

**A corpus-based discourse analysis of representations of
people with schizophrenia in the British press between 2000
and 2015**



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Declaration

This thesis has not been submitted in support of an application for another degree at this or any other university. It is the result of my own work and includes nothing that is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated. Many of the ideas in this thesis were the product of discussion with my supervisor Paul Baker.

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A corpus-based discourse analysis of representations of people with schizophrenia in the UK press

between 2000 and 2015

- James Balfour – October 2019

Abstract

Roughly one in a hundred people experience symptoms of schizophrenia during their lifetime, symptoms which include experiencing delusions and hallucinations, such as hearing voices (Johnstone and Frith, 2004). The frequency and intensity of symptoms is exacerbated by widespread negative attitudes and increases the likelihood that an individual will comply with command hallucinations (Harrison and Gill, 2010; Goldstone *et al.*, 2012). In spite of this, the mass media continues to represent people with schizophrenia in an inaccurate and stereotypical way (Clement and Foster, 2008; Chopra and Doody, 2007). This fosters widespread misunderstandings and negative assumptions around the disorder. These misunderstandings gain traction because schizophrenia is widely misunderstood by the public at large (Jensen *et al.*, 2016), and because people are unlikely to have first-hand experiences with people with schizophrenia. Despite the harmful nature of media representations, no study to date has seriously considered how misconceptions of schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia are mediated linguistically in the media. This is curious given that scholars in fields outside of Linguistics are increasingly recognising that the manner in which mental illness is represented plays an important role in reproducing stereotypical and prejudiced attitudes (Goulden *et al.*, 2011, Kalucy *et al.*, 2011). With these considerations in mind, this thesis draws on theories and methods from the field of Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) to examine representations of people with schizophrenia in articles published in the British press between 2000 and 2015. This thesis uses a combination of corpus toolkits (Wordsmith 5.0, Sketch Engine) to examine repetitive lexicogrammatical patterns in articles published in the press that

refer to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. It takes a particular interest in ‘non-obvious meaning’ (Partington, 2012:11), meanings that are only visible when examining how lexicogrammatical patterns converge around broader semantic and evaluative structures in large repositories of text. Do these patterns, working cumulatively over hundreds and thousands of texts suggest certain ways of understanding or viewing schizophrenia that would not be discernible to the naked eye?

The root of the problem revealed in the analysis was a tension between reporting schizophrenia accurately and the press’ interest in reporting on schizophrenia in a way that is newsworthy in accordance with news values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Jewkes, 2015). In particular, there was a tendency to report on exceptional cases of people with schizophrenia (e.g. worst cases where people experience florid symptoms, people with schizophrenia who have succeeded creatively) that do not represent the majority of people diagnosed with the disorder. In the same vein, there was also a tendency for the press to repackage hard news as entertainment, for instance, by interdiscursively drawing on language and tropes associated with horror fiction. Salient language patterns converged around two main discourses: (1) that people with schizophrenia pose a risk to others, and (2) that people with schizophrenia who kill are intentional immoral agents. The analysis also identified a problematic metaphorical usage, which potentially reproduced the widespread misassumption that schizophrenia refers to a ‘split-personality disorder’ (e.g. Jensen *et al.*, 2015). I conclude by supporting a suggestion made in the academic literature (e.g. Ellison *et al.*, 2018) that the diagnostic term ‘schizophrenia’ should be relabelled so that individuals diagnosed with the disorder do not carry the additional burden of negative stereotypes and misassumptions associated with the label.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Preamble

In September 2006, *The Independent*, a British newspaper, published an article in which the author extolled the beauty of the New Zealand countryside. Among descriptions of the beautiful landscapes, tourist attractions, and the local flora and fauna, the author recounts a warning given by a local fisherman.

- (1) “Wildlife-wise, there are not just hammerhead sharks in these parts, he told me, but school sharks and mako sharks – the paranoid schizophrenics of the shark world (*The Independent*, 2 September 2006).

What may seem like a passing reference to paranoid schizophrenia gives rise to a number of questions. Can sharks or other animals be diagnosed with schizophrenia? And is it possible that an entire subspecies of shark can be defined via such a diagnosis? The lack of hedging in the excerpt would suggest that this the case. However, schizophrenia has not yet been observed in non-human animals. In fact, some psychologists hypothesise that schizophrenia is a brain disorder unique to humans, an unfortunate by-product of our highly evolved brains, and our ability to produce language (Burns, 2004; Preuss, 2012). We must therefore view the reference to paranoid schizophrenia as metaphorical. But what do paranoid schizophrenics have in common with mako sharks? The website *sharksiders.com*, an online bestiary which provides reader-friendly information on different shark species, describes the mako shark as ‘an

incredible and extremely fast beast’ that is ‘easily identified due to their strange (and mean looking) teeth¹. Given popular misconceptions that people with mental illnesses are violent, dangerous and scary (see below), it would seem that the local fisherman quoted in the article is describing mako sharks as *the paranoid schizophrenics of the shark world* in order to highlight their perceived dangerousness. Thus, the metaphor suggests that mako sharks are scary and dangerous members of their species, just as paranoid schizophrenic people are assumed to be scary and dangerous humans. We could unpack the metaphor even further. If paranoid schizophrenics are dangerous in the same way that school and mako sharks are dangerous, does this suggest that the violent behaviour of paranoid schizophrenics is just part of their nature and that they cannot help it? Are paranoid schizophrenics vindicated of responsibility for their actions, in the same way sharks are? Are they to be viewed as a separate species, unchangeable and irredeemable, to be kept at arm’s length and shunned?

As we shall see in this thesis, these associations are not confined to this example, but are characteristic of how the British national press report on people with schizophrenia. Mining a large repository of text using a combination of computer tools and close linguistic analysis, I examine the repetitive ways that the press use language to represent people with schizophrenia. In doing so, I address these questions and others, with reference to dominant patterns in the press’ reportage. In this introduction section, I have given an overview of the thesis. In Section 1.2, I provide a brief account of the history of the diagnostic concept of schizophrenia from the mid-nineteenth century to

¹ <https://www.sharksider.com/mako-shark/>

the present. In Section 1.3, I discuss the motivations driving the thesis, particularly the potentially positive social implications of my findings. In Section 1.4, I describe the original contributions of my thesis, while 1.5. gives my research questions and 1.6 details the structure of the thesis.

1.2. Schizophrenia: a brief historical overview

Recent estimates suggest that 1 in 100 people in the UK will experience symptoms of schizophrenia in their lifetime (Johnstone and Frith, 2003:1). Nevertheless, research shows that the disorder is misunderstood by the majority of the public (Jensen *et al.*, 2015; Scior, Potts and Furnham, 2013). For this reason, I dedicate some space in this introduction to describing what a diagnosis of schizophrenia has been understood by psychiatrists to mean. This is by no means a simple task, as it has been defined in different ways throughout its near-200 year history. Neither is schizophrenia an uncontroversial subject today, with some clinicians criticising its legitimacy as a coherent diagnostic concept (e.g. Boyle, 2002). Thus, the purpose of this section is to give the reader a flavour of the different ways that schizophrenia has been understood. These different perspectives will also underlie some of the representations encountered in the forthcoming chapters.

Schizophrenia as a diagnostic term owes its existence to the 19th century German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin. In the sixth edition of his *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie* (1899), a classification of mental disorders (or ‘nosology’), he distinguished two types of psychosis, manic-depressive disorder and dementia praecox. The latter - derived from the Latin *prae* (‘before’) + *coquō* (‘ripe’) - referred to a what Kraepelin saw as a

neurodegenerative disease that primarily affected young people. Kraepelin's compendium was a landmark text as it viewed so-called 'madness', not as a product of unreason, moral deviance or subjection to evil spirits, as had often been the case at different points through history (see Hinshaw, 2007, Chapter 3), but as a physical deformity in the brain. In other words, schizophrenia became a neuropathological concept, that is, a mental illness. Kraepelin's nosology was important, being the forerunner to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), the two most influential handbooks of standardised diagnostic criteria used by clinicians today.

Kraepelin's observations were later developed by the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler who applied Freud's theory of psychoanalysis to his own observations of dementia praecox. Bleuler redefined dementia praecox as 'schizophrenia', which is derived from the Greek *skhizein* meaning 'to split' and *phrēn*, meaning 'mind', thus literally translating into English as 'split mind'. However, schizophrenia is unrelated to a split identity disorder – now formally diagnosed as 'dissociative identity disorder' (American Psychiatric Association, 2013:291-298) – which is a common misconception (Jensen *et al.*, 2015). Instead, Bleuler ([1911] 1950:8) offers the clarification that 'I call dementia praecox 'schizophrenia' because (as I hope to demonstrate) the 'splitting' of the different psychiatric functions is one of its most important characteristics.' This 'splitting' referred to what he saw as, for instance, the incoherent expression of thought via speech, and a split between thoughts and emotions. He also viewed schizophrenia, not as a single condition, but a set of related conditions, referring to them in the title of his book as the 'group of schizophrenias' (1950).

Bleuler (1950:7) also coined the word form ‘schizophrenic’, which he felt circumvented the traditional psychiatric nomenclature which ‘only designates the disease, not the diseased.’. The justification behind the term ‘schizophrenic’ was later rearticulated by the psychiatrist R.D. Laing in his book *The Divided Self* (1960), which helped to popularise the anti-psychiatry movement. As Laing puts it, ‘[n]o one has schizophrenia, like having a cold. The patient has not ‘got’ schizophrenia. He is schizophrenic’ (his emphasis) (1960:34). In other words, the nominal form ‘schizophrenic’ highlights that a patient’s diagnosis is a core part of who they are. In contrast, labels which grammatically separate patients’ identities out into separate parts (e.g. *person with schizophrenia*) may exacerbate the sense of a fragmented self which Laing believed was the main cause of schizophrenia. However, today, use of the word schizophrenic is often criticised. For instance, the UK-based mental health awareness campaign *Time to Change* disapproves of journalists’ use of the word *schizophrenic*, primarily because it reduces people to ‘the sum total of the symptoms they experience.’² However, Laing’s perspective shows that use of the term was well-intended, being an early attempt to view patients holistically as people, and to view appropriate use of language as an important component in a patient’s recovery and wellbeing.

One controversial aspect of Laing’s account of schizophrenia was his hypothesis that schizophrenia was caused by abnormal communication practices between parent and child. Laing’s view drew on Bateson’s (1972:195-196) hypothesis that symptoms were caused, not by brain abnormalities, but a psychological phenomenon caused by a

² <https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/blog/schizophrenic-man-bbc-media-language>

‘double bind’. Double binds occurred as a result of a parent making two mutually-exclusive demands, where a successful response to one would result in a failure to respond to the other. While Singer and Wynne (1965) found some tentative evidence at the time for Laing’s hypothesis, their study was later found not to be replicable and the deviance scores attributed to the parents of children with schizophrenia were found to be skewed as a result of a small number of families in the sample. Early psychiatrists could therefore be criticised for blaming parents on the basis of speculation and anecdotal evidence. As Frith and Johnson (2003:114-5) put it, ‘to be the parent of a patient with schizophrenia causes enough suffering without the added distress of being told, on the basis of little evidence, that you may be the cause of the breakdown’.

From the 1970s onwards, schizophrenia was increasingly viewed from a Neo-Kraepelinian perspective, as a physical illness, rather than an abnormality of thought, and in terms of its physical symptoms rather than underlying psychodynamic causes. Modern diagnostic criteria are largely based on Schneider’s (1959) set of ‘first rank symptoms’ which he felt distinguished schizophrenia from other psychoses. These symptoms each led to a fragmented sense of self, where the patient was unable to distinguish their own thoughts and feelings from those of others. These included ‘thought insertion’, where the patient believed that thoughts are placed into their minds by others and “‘made” volitional acts’ where the patient feels as if someone else is controlling their actions. Today, the DSM and ICD are the two most influential formalised classifications of mental disorders in the West. The DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), which is currently in its 5th edition primarily informs psychiatric practice in America, whereas the ICD (World Health Organisation, 1992)

informs practice in the UK and the rest of Europe. As the latest edition of the DSM was published 11 years later than the latest edition of the ICD, and, because, as a result, the DSM partially informs the ICD, I will primarily draw on diagnostic criteria in the DSM where necessary. Here schizophrenia spectrum disorders are ‘defined by abnormalities in one or more of the following five domains: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking (speech), grossly disorganised or abnormal motor behaviour (including catatonia), and negative symptoms’ (2013:87). Delusions are ‘fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence’, whereas hallucinations are ‘perception-like experiences that occur without an external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full force and impact of normal perceptions, and not under voluntary control.’ (ibid.). The DSM and the ICD differ in their sub-classifications of schizophrenia. For instance, paranoid schizophrenia is only mentioned in the ICD, which it acknowledges as the most commonly diagnosed type of schizophrenia in the world (WHO, 1992), but this sub-classification is not found in the DSM.

For the public at large, schizophrenia remains a poorly understood concept. With some mental disorders, there are visible traces of brain damage. For instance, with Alzheimer’s disease, plaques and tangles in brain tissue can be found using neuroimaging (e.g. Dolgin, 2018). The disorder is also linked specific genes (Cowan, Kopnisky and Hyman, 2002). However, no physical traces of schizophrenia have yet been observed. While neuroimaging has found that people diagnosed with schizophrenia are likely to have reduced activity in their frontal lobes (Andreason, *et al.*, 1986), this is not found in all patients. There is also the hypothesis that schizophrenia is caused by an excess of dopamine in the mesolimbic pathway (Di Forti, Lappin and

Murray, 2007) and, indeed, anti-psychotic drugs which block the dopamine receptor D2, have been shown in many cases to ease recovery. However, again, antipsychotics are not conducive to recovery for all patients.

The causes (or ‘aetiologies’) of schizophrenia are also rooted in speculation. The dominant view is that schizophrenia has a genetic basis. For instance, Gottesman and Wolfgram (1991) found that if the parents of a child both had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the child’s risk of developing schizophrenia increased from 1% to 50%. Other proposed aetiologies include drug consumption, particularly cannabis (Andréasson, Allebeck and Rydberg, 1989) and amphetamines (Bramness *et al.*, 2014), stressful life events (Day *et al.*, 1987), living in an urban environment (Sundquist, Frank and Sundquist, 2004) or childhood trauma (Janssen *et al.*, 2004). Despite these uncertainties, the prognosis for people with schizophrenia is improving. Given advances in treatment, today roughly 45% of people diagnosed with schizophrenia recover after one or more psychotic episodes, with roughly 20% exhibiting ‘unremitting symptoms’ (Barbato, 1998).

1.3. Motivations

There are various reasons why it is important to examine representations of people with schizophrenia in the press. Despite affecting 1% of the British population, schizophrenia is one of the most widely misunderstood mental disorders. On the one hand, it is frequently confused with a split personality disorder. For instance, Jensen *et al.* (2015) asked 440 respondents in Denmark to complete a questionnaire about what they thought some symptoms of schizophrenia were. They found that 70.9% of respondents believed

that people with schizophrenia were suffering from a split personality phenomenon. This is curious given that 32.9% said they knew someone with schizophrenia. It is perhaps a testament to the influence of media representations that popular prejudices may over-ride personal experiences. This is supported by Philo (1994:174) who found that 21% of a focus group of 70 people said that they still believed that people with mental illnesses were violent and dangerous despite having had a non-violent experience with someone with a mental illness. They traced this back to representations in the mass media. One of the potential reasons why schizophrenia is so misunderstood is that psychotic symptoms are difficult for people to empathise with, in a way that illnesses such as anxiety disorders and depression are not (Frith and Johnstone, 2004:123). This is largely due to our level of familiarity with its symptoms. Whereas feelings of anxiousness, and sadness and hopelessness (symptoms of anxiety disorders and depression respectively) are experienced by most people during their lifetimes (however fleetingly), psychotic symptoms like delusions and hallucinations are experienced much more rarely. Thus, by examining dominant representations of schizophrenia in the press, I aim to examine how the press might contribute to popular misconceptions around the disorder and suggest guidelines regarding how journalists might help increase awareness of its true symptoms.

Furnham and Murao (1999) suggest that the lack of accurate information about schizophrenia provides a space for negative misassumptions to arise. Schizophrenia is one of the worst examples of a mental health disorder attracting incredibly negative misassumptions (Sayce, 2000:60), with some scholars viewing stigma as a secondary impairment of the disorder (Shulz, Jaggi and Schleifer, 2003; Wing, 1978). These

negative stereotypes are stigmatising, in that they define an aspect of someone's identity in terms of an 'undesired differentness' (Goffman, 1963:15) where there is a discord between a group's 'virtual social identity' realised by these misassumptions and their 'real social identity' (ibid. 12). Whereas public perceptions of other mental illnesses are ameliorating over time (Angermeyer and Matschinger, 2005), this is not the case with schizophrenia (Corrigan, Markowitz and Watson, 2004). Perceptions typically centre around people with schizophrenia as being violent and dangerous (e.g. Clement and Foster, 2008; Chopra and Doody, 2007). However, studies have shown that people diagnosed with schizophrenia are not significantly more likely to commit violent crimes than the general population when a drug addiction comorbidity is factored into the analysis (Fazel and Grann, 2009a; Fazel and Grann, 2009b). In other words, violent crimes are primarily caused by drug addiction, and not schizophrenia. Elsewhere, Brekke *et al.* (2001) found that people with schizophrenia are 14 times more likely to be the victims of violent crime rather than arrested as a perpetrator. Neither do crimes committed by people with schizophrenia constitute a significant proportion of all crimes. Fazel and Grann (2006) found that only 5% of crimes committed over a 13 year period in Sweden were committed by people with schizophrenia.

Negative attitudes towards schizophrenia even extend to professionals. Mittal *et al.* (2014), conducting a study in the US, found that healthcare professionals' attitudes were more negative towards people with schizophrenia than people who didn't have the disorder. Even within the field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) (introduced in Section 2.1), language relating to people with schizophrenia can be used in a problematic way. Norman Fairclough, one of the founders of the field, writing about the

English Language, writes that ‘There is an element of schizophrenia about standard English, in the sense that it aspires to be [...] a national language [...] and yet remains in many respects a class dialect.’ (1989:57). Here, the word ‘schizophrenic’ is used metaphorically to refer to the conflicting identity of the English Language. This seems to reproduce the misassumption that having a diagnosis of schizophrenia is the same as having a split personality disorder.

The national press have been shown to shape their readers’ attitudes towards people with mental illnesses. For instance, Angermeyer *et al.* (2005) found that people in Germany who regularly read tabloid newspapers typically desired greater social distance from people with schizophrenia. Elsewhere, Corrigan, Powell and Michaels (2013) showed respondents a news story that either reported on the recovery of someone with a mental illness or a story depicting a dysfunctional mental health system, and then assessed their attitudes towards people with mental illnesses via a questionnaire. They found that respondents given the positive story were significantly more likely to express positive attitudes towards people with mental illnesses whereas those who received the negative story were more likely to express negative attitudes. Likewise, Dietrich *et al.* (2006) found that adolescents who were shown stories depicting mentally ill people committing violent crimes were more likely to express the belief that mentally ill people are violent and dangerous in a subsequent questionnaire. Those shown a more informative article were less likely to use words like ‘violent’ and ‘dangerous’ in their responses. These studies suggest that the language used in news stories shape the language readers use themselves towards people with mental illnesses.

Other examples of studies linking negative attitudes with media exposure include Bowman and West (2019) and Quintero Johnson and Riles (2018).

Widespread stigma has a negative impact on the health and well-being of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Bifftu, Dachu and Tiruneh (2014) and Gerlinger *et al.* (2013) found that the ability for people with schizophrenia to resist stigma is quite low and Karakaş, Okanlı and Yılmaz (2016) found that people with schizophrenia had high levels of internalised stigma, known in the literature as ‘self-stigma’ (Harrison and Gill, 2010). The negative effects of stigma can apply to various aspects of a schizophrenic person’s life, such as well-being, health and socio-economic status. For instance, stigma tends to limit their life chances, leading to poverty (Vick, Jones and Mitra, 2012; Saha, Chant and McGrath, 2007) and social withdrawal (Karakaş *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, those who self-stigmatise are more likely to interpret their psychotic symptoms negatively, which contributes to higher levels of stress (Aakre, Klingaman and Docherty, 2015). Stigma may also induce self-esteem problems (Kim *et al.*, 2015), and diminish a sense of hope, leading to a poorer quality of life (Livingston and Boyd, 2010). This may deter people with schizophrenia from seeking professional psychiatric help. Indeed, the World Mental Health Survey found that only 58% of people diagnosed with schizophrenia sought professional treatment (cited in Olafsdottir and Pescosolido, 2011:932). There is even reason to believe that representations of people with schizophrenia as violent criminals is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Harrison and Gill (2010) found that internalised stigma leads to low self-esteem issues and increases the likelihood that an individual experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia will not seek professional medical help. This is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of

psychotic symptoms (Goldstone *et al.* 2012:1369) and the likelihood that an individual experiencing command hallucinations³ will comply with their demands (Barrowcliff and Haddock, 2006).

Some readers may object to my focus on the diagnostic term ‘schizophrenia’ on the grounds that diagnostic labels are inherently stigmatising. Labelling Theory, which originated in Criminology, suggests that social deviance is a product of labels themselves assigned to people by social elites (e.g. Blumer, 1969; Becker, 1963). For instance, labelling theorists believe that rehabilitation programmes are doomed from the start, because they involve labelling criminals as just that, ‘criminals’. Scheff (1966), who applied labelling theory in the context of mental illness, suggested that people with mental illnesses only displayed deviant behaviours because they conformed to the expectations suggested by a diagnostic label. However, many people diagnosed with schizophrenia have found the diagnostic label useful. For instance, Tucker (2009), who conducted interviews with people with schizophrenia, found that some interviewees viewed diagnostic labels and symptoms as useful as it enabled them to understand their own symptoms and also comprised a useful metalanguage that helped to explain and justify their behaviour to others. Furnham and Muraio (1999:936) also found that members of the public who viewed schizophrenia according to the prevailing biomedical model were more likely to accurately diagnose it and Olafsdottr and

³ Command hallucinations are hallucinations which take the form of commands. They can appear to be auditory or inside a person’s mind.

Pescosolido (2011:936), found that people who viewed the disorder according to the medical model were faster at seeking out professional treatment.

One may also object to the focus on the diagnostic label on the grounds that it simply doesn't exist. For instance, Boyle (2002:206ff) regards schizophrenia as a dubious clinical concept, as its diagnosis is based on a psychiatrist's interpretation rather than observable behaviours. Instead, she believes that its legitimacy as a diagnostic concept is sustained merely via rhetorical devices such as the use of highly technical (although impenetrable) language and what she refers to as a 'discourse of progress' where words such as 'discoveries' and 'innovations' are used by the medical community to suggest that their understanding of schizophrenia is improving when it isn't. However, this is not a thesis that aims to appraise the credibility of the diagnosis. From a linguistic point of view, (whether commentators approve of it or not) schizophrenia and words relating to it are used in meaningful ways in the media to refer directly or indirectly to people who experience hallucinations and delusions, and this has important implications regarding how these people live their lives. My thesis therefore does not directly explore whether the term schizophrenia is 'useful' in itself but the way that the word (and related forms) are represented in the press (in useful ways or otherwise).

1.4. Originality of contribution

This is the first large scale linguistic study examining how the British national press use language to represent people with schizophrenia. As such, it can be viewed as parallel to other large-scale corpus-based studies examining how marginalised identities are represented in public discourse. These include Baker, Gabrielatos and McEney's

(2013) study examining the representation of Muslims in the British press 1998-2009 and Baker's (2005) study of public discourses around gay men. Widespread stigma towards people with mental illnesses is increasingly being taken as seriously by scholars as Islamophobia and homophobia, although a label for the phenomenon has not yet fallen in widespread use. Cheung (2015) has reviewed some of the labels, which include the unfortunately named 'mentalism' (Chamberlin, 1978) and also 'sanism' (Birnbaum in Cheung, 2015).

While there is a reasonably sized body of scholarship that has examined representations of people with mental illnesses in the press, these have tended to have some limitations. For instance, many of studies focus on a narrow time frame, rarely more than three years (e.g. Goulden *et al.*, 2011; Kalucy *et al.*, 2011; Kenez *et al.*, 2015). They also tend to be limited to specific genres of news. For instance, several focus solely on hard news stories, excluding articles that feature in entertainment or business sections of newspapers (e.g. Kenez, Halloran and Liamputtong, 2015; Paterson, 2007). This is an oversight, as attitudes towards marginalised groups are shaped by more than hard news stories. Anderson (2003:298), for instance, observes how various media, including news, television and film all collaborate and borrow from each other in their representation of people with mental illnesses. Other studies exclude online articles (e.g. Vilhauer, 2015) which are increasingly providing newspapers with a substantial proportion of their readership. For instance, according to Ofcom's (2018) report, more people read *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* online than in print. By using a corpus linguistic approach, I am able to examine patterns in a large dataset that is fully representative of articles published by the British national press between 2000 and

2015, which mention schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. This entails that the analysis is not biased towards a particular year or sub-genre of reporting.

The majority of previous studies also take a content-analysis approach where analysts count the frequency of a certain topic or theme in a sample of texts (e.g. Goulden *et al.*, 2011; Vilhauer, 2015; Rydderich, *et al.*, 2016). As a result, these studies typically focus on the incidence of topics and almost never consider how they are linguistically instantiated. This is curious given that some researchers have suggested language and style as an area of interest. Goulden *et al.* (2011:5), for instance, acknowledged that ‘[w]hat concerns campaigners more is [...] *how* such incidents are reported’ and that ‘clearly inflammatory language is quite rare.’, with the press presumably reproducing stereotypes in more indirect ways. Likewise, Kalucy *et al.* (2011:546) suggest that, in response to more stringent guidelines from independent regulators, the press’ biased reporting ‘may have its foundations in the manner in which mental illness is reported rather than [just] selective over-reporting.’ Due to increasing regulation as a result of the Leveson Inquiry, the British press are likely to be more cautious in publishing overtly stigmatising stories, and are instead likely to engage in more subtle strategies. An advantage of the corpus approach that I take in this thesis (see Section 2.1.3.1) is that it is able to uncover ‘non-obvious meaning’, that is, ‘meaning which might not be readily available to naked-eye perusal’ (Partington, 2012:11). By examining repeated linguistic patterns across hundreds of texts, I am able to reveal assumptions and values implicit in the language used by the press which would not otherwise be noticed by the naked eye. Another problem with content analysis is that it tends to employ a deductive approach where the analyst looks for the incidence of a topic which is thought up in advance. By

using corpus based methods where I focus on themes which emerge as salient in the data, I am able to potentially uncover original patterns in the reportage.

By describing frequent negative assumptions and values relating to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia reproduced by the press, the analysis may also contribute towards developing new interview methods to help people diagnosed with schizophrenia with the problem of self-stigma (see above). One of the issues with self-stigma is that it is difficult to assess in patients as previous interview methods are unreliable (Rüsch *et al.*, 2010). These findings may also be used by charities that are trying to dispel negative stereotypes around schizophrenia by informing anti-stigma campaigns.

1.5. Research questions

This thesis uses a combination of theories and methodologies from Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) to examine how language is used to represent people with schizophrenia in articles published in nine British national newspapers between 2000 and 2015. The thesis takes an explicitly critical stance, evaluating linguistic features and broader themes which emerge through the analysis and reflecting on how representations may contribute to stigma, and negatively impact the health or wellbeing of people diagnosed with the disorder. In order to maximise findings, the analysis orients towards the corpus-driven end of the methodological continuum (Tonghini-Bolonelli, 2001), where the focus of analysis is guided by patterns identified by statistical calculations rather than the analyst's own interests or

hypotheses. The analysis is structured into four chapters, each of which addresses an aspect of the over-arching research question:

How do the British Press use language to represent people with schizophrenia?

Chapters 4 and 5 address questions 1 and 2 respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 both address question 3.

1. What do lexicogrammatical patterns around words referring to people with schizophrenia say about the way such people are typically represented in the British press? (Chapter 4)
2. What distinctive words are used by the tabloids and broadsheets when reporting on stories that mention schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia? Do the ways in which such words are used in context shed light on differences in how people with schizophrenia are represented in the tabloids and broadsheets? (Chapter 5)
3. How do the British press use language to re-contextualise violence committed by people with schizophrenia? How is the press' re-contextualisation of these crimes likely to shape a reader's blame judgement? (Chapters 6 & 7)

The thesis does not align itself with a specific theoretical approach, instead choosing to draw on theoretical concepts when and where they help describe or explain linguistic patterns.

1.6. Structure of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I locate this thesis in its research context, first by providing overviews of the fields of CDS and CL, and then discussing previous scholarship that overlaps with the topic of this thesis. In Chapter 3, I provide a summary of my data collection process, with a particular focus on the nature of duplicated articles in my data and how I removed them. The second part of the chapter discusses some of the basic corpus linguistic methods that are used in the analysis.

Chapter 4 commences the analysis part of the thesis. I begin by providing a broad overview of how schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia are represented in the data by examining grammatical collocates of the three most frequent words referring to explicitly to schizophrenia. This is achieved by using the ‘word sketch tool’ in the corpus analysis software Sketch Engine. In Chapter 5, I turn my focus towards differences between how sub-corpora consisting of tabloids and broadsheets represent schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia in distinctive ways. This involved calculating the top strongest keywords in each sub-corpus relative to the other and conducting a concordance analysis of each list. In Chapter 6, I begin formulating my methodological approach for Chapter 7, which examines ways in which the British press re-contextualise violence committed by schizophrenic people in terms of responsibility. To date, no research in CDS or Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) has examined the linguistic representation of responsibility, so forming a new methodology for examining it was necessary. In Chapter 7, I apply the methodological framework formulated in Chapter 6 to the data. This involves examining collocates of the 10 most frequent words referring to violent crime committed by schizophrenic

people in the corpus and grouping them according to various responsibility criteria discussed in the literature.

In Chapter 8, I conclude my thesis by summarising my findings, linking them to broader social issues and providing guidelines for how the press could make their reporting of schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia less unnecessarily stigmatising. I then provide some brief reflections on my methodology and findings before making some final closing remarks.

2. Literature Review

In this chapter, I explore relevant background literature that will inform the analysis. I also contextualise my research among the fields of CDS, Corpus Linguistics and other CADS research examining topics relating to mental health.

2.1. Critical Discourse Studies

This thesis draws on theories and methods from Corpus Linguistics and CDS. In this section, I outline some of the characteristics of CDS research and, in doing so, provide working definitions of key concepts.

CDS developed out of Critical Linguistics, a field developed by scholars at the University of East Anglia using linguistic theory to describe how language was manipulated, primarily in news media, to obscure meanings and mislead readers (e.g. Fowler, 1979). The field has since expanded into Critical Discourse Analysis, a term which is now preferred (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). More recently, van Dijk (2009:62) has suggested the term Critical Discourse Studies in order to highlight that this is a broad area of study that involves more than descriptive analyses (e.g. new theories about language etc.). The pluralised term *studies* also highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field. That is, that it doesn't involve a single way of doing analysis but captures a variety of different theories and methods. CDS can be understood as encapsulating three central foci, each linked with a word in its name. First, language should be examined as 'discourse', that is, as made meaningful by text producers and text recipients, and shaped by the social context under which it is produced (see Section

2.1.1). Second, work in CDS should not merely be descriptive, but also ‘critical’ of power relations enacted and sustained through discourse (see Section 2.1.2). Third, it captures a heterogenous set of ‘studies’, which draw on a range of theories and methods (see Section 2.1.3).

2.1.1. Working definitions of discourse (non-count noun), discourses (count noun) and representation

CDS is concerned with analysing text as discourse. However, the term discourse has a ‘bewildering array’ of definitions in CDA research (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013:2). Owing to these different definitions, the meaning of the term can easily become muddled and ambiguous if not carefully defined at the outset. The following section thus sets out some working definitions of the term that will be used in this thesis.

2.1.1.1. Discourse (non-count noun)

Émil Benveniste ([1966] 1971) first proposed the term discourse as an alternative to *language* to distinguish two levels of linguistic analysis. The word ‘language’ is appropriate in contexts where language is described as an abstract system, divorced from the real-life situations in which it is used (à la Structuralist approaches to linguistics). Alternatively, ‘discourse’ is appropriate when language is described as part of an utterance, used in a particular situation for a particular purpose. We might say that whereas language refers to meaning-making under the microscope, discourse refers to meaning-making in its natural habitat.

To quote Benveniste (1971:209),

‘Discourse must be understood in its widest sense: every utterance assuming a speaker and hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the other in some way.’ (Benveniste, [1966] 1971:209]

Thus, when we analyse linguistic structures as discourse, we examine them as part of an intended social action between producers and recipients (see Austin, 1962), and not just in terms of their formal characteristics. One of the ironies of discourse analysis is that discourse becomes a static text (or Benveniste’s understanding of Language) once it is recorded to carry out discourse analysis. To examine newspaper texts as discourse, we would require direct insight into how journalists cognitively process texts in the moment and how readers interpret stories when and where they pick up the newspaper, both of which are currently impossible. Instead, it is more accurate to say that we as discourse analysts examine a ‘trace of discourse’ (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013:2-3).

Once language is viewed as existing in the here-and-now, and not an abstract virtual reality, linguists begin to recognise that language is an inherently social affair. Not only is language an act of communication between a producer and interpreter as Benveniste (1971) sought to emphasise, but a set of resources circulated between users. After all, the language we speak is not our own invention but a conventional system, where forms are associated with certain meanings, and certain forms are associated with certain contexts. This system is circulated between speakers and passed on intergenerationally through time. Thus, discourse is permeated with the voices of others, and their

assumptions and values (Bakhtin, 1981). When we use language, we choose to draw on certain assumptions and values, and reject others.

With these considerations in mind, Fairclough (1989) expands on Benveniste's definition of discourse to include the influence of social and historical forces on language and interaction. For Fairclough (1989:25), the interactants and their intended meaning comprise only one level of description, the '*Interaction*' level. This contrasts with the '*Textual*' level, which describes the linguistic structures employed by the text producer(s). However, he also observes the textual and interactional levels (the structures one chooses, one's goals for producing a text, how one interprets it) are shaped by the social/societal conditions in which they are produced. These refer to both the immediate situational context and the broader socio-political forces that determine the way we compose linguistic utterances.


'Linguistic phenomena are social in the sense that whenever people speak or listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have social effects' (Fairclough, 1989:22-3).

Fairclough calls this the '*Context*' level. He illustrates the relationship between these levels via concentric rectangles (see Figure 2.1).

These three levels correspond to three levels of analysis: 'description', 'interpretation' and 'explanation' (ibid. 26). During description, the linguist describes the relationship between form and meaning with reference to a formal grammar. During interpretation, the linguist uses linguistic evidence to speculate on the goals of the interactants and how they compose and interpret the text respectively. During explanation, they explain how

the text and its interactional features are shaped by the social conditions under which they are produced.

Figure 2.1 Fairclough's (1989:25) illustration of the relationship between text, interaction and social context



To summarise, 'discourse' as a non-count noun is used in the following sense in this thesis:

Discourse (non-count noun):	language recognised as a trace of a social event involving text producers and interpreters, the conditions of which are socially shaped and shaping (Fairclough, 1989, Benveniste, 1971)
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2.1.1.2. *Discourse (count noun)*

A discourse can also be defined as linguistic structures (e.g. words, metaphors etc.), and other language practices, associated with a particular genre (e.g. news discourse) or professional domain (e.g. medical discourse) (Bakhtin, 1981). Thus, a discourse is viewed as akin to a ‘social language’ (ibid. 275), a shared metalanguage or jargon associated with a certain domain that constructs the world in a certain way according to the goals associated with that genre. Discourses as vocabularies have arisen to meet certain demands in certain social contexts. A medical discourse features vocabulary that is polysyllabic and typically of Greek origin (e.g. *paragonimiasis*, *campylobacteriosis*) because it needs to be unambiguous and highly specific, whereas literary discourse tends to use vocabulary that relates to sensory experience (*bright*, *gentle*, *pungent*) in an effort to be more vivid and evoke imagery. Linguistic features are often redolent of a particular discourse. For instance, a word such as *schizophrenia* calls to mind a psychiatric discourse, comprising other words such as *symptoms* and *diagnoses*, whereas *loony* is more redolent of a lay or populist discourse around mental illness, which also includes words such as *crazy* and *nutter*.

To summarise, *discourse* as a non-count noun is also used in the following sense:

Discourse (count noun):	a linguistic inventory (words, metaphors, pragmatic strategies etc.) associated with a genre or professional domain that serve its goals (Bakhtin, 1981)
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This meaning of discourse is related to a third, broader meaning which has been taken up by social constructionists who posit we construct certain version of reality for ourselves through linguistic and broader social practices (e.g. Burr, 1995). Each of these visions of the world, embodied in a set of utterances, is a discourse. While this sense of the word originates in Foucault (1972), Hall's (1992:291) definition more clearly articulates the central role played by language.

‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about –a way of representing the knowledge about –a particular topic at a particular topic at a particular historical moment’.

The inventory of linguistic resources and practices we routinely use inevitably constructs a particular worldview. This is most apparent with epistemological rather than ontological concepts (those that do vs. those that don't have any tangible materiality), such as gender, morality or what it means to be mentally ill⁴. For instance, heteronormative discourses around gender and sexuality construct a worldview whereby individuals are either men or women (and perform behaviours prescribed by those gender roles) depending on their biological sex. In the same way, traditional discourses around animals construct them as inherently different from humans. These contrast with more humanitarian discourses that attribute personhood to animals and construct them as social and emotional beings much like us (Cook, 2015). Thus, the linguistic resources and practices we routinely use are inseparable from the worldview we carve out for

⁴ The distinction between ontological and epistemological concepts is made in Parker (1992).

ourselves. A characteristic of a discourse is that they are composed of ‘systems of representations’ (Hall *et al.*, 1992:17). In other words, a discourse is rarely stated explicitly but is implicit in the ways individuals routinely use language in a particular domain to represent the world. To return to the example above, people will rarely describe the characteristics typifying men and women (unless they feel this worldview is being challenged). Instead, this worldview is implicit in the way individuals use language to represent people (e.g. their use of gendered pronouns, language practices used when speaking to individuals perceived as men and women etc.).

To summarise, a discourse is also used in the following broader sense:

Discourses (count noun)	A certain worldview constructed via a set of linguistic resources and practices (Hall, 1992; Burr, 1995)
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2.1.1.3. *Representation*

Language doesn’t accurately reflect the world but constructs a certain version or representation of events. Bakhtin (1981) illustrates this process using a metaphor where a word is construed as a ray of light cast upon its referent. Each word can only illuminate one side of the object and not the entire object. In the same way, linguistic structures inevitably highlight some aspects of a referent at the expense of others. Hence, the words *schizophrenic* and *psycho* may both be used in different texts to refer to the same referent, but they draw attention to very different aspects of each. For the former it is their place among formalised psychiatric criteria, while for the latter it is

their antisocial and dangerous characteristics. As Hall's (1992) definition of discourse above makes clear, a discourse is comprised of a collection of representations that together represent the object in a coherent way. Thus, a discourse in the social constructionist sense can be viewed as a broad assumption about the world implicit in a set of coherent representations.

To summarise, a representation is used in the following sense:

Representation	an inevitable process where a linguistic structure (e.g. word, wording, metaphor...) highlights and backgrounds certain aspects of its referent (Bakhtin, 1981)
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2.1.2. *Critical research*

CDS is goal-oriented in that, as well as describing and interpreting language in use, practitioners evaluate the implications of certain linguistic choices at the societal level, specifically where they contribute to the disempowerment of social groups (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; van Dijk, 1993:249-250; Flowerdew, 2012:179). It thus adheres to the values of the Frankfurt school who argued that academia should play a role in critiquing and challenging societal injustices or abuse of power (Horkheimer, 1937).

2.1.2.1. *Ideology*

Discourses (in both senses) are thus appropriated, prioritised and deployed by social elites in order to serve their own value systems. This value system is their *ideology*.

Thus, while discourses flesh out a theoretical paradigm (what is perceived as true or false), ideology dictates an ethical one (what we should do or shouldn't do). Put another way, discourses claim to tell us what *is*, ideologies claim to tell us what *ought*. This is a useful strategy for distinguishing a discourse from an ideology. After all, it would be unusual to think of an opinion as true or false, or a fact as right or wrong. An ideology is also a 'higher-order' category in that it prioritises certain discourses and makes them appear connected to one another in what looks like a coherent way.

As ethical systems, they are typically political or religious in character (e.g. *neoliberal ideology*, *Christian-Judeo ideology*). However, ideologies are rarely made explicit in texts. In contrast to the more traditional Marxist view of ideology, which saw it as an explicit set of 'ruling ideas' consciously recognised by bourgeoisie and proletariat alike, (Marx and Engels, [1846] 2004:39), Althusser, ([1970] 2004) observed that ideology was more insidious. Instead, social subjects entertain belief systems that are often not in their own interests, which have been inculcated in them from an early age through a set of seemingly innocuous state institutions, such as the hospital, school and the media. Indeed, ideologies may appear like discourses in that they are frequently presented as indisputable. Thus, while some discourses are presented as 'true' or 'objective', some ideologies are presented as 'rational' or 'commonsensical', which conceals their subjective nature.

To summarise, an ideology is used in the following sense:

Ideology	A value system associated with a particular (usually political or religious group). An ideology will
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	appropriate and deploy certain discourses in order to achieve its goals.
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2.1.2.2. *Discourses, ideologies and power*

Dominant discourses (in both senses of the term) do not necessarily evolve naturally. They may evolve because of certain social conditions. After all, it is social elites, who have access to public channels of communication (e.g. journalists) who are able to dictate which discourses are more appropriate (van Dijk, 1996). In contrast, discourses serving the interests of marginalised identities, such as people with schizophrenia, who do not have access to public channels, are likewise marginalised. This is not to say that social elites are self-aware machiavels, pulling the strings behind the scenes. Instead, social elites will use their privileges to promote discourses that are in their own interests, not necessarily being aware that alternate discourses exist, or of the limitations of their own discourses.. Journalists in the UK, after all, represent a relatively homogenous demographic made up of university educated, white individuals (Kirby, 2016) who, like many of the population, are unlikely to have had first-hand experiences with people with schizophrenia. As a result, the interests of more marginalised identities may not always be apparent when choosing news stories and composing news texts (journalistic ethos and the practices behind news production are discussed more extensively in Section 2.2.5.)

Dominant discourses are likely to endure because of both habit (via priming) and social sanctions. When we hear or read linguistic structures, we tend to also remember, or be ‘primed’ according to, their co-text and wider context as part of their meaning (Hoey,

2007). This further entrenches a certain idea of what is appropriate language use in a particular domain. As Hoey (2007:15-16) goes on to remark, 'fluency is the result of conformity to one's primings.'. Thus, a new journalist begins to draw on certain discourses because they comprise 'good practice'. Dominant discourses are also enforced by social sanctions. One is suddenly perceived as less competent, less interesting or less humorous etc. when they try to test the boundaries of what is deemed appropriate language use in specific situations. Individuals' prestige and privileges in society are on the line as a result. The idea that discourses are tied to social situations also helps explain why social subjects (in the sense of 'subjects of discourse') often draw on a set of inconsistent and even contradictory discourses as they navigate different social situations (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). A journalist may draw on a very different set of discourses sat at their writing desk, for instance, than when speaking with their family at dinner.

Owing to the plurality of discourses and ideologies, discourse analysts are able to expose them for what they are by recognising another way of structuring experience. By recognising different ways of linguistically representing and constructing the same object, we are able 'to look at one of these languages through the eyes of another language' (Bakhtin, 1981:295), and thus reveal their potential limitations or problematic nature. Thus, a discourse analyst must be able to embrace what the Romantic poet John Keats referred to as 'negative capability', that is, the ability to be open to all ways of perceiving when contemplating an object, and not only those perceived as authentic or appropriate by contemporary standards (Li, 2009). From here, practitioners are able to critically evaluate which are useful and fair, or problematic and unfair. Problematic

discourses and ideologies may then be challenged via awareness campaigns and policy changes.

Of course, CDS need not be an entirely political endeavour. It may also be useful as an epistemological enquiry. Nietzsche argued that exploring different ways of seeing was the royal road to objectivity. That, by developing fluency in many discourses and ideologies, we are better able to see and understand the objects we speak of. The truth doesn't exist within discourses but across them. To quote Nietzsche (1887 in Tanner, 2000):

‘There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’, and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity” be’.

2.1.3. Interdisciplinarity

CDS draws on theories from diverse fields from within and outside Linguistics. Wodak and Meyer (2009:9) suggest that ‘critical theory should improve the understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences, including economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology and psychology.’ As CDS is committed to denaturalising discourses and ideologies, it makes sense that practitioners should draw on a range of analytic perspectives, as well as combining them creatively, in order to defamiliarise ourselves with naturalised discourses and ideologies. For this reason, van Dijk (2009:62) has proposed that the field should be renamed Critical Discourse ‘studies’ in order to emphasise its theoretical and methodological heterogeneity. In this

section, I discuss some of the main fields, theories and methods I draw on in my analysis.

2.1.3.1. *Corpus Linguistics*

Corpus Linguistics is a field in which a combination of computer tools and manual analysis are used to look for and examine patterns in large machine-readable text files (McEnery and Wilson, 2001). It is part of a now dominant empiricist tradition, where theories are based on observable patterns in authentic language examples, rather than former rationalist approaches, which intuited theories about language based on invented examples (e.g. generative grammar, structuralist semiotics). Indeed, since the ‘corpus revolution’ (Leech, 2000:676), which began with the emergence of electronic corpora in the 1960s, CL has shown that our intuitions about language are often incorrect. As Sinclair (1991) has observed, our understanding of how to use language is often confined to the immediate context in which we use it.

CL is a partly quantitative approach in that it measures the frequency and probability of language features (Partington *et al.*, 2013). All corpus tools are designed to measure the frequency with which linguistic features occur. Almost all packages can also measure the statistical significance of that frequency by comparing how often features occur with the probability that we would expect it to occur were due to chance. However, as Biber and Conrad (2001) have highlighted, CL ‘is much more than just bean-counting’ and, while CL research is grounded in quantitative evidence, almost all CL-assisted analysis

interweaves qualitative and quantitative methods. For instance, particularly salient examples of patterns are typically examined in more detail, with reference to the interactional and social levels of context (see above). However, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative analysis is misleading. To quantify a feature, we must first decide what should be counted (e.g. a word form, a metaphor), and the level of abstraction at which it should be counted (e.g. the word form vs. lemma; particular instantiation vs. conceptual metaphor). These frequencies are then viewed as more or less salient depending on a certain subjective view of statistical significance. Even once the particular phenomenon has been counted, qualitative analysis is necessary to give meaning to those results. As Baker *et al.* (2008) have noted, qualitative data does not have independent value, and must be interpreted subjectively in light of other frequencies and certain research goals if it is to be meaningful. Thus, corpus analysis inevitably involves a merging of quantitative and qualitative methods.

2.1.3.2. *Lexical Grammar*

CL methods were instrumental in informing the theory of Lexical Grammar (Sinclair, 1991, Halliday, 1966). Lexical Grammar challenges popular perceptions of what a word is by positing that individuated orthographic words are rarely a product of single linguistic choices. Instead, Sinclair (1991:110ff) suggests that language processing is governed by an ‘idiom principle’ where language is composed of multi-word sequences called ‘extended lexical units’ that vary according to their length and internal variability. Thus, texts are not like walls, in which individual words are set like bricks,

but like constellations, where certain words are like planets in that they attract certain other words into their orbits.

An extended lexical unit subsumes various patterns. Lexical associations are called collocations and refer to words that occur unusually frequently in the co-textual environment of another word⁵. The association may be directional. For instance, McEnery (2006:18) provides the example of the collocation *red herring*. Whereas we are likely to encounter *red* when we read *herring*, we are unlikely to encounter *herring* when we encounter *red*. Hence, *herring* collocates with *red* but not vice versa.

Alternatively, associations based on grammatical criteria are called colligations, which refer to associations between a word and a specific word class (Hoey, 1997). For instance, Sinclair (1998:15) found that the word *budge* tended to occur with unusual frequency after a modal auxiliary verb. Importantly, this relationship, between a word form and a grammatical category, is not accounted for by traditional grammars.

Last, associations based on semantic criteria are those where a word co-occurs unusually frequently with a specific semantic field (a set of words that share meanings). Stubbs (2001:65) named this process ‘semantic preference’. For instance, Baker (2006) found that the phrase *glass of* tends to co-occur with words referring to cold drinks such as *water* and *lemonade*.

Semantic preference may cause a feature to develop a ‘semantic prosody’. This is a process where a word’s meaning is shaped by its semantic preference(s). As Louw

⁵ hence, *co-* (mutual) *-location* (environment)

(1993:157) puts it, semantic prosody is the ‘consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates.’ This is a result of ‘priming’, where characteristic features of a word’s co-text and context are stored in our long-term memories (Hoey, 2007). Louw (1993:171) argues that semantic prosody is a polar affair, that is, ‘can bifurcate into general notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’’. However, Sinclair (2004) (to whom Louw attributes the term) argues that it may involve more specific semantic categories. For instance, he argues that the word *budge* has a semantic preference for words relating to ‘difficulty’ (ibid.), while *undergo* has a semantic prosody of ‘involuntary’ (Stubbs 2001). In order to distinguish these two processes, if a word co-occurs with a specific evaluative polarity (i.e. positive or negative), then I follow Partington *et al.* (2013) in referring to this as ‘evaluative prosody’. However, if a word co-occurs unusually frequently with a specific semantic field, then I refer to this as ‘discourse prosody’, although I acknowledge here that this term has been used by some scholars to capture both processes (e.g. Stubbs, 2001).

2.1.3.3. *Advantages of a methodological synergy between Corpus Linguistics and CDA*

CL and CDS practitioners as fields are ideal bedfellows because they share an interest in authentic, naturally occurring language data, and recognise language as a social affair (Mautner, 2009). Baker *et al.* (2008) argue that a ‘cross-pollination’ between the two fields helps to minimise the limitations of both while at the same time maximising their respective advantages. For instance, traditional approaches to CDS have been criticised for carrying out a ‘partial analysis’, where analysts observe patterns in a small number

of texts are then extrapolate those findings to the language variety as a whole (Widdowson, 1995). In using CL methods, the analyst is able to examine large corpora that are partially or fully representative of texts in language variety and is hence able justifiably to make claims regarding that variety as a whole. In addition, a corpus-driven approach, where the topics or patterns raised for analysis are those chosen by the computer tool in use rather than the analyst (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001), helps reduce the tendency to ‘cherry-pick’ (Mautner, 2007:6) texts that conform to a priori biases. In this way, a corpus-driven methodology is conducive to ‘serendipitous discoveries’ (Partington *et al.*, 2013:9). Use of a reference corpus may also guard against over-interpretation. O’Halloran and Coffin (2004) recommend using a reference corpus to identify contexts in which words typically occur in a language variety that a reader is likely to be routinely exposed to (e.g. other texts of the same text type, or a general corpus of the same language variety). This enables the analyst to more accurately deduce how a word or wording is likely to be interpreted by a text’s audience.

CL techniques are also conducive to identifying discourses and ideologies. For instance, Mills (2004:15) suggests ‘a discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context’. This reflects the observation made by Hall *et al.* (1992) that discourses comprise a coherent set of representations (see above). Rarely will this systematicity be evident within a text, but between texts, where discourses are noticeable by virtue of their ‘incremental effect’ (Baker, 2006:13). The same applies to ideologies. Adolphs (2006:20) suggests that semantic prosodies provide insight into certain values that are implicitly encoded in texts. Thus, via these methods, a CL

methodology can aid CDS practitioners by uncovering what Teubert (2000:76-77) has called ‘subliminal messages’ that underlie texts.

Theories developed within CL may also help resolve Stubbs’ (1997) criticism of CDS that it does not explain the link between linguistic structures and the worldviews of text interpreters. Hoey’s (2005) theory of lexical priming suggests that a word’s co-text (its collocations, colligations and semantic preference) are stored in our long-term memories and inform the way we interpret and (re-)produce language. This suggests that individuals who are exposed routinely to certain text types are likely to reproduce the assumptions and values characteristic of that text type in their language. This is unlikely to be a conscious affair. As we have seen, language patterns often conceal certain discourses and ideologies and, because of this, speakers may find themselves inadvertently promulgating discourses and ideologies, which they may disagree with, through instinctual language choices made in specific contexts. As Barthes ([1967] 1977:143) puts it, ‘it is language which speaks, not the author.’ (For more on the relationship between text types and their readership see Section 2.2.1).

However, CL methods can pose some problems for CDS practitioners. For instance, Fowler (1991:68) argues that ‘CDS cannot be carried out by machines’, while similarly Fowler and Kress (1979:198) protested that ‘pulling decontextualized features out a corpus is the very antithesis of our approach.’. However, corpus linguists never work with frequency lists alone, but also closely examine how each word is used in context. CDS practitioners using CL methods should also be wary of equating frequency with significance. There are many factors that determine the cognitive salience of a feature in a discourse community. For instance, psychological studies have shown that events

connected with strong emotions are more easily memorised (e.g. LaBar and Phelps, 1998; Baddeley, 1982). This suggests that representations that are scary, enraging, humorous etc. are more likely to be memorable than those that elicit a less marked response. Last, as CL techniques are mainly quantitative, they lend themselves to the study of linguistic features that computers can easily identify and quantify. This entails that CL-assisted studies can fall into ‘counting what is easy to count’ (Stubbs and Gerbig, 1993:78) and thus be biased towards surface structure over semantic and pragmatic features. For instance, while words and phrases are quantifiable via their surface form, conceptual metaphors, which have many linguistic instantiations (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) are not. Likewise, pragmatic features such as implied meanings or ‘implicatures’ (Grice, 1975), are not identifiable by the surface form alone but via the interaction between the surface form and the context in which it is produced. Because these phenomena are not identifiable via identical surface structures, they constitute what Baker and Levon (2015:231) call ‘non-patterned uses of language’, which they acknowledge are more difficult to trace using CL methods.

Over the last five years, research in the field has organised around the field of Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) whose overarching goals are loosely set out in Partington *et al.* (2013). One of the major goals of CADS, which is also a focus of this thesis, is the discovery of what Partington calls ‘non-obvious meaning’, that is ‘meaning which might not be readily available to naked-eye perusal’ (ibid. 11). These typically include aspects of the extended unit of meaning (see above). However, within CADS, some analysts take a more critical approach than others. For instance, Partington *et al.* (2013:10) very clearly state that ‘it must be emphasised that CADS is not tied to any

particular school of discourse analysis, certainly not, for instance to *critical* (their emphasis) discourse analysis (CDA). Unlike CDA, it [CADS] has no overarching political agenda.’ However, recent work relating to CADS has embraced the critical impetus associated with CDS (e.g. Potts and Weare, 2018; Baker *et al.*, 2013; Harvey, 2012). This is encouraging. Research purporting to be impartial may be seen as tacitly consenting towards the political status quo (see Lyotard, 1979), and, in a world of growing inequality, populism and extremism, experts have a duty to critique society and help individuals and organisations make decisions which are in the public interest.

2.1.3.4. *Social Actor Representation*

Other theories closely associated with CDS are sometimes drawn upon to describe and interpret findings. Unlike the CADS framework, these theories were not decided upon a priori but were used if they helped describe or elucidate features that emerged from the data-driven analysis. Theories are inevitably useful at explaining some things and not others, so it is important that other theories can be used to explain phenomena that the main theoretical frameworks cannot, rather than attempt to shoehorn phenomena into a framework even when they do not quite fit.

As I am interested in the representation of identities, van Leeuwen’s (2008) theory of Social Actor Representation (SAR) is potentially relevant for my analysis. SAR was developed within the broader framework of Systemic Functional Linguistics which views language as a set of choices among alternatives (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). In the same vein, SAR conceptualises the way in which we represent social groups using language as a closed network of ‘socio-semantic categories’ (2008:23). The

general point is that, when we represent people through language, we are faced with a set of discrete choices, which we use to realise a goal. “[E]ach choice in the system acquires its meanings against the background of other choices which could have been made.” (Eggins, 1994:3). This notion seems to be inherited from de Saussure’s notion of differential meaning, where a word only acquires meaning by virtue of its differences with other words (de Saussure, 1916). In contrast to more traditional approaches, which began with grammatical processes and their obfuscation of agency (e.g. Fairclough, 1989), van Leeuwen begins at the level of semantics. As a result, a contrast is drawn between grammatical and sociosemantic representations. This means that an actor can be represented as agentive grammatically (i.e. located in subject position in a clause) but ‘passivated’ sociosemantically; that is, by representing them lexically as being on the receiving end of a process (e.g. *customer*, *patient* etc.).

Other categories described by van Leeuwen which will be relevant to the forthcoming analysis include ‘functionalisation’, where social actors are represented by means of what they do (i.e. receive treatment). Alternatively, the text producer might have represented social actors via what van Leeuwen calls ‘identification’. One way of referring to social actors via identification is through physical identification, that is, by an aspect of their physicality. Given that mental disorders are increasingly being understood as physical disorders, the label ‘schizophrenic’ may be seen as a form of physical identification. Sometimes, SAR can relate not only to how people are referred to, but whether or not they are referred to at all. Thus, social actors may be backgrounded in texts, where they are not mentioned in relation to an event, but are mentioned elsewhere or can be inferred from the context. Alternatively, they may be

suppressed, where they are not referred to in relation to an event and their presence is unlikely to be inferred. Other categories are introduced and explained in the analysis when they arise.

Several studies have used van Leeuwen's framework for the purposes of CDA research. For instance, Bernard (2018) examined how social actors were represented in the annual reports of two South African mining companies. She found that, while the mining companies themselves were often personalised using personal pronouns (e.g. *we*), employees were often objectivated and aggregated, especially in the context of workplace accidents (e.g. *fatalities*). Employees were also represented through metonymy in terms of their usefulness to the company (e.g. *skills*). Bernard (2018) links these features with a pervading capitalist discourse that constructs employees as human capital.

Social Actor Representation has also been applied to CDA research into healthcare discourse. For instance, Hunt and Kotekyo (2015) examined three Facebook pages providing advice healthcare information to people with diabetes. Social actors were typically individuated (rather than represented as a collective) and activated. This constructed people with diabetes as personally responsible for monitoring their own health.

There is also an emerging tradition of corpus linguistic tools being used to examine the representation of social actors. Lirola (2016) used corpus linguistic techniques to examine the representation of women in three Irish newspapers between 1997-2006. She found, for instance that, over time, women were increasingly being activated,

collectivised and functionalised as workers. She linked these patterns with social changes, namely the incorporation of women into the labour market during the Celtic tiger period.

2.1.3.5. *Hearing voices: Heteroglossia and discourse representation*

News discourse is characterised by a high level of heteroglossia. In other words, it tends to incorporate other people's voices, either via quotes or allusions, in order to flesh out the story being told, and lend it credibility. Speech representation is especially important when representing people with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia, like other mental disorders, is only immediately perceptible to the person with the disorder, and so our accurate representation of the disorder is largely dependent on their testimonies. The testimonies of people with schizophrenia are also likely to come under close scrutiny in cases where they are accused of having committed a crime.

The word *text* shares its etymology with words such as *textile* and *texture*, all deriving from the Latin word *texere*, meaning 'to weave' (Oxford English Dictionary, *text* n. 1)⁶ and, like textiles, texts are interwoven from different threads. For Bakhtin (1981), these threads take the form of types of speech representation and discourses (as social languages). As Bakhtin ([1936] 2004:578) put it, 'every conversation is full of

⁶ <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200002?rskey=yYGMGI&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> (Accessed 13 October 2019).

transmissions and interpretations of other people's words'. These two processes – referencing specific texts and appropriating discourses associated with other text types – are referred to as 'intertextuality' (e.g. Fairclough, 1989) and 'interdiscursivity' (e.g. Bhatia, 2010) respectively.

One of the frameworks for describing intertextuality is Leech and Short's (2007:255ff) framework of discourse representation, which may be used to describe how the speech and thoughts of others is represented in texts. They distinguish five types and arrange them along on a cline of narrator intrusiveness (the extent to which the text that is drawn on is paraphrased by the text producer). Direct discourse representation occurs where the text is quoted verbatim, inserted between speech marks and explicitly attributed to the original text producer via a reporting clause (e.g. *he said 'I'm hungry'*). A less intrusive form of direct representation is free direct discourse representation, where there is no reporting verb and potentially no speech marks (e.g. *I'm hungry*). With indirect discourse representation, the text alluded to is inserted in a subordinate clause after a reporting verb, although deictics (words indexing the text producer's location in time and space) are relevant to the reporter or narrator (*he said that he was hungry*). Indirect discourse representation also has a freer form called free discourse representation. This is like indirect representation, although there is no reporting clause (*he was hungry*). Finally, there is the Narrator's Representation of Speech Act (NRSA), which is where only the speech act (the social action intended by the speaker), rather than the message itself, is oriented to (*he announced his hunger*). Obviously, to most neurotypical people, this only applies to speech, as thoughts cannot be transmitted between people.

Whereas intertextuality involves referencing a specific text inside another text, interdiscursivity involves drawing on discourses, that is, context-specific vocabularies stratified according to profession and genre (see Section 2.1.1.1). According to Bhatia (2010:35), interdiscursivity ‘refers to more innovative attempts to create various forms of hybrid and relatively novel constructs by appropriating or exploiting established conventions or resources associated with other genres and practices.’ Interdiscursivity is often a sign of generic change, or a change in the practices or culture of a particular professional domain (Bhatia, 2010).

2.2. The British press and its language

Language use and other social practices that shape texts are determined by the goals those texts are intended to achieve (e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). Thus, in our case, representations of schizophrenia in the press are largely shaped by the over-arching values and goals of news institutions. The primary goal of any news organisation, like most other businesses, is to maximise profits (Sparks, 1999:45-6). Their second, perhaps, is to avoid regulation and it could be argued that their third is to influence public attitudes according to their respective ideological worldviews. A recognition of these goals is important as it helps explain why journalists make the choices they do when they compose news texts. It is also important that ‘best practice’ guidelines pay at least some consideration to the press’ over-arching goals where possible. Many newspapers are currently in an unstable financial position (see Section 2.2.3), and this should be considered so that proposed guidelines do not significantly threaten sales and cause newspapers to close.

As the primary goal of newspapers is to maximise profits, the process of news production is carried out in a way that maximises newspaper circulation, which includes both ‘hard copy’ print sales and visits to their websites (from which they make advertising revenue). Thus, news stories are put together in a way that makes potential readers want to purchase a newspaper or visit a webpage on the website of newspaper. This is largely achieved by appealing to what have been called ‘news values’.

2.2.1. News values

The theory of news values posits that there is an implicit set of criteria that the press use to select stories for publication (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). These include, for instance, ‘negativity’, ‘unexpectedness’, ‘unambiguity’, and reference to ‘elite nations and persons’. To take ‘negativity’ as an example, bad news is seen as having a higher news value than good news. While it was Lippman (1922), who first observed that the ‘news value’ of a text could increase or decrease according to a narrow set of factors, news values are typically linked with Galtung and Ruge (1965) who expanded the theory into a formal taxonomy. However, the set of values I will draw on in this thesis are primarily those provided by Jewkes (2015). While they are heavily based on the values of Galtung and Ruge (1965), they are adapted specifically to explain the way the press reports on crime, a topic which emerged as frequent in the forthcoming analysis (see Sections 4.5 and 5.3.1).

Jewkes (2015:63) suggests that the value of ‘violence and conflict’ is one of the most salient news values in all forms of contemporary media. This entails that news institutions are likely to publicise a story if it features violence as a main topic. Her

news value of ‘visual spectacle and graphic imagery’ suggests that they are even more likely to report on crime that can be represented graphically (ibid: 64). Jewkes (2015) identifies a political motivation behind these values. She argues that representing violence ‘marks the distinction between those who are of society and those who are outside it.’ (2015:63). In other words, the media may exploit violent events, and the way they tend to implicate actors as victims and villains, in order to characterise certain individuals or groups as desirable and others as undesirable.

Elsewhere, the news value of ‘simplification’ captures the media’s tendency to report on stories that can be reduced to small set of topics or themes. For instance, court cases can easily be reduced to a single moral angle regarding who is blameworthy. This may mean that the media focusses on some aspects of a story that suggest that a belligerent person was responsible and play down other aspects suggesting they weren’t. In contrast, stories that are more complex in terms of blame attribution may be overlooked. Another characteristic of simplified stories is the tendency to view the world in terms of mutually exclusive binary opposites. Individuals are typically characterised as victims or villains, sane or mentally ill, harmless or dangerous by the media. In these ways, ‘simplification’, Jewkes (2015:52) argues, ‘encourages the reader, viewer and listener to suspend their skills of critical interpretation and respond in unanimous accord.’ The news value of ‘simplification’ is particularly important for the press because, as Wodak (1996) has observed, stories that do not demand a critical reading are accessible to a larger readership, thus facilitating greater sales.

Indeed, the moral angle of a story is typically decided before the event even occurs.

Jewkes’ (2015) news value of ‘predictability’ refers to the media’s tendency to report on

events they can either anticipate or prepare for in advance. Predictable events such as the court trials of criminals are newsworthy because a news institution can have a camera crew assembled and establish an angle for the story before the trial even begins. This means that stories can be produced quickly and efficiently, thus increasing the speed of media production. However, despite their tendency to focus on stories they can predict, the media tend to represent crime as something unpredictable. Jewkes' (2015:55) value of 'risk' posits that 'the media persist in presenting a picture of serious crime as random, meaningless, unpredictable and ready to strike anyone at any time.' This is despite evidence showing that violent crimes tend to be carried out between people who know each other, and that violence tends to occur in relatively predictable ways (ibid.).

The media's representation of responsibility is also shaped by the news value of 'individualism' (Jewkes, 2015:63). Adapted from Galtung and Ruge's (1965:68-9) value of 'personalisation', which captures the press' tendency to report on stories aligning with 'cultural idealism' (ibid.), where individuals are constructed as masters of their environment and fortunes, Jewkes' (2015) value of 'individualism' captures the media's tendency to choose to report on crimes perceived to be caused by volitional individuals rather than socio-political forces. Over-representing individuals as fully responsible for violent crimes helps justify the media's ideology of 'populist punitiveness' (Jewkes, 2015:68) which values a strict sense of personal responsibility and thus calls for harsher punishments for offenders. Jewkes (2015:65) views this as a form of 'political diversion' in that focus is taken away from the socio-political motivations for crime (which could help prevent similar crimes from occurring in the

future), and instead towards the comparatively more trivial issue of the length of an offender's sentence.

Harcup and O'Neill (2001) highlight how the goal of news media is not solely to inform their audience but increasingly to entertain them (see also Fairclough, 1995). They write, 'no contemporary set of news values is complete without an "entertainment factor"' (2001:277). They therefore propose 'entertainment' as a news value in its own right, as well as several subcategories or topics that relate to it. These include 'humour' and 'showbiz' (ibid. 275). The subcategory of 'humour' refers to the press' tendency to choose stories or topics that audiences are likely to perceive as humorous, whereas 'showbiz' refers to stories linked to soap operas or minor celebrities. Jewkes (2015:57) also proposes the news value of 'celebrity', but in the context of criminal offenders. She observes, for instance, that criminals of considerable notoriety can become celebrities in their own right. With reference to the 'Yorkshire Ripper', Peter Sutcliffe, who was convicted of murdering 13 women between 1969 and 1980 in Yorkshire, England, Jewkes (2015:59) writes that the media 'treat Sutcliffe as a side-show, an entertaining if somewhat macabre diversion to fill media space when there is little else of import to report.' Jewkes (2015) views this as part of a broader tendency for the media to frame violent crimes as entertainment. She writes that 'crime, humiliation and cruelty are objectified, commodified and desired to the extent where they are widely distributed through all forms of media to be pleurably consumed.' (2015:64).

Scholars differ in what they believe news values refer to. Jewkes (2015:45), for instance, refers to them as 'ideological values' which is in line with a number of other

scholars who view news values as socially constructed (e.g. Fowler, 1991; Bednarek and Caple, 2012). According to this view, news values are criteria of newsworthiness mutually shaped by producers of news texts and their readership, with the media at once trying to appeal to the interests of the public while simultaneously pursuing a political agenda. By repeatedly publishing stories around certain topics and positioning those topics in salient positions in articles or newspapers, the media set the agenda regarding what topics are deemed important for discussion, and thus inculcating in their readers a certain ideology. Certain topics become associated with particular salient positions in newspapers, a process called ‘textual colligation’ (Hoey, 2005), thus leading viewers, through repeated exposure, to believe they are inherently newsworthy. As Hinshaw (2007:119) notes ‘advertising would not be the multibillion dollar industry that it is unless there were strong belief that media exposure affects consumer attitudes and behaviour.’ What is constructed as newsworthy is likely to endorse discourses that help achieve – or, at the very least, do not clash with – the interests of senior members of news institutions. However, journalists working for the British press comprise a very narrow demographic. A report called the Sutton Trust’s Leading People Report by Kirby (2016)⁷ found that 54% of ‘leading journalists’ were Oxbridge educated while only 0.4% were Muslim (Muslims make up 5% of the population overall), and 0.2% were black (2% of the population overall). Thus, the discourses and ideologies drawn on in the press are likely to serve the interests of a particular demographic group which perhaps do not reflect the wider interests of the public at large.

⁷ https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Leading-People_Feb16.pdf

However, some scholars suggest that news values are linked to positivistic human interests. For instance, Jewkes (2015) refers to Presdee (2000), who argues that the public's interest in violence appeals to some primordial instinct, in the same way a public execution in the past might have in the Middle Ages, or a boxing match today. This sentiment is echoed by Labov (2013) who views death and moral judgement as two of the 'three universal centres of interest'. Even in the Victorian era, a markedly different society from our own, grisly tales sold more copies than more other publications. In 1837, the 'execution papers' of James Greenacre, which reported on how he killed his fiancé and dismembered her body, leaving parts all over London sold 1.65 million copies (Altick, [1957] 1998:336). It is likely then, that news values originate from the dialectical interaction between human instincts and press ideology within a capitalist economic system, with the press providing more of the types of articles that prove to be popular with readers over time, while also nudging them along ideologically in certain directions.

That is not to say there are no other ways of accounting for the relationship between media texts and their reader's attitudes. Audience response theorists as far back as Rosenblatt (1938) – in many ways a precursor to reader response theorists of the 1970s – conceptualised reading as a transaction between text producer and reader, where both play a dialectical role in shaping the meaning of texts. This idea was later developed by Fish (1972:217) who viewed a reader's interpretation as largely being based on the 'interpretative communities' they belonged to (i.e. readers that have been exposed to similar texts). Within this climate, Hall (1973:61-2) suggested two ways of opposing a text's preferred reading. One is to decode the text using a 'negotiated code' – where the

reader accepts the beliefs and values therein but views themselves or members of their social group as exceptions. The other is to use an ‘oppositional code’ where the values and beliefs are rejected.

While there is no doubt that each reader’s response to media texts will be nuanced and unique, the evidence suggests that oppositional readings are not the norm. Lynett *et al.* (2019), for instance, showed that readers of the *Daily Mail* were more likely to exhibit implicit biases towards immigrants than readers of *The Guardian*, and that these attitudes mirrored collocation patterns in corpora for the two newspapers. The authors are wary of suggesting a causal relationship, however. It may simply be the case, they suggest, that readers who hold certain views of immigrants are likely to seek out newspapers that reaffirm those attitudes. Given the fierce competition between UK newspapers and their efforts to cling onto their readerships (Glenslade, 1996), a close affiliation between newspapers and certain interpretative communities that share their beliefs and values is likely.

Oppositional readings are also unlikely based on the nature of ideological meaning. Ideological meanings in texts are often implicit and insidious in their influence, often shaping audience beliefs at a more background level of cognition (Adolphs, 2006). If specialists at universities, who are trained in the use of computer tools, need to be employed to uncover these meanings, what chance does a casual reader of news have at identifying and opposing them (also see O’Halloran, 2003)? In fact, the emerging tendency for newspapers to repackage hard news as entertainment is, on the contrary, likely to invite readers to suspend their critical faculties (see Section 8.3.1.2). Neither are negotiated readings likely, at least in the context of representations of schizophrenia.

Studies have suggested that negative media representations of people with schizophrenia are likely to over-ride first-hand experiences (Jensen *et al.*, 2015; Philo, 1996; see Section 1.3), and, as a consequence, readers are unlikely to view individuals with schizophrenia as exceptions to the beliefs and values espoused by the press.

2.2.2. *Discursive strategies: sensationalism and conversationalisation*

Sensationalistic language is a product of news values. Molek-Kozakowska (2013) views sensationalism as a set of strategies used to maximise the news value of a story and thereby maximise its attractiveness to audiences. For instance, she found that, in a sample of headlines published by *The Mail*, over half involved utterances that enacted the speech act of ‘exposing’. This, she argues, frames the information conveyed by news stories as shocking, revelatory and urgent. Another way of saying this is that the headlines appeal to the news value of ‘unexpectedness’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:83). Thus, while news values refer to topics that occur in stories, sensationalism refers to a set of discursive strategies which exaggerate those topics in the story.

Another linguistic strategy employed by the press to increase circulation is what Leech (1966) has called public colloquial, where features of everyday conversations, such as the use of first and second person pronouns, imbue the language with a friendly, informal tone. Fairclough (1995:10) views this tendency towards informal language as part of a broader historical process of ‘conversationalisation’, whereby the language used in the public sphere is becoming increasingly conversational in style over time. By drawing on a populist or lay discourse, the media are able to make their stories

accessible to as wide a readership as possible, and thus helping maximise a newspaper's circulation. Conversational features may also be used for sensationalistic ends as they can maximise the news value of stories on the grounds of simplification. Conversational language is often vague and more context-dependent than formal language, and, when appropriated into writing, can sometimes represent events in broad-brush strokes.

2.2.3. *Tabloidization: a 'disappearing frontier'?*

Despite their best efforts, several technological and cultural changes, driven primarily by the expansion of the internet, and the availability of an ever-growing number of alternative news outlets, have entailed that the circulation and readerships of British national newspapers have been steadily declining. The graph in Figure 2.2 shows how the circulation figures for each newspaper have steadily declined between 2000 and 2009, based on data provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations. On average, British national newspaper sales are declining by half a million readers each year.⁸ However, as previous scholars have noted, the circulations for each newspaper do not tell the full story, as these do not account for readers who access articles via the online websites of newspapers, or multiple people who read the same newspaper (Baker *et al.*, 2013). For instance, Figure 2.3 shows the readership figures for each newspaper between 2013 and 2015 based off data collected by Ofcom⁹.

⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/apr/10/national-daily-newspapers-lose-more-than-half-a-million-readers-in-past-year>

⁹ <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/tv-radio-and-on-demand/news-media/news-consumption>

While readership figures have clearly still been declining over time, the overall readership figures are actually much higher than suggested by the circulation figures. Even in 2015, the readership of *The Mail* is more than twice as high as its circulation in 2009. This is likely because Ofcom records a newspaper's online readership whereas the ABC does not. An exception to this gradual decline in readership is *The Independent*, whose readership has increased by several thousand between 2013 and 2015.

Because of the decrease in circulation and readership, the British press increasingly depend on sensationalistic strategies in order to secure a tighter grip on their circulation figures (Greenslade, 2005). This is part of a wider process of what has been called 'tabloidisation', where features, topics and genres associated with the tabloid press are interdiscursively employed in the broadsheet press. This process relates to the historical distinction between tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. Traditionally this related primarily to format (broadsheets were traditionally printed on larger sheets of paper), whereas the distinction today is largely stylistic. Tabloids typically feature shorter articles that are written in a more informal and humorous style whereas broadsheets traditionally adopt a more formal style. Tabloids also tend to be more interested in topics to do with celebrities, sports and pop culture whereas the broadsheets tend to focus more on politics and international news (Baker *et al.*, 2013).

Figure 2.2 Circulation figures of British national newspapers 2000-2009





Figure 2.3 Readership figures for the British national press 2013-2015



However, because of the process of tabloidization, this distinction is gradually breaking down. Engel (1996:2) writes of a ‘disappearing frontier’ between the tabloids and broadsheets, and Franklin (2008:15) documents the emergence of what he calls the ‘broadloid’. Thus, tabloidization entails that news is increasingly made to seem colourful, but also condensed and easily digestible. It is no coincidence that the word *tabloid* shares its etymology with the word *tablet* (Oxford English Dictionary, *tabloid* n. 1a)¹⁰

The majority of media commentators have been critical of tabloidization as they feel that it threatens democracy. For instance, Fairclough (1995:13) observes ‘there is a diversion of attention and energy from political and social issues [...] people are constructed as spectators of events rather than participating citizens.’ Likewise, Franklin (2008) observes that one of the necessary conditions for a democracy to function effectively is that citizens must be able to have an informed understanding of world affairs (see also Greenslade, 2015). This ‘dumbing down’ of media may also be negatively affecting our capacity for critical thought. As Langer and Chanowitz (1988) suggest, some forms of media breed a state of ‘mindlessness’ in their audience rather than ‘mindfulness’. When we experience something mindfully, we compare our perception of an object against our previous experiences of the object, reshaping each accordingly. When we experience something mindlessly, we merely experience the object without activating higher-level cognitive processes.

¹⁰ <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196821?rskey=xEtN0a&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> (Accessed 13 October 2019).

However, we should be wary of viewing tabloid discourse as inherently harmful. As Gripsrud (2008:37) notes, ‘a totally intellectual or “literary” journalism is practically unthinkable and politically undesirable: too many citizens would be excluded and so would most probably a number of perspectives based on their life worlds.’ (ibid: 37). In other words, the language and values of the tabloids, as well threatening democracy, also helps realise it, in that it makes information accessible to more people, and celebrates popular culture. Discursive strategies such as sensationalism can also help make important but otherwise dull stories more attractive to their readership, and thus foster a national interest towards important issues. Thus it is the contexts in which tabloidese is used, rather than tabloidese per se, that is potentially problematic. The language of the tabloids, with its tendency towards conversational language, often paints stories with a broad brush, and may thus simplify complex stories. In addition, it may come across as flippant at times and thus may be inappropriate when reporting on sensitive issues.

2.2.4. Media regulation

A series of regulating bodies have been established in order to ensure that news institutions are not involved in illegal or unfair practices. Like news values, these rules shape the productive processes of journalists, and help explain why certain features may have been chosen over others. For instance, journalists may choose to convey certain meanings indirectly rather than directly to avoid the censure of regulating bodies. Until 2011, the primary regulator of the press was the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), which provided guidelines for journalists to follow as well as dealing with complaints

made towards the press. However, after the Leveson Inquiry, in which the journalistic ethics of News International (now News UK) were investigated in relation to allegations of phone hacking, the PCC was replaced with the Independent Press Standard Organisation (IPSO).¹¹ Their code of practice¹², which is almost identical to that of the PCC code as of its last update in 2017, lists sixteen rules, each divided into several subclauses. Rules 1. parts i) and iv) and 12. Part i) are most relevant to this thesis, relating to accuracy and stigma respectively.

1. i) The press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information or images, including headlines not supported by the text

iv) The press, while free to editorialise and campaign, must distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact

12. i) ‘The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s race, colour, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or any physical or mental illness or disability

Readers may complain to IPSO if they are found in breach of any of their code of practice. Reports of these complaints are listed on their website. Between January 2017 and December 2018, a total of 22,801 complaints had been made to IPSO. Of the 994

¹¹ All newspapers in the dataset, besides *The Independent* and *The Guardian* are regulated by ISPO

¹² <https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/>

considered for investigation, 736 (74%) were resolved, 124 of these (12.47%) resulting in sanctions aimed towards the news organisation. The most common type of complaint found to be successful were on the grounds of accuracy (40). Looking through the list of successful complaints against British national newspapers, many of the complaints relate to misleading word choices. For instance, in *Various v. Express.co.uk* (2019), The Express newspaper were criticised for their use of the term *clash* to describe a meeting between SNP supporters and Pro-Union activists. The complainants argued that the word *clash* had violent connotations which did not represent events accurately. However, there were no complaints relating to the representation of people with schizophrenia or people with mental illnesses more broadly. This either suggests that the British press are not violating the rules put forward by IPSO when reporting on people with schizophrenia, or that they are using language in more subtle ways that is difficult for readers to notice.

2.2.5. *Journalistic practice and professional ethos*

To provide a full account of the procedures involved in news production is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some recourse to them will be necessary in order to help explain the incidence of repetitive linguistic structures in the corpus. Similarly, it would be naïve to propose guidelines for how the press can improve on their representation of people with schizophrenia without being aware on the various constraints which act upon news production. After all, the degree to which participants are able to deviate from their routine in an activity type is dependent on the constraints that dictate their ‘allowable contributions’ (Levinson, 1979:368).

Scholars are increasingly calling for greater emphasis in CDA research into the relationship between patterns in news texts and the practices, conventions and procedures involved in news production (e.g. Catenaccio *et al.*, 2011; Cotter, 2010). While news institutions have traditionally been secretive about their news selection practices (Brighton and Foy, 2007), there is reason to believe that this curtain is slowly being lifted. For instance, while traditional work in CDA has (perhaps inadvertently) painted a picture of journalists as shadowy masters of obfuscation who mislead readers (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; Fowler, 1979) several studies over the last two decades have contributed a picture which is more nuanced than previously assumed. Hanitzsch *et al.* (2011), conducted a series of interviews with 100 working journalists from 18 countries, to identify patterns in how journalists across the world viewed their role in society. They found remarkable levels of consistency across cultures, where journalists largely viewed their role as to provide political information, and to closely monitor and critique the government. Moreover, their study showed a universal interest in journalistic values such as impartiality and neutrality as well as the reliability of information (see also Guðmundsson and Kristinsson, 2019). However, the results of the survey suggested a utilitarian principle at work where some harm is justified if it ultimately helps contribute to the overall public good. Similarly, Witschge and Nygren (2009) found that contrary to the claims of some media commentators (e.g. Sparks, 1999), journalists expressed a stronger commitment to the public good over other factors such as profit.

Neither are journalists dismissive of positive stories. While theories of news values would have us believe that journalists obsess over negative stories (see Section 2.2.1 above), Leung and Lee (2015:293) showed that journalists in Hong Kong typically

extolled the practice of reporting on positive stories as it ‘brings hope to people when society is in a crisis’. The authors conclude by breaking down a putative contradiction. ‘Being an adversary of power holders’, the authors argue ‘does not mean that journalists should dismiss the media’s role in promoting social solidarity and/or articulating common values.’ (ibid 2015:301). While we should be cautious in assuming that what journalists say they believe is tantamount to what they say they actually believe, these studies do provide a more nuanced picture of journalists than previous work in CDA has assumed. As Harrison (2006:128) puts it, ‘the organisations in which journalists work have a range of aims, from primarily making a profit to prioritising the public interest, with shades of grey in between.’

Several studies have also provided original insights into the processes that impact on news production. For instance, Firmstone (2008) examined the organisational decisions involved in producing editorials about the EU in British newspapers. She identifies various facets to topic selection and news production that largely go unmentioned in CDA research. For instance, while news values play a large role in influencing topic selection, they are not the only factor. Others include, for instance ‘editorial importance’ where a topic is governed by the interest of the editor, or the values enshrined in the newspaper brand itself (ibid.)

Another factor identified by Firmstone (2008) was ‘readership interest’, which influenced topic selection most for the right-leaning newspapers *The Mail*, *The Sun* and *The Telegraph*. With the widespread digitisation of the news around the turn of the century, and the participatory journalism that emerged in the form of reader comments, news institutions are increasingly conscious of how stories will be received. As a result,

newspapers typically employ a social media editor to track trending/viral topics online (Tandoc and Vos, 2016), and articles that receive more ‘clicks’ online are more likely to be covered again (Lee and Tandoc, 2017).

Likewise, the writing process isn’t merely a matter of choosing what to write and writing it. Lead writers will often consult other journalists for advice and opinions on what they write (Catenaccio *et al.*, 2011), and what is written will, to some extent, be influenced by how an individual journalist orients to their professional role (Firmstone, 2008). Likewise, the extent to which an editor rewrites the text before publication differs widely between editors and news institutions (*ibid.*). In short, journalistic decisions are not necessarily dictated at the editorial level, or even by news proprietors, as was traditionally the case (Bell, 1991). Instead, these decisions are increasingly being made by lead writers and negotiated among their peers.

This section has explored some of the working practices of journalists in the UK and around the world which challenge some of the assumptions made about them in some traditional CDA research. These practices will be borne in mind in Section 8.3.2 when guidelines for ‘best practice’ are proposed.

2.3. Stigma and self-stigma

Because much of this thesis is concerned negative representations of schizophrenia, it is worthwhile outlining previous research into stigma. Much contemporary research into stigma has as its theoretical basis the work of Goffman (1963). Drawing insights from his sociological work on self-presentation (1956) and on asylums (1961), Goffman

(1963) examined how individuals manage stigma in everyday interactions. Goffman (1963) traces the origins of stigma to a sense of an ‘undesired differentness’ towards a person (1963:15). From this, members of the wider community construct an ever more elaborate ideology to legitimise their dislike of the stigmatised person.. Often, these ideologies construct the out-group as threatening to the in-group. Thus, according to stigmatising ideologies, Muslims are potential terrorists (Baker *et al.*, 2013) and homosexuals are proselytisers of children (Baker, 2005). Over time, these ideologies fade into ‘implicit biases’ that drive negative attitudes and avoidance behaviours towards marginalised groups (Lynott *et al.*, 2019). Thus, Goffman (1963) showed that stigma is not something inherently attached to a group in society, but a set of implicit ideological beliefs which highlight (often inaccurately) a group’s differentness and remoteness.

Since Goffman (1963), scholars have highlighted the different forms stigma can take. For instance, Livingston and Boyd (2010) differentiate three types of stigma: (1) public/social stigma, (2) structural stigma, and (3) self-stigma. Stigma towards people with schizophrenia converge around all three criteria. Public stigma typically revolves around negative portrayals in the media (Cechnicki, Angermeyer and Bielańska, 2011; Schulze and Angermeyer, 2003). For instance, in the press, people with schizophrenia are typically represented as being violent and dangerous (Clement and Foster, 2008; Chopra and Doody, 2007) and, this picture – unlike other mental disorders – is not getting better over time (Angermeyer and Matschinger, 2005). Moreover, public stigma is often punctuated with an exclusionary rhetoric which labels people according to their differences and draws a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Link and Phelan, 2001).

Widespread stigma then leads to individuals anticipating stigma from others. For instance, people with schizophrenia, as a result of widespread public stigma are likely to anticipate rejection in social relationships (Cechnicki *et al.*, 2011). People with schizophrenia are also likely to experience structural stigma. For instance, they are likely to anticipate discrimination and rejection in legal proceedings or during rehabilitation (Angermeyer, Schulze and Dietrich, 2003) and anticipate rejection from employment (Thorncroft *et al.*, 2009, Cechnicki *et al.*, 2011).

However, many problems people with schizophrenia face are from self-stigma or 'internalised stigma'. This is where stigmatising ideologies are internalised by members of the stigmatised group (Boyd *et al.*, 2014). This leads to an individual having a negative view of other people with the same stigma, which in turn shapes the way they view themselves and their own capabilities (Aakre, Klingaman and Docherty, 2015).

While self-stigma has its origins in public stigma, it not an inevitable consequence of the former. Instead, the internalisation of stigmatising ideologies is the result of a complex process of (1) stigma awareness (2) acceptance, and (3) application (Corrigan *et al.*, 2006). To some extent, the likelihood of individuals internalising stigma is dependent on their ability to resist stigma. However, studies have shown that people with schizophrenia typically show reduced levels of stigma resistance (Bifftu *et al.*, 2014; Gerlinger *et al.*, 2013). This helps explain why people with schizophrenia exhibit very high levels of internalised stigma (Karakas *et al.*, 2016). For instance, a large-scale survey across 14 countries found that 41.7% of people with schizophrenia exhibited strong signs of internalised stigma (Brohan *et al.*, 2011).

There is reason to believe that this picture is somewhat exacerbated by treatment. Mittal *et al.* (2014) found widespread negative beliefs towards people with schizophrenia in the medical community, whereby many professionals expressed a desire for more social distance from people with schizophrenia than people with other psychiatric disorders. Similarly, Walsh (2017), who examined interactions in support groups for people with schizophrenia found that older clients would often ridicule the younger (and more optimistic) ones, dismissing their optimism as naïve and blaming medical staff for planting false hopes in people. This suggests that self-stigma is not only caused by negative media portrayals but is also inculcated in other settings.

The cumulative effect of different forms of stigma takes a devastating toll on people with schizophrenia. The prevalence of stigma towards schizophrenia is so pervasive and harmful that many issues faced by people with schizophrenia will be caused by stigma rather than the symptoms themselves. This has led to the long-standing view among scholars of stigma as a secondary impairment of the disorder (Shulz, Jaggi and Schleifer, 2003; Wing, 1978) or even as harmful as the illness itself (Corrigan, Druss and Perlick, 2014). Self-stigma in people with schizophrenia anticipates a poorer prognosis (Boyd *et al.*, 2014). It also leads to a poorer quality of life as a result of social withdrawal and various social disadvantages (see Karakaş *et al.*, 2016) and reduces the likelihood that individuals who are experiencing symptoms will seek medical treatment, thus exacerbating their frequency and intensity (Harrison and Gill, 2010; Aakre, Klingaman and Docherty, 2015). They are also more likely to experience self-esteem issues and are more likely to comply with command hallucinations, where

hallucinations experienced inside the person's mind take on the form of a command (Barrowcliff and Haddock, 2006).

2.4. Relevant academic literature

2.4.1. *CADS approaches to news discourse*

A large body of work in CADS has examined newspaper data. Part of the reason for this, perhaps, is that the availability of online newspapers archives at most universities enables analysts to accumulate newspaper data very quickly, en masse. Some of this research has examined news discourse for its own sake. For instance, there have been several studies that illustrate how corpus techniques can be used to examine how journalists use language in accordance with news values (Bednarek and Caple, 2012; Bednarek and Caple, 2014; Potts, Bednarek and Caple, 2015; Brett and Pinner, 2013). Other scholars have used CADS to specifically examine evaluation in media discourse, for example, Marchi (2010) who looked at moral evaluation in British newspapers. Comparing different news corpora from 1993 and 2006, she found that while words relating to morals (which refer to intrinsic moral values) were declining in the press, words referring to ethics (referring more to human behaviours) were increasing. There was also an increasing emphasis on moral relativism which had a negative semantic prosody owing to it being used by conservative journalists to criticise more politically liberal people. Similarly, Brett and Pinna (2013) looked at the distribution of affective words (words appealing to broadly to various types of feeling) in a corpus of British broadsheet newspapers. They found that crime reporting, in contrast to genres such as

travel reporting, used language eliciting powerful emotions rather than feelings relating to (un)pleasantness or power(lessness). Other scholars have been interested in ‘evidentiality’, that is, how we use language to evaluate evidence in terms of how convincing/dubious it is (e.g. Bednarek, 2006). For instance, Clark (2010) examined the British broadsheet press in 1993 and 2005, observing an increased usage of evidentiality markers, although a greater reliance of hearsay or speculation as evidence. There was also greater emphasis on unidentified speakers (see also Schubert, 2015). Other scholars have looked at a specific linguistic feature, such as the use of metaphor in the broadsheet press (Krennmayre, 2015) or the phenomenon of ‘textual colligation’ (O’Donnell *et al.*, 2012). The latter refers to the tendency for certain words or clusters of words to occur at certain structural points in articles.

2.4.2. *CADS approaches to the representation of identities in news discourse*

Furthermore, patterns of reporting in newspapers, especially those with high circulations (such as the national press) are often indicative of a large demographic in society, and can therefore be examined for insights into popular beliefs or opinions about a particular topic. For instance, Tabbert (2012) investigated the representation of offenders in British newspapers published over a three-month period in 2009. She found that offenders were often equated with their crimes and reduced to them (e.g. rapist). Moreover, she found that important words like ‘alleged’ were disguised within bundles of premodifying adjectives to draw readers’ attention away from them and therefore represent potential offenders as more guilty. Grundmann and Krishnamurthy (2010)

revealed striking differences in how newspapers in different countries constructed climate change. In France and Germany, language was used to frame climate change as a political issue, whereas in the US, it was constructed more as a scientific issue. For instance, whereas European newspapers typically constructed climate change as a global problem, US newspapers typically constructed it as an issue that should be addressed according to a country's own political agenda. The insights gleaned from these studies show how newspapers use language to construct identities and topics in different ways according to an ideological agenda.

There is also an emerging body of research in CADS examining the representation of specific identities through discourse. For instance, there have been several studies looking at how the press use language to represent RASIM (Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Immigrants and Migrants) in the British press (Baker *et al.*, 2008; Baker and Gabrielatos, 2008; Taylor, 2014; Blinder and Allen, 2016), whereas Partington has focussed on how the press represent national identities, by looking at topics such as antisemitism (Partington, 2012), and Arabs (Partington, 2015). Other scholars have looked at the representation of Muslims in the press. A good example of this type of research is provided by Baker *et al.* (2013) who examined a 143 million word corpus of all articles published in British national newspapers that refer to Muslims and Islam, published between 1998 and 2009. The authors begin their analysis by using the 'word sketch' tool via Sketch Engine to examine grammatical collocates of words relating to the lexemes MUSLIM and ISLAM. They found, among other things, that these words had a strong semantic preference for collocates referring to 'strong belief', which served to construct them as particularly fundamentalist or militant (p. 39-45). Elsewhere, Baker

has also examined the use of language to construct sexual and gender identities, for instance gay men (Baker, 2005) and trans people (Baker, 2014) (see also Bartley and Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2015).

2.4.3. CADS approaches to health discourse

Over the last ten years, there has been increasing interest in using CADS to examine language in the context of health communication. For instance, Brookes and Harvey (2014) have examined public health promotions making reference to diabetes, particularly how these promotions use language to employ scare tactics, and Baker and colleagues have analysed corpora of patient feedback to the National Health Service (Baker *et al.*, 2019; Brookes and Baker, 2017). Many studies using CADS to examine healthcare discourse have looked in particular at the role of metaphor. Semino and colleagues have used corpus-based techniques to examine how metaphor is used in the context of end of life care (Semino *et al.*, 2018; Demmen *et al.*, 2015), whereas Semino and Potts (2017) have examined the use of metaphor in healthcare professionals' writing online, conducting a comparison between the UK and the US. They were particularly attentive to the implications that metaphors had on agency and patienthood in relation to a number of different social actors, including hospital patients and medical professionals. Finally, Mullany *et al.* (2015) have used corpus techniques to examine knowledge gaps in a corpus of emails sent by young people to a health advice website. By examining certain word clusters used to formulate questions (e.g. *what if, why is*), Mullany was able to identify the sort of advice that young people frequently sought out.

2.4.4. CADS approaches to health-related identities

Like this thesis, several studies have examined how language is used to represent a mental health diagnosis. An early but very good example is Harvey (2012), who examined a 100 million word corpus of emails sent by young people to a health website. Towards the end of the paper, he focusses on the language used by users around depression, focussing on grammatical as well as lexical patterns. Looking at collocates of *depressed* and *depression*, Harvey identifies two frequent clusters: *I have depression* and *I am depressed*. He notes that whereas *I have depression* suggests that the individual construes their disorder as an enduring part of their identity, *I am depressed*, in contrast, suggests that they anticipate that their symptoms will alleviate at some point. Other studies have focussed on other diagnoses. For instance, Brookes *et al.* (2018) examine the metaphorical representation of dementia as a ‘killer’ in 11 articles published across two days in British newspapers, looking at representations mediated by both text and image. This is one of several recent studies focussing on the representation of mental health disorders in multimodal texts. For instance, Harvey and Brookes (2019) examined representations of dementia in commercial stock images and Hunt (2015) examined representations of dementia in a sample of multimodal posts on two diabetes-related Facebook groups. Other studies have looked at representations of self-harm in emails sent to an online website by young people (Harvey and Brown, 2012), how language on ‘pain cards’ may help patients experiencing chronic pain express themselves (Semino, Zakrzewska and Williams, 2017) and narrative practices used by

women with post-natal depression on the website ‘mumsnet’ (Kinloch and Jaworska, 2018). In a recent study, Bowen, Kinderman and Cooke (2019) examined language used by the British tabloids in articles that mentioned *schizophrenia* or *schizophrenic* between 2016 and 2018. Comparing the corpus with a parallel corpus featuring articles in which diabetes is mentioned, the authors identified several key themes, such as words referring to violence, violent implements or notorious killers. They also criticise the use of the identifying label *schizophrenic* which, despite a drive for the press to stop using the word (see National Union of Journalists, 2015), was found to be commonplace in tabloid reporting, especially to name perpetrators of violent crimes (p. 147).

Research in CADS tends to have several themes in common. For instance, it typically focusses on language used to represent marginalised minority groups in public discourse. In doing so, it is particularly attentive to ways in which language serves to misrepresent and stigmatise those groups. Given the similarity in tools provided by corpus software, CADS studies tend to also focus on similar language features. For instance, studies tend to focus on collocates of labels used to represent marginalised groups and how these are indexical of public discourses and ideologies (e.g. Taylor, 2014; Baker and Gabrielatos, 2008). Alternatively, CADS researchers examine comparative keywords in a corpus in order to identify distinctive lexis used in the reporting that may be suggestive of ways in which the marginalised group is represented.

There have also been some relevant studies that use more traditional CDS methods (and not CL) to examine the how language is used to represent mental health diagnoses. For instance, Dyson and Gorvin (2017) manually analysed 200 tweets that made reference

to borderline personality disorder. They were interested in how users of Twitter used language to construct their experience of the disorder. Elsewhere, O'Brien (2013) examined metaphors used to represent so called 'feeble-minded people' by pro-Eugenics supporters in the American Eugenics era. Salient metaphors included representing mentally ill people as objects, as a poisonous organism or as animals. Additionally, Semino and colleagues have carried out linguistic research looking how people with schizophrenia construct their experience of the disorder. For instance, Demjen and Semino (2014) examined how the language used in a novel called *Henry's Voices* (2011), which was co-written by somebody with schizophrenia, could provide insights into the lived experience of the disorder. They found for instance, how verbs relating to touch were frequently used to report auditory hallucinations, suggesting that Henry experienced these symptoms in a unique way. The authors note that this may reflect a lack of resources in the English language for Henry to write about his experiences of psychosis. More recently, Demjen *et al.* (2019) examined metaphors used by people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders to describe their subjective experiences of auditory hallucinations. Using a corpus of 10 interviews conducted with schizophrenic people, they found that people who experienced voice-hearing employed a range of metaphors to represent their phenomenological experience of voice-hearing, which was sometimes influenced by the level of stress the voices caused them. Salient metaphors included violence metaphors, either used to describe the intrusive nature of the voices, or the individual's struggle to resist their symptoms. On the other hand, the authors also identified metaphors that were more positive, for instance, where auditory hallucinations were construed as supportive. Interviewees also frequently used spatial metaphors, with voices being construed as 'coming' and 'going', which the authors

note, suggested that they viewed the hallucinations as having autonomy and in some cases power over the voice hearer.

2.4.5. Non-CADS studies examining representations of mental illness in the media

There is a large body of literature that has examined representations of mental illness in the media outside of linguistics. These studies are mainly carried out in psychiatry, health or media studies. Many of these have looked at representations of mental illness broadly in the media. For instance, Philo (1994) conducted a content analysis of representations of mental illness in the British media, and combined this with a focus group discussion. By far the most common topic identified was ‘violence’ and 40% of the focus group believed that serious mental illness was associated with violence.

Elsewhere, several studies have conducted a diachronic analysis looking at how representations have changed in the British press (Rydderch *et al.*, 2015; Paterson, 2007). To take one example, Goulden *et al.* (2011) examined representations of mental illness in the years, 1992, 2000 and 2008 in British tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. They found that whereas representations of depression, anxiety and eating disorders were becoming more positive over time, representations of schizophrenia and personality disorders remained largely negative. Other studies have looked specifically at genre, and have compared reporting on mental illness between tabloids and broadsheets (e.g. Barnes and Earnshaw, 1993). For instance, Foster (2006) compared attitudes in British broadsheet and tabloids newspapers towards the 2002 Mental Health Act which, among other things, permitted the compulsory detainment of mentally ill

people. She found that, whereas the broadsheets mostly opposed the bill, over half of the articles in the tabloids mentioned in the bill supported it, and none explicitly opposed it. She noted that, even when the articles represented mentally ill people more positively they still tended to mention mental illness in the context of violence. In addition, Cross (2014) discusses the populist rhetoric in the British tabloids and how people with mental illnesses who kill are represented in a contradictory way as both ‘mad and bad’. On the one hand, they are represented as being obviously insane, on the other, they are represented as being morally culpable for their crimes.

Other studies have examined representations of mental illness in foreign media, for instance the Irish press (Meagher *et al.*, 1995) and the Serbian press (Bilić, and Georgaca, 2007). There has also been a lot of work examining media representations of mental illness in Australasia. For instance, both Dean *et al.* (2001) and Coverdale *et al.* (2002) examined representations of mental illness in the New Zealand press and Kenez *et al.* (2015) examined representation in the Australian press. Elsewhere, Whitley, Adeponle and Miller (2015) examined representations of mental illness in the Canadian press, with a particular focus on gender differences. They found that newspapers’ reporting of mentally ill people supported the so-called ‘Chivalry Hypothesis’ (Pollak, 1950), where women with mental illnesses were portrayed more sympathetically than men. Men with mental illnesses were represented more frequently in the context of violence than woman, and while the authors concede that the majority of recorded crimes were perpetrated by men, articles reporting on women were significantly more likely to have recovery as a main theme. This was despite several high-profile criminal cases involving female perpetrators having occurred within their 2000-2001 time frame.

There have been a small number of non-linguistic studies that have focussed on the representation of schizophrenia and psychosis in the press. For instance, Chopra and Doody (2007), compared representations of schizophrenia in the regional newspapers *The Nottingham Evening Post* (published in Nottinghamshire) and *The Daily Echo and Dorset Echo* (published in Bournemouth) between January 2003 and May 2006. They found that, despite Nottinghamshire having a crime rate just over the national average, and Bournemouth having one two and half times the average in 2005, both newspapers referred to schizophrenia in the context of violence in a large proportion of cases. This suggests that the frequency with which the regional press report on violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia does not mirror the frequency with which they actually occur. Of the articles judged to represent the disorder negatively, 80% represented schizophrenic people in the context of violence. In contrast, the authors noted that very few cases represented schizophrenic people as living well with the disorder.

Clement and Foster (2008) examined the representation of schizophrenia in two British tabloids and three broadsheets in 1996 and 2005. In the 1,201 articles identified, they found that schizophrenic people were more commonly referred to in the context of violence in the tabloids than the broadsheets (62% vs. 32%) and that so called 'stigmatising descriptors' (p. 178) such as 'maniac' and 'madman' were more common in the tabloids. The authors also noted a tendency in both the tabloid and broadsheet press to use 'release' and related words when referring to the deinstitutionalisation of patients, even in cases where the individual in question had not committed a criminal act. Magliano, Read and Marassi (2010) were instead interested in how words relating

to schizophrenia were employed metaphorically in the Italian press. They found that words referring to schizophrenia were used in 73.3% of articles metaphorically. However, the authors acknowledge that the high proportion of metaphorical uses was likely because metaphors are used unusually frequently in the Italian press relative to other countries. In 85% of cases where words referring to schizophrenia were used metaphorically, it meant 'contradiction/split' and in 10% of cases, 'eccentricity/oddness' (ibid. 1021). Whereas the 'split' metaphor was used significantly more frequently in politics than in culture and entertainment articles, the 'oddness' metaphor was found to be significantly more frequent in culture and entertainment (p. 1023). Metaphorical uses of words referring to schizophrenia have been shown to be much less frequent in English than the Italian press. For instance, Duckworth *et al.* (2003) who found that only 28% of references to schizophrenia were metaphorical in the American press.

Finally, Vilhauer (2015) examined representations of Auditory-Visual Hallucinations (AVH) in American newspapers. In a corpus of 181 news articles published between 2012 and 2013, she found that they were most frequently mentioned in relation to negative events, primarily criminal behaviour (51.9%) but also suicide (18.2%). They were also consistently linked with supernatural entities, notably 'ghostly figures, vampires, gremlins, religious figures or intimations of magical power.' (ibid. 60). More positive experiences of AVH were rarely mentioned and as it was rarely suggested that AVH could be experienced by neurotypical people.

One of the limitations of these studies is that, because they largely employ manual forms of analysis (which is more time-consuming than computer-assisted research),

they tend to only focus on articles in a specific year, and rarely more than three years. As a result, they sometimes focus on a small corpus of newspapers, which are not necessarily representative of the press' reportage as a whole. Such studies, for instance, are prone to over-look emerging and resistant discourses that are much less frequent in text types. In contrast, this thesis will examine representations of schizophrenia in the press over a 16-year period in nine national newspapers. As a result, findings are more likely to be representative of the press' use of language relating to schizophrenia as a whole and more likely to detect signs of resistant discourses. Another unique contribution of this thesis is that it takes an explicitly linguistic focus. That is, it not only examines frequent topics or themes, but how those themes are articulated through language and how linguistic features operating over hundreds or thousands of texts can suggest additional meanings not observable using more traditional means of analysis (e.g. content analysis, traditional CDS approaches). While previous research has suggested language and style as an area of interest (Goulden *et al.*, 2011, Kalucy *et al.*, 2011:546) these studies, like others, tend to employ a content analysis, which lacks the level of detail and systematicity of a CADS approach.

Having described the theories and broad methodological framework employed in this thesis, the next chapter describes my data collection process and the specific methods I use in more detail.

3. Data and method

3.1. Introduction

This chapter details how I answered each of the research questions listed in Section 1.5. In particular, it focusses on how I collected and analysed newspaper articles published in British national newspapers that made reference to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. Collecting these articles posed a number of challenges. For instance, it is not necessarily clear when words refer to people with schizophrenia or not. On the one hand, the press may refer to people with schizophrenia without invoking the label, which is potentially likely considering widespread misconceptions about the disorder. On the other, the press may invoke the label without referring to someone with schizophrenia. For instance, they may use the word incorrectly or they may use the word creatively to refer to something else. These considerations are explored in this chapter. In Section 3.2.1, I discuss how I developed my sampling frame, with a particular focus on how I developed my search query in LexisNexis. In Section 3.2.2, I discuss the problem of duplicated articles in my corpus and, in Section 3.2.3, how I developed a system to remove them. In Section 3.2.4, I describe how the corpus was subdivided into subcorpora and in Section 3.2.5, I introduce my reference corpus and the rationale behind choosing it. Finally, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I discuss the tools I used during the analysis and my analytic framework respectively.

3.2. Data collection

3.2.1. *Sampling frame*

To answer the research questions, I constructed what is commonly referred to as a ‘specialised corpus’. This is a corpus constructed for a highly specific purpose and for that reason tends to have a very specific sampling frame, typically representative of language used in a specific context at a specific time (Partington, 2008:186). News articles were obtained from the online news archive LexisNexis, a database that has been used in previous research examining representations of people with mental health problems in the media (e.g. Vilhauer, 2015; Foster, 2006; Wahl *et al.*, 2002).

LexisNexis was chosen from amongst other online archives for several reasons. For instance, it has a detailed search interface which enables the user to search the database for articles from specific newspapers or those published between a particular time span. In addition, LexisNexis enables the user to download articles en masse (500 articles in a single download) thus speeding up the data collection process.

However, before articles were downloaded it was necessary to draft a sampling frame determining which articles to include in the corpus. As I am examining representations of schizophrenia in the British press, I restricted the search query to articles published in British newspapers. Articles were also restricted to those published in British national newspapers rather than regional newspapers. National newspapers have a significantly higher output than regional editions, and are available to purchase in many places all over Britain. Indeed, with the introduction of online editions of British newspapers around the turn of the century, British national newspapers were made even more

widely available. This, coupled with the high prestige of British English, means that British national newspapers are also widely read outside of the UK. The *MailOnline*, which in 2011 overtook the *New York Times* as the most visited news website in the world, saw its largest increase in readership in the US, for example.¹³ For this reason, British national newspapers are likely to have a greater influence on dominant public attitudes towards schizophrenia in Britain and throughout the world. Another reason why British newspapers have been selected over regional ones is that there are literally hundreds of regional additions, many of which will have readerships so small that they are unlikely to be stored on the LexisNexis database. By focussing exclusively on national newspapers, I am able to make my corpus, in theory, fully representative of a language variety, that is, all articles published by the British national press that make explicit reference to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. In any case, the absence of regional newspapers is unlikely to restrict the number of findings. Foster (2006), for instance, comparing attitudes towards the 2002 Mental Health Bill in British newspapers found that attitudes expressed in national newspapers were very similar to those in regional ones.

The sampling frame therefore specified articles published in nine British national newspapers, five tabloids (*The Express*, *The Mail*, *The Mirror*, *The Star* and *The Sun*) and four broadsheets (*The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Telegraph* and *The Times*). For more on the distinction between tabloids and broadsheets in Britain, see Section 2.2.3. The Sunday editions of newspapers (e.g. *The Mail on Sunday* for *The Mail*) and

¹³ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16746785>

their sister titles (i.e. *The People* for *The Mirror* and *The Observer* for *The Guardian*) were subsumed under their main weekday title.

Table 3.1 Subcorpora and the titles they contain

Subcorpus	Editions included
<i>The Express</i>	<i>The Express, The Sunday Express, express.co.uk</i> (from 2014)
<i>The Mail</i>	<i>The Mail, The Mail on Sunday, mailonline.co.uk</i> (from 2012)
<i>The Mirror</i>	<i>The Mirror, The Sunday Mirror, The People, mirror.co.uk</i> (from 2014)
<i>The Star</i>	<i>The Star, The Sunday Star</i> (from 2004)
<i>The Sun</i>	<i>The Sun</i>
<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Guardian, The Observer, guardian.co.uk</i> (from 2013)
<i>The Independent</i>	<i>The Independent, The Independent on Sunday</i> (from 2006), <i>independent.co.uk</i> (from 2011)
<i>The Telegraph</i>	<i>The Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, telegraph.co.uk</i> (from 2006)
<i>The Times</i>	<i>The Times, The Sunday Times</i>

Two additional national newspapers, *The Business* and *The Morning Star*, were not included in the corpus. This was because *The Business* is closer to a magazine in terms of its genre, and focussed solely on financial reporting rather than hard news. In any case, the title was cancelled in 2008 and thus would be difficult to compare with the other nine newspapers that have been in publication twice as long. Likewise, *The Morning Star* has a significantly lower readership than the other newspapers. In 2005 it

only sold between 13,000 to 14,000 copies¹⁴ which is a much lower circulation than even the lowest selling newspaper in the corpus, *The Independent*, which in the same year sold 257,100 copies, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulations. Other newspapers, such as the *Financial Times*, *Eastern Eye* and *The Independent's* sister newspaper, *The i*, were not included as they were not available via LexisNexis at the time of data collection.

Another consideration was the mode of the articles. A shortcoming of many previous studies examining the representation of people with mental health problems in newspapers is that they fail to examine online articles. Previous studies almost always make no mention of including online articles (e.g. Goulden *et al.*, 2011; Bilić and Georgaca, 2007), except in rare cases when studies restrict their analysis to online media because of their easy availability (e.g. Magliano *et al.*, 2010). However, online articles are increasingly providing newspapers with a large proportion of their readership. For instance, in 2015, more than half the readership of every national newspaper besides *The Times* and *The Sun* viewed articles via their online websites¹⁵. For this reason, I chose to include both print and online editions in the corpus, although this exacerbated the issue of duplicated articles (see Section 3.2.2). The time frame of the corpus was selected to collect as many articles as possible without jeopardising its representativeness. Given that availability of articles is patchy for some newspapers

¹⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4361137.stm>

¹⁵ https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/103570/news-consumption-uk-2016.pdf

from before 2000, I decided to collect articles that were published from 1 January 2000 until 31 December 2015 (the project began in late 2015), totalling a 16 year period.

Next, I considered the search query I would use in LexisNexis to identify articles for inclusion in my corpus. As I was interested in how schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia were represented in the press, it made sense to search for words referring to schizophrenia. Previously, Clement and Foster (2008:179) have used the search query *schizo** (in their searchable database the * character acts as a wildcard for any set of characters) whereas Chopra and Doody (2007), Magliano *et al.* (2010) and Bowen *et al.* (2019) looked for articles containing the words *schizophrenia* and *schizophrenic* specifically. In contrast, I chose the broader search query *schiz!*¹⁶ in order to capture usages such as *schiz* which does, for instance, feature once in the spoken part of the British National Corpus 2014, a corpus of 11 million words of contemporary spoken British English (see Excerpt 2).

(2) Er and I got my A-levels (.) and they went absolutely **schiz** (*Spoken BNC2014*, Text SU82)

This pejorative term of abuse, which borrows from the historical root morpheme of *schizophrenia* could indirectly contribute to negative attitudes towards schizophrenia. However, the case of *schiz* raises a host of methodological and theoretical issues. If a journalist uses words referring to schizophrenia pejoratively as a term of abuse to

¹⁶ Within LexisNexis the ! character finds a root word plus all the terms made by adding letters to the end of it while the * character stands for any single character.

describe someone who doesn't have schizophrenia, is this still relevant to my research questions? After all, my core research question regards how people with schizophrenia are represented in the British press. Neither is this an uncommon practice. For instance, Bowen *et al.* (2019:7) found that, in the British tabloids, words referring to a diagnosis of schizophrenia were sometimes exploited as a general insult, and did not refer to a clinical diagnosis e.g. 'Scaramucci branded him a f*****g paranoid schizophrenic'. However, these usages still indirectly contribute to negative attitudes towards people with schizophrenia, in that the label is being used as a term of abuse, thus reproducing negative assumptions and values surrounding the label. An analogous case is the use of *gay* as a broad pejorative term (see Baker, 2005). Similarly, a label may be ascribed to someone by mistake. These may still be interesting as they provide insight into people's misconceptions over what symptoms a diagnosis of schizophrenia describes.

Another potential issue is that labels referring directly to schizophrenia may not always be used in articles referring to people with schizophrenia, either, for instance, because they have not been diagnosed yet or because it is in the journalist's interest not to mention the diagnosis. For instance, a journalist, wishing to depict someone with schizophrenia who has killed someone as evil, may choose to avoid mentioning a possible diagnosis that may vindicate them of blame. Such articles still use language to represent people with schizophrenia in the real world and are thus in line with the over-riding research question of the thesis. However, it is difficult to see how such cases could be identified. After all, such articles could only be traced if they made reference to symptoms of schizophrenia. But the most common symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. delusions, hallucinations) are experienced by people with other diagnoses (e.g. Bipolar

Disorder, BPD) or even neurotypical people. This would mean that queries such as *hallucination, psychosis* or *hear* voices* would be insubstantial for identifying articles referring to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia per se. Moreover, one of the over-riding goals of this thesis is to develop guidelines to help challenge dominant stereotypes around schizophrenia. Articles that do not mention schizophrenia explicitly are unlikely to impact as strongly on dominant public attitudes towards the disorder, and are therefore less important in this respect. Instead, the search query was designed to identify all articles published by the British national press that made explicit or indirect linguistic references to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. For this reason, the search query was left at *schiz!*.

However, the search query was still found to be too broad, as it identified some articles only containing words that began with the character sequence *schiz* but were not relevant to the diagnosis of schizophrenia. These included words referring to disorders such as *schizotypal, schizophreniform, schizoaffective* and *schizopsychotic*. These are more specific diagnostic variants on the schizophrenia spectrum¹⁷. For instance, schizotypal disorder encapsulates symptoms such as severe anxiety, social withdrawal and paranoia, and schizophreniform disorder refers to symptoms of schizophrenia but that do not persist past a six month period required to diagnose them as having schizophrenia. Articles containing only these types of *schiz* words were removed from the corpus for two reasons. First, they were so infrequent that they would have been given little attention during the analysis. For instance, *schizotypal* only occurred 76

¹⁷ Recall that in Section 1.2, Bleuler was described as having referred to the ‘group of schizophrenias’

times (not accounting for duplicates) over the 16 year period and *schizophreniform* only 30 times. By contrast, the least frequent word relating to schizophrenia which is explored in the analysis is *schizophrenic* (n.), which occurs 3,605 times (see Section 4.5). Evidently, these words are unlikely to influence dominant public attitudes towards schizophrenia. Second, as highly specialist terms, which are likely to be unknown to the general public, they may not necessarily be associated with the concept of schizophrenia at all. Cases where these disorders are explicitly referred to as being on the schizophrenia spectrum will be included on the basis that they make explicit reference to schizophrenia elsewhere in the article. Other false positives included surnames (*schizano*), and the names of flowers (*schizostylis*, *schizophragma*). These irrelevant articles were removed using the cleaning procedure described in Section 3.2.3 below.

3.2.2. *Duplicated articles*

There were several additional steps that had to be taken before the data could be used. For instance, the corpus was found to contain many duplicated articles. The problem of duplicated articles in corpora downloaded from online newspaper archives is more of a problem, and more of a nuanced problem, than most previous studies have acknowledged. For this reason, I dedicate some space to describing the nature and variety of duplicated articles, and the procedure via which I removed them in some detail. The reason why articles were duplicated and the extent to which the text in articles was duplicated differed widely. I distinguished duplicates into six types (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Six types of duplicates

Type	Description	Decision
1	Duplicated text in an article published on the same day in the same newspaper, but with some additional text appended.	Excluded
2	Duplicated text in an article published on the same day in the same newspaper, but with slight linguistic variation in the copy text.	Excluded
3	Duplicated text in an article published on the same day in the same newspaper but slightly different metadata preceding the article.	Excluded
4	Duplicated text in an article published in the same newspaper but on different days.	Excluded
5	Duplicated text in an article published on the same day but in different newspapers.	Included
6	Duplicated text published on the same day in the same newspaper but published in a different mode (i.e. print vs. online edition).	Excluded

Some of the types of duplicates listed in Table 3.2 may strike the reader as quite unusual so it is worth briefly providing an overview of each. Type 1 duplicates were always found in online editions, and occurred where an article had been updated with additional text appended to it. LexisNexis had saved both versions of the article, and articles containing additional updates. Type 2 duplicates were very similar, although rather than having additional text appended to the article, internal changes had been made to the copy text. The change typically constituted a word or wording, a different headline, or an alteration in punctuation (e.g. spacing, capitalisation). Again, this was always found in online editions, which, unlike print editions, may be edited post-publication. Type 3 duplicates do not relate to the text of the articles themselves but the metadata. In LexisNexis, the metadata provided for each article (which is encoded into the texts themselves, immediately preceding and following the headline) includes the newspaper

title, the date of publication, the author, the section of the newspaper (e.g. OPINION, FEATURES) and the article length. Duplicates of this type may have been a result of two archivists uploading the same article but inputting the metadata slightly differently. Type 4 duplicates were those that contained a duplicated section of text, published in the same newspaper, although on different dates. These were almost always identical film or book synopses that had been reused in a future listing. Type 5 duplicates were identical stories published on the same day but in different newspapers. These were rare and only occurred in *The Express* and *The Star* subcorpora, which are both owned by the same publishing group, *Northern and Shell*. This suggests that the publishing group had decided to publish the same article in two of their newspapers. Finally, type 6 duplicates were those where the same article had been published in the print and online editions of the same newspaper. Readers of a newspaper are likely to have a preference for the print or online addition (they are unlikely to read both), so it makes sense that articles published in one mode should be made available to readers of another mode.

Deciding which duplicates are relevant for inclusion in the corpus is determined by one's research agenda. One of the over-arching goals of the thesis is to investigate frequent language patterns in the corpus in order to reveal ways in which the press reflects and shapes dominant public discourses and ideologies relating to people with schizophrenia. As it was thought that a single reader would be unlikely to read the same article twice over, even when published on different days, all duplicates besides type 5 duplicates were removed. Type 5 duplicate were included because the two articles would be available to different readerships and thereby be more influential on public attitudes. In the case of type 1 and 2 duplicates (those that have been edited over time)

only the newest version of the article was kept in the corpus. However, comparing type 2 duplicates might be an idea for a future news production study in order to see the kinds of changes that journalists make to a story, perhaps after new information is uncovered or as a result of feedback from readers in the comment sections of online articles.

3.2.3. *Cleaning procedure*

Having identified which articles were relevant and irrelevant, it was necessary to formulate a cleaning procedure to remove the irrelevant ones. Because cleaning procedures in CADS research are usually relatively opaque, being typically referred to in passing, I describe it here in some detail (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Method for removing irrelevant articles

Phase	Description
1: search criteria	<p>The search query was set as <i>schiz!</i> and the LexisNexis parameters were set to only identify articles published in British national newspapers (both online and print editions) only. Additional criteria were also placed after the Boolean operator NOT to remove additional duplicated regional articles.</p> <p><i>Edition 1; Ireland OR Edition 1; Scotland OR Eire Edition OR Ulster Edition OR Edition 2; OR Edition 1; Northern Ireland OR 3 Star Edition</i></p>
2: data collection	<p>Articles were periodically downloaded for each newspaper between the years 2000 and 2015, 500 articles at a time (the maximum LexisNexis allows). These were arranged in a series of plain text files (in Wordpad) which were then placed in folders corresponding to their newspaper and year of publication (see Section 3.1.4 below).</p>

3: duplicates	<p>In order to identify duplicates, each text file was uploaded to the corpus software <i>Wordsmith</i> and the search query <i>schiz*</i>¹⁸ was entered into the concordance tool. By sorting the concordance 1, 2 and 3 places the right of the node word I was able to look for duplicated text. If a repeated wording was identified, I used Wordsmith's feature enabling the user to quickly refer back to the text in its entirety (for information about Wordsmith, see Section 3.2 below). Articles that were considered irrelevant duplicates were deleted.</p>
4: false positives	<p>It became evident that my search criteria was not narrow enough and it was therefore necessary to remove irrelevant articles and narrow the search criteria. This was carried out at the same time as phase 3 above by identifying cases where a word not relating to schizophrenia was captured by the search query <i>schiz*</i>. Each time an irrelevant (and usually unfamiliar) word was identified, I first confirmed that the word did not relate to schizophrenia, and then looked back at the original article, using the ctrl+f feature to check that another word that did relate to schizophrenia was not used. In cases where only the irrelevant word occurred in the article, these articles were deleted and the irrelevant word was entered before the Boolean NOT operator when searching for articles in LexisNexis for subsequent years. The resulting criteria at the end of the data collection process are listed below:</p> <p><i>Edition 1; Ireland OR Edition 1; Scotland OR Eire Edition OR Ulster Edition OR Edition 2; OR Edition 1; Northern Ireland OR 3 Star Edition OR schizostylis OR schizostylus OR schizano OR schizotypal OR schizo-typal OR schizo –typal OR schizo typal OR schism OR schizanthus OR schizophragma OR schizzle OR schizopolis or schizas OR schizocalyx OR schizoffective OR schizandra OR schizophreniform OR schizuoka OR schizophrenza OR schizotypy OR schizoporotica OR schizencephaly OR schizzo OR schizosaccharomyces OR schizocephala OR schizubert OR schizopsychotic OR</i></p>

¹⁸ In Wordsmith an Asterix (*) functions as a truncation wildcard rather than an exclamation mark (!).

	<p><i>Schizachyrium OR schizont OR schizz OR schizoid affective OR schizoid defective</i></p> <p>One word that was not removed in the search query was <i>schizoid</i> as it was thought early on the analysis that it could function as a term of abuse referring to schizophrenia in the same way <i>schiz</i> and <i>schizo</i> can. Indeed, as we shall see, the word is sometimes used interchangeably with schizophrenia (see Section 4.3). The word is not infrequent, occurring 556 times during the 16 year period (not accounting for duplicates). However, the word can sometimes occur as part of a long noun phrase referring to specific diagnoses (i.e. <i>schizoid affective disorder</i> and <i>schizoid defective disorder</i>). These phrases were also inserted before the Boolean operator for the reasons discussed at the end of Section 3.1.1 above.</p>
5: repeat	<p>This process was repeated for each newspaper for each year. Each document was arranged into two corpora, organised into folders according to their newspaper and year of publication respectively (see Section 3.1.4).</p>

While this proved a time-consuming procedure, 4,542 articles were removed, which makes up 21.6% of the original corpus size before cleaning. This is a large proportion of the total corpus size, which had the potential to skew corpus findings. Evidently, removing duplicates and false positives from a large corpus before beginning the analysis is an important step to take. On this basis, CADS researchers working with large corpora should perhaps be more transparent when describing how they cleaned their corpora.

3.2.4. Structuring the corpus

The resulting corpus contained 4,542 articles, a total 15,134,066 tokens. So that it was possible to make comparisons between different newspapers and articles published in different years, the corpus was subdivided into subcorpora (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below). This was achieved by saving each text file into an appropriate folder. While *The Mail* and *The Express* are often viewed as so-called ‘middle market’ newspapers, incorporating stylistic features of both broadsheets and tabloids, I follow previous studies in including them in the tabloid subcorpus (e.g. Baker *et al.*, 2013). As we shall see in the forthcoming chapters, the representations of people with schizophrenia provided by these papers more closely resemble dominant tendencies in the tabloids rather than the broadsheets.

As Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show, the subcorpora are not weighted proportionally. For instance, looking at Table 3.4, the tabloid papers contain much fewer articles and text than the broadsheets. Whereas the broadsheets (*The Guardian*, *The Telegraph*, *The Times* and *The Independent*) contain 9,737 articles and 9,948,360 tokens, the tabloids (*The Mail*, *The Star*, *The Sun*, *The Express* and *The Mirror*) contain 6,438 articles and 5,213,019 tokens. The broadsheet subcorpora thus contains 51% more articles than the tabloid subcorpora. Because of the disparity in token size, frequencies are normalised to one in a hundred thousand words when carrying out comparisons.

Table 3.4 The arrangement of Schizophrenia 2000-2015 into subcorpora by newspaper

Newspaper	Article frequency	Token frequency	Avg. token count/article
<i>The Express</i>	969	695,125	717
<i>The Mail</i>	3,139	3,258,052	1,038
<i>The Mirror</i>	1,096	675,989	617
<i>The Star</i>	229	121,945	533
<i>The Sun</i>	1,005	461,908	460
<i>The Guardian</i>	2,963	3,244,894	1,095
<i>The Independent</i>	1,921	1,930,571	1,005
<i>The Telegraph</i>	2,101	2,042,161	972
<i>The Times</i>	2,752	2,730,734	992

In summary, the corpus is highly representative of articles published by the British national press between 2000 and 2015 that made explicit reference to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. I write highly representative, rather than fully representative for two main reasons. First, as discussed in Section 3.2.2 above, a large number duplicated articles were removed, which were deemed irrelevant in light of my research agenda. So it might be more accurate to say that the corpus representative of news articles that newspapers' readerships have the choice of reading, without re-reading articles. Secondly, LexisNexis did appear patchy for some newspapers in some years. For instance, the average number of articles that mention schizophrenia published each year by *The Express* is 61, however, according to the LexisNexis database, only 18, 16 and 19 articles were published in 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. However, even in spite of these potential omissions, the sample is large enough to be representative of the press' reporting on people with schizophrenia as a whole.

Table 3.5 The arrangement of Schizophrenia 2000-2015 into subcorpora by year of publication

Year of publication	Number of articles	Number of tokens	Avg. token count/article
2000	950	908,733	957
2001	1092	980,637	898
2002	1259	1,068,062	848
2003	954	824,158	864
2004	865	844,049	976
2005	977	837,089	857
2006	1,056	917,369	869
2007	1,046	855,262	818
2008	917	871,535	950
2009	762	701,560	921
2010	610	602,144	987
2011	680	660,111	971
2012	1,231	1,162,134	944
2013	1,336	1,286,234	963
2014	1,322	1,208,113	914
2015	1,406	1,433,491	1,020

3.2.5. Reference corpus

In order to reduce cognitive bias when interpreting features, CDS practitioners often use a reference corpus to examine how features are used outside of the text(s) under analysis. The use of reference corpora for this purpose was first suggested by O'Halloran and Coffin (2004:275) who warned CDA practitioners against 'narcissistic' (that is, purely intuitive) interpretations of data, which were until then commonplace in

CADS research. Instead, they suggest that we should examine how words or phrases under analysis are used in a relevant reference corpus, thus hinting at how it would be interpreted by the average reader. After all, words are not interpreted in a vacuum, but retain the flavour of the text types and professional domains in which they are commonly used (Bakhtin, 1981). A reference corpus suitable for this use would preferably be large (so as to contain as many instances of the word under examination as possible) and be representative of general British English usage. The reference corpus I chose was a 50% sample (the complete corpus was unavailable) of ukWaC, which was available to use via the online corpus workbench CQPweb (Hardie, 2012). The ukWaC (.uk Web as Corpus) is a corpus of roughly two billion words (50% is 1,127,056,026 words) of British English written texts. These were obtained online using web-crawling software which accumulated texts from websites with a .uk domain between 2005 and 2007 (Ferraresi *et al.*, 2008). As such, the corpus contains a heterogeneous variety of genres of texts, including online content (such as from forums and blogs) but also so called ‘pre-web’ content (*ibid.*) such as books, recipes and sermons.

3.3. Corpus tools

To carry out the analysis I use a combination of corpus software. Different software make different tools available, which may differ in their quality and functionality. For this reason, it is not unusual for a corpus linguist to employ multiple tools for a single study. For instance, a study carried out by Baker *et al.* (2013) into the representation of Muslims in the British press used a combination of Sketch Engine and Wordsmith, as

did Taylor's (2014) study looking at the representation of migrants in the British and Italian press. The software used most frequently in this thesis (Chapters 4 and 7) is Sketch Engine, an online suite of corpus tools developed by Kilgariff, Rychly and colleagues (e.g. Kilgariff *et al.*, 2014). Sketch Engine was chosen over other software primarily for practical reasons. I have a Macbook computer and other corpus software that are able to process millions of words of text e.g. Wordsmith (see below) are only compatible with a Windows operating system. Second, Sketch Engine, unlike other software provides access to its unique 'word sketch' tool. This is used in Chapter 4 to examine the most frequent words that explicitly refer to schizophrenia. Once a corpus is uploaded to Sketch Engine it is tagged for parts-of-speech by way of the TreeTagger tool (Schmid, 1994). The word sketch tool, described by its creators as offering 'a feast of information on the word' (Kilgariff *et al.*, 2014), then calculates collocates of words belonging to a specified lexeme and groups them into 'frames' based on their grammatical relationship with the node word. For instance, the word sketch may group a lexeme's collocates into verbs that predicate the word, collocates that are modifiers etc. In doing so, a word sketch offers a comprehensive semantic profile of a word, giving a good idea of its general usage in a corpus. To calculate collocates, the window span was set at +/-5, a span which has been used in similar CADS studies. As Baker *et al.* (2013:36) write, 'the default span at five words either side of the search word [...] seems to offer a good balance between identifying words that actually do have a relationship with each other (longer spans can throw up unrelated cases) and giving enough words to analyse shorter (shorter spans result in fewer collocates). The logDice statistic, the default score in Sketch Engine, was chosen to determine collocation

strength.¹⁹ While a logDice score can range between 1 and 14, where 14 denotes the highest collocation strength (i.e. the two words always occur together in the corpus), it is unlikely to exceed 10 (Rychly, 2008). Sketch Engine's collocates tool is also used in Chapter 7 to examine ways in which the press re-contextualise violence committed by people with schizophrenia using words relating to moral responsibility.

One of the shortcomings of Sketch Engine is that, from concordance lines, it only allows the analyst to view a narrow strip of co-text and, if the analyst wished to view the article in its entirety, would need to refer back to the original file. This is time consuming when examining the usage of multiple collocates and, thus, the concordance tool available via Wordsmith 5.0 (Scott, 2008) was typically used to carry out concordance analyses instead. Unlike Sketch Engine, Wordsmith's concordance tool allows the analyst to view the entire text from the concordance line almost instantly. This is helpful in cases where a word's usage cannot be deduced from the narrow strip of context offered by Sketch Engine, or where the analyst wishes to examine something else in the text, for instance the article's metadata.

Another tool used via Wordsmith was the keywords tool, which is used to examine distinctive lexis used in the tabloids and broadsheets in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I examine distinctive lexis used in the tabloid and broadsheet subcorpora in stories in which schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia are mentioned. Keywords are words

19 Sketch Engine describes logDice as “a statistic measure for identifying collocations. It expresses the typicality of the co-occurrence of the node and the collocate. It is only based on the frequency of the node and the collocate and the frequency of the whole collocation. logDice is not affected by the size of the corpus and, therefore, can be used to compare the scores between different corpora. logDice is the preferred option when working with large corpora.” https://www.sketchengine.eu/my_keywords/logdice/

which are statistically significantly more frequent in one corpus relative to another. This is carried out by comparing two word lists (tokens listed in order of their frequency), derived for two corpora. Keywords are often used to identify salient topics in contrasting corpora. As Kilgarriff (1997:233) claims, ‘any difference in the linguistic character of two corpora will leave its trace in differences between their word frequency lists.’ As it is not helpful to compare the raw frequencies of words in two corpora of different sizes, I used the log-likelihood significance metric to determine whether the difference in frequency of a word in the two word lists was statistically significant. Log-likelihood is one of two metrics (the other being the chi-square metric) available to use via Wordsmith 5.0. The log-likelihood metric tests the difference in frequency of a word against the null hypothesis, which stipulates that difference between two frequencies is due to random variation in the dataset. The p-value was set lower than is customary in the social sciences at 0.000001, in order to ensure that I examined the most statistically significant lexis. It is also customary for corpus analysts conducting keyword analyses to set cut-offs in order to limit the number of keywords to the extent that each can be analysed in detail. As with many previous CADS studies, I chose to limit the number of keywords for each tabloid/broadsheet subcorpus to the top 100 in descending order of their keyness score (i.e. their statistical significance). This also ensured that keywords obtained were distributed equally among the two subcorpora. The frequency threshold was set at three, which is the default settings in Wordsmith 5.0. An advantage of setting the frequency threshold very low is that the tool is able to capture cases where a feature may be very infrequent in one corpus and very high in another, with the frequency difference being significant (Gabrielatos, 2018:239).

Each research question and the methods used to answer each one are listed in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6 Parts of the methodological framework and how they correspond to each of my research questions

Chapter	RQ	Method
Chapter 4	What do lexicogrammatical patterns around words referring to people with schizophrenia say about the way such people are typically represented in the British press?	I use Sketch Engine's word sketch tool to examine the strongest 25 collocates in each grammatical frame for the words <i>schizophrenia</i> (n.), <i>schizophrenic</i> (adj.) and words relating to the lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.). The concordance tool available via Wordsmith 5.0 is then used to examine patterns in usage.
Chapter 5	What distinctive words are used by the tabloids and broadsheets when reporting on stories that mention schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia? Do the ways such words are used in context shed light on differences in how people with schizophrenia are represented in the tabloids and broadsheets?	I use the keywords tool via Wordsmith 5.0 to calculate distinctive words used in the tabloid and broadsheet subcorpora relative to each other. The concordance tool is then used to examine patterns in usage.
Chapter 6	How could one use corpus techniques to examine ways in which the press represent schizophrenic people as moral agents of violent crime?	This chapter takes the form of a short literature review in which I outline relevant literature in Philosophy, Psychology and Psycholinguistics in order to develop a methodological approach for Chapter 7.
Chapter 7	How do the British press use language to re-contextualise violence committed by	I use Sketch Engine's word list tool to identify the ten

	people with schizophrenia? How is the press' re-contextualisation of these crimes likely to shape a reader's blame judgement?	most frequent words in the corpus that typically refer to violence committed by people with schizophrenia. The top 100 strongest collocates of these words were surveyed in order to identify those that appealed to responsibility criteria discussed in Chapter 6. These are then examined in more detail using Wordsmith's concordance tool.
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3.4. Analytic framework

The theoretical-methodological approach used in this thesis is loosely based on Fairclough's three tier approach (e.g. 1989, 1995). Fairclough breaks down critical discourse analysis into three stages, linguistic description, interpretation and explanation. These roughly correspond to each of his concentric rectangles in his model representing the relationship between text, interaction and social context (see Section 2.1.1.1). The first phrase of Fairclough's model is description, where the linguist describes language patterns in the text. In the case of the corpus linguist, who is probably dealing with a corpus size hundreds of times larger than the traditional CDA practitioner, this refers to identifying and describing patterns in the data. This contrasts with the second phase, interpretation, where the analyst examines how the 'member's

resources' (e.g. beliefs, assumptions, attitudes etc.) (Fairclough, 1989:24) of the text producer and intended audience shape the text as discourse.

Identifying patterns in data by means of corpus methods is a complex process that relies on a combination of computer processing and interpretative ingenuity. The language data is first processed through the corpus tool whereby the text is greatly reduced to word forms calculated to be frequent or salient. These words are then represented in a patterned way to ease interpretation. For instance, a word list arranges word forms vertically in descending order of frequency. Alternatively, Sketch Engine's word sketch tool arranges collocates according to their grammatical relationships with the node word. However, almost all corpus tools look for surface patterns, that is, repetitive strings of characters, and it is then the analyst's task to look for semantic, pragmatic and broader rhetorical relationships between the salient word forms calculated by the software. The process of looking for patterns was carried out in a relatively systematic way. A concordance was generated for each word identified as frequent or salient by the corpus software. In cases where the number of instances of the word exceeded 100, a concordance of randomly sampled lines was generated instead. This concordance would then be sorted alphabetically one, two and three words to the left and right of the node word in order to identify similar wordings that shape the meaning of that word. This helped me get a sense of the word's frequent usage in the data.

The art of the corpus linguist is essentially one of pattern finding. Patterns between words, whether they be semantic, pragmatic or rhetorical help corpus linguists discover 'non obvious meaning' (Partington, 2012:11). There are several strategies that are conducive to finding patterns in the results offered by corpus software. One is to

experiment with a combination of naïve and more informed perspectives on the data. For instance, I found that, if I began examining patterns from a naïve position, without having conducted any background reading, I found different patterns to those discovered later when I returned to the concordance after having explored the literature in detail. For instance, the original observation I make in Section 5.5 that the press reproduced misconceptions about schizophrenia through lay diagnoses was made before I undertook the literature review. Conversely, the observation command hallucinations could be represented either as an auditory or tactile phenomenon in Section 7.3.6 only became apparent after reading Demjen and Semino (2014). Thus, carefully reading through the literature before beginning the analysis may urge the analyst to look for specific patterns that have already been found and discussed extensively in the literature. Instead, a more naïve approach is more conducive to the identification of original patterns. The second method conducive to finding patterns is to look for a variety of patterns. The easiest type of pattern to spot are semantic patterns. To do this, the analyst groups collocates or keywords that share a similar meaning into semantic groups which correspond to salient topics or themes in the dataset. However, these are not the only patterns. For instance, words could be grouped together because they belong to a similar discourse, that is, they are redolent of a particular genre, register or professional domain (see Section 2.1.1.2). Words may also belong to a shared rhetorical strategy. For instance, they may instantiate the same metaphor, or all occur inside a quotation. The sorts of groupings one uses depends on the research question and the sorts of patterns that emerge from the data, but analysts should be receptive to all patterns if they yield interesting findings. In my analysis I typically grouped items together that belonged to a shared semantic class. This was because these sorts of

patterns emerged as most frequent during the analysis. This makes sense because, as this thesis is concerned patterns in what is being represented through language, and only indirectly in genre and rhetorical devices. However, in one case, items were grouped together based on their rhetorical function, namely words that served to lay diagnose individuals in Chapter 4.

The third phase of Fairclough's (1989) three tier model is explanation. This involves describing the dialectic relationship between language and wider social forces. One way this was carried out was to identify patterns that suggested particular discourses (in the broad social constructionist sense of knowledge system) and ideologies. Given the critical impetus of this research, the explanation phase also functioned as an evaluation phase. Words and patterns were judged to be problematic if they (1) presented the world in an inaccurate way or (2) if they promoted a prejudiced worldview. Words and patterns were judged to be inaccurate if they promoted a worldview which deviated substantially from that espoused by recent academic consensus. Words and patterns were judged to promote a prejudiced worldview if they were likely to shape beliefs and attitudes that could potentially lead to unnecessary suffering or harm of individuals or groups.

Having introduced my data and described my analytical framework, the next chapter begins the first of a series of four analysis chapters each corresponding to a research question introduced in Section 1.5. The first chapter begins by offering a broad overview of how people with schizophrenia are represented in the corpus by examining lexicogrammatical patterns around the three most frequent word forms explicitly

referring to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia – *schizophrenia*,
schizophrenic (adj.), *schizophrenic* (n.).

4. Using the word sketch tool to examine lexicogrammatical patterns around schizophrenia, schizophrenic (adj.) and SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.)

4.1. Introduction

This analysis chapter responds to the first research question listed in Section 1.5:

1. What do lexicogrammatical patterns around words referring to people with schizophrenia say about the way such people are typically represented in the British press?

I begin by identifying the most frequent word forms in the corpus that explicitly refer to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia (see Section 4.2). I then examine collocates of these word forms in order to determine the patterned way in which they are used by journalists in context (see Sections 4.3-4.5). To do this, I use Sketch Engine's word sketch tool (see Section 3.3) which groups collocates of words into frames based on their grammatical relationship with the node word. Word sketches are a useful entrance point into an analysis as they provide a semantic profile of a word's usage by identifying the typical lexicogrammatical contexts in which it occurs. In Section 4.2 I explain my rationale for choosing the three lexemes for analysis. In Section 4.3 I examine lexicogrammatical patterns around SCHIZOPHRENIA as a noun

whereas in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 I examine patterns around SCHIZOPHRENIC as an adjective and as a noun respectively. In Section 4.6, I offer some concluding remarks.

4.2. The most frequent *schiz* words

The search query *schiz** identified 23,380 tokens, making up 0.05% of the total number of tokens in the corpus. Ignoring rare misspellings and hyphenated forms (e.g. *schizophrenia*), these tokens comprise 12 different word forms. These can be grouped into five lexemes (all inflectional variants of a word form with roughly the same sense) (see Table 4.1). Note that in this table and the rest of the chapter, words that are capitalised represent lexemes and words that are in lower case and italicised represent a specific word variant. Thus, the word SCHIZOPHRENIC stands for the word forms *schizophrenic*, *schizophrenics* and *schizophrenic's*.

Table 4.1 Terms used to refer to (people with) schizophrenia in the corpus

Lemma	Word forms
SCHIZOPHRENIA (13,262)	<i>schizophrenia</i> (13,253) <i>schizophrenias</i> (2) <i>schizophrenia's</i> (7)
SCHIZOPHRENIC (9,090)	<i>schizophrenic</i> (8,421) <i>schizophrenics</i> (644) <i>schizophrenic's</i> (25)
SCHIZOID (473)	<i>schizoid</i> (466) <i>schizoids</i> (7)
SCHIZO (355)	<i>schizo</i> (335) <i>schizos</i> (17) <i>schizo's</i> (3)
SCHIZ (14)	<i>schiz</i> (14)

Several observations can be made at this stage. First, there are a variety of ways that schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia are lexicalised in the British press.

Halliday (1978) has suggested that over-lexicalisation – many different word forms having the same referent – provides indication that a topic is contentious in a particular discourse community, as different text producers try to represent the referent in different ways. Second, the frequency distribution across these lexemes and word forms is not equal. By far the most frequent of the lexemes are SCHIZOPHRENIA and, to a slightly lesser extent, SCHIZOPHRENIC, which, together, make up 96.4% of all the word forms captured by the search query *schiz**. As these are the two terms typically used by the press to refer directly to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia, these two lexemes are the focus of this chapter.

In contrast, the remaining word forms are highly infrequent. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether SCHIZOID and SCHIZO refer to people with schizophrenia or not. Words linked to the lexeme SCHIZOID typically refer to schizoid personality disorder, a disorder related to schizophrenia, which has symptoms of social reclusiveness and emotional coldness. The way it is used in the tabloids also suggests there is some confusion around the term *schizoid* and *schizophrenic*. For instance, In Excerpt 3, *The Sun* identifies Andrew Kernan as *schizoid*, despite referring to him as *schizophrenic Andrew* in an article published two days previously (PROBE AS SWORD NUT IS SHOT DEAD BY COPS, *The Sun*, 14 July 2001) and as *Schizophrenic Andrew Kernan* in an article published the following day (see Excerpt 4). In the following Excerpts, the term relating to schizophrenia is highlighted in bold.

- (3) Home secretary David Blunkett is considering the move after **schizoid** Andrew Kernan was shot dead by cops in Liverpool. (*The Sun*, 16 July 2001).
- (4) **Schizophrenic** Andrew Kernan, 37, was blasted twice in the chest by police marksmen after running into the street waving a Samurai sword. (*The Sun*, 17 July 2001).

The nouns *schizo* and *schizos*, and the verb *schiz* are backformations of the word *schizophrenia*, and are typically used as negative labels referring to individuals exhibiting unpredictable and unexpected behaviour. In Excerpt 5, the author is aware and critical of this usage and refers to it as *demeaning*. Regarding *schiz*, almost half of its instances (5/12, 41.67%) are from a quote from Ian Huntley, who was convicted of murdering two children in 2002. He refers to the behaviour of one of the girls as *schiz* when finding out that her school friend was dead.

- (5) The media frequently make unfounded and exaggerated links between a diagnosis of schizophrenia and violent behaviour, while the bastardisation of the term "**schizo**" is in common usage as a particularly demeaning insult. (*The Guardian*, 29 May 2013).
- (6) Everything happened as I said it did, apart from that. "As soon as I got Holly out of the bath and everything, and realised she was dead, Jessica just went **schiz**. (*The Telegraph*, 26 November 2004).

The base forms of the words (i.e. *schizophrenia*, *schizophrenic*, *schizoid*, *schizo*) are also significantly more frequent than their inflected forms. That the plural forms are relatively infrequent tentatively lends credence to the observation of Whitley *et al.* (2015) that people with mental illnesses tend to be individualised in the press and rarely represented as a collective.

While SCHIZOPHRENIA always functions as a noun, it is useful to consider the noun and adjective uses of SCHIZOPHRENIC separately (cf. *a schizophrenic*, *a schizophrenic person*). As we shall see, these two forms occur in very different lexicogrammatical contexts. While SCHIZOPHRENIC as a noun occurs 3,605 times, as an adjective it occurs 5,437 times. Thus, if we distinguish the nominal and adjectival forms of the lexeme, we might say that the most frequent ways of referring to schizophrenia or people with schizophrenia in the corpus is via three lexemes, SCHIZOPHRENIA (n.), SCHIZOPHRENIC (adj.) and SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.), listed in descending order of their frequency. As different labels for the same referent typically exhibit different lexicogrammatical patterns (Baker, 2012, Bartley and Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2015), the analysis will consider each of these lexemes separately.

4.3. Word sketch for *schizophrenia* (n.)

The word sketch for the noun SCHIZOPHRENIC can be found in Figure 4.1²⁰. From the left hand side, the frames distinguish collocates of SCHIZOPHRENIA that are modifiers, nouns and verbs that are modified by SCHIZOPHRENIA, verbs that collocate with SCHIZOPHRENIA when it is a subject, verbs that collocate when it is an object and lastly, collocating nouns that are grammatically co-ordinated with SCHIZOPHRENIA. As inflected forms of *schizophrenia* are rarely used in the corpus (see Table 4.1) above, I will refer to the base form of the word throughout this part of the analysis rather than then lexeme in small caps.

I begin by examining collocates of *schizophrenia* that function as modifiers. Of the 24 listed, 10 (41.67%)²¹ are words referring to the severity of the diagnosis (see Table 4.2). These refer to the severity of the symptoms.

²⁰ The + sign next to some of the collocates indicate that they co-occur frequently enough to carry out a ‘multiword’ sketch. This allows the analyst to carry out a second word sketch of cases where the two lexemes co-occur. For instance, clicking on *people* + would allow the analyst to examine lexicogrammatical patterns in contexts where *people* and *schizophrenia* collocate. Multiword sketches are not used in this chapter, however, as they did not contribute anything to the analysis that wasn’t already suggested by each word form’s collocates taken in isolation.

²¹ All decimals will be rounded up to two decimal places.

Figure 4.1 Word sketch for *schizophrenia* (n.)

modifiers of "schizophrenia"		nouns and verbs modified by "schizophrenia"		verbs with "schizophrenia" as object		verbs with "schizophrenia" as subject		"schizophrenia" and/or ...	
	21.81		11.95		18.22		12.72		29.41
paranoid +	<u>1,343</u>	fellowship	<u>96</u>	develop +	<u>390</u>	affect	<u>38</u>	disorder +	<u>698</u>
depression +	<u>110</u>	seroquel	<u>78</u>	treat +	<u>147</u>	stab	<u>13</u>	depression +	<u>686</u>
autism	66	depression +	<u>105</u>	diagnose	<u>90</u>	diagnose	<u>10</u>	autism +	<u>269</u>
acute	65	autism	<u>23</u>	trigger	<u>58</u>	mean	<u>12</u>	psychosis +	<u>197</u>
chronic	50	disorder +	<u>110</u>	include +	<u>146</u>	be +	<u>786</u>	illness +	<u>131</u>
mild	46	drug	<u>84</u>	suffer	<u>74</u>	commit	<u>7</u>	disease	<u>94</u>
illness	46	treatment	<u>57</u>	cause	<u>80</u>	develop	<u>8</u>	epilepsy	<u>58</u>
disorder	42	mania	<u>18</u>	have +	<u>482</u>	increase	<u>7</u>	paranoia	<u>57</u>
severe	46	sufferer	<u>22</u>	control	<u>29</u>	get	<u>17</u>	dementia	<u>45</u>
disease	26	patient	<u>54</u>	battle	<u>22</u>	have +	<u>211</u>	mania	<u>38</u>
long-term	20	ireland	<u>19</u>	cure	<u>17</u>	afflict	<u>5</u>	diabetes	<u>40</u>
possible	19	psychosis	<u>19</u>	induce	<u>14</u>	do	<u>40</u>	anxiety	<u>43</u>
psychosis	15	gene	<u>17</u>	overcome	<u>13</u>	cause	<u>9</u>	sclerosis	<u>32</u>
cultural	15	medication	<u>16</u>	portray	<u>10</u>	kill	<u>9</u>	cannabis	<u>35</u>
undiagnosed	12	diagnosis	<u>15</u>	precipitate	<u>9</u>	receive	<u>7</u>	cancer	<u>34</u>
cause	12	humanity	<u>11</u>	disorganise	<u>8</u>	remain	<u>9</u>	condition	<u>31</u>
anxiety	12	schistos	<u>12</u>	stabilise	<u>8</u>	cost	<u>5</u>	delusion	<u>29</u>
term	11	commission	<u>19</u>	suspect	<u>8</u>	follow	<u>9</u>	alcoholism	<u>25</u>
epilepsy	10	diabetes	<u>11</u>	worsen	<u>7</u>	rise	<u>6</u>	syndrome	<u>22</u>
syndrome	10	bulletin	<u>10</u>	institutionalise	<u>6</u>	make	<u>17</u>	study	<u>22</u>
dementia	10	paranoia	<u>10</u>	fake	<u>6</u>	tend	<u>5</u>	suicide	<u>19</u>
pressure	10	zyprexa	<u>9</u>	resemble	<u>6</u>	recover	<u>4</u>	pressure	<u>18</u>
latent	9	research	<u>21</u>	understand	<u>8</u>	seem	<u>9</u>	use	<u>18</u>
early-onset	8	epilepsy	<u>9</u>	describe	<u>9</u>	choose	<u>4</u>	problem	<u>20</u>
full-blown	8	anorexia	<u>8</u>	call	<u>17</u>	live	<u>7</u>	addiction	<u>17</u>
	6.46		7.34		6		5.94		7.04

Table 4.2 Modifier collocates of *schizophrenia* (n.) that refer to the severity of symptoms

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>acute</i>	65	9.30
<i>chronic</i>	50	8.88
<i>early-onset</i>	8	6.50
<i>full-blown</i>	8	6.46
<i>latent</i>	9	6.66
<i>long-term</i>	20	7.41
<i>mild</i>	46	8.87
<i>possible</i>	19	7.34
<i>severe</i>	46	8.37
<i>term</i>	11	8.65

Three collocates refer to the magnitude of symptoms (*acute, full-blown, severe*), four refer to the duration of the symptoms (*chronic, early-onset, long-term, term*) and two refer to the visibility of the symptoms (*latent, possible*). However, what they have in common, with the exception of *mild, possible* and *latent*, is that they represent the disorder as having severe, enduring symptoms. Thus, *schizophrenia* exhibits a semantic preference for modifiers that characterise the diagnosis in its more severe forms. This is likely a consequence of the press appealing to the news value of ‘magnitude’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:66), that is, that stories on a bigger scale are more newsworthy. It also follows Wahl, Wood and Richards’ (2002:21) observation that newspaper articles reporting on mental illness would often focus on the most florid, frightening and debilitating aspects of a mental disorder. References to severe forms of the illness

typically occur in the context of stories reporting on violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia (Excerpt 7). To a less common extent, mentioning florid symptoms is sometimes intended to shock, for instance in reporting on the long-term implications of smoking cannabis (see Excerpt 8).

(7) According to Robert's lawyers, and court reports from the time, an expert witness at the trial said that Richard was paranoid, delusional, suffering from hallucinations and from **chronic** schizophrenia at the time of the killing. (*The Guardian*, 17 December 2013).

(8) The mental illness induced by cannabis is schizophrenia, one of the most horrible experiences that can befall any human being. In a minority of cases it develops into **full-blown** paranoid schizophrenia. (*The Mail*, 20 October 2006).

However, even collocates referring to milder forms of the illness typically occur in contexts where people with schizophrenia are represented as violent. The collocate *possible*, for instance, occurs in the context of violence in 17/19 (89.47%) instances, where individuals who at first experience less serious forms of the diagnosis suddenly experience more serious symptoms before committing violent crimes (see Excerpt 9). Alternatively, *latent*, in seven of its nine instances occurs in contexts where smoking cannabis is revealed to prompt symptoms of schizophrenia that have otherwise been dormant (see Excerpt 10). These stories typically involve someone who has a genetic

predisposition to schizophrenia, whose symptoms are suddenly triggered by taking recreational drugs such as cannabis.

(9) Former Naval reservist Aaron Alexis, 34, was being treated for paranoia, insomnia and **possible** schizophrenia before his Washington DC killing spree. (*The Sun*, 18 September 2013).

(10) Researchers find that cannabis could trigger **latent** schizophrenia, intensify symptoms and cause the condition where it would not otherwise occur. (*The Mail*, 22 February 2006).

Ignoring the mistaggings in this frame, such as *epilepsy*, *psychosis* and *illness* (which typically co-occur with *schizophrenia* in lists of disorders), another interesting collocate is *cultural* (n = 15, ID = 7.12), which occurs where *schizophrenia* is exploited metaphorically to refer to inconsistent aspects of one's identity. In Excerpt 11, this tension is between an individual's religious beliefs and their desire to conform to contemporary British teenage culture. A more in-depth analysis of metaphorical exploitations of schizophrenia is provided in Section 4.4 below.

(11) There are young Muslim men today who'd like to have girlfriends, be part of a dating culture, and yet when they want to get married they look for a devout, religious wife. This is **cultural** schizophrenia. (*The Guardian*, 7 March 2009).

The second frame to the right lists nouns modified by *schizophrenia*. As *schizophrenia* is a noun rather than a modifier, this frame is almost entirely composed of mistaggings and will be passed over.

Turning to verb collocates when *schizophrenia* is a grammatical object, 6/24 (25%) refer to the process by which the disorder manifested (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Verbs collocates of *schizophrenia* (n.) that refer to the manifestation of the illness

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
CAUSE	80	8.77
DEVELOP	390	11.20
DIAGNOSE	90	9.72
INDUCE	14	7.41
PRECIPTATE	9	6.89
TRIGGER	58	9.25

While DEVELOP and DIAGNOSE are more neutral in meaning, INDUCE, PRECIPTATE and TRIGGER are suggestive of a sudden manifestation of symptoms.

Looking more closely, 443/652 (68%) of instances occur in articles discussing the harmful effects of psychotropic drugs, mainly cannabis and LSD (see Excerpt 12).

(12) How cannabis can trigger schizophrenia, by scientists. SMOKING cannabis affects brain chemistry so seriously it can **trigger** schizophrenia, scientists warn today. (*The Mail*, 3 July 2002).

As we shall see, the press exhibits a tendency to locate violence as a primary symptom of schizophrenia (see Section 4.5). Thus, these articles may be implicitly alluding to violent behaviour that may be prompted in people with schizophrenia who take drugs²². This pattern is part of a broader historical discourse whereby people with mental illnesses are constructed as ‘dormant volcanoes’, wolves in sheep’s clothing who are otherwise able to ‘pass’ as neurotypical citizens until suddenly outed in some way (O’Brien, 2013:84-5). Unlike other stigmatised identities, people with schizophrenia cannot be identified by virtue of their ‘stigma symbols’ (Goffman, 1963:58-9), that is, features of their physical appearance that can be used to identify them as such (e.g. a blind person’s cane). For this reason, people with schizophrenia are able to ‘pass’ as what Goffman calls ‘normals’ (people who don’t have a stigma) (p. 23). Thus, these representations raise the possibility that someone we know may have schizophrenia (unbeknownst to us) which may manifest at any time in extreme violence.

Another six collocates (25%) in this frame refer to the process of treatment.

Table 4.4 Verb collocates of *schizophrenia* (n.) that refer to treatment

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
BATTLE	22	8.10
CONTROL	29	8.16
CURE	17	7.73
OVERCOME	13	7.30
<i>stabilise</i>	8	6.73
TREAT	147	10

²² <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/schizophrenia/>

While CONTROL, TREAT and *stabilise*²³ refer to mitigating symptoms, OVERCOME and CURE refer to the process of suppressing them. Brookes *et al.* (2018), in their study of media representations of dementia, are critical of references to cures given that, like schizophrenia, there are currently no specific treatments that can reliably alleviate symptoms of dementia entirely. However, looking more closely, only 4/13 (30.77%) instances of OVERCOME and 1/17 (5.88%) of CURE refer to real-life stories. Instead, nearly all instances refer to hypothetical scenarios that are either dismissed as unrealistic or highly unlikely (see Excerpts 13 and 14).

- (13) As that film showed, Mr Nash was diagnosed with incurable schizophrenia in the late 1950s, but **overcame** his condition, ridding himself of the "voices" that haunted him and returned to normal life. It is a remarkable achievement, though one that tends to prompt a stock response from psychiatrists: anyone who **overcomes** schizophrenia was misdiagnosed (*The Telegraph*, 16 January 2005).
- (14) Friend and parish priest Fr Joe Drumgoole told how Jason had "tried and tried for years" to **cure** his schizophrenia. He added: "Jason could not take any more and decided to end it all (*The Sun*, 17 May 2006)

²³ Collocates in italics refer to word forms rather than lexemes. Unlike lexemes, these do not vary in terms of their inflectional morphology in the concordance.

Instead, people with schizophrenia are typically represented as not managing well with their symptoms. Three verbs in this frame, BATTLE, CONTROL and OVERCOME, are used metaphorically, and are part of a more general tendency in healthcare discourse to conceptually map features of the conceptual domain of WAR onto that of treating an illness (e.g. Demmen *et al.*, 2015). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have previously argued that metaphors are not merely literary devices but a conceptual affair, where one (typically more tangible) domain of experience is used to understand another (typically more abstract one). Demmen *et al.* (2015) suggest that war metaphors in the context of healthcare, specifically end-of-life care, are problematic because they frame patients as ‘winners’ or ‘losers’. Indeed, as Potts and Semino (2017) have observed, these war metaphors tend to be used in contexts where treatment is unsuccessful, and thus the metaphor typically serves to characterise individuals whose treatment has been unsuccessful as ‘losers’. In Excerpt 15, the war metaphor has been creatively elaborated in that the battle with schizophrenia has been settled down to a *draw*, only for the individual to be defeated by another health problem.

(15) Five years ago Peter, having **battled** schizophrenia to a draw, dies when he developed idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, which destroyed his lungs (*The Guardian*, 9 February 2015).

The fourth frame to the right lists verb collocates that predicate *schizophrenia* as a grammatical subject (see Table 4.5). All of these besides *chose* refer to material processes, in that they typically involve happenings in the material world (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014).

Of the 237 instances, 60 (25.32%) of the verbs predicate *schizophrenia* when it occurs in a longer noun phrase referring to a human subject (e.g. *person with schizophrenia*). In other words, they refer to the material actions of a human agent. This applies to all the cases of *stabbed*, KILL and COMMIT, which report on violence carried out by people with schizophrenia (see Excerpt 16).

Table 4.5 Verb collocates that take *schizophrenia* (n.) as their subject

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
AFFECT	38	8.96
<i>afflicted</i>	5	6.57
CAUSE	80	8.77
COMMIT	7	6.71
<i>chose</i>	4	5.96
DO	40	6.56
GET	17	6.60
KILL	9	6.42
MAKE	17	6.16
RECIEVE	7	6.41
<i>stabbed</i>	13	7.45

(16) Religious fanatic suffering from schizophrenia **stabbed** his retired computer analyst neighbour to death as he was doing odd jobs in his garage (*MailOnline*, 19 April 2014).

Conversely, AFFECT, *afflicted* and *chose* always occur in contexts where material agency is attributed to the abstract diagnosis. This is also the case in 15/17 instances of MAKE. In 11/17 instances of MAKE and 7/9 instances of CAUSE (see Excerpts 17 and 18).

(17) Amanda Bynes detained in a psychiatric hospital in Los Angeles over fears her schizophrenia **makes** her a danger to herself and others (*The Mirror*, 19 October, 2004).

(18) Peter Thomas, 21, left Lisa Voice, the mother of his girlfriend, with devastating facial injuries after punching her in the face and then jumping on her head in an unprovoked assault **caused** by his schizophrenia (*The Telegraph*, 7 February 2006).

All four instances of *chose* occur in the context of a quote provided by the mother of James Holmes, a man with schizophrenia who was convicted of killing 12 people and injuring 70 others in an attack on a cinema in Colorado, United States in 2012. Here a cognitive process is attributed to the diagnosis of schizophrenia whereby it decided to afflict Holmes rather than other people (see Excerpt 19).

(19) Breaking down in tears, she said she still loved her son despite his actions, saying:
'I understand he has a serious mental illness that he didn't ask
for. Schizophrenia **chose** him. He didn't choose it.' (MailOnline, 20 June 2015).

These three verb collocates are part of a more general tendency to linguistically frame mental health diagnoses as autonomous, agentive and aggressive entities (Brookes *et al.*, 2018; Potts and Semino, 2017; Dyson and Gorvin, 2017; Demmen *et al.*, 2015; Hunt and Harvey, 2015). The disorder is framed as independent from the sufferer, rather than being part of them, a distinction which may then be exploited to direct responsibility for crimes committed by the individual at the abstract disorder rather than the individual's actions. How language may be used to attribute more/less blame to people with schizophrenia who kill is explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

The frame furthest to the right of Figure 4.1 lists nominal collocates that are grammatically co-ordinated with *schizophrenia*. Collocates that are unusually frequently co-ordinated with a word are interesting because they tell us something about what diagnoses the press view as equivalent to schizophrenia. Fifteen of these refer to health problems (see Table 4.6).

Eight of these are specifically mental health diagnoses in that they are primarily diagnosed on the basis of mental symptoms - e.g. *autism, dementia, paranoia*- whereas four are associated more with physical symptoms - *cancer, diabetes, (high blood) pressure, (multiple) sclerosis*. In most cases, schizophrenia is grammatically co-ordinated with both types of diagnoses either because they are said to share a similar aetiology (53/124, 42.74%) or a specific type of treatment (40/124, 32.26%).

For instance, schizophrenia and other diagnoses are linked with aetiologies as diverse as vitamin deficiency, parasites on cats, being left handed (see Excerpt 20) and the weather (and vitamin D deficiency more broadly) (see Excerpt 21). In one article from *The*

Express entitled *A plate of pasta could trigger schizophrenia* (22 April 2009),

schizophrenia and diabetes are linked with eating gluten-rich foods. Again, the word *trigger* suggests the sudden eruption of florid symptoms.

(20) Some may become prodigies, but left-handedness has also been associated with **autism** and some forms of schizophrenia. (*Sunday Times*, 17 March 2002).

Table 4.6 Noun collocates that are grammatically co-ordinated with *schizophrenia* (n.)

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>anxiety</i>	43	8.16
<i>autism</i>	269	10.94
<i>cancer</i>	34	7.89
CONDITION	31	7.84
DELUSION	29	7.78
<i>dementia</i>	45	8.49
<i>depression</i>	686	11.78
<i>diabetes</i>	40	8.23
<i>epilepsy</i>	58	8.86
ILLNESS	131	9.70
<i>mania</i>	38	8.27
<i>paranoia</i>	57	8.74
<i>pressure</i>	18	7.10
<i>problems</i>	20	7.06
PSYCHOSIS	197	10.49
<i>sclerosis</i>	31	8.02

(21) While cancer charities and skin experts campaign to persuade us to stay out of the sun, there is growing evidence that lack of exposure to sunlight is responsible for a multitude of chronic diseases, from multiple **sclerosis** (MS) and diabetes to several types of cancer, and even schizophrenia. (*Independent on Sunday*, 25 January 2004).

Anxieties about everyday practices that could be linked to schizophrenia and other diagnoses may reflect an emerging risk culture. Since the Enlightenment, an increasing confidence in the scientific method over religious explanations has resulted in a move away from the notion of fate and towards an interest in making informed choices. This has entailed a growing concerns around risk and how some choices are more 'risky' than others (see Giddens and Pierson, 1998). Headlines that link serious illnesses with everyday practices are bound to be newsworthy because they appeal to the public's interest in managing risk in our everyday lives. These stories are made especially newsworthy when they involve practices enacted by the majority of the population, such as eating pasta and owning a cat. The representation of putative aetiologies of schizophrenia are explored in more detail in Section 5.3.4.

Schizophrenia is also co-ordinated with other maladies in relation to cannabis consumption. Interestingly, in two instances, cannabis is mentioned as a treatment for schizophrenia (see Excerpt 22). This contrasts with Excerpts 8, 10 and 12 above in which it was framed as an aetiology.

- (22) Other possible uses for cannabisbased (sic.) medications could include the treatment of schizophrenia and **diabetes**, while there are hopes Sativex may be approved to ease pain in terminal cancer patients (*The Sun*, 25 November 2014).

In Excerpt 23, schizophrenia, cancer and asthma are simultaneously framed as being very different and yet sharing a common genetic aetiology.

- (23) Damage to the epigenome - the pattern of chemicals that controls our genes - has been linked to medical conditions as diverse as asthma, schizophrenia and **cancer**. (*The Guardian*, 15 October, 2019).

This is part of a wider pattern where schizophrenia and other disorders are framed as being very different while sharing a common feature (see Excerpts 24 and 25).

- (24) Patients with diseases as different as schizophrenia and colon **cancer** are more likely to carry such long genetic signatures, perhaps as evidence that ancient within-family sex affects a descendant's health (*The Telegraph*, 9 December 2008).

- (25) Conditions such as schizophrenia and **cancer** of the pancreas may sit at polar extremes of the illness spectrum but people with schizophrenia nearly always have associated physical concerns, too, and I have yet to meet a patient with cancer of the pancreas who doesn't have some degree of emotional upset (*The Times*, 21 January 2014).

Two additional collocates are potentially suggestive of confusion around the diagnosis of schizophrenia. For instance, the collocates DELUSION (n = 29, ID = 7.78) PSYCHOSIS (n = 197, ID = 10.47) are grammatically co-ordinated with *schizophrenia* and are framed as disorders in their own right. In Excerpt 26 below, psychosis is referred to as a *serious mental illness* on par with schizophrenia, whereas in Excerpt 27, *delusion* is referred to as having symptoms in the same way that schizophrenia does. However, in the DSM, both psychosis and delusions are usually referred to as symptoms of mental illness rather than a diagnosable disorder. Furthermore, co-ordinating schizophrenia with these symptoms may imply to readers not familiar with the diagnosis that these phenomena are distinct from one another. In fact, psychosis, which itself involves experiencing delusions and hallucinations, is the most common symptom of schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013:87).

(26) Anti-psychotics, which act as powerful and mind-altering sedatives, are licensed for specific and serious mental illnesses including schizophrenia and **psychosis**. (*The Express*, 20 May 2012).

(27) News from nowhere and everywhere became, for them, a mishmash of stimuli, which was then retransmitted as "messages" via poetically skewed psyches - and were diagnosed as symptoms of **delusion** and schizophrenia (*guardian.com*, 21 January 2011).

The word *schizophrenia* co-occurs unusually frequently with the word *suicide*. In 11/19 instances, people with schizophrenia are represented as having committed suicide (see Excerpt 28). One of the implications of repeatedly representing schizophrenic people as

having committed suicide is that it represents the disorder as being unbearable to live with. Alternatively, in four instances, *suicide* is grammatically co-ordinated with *schizophrenia* on the basis that they are the negative consequences of other disorders or substances. For instance, in Excerpt 29, the widespread availability of recreational drugs caused by relaxing drug laws is represented as potentially causing increased rates of schizophrenia and suicide. There are two ways of interpreting these. On the one hand, the grammatical co-ordination between *schizophrenia* and *suicide* in these contexts frames them as being equivalents. Thus, one may potentially infer that having a diagnosis of schizophrenia is tantamount to losing your life. Another way of reading these examples is that suicide is a consequence of developing schizophrenia, and thus an indirect risk of substance abuse. This meaning is hinted at because in all four instances, suicide is positioned last in the pairing (the inference would not be possible were *suicide* positioned first). One implication of this second reading is that suicide is a likely consequence of developing schizophrenia. While the suicide rate of people with schizophrenia is between 5% and 10% (Hor and Taylor, 2010) and thus higher than the national average (which is around 1%), this increased risk is largely mediated by substance abuse (Nock *et al.*, 2009) or non-adherence to medical treatment (Hawton *et al.*, 2005).

(28) We have been through most of the agonies highlighted in Magnus Linklater's article. Our daughter suffered from schizophrenia and committed **suicide** some years ago at the age of 21. (*The Observer*, 4 March 2001).

(29) In short, legalising drugs won't provide a panacea for our epidemic. If anything, it will render so-called 'recreational' narcotics respectable, thereby putting many more at risk of schizophrenia and **suicide**. (*The Mail*, 27 February 2007).

Another four collocates in this frame specifically refer to substance abuse, namely *addiction* (n = 17, ID = 7.04), *alcoholism* (n = 25, ID = 7.66), *cannabis* (n = 35, ID = 7.96) and (*cannabis*) USE (n = 18, ID = 7.07). These words always co-occur in the context of a claim that regular use of recreational drugs causes schizophrenia (see Excerpt 30). The collocate *addiction* in 5/17 instances (29.41%), occurs in contexts where both alcoholism and schizophrenia are in inadvertent consequence of prescribing medical marijuana (Excerpt 31).

(30) Several recent studies have demonstrated the links between **cannabis** and schizophrenia. (*The Observer*, 19 February 2006).

(31) However some research has suggested that medical marijuana, when given to epilepsy patients, can cause anxiety, schizophrenia and **addiction**. (*MailOnline*, 30 July 2014).

The concordance analysis of collocates referring to material processes above showed that *schizophrenia* sometimes occurred as part of longer phrases (e.g. *a man with schizophrenia*). To explore this in more detail, I examined one of the frames in the word sketch that listed collocates that are modified by *schizophrenia* when it occurs as the

head in a prepositional phrase. These are separated out into different frames depending on the preposition (see Figure 3.1 for this part of the word sketch).

Predictably, many of the collocates in the frame ‘*with schizophrenia*’ refer to social actors (see Table 4.7). People with schizophrenia are typically referred to using the more neutral term *people*, although are also frequently functionalised as a PATIENT (of a psychiatric hospital). The label ‘[social actor] *with schizophrenia*’ is potentially more appropriate than the nominal label *schizophrenic* because the former highlights their status as a person (with their disorder being just one aspect of their identity) whereas the latter entirely reduces someone’s identity to their mental health condition.

Table 4.7 Noun collocates postmodified by *with schizophrenia* (n.) that refer to social actors

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>people</i>	327	11.30
PATIENT	124	10.78
MAN	62	9.80
<i>person</i>	17	8.22
CHILD	13	7.61
WOMAN	11	7.44
INDIVIDUAL	7	6.98
ADULT	6	6.78
<i>son</i>	5	6.52

Figure 4.2 Collocates modified by *schizophrenia* (n.) when occurring as a head in a prepositional phrase

schizophrenia (*noun*)
Schizophrenia 2000-2015 freq = 13,189 (759.64 per million)

displaying only: prepositional phrases whole word sketch

... with "schizophrenia" of "schizophrenia" from "schizophrenia" for "schizophrenia" to "schizophrenia"
diagnose + 673 12.82		symptom + 156 11.07		suffer + 1,214 12.96		treatment + 148 11.75		link 44 10.32
people + 327 11.30		diagnosis + 130 11.04		suffering 85 10.72		treat 88 11.65		depression 13 10.16
patient + 124 10.78		risk + 151 10.50		everything 8 7.37		medication 48 11.01		predisposition 12 9.98
man 62 9.80		form + 102 10.01		indistinguishable 6 7.16		seroquel 24 10.37		succumb 12 9.73
struggle 34 9.21		case 88 10		sufferer 6 7.14		drug 28 10.10		prone 13 9.61
someone 27 8.82		sign 70 9.79		range 6 6.90		prescribe 14 9.49		link 13 9.61
live 37 8.81		incidence 49 9.73		recover 5 6.68		use 15 9.30		similar 12 9.59
associate 33 8.71		history 77 9.63				factor 11 9.15		predispose 7 9.29
battle 22 8.52		cause 55 9.52				gene 9 8.88		susceptibility 7 9.28
link 19 8.36		treatment 52 9.52				test 7 8.41		disorder 5 8.83
suffer 17 8.27		onset 32 9.14		such + 528 11.56		medicine 6 8.30		vulnerable 5 8.46
person 17 8.22		bout 23 8.59		diagnose 16 9.34		hospital 8 8.13		relate 9 8.30
link 13 7.79		rate 25 8.57		illness 7 8.44		cure 6 8.13		lead 24 8.21
struggle 12 7.61		development 22 8.38		condition 5 8.05		risk 5 7.97		due 11 8.18
child 13 7.61		kind 37 8.03				basis 5 7.92		contribute 5 7.67
misdiagnose 10 7.54		stage 16 8.02						
woman 11 7.44		study 18 7.98						
suffering 8 7.22		episode 15 7.94						
battle 8 7.20		experience 15 7.85						
individual 7 6.98		eradication 12 7.83						
cope 8 6.85		grip 10 7.48						
adult 6 6.78		label 9 7.42						
deal 10 6.76		prevalence 9 7.38						
hospital 6 6.70		attack 9 7.38						
son 5 6.52		sufferer 9 7.36						

Collocates referring to causes of schizophrenia e.g. *linked* (n = 44, ID = 10.32), *associated* (n = 33, ID = 8.71), *predisposition* (n = 12, ID = 9.98), *prone* (n = 13, ID = 9.61), *susceptibility* (n = 7, ID = 9.28), *vulnerable* (n = 5, ID = 8.46) are used to associate schizophrenia with some of the aetiologies discussed above. The word *prone* is used in contexts where particular social groups are cited as being particularly susceptible to the disease. These include men, African-Caribbean people, Indian people and even actors. However, references to schizophrenia do not always refer to the disorder in its medical sense. In Excerpt 32 below, the author seems to be referring to schizophrenia inaccurately as a split personality disorder. Indeed, in the previous sentence, the author invokes the word *schizoid* to mean ‘having two identities’. This example demonstrates how *schiz* words can all be exploited figuratively to refer to a split personality phenomenon, despite referring to quite different mental conditions. Metaphorical exploitations of words referring to schizophrenia are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 below.

(32) Despite this, she was always a somewhat schizoid character -- a rebel who kept one foot firmly in the Establishment. Indeed, when I expressed surprise at her acceptance of the CBE, she said: 'Actors are always **prone** to schizophrenia -- which is always worrying!' (*The Mail*, 27 February 2010).

The analysis has thus far described some of the lexicogrammatical patterns in which the word *schizophrenia* is embedded in in the corpus, and commented on some of the implicit implications of these patterns. Given that *schizophrenia* typically refers to the

diagnosis as an abstract entity, it is unsurprising that collocates are loosely part of a medical discourse, words which refer to symptoms, risks and prognoses. However, all of these representations portray schizophrenia as something very negative, with treatment and recovery being represented as more or less hopeless. This picture, for instance, runs contrary to a consensus in the medical literature that the prognoses of people with schizophrenia are getting better. 1 in 5 people diagnosed with schizophrenia will show signs of recovery after 6 months of community-based psychosocial rehabilitation (Lim *et al.*, 2017), and one in 4 people will show signs of sustained symptomatic remission if treated promptly after their first experience of symptoms (Macbeth, 2014). Thus, the press present a somewhat narrow picture of the disorder, which overlooks a more positive and optimistic picture emerging in the clinical literature.

4.4. Word Sketch for *schizophrenic* (adj.)

The second most frequent way of explicitly referring to people with schizophrenia is via the adjective *schizophrenic*, which is more frequent than the nominal form (for a discussion of the nominal form, see Section 4.5 below). Figure 4.2 presents the results of the word sketch for *schizophrenic* (adj.).

While we would expect *schizophrenic* to typically modify human entities, as only humans are capable of developing schizophrenia, as many as seven collocates in this frame refer to abstract states or processes. While *episode* and *symptom* occur in literal contexts where *schizophrenic* serves to classify symptoms under the diagnostic label, others index more figurative usages (see Table 4.8).

Table 4.8 Noun collocates modified by *schizophrenic* (adj.) that refer to abstract processes

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>approach</i>	26	7.52
ATTITUDE	83	9.38
<i>existence</i>	24	7.71
<i>nature</i>	61	8.87
<i>relationship</i>	25	7.28
TENDENCY	39	8.41

The figurative meaning of *schizophrenic* (adj.) is included in its entry in the Oxford English Dictionary.

schizophrenic adj. (figurative) (frequently with the implication of mutually contradictory or inconsistent elements. (Oxford English Dictionary, *schizophrenic* adj. b)²⁴

This meaning likely draws on Bleuler's understanding of schizophrenia as a lack of connection between different parts of the brain (see Section 1.2). Its first citation is in a 1955 issue of the popular science magazine *Scientific American* (see Excerpt 33). Here the word seems to mean that that members of the board had to perform many different roles, and thus seems to draw on the misconception that schizophrenia is a split personality disorder.

²⁴ <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172411?> (Accessed 12 October 2019)

(33) The behavior of the puzzled Board reflected its schizophrenic task. The members performed as part jury, part judge, and then as part administrative agency, engaged in a part rule-making, part quasi-judicial proceeding. (*Scientific American*, 13 January, 1955).

The most frequent and strongest collocate referring to abstract states or processes in this frame is ATTITUDE, which is part of broader group of collocates loosely meaning ‘perspective’ (*approach, relationship*). The word ATTITUDE typically occurs in the construction *schizophrenic ATTITUDE to* (31/83, 37.35%) or *ATTITUDE towards* (22/83, 26.51%) ‘a particular practice or social issue’, such as *fame* (2 instances), *food* (2 instances) and *sex* (2 instances).

These constructions are typically followed by two statements that are logically inconsistent (see Excerpt 34).

(34) We have a schizophrenic **attitude** to fame. We worship and resent celebrities: worship in order to discover the secret of their fame; resent when fame eludes us. (*The Mail*, 12 May 2003).

The word *approach* displays a similar pattern, and likewise typically occurs in the construction *schizophrenic approach to* (17/26, 65.38%) ‘some practice or issue’. In Excerpt 35, it is suggestive of having two different identities, similar to Excerpt 33 above.

(35) Her schizophrenic **approach** to making her novel a success required her "to have two of everything. Two phone lines, two mobiles, two e-mail addresses. And I had to change my voice to be Preu - she was more high-pitched and shrill (*The Telegraph*, 7 March 2003).

The word *schizophrenic* also occurs in the phrase *schizophrenic relationship*, which is also used to refer loosely to one's attitude or outlook on something. It typically occurs in the construction *schizophrenic relationship with* (20/25, 80%) followed by a practice or social issue (9/20, 45%) or a person or social group (7/20, 35%). In both cases, it refers loosely to a vacillating attitude to something. In Excerpt 36, the phrase is used to refer to *The Mail's* vacillating attitude towards televised pornography.

(36) That said, the Mail has a schizophrenic **relationship** with Channel Porn - one day loving it, and the next hating it (*The Telegraph*, 25 March 2004).

While ATTITUDE, *approach* and *relationship* refer broadly to a vacillating attitude, TENDENCY, *nature* and *existence* refer to inconsistent behaviour. The collocate TENDENCY typically occurs, in 23/39 of its instances (85.97%), in contexts where *schizophrenic* is invoked in its medical sense (see Excerpt 37).

(37) My mother was nearly gleeful when she told me I was a 'borderline psychotic' with 'strong schizophrenic **tendencies**.' (*The Independent*, 19 August 2005).

However, in 10/39 instances (25.64%), it occurs in the context of sports reporting (in 9 instances football) where the *schizophrenic tendencies* refer to the inconsistent performance of a particular player or team, thus meaning something like ‘erratic’.

(38) United's schizophrenic **tendencies** reflect poorly on McCall; why can they play so well against Aberdeen in the Cup and then surrender meekly at Motherwell and Killie? (*The Mail*, 14 March, 2005).

There are a small handful of instances where the metaphorical exploitation of *schizophrenic* performs a more positive meaning (see Excerpt 39). In this advertisement, the construction *schizophrenic tendencies* is attributed to a car and means something like ‘eclectic’ or ‘versatile’. That this more positive usage is very rare is evidenced by the fact that the authors find it necessary to explicitly reject the more typical negative meaning (*that sounds alarming but don't worry*). Here, the metaphorical use of *schizophrenic* seems to be drawing on the misconception that schizophrenia is the same as multiple personality disorder, a widespread misconception (Jensen *et al.*, 2016). By attributing a medical diagnosis to a car in the context of an advert, the author is also potentially trivialising the diagnosis.

(39) first drive VAUXHALL ZAFIRA TOURER VAUXHALL design boss Mark Adams describes the Zafira Tourer as a car with schizophrenic **tendencies**. That sounds alarming but don't worry, both personalities are positive - and it can change from family workhorse to executive limo at the touch of a few levers. (*The Sun*, 14 October 2011).

Elsewhere, 5/63 instances (7.94%) of *nature* occur in the context of fashion reporting, where *schizophrenic* means something like ‘eclectic’ as in Excerpt 39 above. In these instances, the typically negative meaning of *schizophrenic* is exploited to mean something more positive, indicating that the brand is creative or fresh (see Excerpt 40).

(40) The SS14 campaign aims to provide the perfect backdrop for the schizophrenic **nature** of the collection, says the brand. The lingerie comes in colour-popping saturated hues complete with peekaboo lace, girly gingham, intricate embroidery and slinky knee high splits. (*MailOnline*, 23 January 2014).

A similar meaning is suggested by the collocate *style* which is included under the frame listing subject collocates occurring in the construction (subject) BE *schizophrenic* (bottom right of Figure 4.2). In 9/10 of its instances it occurs (with some minor variations) in the construction *my style is schizophrenic*, and 8/10 refer specifically to an individual’s fashion style. Like in Excerpt 40 above, *schizophrenic* means something like ‘fresh’ or ‘stylish’ (see Excerpt 41).

(41) My **style** is schizophrenic. Some days I wake up and I want to wear over-the-top heels to the supermarket. Then other days I want to be really cosy and comfy and wear something that's easy. (*The Star*, 10 August 2014).

Incidentally, the neologism *schiz-shoe-phrenic* was identified during the data collection process. This is constructed via morphological reanalysis of *schizophrenia* into two morphemes *schizo* and *phrenia* (reflecting its Greek etymology as consisting of two morphemes) and then the morphological substitution of another morpheme, *shoe*, for the <o> (pronounced as schwa) in the middle of the word.

(42) Sadly, this waterproof, sheepskin-boot hybrid has ended up a rather poor - not to mention ugly - **schiz**-shoe-phrenic specimen (*The Telegraph*, 14 November 2007).

To summarise the analysis so far, the analysis has distinguished two main meanings of *schizophrenic* (adj.) when exploited metaphorically. When premodifying words referring to attitude, it typically means ‘vacillating’, whereas when it premodifies words referring to behaviour it typically means ‘erratic’. Both meanings can be grouped more broadly into the meaning of ‘internally inconsistent’.

Metaphorical exploitations of *schizophrenic* are also signalled via collocates that function as copula verbs (frame on the top right of Figure 4.2). These collocates are listed in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9 Verb collocates of *schizophrenic* (adj.) that anticipate metaphorical expressions

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
APPEAR	6	7.35
BECOME	64	8.76
MAKE	6	5.83
REMAIN	8	7.04
SEEM	9	6.82
SOUND	6	7.21
TURN	5	7.27

The collocates BECOME, MAKE, TURN and REMAIN refer to a process of transition (or lack thereof). With the exception of TURN, these words almost always occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* means ‘inconsistent’ (see Excerpt 43).

(43) Marks & Spencer has now **become** schizophrenic. Opposite the drab core collections are the vibrant Per Una ranges which are said to be among the store's bestsellers. (*The Telegraph*, 25 May 2005).

That the metaphorical meaning of *schizophrenic* is typical in these patterns is evidenced by the fact that the author must employ the word *literally* when using it in its medical sense (see Excerpt 44).

(44) Like second-generation settlers everywhere, they feel torn between the country where they grew up and the sunlit land of their parents' reminiscences. Some of them **become** literally schizophrenic: personality disorders are 10 times more common among second. (*The Telegraph*, 28 October 2006).

Instead, TURN, in three of its five instances, occurs in a context where the medical sense of *schizophrenic* is invoked. The word TURN in the context of *schizophrenic* is suggestive of a total transformation of identity, and possibly evokes the idea of werewolves and vampires transforming (see Excerpt 45).

(45) My friend was chuckling away at the movie and I wondered if I should tell her the terrible supposition that was eating away at my brain - that maybe I was **turning** schizophrenic, too. The next day, when I told her, she shrugged and said:

"Sounds like a panic attack. I get them all the time. Go see a therapist." (*The Times*, 18 November 2001).

One instance of the collocate SOUND is particularly interesting. It occurs within a response in an Agony Aunt column, where the issue of somebody being schizophrenic or not is being discussed (see Excerpt 46).

(46) IT'S very unlikely your wife has suddenly become schizophrenic. Nor does she **sound** schizophrenic. In any case, you'd have seen tell-tale signs well before now (*The Mirror*, 19 October 2001).

This is a response to a letter contributed by a reader who writes to the paper about his suspicions that his wife may have schizophrenia. The contents of this letter are provided at the beginning of the same article (see Excerpt 47).

(47) I'm beginning to wonder whether my wife is a schizophrenic. When we row, which is all the time, she ends up throwing things around the house and wrecks the place. I try to pacify her but to no avail.

The only evidence that inform the husband's suspicion that she is schizophrenic is that she is physically and verbally aggressive. This is despite the DSM's claim that, although aggressive behaviour may be exhibited in schizophrenic people in response to severe psychotic symptoms, they are not a symptom per se (American Psychiatric Association, 2013:92). While the respondent does challenge the husband's lay diagnosis (*nor does she sound schizophrenic*), they do not challenge the stereotypical link between aggressive behaviour and schizophrenia, or indeed, provide corrective information

about what schizophrenic symptoms entail. The press' publication of lay diagnoses based solely on evidence of violent behaviour are part of a broader tendency and will be discussed in more detail in section 4.1.3. below.

Another set of words, APPEAR, SEEM and SOUND, are verbs of perception that serve as weak epistemic modal markers suggesting a degree of uncertainty. These always occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* is invoked in its metaphorical sense. Notably 4/6 instances (66.67%) of SOUND and 1/9 of SEEM (11.11%) occur in the close vicinity of negatives, where the label *schizophrenic* is rejected (see Excerpt 48). Given its negative evaluative prosody (after all, inconsistency is typically perceived as a negative trait), it is understandable why the quality of being *schizophrenic* in the sense of 'inconsistent' would be perceived as undesirable. Excerpt 48 also draws on the popular misconception that having schizophrenia is the same as having multiple personalities (*I'm two people*).

(48) "I've learnt to compartmentalise," he says. "There's me and there's famous Him. I don't want to **sound** schizophrenic, but probably I'm two people. I'm the guy who does shows in Israel, but I'm also the guy who goes home to the kids. There I am just Dad. (*The Times*, 23 November 2008).

The most frequent collocate in this frame by far is BE (n = 632, ID = 7.67) which typically occurs in contexts where *schizophrenic* is used in its medical sense. Only 27 instances of a sample of 100 were metaphorical. Notable exceptions include where BE + *schizophrenic* is followed by a preposition, namely *about* (4), *regarding* (2) and *in* (3) (see Excerpt 49).

(49) Americans **are** schizophrenic about Syria. They feel a moral outrage at a regime that turns sarin gas on its own people. On the other hand the last thing the US wants is involvement in another Middle East war. (*independent.co.uk*, 31 August 2013).

Before critically reflecting on these non-medical senses of *schizophrenic*, it is worth examining collocates in other frames that typically occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* is used in a metaphorical sense. Of the 25 collocates in the modifiers frame (far left of Figure 4.2), 14 of these characterise the word *schizophrenic* in terms of how suitable/appropriate the label is (see Table 4.10). These can be subdivided into those that refer to prototypicality (*almost, completely, quite, rather, slightly, somewhat, totally, very, so, as, increasingly*), epistemic modal markers (*positively, possibly, probably, truly*) and adverbs referring to severity (*deeply, mildly, wildly*).

Unexpectedly, the modifiers referring to severity typically occur in contexts where the non-medical sense of *schizophrenic* is activated. While the weaker modifier *mildly* does occur half the time in a medical context (10 instances), *deeply* and *wildly* both always occur in non-medical contexts (see Excerpt 50).

(50) I am **wildly** schizophrenic on most of these issues. (*The Times*, 25 September 2007).

Likewise, all instances of all the modifiers functioning as epistemic modals, besides all 25 instances of *positively* and all five of *truly*, occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* is used in its non-medical sense. This may be because *positively* and *truly* are potentially

functioning as more as intensifiers rather than adjectives referring to likelihood or severity.

Table 4.10 Adverb collocates of *schizophrenic* (adj.) that anticipate metaphorical expressions

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>almost</i>	26	7.52
<i>completely</i>	83	9.38
<i>deeply</i>	24	7.71
<i>mildly</i>	61	8.87
<i>positively</i>	25	7.28
<i>possibly</i>	39	8.41
<i>probably</i>	5	5.95
<i>quite</i>	18	7.35
<i>rather</i>	24	8.42
<i>slightly</i>	51	10.14
<i>somewhat</i>	28	9.95
<i>totally</i>	4	6.52
<i>truly</i>	5	7.04
<i>very</i>	15	5.27
<i>wildly</i>	4	7.45

- (51) It struck me that we've found ourselves in a **truly** schizophrenic era. We're forever looking forward, peering into the future to discern the shape of things to come and what button to press to make it happen; at the same time, we're gazing longingly into the past, shipping in the comforting attributes of someone else's long-gone life to make us feel secure and alive in our smooth, grey digital world where everything is binary and nothing ever deviates from the code. (*MailOnline*, 14 April 2013).
- (52) Currently there are so many identities on offer that the Government appears **positively** schizophrenic. Ministers change their minds from hour to hour as they rush through their own legislation. (*The Mail*, 19 February 2006).

The modifiers referring to prototypicality almost always occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* is employed in its non-medical sense. This is the case in all instances of *almost*, *completely*, *rather*, *totally*, *very* and *increasingly*, and in 44/51 cases (86.27%) of *slightly*, 25/28 instances (89.29%) of *somewhat* and 13/14 instances (92.86%) of *so*. The collocate *as* is slightly different, as 34/37 instances (91.89%) occur where *schizophrenic* is used in its literal medical sense, 24 of which occur in some variation of the construction *diagnosed as schizophrenic*. Two instances of *as* are interesting as they occur in the grammatical structure of a simile. In Excerpt 53, an equivalence is drawn between an inconsistency of a footballer's ability and inconsistency in the weather in the month of April. Likewise, in Excerpt 54, the inconsistency in one's day-to-day routine is equated with the inconsistency in the personality of Gollum, a character represented in Peter Jackson's *The Lord of the Rings* film trilogy (2001-3).

(53) The England captain’s dismissal, caught in two minds over whether to leave the ball, was **as** schizophrenic as the April weather, which saw skies alternate between blue and glowering (*The Independent*, 26 April 2001).

(54) I felt almost **as** schizophrenic as Gollum when I returned home from shoots. I’d just be getting over the jet lag and I’d have to up and go again (*Mail on Sunday*, 18 July 2004).

Moreover, four collocates in the modifiers frame, which always occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* is invoked in its metaphorical sense, characterise being *schizophrenic* as unexpected (see Table 4.11 and Excerpts 55 and 56 below). This makes sense, as the quality of being internally inconsistent is a trait that is negative and undesirable. Thus, this usage exploits the word *schizophrenic* in a way that appeals to the news value of ‘unexpectedness’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:65).

Table 4.11 Modifiers of *schizophrenic* (adj.) referring to ‘unexpectedness’

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>curiously</i>	7	8.52
<i>oddly</i>	6	8.11
<i>peculiarly</i>	4	7.76
<i>strangely</i>	10	8.71

(55) BRITAIN seems **strangely** schizophrenic at the moment. We are told to leave our cars at home, but the railways are out of commission (*The Mail*, 6 January 2008).

(56) Even when he was a rock star, he led a **peculiarly** schizophrenic life. At night, he'd play gigs and party - and then the next morning, he would put on a tie and go off to study economics and business administration at the Norwegian School of Economics. (*The Telegraph*, 11 March 2012).

The analysis has thus far established that the word *schizophrenic* is used in a way which exhibits 'metaphoricity' (Hanks, 2010:140). It exploits a more concrete meaning (people who exhibit certain non-neurotypical symptoms) to construe a more abstract one (internal inconsistency). In addition, it exhibits the behaviour of a metaphorical exploitation, namely, that 'the distinction between literal meaning and metaphor blurs into a distinction between primary and secondary sense, the latter being syntagmatically more tightly constrained than the former' (Hanks, 2010:147). As we have seen, the metaphorical use of *schizophrenic* is found in a more tightly constrained set of lexicogrammatical patterns. It tends to modify a specific set of abstract nouns, or is preceded by adverbs referring to prototypicality, modality etc.

However, the metaphorical uses of schizophrenic seem to be exploiting a difference sense of the word to the medical meaning. That is, it seems to be exploiting the meaning of *schizophrenic* as 'having multiple personalities'. This is interesting because this meaning is rarely expressed explicitly in the data. Exceptions include Excerpt 56 above, and the following, where Channel 4 viewers who have schizophrenia are flippantly counted as four people (see Excerpt 57).

(57) On the basis of the research in their own show, they could have argued that each schizophrenic watching the show counted as four separate people, and easily added an extra million to the ratings. Duh. (*The Times*, 19 June 2006).

In summary, we can distinguish three meanings of *schizophrenic*: (1) the accurate medical meaning of *schizophrenic* (i.e. someone who may experience among other things, delusions and hallucinations), (2) an inaccurate medical meaning (someone who has multiple personality disorder, and (3) a metaphorical meaning whereby things or processes are said to be internally consistent via analogy with meaning (2). Thus, it may be the case that, while the ‘multiple personalities’ meaning has fallen out of use in the press, it has survived in the metaphorical exploitations of the word. Neither are these metaphorical usages uncommon. Looking at a 100 randomly sampled concordance lines for *schizophrenic*, 17 of these exploit the term metaphorically, thus drawing on the inaccurate meaning. In other words, roughly a fifth of usages of *schizophrenic* (adj.) draw on the inaccurate metaphorical meaning. This is close to the percentage of metaphorical uses of words relating to schizophrenia observed in the US press (Duckworth *et al.*, 2003).

Creatively exploiting words referring to illness or perceived illness in order to express negative evaluations is not an uncommon phenomenon. Susan Sontag (1978:58) described the linguistic evolution of this process well:

First, the subjects of deepest dread (corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are identified with the disease. The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in the name of the disease (that is, using it as a metaphor), that

horror is imposed on other things. The disease becomes adjectival. Something is said to be disease-like, meaning that it is disgusting or ugly. In French, a mouldering stone facade is still *lepreuse*.

In the same way, the adjectival form of *schizophrenic* is being used in the press to express a primarily negative attribute (being inconsistent).

From a critical perspective, the non-medical sense in which *schizophrenic* is used is problematic. Maglano *et al.* (2011), examining metaphorical exploitations of words referring to schizophrenia in Italian newspapers (it is not particularly clear whether they examine both the adjectival and nominal forms), found that 85% of metaphorical uses invoked words relating to schizophrenia to mean ‘eccentricity/oddness’. Most metaphors were used in articles reporting on politics (49.7%), and in entertainment (85.1%). They suggest that the metaphorical use of these words may perpetuate the misconception that schizophrenia is akin to a good vs. evil split in an individual’s personality, associated with fictional characters like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

In a minority of cases, newspapers adopt a critical attitude towards the metaphorical exploitation of the word *schizophrenic*. For instance, Excerpt 58 is taken from the corrections page in *The Guardian*.

(58) A piece looking at the role of politicians' spouses remarked that wider social advancement of women "has not prevented a schizophrenic **attitude**" in Britain towards wives of prominent figures. The Guardian style book says the term schizophrenic should be used in a medical context only - "never to mean 'in two

minds', contradictory, or erratic, which is wrong, as well as offensive to people diagnosed with this illness" (Spouses of Parliament, 28 April, page 10, G2) (*The Guardian*, 29 April 2010).

The excerpt touches on the three main uses of the metaphor identified in the corpus – ‘contradictory’, ‘erratic’ and ‘split mind’ - and argues that these are *wrong* and *offensive*. They are wrong, because they seem to perpetuate misconceptions about schizophrenia. For instance, it may mislead people into thinking that schizophrenia is the same as having a split personality disorder. Additionally, the metaphorical meaning of ‘erratic’ in relation to one’s attitudes or behaviour, may perpetuate the misconception that schizophrenia is akin to bipolar disorder. Finally, a likely reason that the words *schizoid* and *schizophrenic* are confused (see above) is because they share a similar metaphorical meaning (see Excerpt 32 above). The following excerpt from *The Guardian*’s style guide suggests that the use of *schizoid* to mean ‘internally inconsistent’ is a part of a more frequent tendency.

(59) How ironic it is that non-scientific writers - the editors of the Guardian's Style Guide - insist on the use of a scientific fact that seems to be unknown even by at least one distinguished scientist (It's every man for himself, October 2). Vint Cerf uses the word "**schizoid**" to mean "in two minds", despite the style guide's correct statement that such a use is incorrect as schizophrenia is not Multiple Personality Disorder. (*The Guardian*, 9 October 2008).

The usage is also potentially offensive as it is often used in contexts that potentially trivialise the disorder, for instance when it used in sports or fashion reporting. Despite

these criticisms, however, the metaphorical usage of the adjective *schizophrenic* seem to be fairly typical in the British press as a whole.

However, some newspapers defend the non-medical meaning of *schizophrenic*. For instance, one example of SOUND occurs within a metadiscursive reference to a letter sent in by a reader in which a metaphorical exploitation of *schizophrenic* is criticised (see Excerpt 60).

(60) This week we published a letter objecting to the following headline, from last Saturday's magazine: "Don't make me **sound** schizophrenic. The correspondent chided this newspaper: "Schizophrenia is an extremely serious and debilitating illness. The use of the word as a trailer for a trivial article about a Hollywood actress is completely inappropriate. After all, you wouldn't say, 'Don't make me sound spastic' - or would you?" (*Independent.co.uk*, 8 September 2012).

Here, it is the context in which the metaphor is used which is criticised. It is argued that a word which otherwise refers to a serious illness should not be used in an article which describes a comparatively trivial situation. However, the metaphorical usage isn't criticised per se. Interestingly, it is compared with the use of the reductive slang word *spastic*, suggesting that it is equally offensive. The newspaper responds by arguing that, as *schizophrenic* is not inherently offensive like *spastic*, they are at liberty to use it in any context they like (see Excerpt 61). Of course, this disregards the other ways in which the non-medical usage of *schizophrenic* is problematic, namely that it exploits the term inaccurately and reproduces misconceptions about the disorder and somewhat trivialises it.

(61) Well, no, we wouldn't, because "spastic" is now a cruel insult. "Schizophrenic" isn't. Would we run a headline saying "Don't make me sound psychotic" or "Don't make me sound paranoid"? Yes, of course we would. There is no general ban on the use of terms from psychiatry in broader descriptive senses. What is it about "schizophrenic" that so often raises politically correct hackles?
(*independent.co.uk*, 8 September 2012).

I now move the analysis away from a discussion of the metaphorical exploitation of *schizophrenic* and focus on how it is used in a medical context in the data. Staying in the frame listing nouns modified by *schizophrenic*, ten refer to human identities (see Table 4.12 below). The rest refer to names which occur in contexts where *schizophrenic* has been mis-tagged as it functions grammatically as a noun (e.g. *schizophrenic Andrew Kernan*)

Table 4.12 Noun collocates modified by *schizophrenic* (adj.) that refer to social actors

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>brother</i>	36	7.96
<i>genius</i>	33	8.06
<i>man</i>	115	8.22
<i>mathematician</i>	16	7.31
MOTHER	48	7.48
PATIENT	110	8.92
SISTER	35	8.08
SON	68	8.75
<i>woman</i>	48	7.48

These represent social actors in different ways. Two functionalise the social actor (*mathematician, patient*) whereas the rest identify social actors using either gender labels (*man, woman*) or via relational identifiers (*brother, mother, sister, son*). The collocate *genius* is a type of ‘positive appraisal’, where the text producer’s attitude is encoded in the way the actor is represented. Both *genius* and *mathematician* refer to the Nobel prize-winning mathematician John Forbes Nash who developed symptoms of schizophrenia in his early 30s. They refer to him in the context of the 2001 film *A Beautiful Mind* in which he is played by the actor Russell Crowe (see Excerpts 62-3). This topic is also indicated by the collocate *nash* where *schizophrenic* is mistagged as an adjective instead of a noun.

- (62) His latest movie role, as schizophrenic mathematical **genius** John Nash in *A Beautiful Mind*, is his most ambitious yet and looks set to be his most acclaimed (*Sunday Express*, 27 January 2002).
- (63) The New Zealander received his award for the portrayal in *A Beautiful Mind* of schizophrenic mathematician John **Nash**. As with Dame Judi's award, it supported the long-held Hollywood belief that a portrayal of mental illness can be the key to bringing home acting honours, as with Dustin Hoffman in *The Rain Man* (sic.) (*The Express*, 25 February 2002).

While Nash is referred to positively as a genius, the main focus of the article is always on the cast and production team of the film rather than the life of Nash himself. Indeed, there is something very cynical about Excerpt 63, where the dramatization of the lives of mentally ill people are viewed as sought-after roles, not because they provide an insight

into the lived experience of mental illness, but because they can secure an award for actors. Likewise, many of these articles draw on a film marketing discourse (e.g. Excerpt 64) which frames mental health problems – particularly Nash’s paranoia - as an attraction for film audiences (*tear-jerker, paranoid thriller elements*). Thus, audiences are invited to view Nash as a spectacle of intrigue rather than to sympathise or understand him.

(64) This well-made, well-played but slightly disingenuous Oscar-winning tear-jerker is a biopic of the schizophrenic mathematician John **Nash**, with paranoid thriller elements. It barely explains the detail or significance of the game theory Nash developed, but instead focuses on his eventual triumph over the adversity of his illness (*The Independent*, 28 March 2009).

Collocates in this frame referring to relational identifiers are also potentially interesting. How people with schizophrenia are referred to in the context of their families is important, because their families will usually be the first people they turn to for help. They are also likely to experience disruption and potentially trauma in light of exacerbating symptoms.

The word *father* does not emerge as a collocate here, suggesting that schizophrenic people are rarely represented as being fathers or that schizophrenic people are rarely mentioned in the context of their fathers. However, these collocates may be skewed by near-synonyms such as *mum* and *dad* which are popular in the tabloid press. Likewise, *daughter* is not a collocate, although this may reflect statistics showing that males are

1.4 times more likely to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia than females and that the onset of symptoms is often earlier (Picchioni and Murray, 2007). Symptoms also tend to be less severe in females (Johnstone and Frith, 2004).

In 29/68 instances of SON, the parents are represented as sympathetic but distressed with regard to their son's exacerbating symptoms. They are typically represented as powerless, however, both in relation to their child's behaviour and the punitive actions of the police (see Excerpt 65).

(65) 'It's not a hospital, it's a prison': Mother's desperate plea for release of her schizophrenic **son** after 263 days in solitary confinement left him unrecognisable and in 'worse mental state' (*MailOnline*, 2 April 2014).

In two instances of SON, there is the suggestion that the parents have contributed to their child's schizophrenia. These frame schizophrenia according to the hypothesis that schizophrenia is brought on via environmental factors (see Section 1.2).

(66) In a famous example of Laing's theory, a mother visited her schizophrenic **son** in hospital. As the son was about to kiss her on the cheek, his mother froze and turned her head away, so he backed off. She then said, 'Darling, don't you want to show that you're glad to see your mother by giving her a kiss?' (*The Observer*, 23 May 2004).

However, by far the most typical contexts in which these familial-term collocates occur is that of violence. In total, 43/68 instances (63.24%) of SON occur in the context of

violent crime, along with 28/66 instances (42.42%) of MOTHER and 23/35 instances (65.71%) of SISTER (see Excerpts 67-69). The majority of instances of SISTER occur in the context of the so-called White House Farm murders, where Jeremy Bamber was convicted of killing seven of his family members and framed the murders on his sister who was diagnosed with schizophrenia (see Excerpt 69).

- (67) Loving mum stabbed to death by schizophrenic **son** 'who thought she was the devil'; Sandra Brotherton was stabbed by her son David who she cared for during his long term mental health problems, a court heard (*The Mirror*, 15 December 2015).
- (68) Two children who were killed by their schizophrenic **mother** were left "exposed and open" by social services, according to their father, Jimi Ogunkoya. (*The Independent*, 28 May 2008).
- (69) Bamber, 50, was sentenced to life in jail for the murders of his adoptive parents, his sister and her twin boys. He shot them with a hunting rifle, then tried to pin the blame on his schizophrenic **sister**, former model Sheila "Bambi" Caffell, 27. (*The Express*, 12 February 2011).

The typical contexts in which these collocates occur represent people with schizophrenia as disruptive to their families. This is made particularly alarming in instances of *mother*, who in 20/66 instances (30%) are represented as psychologically abusing their children. In ten of these, they are represented as murdering their children (see Excerpts 70 and 71).

(70) Of course, when I grew up I discovered that one of my classmates had lived alone with a schizophrenic **mother** who, at night, used to creep in and sit on the end of her bed with a knife (*The Independent*, 21 March 2002).

(71) A GIRL of three was stabbed to death by her schizophrenic **mother** who then tried to dissolve the body in acid, a court heard yesterday (*The Mail*, 27 October 2010).

Portraying mothers with schizophrenia as dangerous and cruel may end up deterring mothers who experience symptoms of schizophrenia from seeking help as they may fear being viewed as an unfit mother. It may also deter women with schizophrenia from beginning a family.

The gender-related collocates *man* and *woman* also provide an opportunity to compare differences in the way people with schizophrenia are represented depending on their gender. Whitely *et al.* (2015) found that the representation of people with mental health problems were shaped in accordance with ‘the chivalry hypothesis’, a theory from Gender Studies predicting that women are framed in more compassionate terms than men (see Pollak, 1950). Whereas 48/115 (42%) instances of *man* occur in contexts where they are represented as enacting violent crime, this is only the case in 10/48 (21%) instances of *woman*. For instance, 14/48 instances (29.17%) occur in the context of recovery (e.g. Excerpt 72). This provides some tentative evidence for the chivalry hypothesis, which will be explored in more detail in Section 5.3.3).

(72) He talks about a schizophrenic **woman** whom he would prefer not to be named:

'She was unusual in having her florid symptoms relatively under control.' (*The Observer*, 21 August 2005).

Another collocate in this frame is EPISODE, which, in 31/79 instances (39.24%), is used in articles reporting on the unusual behaviour of a sign-language interpreter who was employed for Nelson Mandela's memorial service in 2013. Jantjie, the interpreter, later claimed that this unusual behaviour was the result of *a schizophrenic episode* (see Excerpt 73).

(73) THE question about the Mandela memorial sign language guy isn't really if he meant it, had a schizophrenic **episode** or was just mucking about (*The Sun*, 15 December, 2013).

In the examples examined, the claim that Jantjie was experiencing a schizophrenic episode is framed as a ploy in order to save face (*just mucking about*), presumably after lying about his competence in sign language in order to land the job. There is a dilemma here. Like other mental disorders, schizophrenia tends to involve self-reported symptoms (see Section 4.3), and therefore it is possible to that someone might try to fake having symptoms of the disorder. There are a variety of reasons why one might conceivably choose to do so. For instance, to get a lighter sentence in court or, as is possibly the case in the Jantjie examples, find an excuse to explain away an embarrassing situation. Newspapers are probably no better or worse than anyone at being able to spot such cases – and while their occasional disbelief probably doesn't

make things easier for real schizophrenic people, the root problem here are the people who claim to have the illness for personal gain.

The third frame from the left lists adjectival collocates of *schizophrenic* that are grammatically co-ordinated with it (see Table 4.13).. Nine of these refer to other mental diagnoses and are typically used to represent schizophrenic individuals as having multiple comorbidities (see Excerpt 74).

Table 4.13 Adjectival collocates co-ordinated with *schizophrenic* (adj.) that refer to diagnoses

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>autistic</i>	11	8.19
<i>bipolar</i>	48	10.24
<i>depressed</i>	7	7
<i>depressive</i>	13	13
<i>epileptic</i>	6	7.35
<i>maniac</i>	7	7.38
<i>manic-depressive</i>	5	7.09
<i>paranoid</i>	434	12.77
<i>psychotic</i>	21	8.79

(74) The reason is simple: it is not seen as necessary to prove that there is something wrong with the brains of patients diagnosed as schizophrenic, **bipolar**, depressed and so on (*The Guardian*, 10 January 2002).

Other collocates in this frame refer to negative modifiers that do not refer to mental illnesses (see Table 4.14). For instance, two of these refer to violence enacted towards others – *violent* (n = 12, ID = 7.73), *serial* (killer) (n = 10, ID = 7.93). Co-ordinating these modifiers with *schizophrenic* potentially perpetuates the notion that people who have schizophrenia are also likely to be violent (Excerpt 75). One collocate - *alcoholic* (n = 9, ID = 7.88) - refers to drug addiction (Excerpt 76). The latter collocation may reflect the fact that 47% of patients with schizophrenia also suffer from a substance abuse comorbidity (Buckley, 2008).

(75) She plays the daughter of two psychiatrists, struggling to find space for her own life while dealing with an overdependent and unpredictably **violent** schizophrenic brother. (*The Express*, 30 June 2002).

(76) ROBERT LONG, the man police believe started the fatal fire, is an **alcoholic**, schizophrenic loner with a criminal record. (*The Observer*, 25 June 2000).

Table 4.14 Adjectival collocates co-ordinated with *schizophrenic* (adj.) that refer to identities perceived as problematic

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>alcoholic</i>	9	7.88
<i>gay</i>	6	7.13
<i>homeless</i>	20	8.92
<i>lesbian</i>	15	8.60
<i>serial</i>	10	7.93

Two collocates here, *lesbian* and *gay*, refer to homosexual identities. Of these 19/21 (90.48%) refer to fictional representations of people with schizophrenia, with 17 referring to Zoe Tate, a character from the British soap opera *Emmerdale* (see Excerpt 77).

(77) "You're a decent person. You won't be able to lie under oath," Charity pleads, alluding to the days when Zoe, a schizophrenic **lesbian** vet, was having her religious phase and was prone to standing in rivers in the crucifixion pose insisting that her baby (Jean) was the devil's spawn. (It's a long story) (*The Mirror*, 27 January 2004).

Like many of the fictional representations we will encounter in this thesis, Zoe is hardly ever represented sympathetically, but as a source of entertainment and perhaps even humour. Symptoms such as psychotic delusions (*having her religious phrase, insisting her baby (Jean) was the devil's spawn*) and unpredictable behaviours caused by these symptoms (*standing in rivers*) are never described using appropriate medical language, but instead seem to be framed as merely odd behaviours. The flippant aside (*it's a long story*) seems to suggest that Zoe's diagnosis is too complicated or tiresome to report. While it might be argued that the newspapers are only reporting on a representation in the soap opera, they nevertheless frequently choose to report on it uncritically. The only two positive collocates in this frame, *brilliant* (n = 8, ID = 7.48) and *prize-winning* (n = 4, ID = 6.77) likewise also occur in the context of a fictional representation of John Forbes Nash (see above).

Other collocates reflect patterns found elsewhere. One collocate, *suicidal* (n = 5, ID = 6.99), reflects the co-ordination between *schizophrenia* and *suicide* identified in section 4.3 above. Here, again, through their repeated co-occurrence, people with schizophrenia are unusually frequently represented as being suicidal (see Excerpt 78). Likewise, *strange* reflects the adverbial collocates of *schizophrenic*, such as *curiously* and *peculiarly* and always occurs in the context of *schizophrenic* being used in its non-medical sense (see Excerpt 79). This again suggests that metaphorical exploitations of *schizophrenic* occur in a relatively constrained set of lexicogrammatical patterns.

(78) Kerry Katona survived a deprived childhood with a schizophrenic, **suicidal** mother, an absent father and nowhere to call home. (*The Mirror*, 23 January 2002).

(79) [“]But then I learnt that he'd sent copies of my books to his friends, so . . . it was a **strange** and schizophrenic, very troubled, relationship” (*The Observer*, 22 March 2009).

Last, *ill* (n = 6, ID = 6.97) occurs in contexts describing schizophrenic people as particularly unwell. An additional two of its instances are striking in that they distinguish the quality of being *schizophrenic* from the quality of being *mentally ill* (see Excerpts 80 and 81). While, in Excerpt 81, *schizophrenic* is functioning as a noun rather than an adjective, again, these examples reflect confusion as to what the illness refers to. It begs the question as to what the text producers think schizophrenia is if not a mental illness. G (see section 4.5 below).

(80) [“] Bo's political career is dead, but they will try to protect him otherwise. One way of them doing that is the rumours that have spread that his wife is schizophrenic, or mentally **ill**,” he said (*telegraph.co.uk*, 18 June 2012).

(81) But Lord Wakeham pointed to a number of recent adjudications where newspapers and magazines had used pejorative language about the mentally **ill** and schizophrenic (*The Independent*, 25 February 2000).

This section has examined lexicogrammatical patterns around the word *schizophrenic* (adj.). A unique (and not entirely unexpected) part of this word's usage was its frequent metaphorical meaning, which broadly means 'internally inconsistent'. It was noted that this meaning likely evolved from the widespread misconception that schizophrenia is the same as multiple personality disorder. In the next section, I examine collocates of word forms relating to the lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.).

4.5. Word sketch for SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.)

Finally, the third most frequent *schiz* word referring to people with schizophrenia is SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.). As already mentioned, SCHIZOPHRENIC is a form of 'identification' (van Leeuwen, 2008), where social actors are referred to with reference to one aspect of their physical identity (in this case, that they have been diagnosed with schizophrenia). Baker observes that, when representing homosexual men (2005) and trans people (2014), identifying labels are reductive as they define people via only one

aspect of their identities. Thus, unlike SCHIZOPHRENIA and *schizophrenic* (adj.)²⁵, SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) always refers to people with schizophrenia rather than the diagnosis in the abstract or non-medical qualities.. Figure 4.3 below shows the five frames in the word sketch that contain the most collocates.

Beginning with the modifiers frame, two collocates, *dangerous* and *violent*, explicitly characterise schizophrenic people as dangerous (See Table 4.15 and Excerpts 82 and 83). Three additional collocates, *crazed*, *psychotic* and *paranoid*, are perhaps also suggestive of violence in that they characterise schizophrenic individuals as suffering from florid symptoms. As we saw in Section 4.3 above, references to florid symptoms frequently occurred in the context of stories reporting on people with schizophrenia committing violent crimes. In contrast to the others, *crazed* is not a medical term but a simplistic lay term that has been employed since the early 20th century to refer to thought or behaviour perceived as abnormal (Hinshaw, 2007:116-117). However, it is used to refer directly to refer to people with schizophrenia in only three instances, twice in *The Express* and once in *The Sun*, reflecting the populist language of these newspapers (see Excerpt 84).

²⁵ In this section, all references to SCHIZOPHRENIC imply the nominal form.

Table 4.15 Adjectival collocates of SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) that refer to dangerousness

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>crazed</i>	5	6.06
<i>dangerous</i>	47	8.79
<i>paranoid</i>	1234	12.81
<i>psychotic</i>	7	5.97
<i>violent</i>	48	8.79

- (82) HOW is it that **dangerous** schizophrenics are let out to roam the country and kill people - but a man is put in a mental hospital against his will just for being fat? (*The Sun*, 25 February 2005).
- (83) TWO mental patients - one a **violent** schizophrenic, the other a man who had been held at the Carstairs State Hospital - were being prepared for release from their secure clinic at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. (*The Express*, 8 January 2002).
- (84) IT IS almost six years since brave policewoman Nina Mackay was stabbed to death as she tried to arrest a **crazed** schizophrenic. (*The Express*, 3 December 2003).

Figure 4.4 Word sketch for SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.)

schizophrenic (noun) Alternative Pos: adjective (freq: 5,437) Schizophrenia 2000-2015 freq = 3,605 (207.63 per million)		modifiers of "schizophrenic"		nouns and verbs modified by "schizophrenic"		verbs with "schizophrenic" as object		verbs with "schizophrenic" as subject		"schizophrenic" and/or ...				
	61.83		5.77		32.07		34.09		18.92					
paranoid +	1,234	12.81	depressive	4	8.95	diagnose	77	10.13	stab	90	10.53	depressive	18	9.68
bit	47	9.22	clunis	4	8.49	free	13	8.24	kill	76	9.70	clunis	16	9.50
dangerous	47	8.79	gunman	4	8.30	jail	12	7.84	attack	18	8.41	kernan	13	9.20
violent	48	8.72	fellowship	4	8.01	release	18	7.72	behead	12	8.22	addict	15	9.11
paranoid	22	8.30	barrett	5	7.94	treat	19	7.50	commit	13	7.94	barrett	13	9.02
chronic	26	8.24	nash	4	6.78	mumble	6	7.37	murder	11	7.82	psychopath	8	8.47
borderline	20	8.11	killer	6	6.57	arm	6	7.21	believe	21	7.59	ray	8	8.45
gmt	33	7.93	man	11	5.27	detain	7	7.20	rape	7	7.40	napper	8	8.41
pm	24	7.66	byline	4	2.81	be +	578	7.10	knife	6	7.25	campbell	8	8.30
undiagnosed	12	7.42				play	27	7.07	claim	15	7.18	bryan	7	8.27
alcoholic	10	7.11				seen	8	7.07	threaten	7	7.09	abram	6	8.03
homeless	11	7.07				delude	5	7.04	suffer	16	7.07	gettler	5	7.89
likely	10	7.04				arrest	8	6.91	spend	10	7.04	psychotic	5	7.87
37-year-old	8	6.84				allow	12	6.86	hear	15	7.02	ferguson	5	7.75
little	21	6.74				feel	11	6.81	admit	10	6.98	nash	6	7.67
incurable	7	6.65				institutionalise	4	6.77	pose	6	6.96	linford	4	7.56
sword-wielding	6	6.45				lock	5	6.67	think	11	6.82	elgizouli	4	7.56
am	8	6.29				sentence	5	6.64	punch	4	6.64	fischer	4	7.48
40-year-old	5	6.13				shoot	9	6.61	inherit	4	6.64	deyanov	4	7.47
crazed	5	6.06				become	21	6.57	slash	4	6.63	killer	5	7.45
psychotic	7	5.97				charge	5	6.52	stalk	4	6.61	khan	4	7.42
edition	10	5.95				convict	5	6.43	die	10	6.41	alcoholic	4	7.39
most	9	5.93				name	6	6.39	lose	6	6.35	joseph	4	7.37
album	5	5.89				hold	7	6.06	live	8	6.33	suspect	4	7.35
pint-sized	4	5.86				help	7	5.97	keep	5	6.27	patient	8	7.25

By characterising schizophrenic people as dangerous, the press draws on and perpetuates the widespread stereotypical link between schizophrenia and violent crime (Schizophrenia Commission Report, 2012). That said, only two collocates convey this explicitly, perhaps reflecting the claim made by Goulden *et al.* (2011:5) that, in the context of news articles reporting on people with mental illnesses, ‘clearly inflammatory language is quite rare’. Perhaps the press is hesitant to violate the rules dictated by the PCC and IPSO that the press should not publish inaccurate information or discriminate against marginalised social groups. Instead, Kalucy *et al.* (2011) and Thornicroft *et al.* (2011) suggest that the press is using more subtle linguistic strategies to convey these stereotypes. Goulden *et al.* (2011:5) acknowledges that ‘[w]hat concerns campaigners more is [...] *how* such incidents are reported’ and that ‘clearly inflammatory language is quite rare.’ To take one example, in Excerpt 82 above, *schizophrenics* is predicated by the verb *roam*. In a 50% sample of UKWaC, the word form *roam* tends to predicate grammatical subjects that are animals such as *wildebeest* (n = 5, LR = 9.21), *peacocks* (n = 7, LR = 9.2), *deer* (n = 59, LR = 7.79), *buffalo* (n = 18, LR = 7.75). In other words, in Excerpt 82, *schizophrenic* is occupying the place of what would normally be an animal subject. Given readers’ primings associated with *roam*, the reader would likely infer some equivalence between the *schizophrenics* mentioned and animals. Thus, the use of the word *roam* in this context is an example of animalising rhetoric, where humans are likened to animals, which is typically to characterise undesirable social groups as unpredictable, primitive or estranged from social norms (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014). This may also implicitly characterise schizophrenic people as dangerous. Incidentally, another top 25 collocate of *roam* in

UKWaC was *gangs* (n = 12, LR = 7.42), suggesting that the use of the word is also often employed to characterise other undesirable people as dangerous (see Excerpt 85). While this is only one instance of the word, Sayce (2000:66) uses *roam* as an example of animalising language used to represent mentally ill people in the media, suggesting that it is part of a more frequent pattern. Indeed, there are 67 instances of *roam* in the corpus, and 43/67 are used to describe people with schizophrenia or people with mental illnesses more generally being unsupervised in the community.

(85) These murder **gangs** who roam our land at will have killed thousands of our people, injured and maimed tens of thousands more and caused damage to property running into tens of millions of pounds (*UKWaC*, text 550197)

Another way that the press indirectly characterises schizophrenic people as violent is evidenced by the collocate *sword-wielding*. All six instances are used to characterise Andrew Kernan, an individual with schizophrenia who was shot and killed by police after he refused to drop a sword he was carrying, having been judged by police as a threat to others. While, like the example featuring *roam* above, there is a scarcity of evidence in the word sketch, an analogous phrase, *a MACHETE-wielding schizophrenic*, in Excerpt 86 below, suggests that it is part of a more frequent pattern.

(86) Earlier yesterday the mother of Andrew Kernan, 37, the **sword-wielding** schizophrenic shot dead by police in Liverpool, denied that he was a danger to the public. (*The Mail*, 17 July 2001)

In these excerpts, the act of holding an object (which would typically be expressed via a verb predicate) has instead been expressed via a pre-modifying participle (cf. *the schizophrenic wielding the sword, the sword-wielding schizophrenic*). Halliday and Hasan (1976) have argued that certain semantic categories are typically expressed via certain grammatical classes. Thus, processes are typically expressed via verbs, things are represented via nouns and qualities by adjectives. When an aspect of experience is construed via an incongruent grammatical option, this is an example of a grammatical metaphor. In this case, the process of holding a weapon is construed via an attributive adjective (*sword-wielding*) rather than a verb. This results in an unusual construction where someone is characterised via an instrument they use. In this way, these constructions resemble examples of what van Leeuwen (2008) has called ‘instrumentalisation’, that is, where people ‘are represented by means of reference to the instrument with which they carry out the action and in which they are represented as being engaged.’. However, unlike van Leeuwen’s examples of instrumentalisation, where an instrument stands in place of a social actor (e.g. *the bomb landed in the marketplace*), here the instrument is construed as an attributive adjective which modifies reference to the actor (i.e. *sword-wielding schizophrenic*). Thus, we might refer to these instances as semi-instrumentalisation, by analogy with van Leeuwen’s (2008:60) notion of ‘semi objectivation’. This occurs, argues van Leeuwen, when social actors are represented by way of a body part, but in close proximity to a reference to the owner of that body part. He writes,

‘*Somatisation*, finally, is a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a part of their body, as in: *11.6 She put her hand on Mary Kate’s shoulder*. The noun denoting the body part is almost always premodified by a possessive pronoun or genitive referring to the ‘owner’ of the body part, and perhaps we should, in such cases, speak of ‘semi objectivation’.’ (p.60).

Instrumentalising Kernan in this way serves three discernible functions. First, it is a strategy for packaging the information in as few words as possible. Press reporting is characterised by succinct language use, where meaning is densely packaged into as few words as possible (Crystal, [1988] 2004). By grammatically transposing the information into an attributive modifier, the press leave space to include additional information in the relative clause (that he was shot dead by police in Liverpool). Second, it places the newsworthy item *sword*, which appeals to the news value of ‘unusality’ (Bednarek and Caple, 2012), in a prominent position by locating it at the beginning of the phrase. Third and finally, it defines Kernan via the potential threat that he posed rather than other, arguably more important aspects of the story such as his mental trauma and what socio-political circumstances led to it. The collocate *gunman* in the frame entitled *nouns and verbs modified by ‘schizophrenic’*, where SCHIZOPHRENIC is mistagged as a noun (see Figure 4.3), suggests that instrumentalization is a broader strategy employed by the press to represent schizophrenic people.

Some collocates in this frame occur in contexts where the link between people with schizophrenia and violent crime is challenged. This is the case in one instance of *dangerous* and three instances of *violent*.

(87) Everyday in my job I talk to people who have the condition but have nothing in common with the "**dangerous** schizophrenic" stereotype aside from their diagnosis (*independent.co.uk*, 14 May 2013).

(88) The 2007 act was motivated as much by the desire to assuage popular fear of the mythological marauding '**violent** schizophrenic' as by the hope of getting better clinical outcomes (*The Guardian*, 29 June 2008).

Likewise, the determiner *most* in 9/6 instances (66.67%) is used in some articles to challenge the exaggerated association between people with schizophrenia and violent crime.

(89) **Most** schizophrenics are not violent. There is more danger outside a pub on a Saturday night. Many with schizophrenia do kill. They kill themselves (*The Express*, 17 March 2003).

(90) Schizophrenics tend to be hospitalised rather than jailed, because they are deemed treatable. **Most** schizophrenics are not violent (*The Times*, 10 September 2008).

In these excerpts, the popular misassumption that people with schizophrenia are all dangerous criminals is criticised. However, the overall stance of these newspapers

towards people with schizophrenia may be viewed as hypocritical, as there exist far more articles elsewhere in the data, published in these same newspapers, that indirectly reproduce these misassumptions (e.g. see Excerpts 83, 75, 95 etc.). While these articles are written by different journalists, it would be more appropriate if these writers acknowledged the role that their own newspaper plays in shaping public biases. That said, it is encouraging that the press is gradually beginning to incorporate articles that challenge dominant stereotypes of people with schizophrenia. It is also interesting that the press offers more positive representations of people with schizophrenia when SCHIZOPHRENIC occurs in its plural form. This might be because the press is hesitant to provide negative representations of schizophrenic people explicitly when referring to them as a collective group, instead choosing to suggest this implicitly over cumulative references to individual schizophrenic people (see below).

Another way that the press implicitly frame schizophrenic people as dangerous is by quoting lay diagnoses. These are interesting because they tell us what behaviours non-specialists view as symptomatic of schizophrenia. One of the collocates in the modifiers frame is *likely*, which, in all of its ten instances occurs in the context of a quote from the actor Christian Bale, in which he characterises the biblical prophet Moses as *likely schizophrenic* (see Excerpts 91 and 92). While in eight of the ten instances, SCHIZOPHRENIC is mistagged as a noun rather than an adjective (Excerpt 91), *likely* still functions as a modifier.

(91) I think the man was **likely** schizophrenic and was one of the most barbaric individuals that I ever read about in my life,' he said (*MailOnline*, 28 November 2014).

(92) Christian Bale describes Moses as 'barbaric' and a 'likely schizophrenic'; The actor plays the biblical character in Ridley Scott's new film (*Independent.co.uk*, 27 November 2014).

In all of these occurrences of *likely*, the only evidence provided by Bale on which he bases his diagnosis is that Moses was *barbaric*, which in 8 instances is modified with superlatives (*one of the most barbaric individuals that I ever read about in my life*). Indeed, the link between schizophrenia and barbarism is strengthened in Excerpt 99 by the co-ordinating conjunction *and*. To be co-ordinated, items typically must share a semantic feature (cf. *red and green, cat and dog* vs. **green and dog*). Thus, co-ordinating *schizophrenic* and *barbaric* implicitly suggests that the two characteristics are related. One possible reading of this is that it suggests that schizophrenic people are violent. While, later in some of the articles, Bale's views are referred to as *reflecting bigotry* or *causing upset*, this is always with reference to religious faiths, seemingly unaware of how they may offend or cause potential harm to people with schizophrenia.

Other examples of lay diagnoses are provided by the collocate *undiagnosed*. In two of its twelve instances (16.67%), it refers to people with schizophrenia retrospectively, before they have committed a violent crime (see Examples 93 and 94). The implication here is that the violent crime revealed them to be schizophrenic. Again, this potentially frames violent behaviour as the main symptom of schizophrenia. The notion that people with mental illnesses have a concealed identity that is only revealed after they commit violent crimes has also been observed by Bilić and Georgaca (2007). They suggest that

this stokes public fears as it suggests that dangerous mentally ill people are able to disguise themselves as neurotypical people and therefore that they could strike suddenly at any moment without warning (2007:175). In this way, these representations appeal to Jewkes' (2015) news value of 'risk', where stories are chosen that represent criminal acts as unpredictable and occurring randomly.

(93) Session drummer Gordon, 63, wrote Layla with Eric Clapton. But in June 1983, the **undiagnosed** schizophrenic beat his mother to death with a hammer. He was jailed for second-degree murder. (*The Mail*, 23 September 2008).

(94) Peter Lanza dubbed his son Adam 'evil' for killing 20 children and six staff at the Connecticut school just before Christmas in 2012. Explaining that his son spent his entire life troubled by mental illness, Lanza, a vice president for GE Energy Financial Services said that in his opinion he thought his youngest boy was an **undiagnosed** schizophrenic. "You can't get any more evil" (*MailOnline*, 10 March 2014).

Excerpts 93 and 94 are interesting for other reasons. For instance, Excerpt 93 simultaneously draws two frequent representations of people diagnosed with schizophrenia: (1) that they are violent towards other people and (2) that they possess creative talent. The representation of people with schizophrenia as inherently creative is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.3. Excerpt 94 is also interesting for two reasons. First, like many of the Bale examples (above), it associates schizophrenia with excessive forms of violence via the superlative construction *you can't get any more evil*. Second, referring to the individual as *evil* draws on a religious discourse to characterise

the individual as immoral. Eagleton (2010), for instance, in examining how the notion of 'evil' is constructed in a selection of literary works suggests that it is defined by immorality, purposelessness and violence. In this way, this excerpt is also an example of where mentally ill people are linguistically framed as both 'mad and bad': criminally insane on the one hand and yet morally culpable on the other (Cross, 2014). The tension between insanity and moral culpability is explored in more detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

An additional two instances of *undiagnosed* occur in lay diagnoses where individuals are judged to have schizophrenia based on evidence of aggressive (Excerpt 95) or generalised sordid behaviour (Excerpt 96). These likewise suggest that schizophrenic people are typically dangerous.

(95) I genuinely believe he was an **undiagnosed** schizophrenic. He'd just snap... once in Tramp, he had a go at Keith Richards; he gave him some verbal that was fuckin' ugly. Keith ignored it, but if the guy had done it to me, I'd have run (*The Independent*, 19 February 2000).

(96) Yet there are acute moments as Keith reminds them of his increasingly dire deeds, and an intriguing suggestion that Keith may be an **undiagnosed** schizophrenic as well as an addict (*The Times*, 9 May 2012).

The collocate *borderline* (n = 20, ID = 8.11) on three occasions also occurs within lay diagnoses, with the rest referring to a formal diagnosis of *borderline schizophrenia*. All of these instances refer to the vocalist Britney Spears who is described by her ex-

bodyguard, Tony Barretto, as a *borderline schizophrenic*, in all instances because of outrageous, potentially destructive, behaviour (see Excerpt 97 below). Lay diagnoses that construe violence or other negative behaviours as primary symptoms of the disorder are problematic for a several reasons. On the one hand, they serve to characterise people with schizophrenia as high-risk individuals who should be avoided. However, they also reproduce inaccurate representations of the disorder. That the general population has an inaccurate understanding of schizophrenia may potentially cause problems. For instance, if a lay diagnosis cannot be aligned with a medical diagnosis, this is likely to delay the time in which it takes someone experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia to seek professional help, thus preventing individuals from receiving the treatment they need while experiencing exacerbating symptoms (Furnham and Murao, 1999:936).

(97) He also told how he feared for her children's safety and believed she was out of her mind on drink or drugs when looking after them. Barretto was prepared to testify about Britney's hell-raising, but neither the court or her legal team chose to examine him, meaning his evidence went unchallenged. He branded her a "**borderline** schizophrenic" and told how she overdosed in a hotel room days after leaving rehab. (*The Star*, 2 October 2007).

The lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC resembles *schizophrenia* (n.) (see Section 4.2 above) in that it co-occurs with modifiers characterising symptoms as particularly severe, namely *chronic* and *incurable* (e.g. see Excerpt 98). Once again, we find that the press tends to typically refer to more serious forms of the diagnosis. The modifier *incurable* is particularly interesting, as it reflects a tendency in the press to highlight how schizophrenia cannot be cured (see section 4.3 above). While there is no 'cure' for

schizophrenia as such, the prognosis for people with schizophrenia who receive treatment early on is improving. Indeed, research suggests that just under half of people with schizophrenia who are treated early begin to recover after experiencing one of two episodes (Barbato, 1998).

(98) One recent research project was in Australia. It revealed that four out of five **incurable** schizophrenics were regular cannabis smokers. (*The Mail*, 25 November 2005).

Moving onto the frame listing verb collocates of SCHIZOPHRENIC when it is a grammatical subject, 13 of these (52%) explicitly represent schizophrenic people as causing harm to others (see Table 4.16). While nine refer to violent actions themselves (e.g. *attacked*, *beheaded*), two refer to threat of violence (POSE, THREAT). In particular, there is a semantic preference for verbs relating to knife crime, which is the most common way in which people with mental illnesses commit homicides (Kalucy *et al.*, 2011).

Table 4.16 Verb collocates of SCHIZOPHRENIC that refer to violence

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
<i>attacked</i>	18	8.41
<i>beheaded</i>	12	8.22
COMMIT	13	7.94
DIE	10	6.41
<i>killed</i>	76	9.70

<i>knifed</i>	6	7.25
MURDER	11	7.82
POSE	6	6.96
<i>punched</i>	4	6.64
<i>raped</i>	7	7.40
<i>slashed</i>	4	6.63
<i>stabbed</i>	90	10.53
THREATEN	7	7.09

Some verbs are more detailed in the meanings they convey than others. For instance, while *attacked* and *killed* are quite vague about the violence inflicted, *slashed* and *stabbed* orient specifically to the trajectory of the knife, whereas *beheaded* orients to the bodily mutilation caused to the victim (see Excerpts 99 and 100). Arguably, these appeal to Jewkes's (2015:64) news value of 'visual spectacle' in that they convey violent imagery. In this way, these more detailed verbs qualify as sensationalist as they maximise the news value of the story while drawing attention away from arguably more important aspects of the story, such as the mental condition of the assailant, failures of mental health teams, stigma etc. (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013). This is part of a more general trend identified by Zizek (2009:9) for the media to privilege more tangible violence carried out by social actors over other systemic forms of violence, for instance, in this case, cuts to healthcare, organisation of social services, stigma towards people with schizophrenia etc. Also note that, while the press is cautious to describe people with schizophrenia in the collective as violent and dangerous (see above), it nevertheless chooses to represent schizophrenic people as typically enacting violent crimes. By representing schizophrenic people unusually frequently as carrying out

violent crimes, the press imply that schizophrenic people are more violent and dangerous than other types of people.

(99) A paranoid schizophrenic **beheaded** his flatmate in a frenzied attack after suffering from delusions that he was being persecuted, a court has heard. (*The Mirror*, 2 December 2013)

(100) A MACHETE-wielding schizophrenic who **slashed** two guards in a rampage through MI5's HQ was locked up in a mental health unit indefinitely yesterday. (*The Sun*, 22 June 2005)

While the above verbs occur in contexts where schizophrenic people are represented as the agents of violence, the verb DIE occurs, in four of its ten instances, in contexts where schizophrenic people are the targets of violence (see Excerpts 101-103).

(101) They found the 52-year-old schizophrenic had **died** from asphyxia after officers restrained him in the prone position, with his hands cuffed behind his back (*Independent.co.uk*, 23 February 2015).

(102) They highlight the inquiry in 2004 into the death of David "Rocky" Bennett, a schizophrenic who **died** after a struggle with staff at an NHS hospital in Norwich (*The Telegraph*, 11 January 2006).

(103) The Met is bracing itself for more criticism this week when a private investigation into the death of Sean Rigg, a 40-yearold musician and schizophrenic who **died** in police custody in Brixton in 2008, reports its results (*Sunday Express*, 12 May 2013).

Here, violence is represented very differently than in Excerpts 99 and 100 above. In those, the verbs were in the active voice where the subject was the agent and the object was the patient. In these examples (i.e. 108-110), the verb *died* is used, which is an example of a verb which is in the ‘middle voice’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014:350). This is where a clause is not coded for agency because of the choice of verb and hence neither active nor passive (cf. *officers suffocated the schizophrenic, the schizophrenic had died from asphyxia*). Dreyfus (2017:381), examining choices language users can make to represent action as more or less deliberate, argues that verbs in the middle voice code the least responsibility. In Excerpts 101 and 102, the responsible agents are further removed from the action in that they are linked to the clause via a temporal conjunction (*after*) rather than a *by*-phrase. In Excerpt 103, the agents are ‘backgrounded’ (van Leeuwen, 2008), as they are only inferable from the location in which the event occurred (*police custody*).

To examine whether these examples are symptomatic of a broader stylistic tendency to obscure agency around violence committed against schizophrenia people, I examined a concordance for the names of the three people mentioned in these articles, (*Sean*) *Rigg*, (*Colin*) *Holt* and (*David*) *Bennett*. Agency is never fully transparent (i.e. the action is never represented using a transitive clause) in any of the clauses featuring these names. Indeed, in roughly a third of the instances (32/104), the killing is nominalised as *death*,

which may obscure the notion that the schizophrenic person was killed at all (see Excerpt 104).

(104) David "Rocky" **Bennett** died where he had spent most of his adult life: in psychiatric hospital. (*The Guardian*, 18 July 2001).

Two things are of note here. One is that very few collocates in the word sketch represent people with schizophrenia as the targets of violence. The only other collocate in the entire word sketch that does this is *shot* (n = 9, ID = 6.61), where, given that in all instances the schizophrenic person is characterised as dangerous, frames the violence as somewhat justified. This is curious given that schizophrenic people are 14 times more likely to be the victims of violent crime rather than be arrested as a perpetrator (Brekke *et al.*, 2001). Second, it is curious that agency is obscured when social services are the agents of violence, but not when schizophrenic people are, especially given that judging moral responsibility is a more complex affair when agents perform acts under the influence of symptoms of a mental disorder. Admittedly, as Dreyfus (2017:382) suggests, the press may choose to obscure agency until the potentially responsible parties have been convicted. Likewise, Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) observe that social services such as the police work closely with the press in order to maintain their media image. However, elsewhere in the articles in which Excerpts 101 and 103 occur, the responsible parties are referred to as having been convicted of murder. Moreover, the press criticises state services elsewhere. A case in point is, ALLOW, which typically occurs in contexts where state services are explicitly criticised (see Excerpt 105).

(105) A "SYSTEMATIC failure" by the NHS **allowed** a schizophrenic to murder a pal and eat his brain, a report claimed yesterday. (*The Sun*, 4 September 2009)

Table 4.17 Verb collocates taking SCHIZOPHRENIC as their object that refer to speech/thought representation

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>admitted</i>	10	6.98
BELIEVE	21	7.59
CLAIM	15	7.18
HEAR	15	7.02
SUFFER	16	7.07
THINK	11	6.82

As well as material processes, there are two collocates in this frame referring to verbal processes, *admitted* and CLAIM (see Table 4.17). However, these always occur in court cases where a schizophrenic person has been accused of a violent crime. Thus, based on collocates from all of the three word sketches, the only occasion in which readers gain insight into the perspectives of people with schizophrenia is when they commit violent crimes. CLAIM, in 11/15 (73%) instances, occurs in contexts where schizophrenic people argue that they were experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia when they committed the violence (see Excerpts 106 and 107). Bednarek (2006:135) has suggested that the verb CLAIM implicitly codes scepticism towards the reported speech, in comparison to verbs such as SAY or TELL. Thus, this may be one of the strategies that the press uses to subtly undermine claims to diminished responsibility, a tendency that Cross (2014) has identified as characteristic of reporting in the tabloid press. How the

press use language to orient to claims of diminished responsibility will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7. The collocate *admitted*, on the other hand, in all its instances occurs in contexts where people with schizophrenia confess their crimes (see Excerpt 108).

(106) Paul Khan, a schizophrenic who **claimed** to hear voices from microwaves, stabbed 72-year-old Brian Dodd 37 times with a butcher's knife as the pensioner walked his dogs on the beach at Prestatyn in North Wales (*The Times*, 11 October 2003).

(107) Duncan Sloan, a schizophrenic who **claimed** to be the Son of God and called himself Freaky Jesus, will walk free from Cork prison at 8am (*The Mirror*, 22 January 2002).

(108) A GRIEVING family condemned lax treatment of dangerous mental patients yesterday after a paranoid schizophrenic **admitted** stabbing a retired banker to death. (*The Express*, 26 February 2005).

There are also four mental processes in this frame, HEAR, BELIEVE, THINK and SUFFER. These serve the same function as *claimed* and *admitted* in that they are used as reporting verbs to introduce evidence of diminished responsibility in the context of court trials (Excerpt 109). Evidently, the press are less interested in the voices of people with schizophrenia, and more interested in the voices in their heads.

(109) The jury heard that Abram was a paranoid schizophrenic who **thought** the Beatles were all witches who flew around on broomsticks. (*The Express*, 16 November 2000).

All concordance lines featuring all of the verbal and mental processes share two features. The first is that they all represent the speech or thoughts of schizophrenia people in indirect forms of speech. The second is that none feature medical terminology, even essential terms such as *delusion* or *hallucination*, despite referring to psychotic symptoms. One of the functions of indirect speech/thought is that it has a ‘summarising function’, hence why it is preferred in hard news (Semino and Short, 2004:78)²⁶, as, it allows journalists to paraphrase a quote in order to condense information into as few words as possible. Evidently, the press chooses to focus on the illogical details of these claims (e.g. *called himself Freaky Jesus, claimed to hear voices from microwaves*) at the expense of other aspects when paraphrasing these quotes. The lack of terminology, combined with potentially vague and misleading mental and verbal processes (e.g. BELIEVE, THINK), may lead readers to infer that these claims are merely bizarre or illogical beliefs rather than symptoms of a serious medical condition. It is also worth observing that in none of these cases are voices represented as positive. By framing Auditory-Visual Hallucinations (AVH) as harmful, people who experience psychotic

²⁶ Although Demjen and Semino (2014) have shown how in the novel *Henry’s Demons*, the author, who recounts his experiences of schizophrenia, uses Indirect Speech to show that auditory hallucinations are experienced differently to everyday speech.

symptoms are likely to perceive those experiences negatively, which in turn increases the distress often caused with such experiences (Vilhauer, 2015).

Collocates in the frame listing verbs when SCHIZOPHRENIC is an object touch on some of the topics already discussed. Of the 25, 12 (48%) refer to various legal sanctions (see Table 4.18). In other words, schizophrenic people are typically represented as being punished by the law. Even collocates such as (set) FREE, *released* and ALLOW denote freedom from previous restraint, and, even these occur in contexts where the offender has gone on to commit further crimes after being deinstitutionalised (see Excerpts 110 and 111). These cases are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.

(110) A PARANOID schizophrenic who was **allowed** to live in the community stabbed a young woman 29 times in revenge for years of bullying by girls, it was claimed yesterday (*The Express*, 28 January 2009).

(111) THE family of a British woman who was beheaded in Tenerife hit out yesterday at the UK care authorities that **freed** the Bulgarian schizophrenic who murdered her. (*The Express*, 23 February, 2013).

Table 4.18 Verb collocates taking SCHIZOPHRENIC as their object that refer to incarceration

Collocate(s)	Frequency	logDice
--------------	-----------	---------

ARREST	8	6.91
ALLOW	12	6.86
CHARGE	5	6.52
CONVICT	5	6.43
<i>detained</i>	7	7.20
FREE	13	8.24
<i>held</i>	7	6.60
<i>institutionalised</i>	4	6.77
<i>jailed</i>	13	17.84
<i>locked</i>	5	6.67
<i>released</i>	18	7.72
SENTENCE	5	6.64

Clement and Foster (2008) suggest that, in light of the guidelines proposed by The National Union of Journalists (2004, in Clement and Foster, 2008) that the word *release* is inappropriate to use in contexts where a patient has been discharged from hospital. Instead, it is more appropriate to use it in stories where someone has been released from prison. However, all 18 instances of *released* occur in contexts where a patient has been discharged from a hospital (e.g. see Excerpt 112). This implicitly frames the individuals as criminals, even, in some cases, before they have committed any crimes.

(112) A schizophrenic **released** after a lengthy stay on a psychiatric ward finds himself drawn back to his childhood haunts, causing his fragile grip on reality to slip again. (*The Express*, 21 February 2015).

A more positive collocate in this frame is HELP, which in 4/7 (57%) instances, refers to various treatments that may potentially treat symptoms of schizophrenia (see Excerpts 113 and 114). These include fish oil tablets, microphones in pillows and a computerised

‘avatar system’. However, they are framed as speculative and it is hard not to view them as trivial remedies when compared to the expensive antipsychotic drugs that have been shown to be effective in treating schizophrenic people.

(113) A programme called Reach4Dance is now looking at whether dance can **help** schizophrenics. (*The Sun*, 30 November 2006).

(114) You can aid reading in dyslexic kids [Rick's son Edward is dyslexic], concentration in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder kids, coordination in dyspraxia and even, we think, the social functioning of autistic children." Others believe that fish oils could **help** schizophrenics and manic depressives. (*The Telegraph*, 21 July 2004).

Table 4.19 Noun collocates are grammatically co-ordinated with SCHIZOPHRENIC

Collocate	Frequency	logDice
ADDICT	15	9.11
<i>alcoholics</i>	4	7.39
KILLER	5	7.45
PSYCHOPATH	8	8.47

Referring back to Figure 4.3, the frame on the far right lists nominal collocates that co-occur with SCHIZOPHRENIC. Like *schizophrenia*, it collocates with other mental health problems such as DEPRESSIVE and PSYCHOTIC (see Table 4.19). The collocates PSYCHOPATH and KILLER are potentially more interesting. Psychopathy, while not recognised as a formal medical diagnosis by either the DSM or the ICD

(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, World Health Organisation, 1992), is understood by its proponents to characterise ‘instrumentally impulsive individuals with poor behavioural controls who callously and remorselessly bleed others for purely selfish reasons via manipulation, intimidation, and violence.’ (Hervè, 2006:31). In five instances, PSYCHOPATH and SCHIZOPHRENIC are co-ordinated via *and* or via apposition. This potentially draws equivalence between the two social categories (Excerpt 115).

(115) What a choice of boyfriends the poor girl has - a **psychopath** and a schizophrenic!

This brutal twist to the middle-class woman's complaint about the lack of suitable men deserves a more complex treatment than it gets here. (*The Independent*, 22 March 2004).

In other words, the fact that SCHIZOPHRENIC is sometimes co-ordinated with social categories defined by moral deviance may imply that schizophrenia itself is a form of moral deviance. This reflects historical discourses around the illness. For instance, the English physician James Prichard in his *Treatise on insanity and other disorders affecting the mind* (1835:175ff) diagnosed cases of mental illness, many of which seem to capture what we would now call schizophrenia as ‘moral depravity’. He writes, ‘Vices, inordinate passions, and the want of mental discipline tend [...] to increase the prevalence of insanity.’ (p. 177).

In three instances, the two are co-ordinated by the conjunction *or* in contexts where the narrator is unsure of the difference between the two (see Excerpts 116 and 117). Indeed, one would be forgiven for confusing schizophrenics with psychopaths. As we have

seen, schizophrenic people are likewise portrayed as excessively violent and cruel. That they are sometimes represented as posing as neurotypical people and as potentially lying to court judges about their mental health is another way in which they might resemble psychopaths. That said, according to proponents of the psychopathy diagnosis, offenders of violent crimes are unlikely to meet the formalised criteria for psychopathy (Rice and Harris, 1995).

(116) Was he a schizophrenic or a potential **psychopath**? Both thoughts raced through his mind (*The Observer*, 16 June 2016).

(117) Had I crossed a mental Rubicon and become a schizophrenic, or a potential **psychopath**? (*The Telegraph*, 27 May 2013)

The lexeme KILLER is an example of ‘functionalisation’ (van Leeuwen, 2008:42), where social actors are defined according to what they do, in this case, kill people. In four instances, KILLER is co-ordinated with SCHIZOPHRENIC via the co-ordinator *and*. However, in one instance, it is co-ordinated with *or* in the context of debates around diminished responsibility (see Excerpt 118). How the press use language to orient to the topic of diminished responsibility will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7.


(118) Jury's question: was he a schizophrenic or a cold-blooded **killer**? (*The Independent*, 17 March 2006).

Other collocates in this frame are ADDICT and ALCOHOLIC, which likewise draw equivalence between schizophrenic people and other social categories perceived to be problematic. McEnery (2005:169-173) found that, in moral panic discourse, behaviours perceived as threatening, such as adultery and drunkenness, were frequently co-ordinated in order to form what Hall *et al.* (1978:223) call a ‘spiral of signification’. This entails that that the similarities between the behaviours are highlighted and the threat they pose is amplified. Here, too, the potentially threatening aspects of schizophrenics and other social identities is highlighted via the co-ordination. This process has also been observed by Bilić and Georgaca (2007:176) who observe that ‘simply by the successive listing of patients with psychosis, alcoholics, drug additions and HIV positive patients, all groups that are typically associated with some form of dangerousness to themselves and others, the dangerousness of these groups is consolidated and their distance from ‘normal people’ intensified’ (ibid. 176).

As with *schizophrenia* above, it is interesting to see whether SCHIZOPHRENIC collocates with words as part of a larger noun phrases. Collocates co-ordinating with SCHIZOPHRENIC in noun phrases are listed in Figure 4.4. Two interesting collocates here are *rantings* and *mind*. The collocate *rantings*, in all ten of its instances, occurs in the context of a quote from the author Sebastian Faulks who in 2009, characterised the Qur’an as the *rantings of a schizophrenic* (see Excerpt 119). As we have seen, this is

part of a broader tendency to associate religious texts with schizophrenia (see Excerpts 91-92).

Figure 4.5 Word Sketch for when SCHIZOPHRENIC occurs in prepositional



(119) Faulks turned to the Koran for his research, and was appalled: "It's a depressing book. It really is. It's just the **rantings** of a schizophrenic. It's very one-dimensional, and people talk about the beauty of the Arabic and so on, but the English translation I read was, from a literary point of view, very disappointing (*The Times*, 23 August 2009).

Looking more closely at these articles, the attributes Fawkes ascribes to the Qur'an are *a depressing book, very one-dimensional, from a literary point of view very disappointing, and it has no ethical dimension*. How these relate to a diagnosis of schizophrenia, or indeed the non-medical sense of *schizophrenic* (after all, this metaphorical sense is suggestive of two dimensions) is difficult to pinpoint. It is likely that the phrase *rantings of a schizophrenic* is being used to characterise the Qur'an as meaningless, or, more specifically, from an atheist's point of view, referring to things that don't exist. This represents the opinions of people with schizophrenia as meaningless. This aligns with Sayce's (2000:64) observation that the voices of the mentally ill are 'invalid by definition [...] what could be more ludicrous than 'mad' people having a say about anything?'. Indeed, the view that the voices of people with schizophrenia are meaningless seems to be echoed in the practices of the press. People with schizophrenia are rarely quoted outside of the testimonies they give in court trials (see above).

The collocate *mind* occurs in all of its five instances as part of the phrase *the mind of a (paranoid) schizophrenic*. Each instance occurs in the context of literature or film in which such a mind is depicted (see Excerpts 120-122)

(120) Eli's first-person narration of her troubled life, from childhood to middle-age, tugs you into the **mind** of a schizophrenic a (sic.) kaleidoscope of mayhem and misery in which self-destruction is always only an internal whisper away (*The Mail*, 25 September 2015).

(121) In fact, *A Beautiful Mind* is pulling us into the **mind** of a paranoid schizophrenic (*The Observer*, 24 February 2002).

(122) Julie Hearn's *Rowan the Strange* is set in a psychiatric hospital during the second world war. It "gives a striking insight into the **mind** of a schizophrenic", wrote Rakhi Biswas Evans, 13 [...] (*The Guardian*, 6 October 2009).

Three observations can be made about the language in these examples. First, the choice of the word *mind* reflects a Cartesian distinction between body and mind, a distinction which is potentially misleading, as the mind is increasingly being understood as a product of the body. The word *mind* is also metonymic for someone with schizophrenia. In other words, people with schizophrenia are being objectified as a mind, as objects of study rather than objects of sympathy or understanding. Second, of the use of deictics constructs an interesting relationship between the reader and people with schizophrenia. Social deictics in Excerpts 120 and 121 (*you, us*) presupposes that the reader couldn't already have any experiences of schizophrenia, despite statistics suggesting that 1% of the population are likely to experience symptoms of schizophrenia at some point in their lives (Johnstone and Frith, 2004). This has the effect of othering people with

schizophrenia, which, as Sayce (2000) has suggested, is one of the core beliefs motivating stigmatising behaviours towards the mentally ill. Finally, several words in these examples draw on an entertainment discourse, representing people with schizophrenia as an intriguing curiosity (*striking insights, kaleidoscope of mayhem and misery*). This is also accomplished by the spatial deictics, which construct the mind of a schizophrenic as an attractive ‘deictic centre’ (Culpeper and Schauer, 2009:204), and drawing on the conventional metaphor that what is captivating is physically attractive (*tugs you, pulling us*). Representations of people with schizophrenia that draw on an entertainment discourse will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.

Thus, to conclude, the word *schizophrenic* (n.) tends to occur in contexts where people with schizophrenia are represented less sensitively than *schizophrenic* (adj.) and *schizophrenia* (n.). In particular, the press employs various discursive strategies in order to represent people with schizophrenia implicitly as dangerous. Strategies included co-ordinating references to schizophrenic people with social deviants popularly perceived as dangerous (*alcoholics, psychopath, killers*) and locating violent as a primary symptom of schizophrenia in the form of lay diagnoses.

4.6. Conclusion

The analysis of word sketches for the three most frequent lexemes directly referring to schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia has established some salient topics and stylistic patterns in the dataset, some of which will be explored in more detail in later chapters. As expected, the three lexemes exhibited different lexicogrammatical patterns.

The word *schizophrenia*, for instance, tended to occur in contexts where the disorder was understood via a more medico-scientific discourse, along with questions about the aetiology of schizophrenia and possible cures. The word *schizophrenia* was also typically used in contexts where responsibility, either for one's illness or crimes enacted when experiencing symptoms, was directed at the illness as an independent agentive entity.

Conversely, *schizophrenic* (adj.) typically occurred in contexts where it modified labels referring to family members (e.g. MOTHER, SISTER, SON, *brother*). However, another frequent pattern was its tendency to be exploited metaphorically to mean 'inconsistent', particularly in the context of reporting on entertainment. This meaning was typically activated by collocates referring to an individual's behaviour or lifestyle when it functioned attributively, and modifiers referring to prototypicality or epistemic modality when it functioned predicatively. This non-medical sense almost always had a negative evaluative prosody, although, particularly in the context of fashion reporting, it was also used with the more positive ideological meaning of 'creative' or 'eclectic'. The metaphorical exploitation of *schizophrenic* was judged problematic as it reproduced the misconception that being schizophrenic was the same as having a split personality disorder (a disorder that is in any case not recognised by the DSM or ICD). This usage is problematic as it has various real world implications that negatively impact people with schizophrenia and the wider general public. For instance, individuals who experience symptoms of schizophrenia for the first time may experience more confusion, fear and stress without the aid of an accurate understanding of what

schizophrenia entails. Likewise, friends and family of people who first begin to experience psychotic symptoms are more likely to react with fear or a dismissive attitude if they do not recognise behaviours as potential symptoms of a mental disorder. Journalists instead might consider reserving medical language for strictly medical contexts and referring to erratic behaviour, vacillating opinion etc. more literally. Of course, such alternatives do not strictly have the same meaning. The word *schizophrenic* used metaphorically is more suggestive of playful journalistic discourse than its near-synonyms. The word *schizophrenic*, used metaphorically, also seems to imply that the behaviour referred to is out of the ordinary (possibly as a result of its adverbial collocates referring to ‘unexpectedness’) than ‘erratic’ or ‘vacillating’. An alternative (and perhaps more realistic) solution is to re-label the diagnosis of schizophrenia so that the metaphorical exploitations (and other negative associations identified in this chapter) cannot taint perceptions of the disorder. The possibility of re-labelling schizophrenia is discussed in more detail in Section 8.3.2.

Whereas *schizophrenia* occurred in a more medical context, SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) typically occurred in contexts where schizophrenic people were represented via an entertainment or fictional discourse. For instance, the press frequently used sensationalist language when reporting on crimes committed by schizophrenic people (e.g. *behead, slash, stab*). There was also substantial evidence to suggest that SCHIZOPHRENIC has a discourse prosody of ‘dangerous’ in the press. While modifiers explicitly characterising schizophrenic people as such (e.g. *violent, dangerous*), were infrequent compared to other collocates in the word sketch, several broader discursive strategies were identified that served to imply that schizophrenic

people are violent and dangerous. These include animalising language (*roam*), lay diagnoses situating violence as a primary symptom of schizophrenia, semi-instrumentalization linking schizophrenic people with weapons, the over-representation of individuals with schizophrenia as violent, and a tendency to co-ordinate or indeed confuse schizophrenic people with social categories referring to dangerous people (e.g. *killer, psychopath*). Interestingly, out of all the word sketches, this was the only one featuring collocates relating to the speech and thought presentation of schizophrenic people. However, these were always represented in indirect speech and always referred to admissions and explanations of violent crime. As a consequence, we as readers are given little insight into the lived experience of the disorder. One of the recommendations for newspapers listed in Chapter 8.3.2 suggests that journalists ought to try to quote people with schizophrenia outside of a legal/criminal context.

Despite these individual differences, the word sketches largely touched on common themes suggestive of ways in which schizophrenic people more broadly are represented, regardless of the specific label. For instance, the diagnosis tended to be represented in its most extreme forms. Likewise, there was a pervading tendency to link schizophrenia with moral deviance, either by co-ordinating these labels with social categories referring to morally deviant people (*killers, alcoholics, addicts* etc.), by framing mentally ill individuals using a religious discourse (*evil*) or over-representing schizophrenic people as agentic killers. This is coupled with the representation that they are ‘passing’ as everyday individuals, but who are ‘dormant volcanoes’ whose violent behaviour could be triggered at any moment. There was also a tendency for collocates in each word

sketch to appear in the context of film, television or fiction more broadly, reflecting a broader tendency to present human tragedies as entertainment. Lastly, there were several examples showing that schizophrenia is misunderstood by the press. These include cases where schizophrenia is treated as if it were a symptom rather than a diagnosis (e.g. where *schizophrenic* and *mania* are co-ordinated) and cases where *schizophrenia* and *mental illness* are treated linguistically as being distinct.

In summary, this chapter has shown some of the salient lexicogrammatical patterns around the three most frequent words referring to people with schizophrenia in the data. However, one of the limitations of this chapter is that it has only considered patterns in the corpus as a whole. As previous scholars have noted, there are various stylistic differences between reporting of people with mental illnesses in the tabloids and the broadsheets, some of which have been noted in passing in this chapter. In the following chapter, I examine some of the main stylistic differences between the tabloids and broadsheets when they report on schizophrenia in more detail.

5. Distinctive lexis in the tabloids and broadsheets

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined lexicogrammatical patterns around the three most frequent *schiz* terms in the British press as a whole. However, there is reason to suspect that the tabloids and broadsheets report differently on people with schizophrenia based on generic differences between the two types of newspaper. This largely relates to the sorts of stories that either choose to report on. For instance, whereas the tabloid press tend to report on stories that have occurred within the UK and celebrity gossip, the broadsheets tend to report on international and hard news stories. Other differences are more stylistic. Molek-Kozakowska (2013) reports that the tabloid press tends to adopt a more sensationalistic language style, employing language that appeals to and maximises the news value of a story. She found that a large proportion of speech acts employed by *The Mail* (which she classifies as a middle market tabloid paper) performed the speech act of ‘exposing’ (ibid, 184) thus appealing to the news value of ‘unexpectedness’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:65). This tendency towards sensationalism also affects story selection, as the press are more likely to report on stories that are perceived as newsworthy in accordance with news values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). Additionally, Baker *et al.* (2013) observed that, whereas the tabloid press tend to employ what Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998:151-2) call an ‘involved’ reporting style (e.g. the use of first and second person pronouns), the broadsheets tend to employ a more ‘informative’ style (e.g. the use of grammatical words suggestive of

post modification such as *of*). These differences reflect the broadly different functions of each. While the goal of the tabloids is perhaps to entertain, the function of the broadsheets is largely to inform, although this distinction is increasingly breaking down (see Section 2.2.3).

Given the range of differences in style and content between these two formats, there is reason to suspect that each will exhibit different linguistic and discursive patterns when reporting on people with schizophrenia. With this in mind, this chapter considers the following two questions:

What distinctive words are used by the tabloids and broadsheets when reporting on stories that mention schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia?

Do the ways in which such words are used in context shed light on differences in how people with schizophrenia are represented in the tabloids and broadsheets?

Despite the number of studies examining the representation of people with mental illnesses in the press, few examine differences between the British tabloids and broadsheets in detail. That said, several studies have observed an increased tendency for tabloids to draw on sensationalist language when reporting on people with schizophrenia who have committed violent crimes (Crepaz-Keay, 1996; Barnes and

Earnshaw, 1993). Paterson (2007), who also identified this tendency, anticipates that the ‘quality’ or broadsheet press would instead mention schizophrenia in a more diverse set of topics, but didn’t test his hypothesis. Clement and Foster (2008:178) found more fine-grained differences, for instance that the tabloids make use of more so-called ‘stigmatising descriptors’, such as *maniac* and *madman* than the broadsheets. They also found the tabloids tended to mention schizophrenic people in the context of violence more than the broadsheets. Evidently, there is an interest in differences between how the tabloids and broadsheets report on people with schizophrenia in the literature, although a detailed study has not yet been carried out.

The Schizophrenia 2000-2015 corpus is divided into two sub-corpora based on whether the texts were published in the tabloids or the broadsheets. These in turn are subdivided into subcorpora based on their publication. Thus, the tabloid subcorpus is composed of five newspapers, *The Express*, *The Mail*, *The Mirror*, *The Star* and *The Sun*.

Conversely, the broadsheet subcorpus is composed of four newspapers, *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Telegraph* and *The Independent*. For the purposes of this analysis, *The Express* and *The Mail*, while, strictly speaking, middle market newspapers, were included in the tabloid subcorpus as they exhibit many of the features of tabloid newspapers. For instance, they demonstrate a tendency to report stories in a sensationalistic style and a preference for local rather than international news. The decision to categorise *The Mail* and *The Express* as tabloid newspapers mirrors previous studies in CADS (e.g. Baker *et al.*, 2013).

The distribution of tokens across the different subcorpora can be found in Figure 5.1 below. In total, the tabloids contain 5,213,019 tokens whereas the broadsheets contain 9,948,360 tokens. In other words, the broadsheet corpus contains almost double (+90.84%) the number of articles in the tabloids. The broadsheet subcorpus also contains more articles than the tabloids. Whereas the tabloids contain 3365 articles, the broadsheets contain 4064. This is a percentage increase of 20.77%. Also, articles in the broadsheets are traditionally longer with the average length of an article in the broadsheets being 1021 words compared to 811 words for the tabloids.

However, frequencies in the tabloids are skewed by *The Mail*, which is idiosyncratic in that it contains more tokens than any of the other tabloid newspapers, largely to the prodigious output of its online publication, the *MailOnline*. Containing 3,258,052 tokens (the most out of any newspaper, including the broadsheets), *The Mail* makes up 62.50% of the tabloid subcorpus. Conversely, *The Star*, which is the smallest newspaper in terms of tokens, only contains 121,945 tokens, 2.34% of the tabloid subcorpus. *The Mail* also contains almost half of all the articles in the tabloid subcorpus (3,139 out of 6,430, 48.82%), whereas *The Star*, again, only makes up a small percentage (229 out of 6,430, 3.56%). The findings in this chapter relating to the tabloids are likely, therefore, to be skewed towards *The Mail*. The broadsheets, on the other hand, are more equally distributed, with the largest newspaper, *The Guardian*, at 3,244,894 tokens, making up 32.62% of the broadsheets, and the smallest broadsheet newspaper, *The Independent*, containing 1,930,571 tokens, which is 19.41%. Table 5.1 lists the token distribution across the newspaper subcorpora. More detailed information can be found in Table 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Graphical distribution of tokens across newspaper subcorpora




Table 5.1 The distribution of tokens and articles across each newspaper subcorpus

Newspaper	Article frequency	Number of tokens	% of tabloids/broadsheets	Average word count per article
<i>The Mail</i>	3,139	3,258,052	62.50%	1,038
<i>The Express</i>	969	695,125	13.33%	717
<i>The Mirror</i>	1,096	675,989	12.97%	617
<i>The Sun</i>	1,005	461,908	8.86%	460
<i>The Star</i>	229	121,945	2.34%	533
<i>The Guardian</i>	2,963	3,244,894	32.62%	1,095
<i>The Times</i>	2,752	2,730,734	27.45%	992
<i>The Telegraph</i>	2,101	2,042,161	20.53%	972
<i>The Independent</i>	1,921	1,930,571	19.41%	1,005

To determine distinctive language choices in the tabloids and broadsheets, I conducted a keyword analysis. This involved comparing the frequency of each word in the tabloids against the frequency of each word in the broadsheets and obtaining a list of words which are more statistically significant in one relative to the other. Keywords are useful because, as Kilgarriff (1997:233) claims, ‘any difference in the linguistic character of two corpora will leave its trace in differences between their word frequency lists.’ Using the ‘keywords’ tool via Wordsmith 5.0 (Scott, 2009), I calculated word lists for each subcorpus. As it is not helpful to compare the raw frequencies of words in either corpus (as the two are of different sizes, which is likely to skew the results), I follow previous CADS scholars (e.g. Harvey, 2012; Partington, 2012) in using the log-likelihood significance metric to compare the frequency of words in the word lists in terms of statistical significance. Log-likelihood is one of two metrics (the other being the chi-square metric) available to use via Wordsmith 5.0. The log-likelihood metric tests the frequency difference between words in either word list against the null hypothesis, which stipulates that difference between two frequencies is due to random variation in the dataset. While in other disciplines in social sciences, the p value is set at < 0.05 , the default p value in Wordsmith is set at < 0.000001 . On the one hand, this helps reduce the number of keywords calculated to a more manageable set for analysis and, on the other, it ensures that the keywords calculated are not down to error.

It is typical for analysts conducting keyword analyses to set cut-offs in order to limit the data to size that can be manually analysed in a reasonable level of detail. As with many previous CADS studies, I chose to limit the number of keywords for each tabloid/broadsheet subcorpus to the top 100 in descending order of their keyness (i.e.

statistical significance) score. This also ensured that keywords obtained were distributed equally among the tabloids and broadsheets. The frequency threshold was set at three, which is the default threshold for the Keywords tool via Wordsmith 5.0. An advantage of setting the frequency threshold very low is that the tool is able to capture cases where a feature may be very infrequent in one corpus and very high in another, with the frequency difference being significant (Gabrielatos, 2018:239). For instance, the lowest frequency word, *bynes* only occurred three times in the broadsheets but 302 times in the tabloids. Likewise, the word *laing* only occurred seven times in the tabloids but 431 times in the broadsheets. These words would not have been revealed as key if the frequency threshold was set at a higher value.

One issue with traditional keyword analyses is that they base their findings on the frequency of word forms, ignoring the fact that roughly the same meanings can be lexicalised in different ways. While a word or selection of words might emerge as key for one corpus, and be suggestive of a certain topic, this does not necessarily mean that the topic is reported on less frequently in the other corpus. For instance, it may be the case that the other corpus orients to the topic equally as frequently, but uses a more diverse vocabulary where none of those individual words are key. In order to help ensure this wasn't the case, I calculated the type-token ratio of each subcorpus in order to ensure that there was not a marked difference in the vocabulary style between the tabloids and broadsheets. This determines how many types there are in a corpus (unique words) relative to the total number of tokens in the corpus (the total word count). The type token ratio of the tabloids corpus is 1.53 whereas for the broadsheet corpus it is 1.29. However, because the two corpora are of different sizes (see above), it is better to

calculate a standardised type/token ratio, which is possible via Wordsmith 5.0. This is because, as the text size increases, the number of new word types encountered starts to decrease. After all, journalists only have a limited vocabulary, and, over millions of words of text, they will increasingly begin to use the same words again and again, particularly grammatical words. I thus calculated the standardised type-token ratio (STTR) for both subcorpora using the tool by the same name in Wordsmith. This calculates the type-token ratio of a corpus every 1000 words (by default) and then calculates the average overall. The STTR in the tabloids was 46.99 whereas in the broadsheets it was 48.89. This still suggests that the vocabulary style in either subcorpus is roughly equally varied. Once the top 100 keywords for the tabloid and broadsheet subcorpora were calculated, they were grouped according a shared set of topics. These topics were formed deductively by examining a 100 line random sample of each word in context via Wordsmith's concordance tool. In cases of homonymy/polysemy, or where the same word occurred in markedly different topics, the word was categorised according to its most frequent meaning. Grammatical words are given their own category because closed class words occur much more frequently than open class words, and therefore tend not to be associated with specific topics. The keywords for each subcorpus and the topical categories they are grouped into are found in Table 5.2. A table listing the frequencies and relative frequencies of each keyword can be found in Appendix 1.

In the following sections, I carry out a more fine-grained analysis of how each of the keywords are used in context and how they are linked with topics that represent schizophrenic people in particular ways.

Table 5.2 The top 100 most statistically significant keywords grouped based on shared topical or grammatical criteria

Category	Tabloids	Broadsheets
misc. grammatical words	<i>also, been, had, was, who</i>	<i>about, an, are, as, between, does, example, is, kind, like, might, not, of, or, perhaps, rather, such, than, that, the, there, these, this, what, which</i>
quantifiers	<i>ten</i>	<i>many, most, much, some</i>
pronouns	<i>he, her, him, his, i, she</i>	<i>it, it's, its, itself, self, us, you,</i>
social actors	<i>dad, daughter, family, husband, miss, mother, mr, mum, son</i>	<i>american, community, jewish, people</i>
places	<i>home, went</i>	<i>world</i>
verbal processes	<i>added, admitted, claimed, found, heard, pleaded, revealed said, told</i>	<i>interesting, says</i>
mental processes		<i>ideas, seems, sense</i>
business and commerce	<i>gbp</i>	<i>billion, company, director, executive, growth, industry, market, pounds, sales, sector, works</i>
temporal deixis	<i>after, before, later, months, night, old, when, year, yesterday</i>	<i>century, contemporary, formerly, modern</i>
the law	<i>attorney, cops, court, crown, defense, guilty, judge, officers, pc, police, prosecutors, trial</i>	
violence	<i>attack, attacked, blood, body, death, gun, incident, kill, killed, killing, knife, manslaughter, murder, murdered, shooting, shot, stabbed, stabbing, tried</i>	

murderers	<i>brady, holmes, killer, mcfadden, ripper, sutcliffe</i>	<i>breivik</i>
victims of violence	<i>cerys, savident, victim</i>	
incarceration	<i>arrested, broadmoor, carstairs, freed, hospital, jail, jailed</i>	
culture	<i>amanda, bynes, eastenders, kerry, zoe</i>	<i>art, artist, artists, book, books, cultural, education, exhibition, festival, fiction, film, films, literary, literature, music, novel, novels, play, poet, poetry, reader, readers, stories, story, theatre, work, write, writer, writers, writing</i>
psychiatry	<i>cannabis, drug, paranoid, schizophrenic</i>	<i>astrazeneca, freud, genome, human, laing, project, psychiatry, science</i>
interactive content	<i>scroll, video</i>	

5.2. Stylistic differences

Words may emerge as key for several reasons. For instance, words could be key because of stylistic differences between the tabloids and broadsheets. A case in point is the tabloid keyword *defense*. This is the conventional American spelling of what in British English would normally be spelt *defence*. Baker (2017:41-42) observes that the *-se* spelling variant is strongly preferred in American English and that the *-ce* variant is strongly preferred in British English. There are 350 instances of *defense*, 341 of which are from *The Mail*, specifically the *MailOnline* between 2014 and 2015, and is used in articles reporting on stories that occurred in America. It possible, for instance, that the

MailOnline employs American journalists to write such stories. Keywords can also indicate broader stylistic differences between the tabloids and broadsheets. For instance, many of the keywords in Table 5.2 highlight similar stylistic differences between the British tabloids and broadsheets identified by Baker *et al.* (2013:74-5) in their study of the representation of Muslims in the British press. For instance, like in Baker *et al.* (2013) there are several reporting verbs that are key in the tabloids that are used to emphasise the newsworthiness of the story (e.g. *found, told, revealed*), while the more neutral reporting verb *says* is key in the broadsheets. Moreover, while keywords in the broadsheets reflect their preference for international stories (e.g. *american*), tabloid keywords reflect a preference for reporting on stories that have occurred in the UK (*Broadmoor, carstairs*). It might additionally be suggested, based on Table 5.2, that the tabloids tend to focus on narrower time frames than the broadsheets. While temporal conjunctives such as *yesterday* and *months* are key in the tabloids, words referring to entire epochs, such as *century* and *modern* are key in the broadsheets. We might say that the tabloid reporting is more localised in a broader sense, focussing on small-scale, short term events close to home than the broadsheets. In total, 18 of the tabloid keywords and 14 of the broadsheet keywords are identical to those identified in the Baker *et al.* (2013) study. This would suggest that, to some degree, the language used by the British tabloids and broadsheets is relatively formulaic and predictable. However, a large proportion of these (14/32) are grammatical words. Moreover, some stylistic keywords are confined to specific newspapers rather than the tabloids or broadsheets as a whole. For instance, 416/419 instances of *scroll* and 387/1091 instances of *video* occur in the *MailOnline* in the cluster *scroll down for video*, inviting readers to engage with interactive content. In summary, therefore, some of the words in Table 5.2 are key,

not because they are distinctive ways in which tabloids/broadsheets report on schizophrenic people, but because of stylistic differences independent of either's reporting of people with schizophrenia.

5.3. Distinctive lexis in the tabloids and broadsheets

One of the word forms from the previous chapter, *schizophrenic*, is key in the tabloids, indicating that the tabloids show a distinctive preference for this label. There are 3,835 occurrences of *schizophrenic* in the tabloids, 1,465 as a noun and 2370 as an adjective, whereas there are 4,581 occurrences in the broadsheets, 1,488 times as a noun, and 3067 times as an adjective. Thus, while the tabloids use the adjective form 61.77% more frequently than the noun form, the broadsheets use the adjective form 106.12% more frequently than the noun form. It was noted in Section 1.2 that the noun form *schizophrenic* is seen by charities as potentially problematic as it views people with schizophrenia as the sum total of their symptoms. This is roughly analogous to the difference between referring to someone as *gay* and as *a gay*, the latter which may be viewed as offensive (see Baker, 2005:22). Incidentally, both the tabloids and broadsheets exploit *schizophrenic* as a metaphor at roughly the same rate, with 27/100 occurrences in the tabloids and 32/100 in the broadsheets (based on taking random samples of 100 cases), indicating that this more problematic use of *schizophrenic* is not merely a tabloid issue.

By way of contrast, the word *people* is key in the broadsheets, which potentially refers to schizophrenic people. Indeed, it tends to occur in larger clusters comprising referential strategies referring to people with schizophrenia. For instance, the cluster *people with mental health problems* occurs 305 times. The cluster *people with mental* occurs 615 times, which reveals the frequent variant *people with mental issue(s)* (203). The word *people* occurs in similar clusters in the tabloids such as *people with mental* (113), *people with schizophrenia* (73) and *mentally ill people* (67) (see Table 5.3).


Table 5.3 Frequencies of people clusters relating to schizophrenia in the tabloids and broadsheets.

Cluster	Tabloids	Broadsheets	Tabloids (per million)	Broadsheets (per million)
<i>people with mental health problems</i>	49	305	9.40	30.66
<i>people with mental health issues</i>	9	28	1.73	2.81
<i>people with mental</i>	116	487	22.25	48.95
<i>people with schizophrenia</i>	73	257	14.00	25.83
<i>mentally ill people</i>	67	251	12.85	25.23

These labels are potentially more appropriate ways of referring to people with schizophrenia because than *schizophrenic* (n.) because they grammatically distinguish the illness from the person. However, an alternative few is the one espoused by Laing (1960) who argued that phrasal labels referring to people with schizophrenia (e.g.

people with schizophrenia) potentially trivialised their illness, and did not reflect the fact that their condition was a core part of their identity and changed the way they viewed the world. As Laing puts it, '[n]o one has schizophrenia, like having a cold. The patient has not 'got' schizophrenia. He is schizophrenic' (his emphasis) (1960:34). He also potentially viewed labels separating out the person from their condition as potentially harmful as he believed a fractured sense of identity was the reason why people experienced symptoms of schizophrenia. While Laing's views represent an interesting counter voice, it should be noted that his view that psychotic symptoms were the product of a divided self are not currently supported by the dominant medical literature in the UK. The respective frequencies of these words in the tabloids and broadsheets per million words are presented in Figure 5.2 below.

Figure 5.2 A bar chart showing the rate of occurrence of schizophrenia, schizophrenic (adj.) and words relating to the lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) in the tabloid and broadsheet subcorpora



The tabloids show a roughly equal preference for *schizophrenia* and *schizophrenic* (adj.), and half as much for SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.). On the other hand, the broadsheets refer *schizophrenia* at a rate which is almost twice as much, and are less likely to use *schizophrenic* (adj.) (its rate of occurrence is 47.47% more frequent in the tabloids). This perhaps indicates that the broadsheets tend to refer to the diagnosis more in the abstract. Conversely, the identifying word form SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) is much less frequent in the broadsheets, and 87.88% more frequent in the tabloids.

5.3.1. Violence and sensationalism

Many of the tabloid keywords typically in stories where violent crime is a main theme. This shows that, relative to the language of the broadsheets, the tabloids are more likely to refer to people with schizophrenia in the context of violent crime. This observation reflects the findings of other studies (Schizophrenia Commission Report, 2012; Clement and Foster, 2008). Table 5.4 lists the 12 keywords in the tabloids referring to violent crime committed by people with schizophrenia. This table lists the raw frequency of the word in both the tabloids and the broadsheets, the number of articles these words occur in, and the % frequency difference between the standardised frequencies of the keyword in the tabloids and broadsheets. The last column shows the keyword's keyness score in the subcorpus in which it emerges as key. As Table 5.4 shows, the frequency difference of these words between the tabloids and broadsheets is significant. Even the least frequent word referring to violence, *stabbing*, occurs 484 times whereas it only occurs half as frequently in the broadsheets (247 times). These may not seem like much of a difference in terms of raw frequency, but when the frequencies are normalised

according to the size of either corpora, the frequency in the tabloids of *stabbing* is 273.95% higher than in the broadsheets.

Table 5.4 Tabloid keywords referring to violent acts

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
attack	2525	1261	1839	1157	1006.42
attacked	869	617	553	430	423.46
kill	1840	1060	1512	1033	592.72
killed	2605	1454	2155	1339	828.48
killling	1847	1034	1458	923	164.22
manslaughter	713	520	497	363	313.99
murder	3063	1388	2457	1223	1032.74
murdered	791	531	573	434	317.97
shooting	1039	410	769	486	403.26
shot	1730	727	1850	486	297.21
stabbed	1726	869	866	508	1118.20
stabbing	484	480	247	196	307.94

While the tabloids do report on schizophrenic people in the context of violence more frequently than the broadsheets, the broadsheets still use words relating to violence quite frequently. For instance, the total frequency of all 12 words in Table 5.4 above in the broadsheets is 14,776, which is more than the combined frequency of *schizophrenia* and *schizophrenic* (both nominal and adjectival forms) in the broadsheets, which is 13,104. This indicates that in stories that mention schizophrenia in the context of violence, journalists are likely to refer to violence more than once. Indeed, some of these words are spread over a relatively small number of articles. For instance, the word *murder* occurs 3063 times in the tabloids, but only in 1388 articles.

Fazel *et al.* (2009a) conducted a meta-analysis of the link between schizophrenia, substance abuse and crime, and found that 13.2% of patients with schizophrenia had committed a violent crime compared with 5.3% of the general population. However, while the percentage is higher for people with schizophrenia, it is not the entire story. Indeed, the vast majority of people diagnosed with schizophrenia – between 87-88% in their study – do not commit violent crimes. Furthermore, the likelihood of being attacked by someone with schizophrenia is very low. As Taylor and Gunn (1999) put it, the chances of people killed by a mentally ill person are similar to the chances of winning the lottery. Nevertheless, a large proportion of references to schizophrenic people occur in the context of violent crimes in the press. This is likely to mislead readers into thinking both that people with schizophrenia are likely to be violent and that violence committed by people with schizophrenia is common. The press likely report on such stories with unusual frequency because they satisfy a number of news values, namely ‘negativity’ and ‘unexpectedness’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:65-8). That is, these stories are viewed as more newsworthy to readers because they comprise bad news, and because they are events we would not expect to happen.

Fazel *et al.* (2009a, 2009b) also found that people with schizophrenia who kill also tended to abuse substances and that, when this was accounted for, people with schizophrenia were no more likely to kill others than the general population. In a follow up study, the authors found that patients who had abused substances before hospital admission and after discharge were more likely to go on to commit violent crimes (Fazel *et al.*, 2010). Likewise, Large, Smith and Nielsson, (2009) found that the rate of homicides per capita was linked with the rate of homicide in the general population,

which corroborates the observation made by Fazel and colleagues that other factors beyond a diagnosis of schizophrenia increases the risk of someone committing a violent homicide. Despite this, few articles that represent schizophrenic people as committing violent crimes unambiguously associate the violent behaviour with substance abuse over the diagnosis of schizophrenia.

Philo (1996) claimed that, in press articles reporting on mental illness, the word *violence* was more frequent than other words relating to mental illness at a rate of four to one. Here too, we find that words referring to violence are much more frequent than words we would expect to be mentioned frequently in relation to schizophrenia (see above). Elsewhere, the words *hallucination(s)* and *delusion(s)*, words used to refer to the primary symptoms of schizophrenia, are comparatively very infrequent. In the tabloids, there are only 336 mentions of *hallucination** and 598 references to *delusion**. Taken together, these are only about as frequent as the fourth-least frequent violence word in the tabloids, which is *shooting* (n = 1039). However, these words are equally infrequent in the broadsheets. The word *hallucination** only occurs 568 times and *delusion** only occurs 939 times. Indeed, when the frequencies are normalised according to the respective sizes of the subcorpora, the combined frequencies of these two words are roughly equal (179.17 per million words in the tabloids and 151.48 in the broadsheets). These, too, are much less frequent than the words referring to violence in Table 5.4. In short, both the broadsheet and tabloids press frequently report on people with schizophrenia in the context of violent crime whereas they report comparatively infrequently on the primary symptoms of schizophrenia. However, it is only by understanding why people with schizophrenia may commit a violent crime and how

symptoms can potentially undermine one's sense of agency, can readers interpret such stories accurately and compassionately. Moreover, readers of the press are likely to have a distorted view of schizophrenia, if they typically read stories in which people with schizophrenia are represented as violent, but rarely encounter articles in which symptoms of the disorder are discussed. This may, for instance, lead to the view that schizophrenia refers to moral depravity rather than a mental health condition.

As well as typically mentioning people with schizophrenia in the context of violence, the tabloids report on this violence in a specific style by drawing attention to the frightening and macabre details of the stories. Four additional keywords in the tabloids, *blood*, *body*, *knife* and *tried*, do not directly refer to the act of violence, but typically occur in the description of its aftermath (see Table 5.5). The keyword *tried*, in 29/100 instances, collocates with *kill* (n = 110, LD = 9.97) *strangle* (n = 19, LD = 36) and *murder* (n = 39, LD = 8.06) and refers to a schizophrenic person's attempt to kill someone (see Excerpt 123).

(123) 'My mother drowned my sister and **tried** to strangle me in my sleep': One woman's terrifying memories of growing up with a mentally ill parent.
(*MailOnline*, 2 June 2014).

However, *tried* also collocates with *stop* (n = 46, LD = 8.91), *get* (n = 84, LD = 8.66) and *escape* (n = 21, LD = 8.24), in contexts where the victims of schizophrenic people

who are violent try to avoid harm. Excerpt 124 describes how a victim who has been trapped inside a house tries to flee from her attacker while he is asleep.

(124) Finally, McKay fell asleep and the woman **tried** to escape through a window but could not open it. She then wrote her message on the glass pane. (*The Mail*, 19 April 2008).

Table 5.5 Tabloid keywords referring to the macabre details of crimes

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>blood</i>	1621	824	1722	1052	284.00
<i>body</i>	2331	1177	2628	1609	339.00
<i>knife</i>	1617	745	802	509	1060.23
<i>tried</i>	1879	1245	1835	1382	414.14

The words *body* and *blood* instead refer to the gruesome aftermath of violence. To investigate the context in which *blood* is used more closely, I examined a concordance of 100 randomly sampled instances in the tabloid subcorpus. In 49/100 of these instances, the word *body* refers to the corpse of the victim, which is either discovered after a murder (see Excerpt 125) or being described as being disposed of by the attacker. In 21/100 instances of *body*, its mutilation is described in graphic detail. In Excerpt 125, for instance, four clauses, linked together in a complex sentence, are used to describe the gruesome aftermath of the murder. Evidently, the degree to which a body has been mutilated by the attacker is viewed as an important part of the story to report on.

(125) She had suffered almost 50 separate injuries and her head had been cut off completely off, rotated 180 degrees, and placed back on her **body**. (*The Mail*, 2013)

In contrast, the word *body* only refers to a corpse in 11/100 instances and in none of these instances is its mutilation described in detail.

Similarly, the word *blood*, which is key in the tabloids, and occurs in 43/100 instances in the context of violent crime, is, in 24/47 instances (51.06%) accompanied by verbs and modifiers that draw attention to the macabre details of the crimes. Of these, 16 refer to the extent to which blood covers a surface and eight refer to the arrangement of blood on a surface (see Table 5.6). Indeed, the top 25 collocates of *blood* in the tabloids indicate a strong tendency to over-lexicalise the movement and arrangement of blood in a violent context. These include *covered* (n = 99, LD = 10.501), *pool* (n = 49, LD = 9.648), *pouring* (n = 17, LD = 8.427), *stained* (n = 15, LD = 8.302), *everywhere* (n = 19, LD = 8.283), *soaked* (n = 14, LD = 8.194), and *stains* (n = 13, LD = 8.106). In Excerpt 126, *blood-soaked* is used figuratively to describe the killer's intention to kill. A likely interpretation of this is that the killer imagined beforehand that he was going to cause his victim to lose large amounts of blood. The killer is also intertextually linked with the film *Nightmare on Elm Street* (1984), a slasher film where the killer dispatches a number of teenagers in gruesome and creative ways. Anderson (2003) has previously observed the way in which the British press make intertextual references to horror cinema in stories reporting on people with mental illnesses who commit violent crimes.

Table 5.6 Phraseological patterns around blood in the tabloids

Topic	Clusters found in concordance
Blood covering a surface (16)	<i>covered with blood</i> (9), <i>blood everywhere</i> (2), <i>blood pouring</i> (1), <i>blood-soaked</i> (2), <i>blood all over my face</i> (2), <i>drenched in blood</i> (1), <i>blood leaking</i> (1)
Arrangement of blood on a surface (8)	<i>pool of blood</i> (4), <i>blood splatters</i> , (1), <i>blood splattered</i> (1), <i>blood running</i> (1)

(126) When the officer Daniel Gonzalez, 25, was facing life behind bars last night. The fan of the razor-fingered Nightmare On Elm Street slasher went on a **blood-soaked** mission to kill "as many people as possible" (*The Star*, 17 March 2006).

The word *knife* almost always occurs as a noun (98/100) and as such refers to the murder weapon used by people with schizophrenia to commit violent crimes. As a percentage increase, *knife* occurs 284.77% more frequently in the tabloids than the broadsheets. This suggests that the tabloids are significantly more likely to mention people with schizophrenia as committing knife crimes than the broadsheets. In 25/100 instances, *knife* occurs alongside modifiers that describe the characteristics of the knife used. In 20/100 its instances, it is pre-modified by adjectives describing the type of knife used to commit the crime, whereas in 5/100 instances, modifiers refer to the size of the knife (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Phraseological patterns around knife in the tabloids

Topic	Cluster found in concordance
Types of knife (20)	<i>kitchen knife</i> (11), <i>carving knife</i> (2), <i>swiss-army knife</i> (1), <i>butcher's knife</i> (1), <i>combat knife</i> (1), <i>cutlery knife</i> (1), <i>fishmonger's knife</i> (1), <i>nazi-style knife</i> (1), <i>lock-knife</i> (1)
Length/size of knife (5)	<i>large-bladed knife</i> (1), <i>long-bladed knife</i> (1), <i>22cm-long knife</i> (1), <i>ten inch kitchen knife</i> (1), <i>biggest and strongest knife</i> (1).

In Excerpt 127, the knife is described as both a *kitchen knife* which is further clarified in a subordinate comparative clause by *like the type used to cut vegetables*. Thus, not only does the author specify the type of knife, but also tries to evoke a clear image of the knife in the minds of readers by way of a simile. Evidently, the detailed characteristics of the murder weapon are of peculiar, prurient interest to the newspaper.

(127) When the officer's (sic) went inside the defendant grabbed a kitchen **knife**, like the type used to cut vegetables, and began to get very aggressive. (*MailOnline*, 11 September 2012).

As with *blood* above, the language around *knife* serves to construct a vivid mental picture in the minds of readers by orienting to its physical details. Note that, like in the examples of *blood*, the descriptions of knives tend to maximise the 'magnitude' of the story (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:66). All knives are dangerous, but kitchen knives, carving knives and fishmongers' knives are particularly large, sharp or threatening, and are more easily able to cause bodily harm. Likewise, attacks that have drawn large

amounts of blood are suggestive of more savage crimes. These ways of representing violence also appeal to the news value of ‘visual spectacle and graphic imagery’ (Jewkes, 2015:64). Like Barthes’ (1973:15) description of a French wrestling match, the audience reading these articles is invited to ‘abandon itself to the primary virtue of the spectacle, which is to abolish all motives and all consequences: what matters is not what it thinks but what it sees.’ While Jewkes had visual modes (images, videos) in mind when formulating this news value, language can also involve imagery in order to form vivid mental pictures in the minds of readers. Molek-Kozakowska (2013) defines sensationalistic language as a pragma-linguistic strategy used to maximise the newsworthiness of a story to maintain a reader’s attention. These representations of violence are thus sensationalistic in that they exploit readers’ interest in the gory details of stories in order to enhance its newsworthiness. One might argue that they provide detailed emphasis on the visuals of violent stories and draw attention away from the more complex non-visual aspects such as agency and cause and effect. No words explicitly relating to reduced agency emerge as key, and, as we have already seen, reference to symptoms of schizophrenia, such as delusions and hallucinations are relatively rare. From a critical perspective, the lurid description of gore may be viewed as trivial, especially relative to other aspects of the story such as moral questions involving the agency of the attacker. It may also be viewed as inappropriate given that family members of the victim would likely find such widely reported details to be upsetting. However, the amount and location of blood may be relevant in terms of indicating excessive violence, which may contribute towards explaining the length of the perpetrator’s sentence. Also, an alternative reading might be that some family

members might want revenge and as much detail about the crime to be given as possible, to make people angry so that the perpetrator is never released.

Another feature of the language used is that it represents the attacker in a way that is designed for evoke fear. Killers who wield large knives are more threatening than those who do not. An extreme example of this is Excerpt 128, where the characteristics of the knife are described used compounded superlatives as part of a quote, although it unclear in the article who the quote is from. Here, the superlatives maximise the threshold of the story and can be perceived according to Molek-Kozakowska's (2013) definition as sensationalist.

(128) When he was refused entry, he tried the nearby home of retired paediatrician Derek Robinson, 75, and his wife Jean, 60, armed with the “biggest and strongest” **knife** he could get from a local hardware store (*The Star*, 17 March 2006).

The level of detail used by the tabloids also extends to where the knife is from. Excerpt 129 reports the story of a schizophrenic person who invaded his neighbours house and killed him. He is described as obtaining the knife from the neighbour's dishwasher. Again, we can see how the press report on seemingly trivial aspects of the story in order to create a more vivid picture of the scene in a reader's mind.

(129) He tried to undress Lucy then cut off her clothes with scissors. Jaggs stabbed her in the arm with a **knife** from the dishwasher. (*The Mirror*, 13 July 2007).

Articles about killing occurring far away are not nearly as frightening as those that occur in the home. In referring to the dishwasher, the article potentially highlights the quotidian environment of the attack, reminding readers that potential weapons are often closer to us than we realise.

Indeed, the language used to represent violence committed by schizophrenic people appears to appeal to several themes and tropes associated with ‘slasher’ films. Anderson (2003:204) makes the broader point that ‘in our culture, phenomena (sic.) such as fiction, reality and myth exist, they are used, they operate together. This is so intrinsic to the relationship between film representations and newspaper reporting of mental illness.’ The link between the representation of schizophrenic people who are violent and slasher cinema is also implicit in Sayce’s (2000:61) observation that the media frequently draw on a ‘psycho-killer’ narrative when representing people with mental health problems.

Clover (2011:20) has defined the ‘slasher’ film as ‘the immensely generative story of a psycho killer who slashes to death a string of mostly female victims, one by one, until he is subdued or killed, usually by the one girl who survives’ (Clover, 2011:20). In a previous work, she outlined some of the defining features of the slasher film, which were later listed in Staiger (2015:214). The language used in stories reporting on violence committed by schizophrenic people often appeals to some of these themes. For instance, both reporting on schizophrenic people and the slasher film share an interest in ‘visceral bodily mutilation’ (Clayton, 2015:17) (see discussion of *body*, *blood* and *knife*

above). They also share a tendency to report on melee weapons (see discussion of *knife*). As Clover (1992:31) writes, ‘the preferred weapons of the killer are knives, hammers, axes, ice picks, hypodermic needles, red hot pokers, pitchforks, and the like’. By far the most frequent type of knife specified in the tabloid press is a kitchen knife (11/20, 55%), the same type knife used by iconic antagonists in the John Carpenter’s film *Halloween* (1978) and Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (1960). It is probably no coincidence that Anderson (2003) uses both of these films as examples of those that the press allude to in their reporting of mental illness. That said, Kalucy *et al.* (2011:542) found, in examining court cases relating to violent crime that had an outcome of diminished responsibility, that the majority of perpetrators used sharp objects as weapons. Thus, the link between these stories and typical features of the slasher film may not entirely be due to the way the tabloids frame these stories using language, but may reflect the ways in which people with schizophrenia typically commit violent crimes.

Lastly, there is a tendency to characterise the aggressor in these stories as a faceless, depersonalised figure, which Roche (2015:35) has also identified as a typical feature of slasher films. For instance, the word *killer*, which is key in the tabloids, is a label, which defines offenders in terms of their crimes, a form of functionalisation (van Leeuwen 2008: 54) rather than via their unique identity. This is a distinctive feature of the tabloid reporting, as it occurs 227.51% more frequently in the tabloids compared to the broadsheets. The word *killer* occurs in monikers such as *cannibal killer* (3) and *kinky killer* which serves to give the perpetrator a unique identity via a certain characteristic of their crime rather than by their name. The identifying nominal form *schizophrenic*,

which is used significantly more frequently in the tabloids, and is typically used when reporting on people with schizophrenia who commit violent crimes (see Section 4.5) also serves to depersonalise them. We also saw in Section 4.5, that speech or thought processes were rarely attributed to people with schizophrenia in the press, and that, when quotes were ascribed to schizophrenic people, they were usually paraphrased in indirect speech. Again, this serves to other the perpetrator, and represent them as something alien and unknowable.

In slasher films, the violent antagonist is also defined by their weapon. Roche (2015:35) for instance, alludes to ‘metonymical representation of the killer via his feet, hands and weapons.’. Michael Myers is embodied in the kitchen knife (*Halloween*, 1978) Jason Voorhees in the machete (*Friday the 13th*, 1980) and Leatherface in the chainsaw (*The Texas Chainsaw Massacre*, 1974). Likewise, and as noted in the previous chapter, people with schizophrenia who kill are often semi-instrumentalised, by associating them with the weapons they use to carry out violent crimes. This is also indicated by some of the keywords in the tabloids. For instance, in the concordance for *killer* there is reference to *knife killer* (1). Likewise, in the concordance for *knife*, there is reference to a *knife maniac* (2), *knife-wielding schizophrenic* (1) and a *knife-wielding man* (1). In Excerpt 130, the noun phrase *hour of terror*, seems redolent of language used to market horror films.

(130) Knife maniac's hour of terror (*The Mail*, 24 December 2004).

The tendency to semi-instrumentalise killers via their weapons is also apparent in the broadsheets. There are two references to *knife killer* from *The Independent* and *The Guardian*, and two references to *cannibal killer*, both which occur in headlines. This suggests that, while they report on violent crimes at a less frequent rate than the tabloids, they sometimes draw on the same sensationalist devices to report on that violence (see Excerpt 131).

(131) Life in hospital for **knife** killer (*The Times*, 3 March 2006).

The tabloid's distinctive tendency to draw interdiscursively on features from the horror genre, specifically 'slasher' films, is probably appealing to journalists for two reasons, one practical, one ideological. On the one hand, more or less all stories with violence committed by mentally ill people as its theme can be hammered into the shape of the same psycho-killer narrative, thus increasing the speed and efficiency of news production. Thus, stories with this theme satisfy the news value of 'predictability' proposed by Jewkes (2015), with the story being more or less written in a way that is certain to catch the attention of their readership once it has been received from the newswire. On the other hand, horror fiction is inherently ideological, because it designates certain people or groups of people (or sometimes other entities) as negative and urges us to respond to them fearfully. By establishing what is deviant, horror fiction reinforces what is normal. As the horror novelist Stephen King (1981:64) has written, 'the creator of horror fiction is above all else an agent of the norm.' By interdiscursively drawing on stylistic features associated with slasher cinema, which magnifies their

dangerousness, and characterising schizophrenic people who kill as akin to characters from slasher cinema, the tabloids invite readers to look upon people with schizophrenia with fear. Thus, people with schizophrenia can easily be framed as villains and those they kill their victims.

5.3.2. *Social actors and diminished responsibility*

Other keywords in the tabloids are grouped into the category of ‘murderers’ (see Table 5.8). Besides the functionalising and depersonalising label *killer*, this category includes names of people. Names, and proper nouns more generally, are likely to emerge as key in a keyword analysis (Scott, 1999), because proper nouns by their very nature refer to very specific things, and, unlike other words, cannot be used in multiple contexts to describe broader categories of things. The names refer to people who notoriously murdered other people and at some point have received a diagnosis of schizophrenia. This may be linked with what Anderson (2003:300) views as a popular assumption that particularly extreme crimes must be caused by mental illness. The keyword *brady* refers to Ian Brady, a serial killer who, along with his partner Myra Hindley, was convicted of murdering five children between 1963 and 1965 in Manchester, and sexually assaulting at least four of them. The keyword *holmes* refers to James Holmes who was convicted of murdering 12 people and injuring 70 when he opened fire on cinema-goers in Colorado in 2012. The keyword *mcfadden* refers primarily to Philip McFadden who killed a police officer in 1994. Finally, both *ripper* and *Sutcliffe* refer to the serial killer Peter Sutcliffe, dubbed by the press ‘The Yorkshire Ripper’, who was convicted in 1981 of murdering 13 women and attempting to murder seven others. Alternatively, in 10/100

cases of *ripper*, it refers to Jack the Ripper, the unidentified Victorian serial killer who is believed to have murdered five women in London. Instances of *ripper* in this context are in relation an ostensible ‘big reveal’ in *The Mail* in 2014 where the true identity of Jack the Ripper was supposedly uncovered due to new DNA evidence. In these stories, the crimes are attributed to a polish immigrant who it is believed had what we would today call paranoid schizophrenia. The only keyword in this category in the Broadsheets is *breivik*, which refers to Anders Breivik, a man convicted of murdering 77 people in Norway in 2011. This may reflect the preference in the broadsheets for international stories.

Table 5.8 Tabloid keywords referring to notorious murderers

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>brady</i>	721	106	518	99	293.69
<i>holmes</i>	1077	104	322	98	1065.41
<i>killer</i>	1814	988	1057	688	991.38
<i>mcfadden</i>	246	72	33	33	351.21
<i>ripper</i>	460	149	214	88	321.53
<i>sutcliffe</i>	871	139	372	88	659.05

It should be noted that, besides McFadden, the diagnosis of schizophrenia attributed to these criminals is contested. Brady and his legal team rejected the diagnosis of schizophrenia and, in the case of Holmes, his plea of insanity was rejected by all but one member of the jury. Likewise, while Sutcliffe claimed during his trial that he had

schizophrenia and that he heard a voice in his head telling him to carry out the murders, this explanation was criticised by subsequent psychologists.

Another notable difference between the keywords in this category between the tabloids and broadsheets is that, while Breivik committed his crimes in 2011, and during the span of the corpus, all names besides *holmes* in the tabloids refer to people who carried out their crimes prior to the span of the corpus. For instance, McFadden committed his crimes in 1994 and Peter Sutcliffe carried out his between 1969 and 1980. At the extreme end is Ian Brady, who committed his crimes between 1963 and 1965, roughly forty years prior to the span of the corpus. This begs the question as to why the tabloid press choose to invoke the names of killers with a contested diagnosis of schizophrenia, up to forty years after they have happened.

One explanation for this is offered by Jewkes (2015). Jewkes (2015:59), uses Peter Sutcliffe as an example of how ‘convicted criminals can also become ‘celebrities’ by virtue of the notoriety of their crimes.’ She goes on to suggest that ‘the fact that Sutcliffe is unlikely ever to be released means that the media are able to treat Sutcliffe as a side-show, an entertaining if somewhat macabre diversion to fill media space when there is little else to report.’ (ibid.). In this way, high profile cases like Sutcliffe’s satisfy the news value of ‘predictability’ in that they are a dependable source of potential news stories. In the case of Brady and Sutcliffe, there is debate around whether they should remain in psychiatric care or be sent to a standard prison. Both wish to be moved to a standard prison. Despite authorities maintaining that both are severely mentally ill, there

are several claims in the tabloids challenging the notion that they should be treated in a psychiatric hospital. In Excerpt 132, the husband of one of Sutcliffe's intended victims argues that he should be relocated to a 'normal' (non-psychiatric) prison. The implication is that a psychiatric prison is a lighter form of punishment than a normal prison, and that people who commit particularly heinous crimes are undeserving of magnanimity. In Excerpt 133, the author focusses on the cost difference between housing Sutcliffe in a psychiatric prison over a non-psychiatric one, which they claim would be *eight times more expensive*. The implication here is that spending money on Brady's mental treatment is wasteful. Another potential interpretation of both excerpts is that the offender in question is not mentally ill at all but sane, and therefore should not be treated in a psychiatric prison. Again, we see a reluctance to view offenders in the tabloids as insane, as this to some extent exonerates them from blame. The author seems to be suggesting that that money is being wasted on someone who committed crimes as heinous as Brady.

(132) 'I don't think he should be locked up in Broadmoor, it should be a normal prison.'

Sutcliffe mainly killed prostitutes in the streets of northern England. (*The Mail*, 15 May 2008).

(133) It is almost eight times more expensive holding **Brady** in the mental health unit than in a prison, which would cost around £40,000 per year. (*MailOnline*, 30 July 2013).

Stories regarding Brady's potential transferral from a psychiatric hospital to a prison in the broadsheets are typically more measured, and tend to provide a range of competing perspectives. A recurring topic in these articles is the tension between viewing him as mad or bad. If he is viewed as bad, he can legitimately be sent to a prison, where Brady had announced plans to take his own life. However, if he is viewed as mad, he must remain in a psychiatric hospital. In an article entitled 'Brady is bad, not mad. Let him die if he wants', the author asserts that:

(134) 'It is time to give **Brady** what he wants. He is atrocious but he is not insane and, if he wants to die, we should let him.' (*The Times*, 21 June 2013).

This is despite the fact that a mental health tribunal had already agreed that Brady was psychotic earlier that year. Evidently, the author believes that some people's crimes are so horrifying, that their mental health and the views of experts become irrelevant. How the tension between criminals as mad and bad is negotiated linguistically is explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

As with Brady, Breivik did not wish to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia, in this case because it would undermine the political motivations behind his attacks. In 44/100 instances in the broadsheets, his name is invoked in the context of contention around whether Breivik should be deemed legally insane or not. Early during the trial, two psychiatrists determined that Breivik was paranoid schizophrenic, which was then rejected in a second examination before the trial.

Especially in *The Telegraph*, there is language suggestive of the populist punitiveness associated with the tabloids. Compulsory psychiatric treatment is construed as a way to *escape jail* (*telegraph.co.uk*, 21 June 2012) and to *save him from a prison sentence* (*telegraph.co.uk*, 30 November 2011). The implication of such language is that diminished responsibility should not be an option for people who commit particularly heinous crimes. Instead, these criminals are deserving of the severest punishment possible, regardless of the outcome of psychiatric assessments. In Excerpt 135, the families of the victims of the attack are described as calling on the judge presiding over the case to *show “courage”*. The implication here is that the judge is afraid of punishing Breivik. The use of adverb *properly* in *properly punished* suggests that a verdict of diminished responsibility would result in an inappropriate level of punishment.

(135) THE judges ruling on Norwegian killer Anders Behring **Breivik** should show “courage” and declare the mass murder sane so that he can be properly punished in jail, the friends and relatives of his victims have said. (*The Telegraph*, 24 August 2012).

Elsewhere, in one article entitled ‘*Yorkshire Ripper Peter Sutcliffe to be moved to a cushier low-security Priory unit' to the fury of his victims' families*’, which was published in the *MailOnline* (12 April 2015), reports from authorities that Sutcliffe is no longer experiencing psychotic symptoms and can be relocated to a less secure hospital are met with criticism. While he is reported to have expressed remorse and said he no longer hears the *voices from God* which he had blamed for his killing spree, this is

viewed negatively by the author because *it just rubs salt into the wounds of families and I believe any remorse he has shown is fake*. The epistemic modality of the claim that Sutcliffe's remorse was not genuine is weakened by the reporting verb *believe*, which frames it as the speaker's opinion. In addition, no evidence is provided for the claim. Instead, the author argues that *'he should stay there and they should throw away the key'*. Again, the deontic modal *should* is not supported with any reasoning. The author seems to frame it as self-evident that Sutcliffe should receive the harshest punishment possible and not be treated in a psychiatric hospital.

The notion that a verdict of diminished responsibility is not befitting criminals who commit heinous crimes is echoed in an article from *guardian.com* (see Excerpt 136). Here, it is claimed that a verdict of diminished responsibility necessarily means that we must view offenders with pity. The unhedged conditional statements at the end of the excerpt are simplistic, however, as a diminished responsibility verdict does not necessarily vindicate offenders entirely of responsibility but only reduces it. The use of the deontic modal phrase *have to pity him* also suggests that a response of pity is enforced by others and not a genuine response from most people.

(136) If **Breivik** is not insane, that ruling will cast a long shadow over how the country deals with extremists. If he is judged to be insane the consequences are equally profound, as one of the lawyers for the victims told me: "If he is mad, he is not responsible, if he is not guilty then that means we will have to pity him."
(*guardian.com*, 18 June 2012).

There is thus a contradiction between the tendency to attribute extreme crimes to mental illness and the view that receiving a verdict of diminished responsibility is a way in which criminals can 'get off the hook'. In other words, the worse the crime, the greater desire in the tabloids to see the criminal blamed and punished.

A verdict of diminished responsibility ensures that people who commit crimes because of mental illness rather than their own volition are not punished to the same extent as people who commit crimes intentionally of their own accord. It also recognises that such people require psychiatric treatment as part of their rehabilitation. While Breivik's crimes were particularly serious, and it is understandable why people may wish to see him punished, calling for an individual to be sent to a standard prison over a psychiatric one, merely because it is felt he deserves a more severe punishment misunderstands the reason why the diminished responsibility verdict exists. It also offers a distorted view of diminished responsibility to readers of the press. Questioning the legitimacy of diminished responsibility in high profile cases may lead people to undermine its legitimacy more generally. Additionally, people with schizophrenia reading these articles may become worried that crimes they commit, which they may not have control over, will not be dealt with in the appropriate way.

Table 5.9 Tabloid keywords referring to victims of crimes committed by people with schizophrenia.

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>cerys</i>	336	84	73	39	396.49
<i>savident</i>	282	5	28	5	438.81
<i>victim</i>	1233	550	893	669	495.84

Three keywords in the tabloids, *cerys*, *savident* and *victim*, refer to the victims of people with schizophrenia who committed violent crimes (Table 5.9). The name *cerys* refers to Cerys Yemm who was killed by Matthew Williams in 2014. The murder was particularly gruesome, with the convicted being found eating parts of his victim’s face. This again reflects the tendency for tabloids to take an interest in gruesome violence (see above). On the other hand, *Savident* refers to the actor John Savident who was attacked by Michael Smith in 2002. There are 282 occurrences of *savident* in only five texts in the tabloids because they quote a transcript which features Savident’s surname multiple times. The scene is described in detail via extracts from the 999 call in which Smith proceeds to break through a locked door to get to Savident. A quote from Savident links the incident with slasher cinema (Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho*) – ‘it was like a scene from Bates motel’ (*The Mirror*, 11 December 2002). This is part of wider tendency to equate schizophrenic people who commit violent crimes with slasher cinema (see Section 5.3.1 above).

Besides Amanda Bynes and Kerry (Katona) (discussed below), the only names referring to real people refer either to the names of people convicted of murder who have received a diagnosis of schizophrenia or their victims. Given that the general public are unlikely to have had first-hand experiences with people with schizophrenia, these serial killers are likely to be perceived as representative of people with schizophrenia, people who embody the typical characteristics shared by the entire group. In light of a dominant representations of schizophrenic people in the press as a whole (see Section 4.5), one would be forgiven for thinking so. As Goffman (1963:40) observed, ‘each time someone with a particular stigma makes a spectacle of himself by breaking the law, [...] they who share the noted person’s stigma [...] become subject to a slight transfer of credit or discredit to themselves’. Thus each time the tabloids dredge up a killer from the past, with a contested diagnosis of schizophrenia, in order to fill media space, they help reinforce the stereotype that people with schizophrenia are typically murderers, or at least potential murderers. To reiterate, while people with schizophrenia are more likely to commit violent crimes than the general population, this still applies to a small percentage of schizophrenic people as a whole.

Table 5.10 Tabloid keywords referring to the incarceration of criminals with schizophrenia

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>arrested</i>	1105	747	880	638	377.47
<i>broadmoor</i>	821	330	569	287	353.70
<i>carstairs</i>	239	114	39	14	318.65
<i>freed</i>	378	274	169	141	274.36
<i>hospital</i>	5099	2143	5588	2451	813.05
<i>jail</i>	1132	666	910	557	380.06
<i>jailed</i>	867	537	443	310	550.93

Some of the tabloid keywords refer to incarceration (see Table 5.10). This suggests that a distinctive feature of the tabloids is a tendency to represent schizophrenic people as being incarcerated in prisons. Examining collocates of the two words referring to psychiatric institutions, *broadmoor* and *carstairs*, the language typically used around these words suggest concerns about people with schizophrenia who have killed being released from psychiatric institutions. For instance, the word *indefinitely* is a strong collocate of both *broadmoor* (n = 41, LD = 9.736) and *carstairs* (n = 5, LD = 7.367), and is used to represent people with schizophrenia as being permanently detained after committing their crimes (see Excerpt 137). Another collocate pertaining to indefinite incarceration is *without*, which collocates with *carstairs* (n = 20, LD = 6.716) and occurs in 21 instances in the phrase *without limit of time*. Evidently, journalists take a particular interest in patients being incarcerated for good. This perhaps reflects historical discourses around psychiatric hospitals or asylums, which were traditionally

viewed as means of protecting the wider public from the putative risk caused by people with mental illnesses (Scull, 2001:47), rather than being seen as places where mentally ill people receive treatment.

(137) In 2004, advances in DNA techniques allowed police to link Napper to Miss Nickell. Napper, a paranoid schizophrenic, was charged with her murder last year and pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. He will now be held at Broadmoor **indefinitely**. (*The Mail*, 21 December 2008).

The press are particularly vituperative when schizophrenic people who have committed crimes have been released only to cause more violence. For instance, collocates of *freed* in the tabloids include a large number of what Clement and Foster (2007:178) have called ‘stigmatising descriptors’ such as *maniac* (n = 9, LD = 8.980) (see Excerpt 138), *cannibal* (n = 4, LD = 7.827), and *knifeman* (n = 3, LD = 7.599). This suggests that the press are more likely to use stigmatising descriptors when schizophrenic criminals have been freed only to kill again. Perhaps the tabloids feel that offensive, identifying labels are more legitimate in cases where people with schizophrenia have been violent repeatedly.

(138) A DANGER TO THE PUBLIC FOR 20 YEARS. BUT THEY FREED **MANIAC**
TO KILL POLICEMAN (*The Express*, 20 May 2005).

The release of patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia from institutions is often framed as being a mistake rather than a conscious decision on the part of authorities. Three top 25 collocates of *freed* include *blunder* (n = 4, LD = 8.215), *blunders* (n = 3, LD = 7.630), *mistake* (n = 6, LD = 7.657) and *error* (n = 3, LD = 7.290). In Excerpt 139, the word *blunders* functions as a grammatical actor which is subject of the verb *freed*.

(139) BLUNDERS FREED KILLER FROM MENTAL HOSPITAL. A SERIES of errors left a crazed killer at large to stab to death a hero detective. (*The Star*, 20 May 2005).

When patients with schizophrenia are represented as having been released by authorities intentionally, they are depicted as having done so irresponsibly. Two collocates, *unsupervised* (n = 5, LD = 8.400) and *supervision* (n = 6, LD = 8.139), occur in cases where schizophrenic people who have committed crimes, although are now judged to be managing their illness, are released under professional supervision. In Excerpt 140, the released patient is dehumanised with the word *roam* a verb which is associated with the movement of animals (see discussion in Section 4.5). One implication of this animalising metaphor is that these individuals are aggressive and unpredictable by nature and should be restrained for their own good and the safety of others.

(140) Despite a history of violence, Simelane, from Walsall, West Midlands had been allowed to roam the streets **unsupervised** after being freed from jail three months before. (*The Express*, 16 September 2014).

In contrast, the word *freed* is significantly less frequent in the broadsheets, only occurring 169 times. In other words, *freed* occurs in the tabloids roughly 327% more frequently than in the broadsheets once the frequencies are normalised. Conversely, the most frequent word in the broadsheets referring to deinstitutionalisation is *released*, which occurs 1,598 times. However, this word is still used at a more frequent rate in the tabloids, where it occurs at a rate of 289.8 times per million words compared with 160.63 times per million words in the broadsheets. This word, too, in both the broadsheets and the tabloids typically refers to cases where schizophrenic people have been deinstitutionalised and gone on to kill people (see Excerpt 141). Again, in these cases, responsibility is constructed as falling at the feet of the professionals who are in charge of the patient's treatment.

(141) George Harrison was offered a "full and formal apology" yesterday from the hospital that **released** a schizophrenic who attacked and nearly killed him. (*The Times*, 24 October 2001).

Intuitively, I thought that *released into* was redolent of language used to refer to animals that are let back into their natural habitat. That is, that it was intuitively primed for the prepositional phrase complement (*released into*) *the wild*. However, examining patterns

around 100 random cases of *released into* in the reference corpus, ukWaC, revealed a very different picture. While 11/100 instances refer to animals being released into their habitat (usually the sea), almost a third of instances (30/100) refer to pollutants entering the environment (see Excerpt 142).

(142) A Friends of the Earth Study (FOE) looking at the Environment Agency's official pollution data from the UK's biggest factories shows that two-thirds of all cancer-causing chemicals, **released into** the environment every year, come from factories in the most deprived communities in England (*ukWaC*, Text 416096).

This suggests that the verb phrase *released into* has a discourse prosody whereby the subject causes harm to the object. The phrase may therefore be seen as implicitly characterising people with schizophrenia who have been discharged from care as pollutants that are harmful to wider society. These characterisations are particularly poignant, because they have historically been used to metaphorically demonise mentally ill people in past. For instance, O'Brien (2013:141-2) notes, in his exploration of metaphors used to represent people with mental health problems in the US eugenics era, that 'morons and other undesirable groups were a form of societal 'pollution' [...] the community had as much right to bring this under control as any other deleterious or toxic consequence of manufacturing'. Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that metaphors used to conceptualise crime influenced the solutions respondents came up with to solve them. For instance, they found that whereas animalising metaphors anticipated calls to jail criminals, metaphors construing crime as a 'virus' anticipated

calls to further understand the underlying causes of crime. Implicitly construing people with schizophrenia as pollutants may, for instance, may lead readers to believe that patients should be confined indefinitely, or at least ‘disposed of’ in areas where they cannot harm members of the public.

5.3.3. *Entertainment and culture*

Table 5.11 Tabloid keywords occurring in the context of entertainment

keyword	tabloids		broadsheets		keyness score (tabloids)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>amanda</i>	755	170	167	107	883.26
<i>bynes</i>	302	25	3	1	614.93
<i>eastenders</i>	338	102	115	66	306.49
<i>kerry</i>	370	80	98	68	393.63
<i>zoe</i>	304	73	97	56	288.20

Both the tabloids and broadsheets refer to schizophrenic people in the context of entertainment. Two keywords in the tabloids, *eastenders* and *zoe*, refer to *Zoe Tate*, a fictional character with schizophrenia in the British soap opera *Eastenders*, who is played by the actress Leah Bracknell (see Table 5.11). Fictional portrayals are interesting because, although they do not refer to the lives of real people they are nevertheless able to shape public attitudes towards social groups (Semino, 2014). For instance, fictional portrayals have the potential to foster empathy towards people with non-neurotypical people and potentially encourage us reflect on our own perception (and the perception of wider society) towards people with mental illnesses (Bates,

2010:51) Fictional portrayals of schizophrenia are perhaps more important than portrayals of other illnesses because members of the public are unlikely to have first-hand experiences with people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Angermeyer *et al.*, 2005).

What is noticeable about the language used to represent fictional characters with schizophrenia is that it is more vague and dismissive. For instance, in Excerpt 143, Zoe Tate is described as *going bonkers*. The word *bonkers* typically occurs in humorous texts in UKWaC referring to unconventional ideas and is thus potentially trivialising when used to refer to mental illness. Moreover, the description of Zoe's psychotic hallucinations uses vague and potentially offensive language. Use of the word *shag* is informal and colloquial and invites us to view what is likely a scary experience for Zoe as a character as something humorous or trivial. Likewise, nowhere in the article is there reference to the psychiatric terms *psychosis* or *hallucination*. Elsewhere in the corpus, Zoe is referred to as *a schizo*, *loopy* and *a psycho-vet*. This sort of language may be used by journalists in order to reflect the 'lay' or 'populist' associated with UK soap operas. Soaps dramatize the daily lives of working class people and the tabloids may wish to evoke this style when they report on them. Another explanation is that the press may feel less cautious in using stigmatising labels to describe Zoe as the representations are third-removed from reality. After all, a story reporting on a soap opera is a representation of a representation.

(143) **Zoe** going bonkers is already one of my all-time favourites. Yes, Zoe – the lesbian vet – is hearing voices. Whether these are the same voices that told her to shag Scott recently it is too early to tell. (*The Mirror*, 13 July 2002).

The words *zoe* and *eastenders* tend to occur in lists of highlights from soaps throughout the week. This suggests that journalists anticipate that their readers would find her character and narrative particularly entertaining, which is also indicated in Excerpt 143 where the author describes part of Zoe's narrative using the subject complement *one of my all-time favourites*. In one article, Zoe's character is praised for its authenticity, which, according to the article, is supported by experts in the medical profession (see Excerpt 144). Elsewhere, in Excerpt 145, a transcript is provided of email correspondences between the Bracknell, the actress playing Zoe, and people who watched the programme. The actress reveals ways in which she tried to make her performance as accurate as possible, Bracknell represents the mental health awareness charity, *Rethink*, as having an active role.

(144) Emmerdale's **Zoe** Tate, played by Leah Bracknell, is a strong outsider for the best actress award. Her descent into schizophrenia, which came to a head when she triggered a church fire, has been praised by the public and medics alike. (*The Star*, 14 August 2002).

(145) Yes. Rethink, the national society for schizophrenia, supplied us with information and videos. We all needed advice on how people would behave, what drugs would

be used and their effects. We wanted to be sensitive and realistic. (*The Mirror*, 14 September 2002).

Although Bracknell's performance may have been more sensitive, Zoe's narrative is based on some of the stereotypes associated with schizophrenia encountered hitherto. For instance, she is violent towards others, is duplicitous (she falsely accuses others of sexually assaulting her) and is negligent towards her children. In Excerpt 144, she is represented as having caused a fire in a church, which manages to simultaneously link people with schizophrenia with dangerous crimes and the supernatural. Naturally, screenwriters need to write characters in a way that establishes conflict. However, establishing conflict by drawing on stereotypical representations of mental illnesses only serves to reinforce those stereotypes. Instead, screenplay writers and other authors could produce stories that are more fresh and nuanced by challenging audience expectations and subverting stereotypes towards people belonging to marginalised social groups.

While Zoe Tate refers to a fictional character, *kerry*, *amanda* and *bynes* refer to celebrities in the entertainment industry. The word *kerry* primarily refers to Kerry Katona, who was previously a member of the popular girl band *Atomic Kitten* and who more starred in the British reality television programme *I'm a Celebrity Get Me Out of Here* in 2004. Her previous surname was McFadden which partly contributed to *mcfadden* emerging as a keyword in the tabloids (see above). Katona's mother, who is diagnosed with schizophrenia, is mentioned in the context of a short biography of

Katona, which attempts to foster sympathy towards her as a way of encouraging viewers not to vote her off the show (see Excerpt 146). The language used to characterise Katona's mother echoes the prevailing representation that women with schizophrenia are negligent mothers who are perceived as frightening by their children. Her competence as a mother is particularly denigrated via the rhetorical question *could a little girl have had a worse start in life?*

(146) Worse still, she was to discover that her mother was a schizophrenic, who had been slashing her wrists. Could a little girl have had a worse start in life? One minute Susan would be laughing and joking, the next she would be telling **Kerry** that she wanted to die. (*The Mail*, 9 February 2004).

In contrast, the tabloid keywords *amanda* and *bynes* refer to the actress Amanda Bynes who was reported to have been forcibly hospitalised after displaying symptoms of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia in 2013. The list of behaviours reported as symptoms include dousing her pet dog with petrol, launching drug paraphernalia from the window of a skyscraper and accusing her father of sexual assaulting her. However, Bynes' diagnosis of schizophrenia was later reported as having been disputed by her lawyer. Likewise, her mother Lynne rejected the diagnosis and *blamed her behaviour on marijuana* (*mirror.co.uk*, 18 May 2014).

In these stories, the news value of 'celebrity' and 'entertainment' appear to have outweighed the value of 'negativity' as the representations of her behaviour are

sympathetic rather than negative. For instance, many articles typically feature evaluative markers that express concern for Bynes' health and wellbeing. In Excerpt 147, the text invites readers to view Bynes sympathetically by describing her theft accusations as *worrying*. In addition, the article's emphasis is on her response to her arrest rather than on her alleged crimes. The verb *deal*, which represents her reaction to accusations of her misbehaviours, is the main verb in the first clause, while references to her alleged crimes are nominalised (*her recent DUI arrest, theft accusations*), which, as nouns, are not coded for agency.

(147) As she continues to deal with the fallout from her recent DUI arrest, **Amanda Bynes** is also racking up a worrying list of new attempted theft accusations.
(*MailOnline*, 9 October 2014).

These representations stand in contrast to other representations of schizophrenic people who have committed crimes, albeit violent ones. This contrast may reflect Galtung and Ruge's (1965:78) observation that, in the press, 'where positive events are reported, they will be more likely to occur in contexts for an elite person than as something surrounding the common man.' This also explains why the press would choose to report on her recovery, which would be perceived as more banal were she not famous. Harper (2009:160), for instance, has observed that 'middle-class sufferers, who are often highly literate and articulate professionals, are more likely to have their experiences serialised in newspaper features and magazine supplements [...]. Working class people, meanwhile, tend to feature more often in mental health stories as violent 'nuts'.'

Another factor that may have led the tabloids to represent Bynes more positively is the so-called ‘chivalry hypothesis’ (see Section 2.3.1). This may derive from the stereotype that women are more delicate and vulnerable than men. Whitley *et al.* (2015:331), who has observed the chivalry hypothesis in the context of representations of mentally ill people in the Canadian press found that whereas articles representing men with mental illnesses typically had violence as a main theme, articles about women typically had recovery or aetiology (i.e. what caused the mental illness) as a main theme. Indeed, in 25/100 instances of Bynes are situated in descriptions of her recovery (e.g. Excerpt 148 and 149) and in many of the articles she is referred to as receiving treatment in residential rehabilitation or otherwise being cared for by her parents. Excerpt 149 also refers to her as *troubled*, a word which suggests concern and sympathy towards her mental state, aspects that were not found in any of the stories analysed earlier in this chapter.

However, Bynes is not necessarily represented as passive. In Excerpt 149, she is constructed as an active participant in her rehabilitation by representing her as a participant in subject-position who acts upon her treatment, which is in object position (*Amanda Bynes has completed her treatment*). Thus, treatment is not represented as something she is subjected to (cf. references to compulsory confinement above), but something she actively participates in.

(148) Five months after being forcibly hospitalised in a rehab facility **Amanda** Bynes has completed her treatment and is now recovering in her parents' home. (*mirror.co.uk*, 6 December 2013).

(149) For the past year Lynn and Rick **Bynes** have been taking care of their troubled daughter by opening the doors of their Thousand Oaks, California home and overseeing her medication after the star experienced a string of run-ins with the law. (*MailOnline*, 7 October 2014).

While Bynes is represented as having agency over her treatment, her agency in her alleged crimes is reduced. For instance, in Excerpt 149, the act of law-breaking is nominalised as a *run-in*, which is further mitigated by framing the act of law-breaking as something *experienced* – a mental process of ‘perception’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014:257) – rather than perpetrated intentionally by Bynes. This frames Bynes’ acts of law-breaking as something external to Bynes which she passively perceives. This representation of Bynes’ alleged crimes reflects the observation made by Whitely *et al.* (2015:331) that, whereas articles about men with mental illnesses were typically written in a ‘more dismissive and contemptuous manner’, articles about women were represented as ‘victims of circumstance or passions beyond their control.’ Admittedly, while Bynes’ crimes are less serious than the majority of cases reported (i.e. she is never represented as being directly physically violent to anyone), it is curious how less blame is attributed to Bynes, especially given that her diagnosis is more contested than other criminals represented in the press. Indeed, her mother’s claim that her behaviour is due

to her consumption of illegal drugs rather than mental health problems would suggest she is more blameworthy than other agents discussed. It is also interesting to observe how the language used to represent one's agency over one's crimes and treatment can cast people with mental illnesses in a positive or negative light. For instance, Bynes, who is reported as having enacted some bizarre behaviours, is represented as less agentive, and represented more sympathetically, than Jantjie, the sign language interpreter at Nelson Mandela's funeral (see Section 4.4). Of course, this difference in reporting may be influenced by other factors, for instance the international and symbolic significance of Nelson Mandela's funeral as opposed the small-scale crimes committed by Bynes. However, the contrast between the two ways of reporting show how similar experiences associated with schizophrenia can be portrayed in significantly different ways, and may suggest varying levels of responsibility.

There are more keywords in the broadsheets referring to the topic of entertainment than in the tabloids, although in the context of the creative arts rather than television. In total, 26 keywords in the top 100 keywords for the broadsheets refer to the creative arts. For instance, three keywords refer to fine art (*art, artists, exhibition*), 15 refer to creative writing (e.g. *literary, fiction, writer, writing*), three refer to cinema (*festival, film* and *films*) and one to music (*music*). That said, some of these words may have emerged as key due to stylistic differences between the broadsheets and tabloids rather than due to differences in the way they report on schizophrenic people. For instance, *art, book, books* and *writers* all occur as key in the broadsheets in Baker *et al.* (2013) in their study into the representation of Muslims in the UK press. This suggests that the broadsheets are more likely to use words referring to the creative arts in their articles

independent of whether they report on schizophrenia. Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore how the broadsheets link schizophrenic people with the topic of culture.

The most frequent of the words referring to cinema is *film*. This tends to occur in the context of reviews of films portraying people with schizophrenia, such as *A Beautiful Mind* (2001) (discussed in Chapter 4) and *The Soloist* (2009), which dramatizes the story of Nathaniel Ayers, a homeless, man with schizophrenia who rose to stardom as a professional violin player. Of the 58 instances where *film* collocates with *schiz**, eight criticise the accuracy of representations of schizophrenia in cinema, and for reproducing misconceptions about the disorder. For instance, the film *Me, Myself and Irene* (2000), in which the protagonist, Hank, suffers a psychotic episode which results in him developing a second personality, is criticised for reproducing the misconception that schizophrenia is the same as multiple personality disorder (see Excerpt 150). We saw in Section 4.4 that the misconception that schizophrenia involves having two personalities was the basis behind metaphorical uses of the adjective *schizophrenic*. They also criticise the film for drawing a link between schizophrenia and violence.

(150) This **film** contains many confusing and inaccurate references to very real and distressing psychiatric illnesses. Mental illness, "schizo", schizophrenia, split personality and other such terms are emotive and poorly understood by the public; they create and perpetuate a climate of ignorance, fear, shock, embarrassment and cynicism. Violence is not a symptom of schizophrenia, but Hank in the film perpetuates the myth that it is. (*The Independent*, 25 September 2000).

The words referring to music typically occur either in articles where musicians have schizophrenia (e.g. Syd Barrett from the rock band *Pink Floyd*) or where there is a reference to schizophrenia or related diagnoses in the title of an album, for instance *Twenty First Century Schizoid Man* (1969) by King Crimson (46 instances). In order to investigate more closely, I examined words in this category referring to identities (*artist, artists, writer, writers*), as these were more likely to play a role in shaping representations of people with schizophrenia (see Table 5.12). In particular I examined references to these words which collocated with *schiz** so I could examine how the press framed links between these two aspects of one's identity.

Table 5.12 Broadsheet entertainment words referring to identities characterised by artistic talent

keyword	broadsheets		tabloids		keyness score (broadsheets)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>artist</i>	1091	101	238	616	176.90
<i>artists</i>	832	52	93	433	294.67
<i>writer</i>	1534	178	384	986	190.42
<i>writers</i>	696	50	117	462	165.38

In 24/44 instances, (54.55%) artists and writers are referred to as having a diagnosis of schizophrenia. These stories may be viewed positively as they represent people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia as able to triumph over their symptoms and be successful members of society. These stories may also reflect the Andreason's (1976) finding that most creative geniuses from the past suffered from mental illnesses, although this has recently been cast into doubt by Dietrich (2014). Indeed, one article in *The Times* (20

January 2003), quoting an unknown source, writes *manicdepressive (sic.) illnesses, especially bipolar ones, are common among writers, but schizophrenia is entirely absent*. Other instances orient to the link between schizophrenia and creativity in more detail. In nine instances (20.45%), the broadsheets report on the hypothesis that artists exhibit traits associated with ‘schizotypy’ (the continuum along which schizophrenia is located, which also includes diagnoses such as schizophreniform disorder). These are caused by genes linked with psychoticism that enhance creativity but do not lead to symptoms of schizophrenia (see Excerpt 151).

(151) Some of the genes that predispose to **schizophrenia** might be carried by **artists** and in many cases play a factor in their creativity, but because the artists do not develop full-blown schizophrenia and are able to direct their creativity, they are able to pass the genes on to their children. (*The Guardian*, 30 November, 2005).

This is supported by some of the literature in Psychology. For instance, Eysenck (1995) has linked creative genius with borderline psychoticism. More recently, Prentky (2001:97-98), reviewing literature on the subject, reports that schizophrenic people and highly creative people may share similar ‘cognitive styles’, although while creative individuals are able to focus their attention, ‘psychotic thinking is unbridled and capricious.’ Broadly speaking, psychoticism is characterised by loose, intuitive and lateral thought processes, rather than critical, logical thinking, and, when under control, is said to enhance creativity (see also McConaghy, 1960).

However, sometimes it is hard to tell whether the characterisation of artists as schizophrenic is metaphorical or not (e.g. see Excerpt 152). The use of the weak epistemic modal *little bit* suggests the former, as metaphorical uses of *schizophrenic* were found to be frequently preceded by weak modals (see Section 4.4).

(152) Religion comforts people. Instant gratification is addictive. **Artists** are a little bit **schizophrenic**. (*The Telegraph*, 8 June 2008).

These patterns reflect a long history of viewing mental illness and creative geniuses as two sides of the same coin. The link stretches back to classical antiquity, with Aristotle (1936:155) observing in his *Problemata* that geniuses through history often suffered from ‘black bile’ which was viewed in Ancient Greece as the cause of ‘melancholia’ or depression. Likewise, Seneca (1900:287) famously (and probably apocryphally) attributed the quote to Aristotle in his *De Tranquillitate Animi* that ‘there is no genius without a touch of madness’. These hypotheses may be viewed as analogous to a so-called ‘supercrips’ view of disability (EnglandKennedy, 2012:29). A ‘supercrip’ has been defined as an individual with disabilities who does more and performs better than is possible for most nondisabled people. For instance, people with autism are popularly viewed as having a special talent despite their mental health condition (Draaisma, 2009).

The representation of people with schizophrenia as talented artists as a topic is not salient in the tabloids. The only evidence of this representation can be found in the

concordance for *broadmoor* which reports on one of its previous inmates in the nineteenth century, Richard Dadd, who was a surrealist painter. Dadd was diagnosed with schizophrenia and institutionalised in Broadmoor psychiatric prison in 1844 for murdering his father. Despite his criminal acts, he is described as relatively benign (see Excerpt 153).

(153) He arrived at Bethlem in a straitjacket in 1844 and was transferred to **Broadmoor** 20 years later. He was a tranquil patient and at both asylums devoted himself to painting. (*The Express*, 31 May 2013).

There are two main reasons why the press uses more positive language (*tranquil*) to describe Dadd's crimes in comparison with other individuals. First, the crime happened so long ago in the past, where the victims and those affected by his crimes have long since died. Thus, emotions around the event are not as raw as with more recent crimes. Second, the art he produced, and the joy he brought to posterity may have brought him redemption in the eyes of society. There is also an interesting example where Dadd is mentioned in the broadsheets. In Excerpt 154, that his art is the product of a hallucination is described as making it more authentic than art produced by neurotypical people. While the conceits of a professional artist are merely *let's-pretend*, Dadd's hallucinations, reified in his art, are referred to oxymoronically as a *genuine fantasy*.

(154) Oberon and Titania (1854/58) by the schizophrenic Richard **Dadd** offers genuine manic fantasy, as opposed to the tiresome let's-pretend of so much of the art of his contemporaries. (*The Telegraph*, 21 September 2003).

The link between symptoms of schizophrenia as effortless sources of creativity is a more pervasive one. Indeed, the literary critic Terry Eagleton (1996:138) appeals to this idea when he writes that '[s]chizophrenic language has [...] an interesting resemblance to poetry'. In reality, symptoms of schizophrenia are often distressing and can be very disruptive to one's life and wellbeing unless treated. Representing these symptoms as inherently creative and fascinating (seemingly to people other than the schizophrenic person) potentially trivialises these symptoms and casts individuals with the disorder as sources of entertainment rather than compassion. Alternatively, doing so may imbue the language of people with schizophrenia with a value which challenges the representation of their perspective and contributions as meaningless (see Section 4.5).

On the one hand, by repeatedly mentioning schizophrenic people in the context of art, the press potentially contribute to a more positive representation of schizophrenic people as creative individuals. For some people diagnosed with the disorder, creative pursuits are a way of understanding their disorder and are sometimes used in treatment. However, representations of such creative abilities could give rise to high expectations. As Lavis (2005:159) notes, 'embedded within the construction of genius through madness is the idea of individuality, agency and uniqueness.' Given that creativity is associated with genes linked to schizophrenia rather than a diagnosis of schizophrenia


itself, the expectation that being diagnosed with schizophrenia can enhance creative achievement is likely to lead to frustration and disappointment from either individual sufferers or their friends and families. For instance, Knapp, Mangalore and Simpson (2004) found that 70% of people diagnosed with schizophrenia were unable to return to work, and, the Schizophrenia Commission Report (2018:6) found that only 5% of people with schizophrenia were in employment.

5.3.4. *Science and pharmaceuticals*

Another broad tendency in both the tabloids and the broadsheets is to inquire or make claims regarding the aetiology of schizophrenia. As we saw in Section 1.2, a clear aetiology of schizophrenia has not yet been identified and claims in the medical literature are still largely speculative, although researchers are increasingly viewing the disorder as primarily having a genetic basis. Two keywords in the tabloids, *cannabis* and *drug*, link the onset of schizophrenia with substance abuse. The word *cannabis* is particularly frequent between the years 2004 and 2008, which make up 50.19% of all the instances of this word in the tabloids (see Figure 5.3). This is likely in response to the UK government's decision to reclassify cannabis from a class B drug to a class C drug in 2004 and renewed debate around its reclassification to a class B drug between 2006 and 2009. It was finally reclassified as a class B drug in 2009. In UK legislation, the class of a drug determines the severity of the penalty you will receive if you are found to be dealing or producing it. Links between cannabis consumption and mental illness are one of the reasons the tabloids propose as to why the government should reconsider its decision to (re)classify the drug. In many of the examples, the link

putative link between cannabis consumption and the onset of schizophrenia is made more credible by invoking social actors referred to as experts. In Excerpt 155, the epistemic modality of the statement is enhanced via reference to *MENTAL health experts* and the force of the illocutionary act they are representing as performing (*begged*).

Figure 5.3 The frequency of cannabis in the tabloids across time in the tabloids



(155) MENTAL health experts last night begged the Government to restore **cannabis** to Class B status after status after studies linked the drug to psychosis and schizophrenia (*The Sunday Express*, 30 January 2005)

There is also a tendency to use strong epistemic markers to highlight the putative certainty of the evidence. For instance, elsewhere, the link between cannabis use and the onset of schizophrenia and other mental illnesses is described as *clear and conclusive*

(‘PLATELL'S PEOPLE: What has idiotic Mr Clegg been smoking’ *MailOnline*, 7 March 2015) and *causal* (‘How smoking could raise the risk of psychosis’ *MailOnline*, 10 July 2015). However, claims made in the academic literature are much more tentative, and a direct link between substance abuse and schizophrenia is contentious. For instance, there is emerging evidence that the proclivity for consuming cannabis and the likelihood that an individual will develop schizophrenia actually share a common genetic aetiology (Verweij *et al.*, 2017). That is, that a genetic predisposition to cannabis use is bound up with a genetic predisposition to developing schizophrenia. In contrast, Hickman *et al.* (2007) find evidence that challenges the link. They find that, despite an increase in the number of young people consuming cannabis, the rate at which schizophrenia is diagnosed in the UK has not been increasing.

By exaggerating the legitimacy of the direct link between substance abuse and schizophrenia, the press suggest that people who are diagnosed with schizophrenia are likely to have abused substances in their youth. This represents people with schizophrenia as potentially responsible for the onset of their disorder. It also suggests that the onset of schizophrenia is a punishment for illegal behaviour. These representations align the so-called ‘moral behaviour model’ where ‘schizophrenics are seen as suffering for their ‘sinful’ behaviour in the past, and should be treated accordingly.’ (Siegler and Osmond, 1966:5). The representation of people with schizophrenia as responsible for their own illness is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.4.

Cannabis is one of several aetiologies proposed by the press. In order to examine more closely the different causes of schizophrenia discussed in the tabloids and broadsheet, I searched for cases where the word *link** collocated with *schiz**. It was found in the previous chapter that *link* was a collocates of *schizophrenia* (see Section 4.3) and occurred in cases where the aetiology of schizophrenia was frequently discussed. Beginning with the tabloids, there are 93 instances where *link** collocates with *schiz** of which 89 occur in a context where the aetiology of schizophrenia is represented. In the broadsheets, there are 2,136 instances, so a 100 word random sample was generated to more closely examine patterns. Of these, 82 referred to the aetiology of schizophrenia.

By far the most frequent cause of schizophrenia discussed is cannabis, which makes up half of the instances (54/89) in the tabloids (60.67%) and only slightly less, 38/82 instances (46.34%), in the broadsheets. There is a particular interest in so-called *skunk*, which is a strong collocates of *cannabis* in both the tabloids (n = 115, LD = 9.47) and the broadsheets (n = 95, LD = 9.04). This strain of cannabis, which is recently being developed, is more potent and, compared with weaker strains is represented as more likely to trigger the onset of schizophrenia (see Excerpt 156).

(156) ULTRA-POTENT skunk **cannabis** is seven times more likely to trigger psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia than traditional hash, a study warned yesterday.
(*The Mail*, 1 December 2009).

Another aetiology proposed in the tabloids is that of the parasite *toxoplasma* which is able to enter the human immune system and eventually the brain, potentially leading to the onset of schizophrenia. This is based on research showing that 50.6% of people who develop schizophrenia own a cat in childhood, on which *toxoplasma* is sometimes found (*The Independent*, 12 June 2015). This is proposed as an aetiology five times in the tabloids (all three are from *The Mail*) and 10 times in the broadsheets, in the sample of lines mentioned above (in total *toxoplasma* occurs 79 times in the tabloids and 132 times in the broadsheets). However, there is a contrast in how language is used to frame this link between the two. *The Mail* typically frames the link as one between the onset of schizophrenia and cats. In the headline cited in Excerpt 157, *owning a cat* is the subject of the verb *give*, thus framing the cat as carrying and transmitting the disease (rather than the parasite *toxoplasma*). While this is clarified later in the article, it is interesting that *The Mail* initially chooses to frame the link initially in a more simplistic way. This is possibly done to make the article more alarming to people who own cats, especially given that cats are a common household pet in the UK. In doing so, the headline of the article appeals to the news value of ‘risk’ (Jewkes, 2015:55), and thus readers are potentially more likely to read the article. The direct address towards the reader, mediated via the use of second person pronouns (*you, your*) may also make the notion of catching schizophrenia from a household cat feel uncomfortably close to home for a reader.

(157) COULD OWNING A CAT GIVE YOU SCHIZOPHRENIA? While viewing cat videos online may be therapeutic, a study published last week suggests owning a cat may be bad for your mental health. Scientists believe a parasite that lives in

cats could be **linked** to a greater risk of **schizophrenia**. (*MailOnline*, 16 June 2015).

The press have a history of offering misleading representations of scientific studies. For instance a complaint documented on the IPSO website (Wilson v. *The Times*, 2016) found that *The Times* published a story entitled *Light drinking does no harm in pregnancy* that ignored Wilson's claim in his research that the evidence for this was only meagre.

On the other hand, the broadsheets are less likely to distort the story to the same degree. While the headline in Excerpt 158 can still be viewed as sensationalist (*beware of the cat* intertextually points to the genre of warning signs, and the claim is unhedged), the focus this time appears to be on the potential risks caused by parasites living on the cat rather than the cat itself. Moreover, the use of quantification in the headline (*350,000 Britons a year*) initially frames the situation as one that only affects a small minority of cats.

(158) Beware of the cat: Britain's hidden toxoplasma problem; New research shows 350,000 Britons a year are being infected with pet-borne parasite **linked** with **schizophrenia** and increased suicide risk. (*independent.co.uk*, 6 December 2012).

Indeed, in an article entitled *Pet subjects: Can my cat make me ill?*; Pete Wedderburn answers readers' pet problems on *The Telegraph's* online website, Wedderburn

responds to a reader anxieties about the link between toxoplasma and schizophrenia with the following (Excerpt 159). Two weak epistemic markers, *suggestion* and *tentative*, characterise the claim as speculative. It is later dismissed as being *alarmist*.

(159) The British Veterinary Association referred to the this (sic) week's suggestion of a "tentative **link**" between cats and schizophrenia and other psychotic illnesses as "alarmist". (*telegraph.co.uk*, 10 September 2012).

Another difference between the tabloids and broadsheets in the sample of concordance lines examined, is that the tabloids only propose a genetic aetiology for schizophrenia in 4/89 instances (4.49%), compared to 17/82 instances (20.73%) in the broadsheets. This is despite emerging consensus in psychiatric research that schizophrenia is primarily caused by genetic factors (Frith and Johnstone, 2004). Perhaps the genetic aetiology is less newsworthy, first, because it is less surprising, and, second, because, we have no control over our genetics. By framing schizophrenia as caused by certain lifestyle choices, people who make these choices are more likely to read these articles if their headlines characterise them as potentially dangerous. This tendency is perhaps symptomatic of an emerging 'risk culture' (Giddens and Pierson, 1998:102) (also see Section 4.3). References to skunk cannabis are a form of 'manufactured risk' (1998:210) as advances in technology (in this case, the development of a more potent drug) gives rise to additional risks.

Another topic that emerged in the broadsheets was that of psychiatric treatment. Eight keywords in the broadsheets typically occur in articles reporting on schizophrenia in the context of psychiatry (see Table 5.13).

Whereas the tabloids typically report on drugs that trigger schizophrenia, the broadsheets typically report on drugs sold to treat it. For instance, *astrazeneca* refers to the Anglo-Swedish pharmaceutical company of the same name. This is always referred to in the context of the profits made by its antipsychotic drug *Seroquel*, which explains why some of the words in the ‘business and commerce’ category are key in the broadsheets. In fact, the words *company*, *executive* and *sales*, which are key in the broadsheets, are top 25 collocates of *astrazeneca*. In doing so, the broadsheets draw on a consumerist discourse which constructs drugs as marketable products designed to make profit (as opposed to, for instance, drugs that help change people’s lived experience for the better) (see Excerpt 160).

Table 5.13 Broadsheet keywords relating to psychiatry

keyword	broadsheets		tabloids		keyness score (broadsheets)
	freq	no. of articles	freq	no. of articles	
<i>astrazeneca</i>	789	56	152	248	156.12
<i>freud</i>	448	8	39	176	188.26
<i>genome</i>	509	21	40	138	226.84
<i>human</i>	3859	504	1230	1828	246.24
<i>laing</i>	431	1	7	119	305.44
<i>project</i>	1322	122	256	784	259.62
<i>psychiatry</i>	1290	171	292	670	195.73
<i>science</i>	1956	235	439	1956	301.47

(160) One of AstraZeneca's bestselling drug, Seroquel for schizophrenia, lost US patent protection in March, while the patent on Nexium for ulcers expires in the US in 2014. The two generated \$10.3bn (£6.4bn) in **sales** last year. (*telegraph.co.uk*, 25 October 2012).

In that Seroquel is an antipsychotic drug, these references implicitly construct schizophrenia from a biomedical perspective, that is, as a physical symptom to be treated via pharmaceuticals. Other keywords in the broadsheets implicitly constructing schizophrenia from a biomedical perspective include *human*, *genome*, and *project*. These words sometimes occur together in the cluster *the human genome project*, which occurs 69 times in the broadsheet subcorpus. This refers to an international scientific research project that took place between 1990 and 2003 where scientists collaborated to sequence the bases that make up the human genome²⁷. By mapping the small proportion of bases that make up DNA which code for genes, scientists had hoped that by using this data, it would become possible to identify mutations to this normal sequence in order to more readily diagnose diseases such as schizophrenia (Excerpt 161). While the project proved a landmark in the development of medicine (Cowan *et al.*, 2002), it did not provide conclusive results that would help diagnose schizophrenia more readily. Instead it found that schizophrenia, like other diseases that fall into the category of

²⁷ <https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What>

complex genetic disorders (such as cancer and heart disease) are likely caused by an interplay of one or more genes and environmental factors (Moore, Kelleher and Corvin, 2011, Frith and Johnstone, 2004, Cowen *et al.*, 2002).

(161) Major variations in the number of genes carried in a person's **genome** have been linked with schizophrenia, in a study that provides further evidence of the important role played by genetics in raising the risk of illness, which affects one in 100 people. (*The Independent*, 11 May 2010).

While references to *Seroquel* and *The Human Genome Project* construct schizophrenia using a biomedical discourse, two additional collocates, *freud* and *laing*, occur in articles that construct schizophrenia using a psychoanalytic discourse. Psychoanalytic discourse constructs mental illness, not as a genetic phenomenon, but as a psychodynamic, mental phenomenon primarily caused by so-called neuroses, that is, repressed desires. As such, it constructs schizophrenia as primarily a mental phenomenon rather than a physical one, as in the case of the biomedical discourse. Proponents of psychoanalysis were relatively uninterested in symptoms of disorders, but instead sought to treat the patterns of thought which they believed were the underlying cause of mental disorders. The word *freud* refers to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the founder of psychoanalysis, who is frequently mentioned in relation to his depiction in the 2011 film *A Dangerous Method*. He is praised by the broadsheets for beginning a trend of treating the mentally ill in a humane way, in contrast to more barbaric forms of treatment throughout history (see Excerpt 162)

(162) Thousands of women suffering from hysteria, hypertension and emotionality would have been given either a hysterectomy or a clitoridectomy – the surgical removal or cauterisation of the clitoris. There was also a trend (particularly in Germany and France) to castrate male schizophrenics. **Freud** was among the first physicians to treat the mentally ill in a humane, non-surgical way.’ (*The Telegraph*, 12 May 2002).

R.D. Laing (1927-1989) was a British psychiatrist, famous for his role in the anti-psychiatry movement, which argued that psychiatric treatment, and the unequal power dynamic between doctor and patient, can be harmful to people with mental illnesses who should be treated in more humane and personalised ways. He rose to fame following the publication of his book *The Divided Self* (1960). In the book, Laing calls for a more holistic approach to the treatment of schizophrenia, that views people with schizophrenia as people rather than sets of symptoms, and that their treatment should be shaped according to their unique ‘existential position’ in the world (p. 35). In this way, Laing’s position overlaps with psychoanalysis. His view is summed up in the following Excerpt from *The Observer* (see Excerpt 163).

(163) **Laing** theorised that insanity could be understood as a reaction to the divided self. Instead of arising as a purely medical disease, schizophrenia was thus the result of wrestling with two identities: the identity defined for us by our families and our authentic identity, as we experience ourselves to be. When the two are

fundamentally different, it triggers an internal fracturing of the self. (*The Observer*, 1 June 2008).

The majority of instances occur in *The Guardian* subcorpus (46/100), where attitudes towards the *The Divided Self* are ambivalent. On the one hand, Laing's perspective is lauded for listening to people with schizophrenia and being carefully attentive to potential meanings in their psychotic symptoms which could help contribute to recovery. On the other hand, he is criticised for characterising the families of people with schizophrenia as at least partly responsible for its onset. Laing's perspective has indeed been heavily criticised in the academic literature (see Section 1.2). In Excerpt 164, Laing's model is described as blaming families but concedes that there may be some truth to the hypothesis.

(164) Laing has become notorious as the man who blamed schizophrenia on families.

But those who dismiss him on that basis have to ask if any attempt to understand a person's mental state can be made without reference to their closest relationships. (*The Guardian*, 26 August 2013).

However, *The Guardian's* ambivalence is not shared by its readership. The word *laing* occurs in 9/100 instances in articles published under a section of the newspaper entitled 'your letters'. Letters written by readers and published by newspapers provide insights into the interpretative processes occurring in the minds of their readership that reify texts into discourse (see 2.1.1.1). Indeed, these letters respond negatively to *The*

Guardian's negative characterisation of Laing as someone who blamed the onset of schizophrenia on the families of people who develop the disorder. In Excerpt 165, the reader intertextually quotes the article and uses negative authenticity markers (*false*, *misunderstanding*) in order to construct *The Guardian*'s stance as a misrepresentation.

(165) As convenor of the RD Laing conference for 10 years, I dispute several points in 'The tragic legacy of RD **Laing**'. You said: 'He was a pioneering psychiatrist who blamed parents for the psychological problems of their offspring' and 'Attributing schizophrenia to bad parenting is Laing's most criticised idea, put forward in *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (1964)'. Both these statements are false and the second one is based on a misunderstanding of Laing's theoretical position as outlined in that groundbreaking work. (*The Observer*, 8 July 2008).

While these letters cannot be viewed as representative of attitudes in the UK as a whole, they do tentatively corroborate Furnham and Rees' (1988) finding that people in Britain, in comparison with other countries, are more likely to favour environmental explanations of mental illness than biological ones. That said, psychoanalytic discourses used to construct schizophrenia should be used with caution. On the one hand, psychoanalytic explanations of mental health problems such as schizophrenia view symptoms as meaningful and nuanced, which has been shown to be conducive to the recovery of people with schizophrenia (Holt and Tickle, 2015). It also views mental illness, not solely as a biomedical phenomenon, but also shaped by social and political factors. On the other hand, psychoanalytic explanations may construct people with

schizophrenia negatively as a product of a dysfunctional family, and attribute blame to parents. Psychoanalytic theories are largely rejected in the medical community (at least in the UK) on the basis that there is little evidence to support the theory. Theories based on a unconscious part of our brains which are only accessible indirectly (for instance, through our memory or dreams) are viewed as non-falsifiable and therefore unscientific. For this reason, it has increasingly become marginalised in psychiatric practice in favour of symptom-based biomedical approaches (Paris, 2005).

5.4. Conclusion

O'Brien (2013:58) writes that 'entities that defy categorisation have always evoked feelings of both wonder and defilement, conjuring up at the same time visions of awe and mystery alongside those of trepidation and fear.' People with schizophrenia are no different and these feelings of both 'wonder' and 'defilement' loosely characterise the representations of schizophrenia offered by the broadsheets and tabloids respectively. While the broadsheets link schizophrenic people with vague and esoteric subjects such as creativity and the unconscious, the tabloids almost entirely represent people with schizophrenia as dangerous and evoking fear. As Sayce (2000:62) remarks, 'it is as though we only have a few 'stories' of mental illness and slot everything – fact or fiction – into them.'

Three main topics identified by the analysis were 'violence', 'culture' and 'aetiology'. These can be broken down into two main discourses used in the reporting of

schizophrenia – ‘entertainment’ and ‘science’. Many of the representations within these topics had interesting implications in terms of how people with schizophrenia were represented in terms of agency. For instance, linguistic choices made by the press when representing violence committed by schizophrenic people could determine whether they were represented as responsible for their actions or not. Likewise, aetiologies linking schizophrenia with substance abuse or a dysfunctional family constructed various parties as responsible for the onset of the disorder. That said, differences between the tabloids and broadsheets should not be overstated. While the broadsheets do tend to represent schizophrenic people in a more varied range of topics, they do still frequently report on them in the context of violent crime. It was shown, for instance, that in both tabloids and broadsheets, the incidence of words referring to violence were typically higher than words referring to schizophrenia and its symptoms.

With these considerations in mind, the following two chapters more closely examine how the press use language to construct schizophrenic people who commit violent crimes as more or less responsible for their actions.

6. Linguistic and cognitive accounts of (moral) responsibility

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter revealed that one of the salient topics in the tabloid subcorpus was ‘violence’ where schizophrenic people were represented as committing violent crimes. It was noted that the language used to represent those crimes may represent the people who carried them out as more or less agentic. This is associated with a broader issue of whether schizophrenic people are represented as morally responsible for their crimes, which is defined here as ‘the extent to which the protagonist is worthy of blame’ (Schleifer and Altman, 1981:242). Under the Coroners and Justice Act (2009)²⁸, people who commit violent crimes while experiencing symptoms of a recognised medical condition (that can be shown to have inhibited normal mental functioning) have their crimes reduced on the grounds of diminished responsibility. The defendant must be able to demonstrate that they did not understand the nature of what they did, could not think rationally and could not exercise control over their own actions. When representing these cases, the press must be cautious in the language they use so as not to represent individuals as morally responsible when they may not have been.

²⁸<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/part/2/chapter/1/crossheading/partial-defence-to-murder-diminished-responsibility>

The extent to which the press represent schizophrenic people as moral agents has important real-world implications. For instance, negative reactions in the press towards diminished responsibility verdicts have the potential to sway the decisions of the judge or jury in high profile cases. Bilton (2003) reports that the fear of a public backlash led the judge presiding over Peter Sutcliffe's trial to put evidence of diminished responsibility (four psychologists diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia) before a jury rather than making a decision himself. Moreover, Corrigan *et al.* (2002) found that the misconception that people with schizophrenia are typically intentional moral deviants (in addition to the misconception that they are likely to be violent) is one of the two main misassumptions motivating public stigmatising attitudes and avoidance behaviours. This reflects historical attitudes towards people with serious mental illnesses. For instance, O'Brien (2013:85) observed that in the US Eugenics era, those deemed 'feeble minded' who committed crimes were often perceived as being 'intentional and motivated by malice or greed.'

With these considerations in mind, this chapter and Chapter 7 both attend to the third research question listed in Section 1.5:

1. How do the British press use language to re-contextualise violence committed by people with schizophrenia? How is the press' re-contextualisation of these crimes likely to shape a reader's blame judgement?

This chapter takes the form of a short literature review of relevant literature around responsibility in psychology and philosophy towards the view of developing a

methodology for examining the representation of blame in the corpus. In Section 6.2, I discuss previous literature in CDA that has touched on the topic of agency and responsibility, particularly in the context of health based research. In Section 6.3, I discuss psychological accounts of criteria linked to responsibility, whereas in section 6.4, I explore how language can be used to construct moral responsibility. In Section 6.5, I outline my method for the analysis found in Chapter 7.

6.2. Research context

How text producers represent responsibility in the context of violent crime using language has not been examined in detail in CDA research. However, a wealth of research in CDA has explored the way that language is used to represent agency. Linguists typically distinguish grammatical agency from sociological agency (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2008). Whereas grammatical agency refers to agency as coded in the grammar of a clause (e.g. passive agent deletion), sociological agency refers to the agency of individuals as encoded in the semantics of a clause. ‘One of the first CDA practitioners to discuss the role of grammatical agency was Fairclough (1989:121) who describes how passive agent deletion may obscure agency. The grammatical notion of agency is here understood as tantamount to causality i.e. that something (e.g. a social actor) initiated an action. Indeed Fairclough (1989:125, 253) often co-ordinates *agency* with *causality* as if they were equivalent terms. Fairclough (1989) goes on to discuss a number of linguistic strategies that can be used by text producers to obscure agency. For instance, he found that the decision to nominalise an action (rather than represent it

using a verb) may be used to obscure who caused the action, as nouns do not take a subject or object (1989:50). Agentless passives, where the agent is likewise removed from the clause, may likewise be used to obscure agency (ibid. 125). Here, Fairclough may have been inspired by Orwell's ([1946] 2006) observation that the use of passive constructions instead of active ones may inhibit 'clear thinking'. More recently, Dreyfus (2017) developed a cline of responsibility which positioned various clause constructions in order of how much personal responsibility they suggested. She argued that, whereas clauses in the active voice represent actors as fully responsible, passive clauses represent actors as less responsible, especially if the agent is deleted and not mentioned in a prepositional phrase. She suggested that clauses that use the middle voice, that are neither active nor passive and are not coded for agency (e.g. *the pot broke*), are suggestive of the least responsibility. However, while Dreyfus (2017) refers to her analysis as one examining links between grammatical agency and responsibility, her analysis in practice is largely one examining links between grammatical agency and sociological agency. As we shall see, responsibility, according to several accounts from scholars in philosophy and psychology, involves more criteria than just agency.

Whereas grammatical agency is expressed via grammatical choices, sociological agency is expressed via lexical choices. Sociological agency can be illustrated via van Leeuwen's (2008) categories of 'activation' and 'passivation' in his theory of Social Actor Representation. As van Leeuwen (2008:33) writes, activation occurs when social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, passivation when they are represented as 'undergoing' the activity, or as being 'at the receiving end of it.' Thus the term 'street vendor' activates a social actor while 'customer' passivates them. van

Leeuwen (2008:23) is careful to point out that these categories are not the same as the active and passive voice, which refer to grammatical categories. Thus, *street vendor* would still be activated even if it was in an oblique in a passive construction. Activation and passivation are semantic categories rather than grammatical ones.

CDA scholars critically examining language use in a healthcare context have often looked at the association between language choices and agency. In particular, scholars have identified a tendency for people with mental health problems to represent their own sense of agency (in the sense that they are able to make their own choices) in unique ways. Dyson and Gorvin (2017), in their study of how people with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) construct their identities on Twitter, found that users frequently described their disorder as an agentive entity that had its own desires, and was able to ‘take over’ their body and control it. Users oscillated between attributing agency to themselves when they acted in a way they perceived as moral and representing themselves as being controlled by their BPD when they acted in a way they perceived as immoral (2017:782). Likewise, Hunt and Harvey (2015:147) found that people with anorexia writing about their experiences online would sometimes represent their eating disorder as grammatically agentive and positioned as the actor or sayer of material or verbal processes (p. 147). This, the authors observed, framed anorexia as having agency over the sufferer. Elsewhere, Harvey (2012) examined representations of depression in a corpus of emails sent to the website Teenage Health Freak, where young people can receive help and advice from doctors about their mental health. The two most frequent constructions in which the words *depressed* and *depression* occurred were *I am depressed* and *I have depression*, respectively. Whereas *I am depressed*

occurred in contexts where users framed their illness as a temporary condition that was the result of difficult circumstances, the construction *I have depression* occurred in contexts where users framed their illness as part of their identity.

Some of these strategies are also used by people with schizophrenia. Tucker (2009), who conducted interviews with 39 participants who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, found that, during the interviews, participants represented their sense of agency in different ways. For instance, one interviewee represented themselves as being knowledgeable about their symptoms in order to represent themselves as having agency over their diagnosis. Elsewhere, the same interviewee used euphemistic phrases such as *sometimes when I'm off on one* to express their reduced sense of agency during psychotic episodes.

Other studies have examined the role metaphor plays in construing agency in the context of healthcare. Potts and Semino (2017) conducted a corpus-assisted comparison of the frequency and variety of violence metaphors used in healthcare professionals' writing online in the UK and the US. They were particularly interested in how different violence metaphors could represent patients and caregivers either as 'violent agents' or 'objects of violence'. One pattern they found was that a patient's illness was sometimes metaphorically framed as a violent aggressor that was attacking the patient (p. 79). Similarly, Brookes *et al.* (2018) found that articles in the British press that reported on dementia sometimes metaphorically framed the illness as a metaphorical 'killer'. The authors argue that the metaphor is problematic, as it suggests that dementia necessarily

leads to an inevitable death and that someone with dementia would not be able to live a happy life with the disease.

Elsewhere, several scholars have touched on how responsibility is represented in the context of crime in the media. In her study of media representations of crime, Jewkes (2015) proposes a couple of news values that may influence how the media frame violent events in terms of agency and responsibility. For instance, she proposes the news value of 'simplification' (ibid. 52), which refers to the media's tendency to report on stories that can be simplified so that their audience are likely to interpret the story in a unanimous way. In the context of crime, this usually means that the media paints complex moral issues with a very broad brush that are biased towards a particular perspective or ideology. As Jewkes (2015:52) puts it, 'simplification of news can boil down to partiality'. A news value that intersects with 'simplification' is 'individualism' (ibid. 54), which refers to the tendency to report on stories where criminals can be represented as autonomous individuals who acted of their own accord (rather than by other forces e.g. socio-political ones) and are fully responsible for their actions. As Jewkes (2015:54-5) puts it, 'popularly conceived as a 'breed apart', many offenders are judged within a moral framework which constructs them as morally deficient malcontents who must be dealt with punitively and taught the lesson of individual responsibility'. Instead, broader social structures, such as 'institutions, corporations and governments may be literally getting away with murder.' (ibid.) In other words, the press are more likely to choose to report on stories and use language in a way that attributes responsibility to individuals involved in crime rather than broader socio-political forces.

The hypocrisy of the tabloid press in representing people with mental health problems as both ‘mad and bad’, that is as both mentally ill and morally culpable, has already been observed by a number of scholars in media studies (McCarthy and Rapley, 2001). Cross (2014) views this as a problem that is particularly characteristic of the tabloid press. He goes on to conclude that the ‘British tabloids have too long been left to distort legal, moral and humanitarian responses to mentally disordered offenders, and if we were to diagnose the consequences of this condition we should declare it insane.’ (p. 216). The conflation of mental illness with moral deviance reflects historical discourses around mental illness. Foucault ([1972] 2006) in his exploration of the discursive history of ‘madness’ in Europe, observed that, from the mid-17th century onwards, before which the ‘mad’ were treated with relative benignity, they were expelled from society and declared to be tantamount to moral deviants. This was followed by a modern period where the mad received care but only if they recognised themselves as moral deviants who needed to be reformed.

6.3. Definitions of moral responsibility and the Path Model


Before it is possible to examine how moral responsibility is represented through language, it is first necessary to define what moral responsibility is. Different scholars throughout history have defined responsibility in different ways. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle ([circa. 330 B. C.] 1980:48-52) discusses moral responsibility in terms of blame or praise that may be attributed to moral agents. For Aristotle, individuals do not qualify as moral agents if they do not perform their action voluntarily. Two

conditions of voluntary action, according to Aristotle, are that ‘the moving principle is in the agent himself’ (i.e. they exhibit agency) and that the agent is aware of what they were doing at the time they performed the action (p. 52). Recent work in philosophy has viewed responsibility as a socio-cognitive phenomenon. Whereas previous philosophers viewed moral praise or blame as objectively valid under certain conditions, Strawson (1962) redefined praise and blame as merely ways of expressing positive or negative evaluations of behaviours against the backdrop of social norms.

In this vein, Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) propose a theory of blame which maps out the ‘conceptual structure’, which takes the form as a set of hierarchical criteria, that individuals typically navigate in order to make a blame judgement. The authors avoid the term ‘responsibility’ owing to its inherent ambiguity, as it may refer to obligation (being responsible for a duty), deserving of a moral judgement (naming someone responsible) or intentionality (diminished responsibility). It may also refer to moral praise (a responsible parent). Instead, they concern themselves with blame judgements, which is one of the barometers we use for determining moral responsibility (Schleifer and Altman, 1981:242). Their model is supported by the findings from a previous study (Guglielmo, 2012). For these studies, respondents read about immoral events and were asked to determine whether the agents were deserving of blame. In Guglielmo (2012), respondents could ask for any type of information they wanted, which helped establish what evidence blamers typically look for in making a blame judgement. In Guglielmo and Malle (2012), respondents were allowed to ask for additional information, formulated as questions, corresponding to the different categories. This allowed the authors to establish the order in which blamers typically

inquired for evidence relating to responsibility. Note that each of these studies was text based, which meant that blame judgements were formulated from written accounts of immoral events and not conducted using visual stimuli, where the respondent witnesses a morally transgressive act first-hand. This is important because readers of the press are unlikely to have witnessed violent crimes committed by people with first-hand, but will formulate their blame judgements based on a secondary representation offered by the press. The authors then presented their findings in a flow chart in the form of a so-called 'Path Model' of responsibility (see Figure 6.1). This depicts the step-by-step process that individuals are likely to take in their minds when determining the level of blame that a potentially responsible individual deserves. The authors argue that blame judgements need not be a conscious affair. To clarify, Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) are not re-establishing a set of essentialist criteria on which blame judgements should be based, but are recording the way that people *do* make blame judgements, based on empirical evidence.

Figure 6.1 Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014) Path Model for ascribing moral judgement




As Figure 6.1 shows, the first step of the model involves the potential blamer identifying an immoral act against a backdrop of social norms. Given that we may presume that most of the British public view murder as an immoral act, words referring to the act of killing in the press are very likely to elicit a blame judgement from readers. According to the Path Model, once an immoral act has been detected, the reader is

likely to try to determine whether an agent caused the event. This can be made more or less readily retrievable. After all, the way in which the action is represented linguistically may obscure agency, or be suggestive of reduced causality (e.g. via passive agent deletion or nominalisation). How clause structure influences agent detection is not discussed by the authors. While the authors suggest that most blamers will automatically assume an agent upon mention of an immoral behaviour, they do argue that ‘if the event is underspecified, agency will be probed before reasons etc.’ (p. 152).

According to the Path Model, blame judgements are typically based on more than just agency. This suggests that Dreyfus (2017) and other CDA practitioners who link grammatical or sociological agency with responsibility are likely overinterpreting the response of readers. Instead, Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) suggest that once blamers have established agency, they typically look for evidence of intentionality before making a blame judgement. When discussing the category of intentionality, the authors refer to a study conducted by Malle and Knobe (1997). Malle and Knobe (1997) conducted a psychological experiment in order to determine the criteria people base their judgements on when determining whether actions were performed intentionally or not. To do this, they invited university students to complete questionnaires where they were asked to rank descriptions of behaviours according to their perceived intentionality. Some respondents were asked to also provide a definition of what made an action intentional. Their findings suggested a number of necessary conditions of intentionality which they lay out in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 A model of the folk concept of intentionality, taken from Malle and Knobe



According to the university respondents, two necessary conditions of intention are ‘belief’, which they define as ‘beliefs or thoughts about the consequences of the act or the act itself before it takes place’ and ‘desire’, ‘the desire for an outcome or the outcome itself as a goal, purpose, or aim’ (1997: 106). The authors also distinguished judgements of intention and judgements of intentionality. Broadly, speaking, intention refers to the will of the agent and intentionality refers to the nature of the act. There are three necessary conditions of ‘intentionality’: ‘intention’, ‘skill’, and ‘awareness’. The criterion of ‘intention’ refers to the intention to perform the act, intending, meaning, deciding, choosing, or planning to perform the act’ and the criteria of ‘skill’ refers to ‘awareness of the act while the person is performing it.’ (p. 105-106). The authors demonstrate the distinction between intention and intentionality via an example of a

darts match. If an amateur darts player lands their dart in the treble twenty bed (the highest score one can make with a single dart in a traditional darts match), we may be tempted to say they intended to hit treble 20 (i.e. they acted with intention) but, because they hit treble 20 because of luck and not skill, they did not hit it intentionally.

Intentionality has traditionally been viewed as the central criterion on which blame judgements need be based. Indeed, the 20th century Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie (1977) proposed ‘the straight rule of responsibility’, which posits that ‘an agent is responsible for all and only his intentional actions.’ (ibid. 208). The centrality of intentionality to the issue of personal responsibility has been corroborated by psychologists, who have found that individuals are more likely to blame others if they perceive the action as intentional (Darley and Shultz, 1990; Gray and Wegner, 2008, Lagnado and Channon, 2008).

Returning our attention to Figure 6.1, once the blamer begins to consider the ‘reasons’ why the agent carried out the action, they begin to determine degrees of blame that the agent deserves, depending on the validity of those reasons. Which reasons are valid and which are not are largely determined by cultural norms (Alexander, 2009). People making blame judgements have been shown to identify reasons for immoral acts very quickly (Malle and Holbrook, 2012) and even experience a sensation tantamount to pain if the reasons cannot be determined (Malle, 2004). The criteria of ‘obligation’ and ‘capacity’ are concerned with what could or ought to have occurred. Obligation refers to the extent to which the agent was obliged to prevent the immoral act from occurring. In

this context, for instance, it may refer to the schizophrenic person's obligation to take prescribed drugs and not consume substances that may interfere with those drugs, especially if they have a history of violent crime during periods when they experience serious symptoms. The authors also allude to what they call 'vicarious blame' (2014:168), where individuals responsible for the behaviour of the agent are indirectly framed as being an agent in the crime. They provide the example of a dog that bites someone. In this case, the owner of the dog is typically blamed for allowing the dog to bite the person, as they were obliged to protect other citizens from harm potentially posed by the dog. (p. 168-9). Capacity refers to the ability to the cognitive capacity to anticipate the event happening and the physical capacity to stop it. Thus, capacity relates, in this context, to the schizophrenic individual's ability to anticipate their own symptoms and control them. Malle and Knobe's (1997:117-118) also make reference to the notion of psychological and physical coercion in their summary of Heider's (1958) work. They suggest that these factors may influence judgements of intentionality. Psychological coercion refers to situations where third parties physically force someone to do something, for instance, by pushing someone into someone else. Behaviours resulting from such coercion are unlikely to be perceived as intentional. Psychological coercion refers to situations involving persuasion or threats. Behaviours resulting from psychological coercion are likely to be perceived as intentional but are likely to absolve the agent of responsibility to some extent.

The questions remains as to what would happen in cases where only a paucity of evidence relating to the blame criteria is available to the blamer. This is a realistic possibility. Someone reading a press article for gist, for instance, may only choose to

read a headline and not the rest of the article, which may be very limited in terms of blame criteria. Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014:153) suggest that certain events such as school shootings will predispose blamers to automatically assume agency and intentionality. Indeed, research in psychology suggests that we have an ‘intentionality bias’, which refers to our tendency to over-attribute intention to stimuli that are ambiguous in terms of intentionality (Rosset, 2008; Slavney and Moore, 2018; Moore and Pope, 2014). People taking part in Rosset’s (2008) study were presented with sentences that were ambiguous in terms of intentionality (e.g. *he set the house on fire*) and asked to determine whether the actions were intentional or not. Actions were more likely to be judged intentional when the respondent had to act quickly. This would suggest that gist readers of the press are more likely to attribute intentionality to actions that are ambiguous. This is particularly the case with negative actions, which Knobe (2003) has shown are more likely to be perceived as intentional. In addition, Lakoff (1987:54-5) has provided numerous other biases that inform our prototypical interpretations of actions represented in language.

1. There is a single definite agent and a single definite patient
2. The agent wills his action
3. The agent is in control of his action
4. The agent bears primary responsibility for both his action and the change

These biases indicate that, without, evidence to the contrary, readers are likely to interpret people who perform actions as intentional and responsible. The bias listed in

(1) may be problematic in this context as violent crimes committed by schizophrenic people with diminished responsibility may implicate various other social actors, such as governmental or medical authorities caring for the patient. The biases listed in (2) and (3) are problematic as schizophrenic people who kill and have received a verdict of diminished responsibility may have felt as if they were being controlled by someone else (see Section 4.3). The bias in (4) is problematic as people who commit crimes while experiencing symptoms of a medical diagnosis may be convicted on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

The notion that we are biased towards interpreting actions as intentional is convincing, especially in the context of violent crime. To demonstrate, if we picture the clause *John hit Jacob*, we are likely to imagine an intentional physical attack between two people, rather than an instance where John accidentally caught Jacob with his elbow while walking past him. We are also unlikely to imagine a situation where John was coerced by someone else into hitting Jacob, or where certain conditions outside of his control led him to hit Jacob, such as if someone ran into John who caused him to hit Jacob. This is likely because the majority of times we encounter the lexicogrammatical structure [human] *hit* [human], it is in contexts where the action has been intentional, and we are hence primed to assume that the action is intentional. Thus, when we read the headline *Schizophrenic who killed 12 in cinema is allowed to live* (*The Times*, 8 August 2015), we are likely to attribute intentionality and responsibility to the agent, especially given widespread misunderstandings of the disorder. On the contrary, given language patterns found in the data so far, routine readers of the press are already likely to view schizophrenic people as intentional or at least dangerous. For instance, we have seen

that people with schizophrenia have been characterised as intentionally malign (*evil*) and grammatically equated with moral deviants (e.g. *psychopaths*) (see Section 4.5).

The way to challenge these biases is to re-contextualise references to violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia with linguistic evidence appealing to the responsibility criteria listed in Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014) Path Model. This has been suggested by Rosset's (2008) study. Rosset (2008) found that when respondents were reminded that actions could be accidental before deciding whether or not an action was intentional, they were more likely to view the actions as accidental. This would suggest that readers making a blame judgement are particularly sensitive to evidence that undermines their tendency to perceive violent crimes as intentional.

6.4. Responsibility and representation

Whether or not readers perceive people with schizophrenia as morally responsible for violent crime depends on representations of the acts reported by the press. Given the press' tendency to select and report on stories according to the news value of 'simplification' (Jewkes, 2015), it is likely that the press re-contextualise crimes in a way that steers their readership to a unanimous moral judgement. We might say that the representation of people with schizophrenia as more or less morally responsible for violent crime is largely discursively constructed via the media. The process by which moral responsibility is discursively constructed is summed in Solin and Ostman's (2012:289) claim that

‘[r]esponsible selves, identities and relations are not perceived as predetermined and stable, but as construed and negotiated in discourse, in interactions and texts; responsibility can be taken on, denied, assigned to other participants and evaded.’ (Solin and Ostman, 2012:289).

Viewing responsibility as a discursively constructed phenomenon can be justified in the following way. Blame judgements are inherently based on representations of events, which are often textually mediated. The intentional fallacy dictates we can never know other people’s intentions and desires (Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1946). For these reasons, the empiricist philosopher David Hume observed that praise and blame attributed to the actions of others is not informed by the psychological state of the actor (i.e. questions of intentionality and capacity) but a certain representation of those circumstances. These may take the form of the outward appearance of the agent, which may offer clues as to what they thought or, in our case, a certain textual representation of the events that occurred. Hume contrasts praise and blame judgements with pride and humility, which are applied to oneself and whose thoughts we may perceive directly:

‘As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious.’ (T. 2.3.3.1. SBN 214).

Thus, the way the press represent schizophrenic people who commit crime plays a large role in shaping the extent to which the public attribute blame to them, especially given that readers are highly unlikely to be witnesses when the event occurred.

6.5. Method

Collocation analysis lends itself to the study of responsibility as it can explore patterns in the ways specific words are contextualised using other words. As we have seen, it is necessary to re-contextualise acts appropriately (when reporting stories in which blame is problematised) in order to challenge our cognitive biases relating to intentionality and responsibility. Given that the first phase of Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014) Path Model is *event detection*, it made sense to begin by identifying occurrences of words referring to violent acts. It would not be feasible to examine every word referring to violent crime in the corpus. There are potentially hundreds of words that refer to violent crime, many of which occur so infrequently as to prevent collocation analysis to be carried out on them. Instead, I chose to examine a manageable sample of words whose occurrences are likely to be representative of the way the press reports on crimes committed by schizophrenic people. The 10 most frequent words have a very high raw frequency. They comprise 30,708 unique references to violent crime occurring in 15,803 articles (52.02% of the total articles in the corpus). To put this figure into perspective, there are more references to just these 10 violence word forms in the corpus than there are references to *schizophrenia* (13,213 instances) and *schizophrenic* (8,382 instances) put together. To put it another way, there are more references to these 10 words than there are explicit references to schizophrenia. Given the high frequency of

these violence words, it is likely they are representative of the way the British press reports on people with schizophrenia who commit violent crimes. These 10 words are listed in Figure 6.1.

Table 6.1 The top 10 most frequent word forms relating to violence

Word form	Word class	Frequency
<i>murder</i>	noun	5,187
<i>killed</i>	verb	4,648
<i>attack</i>	noun	4,017
<i>kill</i>	verb	3,092
<i>shot</i>	verb	2,609
<i>stabbed</i>	verb	2,563
<i>dangerous</i>	adjective	2,411
<i>violent</i>	adjective	2,222
<i>violence</i>	noun	2,044
<i>killing</i>	verb	1,915

I then used Sketch Engine's collocations tool to generate the top 100 collocates of each of these word forms and identified those that appealed to the criteria listed in Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) and Malle and Knobe (1997). This allowed me to identify which types of evidence the press typically use to re-contextualise violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia, and whether or not, on the whole, they challenge or reinforce our cognitive biases. Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) report that blamers will often pick up on subtle clues in cases where moral responsibility is ambiguous, so I was particularly attentive to cases where responsibility was implied rather than stated outright. Indeed, Marchi (2010) found that moral evaluations in the press were often suggested implicitly. While the method of analysis was devised independently, it bears resemblance to other studies. For instance, Brookes and Baker

(2017), examining positive and negative NHS patient feedback, began by identifying the ten most frequent evaluation markers in the corpus. They then proceeded to examine collocates of these words in order to work out the source of the complaint.

As with previous chapters, the logDice collocation statistic was used and the minimum collocation frequency set to the default of four. I considered extending the collocation span in order to capture a more varied set of collocates. However, after experimenting with spans between 5 and 10, it became evident that different spans tended to identify very similar collocates. For this reason, I selected a collocation span of +/- 5 to keep the span consistent across the analysis chapters.

Having outlined by theoretical perspective and methodological approach for examining the linguistic representation of moral responsibility, the next chapter applies these methods and theories to my corpus in order to uncover ways in which the British press represent people with schizophrenia as more or less responsible for their crimes.

7. Collocates of ‘violence’ words appealing to responsibility criteria

7.1. Introduction

In the previous section, I set out the theoretical and methodological background to the present chapter, which now examines the extent to which schizophrenic people are represented in the press as being morally responsible for violent crimes. Hence, this chapter also addresses the third research question listed in Section 1.5.

How do the British press use language to re-contextualise violence committed by people with schizophrenia?

This chapter begins by examining the distribution of violence words across the different newspapers in the corpus (Section 7.2). I then proceed in Section 7.3 to examine how each of the collocates are used in context and how they are likely to represent schizophrenic people in terms of moral responsibility. In section 7.4, I describe the broader picture of schizophrenic people that these collocates suggest and attempt to explain these patterns with reference to the institutional goals of the press.

7.2. Distribution of violence words in the corpus

Figure 7.1 Raw frequencies of the top 100 killing word forms in each newspaper





Figure 7.1 shows the raw frequency of the 10 violence words²⁹ listed in Table 6.1 in each newspaper in the corpus. Overall, they occur marginally more frequently in the tabloids (16,651 instances) than the broadsheets (14,644), although their frequency in the tabloids is skewed by *The Mail*, which comprises 59.01% of all occurrences of these words in the tabloids. In comparison, the violence verbs occur infrequently in the rest of the tabloids. Their frequency is spread relatively consistently across the broadsheets (with a mean frequency of 3,661) and the frequency in each broadsheet paper is higher than any tabloid paper besides *The Mail*. However, when the frequencies are

²⁹ The 10 violence words were as follows: murder, killed, attack, kill, shot, stabbed, dangerous, violent, violence, killing.

standardised across the newspapers according to the size of each subcorpus (Figure 4), a different picture arises where the word forms are much more frequent in the tabloids than the broadsheets. This supports the findings of Chapter 5 that the tabloids were more likely to report on schizophrenia in the context of violence than the broadsheets (although due to their larger size, the broadsheets report about schizophrenic people in the context of violence more frequently overall). A comparison of Figures 7.1 and 7.2 shows that while newspapers like *The Star* and *The Sun* refer to violence verbs in the context of schizophrenia very infrequently in raw terms relative to the other newspapers, when their frequencies are standardised they refer to violent crime at a higher rate than any other newspaper.

Figure 7.2 Standardised frequencies for each violence word form in each newspaper



Below is the table of collocates of the ten violent verbs grouped according to the responsibility criteria outlined by Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014) Path Model and Malle and Knobe's (1997) Folk Model of Intentionality (see Table 7.1). It also contains the additional category of 'generic' for words that refer to mental illness generally without necessarily appealing to specific criteria. The categories are arranged in the order in which they occur in the Path Model. Words in bold collocate with more than one violence word form, with the number of verb forms that they collocate with in brackets beside it. As these words collocate with more than one violence word form, it could be argued that they are more typical of the UK press' reporting on violence enacted by people with schizophrenia rather than being linked to a specific word form. Note that the hierarchical nature of Malle and Knobe's (1997) Folk Model of Intentionality (i.e. that belief and desire are necessary conditions of intention; see Figure 6.2) is not captured in the table. This is because Malle and Knobe's (1997) nuanced model would be difficult to represent clearly in tabular form.

Table 7.1 Collocates of the ten most frequent violence verb forms

Criterion		Collocates
Generic		<i>acquitted, diminished, grounds, reason</i>
Causality		by (2)
Intentionality	belief	believed (3)
	desire	fantasies (2), <i>harboured, obsessed, want, wanted</i>
	intention	<i>chose, decided, evil, first-degree, going, hatred, intended, intending, intent, manslaughter, motiveless, planned (2), planning, plot, plotting, random (2), second-degree, thoughts, threatened, threatening, threats, unprovoked (2), victim (5), victims (4)</i>
	awareness	believed (3), <i>demons, paranoid (3), psychotic, supernatural, thought</i>
Reasons		after (6), <i>because, before (7), then (3), when (2), while (2)</i>
Obligation		<i>allowed, despite (2), feared, free, freed, might, patient (3), patients (2), released, warned, went, would</i>
Capacity		<i>commanding, compelled, crazed, disturbed (2), drove, felt, god, head (3), heard, ill (3), illness (2), mental (2), mentally (5), mission, ordered, paranoid, saying, telling, told (2), urging, voices, wanted, schizophrenic (8), schizophrenics (2)</i>

7.3. Analysis

7.3.1. General words relating to intentionality

Five collocates, *acquitted, reason, diminished* and *grounds* typically occur in contexts where the press explicitly contextualises violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia in terms of responsibility. The words *acquitted* (n = 50, ID = 8.25),

reason (n = 50, ID = 7.74), *diminished* (n = 72, ID = 7.43) and *grounds* (n = 53, ID = 8.07) all collocate (quite strongly) with *murder* (noun) and typically represent people with schizophrenia as having had their sentence reduced on the grounds that they exhibited diminished mental functioning when they carried out their crimes. The words *grounds* and *responsibility* tend to co-occur in the cluster *grounds of diminished responsibility* (e.g. see Excerpt 166) and *reason* in the phrase *by reason of insanity*.

(166) Ali Alsenaidi, a student from Oman, who since the attack has been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, admitted manslaughter on the grounds of diminished **responsibility**. (*The Express*, 7 April 2005).

However, the majority of collocates contextualise violence in terms of responsibility less directly. That is, they implicitly suggest that the agent was more or less responsible for their crimes by appealing either to the criteria in Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014) Path Model (see Table 6.1) or the criteria in Malle and Knobe's 1997 Folk Model of Intentionality (see Table 6.2).

7.3.2. Agent causality

Before it is possible to make a blame judgement, readers must first identify an agent. Some of the words referring to violence can obscure agency. For instance, the words that refer to violence via nouns (e.g. *attack*, *violence*), rather than verbs, do not take subject or object arguments and therefore can be used in a way that obscures grammatical agency. For instance, in the headline in Excerpt 167, the identity of the attacker is backgrounded, and only identified later in the article.

**(167) HARRISONS HIT OUT AT HEALTH CARE REFORMS AFTER
KNIFE ATTACK** (*The Express*, 18 December 2000).

In the same way, the adjective *violent* collocates with nouns referring to violence (e.g. *crime*, *behaviour*, *outbursts*) and thus is used in ways that obscure agency (see Excerpt 168).

(168) Questions were raised as to why Deyanov, originally from a wealthy family in Ruse, northern Bulgaria, had been allowed free following a spate of violent outbursts in the months preceding the **attack**. (telegraph.co.uk, 22 February 2013).

In contrast, the adjective *dangerous* is typically used to refer to people who are expected to be violent in the future. Excerpt 169 refers to a procedure whereby people with

schizophrenia who do not take a specific type of medication are to be compulsorily detained and treated.

(169) New outreach teams will track down the 15,000 schizophrenics and other potentially **dangerous** patients who fail to take vital mood control doses. (*Sunday Express*, 18 November 2001).

The preposition *by* is a collocate of the past participle verbs *killed* (n = 651, ID = 8.10) and *shot* (n = 406, ID = 7.46), and is a typical way in which the subject is transposed into an oblique in the passive voice. Dreyfus (2017:378) has argued that passive constructions are suggestive of less responsibility than active clauses because ‘[t]he Doer is not foregrounded at the front of the clause in Theme position and thereby is not the point of departure for the message.’ In other words, by positioning the doer as an oblique, rather at the beginning of the clause, less emphasis is placed on the agent’s role in the action. For instance, in Excerpt 170, the schizophrenic person is not the theme and the point of the departure in the clause. The emphasis in the clause is instead placed on the victim and slightly lifted from the semantic agent. This may be contrasted with Excerpt 171, where emphasis is placed on the person with schizophrenia as the doer of the action. Similarly, O’Halloran (2003:21) suggests that passive constructions take more concentration to process and thus, in such cases, causality may be overlooked by the gist reader.

(170) In October 1997, WPC Nina Mackay was stabbed and killed **by** a paranoid schizophrenic in London while part of a team moving in to arrest him for a bail offence. (*MailOnline*, 14 November 2014).

(171) Nine years ago, Clunis, a schizophrenic, stabbed and **killed** Jonathan Zito, a musician, at Finsbury Park Underground station in north London. (*The Sunday Times*, 11 November 2001)

However, just because *by* emerges as a shared collocate, we cannot assume that passive constructions are typical of the reporting of violence perpetrated by people with schizophrenia, as the active voice does not have a marked phraseology in the way the passive voice does. Out of a sample of 100 lines featuring any of the 10 violence words, only 20 are in the passive voice. Of those in the passive voice, 12 are agentless passives (see Excerpt 172). In agentless passives, the agent of the process is 'backgrounded', that is, absent from the clause in which the action is reported but mentioned elsewhere in the text or inferable from the context (van Leeuwen, 2008:29).

(172) Staff at the mental health hospital where Sharon Wall was **killed** have vowed to step up security after admitting they have 'no idea' how her murderer smuggled a Sainsbury's kitchen knife into the facility. (*MailOnline*, 9 January 2015).

In example 172, the agent is not directly related to the verb *killed* although is identified as *her murderer* later in the sentence. Indeed, the article's headline and first sentence

contain active sentences where the agent is clearly described as stabbing a person. Such cases suggest that not all passive cases should be straightforwardly read as having the effect of reducing a sense of responsibility.

In contrast, more than double those in the passive voice are in the active voice (46/100). In the active voice, the actor is the point of departure for the message. For this reason, the agent is the emphasis in the clause, and agency is not grammatically mitigated.

(173) The report into the case of Winston Williams, a schizophrenic who **stabbed** a young woman, revealed his carers had failed to pick up on the fact he was abusing crack cocaine. (*Independent on Sunday*, 14 July 2002).

In summary, violence enacted people by people with schizophrenia is most commonly represented using the active voice which does not mitigate grammatical agency. Even in cases where the passive is used, the semantic agent is often easily retrievable from elsewhere in the article.

7.3.3. Intentionality

Once the violent act has been linked with an agent, readers are likely to try and determine whether they acted intentionally before they can make a blame judgement. Malle and Knobe's (1997) study suggests that the individuals first determine whether the actor had the intention to act (i.e. evidence pertaining to the criteria of belief, desire and intention) before they can determine whether the action was intentional (i.e.

awareness, skill) (see Section 6.3). In Malle and Knobe's (1997) Folk Model of Intentionality, belief and desire are necessary conditions for intention, and intention, awareness and skill are necessary conditions for intentionality. In total, 24 of the 92 collocates contextualise violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia in terms of intentionality.

7.3.3.1. *Belief*

In determining intention, the reader must thus determine whether the agent believed that their actions led to the consequences it did. In this context, the actor must possess the knowledge that their behaviour causes harm. While the intentionality bias means that readers are likely to assume intentionality, evidence to the contrary is likely to problematise the intentionality of the action in the judgement of a reader.

Collocates appealing to *belief* are infrequent. There is only one instance in which violent crime is contextualised in terms of *belief* (see Excerpt 174). In this Excerpt, the belligerent, Jaggs, is quoted as believing that killing someone was the same as having sex with them, the implication being that killing her would be tantamount to raping her. However, while this represents Jaggs as not understanding that his action would lead to her death, it still represents Jaggs as knowing that he was committing a violent crime. Thus, it represents Jaggs as having the intention to carry out a crime, but not the intention to carry out murder.

(174) Jaggs stabbed her in the arm with a knife from the dishwasher. Mr Jafferjee said:

"He said he believed stabbing or **killing** her would be the same as having sex with her." (*The Mirror*, 13 July 2007).

That said, there are other borderline cases. Four additional instances of *believed* occur in contexts where the schizophrenic person is represented as believing that killing someone would bring about a better outcome than if they didn't (see Excerpts 175 and 176). In Excerpt 175, the violent act is represented as a moral necessity by the deontic modal verb *had*, which is a collocate of *kill* ($n = 259$, $ID = 7.04$). In Excerpt 176, the attacker's conviction in the outcome is emphasised via the strong epistemic modal auxiliary *would*. These relate to belief because the agent believed that the act of killing would bring about a positive outcome, which was later found not to be the case.

(175) Earlier, the jury had been told that Hall **believed** he had to kill his own family and commit suicide to save 15 other families from death. (*The Guardian*, 12 April 2001).

(176) He said Bellante **believed** 'that by killing the victim and eating his heart he would end evil'. (*MailOnline*, 31 July 2015).

In these examples, the schizophrenic person is represented as having intentionally carried out a violent crime, although having mistakenly viewed their crime as a necessary evil. The inability to accurately foresee the consequences of one's own

actions also relate to Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe’s (2014) category of psychological capacity. According to their Path Model, individuals are likely to attribute less blame to agents that did not have the capacity to accurately foresee the true consequences of their actions.

7.3.3.2. *Desire*

Another criterion used to determine whether individuals acted with intention is desire.

There are seven collocates that typically refer to desire (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Collocates appealing to desire

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>fantasies</i>	<i>kill</i>	7	6.74
<i>harboured</i>	<i>kill</i>	7	6.86
<i>obsessed</i>	<i>violent</i>	8	6.51
<i>want</i>	<i>kill</i>	62	7.00
<i>wanted</i>	<i>kill</i>	117	8.93
<i>obsessed</i>	<i>violent</i>	8	6.51
<i>hatred</i>	<i>violence</i>	17	7.91

The collocates *want* and *wanted* are finite verbs and collocate with *kill* which occurs as a non-finite *to*-infinitive. In a random sample, just over half the instances of *want* (32/62) and the majority of instances of *wanted* (95/117) refer to people with schizophrenia wanting to kill other people (other contexts include them wanting to kill themselves or experiencing paranoid delusions that other people want to kill them). Only in two instances of *want* as a collocate (and none of *wanted*) is it preceded by a negative. In particular, there is a tendency to orient to desire in indirect speech via a

relative clause. In Excerpt 177, the schizophrenic person's desire to kill is represented in confession made to his psychiatrist.

(177) During his initial medical assessment, Theophilou told a psychiatrist that he **wanted** to kill children in the street and that he would have killed the neighbours if they had been around. (*The Mail*, 23 November 2005).

The press must be cautious in contextualising violent crime committed by schizophrenic people in terms of desire, as these desires may have been a product of their altered mental state during a psychotic episode. Mackie (1977) argues that the dislocation of mental state between the event and the time of the blame judgement are enough to reduce the responsibility of the actor. He argues that 'the identity of persons through time (like that of other things) rests only upon various continuities which are themselves matters of degree. It goes along with the view that the ownership even of fully intentional actions fades out gradually even in ordinary circumstances; mental disturbances merely accelerate this fading.' (1977:214).

The use of adverbials around *want* or *wanted* may affect the degree of desire we infer. For instance, in Excerpt 178, the use of subjunct *just* implies that the killer thought that what they were doing was reasonable, and helps emphasise that Gonzalez's desires were different from social norms. In Excerpt 179, the disjunct marker *I guess* qualifies the admission of intention in terms of weak epistemic modality, and suggests that the belligerent was unsure of what they wanted. This in turn suggests that his desire to kill

was impulsive or that he wasn't necessarily aware of what he was doing when he committed the crime. This again may lead readers to view the individual as less responsible for their actions.

(178) Gonzalez described it almost with pride: 'I jumped up and stuck it all the way in.

It was such a long knife. I just **wanted** to kill him quickly, so I stuck it in his throat. The woman she was basically screaming for help. I went through her throat and into her heart.' (*The Mail*, 17 March 2006).

(179) He told psychiatrists that when he saw them in the street he deliberately sped

across at them. "It all happened in a blur - it was a fast and furious thing that happened," he said. "I just ploughed straight into them. I guess I **wanted** to kill her and her children. I had become really revengeful at that point. I knew I was doing wrong." (*guardian.com*, 5 June 2013).

The past participle form *wanted* has slightly different implications to *want*, as it allows for the interpretation that the agent no longer desires what they once did. If that desire was formulated under false pretences because of psychotic symptoms, then a reader may come to conclusion that the agent is not as responsible for what they did. This is especially the case in contexts where *wanted* is preceded by the past perfect marker *had*, which suggests that schizophrenic person only desired to kill for a finite amount of time which has since ended. In other words, it implies that the feeling of 'wanting to kill'

was not an enduring mental state but only one that occurred presumably for the duration of the psychotic episode during which the crime was committed.

The words *want* and *wanted* occur as collocates of the ten most frequent violence words in the corpus 117 times in the tabloids and 82 times in the broadsheets. Given that the broadsheet corpus is roughly 52% larger than the broadsheet corpus, this suggests that the tabloids appeal to intention when contextualising violence committed by people with schizophrenia much more frequently than the broadsheets do.

The collocates *harboured* and *fantasies* are also used to contextualise violence enacted by people with schizophrenia in terms of desire. They almost always occur together, and represent the schizophrenic person as having desired to kill before the event took place (see Excerpt 180). Of the six instances where the two collocates occur together, four are from the broadsheet press.

(180) Stone, a heroin addict, armed robber and police informant, had a long history of mental illness and **harboured** fantasies about killing. (*The Observer*, 24 September 2006).

The verb *harboured* represents the individual as having secretly entertained the desire to kill people and reproduces the representation of schizophrenic people as ‘dormant volcanoes’ (O’Brien, 2013:85) who are able to pass as everyday subjects (see Section 4.3). Similarly, the word *obsessed* (n = 8, ID = 6.51) which is a collocate of *violent*

(adj.), is used to represent people with schizophrenia as having a secret interest in violent horror films and video games (see Excerpt 181). As with the other words in this category, it is typically ambiguous whether the desire to kill is a result of psychotic symptoms or the will of the individual.

(181) The court heard how Palmer, now 20, was a 'fit strong man' who left school at 16 and was a keen member of the Army cadets. But he had become **obsessed** with violent horror films, and particularly one about a serial killer who filmed himself stabbing his victims. (*The Mail*, 15 March 2007).

The word *hatred*, which is a collocate of *violence*, is also used in a way that seems to suggest that the schizophrenic person had an intention to kill. In 11/17 instances, it occurs in a quote attributed to Dhani Harrison, the son of the Beatle George Harrison, who was attacked by Michael Abram in 1999 (see Excerpt 182). On the one hand, he describes Abram as *full of hatred*, which suggests that he tried to kill Harrison intentionally. However, in the previous sentence, a grammatical parallelism is established between suffering from mental problems and committing the violent act, and the use of the psychological process *suffer* implies that Abram is a victim in his own right. This example shows how different types of evidence used to contextualise references to people with schizophrenia committing violent crimes may push and pull blame in various directions.

(182) A statement read on behalf of the family by their 22-year-old son Dhani, said: "It is tragic that anyone should suffer such a mental breakdown and commit such a brutal act. "We shall never forget that he was full of **hatred** and violence when he came into our home. (*The Mirror*, 16 November 2000).

7.3.3.3. *Intention(ality)*

In Malle and Knobe's (1997) Folk Model of Intentionality, the category of intention refers to 'the intention to perform the act, intending, meaning, deciding, choosing, or planning to perform the act.' (p.105-6). The criteria of belief and desire are both necessary conditions of intention and will be assumed to be true if intention is attributed to an actor. Like desire, the press should be cautious in contextualising violent crimes committed by people with schizophrenia in terms of intention. If an individual's sense of reality is distorted because of symptoms beyond their control (because of paranoia, delusions of grandeur, hallucinations etc.) it is doubtful that they 'intend' to behave in the way they do in the typical sense of the word. To demonstrate this, I shall adapt slightly a scenario invented by Aristotle (1980:38) in his *Nicomachean Ethics* where he discusses involuntary actions. If I throw all my cargo off my ship believing it to be sinking (although it wasn't) it is slightly misleading to say that I squandered my cargo intentionally, without also referring to the fact that I was unaware of the nature of my surroundings (i.e. that the ship was not in fact sinking). In the same way, it would be misleading to merely refer to people with schizophrenia as wanting to kill others, without also making reference to their altered mental state. To put it another way, references to desire tend to assume a semi-permanent mental state, and not one shaped

by specific circumstances. For these reasons, appeals to intention and intentionality should be contextualised appropriately so that the press do not publish misleading representations of people with schizophrenia who commit violent crimes.

Table 7.3 Collocates appealing to legal responsibility

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>manslaughter</i>	<i>murder</i>	196	9.97
<i>first-degree</i>	<i>murder</i>	99	9.26
<i>second-degree</i>	<i>murder</i>	33	7.69

Three collocates refer to legal terms that are associated with intentionality (Table 7.3).

The word *manslaughter* (n = 196, ID = 9.97) which collocates with *murder* (n.) typically occurs in contexts where the defendant has denied murder but admitted manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. In UK law, individuals convicted of manslaughter are perceived as less responsible than people committing murder, either because they killed without intent or because of diminished responsibility³⁰. The compound words *first-degree* (n = 99, ID = 9.3) and *second-degree* (n = 33, ID = 7.70) are also collocates of *murder* (n.) and refer, in US law, to intentional acts. However, they differ in that first-degree murder refers to murder that has been planned (i.e. premeditation to murder) whereas the second-degree murder does not. In that one criterion of intention listed by Malle and Knobe (1997:105-6) is ‘planning to perform the act’, schizophrenic people who have been convicted of second degree murder are represented as less responsible than people convicted of first-degree murder.

³⁰ <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/homicide-murder-and-manslaughter>

Table 7.4 Collocates appealing to intention

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>chose</i>	<i>kill</i>	13	6.89
<i>decided</i>	<i>kill</i>	19	6.84
<i>intended</i>	<i>kill</i>	47	8.70
<i>intending</i>	<i>kill</i>	16	7.38
<i>intent</i>	<i>killing</i>	9	7.00

Five collocates directly refer to intention (see Table 7.4). All four are verbs, where four premodify *kill* as a *to*-infinitive (see Table 7.4). More than any other collocates, these words invite the reader to perceive the agent as morally responsible for their actions, as intentionality is the criterion on which judgements of responsibility tend to hinge on (Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe, 2014; Mackie, 1977). Blame is only likely to be mitigated if other evidence is present, such as a valid reason for committing the crime, or evidence of reduced mental or physical capacity.

Excerpt 183 reports on a case where a man with schizophrenia, John Barrett, was discharged from care despite a history of violence, whereupon he killed a passer-by with a knife. He was later convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility in court. On the one hand, he is described as having *intended to kill*, although later in the article he is represented as having been psychologically coerced (*prompted by voices in his head*).

(183) A national scandal PARANOID schizophrenic John Barrett **intended** to kill when he was allowed to walk out unhindered from a supposedly secure psychiatric clinic in Tooting. (*The Mail*, 17 November 2006).

In 8/11 instances of *chose*, it occurs in a quote from the defence lawyer of Anders Breivik (introduced previously in Section 5.3.2), where intention is framed as the sole criterion on which attributions of intentionality need be based. This representation of moral responsibility is misleading as it does not account for criteria such as cognitive capacity.

(184) "He realised that it is wrong to kill, but he **chose** to kill. That's what terrorists do," Mr Lippestad said. (*The Telegraph*, 23 June 2012).

Like desire, intention is not something we can perceive directly, but something that we perceive indirectly, either through an individual's behaviour or second hand accounts. Despite this, only one instance of all the six collocates that appeal to intention occurs in a direct quote from the agent themselves (see Excerpt 190 below). Instead, claims that the agent killed intentionally are typically attributed to psychologists or court judges.

Interestingly, the majority of the instances of the words in Table 7.5 (73%) occur in the tabloid press. This may suggest that the tabloid press have a more individualistic view of crime, with more emphasis placed on the agent's decisions rather than broader social forces acting on them.

One collocate that is also suggestive of intent is *evil* which is a collocate of *dangerous* (n = 10, ID = 6.52). As discussed in Section 4.5 above, *evil* is culturally associated with malign intent. In 5/6 instances it occurs a quote attributed to a court judge who describes someone they have sentenced. In five of these, they refer to Allan Menzies who killed Thomas McKendrick in 2002 and ate some of his body. He was later referred to as the ‘vampire killer’ by *The Mail*, and *The Sun*. Menzies’ claim that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the attack was rejected by the judge, and several psychiatrists instead diagnosed him as having psychopathic traits. In all of these instances, the words *dangerous* and *evil* are co-ordinated (see Excerpt 185).

(185) The judge branded Menzies an "**evil** and dangerous psychopath". He said: "Three psychologists have diagnosed you as a psychopath. In my opinion, you are an evil, violent and highly dangerous man who is not fit to be at liberty. (*The Independent*, 9 October 2003).

Table 7.5 Collocates referring to premeditation

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>planned</i>	<i>kill</i>	49	8.70
<i>planning</i>	<i>kill</i>	16	7.05
<i>plot</i>	<i>kill</i>	22	7.50
<i>plotting</i>	<i>kill</i>	11	6.79
<i>random</i>	<i>attack</i>	109	9.60
<i>motiveless</i>	<i>attack</i>	19	7.26

Another factor involved in determining whether someone had the intention to do something is whether the act was premeditated. If an actor plans a violent crime, this is likely to suggest to readers that the agent intended to carry out the attack, once again implying that the agent both knew the implications of the violent attack and desired the outcome. That said, psychotic episodes may last for extended periods of time, so it is possible for someone with schizophrenia to carefully plan a violent attack as a result of their illness. Five collocates in this category refer to preparations made before the attack (see Table 7.5). The collocates *planned*, *planning*, *plot* and *plotting* all typically occur in contexts where the schizophrenic person is represented as having planned out their violent crime beforehand. Excerpt 186 reports on a case where a schizophrenic man killed his mother and was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. The verb *planned* is modified by the adverb *meticulously*, which is suggestive of particularly careful planning. It also links the attack to an ongoing feud, thus appealing to desire (*Kalejaike disliked his mother*). These elements all serve to represent the killing as intentional and the killer as responsible.

(186) During the trial the prosecution alleged that Kalejaike disliked his mother, who was described as strict, stubborn and with an explosive temper, and that he "meticulously" **planned** to kill her. (*mirror.co.uk*, 19 June 2015).

Sometimes the newspapers criticise each other of using misleading language to represent schizophrenic people as more responsible for their crimes than they probably were. On one occasion, *The Guardian* criticises *The Mail* and a US publication, *The*

Cincinnati Enquirer, for using language suggesting that a schizophrenic man, Michael Hoyt, intended to kill a government official. The headline from *The Mail* (see Excerpt 187) only contextualises the putative crime in terms of premeditation (*plotted*), which suggests that Boehner intended to kill. That Boehner claimed he heard voices instructing him to kill are only mentioned later in the body text. Despite *The Mail's* framing of these events, Hoyt was later declared not guilty by reason of insanity by the American justice system.

(187) John Boehner's barman **plotted** to kill him: Country club employee arrested for plan to poison wine after he blamed 'mean' Speaker for getting him fired (*MailOnline*, 13 January 2015).

On the same day, *The Guardian* intertextually refers to the headline in *The Mail* (see Excerpt 188). The use of semi-onomatopoeic reporting verb *screached* suggests that *The Mail's* headline was overly sensationalistic and ill thought through.

(188) "John Boehner's barman **plotted** to kill him," screached the Daily Mail. "Deer Park man charged with trying to kill Boehner," echoed the local paper, the *Cincinnati Enquirer*. (*The Guardian*, 15 January 2015).

Later the article suggests that the murder attempt should have been contextualised in terms of mental illness more appropriately (see Excerpt 189). Thus, while *The Mail* prioritises evidence relating to intention and uses it to contextualise the schizophrenic

person's attempt to kill, *The Guardian*, explicit refers to the individual as mentally ill instead (*a man requiring urgent medical attention*).

(189) What has been portrayed by the FBI as a foiled assassination plot on further probing looks more akin to an incident involving a man requiring urgent medical attention. (*The Guardian*, 15 January 2015).

The word *going* is also a collocate of *kill* ($n = 180$, $ID = 8.92$). In 62 instances in a 100 line sample, it is also used to represent people with schizophrenia as intending to kill. In Excerpt 190, *going* occurs in a quote attributed to a schizophrenic person who declared that he had the intention of killing someone.

(190) I didn't say anything and he was saying 'I'm **going** to kill you, you ***** b*****'." (*The Express*, 18 January 2014).

Three collocates refer to threats, namely *threatened*, *threatening* and *threats* (e.g. see Excerpt 191). These characterise the attack as intentional because, according to Searle (1970:14) one of the felicity conditions of threats i.e. the conditions in which a speech act such as threatening are made valid, is a sincerity condition, which is to 'commit the speaker (again in various degrees) to some future course of action.' In other words, a threat would only be felicitous if the speaker indicated that they would be prepared to go through with it.

(191) THE grandmother shot dead in the massacre of a British family in France has a son who has allegedly previously attacked and **threatened** to kill her and her husband. (*The Telegraph*, 13 September 2012).

The collocates *victim* and *victims* also seem to be suggestive of intention. After all, if an individual were to injure someone accidentally, it would hardly be appropriate to refer to them as their *victim*. This is because the word *victim* is suggestive of the agent's intention to cause harm. On these grounds, it would also be misleading to refer to someone who had been attacked by a schizophrenic person because they thought they were the devil as their 'victim'. It would perhaps be more appropriate to say that the devil was their (intended) victim rather than the person they really killed.

To investigate, I examined a random sample of 100 instances each of *victim* and *victims* in ukWaC, to determine their typical usage. The words *victim* and *victims* are typically used to represent the targets of intentional actions. This meaning is especially apparent in cases where it is preceded by a possessive determiner (see Excerpt 192).

(192) Her lover returned only in time to catch the devil devouring his **victim**. (Text 79983, UKWaC).

However, if *victim* or *victims* is in a prepositional phrase, *victim(s) of*, it typically refers to someone who is the object of an abstract process that does not assume intent e.g. *a victim of the moral silence* (text 936576), *victim of a secret and irresistible destiny* (text

2077204). The word *victim* occurs in this pattern 23/100 times and *victims* 29/100 times in ukWaC. Even when *victim of* precedes intentional actions, the emphasis is on a broader phenomenon rather than a single intentional process e.g. *a victim of racial prejudice* (text 2502386), *a victim of crime* (text 1602165), which perhaps places less emphasis on the intention behind the actions. The phraseological pattern *FALL victim to* (4 instances) also typically features an abstract phenomenon as its object.

Table 7.6 The collocates *victim* and *victims*

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>victim</i>	<i>kill</i>	17	6.74
	<i>stabbed</i>	31	7.76
	<i>murder</i>	40	7.49
	<i>attack</i>	47	7.97
	<i>violence</i>	15 (total = 150)	6.88
<i>victims</i>	<i>killed</i>	40	7.54
	<i>shot</i>	31	7.67
	<i>violence</i>	40	8.21
	<i>violent</i>	19 (total = 130)	7.07

Returning to the Schizophrenia 2000-2015, the violence words that *victim* and *victims* collocate with are shown in Table 7.6. Besides when they are collocates of *violence* and *violent* (where individuals are typically represented as the victims of crime more broadly rather than a crime committed by a schizophrenic person), the words *victim* and *victims* are typically used to represent the individuals that people with schizophrenia have killed (see Excerpt 193). That these words collocate with 5/10 violence words a total of 206 times suggest that they are relatively typical of the press’ language used to contextualise violent crimes committed by schizophrenic people. Excerpt 193 reports

the story of a schizophrenic person called Nicholas Salvador, who killed a woman, Palmira Silva, in 2014 and was convicted on the grounds of diminished responsibility (the article emphasises that it took the jury less than 40 minutes to make up their minds). By referring to Silva as his victim, the press thus potentially frames his crime as an intentional one, and Salvador as more morally responsible.

(193) Salvador, who denied murder by reason of insanity and was assessed by two psychiatrists as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, stabbed his elderly **victim** multiple times before cutting off her head and holding it aloft, the court heard. (*independent.co.uk*, 23 June 2015).

Conversely the word *random*, which is a collocate of both *attack* (n.) (n = 109, ID = 9.60) and *violence* (n.) (n = 14, ID = 7.45), and *motiveless*, which is a collocate of *attack* (n.) (n = 19, ID = 7.26) characterise crimes as being unpremeditated. They are used in contexts that characterise the schizophrenic person as not having a motive (see Excerpt 194). These potentially represent the agent as being less responsible.

(194) Thirteen other people were injured in the chaotic scenes surrounding the apparently **motiveless** attack. (*The Independent*, 25 May 2013)

7.3.3.4. *Awareness*

Whereas *belief* and *desire* are necessary conditions for having the intention to do something, the agent’s awareness of what they are doing and their skill in performing it determine whether the action exhibited intentionality. Given that no collocates refer to skill, I will focus only on collocates that refer to awareness. According to Malle and Knobe (1997:105-6), the category of awareness refers to the agent’s ‘awareness of the act while the person is performing it.’

Table 7.7 Verb collocates appealing to awareness

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>believed</i>	<i>killed</i>	39	7.46
	<i>kill</i>	22	6.98
	<i>killing</i>	16 (total = 77)	6.86
<i>thought</i>	<i>kill</i>	47	7.28

Two verb collocates in this category, *believed* and *thought*, refer to mental processes of the ‘cognitive’ type (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014:257), which are typically used to introduce the content of the subject’s thoughts in an embedded clause (see Table 7.7). These delusions are represented as falling into two types. The most frequent type is where the target of the attack is perceived as turning into a malign supernatural entity. Excerpt 195 provides a quotation from a schizophrenic person called David Tarloff, in which he reveals that he killed his psychologist in 2008 because he perceived her as evil. A disjunct in the form of an imperative (*believe me*) is quoted by the paper, which is used by Tarloff to entreat the jury to believe his story. Tarloff’s representation of events is quoted in direct speech which may be used as a distancing strategy to

foreground that this is Tarloff's own representation of events rather than what 'actually' happened.

(195) "Believe me, I wish she was never there – but I **thought** she was evil", Tarloff told a psychologist in 2010. 'I went to kill her. I thought I had no choice.'
(*MailOnline*, 4 March 2013).

A second scenario is where the schizophrenic person believes that they themselves have transformed into a supernatural, God-like figure. Here, in Excerpt 196, in contrast to Excerpt 195, the defendant's psychotic symptoms are represented in free indirect speech, thus potentially increasing the evidentiality of the claim.

(196) Italian 'cannibal' who **believed** he was God killed his Irish landlord following an argument during a game of chess and ate his lung after mistaking it for his heart
(*MailOnline*, 31 July 2015).

Arguably, representations of the latter type suggest more responsibility, as the possession of superhuman powers does not justify cruelty to others.

The other collocates in this category contextualise violent crimes in terms of the content or nature of the delusions experienced by the belligerent. The words *demons* (n = 9, ID = 6.96) and *supernatural* (n = 9, ID = 7.18), which are both collocates of *killing*, are used to describe the object of the crime from the perspective of the schizophrenic

person, and represent them as being unaware of what they were really doing (see Excerpt 197). Again, these serve to frame the schizophrenic person as less intentional and therefore less responsible for their crimes.

(197) At the time, Salvador believed he was killing a **supernatural** entity in the guise of Hitler back from the dead, or a demon who had taken the form of a little old lady, Mr Rees said. (*MailOnline*, 23 June 2015)

7.3.4. *Obligation (vicarious blame)*

Another criterion that may affect the degree of blame attributed to an individual is *obligation*. Whereas Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) defined this category as applying to the obligations of the agent themselves (i.e. their obligation to prevent the event from happening in cases where the action is perceived as unintentional), here it seems to apply to third parties. In this way, it is linked to Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe's (2014:168) additional category of vicarious blame. This makes the category a bit different from the others as it implicates people who do not have schizophrenia, and reference to it in an article is likely to indicate some sort of amelioration of blame on behalf of the schizophrenic person. References to obligation/vicarious blame are important to make because we are otherwise biased to view actions as being carried out between two individuals (Lakoff, 1987).

The perceived failings of medical authorities hinge on a sense that they have neglected their institutional obligations. The NHS UK Health and Safety Act, under 4.1 a),

stipulates that all employees must “take reasonable care of their own health and safety and that of other people who may be affected by their work under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974³¹. Thus, when medical authorities are represented as putting the lives of citizens at risk by their choices, they are violating their institutional obligations.

One of the ways medical authorities can be implicated is where patients are functionalised as patients, as this suggests that healthcare professionals are responsible for their wellbeing. Collocates referring to patienthood are listed in Table 7.8

Table 7.8 Collocates referring to healthcare

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>patient</i>	<i>stabbed</i>	44	8.02
	<i>violent</i>	21	7.04
	<i>dangerous</i>	22	7.06
<i>patients</i>	<i>violent</i>	47	7.42
	<i>dangerous</i>	74	8.04

Given the institutional obligations of healthcare professionals, readers are likely to indirectly view them as partially blameworthy for the violent crimes carried out by their patients (see Excerpt 198).

³¹ <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37>

(198) A CARE in the community **patient** who stabbed a pensioner to death as she waited for a lift to a skittles match was locked up indefinitely yesterday. (*The Express*, 5 May 2010)

Additional collocates relating to obligation and vicarious responsibility are listed in Table 7.9.

Table 7.9 Collocates appealing to obligation/vicarious blame

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>allowed</i>	<i>kill</i>	24	7.15
<i>feared</i>	<i>kill</i>	12	6.76
<i>free</i>	<i>kill</i>	52	8.90
<i>freed</i>	<i>kill</i>	31	8.13
<i>might</i>	<i>kill</i>	41	6.94
<i>released</i>	<i>kill</i>	23	6.91
<i>would</i>	<i>kill</i>	173	7.38

There are three epistemic markers, *would* (n = 173, ID = 7.38), *feared* (n = 12, ID = 6.76) and *might* (n = 41, ID = 6.94) that occur in contexts where healthcare professionals are represented as having not been aware of (or ignoring) evidence that suggested that schizophrenic patients were going to commit violent crimes. In Excerpt 199, the word referring to the speech act of a request (*begged*), which is coded for strong deontic modality, combined with the premodifying adverb *repeatedly* represents the patient as insisting to be admitted to professional care. This, combined with the unexpectedness marker *but* represents medical authorities as having been particularly naïve or negligent.

(199) Stephen Soans-Wade, 39, repeatedly begged to be sectioned because he **feared** he was going to kill. But three hospitals refused to admit him. (*The Mail*, 28 July 2006).

Two other collocates, *warned* and *despite*, also occur in contexts where authorities do not heed warnings. The word *warned*, a collocate of *dangerous* (n = 16, ID = 7.21) in six instances occurs in the context of a story involving Nicola Edgington, who requested to be admitted to psychiatric hospital, fearing that her condition was worsening (see Excerpt 200).

(200) While waiting to be admitted, she rang 999 five times and **warned** that she was dangerous and would harm somebody if she was not sectioned. She was taken to the mental health unit Oxleas House but walked out and took a bus to Bexleyheath where she attacked Miss Clark and Mrs Hodkin. (*The Telegraph*, 5 March 2013)

Likewise, the conjunct *despite* is a collocate of *violence* (n = 23, ID = 7.30) and *violent* (adj.) and typically occurs in contexts where authorities give patients greater freedoms despite evidence of violent tendencies. The conjunct *despite* functions as an evaluation marker of ‘unexpectedness’ (Bednarek, 2006), used to represent the response of medical authorities as different from what would be expected (see Excerpt 201).

(201) He had complained of hearing voices, but **despite** increasingly violent behaviour, a junior doctor gave him home leave. (*The Independent*, 28 November 2001).

The description of the doctor as *junior* also implies negligence on behalf of the medical institution, that someone with relatively less experience was not capable of making such a decision and should not have been placed in that position.

There are four collocates that refer to the deinstitutionalisation of patients from secure units: *allowed*, *free*, *freed* and *released*. It may be argued, on linguistic evidence, that the press sometimes exploit ambiguities in their phrasing around some of these collocates in order to suggest that medical authorities are more responsible than they probably were. For instance, the word *allowed* has two main senses: ‘permit someone to do something’ or ‘enable (usually inadvertently) someone to do something’ depending on its phraseology.

One of the main findings of Lexical Grammar is that different meanings can be activated by a word’s phraseological environment. Sinclair (1991) refers to this as ‘semantic reversal’. The sentience of the subject has been shown to trigger semantic reversal. For instance, Hunston (2007:251-253) found that the lemma CAUSE only exhibited a negative semantic prosody if human beings and interests were involved in the process. Looking in a random sample of 100 lines in UKWaC, *allowed* is typically used in the sense of ‘permit’ (66%) and less often in the sense of ‘enable’ (34%). The former meaning is signalled if both the sayers and the addressees are sentient, which

makes sense since only organisms capable of thought and communication are able to grant permission to social actors, and only social actors would seek permission (see Excerpt 202). An exception to this trend is when the clause is in the passive voice, as it is nearly always signals the meaning of ‘permit’. (see Excerpt 202).

(202) LCGB Club Member Andy Avery from Oxford has kindly **allowed** us to bring you these line drawings. (Text 3511, ukWaC)³²

The ‘enable’ sense is less frequent (34%) and activated when the subject is not sentient (see Excerpt 203).

(203) This included opening up the hallway with a large entrance staircase that **allowed** light to flood down from rooflights above the galleried landing. (Text 592, ukWaC)

Interestingly, whereas permission involves a more powerful individual authorising an action or event, to enable is to do something that causes an action or event to happen. Thus, while the meaning of ‘permit’ involves agency and intentionality and suggests choice on the part of the subject – the speech act of giving permission - ‘enable’ does not, necessarily. On the contrary, it suggests that they have neglected to do something

³² The identifiers in Excerpts 202-204 refer to the text number in the ukWaC corpus and may be used to trace the original text.

they should have done which has enabled something (negative) to happen. (see Excerpt 204). Thus, on the grounds of intentionality, someone can be held responsible for permitting someone to permit something, but less so for enabling something to happen.

(204) Dogs are **allowed** on the campsite but must be kept under control at all times and no pets are allowed in the caravans. (Text 453464, ukWaC)

Turning now to the press data, these phraseological patterns triggering the different senses of the word *allowed* typically apply to the schizophrenia 2000-2015 corpus. For instance, examples of *allowed* as a collocate that have a non-sentient agent suggest that dangerous patients were ‘given the opportunity’ to kill. In Excerpt 205, the use of *allowed* anaphorically traces its subject back to a non-sentient grammatical actor (*blunders*) in the previous clause, thus activating the ‘enable’ sense. In Excerpt 206, the word *allowed* traces its subject back to the noun phrase *an hour’s leave from a secure unit in 2004*, which is again a grammatical actor (a nominalisation of a process). Considering the ambiguity of *allowed* in terms of assigning responsibility, the word *enabled* may have been a more appropriate word to use in both examples here.

(205) As an inquiry begin into the blunders which **allowed** cannibal Peter Bryan to kill repeatedly, relatives of his victims last night called for him to be given the death penalty, writes Mark Reynolds. (*The Express*, 16 March 2005).

(206) An inquiry into the case of John Barrett found that he should never have been given an hour's leave from a secure unit in 2004, which **allowed** him to abscond and kill Denis Finnegan in Richmond Park, south-west London. (*The Telegraph*, 18 November 2006).

However, if a sentient subject precedes *allowed*, then it seems to suggest that the medical authorities gave the patients permission to kill members of the public, as a sentient subject can give permission whereas a non-sentient subject cannot. This is the case in six instances of the 24 instances of *allowed* as a collocate of *kill*. Two examples are presented in Excerpts 207 and 208. In Excerpt 208, the use of aggregation (*six other patients*) increases the blame laid on the institution. Moreover, the adverb *alone* implies there are other killings in previous years, situating the event as part of a larger problem.

(207) Yesterday, as Bryan was finally locked up for life, a judge called for an immediate inquiry into the 'kid glove' treatment by medical staff and social workers that **allowed** him to kill twice within weeks. (*The Mail*, 16 March 2005).

(208) THE NHS trust that left a dangerous schizophrenic to kill a Birmingham schoolgirl **allowed** six other patients to kill people last year alone, The Sunday Telegraph has learnt. (*The Sunday Telegraph*, 6 October 2013).

Of course, it is unlikely that readers would suspect medical authorities of granting dangerous patients permission to kill others, as it conflicts with the public's background

knowledge of medical professionals. Medical professionals are paid to heal and protect others, and are generally not interested in abetting criminals. According to the IPSO MORI Veracity Index 2018³³, where respondents were asked whether they trusted people belonging to a range of professions, doctors and nurses were trusted the most. In fact, 96% of respondents trusted nurses and 92% trusted doctors. Incidentally, journalists scored fourth from bottom (26%), only ahead of ‘government ministers’ (22%), ‘politicians generally’ (19%) and ‘advertising executives’ (16%). Nevertheless, this seems to be part of a wider tendency for the British press to suspect doctors of causing harm to their patients. Baker and McEnery (2014), for instance, found that the British press sometimes labelled foreign doctors *killers* and their patients *victims*, thus implying that the doctors were responsible for those deaths. Moreover, as we have seen, the word *victims* is to some extent suggestive of intentionality.

While infrequent in the corpus as a whole, they are nevertheless cases where language has been manipulated (either consciously or unconsciously) by the press in order to frame medical authorities as responsible for the deaths caused by their patients. However, other rhetorical strategies found elsewhere seem to suggest the same meaning. The words *freed* and *free* collocate with *kill* relatively frequently and relatively strongly. In 31/43 cases of *freed* and 50/63 instances of *free*, this is part of the elliptical verb phrase *free/d to kill*. Overall, there are 30 instances of *freed to kill* and 50 instances of *free to kill* in the corpus. The expression is typically used by the tabloids

³³https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-11/veracity_index_2018_v1_161118_public.pdf

(52/80 instances), although of the remaining broadsheets, is more commonly found in *The Telegraph* (13/28 instances). It first appeared in the corpus in *The Telegraph* in October 2003 in the following headline (Excerpt 209), which is designed to be interpreted by readers as a quote from the wife of a man who was killed by someone with schizophrenia. However, it is unclear in the corpus whether the woman actually uttered these words. The headline prefaces an article that reports on how a man with paranoid schizophrenia stabbed a man to death in Prestatyn in 2003. The killer said that he had no memory of the incident and was later convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

(209) Why was this man **freed** to kill my husband? (*The Telegraph*, 11 October 2003).

The social deictic determiner *my*, which precedes *husband*, suggests that the question is uttered by the victim's wife. The ambiguous nature of quotations in reporting on mental illness has been noted by Foster (2006). This is an example of the press reporting in what Bakhtin (1981:589) called 'concealed form', that is, in a way that assumes the words of someone else without using any explicit markers e.g. reporting verbs, speech marks etc. Because of the lack of the formal markers, whether it was uttered by wife or not is made ambiguous. This ambiguity may be apposite as it allows *The Telegraph* to avoid blame for criticising the NHS by making the headline appear like the quote from a victim.

The query *freed** as a collocate of *kill* had 65 hits in the tabloids and 44 hits in the broadsheets (e.g. Excerpts 2010 and 2011). It was particularly frequent in *The Mail* (24 results) and in *The Telegraph* (18). In Excerpt 210, the phrase is embedded in a rhetorical question. This, combined with the fact that the headline is formatted into majuscules or caps, iconically maps the size of the letters onto speaker's volume of voice and potential represents them as being incredulous.

(210) WHY THE HELL WAS MANIAC **FREED** TO KILL MY HUBBY? (*The Sun*, 11 October 2003).

(211) Schizophrenic obsessed by Hannibal the Cannibal **freed** to kill friend. (*The Mail*, 22 June 2007).

Grammatically, the verb phrases in these examples are composed of a non-finite independent clause [subject] (was) *freed* and a dependent clause *to kill* ([victim]). The first clause can stand independently e.g. *why was this violent man freed* whereas the second clause cannot **to kill our daughter*. Biber *et al.* (1999:724) observe that genres favouring brevity will choose to employ non-finite clauses because the non-finite clause can be 'syntactically compressed', that is, certain grammatical words can be elided to save space. However, the authors (*ibid.*) note that, via ellipsis in non-finite clauses, 'the advantage of compactness must be balanced against the stumbling block of ambiguity.' Indeed, the role of the infinitive marker *to* is ambiguous. It is perhaps most likely to be interpreted as an elliptical form of one of two complex infinitive markers, *in order to*,

and *so as to*, which are typically used to introduce adverbial clauses referring to purpose (see Biber *et al.*, 1999:89). In other words, in these examples, the preposition *to* could suggest either purpose or an eventuality, like the verb *allowed* discussed above.

Whereas the meaning of ‘purpose’ implies intent and agency, the meaning of ‘eventuality’ does not. In this way, it is analogous to the distinction between the two meanings of *allowed* discussed above. Thus, while manipulation of the word *allowed* is infrequent in the press, it is part of a broader pattern which may be instantiated elsewhere in the corpus.

These examples can also be glossed using van Leeuwen’s (2008) linguistic framework for analysing how purpose can be discursively constructed in clauses. The headlines in Excerpts 15-17 are partly composed of a ‘generalised action’ (i.e. a non-finite clause referring to an action abstracted from a specific time) which is represented in the non-finite clause (*to kill*). It is also composed of what van Leeuwen calls a ‘micro-action’ which is represented by a finite clause ([subject] [*was*] *freed*). In other words, an action has been carried out on a particular occasion (*freed*) which led to a de-contextualised event (*to kill*).

freed (purposeful action), *to* (typical purpose link), *kill* (purpose).

The infinitive marker *to*, which van Leeuwen (*ibid*, 126) suggests as a typical ‘purpose link’ (i.e. indicating that the micro-action had the intended purpose of causing the generalised action) is ambiguous, and suggests one of two readings. If *to* stands for a

complex infinitive marker, the micro-action is represented as a ‘goal-oriented action’ (e.g. *freed* [in order] *to kill*), that is, as purposeful. On the other hand, if *to* stands in place of *to go on to*, then the micro-action is represented as an ‘effective action’, that is, ‘as something that turned out to exist in hindsight, rather than as something that could have been fully planned. As a result, the people who perform effective actions are represented as not fully able to be purposeful, not fully in control.’ (van Leeuwen, 2008:130). Given that van Leeuwen (2008) calls *to* a typical purpose link, this implies that it is more suggestive of a goal-oriented action than an effective action. This suggests that the elliptical nature of tabloidese is being exploited in order to produce misleading ambiguities. At the very least, the elliptical wording *freed to kill* suggests that killing is an inevitable consequence of deinstitutionalising patients, which serves to construct institutionalised people with schizophrenia as dangerous lost causes. This is despite the fact that, between 2000 and 2001, only a fifth of schizophrenic people who carried out homicides in the UK had been involved with medical services (Kalucy *et al.*, 2011:542).

All 80 instances of *free/d to kill* occur either in the headline or the lead. The opening sentences of a news story are particularly important because they have the potential to frame the rest of the article in terms of the moral perspective taken. By establishing a firm ideological angle in the headline, the press are able to ensure that the story is presented in a way that satisfies the news value of ‘unambiguity’ (Jewkes, 2015). That is, they ensure that readers view the story from a single moral angle (in this case, that medical authorities are to blame).

The collocate *released* occurs in an identical phraseological pattern to *freed*, where the choice of grammatical expression seems to suggest that dangerous patients were freed on purpose in order to kill members of the public. The phrase *released to kill* is less frequent (only occurring five times in the corpus), however, and in two of its instances, a post modifying clause is used to clarify the ambiguity in the phraseology. In Excerpt 212, the newspaper on the one hand appears to implicate the medical authorities with the phrase *released to kill* yet also invites sympathy by referring to them as *over-worked*. The sympathetic representation of medical staff may be explained by the left-leaning political stance of *The Independent*. By coding this in an adjective, the actor(s) doing the over-working are grammatically obscured, although the government's responsibility in reducing funding is mentioned elsewhere in the article. Thus, responsibility is ameliorated from the medical authorities and redirected at the government who in turn have violated their obligation to fund social services appropriately. In Excerpt 213, responsibility is directed towards a single psychiatrist who has erroneously judged a patient 'mostly stable'. Again, these Excerpts show how attributions of blame are sometimes a complex affair and how different types of evidence may push and pull blame in various directions.

(212) Psychiatrists already have the power to detain people who are considered a risk to society. These men were **released** to kill as a result of human error by no doubt over-worked professionals who failed to take into account the fact both patients had a history of violence. (*Independent on Sunday*, 27 March 2005).

(213) Oxleas NHS Trust came under fire earlier in the year when it was revealed that Nicola Edgington, a schizophrenic who killed her mother in 2005, was **released** to kill again following a psychiatrist's advice that her condition was ‘mostly stable’. (*telegraph.co.uk*, 17 October 2013).

7.3.5. Reasons

Another factor influencing whether a reader perceives the agent to be blameworthy is whether or not their reasons for doing so were valid. McEnery, McGlashan and Love (2015:250) found that the press are more likely to look for reasons, motivations and explanations behind an event than other news-oriented media (i.e. Twitter).

Table 7.10 Collocates that are conjunctives used to cite reasons

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>after</i>	<i>shot</i>	184	7.50
	<i>murder</i>	393	8.49
	<i>killing</i>	201	7.66
	<i>attack</i>	415	8.61
	<i>killed</i>	297	8.10
	<i>stabbed</i>	183	7.49
<i>because</i>	<i>kill</i>	80	6.97
	<i>dangerous</i>	53	6.40
<i>before</i>	<i>stabbed</i>	100	7.52
	<i>killing</i>	125	7.89
	<i>killed</i>	207	8.41
	<i>kill</i>	74	7.04
	<i>shot</i>	115	7.72
	<i>murder</i>	109	7.45
	<i>attack</i>	286	8.92
<i>then</i>	<i>shot</i>	76	6.94

	<i>stabbed</i>	105	7.41
	<i>killed</i>	90	7.05
<i>when</i>	<i>shot</i>	159	6.93
	<i>killed</i>	284	7.70
<i>while</i>	<i>killed</i>	74	7.18
	<i>shot</i>	50	6.80

The press may orient to the reasons behind killings even via grammatical words. There are six collocates, all of which are conjunctives, which typically occur in contexts where the press suggest reasons as to why the violent incident occurred (see Table 7.10).

Conjunctives are characteristic of sensationalist newspaper reporting which operate using an inverted climax-complication narrative structure, in order to draw attention to the most newsworthy event in the story (Molek-Kozokowska, 2013:186-7). These conjunctives are used to link the main clause reporting on the violent event with an adverbial clause referring to the conditions under which they happened. Importantly, conjunctives expressing causal relations are not merely ‘reporting the facts’ but convey a subjective way of viewing the world. Cause and effect is, after all, rarely self evident, but must be intuited by individuals. In this way, conjunctives may be suggestive of particular discourses around people with schizophrenia.

For instance, there are cases where the illness as a whole rather than specific symptoms are identified as the reasons why a schizophrenic person committed the violent crime. Excerpt 214 is the caption to an image in an article entitled ‘Rats told our daughter to kill her baby brother’.

(214) URGES: Jani used to try to kill Bhodi **because** of her condition (*The Mirror*, 12 October, 2012).

While the angle of the story is sympathetic towards Jani and her mother, the wording here has implications that are potentially problematic. On the one hand, it exonerates Jani of blame by attributing causality to her condition (construed as a separate autonomous entity) as opposed to her. However, it also reproduces and strengthens the association between violence and schizophrenia (and mental illness generally). In particular, the use of the strong causal marker *because* potentially frames the practice of killing as an inevitable consequence of having a condition like schizophrenia. This is despite the fact that schizophrenia does not lead to violent crime if it is treated medically. Indeed, in other studies looking into the representations of mental health in relation to responsibility in the media, the press have been observed to link certain identities with 'natural predicates', for instance, that of the 'loner' with sudden violent behaviours (McCarthy and Rapley, 2004:163). While there is an increased risk of people with schizophrenia committing homicides, this increased risk is insignificant when substance abuse is factored into the analysis (Fazel *et al.*, 2009b). In other words, people who abuse substances are more likely than the general population to commit homicides whether they have a diagnosis of schizophrenia or not. However, the majority of people who have schizophrenia do not kill so representing schizophrenia as an explanation for why someone killed may be seen as reductive.

A potentially less problematic way of representing the same idea would be to use a causal verb which frames the causing as a particular instance rather than an inevitability e.g. *Her condition led Jani to try to kill Bhodi*. It would also be more accurate to write that Jani's particular 'symptoms' rather than her *condition* caused her to be violent towards Bhodi, as different people with the disorder may experience their symptoms differently and with varying levels of intensity.

In some cases, intentionality is framed as a reason, as one of the collocates of *because* when it co-occurs with *kill* is *wanted* (n = 10, ID = 6.09) (see Excerpt 215). This represents the schizophrenic person as morally responsible as a one's desire to kill is unlikely to be perceived as a legitimate reason for doing so.

(215) I killed Andrew Boldt **because** I wanted to, and I do what I want to do,' said killer Cody Cousins, 42, in court on Friday. (*MailOnline*, 20 September 2014).

Similarly, in two cases (Excerpts 216 and 217), the person with schizophrenia is described as attacking someone else after arguing over a trivial issue. It is not made explicit in these two articles whether the violence was caused by psychotic symptoms. Instead, individuals with schizophrenia are represented as becoming violent because other people irritate them or do not co-operate with their demands. Again, readers are unlikely to perceive these as legitimate reasons for being violent and thus attribute blame to the schizophrenic person.

(216) A Jamaican man stabbed his wife to death and seriously hurt two other women in ‘ferocious rampage’ **because** he was ‘fed up of their nagging’ is jailed for life. (*MailOnline*, 24 March 2015).

(217) She went back home on February 28, and, a week later her son came home after an afternoon in the pub and asked for cigarettes. He attacked his mother **when** she didn’t have any and police were called in after Mrs McEwan showed her bruises to a friend. (*The Express*, 20 July 2005).

Representing otherwise placid individuals as suddenly turning violent over a petty squabble potentially contributes to the representation of people with schizophrenia as ‘dormant volcanoes’ (see Section 4.3). This may cause members of the public to avoid people with schizophrenia, even if they haven’t been violent towards anyone.

The other five conjunctives (i.e. all except *because*) are temporal conjunctives in that they express temporal relations between real world events across time. Unlike *because* which conveys subjective relations (causal relations are intuited rather than perceived), temporal conjunctives seem to express objective relations between events. However, by linking the clause reporting on the violent acts with an adverbial clause reporting on another event that occurred before or after it, the press implicitly frame this event as being a reason for why the violent event occurred. In other words, temporal conjunctives implicitly express logical relations as well.

There are two conjunctives, *when* and *while* that express synchronous relations, in that they represent events occurring at the same time. An event occurring at the same time as another event may sometimes serve to explain and justify it i.e. may be perceived as having caused it. For instance, if I lose control of my bike and crash into somebody at the same moment when there was a strong gust of wind, I could justify my actions by blaming it on the gust of strong wind. Similarly, when they collocate with violence words, temporal conjunctives expressing synchronous relations typically occur in contexts that implicitly frame the agent's symptoms as the reason the violent event occurred (Excerpt 218). This attributes blame towards the individual's psychotic symptoms rather than themselves which reduces the responsibility we are likely to attribute to them.

(218) The prosecution said the plea was acceptable because Addo had been severely mentally ill **when** he killed Mr Marquez, who lived in Coin near Malaga in Spain and had come to England to find work. (*mirror.co.uk*, 2 December 2013).

The other three temporal conjunctives, *before*, *after*, *then*, express diachronic relations, and represent events as occurring in a chronological order. Like events occurring at the same time, an event that occurs before another event may be used to explain it, as it may have enabled the event to happen. If I crash into somebody on my bike having previously swerved to avoid an oncoming car, I may justify my behaviour by blaming them on the error made by the person driving the car. Temporal conjunctives expressing diachronic relations typically occur in contexts where the press implicitly suggests that

the negligence of medical authorities is the reason why the violent event occurred.

Again, blame is lifted from the schizophrenic person and this time attributed towards a third party (see Excerpt 219).

(219) A PARANOID schizophrenic with a history of violence killed a man **after** being allowed to leave a psychiatric hospital, the Old Bailey was told yesterday. (*The Times*, 26 February 2005).

In two instances, the temporal conjunctives *then* and *after* occur in contexts where people with schizophrenia are represented as choosing not to take their prescribed antipsychotic medication (see Excerpt 220). Thus far, the analysis has considered direct appeals to intention. However, events may be also be obliquely intended. 'Oblique intention' was first suggested by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1948) although elaborated on by Mackie (1977). According to Mackie (1977), an event is obliquely intended if the outcome is a foreseen consequence of an intentional action. For instance, if someone decided to drive a car, fully aware that they did not know how to drive one, the outcome of a road accident would be obliquely intended. As the patient would likely be aware that not taking their medication would exacerbate their symptoms, thereby leading to reckless behaviour (as a result of psychosis), the actors can be seen as having obliquely intended to act recklessly, and thereby are responsible. They may also be perceived as responsible on the grounds of obligation, as they may be perceived as having shirked their obligation to take their medication in order to ensure that they don't harm anyone.

(220) A NURSE told yesterday how a schizophrenic ignored her pleas to remain on vital medication - **then** killed a policeman weeks later. (*The Sun*, 26 September 2002).

To return to the discussion of conjunctives above, it is clear that in news discourse at least, temporal conjunctives also imply logical relations (in this case causal) as well. They are likely examples of what Levinson (1983: 104-107) describes as ‘standard implicature’. Grice (1975) argued that implied meanings are generated by ostentatiously violating conversational norms encapsulated in his Co-Operative principle’. The Co-operative Principle stipulates that you should ‘make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’ (p.67-8). However, according to Levinson (1983) standard implicatures arise from observing rather than violating the Co-operative Principle, specifically, in these instances, RELATION – ‘be relevant’. In other words, in Excerpts 218 and 219 considered above, it is possible to derive a standard implicature by inferring that the information in the elaborating clause bears some relation to the information in the main clause. For instance, Excerpt 218 seems to say more than that the person who killed someone was mentally ill whilst doing it (the purely temporal reading). It also seems to imply that the killer was less responsible because he was mentally ill (the implied logical reading). Likewise, in Excerpt 219, the sentence seems to say more than just ‘a schizophrenic person killed someone at a moment in time after being deinstitutionalised’ (the purely temporal reading). It also seems to say that a schizophrenic person killed someone only once they were

deinstitutionalised, thereby pinning blame on the institution themselves (the implied logical reading). The press are using temporal conjunctives to suggest reasons why the violent attacks happened. The press may use implicature to suggest the reasons why violent events occur because it allows them to blame medical authorities without claiming responsibility for doing so. They are able to argue that they only intended its literal meaning rather than its implied meaning.

7.3.6. *Capacity*

References to the capacity of the schizophrenic person to stop the violent event from occurring may also override the intentionality bias. Capacity is problematised in contexts where the agent feels that they are compelled or coerced into doing something either mentally or physically. For instance, four collocates, *mentally ill*, *paranoid*, *schizophrenic* and *schizophrenics* contextualise violent crimes by referring to the agent having a mental illness. The adjectival phrase *mentally ill* is perhaps suggestive of less responsibility as it explicitly refers to them as having an illness, that is, as something that is not their fault (see Excerpt 221).

(221) Mentally **ill** man detained for killing teenage sunbather. (*The Guardian*, 11 December 2001).

In contrast, the word *crazed* has negative connotations and is likely employed by the press as a distancing technique. Thus, while *mentally ill* may invite sympathy from their readership, *crazed* refers to their mental illness in a simplistic, dismissive way. The fact

that the words attribute less responsibility to the actor is likely to be a side-product of the journalists' distancing technique, and not their main motivation. Clement and Foster (2008) refer to labels such as *crazed* as *stigmatising descriptors*, which they identify as particularly frequent in the tabloid press, especially headlines. They suggest that the use of stigmatising descriptors at the expense of more accurate medical terminology results in a representation that does not 'put violence into perspective.' (2008:182). All instances of *crazed* as a collocate of *stabbed* occur in the tabloids, and 11 of these occur in headlines.

Malle and Knobe (1997) distinguish cognitive and physical capacity in their discussion of mitigating factors in the context of intentionality. Cognitive capacity refers to the extent they were able to foresee the event and therefore prevent it whereas physical capacity refers to whether they were able to physically prevent it from happening.

Table 7.11 Words appealing to reduced capacity via reduced motor control

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>felt</i>	<i>kill</i>	23	6.72
<i>frenzied</i>	<i>stabbed</i>	15	7.42
	<i>attack</i>	199	10.96

Two collocates, *felt* and *frenzied*, occur in contexts where the agent is represented as experiencing physical coercion (see Table 7.11). This seems to vindicate schizophrenic people to some extent based on reduced physical capacity. The collocate *felt*, in six instances, occurs in contexts where the agent is represented as killing because of an instinct to do so. There are four instances of *felt the urge* (see Excerpt 222). In this

excerpt, Hernandez, who was convicted of killing a 6 year old boy in 1979, is quoted as saying that he felt the urge to kill when setting eyes on a passer-by. The adverb *just* potentially frames the sensation as something easily succumbed to. Likewise, the use of the definite article (*the*) suggests that the urge is something familiar to Hernandez and that he may have felt similar urges before.

(222) Hernandez told police he had never seen Etan before that day, but once he saw him, 'I knew he was the one... [I] just **felt** the urge to kill,' a law-enforcement source told the New York Post. (*MailOnline*, 27 May 2012).

Other objects of *felt* when it occurs as a collocate of *kill* include *compelled* (5), *needed* (2), *had* (2) and *could not refrain*, all of which are likely to reduce reader’s assumptions that the schizophrenic people had the capacity to stop themselves from carrying out the violent act. They resemble representations of command hallucinations seen elsewhere in that they involve a sudden compulsion to commit a violent crime, although this compulsion is represented as coming from within rather than from an external entity i.e. a voice. This reflects Demjen and Semino’s (2014) finding that for some schizophrenic people, the experience of hearing voices may be difficult to express using the English language, and may be expressed using words either to do with hearing or feeling.

Table 7.12 Collocates appealing to psychological coercion

Collocate	Node(s)	Frequency	logDice
<i>commanding</i>	<i>kill</i>	11	6.82
<i>compelled</i>	<i>kill</i>	11	6.81
<i>drove</i>	<i>kill</i>	16	7.11

<i>mission</i>	<i>kill</i>	47	8.72
<i>ordered</i>	<i>kill</i>	20	7.26
<i>saying</i>	<i>kill</i>	29	6.96
<i>telling</i>	<i>kill</i>	79	9.06
<i>told</i>	<i>kill</i>	94	7.57
	<i>killed</i>	74	7.09
<i>urging</i>	<i>kill</i>	14	7.13
<i>wanted</i>	<i>kill</i>	117	8.93

Several collocates occur in contexts where responsibility is attributed to command hallucinations which direct the agent to carry out the attack (see Table 7.12). As such, they may be viewed as forms of psychological coercion. These take the form of speech acts attributed to hallucinations (there are also words referring to hallucinations themselves, namely *god* and *voices*, and other words connected with the experience of psychosis, namely *heard* and *head*). These words referring to speech acts may represent the schizophrenic person as less responsible as they attribute intentionality to an imagined agentive entity. The term *command hallucinations* suggests that speech acts are always commands. However, based on the language used by the UK press to represent hallucinations of this type, command hallucinations exhibit different degrees of psychological coercion. Of course, the choice of word representing the speech act determines to what extent the individuals were represented as being coerced and therefore their psychological capacity during the incident. Below are the collocates that relate to the force of command hallucinations, grouped according to Searle's (1979) classification of speech acts (see Table 7.13). They are arranged in increasing order of coercion. The word *mission* is in brackets because, while it does not represent a speech act per se, in 40/46 instances as a collocate of *kill*, it occurs in the phraseology *on (a)*

mission where, in 36 cases, the mission is attributed to God. This wording implies that the individual experienced their hallucination as a speech act enacted by God.

Table 7.13 Collocates appealing to capacity and the speech acts with which they are associated

Speech act type	Example
Assertion	<i>saying</i>
Directive	<i>wanted, told, telling, ordered, commanding, wanted, (mission), compelled, drove</i>

The degree of coercion implied varies according to the degree of deontic modality (coded in the different communicative verbs). These words are listed in increasing order of psychological coercion. First, there are assertives. Assertives merely state something and do not typically convey deontic modality. The reporting verb *saying* is more typical of expressing assertions rather than directives. In a 100 line random sample of *saying* in ukWaC, it is never used in conjunction with a directive. However, in the corpus it is followed by a dependent clause which has an imperative structure used to express commands (see Excerpt 223).

(223) He told Dr Xavier that, at this point, "the voices were going mad, screaming at me 'kill yourself'. The voices were **saying** kill random people." (*The Guardian*, 4 April 2009)

In terms of speech act theory, the collocates here involve complex levels of embedding, as they are representations of speech acts represented in other speech acts. For instance,

in reference to Excerpt 224, the original directive perceived by the schizophrenic person has been represented in an assertion made by the schizophrenic person in court, which has then been represented in this assertion made by the press.

(224) He told Dr Panchu Xavier at Ashworth Hospital he didn't want to do anything "but the voices **wanted** me to kill everyone". (*independent.co.uk*, 15 October 2013).

The reporting verb *wanted* indirectly functions as a directive, where the speaker tries to exhort the hearer into doing something (see Excerpt 224). It is perhaps more accurate to view it as part of the phrasal verb *wanted* [pronoun], which is used conventionally as a directive. One might view it as, strictly-speaking, indirect because, literally, it only expresses a desire. However, in that it flouts the maxims of 'relevance' (why would you express a desire out loud unless you wanted something from it?), it indirectly functions as a directive.

It is interesting to note that this is a report of the same story as above published in a different newspaper and demonstrates how different newspapers can choose to use different quotes featuring speech acts varying in the deontic modality they encode, and shows how this may determine to what extent the schizophrenic person is represented as having been psychologically coerced. Representing the command hallucination using an indirect directive rather than an assertion, for instance, frames it as slightly more coercive.

The directives listed in Table 7.13 are ordered in what I perceive as increasing deontic modality or obligation. In Excerpt 225, the choice of the verb *ordered* represents the schizophrenic person as less capable of resisting. One of the felicity conditions for a command is a secure power base, which suggests that the schizophrenic person perceived the hallucination as more powerful than they were. That said, functionalising the agent as a *druggie* may suggest that the individual obliquely intended to kill given the reported link between schizophrenia and drug use reported elsewhere. Elliott (1996:92) alludes to this in his discussion of psychosis and responsibility, when he suggests that ‘[a]mphetamine intoxication, for example, may cause delusions of persecution, and this is obviously a condition which the sufferer bears a considerable amount of responsibility for acquiring.’ Bailey (2005) has observed that addiction implies the failure to take responsibility for oneself. Thus, the representation of schizophrenic people who kill as addicts may reflect an older Roman discourse where people were judged responsible for having a mental disorder because of their weak character or resilience (Hinshaw, 2007).

(225) THE Bulgarian druggie accused of beheading a British gran in Tenerife said voices in his head **ordered** him to kill. (*The Star*, 19 February 2013).

The collocate *mission* is used to represent people with schizophrenia as having believed they had been sent on a mission to kill by God. As God may be viewed as culturally holding a strong power base, this frames the speech act that is difficult to resist (see

Excerpt 226). However, in this excerpt, Sutcliffe's testimony is framed as direct speech which is a potential distancing strategy used to undermine its authenticity.

(226) Many of his victims were prostitutes and Sutcliffe told authorities that "the voice of God" sent him on a **mission** to kill them. (*independent.co.uk*, 4 October 2015).

The language used to represent the act of sending the schizophrenic person on a mission is in some cases vague, and issues of intentionality are ambiguous. Compare the Excerpts 227 and 228 below which report on the same story but which are published in two different newspapers. The story involves Michael Abram, a man with schizophrenia who attempted to kill former Beatle George Harrison but was cleared on the grounds of diminished responsibility. The first excerpt suggests that the mission is given by an auditory hallucination, while the second seems to suggest that the mission was decided upon by the individual themselves. This is because, grammatically, the possessive determiner *his*, which premodifies *mission*, is ambiguous as to whether it was devised by him or just given to him. An alternative reading is possible here, but I argue that, because God is not mentioned at all, the language used makes this interpretation slightly less possible. Once again, we see the press using ellipsis to exploit ambiguities in order to hint at meanings suggestive of increased responsibility.

(227) The former heroin addict admitted being on a **mission** from God to kill Harrison. (*The Mirror*, 16 November 2000).

(228) A DERANGED Beatles fan who believed it was his **mission** to kill George Harrison was yesterday ordered to be detained indefinitely in a top security mental. (*The Express*, 16 November 2000).

The collocate *urging* instead represents the hallucinations as being more persuasive, rather than simply domineering. In Excerpt 229, the hallucination is represented as tempting the individual into an immoral action rather than ordering them

(229) He said that he had heard voices in his head **urging** him to kill and pleaded to be admitted. (*The Sun*, 27 June 2002).

Lastly, the collocates *drove* and *compelled* are suggestive of the most amount of coercion exercised by the voices and the least amount of volition exercised by the individual (see Excerpts 230 and 231). The word *compelled* is actually etymologically formed from the Latin verb *pellere* meaning 'to drive'. In Excerpt 230, the word *drove* invites the metaphorical construal where the schizophrenic individual is conceptualised as a vehicle and the hallucination as operating the controls. This would suggest that the hallucination has entirely taken control of their actions and made them commit the crime. However, symptoms of schizophrenia are framed as the agent of *drove* in only 5/18 instances of *drove* as a collocate.

(230) He is claiming to be still suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Sutcliffe says he has begun hearing the "voice of God" again. When he was sentenced in 1981, he claimed voices in his head **drove** him to kill. (*The Star*, 6 December 2015).

In Excerpts 231 and 232, drugs are represented as making schizophrenic people kill rather than their psychotic symptoms. Emerging research suggests that when a drug use comorbidity is factored into the analysis, schizophrenic people are no more likely to commit violent crimes than the general population (Fazel *et al.*, 2009a). This suggests that violent crime is caused by drug use, and not psychotic symptoms per se. Excerpts 232 and 233 may be contrasted with other examples where schizophrenic people take drugs before going on to kill (see Excerpts 231 and 232) which represent the agent as more blameworthy on the grounds of oblique intention (see above). In contrast, in these excerpts, drugs are represented as a grammatical actor that has agency over the schizophrenic person, and thus suggests that they were less responsible on the grounds of reduced capacity.

(231) Cannabis '**drove** boy to kill mother' (*The Times*, 25 September 2014).

(232) THE father of a young fashion designer stabbed to death by a former pupil of Harrow school who went on to Oxford University yesterday blamed both institutions for failing to tackle the "despicable" drug culture that **drove** the student to kill. (*The Telegraph*, 13 July 2007).

7.4. Conclusions

This chapter examined the ways in which the press contextualise violence committed by schizophrenic people in terms of responsibility. While the press may explicitly represent schizophrenic people as more or less responsible by referring to legal verdicts (e.g. *on the grounds of diminished responsibility, by reason of insanity*), they typically achieve this more subtly by contextualising references to violent crimes in terms of various criteria of blame. Table 7.14 categorises the various collocates according to whether they are typically used in contexts that represent schizophrenic people as more or less responsible for their crimes.

Table 7.14 Collocates of words referring to violent crime and whether they typically suggest moral responsibility

Suggestive of responsibility (24)	Suggestive of reduced responsibility (60)
<p><i>chose, decided, evil, fantasies (2), first-degree, going, harboured, hatred, intended, intending, intent, obsessed, planned (2), planning, plot, plotting, thoughts, threatened, threatening, threats, victim (5), victims (4), want, wanted</i></p>	<p><i>acquitted, after (6), allowed, because, before (7), believed (3), believed (3), by (2), commanding, compelled, crazed, demons, despite (2), diminished, disturbed (2), drove, feared, felt, free, freed, god, grounds, had (2), head (3), heard, ill (3), illness (2), manslaughter, mental (2), mentally (5), might, mission, motiveless, ordered, paranoid (3), paranoid, patient (3), patients (2), psychotic, random (2), reason, released, saying, schizophrenic (8), schizophrenics (2), second-degree,</i></p>

	<p><i>supernatural, telling, then (3), thought, told (2), unprovoked (2), urging, voices, warned, went, when (2), while (2), would, wanted</i></p>
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Of the 84 collocates referring to responsibility, 60 typically contextualise violence committed by schizophrenic people in terms of reduced responsibility. This suggests that when the press use words relating to responsibility to contextualise violent crimes committed by schizophrenic people, they typically do so in a way that reduces blame. This is reassuring, as, in cases where schizophrenic people commit violent crimes, issues of agency, intentionality and responsibility are often problematized and called into question. The majority of these collocates either contextualise violence in terms of reduced capacity (33), that is, their reduced ability to exercise psychological or even physical control over their own behaviour, or the failures of medical institutions for violating their institutional obligations to keep people safe (12). Interestingly, where the press attribute responsibility to authorities, they typically do so using implicit strategies such as conventionalised implicature (i.e. the use of conjunctives) or by exploiting ambiguities in prepositions (e.g. *freed to kill*). This may be a way for the press to implicate the authorities without explicitly saying so. Blaming people for someone's death is a serious affair, and, especially in complex moral situations such as these, where the blameworthy actors cannot be easily determined and are otherwise not clean cut, blaming institutions explicitly may incur a serious risk.

On the other hand, 24 of the 84 collocates potentially framed people with schizophrenia who kill as responsible for their crimes. Almost all of these collocates do so by appealing to intention (21), either by explicitly referring to the actions as intentional or by referring to them as premeditated. Alluding to intention without contextualising it appropriately may be misleading in cases where schizophrenic people were convicted on the grounds of diminished responsibility, as notions of intention are problematized when people's actions are based on false beliefs.

Of course, this is not the entire story. In this chapter, I have only examined cases where the press explicitly contextualise references to killing using words referring to responsibility. As we have seen, given our intentionality bias, we are likely to interpret actions as intentional (and their agents, therefore, as responsible) even in cases where the text does not allude to responsibility. While the collocates examined make up a large proportion of references to violence committed by people with schizophrenia, it may well be the case that the majority of references do not mention these words at all, and we as readers are therefore more likely to view the individuals involved as responsible. Future research might consider examining a smaller sample of articles referring to violence committed by schizophrenic people, and observe how often the press contextualise such violence using words relating to responsibility.

The analysis also suggested that the press represented moral responsibility in a simplistic way. Almost all of the collocates direct blame at somebody, whether that be schizophrenic people or medical authorities. Where schizophrenic people are

represented as being less responsible, medical authorities are blamed, and when schizophrenic people are implicated, medical authorities are not usually mentioned. The only exceptions are *motiveless* and *random*, although even these always occur in articles where blame is attributed to medical authorities. Thus, this chapter seems to suggest that, even in contexts where moral responsibility is a complex affair, the press continue to cast actors as clear-cut victims and villains. This may relate to the news value of ‘simplification’ (Jewkes, 2015). As stories involving schizophrenic people who kill are often morally complex, the press therefore usually represent stories in a way that ensures that readers view such stories from a unanimous moral position. It is also the case that stories which are more simple in their moral angle as more easily digestible and therefore available to a wider audience. However, the press’ tendency to simplify stories may reflect and appeal to a broader human tendency to look for blameworthy actors in stories where people are harmed. Negative events have been shown to typically elicit an increased interest in causal explanations (Taylor, 1991) and, given the presence of a victim, people will instinctively begin searching for someone who can fit in the role of the villain (Nichols and Knobe, 2007).

This ends the final analysis chapter of the thesis. In the next chapter, I will summarise the main findings from each of the four analysis chapters, reflecting on the broader themes emerging from such findings and the utility of the CADS approach. The chapter will end with a short list of guidelines for journalists to help make their representations of people with schizophrenia more accurate and less prejudiced.

8. Conclusions

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I provide a summary of my findings as well as explore some of the broader implications of my research. In Section 8.2, I recount my main findings by providing short responses to my research questions. From Section 8.3 onwards, I begin to critically reflect on the thesis as a whole, first on the broader patterns observed across the analysis as a whole (Section 8.3.1), and then on potential guidelines for journalists (Section 8.3.2). In Section 8.3.2, reflect on the advantages and limitations of my method, in Section 8.3.3, I discuss the original contributions made by this research, and in Section 8.3.4, I offer some suggestions for future research. In Section 8.4, I offer some concluding remarks.

8.2. Summary of research findings

The analysis was divided into four chapters, each of which addressed a research question listed in Section 1.5. In this section, I explicitly address each of those questions by providing a short summary of the findings gleaned from each of the respective chapters.

- 1) What do lexicogrammatical patterns around words referring to people with schizophrenia say about the way such people are typically represented in the British press?

To answer this question, using the word sketch tool, I examined lexicogrammatical patterns around three lemmas directly referring to schizophrenia – *schizophrenia*, *schizophrenic* (adj.) and *schizophrenic* (n.). The word *schizophrenia* was typically used to refer to the abstract diagnosis and less commonly occurred as part of a label referring to a specific person with the disorder (e.g. *man with schizophrenia*). In either case, schizophrenia was almost always represented in its most extreme and disruptive forms and almost never in its more manageable forms or cases where symptoms are less severe because of successful treatment. Instead, there was a tendency in the press to represent schizophrenia as an autonomous agentive entity, a phenomenon that has also been seen with other diagnoses such as eating disorders (Harvey and Hunt, 2015), BPD (Dyson and Gorvin, 2017) and dementia (e.g. Brookes *et al.*, 2018). These findings are in line with previous research showing that the press tends to represent mental health diagnoses as a whole in their most extreme forms (Wahl *et al.*, 2002). However, focussing on extreme cases at the expense of more typical cases is likely give the public an inaccurate impression. As a consequence, routine readers of the press are likely to perceive all people with schizophrenia as more unpredictable, dangerous and more of a burden on their families and wider society than they are likely to be, potentially leading to avoidance behaviours and increased stigma. Moreover, people diagnosed with the disorder are likely to view their symptoms more negatively and their futures with less hope if representations in the media focus on the worst cases of the disorder.

The lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC functioned as both an adjective and a noun in the corpus. The word *schizophrenic* has previously attracted criticism as it has been viewed as defining people solely via their mental disorder. Indeed, the analysis found that both grammatical forms tended to exhibit problematic usages. For instance, many of the collocates of *schizophrenic* (adj.) suggested a frequent metaphorical usage. This metaphor broadly referred to phenomena exhibiting internal inconsistency, such as a player's vacillating performance throughout a sports match or one's wavering preference for certain styles of clothing. In using these metaphors, the press were drawing on and reproducing a common misconception that schizophrenia is the same as having a split personality disorder (e.g. Jensen *et al.*, 2015). Interestingly, this misconception was rarely expressed explicitly in the data, but rather indirectly reproduced primarily by way of the metaphorical usage. There are various negative implications to spreading confusion about the disorder via these metaphors. First, people who experience symptoms of schizophrenia for the first time are likely to respond with confusion and panic if they are unfamiliar with symptoms and cannot readily associate them with a diagnostic label. By the same token, family members and friends are likely to respond negatively to people experiencing psychotic symptoms if they cannot associate them with a diagnostic label.

Words belonging to the lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) typically occurred in contexts where people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were represented via 'identification' (van Leeuwen, 2008). This is where people are identified with reference to one semi-permanent feature of themselves (cf. gays, the disabled). These words tended to occur in contexts where people with schizophrenia were represented as being inherently violent

and dangerous, although this is never explicitly stated, and instead suggested via broader discursive strategies. A number of strategies were identified such as quoting lay diagnoses that diagnosed people as schizophrenic solely on the basis of violent behaviour, or grammatically co-ordinating SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) with social groups defined by their potential for violence (e.g. *psychopath, alcoholic*). It was noted that the contexts in which SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) occurred offered a distorted picture of what the majority of people with schizophrenia are like. In fact, the vast majority of people with the disorder are unlikely to be violent (Fazel and Grann, 2009) and are instead more likely to be the victims of violent crime (Brekke *et al.*, 2001). Instead, the distortion of the truth may be a result of journalists' choosing stories that appeal to the news values of 'unexpectedness' and 'negativity' (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) (see Section 8.3.1.4 below).

- 2) What distinctive words are used by the tabloids and broadsheets when reporting on stories that mention schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia?

To answer this question, I examined the top 100 strongest keywords for the tabloids and broadsheets when the two subcorpora are compared against each other. The tabloid keywords suggested a distinctive tendency to represent people with schizophrenia as criminals who have enacted violent crime. Some of the tabloid keywords were also suggestive of a sensationalistic style. For instance, the keywords *body* and *blood*, and the contexts in which they occurred, oriented to the macabre details of violent crime using language redolent of the horror fiction genre. Drawing on a lexicon redolent of the

horror genre, and describing violence and gore in gruesome terms, has the effect of simplifying events into clear victims and villains, thus appealing to the news value of 'simplification' (Jewkes, 2015). However, such stories are often morally complex, involving many causal factors, where responsibility is shared among a number of third parties. As a consequence, the tabloids may be implicitly attributing more blame to schizophrenic people who commit violent crimes than they deserve. Elsewhere, the tabloids represented schizophrenic people in the context of entertainment. This mainly comprised articles which discussed events that had occurred in the soap opera *Emmerdale* which featured a character with schizophrenia. It was noted that the press often made use of more explicitly simplistic and reductive language in describing the character's illness than were found elsewhere in the data, perhaps because journalists may feel more at liberty to draw on stereotypes around mental illness and schizophrenia when reporting on fictional characters.

The keywords in the broadsheets signalled a marked difference in the distinctive way they reported on schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia. For instance, while a large proportion of broadsheet keywords were also grouped under the topic of entertainment, they instead referred to aspects of high culture, such as art and literature, as opposed to soap operas and television celebrities. Many of these stories posited a potentially problematic link between psychosis and creativity. Schizophrenia is a serious mental disorder that is often very debilitating when not treated, and thus, only a minority of people with schizophrenia are likely to be successful creatively. As a result, these representations may result in unmet expectations or contribute to feelings of inadequacy or hopelessness. These representations may be viewed as parallel to the

stereotype that people with autism and Asperger's are in possession of a special skill or talent (Draaisma, 2009). Also, while the tabloids almost exclusively approach schizophrenia from a psychopathological or broadly biomedical perspective, the broadsheets also sometimes draw on perspectives from psychoanalysis which are problematic because they are difficult to falsify, by way of practitioners like Freud and R. D. Laing. Whereas articles themselves were often critical of psychoanalytic approaches, some select letters from readers, published in *The Guardian*, suggest that readers are more sympathetic to this view than journalists.

- 3) How could one use corpus techniques to examine ways in which the press represent schizophrenic people as moral agents of violent crime?

Before it was possible to approach question 4, it was first necessary to develop a method for analysing the linguistic representation of moral responsibility. Despite increasingly being viewed as a socially constructed phenomenon, negotiated through linguistic acts (e.g. Solin and Ostman, 2012), to date, no CDS research has examined the representation of moral responsibility beyond the representation of agency and causality (see Fairclough, 1989; Dreyfus, 2014). Drawing on research conducted by Guglielmo and colleagues, I developed a list of categories of evidence that readers typically use as criteria in making a blame judgement. These included *agency*, *intentional(ality)*, *reasons*, *obligation* and *capacity*. In light of evidence suggesting that language users are biased towards interpreting acts as intentional unless additional information is available (Rosset, 2008), I resolved to examine collocates of the top most

frequent words referring to violence committed by schizophrenic people in the corpus that appealed to these types of evidence. This would enable me to examine how the press typically contextualise violence enacted by schizophrenic people and how readers are likely to view the agents in terms of moral blame.

How do the press typically contextualise violence committed by people with schizophrenia using language?

In Chapter 7, I applied the methodological framework developed in Chapter 6 to my data. This involved examining the top 100 collocates of each of the ten most frequent violence word forms for words that appealed to the criteria of responsibility discussed in Section 6.3. The analysis revealed some of the frequent ways that the British press contextualised violent crimes enacted by schizophrenic people in terms of moral responsibility. For instance, words appealing to legal definitions of responsibility (i.e. legal verdicts) only made up a small proportion of cases. Instead, the press tended to orient to responsibility more subtly by indirectly appealing to implicit criteria typically used by individuals as evidence for blame judgements. The majority of the collocates appealed to capacity and obligation. Words appealing to capacity are unsurprising given that psychotic symptoms may, in extreme cases, may restrict one's personal agency and volition, and thus reduce one's capacity to act morally. On the other hand, words appealing to *obligation* were used to attribute vicarious blame at medical professionals for not responding to the possible threat posed by schizophrenic people appropriately. The analysis also revealed that the press represented volition in misleading ways. For

instance, the press would characterise some schizophrenic people, who had received reduced sentences, as intending or desiring to kill, even though intention and desire are often problematised in cases where people suffer from psychosis and commit crimes. Because of this, people with the disorder may feel that will be blamed for behaviour that is prompted by psychotic symptoms and out of their control. One of the reasons that this may be in the press' interests, is that it helps package the story in a way that appeals to the news value of 'simplification' (Jewkes, 2015), where complex or nuanced stories are simplified into a villain vs. victim narrative (see above).

8.3. Critical reflection

8.3.1. *Broader patterns in the data*

8.3.1.1. *Exploitation of ambiguities*

In answering these questions, a number of broader patterns and themes emerged which are worthy of more detailed consideration. For instance, in all the analysis chapters, inaccurate or prejudiced representations of schizophrenic people were almost never conveyed explicitly in the language but implicitly through language manipulation and implied meaning. These findings are in line with Page's (1998) observation that the press often express problematic attitudes by way of insinuation rather than stating them outright. These were often suggested via ambiguities in meaning. Some of the most interesting ambiguities came from grammatical features, which are sometimes neglected in CADS research (although see McEnery, 2005). Many of these were found in Chapter

7. For instance, elliptical forms of complex prepositions (e.g. in *freed to kill*) were potentially used to attribute blame indirectly and temporal conjunctives seemed to be used as causal conjunctions in order to posit reasons why people with schizophrenia killed. However, interesting grammatical features were found in other chapters. For instance, the word *released*, which emerged as a keyword in the tabloid subcorpus, tended to occur in the colligation *released into*. Through close concordance analysis, this colligation was found to exhibit a semantic prosody that potentially characterised schizophrenic people being cared for in the community as pollutants. These patterns indicate that the press reproduce more extreme and controversial representations suggestively rather than explicitly. One of the advantages of implying rather than stating meanings is that they can be denied by the text producer. That is, the author is able to dismiss the implied meaning as unintentional or even accuse readers who make the inference of reading meanings into the text, thus escaping censure by independent regulators. Sometimes, the journalist will appeal to the literal definition of the word in order to justify their word choices. This has already been seen in responses to previous criticisms. For instance, a report on the *Time to Talk* website recounts how an email was sent to the BBC criticising the use of the potentially reductive word *schizophrenic*, whereupon the BBC responded by appealing to the dictionary definition of the word.³⁴ However, appealing to the dictionary definitions of words fails to acknowledge that the meanings and implications of words depends on their usage in context. Dictionary entries abstracted from usage tell us very little.

³⁴ <https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/blog/schizophrenic-man-bbc-media-language>

8.3.1.2. *Emerging discourses (as context-specific vocabulary)*

In Chapter 2, a discourse was defined first as a genre or profession specific vocabulary used to achieve a set of goals specific to that domain. The analysis has shown that the press often draw on a populist or lay discourse to represent people with schizophrenia. This included, for instance, the quoting of lay opinions about schizophrenia (*Lanza dubbed his son Adam 'evil'*), or language that represents symptoms of mental health problems in a simplistic and dismissive way (e.g. *psycho, bonkers*). This seems to be part of a broader process of conversationalisation, where everyday, conversational language is increasingly used by the media to report on hard news or specialist topics (Fairclough, 1995:10). One of the potential reasons for this process is that it helps align texts with the news value of simplification and thus helps garner a wider audience. However, by drawing on the lexicon associated with another discourse, we use words which are designed to suit the intentions of that discourse (Bakhtin, 1981). A lay discourse has evolved to communicate everyday issues in a way that is inclusive and can be easily processed by the majority of the public. Lay discourses are useful, and we all make use of them from time to time. However, there are many reasons why this discourse is unsuitable for the reporting on stories involving people with schizophrenia. For instance, it entails the mixing of specialist and lay discourses, which can mean that psychiatric labels are easily distorted and misunderstood. Diagnostic labels are part of a specialist medical discourse, and have been developed and employed in order to describe symptoms of disease or deformity with precision. This helps guarantee that people with illnesses are diagnosed accurately and receive treatment specific to their needs. However, by mixing lay and medical discourses, diagnostic terms are described

using conversational language that is at best simplistic and, at worst inaccurate. A case in point were the tabloid stories describing the events in the soap opera *Emmerdale* which featured a character with schizophrenia. On the one hand, the character, Zoe, is referred to explicitly as having schizophrenia (after all, the sampling frame dictated that an article had to at least feature *schizophrenia* or related words), but elsewhere described using language such as *going bonkers* or *loony*. As a consequence, the diagnostic label of schizophrenia, which many people find useful in understanding their symptoms and explaining them to others, were associated with simplistic and dismissive language. The same can also be said of journalists' use of the popular metaphor which equates schizophrenia with a split personality disorder. Or where people with schizophrenia who have killed people are described as having been *fed up with her nagging* or having *intended to kill*. Here, complex moral issues are being represented in simplistic terms, which distorts the wider picture.

The tabloid press also drew on a discourse redolent of horror genres. Horror discourse serves two functions: first, to entertain audiences by exposing them to safe danger, and second, to suggest to us what we should fear. As the horror author Stephen King (1981:64) writes, 'the creator of horror fiction is above all else an agent of the norm'. It is for these two reasons that a horror discourse may be viewed as problematic in the context of reporting on people with schizophrenia. On the one hand, it trivialises stories involving human tragedies by construing them as sources of entertainment, and on the other, it invites us as readers to fear rather than empathise with people with schizophrenia, many of whom are victims themselves (of stigma, problems with healthcare etc.). There were also cases identified in Chapter 4 where the mind of a

person with schizophrenia was framed as an object of entertainment or curiosity (e.g. *pulling us into the mind of a paranoid schizophrenic*), where little attention was paid to the lived experience of the disorder and the problems it can cause on health and wellbeing. The tendency for the tabloids to draw on a discourse associated with entertainment may be viewed as a symptom of a broader process where news is increasingly becoming a channel for entertainment rather than information. As Franklin (1997:72) writes, ‘the history of the British press, since the emergence of popular journalism, has been a history of newspapers increasingly shifting its editorial emphasis towards entertainment’. There are several reasons why the press might choose to do this. For instance, using language redolent of entertainment genres packages stories in a way that makes them more readable and attractive to consumers, thus maximising circulation figures. In addition the very process of interdiscursivity, of blending discourses associated with hard news and entertainment, enables newspapers to appeal to groups with different sets of interests and thus reach a larger audience. Drawing on an entertainment discourse may also serve a political purpose. Framing stories as entertainment invites readers to let their critical guard down, and thus more easily discursively and ideologically indoctrinate or persuade their readership. This has been a concern of Marxist cultural critics. For instance, the Frankfurt School critic Theodor Adorno saw the growing emphasis towards entertainment in the media and less on training the populace to think critically, as symptomatic of what he called the ‘culture industry’ (that is, the increasingly mass-produced nature of information and the arts). As Adorno ([1944] 122:136) writes, ‘the culture industry remains the entertainment business. Its influence over the consumers is established by entertainment.’ In doing so, the media invites us to temporarily suspend our critical faculties and yet expose its

audience to discourses and ideologies favoured by social elites. This view is also taken by Fairclough (1995:13) who observes that hard news is increasingly being framed as entertainment. He writes that ‘there is a diversion of attention and energy from political and social issues ... people are constructed as spectators of events rather than participating citizens (ibid.)’. Thus, by construing stories where people with schizophrenia kill others as entertainment, journalists help ensure that readers are unlikely to view the (usually highly simplified) moral stance they take in their articles critically.

8.3.1.3. *Broader discourses and ideologies*

In Section 2.1.1.2, a discourse was also associated with a broader meaning, as a certain theoretic position on how the world exists. In other words, they are an expression of what the text producer believes to be (or at least presents as being) ‘the facts’. On the other hand, an ideology was defined as a moral/ethical position which prioritised certain discourses and provided a framework for effective action. Discourses and ideologies go hand in hand. After all, it is not possible to determine how we should act (our ethical framework) unless we have a certain conception of the world (our theoretical position). In this way, discourses and ideologies will often be suggestive of their counterparts. For instance, an ideology calling for the tighter immigration restrictions is likely to call to mind a discourse whereby immigrants are viewed as problematic in some way. Likewise, a racist discourse that constructs white people as superior to other races is likely to be suggestive of an ideology which privileges white races.

Despite their heterogeneity, the various representations of people with schizophrenia identified in the data seemed to mutually elaborate on one another, and, between them, form a logical consistency, which itself suggests a discourse. Indeed, this is one of the effective ways of identifying influential discourses. As Mills (2004:15) observes, ‘a discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context’. Thus, representations, as manifest through sequences of linguistic choices, sketch out a bigger picture than each representation taken alone. The most salient discourse identified was one that represented people with schizophrenia as a threat to wider society. All of these were first identified in Chapter 4, in the tabloids and the broadsheets, but were often identified in subsequent chapters as well. This discourse incorporated a range of representations (see Table 8.1), including the representation of violent behaviour as a primary symptom of the disorder, and the representation that people with schizophrenia always experience florid symptoms (and rarely people managing well with their symptoms). There was also the discourse whereby people with schizophrenia were represented as ‘dormant volcanoes’ (O’Brien, 2013:85). This was elaborated and legitimised by drawing parallels between schizophrenia and a multiple personality disorder (thus suggestive of a sudden change in character), and reporting on risks that popular everyday habits (e.g. eating a plate of pasta, owning a cat, consuming cannabis etc.) could suddenly trigger an episode. Given that florid episodes of schizophrenia are almost always represented as violent, the logical inference that a reader is likely to make, is that these seemingly innocuous behaviours are able to trigger a violent response in the most unlikely of people.

Table 8.1 The discourse that people with schizophrenia pose a threat

Discourse	Representations
People with schizophrenia pose a risk	People with schizophrenia are unpredictable and dangerous
	Violence is a primary symptom of schizophrenia
	People with schizophrenia always experience florid symptoms
	People with schizophrenia may be 'dormant volcanoes'
	Schizophrenia is the same as multiple personality disorder
	Everyday habits can trigger schizophrenia
	Mothers with schizophrenia are a threat to their children
	Sons with schizophrenia are a threat to their parents
	Dangerous people with schizophrenia are routinely cared for in the community
	The prognosis of schizophrenia is never good.

The ideological counterpart to the discourse constructing people with schizophrenia as a threat is a right wing ideology calling for dangerous patients to be institutionalised in secure units. Evidence for this was most obvious in Chapter 5, where keywords relating to incarceration were identified in the tabloid subcorpus. Here, the press exhibited anxieties about potentially patients being cared for in the community (*allowed to roam the streets unsupervised*) and relief when dangerous patients are returned to secure units indefinitely (*held in Broadmoor indefinitely*). An ideology restricting the freedoms of people with mental illness in the tabloid press has also been identified by Foster (2006) who identified language suggestive of a positive attitude towards the 2002 Mental Health Bill. This legislated that people with mental illnesses could be compulsorily detained and given medication, even in cases where they hadn't committed any crimes.

Thus, representations of discourses around people with schizophrenia seem to take on the structure of a moral panic, which has been touched on by previous scholars (e.g. Anderson, 2003:298). Cohen (1972:1) defines a moral panic as ‘a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media.’ Thus, people with schizophrenia appear to be represented in the press as what Cohen (1972:2) calls ‘folk devils’, that is, where a social group becomes a morally transgressive concept, ‘visible reminders of what we should not be.’ The reporting around people with schizophrenia also contains many of the language features associated with moral panic discourse. This includes for instance, the use of sensationalist language or ‘over-reporting’, that represents transgressive entities and behaviours as worse than they probably are, and the tendency to amplify risks posed by a social group. (Cohen, 1972:19-20). There was even a tendency identified by Cohen, where ‘neutral words such as place-names can be made to symbolise complex ideas and emotions’ (p. 7). For instance, murderers were sometimes referred to by way of the location of the psychiatric hospital they were being treated in (e.g. *Broadmoor killer*). Unfortunately, there was not the space to explore this in more detail. Perhaps future research could investigate the role people with schizophrenia play at the centre of moral panic discourse in the press in more detail, perhaps by locating some of the narrative elements of moral panics identified by McEnery (2005).

That said, a couple of less frequent representations emerged from the data which challenged the dominant discourse that people with schizophrenia pose a risk. For instance, we saw in Chapter 4 that both the tabloids and broadsheets were beginning to

print articles challenging the view that people with schizophrenia were a risk to others, and instead represented them as either unlikely to be violent or as more of a risk to themselves. Additionally, there was a relatively frequent representation in the broadsheets representing people with schizophrenia as creatively gifted. However, this did not necessarily contradict the discourse that people with schizophrenia were a risk to others, as some artists that were represented, such as Richard Dadd, produced their best work in psychiatric prisons after committing a crime.

A second dominant discourse in the data was a moral one, which represented people with schizophrenia as intentional agents of immoral acts. This likewise captures a number of representations (see Table 8.2). For instance, people with schizophrenia were represented as manipulative and, in some cases, were confused with psychopaths (*was he a schizophrenic or a potential psychopath?*). This was coupled with examples describing people with schizophrenia who had committed crimes as *evil*, and sometimes likening such people to characters from horror cinema and literature. That is not to say that there may be cases where criminals may lie to psychiatrists about having schizophrenia in order to incur a lighter sentence, or that psychiatrists may misdiagnose individuals. After all, a free press plays an important role in a democracy. It provides an impartial commentary on national affairs independent of government control. As such, it can expose legal bias or provide a counter-voice on important issues. In the context of court trials where the issue of personal responsibility is contentious, for instance, the press may potentially play an important role in calling out injustices. However, these needs to be based on firm evidence. They cannot be based on suspicions or stereotypes. There were cases, for instance, prevalent in *The Mail*, where individuals were indirectly

blamed for their crimes on the basis that the onset of their diagnosis was their own fault, as they used recreational drugs (primarily cannabis). However, research on the link between drug use and schizophrenia is still contentious in the medical literature, with more recent work suggesting that both drug addiction and the onset of schizophrenia share a similar genetic aetiology.

Neither can it be based on one's gender, appearance or celebrity status, as seems to be the case with the reporting on the actress Amanda Bynes. Language used to describe her criminal acts in the tabloids represented her as experiencing them passively, as if she had little control over her actions (*the star experienced a series of run-ins with the law*). It was noted that this representation, in contrast to others (usually men) provided evidence for the 'chivalry hypothesis' in reporting on people with mental illnesses. It is irresponsible of a press to invite their sizeable readership to condemn individuals who are already potentially suffering from a frightening and debilitating mental condition on the basis of stereotypes, hunches or hearsay, especially in cases where a court verdict has already been arrived at. Instead, the press must therefore be prepared to hedge their bets until firm or convincing evidence comes to light. They must be responsible in matter of responsibility.

The discourse constructing people with schizophrenia as criminals may be a reflection of a broader set of neoliberal discourses and ideologies where people are viewed as autonomous individuals and who should be viewed as personally responsible for the choices they make. As a consequence, these discourses legitimise ideologies calling for

less lenient court sentences (*judges...should show “courage” and declare the mass murderer sane*) and for potentially ill people to be treated as criminals, and punished in standard prisons rather than psychiatric prisons (*it should be a normal prison*). This individualistic view of crime – captured by Jewkes’ (2015) news value of ‘individualism’ (see Section 2.2.1) – also tends to side line broader social and political reasons why people commit violent crime, and calls for moral rather than political solutions.

Table 8.2 The discourse that schizophrenic people as intentional criminals

Discourse	Representations
People with schizophrenia are criminals	People with schizophrenia are manipulative liars
	Criminals pretend to have schizophrenia to incur lighter sentences
	It’s their fault people develop schizophrenia because they take recreational drugs or live an unhealthy lifestyle
	People with schizophrenia are evil

8.3.1.4. *News values*

All of the representations discussed above can be explained using news values. The underlying cause of almost all of the patterns identified is the tension between reporting stories accurately, and packaging them in way so they that are newsworthy and help maximise circulation. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, ever-decreasing circulation figures are likely to entail an ever-increasing focus on what is newsworthy over what is accurate and relevant. This means that stories involving schizophrenic people will only

‘make the cut’ as it were, if they evoke a strong reaction in the reader (e.g. if the story is exciting, inspirational, horrifying etc). Indeed, it may be the case that journalists not only desire to package stories as newsworthy but that they themselves tend to be drawn to reporting on exceptional cases over normal ones. This may be a result of broader cognitive processes, as humans tend to be drawn towards what is salient over what is frequent. This means that only people with schizophrenia who are also exceptional in some way get reported on. That is not to say they need to be exceptional in a negative way, as representations of people with schizophrenia as creative geniuses have demonstrated. However, at no point during the analysis did a story emerge where an average person with schizophrenia was represented as living their lives or even that their schizophrenia was presented as somewhat incidental. Thus, the problem is not so much one of inaccuracy - after all, people with schizophrenia did commit these crimes and some do succeed in creative disciplines - but one of imbalance. The press choose to represent the worst cases or best cases of people with schizophrenia – that is, either murderers or geniuses – and not representing those in between very much, who are the vast majority. This is likely to distort dominant public discourses. For instance, Hinshaw (2007:1) has discussed the ‘outgroup homogeneity effect’, which is a cognitive process we tend to view outgroups as similar. If we typically read about people with schizophrenia being murderers and geniuses we are likely to attribute those traits to the group (people with schizophrenia) as a whole. When we encounter an average person with schizophrenia, we are likely to impose these expectations on them.

8.3.2. *Guidelines*

The analysis has showed that, in articles reporting on people with schizophrenia, the press collectively do violate IPSO's code of practice, namely rule (1), not to publish inaccurate or misleading information, and rule (12), not to reference a person's mental illness in a prejudiced way. Nevertheless, there are currently no complaints documented on the IPSO website regarding how the press represent people with schizophrenia or of people with mental illnesses as a whole. One reason for this is that IPSO seems to accept complaints made against a specific wording in a specific article, whereas the problematic representations identified in my analysis tend to be a result of imbalanced representations across multiple articles. Additionally, many of the problematic representations of schizophrenic people are suggestive rather than explicit, so journalists may easily respond by claiming that only the literal meaning was intended. With these considerations in mind, I propose a set of guidelines for journalists who are interested in making their language used to represent people with schizophrenia more tolerant and inclusive. Guidelines must strike a balance between being not so draconian that they foster a 'loop-hole seeking' frame of mind (Harris, 1992:64) and not so vague that they can be misinterpreted or argued against (Page, 1998:131). The language used in the following five guidelines has been tailored to reflect these considerations.

1. Given widespread misunderstandings of schizophrenia, it would be helpful if in articles in which the diagnostic term *schizophrenia* or related words are mentioned, the author made reference to the main symptoms of the disorder (i.e. hallucinations and delusions). This would help dispel some of the myths around the disorder (e.g.

schizophrenia as multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia as a disorder that refers to violent people).

2. Journalists should try to quote people with schizophrenia (especially outside of the context of crime) in order to provide insights into the lived experience of the disorder. Conversely, they should avoid quoting people who express uninformed beliefs relating to schizophrenia.
3. Where relevant and appropriate, stories reporting on violent crime committed by schizophrenic people should be contextualised to account for reduced agency and responsibility. Where reference is made to the desires, intentions and reasons of the assailant, the article should clearly state, where appropriate, that these were influenced by false beliefs. Journalists should especially try to avoid implying that people with schizophrenia performed crimes intentionally when not enough evidence has emerged to suggest so.
4. The press should try to report more on individuals who represent everyday lived experience of schizophrenia (i.e. who are not criminals or putative ‘geniuses’). This would help ensure that the press do not implicitly suggest that the majority of people with schizophrenia are violent or inherently creative.

5. The press should refrain from framing stories as entertainment when they involve significant human tragedy or suffering. This includes, for instance, violent crimes enacted by people with schizophrenia.

These guidelines may strike some readers as idealistic. However, it is important to identify the end goal towards which changes in the press should ultimately be moving. From here, awareness campaigners who draw on the findings of this research may want to suggest more gradual changes if they feel they are more likely to be appropriated by journalists.

Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that the guidelines are in harmony with the values and working practices of journalists (see Section 2.2.5). First, these suggestions are in line with the professional ethos espoused by journalists themselves in that they contribute to positive social change (Hanitzsch *et al.*, 2014). By making their reporting more tolerant and accurate, they may help dispel some of the misconceptions that motivate stigma towards people with schizophrenia. Neither are these guidelines likely to jeopardise the newsworthiness of stories. Feature articles that explore the lived experience of having a diagnosis of schizophrenia may be written in a way that appeal to ‘unexpectedness’, in that they challenge readers’ perceptions about schizophrenia. They may also appeal to the value of ‘personalisation’ in that they focus on people rather than abstract concepts or things (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:82). Those stories that involve patients recovering or receiving support will also appeal to the news value of ‘good news’ (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001:1482), stories which are viewed positively by journalists in other countries (Leung and Lee, 2015).

Journalists have also claimed that news selection is to some degree governed by readership interest, especially right-leaning newspapers (Firmstone, 2008). Thus, awareness campaigns should continue challenging negative beliefs and attitudes held by the wider public and inculcate an interest in the lived experience of schizophrenia. If a newspaper's readership becomes increasingly interested in more positive and accurate stories surrounding schizophrenia it is likely that journalists will change their news agenda, and the way they report stories, in order to reflect this. There is reason to think we are approaching a turning point in this regard. For instance, in Chapter 5, there were excerpts from letters sent into *The Guardian* (reproduced in the newspaper) which challenged the journalists' dismissal of more humanistic approaches to psychiatry (see Section 5.3.4). One of the ways in which misconceptions of the disorder (e.g. that it is a split personality disorder, or that violence is a primary symptom) is by changing the diagnostic label. This is not so drastic or radical as it may first appear. For instance, this worked well with bipolar disorder (previously manic-depressive disorder), where changing the diagnostic label helped dispel some of the negative assumption around the disorder. For instance, a study carried out by Ellison, Mason and Scior (2018) showed that the term 'bipolar disorder' tends to elicit less fear and desire for social distance from individuals than the older term 'manic-depressive disorder'. There are additional reasons for changing the label for schizophrenia. As we saw in Section 1.2, the etymology of the word schizophrenia is itself a misnomer as it literally translates as 'split mind', reflecting potentially outdated psychodynamic explanations and perhaps contributing to the misconception that schizophrenia is a split mind disorder. Moreover, there are a number of pejorative terms that closely resemble the form *schizophrenia* (e.g. *schiz*, *schizo*, *schizoid*), which might contribute to prejudice. This would also help

remedy the issue of the metaphorical usage of *schizophrenic*. Language is particularly difficult to police (as previous attempts at political correctness have demonstrated), so calls for the media and the wider public to avoid using the word metaphorically are unlikely to be effective. By redefining the disorder, the media would be able to continue exploiting the metaphorical meaning, without it contributing to misunderstandings of the diagnosis. However, changing diagnostic labels may have a complex effect on public attitudes. Ellison *et al.* (2018) also found that while the term ‘integration disorder’ (an alternative term for schizophrenia now used in Japan) elicited less fear from participants than ‘schizophrenia’, it did elicit more desire for social distance (perhaps owing to its unfamiliarity) and a tendency to view the disorder as having a psychosocial over a biomedical aetiology.

These are considerations not only for journalists, but also for charities organising awareness campaigns. Given dominant representations uncovered in the analysis, public perceptions are likely to be negative. Language doesn’t exist in a vacuum, but is inextricably linked with cognitive processes and social practices (Fairclough, 1989). If schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia are represented primarily through a lexicon that constructs them as violent and dangerous, the only linguistic resources readers have to communicate about people with schizophrenia is a lexicon constructing them as violent and dangerous. Representations in the press to some extent mirror those of their readership. If dominant attitudes towards people with schizophrenia change because of successful awareness campaigns, then newspaper representations may change with them in order maintain circulation figures. Thus, social change can be enacted incrementally at the local level (Mills, 2004; Fairclough, 1989). On the other

hand, as Anderson (2003:204) has pointed out, representations of mentally ill people in the press mirror those of other media, such as representations in horror films. Given that the press report on these films in film listings and reviews, and reproduce stigmatising representations therein, awareness campaigns should also be directed at the film and television industries.

8.3.3. Methodological reflections

Before I offer concluding remarks, in this section, I reflect on the usefulness of my method in helping me address my research questions. Ultimately, my findings could not have been discovered without the use of corpus methods. Most obviously, corpus methods have enabled me to examine patterns in large amounts of language data, and thus identify language features that are typical in the press' reportage as a whole. This circumvents the pitfalls of previous studies that have only focussed on narrow time frames or a select few newspapers given that they carried out a manual analysis.

Examining patterns in a large sample of data revealed that while individual features or articles are rarely explicitly stigmatising themselves, they are part of broader patterns, which cumulatively flesh out a larger picture which is implicitly stigmatising.

Moreover, in some cases, the use of a large reference corpus enabled me to examine implications of certain wordings that would not be apparent without corpus tools.

However, there were also several cases where the corpus method as a whole seemed to fall short, or raised further issues for consideration. For instance, when examining lexicogrammatical patterns around the lexeme SCHIZOPHRENIC (n.) in Chapter 4, it

became apparent that its semantic prosody of 'dangerous' was not a result of its collocates per se but the broader discursive devices identified via those collocates. These included quoting lay diagnoses that located violence as a primary symptom, the device of semi-instrumentalisation, which defined schizophrenic people by means of a dangerous weapon and metaphors construing schizophrenic people as animalistic. As corpus techniques are designed to measure the frequency of surface forms (i.e. sequences of characters), the frequency and variety of these broader discursive strategies, given that they are not instantiated in a single surface form, is difficult to measure. This has been touched on by Gabrielatos and Baker (2008:61) who found that the same semantic prosody could be instantiated by any number of different collocations, and were not linked with a single word form.

Similarly, the analysis showed that interesting patterns in the data were not necessarily associated with frequent word forms. A case in point was the tendency to co-ordinate SCHIZOPHRENIC with words referring to identities popularly viewed as potentially dangerous. None of these collocates were high in frequency, and yet viewed together, cumulatively fleshed out a larger picture that was more salient. Thus, these findings were only made available by setting a low frequency threshold for collocates. For this reason, CADS practitioners should be wary of setting arbitrarily high frequency thresholds in case patterns such as these go unnoticed. After all, if the threshold had been set at $n = 10$ (a commonly used threshold), such a pattern would not have been identified.

Another issue with corpus tools arising from the analysis related to collocation span. Collocation tools identify word forms that occur with unusual frequency within a specific word span around the node, and corpus linguists making use of these tools must necessarily choose a span relatively arbitrarily. However, the relationship between words is sometimes interesting across longer distances. This proved to be a limitation in Chapter 7. While I experimented with spans between 5 and 10 (judging the collocates generated to be more or less the same), words referring to the moral capacity of the agent may have occurred outside of this span and informed a reader's interpretation of the violent act in terms of moral responsibility. For instance, evidence at the beginning of the article in the headline, describing the individual's florid symptoms may very well impact the way a reader interprets reference to that individual's violent actions towards the end of the article. To remedy this, additional research would need to be carried out investigating to what extent readers' working memories can process collocation at such longer distances and whether certain types of evidence and the way that are represented linguistically may be more or less memorable to readers. An alternative method to the one used in this thesis may be to consider co-occurrence as well as collocation. That is, whether a word appealing to the responsibility criteria discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 occur *anywhere* in articles representing people with schizophrenia as violent. Again, given potential constraints on working memory, especially in the case of gist readers, it might be better to consider shorter articles over longer ones. Another method would be to consider keywords that relate to these criteria, although one couldn't be certain whether these words occurred in articles where people with schizophrenia are simultaneously represented as violent.

A perennial problem faced by corpus linguistics concerns the large amount of data they have to work with. The corpus used in this thesis was over 50 million words, which is quite large for a specialised corpus. As a result, the analysis often proved a balancing act between surveying large patterns representative of the language in the corpus or subcorpus and focussing on specific instances in context. This has previously been articulated as a tension between breadth and depth (Koller and Mautner, 2005:218). Any study examining hundreds or thousands of texts in tandem, and attempting to describe the relationship between nuanced textual choices and broader socio-cultural forces is prone to veer towards one or the other. Either the analyst is hampered by a textual myopia, focussing on nuanced features in context at the expense of broader political issues, or the analyst finds themselves caught up in their own political agenda at the expense of textual evidence (a tendency which is not uncommon in CDA). There was thus a tension between the two goals of this thesis: on the one hand, to examine language patterns in the press' reportage and the discovery of non-obvious meanings. This inevitably meant that, patterns were not always explored in close qualitative detail and that some broad patterns in the data were not necessarily accounted for. A corpus linguist cannot look at everything and instead must decide on a level of detail to pursue based on their own interests or intuitions.

8.3.4. Originality of research

There are several ways in which this thesis has made an original contribution to academic scholarship. First, and most obviously, this thesis is the first large-scale study examining the representation of schizophrenia and people with schizophrenia in the

media. In contrast to previous research, which has tended to focus on a narrow time span or individual newspapers, this study looked at patterns across a 16 year period and in nine national newspapers. It is also the first study examining the representation of schizophrenia in the media to conduct a close linguistic analysis of how such representations were articulated. Whereas two previous studies have conducted a quasi-linguistic approach (Clement and Foster, 2008; Bowen *et al.*, 2019), these have tended to focus on the distribution of certain words without looking closely at how they are used in context and without considering more subtle forms of language manipulation. The thesis is also the first study in CDS to consider the linguistic construction of moral responsibility in texts. While earlier studies examined the linguistic representation of causality and agency (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; Dreyfus, 2017), this is only one consideration an individual is likely to make when assessing an action or actor in order to make a blame judgement (see Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe, 2014). Finally, the thesis touched on a number of features, themes and issues that have not previously been considered in detail by CADS researchers. These include for instance, how the semantic prosody of a word can relate to agency (see Sections 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.4) and how language used to describe fictional narratives is sometimes less tolerant when referring to marginalised identities (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3).

8.3.5. *Suggestions for future research*

The corpus linguist, faced with so much data, is rarely able to explore all interesting findings in detail. There are therefore several patterns touched on that would warrant further study. For instance, in Section 5.3.3, I found that the broadsheet press exhibited

a tendency to link schizophrenia and mental illness more broadly with creative talent. It would be interesting to interrogate this pattern in more detail, perhaps looking at how mental illness has been associated with arcane talent historically as well (e.g. see Andreason, 1987). Second, having pioneered a basic theoretical and methodological framework for examining the representation of moral responsibility in the context of violence, this opens up a range of possible applications. For instance, future research might apply this framework to examining the representation of other morally contentious events such as accidental killings/deaths or other contexts where people who kill have been coerced.

Future research could also redress some of the shortcomings of this thesis. For instance, negative representations emerged as much more salient in the data than positive stories which were therefore not discussed as much in the analysis. This research could explore positive representations in more detail, for instance by determining their prevalence and revealing ways in which they too may be problematic. Similarly, in Chapter 5 more emphasis was placed on keywords in the tabloids over those in the broadsheets. This was largely because the tabloid keywords were more suggestive of ‘aboutness’ whereas broadsheet keywords were more a result of stylistic differences, which would likely have emerged whatever topic was reported on. Future research could therefore examine representations in the broadsheets more closely. Another shortcoming of the analysis (due to reasons of space) was that it did not consider how representations have changed over time, or how images accompanying news articles could shape or contribute to representations in the copy text. These could be considered in future research. Last, the findings of this thesis may be compared with emerging research conducted by Semino

and colleagues looking at how people who hear voices use language to express their own phenomenological experience of their symptoms (e.g. Demjen *et al.*, 2019). This would help reveal the extent to which the press' reportage of schizophrenia reflected the lived, phenomenological experience of the disorder.

8.4. Concluding remarks

I began this thesis with an excerpt from *The Independent* where a local fisherman warns tourists in New Zealand of the dangers of the school and mako sharks.

- (1) “Wildlife-wise, there are not just hammerhead sharks in these parts, he told me, but school sharks and mako sharks – the paranoid schizophrenics of the shark world (*The Independent*, 2 September 2006).

It should be clear why this relatively creative metaphor was and could be quoted by the journalist. This is because the author could depend on the reader being able to decode the metaphor (and bypass its literal meaning) based on their exposure to a rich intertextual network of meanings, implications and associations in the press constructing people with schizophrenia as violent and dangerous. What I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis is that texts are never interpreted in a vacuum but are informed by a host of other texts within the same discourse whose meanings shape the way we process and understand other texts. As a result, meanings often don't reveal themselves within texts but between texts. And what may seem like a single innocuous

instance is often one piece in a complex jigsaw which reveals a bigger picture of the way we see the world.

9. References

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10. Appendices

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Appendix 2. *violence* (n.) 481

Appendix 2. *killed* (v.) 486

Appendix 2. *kill* (v.) 491

Appendix 2. *shot* (v.) 496

Appendix 2. *stabbed* (v.) 501

Appendix 2. *killing* (v.) 506

Appendix 2. *violent* (adj.) 511

Appendix 2. *dangerous* (adj.) 516

Appendix 1. Keywords for tabloid and broadsheet subcorpora (Chapter 5)

Tabloid keywords

No.	Keyword	Freq.	RC. Freq.	Keyness	p-value
1	her	33845	36381	5705.351563	4.38561E-21
2	was	64668	88671	4062.975342	1.22322E-20
3	she	30094	34876	3961.702393	1.3203E-20
4	said	20908	21782	3857.032471	1.43175E-20
5	he	58122	83074	2843.932129	3.60581E-20
6	gbp	1217	1	2584.716309	4.82063E-20
7	told	7147	5951	2233.287109	7.52046E-20
8	after	14625	16226	2226.757324	7.58784E-20
9	police	7694	6743	2166.009033	8.25511E-20
10	him	14614	17831	1580.214478	2.16412E-19
11	had	25116	35336	1349.366577	3.5152E-19
12	court	5099	4849	1192.646973	5.14324E-19
13	mum	1597	729	1133.134277	6.02473E-19
14	stabbed	1726	866	1114.284546	6.34564E-19
15	holmes	1077	322	1062.619995	7.35064E-19
16	knife	1617	802	1056.550293	7.48231E-19
17	murder	3063	2457	1027.278442	8.16351E-19
18	his	42029	65747	1013.046936	8.52471E-19
19	attack	2525	1839	1001.613708	8.83047E-19

20	killer	1814	1056	988.6563721	9.19494E-19
21	heard	2701	2114	947.4307861	1.04969E-18
22	amanda	755	167	881.2088623	1.31558E-18
23	killed	2605	2155	823.9366455	1.62298E-18
24	yesterday	2546	2083	822.6417847	1.63099E-18
25	scroll	419	10	808.616394	1.72119E-18
26	hospital	5099	5588	806.3512573	1.73638E-18
27	mother	4752	5173	767.3481445	2.02843E-18
28	old	6404	7778	704.366272	2.65554E-18
29	judge	1949	1544	668.7758179	3.12773E-18
30	added	1880	1473	658.1147461	3.29076E-18
31	sutcliffe	871	372	656.9675903	3.30897E-18
32	found	5534	6638	639.0272217	3.61215E-18
33	killling	1847	1458	637.8865356	3.63265E-18
34	bynes	302	3	614.0044556	4.10011E-18
35	cannabis	4470	5117	612.0287476	4.1423E-18
36	i	40587	66391	601.4266968	4.37886E-18
37	kill	1840	1512	589.4952393	4.66712E-18
38	before	6716	8610	586.8626099	4.73411E-18
39	guilty	1546	1160	583.6223755	4.81833E-18
40	year	9703	13403	579.5071411	4.9282E-18
41	jailed	867	443	548.9751587	5.85775E-18

42	ten	1154	749	544.8480835	6.00088E-18
43	officers	1993	1774	542.2645874	6.09285E-18
44	revealed	1274	897	533.2620239	6.42842E-18
45	defense	350	40	523.4771118	6.8217E-18
46	family	5763	7361	512.0390625	7.32318E-18
47	miss	1418	1107	499.5928955	7.92631E-18
48	admitted	1614	1358	493.6929016	8.23544E-18
49	victim	1233	893	493.4887085	8.24642E-18
50	home	5973	7839	467.2070313	9.84019E-18
51	mr	4994	6333	458.2044373	1.04801E-17
52	daughter	2179	2173	451.8959961	1.09619E-17
53	schizophrenic	3837	4581	450.9570313	1.10361E-17
54	son	2935	3248	449.7964783	1.11288E-17
55	savident	282	28	437.9929504	1.2133E-17
56	night	3029	3426	432.0115356	1.26883E-17
57	gun	1023	723	425.671051	1.33145E-17
58	attacked	869	553	421.6805115	1.37299E-17
59	video	1093	811	420.4047546	1.38664E-17
60	death	4531	5732	420.1565857	1.38931E-17
61	tried	1879	1835	411.311615	1.48932E-17
62	shooting	1039	769	401.3058472	1.61438E-17
63	been	15990	24917	397.991272	1.65889E-17

64	cerys	336	73	395.572998	1.6924E-17
65	pc	579	275	395.2566528	1.69685E-17
66	kerry	370	98	392.65448	1.73405E-17
67	cops	356	90	387.7608948	1.80701E-17
68	when	15677	24468	384.400177	1.8595E-17
69	jail	1132	910	378.0397339	1.96455E-17
70	arrested	1105	880	375.4890442	2.00891E-17
71	claimed	1359	1219	363.5718384	2.23481E-17
72	who	21339	34577	353.2653503	2.4583E-17
73	broadmoor	821	569	352.0924683	2.48559E-17
74	mcfadden	246	33	350.5058594	2.52316E-17
75	dad	1009	800	345.6563416	2.64279E-17
76	body	2331	2628	336.0566711	2.90285E-17
77	went	3148	3884	324.7269897	3.25562E-17
78	crown	859	646	322.9966125	3.31445E-17
79	ripper	460	214	320.4607239	3.40326E-17
80	carstairs	239	39	317.9772339	3.49333E-17
81	murdered	791	573	316.4624634	3.54983E-17
82	paranoid	1885	2033	313.109375	3.67931E-17
83	manslaughter	713	487	312.5851135	3.70012E-17
84	husband	1649	1703	310.955658	3.76582E-17
85	stabbing	484	247	306.8536682	3.93823E-17

86	eastenders	338	115	305.6405029	3.99123E-17
87	drug	4140	5499	304.9803772	4.02047E-17
88	months	2792	3413	299.0880737	4.29457E-17
89	shot	1730	1850	294.8639526	4.50659E-17
90	incident	760	561	294.8401794	4.50782E-17
91	brady	721	518	292.3058472	4.64181E-17
92	later	3857	5100	290.6463623	4.73243E-17
93	zoe	304	97	287.42099	4.91544E-17
94	trial	1875	2085	282.8529053	5.19113E-17
95	blood	1621	1722	281.7901306	5.25821E-17
96	attorney	458	242	279.578949	5.40153E-17
97	freed	378	169	273.4707336	5.82549E-17
98	prosecutors	434	223	273.1453247	5.84931E-17
99	pleaded	520	312	272.792572	5.87527E-17
100	also	8059	12117	272.5065002	5.89643E-17

Broadsheet keywords

No.	Keyword	Freq.	RC. Freq.	Keyness	p-value
1	of	272939	117984	3178.057129	2.57406E-20
2	the	507905	233722	2844.660156	3.60301E-20
3	its	14828	3532	2054.434326	9.69964E-20
4	is	104761	43804	1623.364136	1.9926E-19
5	that	109075	46537	1416.916626	3.02484E-19
6	art	2907	376	914.6713867	1.17125E-18
7	book	5142	1200	741.1265259	2.26255E-18
8	or	26976	10523	684.2227783	2.91007E-18
9	novel	2315	391	549.4733887	5.84079E-18
10	are	42378	18076	548.3944092	5.87762E-18
11	books	2483	449	539.7606812	6.18379E-18
12	film	6848	2082	515.8744507	7.14971E-18
13	work	9042	3049	472.4433899	9.49182E-18
14	this	36840	15947	413.7991638	1.46025E-17
15	director	3303	847	390.9553833	1.75893E-17
16	you	30374	12974	387.5561829	1.81015E-17
17	market	1979	421	336.9568481	2.87705E-17
18	world	7806	2755	335.9776611	2.90513E-17
19	about	25999	11122	326.9795227	3.18111E-17
20	us	10070	3773	322.4512939	3.33329E-17

21	century	1926	414	322.2183228	3.34137E-17
22	rather	3934	1171	316.1378479	3.5621E-17
23	billion	965	123	307.6094055	3.90568E-17
24	laing	431	7	306.1072083	3.97073E-17
25	science	1956	439	303.2656555	4.09777E-17
26	artists	832	93	295.7172241	4.46265E-17
27	it's	15218	6187	291.3858032	4.69176E-17
28	as	66143	30825	290.5595703	4.73724E-17
29	fiction	976	135	288.3269348	4.8631E-17
30	music	3475	1024	287.7106628	4.89862E-17
31	american	3418	1002	287.2993774	4.92252E-17
32	self	3695	1113	286.4202881	4.97413E-17
33	cultural	699	73	261.3727417	6.80573E-17
34	project	1322	256	260.9561462	6.84328E-17
35	company	2854	814	259.2188416	7.00287E-17
36	formerly	615	55	255.0444946	7.40715E-17
37	people	21705	9353	254.5572815	7.45634E-17
38	writing	2092	533	251.2166443	7.80568E-17
39	itself	1649	374	250.7893524	7.85193E-17
40	most	11627	4649	250.5132446	7.882E-17
41	an	37482	16985	248.9557648	8.05458E-17
42	human	3859	1230	248.6611023	8.08779E-17

43	says	14208	5848	247.8364716	8.18172E-17
44	it	77837	36971	242.1611938	8.86933E-17
45	some	13413	5497	241.8460846	8.90973E-17
46	sense	2832	827	240.714386	9.05686E-17
47	modern	1756	422	238.7639465	9.31815E-17
48	literary	727	92	233.2208557	1.01178E-16
49	festival	896	141	231.1735687	1.04362E-16
50	between	6641	2451	230.2617798	1.05824E-16
51	genome	509	40	227.5356445	1.10359E-16
52	readers	720	95	222.4299316	1.19575E-16
53	sector	709	94	218.0573883	1.28301E-16
54	might	5770	2099	215.2017365	1.34463E-16
55	ideas	955	169	213.6150055	1.38058E-16
56	novels	643	80	209.3570862	1.48361E-16
57	such	9872	3961	207.6203766	1.52858E-16
58	these	8021	3140	198.6267853	1.79303E-16
59	psychiatry	1290	292	196.9021912	1.85059E-16
60	pounds	3936	1344	195.3448486	1.90469E-16
61	writer	1534	384	191.4884338	2.04807E-16
62	perhaps	2585	793	189.2199249	2.13918E-16
63	theatre	1598	410	188.892334	2.15278E-16
64	freud	448	39	188.8628387	2.15401E-16

65	which	23883	10674	188.7655487	2.15808E-16
66	contemporary	555	66	187.7415771	2.20149E-16
67	stories	1437	354	185.6309814	2.2947E-16
68	poetry	491	51	184.3119507	2.35564E-16
69	exhibition	474	47	183.8116913	2.37932E-16
70	story	3993	1390	182.6236267	2.43684E-16
71	play	3411	1144	182.0058136	2.46748E-16
72	kind	2951	958	178.1236115	2.6723E-16
73	artist	1091	238	177.9260406	2.68332E-16
74	executive	1764	484	177.4994659	2.70732E-16
75	films	1622	433	174.7261047	2.87056E-16
76	what	18259	8040	171.2146759	3.09662E-16
77	than	15703	6823	169.4930725	3.21617E-16
78	interesting	1002	214	169.4666595	3.21805E-16
79	writers	696	117	166.1412048	3.46717E-16
80	there	22140	9942	165.0709534	3.5528E-16
81	write	1570	425	163.4342041	3.68929E-16
82	much	8956	3676	159.5496979	4.04243E-16
83	many	8784	3597	159.292923	4.06734E-16
84	industry	1424	375	158.4816589	4.14738E-16
85	literature	519	70	157.0738983	4.29133E-16
86	astrazeneca	789	152	156.923233	4.30713E-16

87	breivik	985	218	156.6027832	4.34099E-16
88	sales	1215	300	156.1896515	4.38517E-16
89	example	1649	464	155.3506927	4.47675E-16
90	does	4820	1806	154.2443848	4.60146E-16
91	reader	461	56	153.199707	4.72351E-16
92	not	38357	17979	152.3092499	4.83097E-16
93	jewish	585	92	151.0402832	4.98981E-16
94	community	3054	1048	148.4743195	5.33293E-16
95	seems	2968	1012	148.1708374	5.37557E-16
96	works	1629	467	145.8638916	5.71505E-16
97	poet	476	64	144.4857635	5.93159E-16
98	education	1404	382	144.3078918	5.96033E-16
99	growth	905	200	144.2601318	5.96808E-16
100	like	16562	7342	143.9735565	5.96808E-16

Appendix 2. Collocates of word forms referring to violence (Chapter 7)*murder* (n.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
1	attempted	568	1,299	11.486
2	guilty	443	2,700	10.845
3	charged	308	1,309	10.601
4	convicted	258	1,679	10.265
5	manslaughter	196	1,201	9.973
6	counts	173	510	9.958
7	trial	245	3,910	9.785
8	denied	163	1,072	9.737
9	charges	149	1,279	9.560
10	denies	116	353	9.422
11	murder	208	5,483	9.319
12	first-degree	99	106	9.259
13	insanity	102	886	9.104
14	charge	104	1,278	9.042
15	rape	92	665	9.008
16	pleaded	93	832	8.983
17	admitted	104	2,965	8.707

18	found	215	12,114	8.669
19	cleared	66	374	8.603
20	mass	69	1,005	8.512
21	after	393	30,714	8.486
22	jailed	71	1,310	8.484
23	jury	76	1,939	8.449
24	nickell	58	299	8.436
25	weapon	61	602	8.431
26	suspect	63	1,180	8.340
27	arrested	70	1,977	8.322
28	investigation	65	1,604	8.292
29	acquitted	50	189	8.251
30	accused	63	1,608	8.247
31	yesterday	86	4,634	8.164
32	sentence	64	2,186	8.151
33	scene	64	2,265	8.136
34	seven	68	2,859	8.113
35	commit	49	630	8.108
36	mystery	48	605	8.085
37	grounds	53	1,284	8.068
38	kidnapping	43	124	8.051
39	brutal	47	648	8.044

40	inquiry	52	1,483	7.996
41	rachel	46	859	7.961
42	conviction	45	744	7.957
43	capital	46	1,040	7.919
44	committed	50	1,643	7.906
45	assault	44	875	7.893
46	sentenced	45	1,215	7.847
47	rachel's	37	116	7.836
48	degree	40	931	7.743
49	reason	50	2,466	7.742
50	court	95	9,823	7.696
51	second-degree	33	38	7.693
52	of	2,488	390,097	7.688
53	bailey	37	873	7.644
54	for	804	127,240	7.636
55	case	77	7,540	7.631
56	life	150	19,632	7.629
57	13	53	3,682	7.613
58	crown	39	1,503	7.577
59	killling	49	3,279	7.567
60	police	111	14,410	7.536
61	convictions	31	350	7.519

62	plea	32	555	7.512
63	nickell's	29	96	7.490
64	victim	40	2,118	7.487
65	suspicion	30	370	7.466
66	was	868	156,737	7.456
67	before	109	15,310	7.445
68	diminished	32	891	7.430
69	verdict	33	1,128	7.419
70	deyanov	29	418	7.405
71	.	55	5,627	7.380
72	but	419	78,012	7.366
73	conspiracy	28	490	7.336
74	byline	92	13,943	7.300
75	following	40	3,150	7.296
76	crime	39	2,988	7.288
77	confessed	27	482	7.286
78	judge	41	3,477	7.276
79	with	541	110,015	7.265
80	years	130	22,828	7.248
81	mr	76	11,276	7.240
82	including	48	5,285	7.230
83	not	291	58,576	7.224

84	detectives	26	595	7.203
85	away	53	6,609	7.201
86	count	25	518	7.165
87	on	469	103,806	7.139
88	last	91	16,102	7.129
89	torture	24	438	7.127
90	killer	34	2,824	7.119
91	faced	25	707	7.118
92	tried	37	3,707	7.090
93	cases	32	2,516	7.088
94	multiple	25	869	7.079
95	been	190	40,890	7.078
96	his	463	107,786	7.069
97	edgington	23	448	7.063
98	spree	22	325	7.031
99	ms	29	2,381	6.972
100	investigating	21	413	6.941

attack (n.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
1	heart	374	3,801	10.614
2	frenzied	199	299	10.561
3	knife	151	2,330	9.606
4	random	109	588	9.599
5	unprovoked	89	126	9.459
6	launched	98	1,079	9.299
7	before	286	15,310	8.921
8	brutal	69	648	8.920
9	carried	75	1,636	8.764
10	horrific	58	572	8.694
11	died	119	5,438	8.687
12	after	415	30,714	8.613
13	savage	50	339	8.555
14	survived	54	740	8.539
15	suffered	72	2,966	8.400
16	during	109	6,823	8.364
17	panic	43	595	8.255
18	fatal	41	608	8.182
19	vicious	36	348	8.078

20	ferocious	33	122	8.029
21	victim	47	2,118	7.971
22	violent	47	2,262	7.938
23	terrorist	34	563	7.926
24	on	795	103,806	7.916
25	months	73	6,145	7.878
26	.	68	5,627	7.852
27	killed	60	4,757	7.807
28	following	49	3,150	7.807
29	an	399	54,469	7.804
30	weeks	50	3,496	7.768
31	planned	31	784	7.725
32	launching	27	173	7.722
33	machete	26	139	7.679
34	cctv	26	388	7.595
35	stroke	26	432	7.581
36	happened	40	2,866	7.573
37	mr	88	11,276	7.558
38	under	62	7,075	7.516
39	sex	41	3,453	7.490
40	took	56	6,194	7.489
41	since	63	7,750	7.454

42	heard	47	4,813	7.446
43	witnessed	23	316	7.442
44	days	55	6,502	7.420
45	risk	48	5,194	7.415
46	place	47	5,399	7.353
47	byline	88	13,943	7.326
48	arson	20	134	7.302
49	mrs	35	3,366	7.279
50	abram	21	428	7.274
51	hammer	21	444	7.269
52	motiveless	19	45	7.259
53	death	64	10,147	7.210
54	triggered	20	448	7.197
55	miss	29	2,505	7.186
56	sustained	19	286	7.176
57	day	67	11,162	7.176
58	left	52	7,864	7.164
59	shortly	21	836	7.147
60	time	112	22,069	7.136
61	deadly	18	393	7.063
62	out	141	30,541	7.062
63	last	82	16,102	7.061

64	attempted	21	1,299	7.016
65	footage	18	596	6.998
66	had	252	61,353	6.980
67	police	71	14,410	6.980
68	holmes	20	1,221	6.967
69	described	26	2,803	6.964
70	jailed	20	1,310	6.942
71	horror	19	1,113	6.923
72	in	1,061	282,983	6.920
73	suspected	17	593	6.916
74	injuries	18	869	6.915
75	hospital	54	10,675	6.912
76	street	28	3,609	6.910
77	a	1,401	380,648	6.899
78	horrifying	15	143	6.884
79	harrison	17	727	6.875
80	told	60	13,099	6.843
81	stabbed	23	2,592	6.833
82	carry	18	1,164	6.830
83	which	134	34,562	6.830
84	bomb	16	647	6.812
85	schizophrenic	42	8,390	6.793

86	two	79	19,499	6.782
87	aged	21	2,243	6.780
88	prolonged	14	167	6.776
89	at	277	79,203	6.769
90	was	530	156,737	6.755
91	another	43	9,128	6.744
92	leading	20	2,140	6.733
93	july	29	4,939	6.729
94	yesterday	28	4,634	6.728
95	the	2,383	740,923	6.711
96	he	488	148,648	6.710
97	his	357	107,786	6.709
98	court	44	9,823	6.702
99	said	148	42,687	6.698
100	admitted	22	2,965	6.690

violence (n.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
1	domestic	156	707	10.859
2	history	184	3,856	9.997
3	extreme	49	939	9.072
4	acts	45	698	9.070
5	aggression	26	310	8.499
6	sexual	41	2,094	8.342
7	convictions	22	350	8.234
8	victims	40	2,396	8.205
9	gun	33	1,630	8.201
10	hatred	17	270	7.911
11	against	66	6,961	7.907
12	sex	40	3,453	7.897
13	abuse	29	1,994	7.878
14	serious	39	3,509	7.846
15	towards	30	2,343	7.807
16	offences	17	560	7.740
17	profession	16	452	7.714
18	risk	46	5,194	7.702
19	previous	23	1,648	7.673

20	prone	15	384	7.661
21	act	33	3,487	7.611
22	fear	24	2,290	7.503
23	physical	22	1,951	7.495
24	committed	20	1,643	7.473
25	random	14	588	7.445
26	commit	14	630	7.422
27	threats	12	369	7.348
28	crimes	15	1,052	7.310
29	despite	29	3,978	7.301
30	committing	11	260	7.289
31	record	19	2,089	7.234
32	threatening	12	611	7.210
33	gang	12	631	7.199
34	self-harm	10	215	7.180
35	illness	45	8,171	7.173
36	link	14	1,294	7.102
37	explosion	9	213	7.029
38	violence	16	2,044	7.002
39	behaviour	20	3,128	6.985
40	orgy	8	53	6.965
41	worst	13	1,392	6.953

42	perpetrators	8	72	6.952
43	propensity	8	74	6.951
44	incidents	9	372	6.931
45	poverty	9	431	6.896
46	victim	15	2,118	6.883
47	communities	9	477	6.870
48	prevent	11	1,053	6.862
49	between	39	9,068	6.845
50	linked	12	1,394	6.837
51	capable	9	622	6.789
52	involving	9	642	6.778
53	growing	12	1,648	6.734
54	norway's	7	113	6.732
55	unprovoked	7	126	6.723
56	torture	8	438	6.722
57	increased	11	1,414	6.703
58	crime	16	2,988	6.703
59	mental	73	21,487	6.667
60	horrific	8	572	6.646
61	murder	23	5,483	6.645
62	campaign	12	1,886	6.644
63	ultimately	8	625	6.617

64	streets	10	1,296	6.616
65	suicide	14	2,695	6.596
66	weapons	8	696	6.580
67	robbery	7	356	6.578
68	tendency	7	360	6.576
69	shocking	8	714	6.570
70	perpetrated	6	55	6.549
71	rise	10	1,459	6.547
72	potential	10	1,509	6.527
73	outbursts	6	121	6.504
74	alcohol	10	1,565	6.504
75	including	20	5,285	6.482
76	bloody	7	523	6.481
77	corruption	6	192	6.458
78	cases	12	2,516	6.430
79	symptom	6	239	6.428
80	casual	6	249	6.421
81	rising	7	632	6.421
82	theft	6	275	6.405
83	others	16	4,216	6.388
84	subjected	6	331	6.371
85	of	990	390,097	6.370

86	sexuality	6	337	6.367
87	continues	8	1,165	6.352
88	threatened	7	783	6.342
89	eastern	6	386	6.338
90	increasing	7	802	6.332
91	criminal	10	2,029	6.330
92	experienced	7	813	6.327
93	knives	6	408	6.325
94	mentally	13	3,281	6.321
95	honour-based	5	5	6.321
96	associated	16	4,525	6.318
97	officers	14	3,706	6.318
98	incite	5	10	6.317
99	dealing	7	840	6.313
100	directed	7	849	6.309

killed (v.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
1	injured	82	660	8.983
2	mother	211	9,713	8.911
3	schizophrenic	190	8,390	8.899
4	himself	162	6,569	8.886
5	wounded	61	366	8.638
6	herself	91	2,857	8.634
7	shot	99	3,527	8.632
8	man	205	12,780	8.590
9	people	412	31,035	8.563
10	who	698	57,057	8.533
11	before	207	15,310	8.408
12	son	111	6,129	8.398
13	police	182	14,410	8.289
14	paranoid	79	3,897	8.242
15	daughter	81	4,295	8.213
16	77	46	454	8.206
17	crash	46	525	8.186
18	three	134	11,016	8.130
19	after	297	30,714	8.104

20	by	651	72,943	8.102
21	father	98	7,360	8.063
22	someone	77	4,803	8.060
23	two	192	19,499	8.025
24	woman	83	5,900	8.010
25	mum	54	2,288	7.995
26	five	79	5,861	7.944
27	nearly	48	1,816	7.926
28	six	66	4,367	7.906
29	eight	51	2,433	7.882
30	officers	60	3,706	7.878
31	duty	39	784	7.878
32	wife	68	5,006	7.850
33	car	53	3,075	7.812
34	13	57	3,682	7.808
35	mentally	54	3,281	7.801
36	attack	59	4,335	7.749
37	were	272	37,257	7.732
38	four	71	6,402	7.717
39	when	284	40,153	7.698
40	brother	49	3,140	7.687
41	he	962	148,648	7.683

42	was	997	156,737	7.661
43	sister	44	2,542	7.647
44	zito	30	255	7.647
45	ill	53	4,027	7.645
46	husband	48	3,263	7.635
47	nickell	30	299	7.634
48	bomb	32	647	7.629
49	children	95	11,103	7.626
50	seven	45	2,859	7.617
51	accident	31	655	7.581
52	her	434	70,233	7.569
53	12	57	5,243	7.560
54	.	59	5,627	7.555
55	victims	40	2,396	7.539
56	officer	41	2,574	7.539
57	had	374	61,353	7.536
58	women	70	7,773	7.528
59	jonathan	31	1,002	7.490
60	words	130	19,056	7.489
61	parents	54	5,320	7.471
62	believed	39	2,605	7.461
63	whose	49	4,522	7.452

64	gmt	42	3,386	7.420
65	dad	33	1,770	7.396
66	person	47	4,527	7.391
67	being	110	18,215	7.300
68	during	55	6,823	7.295
69	pc	26	841	7.278
70	brutally	23	218	7.275
71	months	51	6,145	7.274
72	silva	23	232	7.270
73	stabbed	34	2,592	7.265
74	gunman	24	498	7.255
75	him	172	32,444	7.247
76	his	519	107,786	7.240
77	been	210	40,890	7.239
78	tortured	23	389	7.225
79	rachel	25	859	7.216
80	mr	72	11,276	7.211
81	17	36	3,379	7.199
82	weeks	36	3,496	7.178
83	while	74	12,103	7.177
84	later	60	8,948	7.176
85	those	71	11,618	7.160

86	men	47	6,574	7.100
87	have	303	67,716	7.100
88	others	37	4,216	7.095
89	told	74	13,099	7.094
90	grandmother	22	684	7.078
91	brady	24	1,241	7.061
92	then	90	17,659	7.046
93	family	71	13,076	7.036
94	last	83	16,102	7.034
95	child	41	5,627	7.030
96	day	63	11,162	7.028
97	in	1,123	282,983	6.999
98	mrs	31	3,366	6.985
99	pm	26	2,096	6.981
100	christina	19	310	6.972

kill (v.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
1	tried	172	3,707	9.695
2	threatened	83	783	9.455
3	himself	163	6,569	9.110
4	telling	79	1,757	9.060
5	god	82	2,001	9.043
6	herself	89	2,857	8.937
7	wanted	117	4,756	8.932
8	someone	117	4,803	8.923
9	going	180	9,078	8.920
10	trying	102	3,873	8.906
11	themselves	87	3,331	8.793
12	mission	47	551	8.723
13	intended	47	604	8.702
14	voices	71	2,502	8.700
15	planned	49	784	8.694
16	prostitutes	42	252	8.684
17	him	435	32,444	8.647
18	threatening	45	611	8.637
19	myself	53	2,803	8.202

20	free	52	2,745	8.189
21	freed	31	544	8.126
22	head	71	5,861	8.021
23	again	73	6,409	7.975
24	seven	41	2,859	7.818
25	me	166	23,762	7.662
26	women	67	7,773	7.658
27	to	2,343	377,366	7.656
28	others	45	4,216	7.656
29	people	206	31,035	7.627
30	told	94	13,099	7.571
31	try	34	2,765	7.571
32	rob	20	400	7.552
33	13	38	3,682	7.522
34	plot	22	893	7.499
35	somebody	21	774	7.475
36	yourself	22	1,132	7.415
37	stone	22	1,179	7.399
38	attempting	18	452	7.378
39	would	173	31,019	7.376
40	intending	16	66	7.375
41	threats	17	369	7.330

42	kill	31	3,332	7.304
43	heard	38	4,813	7.299
44	attempted	21	1,299	7.291
45	thought	47	6,784	7.284
46	ordered	20	1,172	7.263
47	son	43	6,129	7.255
48	did	100	18,512	7.244
49	went	46	7,030	7.218
50	he	683	148,648	7.204
51	fight	20	1,448	7.173
52	joss	14	93	7.170
53	allowed	24	2,447	7.149
54	parents	36	5,320	7.131
55	urging	14	185	7.129
56	drove	16	701	7.110
57	maim	13	19	7.097
58	twice	19	1,496	7.084
59	knife	22	2,330	7.054
60	planning	16	858	7.052
61	before	74	15,310	7.041
62	had	259	61,353	7.041
63	her	292	70,233	7.027

64	harrison	15	727	7.007
65	conspiracy	14	490	7.000
66	want	42	7,717	6.992
67	believed	22	2,605	6.983
68	because	80	17,710	6.977
69	injure	12	39	6.972
70	saying	25	3,475	6.962
71	children	54	11,103	6.961
72	mr	54	11,276	6.944
73	might	41	7,872	6.937
74	men	36	6,574	6.931
75	could	94	22,353	6.919
76	you	192	49,130	6.912
77	person	28	4,527	6.911
78	released	23	3,171	6.910
79	mother	47	9,713	6.910
80	them	88	21,174	6.892
81	chose	13	495	6.891
82	hit	20	2,569	6.855
83	'll	24	3,738	6.847
84	decided	19	2,327	6.844
85	shoot	13	642	6.833

86	sometimes	21	2,941	6.833
87	commanding	11	91	6.823
88	compelled	11	122	6.809
89	byline	58	13,943	6.801
90	miss	19	2,505	6.797
91	plotting	11	169	6.788
92	used	35	7,305	6.785
93	mum	18	2,288	6.776
94	uncle	12	507	6.771
95	feared	12	527	6.763
96	anyone	21	3,242	6.763
97	victim	17	2,118	6.740
98	nickell	11	299	6.731
99	felt	23	4,068	6.717
100	wife	26	5,006	6.717

shot (v.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	<u>logDice</u>
1	dead	620	3,783	11.634
2	fatally	61	243	9.452
3	police	292	14,410	9.134
4	officer	81	2,574	9.000
5	head	130	5,861	8.974
6	gunman	46	498	8.922
7	kernan	37	256	8.725
8	twice	53	1,496	8.724
9	officers	81	3,706	8.715
10	killed	84	4,757	8.545
11	chest	37	725	8.506
12	gun	39	1,630	8.235
13	giffords	25	196	8.190
14	schizophrenic	96	8,390	8.159
15	marksmen	23	76	8.132
16	turning	31	1,046	8.118
17	unarmed	23	139	8.099
18	andrew	38	1,989	8.081
19	times	126	13,064	8.041

20	man	116	12,780	7.948
21	sheila	24	584	7.944
22	fame	26	927	7.912
23	pc	25	841	7.891
24	kyle	21	419	7.828
25	fletcher	19	158	7.813
26	himself	61	6,569	7.766
27	sister	34	2,542	7.756
28	caffell	18	162	7.733
29	before	115	15,310	7.716
30	victims	31	2,396	7.665
31	wounded	18	366	7.631
32	outside	33	3,075	7.571
33	after	184	30,714	7.499
34	herself	30	2,857	7.490
35	.	45	5,627	7.484
36	six	38	4,367	7.479
37	by	406	72,943	7.460
38	libyan	14	44	7.433
39	marksman	14	49	7.431
40	three	71	11,016	7.415
41	cornell	14	94	7.407

42	37	18	929	7.381
43	merseyside	15	342	7.379
44	range	21	1,548	7.370
45	routh	15	366	7.368
46	was	795	156,737	7.353
47	armed	18	1,042	7.335
48	squad	15	479	7.314
49	who	289	57,057	7.310
50	four	43	6,402	7.288
51	stomach	15	543	7.284
52	littlefield	13	125	7.283
53	being	99	18,215	7.283
54	five	40	5,861	7.273
55	hamilton	14	377	7.263
56	scenes	16	806	7.262
57	bamber	17	1,050	7.250
58	close	26	2,998	7.247
59	injured	15	660	7.232
60	survived	15	740	7.197
61	daniel	16	1,097	7.144
62	yvonne	12	181	7.138
63	cops	13	445	7.123

64	liverpool	16	1,160	7.120
65	congresswoman	11	47	7.084
66	through	52	10,283	7.046
67	multiple	14	869	7.043
68	69	12	403	7.028
69	embassy	11	169	7.019
70	guard	12	448	7.007
71	were	155	37,257	6.993
72	panetti	11	221	6.992
73	george	20	2,556	6.987
74	him	134	32,444	6.968
75	men	35	6,574	6.964
76	video	17	1,880	6.955
77	bennett	12	568	6.951
78	then	76	17,659	6.941
79	when	159	40,153	6.928
80	nicholas	12	620	6.928
81	gang	12	631	6.923
82	lanza	10	134	6.900
83	two	80	19,499	6.889
84	black	23	3,804	6.876
85	cinema	12	745	6.873

86	sword	11	473	6.869
87	mentally	21	3,281	6.868
88	samurai	10	230	6.850
89	allegedly	12	835	6.835
90	loughner	10	261	6.835
91	ill	23	4,027	6.827
92	film	38	8,517	6.806
93	point-blank	9	35	6.801
94	while	50	12,103	6.799
95	family	53	13,076	6.790
96	down	46	11,115	6.779
97	alexis	10	379	6.776
98	shoulder	10	386	6.773
99	mistakenly	9	92	6.770
100	policeman	10	421	6.756

stabbed (v.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	<u>logDice</u>
1	death	744	10,147	10.905
2	repeatedly	174	992	10.647
3	times	391	13,064	9.679
4	chest	68	725	9.404
5	paranoid	123	3,897	9.285
6	schizophrenic	206	8,390	9.267
7	mackay	45	215	9.052
8	neck	55	916	9.016
9	knife	76	2,330	8.991
10	fatally	41	243	8.903
11	49	47	767	8.853
12	finnegan	38	185	8.823
13	nina	35	326	8.632
14	pc	37	841	8.476
15	zito	30	255	8.446
16	fulton	26	190	8.273
17	jonathan	33	1,002	8.244
18	man	139	12,780	8.213
19	kitchen	33	1,116	8.199

20	woman	73	5,900	8.142
21	clunis	23	168	8.108
22	twice	34	1,496	8.100
23	stomach	26	543	8.099
24	patient	44	2,990	8.020
25	harrison	26	727	8.016
26	barrett	25	645	7.996
27	policeman	23	421	7.980
28	rachel	26	859	7.959
29	wpc	19	122	7.857
30	crazed	20	267	7.855
31	mother	86	9,713	7.842
32	nickell	20	299	7.839
33	worker	25	1,032	7.832
34	whelan	18	83	7.800
35	words	147	19,056	7.799
36	stranger	21	541	7.792
37	strangled	19	260	7.784
38	assaulted	19	275	7.777
39	knifeman	18	132	7.773
40	victim	31	2,118	7.761
41	66	20	459	7.760

42	who	387	57,057	7.732
43	cyclist	17	110	7.703
44	sexually	20	623	7.684
45	husband	36	3,263	7.661
46	brutally	17	218	7.646
47	christopher	23	1,252	7.626
48	denis	17	269	7.619
49	28	31	2,629	7.612
50	girlfriend	22	1,194	7.584
51	.	47	5,627	7.554
52	25	36	3,738	7.548
53	girl	33	3,244	7.540
54	bus	20	985	7.529
55	before	100	15,310	7.518
56	beatle	15	132	7.510
57	grandmother	18	684	7.505
58	schoolgirl	15	154	7.499
59	after	183	30,714	7.493
60	wife	41	5,006	7.471
61	daughter	37	4,295	7.465
62	gmt	32	3,386	7.461
63	father	53	7,360	7.451

64	elgizouli	14	84	7.437
65	frenzied	15	299	7.424
66	then	105	17,659	7.410
67	decapitated	14	136	7.409
68	casey	14	145	7.404
69	mum	24	2,288	7.340
70	son	43	6,129	7.340
71	lucy	16	674	7.339
72	mcfadden	14	276	7.336
73	braham	13	87	7.328
74	george	25	2,556	7.322
75	heart	31	3,801	7.318
76	officer	25	2,574	7.317
77	street	30	3,609	7.315
78	dad	21	1,770	7.311
79	70	17	954	7.307
80	him	169	32,444	7.305
81	was	767	156,737	7.301
82	39	16	802	7.283
83	eye	20	1,679	7.271
84	allegedly	16	835	7.269
85	killed	34	4,757	7.249

86	mr	64	11,276	7.243
87	1992	15	682	7.242
88	seven	25	2,859	7.239
89	lewis	16	918	7.234
90	swindells	12	71	7.221
91	23	24	2,714	7.219
92	musician	14	520	7.217
93	dodd	12	88	7.212
94	christina	13	310	7.212
95	nurse	18	1,420	7.210
96	her	328	70,233	7.205
97	face	32	4,547	7.204
98	supermarket	13	358	7.188
99	boy	23	2,647	7.176
100	head	37	5,861	7.169

*kill*ing (v.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	<u>logDice</u>
1	spree	76	325	10.118
2	admitted	108	2,965	9.502
3	convicted	64	1,679	9.188
4	confessed	40	482	9.094
5	injuring	32	91	9.029
6	accused	48	1,608	8.802
7	wounding	26	129	8.703
8	admits	32	1,038	8.472
9	77	25	454	8.433
10	oslo	23	328	8.392
11	eight	38	2,433	8.161
12	69	19	403	8.069
13	himself	69	6,569	8.058
14	jailed	26	1,310	8.045
15	1981	19	466	8.030
16	suspected	20	593	8.029
17	guilty	36	2,700	7.997
18	admitting	17	366	7.932
19	before	125	15,310	7.893

20	patz	15	176	7.876
21	lin	14	135	7.805
22	people	218	31,035	7.760
23	women	63	7,773	7.735
24	denied	19	1,072	7.703
25	nickell	14	299	7.694
26	70	18	954	7.683
27	mother	72	9,713	7.664
28	after	201	30,714	7.657
29	intention	13	333	7.566
30	etan	12	201	7.537
31	shooting	21	1,798	7.533
32	lesley	12	225	7.521
33	13	30	3,682	7.456
34	extremist	11	154	7.444
35	12	38	5,243	7.442
36	charged	17	1,309	7.432
37	parents	38	5,320	7.427
38	hindley	11	184	7.423
39	detained	17	1,352	7.413
40	man	76	12,780	7.404
41	six	32	4,367	7.382

42	bomb	13	647	7.377
43	trial	29	3,910	7.349
44	instantly	11	298	7.347
45	themselves	26	3,331	7.343
46	indefinitely	13	754	7.318
47	1996	13	771	7.309
48	shoots	10	153	7.307
49	napper	12	575	7.303
50	ann	12	577	7.301
51	silva	10	232	7.253
52	jun	9	55	7.225
53	raping	9	95	7.196
54	murder	33	5,483	7.191
55	supernatural	9	123	7.176
56	denies	10	353	7.174
57	rachel	12	859	7.147
58	edward	11	699	7.107
59	pauline	9	247	7.091
60	six-year-old	9	286	7.065
61	killing	21	3,279	7.049
62	tucson	8	82	7.036
63	salvador	9	391	6.998

64	hodkin	8	144	6.992
65	intent	9	406	6.989
66	five	30	5,861	6.982
67	finnegan	8	185	6.963
68	adoptive	8	185	6.963
69	attempting	9	452	6.961
70	demons	9	461	6.955
71	wife	26	5,006	6.943
72	finally	17	2,629	6.937
73	woman	29	5,900	6.925
74	denis	8	269	6.907
75	fields	8	306	6.883
76	samantha	8	307	6.882
77	dismembering	7	48	6.868
78	torturing	7	57	6.861
79	harboured	7	58	6.861
80	believed	16	2,605	6.857
81	fire	13	1,767	6.854
82	machine	9	637	6.852
83	sentenced	11	1,215	6.847
84	thoughts	11	1,222	6.844
85	1978	8	371	6.841

86	colorado	8	395	6.826
87	student	12	1,578	6.814
88	someone	23	4,803	6.809
89	aurora	7	141	6.801
90	myself	16	2,803	6.796
91	driver	9	750	6.790
92	father	31	7,360	6.775
93	sadistic	7	182	6.773
94	theater	7	186	6.770
95	broadmoor	11	1,388	6.769
96	32	10	1,106	6.761
97	estranged	7	215	6.750
98	brutally	7	218	6.748
99	fantasies	7	225	6.743
100	two	70	19,499	6.743

violent (adj.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	<u>logDice</u>
1	crime	121	2,988	9.571
2	behaviour	97	3,128	9.214
3	crimes	46	1,052	8.846
4	aggressive	34	567	8.641
5	outbursts	28	121	8.613
6	games	38	1,061	8.567
7	criminals	31	522	8.532
8	struggle	36	987	8.522
9	offenders	29	513	8.440
10	attacks	37	1,519	8.340
11	offences	26	560	8.258
12	video	37	1,880	8.207
13	commit	25	630	8.166
14	abusive	21	268	8.110
15	sexual	35	2,094	8.053
16	unpredictable	19	253	7.974
17	history	46	3,856	7.954
18	attack	47	4,335	7.875
19	schizophrenic	76	8,390	7.874

20	increasingly	26	1,428	7.866
21	dangerous	33	2,431	7.860
22	tendencies	17	213	7.837
23	incidents	18	372	7.828
24	committed	26	1,643	7.784
25	criminal	28	2,029	7.753
26	potentially	19	678	7.746
27	became	50	5,432	7.741
28	schizophrenics	18	638	7.688
29	extremely	20	1,027	7.656
30	become	46	5,691	7.573
31	towards	26	2,343	7.544
32	jihad	13	85	7.528
33	sometimes	29	2,941	7.523
34	often	44	5,807	7.488
35	string	15	560	7.464
36	films	23	2,048	7.463
37	chaotic	13	217	7.448
38	physically	15	629	7.429
39	swings	13	254	7.426
40	patients	47	6,782	7.418
41	assault	16	875	7.403

42	acts	15	698	7.395
43	past	36	4,856	7.380
44	likely	33	4,375	7.356
45	behavior	12	225	7.328
46	offender	12	252	7.312
47	angry	15	1,044	7.233
48	threatening	13	611	7.232
49	playing	21	2,581	7.162
50	mentally	24	3,281	7.158
51	becoming	16	1,503	7.136
52	convictions	11	350	7.130
53	paranoid	26	3,897	7.121
54	victims	19	2,396	7.074
55	convicted	16	1,679	7.070
56	react	10	235	7.059
57	patient	21	2,990	7.044
58	linked	14	1,394	6.987
59	mood	13	1,159	6.977
60	alcoholic	10	380	6.976
61	involving	11	642	6.975
62	rampage	10	405	6.962
63	afghanistan	10	407	6.961

64	never	53	11,767	6.955
65	prolonged	9	167	6.947
66	disturbed	11	700	6.946
67	during	34	6,823	6.944
68	officers	22	3,706	6.926
69	confrontations	8	27	6.864
70	episodes	10	590	6.864
71	despite	22	3,978	6.861
72	drunk	10	603	6.857
73	sexually	10	623	6.847
74	act	20	3,487	6.842
75	rages	8	81	6.830
76	staff	19	3,353	6.803
77	confrontation	8	150	6.788
78	stabbed	16	2,592	6.766
79	most	61	16,246	6.758
80	involved	16	2,624	6.757
81	fantasies	8	225	6.743
82	offence	9	589	6.713
83	advocating	7	47	6.659
84	including	23	5,285	6.649
85	armed	10	1,042	6.649

86	sectioned	9	726	6.644
87	yemen	7	71	6.644
88	inmates	9	733	6.640
89	death	37	10,147	6.615
90	or	118	37,463	6.606
91	streak	7	134	6.605
92	known	20	4,529	6.601
93	rows	7	144	6.599
94	dealing	9	840	6.589
95	temper	7	176	6.579
96	psychotic	12	1,897	6.576
97	considered	11	1,569	6.571
98	illness	30	8,171	6.563
99	horrific	8	572	6.551
100	obsessed	8	648	6.513

dangerous (adj.)

No.	Collocate	Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	<u>logDice</u>
1	potentially	101	678	10.065
2	extremely	40	1,027	8.574
3	considered	46	1,569	8.565
4	personality	48	1,959	8.491
5	driving	37	1,040	8.456
6	offenders	30	513	8.393
7	highly	37	1,320	8.344
8	most	183	16,246	8.328
9	method	27	392	8.302
10	criminals	28	522	8.289
11	cannabis	110	9,377	8.256
12	very	158	14,583	8.251
13	patients	74	6,782	8.043
14	severe	35	1,981	8.028
15	alcohol	30	1,565	7.949
16	drugs	84	9,114	7.899
17	violent	33	2,262	7.854
18	drug	78	8,985	7.809
19	exceptionally	17	122	7.780

20	less	48	5,100	7.710
21	illegal	21	912	7.694
22	britain's	24	1,390	7.692
23	man	95	12,780	7.678
24	situation	24	1,429	7.678
25	schizophrenic	64	8,390	7.601
26	tobacco	17	569	7.546
27	mentally	30	3,281	7.432
28	more	187	33,999	7.394
29	mad	22	1,919	7.379
30	disorder	31	3,926	7.324
31	disturbed	15	700	7.303
32	disorders	22	2,203	7.287
33	psychopaths	12	106	7.287
34	individuals	16	953	7.284
35	manipulative	12	124	7.277
36	armed	16	1,042	7.246
37	warned	16	1,127	7.211
38	unpredictable	12	253	7.205
39	heroin	15	1,056	7.147
40	ill	27	4,027	7.102
41	than	104	22,420	7.100

42	deemed	12	517	7.069
43	patient	22	2,990	7.060
44	society	23	3,242	7.058
45	people	134	31,035	7.036
46	are	248	61,336	6.994
47	warning	13	1,013	6.958
48	ecstasy	11	516	6.944
49	situations	10	320	6.906
50	harm	13	1,269	6.854
51	secure	14	1,630	6.826
52	person	24	4,527	6.824
53	increasingly	13	1,428	6.793
54	is	516	150,926	6.784
55	killers	10	569	6.780
56	scared	10	609	6.761
57	skunk	11	912	6.761
58	be	243	71,561	6.750
59	can	97	27,435	6.734
60	how	61	16,584	6.717
61	bad	19	3,544	6.708
62	law	17	2,940	6.701
63	disordered	8	151	6.676

64	imprisoned	8	191	6.654
65	described	16	2,803	6.651
66	drivers	8	224	6.636
67	treat	12	1,556	6.631
68	locked	11	1,232	6.628
69	addictive	8	253	6.620
70	substances	8	331	6.578
71	clearly	12	1,735	6.567
72	saying	17	3,475	6.564
73	liaisons	7	35	6.551
74	evil	10	1,166	6.517
75	individual	10	1,175	6.513
76	especially	12	1,922	6.503
77	lsd	8	495	6.495
78	substance	8	501	6.492
79	detain	7	138	6.491
80	become	22	5,691	6.475
81	class	13	2,397	6.469
82	scotland's	7	181	6.467
83	particularly	13	2,413	6.464
84	smoking	12	2,047	6.462
85	difficult	14	2,819	6.454

86	places	9	970	6.446
87	prisoners	9	978	6.443
88	threat	9	983	6.441
89	mental	63	21,487	6.432
90	bodily	7	245	6.432
91	because	53	17,710	6.431
92	schizophrenics	8	638	6.425
93	as	260	96,906	6.422
94	notorious	8	645	6.422
95	should	38	12,127	6.420
96	place	20	5,399	6.390
97	could	63	22,353	6.381
98	too	33	10,682	6.367
99	far	19	5,142	6.365
100	if	77	28,230	6.363

