country's interests are aligned with the interests of humankind as a whole. Benevolence can be found on numerous occasions throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric. For example, Xi Jinping (2017b:2), in his *Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind* speech at the United Nations Office, stated:

There is only one Earth in the universe and we mankind have only one homeland. Stephen Hawking has raised the proposition about "parallel universe", hoping to find another place in the universe where mankind could live. We do not know when his wish will come true. Until today, Earth is still the only home to mankind, so to care for and cherish it is the only option for us mankind. There is a Latin motto inscribed in the dome of the Federal Palace of Switzerland which says "Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno" (One for all, and all for one). We should not only think about our own generation, but also take responsibility for future ones.

Similarly, Xi Jinping (2017h:2), during his *Working Together to Build a Better Future* keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting, claimed: “The destiny and future of all of us across the world are increasingly intertwined... We must seize the historic opportunity and make the right choice so as to deliver an even brighter future for mankind.” Benevolence can be seen throughout the rhetoric due to the inherent intertwining, or convergence, of our futures; the nature of the global climate challenge requires us to come together, respect one another, work together, to show compassion and to cherish the Earth we live on. Despite the CPC’s efforts to avoid a convergence with global *values* in constructing their own environmental governance concept of ecological civilisation, the CPC do frequently discuss how domestic and international *interests* are converging.

Righteousness is found in the Chinese classics in two ways: first, as helpful and friendly, and second, as impartial and just (Legge, 1861). Mencius stated: “I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose righteousness” (cited in Legge, 1861c:1). Applying this classical thought to the notion of statecraft, righteousness requires officials to help others (friends) despite cost to oneself (Legge, 1861c). Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric Hu Jintao (2007:18), at the 17th National Congress, claimed that the PRC “will be a country whose people are better off and enjoy markedly improved quality of life and a good environment... The country will be still more open and friendly to the outside world and make greater contributions to human civilization [sic].” Xi Jinping (2016a:2), at the 2016 B20 summit, likewise made claims of friendship with the international community by stating that ecological civilisation was “a course of China and the world embracing each other... we have friends all over the world.” Thus we can see how the CPC’s discursive construction of responsible global environmental governance places great emphasis on the idea of friendship and togetherness (Nordin and Smith, 2018).

Justice, on the other hand, refers to the idea that values, ethics and morals should be universal with no preferential treatment. Within the Chinese classics, Confucius said: “A man in a superior situation, having valour without righteousness, will be guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people having valour without righteousness, will commit robbery” (cited in Legge, 1861:193). With regards to

statecraft this idea suggests that, regardless of position, everyone should obey and comply with shared values, ethics and morals. Confucius said: “righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right” (Legge, 1861:269). A responsible State should always act in a way that is either helpful or impartial: domestically and internationally. Xi Jinping (2017e:55-56), during the 19th National Congress, insinuated righteousness when he called upon:

[T]he people of all countries to work together to build a community with a shared future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. We should respect each other, discuss issues as equals, resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics, and take a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication, not confrontation and partnership, not alliance. We should commit to settling disputes through dialogue and resolving differences through discussion, coordinate responses to traditional and non-traditional threats, and oppose terrorism in all its forms. We should stick together through thick and thin, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all. We should respect the diversity of civilizations. In handling relations among civilizations, let us replace estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence. We should be good friends to the environment, cooperate to tackle climate change, and protect our planet for the sake of human survival [sic].

Xi explicitly invites all States to work towards the CPC’s chosen shared values of: openness, inclusivity, cleanliness, beauty, peace, security and prosperity. Xi claims that through responsible behaviour guided by righteousness that all States should share open dialogue to progress together towards this future. Although Xi discursively recognises differences amongst States, the rhetoric still paints an understanding of

collectively journeying towards the same future, the righteous future that the CPC are propagating.

Propriety refers to restraint from harmful movements, desires and sentiments. As with righteousness, propriety requires compliance with predefined values, morals and ethics, however, propriety requires a greater sense of confinement and control. In theory propriety enables responsible behaviours to create harmony within a State and between States (Legge, 1861). To the CPC, ecological civilisation, as the Chinese way of conducting environmental governance, is described as a set of predefined values, ethics and morals to be followed for better environmental governance. The “old path” of developed Western nations is the harmful movements that must be avoided; and States are told to refrain from copying such behaviour. The following excerpt from Zhou Shengxian’s (2012c:1) World Environment Day speech captures the essence of propriety, stating how:

The development mode that jeopardizes resources and environment has not only brought about all sorts of social conflicts including environmental problems, but also worked against the sustained economic growth. For example, water pollution cuts down the fishery efficiency, and soil salinization, desertification, and loss of soil fertility result in poor harvest. We must awaken to the voluntary protection of the resources and environment, being highly responsible for the survival and development of our future generations. We will definitely not take the old path of developed countries by giving priority to economic development and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will actively explore new path for environmental protection in China which is characterized by optimizing the economic development through the protection of the environment [sic].

Propriety therefore impacts the CPC’s environmental governance through their construction of an alternative propitious approach; one they deem as not harmful, through (re)embracing Chinese wisdom and culture and the Chinese conceptualisations of responsibility.

With regards to intelligence, Confucius argued: “The wise are free from perplexities; the virtuous from anxiety; and the bold from fear” (cited in Legge, 1861:89). Mencius, in furthering the works of Confucius, wrote: “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and they, as a matter of course, had likewise a commiserating government”; here Mencius refers to intelligence as creating an innate goodwill as the foundation of statecraft (cited in Legge, 1861b:1). Together the classical thoughts of Confucius and Mencius are thought to mean that a responsible government must be intelligent, which is acquired through studying morals and ethics. Examples of the responsibility of intelligent governance are present in Xi Jinping’s (2018b:3) closing meeting speech at the 13th national People’s Congress, where he stated: “Today, China, with all ethnic groups striving with one heart, has achieved extraordinary accomplishments. The Chinese people have learned from our own experience that only when we are united can we be strong and march forward, and a divided country will not progress. I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force.” Xi Jinping refers to the shared Chinese wisdom as the driving force behind the CPC’s intelligent governance, which has led the PRC to achieve extraordinary accomplishments together.

Zhou Shengxian (2013c:20), in his speech at the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection 2013, also bolsters ecological civilisation as representing intelligent responsible governance, by claiming that the MEP “will translate theories and methods learned into the wisdoms and capabilities of doing a good job. We shall broaden our horizon, obtain new knowledge, build wisdom, and deepen our strategic thinking of the overall, long term and fundamental nature of environmental protection.” Intelligent responsible governance is also seen in Vice Minister of the MEP, Wu Xiaoqing’s (2013:6) *Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection System* speech, where he stated: “The vast environmental cadres and workers spread and disseminated the spirit of Chinese environmental workers on their own initiatives, developed core values for all in environmental workers for the new age, and staged a wave of “learning from the best, committing to actions”.” The CPC make great use of presenting ecological civilisation as a form of intelligent responsible governance, especially due to the inherent Chinese

wisdom and culture that has helped construct the spirit behind the concept and as a revelation through their correct heroic leadership.

The last of the Five Relationships is trustfulness. Confucius considered trustfulness as a pillar of society, writing that: “I do not know how a man without truthfulness is to get on” (cited in Legge, 1861:17). Mencius furthered the notion by arguing that in order for a government to be responsible with their words and in their actions they should endeavour to complete tasks trustfully by undertaking the tasks themselves and through cooperation (Legge, 1861c). A responsible government must therefore be trustworthy and the people must be able to trust their government.

The following excerpt from Xi Jinping demonstrates how, through their ecological civilisation rhetoric, the CPC intend to gain the trust of the Chinese people to back their intended future governance. Xi Jinping (2018b:4), at the 13th National People’s Congress, argued how the CPC “must base our efforts on the interests of the people, ensure the principal status of the people, humbly learn from the people, and heed to their needs and draw on their wisdom. We must ensure that it is the basic criterion of our work that whether we can gain people’s backing, acceptance, satisfaction and approval. We must focus our efforts in addressing the most pressing, most immediate issues that concern the people the most. We must also ensure that all Chinese people could share the happiness and pride in the historic course of national rejuvenation.” The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, in “keeping with the times”, is specifically designed to discursively convey responsible governance in building trust through the innate Chineseness, as seen in Chapter 4, and through the CPC’s heroic leadership, as discussed in Chapter 5. Thus the “Five Relationships” of responsibility are each present within the CPC’s rhetoric.

Responsible Governance: School of Names and Legalism

Ancient China was filled with a complicated nexus of responsibilities; successful statecraft was believed to originate through successful self-governance, guided by the five relationships (Wood, 1995). Alongside the five relationships is a series of hierarchical relationships defined as the “Three Bonds and Five Relationships” (*San*

gang wu chang, 三纲五常). The Three Bonds refers to the relationship between father and son, sovereigns and ministers and husband and wife; however, they expand to dictate also the relationships between elder siblings and younger siblings and also between friends (Yeophantong, 2013). Filial piety (*Xiao*, 孝顺), the relationship between father and son for instance, brought the concept of responsibility into all aspects of social and professional life and is often described as the root of virtue (Legge, 1959:2). Filial piety created a hierarchical social system whereby younger generations are required to respect older generations, and superior “gentlemen” are marked out as above all others (Yeophantong, 2013).

The five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness are embedded within traditional Chinese values, morals and ethics; in turn they dictate how the positioning of a person, within the nexus of relationships captured within the Three Bonds, impacts a person’s responsibilities. The level of responsibility and the ways in which responsibility should be enacted are understood through a person’s position, otherwise known as the traditional Confucian culture of “positioning” (*Dingwei*, 定位; Chan, 2013). Filial piety was one means of decoding what position a person has within the nexus of the Three Bonds within Chinese society. The dictum: “Let the ruler rule as he should and the minister be a minister as he should. Let the father act as a father should and the son act as a son should” echoes the principals of filial piety and the hierarchical relationships defined in the “Three Bonds and Five Relationships” (cited in Yeophantong, 2013:335).

Positioning originated in the School of Names (*Ming Jia*, 名家), which was concerned with the relationships between actualities (*shi*, 实) and their labels, categories or names (*ming*, 名). Hence, the inherent importance within the CPC’s use of emotion to “position” the PRC through a variety of labels for status, such as: “developing country” or “big responsible country”. Applying the CPC’s labels to the dictum quoted above, we see: *Let the developing nation act as a developing nation should and the developed nation act as a developed nation should*. The “rectification of names”, meant “every ‘name’ (i.e. social position) implied a certain responsibility that must be fulfilled” (Yeophantong, 2013:335). To the CPC, the difference in name, from “developing country” to “big responsible country” implies different rectification of appropriate actualities. Indeed, within *The Analects*, Confucius stated: “The relation between

superiors and inferiors, is like that between the wind and grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it" (cited in Legge, 1861:123).

The CPC's rhetoric contains multiple instances of positioning and insinuating appropriate corresponding responsibility. Hu Jintao (2009:1), in his *Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change* speech at the UN General Assembly, said: "I wish to highlight here a few principles that we need to follow in our common endeavor to tackle this issue of climate change. First, fulfilling our respective responsibilities should be at the core of our efforts. The principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities embodies the consensus of the international community. Adherence to this principle is critical to keeping international cooperation on climate change on the right track [sic]." Similarly, Zhou Shengxian (2007:4-5), in his 2007 Annual General Meeting of the MEP speech, supports Hu Jintao's argument regarding the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) by stating how: "Developed countries should face up to their historical responsibilities and the lingering reality of high level emissions per capita, set stricter objectives in the long run and continue to cut emissions. Developing countries should take active measures and contribute to global fight against climate change according to their own capabilities. Without frank and pragmatic cooperation, we won't make substantial headway in this regard." The CPC apportions greater responsibility, in tackling climate change, onto the countries to which the CPC positions as, and ascribes the status of, developed. Within Hu's quote we see how developed countries should face up to their *responsibilities*, whereas developing countries are expected to contribute based on their *capabilities*.

The "School of Legalism" (*Fajia*, 法家) carried forward the concept of positioning and this became known as the doctrine of "holding actualities responsible to their names" (*Xun ming ze shi*, 循名责实) (Yeophantong, 2013:336). What is different within Legalism from Confucius' School of Names can be found in the arguments of Han Fei Zi, who argued: a ruler's duty is to deliberate duties onto others; the ruler is not responsible for how individuals perform, but they are responsible for distributing punishments and rewards accordingly (Fung, 1997). Responsible statecraft emanates from the ruler, who is perceived as leading on behalf of Heaven and to be acting according to divine will.

The CPC's rhetoric frequently takes on the Legalist position of responsible statecraft in deliberating and disseminating their perceptions of responsible (global

environmental) governance. Suggestions of CPC leadership, directing the world through their superior and responsible governance, can be seen in the extract below from Xi Jinping (2018b:8), who, at the 13th National People's Congress, stated: "China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine of a community with a shared future for humanity illuminate the world!" Legalism saw responsibility as the means through which a ruler demonstrated their legitimacy. Hence, the ruler became responsible for dictating both material and spiritual welfare, for catering to the interests and wellbeing of the people; this became a tangible measure of a ruler's legitimacy (Legge, 1875). This was discussed in Chapter 5, in the mythologising of the CPC as heroic and correct leaders having revelations for an ecological civilisation offering better (global) environmental governance.

To some extent, this also brings us back to the importance of the CPC labeling their ecological civilisation as a *Chinese* approach, based within the values and virtues of Chinese wisdom and culture. Not only does this assign the important positioning associated with concepts such as *hua* over *yi*, but the name attached also carries notions of actualities and responsibilities to the Chinese people. Each name and position carries the CPC's policy directions. For instance, big responsible country requires the benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness of responsibility, claimed to be embedded within Chinese wisdom and culture; the CPC cannot govern responsibly until the people also (re)engage responsibly.

With regards to responsibility and historic environmental governance, there are instances where the rulers' notion of responsibility did culminate in good environmental governance practice (Wang, 2007). For instance, the CPC can choose to refer to how the Confucian government of the early Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) can be argued as giving a great deal of attention to public approbation: water conservancy was introduced to try and control flood waters, hydro-engineering projects were also supported; and famine relief was enacted through producing grain loans (Yeophantong, 2013). Examples of chosen historical analogy, to support Chinese responsible environmental governance, are abundant within Zhou Shengxian's rhetoric. Many examples are

included within Zhou's (2014d:3) speech closing the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation:

To rehabilitate ecosystem is rational cognition as a result of absorbing the traditional Chinese wisdom on nature and drawing upon lessons and experience of environmental management home and abroad. The Chinese civilization has been passed down for more than 5000 years and accumulated rich ecological wisdom. In ancient China, there was strict seasonal limit on such activities as fishing fish and turtles and logging trees and reeds and offenders were subject to punishment (The Rites of Zhou). In The Huainanzi, there was the warning against draining the pond to catch fish and burning forest to hunt animals. In the beginning of Han Dynasty, a set of measures were introduced to restore national strength such as light penalty, reducing tax burden, land grant by military merit, slaves and servants returning to civilians and giving assets back to the escaped, which paved way for Emperor Wudi to expand its territory. During the Zhenguan Period of Tang Dynasty, austerity was advocated. The government carried out land equalization system and Zu-Yong-Tiao system and reduced labor and tax burdens. As a result, there were flocks of cows and horses in the grassland, grains were sold at low price, no one picked up the lost articles on the street and the society was in peace and prosperity. From applying rehabilitation for economic purpose to using it for environmental protection, the strategy has been gradually evolved and enriched. Since reform and opening up, China has practiced a lot of measures to conserve nature such as converting farmland to forest, controlling grazing for rangeland restoration, fishing closure and prohibition and restricted logging of forests. These measures have produced good results. There are similar practices in foreign countries. With profound historical origin, rehabilitation of ecosystem has become the Party's move to borrow and uplift the wisdom of human kind on ecological

conservation [civilisation] at the new start of history. It will usher new development opportunities for China's environmental protection [sic].

Responsibility and responsible Chinese governance can be summarised as the CPC expecting the Chinese people to obey their superiors, according to their name(s); the leader(s), who in order to govern responsibly, should be guided by the principles of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness (Mei, n.d. (no date)). Fundamental to understanding whom to obey and how to act relies on the notion of hierarchical positioning to understand the complex nexus of social relations throughout society, thus confirming the importance of names. The importance of positioning and the impact this has on the CPC's governance as a global actor is considered next.

Chinese Classical Thought on Responsible International Governance

Opinions expressed throughout the ancient Chinese classics were predominantly “ethnocentric” with a “China-centred” philosophy (Têng and Fairbank, 1979:3). Discussed in Chapter 2 was the Sino-centric nature of concepts such as *Tianren heyi*, “all-under-heaven” (*Tianxia*, 天下) and “Middle Kingdom” (*Zhongguo*, 中国) and *Huaxia* (Mancall, 1963; Têng and Fairbank, 1979:3; and Wang, 2014). Ancient Chinese thoughts on the responsibilities of China, with regards to the territories beyond the Middle Kingdom, operated on similar modes of thought, whereby the Chinese elites became obliged through a social paradigm where they were “bound to the world beyond” through a “network of proper behaviour” (Schwartz, 1985a and 1985b:7).

China, as the Middle Kingdom, was believed to possess material, architectural, aesthetical and moral superiority, and through this was considered central to the world's order; thus China was responsible for the dissemination of Chinese civilisation, virtues and understanding to the barbaric foreigners (*Yi*) (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; Cranmer-Byng, 1973; Mancall, 1963; Wang, 2014; and Yeophantong, 2013). This was seen in Chapter 4, where Chinese wisdom and culture is described as innately better, something to be proud of and a “gift to mankind”. To share this with the world became a heroic duty

and responsibility of CPC-led Chinese environmental governance, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Even in the wake of the Century of Humiliation, Chinese intellectuals and political elites unsurprisingly maintained their Sino-centric perceptions of world order, of their moral duties and responsibilities, believing that: “China possessed a universally valid system of beliefs which were ethically right and ought to be followed by all people; that China had a special role in the world as the guardian of these values, and that, although they could not be imposed on other peoples, China must herself live up to them and set an example by which others could learn how to follow the right path” (Cramer-Byng, 1973:68). Governing the world thus became synonymous with sustaining harmony under heaven (*Tianxia datong*, 天下大同) by enhancing moral suasion and using Chinese morals as opposed to employing cohesion or force (Yeophantong, 2013). The ecological civilisation rhetoric continues on these themes; Xi claims the CPC to be “torchbearers”, in the “driving-seat” and invites others to join the PRC on their “express train” to development (Xi, 2017a:10 and 2017e:5).

Xi Jinping (2017f:3), at the APEC CEO Summit, repeatedly makes statements regarding how the CPC will set the right example for others to follow: “This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the future. It focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but it is open to all partners.” A further example is seen in Xi’s (2017h:7) keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting:

As envisaged by the CPC at its 19th National Congress, a moderately prosperous society in all respects will take shape in China by the year 2020. Socialist modernization will be basically realized in China by the year 2035 and, by the mid-21st century, China will turn itself into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful. This will deliver a better life not only to us Chinese, but also to the people of other countries. We call on the political parties in other countries to work with us to create more cooperation opportunities for the world and promote common development and prosperity for all... As a Chinese saying goes, a stone

taken from another mountain may serve as a tool to polish the local jade [sic].

Xi places the CPC's conception of responsible governance, captured through the repeated set-phrase with their ideals of prosperity, harmony and beauty – synonymous with *Tianxia datong* – as their morally superior basis for this Chinese-led encouragement for enhanced international cooperation for furthering global development. Chinese wisdom (a stone from another mountain), when applied to the local situation, can assist with development (provide polished results).

Zhou Shengxian's rhetoric, provides an example whereby the Chinese elites, here the MEP, are obliged through the social paradigm of Chinese superiority, to aid the "world beyond" through their knowledge and access to "proper behaviour" (Schwartz, 1985a and 1985b:7). Zhou Shengxian (2011h:8), at the 2011 AGM of China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, implores his staff to recognise the great responsibility of the CPC's environmental governance, based on Chinese wisdom, saying: "We highly appreciate the efforts and wisdom that every council member and expert have contributed for the increasing development of China's environment protection and development. The green transformation of economic development mode is a great challenge for contemporary China. The realization of China's green transformation will be China's active contribution to the world development [sic]."

Finally, another example of the CPC's claim for responsible and righteousness global governance, is seen in the excerpt below from Liu Xiaoming's (2017:7) speech to the UK Business community:

China has made much progress in building socialism with its own features. This has expanded the horizon for developing countries seeking modernization. Countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence are given a new option. And this is China's wisdom and solution. Confucius once said, "Do not do onto others what you don't want others do onto you." China believes that no one should sanctify its own development model or even

impose it upon others. China respects the right of all countries to choose their own development path. China will not export its own development path or model, or its own value. China is not interested in the competition of ideologies. Other countries are free to find out more about China's development experience and draw on strength or reference as they see fit. They should explore a development path and social system that suits their own history and culture. This is, in essence, the biggest contribution of China's path of socialism with Chinese characteristics to all humanity [sic].

Liu clearly stipulates how the PRC must not only live up to their Chinese ideals and thus set an example for the international community, but that this is done so that the others can learn how to follow this path; echoing the argument of *Huaxia*, the *hua* educating the *yi* (Callahan, 2010; and Cramer-Byng, 1973). Liu's speech professes the CPC to be a responsible government, enacting the five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness; even the positioning of names and actualities found within the School of Names and Legalism were also present.

Changing Perceptions of Responsibility in the Twentieth Century

Guided by these Sino-centric views of responsibility and responsible governance, Chinese culture and philosophy was considered to be unrivalled and thus came the perception that China had responsibility to govern and bring harmony to the world (Cramer-Byng, 1973; Mancall, 1963; and Yeophantong, 2013). This idea is found in the works of Confucius: "Let the superior man never fail reverentially to order his own conduct, and let him be respectful to others and observant of propriety - then all within the four seas will be his brothers" (cited in Legge, 1861:117). However, as with most aspects of Chinese society, the Century of Humiliation put these classical Chinese views to the test and resulted (initially) in dramatic changes in Chinese philosophical thinking, especially with regards to China's global position, and thus their name and actualities for responsibility (Ch'en, 1979; and Feng, 1979). With the Century of Humiliation, the

dominant themes of responsible governance shifted to focus on domestic development, the rejuvenation of China; lofty ideals of global governance were temporarily shelved.

The responsibility of furthering domestic development became intertwined with adopting wisdom and culture from the West, most notably from the uptake of Marxism. One of the most notable reactions to these changed perceptions of China's responsible governance was their participation in World War I (Yeophantong, 2013). Despite good political intentions, ultimately no change would be seen with regards to China's political status due to the country's continued weakness, especially of the Chinese government. 1919 thus saw the beginning of the populist-based May Fourth Movement: a protest in particular against the mistreatment of China in the Treaty of Versailles. The May Fourth Movement captured a new responsibility: if a ruler has failed to govern responsibly, that the people have the "right of revolution" (*Geming quanli*, 革命权), hence the responsible behaviour of protesting against unjust political decisions, especially the unjust political decisions of the Imperial West, was borne (Yeophantong, 2013).

New responsibilities emerged linked to connecting with and learning from the West, as was discussed in chapter 4 with regards to the New Culture Movement. Ch'en (1979) called for China to put an end to isolationist ideologies and instead promoted cosmopolitan learning. Similarly, Feng (1979) argued that Western scholarship, in particular language, mathematics and sciences, should be learned along with Chinese thought. Yet, by far, the greatest level of support was for learning and building upon Western advanced technologies, for instance, in the 1860's Feng contended: "What we then have to learn from the barbarians is only the one thing, solid ships and effective guns" (Ch'en, 1979; Feng, 1979:53; and Têng and Fairbank, 1979). However, the generation of Chinese youth who constituted the New Culture Movement viewed revolution as a paramount responsibility: it was their duty to bring about social and political changes to rid China of the imperial shackles and thus put right the national humiliations suffered since the 1840's (Têng and Fairbank, 1979). China, and the PRC, struggled with what to learn from the West, and how to understand their perceived change in status.

Seeking to redefine China's status away from the "Sick Man of Asia", how people saw, understood and carried out their responsibilities was now focused on promoting a new conceptualisation of China's place on the world stage. For instance, Zeng Guofan

and Li Hongzhang (two figures from the Self-Strengthening Movement) similarly identified that China could no longer afford to consider itself as segregated from the world beyond China's geographical (or indeed cultural) borders: they argued that China's statecraft was now outdated and needed to acclimatise to a more advanced external world; the CPC are beginning to achieve this, especially through the ecological civilisation rhetoric (Yeophantong, 2013). However, the alimony of a peaceful and secure international order is once again understood as essential for peaceful development domestically. This point went on to be raised in the PRC's constitution and is iterated thus: "China's future is the world's future, both are closely linked together" (Pang, 2009:1).

Xi Jinping (2017a:8-9), at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, stated: "This is a path based on China's realities. China has in the past years succeeded in embarking on a development path that suits itself by drawing on both the wisdom of its civilization and the practices of other countries in both East and West. In exploring this path, China refuses to stay insensitive to the changing times or to blindly follow in others' footsteps. All roads lead to Rome. No country should view its own development path as the only viable one, still less should it impose its own development path on others [sic]." Similarly, Zhou Jian (2018:4), Vice Minister of the MEP, stated, in his speech at the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental Protection, how: "As a developing country, China needs to enhance international cooperation to learn from other countries of their top-notch concepts, experience and technologies." Yet, in the very next sentence Zhou (2018:4) goes on to add: "At the same time, China is also willing to jointly promote the realization of the biodiversity conservation goals set for 2020 based on international cooperation and exchange to exert its constructive role of a big and responsible nation [sic]." The rhetoric from both Xi Jinping and Zhou Jian is using the idea of learning from others, to present the PRC as a friendly and responsible nation, cooperating and sharing wisdom, as well as insinuating that anything learned from the West, must be understood through Chinese principles.

Responsibility Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China

From 1949 onwards, following the founding of the PRC by the CPC, the conceptions of responsibility are best understood from the Leaders' thoughts. The PRC's first Premier, Zhou Enlai, proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 1950's, which have remained a common thread throughout the CPC's governance, but the changing demands of domestic development alongside the global positioning of the PRC have ensured fluidity in how responsible governance has been enacted (Yeophantong, 2013).

Responsibility, under Mao Zedong, was primarily focused on bolstering Communism both domestically and internationally. For Mao, domestically, the main responsibilities, or "sacred duties" (*sheng shen zhi ze*, 神圣职责) were framed as: expulsing foreign influences; protecting the "motherland" (*Zuguo*, 祖国); working towards national rejuvenation; "self-reliance" (*zi li geng sheng*, 自力更生); and "working hard to strengthen the country" (Yeophantong, 2013:341). Mao's CPC still held onto hostile sentiments towards certain Imperial Powers, especially the U.S., mostly due to the long experience of semi-colonisation (Lu, 2011). Changing the international system that was dominated by Western powers was still a priority, but self-protection, national sovereignty and independence – which resonated with the arguments made by Ch'en (1979) in the nineteenth century – were now the hallmarks of responsible governance. Kim (1979:82) stated: "if the traditional Chinese image of world order was an extension of the Confucian moral order, so was the Maoist image of world order an extension of revolutionary order and justice at home."

The main developments within the understanding of responsible governance from the Deng Xiaoping Leadership were increasingly concerned with cross-border collaborations (Lu, 2011). In particular was Deng's support for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, which were two of Zhou Enlai's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The CPC became increasingly interested in crafting responsibilities that were interest-driven and pragmatic rather than high-sounding and moralistic (Xu, 2005; and Ying, 2017). Having initially sought to re-join the international community in order to reinstate sovereign autonomy, the CPC increasingly presented ideational statuses that thrust the country onto the world stage (Xu, 2005). In presenting a higher status, with

increased responsibilities in tow, Xu (2005:83) argues that the PRC was already, once again, using responsibility to “inject its own ideas into shaping the new world order.” Thus also feeding back into the identity of heroic leadership guiding superior Chinese wisdom and culture (in Chapters 4 and 5), rejuvenating not only the PRC, but also improving the entire world system (Xu, 2005; Yeophantong, 2013; and Zhao, 1997).

As the PRC’s economic status improved, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continued to support international collaboration, especially with regards to trade for improved economic growth (Gao, 2013; Kong, 2007; Shi, 2007; and Zheng, 2010). For, Xi Jinping (2014:1), his thoughts on the PRC’s external responsibility can be found in his speech at the 60th Anniversary Of The Initiation Of The Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence: “the building of a new type of just and equitable international relations.” In particular, Xi Jinping’s responsible global governance favours the actions of mutual respect of territorial sovereignty and integrity, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual non-aggression (Xi, 2014). Hence the CPC can be seen to incorporate notions of responsibility, throughout their rhetoric, that draw upon both Chinese classical thought and the recent shared experiences of the Century of Humiliation. Ecological civilisation is a concept for demonstrating responsible governance domestically, and provides a means of also governing responsibly internationally.

Summary of the Chinese Classical Thought and Responsible Governance

The sociocultural understandings of responsibility and how these have changed through Chinese classical thought influencing contemporary politics can be divided into the two main themes: morality (the five relationships) and positioning (names and actualities). How the CPC interprets and applies status and associated responsibilities impacts their domestic and foreign policy, and is increasingly engraining the PRC in global governance (Yeophantong, 2013). The CPC have created a convergence between domestic responsibility and global responsibility: a Beautiful China will help create a Beautiful world and vice versa, where a peaceful world is necessary for a peaceful China. Responsibility has shifted from a predominantly domestic affair with natural spillover effect from the innately superior Chinese wisdom and culture, to a

balanced affair, where domestic development now also relies on a secure and healthy world.

The CPC's construction of responsible governance via ecological civilisation is socio-culturally rooted within ancient Chinese thought on responsibility, as well as impacted by more recent socio-historical experiences from the Century of Humiliation. Ecological civilisation brings superior Chinese wisdom and culture to the world, for States to apply it to their own development contexts: it is Jade from a Chinese mountain. Equally, ecological civilisation is concerned with creating a clean, peaceful and beautiful world to ensure continued development domestically within the PRC.

Reflecting on these understandings, with regards to the contextualised ecological civilisation rhetoric, changing themes of status begin to hold a much deeper meaning. How the CPC have initially tended to position the PRC as a developing nation that prioritises domestic development will be considered first, before moving on to analyse how the CPC is starting to (re)position the PRC as a big responsible country, where there is increasingly a more international focus in the role the PRC will play through environmental governance.

The PRC as a Developing Nation: Perceived Responsibilities of Environmental Governance

Having identified how the CPC use emotion, and contextualised this via the three themes of CGT, the CPC can be seen to advance a development narrative within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, which sometimes focuses on the PRC as a developing country. For instance, during the Opening Plenary of the Boao Forum of the Asia Annual Conference in 2011, Hu Jintao (2011a:4-5) stated: "China has made remarkable achievements in development, but it remains the largest developing country in the world. Population, resources and the environment have put great pressure on our economic and social development, and there is lack of adequate balance, coordination or sustainability in our development. China has a long way to go before it can achieve modernization and common prosperity for all its people [sic]". Although Hu Jintao is quick to iterate that the PRC has made "remarkable achievements", he is also quick to

assert that despite this, the PRC is still restricted, not through bad governance, but due to having a large population, limited resources and unique environmental conditions.

Similarly, Li Keqiang (2014b:1), at the Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2014, stipulated how:

Over the years, in light of its own national conditions and drawing on the successes of other countries, China has made tremendous efforts to explore a way to development. Thanks to reform and opening-up, China has scored remarkable achievements in economic and social development. Today, some foreign friends may ask, "China has come such a long way. Isn't it time to stop calling China a developing country?" As a matter of fact, China remains the biggest developing country. True, China has become the world's second largest economy. But its per capita GDP is a mere 7,589 US dollars, ranking 80th in the world. To give it some context, China's per capita GDP is 65% of the global average, 1/7 that of the United States and 1/5 that of the European Union. When it comes to overall development level, especially in terms of innovation capacity, productivity and social welfare, China lags far behind developed countries. And in some areas, China even has lower rankings than some fellow developing countries. Take the United Nations' human development index (HDI) for example, China ranks 91st. Besides, development is uneven between China's urban and rural areas and between its various regions [sic].

Although Li Keqiang, first clarifies that the PRC have made "remarkable achievements", the remainder of his excerpt goes on to reiterate why and how the CPC wish for the PRC to be perceived as a developing country still. Both Hi Jintao and Li Keqiang specify that the PRC, as a developing country, needs to focus on pursuing greater levels of development; especially economic growth.

Discussed above were the political articulations of "self-reliance" (*zi li geng sheng*) and "working hard to strengthen the country" (*fa fen tu qiang*) during Mao's era, as well as "bide our time and build our capabilities" (*tao guang yang hui*) under Deng

Xiaoping (Yeophantong, 2013:346). Both Mao and Deng self-positioned the PRC as a conservative and humble developing nation; Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang's rhetoric is also maintaining this argument. As did the PRC's delegate at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, who stated: "we must not give up eating for fear of choking, nor refrain from building our own industry for fear of pollution and damage to the environment" (cited in Sternfeld, 2017:1). The same sentiment is carried within the status of developing nation; national development comes first, but CPC's discursive inclusivity of responsibility within the ecological civilisation rhetoric changes the tone and focus.

The ecological civilisation rhetoric continues to use emotion to comfort the PRC and to justify the country's current levels of development, showing the desire and need to focus on continued development. Placing continued development as the CPC's priority is constructed as responsible governance, both domestically and globally. In contrast, the earlier rhetoric from the 1972 UN Conference used emotion to instill a sense of desperation and need for continued development. Whereas Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping discursively construct their political ecology as a form of responsible environmental governance, using responsibility to focus on the PRC's continued development first and foremost (especially by endorsing how the PRC embodies the five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness) and from here stipulate the PRC's development will go on to benefit others too.

Wen Jiabao explicitly commented on how the CPC's responsibility, to both the PRC and the world, lay in managing their own domestic affairs effectively (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). Xi Jinping (2012a:1) emphasised this at the opening ceremony of the World Peace Forum, stating how "for China, the biggest developing country in the world, the most important way to be responsible to the world is to manage its own affairs well". Likewise, Li Keqiang (2016c:6) in his speech at the General Debate of 71st session of UN General Assembly, explains how: "China is a major developing country with a 1.3 billion population. Managing its own affairs well is its biggest contribution to peace and development in the world. Meanwhile, China also works in real earnest to fulfill its international obligations."

Domestically, Zhou Shengxian (2012b), in his speech to Interpret the National 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection, elaborated on the measures expected

to be undertaken in order to carry out responsible governance at all levels, including: technological innovation, optimising industrial structures, administrative regulations, public participation and international cooperation. The CPC's policy documents and speeches alike claim further responsibilities, of particular focus at the time was combating desertification (State Forestry Administration, 2014) and protecting animal biodiversity through compliance with the Convention on Biological Diversity (Zhou, 2013a; at the National Conference on Environmental Protection 2013). Internationally, the CPC's responsible global governance saw the PRC beginning to comply with international agreements, such as cooperating with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2016a; and UNFCCC, 2016b).

The CPC continued to discursively further such responsible commitments, for example, Li Keqiang (2014b:1) during the 9th East Asia Summit, said: "Based on its own needs and to honour its due responsibility as a major developing country, China will work hard to address climate change and deliver on its commitments in meeting the targets of energy conservation and emissions reduction". The CPC's repeated reference to the status of developing country positioned the PRC as being able to first and foremost focus on domestic development, whilst discursively representing these actions as both responsible domestic governance and responsible global governance.

This positioning of the PRC, as a developing country, is ostensible when considering the CPC's use of the CBDR principle. CBDR is a core functioning of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and was introduced by the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law in 2002. Succinctly, the principle of CBDR means that the individual circumstances of each State should be considered in how they are able to meet the commonly shared responsibilities in preventing, reducing and controlling environmental threats. However, CBDR exists with a vague definition, creating space for differing interpretations, by different States, at different times. CBDR produces for the CPC a hierarchy of responsibility according to name and thus position.

The CPC demonstrates their willingness to comply with the notion of common responsibilities, yet, there is a great deal more focus on defining and highlighting the notion of "differentiated"; understood as name and thus position (Information Office of the State Council, 2011; Jia, 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; Wen, 2009; and

Wen, 2012). For example, the Information Office of the State Council's *China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change* (2011:1) differentiated the levels of responsibility thus:

China sticks to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". Developed countries should be responsible for their accumulative emissions during their 200 years of industrialisation, which is the main reason for the current global warming. Therefore, they should take the lead in shouldering the historical responsibilities to substantially reduce emissions. With regard to capabilities, developed countries have substantial economic strength and advanced low-carbon technologies. In contrast, developing countries lack the financial strength and technologies to address climate change, and face multiple arduous tasks of developing their economies, fighting poverty, and addressing climate change. Therefore, developed countries should, on the one hand, take the lead in reducing emissions substantially, and on the other hand, provide financial support and transfer technologies to developing countries. Developing countries, while developing their economies and fighting poverty, should actively adopt measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change in accordance with their actual situations.

This excerpt immediately sets out what the name "developed" means, with regards to both position (200 years of industrialisation) and therefore responsibility (substantially reduce emissions). The CPC bluntly places the blame for the PRC's environmental degradation on the "accumulative emissions during their 200 years of industrialisation" of the developed nations, as was seen in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as an emotional construction of a national identity through superior Chinese wisdom and culture, and through "buck-passing" blame. Simultaneously, the Information Office report categorically highlights how the CPC's responsible environmental governance, as a developing country, is focused on national development. The CPC argues developed countries, in possessing a higher status within the current world system, should bear greater responsibility in helping developing nations to reach higher levels of national

development. Endorsing the status of developing country therefore continues to “buck-pass” responsibility onto the developed nations to provide greater levels of assistance to developing countries, thus creating space for the CPC to claim responsible governance whilst prioritising domestic development.

Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, from Zhou Shengxian (2007) at the 2007 Annual General Meeting in Beijing, to Li Keqiang’s (2016c) Statement at General Debate of 71st session of UN General Assembly in Geneva, the CPC continues to support the CBDR principle as highlighted by the Information Office. Zhou Shengxian (2007:5) argued: “We urge developed countries to make more efforts in extension and application of technologies that are affordable and applicable for developing countries”; and, Li Keqiang (2016c:4) stated: “Countries need to stay committed to the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, equity and respective capabilities, and need to jointly tackle climate change and work for the Paris Agreement to be universally accepted and take effect at an early date. Developed countries need to play a leading role, deliver on their emissions reduction pledges and help developing countries improve the capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change.”

Ultimately, through engaging with developing country status, the CPC use emotion to: glorify their development achievements thus far; justify the PRC’s development status through the shared traumas suffered across developing countries, having been subjected to the “denounced” governance from developed countries; and to portray the PRC as a responsible country, furthering both domestic development and to push their international agenda to be perceived as a big responsible country through managing domestic affairs well.

“Big Responsible Country”: Finding the Right Name for Preferred Position and Thus Responsibility

Callahan’s (2012) “pessoptimism” highlights the inherent use of dualisms throughout the CPC’s political discourse. The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, regarding responsible governance, also presents through dualisms: for example, developing country and big responsible country. However, as previously discussed in

Chapter 4, this section aims to demonstrate how this dualism is, once again, not a form of “national schizophrenia” (Shambaugh, 2008a), nor an example of an “identity crisis” (Agnew, 2012); indeed, the CPC have carefully constructed this potential dualism in a way that is tangential from developing versus developed.

As highlighted by Callahan (2012), the CPC repeatedly balances the PRC’s glories with traumas, their rejuvenations with humiliations, in constructing the PRC’s national aesthetic. The status of a developing country is woven through the CPC’s development narrative – focusing on the necessity for continued domestic development – highlighting the PRC’s inflicted development weaknesses (despite governance successes). The CPC simultaneously discursively constructs the status of “big responsible country”, which is used to reflect the CPC’s governance successes and moral superiority. However, despite the dualism in status name, the position the CPC assigns to both allows for a continuation in domestic development. The ecological civilisation rhetoric suggests that big responsible country is used instead of developed nation in order to allow for a continuation in level of responsibility, whilst allowing for the traumas within the status of developing country to be balanced by the glories within big responsible country. As the PRC has begun to enter a period of transition, from a growing economy to a growth economy (Gare, 2017; and Huan, 2008), how the CPC position the PRC, to allow for continued domestic development, has also transitioned, to “keep with the times”.

The CPC cannot deny that the outside world perceives the PRC increasingly as a developed country. Xu (2009:11) stipulates this development and growth in economic and political influence is starting to mark the PRC as possessing “many of the special characteristics’ of a Great Power”. However, when it comes to considering how States possess the dual accountability of domestic as well as international responsibilities, the PRC as a *major developing nation* has acquired a rather unique position. The CPC’s national development goals, such as, pollution reduction - and before that poverty reduction - have predominantly presented with a domestic focus. However, poor domestic governance with either poverty eradication or pollution reduction would threaten not only the CPC’s leadership, but also the PRC’s credibility globally through “spill-over” effects beyond the PRC’s borders. For example, the Yellow Dust (or Asian

Dust) phenomena posed serious health risks not only for the PRC domestically, but internationally with the PRC's neighbours of Korea and Japan (Yeophantong, 2013).

The CPC's rhetoric endorses this increased global status and they discursively make it their own by weaving through the rhetoric references to the thoughts from the School of Names and School of Legalism on "holding actualities responsible to their names" (Yeophantong, 2013:336). Han Fei Zi, a Legalist, argued it was the ruler's duty is to deliberate duties, whilst not being responsible for how individuals perform (Fung, 1997). The CPC's big responsible country status augments this approach; the CPC's responsible environmental governance emanates from the CPC, who lead on behalf of the PRC with the superior Chinese wisdom and culture, to bring betterment to the world. Thus, reflecting the ancient Chinese thoughts discussed above regarding how the Chinese became obliged through their superior wisdom and culture to be "bound to the world beyond" through their "network of proper behaviour" (Schwartz, 1985a and 1985b:7).

Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, especially since Xi Jinping's chairmanship of the CPC, the big responsible country status is inherently captured within the notion that the PRC, as a responsible State, has a duty to share the Chinese wisdom and culture with the world: Xi often refers to Chinese wisdom and culture as a gift to mankind. The CPC are the heroic leaders leading this dissemination. Ecological civilisation itself is a form of responsible environmental governance seen through their aversion to force and adherence to benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness in approach. Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong (2016:1), during his speech for the Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, praised Xi's international approach in stating how:

In September 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, and joined other world leaders in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This Agenda dovetails with China's efforts to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society, and to realize the "Chinese dream" of national rejuvenation. It resonates with China's vision of advancing sustainable development and ensuring that all people share the benefits

of development. It is also consistent with China's pursuit to play the role of a responsible big country and to promote common development of all countries. The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals is China's commitment and its due international responsibility. It is also an effective way to advance China's reform, opening-up and socialism with Chinese characteristics [sic].

Li Baodong's rhetoric makes it abundantly clear that, as a big responsible country, the PRC's increased international cooperation provides a platform for the CPC to further domestic development, to showcase Chinese wisdom and culture via their environmental governance and that in helping global development, this will enhance the PRC's domestic development and global status.

Liu Jieyi's (2017:2) *Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Agenda* speech, delivered to the United Nations, similarly implies changes are coming to the PRC's international situation and that the CPC are committed and on-track to making these changes happen: "The vision of global green and low-carbon development envisaged by the Paris Agreement corresponds with China's strategic choice of building an ecological civilization. Whatever the vicissitudes of the international situation, China will remain committed to its development concepts of innovation, coordination, green, openness and sharing and actively respond to climate change. It is both the intrinsic requirement of sustainable development and part of our responsibility of building a community of shared future of mankind [sic]." Ecological civilisation is adapted to fit to the CPC's construction of being a big responsible country, led through the CPC's responsible governance, and is a discursive tool for enhancing the PRC's position on the world stage and to enable continued development domestically.

Lastly, the most compelling use of emotion identified and contextualised as supporting the CPC's intentions to step up their global environmental governance, as a big responsible country, was found in the frequent use of metaphors. Xi (2017e:5), in his 19th Congress Report, referred to the PRC: "Taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to Climate Change" and that "China has become... [a] torchbearer in the global endeavour for ecological civilisation." Moreover, Zhou Shengxian (2014b:2), during his Public Address on Environmental Protection Work, also

used metaphor to demonstrate the PRC's changing status to that of a big and responsible country: "To resolutely declare war against pollution is a forceful demonstration of China's image as a big and responsible country." All three metaphors produce bold imagery of a fast victory through ecological civilisation with the CPC firmly and responsibly in charge. The metaphors highlight the global intentions within the concept of ecological civilisation, as a means of progressing the PRC's global image and as a method for continued development, domestically and abroad.

The focus within the CPC's foreign policy on morality, justice and responsibility has sparked the emergence of the "China responsibility" thesis (*Zhongguo zeren lun*, 中国责任论) and in many ways it is an alternative from the "China threat" or "China collapse" theses (Yeophantong, 2013). Throughout the 21st Century, political commentators have maintained that the PRC, as a UN Security Council (UNSC) member and nuclear power, must shoulder greater international responsibilities and realign their national interests accordingly (Buzan, 2010; Niu, 2009; Wang and Rosenau, 2009; Yeophantong, 2013; Zhang, 2009; Zhang and Buzan, 2010; and Zheng, 2009). Chinese scholars, such as, Su, (2002), Wang (2002), Xiao (2003) and Zhu and Qiu (2002) argued the CPC began to showcase greater responsibilities in such fields as: cutting carbon emissions, safeguarding harmonious relations in the Asia-Pacific regions and conducting joint ocean explorations; and, that this showcasing of significant improvements in economic growth, political modernisation, as well as social and technological advancements were important steps in national image building for increased power on the world stage (such as Xie Zhenhua's announcement in 2011; Black, 2011. See Appendix 2).

The CPC asserts that their unyielding regard towards sovereignty and territorial integrity demonstrates how the PRC is not only a responsible nation, but one that does not seek hegemony nor to dominate other peoples (Yeophantong, 2013). The legalist thoughts on responsibility regarding the pursuit of justice finds the CPC campaigning for differentiated responsibility and a more equitable environmental protection system by imposing requirements on the more able developed nations. However, what this comes to mean is that the CPC supports all progress and development being internally driven, rather than externally imposed (Lu, 1999; and Tang, 2000). This sentiment is captured in

the Chinese proverb, which advises that: “Each person should sweep the snow from his own doorsteps and should not fret about the frost on his neighbour’s roof”.

An increasingly global outlook in governance was seen during Hu’s leadership, primarily under the banner of “Harmonious World” (*Hexie shijie*, 和谐世界). The aforementioned ideals on “self-governance” and Confucian thought began to be reinserted into the CPC’s guiding principals. Harmonious World instigated a decade of forging a “new international and political order”, supposedly supporting the construction of a world order based upon democratic, multipolar, multilateral and inclusive governance focused on the common ground amongst nations (Hu Jintao, 2005:1). Harmonious World was coterminous with the CPC’s rhetoric on “peaceful development”; evidently based within the classical Chinese thought on preserving the “Great Harmony” (*Datong*, 大同) and “peace under Heaven” (*tianxia Ping’an*, 天下平安) (Nordin, 2016; and Yeophantong, 2013). The traditional elements captured within Hu Jintao’s guiding principles set the scene for an approach to global governance grounded within a pluralistic, albeit hierarchical, conception of the world where the PRC’s development directly serves the international community by fostering “peace, stability and common prosperity” first domestically, and then “in the world” (Ahearne, 2013; and Hu Jintao, 2005:1).

The identity, power and status presented throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric continues this increasingly global outlook; whether to challenge the negative portrayals popularised by the China Threat and China Collapse theories or to positively impose impression management as a “big responsible country”, China scholars and practitioners alike support this increasingly globally-orientated outlook the CPC are fostering (Buzan, 2010; Niu, 2009; Wang and Rosenau, 2009; Yeophantong, 2013; Zhang, 2009; Zhang and Buzan, 2010; and Zheng, 2009). What can be understood from the CPC’s status construction and focus on responsibilities within the ecological civilisation rhetoric is how the CPC’s carrying out of responsibilities is increasingly related to “non-traditional” security concerns. Ren (2007:42; cited in Yeophantong, 2013:357) explains, these are: “not merely a domestic affair, but also one of international significance. It is the greatest contribution that China makes to humankind by working out solutions to internal problems such as development and stability.” The CPC, through the use of emotion, discursively constructs ecological civilisation, as an example of

superior Chinese wisdom and culture to be shared with the world and is a journey towards betterment, which the CPC heroically and responsibly lead.

Conclusion

This chapter has interpreted how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric to present two statuses: “developing nation” and “big responsible country”. Initially, the CPC’s use of emotion was tied to the self-positioning of the PRC as a developing country. The level of responsibility associated with this status was focused on justifying the CPC’s decision to prioritise national development domestically, and to oratorically meet international norms. The CPC’s environmental governance could thus be understood as using responsibility to facilitate national development. However, as the PRC’s economic strength has continued to grow and alongside the CPC increasing the self-positioning of the PRC as a big responsible country, the CPC’s use of emotion, with regards to the moralistic and legalist aspects of responsibility, depicted the PRC as a country fighting for justice, whilst simultaneously arguing for a better future for all, a more highly appreciated position for the PRC and furthering international environmental governance. This is being achieved through the new name, which, whilst not departing from the characteristics of being a developing country, ensures national development continues through sound domestic governance.

Yeophantong (2013:347) described this as the “paradoxical duality of China’s identity”; the PRC is both rising in power whilst still being limited by their resources. However, this chapter has shown how these two statuses are not really as paradoxical as they first seem. Although they represent the natural transitioning from a growing economy to a growth economy, they are not dialectical. The CPC is not choosing to self-position as a developing nation *or* a rising great power. The CPC are self-positioning the PRC as a developing country that is *also* big and responsible. What can be understood from the CPC’s rhetoric is how improved environmental conditions globally are actually a necessity for continued domestic development and is thus a national interest, regardless of developing or developed nation status. Similarly, that domestic development and improved environmental protection aids environmental conditions globally.

The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric captures the emotions of status differentiation by injecting references to their sociocultural understanding of responsibility. The CPC discursively constructs, through the use of emotion, sincerity, determination and resolution over their concepts of justice, fairness and equity, which they offer to deliver through their intended environmental governance captured within ecological civilisation. The environmental governance that the CPC claim is one with the responsibility of solving domestic environmental protection, of furthering the efforts in international environmental protection, specifically by calling for common but differentiated efforts globally. However, to ensure the continuation of their Chinese conception of responsible governance, the CPC have begun to reassert the importance of exerting Chinese influence and understanding to the broader global political field.

From Imperial China to the PRC, responsibility has played an important role in Chinese governance. In imperial China, responsibility was linked to legitimacy and the Mandate from Heaven; during Mao's leadership responsibility became concerned with revolutionary justice positioning the PRC as vanguard of the developing world; currently, under Xi's leadership, responsibility includes constructing an ecological civilisation to create a Chinese-led shared future for mankind. As a big responsible country, the CPC's ecological civilisation concept legitimises their rule by securing continued development, secures their long-term interests by bettering the PRC's position on the world stage and intends to create a stable international environment, safeguarding the PRC's ability to prosper.

Responsibility in Chinese governance has always suggested obligations that extend beyond the immediate self; the futures and spaces of ecological civilisation suggest an increased involvement from the PRC in governing and (re)ordering the international community through global environmental governance. The CPC will continue to conflate their domestic responsibilities for development with international responsibility. Thus, the CPC's future foreign policy projections are likely to continue self-positioning the PRC as a big responsible country, but one with limitations, only acting where this best suits domestic development, as a self-positioned developing nation capable of influencing, through practice, global (environmental) governance.

Conclusion: Contributions and Recommendations

This thesis has considered how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Having conducted a thematic EDA three new interpretations of ecological civilisation have been explored. This thesis has argued that the CPC uses emotion to: 1) construct and further national identity; 2) support and advocate for party power and CPC (global) leadership; and 3) vie for the global status of “big responsible country”. Politicians and scholars have struggled to understand whom the PRC are, where the CPC’s governance is headed, and therefore, what the CPC is likely to do next (for example, see the debates on the China Threat versus Peaceful Development theories; Al-Rodhan, 2007; Breslin, 2010, 2013; Broomfield, 2003; Chan, 2013; Cunningham, 2012; Ding, 2011; Gao, 2013; Hoo, 2013; Nye, 1997; Ren, 2015; Roy, 1996; and Yeophantong, 2013). Yet, Wang (2014) argued, the CPC’s political narratives are a tool of language-based social construction, clearly outlining whom the PRC are and where the CPC’s governance is headed. This thesis has shown how the ecological civilisation rhetoric provides the CPC with a large platform for language-based social construction, to disseminate their ideas, not only on their future environmental governance, but also as a tool for constructing national identity, power relationships and status. The emotional use of language within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric portrays a clear image of the identity, leadership and responsibilities the CPC wish to adorn through their ecological civilisation concept.

Ecological civilisation has been shown to be a discursive tool, emotionally created by the CPC, to: encourage the citizens of the PRC to be proud of and engage with their environmental governance; justify their leadership and assert themselves as the authority of environmentalism within the PRC (and internationally); and to elevate the strategic importance of environmental governance as a means of projecting their big responsible country status to the world. The CPC are using emotion to acknowledge the needs and wants of an increasingly affluent populace, interested in a healthy environment more than ever since the founding of the PRC, in order to continue promoting the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. During this time of uncertainty, regarding the PRC’s place in the world, the CPC are looking to harbour a stronger sense of self, a stronger Chinese identity through their environmental governance. The CPC’s

ecological civilisation rhetoric is attempting to take back control of this knowledge production, creating Chinese identity, power relationships and status, via the CPC's intended environmental governance.

This thesis began in introducing the concept, and the importance, of ecological civilisation. The Introduction and Literature Review highlighted that ecological civilisation had come to the attention of politicians and scholars alike, not just as one of the CPC's latest political slogans, but because how the CPC explores and deploys environmental governance has implications for environmental conditionals globally. Ecological civilisation was argued to be indicative and capable of influencing the way that the CPC interacts with the PRC and beyond, yet little empirical evidence had been presented or discussed. Ecological civilisation was seen to have global importance through implicitly being an intervention that engages with the UNFCCC protocols. Ecological civilisation has therefore, accordingly, attracted much attention and discussion worldwide. The introduction highlighted how the CPC's receiving of, and reaction to, international attentions over their environmental governance – such as the U.S. Embassy's AQI data publications – elicited an emotional response from the CPC. This instigated the exploration into how the CPC use emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric.

In analysing the CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric, through constructing an intuitive thematic EDA, this thesis has contributed a deeper understanding of the CPC's strategic intentions behind, and the likely consequences of, their ecological civilisation concept. In particular, the relationship behind the CPC's use of emotion within their rhetoric and the constructing and disseminating of a new environmentally focused national identity, power relationships through thought-leadership and responsibilities through status were explored and discussed. These interpretations show how the emotion deployed by the CPC, within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, constructs ecological civilisation as an example of the PRC's "discourse power" (*Huayuquan*, 话语权). Ecological civilisation was seen to be carrying the CPC's diplomatic ambitions and pathways to disseminate and propagate an increased Chinese influence globally, through soft power strategy and specifically through the non-traditional security threat of environmental governance (Geall and Ely, 2018). The key methodological contributions and further recommendations will now be summarised.

Methodological Contributions and Recommendations: Empirically Furthering Emotion Research in IR

To examine how the CPC used emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, this thesis intuitively designed a thematic EDA. The thematic EDA was built upon the works of Koschut, et al.'s, (2017) three-tiered EDA and Galtung's (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex. The thematic EDA identified, contextualised and interpreted the CPC's use of emotion, guided by three themes of chosenness, glory and trauma. Three interpretations emerged allowing the analysis to elucidate on the CPC's strategic objectives in constructing a new form of environmental governance, as well as furthering understanding of their domestic political agenda and their wider international ambitions.

The thematic EDA was based within a social constructivist methodology and offers IR an approach to develop the conceptual variety in language-based social knowledge construction, especially with regards to emotion and the impacts this has on identity creation, power relationships and changing statuses, domestically and internationally. The EDA demonstrated how emotion is an additional empirical tool for analysing inter-subjectivity on the world stage. The CPC's use of emotion established a mechanism through the rhetoric with which their audience is able to interact and understand their constructed identity, intended exercises of power at the domestic and international level, and anticipated responsibilities through self-positioning within status hierarchies. The emotional foundations of language, as semantic structures of meaning, add strength to the CPC's rhetoric and any intended social impacts. The thematic EDA allowed for these concepts to be analysed not in isolation, but through existing social constructivist concepts such as language, culture and norms, such as *Tianren heyi*, *Huaxia* and the Three Bonds and Five Relationships. The resulting analysis established new interpretations of ecological civilisation, which complement existing constructivist language-based explanations of identity, power and status within IR more broadly, and of the PRC more specifically.

A secondary aim of this thesis was to develop the thematic EDA to further the analysis of empirical data examples of emotion within the CPC's rhetoric. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated why and how emotion can, and should, be further studied within the broader discipline of IR. The thematic EDA has drawn a comprehensive

picture of the CPC's political thoughts, with regards to environmental governance, and their future intentions for increased impact on global governance more generally. Moreover, the analysis of emotion within the ecological civilisation also provides new explanations for the CPC's behaviours and decision-making, a topic that is hotly debated across IR. The research findings have contributed original knowledge to the theory and methodology of emotion research in IR, as well as furthering the discipline's understanding of the CPC's use of rhetoric in constructing their ecological civilisation. Overall, it can be stated that this thesis provides a new thematic EDA able to identify, contextualise and interpret the use of emotion in political rhetoric and can be applied to any broader analysis of political rhetoric within IR, and beyond.

The obvious space for future research, with regards to methodological recommendations, is to conduct the thematic EDA again, so as to explore divergences and alternative themes and patterns that emerge within CPC ecological civilisation discourse. Further applications would be to extend the data set and include other forms of "text" within the CPC's broader political discourse on ecological civilisation, especially discourse beyond transcribed (and translated) speeches. There is also huge potential to apply the thematic EDA designed within this thesis to a variety of other political discourses both inside and outside of the PRC, as well as the scope to apply other forms of emotionally informed methods, such as an emotion content analysis, to ascertain what further knowledge can be produced on the use of emotion within IR.

Analytical Contributions and Recommendations: The Spirit, Hero-Journey and Responsibility of Ecological Civilisation

This thesis has contributed to IR's wider understanding of the CPC's environmental governance by offering three new ways of interpreting their ecological civilisation slogan. Captured through the ideas of a shared "spirit", the "hero-journey" and "responsibility" what was seen is how the CPC are: discursively constructing a socio-historical cultural identity of Chinese environmentalism; mythologising ecological civilisation to portray themselves as thought leaders on a journey to betterment through environmental governance; and self-positioning the PRC as a responsible global actor.

The Spirit of Ecological Civilisation: Constructing National Identity through Environmental Governance

Chapter 4 deliberated how the CPC's use of emotion is creating a new socio-historical identity of Chinese environmental governance. The CPC claim that their latest approach to environmental protection is a new and uniquely Chinese approach. To what extent ecological civilisation is actually new or uniquely Chinese is, however, not important to the CPC. What *is* of importance is that their rhetoric creates an identity: an identity through Chinese wisdom and culture; an identity for the Chinese to be proud of; and an identity through which the Chinese can engage in supporting the CPC's environmental governance. The CPC are purposefully revitalising elements of classical and "superior" Chinese thought, such as *Tianren heyi*, to validate ecological civilisation as uniquely Chinese. "Spirit" distinguishes ecological civilisation as a Chinese response to domestic and global environmental governance, creating a collective identity for the Chinese to engage with environmental protection, bringing increased competitiveness to the CPC's global environmental governance via this form of discursive soft power.

The CPC uses emotion to create a pathway for Chinese engagement and support of their latest political ecology by creating an identity of what it means to be Chinese with regards to environmental protection and ecological modernisation. Ecological civilisation comes to represent a returning pride and strength of the Chinese nation. This thesis therefore supports arguments that Xi Jinping is abandoning the "keep a low profile and bide your time" (*taoguang yanghui*, 韬光养晦) doctrine (Geall and Ely, 2018).

One of the key contributions from Chapter 4, is the understanding that ecological civilisation must be considered as more than a set of codified policy directives; and that the emotional construction of national identity via the spirit of ecological civilisation demonstrates how the concept needs to be considered beyond the confines of the pre-existing structures of global environmental governance, namely, sustainable development. Debates have been held over whether ecological civilisation represents a paradigm shift away from the ideology of neoliberal capitalism and therefore sustainable development, and to what extent it would compete as an alternative hegemony; no consensus has been reached. This literature urged for more research to be conducted

that considered ecological civilisation, not as a concrete framework or model of environmental policy, but as political discourse. In analysing the how CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, this thesis has brought clarity to these previously debated and often misunderstood pathways to ecological civilisation. The analysis within this thesis, in focusing on the how the CPC use emotion, demonstrates how these pathways, both the continuation of sustainable development, as well as ecological civilisation as a Chinese *alternative* exist as part of the CPC's soft power agenda. Ecological civilisation is designed to rhetorically support and create an increase in Chinese influence on the world stage, in particular through the Chinese wisdom and culture of ecological civilisation.

The interpretation of the use of emotion within Chapter 4 has also contributed a new perspective on how sustainable development is able to exist alongside ecological civilisation within the CPC's political discourse; rather than representing an identity crisis, sustainable development is used as a flexible discursive tool adapted to the CPC's intended political objectives. Sustainable development simultaneously negates and supports the CPC's construction of an ecological civilisation. Ahearne's (2013) Gramscian critique initially considered how ecological civilisation and sustainable development exist as competing or alternative approaches to environmental governance. However, this thesis has instead highlighted how any contradiction between the two approaches in existing simultaneously within the rhetoric is also being utilised as a tool for identity creation, and adheres to Mao's (1937) discussions in *On Contradiction* as opposed to being an identity crisis (Agnew, 2012; Callahan, 2010; and Shambaugh, 2008a).

Future research to explore broader questions on how the use of emotion coincides with the CPC's understanding of contradictions and how to handle them, may bring to light practical implications from the use of emotion. This relationship whereby sustainable development simultaneously negates and supports ecological civilisation conforms to Mao's (1937:36) following definition of competing ideologies in addressing contradiction: "It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity." As Mao (1937:26) argued, "There are many contradictions in the process of development of a

complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions” (Mao, 1937:26). Given the CPC’s continued focus on development, or the national rejuvenation of the PRC, which is repeatedly referred to throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric, development is a clear key theme and intention within the CPC’s concept of an ecological civilisation.

Xi Jinping’s update to the principal contradiction, where “the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”, has placed environmental governance as the ‘place of antagonism’ in the CPC’s principal contradiction. Thus, we see ecological civilisation as the CPC’s new approach to their environment-development antagonism, as an attempt to correctly deal with the principal contradiction where environmental degradation is producing a lower quality of life in the CPC’s quest for continued national development of the PRC (Xinhua, 2017a:1).

The thematic EDA highlighted how ecological civilisation is frequently referred to as the “new path” to environmental protection, with sustainable development labelled as the “denounced” old path of the developed West. This was discussed in relation to an “Us” versus “Them” in identity creation. Mao (1937:31) argued “It is always so in the world, the new displacing the old, the old being superseded by the new, the old being eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.” To what extent the emotionally constructed rhetoric answers to Mao’s understanding of contradiction and what this means with regards to the CPC’s construction of pathways to correctly deal with this new principal contradiction could build on the empirical findings of how, and therefore develop why, the CPC uses emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. This would develop the research further in considering what impacts the use of emotion may have on concrete policy directives.

The CPC can be seen to argue within their ecological civilisation rhetoric that sustainable development does not question the methods of development that have created the current contradiction between development and environmental degradation impacting on the quality of life experiences. Nor does sustainable development answer to the PRC’s unique experiences of environment and development. Future research here may provide a deeper consideration of how the CPC intend for ecological

civilisation, as a so-called socialist and Chinese alternative, to provide new tools that question the methods for development, may provide a greater understanding for how global governments can more appropriately, and successfully, tackle climate change and to what extent ecological civilisation is an appropriate tool for this.

The Mythologising of Ecological Civilisation: Glorifying CPC Leadership

Chapter 5 highlighted how the use of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric communicated the CPC's thoughts on environmental leadership. The ways in which ecological civilisation was communicated revealed how the CPC are trying to position themselves as thought leaders on environmental governance. The emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric frequently shared character traits with what Campbell (2008) calls the hero journey in mythology. The ways in which emotions of glory and trauma are woven through the rhetoric were shown to mirror the mythological traits of trials and tribulations, blame, sacrifice and forbidden behaviours.

This use of emotion presented the CPC as heroic leaders, with ecological civilisation as their latest revelation in good environmental governance. Emotions of glory were used within trials and tribulations to remind the Chinese audience of the humiliations suffered and the achievements made thus far in rejuvenating the PRC by following, supporting and trusting the CPC's leadership. Blame was seen to deflect questions over authority and approach on environmental governance onto their political competitors. Sacrifice and the forbidden thing(s) provided direction on how to support the CPC and why they need to be supported to deliver their revelation of betterment. These emotively discursive creations embedded ecological civilisation into the CPC's on-going journey from humiliation to rejuvenation, where ecological civilisation became an extension to the concepts of *Xiaokang*, national rejuvenation and socialism with Chinese characteristics. This thesis has therefore furthered understandings of how emotion is constructing pathways supporting the CPC's environmental governance leadership via ecological civilisation.

The use of emotions within this mythologising of ecological civilisation can again be understood to indicate a change from the CPC's norm of the "biding our time"

doctrine of taking a backseat in global governance in order to pursue national development. The CPC's use of emotion was shown to create support of a new power dynamic where they portray the CPC as heroic leaders: the "torchbearers" taking the "driving seat" in the global endeavour for ecological civilisation.

The CPC's use of emotion was seen to be creating a power relationship; the CPC uses emotion to support their claims as the authority over the PRC's environment. At times this position of leader is extended to also consider the international field of environmental governance. This interpretation of the ecological civilisation rhetoric creates very specific understandings of the CPC being thought leaders in environmental governance and that their vision and superior understanding of an ecological civilisation as a place of betterment will be a difficult journey, over a long period of time, but will provide better quality of life for all of mankind. Given the literary debate over the timely opportunity for the PRC to "step-up" as global environmental leaders versus the ability or appropriateness for the PRC to "step-up", this thesis has highlighted how the CPC's use of emotion disseminates their intentions for both domestic and global environmental governance leadership.

Chapter 5 also discussed how the CPC attempt to portray ecological civilisation as a real, ideal and symbolic place of betterment, thus creating pathways for implementation, where momentum and concrete (rather than purely ideological) objectives were discursively created to strive towards. Future research could be conducted on unpacking each individual mythologising element to ascertain the broader impacts of discursively constructing ecological civilisation and the related elements on the CPC's wider political discourse. For example, deliberating how the CPC portray themselves as heroic leaders and to what extent this portrayal differs within the rhetoric for a domestic audience versus the rhetoric for the international audience is likely to render interesting results regarding how far the CPC's leadership intentions reach. Another example of potential future research could be to ascertain precisely when within the rhetoric the CPC used emotion to change how economic growth is to be perceived. Economic growth started out within the ecological civilisation as the "forbidden thing"; with Xi's change to the principal contradiction, it would be interesting to understand how emotion is being used in the rhetoric, alongside such momentous changes in the CPC's political direction, to change the way the PRC perceives economic growth.

Chapter 6 demonstrated how the CPC's use of emotion highlighted how ecological civilisation is a concept designed with international consequences through perceived levels of responsible governance. The CPC's use of emotion reveals how they perceive the PRC's status and also how they wish the PRC to be perceived and accepted on the world stage. By actively alternating between the status of developing country and "big responsible country" (the latter increasingly existing within the more recent rhetoric, 2017 onwards), the CPC are attempting to control, through self-positioning, their role in global environmental governance. By increasingly moving towards the ideal of being a big responsible country, the CPC are creating a space for increasing their influence on the world stage, providing a platform for disseminating how to perceive the PRC and therefore its effectiveness in distributing their thoughts on (environmental) governance. The ecological civilisation rhetoric exists, partly, as an index or proxy of how the CPC are trying to articulate, to the world, their intentions of a Chinese-led global environmental governance.

Chapter 6 demonstrated how the CPC choose not to present the PRC as a rule-taker or a rule-maker; they explicitly create the PRC as both. The CPC do not present the PRC as a developing nation *or* a big responsible country; these statuses are not dialectic. The CPC's ecological civilisation rhetoric elects for drastic changes to the international system, but through a "gradualist" approach of maintaining the status quo, of pursuing national development first, and thus providing a more stable world order. The CPC's use of emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric can be understood as amplifying their thoughts on dominance and resistance. The CPC intend to resist the failing ideals of, as well as increased responsibility under, the rubric of sustainable development; whilst simultaneously dominating environmental governance through disseminating instead the supposedly superior ideals of, and better responsibility through, ecological civilisation.

The chapter built upon Yeophantong's (2013) discussions on the importance of responsibility in Chinese statecraft, and demonstrated through empirical examples of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, that responsibility is being used to construct and support the CPC's understanding of environmental governance.

Concealed within the CPC's use of the term responsibility, is the classical Chinese understanding that the PRC's responsibility includes obligations that extend beyond its borders. That is to say that the CPC have an obligation to (re)order and govern the world, through the Mandate from Heaven and superior Chinese wisdom and culture. The CPC are attempting to filter their thoughts on appropriate domestic environmental governance to the external sphere of global environmental governance by positioning themselves as a big responsible country. Ecological civilisation is therefore seen to map the CPC's intended direction of global environmental leadership, especially through the process of "shutting down" the dominance of the developed West in supporting the CBDR principal and increasingly dismissing sustainable development as a failed approach endorsed by developed nations. President Donald Trump's (2017) announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement has made this increasingly easy for Xi Jinping; Trump has created an opening on the global stage for the CPC to present their *alternative*, reliable and responsible environmental governance.

In February 2020 Antonio Guterres, the UN General Secretary, remarked at the Group of Friends on Climate meeting in New York, that the main focus for COP26 in Glasgow 2020 would be "enhanced ambition from all countries" (SDG Knowledge Hub, 2020:1). Chapter 6 has highlighted how the CPC's use of emotion is projecting their heightened ambitions on global environmental governance; how this is being received by other countries and how this rhetoric plays out at COP26 in November 2020 may provide an interesting example of how the findings from this chapter could be carried forward as the focus within future research.

Summary of Analytical Contributions and Recommendations

Overall, this thesis, in conducting a thematic EDA guided by the themes of chosenness, glory and trauma, has highlighted how the ecological civilisation rhetoric is part of a wider effort by the CPC to delineate alternative (environmental) governance to the current liberal intellectual-economic order. The CPC, through the use of emotion, attempts to assert: the PRC as a nation of superior environmental wisdom and culture; the CPC as leaders in contemporary moral and political thinking through focusing,

presently, on environmental governance; and as an increasingly responsible nation, not just domestically but also internationally now that the PRC is reaching higher levels of rejuvenation. Overall, this thesis has identified how ecological civilisation, as a concept, is central to the CPC's ontological security, and is crucial in constructing: the PRC's environmental identity through Chinese wisdom and culture; the CPC as thought leaders on the future of environmental governance, domestically and globally; and as a strong and returning global power, leading the PRC towards their best future as a big responsible country. Thus, the CPC's use of emotion discursively disseminates the CPC's messages pertaining to the PRC's identity, power dynamics and status creation in the beginnings of a movement towards establishing global environmental governance.

The CPC's use of emotion creates ecological civilisation as a nation strengthening exercise, taking national development from being a predominantly inward looking process, to the global stage. The CPC creates the spirit of ecological civilisation, which carries and constructs a national identity, through superior wisdom and culture on one of the most pressing global challenges of the twenty-first century. The CPC discursively constructs, through emotive language, an offer to heroically lead, not only the PRC to the place of ecological betterment, but to share this knowledge of ecological civilisation to the world. Lastly, this thesis has also shown how the use of emotion bolsters the PRC's transition away from relying on the status of developing nation, to the status of becoming a big responsible (developing) country. Ecological civilisation is a pathway to a rejuvenated PRC, domestically and globally; it is not just talk. There is a discursive shift through the use of emotion, which is supporting CPC led pathways for continued nation building, whilst pursuing a change in global environmental governance as a means to assert increased Chinese influence on one of the most pressing challenges to the twenty-first century.

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Appendix 1: Ecological Civilisation Rhetoric

Speeches by Hu Jintao

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Xi Jinping (2017c) *Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road*. Speech Given at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 14th May, Beijing. <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t1465819.htm> [Accessed 4th June, 2018].

Xi Jinping (2017d) *Strengthening Mutually-Beneficial Cooperation for Common Development*. Speech Given at the Dialogue of Emerging Market and Developing Countries, 5th September, Xiamen. http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/xigovernance/2017-09/06/content_41538050.htm [Accessed 4th June, 2018].

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Appendix 2: Timeline of Key Political and Environmental Events Leading up to, and following on from, the Introduction of Ecological Civilisation

| Date: Pre-Ecological Civilisation | Event | Context |
|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 1970's | 1972: The PRC attends the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.[1] | Domestic Policy |
| | 1973: The CPC establish the Environmental Protection Leadership Group (EPLG).[1] | Institution Development |
| | 1978: sees the Third Chinese Constitution issued, with the inclusion of an environmental commission, claiming that the CPC should supervise both natural resource protection and pollution abatement.[5][11] | Domestic Policy |
| | 1978: Also sees The CPC adopt its open door policy; this opens the country to foreign investment and encourages development of a market economy and private sector, which starts an era of outstanding growth of the Chinese economy. This rapid economic development would also lead to serious pollution problems.[1][11] | Foreign Policy & Domestic Policy |
| | 1978: The CPC issues the first Environmental Protection Law on a trial basis.[2][5][7] | Law & Policy |
| | Economic reforms later in the decade encourage economic development, increasing pollution, which manifests as a serious problem.[1] Simultaneously, the CPC begin to introduce institutions, laws and environmental declarations within the constitution to combat pollution and protect the PRC's natural environment.[2] | |
| 1980's | 1982: CPC legislature enacts the Marine Environmental Protection Law.[2] | Law |
| | 1984: CPC legislature enacts the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law; and establishes the Forest Law as measure of nature conservation.[2] | Law |
| | 1985: CPC legislature establishes the Grasslands Law as a further measure of nature conservation.[2] | Law |
| | 1986: The Fisheries Law is enacted.[12] | Law |
| | 1987: CPC legislature enacts the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.[2] | Law |
| | 1989: The CPC formally issues the Environmental Protection Law.[5] | Law |
| | 1989: PLA troops open fire on demonstrators who have camped for weeks in Tiananmen Square initially to demand the posthumous rehabilitation of former CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who was forced to resign in 1987. The official death toll is 200. International outrage leads to sanctions.[29] | Political Crisis |

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| | 1989 - Jiang Zemin takes over as General Secretary from Zhao Ziyang, who refused to support martial law during the Tiananmen demonstrations.[29] | Leadership Change |
| | The decade sees numerous environmental and health laws enacted as a response to significant health complications, including: respiratory, cardiovascular, and cerebrovascular diseases.[3] Levels of air pollution in the main Chinese cities at the beginning of the decade are almost exactly at the level of London at the height of the Industrial Revolution in 1890.[4] The decade ends in political turmoil, with a new era beginning under Jiang Zemin. | |
| 1990's | The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks the PRC's economy as third largest in the world after the U.S. and Japan.[29] | International Statistics |
| | 1993: The 1984 Water Pollution and Prevention Law is deemed unsatisfactory. Rapid economic growth and resulting pollution makes the law an out-dated policy.[2] | Law Reforms |
| | 1993: Preliminary construction work on the Three Gorges dam begins. A lake almost 600 kilometres (375 miles) long is planned that will submerge dozens of cultural heritage sites by the time it is completed in 2009.[29] | Infrastructure |
| | 1994: The Regulation on Nature Reserves is introduced.[12] | Domestic Policy |
| | 1995: The Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law is enacted.[12] | Law |
| | 1996: The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is amended. The amendment is part of a stricter and clearer legislation by lawmakers.[2] The Regulation on Wild Plant Conservation is also introduced.[12] | Domestic Policy & Law Reform |
| | October 1998: The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims is founded by Professor Wang Canfa.[13] | Public Organisation |
| | 1998: The PRC suffered a year of serious flooding; the CPC upgrade EPLG to a ministry-level agency, which became the State Environmental Protection Administration.[1] | Institution Development |
| | 1999: The Marine Environment Protection Law is enacted.[12] | Law |
| | Beijing is recognised as one of the world's most polluted cities.[6] High values of PM2.5 and O3 across the PRC continue to result in an alarming figure of premature deaths.[5] Significant infrastructure projects continue, despite environmental damage, whilst simultaneously reforming policy and law to introduce stricter and clearer legislation. | |
| 2000's | 2000: The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law is enacted. The Seed Law is enacted.[2],[12] | Law |
| | 2001: China joins the World Trade Organization, leading to a quick expansion in manufacturing. As a consequence, emissions in the country spike.[14][29] | International Organisation |

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| 2002: Vice-President Hu Jintao is named General Secretary of the CPC, replacing Jiang Zemin, the outgoing leader. Jiang is re-elected head of the influential Central Military Commission, which oversees the armed forces.[29] | Leadership Change |
| 2002: A new Environmental Impact Assessment Law is amended.[2] | Law Reform |
| 2003: The pneumonia-like Sars virus, thought to have originated in Guangdong province in November 2002, hits the PRC and Hong Kong. Strict quarantine measures are enforced to stop the disease spreading.[29] | Health Crisis |
| 2003: The Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law is enacted. The Environmental Impact Assessment Law is enacted.[12] | Law |
| 2004: The SEPA reports 1,221 environmental accidents in the year, most of which are related to water. However, experts believe the figure is vastly underestimated.[7] | Government Statistics |
| 2004: The PRC signs a landmark trade agreement with 10 south-east Asian countries; the accord has the potential to unite 25% of the world's population in a free-trade zone.[29] | Foreign Policy |
| 2005: An explosion at a chemical plant poisons the Songhua river, cutting off water supplies to millions of people.[29] | Environmental Crisis |
| 2006: According to environmental authorities, on average, one water pollution accident takes place every two to three days throughout the PRC.[7] Work on the structure of the Three Gorges Dam, the world's largest hydropower project, is completed.[29] | Government Statistics. |
| The CPC acknowledges pollution has degraded the PRC's environment to a critical level, threatening health and social stability.[29] This is globally acknowledged as the PRC becomes recognised as the world's biggest CO2 emitter: by 2008, 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in the PRC.[8] The PRC joins the WTO, however, despite the CPC acknowledging the extent of environmental damage across the PRC the WTO membership accelerates manufacturing.[7][14] | |

| Date: Post-Introduction of Ecological Civilisation | Event | Context |
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| 2007 | China ranks the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, overtaking the U.S. for the first time and being responsible for 27 percent of global emissions in the year.[1] | Global Statistics |
| | 2007 is known as the PRC's "first year of climate change communication research." [15] | Research |
| | SEPA's Official Report on the PRC's Environment declares all seven major rivers in the PRC moderately polluted, and grades eleven out of the 28 major lakes with the lowest national standard for water quality, which means the water is essentially unusable for any purpose.[7] | Government Research/Report |
| | The Food and Drug Agency chief is executed for taking bribes. Food and drug scandals have sparked international fears about the safety of Chinese exports.[29] | Health Scandal |
| | Ecological Civilisation is first used by the CPC when Hu Jintao introduced the term in his report to conclude the 17 th National Congress of the CPC. International statistics, government research and the national health scandal all highlight the importance in the CPC better acknowledging environmental degradation across the PRC. | |
| 2008 | Sichuan province earthquake.[29] | Environmental crisis |
| | Beijing hosts the Olympic Games.[29] | Foreign Policy. |
| | The PRC is recognised as the world's biggest CO2 emitter. By 2008, 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in the PRC.[8] | International Statistics |
| | The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is amended to reinforce control.[7] | Law |
| | Nearly 53,000 Chinese children fall ill after drinking tainted milk, leading Premier Wen Jiabao to apologise for the scandal.[29] | Health Crisis |
| | SEPA is promoted to become the Ministry of Environmental Protection. MEP research suggests that air pollution has begun to reduce by gathering reliable SO2 emissions data from continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS), at the prefecture level, and goes on to increase the number of enforcement officials by 17 percent.[4] | Government Research |
| | Building on from the introduction of Ecological Civilisation at the 17 th National Congress in 2007, 2008 sees the promotion of SEPA to become the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Funding is increased allowing for greater detail in research and the hiring of more staff to enforce environmental protection policies and laws. | |

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| 2009 | The PRC experiences a 17.7% rise in exports in December, suggesting it has overtaken Germany as the world's biggest exporter by the end of 2009. | Foreign Policy |
| | Hu Jintao claims that the PRC will increase efforts to improve energy efficiency and curb the rise in CO2 emissions whilst at the UN climate summit in New York.[34] | Foreign Policy |
| | Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attended Copenhagen climate summit (COP15), where the PRC proposed emissions cuts of 40 to 45 percent compared with 2005 levels by 2020. The nonbinding deal, where the target of limiting warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius, was agreed.[35][36] | Foreign Policy |
| | The CPC begin to make international statements on their environmental governance intentions to curb carbon emissions domestically, in particular are CO2 emissions linked to the use of coal. | |
| 2010 | The Administration Regulations of Ozone Depleting Substances legislation is enacted. The Island Conservation Law is enacted.[12] | Law |
| | The MEP estimate the cost of pollution at 1.5 trillion RMB, or 3.5 percent of the GDP.[1] | Government Research |
| | Census data reveals nearly half of all households primarily use solid fuels for cooking, and four out of five of these households are in rural areas.[16] | Government Research (Air pollution) |
| | Research by the Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD) estimates the ambient air pollution in the PRC led to 1.2 million premature deaths in 2010 alone.[5] | International Research |
| | Global UN Climate Talks are hosted by the PRC. Almost 200 countries were represented at the weeklong discussions. The talks were the last to be had before the UN climate summit in Mexico at the end of the year. Activists requested for money to be made available to help developing countries whilst calling for tough emission cuts to be made by rich countries.[37] | Foreign Policy |
| | Vice-President Xi Jinping named vice-chairman of powerful Central Military Commission, in a move widely seen as a step towards succeeding President Hu Jintao.[29] | Leadership Change |
| | Research continued, introducing new laws and policy, linked to the reduction in CO2 emissions and the use of coal. Research also begins to focus on the economic burden on pollution on the PRC. The PRC continue to engage in the international agenda for combating climate change. | |
| 2011 | The PRC formally overtakes Japan to become the world's second-largest economy.[29] | International Statistics |
| | Xie Zhenhua, vice chair of the National Development and Reform Commission, said that to let emissions rise to the same levels as the U.S., with regards to CO2 emissions per person, would be a "disaster for the world" claiming that the PRC will not allow for it.[38] | Foreign Policy |

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| | The PRC continue to develop economically, furthering domestic development, whilst making international statements regarding their environmental governance intentions. | |
| 2012 | CPC figures suggest the urban population outnumbers the PRC's rural population for the first time.[29] | Government Statistics |
| | The Qidong protest takes place as an environmental protest against a proposed waste water pipeline in the Chinese city of Qidong.[17][18] | Citizen Protest |
| | The CPC holds the 18 th NPC, which is expected to start a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. Vice-President and heir-apparent Xi Jinping takes over as party chief (and assumes the presidency in March 2013).[29] | Leadership Change |
| | Xi Jinping takes over CPC leadership from Hu Jintao. With this change comes the acknowledgement that PRC is changing, especially with regards to the movement of people from the countryside into cities. There is also a notable increase in public awareness and dissent over environmental conditions nationally. | |
| 2013 | A severe haze covers many provinces and cities in the PRC. The haze, with its unprecedentedly high index of PM2.5 concentration and extremely low visibility, provokes worldwide concern and eventually becomes known as "Airpocalypse".[5] | Domestic Environment Crisis |
| | The CPC declares "war on pollution". Efforts to curb smog included closing down or moving heavily polluting factories and restrictions on the use of cars.[19] | Government Declarations & Policy. |
| | Xi Jinping launches an efficiency and anti-corruption drive.[29] | Policy |
| | The Fisheries Law is amended. The Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law is amended.[12] | Policy Reform |
| | Politician Chen Jiping, the former leading member of the party's Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs, states that environmental issues are a major reason for "mass incidents" in the country, estimating unofficial gatherings of one hundred or more that range from peaceful protest to rioting.[1] | Government Research |
| | More than 7,500 dead pigs are found in the Huangpu river. The news is spread rapidly online. An estimated 16,000 diseased pig carcasses are found in tributaries of the river.[1][20] | Environmental Crisis (water pollution) |
| | The CPC's National Development and Reform Commission issues its first nationwide blueprint for climate change, outlining an extensive list of objectives for 2020.[1] | Domestic Policy |
| | Xi Jinping's leadership brings a number of significant changes. The number of environmental crises acknowledged increases, as does the government's awareness of environmental protest taking place nationally. Massive changes in policy are introduced in terms of environmental protection specifically, and regarding corruption more broadly. | |

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| 2014 | The CPC necessitates fifteen thousand factories, including large state-owned enterprises, to publicly report real-time figures on air emissions and water discharges.[1] | Policy |
| | The Ministry of Finance reports that 21.1 billion yuan will be spent on energy conservation and environmental protection in 2014; this is up 7.1 percent from 2013. An amount of 64.9 billion yuan was also allocated to agriculture, forestry and water conservation, up 8.6 percent.[21] | Policy |
| | Chinese Premier Li Keqiang opens the annual meeting of parliament and announces pollution as one of his nine "major tasks" for 2014.[1][21] | Government Speech and Policy |
| | The CPC strengthens the Environmental Protection Law for the first time in twenty-five years.[1] | Law Reform |
| | Asian air pollution, especially smog from the PRC, is seen to be having a far-reaching impact on global weather patterns and in particular is strengthening Pacific storms. [30] | Global Environmental Crisis |
| | In a joint statement on climate change with the U.S., the PRC commits to hit peak carbon emissions by 2030 and to have renewables account for 20 percent of its energy source by 2030.[1] | International Policy |
| | Groundwater supplies in more than 60 percent of major cities are categorised by the MEP as "bad to very bad," and more than a quarter of the PRC's key rivers are considered "unfit for human contact." [1] | Government Research |
| | The PRC becomes one of the biggest investors in renewables, investing nearly US\$90 billion in 2014 as part of the CPC's pledge to cut carbon intensity; an amount far outspending the U.S.'s US\$51.8 billion.[1] | Domestic Policy & U.S. Policy |
| | Approximately 4 billion tons of coal are consumed in the country in the year, more than the rest of the world combined.[22] | Research |
| | The PRC signs a 30-year deal, worth an estimated \$400bn, for gas supplies from Russia's Gazprom.[29] | Foreign Policy |
| | The PRC's economic growth falls to its lowest level for more than 20 years - 7.4% percent in 2014. Government revises growth targets down.[29] | Economic Policy |
| | The PRC is recognised as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and is responsible for 27 percent of global emissions in 2014.[1] However, further changes are initiated to suggest a real shift towards better monitoring and prevention of pollution. International research continue to paint a bad picture and international statements continue to portray a positive future outcome. | |
| 2015 | Coal power plants nationally have their capacity increased by 55 percent in the first six months: 155 new coal-fired plants are approved and the CPC admits that it has underreported annual coal consumption since 2000.[1] | Government Statement & Policy |
| | An International team of researchers demonstrate how the global assumptions made for the PRC's CO2 emissions has vastly over estimated the amount of carbon emitted by the PRC's coal-fired power stations. When scientists tested the | International Research |

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| | types of coal burned in the PRC, they found it produced 40% less carbon than had been erroneously assumed. The researchers say the discrepancy is significant. Over the period 2000-2013, they found that the PRC emitted almost three gigatonnes of carbon less than previous estimates, which is around 10% of the global total in any one year.[39] | |
| | The CPC airs <i>Under the Dome</i> , an environmental documentary exposing Beijing's true pollution levels and the government corruption behind them. The film is watched by millions of people and goes viral, before being abruptly removed from the Chinese internet one week later.[1][6] | Government Information, Public Protest & Government Censorship |
| | Beijing authorities took drastic action to ensure blue skies during the largest military parade held: a showcase marking the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II. The day after the parade the familiar sight and smell of dull grey pollution returned.[31] | Government Intervention |
| | The rate of deaths attributable to air pollution across the PRC is estimated at 115 deaths per 100,000 people. Comparisons include the estimated figures for India at 138 deaths per 100,000 people, 49 in Japan, 43 in Western Europe and 31 in the U.S..[16] | International Statistics |
| | The CPC issued the highest-level alert for air pollution for the second time, in December 2015. Particulate pollution at the end of November measured at almost 30 times WHO the recommended level; there was much criticism that not enough was being done.[32] | Air Pollution Crisis |
| | 3.78 billion cubic meters of untreated wastewater was discharged across the PRC in 2015. This is water that has been ruled unusable for agricultural, industrial and even decorative purposes dumped into rivers and lakes.[23] | Research: Environmental Crisis |
| | Economic growth in 2015 falls to lowest rate in 25 years (6.9%, down from 7.3% in 2014), and IMF predicts further deceleration over next two years.[29] | International Statistics |
| | Despite attempts at governmental transparency, ultimately 2015 concluded with more negative instances of the CPC's handling of environmental governance, alongside continued economic decline. | |
| 2016 | The State Council releases the "Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan" or "Soil Ten Plan". It aims to "improve soil quality and ensure safe agricultural products resulting in a healthy living environment for China's population". The plan consists of 231 specific actions, and deadlines are given.[24] | Policy |
| | The Innovative Financing for Air Pollution Control in Jing-Jin-Ji Region Programme is launched, with the goal to finance projects helping to reduce coal consumption.[22] | Research and Design & Policy |
| | US and China formally join pact and ratify the Paris Agreement. This statement was made just before the B20 Summit in Hangzhou.[40] | Foreign Policy |
| | The slow economic growth continues, with the 2016 marking the PRC's slowest growth (6.7%) since 1990.[29] | Government Statistics |

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| | <p>The human-induced carbon dioxide emissions in the PRC account for approximately 30% of global emissions.[9] However, introduced policies start showing promising results. Coal use declines, and the declining trend continues to accelerate along the decade.[10] The CPC begin to provide more specific details of what actions need to be carried out. Importantly, Xi Jinping ratifies the Paris Agreement making taking a big step towards improved global environmental conditions.</p> | |
| 2017 | <p>A new team of environmental police are introduced to reduce hazardous levels of toxic smog engulfing Beijing. Cai Qi, the city's acting mayor said the police force will look for local sources of air pollution, including open-air barbecues and dusty roads.[33]</p> | Policy |
| | <p>Xi Jinping, on a State visit to Washington, announces that the PRC will initiate a national cap-and-trade emissions program.[1]</p> | International Visit & Domestic Policy |
| | <p>The MEP calculates an annual average PM2.5 concentration of 43 µg/m³ for cities in 2017; this is more than 4 times the level of 10 µg/m³ recommended by the WHO.[4]</p> | Government Statistics |
| | <p>The CPC makes a second amendment to the Water Pollution Prevention Act. Based on the first regulation of Water Pollution Prevention Act in 1996, the amendment would increase the punishment for water pollution and the penalty ceiling may be raised to 1 million yuan.[25]</p> | Policy Amendment. |
| | <p>More than 150 coal-fired power plants are halted after launching the first regional Environmental Protection Bureau to consolidate cuts in air pollution following the 19th NPC. The measures are a part of an aggressive action plan that aims to cut wintertime particulate pollution by 15% year-on-year over the next five months.[26]</p> | Policy |
| | <p>President Donald Trump withdraws the U.S. from the Paris Climate Accord.[41]</p> | U.S. Foreign Policy |
| | <p>The CPC votes at its 19th NPC to enshrine Xi Jinping's name and ideology in its constitution, elevating him to the level as founder Mao Zedong.[29]</p> | Leadership Change |
| | <p>Xi Jinping continues to make more international statements regarding furthering the pollution control measures within the PRC, especially with regards to CO₂. Coal-fired power plants begin to be stopped. Donald Trump withdraws the U.S. from the Paris Agreement.</p> | |
| 2018 | <p>The National People's Congress annual legislative meeting votes to remove a two-term limit on the presidency from the constitution; allowing Xi Jinping to remain in office for longer than the conventional decade for recent Chinese leaders.[29]</p> | Leadership Change |
| | <p>A revision of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is approved by the 19th National People's Congress and goes into effect.[27]</p> | Law Reform |

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| | Four years after declaring war on pollution, research gives promising results, and estimate longer life expectancy across the PRC. Cities have cut concentrations of fine particulates in the air by 32 percent on average, in only four years.[28] | Research |
| | During major reorganisation of the CPC's ministries, the MEP became the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The MEE's authority will expand to consolidate pollution-related responsibilities currently allocated among several other ministries, as well as assuming responsibility for climate change policy from the National Development and Reform Commission, a powerful economic planning agency which developed the national emissions trading system launched in late 2017. Specifically, the MEE will expand its authority with respect to supervision and prevention of groundwater pollution, wastewater emission control, protection of rivers, non-point source agricultural runoff, protection of oceanic environments, environmental oversight for China's massive South-North Water Transfer Project, and responsibility for climate change and emissions reduction policies.[42] | Institutional Development |
| | Xi Jinping's leadership in increasingly cemented, both constitutionally and in terms of declared results by the MEE. The major reorganisation of CPC ministries specifically highlights the importance of environmental protection moving forward. | |

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