Does Conflict begin at home? – Using Family Dynamics to understand the Hindu-Muslim Conflict in British India; 1907-1947

Abstract

Despite common use of the term "sibling-rivalry" for Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India, there are few or no attempts to explain this phenomenon from a proper theoretical foci. By employing an indigenous interpersonal conflict model, this article seeks to examine Hindu-Muslim conflict in the pre-partition period. This draws on the dynamics of intimate rivalry among family members to explain Hindu-Muslim conflict dynamics from a fresh psycho-cultural perspective. The institution of joint-family is the most pervasive and the most influential institution in the subcontinent shaping certain views regarding the functioning of other institutions in society; including in the political sphere. People use the concrete knowledge learned inside their families to reason about more abstract phenomena such as group conflict. Therefore, the conflict dynamics associated with the family institution are extrapolated onto intergroup conflicts.

Introduction

Whilst historically, a large number of nation-states have come into being due to intergroup conflicts on political, ideological, religious, territorial, or ethnic grounds, many of these issues have been resolved or become more manageable over time. In India-Pakistan however, many of the problems present at Partition are still with us. Both nations have been psychologically obsessed with each other since their Partition in 1947, and have been unable to forge working relationships with each other, as for instance European nations did after each of the great wars, despite seeing bloodshed of an even higher magnitude. There are numerous theories explaining the causal factors for this ongoing rivalry including examinations of the pre-partition period in terms of ethnic or religious antagonism. The Realists frame the landscape of their mutual conflict in the international system of anarchy, which, in turn, compels both states to maximise their power against each other. While this article recognises the significance of other modes of analysing Hindu-Muslim conflict in the Indian Subcontinent, it nonetheless takes a radical departure from the conventional positions, presenting an alternative and original account of how to interpret the events leading to Partition.

In fact, this article argues that the Pakistan-India conflict is a continuity of the Hindu-Muslim conflict that erupted during the last decades of the British Raj and examines this from a psycho-cultural perspective. Primarily, Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India had its genesis in an intra-party dispute inside the Indian National Congress party which took the shape of an inter-party conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. Gradually, the interpersonal conflicts that had started between the mainstream political leaders both at an intraparty and interparty levels, then spread among their followers. The nature and dynamics of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the pre-partition period have been examined in this article by relating them to the character and behaviour of individual actors, as a psycho-cultural approach enables us to explain the "whole" by examining its constituent parts, allowing the

inquirers to compare the behaviour of individuals to the behaviour of a group or even the behaviour of nations. This article seeks to examine *how* the conflict behaviour learned within the institution of family in the subcontinent, is mapped onto intergroup conflicts. This approach puts forward the idea that behaviour attained by people in certain emotional, usually familial situations are mapped onto structurally analogous political situations (Hartman & Kris, 1945). On this account, we can assume both Hindu and Muslim groups as two branches of the United Indian family competing to have the best position in the family through their respective political leaders

Our values and behaviour are shaped through early cultural experiences (Triandis, 1989), consequently, conflict dynamics learned within the institution of the family remain at the core of peoples' cognitive interpretations of wider events and subsequent emotional responses (Ross, 1995). In understanding intergroup conflicts therefore, we must consider the dynamics of the family amongst the people of a particular area. Accordingly, an indigenous family conflict model known as *Sharike-Bazi* in the Indian subcontinent (Kadir, 2019), has been used to examine the interpersonal conflict dynamics among the leading political figures in the pre-partition period. This model highlights the segmentation process of a joint family and the demands of separation by one branch of the family from the 'other' – demands arising out of being neglected and not being accommodated and respected in the joint family setup. This usually happens after the demise of the father (s) or other elder figures in the joint-family who would have been responsible for maintaining the integrity of the family. Usually, a departing brother (or brothers) perceives that he has been denied a fair share and has been wronged and cheated over resource distribution, including wealth as well as status. The 'wronged' brother (s) then becomes extra competitive to right the wrong done to him and to get back his lost prestige. He might seek help from outside of his family or lineage to settle scores with his family members. The remaining family block, on the other hand, always try to undermine the

new identity of their departing brother (s). They always blame the departing brother (s) for sowing the seeds of disunity in the family. Furthermore, this bitterness passes on to future generations, engaging them in turn in a sort of intimate rivalry.

Surprisingly, despite frequent use of the term 'sibling rivalry' by many political scientists of the India-Pakistan partition and their ongoing conflict, there are few or no attempts to explain this phenomenon from a proper theoretical focus. Arguably, it is problematic to differentiate between Muslims and Hindus purely on ethnic or religious grounds as there has been a complex ethnic and religious criss-crossing of both groups in the subcontinent. Despite adhering to different faiths, people were not much different from one another in terms of behaviour and practices owing to a similar cultural gene-pool and a history of mass conversions from one religion to the other. One can find examples from the personal lives of popular political leaders in British India, to substantiate this argument. For example, Gandhi's son had converted to Islam; Jinnah married a Parsi woman (who converted to Islam); Motilal's daughter was married to a Jain while his grand-daughter was married to a Parsi man (Wolpert, 1996). Furthermore, every religion was divided on caste and sectarian lines; Motilal's own family group had boycotted one of his daughter's marriages because the groom was outside their specific Brahmin caste. Instead of analysing Hindu-Muslim rivalry by situating them strictly along the ethnic or religious categories, it may be more helpful to explain Hindu-Muslim relations by conceptualising them as competing family groups (or persons) because the institution of family is the most basic and the most dominating institution in the lives of local people shaping certain behaviours regardless of ethnic or religious status.

I propose Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a symbolic brother representing the Muslim community, who himself felt marginalised and cornered in the Indian National Congress party which I analogise as a joint-family. At the same time Muslims had also started feeling marginalisation more widely in British India and demanded separation due to not being accommodated

sufficiently well in the united setup. They started reacting as the 'wronged' brother in this dyad by demanding separation from the 'other' brother 'Hindus'. I argue that the conflict dynamics between both groups *can also* be explained adequately by using the indigenous framework of the family conflict model, which examines how the partition among family members creates conflict, bitterness and hostility – if the distribution of assets is not settled while taking into account the wishes of the claimants. As such the interpersonal conflict and the inability of prominent political leaders to reconcile with one another, is one of the main reasons for Partition and the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan.

This article explains the internal rift among leading political leaders especially Gandhi, Jinnah, Motilal Nehru, and Jawaharlal Nehru by situating their characters according to family conflict dynamics. It is appropriate to mention here that people in the Indian subcontinent tend to transpose the value system and structure of their family model to every other institution in the outside world (S. Kakar & Kakar, 2009; Lyon, 2004; Lieven, 2012); be it a multi-national firm or a political party – they tend to have an idealised view that every institution around them should function as per their indigenous cultural and hierarchical values learned within the institution of the joint-family. For this reason, political leaders or any other institutional heads are perceived and treated as family heads – with even the language of kin relations used for political leaders in the subcontinent, such as *Bapu* Gandhi (father), *Chacha* Nehru (uncle), or *Baba-e-Qaum* Jinnah (Father of the nation).

This might explain *why* political leaders in the subcontinent tend to adopt an authoritative posture after assuming the charge of a political party or at best, the government. The unconditional acceptability of such leaders by other party members and followers owes to the authoritative-father model desired by people for their beloved leaders. They are expected by people to exhibit the indigenous qualities associated with the personality of an authoritative father. This indigenous metaphorical conception of "political leaders as family-head" can *also*

explain the power-centric and uncompromising demeanour of leaders such as Jinnah, who sought to fully control his party's as well as the state's power after Partition – as Jinnah was the only father-figure in Muslim League after the 1930s. He then behaved more firmly and authoritatively towards his own and the opposition parties. Given this context in which political leaders are revered as family heads, we can see why the personalities of these powerful figures and their relations with each other had such an impact on Partition.

This is not to say that socio-economic or politico-religious variables were not relevant factors for Hindu-Muslim conflict and animosity, but the emphasis of this article is in recognising the vital role of family-level conflict behaviour in driving the Hindu-Muslim conflict, by shaping the perception of individual actors and providing disputants with the cultural framework for their conflict-perception and emotional responses, a framework then mapped onto their intergroup conflict(s). In contrast to structural theorists who find rational explanations in purely material interests, this article interprets behaviour through motives, goals, emotions, and the cognition of individual actors; of ordinary people as well as political leaders – because after all political institutions and processes operate through human agency as noted by Greenstein (1992). The political actors' "psychology" constructed within the institution of the joint-family then serves the same explanatory role which "material interests" would do for Realists, in interpreting the actions and motives of others. Therefore, the Muslim group identity that emerged during the last decades of colonial rule, was primarily the outcome of an interactive process between individual actors' psychology and the socio-political institutions of that time.

Rationale for using the Family Conflict Model

Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India was a mirror image of their indigenous conflict dynamics which are related to intimate rivalries between kin-groups (paternal cousins). Such a rivalry always has certain characteristics of jealousy and is aimed at competing with and

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defeating the other party even at the risk of your own destruction, which was a basic element in Hindu-Muslim conflict in pre-partition period. This element still reverberates in Pakistan-India relations.

The people of British India (pre-partition) could have imagined themselves as members of a broader Indian family as they had "identical family structures" regardless of ethnicity, faith or sect. In addition to this, South Asian societies have an integrative and hierarchical relationship between the individual and the collective, which forms a link with other societal functions and institutions (Channabasavanna & Bhatti, 1982). Hence, the psycho-dynamics of conflict observed in the idealised joint-family structures are crucial to understanding the conflict behaviour of ordinary people as well as political leaders.

The other rationale for using this approach is that almost every ideology is shaped within the institution of family in the subcontinental societies (Lieven, 2012; S. Kakar & Kakar, 2009). Right from their home, people start learning the concepts of authority and governance; and, learn to understand the differences between right and wrong (Khan, 2014). Given the impact of the institution of family on their lives, the Indians conceptualised their post-independence nation in terms of a joint family after the British departure (Gandhi's and Congress party's vision), while some group [s] (Jinnah's Muslim League) demanded a separate homeland as they had come to understand themselves in terms of "neglected members of the family". Interestingly, many Muslim leaders were also present within the ranks of the Congress party (especially religious clerics), which supports my argument that the focus on "religion" is not the *only* explanation for Hindu-Muslim conflict.

There is another rationale behind using the family-conflict model to re-examine the interpersonal rivalry among Hindu/Muslim leaders and the masses. Ethnographic literature reveals that people in the subcontinent regard their neighbours as their kin (Chaudhary, 1999).

A famous saying goes like this: *Hamsaya Ma ka jaya,* which means a neighbour is our mother's son – near neighbours are considered closer than far-relatives (Chaudhary, 1999, p. 17). In Pakistani culture, Lyon (2004) has also observed that people tend to transpose their kin relations to other people in society, because family remains the starting reference point for them to deal with the entire world – people always use the 'family' lens to situate the position of people around them. For this reason, people in the subcontinent always perceive other people around them in terms of fathers, brothers, uncles, cousins, or nephews (when on good terms), or rival-uncles, rival cousins, or rival nephews (when on bad terms). People use indigenous 'labels' fixed for kin relations when they name their neighbours: for example, they use the terms *Chacha* (father's younger brother) or *Taya* (father's elder brother) for elderly people; and *Beta* (son) or *Bhatija* (nephew) for younger ones. In pre-partition times, therefore, a Muslim would have considered his Hindu neighbour to be closer to him than a Muslim from a more distant place. For that reason, a familial 'near-ness' had been developed between Hindu and Muslim neighbours that had a deep impact on locking both groups in a familial type of hatred and feud, following the confrontation between the Congress and the League.

Furthermore, the family conflict model used in this article explains the construction of conflict-perception between both parties. Different characteristics found in this interpersonal conflict model are also found in the Hindu-Muslim conflict. For example, the misuse of authority and respect by the elder brothers, or brothers having a larger number of sons are the main reasons behind family splits in the subcontinent – by having a greater number of sons one branch of the family tries to claim a larger share from the combined family resources owing to their numbers and greater needs. This can lead to a violation of the cultural norms in the subcontinent where elder brothers are expected to treat their younger siblings with generosity, therefore, it leads to demands for asset division from the brother with less sons. This could explain the mindset of the minority Muslim group in British India who had developed feelings of being

"wronged" after being denied the right of meaningful parliamentary representation in a future United India, who then demanded a separate state for being 'neglected' and not being respected in the joint setup.

Limitations of the Existing Models to explain Hindu-Muslim Conflict

The literature available for explaining the reasons behind Hindu-Muslim conflict in the colonial era is mostly of a historical or descriptive in nature. There is a dearth of scholarly literature that explains this conflict from a theoretical standpoint (Ganguly, 2016).

First, the Primordialist model put forward mainly by Robinson (1974) which argues that the Muslims of India were always different from their Hindu counterparts in terms of religion, culture and civilisation; therefore, Muslim communities were bound to become separatists. A famous historian K.K. Aziz writes: "The Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious, but it was the clash of two civilisations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources and different concepts of art" (Aziz, 1967, p. 143). Sayeed (1968) has also used the metaphor of two parallel but not-mixable rivers for Hindus and Muslims. This view is commonly referred to as the "two-nation theory".

Secondly, there is an Instrumentalist approach put forward mainly by Brass (1974, 1979) saying that from the late nineteenth century and onwards, the stance of the Muslim elite can be explained through socio-economic and political factors. The proponents of this approach say that the Muslim elite's domination over society was threatened by other upwardly mobile groups, especially Hindus, therefore they tried to mobilise their own community behind them through manipulating identity symbols; religious and linguistic (Azad, 1988). Therefore, religion became a decisive force with the beginning of the twentieth century. Primarily, the

instrumentalist approach focuses on identity as a tool, and criticises the individuals, groups or elites for utilising it to obtain material benefits (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 6).

There is another school of thought which opposes both the above versions by drawing a picture of Hindu-Muslim syncretic culture and religious harmony in the pre-colonial and early colonial period. They argue that it was the British who fostered distinct communal identities between both sister-communities. Pandey (1990) suggests that the Muslims in south Asia were linguistically and culturally so diverse, that they could not identify a water-tight "Muslim" identity for themselves only by shared beliefs or religion. Such a "Muslim" category was constructed as well as concretised by the British for their political gain.

Whereas, the above-mentioned approaches explain Hindu-Muslim conflict from different angles, they do not explain this conflict comprehensively. Each variant has its own strengths and inherent drawbacks and explains this conflict in sometimes contradictory manners.

In the Primordialist model, if the difference in religion was the main factor behind Muslim separatism, then how come almost all the leading religious parties and clerics could oppose the idea of Pakistan? Maulana Muhammad Hassan Madni of Jamiat Ulma-e-Hind – the leading religious party of India – had opposed the creation of Pakistan. Another famous Muslim ideologue Maulana Maududi rejected the idea of Muslim nationalism as being a "curse", and favoured the worldwide Muslim community or the "*Umma*" (Syed, 1982, p. 35). Talbot (2003) quotes Abdul Mansur Ahmad, the president of the Bengal Muslim League as saying that

> "religion and culture are not the same thing. Religion transgresses the geographical boundary but *tamaddun* (culture) cannot go beyond the geographical boundary…For this reason, the people of *Purbha* (east) are a different nation…from their religious brothers of Pakistan" (p. 83).

Similarly, Majlis-e-Ahrar was another dynamic Muslim religious party in northern India which opposed the creation of Pakistan.

The instrumentalist approach points its fingers at the Muslim elite/aristocrats as an exploiting class, who used the tool of religion for securing their own political and economic interests – Jinnah's westernised personality is presented to substantiate this argument. The proponents of this school argue that Jinnah wanted to run Pakistan on democratic and secular lines; they quote Jinnah's speech in which he spoke about granting equal constitutional and legal rights to all the minorities in Pakistan regardless of their creed, colour and religion (Jinnah & Ahmad, 1947, pp. 399-404).[1] However, this instrumentalist focus also raises questions: if Jinnah wished to make Pakistan a secular country, then why did he differ with Congress who also wished to run a united India on secular lines. Here, another argument is put forward that Congress leaders had refused to accept Jinnah's demands for provincial autonomy and sovereignty for Muslim majority provinces and therefore Jinnah insisted on a separate state. A question that could be asked is why were political leaders from minority Muslim provinces so sure that they could control the state affairs in majority Muslim provinces after partition? And were not the Muslim political elite in majority provinces concerned about disruption to their own status? Jalal (1985) argues that Jinnah was a political strategist who played the majority Muslim province card originally to secure the best position in a united India; actually he never wished to leave the federation but ended up having to do so.

The picture portrayed by scholars simply blaming the British for constructing antipathies between both groups is also incomplete. This position does not explain why the "constructed" religious identity among Hindus and Muslims did not bring the same hostility against the British Christians who were actually at the helm of this power-play. Moreover, how could this supposedly constructed identity fail to maintain the unity between Pakistan and Bangladesh (former east Pakistan) – in fact, they separated in 1971 on ethno-linguistic grounds. Finally, what was the logic for the British masters to betray their created Muslim clients during partition over the Punjab and Bengal provinces?

One could infer from the preceding analysis of the available models that religious antagonism and ideological differences were not the *only* reasons behind the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. Therefore, while this article does not just reject what has been said in previous analyses; what this article does is introduce a radical alternative view, examining the psychological construction of ordinary peoples' as well as political actors' conflict-perception about the "other" group, and finding it deeply rooted in the institution of the joint-family in the subcontinent. Presumably, it was such a specific antagonistic perception developed within the ranks of certain Muslim and Hindu leaders that had led both groups to the point of no return.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

I have used Discourse Analysis as a theoretical as well as methodological approach, which emphasises the way how knowledge of the world, of society, events and inner psychological world are produced in discourses[2] (Potter, 1997, p. 146). Discourse analysis can be employed through a range of different methods, as it has multiple disciplinary origins in the Humanities and social sciences – linguistics, psycholinguistics, sociology, anthropology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, cultural studies, and international relations (Grant, Michelson, Oswick, & Wailes, 2005). Understandably, these different disciplines are therefore, subject to their own assumptions, analytical tools and methodologies (Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, 1997).

I have used the analogy-making aspect of discourse analysis in this article as a methodological and analytical tool; because analogies are used to relate known knowledge to unknown experiences, to uncover similarities once some basic resemblances are noted (O'Conner, 1971) – a form of scientific method that uses one set of behaviour to analyse and explain the behaviour of the other phenomena (Morlidge & Player, 2010, p. 287). This will help me compare the known attributes of the indigenous family-conflict model to an intergroup conflict, as people

use the institution of family as a very important source to reason about the abstract world around them (Lakoff, 1996).

Hence, by employing the conceptual metaphor of family, this methodology provides a conceptual framework to compare the interpersonal conflict dynamics between political leaders to that of the intergroup conflict dynamics between Hindus and Muslims from 1907-47. Several inferences emerge by analogising the typology of family conflicts to intergroup conflicts, since to paraphrase Zimmerman and Jacobson (1993): while conflict between families and groups is inevitable; as families are systems, so are groups. This approach is useful to critically analyse the existing secondary and primary data to substantiate the hypothesis that Hindu-Muslim or Congress-League conflict in the pre-partition period can also be related in terms of a subcontinental family dispute. Weingarten (1993) has also outlined five 'levels' while developing an interpersonal conflict model to understanding and resolving the conflicts in a family, in an organization, or between larger groups in the international context. These five levels are: problems to solve, disagreements, contests, fights, and war, which are more or less analogous to this indigenous family-conflict model having four levels: the harmonious family, the demand for separation, a painful split, and an ongoing rivalry over generations.

In so doing, I will draw upon the critical moments of British India's political history covering the time period around 1907-1947 by analysing the statements, speech-text and the conversations made between the leading political figures of British India. For this purpose, I have consulted biographies/autobiographies, memoirs, published letters, newspapers, and the policy statements of both the political parties.

This article seeks to clarify the 'mechanism' through which family-level behaviour is mapped onto group level behaviour, something which can be explained with the help of cognitive neuroscience research – as the idealised family becomes the source of the construction of

peoples' moral and political behaviour while conceptualising their group and nation (Lakoff, 1996). To that end, the institution of family also shapes the construction of peoples' conflict behaviour which is also mapped onto their interpersonal, intergroup as well as interstate conflicts. Lakoff (1996) explains how people reason about the abstract concepts (say intergroup conflict) in terms of their more concrete knowledge based in day-to-day experience (say family conflict). Accordingly, people may use the dynamics/metaphors used within more mundane family conflicts to reason about relatively more difficult and abstract intergroup conflicts.

Cognitive neuroscience supports the idea that peoples' beliefs about ideal family life serve as a conceptual anchor for their larger moral belief systems and dictate their political attitudes about how society and the nation should function (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Such a metaphorical understanding of the nation-as-family is automatically acquired, primarily at the early stages of life when basic neural patterns are being formed and strengthened in the mind. Presumably, therefore, parallels are set up between the more difficult and the more readily available concepts of the nation and the family (Lakoff, 1999). Consequently, prevailing family models in any society such as the joint-family in the subcontinent produce certain moral system which directly inform peoples' as well as political actors' worldview; effecting their interpretation of events and decision making.

So, if people can reason about politics using family experiences then they can also understand their intergroup conflicts using the dynamics of family conflict. This is why Hindu-Muslim intergroup conflict was conceptualised by local people in the simpler terms of a family-split as observed in the institution of "joint-family". Such a distinctive understanding of the conflict was due to numerous commonalities between both groups in the subcontinent, ranging from their closeness of daily-life, geographic proximity, kinship structures, and identical kin-labels.

The Dynamics of Hindu-Muslim Family Conflict: 1907-1947

For the analytical purpose explained above, the Indian National Congress can be conceptualised as a joint-family representing all the people of India, with members from all faiths. Mr. Jinnah was effectively neglected and cornered in this family in the 1920s. Despite being one of a very few promising leaders of Congress family, Jinnah was denied the status he felt he deserved. He thought of himself as the potential heir to this family after the deaths of the original patriarchs of the party. At the same time, the other leading political party the Muslim League, needed a father-figure who could ensure party integrity. Therefore, when offered, Jinnah accepted the permanent president-ship of the Muslim League, after repeated marginalisation in his former party. Following this, interpersonal conflicts carried on among party leaders, now from the platforms of their respective political parties.

This war of succession ensued among the Nehrus, Gandhi and Jinnah after the deaths of the founding fathers of the Congress party, such as Daddabhoi Naoroji, Pherozshah Mehta, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Bal Gangadhar Tilak. It had far reaching results in locking their followers (ideological sons) in a familial type of rivalry which sealed the fate of both Hindu and Muslim communities to end up in two separate nation-states. Even after seventy years of Partition, more than one billion people in the subcontinent are still engaged in a debate over who the villain responsible for Partition was. Naturally, people in both countries blame the 'other' national father for Partition.

It is imperative to mention here that this article does not aim at interpreting either of these respectable personalities as *if* good or bad. Different historians and biographers take contradictory views about the roles played by these leaders, for example, Jinnah as power-broker (Brecher, 1959; Brown, 1989, 2003) or otherwise (Ahmed, 1997; Wolpert, 1984; Bolitho, 1954). The objective of this article is to study *if* and *how* these leaders acted according

to the indigenous family values associated with the roles they had gradually assumed in their respective groups – for example, Gandhi as an elder of the family; Jawaharlal Nehru, a potential heir; and Jinnah as a parted brother as well as the head of a splinter family group. The characteristics attributed to the personality of Jinnah such as power centric, non-compromising, narcissistic, or cold strategist, have been analysed by situating his position as a parting family member in the indigenous family-conflict dynamics.

A Harmonious Congress Family

The Indian National Congress was established in 1885 claiming to speak for all the religious communities in British India. Jinnah had started his political career as a political secretary of the 'grand old man of India' Naoroji and joined Congress in 1906. Jinnah had also worked closely with the other prominent leaders of Congress, such as Mehta and Gokhale. They all were against agitational politics and believed in the constitutional approach for gaining rights for Indian people (Wolpert, 1962). Jinnah was famous for being an 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity'; a 'Muslim Gokhale' as noted by Sarojini Naidu (1918), who herself remained the president of Congress and was considered to be very close to Gandhi. Gokhale believed that Jinnah was well suited to the role of moderator between the two communities as he was free from all sectarian prejudice (Naidu, 1918, p. 11). Both Gokhale and Jinnah considered that the Congress party should be pragmatic enough to grant the Muslim community the right of separate representation (Wells, 2005, p. 35).

Jinnah certainly was against the formation of a purely 'Muslim' party for it would make India into those 'two water-tight compartments' (Burke & Quraishi,1997). It was Jinnah who raised questions of the credibility of a delegation led by the Agha Khan to the Viceroy for the formation of the Muslim League in 1906. He described Congress as the only true political voice in the country (Jinnah & Pirzada,1984). The Agha Khan, himself, admitted that for nearly a

quarter of a century, Jinnah remained the League's most inflexible critic and opponent (Shah, 1954, p. 124).

However, after 1910, a group of Muslim nationalists emerged in the Muslim League who considered themselves Indian first and Muslim second. This nationalist group was sympathetic to rapprochement with Congress and adopted its goal as 'the attainment of a system of self-government' in line with Congress (Rahman, 1970). Jinnah was in England with Gokhale in 1913, when Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar and Wazir Hassan approached him to join the Muslim League. Both the Leaguers were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that the League would never show disloyalty to the 'bigger national causes' to which Jinnah's life was dedicated (Naidu, 1918).

B. G. Tilak was another important figure in the Congress whose loyalty was considered to be 'Hindu', counter-balancing Gokhale (Wolpert, 1962, Chapter, VI). Tilak was prosecuted and imprisoned in 1909 for running an anti-British campaign demanding freedom. Jinnah offered his services to defend him in the courts, but he was initially rebuffed for being in Gokhale's camp. However, despite Gokhale's displeasure, Jinnah did go on to defend Tilak in the courts.[3] Later, Jinnah also played a positive role in the rapprochement between Gokhale and Tilak after Tilak's return from gaol (Wells, 2005). By 1914, Jinnah's reputation as an all India leader was well established. Jinnah also became more famous due to his debate against Lord Minto over British atrocities in South Africa, and for praising Gandhi's efforts there (Jinnah & Pirzada, 1984, p. 5). In those years, Jinnah was not only maintaining a balance between the moderates and the extremists within the Congress family, but he was also bringing unity between the Muslim League and Congress members. At this juncture of his life, he was respected by all – the extremists, the moderates, the Muslims, the Hindus, the Parsis and others (Saiyid, 1970, p. 40).

Jinnah emerged as undisputed champion of Hindu-Muslim unity after the Congress-League pact in 1916, also known as the Lucknow-Pact. The right to separate Muslim representation was accepted by Congress in this pact (Allana, 1967a, pp. 25-33). It is worth mentioning that as well as Tilak and Jinnah, Motilal Nehru also enjoyed high prestige within Congress in these times, and he also played a mediating role between the members of both parties. It is also appropriate to mention here that during the meetings of the Lucknow Pact, Jinnah proceeded primarily as a Congressman. As a close colleague of Gokhale, he was in an influential position to persuade Congress to make concessions to the Muslim League who had also adopted the nationalist goal of Congress to attain self-government (Pirzada, 1969, p. 378).

It can be inferred here how staunch a believer Jinnah was in Hindu-Muslim unity and how smoothly the Congress family was functioning with the Muslim League family. Members of both parties could resolve their intra-party and inter-party differences through dialogue like family members and their differences were reconcilable. Congress party exhibited a hopeful climate with all the actors from different religions having clear and direct communication to work out their mutual problems.

The War of Succession in the Congress Family

As ill-luck would have it, Gokhale and Mehta died in 1915; Naoroji in 1917, and Tilak in 1920. It changed the harmonious nature of the relationship among the members of the Congress family as it created a vacuum for first tier leadership in the party. Jinnah naturally but wrongly assumed that he was the heir to the Congress family; since 1915 Gandhi had also appeared on the scene and became a serious candidate for the Congress' headship – interestingly, both Jinnah and Gandhi were of *Gujrati* origin and were both disciples of Gokhale (Lateef, 1961).

A cold war started especially between Gandhi, Jinnah, and Motilal Nehru for the Congress family headship, and in the end, Gandhi triumphed against all: Motilal Nehru conceded to

Gandhi's leadership to secure the best position for his son Jawaharlal (Wolpert, 1996, Chapter 9). As a result, Jinnah felt betrayed – he did not expect this from Motilal who used to be very close to Jinnah. In fact, Motilal used to introduce Jinnah to his own family by saying 'He is one of us; a true nationalist just like us, in fact more [than us]' (Wolpert, 1984) – similarly, Lord Linlithgow described him as 'more Congress than the Congress' (Hasan, 1993, p. 10).

Where Jinnah had previously enjoyed the support of Gokhale and other moderates in Congress, his backers were now outnumbered by Gandhi and his supporters, leading to a more agitational approach towards the government after the promulgation of the Rowlatt Act, 1919[4] – while Jinnah was devoted to constitutional and strictly evolutionary political methods (Bolitho, 1954). Interestingly, Gandhi also grabbed the leadership of the anti-government Khilafat movement run primarily by Muslim leaders, such as the Ali brothers. In 1920 Gandhi launched a campaign of non-cooperation against the British government to protest their humiliating policies towards the Muslims' Turkish spiritual leader Khalifa Abdul Hameed. Gandhi used the metaphor of family to bind both communities by saying: "born of the same mother, belonging to the same soil, Hindus and Muslims must love one another. Hindus and Muslims are brothers, it is their duty to share each other's sorrows" (Gandhi, 1919, pp. 137-141).[5]

Despite being a Muslim, Jinnah did not buy Gandhi's idea of running a crusade-like Caliphate-movement which demanded an abandonment of titles, offices, and services in government offices. Gandhi also demanded that people should remove their children from government schools (Gandhi, 1920, pp. 237-40).[6] Jinnah instead had reservations about how Gandhi was flaring up religious sentiments among people, believing that would result in jeopardising the peaceful communities where Hindus and Muslims were co-existing. Jinnah's prophecy proved to be true and the short honey-moon period of Hindu-Muslim unity in the Khilafat movement ended with bloody communal clashes, which Gandhi was unable to stop. Roy (1998) notes that:

"Gandhi rubbed the magic lamp and invited Ram and Rahim to partake of human politics and India's war of independence against the British…. Now the genie (*of religion*) is out of its lamp, and won't go back in…. Yes, it won us freedom. But it also won us the carnage of partition".

The Ouster of Mr. Jinnah from the Congress Family

Gandhi successfully filled the vacuum created after the deaths of the original leaders of Congress, and Gandhi was where Jinnah might have been (Gandhi, 1986, p. 132). In the special session of Congress in Calcutta in September 1920, Jinnah tried to coordinate with Motilal to oppose Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, but young figures such as Jawaharlal, Azad, the Ali brothers, Dr. Ansari, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajagopalachari, and Rajendra Prasad were with Gandhi, as were other Muslim League leaders (Wolpert, 1984, p. 69). The absence of Tilak also improved Gandhi's position because Tilak had a close relationship with Jinnah, although he opposed some of his political views, and Tilak had opposed Gandhi's alliance with the Khilafatists during his life (Wells, 2005, p.107). To the dismay of liberal members of Congress, Motilal supported Gandhi's non-cooperation resolution (Singh, 2010, p. 78). Many Muslim leaders such as Azad and Ansari accepted Gandhi as their leader but indeed Jinnah was not ready to do so. He along with moderate Hindu members such as Sapru, left Congress (Wells, 2005, p. 128).

Jinnah was also a leading member and ex-president of the Home Rule League whose creator, Dr. Besant had already resigned with the complaint that the party was intertwined with religion due to Gandhi's influence (Dwarkadas, 1950, p. 22). Gandhi even changed its name to the Hindu word '*Swaraj Sabha',* an equivalent to the English name the Home Rule League. In October 1920, Jinnah opposed this change in the constitution of the league, but Gandhi advised him to resign if he was not convinced with the majority (Bolitho, 1954, p. 85). Jinnah felt humiliated and resigned from the Home Rule League. Later, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah to ask him

to take his resignation back and join his struggle against the British (Gandhi, 1920a, pp. 382-87).[7] Jinnah refused, writing that he was fully convinced that Gandhi's "policy" of introducing 'religion' and 'confrontation' would lead the nation towards disaster (Symonds, 1950, p. 58).

Finally, at the joint session of the Congress and League at Nagpur in 1920, Jinnah experienced utter humiliation, at the hands of Gandhi's followers: In this conference, only Jinnah opposed Gandhi's proposal for a non-cooperation movement; this session was attended by fourteen thousand delegates who disturbed Jinnah's speech and objected at his not calling Gandhi '*Mahatma*' (Great soul). Interestingly, the majority of delegates were Muslims and when Jinnah requested Gandhi control the mob he did nothing (Symonds, 1950). Only two Hindu members of the Congress family, C.R. Das and Malaviya, supported Jinnah in the same session, but later even they sailed with the popular tide. It is worth mentioning that a similar resolution was also passed in the Muslim League session under the president-ship of Ansari to support Gandhi (Burke & Quraishi, 1997, p. 127), which shows the policy congruence between the League and Congress during the Khilafat movement. After this set-back, Jinnah resigned from Congress due to his inability to submit to Gandhi's elevated status and agitational policies. In fact, Jinnah was now being offered a second rank role in Congress which was not acceptable to him. Therefore, he was effectively ostracised from the Congress family for not obeying the new family head i.e. Gandhi.

The Disunity Phase: The Parting of Ways

The Congress family did not sail smoothly after the departure of Jinnah. From 1927 Gandhi was under pressure from Motilal to support his son Jawaharlal's president-ship of Congress, yet Gandhi had developed differences with Jawaharlal over his demand for complete independence from the British rather than dominion status (Wolpert, 1996, 2001). Moreover, growing communalism within Hindus and Muslim as separate groups had started to worry

Gandhi, so he selected Ansari for the Congress president-ship to console the Muslims (Singh, 2010, p. 134).

After the failure of the Khilafat movement in the mid-1920s, Jinnah-Congress or League-Congress opposition started around a power-sharing formula, but *within* the joint Indian setup. Despite interpersonal differences between their leaders, both parties always proposed a federal structure for a United Indian constitution (Adeney, 2007, p. 34) that shows a strong desire on their part to remain in a joint-setup. However, they kept on competing over the relative strength of the central legislature as well as the powers that should reside in the provinces. Adeney (2007) observes that being a majoritarian party, Congress always rejected the allocation of residual powers to provinces and objected to it as pernicious to the integrity of a United Indian structure. Interestingly, Jinnah was also not an ardent supporter of provincial safeguards as he belonged to one of the Muslim-minority provinces where provincial safeguards were not beneficial to Muslim rights. Instead, he always advocated for a strong representation of Muslims in the central legislature. The Muslim League had more support from Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces (Alavi, 1990) and naturally it did not wish to leave the United Indian family, but always demanded a meaningful say in the decision-making process of the family. Interestingly, Muslims from Muslim-Majority provinces were more interested in provincial autonomy and they objected if their rights were being sacrificed to secure the rights of Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces (Sayeed, 1968, p. 65).

In 1928, members from all the parties drafted a formula for the future constitution of India under the leadership of Motilal Nehru known as the 'Nehru-Report-1928'. The constitutional guarantees for Muslims accepted in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 were rejected in this report. The Muslim league sent several amendments to the Committee to ensure safeguards for the Muslim community, but these recommendations were also rejected (Seervai, 1989). By this time, many Muslim League leaders had lost hope in Gandhi's ability and sincerity to accommodate

Muslims, though they had worked as his lieutenants during the Khilafat movement. Gandhi was seemingly not attending to them as a true family head should.

Muslim League members then approached Jinnah to plead their case before the Committee. In 1927, Jinnah had already made some proposals to Congress for abolishing the separate electorates for Muslims in return for a one third Muslim representation in the central legislature, a population based representation of Muslim-majority provinces, and a mutual veto at the centre (Adeney, 2007, p. 46), which shows Jinnah's wish to remain in a united setup. Sitaramayya (1935) observes that the principle of a mutual veto had remained a part of Congress' policy from the early days and this provision was adopted in Congress' Constitution in 1908 (p. 87). However, despite Jinnah's insistence, it was rejected by Congress in 1928. Although, Motilal Nehru's Report of 1928 proposed a federal structure for the future constitution as "the only solid foundation for responsible government" (Nehru, 1928, p. 85) and also accepted the Muslims' right to have reserved seats, the report rejected the allocation of residual powers to provinces and rejected the demand for one third Muslim representation in the central legislature (Nehru, 1928, p. 54). The report also rejected population-based reservation of seats for Muslim-majority provinces (Nehru, 1928, p. 39). In so doing, the report disappointed Muslim League leaders both from Muslim-minority and majority provinces. It stirred-up insecurity and a feeling of neglect among members of the League-family, and hence brought them closer to each other. Now, Jinnah had to maintain a balance between his centralist tendencies and a provincialist approach, to assume the status of "family-head" of both the League factions.

Motilal was expecting that Jinnah, being an old friend, would endorse his report and get approval from the Muslim League factions; however, Jinnah was unwilling as he had always been in favour of more safeguards for all minorities (Wells, 2005, p.179). It can also be argued that bitter memories of Motilal's betrayal drove Jinnah to act as the League's advocate and to

put his weight on their side. As such Motilal described Jinnah as a friend turned enemy in a letter to Dr. Ansari saying that after 1928 Jinnah had turned cold (Hasan & Ansari, 1979, p. 104).

In the All-Parties Conference of 1928, Jinnah again demanded safeguards for the Muslim minority and warned the committee that the arrogant attitude of the majority party may lead minorities to feel insecure, which would result in disunity (Saiyid, 1970, p. 134). Listeners were not impressed by him and he was labelled a 'spoilt-child' by some members of Congress (Bolitho, 1954, p. 94), and again humiliated with suggestions that he did not represent all Muslims. Gandhi personally told Jinnah that he himself was ready to concede to Muslim reservations over the Nehru Report, but the Sikhs in the Punjab and members of Hindu Mahasabha would not agree (Allana, 1967a, p. 213). Hindu Mahasabha was like another family branch within Congress, as many Congress members were also the members of this party (Jaffrelot, 1996, p. 33). Gandhi, as father or '*Bapu*' of Congress, was supposed to keep all members of the Indian family happy, which was proving to be difficult. The hard work done on the part of Jinnah, Tilak and many for Hindu-Muslim unity through the Lucknow-Pact-1916 had been destroyed. Jinnah himself had tears in his eyes after the rejection of his proposals, and a witness quotes Jinnah as having said, "this is a "parting of ways" (Bolitho, 1954, p. 95). This incident ultimately sealed the fate of Hindu-Muslim unity (Khaliquzzaman, 1961). After this occasion, the Agha Khan remarked that the League won Jinnah back after Congress had rebuffed him (Shah, 1954).

The Congress' policy of adopting a federal structure and rejecting provincial autonomy as detrimental to the integrity of India, continued at the second Round Table Conference – where Jawaharlal kept on pressurising Gandhi not to surrender to Muslim demands (Nehru & Gopal, 1973, p. 137). It can also be very common within families that the next generation may not possess the same respect and love that was shared between their fathers and uncles. In the same

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way, after the death of Motilal, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru did not share the same regard for Jinnah as his father had. In 1929 Jawaharlal became president of Congress and emerged as the future head of the Congress family. He was hostile to Jinnah and called his proposals ridiculous.[8] His private judgements about Jinnah, shaped by intensely personal and emotional factors and aversions, certainly intruded into all his dealings to accept him as an equal partner (Bolitho, 1954, p. 114).

At this point, many Muslim Leaguers began to develop the feeling that Gandhi was treating them as step-sons – the Agha Khan even noted Gandhi's cold behaviour during the second Round Table Conference in 1931. He recollected that Muslims were expecting father-like affection from Gandhi but were denied:

> "I opened it by saying to *Mahatmaji* (Gandhi) that were he now to show himself a real father to India's Muslims, they would respond by helping him, to the utmost of their ability, in his struggle for India's independence. *Mahatmaji* turned to face me. 'I cannot in truth say', he observed, 'that I have any feelings of paternal love for Muslims. But if you put the matter on ground of political necessity, I am ready to discuss it in a co-operative spirit. I cannot indulge in any form of sentiment" (Shah, 1954, p. 231).

Jinnah went off to self-exile in London after the talks failed as he felt he was left with no more options. According to a report in the Manchester Guardian, the position of Jinnah at this stage, was understood as such: "Hindus thought he was a Muslim communalist whilst Muslims thought he was favouring the Hindus" (Sayeed, 1970, p. 281). Whilst in exile, Jinnah was approached by several Muslim League leaders requesting him to lead their party against Congress. They offered him the permanent president-ship of their party, and Jinnah decided to return in 1935.

On his return, Jinnah made attempts for a rapprochement between the League and Congress, both before and after the 1937 elections, sadly, he was denied again. Jawaharlal Nehru got carried away by Congress' electoral victory in 1937 and remarked that Congress and the Raj

were the only two parties in India (Khaliquzzaman, 1961, p. 167) – a statement belittling the status of Jinnah and his party. Being a potential heir of the Congress family, Jawaharlal had begun to see himself as having the status of family head, and to claim to be the sole leader of both the Hindu and Muslim communities.

Jinnah approached Gandhi several times, still considering him the real father of Congress, and asked him to sort out these issues, but Gandhi could not do much – he himself was feeling pressure from Nehru, who had gained much power in the party. Jinnah made a last attempt at unity by requesting Gandhi include Muslim League members in Congress Ministries, but Gandhi refused to push for this saying that:

> "Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something, but I am utterly helpless [Whilst] my faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight but only impenetrable darkness and, in such distress, I cry out to God for light" (Jinnah & Ahmad, 1942, pp. 24-25).[9]

Consequently, Jinnah completely lost hope in Gandhi and became despondent about Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi's secretary and biographer Pyarelal (1956) described Congress's failure to cooperate with the League in 1937 as the prime cause of the creation of Pakistan (p. 76). Jinnah and the other Muslim Leaguers had been made to feel neglected. Griffiths (1952) points out that Patel and Nehru refused to accommodate even two members from the League as ministers – they would have agreed only on the condition of the abolition of the Muslim League in the United Provinces (p. 340). Nehru's attempt to absorb the Muslim League in the United Provinces can also be seen as in line with family conflict dynamics, whereby the distinct identity of either brother(s) is often undermined by the opposing family block. Interestingly, many Muslim members of Congress also opposed coalition with the League after the 1937 victory to preserve their own positions (Hasan, 1993, p. 13). Maulana Azad, the then Congress president, can also be considered responsible for not taking a firm stand against this non-

accommodating attitude from Nehru and Patel. Later, he would hold Nehru personally responsible for not making a fair decision (Azad, 1988).

Historians such as Griffiths (1952, p. 340), Moon (1962, p. 15), Philips (1949, p. 132), Moraes (1956, p. 268), and Brecher (1966) observe that to not accommodate the Muslim-League and to show an imperious attitude was the greatest mistake on the part of Congress, leading to Partition. Menon (1957) argues that this incident informed Muslim opinion causing more to side with Jinnah (p. 56). The chances for the United Indian family to run as one unit were dropped significantly due to the non-accommodating behaviour of the Congress party.

At this critical moment of "parting ways", Gandhi once again mishandled Jinnah by appointing Azad to talk to him. Gandhi thus bruised Jinnah's ego by equating him to the stature of Azad, while Jinnah felt Azad was just a 'Show-Boy' of Congress (Pirzada, 1977, p. 213).[10] As such, Gandhi was still refusing to acknowledge the importance and stature of Jinnah. In 1938, Gandhi and Subhash Bose met him but it was too late to mend fences (Allana, 1967b, pp. 153-162). Earlier, Jinnah had replied to Gandhi's letter of the 19th of October 1937, reminding him of his partisan role:

> "I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. […] Don't you think your complete silence for all these months identified you with the Congress leadership?" (Choudhary, 1984, pp. 247-48; Nehru & Gopal, 1961, p. 216).[11]

At this point, Gandhi recognised Jinnah's angry attitude but tried to lure him back into the Congress family with the following:

> "You complain of my silence. The reason for my silence is literally and truly in my note. Believe me, the moment I can do something that can bring the two communities together nothing in the world can prevent me so doing. […] In your speeches, I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915, [as] I returned from self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah?" (Gandhi & Narayan, 1968, p. 185).[12]

Jinnah's reply shows the depth of his injury and anger:

> "You say that you miss in my speeches the old nationalist. Do you think that you are justified in saying that? I would not like to [compare] what people spoke of you in 1915 and what they speak and think of you today." (Choudhary, 1984, pp. 249-50).[13]

These letters resemble more of a conversation between siblings than political leaders.

Merriam (1980, Chapter V) in fact observes that except for Gandhi, Jinnah lacked brotherly feelings towards any of the other second-generation Congress leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Patel, or Azad. They had assumed their level of importance in the party only through the absence of Jinnah. Therefore, Jinnah had an aversion to these leaders, and vice versa. On February 25, 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Jinnah asking about his grievances:

> "I am afraid I must confess that I do not yet know what the fundamental points of dispute are. It is for this reason that I have been asking you to clarify them" (Nehru & Gopal, 1961, p. 223).

Jinnah's reply supports the argument that Jinnah did not acknowledge Nehru's authority as head of Congress:

> "I am only amazed at your ignorance. This matter has been tackled since 1925 right up to 1935 by the most prominent leaders in the country, and so far, no solution has been found" (Jafri, 1977, pp. 133-34).[14]

On April 6, Nehru wrote back that:

> "Obviously, the Muslim League is an important communal organization and we deal with it as such. But we have to deal with all organizations and individuals that come within our ken (Nehru & Gopal, 1961, p. 239)."

Jawaharlal Nehru' was speaking as though he had assumed the family-headship of all communities in India. This must have been quite painful for Jinnah who had considered himself as a leader of no lesser stature than Jawaharlal Nehru's own father. Jinnah replied:

> "It seems to me that you cannot even accurately understand my letter. Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and militant spirit, as if Congress is the sovereign power" (Choudhary, 1984, p. 272).[15]

Jawaharlal Nehru could never have enjoyed such unchallengeable political status in Congress if Jinnah had not left the party years before. Nehru had ultimately assumed this status by earlier submitting to Gandhi's headship in the Congress family, where Jinnah was deprived of his right to lead the party, because he would not submit to Gandhi.

The Demand of Separation or Batwara[16]

Jinnah's popularity increased once again after Congress resigned from the ministries in 1939. The 'day of deliverance' announced by Jinnah to observe as a "Thanksgiving-Day" at the end of the rule of Congress was not only celebrated by Muslims but other communities as well. The 'spoilt child' that was not accepted as speaking even on behalf of Muslims a decade ago, was now speaking on behalf of all minorities (Bolitho, 1954, p. 124). It is worth mentioning that at this point, Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah congratulating him for championing minorities' cause (Gandhi, 1949, p. 213). It suggests that Gandhi himself was not satisfied with Nehru's attitude towards dealing with minority members of the Hindustani family.

It was only after the Congress Ministries of 1937 that leaders of the Muslim majority provinces reconciled to Jinnah's idea that they needed security both at the provincial as well as central level (Jalal, 1985, p. 52). Finally, in March 1940 Jinnah and the League members passed a resolution for a separate homeland in Lahore. Jalal (1985) argues that this was a negotiating strategy to gain the most political power possible at the centre, rather than Jinnah wanting to leave the United Indian family forever. Jinnah subscribed to a more decentralised federation only as a strategy to co-opt the Muslim majority provinces into the League (Jalal, 1985, p. 54).

At this historical moment, Gandhi's response further supports the argument that Hindu-Muslim conflict was of a familial nature. He again used the allegory of "joint-family" to interpret the League's demand of a separate home-land, where any member can claim a division (Gandhi, 1949, pp. 288-292). In the same way, Jinnah also stated that "I only want a share, but Congress

wants the whole" (Jinnah & Ahmad, 1942, p. 337).[17] On the other hand, Jawaharlal Nehru always desired a more unitary structure in a United India (A. Zaidi & Zaidi, 1980, p. 191), as he himself noted that "the whole was greater than the sum of its parts" (Nehru, 1946, p. 391). Interestingly, the Muslim members who were well entrenched in the Congress family, also used the metaphor of family to oppose the Muslim League's demand for separation, as Abul Kalam Azad said that: "providence had brought Hindus and Muslims together over a thousand years ago and their fight is as between blood-brothers who do not separate" (Desai, 1940, p. 124).

In 1942 Gandhi started the "Quit India Movement" against the British again without taking Jinnah on board. It was only in 1943 when Gandhi tried to engage Jinnah through a mediator, Raja Gopal Acharya (*Rajaji*), who was in favour of granting safeguards to the Muslim minority – he assured Jinnah that Gandhi also wished to resolve these issues. Such an indirect approach made Jinnah write this:

> "If that is Mr. Gandhi's desire, what is there to prevent him (Gandhi) from writing directly to me? Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? […] if there is any change of heart in his party, he has only to drop a few lines to me" (Rajagopalachari, 1944, p. 70).

Nonetheless, Gandhi and Jinnah agreed to meet in 1944.

During the famous Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944, Gandhi was now more eager to settle the issue than Jinnah (Majumdar, 1966, p. 204). Essentially, Jinnah was reciprocating with the coldness that he had received from Congress in 1937 – he did not even allow Gandhi to address the Muslim League Council, saying that he (Gandhi) did not represent Congress in an official capacity (Gandhi, 1947, pp. 139-42). In his letter of 22 September 1944, Gandhi conceded to Jinnah's demand for separation but declared it as a *Batwara*; a partition as between two brothers (Gandhi & Narayan, 1968, p. 187). Two days later, he wrote to Jinnah:

"I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-west zones […] where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India" (Gandhi & Narayan, 1968, p. 191).[18]

While talking to the journalists on Partition issue, Gandhi said:

"Children of the same family, dissatisfied with one another by reason of change of religion, if they wished could separate, but then the separation would be within themselves and not separation in the face of the whole world, "when two brothers separate, they do not become enemies […] in the eyes of the world. The world would still recognise them as brothers" (Gandhi, 1944, pp. 419-423).[19]

However, Jinnah insisted that brothers could do much better and live in harmony by separating and settling their disputes. Jinnah often quoted an example from his professional experience that one of his clients who was at daggers with his own brother due to property issues, became good friends with his brother again once the property issues were settled (Ahmed, 1997). The talks lasted for about two weeks during which both leaders showed mutual respect and love for each other as per indigenous family dynamics, however, they could not reach a solution. These talks did however elevate Jinnah's status as equal to Gandhi (Mahajan, 1987, p. 847).

The Painful Split

In 1946, as a last reconciliation effort, Jinnah agreed to a Cabinet Mission plan to remain in the loose federation of a United India but Congress rejected the plan considering it a potential threat to the unity of India as it had proposed a weak central government with strong provinces (Banerjee & Bose, 1946, pp. 1-7).[20] While some of Congress' elite were prepared to concede a confederal formula to keep the Indian family intact, Jawaharlal was not ready to share power with Jinnah – he undermined the credibility of the proposal by saying that: although Congress has accepted the plan, it reserves the right to change its stance in the future on the constitutional formation (Azad, 1988; Seervai, 1989). Jawaharlal's double-talk on the matter made Jinnah feel betrayed once again. In the end, it was the mutual hostility between Jinnah and Nehru that

proved to be the major reason for Partition. Modi (1973) writes about Nehru's rejection of the cabinet plan as follows:

> "Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League had accepted the (cabinet) plan because he had got his Pakistan in substance if not in fact. From all points of view, it was a happy compromise which would have preserved the unity of India, gained independence without bloodshed or recrimination, and eliminated the possibility of two hostile neighbours within the same sub-continent. But destiny was to move in a different direction and in one of those strange moments which alter the course of events, Jawaharlal Nehru held a press conference on 10th July 1946 at which, in reply to a question, he repudiated the Cabinet Mission Plan. He stated that Congress would go to the Constituent Assembly "completely unfettered by the agreement and free to meet all situations as they arise" (p. 43).

Azad (1988) also referred to Nehru's press conference as an unfortunate event that changed the course of history. Nehru's personal dislike of Jinnah was further revealed in an excerpt from his Ahmedabad jail diary of 1943:

> "Jinnah [….] offers an obvious example of an utter lack of the civilized mind. […] instinctively I think it is better to (give) Pakistan or almost anything if only to keep Jinnah far away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from interfering continually in India's progress" (Nehru, 1943, pp. 322-24).

During the last days of the Raj, acting as an elder of the family, Gandhi tried to maintain the integrity of the united Indian family and proposed to the last viceroy of British India to appoint Jinnah as the future premier (Mansergh & Moon, 1981, p. 69). He even assured Mountbatten (the last British Indian Viceroy) of his ability to convince all factions to support Jinnah, but to his dismay, Jawaharlal Nehru did not agree to this proposal, leading to a painful split between both groups (Wolpert, 2009, p. 137).

Since day one, Pakistan-India relations is the story of a divorce that went wrong (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 113). This legacy goes on from generation to generation. The future course of the infant Pakistani state was to be determined by certain characteristics of *family rivalry*: feelings of being 'wronged' at the time of partition, a fear of being swamped in India, and the desire to compete with and outperform their Indian cousins even at the risk of their own destruction.

Most of Pakistan's early political leaders, senior civil servants and army officers had migrated from India after experiencing the United Indian-family split personally. It also played an important role in developing Pakistani nationalism on the foundations of family conflict dynamics.

Conclusion

This article has explored the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India during the last three decades before Partition and the interpersonal conflicts among prominent political leaders have been interpreted by using an indigenous family-conflict model. This article has argued that the functioning of the large-scale socio-economic or political institutions of the subcontinent are conceptualised by people in terms of their more local family institutions; the Indian National Congress party can then be understood as a joint-family in the subcontinent, having members from different faiths. Focusing on the personality of Mr. Jinnah and other dominant political figures *can* explain Hindu-Muslim behaviour in the subcontinent and explain how tensions developed within this family, and can *also* explain how a liberal barrister Jinnah, who was once called an 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity', parted ways from his Congress family having been disrespected. The Muslim League then behaved as a splinter family group coming to compete with the main Congress family. The key argument of this enquiry is that conflict behaviour learned within the joint-family in the subcontinent can be mapped onto intergroup conflicts. This article has also raised questions such as whether Jinnah was taking revenge on Gandhi for seizing the Congress headship? Or whether Gandhi and other Congress leaders prompted Jinnah's conversion to separatism by denying him safe-guards for the Muslim population in a united India? Arguably, neither of these political titans can be directly blamed, as the real villain of Partition may rather be the embedded psychology of conflict dynamics extrapolated from typical conflicts within families in the subcontinent.

The rupture between the two communities can be traced to the inability of Congress to deal with the Muslim League over issues such as a separate electorate, reserved seats, representation in the central legislature, and a mutual veto, which could have played a vital role in convincing the Muslim League to remain in the united Indian family. The League's concerns were continuously neglected by the Congress leadership who perceived such demands as detrimental to the integrity of a United India.

As partition neared, the Muslims began to feel more strongly that their reservations were not being properly considered, and the Muslims, suddenly seeing themselves as the 'junior' family members, felt neglected – and as younger siblings oftentimes do, they became extra-competitive. The Hindu-Muslim communal divide began to widen with increasing differences between their political fathers. Gandhi's role can be considered as that of a weak 'father' or elder brother struggling in vain to maintain the integrity of the family – he could neither convince Jinnah nor Nehru to keep the family united. This is not to pass judgement on who was right or wrong, rather this article simply finds their roles analogous to the roles played by similar characters in a family setting; Gandhi as an elder, Jinnah as a parting brother, and Jawaharlal as the heir of the remaining family.

Partition can be described as an outcome of this war of succession within the Congress Party: The ouster of Jinnah from Congress strengthened the Muslim League as Jinnah reconciled himself to the cause of the League. Moreover, the reluctance on the part of Congress to deal affectionately with the Muslim League created a sense of 'not mattering at all' among the Muslim minority.

The article has also explained how after living together for more than a millennium, people in the subcontinent became embroiled in an intimate rivalry of a familial nature. From granting the status of 'spiritual father' to their teachers, 'family-head' to bosses, and 'fathers' to political

leaders, people in the subcontinent transpose the moral framework of their kinship-relations onto other institutions. Similarly, they also frame their enemies in terms of kin rivals, such that the conflict resembles more an inter-family conflict than a traditional political conflict.

It is always nearness, rather than distance, that explains the venom in ethnic and religious violence in South Asia (Nandy, 2001). The analogy of the family-conflict model has the potential for applicability to explain the intensity as well as the intimacy of conflicts between groups with more or less similar cultural values, kinship structures, geographical proximity or a shared past. For example, different ethno-religious groups in Pakistan-India-Bangladesh, Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, North-South Korea, or Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia may behave similarly.

In spite of all the Hindus and Muslim had in common, one can suspect that there was always a fissure, waiting to be prised open. Indeed there was a long-standing precedent for seeing Muslims in the subcontinent as family members, but only as step brothers – never quite accepted as the real children of mother-India or *Bharat Mata*. For this reason, the family rivalry was always likely to surface when tensions were heightened between both groups. The writing of the nineteenth century intellectual Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay hints at the historical roots of this step-brother rivalry. A paragraph is reproduced here to conclude:

> "Although India is the true motherland only of those who belong to the Hindu *Jati* and although only they have been born from her womb, the Musalmans (Muslims) are not unrelated to her any longer. She has held them at her breast and reared them. Musalmans are therefore her adopted children. As a result, there is now "a bond of brotherhood between Hindus and Muslims" who must unite in taking care of our Mother. In keeping with the different status of natural and adopted children, however, "our leader" must be a Hindu. Can there be no bond of fraternity between two children of the same mother, one a natural child and the other adopted? There certainly can; the laws of every religion admit this. There has now been born a bond of brotherhood between Hindus and Musalmans living in India" (Cited in Chatterjee, 1993, p. 222).[21]

Notes:

[1] Jinnah's Presidential Address at the opening session of the Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly, dated 11 August, 1947.

[2] Burr (2003) refers to discourse as "a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular set of events" (p. 45), and discourse analysis is about examining the way knowledge is produced within different discourses and the performances, linguistic styles and rhetorical devices used in particular accounts (Snape & Spencer, 2003, p. 200).

[3] Khan (1992) has cited from the Gokhale papers, dated 21 January 1915 in "Tilak and Gokhale: A comparative study".

[4] The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act of 1919, popularly known as the Rowlatt Act or Black Act, was a legislative act passed by the Imperial Legislative Council allowing certain political cases to be tried without juries and permitted internment of suspects without trial.

[5] Gandhi's speech at Khilafat Conference, Delhi, dated 24 November, 1919.

[6] Gandhi's speech at Subjects Committee meeting, Calcutta, dated 5 September, 1920.

[7] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, dated 25 October, 1920.

[8] In his letter dated 4 April, 1931, Jawaharlal wrote to Gandhi: "Certainly there can be no peace or solution of the problem [communal] by merely agreeing to Jinnah's ridiculous 14 points."

[9] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, dated 22 May, 1937.

[10] In his letter, dated 3 March, 1938, Jinnah passed his displeasure to Gandhi for trusting Azad's advices. A copy of this letter can be seen at pp. 37-38 in "Congress Leaders' Correspondence with Quaid-i-Azam by Syed Qasim Hussain Jafri (1977).

[11] Jinnah's letter to Gandhi, dated 5 November 1937, in Dr. Rajendra Prasad's Correspondence and Select Documents (Volume Two).

[12] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, dated 3 February, 1938.

[13] Jinnah's letter to Gandhi, dated 15 February, 1938.

[14] Jinnah's letter to Nehru, dated 3 March, 1938.

[15] Jinnah's letter to Nehru, dated 12 April, 1938.

[16] *Batwara* is an indigenous term used in the subcontinent for the distribution of ancestral property among the blood relations. People also use this term to memorise the Partition of British India in 1947.

[17] The Presidential Address of Mr. Jinnah at the fifth Annual session of All-India Muslim Students' Federation of Nagpur on December 26, 1941.

[18] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, dated 24 September, 1944.

[19] Gandhi's interview to the Press, dated 28 September, 1944.

[20] Only three powers: foreign affairs, currency, and defence were to be the domain of the central government in a three-tier federation, which was proposed in the Cabinet Mission Plan, while extensive residual powers would reside with the provinces.

[21] Partha Chatterjee has translated these lines from "Svapnalabdha Bharatbharser ithas", In Bhudeb racanasambhar (pp. 341-74).

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