

India Review

Politics and the Family: Rethinking the India-Pakistan Two-Nations Theory through the Familial Construction of Political Ideas --Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	INDIAREVIEW-D-19-00027R1
Full Title:	Politics and the Family: Rethinking the India-Pakistan Two-Nations Theory through the Familial Construction of Political Ideas
Article Type:	Original Article
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Author Comments:	<p>I would not miss a chance to extend my gratitude to the publication team who managed to get my article reviewed by so worthy reviewers that helped much developing it into a far better version. Secondly, i was wondering that during re-submission process I did not include the first submission. I am pretty sure that the publication team must have it. Please let me know to upload the first manuscript if needed by the worthy reviewers. Thanks</p>
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Keywords:	India-Pakistan, Two-Nations Theory, Conceptual Mapping, Cognitive Modelling, Qaum

Politics and the Family: Rethinking the India-Pakistan Two-Nations Theory through the Familial Construction of Political Ideas

Abstract

There are few or no scholarly endeavours to explain Pakistan-India partition and their ongoing conflict from an indigenous theoretical lens. A psycho-cultural paradigm has been used in this article to re-examine and reconceptualize the famous two-Nations theory – a political ideology, which manifests Hindu-Muslim discord in the Indian subcontinent by construing both communities as distinct nations based on their inherent ethno-religious and civilizational differences. Considering a very complex process of mass conversion, assimilation, and criss-crossing of caste-system between both groups, this article argues that it is theoretically problematic to differentiate between Hindus and Muslims purely on ethno-religious grounds. Given the significant impact of the institution of family on the lives of the subcontinental people, regardless of their faith – I propose that it can be more explanatory to categorize both groups as competing branches of a joint family, to understand the construction of political ideology of two-Nations Theory in familial terms. This article seeks to clarify the theoretical mechanism through which the emotions associated with family-level ideas can shape peoples' worldview, informing the way they perceive abstract concepts such as group-conflict and the nation, thus impacting their political thoughts.

Key Words: India-Pakistan, Two-Nations Theory, Conceptual Mapping, Cognitive Modelling, Qaum

Introduction

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4 India and Pakistan have been locked into an open hostility since their inception. They have
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6 fought three conventional wars and several armed conflicts. The India-Pakistan conflict is said
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8 to be simultaneously over territory, national identity, and power position in the region.¹ Indian
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10 obsession is a key factor in determining Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies, which are
11
12 always aimed at competing with India at any cost.² Both states regularly display their nuclear
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14 capability to outpace each other, which is always a question mark for the South Asian/Asian
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16 security. Both nations have been unable to forge normal relationships with each other after
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18 parting ways in 1947. Despite several mediatory efforts by the international players, both are
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20 not ready to settle their territorial conflict over Kashmir, which is a fatal legacy of Partition.
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26 The roots of permanent hostility and wide-ranging passions associated with India-Pakistan
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28 relations are traced within two-Nations theory – a political cum theological ideology, which
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30 provides India-Pakistan Partition and their post-Partition conflicts with a *raison d'etre*. Simply
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32 put, this theory presents the idea that due to inherent religious and ethnic differences, Hindus
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34 and Muslims in the Asian Subcontinent were always two distinct nations, who could not co-
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36 exist peacefully.
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42 There are numerous explanations in respect of two-Nations theory, holding the views that
43
44 cultural and civilizational differences created an ideological ocean between both groups. While
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46 this article does not reject what has been said in previous analyses, it offers a radical alternative
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48 view to examine the socio-cognitive nature and components of two-Nations Theory from an
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50 indigenous perspective – because, ideologies are unconsciously motivated processes;
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52 passionately held and emotionally committed, stemming from peoples' underlying cognitive
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58 ¹ See for an extensive debate on the subject: Thazha Varkey Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring*
59 *rivalry* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-8.

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61 ² Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a century: The India-Pakistan conundrum* (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

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assumptions of certain beliefs.³ This article subscribes to the notion that ideologies are pre-packaged units of interpretation, as opposed to the view that political convictions *always* reflect independent and biased thinking.⁴

This article seeks to examine the psychological construction of ordinary peoples' as well as political actors' perception about the "other" group – which formed the building blocks of two-Nations theory – and finds it deeply rooted in the indigenous institution of "joint-family" for its significance, endurance, and a deep emotional impact on the lives of people in the Indian Subcontinent. This article presents a theoretical framework of how to examine the construction process of goals, motives, emotions, and the cognition of individual actors; because, after all, political ideologies, processes, and institutions are made and executed through human agency.⁵ I, therefore, propose that a firm Muslim group identity that emerged during the last decades of the British rule in India, was primarily the outcome of an interactive process between individual actors' psychology constructed within the institution of "joint-family" and their contemporary political environment.

An ideal family life serves as a conceptual anchor for peoples' larger moral belief systems and dictate their political attitudes about how society and the nation should function.⁶ So, if people can reason about politics using family experiences then they can also understand their intergroup-conflict ideologies using the dynamics of family conflict. To that end, Hindu-Muslim conflict could be conceptualized and understood in the simpler terms of a family-split as observed in the local institution of "joint-family". Such a distinctive understanding of the conflict by people was due to numerous commonalities between both groups in the

³ Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The elements of the concept of ideology." *Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (1987): 18-38.
⁴ John T. Jost, Ledgerwood Alison, and Hardin. Curtis D, "Shared reality, system justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 1 (2008): 171-186.
⁵ See for a similar debate: Fred I. Greenstein, "Can Personality and Politics Be Studied Systematically?" *Political Psychology* 13, no. 1 (1992): 105-128.
⁶ George Lakoff and Johnson Mark, *Metaphors we live by* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

1 subcontinent, ranging from their geographic proximity, social practices, frequency of daily-
2 life, identical kinship structures, and kin-labels.
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5 It is problematic to differentiate between Muslims and Hindus strictly on ethnic or religious
6 grounds as there has been a complex ethnic and religious criss-crossing of both groups in the
7 subcontinent. Despite adhering to different faiths, people were not much different from one
8 another in terms of behaviour and practices, owing to a similar cultural gene-pool and a long
9 history of mass conversions from one religion to the other. Due to such distinctiveness of the
10 Asian subcontinent – especially the emotional nature of relations between India and Pakistan
11 – this article builds an indigenous framework to analyse this conflict from a cultural,
12 psychological and historical perspective. A psycho-cultural paradigm as a mode-of-analysis is
13 therefore used to analyse some unexplored aspects contributing to the development of the two-
14 Nations ideology. Typically, a psycho-cultural paradigm involves the analysis of the sociology
15 of politics, the culture of mass psychology, of political psychology, and the political culture.⁷
16 This approach puts forward the idea that the behaviour attained by people in certain emotional,
17 usually familial situations are mapped onto structurally analogous political situations.⁸
18 Accordingly, this article seeks to examine *how* the ideas learned by people within the institution
19 of family in the subcontinent, could be mapped onto their political thought processes shaping
20 a certain conflict ideology. On this theoretical account, we can assume both Hindu and Muslim
21 groups as two branches of the United Indian family competing to have the best position in the
22 family through their respective political leaders. This approach enables us to explain macro-
23 level group concepts by comparing them to the micro-level beliefs, values, and world-views
24 developed in a specific cultural milieu.
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57 ⁷ Bakhtawar M. Jain, *Nuclear politics in South Asia: In search of an alternative paradigm* (Jaipur and New
58 Delhi: Rawat Publications, 1994).

59 ⁸ Heinz Hartmann and Kris Ernst, "The genetic approach in psychoanalysis." *The psychoanalytic study of the*
60 *child* 1, no. 1 (1945): 11-30.
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Justification for using a Psycho-cultural Mode-of-Analysis

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3 While the existing literature does not disregard the passions and intensity found in India-
4
5 Pakistan relations, it does not frame them within a proper theoretical structure. Their mutual
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7 hostility is usually explained as a logical outcome of bloody incidents of Partition – which does
8
9 not explain this phenomenon convincingly, as for instance European nations managed to forget
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11 their past despite seeing bloodshed of an even higher magnitude. Furthermore, Pakistan despite
12
13 being a much weaker state, is not ready to accept any international threat like the suspension
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15 of military or economic assistance in trading off it with its reduction in military build-up against
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17 India. The hostile psychologies of people as well as leadership on both sides is constantly
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19 contributing to the problem – the origins of which need to be spelled out apart from reiterating
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21 the conventional explanations of two-Nations ideology.
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28 Traditionally, India-Pakistan conflict has been studied by assigning both nations fixed rather
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30 diametrically opposite ethno-religious categories i.e. “Hindus” and “Muslims”, which is
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32 theoretically problematic, and does not explain this conflict in entirety. The term “ethno-
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34 religious”, itself is an amalgam of two different cultural identities; religion and ethnicity.
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36 Primarily, there are two distinct ways in which the term “ethnic” has been used by the political
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38 scientists. In its narrower sense, “ethnic” means “racial” or “linguistic”.⁹ This is the sense in
39
40 which the term is widely understood in popular discourse. However, in British India, the term
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42 “communalism” has been used more often to mention conflicts between Hindus and Muslims
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44 based upon religious differences, because of their racial, linguistic, and ethnic similarities.¹⁰
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46 Therefore, the narrower context of the term ‘ethnic’ is not applicable to differentiate between
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48 Punjabi Hindus and Muslims or Bengali Hindus and Muslims.
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58 ⁹ Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Yale University Press, 2003),
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60 ¹⁰ Ibid
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1 But if one insists on examining Pakistan-India or Muslim-Hindu conflicts in ethnic terms, he
2 will have to subscribe to another broader approach of defining ethnic groups in social sciences.
3
4 All conflicts, Horowitz argues, based upon ascriptive identities – race, language religion, tribe,
5 or caste can be called ethnic. Even the groups differentiated by “nationalities” come under this
6 wider umbrella of ethnicity.¹¹ Using this wider concept, ethnic conflicts might range from
7 Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland, and Hindu-Muslim conflict in both post-
8 partition and pre-partition periods. The black-white conflict in United States and South Africa
9 also comes under its rubric.¹²

10
11 However, using this wider criteria of defining ethnicity is also problematic in India-Pakistan
12 case and does not serve the cause of our inquiry: Because, in so doing not only the interstate
13 Pakistan-India conflict and Hindu-Muslim inter-group conflict can be regarded as ethnic, but
14 we will also have to subscribe to Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict in Pakistan and upper caste-
15 lower caste conflict in India as ethnic conflicts.

16
17 In fact, there has been a paradox of identity for both Hindus and Muslims in the Indian
18 Subcontinent. They are caught in the web of deciding between different cultural identities;
19 religious, ethnic, caste and sectarian ones being at the top. Religion is often viewed as the
20 number one variable responsible for Pakistan-India partition. However, this fact must not be
21 ignored that despite having different religions, large number of people belonged to the same
22 ethnic groups and castes. For example, Punjabi or Bengali population was divided on religion
23 factor during Partition despite belonging to same ethnic groups. Conversely, these
24 Punjabi/Bengali ethnic groups had their representation in almost all the religions prevailing in
25 the subcontinent. Despite being divided on religions, people had strong ethnic, linguistic and
26 even kinship ties.

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59 ¹¹ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 53.

60 ¹² Ibid

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Now, finding religion as the *only* reason for isolating the members of a homogeneous ethnic group can be very interesting and needs to be reconsidered on the grounds that people conceptualize their ethnic group in terms of a family. A simple question that could be asked to explain this phenomenon is that what if a member of a Catholic Irish family embraces Islam? Will he lose his Irish identity? An ethnic group members often call each other brothers and call distantly related groups cousin-brothers; a term with a figurative meaning: the word connotes the condition of being like brothers but not actually brothers.¹³ Rare are the cases if people can change their ethnic identity: For example, a Punjabi will remain Punjabi even he is divided between different nation-states or religions – Muslim Punjabi, Hindu Punjabi, Sikh Punjabi, Indian Punjabi, Pakistani Punjabi, British Punjabi, or Canadian Punjabi. Furthermore, there is a strong line of argument that when an ethnic group is divided for some reasons (say religion), its members tend to behave like when someone leaves his family. One could infer that the animosity between Hindu and Muslim communities in India and Pakistan *can also* be examined by ascribing them the category of “rival kin groups”; as the nations, themselves, are a fully extended form of family.¹⁴

The institution of family can be beneficial for our inquiry while examining the cognitive components of two-Nations theory by understanding how people conceptualize the ideas of nation, nationalism, national identity, nation-building and state-building in the Indian subcontinent – because, the family (joint-family to be specific) is the most salient, initial, most emotionally powerful, most functional, and the most enduring institution in this region and almost every ideology is shaped within this institution.¹⁵ To that end, the family/lineage identity can be a potential rival to every other group identity – religious, linguistic, and political.¹⁶ Right

¹³ Ibid., 56.

¹⁴ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism : The Quest for Understanding*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 202.

¹⁵ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Public Affairs, 2012) and Sudhir Kakar and Katrina Kakar, *The Indians: Portrait of a people* (Penguin Books India, 2009).

¹⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*.

1 from their home, people start learning the concepts of authority and governance; and learn to
2 understand the differences between right and wrong.¹⁷ The family institution is taken as a
3 model while conceiving the ideas about their ethnic group or nation, as Indian people use the
4 familiar building blocks of family and kinship in order to make sense of larger political
5 entities.¹⁸ Therefore, given the larger impact of institution of family on their lives, this article
6 argues that near the Partition, Hindu and Muslim communities conceptualized themselves in
7 terms of warring family branches. Their group identity was not thought upon *only* in terms of
8 distinct ethnic or religious groups, which informs the conventional bases of two Nations-
9 Theory.
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11 The rationale for using family dynamics to analyse two-Nations Theory also lies in the fact that
12 India-Pakistan Partition and their ongoing conflicts, have always been expressed by ordinary
13 people as well as political leaders in a heavily familistic language carrying indigenous familial
14 labels. For example, Jai Prakash Narayan, an Indian independence activist, argued that Hindu
15 and Muslim are like two brothers fighting for separation and they would live in amity and
16 fraternal harmony once the parental assets are settled after partition.¹⁹ This also explains the
17 nature of emotions attached to Kashmir conflict that make it's resolve so difficult, as it is
18 conceptualized by both groups in terms of their ancestral property. Pakistani people imagine
19 Kashmir as their lost *Jaddi Virsa* (ancestral property), and stepping down from your ancestral
20 property's claim can bring shame to home according to the indigenous cultural values.²⁰ In
21 famous Gandhi-Jinnah Talks in 1944 to settle the issue of Partition, Mr. Gandhi never agreed
22 to use the term "nation" for both groups and proceeded on the assumption that Hindus and
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24 ¹⁷ Saeed Ahmed Khan, *A Cross-cultural Investigation of Person-centred Therapy in Pakistan and Great Britain*
25 (Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2014).

26 ¹⁸ Patrick Colm Hogan, *Understanding nationalism: On narrative, cognitive science, and identity*. (The Ohio
27 State University Press, 2009),132-133.

28 ¹⁹ Asghar Ali Engineer, *Communal riots in post-independence India*. (Hyderabad: Sangam Books,1985), 238-
29 71.

30 ²⁰ Jawad Kadir, "Perceiving the Enemy Differently: A Psycho-cultural Analysis of Pakistan-India
31 Conflict." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 6, no. 2 (2019): 189-216

1 Muslim constitute a “family” and Muslim family members want to live separately.²¹ Mr. Jinnah
2 was quite optimistic that “division” would improve the relations between two nations.²² He
3 was also of the opinion that Hindu-Muslim animosity would be pacified after settling the
4 power/resource sharing issues as it usually happens among brothers.²³ Sardar Patel – the first
5 deputy prime minister of India – conceded to the demand of Pakistan in 1947 by saying that: it
6 is better for brothers to live separately in peace than to live together and quarrel all the time.²⁴
7 The above are a few of many statements on the part of Partition’s key actors, substantiating my
8 argument to review the familial construction of of two-Nations theory.
9

10 Another rationale behind using the family dynamics to reassess the two-Nations theory lies
11 within ethnographic literature confirming that the subcontinental people do treat their
12 neighbours as their kin.²⁵ A famous saying goes like: “*Hamsaya Ma ka jaya*” which means
13 “your neighbour is your mother’s son – near neighbours are considered closer than far-
14 relatives.²⁶ Lyon has also observed in Pakistani culture that people tend to transpose their kin
15 relations to other people in society; and the family remains the starting reference point for them
16 to deal with the entire world – situating the position of other people around them.²⁷ People use
17 indigenous kin “labels” for their neighbours, which develops an intimate bond among them.²⁸
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42 ²¹ Stanley A. Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 231.

43 ²² Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London ; New York:
44 Routledge, 1997).

45 ²³ Mr. Jinnah often quoted an example from a family in which blood-brothers remained at daggers for dividing
46 their ancestral property. One of the brothers was Jinnah’s client. After the distribution of assets was settled through
47 court, the brothers again developed their cordial relations. This incident has been quoted by Ahmed, Akbar in:
48 *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*.

49 ²⁴ Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom : The Complete Version* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan
50 Private Limited, 2014), 201.

51 ²⁵ Muhamad Azam Chaudhary, *Justice in practice: legal ethnography of a Pakistani Punjabi village* (Oxford
52 University Press, USA, 1999).

53 ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

54 ²⁷ Stephen M. Lyon, *An anthropological analysis of local politics and patronage in a Pakistani village* (Wales:
55 Edwin Mellen Press, 2004).

56 ²⁸ The labels reserved for the blood relations, such as *Chacha* (father’s brother), *Taya* (father’s elder brother),
57 *Mama* (mother’s brother), *Beta* (son), and *Bhatija* (nephew) are also used for those living close by (neighbours).
58 The traditional use of such familiar terms developed intimate relations between Hindu and Muslim neighbours.
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1 In pre-partition times, a Muslim would have considered his Hindu neighbour to be closer to
2 him than a Muslim from a more distant place. Thus, a familial “near-ness” had been developed
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4 between Hindu and Muslim neighbours impacting deeply on locking them in a familial type of
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6 feud when an intergroup conflict broke-out.
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10 **Objectives of the Article**

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13 Clarifying the theoretical mechanism of “Conceptual-Mapping” through which family-level
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15 learning and concepts are mapped onto group level thought-processes and political ideologies,
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17 is one of the core objectives of this article. In addition to that, by employing discourse analysis,
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19 this article re-examines the famous two-Nations Theory to understand the cognitive
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21 construction of a distinct Muslim identity in familial terms. The different indigenous terms
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23 such as *Batwara* and *Qaum*²⁹ – popularly used in the political and nationalist discourses of
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25 India-Pakistan history – have been re-evaluated in the light of their indigenous contexts.
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27 Another objective is to explain how the images of an extended family or a lineage group
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29 associated with these terms, could have provided both groups with ready-made templates to
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31 situate their own political identity vis-à-vis the ‘other’.³⁰
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39 **Why A Paradigm Shift? An Engagement with the Existing Literature**

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42 While this article acknowledges the significance of the existing literature explaining the roots
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44 of Hindu-Muslim hostility in the pre-partition as well as in post-partition period, the available
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46 literature is mostly of a historical or descriptive nature. Dr. Sumit Ganguly has aptly remarked
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48 that there is a dearth of scholarly literature capable of analysing this ongoing rivalry from a
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53 ²⁹ The term *Qaum* is usually translated in English language as the “nation”, which gives readers the meanings of
54 the nation-state. The indigenous usage of this term is of *Biradari* or *Jati*, which denotes an extension of family
55 groups with common descendant; literally a brotherhood. This term must also not be confused with the local
56 terms such as *Janta* or *Praja*, which are used to represent the common people “the masses”; the subjects of a
57 state.

58 ³⁰ Hamza A. Alavi, "Kinship in west Punjab villages." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 6, no. 1 (1972): 1-27.
59 The terms such as *Qaum*, *Biradari* and *Jati* (Brotherhood) are replaceable, which represent a group of people
60 having common descendant; a sort of large paternal family group.
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1 theoretical foci.³¹ There are several viewpoints with their own strengths and drawbacks,
2 explaining this conflict by focusing on different factors.
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5 ***The Genesis of Two-Nations Theory*** 6

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9 In tracing the genesis of Hindu-Muslim discord in the Indian Subcontinent, first comes the
10 primordial model presenting the idea that both groups always had distinct identities for having
11 dissimilar religions and cultures.³² Robinson argues that Indian Muslims were always different
12 from their Hindu counterparts in terms of religion, culture and civilization; therefore, Muslim
13 communities were bound to become a separate nation.³³ A famous historian K.K. Aziz also
14 supports this argument by saying: “the Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious, but it
15 was the clash of two civilizations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary
16 roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources and different concepts of
17 art”.³⁴ Sayeed has used the metaphor of two parallel but not-mixable rivers for Hindus and
18 Muslims.³⁵ This view is commonly referred to as “two-Nations Theory”.
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34 While this model has its own strengths, it does not clarify that: if religion was the main factor
35 behind Muslim separatism, then how come almost all the leading religious parties and clerics
36 could oppose the idea of Pakistan? The top Muslim clergy including Maulana Abul Kalam
37 Azad (Congress), Maulana Muhammad Hassan Madni (Jamiat Ulma-e-Hind), and Maulana
38 Maududi (Jamaat-e-Islami) had rejected the idea of Muslim nationalism and equated it to a
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49 ³¹ Sumit Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century* (Cambridge:
50 Cambridge University Press, 2016).
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52 ³² Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-
53 1923* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, *Hindutva; who is a Hindu?*
54 (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969) and Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948*
55 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
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57 ³³ Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*

58 ³⁴ Khursheed Kamal Aziz, *The making of Pakistan: A study in nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967),
59 143.

60 ³⁵ Sayeed, *The Formative Phase*
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“curse”.³⁶ Similarly, Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari of Majlis-e-Ahrar – another dynamic Muslim religious party in northern India – also opposed the theory that Indian Muslims constituted a different nation. All the first rank Muslim clerics blamed Muslim League leaders to protect the British raj and called the Hindu-Muslim conflict “nothing more than friction between two brothers over the distribution of their father’s property”.³⁷

The two-Nations Theory has been further explained from different schools of thought, such as the Instrumentalists interpreting it through socio-economic and political factors.³⁸ The proponents of this approach say that during the early period of British rule, the Muslims were lagged far behind to Hindus in educational, economic, political, administrative and professional fields.³⁹ As Muslim elite’s domination over society was threatened, they tried to mobilise their own community behind them through manipulating identity symbols; religious and linguistic.⁴⁰ It is worth mentioning that again, the “instrumental role of religion” is emphasized in dividing both groups – as this approach focuses on identity as a tool used by the individuals, groups or elites for obtaining material benefits.⁴¹ In so doing, this approach points its fingers at the Muslim elite/aristocrats in minority Muslim provinces as an exploiting class, who made use of religion for securing their own political and economic interests – Jinnah’s westernised personality is presented to substantiate this argument, who was to become the first Muslim Governor General of Pakistan. Jalal argues that Jinnah was a political strategist who played the majority Muslim province card originally to secure the best position in a united India; actually

³⁶ Ian Talbot, “Back to the future? Pakistan, history and nation building,” in *Pakistan at the Millennium*, ed., C.H. Kennedy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 65:95 and Syed Anwar Hussain, *Pakistan: Islam, politics, and national solidarity* (Praeger Publishers, 1982).

³⁷ Salil Misra, *A Narrative of Communal Politics, Uttar Pradesh, 1937-39* (California: Sage publications Inc., Thousand Oaks), 235.

³⁸ Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974) and “Elite group, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia” in *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed., David T. Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (London, Curzon Press, 1979).

³⁹ Louis Dumont, “Nationalism and Communalism”, in *Religion, Politics and History in India* (Paris: Mouton De Gruyter, 1970), 98:99.

⁴⁰ Azad, *India wins freedom*.

⁴¹ David A. Lake, and Donald S. Rothchild, *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 6.

1 he never wished to leave the federation but ended up having to do so.⁴² An objection can be
2 raised against this “elitist” explanation that why were political leaders from minority Muslim
3 provinces so sure that they could control the state affairs in majority Muslim provinces after
4 partition? And were not the Muslim political elite in majority provinces concerned about
5 disruption to their own status?
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12 Jalal’s thesis explaining the reasons behind Jinnah’s advocacy for a separate home-land in
13 contrast to his previous ideals of Indian nationalism, is also viewed from different angles.
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15 While this article does not deny the impact of contemporary political and constitutional issues
16 on Jinnah’s stance to change from a staunch nationalist to a communalist, it suggests that
17 Jinnah’s political trajectory can also be viewed by way of an inherent cognitive modelling
18 inside Jinnah, he developed after being denied a wishful status in Congress party. This
19 argument is supported by examining Jinnah’s discursive reproduction of inner thoughts while
20 using the familial metaphors when defending his communalist stance that: “we are glad we are
21 communalists. Instead of waiting at other’s door, if you want to create self-respect and self-
22 reliance, organise yourself.”⁴³ Also, his statement that “Muslims have no home and no place
23 to call their own”;⁴⁴ unconsciously gives a clue that besides other objective realities; his
24 outward rejection to work with Congress was a result of being rebuffed by the Congress
25 leadership.
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45 Dhulipala categorically rejects Jalal’s argument and says that Pakistan was never created in a
46 vacuum, rather it was purposefully imagined and popularly accepted in minority Muslim
47 provinces as an ideal Islamic state of Medina.⁴⁵ He explains to the extent that contemporary
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54 ⁴² Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge
55 University Press, 1985).

56 ⁴³ Waheed Ahmad, *The Nation’s voice: Towards Consolidation, Vol. 1: Speeches and Statements of M.A.
57 Jinnah, 1935-40* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1992), 150. Jinnah’s public address, 16 May 1937.

58 ⁴⁴ Ibid., 294. Jinnah’s address at the Muslim Students’ Conference at Karachi, 11 October 1938.

59 ⁴⁵ Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a new Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial
60 North India* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 501.
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1 Pakistan's crisis also owes to its inability towards fulfilling those imagined Islamist ideals.
2 Devji also seems to be supporting this argument when he uses the term "Muslim Zion" to
3 describe the sacrifices of millions of people who abandoned their homelands to settle in the
4 promised land of Pakistan.⁴⁶
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10 This article does accept that: the ideology of being a distinct group, and the desire for having a
11 separate homeland, had gained enormous public support in the minority Muslim provinces –
12 however, this article doubts the role of religion as the *only* catalyst for widening the gap
13 between both communities that sustained their religious differences for centuries. Dhulipala
14 himself admits that "two Nations-Theory", itself was divided between pro-Congress and pro-
15 League clergy. It implies that there are certainly some other complexities embedded within the
16 construction of this ideology – a few of which this article has attempted to present by way of
17 theorization that how both communities *perceived* each other in familial terms.
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30 I argue that Jalal's thesis of an "accidental" creation of Pakistan or a "purposeful" selection of
31 an Islamic state (Dhulipala and Devji theses) *can also* be explained as a Muslim communalism
32 conceptualized upon by the masses in terms of a family fissure – that underwent a political
33 mobilizational process under the leadership of Jinnah, who himself was trying to situate his
34 own position as a new family-head of Muslim family after losing a more or less similar position
35 in the Congress family. Conceived this way, Muslim identity politics was transformed into an
36 irresistible social force. The role of Jinnah can be explained as an articulator of the ideology
37 that had already been constructed in peoples' minds, especially in the minority Muslim
38 provinces.
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60 ⁴⁶ Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (London: C. Hurst, 2013).
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There is another Subaltern school of thought blaming the British rulers for fostering and concretizing the communal identities between both sister-communities for their political gain.⁴⁷ Pandey suggests that the Muslims in south Asia were linguistically and culturally so diverse, that they could not identify a water-tight “Muslim” identity for themselves only by shared beliefs or religion.⁴⁸ While fully agreeing to the notion that due to an assimilation process spanning over centuries, both religions are severely fragmented along caste and sectarian lines in the subcontinent, and therefore the identification of these groups with strict ethno-religious markers is difficult – this article suggests that the picture of holding the British as sole responsible for constructing religious antipathies, is also incomplete. This position does not explain convincingly that why such “constructed” religious identity could not bring the same hostility against the British Christians, who were at the helm of power-play; as the identities once constructed can be difficult to be deconstructed. I argue that British Christians could not be absorbed into local population according to the indigenous principles of caste and hierarchy, what Muslims did centuries ago. Therefore, the local people could not put the same amount of intensity into their rivalry against such “outsiders”. Subsequently, the Muslim-League leaders were ready to work under the British masters but did not digest Hindu-Congress rule in 1937. Similarly, the Hindus began to feel contempt against Muslim neighbours for their beef-eating habit, but the same practice by the British outsiders remained acceptable to them. Moreover, how could this supposedly constructed religious identity fade away so quickly after Partition and failed to maintain the unity between Muslim Pakistanis and Muslim Bangladeshis (former East Pakistan) – who separated again in 1971 on supposedly ethno-linguistic grounds.

⁴⁷ A school pioneered by Ranajit Guha. See for a detailed discussion: Ranajit Guha, *An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth Century Agenda and its Implications* (Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1988).

⁴⁸ Gyanendra Pandey, *The Colonial Construction of Communalism in North India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

1 Interestingly, the Hindu India then helped the cause of Muslim Bengalis against their own West
2 Pakistani Muslim brethren.⁴⁹
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4 5 6 ***Literature Explaining Post-Partition Conflict*** 7

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10 Post-Partition conflict between both nation-states is also explained in terms of ideological
11 differences stemming from this two-Nations theory. Stephen Cohen had identified the vitality
12 of an anti-Indian approach for Pakistani policy makers, which constantly urges them to
13 strengthen themselves militarily.⁵⁰ While asserting Pakistan's pursuance for Kashmir as a
14 religious mission, Cohen also takes a notice of the paradoxical religious character of Pakistani
15 society by saying that Pakistanis are not in the favour of an orthodox Islamic state. In fact, due
16 to conflict prone nature of India-Pakistan relations, scholars such as Ganguly and Fair hold
17 Pakistan's revisionist, expansionist and greedy agenda responsible for spreading its territorial
18 and ideological expansionism in the region.⁵¹ Ganguly also mentions the presence of firm
19 ideological beliefs that do not let Pakistan to back-off from Kashmir cause. Paul and Siddiqa
20 define Pakistan as a "Garrison" and "Warrior" state, run by a handful military elite for serving
21 their own as well as extra-regional agendas.⁵² There seems to be an intellectual agreement
22 among many scholars that military regimes in Pakistan pursue their own institutional interests,
23 and therefore regard permanent enmity with India as *raison d'etre* for their existence. However,
24 from Pakistani standpoint, it is the "fear" of Indian hegemonic designs that makes Pakistan to
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52 ⁴⁹ Hafeez Malik, *Dilemmas of national security and cooperation in India and Pakistan* (London: MacMillan
53 Press Springer, 1993).

54 ⁵⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, *The idea of Pakistan* (Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 69-72.

55 ⁵¹ Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse*, and C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*
56 (Oxford University Press, 2014).

57 ⁵² Tahzha V. Paul, *The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world* (Oxford University Press, 2014) and
58 Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc, The politics of Military's Economy in Pakistan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson
59 Centre for International Scholars, 2007).
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1 adopt security seeking behaviour.⁵³ Admittedly, this pro-Pakistani model can partly explain a
2 state's defensive approach for its survival but does not put forward a plausible explanation for
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4 an adventurous and extra-aggressive Pakistani stance against India.
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8 In fact, regardless of civil or military regimes, Pakistan has always pursued policies that must
9 be diametrically opposite to Indian policies. Jaffrelot has used the metaphorical conception of
10 husband-wife relations to describe India-Pakistan troublesome dyad: "The story of a divorce
11 that went wrong".⁵⁴ While analysing Pakistan's military's paranoia to fight India to the end,⁵⁵
12 Fair does not focus much on the public mentality that loves Army as the only powerful
13 institution capable of competing and defeating India. Pakistan's ambitious behaviour against
14 India *can also* be interpreted as the outcome of an interactive process between mass psychology
15 and the political culture, only to be executed by the political elite. In fact, it is politicians in
16 Pakistan not men-in-uniform, who gain more by anti-Indian rhetoric,⁵⁶ and the leaders in both
17 states try to acquire nuclear supremacy only to bolster their own individual popularity.⁵⁷ It
18 implies that political elite capitalize upon the popular sentiments already found in each country
19 against the other. This article proposes that the development of such popular urge to compete
20 each other *must* be examined apart from considering it merely a statist project, which *can*
21 explain Pakistan's extra-adventurous attitude against a country ten times bigger than his own.
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25 Nevertheless, Ganguly has pointed out the cognitive and affective biases arising from the
26 ideological differences that drive Pakistan to challenge India even after nuclear deterrence.⁵⁸
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⁵³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the geostrategic environment: a study of foreign policy* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993) and Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan the garrison state: origins, evolution, consequences, 1947-2011* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁵⁴ Christophe Jaffrelot, *A history of Pakistan and its origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 113.

⁵⁵ Fair, *Fighting to the End*, 7.

⁵⁶ Ahmad Faruqui, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* (Ashgate Publication, Limited, 2005).

⁵⁷ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Un-ending: India-Pakistan tensions since 1947* (Columbia University Press, 2002), 127-38.

⁵⁸ Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse*, 13.

1 This article fully accepts the presence of certain cognitive biases among masses as well as
2 political leaders on both sides, which contribute towards the construction of their emotional
3 national agendas aimed at letting each other down. By using the theoretical framework of
4 conceptual mapping, this article examines how these cognitive biases are constructed through
5 the early socialization in a family setting.
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11 **How Ideology and the Nation draw on the “Family”? A Theoretical Framework**

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14 An ideology is a set of certain normative beliefs and values; the systems of ideas and ethical
15 ideals which can impact the formation of politico-economic theories and resultantly their action
16 plans.⁵⁹ In political science, the term ideology is synonymous to the term political ideology that
17 refers to a political belief system providing a social movement, institution or class with
18 doctrines, myths, and symbols that how society or nation should work.⁶⁰ However, an ideology
19 is further explained in terms of a worldview⁶¹ – the imagined existence (or idea) of things as it
20 relates to the real conditions of existence.⁶² These normatively imbued ideas or conceptual
21 maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe including particular
22 representations of power relations.⁶³ One of the core characteristics of an ideology is its power
23 over cognition that influence peoples’ evaluations of the political situations.⁶⁴ Moreover, the
24 main elements of the concept of ideology are the underlying cognitive assumptions of belief,
25 or the total structure of the mind including the conceptual apparatus – therefore, it is
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50 ⁵⁹ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University
51 Press, 1996).

52 ⁶⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk, "Ideology and discourse analysis." *Journal of political ideologies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 115-
53 140.

54 ⁶¹ Manfred B. Steger, and James Paul, "Levels of subjective globalization: Ideologies, imaginaries,
55 ontologies." *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 12, no. 1-2 (2013): 17-40.

56 ⁶² Louis Althusser, "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. Lenin and philosophy and other essays." *Trans.*
57 *Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press* 1270186 (1971).

58 ⁶³ Manfred B. Steger, "Ideologies of globalization." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 11-30.

59 ⁶⁴ Willard A. Mullins, "On the concept of ideology in political science." *American Political Science Review* 66,
60 no. 2 (1972): 498-510.
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1 unconsciously motivated, passionately held, and emotionally committed.⁶⁵ Therefore,
2 ideologies can be explained as a manifestation of the unconscious motivational processes; pre-
3 packaged units of interpretation, as opposed to the view that political convictions always reflect
4 independent and biased thinking.⁶⁶ One could easily infer from the above discussion that the
5 compositional structure of an ideology is considerably of a socio-cognitive nature – which, in
6 turn, is also reproduced in political discourse.

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15 This article argues that the family-level morals and beliefs are mapped onto group-level
16 political ideas – something which can be explained effectively with the help of cognitive
17 neuroscience research. The idealised family experiences become the source of the construction
18 of peoples’ ethical and political behaviour while conceptualizing their group and nation.⁶⁷ To
19 that end, the institution of family can also shape the construction of peoples’ conflict
20 ideologies, which are then mapped onto their interpersonal, intergroup as well as interstate
21 conflicts. Lakoff explains how people reason about the abstract concepts (say intergroup
22 conflict) in terms of their more concrete knowledge based in day-to-day experience (say family
23 conflict).⁶⁸ Accordingly, people may use the dynamics and metaphors used within more
24 mundane family conflicts to reason about relatively more difficult and abstract intergroup
25 conflict situations.

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Apparently, the ideological beliefs seem to stem from an individual’s personality traits and
needs, and therefore the utility of purely psychological explanations declines sharply when
making comparisons across different societies. Here, culture being a group concept, acts as an

⁶⁵ Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The elements of the concept of ideology." *Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (1987): 18-38.

⁶⁶ John T. Jost, Ledgerwood Alison, and Hardin. Curtis D, "Shared reality, system justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 1 (2008): 171-186.

⁶⁷ George Lakoff, *Moral politics: How conservatives and liberals think*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). George Lakoff is the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of Berkeley. He is the founding senior fellow at the Rockridge Institute, which specializes in applying cognitive linguistics to the use of framing in political discourse. Cognitive linguistics is the systemic, scientific approach within the cognitive sciences to the study of how we understand.

⁶⁸ Ibid

1 intermediary in the relationship between individual perceptual tendencies and a group's
2 political orientation. I propose that sociological and anthropological understandings of the
3 concept of culture-as-worldview – shared belief systems irreducible to their individual
4 adherents that once established become highly resistant to change – could offer a solution to
5 these apparent inconsistencies.⁶⁹ Culture affects the mental programming of its adherents and
6 thus determine their collective behaviour.⁷⁰ Simply put, human psyche and culture are
7 inseparable and co-construct each other. The affects of culture on collective action and political
8 life are generally indirect, therefore, it is necessary to investigate how culture interacts with,
9 shapes, and is shaped by interests and social institutions.⁷¹ Examining a specific culture and
10 associated emotions within it, can reveal important political strategies key actors adopt.
11 Considering these theoretical findings, this article has probed into the local institution of joint-
12 family for its cultural significance and emotional impact over peoples' cognition that influence
13 their evaluation of the political situations.

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33 As the earliest learning of living, relationships, conflict, authority and being governed is inside
34 their family, it should not be surprising that how this familial learning informs peoples' political
35 ideas and behaviours in the wider domains. The dynamics of the family models idealized and
36 practised by the majority population of a group give an insight of how a particular group
37 conceptualizes and reacts to certain political situations. People idealize in terms of their most-
38 loved family models – which are deeply imbedded in their psyche through early socialization
39 – that how their society and nation should work. Different family structures and types are

54 ⁶⁹ Anthony J. Marsella, "Culture and Conflict: Understanding, Negotiating, and Reconciling Conflicting
55 Constructions of Reality." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 29, no. 6 (2005): 651-73.

56 ⁷⁰ Gustav Jahoda, *Psychology and anthropology: A psychological perspective* (London: Academic Press, 1982)
57 and *Crossroads between culture and mind: Continuities and change in theories of human nature* (Harvard
58 University Press, 1993).

59 ⁷¹ Sheri Berman, "Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis (Book Review)." *Comparative Politics* 33, no.
60 2 (2001): 241-44.

1 idealized in different parts of the world; joint-family system being the most desirable in the
2 Indian subcontinent as compared to more nuclear family models of western societies.
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5 As available literature has it, the two-Nations theory manifests that both communities,
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7 especially the Muslims, had conceptualized (consciously) about their own community and
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9 future nation-state as an ideal Islamic state, which would be free of Hindu majoritarian rule.
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11 While I do not reject this assertion in toto, what only I suggest is an additional examination of
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13 the “unconscious” conceptualization of this phenomenon by both communities for
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15 understanding the deep-rooted passions found in their mutual relations. This argument is
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17 backed by the psycho-culturalists such as Lagace that: “Thoughts and feelings occur and are
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19 manifested both consciously and unconsciously”⁷²; and the psychoanalysts such as Herbert
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21 that: “Often-times, people are not consciously aware of some of the most significant
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23 motivations and attitudes that shape their thinking and behaviour”.⁷³ These unconscious factors
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25 can be traced through clues that people give in an indirect way and usually they are in a
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27 symbolic form. A few of these crucial clues or signals have been analysed in this article for
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29 understanding the cognitive components of the conflict ideology imbued in two-Nations
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31 theory.
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40 From the standpoint of this article, the concept of “National Community” needs to be re-
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42 examined in relation to the institution of family. A National community is quite old concept,
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44 and it existed much before it was named so. People used to identify themselves in terms of
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46 family, lineage group, tribes, and clans. With the passage of time, the growth of means of
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48 communication, and growing relations among different groups had generated the concept of
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50 commune of families, tribes or clans – which can be regarded as the beginning of the
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57 ⁷² Robert O. Lagacé, "Psychocultural Analysis, Cultural Theory, and Ethnographic Research." *Behavior science*
58 *notes* 1, no. 3 (1966): 165-199.

59 ⁷³ Hendin Herbert, Willard Gaylin and Arthur C. Carr, *Psychoanalysis and social research: The psychoanalytic*
60 *study of the non-patient*. Vol. 530 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965).
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1 conceptualization of “national community” or “nation” as defined in the modern terms – family
2 remained the unit-cell of this concept.
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5 Anderson has pointed out that we cannot experience the nation directly, therefore, we imagine
6 it in terms of some community which is necessarily imaginary.⁷⁴ As nation is an abstract
7 concept, therefore it is thought upon by people in relation to more understandable or concrete
8 concepts. Therefore, the “operational code” behind the conceptualization of a nation can be de-
9 coded by exploring into the concrete and daily-based concepts that people usually rely upon to
10 visualize their ideal community. Connor affirms that a national community is envisioned on
11 model of the family and goes so far as to define the nation as “the fully extended family”.⁷⁵ He
12 suggests that the nation works its magic through “familial metaphors”.⁷⁶ It becomes more
13 evident when we see people around the world conceptualizing their nation-states in terms of
14 familial metaphors: e.g. Mother India, and Mother Russia.
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29 The “type” of family-model cherished and respected by people is important as it impacts deeply
30 on running a nation’s affairs. Such metaphorical understanding of the nation-as-family directly
31 informs our political worldview in a very direct but an *unconscious* way.⁷⁷ The idealized family
32 models produce certain moral systems for running a nation and functionality of the state. The
33 individual actors map these moralities onto the societal/national domain by mentally engaging
34 themselves with the nation-as-family metaphor, which facilitates reasoning about their abstract
35 political world in term of more concrete and daily-based world experiences i.e. family life.
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47 ***The Mechanism of Conceptual Mapping***

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50 Cognitive neuroscience supports the assertion that people conceptualize nation on the same
51 cognitive patterns as they conceptualize other abstract entities through cognitive modelling or
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56 ⁷⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London:
57 Verso, 1983).

58 ⁷⁵ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 202.

59 ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 94.

60 ⁷⁷ Lakoff, *Moral politics*.

1 metaphor, which is called “conceptual metaphor”.⁷⁸ Our basic cognitive strategy is to think for
2 newer and difficult problems in connection with the simpler and previously resolved problems,
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4 which remain intact while conceptualizing about “nation”. As discussed by Lakoff and
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6 Johnson, metaphors are (unconsciously) used to set up parallels between difficult and easy
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8 concepts.⁷⁹ They have problem-solving functionality to solve an ill-understood phenomenon
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10 by recalling a better-understood phenomenon. For example, when people say that “don’t waste
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12 your time”, they (unconsciously) use the metaphor of money for time, which should not be
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14 wasted.
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20 The mechanism of “conceptual-mapping” explains how family-level concepts are mapped onto
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22 group-level political stance and clarifies how people can reason about abstract ideas in forms
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24 of more concrete, mundane knowledge through “conceptual metaphor”. Many of such
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26 conceptual metaphors are automatically acquired based on every-day experiences, primarily at
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28 the early stages of life when basic neural patterns are being formed and strengthened in the
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30 mind.⁸⁰ The conceptual structures (known as “frames” and “scripts”) are mental structures, we
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32 use to understand the difficult situations. No one sees or hears these mental structures but they
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34 shape the way we view the world. They are part of what scientists refer to as the “cognitive
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36 unconscious” inaccessible to the conscious mind, but at play in our decisions, our actions and
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38 the way we process data.⁸¹ This mental processing helps people understand difficult concepts
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40 (abstract ones) in terms of easy concepts (the concrete ones).
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47 The conceptual metaphor itself consists of mapping between elements of a source domain
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49 (concrete or daily-based concepts) and elements of a target domain (abstract concepts).⁸² For
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55 ⁷⁸ Hogan, *Understanding nationalism*, 124.

56 ⁷⁹ Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*.

57 ⁸⁰ Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We live by*.

58 ⁸¹ George Lakoff. "Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters To the Global
59 Interdependence Initiative." 1999.

60 ⁸² Ibid.

1 example, we use the source domain of money (a concrete one; visible and touchable) to target
2 the concept of time (an abstract one; invisible and untouchable). On the same pattern, the
3 abstract concept of life is usually understood by using the metaphor of journey – life is a
4 journey. Now, as the nation, politics, governance, and group conflict are highly abstract
5 domains of cognition, so the people employ certain conceptual metaphors when reasoning
6 about them. Resultantly, the development of their political attitudes, ideologies, and action-
7 plans is influenced by the conceptual structures and institutions they use.

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9 Interestingly, the conceptual metaphors have always been used to explain international politics,
10 even by the structuralist theorists. For example, when realism talks about survival of the fittest
11 in an international system, it conceptualizes (unconsciously) states as animals. For example, it
12 uses the source domain “animals have survival instinct” to target that ‘states have a survival
13 instinct’. Waltz stated that: “[states] are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own
14 preservation and at, maximum, drive for universal domination”.⁸³

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 ***Theoretical Relevance for India-Pakistan case***

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37 This article argues that the Subcontinental cultural arrangements need to be considered
38 properly while examining the impact of conceptual metaphors over peoples’ political
39 cognition. The selection, generation, and social generalization of such conceptual metaphors
40 are influenced by cultural norms to a great extent. The concept of cognitive modelling cannot
41 be universalized as all the conceptual metaphors cannot have the same cultural legitimacy in
42 this part of the world. For instance, in Indian Subcontinent and many other regions having hot
43 climate, the conceptual connectivity of “affection” is with coolness rather than warmth.
44 Therefore, the mother’s affection is often described as cool shades/shelter; “*Manwaa’n*”

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⁸³ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (NY: McGraw Hills, 1979), 118.

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thandyeaan chhanwaa 'n” which means “mothers provide you with cool shelters”. The metaphor of “warm breeze” might appeal people in the colder regions, but it was never motivating for the Subcontinental people for having long spells of scorching summers. A famous saying used by Punjabi mothers wishing their sons goes like: “*Ja Puttar tenu Tati hwa na lgy* (go son, god save you from hot breeze). Different animals and birds can have entirely different characteristics attached to them in different regions. For example, an owl is metaphorically used to represent a foolish person in the Subcontinent, whilst it is a symbol of wisdom in many western societies. Similarly, monkey is revered as symbol of power in India, which may not be conceptualized more than a naughty animal in the western countries.

Accordingly, the metaphor of mother-for-nation is widely accepted throughout the Asian Subcontinent, but the nation-as-lover is not appreciated much. While people think of family to imagine a nation, the ideal family structure is also determined by their culture. Therefore, there may be millions of people living in a nuclear family setup in both India and Pakistan, but still the “ideal” family type is a joint-family system, which can be used as a conceptual metaphor while visualizing about nation or state. The study of cultural images stemming from the source concepts help understand the target concepts. So, if people in the subcontinent use the domain-source of joint-family to reason about (or target) their nation and national ideology, then the dynamics, morals, beliefs, images and behaviours associated with the institution of joint-family could help explain that ideology.

Certainly, an All-India Hindu-Muslim conflict was a highly abstract phenomenon for local people, which was automatically (but unconsciously) conceptualized in terms of easier concept such as family-level conflict. A persistent obsession for each other and an enormous amount of emotions involved in this conflict support the idea that the institution of family did inspire the construction of conflicting political ideas of both groups. The ordinary people as well as key political actors mapped the patterns (scripts or frames) of their family conflicts onto their

1 intergroup conflict, which became even more visible when both groups underwent a split due
2 to host of other material factors; such as fight over control of socio-economic, and political
3 resources. The institution of family is still serving the purpose of source domain (obviously
4 unconsciously as per Lakoff's assertion) for people on both sides to make sense of their mutual
5 relations.
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12 On the eve of British departure, while many Indian people conceptualized their future nation
13 as one joint family (Gandhi's and Congress party's vision), some groups (Jinnah's Muslim
14 League's vision) demanded a separate homeland as they had conceptualized themselves in
15 terms of "wronged members of the family". They had situated themselves in this position after
16 being denied a proper representation in the central power according to their own wishes. In
17 fact, the contest between Muslim League and Indian National Congress revolved around a
18 power-sharing formula *within* a united Indian setup, as both parties never rejected the scheme
19 of a federal structure for the Indian constitution, which shows a strong desire on their part to
20 remain in a joint-setup.⁸⁴ While admitting the significance of the contemporary socio-economic
21 and politico-religious factors in dividing both groups, this article examines the mechanism of
22 how people developed such familial and emotional responses to the situations created due to
23 these material factors.
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27 For our theoretical purpose, it is appropriate to reiterate that people in Indian Subcontinent use
28 fictive kinship for relating themselves with the people of same ethnic backgrounds and treat
29 them as far-cousins. For example, when Punjabi people from different regions and religious
30 backgrounds (Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, or Christian) meet each other, they often exchange the
31 sentence: *Tu mera Pujabi Bhra ayn* (you are my Punjabi brother). Here, ethnicity and kinship
32 overlap in quite direct and operational way, as Horowitz asserts that the ethnicity always builds
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59 ⁸⁴ Katharine Adeney, *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan*. (Hampshire; New York:
60 Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 34.
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1 on the kinship.⁸⁵ Therefore, we can categorize Pakistani-Punjabis as a “split-ethnic group”,
2 who parted ways from his ethnic brothers to join his religious brothers having different
3 ethnicities such as Baloch, Sindhi or Pashtun. Similar was the case with Bengalis, as Muslim
4 Bengalis had to side with Pakistanis by abandoning their Hindu ethnic brothers in the West-
5 Bengal in India. As said, the ethnic groups exhibit the characteristics of a large family, these
6 split-ethnic groups also exhibited the behaviour of divided family branches. The conflictual
7 and cooperative patterns observed in their family settings were also mapped onto their ethnic
8 relations.⁸⁶ Moreover, the cultural (indigenous) images associated with these family patterns
9 provided them with ready-made templates to deal with their conflict.
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11 From a psychoanalytic theoretical perspective, the inability of both nations to escape their past
12 and to establish normal relationships can be explained through Freud’s view of the “family as
13 the unconscious prototype of all human groups”. It is what Erikson refers to when he speaks of
14 “those configurational analogies between family life and national mores”, which seem of
15 utmost relevance while explaining the emotional behaviour of both nations.⁸⁷
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37 **Two-Nations Theory explained in Familial Terms**

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40 This article analyses the massively “familistic” language used by both parties while expressing
41 their feelings about Partition, their mutual conflicts, and their distinct identity in relation to
42 each other. Evidently, the language used by common people and the political leaders in both
43 countries is deeply associated to their family dynamics. The language is always directly
44 connected to the unconscious conceptual systems and metaphors.⁸⁸ How we talk matters; one
45 can learn a lot about how people frame situations from how they talk. It is also appropriate to
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57 ⁸⁵ Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 61.

58 ⁸⁶ See for a similar debate: Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 59.

59 ⁸⁷ Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), 316.

60 ⁸⁸ Lakoff, *Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy*.

1 mention here that both Hindi and Urdu languages have, more or less, an identical speaking
2 script. People can easily understand each other's national language and enjoy T.V dramas and
3 films from an "enemy" country.
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7 This section examines two indigenous terms (or conceptual metaphors) widely used by people
8 on both sides to memorise the history of Partition. These are "*Qaum*" and "*Batwara*". The
9 term *Batwara* is widely used to epitomize the incident of Pakistan-India partition; a term which
10 is indigenously reserved for the event of assets distribution between blood brothers/cousins at
11 the time of a family-split. Similarly, the term *Qaum* was/is commonly used to categorize
12 Hindus and Muslims as distinct nations, which was/is originally used to represent
13 *Biradari/Jati*/lineage group in the subcontinent. I argue that both these terms serve the purpose
14 of conceptual-mapping and cognitive-modelling for both groups, situating their identity in
15 contrast with each other. One could also infer that the images associated with these indigenous
16 terms guided both groups conceptualize each other in terms of opposing family branches; and
17 to develop a certain political ideology on the pattern of their family-conflict dynamics – the
18 dynamics that require to compete and defeat the other branch of family at any cost.
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40 ***Reconceptualizing Nation or "Qaum" as Biradari (Jati)***

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43 Two-Nations theory is generally attributed to famous Muslim ideologues such as Sir Syed
44 Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The term two-Nations theory is
45 a literal translation from an Urdu term "*Do-Qaumi Nazria*", where the word *Qaum* stands for
46 the nation.⁸⁹ Here, the term '*Qaum*' needs to be re-explained as it serves more than one context.
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51 The original connotation of the term "*Qaum*" attracts our attention to postulate that both groups
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57 ⁸⁹ Here "*Do*" means two; "*Qaumi*" means national; and "*Nazria*" means theory. However, the word "*Qaum*"
58 has double meanings. The indigenous meaning is of *Biradari or Jati* (an extension of families, lineage group;
59 brotherhood). It is argued therefore, that *Do-Qaumi Nazria* could also be conceptualized as "*two Biradari*
60 *theory*", apart from the rigorous sense of two modern nation-states.
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1 had conceptualized their future nations according to the indigenous meanings attached to the
2 term *Qaum*, which are of an extended family, a *Biradari*.
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5 For centuries, the basic usage of the word *Qaum* has been to represent *Biradari (Jati)* in the
6 Indian Subcontinent. The terms *Qaum, Biradari and Jati* are interchangeable, which can be
7 translated as “brotherhood” – a group of people with common descendant; a sort of large
8 paternal family group.⁹⁰ Sadly, there is no other appropriate word in Urdu language to translate
9 the English word “nation” other than *Qaum*. For that reason, the term *Qaum* was mainly
10 understood by translating it as the “nation” and the traditional context of this term (of *Biradari*
11 or patrilineage group) has been grossly over-looked; otherwise it could provide the academics
12 with an alternative view to interpret two-Nations theory on account of its indigenous
13 conceptualization by people in terms of their most dominant social institutions.
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17 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan is said to coin the term *Qaum* used in *Do-Qaumi Nazria* (two-Nations
18 theory) to describe Muslims as a distinct nation in the strict sense of a modern nation-state. He
19 is widely believed as a champion of two-Nations theory in the late nineteenth century by
20 famously indicating at the numerical supremacy of Hindus in a joint future of Hindu-Muslim
21 communities. He said: “it would be like a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the
22 other only one”.⁹¹ It was his response to a Congress’ president Badruddin Tayabji’s letter.
23 Interestingly, Tayabji was also a Muslim who requested Syed Ahmad Khan to support
24 Congress’ cause. However, a discourse analysis of Syed’s speeches reveals that he actually
25 conceptualized *Qaum* according to its indigenous meanings explained above i.e. *Biradari*. He
26 neither conceived this concept in the rigorous sense of a modern nation-state, nor did he use
27 the word *Qaum* to claim a non-Indian Muslim identity and demanding a separate state.
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59 ⁹⁰ Hamza A. Alavi, "Kinship in west Punjab villages." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 6, no. 1 (1972): 1-27.

60 ⁹¹ Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Syndics of the Cambridge Univ Press, 1972), 129-30.

In fact, these modern western concepts of the nation, nationalism, state, and communalism were quite unfamiliar in the Indian Subcontinent up till the late nineteenth century – and ideally these foreign concepts were to be digested by local people after situating them along with their indigenous and mundane concepts. Devji and Lelyveld support this argument by saying that Syed Ahmad Khan was against the country wide Muslim organizations and he never mentioned Muslim solidarity across borders, and even disapproved of Muslim Ottoman Caliphate’s claim for being commander of the faithful throughout the world.⁹² In his famous speech made in 1883, Syed categorically and metaphorically said that India is a “home” to the Muslims as it is for the Hindus:

“Just as the high caste Hindus came and settled down in this land once, forgot where their earlier home was and considered India to be their own country, the Muslims also did exactly the same thing – they also left their climes hundreds of years ago and they also regard this land of India as their very own”.⁹³

On 27 January 1884, while addressing to a reception in his honour, Sir Syed spoke to the people of Gurdaspur and presented the idea of a secular Hindustani nationalism while opposing the territorial nationalism in the following words:

لاہور ادب ترقی مجلس ناشر “پنجاب نامہ سرفر کا سرسید” کتاب کی صاحب علی اقبال سید جاذب کی شہریوں کے پورگ ورداس دن کے 1884 جنوری 27 ہے کہ لکھا پر 132 صفحہ کے سیکولر نے صاحب سرسید پوئے دیے جواب کا اسد تقبالہ خط یہ میں سکول ڈسٹرکٹ سے کتابوں پر رانی میں تاریخوں پر رانی ”فرمایا انہوں نے انہوں کے یا۔ پیش نظریہ کا قومیت ہندوستانی سوا اور نے کے ملک ایک اطلاق کا قوم کہہ ہیں دیے کھتے ہی اب اور گا ہو سنا اور دیے کھامیں لوگ مخ تلف کے ایران ہیں جاتے کہ ہے قوم ایک لوگ مخ تلف کے افغانستان ہے۔ ہوتا پر رہنے کے ملک اور کسی سوا کے ہندوستان تم کہ یا مسلمان۔ اور ہندو اے ہیں کہ ہلاتے اپرانی ہوتے نہ ہیں دفن تم میں سرزمین اسی ہو؟ رہتے نہ ہیں دونوں تم پر سرزمین اسی کہ یا ہو؟ والے ملک اس بھی جو عیسائی اور مسلمان ہو؟ جاتے نہ ہیں جلائے پر مرگھٹ کے زمین سر اسی یا ہے۔“ قوم ہی ایک سے اے تبار اس ہیں رہتے میں

‘We must have heard and read in the history and history books, and, still we see that the word “qaum” applies on the people living in one country. Different people living in Afghanistan are said to be one “qaum”. Similarly, different type of people living in Iran are called “Irani”. O’ Hindu and Muslim! Are you people living in any else country than Hindustan? Are you not buried in the soil of this country or cremated on the

⁹² Devji, *Muslim Zion*, 54 and David Lelyveld, *Aligarh’s First Generation. Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978), 21.

⁹³ Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*. CERJ Series in Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 47.

cremated grounds of this country. The Mussalman or Christian who live in this country comprise one qaum (nation) in this respect.’⁹⁴

He refused to accept the idea that different religious communities in India belong to different

Qaums and referred to all the religious groups as one broader family-group; the *Qaum*.

On 2nd February 1884 in Lahore, Sir Syed had a meeting with a Hindu delegation led by Lala Singh Lal, which also included secretary Hindu Sabha Lala Ram Krishan and secretary Arya-Samaj Lala Jeevan Das. Sir Syed thanked the delegation and said:

رائے میری کہہ کہ یوں ہے نہ میں درست میں رائے میری وہ ہے کہ یا اسد تعمال ہندو لفظ جو نے آپ تہیں اپنے والے والا رہنے کا ہندوستان شخص ایک پر بلکہ ہے نہ میں نام کا مذہب کی سی یہ میں میں کہہ کہ اسے اس باوجود کو مجھ آپ کہہ ہے اسے سوس ہایتن مجھے پس ہے۔ سکتا کہ ہم ہند کہہ گئے ہوں جانتے یقیناً کو بات اس آپ سمجھتے۔ نہ میں ہندو ہوں والا رہنے کا ہندوستان کہام کہ رمل ہاہم اسلام اہل اور ہنود اہل کہہ ہے ضروری بات یہ لہئے کہے ترقی کی ہندوستان قوم میں دو باشندے کے ملک ایک سے خیال کے مذہب صرف کہہ نہ میں اب زمانہ وہ صاحب بوکر رہیں۔ “جائیں سمجھی

‘The word “Hindu” which you use is not correct according to my opinion because it is not the name of any religion. Every person living in Hindustan can claim to be a Hindu. I am extremely sorry that you do not consider me as a “Hindu” despite the fact that I live in Hindustan. You must know that how important it is for the progress of Hindustan that Religiously Hindus and Muslims should work together. Sahibo! (Respected people)! The time is gone when people could be considered separate nations on the basis of religion only’.⁹⁵

Here, Syed Ahmad Khan had opposed the notion of a territorial nation-state based upon difference of religions. He even said that every-one who lives in the Indian territory was a “Hindu” regardless of his personal religious faith. He defined “Hindu” as a person living in Hindustan (the India).

One could surmise that the tracing of their racial roots to a wider Muslim world could partly be a source of prestige for the Muslims, but the source-domain to conceptualize themselves as a different nation (or *Qaum*) was deeply imbedded in its indigenous sense of a lineage group.

Syed Ahmad did not present Muslims and Hindus as two distinct nations but as two communities destined to work together to build “one” Indian nation. It explains that the ethno-

⁹⁴ Syed Iqbal Ali, *Sir Syed ka Safarnama Punjab* (Lahore: Majlis-e-Taraqa-i-Adab), 132.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 200.

1 religious ideology/nationalism, usually booked in his name, did not bear even the minute traces
2 of separatism other than in the electoral sense.⁹⁶ In his 1883 speech, he stressed again:
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5 “... my Hindu brethren and Muslim co-religionists breathe the same air, drink the water
6 of the sacred Ganga and the Jamuna, eat the products of the earth which God has given
7 to this country, live and die together (...) I say with conviction that if we were to
8 disregard for a moment our conception of Godhead, then in all matters of everyday life
9 the Hindus and Muslims really belong to one nation (Qaum)⁹⁷ I have always said
10 that our land of India is like a newly wedded bride whose two beautiful and luminous
11 eyes are the Hindus and the Musalmans; if the two exist in mutual concord the bride
12 will remain for ever resplendent and becoming, while if they make up their mind to see
13 in different directions the bride is bound to become squinted and even partially blind.⁹⁸
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18 Here, Syed Ahmad Khan used the bride-as-nation metaphor to conceptualize the future Indian
19 nation to whom both Hindus and Muslims were equally important and responsible for
20 maintaining her beauty and charm. Furthermore, in the following speech, he explained how
21 both communities had produced a mixed culture and language after living together for
22 centuries, which was no less than blood relations. Again, the language used by him is densely
23 familistic. He pointed out that even the Urdu language associated only with Muslims, was born
24 in India.
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36 A year later in 1884, he declared that: “Do not forget that Hindus and Muslim are words
37 of religious significance otherwise Hindus, Musalmans and Christians who live in this
38 country form one nation (qaum) regardless of their faith.⁹⁹ He also said that Hindus and
39 Muslim mingled their blood and gave rise to a new culture made of both: “the blood of
40 both have changed, the colour of both have become similar (...) we mixed with each
41 other so much that we produced a new language – Urdu, which was neither our
42 language, nor theirs”.¹⁰⁰
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48 It can be ascertained that the two-Nations ideology put forward by one of the top
49 political/nationalist ideologues such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, had conceptualized the future
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54 ⁹⁶ Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox*, 48.

55 ⁹⁷ Shan Muhammad, ed., *Writings and Speeches of Syed Ahmad Khan*, (Bombay, Nachiketa Publications, 1972),
56 160.

57 ⁹⁸ Vishwanath Prasad Varma, *Modern Indian Political Thought* (Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1980) (7th
58 edition), 430, cited in Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox*, 48-49

59 ⁹⁹ Muhammad, *Writings and Speeches of Syed Ahmad Khan*, 266.

60 ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.
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1 position of Muslim community in terms of a separate family branch within a wider Indian
2 family-domain: A Muslim *Biradari* to live side by side with Hindu *Biradari* in a grand
3 Hindustani *Biradari*. Even to date, the term “*Qaum*” is used to identify peoples’ *Biradari* in
4 Pakistan. In official records, for example, a Pakistani national is registered as Mr. X [Religion:
5 Islam/Christianity/Hindu or Sikh; *Qaum*: Rajput/Jat or Arayeen (one’s lineage or *Biradari*)].
6 The term *Qaum* is also replaceable with one’s *Jati* in India.¹⁰¹
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17 **Significance of the term “*Batwara*”**

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20 An overwhelming number of people across much of the Indian Subcontinent remember the
21 event of partition as *Vibhajan* or *Batwara* rather than freedom (*Azadi*).¹⁰² They do not assume
22 the tragic incident of partition just as creation of two nation-states, but the meanings and
23 feelings they attach to this tragedy can be imagined by a single word i.e. ‘*Batwara*’. *Batwara*
24 is an indigenous term used across the borders to describe the event of “parting ways” between
25 blood brothers or cousins after the distribution of their ancestral property – that usually creates
26 bad blood among kin relations and engage them in a sort of an intimate rivalry full of emotions,
27 resentment, repentance and competition of prestige.¹⁰³ Surprisingly, people still use the
28 metaphor of *Batwara* (consciously or unconsciously) to conceptualize India-Pakistan partition
29 as if it were a divide between fraternal family members. The term *Vibhajan* also carries the
30 similar meanings i.e. fragmentation or segmentation of a kinship or lineage group.
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53 ¹⁰¹ The Indian term *Jati* has its equivalent in Urdu language as *Biradari* and *Zat*. The terms *Zat* and *Biradari* are
54 more common in Pakistani setting. Usually, in Hindi language, the sound of Urdu words with Zzzz are replaced
55 by Jjjj; so, the terms *Zat* and *Jat* or *Jati* are just a matter of pronunciation. By saying *Jati*, I do not mean caste-
56 system or Varna (literally, ‘colour’) in Hinduism; the four sweeping social/traditional categories i.e. *Brahmin*,
57 *Ksatryia*, *Vaisya*, and *Sudra*. The institution of *Biradari* or *Jati* is second only to the extended family, as a
58 pervasive social dimensions of identity; a group of families with a common descendant.

59 ¹⁰² Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2000), 30.

60 ¹⁰³ Kadir, “Perceiving the enemy differently.”

1 Arguably, an academic investigation remains incomplete if it translates local terms in other
2 languages without considering their contextual sense – as the meanings and the fantasies people
3 attach to different words in different cultures can be crucial while examining them in the
4 political discourse. On that account, the literal translation of the term “*Batwara*” as “partition
5 of British India” into two nation-states cannot give outsiders the exact intensity and the familial
6 character this term carries. The indigenous images of harmonious family, painful split, asset
7 distribution and emotional rivalry, attached to the term *Batwara* can open new vistas for
8 understanding India-Pakistan relations in terms of a “parting of ways” between two family
9 branches. The use of this term explains how emotionally people on both sides are concerned
10 about Partition and their post-Partition relations. The metaphorical understanding of Partition
11 as *Batwara*, still produces familistic images into peoples’ minds and informs their future
12 political trajectory against each other.

30 **The Implications of Conceptualizing Nation as Family**

31 In inter-national relations, nation-as-family metaphor is always conceptualized while dealing
32 with other nations. For its emotional impact and inferential effects, the source domain of family
33 is almost certainly the most powerful for modelling the nation.¹⁰⁴ The nation-as-family
34 metaphor acts as a cognitive bridge connecting individual’s family-level intimate experiences
35 of membership and authority to abstract national-level politics.¹⁰⁵ This metaphor is utilized
36 around the world in different languages; commonly used by politicians and plays an important
37 role during political cognition.¹⁰⁶ Hence, the citizenship is commonly construed in terms of
38 family membership e.g. a member of Pakistani, Indian or American family.¹⁰⁷ The citizens are
39 also referred to as family children e.g. the term *Qaum ke sapoot* is used in Pakistan which

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55 ¹⁰⁴ Hogan, *Understanding the Nationalism*, 154

56 ¹⁰⁵ Lakoff, *Moral politics*.

57 ¹⁰⁶ Andreas Musolff, "Metaphor scenarios in public discourse." *Metaphor and symbol* 21, no. 1 (2006): 23-38.

58 ¹⁰⁷ See Lieven, *A Hard Country* for a detailed discussion. The author argues how Pakistani people conceptualize
59 their nation-state in terms of a large *Biradari* (lineage group) and situate it within other nation-states by
60 perceiving them as the other *Biradaris* in the world..

1 means “sons of the nation”. Also, the state-land is conceptualized as a home: the German
2 “*Vaterland*” (literally: father land), Russian “*Mat Rossiya*” (literally: mother Russia), and
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4 Indian “*Bharat Mata*” (literally mother India) are a few of many examples.
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7 On the same pattern, political leaders all over the world are also treated in terms of head of the
8 national family – the concept of founding fathers is also derived from the institution of family.
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10 So, the leaders are bestowed upon the indigenous labels reserved for senior family members,
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12 such as elder brother/sister or father/mother. German chancellor Angela Merkel is called “*Mutti*
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14 *Merkel*” (literally: mom Markel). Recently, Donald Trump has been dubbed as “*Big daddy*
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16 *Trump*”.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Mr. Gandhi was literally called *Bapu* (the father), while Jawaharlal
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18 Nehru was named as *Chacha* Nehru.¹⁰⁹ Nehru was given the kin-label of “*Chacha*” for being
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20 younger to Gandhi, which literally means “Father’s younger brother”. It explains how deeply
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22 the familial terms are rooted in the Subcontinental politics.
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29 The metaphor of family is recalled to memory especially when a national level group undergoes
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31 a fissure, as it was in the case of Hindu-Muslim conflict – an argument supported by the usage
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33 of densely familistic language by the mainstream leaders. The majority party led by Gandhi
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35 made use of familial terms such as “brothers” and “united-family” to keep the integrity of
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37 Indian union intact, and to avoid partition. India has always been analogized as a mother
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39 (*Bharat Mata*). A famous Indian writer, poet and journalist Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay
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41 personified India as mother Goddess and this metaphor inspired millions in the Asian
42
43 Subcontinent during colonial period. He writes:
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48 “The mother that used to be, that is now, and that will be. Worship mother India, for
49 we are all, offspring of one mother...brothers all”.¹¹⁰
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56 ¹⁰⁸ Retrieved at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/esther-rapoport/trump-as-uncastrated-primal-father>

57 ¹⁰⁹ Sailaja Krishnamurti, "Uncles of the Nation: Avuncular Masculinity in Partition-era Politics." *South Asian*
58 *History and Culture* 5, no. 4 (2014): 1-17.

59 ¹¹⁰ Abhijit Chowdhury, “Internalising the Concept of National Movement in India: Some Problems of
60 Cognition” (with a reference to Tagore-Gandhi Debate), cited in Hogan, *understanding the nationalism*, 159.
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1 I argue that although the metaphors such as mother-India and brothers-from-same-mother (for
2 Muslims) used by the Congress leaders, can be justified as their sincere efforts to dilute the
3
4 Muslim separatist tendency, this metaphorical conception of mother-child relations impacted
5
6 upon the development of a deeply wounded psyche of neglected children among the Muslims.
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8 The Muslims, by using the same familial lens, had developed a feel that the Hindus had self-
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10 proclaimed the status of the eldest children of mother India just because of their numerical
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12 majority. It provides us with an alternative view of understanding how the Muslims adopted an
13
14 entirely different political path and developed so intense a competitive urge against their Hindu
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16 siblings (metaphorically speaking). One could also construe that such minority groups tend to
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18 leave the home-state (home) and may start a sibling rivalry after acquiring a new state (new
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20 home).

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27 Sadly, conceptualizing your group or nation in terms of intimate familial relations can also
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29 bring incalculable violence when such groups part ways. This partly explains the acts of
30
31 brutality committed by Hindu-Muslim communities at the time of Partition, because both were
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33 conceptualizing their own future nation in terms of “mother”. Such a conceptualization brought
34
35 terrible misfortunes in a region where mothers are worshipped as goddesses, and violence can
36
37 be legitimized and even glorified in the name of defending one’s mother.¹¹¹ In fact, the
38
39 separation of north western parts into another state of Pakistan was regarded by many Indians
40
41 as amputation of their mother’s limbs. Mr. Gandhi’s oft-used metaphor for Partition “slicing
42
43 of a baby into two halves” is also contextual as Gandhi considered both communities as his
44
45 children. However, the Muslims had begun to feel that Gandhi had softer corner for his real
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47 sons (the Hindus), and started conceptualizing him as a step-father.¹¹²
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57 ¹¹¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *The Home and the World*, transl. Surendranath Tagore (NY: Penguin reprint ed.,
58 1985), cited by Hogan, *Understanding nationalism*, 160.

59 ¹¹² Sultan Muhammad Shah, *The memoirs of Aga Khan: World enough and time* (New York: Simon and Shuster,
60 1954), 231.

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6 *Two-Nations Ideology after Partition: Nations-as-Cousins Conceptualization*
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9 Viewing through the familial prism created in this article, the pre-partition Hindu-Muslim
10 conflict can be viewed as a wrestling between both communities to win over the Indian family-
11 headship and resources after the British departure. However, as per local family dynamics,
12 peoples' inability to live peacefully as one unit leads to a separation between family branches.
13 After split, these branches usually develop grievances against the other for being wronged in
14 terms of distribution of assets. Similarly, Pakistanis conceptualize themselves in terms of
15 Jinnah's sons, who was wronged by Gandhi and Nehru. On the same conceptualizing pattern,
16 the Indians regard Gandhi and Nehru as father-figures and believe that Jinnah is the villain
17 responsible for the partition of Indian family. Such a metaphorical conceptualization makes
18 both nations fictive cousins and engage them in a revenge-seeking competition to right the
19 wrong done to their respective fathers. On that account, the Kashmir Conflict has acquired the
20 status of an ancestral property dispute between both nations – never to be given up by either
21 party as per indigenous norms associated with inheritance disputes.
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40 When there is a family split, the integrity or oneness of family shatters and parting family
41 members strive hard to get their own identity; an identity that must be different from the
42 previous one. Similarly, the separatist groups always try to establish their own "distinct"
43 identity, an identity that could not associate them with the groups they sought partition from.
44 Therefore, such groups always focus on the minute differences that could prove them entirely
45 different from the other groups.¹¹³ On the similar pattern, certain Muslim groups behaved in
46 the same manner when they felt that they were being made to leave the united Indian family.
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59 ¹¹³ Anton Blok, "The narcissism of minor differences." *European Journal of Social Theory* 1, no. 1 (1998): 33-
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1 Resultantly, the “religion” factor came to surface with much intensity between both groups as
2 it was among a very few dissimilar elements between them. Moreover, after Partition,
3
4 Pakistanis tried to adopt every possible identity that could prove them different from their past-
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7 identity as an Indian.
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10 The conceptual framework of family-rivalry allows us to analyse the behaviour of both states
11
12 in terms of a prestige-competition between two individuals or persons. It would not be out of
13
14 context to mention here that “Nation as a person” is also a very popular metaphor in
15
16 international relations.¹¹⁴ Thereupon, India conceptualizes itself as a BIG brother in the region
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18 – a stance strengthened by his massive numerical, economic, and military strength. However,
19
20 such an Indian claim is persistently challenged by Pakistan as he also conceptualizes himself
21
22 in familial terms – a younger brother who was robbed of his wishful right in the united Indian
23
24 family. The rejection of such an Indian claim also owes to Pakistani resentment over Indian
25
26 inability to fulfil the indigenous responsibilities associated with the character of a big brother;
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28 such as an extension of care, sacrifice, and nurturance to younger ones. On the other hand,
29
30 India perceives Pakistan as a disobedient younger sibling who brought bad name to the family
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32 by disintegrating its unity.
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40 By means of similar theoretical considerations found in this article, the Punjab province in
41
42 Pakistan can also be examined in terms of a self-proclaimed big brother representing Pakistani
43
44 family – a status earned due to its numeric superiority, and overwhelming presence in Pakistani
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46 parliament and military. Now, as per indigenous responsibilities associated with the role of an
47
48 eldest son, Punjab-Pakistan believes it as his duty to settle scores with India on the behalf of
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60 ¹¹⁴ Lakoff, *Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy*.
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entire Pakistani family.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, it is akin to the leading role once claimed by Hindu majority in the British India.

Conclusion

This article does not claim that a psycho-cultural paradigm is the only mode capable of analysing two-Nation theory in its entirety. However, given the specific socio-psychological and cultural milieu of the Asian subcontinent, this approach presents an alternative and original account of how to examine the emotional components of this political ideology causing an unending rivalry between both nations. Furthermore, such a paradigm shift not only contributes to the historiography of the Indian Subcontinent, but it can also break new theoretical grounds for further investigation in the fields of conflict studies and emotions in International Relations – by inquiring into *how* the political and conflict ideologies can be influenced by the most basic, and the most emotional institution in a specific society. The dominant family models may produce certain moral systems, which can directly inform individual actors' worldview; effecting their political choices.

The criss-crossing of kinship groups in the Indian subcontinent bind Hindus and Muslims in a large network of extended families. One can easily find Muslims who trace their lineages with Lord Rama, and there are many common castes within both communities. Moreover, people in the Indian subcontinent tend to establish family relations with their neighbours by using kin labels. They even use the metaphor of *Sanjhi Kndh* (common wall) to express their intimate bonds with their neighbours. Even the leaders representing the hard-line Hindu organizations such as Hindu Mahasabha, used the metaphor of “common wall” to recall the history of unity

¹¹⁵ This argument is endorsed by Lieven, *Pakistan; a hard country*, from a different perspective. He argues that Punjabis consider themselves superior to other groups in Pakistan, thus self-assumed the status of the guardian of the state. They think of themselves in terms of a competitor to Indian state itself.

1 between both communities.¹¹⁶ The intimate bonds so developed through the nearness of daily
2 life had also tied different religious communities of British India into a fictive kinship structure
3
4 before they underwent partition in 1947.
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8 One can easily find overlapping between Hindu-Muslim relations to that of family relations in
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10 the subcontinent. It is not to assert that both groups always lived peacefully without having any
11
12 religious clashes. In fact, even after centuries of the assimilation of Muslims into Indian
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14 territory and conversion of local Hindus to Islam, the factors of “original inhabitants” and
15
16 “prior occupation of territory” kept on playing their roles in constructing their mutual relations.
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18 But, it is also true that the phenomenon of prior occupation, itself, stems from the ranks of
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20 families,¹¹⁷ So, their inter-communal relations were always a mere reflection of the hostility
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22 expressed in the interfamilial relations in the Indian Subcontinent.
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28 This article has reconceptualized the two-Nations theory – a theory that has conventionally
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30 explained Hindu-Muslim split and their ongoing conflicts by considering them as two distinct
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32 nations purely on their ethno-religious and civilizational divergence. This article has rather
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34 focused on the socio-cognitive components of this political cum conflict ideology for impacting
35
36 the construction, articulation, transmission, and mobilizational process of this ideology.
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38 Therefore, using the theoretical mechanism of conceptual-mapping that explains how people
39
40 make sense of difficult political situations in terms of easier and mundane ideas, this article
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42 finds that the indigenous institution of joint-family influences peoples’ political choices in
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44 conflict situations. The perceptions, concepts, and beliefs learned inside this most emotionally
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46 powerful institution, are mapped onto the way the local people conceptualize their self, group,
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48 national and international identities. Hence, the political ideology so developed during Hindu-
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57 ¹¹⁶ Madan Mohan Malaviya’s speech at Uttar Pradesh’s Hindu Sabha Conference, 18 April 1936, Cited in
58 Misra, A Narrative of Communal Politics, 294.

59 ¹¹⁷ Weiner Myron, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
60 1978).
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1 Muslim conflict, engaged disputants in a an unending rivalry full of emotions. The findings of
2 the article not only help us to understand the emotionally charged atmosphere between both
3 nations, apart from the tragic incidents of mass murders at the time of Partition – it also explains
4 that conceptualizing the future nations in terms of familial metaphors, was one of the reasons
5 behind such a ruthless violence.
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12 This article also concludes that the majoritarian status was not the *only* reason behind Hindu
13 community's desire to control the future setup of united India, but such claims over the
14 ownership of India were based on for having been there first; for being more indigenous than
15 their Muslim counterparts – as explained by Erikson, such conceptual mapping is derived from
16 the rivalry between older and younger siblings.¹¹⁸ Therefore, near the British departure, the
17 Hindus, the original inhabitants or prior occupants; the older siblings – claimed their natural
18 right of power (family-headship) for being *Dharti Ma ke sapoot* (sons of the soil). The Muslims
19 were referred to as *Lutery* (the invaders) by ignoring the fact that mostly Muslims were also
20 the original inhabitants of the soil. Thus, the Muslims' demands for an equal status at par with
21 their senior Hindu siblings, were met with refusal for being the immigrants and the younger
22 siblings. Whenever prior ownership is contested by a claim to equality, the contradiction is not
23 easily reconciled either in systems of child rearing or in political systems.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the
24 emotional characteristics associated with the local family conflicts also surfaced and reflected
25 in the political discourse.
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47 Now, Pakistan presumes himself as a wronged brother/cousin of India; a victim nation. As per
48 Pakistani conceptualization, India is the villain state who wronged Pakistan at the time of
49 partition and occupied Kashmir by trick. The triangle of Nehru, Mountbatten, and his wife
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59 ¹¹⁸ Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 412.

60 ¹¹⁹ *Ibid*

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Edwina is oftentimes quoted to sensationalize the story.¹²⁰ Accordingly therefore, Pakistan must act heroically to take its ancestral land back from India. It will settle scores with India and bring psychological and moral victory to Pakistanis. However, from an Indian perspective, India should be respected as a big brother by all the south Asian states including Pakistan. Indians conceptualize Pakistan as a mischievous child in the subcontinental family who first caused breach in family unity and who is now disturbing the regional peace, and should be punished accordingly.

¹²⁰ See Akbar, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*.

The Editor,
India Review.

Sub: RESUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPT *"Politics and the Family: Rethinking the India-Pakistan Two-Nations Theory through the Familial Construction of Political Ideas"*

Dear Sir,

I am grateful to you for providing me with this opportunity to revise my manuscript. I do appreciate the interest that both the reviewers and the editorial team have taken in my manuscript. I am also thankful for the careful reviews and constructive suggestions received from both the peer reviewers, which really helped to improve the quality of the manuscript.

Following this statement, I have added the reviewers' comments in original (**bold letters**) along with my responses (**in red**), explaining how I have addressed the concerns raised by the worthy reviewers. I have also mentioned the page numbers (in revised manuscript) where the suggestions have been addressed, according to each comment/suggestion. The revised manuscript has also been uploaded as a separate document in which the major changes appear in **YELLOW** colour.

I hope that I have addressed the major concerns of the reviewers in the revised manuscript. I can say it with conviction that manuscript is substantially improved after restructuring it as desired by the worthy reviewers and engaging it with the existing literature. I am extremely thankful to both the reviewers for their time to provide me with so constructive suggestions.

I am looking forward to hear from you regarding my revised submission and any further questions/comments the reviewers may have.

Best Regards

Jawad Kadir

Reviewers' comments:

The reviewers' para-wise comments have been reproduced in **Bold** along with my point-to-point replies in **Red** (including page numbers of the revised manuscript). Major revisions in the revised manuscript appear in **YELLOW** to be picked-up easily.

Reviewer #1:

The argument that the paper seems to be making is that the conceptualisation of the 'Two Nation Theory' ought to be read from what the author terms an 'indigenous' perspective, that is based on the interpretation of political ideology being understood in familial terms. To state at the outset, this reviewer has often been sceptical about the rewards of the approach and methodology in general. That said, however, the author's assertion that the simple dynamics of inter- state rivalries are inadequate to explain the wide-ranging passions associated with the India Pakistan relationship is not incorrect. Neither is the reviewer necessarily unwilling to concede that the explanation for this in terms of a deep seated perception about betrayal by a family member should be a better lens with which to understand the partition, and the subsequent trajectory of India- Pakistan relations.

Thanks for the encouraging words and buying the idea this paper has offered for re-examining the famous two-Nations theory from a psycho-cultural perspective. You are very right in saying that the this article does not reject the conventional explanations of inter-state rivalries, however, they are 'inadequate' while explaining the wide ranging emotions associated with India-Pakistan relations. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap by introducing a fresh conceptual framework of how the family-level cognition maps onto the political situations in the wider domain.

But in order to convincingly demonstrate this explanation, the author has to firstly rewrite the article in more tightly knitted, and more rigorously defined terms. Secondly, they should engage more with the existing literature, and make his arguments relate more to the concerns raised within it.

As suggested, I have now thoroughly restructured the article and balanced it in a more rigorous manner to let the main arguments flow more easily. For this reason, the abstract and the introduction sections have been re-written in a very compact and coherent style (Pgs. 1-10). Moreover, the "objectives of the paper" section has also been added (Pg. 10).

Thanks for suggesting a meaningful engagement with the existing literature on the subject. In the first draft, I deliberately avoided such a debate for the fear of being over-stretched but I can confess that the inclusion of a constructive dialogue with the available models explaining India-Pakistan conflict, has enriched the quality of this article. In fact, it allowed me to situate my thesis within the academic literature on the subject (Please see Pgs. 10-18 for "an engagement with the existing literature").

For one thing, the author may wish to thoroughly rewrite the article, so that the argument comes across much more explicitly. The author may wish to clearly frame it upfront, rather than making the reader wait for 10 pages before encountering it. The author may also wish to build upon their claims that ethnicity as a concept needs to be more firmly understood within South Asian politics— exactly why difference is perceived in South Asia, beyond the broad rubric of 'ethnicity' is not a bad foundational question, but the author should be able to present it in a more structured way.

As said, the fundamental concerns this paper raises to re-assess the two-Nations theory such as problematic definitional value of ethnicity in the Indian subcontinent, have been brought up-front in the introduction section "Justification for using a Psycho-cultural Mode-of-Analysis" (Please see Pgs. 5-10 for a discussion regarding the rationale(s) for using a fresh perspective to examine India-Pakistan dyad). Thanks for this valuable suggestion

Furthermore, several definitional assumptions should probably be defended more strongly: for instance: the term 'quam' is sought to be equated with biradari or jati (ie, this is because the author is saying that the national community was understood in familial and kinship terms)—but it seems to the reviewer that the word 'praja/ janta' might be a better equivalent..? Such objections might well be able to still be reconciled with the authors claims, but if they are being made in the first place, then the author should take care that a reviewer is not able to easily fault them. At present, however, partly because the argument has not been clearly stated, and partly for reasons to do with the looseness of the language, it can appear as if the argument is as yet unformed, and inadequately developed.

You are very right in saying that such indigenous terms should be defended more strongly in the first place building a plausible case for using them accordingly. I have now defined and discussed them more rigorously and put additional details in the footnotes for clarification. The terms mentioned by you such as *Praja/Janta* are, in fact, used locally to represent the common people, the masses; the subjects of a state. I can feel that you offered these synonyms to guide me that how should I defend my own terms while using them accordingly and to avoid any potential objections that could be raised. Thanks for this kind gesture. I have addressed this issue at:

Highlighted Footnotes at Pgs. 9-10

Highlighted paragraphs at Pgs. 28-29

Footnote at Pg. 28

Highlighted text at Pg. 32-33

Footnote at Pg. 33

Sub section: "Significance of the term Batwara" at Pgs. 33-34

Footnote at Pg. 34

Moreover, re-structuring of the article has helped much to present these terms upfront flowing side by side with the main arguments.

Underpinning some of the assumptions in this argument is that Muslims themselves viewed themselves as the wronged brothers in a inequitable joint family. This assumption is not necessarily held across a wide literature on the partition. A great deal of the historical literature on partition for instance looks at the events that unfolded from the point of view of a straightforward problem of electoral representation, and the fight for control of political resources. (The author should—or possibly may well have already—consulted Jalal, Faisal Devji, Joya Chatterji or even Venkat Dhulipala). These arguments are not necessarily conclusive, but the author should be able to at least engage with them, and ideally critique, or be able to further demolish the more conventional historical explanations that are offered for the 'batwara', or partition, on the basis of their own argument.

This article does not reject the significance of the contemporary socio-economic and politico-religious factors in dividing both communities, however, the core objective of the article is to examine the

mechanism of how people developed such familial and emotional responses to the situations created due to these material factors. This article focuses on the way the people make sense of their political situations on the patterns of their daily-based situations. Please see at Pgs. 2-3, objectives of the paper (Pg. 10), Pg. 14, and Pgs. 25-26 for the similar thread of arguments.

As suggested, the different view-points explaining Hindu-Muslim conflict and their future trajectory, have been engaged from the standpoint of this article (Pgs. 10-18). For a specific dialogue with the worthy authors' work you have mentioned, please see Pgs. 12-14.

The author has to evolve a cleaner sequence of explanation about partition politics: is it because all politics is always conducted in familial terms that the Muslim League behaved in the ways that it did; or is it because that politics is subsequently explained in familial terms that the Muslim League used the language of kinship family etc to justify its choices.

Both the criterion you have suggested to explain partition politics are relevant from this article's standpoint that:

"is it because all politics is always conducted in familial terms that the Muslim League behaved in the ways that it did;

or

is it because that politics is subsequently explained in familial terms that the Muslim League used the language of kinship family".

In fact, this article cannot ignore either because both are in a dialectical relationship. I have discussed the idea that the nature and structures of an ideology can be socio-cognitive; which, in turn, are reproduced in political discourse (Please see Theoretical Framework).

The framework of conceptual mapping I have used allows us to argue that how the leaders as well as the supporters of Muslim League had 'perceived' a political conflict on the model of family conflict. Then, the familial language they used, are signals or clues; a sort of empirical evidence for such assertion that I have presented throughout the article.

Please see highlighted text at Pgs. 8-9, Engagement with the existing literature (Pgs. 10-18), Pg. 21, Pg. 32-33, Pg. 35-36, Pg. 37-38, and Conclusion section. All these suggested edits present a much clearer sequence of partition politics now.

Reviewer #2:

Reviewer #2:

This is an interesting paper. I suggest acceptance provided a few alterations/improvements can be made.

Thanks for the encouraging words and buying the idea this paper has offered for re-examining the famous two-Nations theory from a psycho-cultural perspective. I have tried my best to improve the quality of paper according to your valuable suggestions.

1. This is a micro-level analysis for the enduring nature of the conflict. It serves a purpose in terms of scholarship on the India-Pak conundrum.

You are very right in saying that the main objective of this paper is to explain the mapping of micro-level concepts onto the macro-level political situations.

2. Why is that not all brothers and sisters end up in such a bitter rivalry? Don't you need political entrepreneurs- leaders- to mobilize group loyalty and identity? The author would benefit from reading/citing the ethnic conflict literature on political entrepreneurship. Horowitz comes to mind.

Thanks for suggesting the role of a political entrepreneur, which is much relevant once the conflict erupts, therefore, the binary of leader-masses has been discussed now in this article by engaging Mr. Jinnah (also Gandhi and Nehru) as the political mobilizers (Please see 12-14, Pg. 37-38). Horowitz has also been borrowed to explain why some conflicts are more intractable than the others (Please see at Pg. 6, and Pg. 27).

Moreover, the fundamental concern suggested by you has been addressed that why some family clashes are more lethal than the other? The paper clarifies that the rivalry can be of familial nature and full of emotions, if competing groups live in proximity and consider each other (unconsciously) as family branches. Please see "justification for using a psycho-cultural mode" section at Pgs. 5-10.

3. The existing literature on the rivalry need to be discussed or mentioned. The political science literature is completely ignored, except a few like Varshney. The works of Paul ed., the India-Pakistan conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge 2005); Ganguly, Sumit, Conflict Unending, Stephen Cohen, (several books on Pakistan) are just some examples. Also there are several works on identity based explanations for the persistence of the conflict.

Thanks for suggesting a meaningful engagement with the existing literature on the subject. In the first draft, I deliberately avoided such a debate for the fear of being over-stretched but I can confess that the inclusion of a constructive dialogue with the available models explaining India-Pakistan conflict, has enriched the quality of this article. In fact, it allowed me to situate my thesis within the academic literature on the subject (Please see Pgs. 10-18 for "an engagement with the existing literature"). All the worthy scholars mentioned have been engaged in "Literature Explaining Post-Partition Conflict" section at Pgs. 16-18.

4. The role of property/territory in joint families could be discussed. Why Kashmir is so important? Using this kind of explanation, is it possible to account for the claim on Kashmir as siblings fighting over ancestral property assumed to be theirs? Some discussion of Kashmir is needed.

I could not agree more. Interestingly, one of my articles explaining Kashmir conflict as an ancestral property dispute between India and Pakistan is in editing phase. The scope of this paper is somehow different; something of theoretical nature. It explains the theoretical mechanism of conceptual mapping that how people perceive such national disputes in terms of family conflicts. However, as per your valuable suggestion, I have included the same idea in the article. Please see Pg. 8, Pg. 37, and Pg. 41 for a similar thread of arguments.

5. What are the roles of great powers, militaries, especially in Pakistan, status competition, Bangladesh separation by India and its impact on the revenge mentality in Pakistan etc. in this rivalry? Paul, The Warrior State (OUP, 2014) will help. In other words, the micro foundations can explain some things, but not comprehensively. Some recognition to this effect will be useful.

This article does not reject the significance of the contemporary socio-economic and politico-religious factors in dividing both communities, however, the core objective of the article is to examine the mechanism of how people developed such familial and emotional responses to the situations created due to these material factors. This article focuses on the way the people make sense of their political

situations on the patterns of their daily-based situations. Please see at Pgs. 2-3, objectives of the paper (Pg. 10), Pg. 14, and Pgs. 25-26 for the similar thread of arguments.

As suggested by you, the eminent scholars explaining India-Pakistan conundrum have been borrowed in the "engagement with the existing literature section" for a meaningful dialogue to situate the position of my own argument. Please see at Pg. 2 and Pgs.15-18.

6. What are the general theoretical conclusions for understanding rivalries?

AS suggested, the theoretical conclusions have been added in the revised manuscript. Please see the at Pgs. 25-27, Pg. 38, and conclusion section at Pgs. 39-42.

In the end, I would not miss a chance to thank both of the reviewers for their precious time and energies that they spent for making these valuable suggestions, which helped develop this article into a far better version as compared to the first draft I submitted. Thank You !

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Politics and the Family: Rethinking the India-Pakistan Two-Nations Theory through the Familial Construction of Political Ideas

Introduction

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4 India and Pakistan have been locked into an open hostility since their inception. They have
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6 fought three conventional wars and several armed conflicts. The India-Pakistan conflict is said
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8 to be simultaneously over territory, national identity and power position in the region.¹ Indian
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10 obsession is a key factor in determining Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies, which are
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12 always aimed at competing with India at any cost.² Both states regularly display their nuclear
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14 capability to outpace each other, which is always a question mark for the South Asian/Asian
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16 security. Both nations have been unable to forge normal relationships with each other after
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18 parting ways in 1947. Despite several mediatory efforts by the international players, both are
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20 not ready to settle their territorial conflict over Kashmir, which is a fatal legacy of Partition.
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26 The roots of permanent hostility and wide-ranging passions associated with India-Pakistan
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28 relations are traced within two-Nations theory – a political cum theological ideology, which
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30 provides India-Pakistan's Partition and their post-Partition conflicts with a *raison d'etre*.
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32 Simply put, this theory presents the idea that due to inherent religious and ethnic differences,
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34 Hindus and Muslims in the Asian Subcontinent were always two distinct nations who could
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36 not co-exist peacefully.
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41 There are numerous explanations in respect of two-Nations theory, holding the views that
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43 cultural and civilizational differences created an ideological ocean between both groups. While
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45 this article does not reject what has been said in previous analyses, it offers a radical alternative
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47 view to examine the socio-cognitive nature and components of two-Nations theory from an
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49 indigenous perspective – as ideologies are unconsciously motivated processes; passionately
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51 held and emotionally committed, stemming from peoples' underlying cognitive assumptions
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58 ¹ See for an extensive debate on the subject: Thazha Varkey Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring*
59 *rivalry* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-8.

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61 ² Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a century: The India-Pakistan conundrum* (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

1 of certain beliefs.³ This article subscribes to the notion that ideologies are pre-packaged units
2 of interpretation, as opposed to the view that political convictions *always* reflect independent
3 and biased thinking.⁴
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7 This article seeks to examine the psychological construction of ordinary peoples' as well as
8 political actors' perception about the "other" group, which formed the building blocks of two-
9 Nations theory – and finds it deeply rooted in the indigenous institution of "joint-family" for
10 its significance, endurance, and a deep emotional impact on the lives of people in the Indian
11 Subcontinent. This article presents a theoretical framework of how to examine the construction
12 process of goals, motives, emotions, and the cognition of individual actors; because, after all,
13 political ideologies, processes, and institutions are made and executed through human agency.⁵
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15 I, therefore, propose that a firm Muslim group identity that emerged during the last decades of
16 the British rule in India, was primarily the outcome of an interactive process between individual
17 actors' psychology constructed within the institution of "joint-family" and their contemporary
18 political environment.
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35 An ideal family life serves as a conceptual anchor for peoples' larger moral belief systems and
36 dictate their political attitudes about how society and the nation should function.⁶ So, if people
37 can reason about politics using family experiences then they can also understand their
38 intergroup-conflict ideologies using the dynamics of family conflict. To that end, Hindu-
39 Muslim conflict could be conceptualized and understood in the simpler terms of a family-split
40 as observed in the local institution of "joint-family". Such a distinctive understanding of the
41 conflict by people was due to numerous commonalities between both groups in the
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54 ³ Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The elements of the concept of ideology." *Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (1987): 18-38.

55 ⁴ John T. Jost, Ledgerwood Alison, and Curtis D. Hardin "Shared reality, system justification, and the relational
56 basis of ideological beliefs." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 1 (2008): 171-186.

57 ⁵ See for a similar debate: Fred I. Greenstein, "Can Personality and Politics be Studied
58 Systematically?" *Political Psychology* 13, no. 1 (1992): 105-128.

59 ⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors we live by* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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1 Subcontinent, ranging from their geographic proximity, social practices, frequency of daily-
2 life, identical kinship structures and kin-labels.
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5 It is problematic to differentiate between Muslims and Hindus strictly on ethnic or religious
6 grounds as there has been a complex ethnic and religious criss-crossing of both groups in the
7 Subcontinent. Despite adhering to different faiths, people were not much different from one
8 another in terms of behaviour and practices, owing to a similar cultural gene-pool and a long
9 history of mass conversions from one religion to the other. Due to such distinctiveness of the
10 Asian Subcontinent – especially the emotional nature of relations between India and Pakistan
11 – this article builds an indigenous framework to analyse this conflict from a cultural,
12 psychological and historical perspective. A psycho-cultural paradigm as a mode-of-analysis is
13 therefore used to analyse some unexplored aspects contributing to the development of the two-
14 Nations ideology. Typically, a psycho-cultural paradigm involves the analysis of the sociology
15 of politics, the culture of mass psychology, of political psychology, and the political culture.⁷
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17 This approach puts forward the idea that the behaviour attained by people in certain emotional,
18 usually familial situations are mapped onto structurally analogous political situations.⁸
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20 Accordingly, this article seeks to examine *how* the ideas learned by people within the institution
21 of family in the Subcontinent, could be mapped onto their political thought processes shaping
22 a certain conflict ideology. On this theoretical account, we can assume both Hindu and Muslim
23 groups as two branches of the United Indian family competing to have the best position in the
24 family through their respective political leaders. This approach enables us to explain macro-
25 level group concepts by comparing them to the micro-level beliefs, values, and world-views
26 developed in a specific cultural milieu.
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57 ⁷ Bakhtawar M. Jain, *Nuclear politics in South Asia: In search of an alternative paradigm* (Jaipur: Rawat
58 Publications, 1994).

59 ⁸ Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris, "The Genetic approach in psychoanalysis." *The psychoanalytic study of the*
60 *child* 1, no. 1 (1945): 11-30.
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Justification for using a Psycho-cultural Mode-of-Analysis

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3 While the existing literature does not disregard the passions and intensity found in India-
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5 Pakistan relations, it does not frame them within a proper theoretical structure. Their mutual
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7 hostility is usually explained as a logical outcome of bloody incidents of Partition – which does
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9 not explain this phenomenon convincingly, as for instance European nations managed to forget
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11 their past despite seeing bloodshed of an even higher magnitude. Furthermore, Pakistan despite
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13 being a much weaker state, is not ready to accept any international threat like the suspension
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15 of military or economic assistance in trading off it with its reduction in military build-up against
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17 India. The hostile psychologies of people as well as leadership on both sides is constantly
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19 contributing to the problem – the origins of which need to be spelled out apart from reiterating
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21 the conventional explanations of two-Nations ideology.
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28 Traditionally, the India-Pakistan conflict has been studied by assigning both nations fixed
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30 rather diametrically opposite ethno-religious categories i.e. “Hindus” and “Muslims”, which is
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32 theoretically problematic and does not explain this conflict in its entirety. The term “ethno-
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34 religious”, itself is an amalgam of two different cultural identities; religion and ethnicity.
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36 Primarily, there are two distinct ways in which the term “ethnic” has been used by the political
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38 scientists. In its narrower sense, “ethnic” means “racial” or “linguistic”.⁹ However, in British
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40 India, the term “communalism” has been used more often to mention conflicts between Hindus
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42 and Muslims based upon religious differences, because of their racial, linguistic, and ethnic
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44 similarities.¹⁰ Therefore, the narrower context of the term ‘ethnic’ is not applicable to
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46 differentiate between Punjabi Hindus and Muslims or Bengali Hindus and Muslims.
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52 But if we need to re-examine the Pakistan-India or Muslim-Hindu conflicts by repositioning
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54 them in ethnic terms, we will have to subscribe to a broader view of ethnicity in the social
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58 ⁹ Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Yale University Press, 2003),

59 4.

60 ¹⁰ Ibid.

1 sciences. All conflicts, Horowitz argues, based upon ascriptive identities – race, language
2 religion, tribe, or caste can be called ethnic. Even the groups differentiated by “nationalities”
3
4 come under this wider umbrella of ethnicity.¹¹ Using this wider concept, ethnic conflicts might
5
6 range from Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland, and Hindu-Muslim conflict in both
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8 post-partition and pre-partition periods. The black-white conflict in United States and South
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10 Africa also comes under its rubric.¹² However, using this wider criteria of defining ethnicity is
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12 also problematic in India-Pakistan case and does not serve the cause of our inquiry. Because,
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14 in so doing not only the interstate Pakistan-India conflict and Hindu-Muslim inter-group
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16 conflict can be regarded as ethnic, but we will also have to re-examine the Shia-Sunni sectarian
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18 conflict in Pakistan and upper caste-lower caste conflict in India by treating them as ethnic
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20 conflicts.
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26 In fact, there has been a paradox of identity for both Hindus and Muslims in the Indian
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28 Subcontinent. They are caught in the web of deciding between different cultural identities;
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30 religious, ethnic, caste and sectarian ones being at the top. Religion is often viewed as the
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32 number one variable responsible for Pakistan-India partition. However, this fact must not be
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34 ignored that despite having different religions, large number of people belonged to the same
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36 ethnic groups and castes. For example, Punjabi or Bengali population was divided on religion
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38 factor during Partition despite belonging to same ethnic groups. Conversely, these
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40 Punjabi/Bengali ethnic groups had their representation in almost all the religions prevailing in
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42 the Subcontinent. Despite being divided on religions, people had strong ethnic, linguistic and
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44 even kinship ties.
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49 Now, finding religion as the *only* factor for dividing the members of a homogeneous ethnic
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51 group can be very interesting if we take notice of the fact that people do conceptualize their
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53 ethnic group in terms of a family. An ethnic group members often call each other brothers and
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59 ¹¹ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 53.

60 ¹² *Ibid.*

1 call distantly related groups cousin-brothers; a term with a figurative meaning: the word
2 connotes the condition of being like brothers but not actually brothers.¹³ A simple hypothetical
3 situation can explain this phenomenon; for instance, if a non-Punjabi embraces Islam,
4 Hinduism or Sikhism, he/she shall remain an outsider for Punjabis despite his/her new religion.
5 Similarly, by switching or even abandoning the religion, a Pashtun is not likely to lose his
6 Pashtun identity. It is a rare occasion that people are able to change their ethnic identity. For
7 example, a Punjabi will remain Punjabi even he is divided between different nation-states or
8 religions – Muslim Punjabi, Hindu Punjabi, Sikh Punjabi, Indian Punjabi, Pakistani Punjabi,
9 British Punjabi and Canadian Punjabi. Furthermore, there is a strong line of argument that when
10 an ethnic group is divided for some reasons (say religion), its members tend to behave like
11 when someone leaves his family. One could infer that the animosity between Hindu and
12 Muslim communities in India and Pakistan *can also* be examined by ascribing them the
13 category of “rival kin groups”; as the nations, themselves, are a fully extended form of family.¹⁴
14 The study of the institution of family can be beneficial for our inquiry while examining the
15 cognitive components of the two-Nations theory through an understanding of how people
16 conceptualize the ideas of nation, nationalism, national identity, nation-building and state-
17 building in the Indian Subcontinent. To that end, the family (joint-family to be specific) is the
18 most salient, initial, most emotionally powerful, most functional and the most enduring
19 institution in this region and almost every ideology is shaped within this institution.¹⁵ The
20 family/lineage identity can be a potential rival to every other group identity; religious,
21 linguistic, and political.¹⁶ Right from their home, people start learning the concepts of authority

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¹³ Ibid., 56.

¹⁴ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 202.

¹⁵ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Public Affairs, 2012) and Sudhir Kakar and Katrina Kakar, *The Indians: Portrait of a people* (New York; New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2009).

¹⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*.

1 and governance; and learn to understand the differences between right and wrong.¹⁷ The family
2 institution is taken as a model by the Indian people while conceiving the ideas about their ethnic
3 group or nation; since the people always use the mundane building blocks of family and kinship
4 institutions in order to make sense of larger political entities.¹⁸ Therefore, given the larger
5 impact of institution of family on their lives, this article argues that near the Partition, Hindu
6 and Muslim communities conceptualized themselves in terms of warring family branches.
7 Their group identity was not thought upon *only* in terms of distinct ethnic or religious groups,
8 which informs the conventional bases of two-Nations theory.
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19 The rationale for using family dynamics to analyse two-Nations theory also lies in the fact that
20 India-Pakistan Partition and their ongoing conflicts, have always been expressed by ordinary
21 people as well as political leaders in a heavily familistic language carrying indigenous familial
22 labels. For example, Jai Prakash Narayan, an Indian independence activist, argued that Hindu
23 and Muslim are like two brothers fighting for separation and they would live in amity and
24 fraternal harmony once the parental assets are settled after partition.¹⁹ This also explains the
25 nature of emotions attached to Kashmir conflict that make it's resolve so difficult, as it is
26 conceptualized by both groups in terms of their ancestral property. Pakistani people imagine
27 Kashmir as their lost *Jaddi Virsa* (ancestral property) and stepping down from your ancestral
28 property's claim can bring shame to home according to the indigenous cultural values.²⁰ In
29 famous Gandhi-Jinnah Talks in 1944 to settle the issue of Partition, Mr. Gandhi never agreed
30 to use the term "nation" for both groups and proceeded on the assumption that Hindus and
31 Muslim constitute a "family" and Muslim family members want to live separately.²¹ Mr. Jinnah
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52 ¹⁷ Saeed Ahmed Khan, *A Cross-cultural Investigation of Person-centred Therapy in Pakistan and Great Britain*
53 (Bloomington; Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2014).
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55 ¹⁸ Patrick Colm Hogan, *Understanding nationalism: On narrative, cognitive science, and identity* (The Ohio
56 State University Press, 2009), 132-133.

57 ¹⁹ Asghar Ali Engineer, *Communal riots in post-independence India* (Hyderabad: Sangam Books,1985), 238-71.

58 ²⁰ Jawad Kadir, "Perceiving the Enemy Differently: A Psycho-cultural Analysis of Pakistan-India
59 Conflict." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 6, no. 2 (2019): 189-216.

60 ²¹ Stanley A. Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 231.
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1 was quite optimistic that “division” would improve the relations between two communities.²²

2 He was also of the opinion that Hindu-Muslim animosity would be pacified after settling the
3 power/resource sharing issues as it usually happens among brothers.²³ Sardar Patel – the first
4 deputy prime minister of India – conceded to the demand of Pakistan in 1947 by saying that: it
5 is better for brothers to live separately in peace than to live together and quarrel all the time.²⁴

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7 The above are a few of many statements on the part of Partition’s key actors, substantiating my
8 argument to review the familial construction of the two-Nations theory.
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11 Another rationale behind using the family dynamics to reassess the two-Nations theory lies
12 within ethnographic literature confirming that the Subcontinental people do treat their
13 neighbours as their kin.²⁵ A famous saying goes like: “*Hamsaya Ma ka jaya*” which means
14 “your neighbour is your mother’s son – near neighbours are considered closer than far-
15 relatives.²⁶ Lyon has also observed in Pakistani culture that people tend to transpose their kin
16 relations to the other people in society and the family remains a starting reference point for
17 them to situate their own position vis-à-vis the others while dealing with them.²⁷ People use
18 indigenous kin “labels” for their neighbours, which develop an intimate bond among them.²⁸

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20 In the pre-partition times, a Muslim would have considered his Hindu neighbour to be closer
21 to him than a Muslim from a more distant place. Thus, a familial “near-ness” had been
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23 Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997).

24 Mr. Jinnah often quoted an example from a family in which blood-brothers remained at daggers for dividing their ancestral property. One of the brothers was Jinnah’s client. After the distribution of assets was settled through court, the brothers again developed their cordial relations. This incident has been quoted by Ahmed, Akbar in: *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*.

25 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 2014), 201.

26 Muhamad Azam Chaudhary, *Justice in practice: Legal ethnography of a Pakistani Punjabi village* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999).

27 *Ibid.*, 17.

28 Stephen M. Lyon, *An anthropological analysis of local politics and patronage in a Pakistani village* (Wales: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004).

29 The labels reserved for the blood relations, such as *Chacha* (father’s brother), *Taya* (father’s elder brother), *Mama* (mother’s brother), *Beta* (son), and *Bhatija* (nephew) are also used for those living close by (neighbours). The traditional use of such familiar terms developed intimate relations between Hindu and Muslim neighbours.

1 developed between Hindu and Muslim neighbours impacting deeply on locking them in a
2 familial type of feud when an intergroup conflict broke out.
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5 **Objectives of the Article**

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7
8 Clarifying the theoretical mechanism of “Conceptual-Mapping” through which family-level
9 learning and concepts are mapped onto group level thought-processes and political ideologies,
10 is one of the core objectives of this article. In addition to that, by employing discourse analysis,
11 this article re-examines the famous two-Nations theory to understand the cognitive construction
12 of a distinct Muslim identity in familial terms. The different indigenous terms such as *Batwara*
13 and *Qaum*²⁹ – popularly used in the political and nationalist discourses of India-Pakistan history
14 – have been re-evaluated in the light of their indigenous contexts. Another objective is to
15 explain how the images of an extended family or a lineage group associated with these terms,
16 could have provided both groups with ready-made templates to situate their own political
17 identity vis-à-vis the ‘other’.³⁰
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32 **Why A Paradigm Shift? An Engagement with the Existing Literature**

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34 While this article acknowledges the significance of the existing literature explaining the roots
35 of Hindu-Muslim hostility in the pre-partition as well as in post-partition periods, the available
36 literature is mostly of a historical or descriptive nature. Dr. Sumit Ganguly has aptly remarked
37 that there is a dearth of scholarly literature capable of analysing this ongoing rivalry from a
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53 ²⁹ The term *Qaum* is usually translated in English language as the “nation”, which gives readers the meanings of
54 the nation-state. The indigenous usage of this term is of *Biradari* or *Jati*, which denotes an extension of family
55 groups with common descendant; literally a brotherhood. This term must also not be confused with the local
56 terms such as *Janta* or *Praja*, which are used to represent the common people “the masses”; the subjects of a
57 state.

58 ³⁰ Hamza A. Alavi, "Kinship in west Punjab villages." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 6, no. 1 (1972): 1-27.
59 The terms such as *Qaum*, *Biradari* and *Jati* (Brotherhood) are replaceable, which represent a group of people
60 having common descendant; a sort of large paternal family group.
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theoretical focal point.³¹ There are several viewpoints with their own strengths and drawbacks, explaining this conflict by focusing on different factors.

The Genesis of Two-Nations Theory

In tracing the genesis of Hindu-Muslim discord in the Indian Subcontinent, first comes the primordial model presenting the idea that both groups always had distinct identities for having dissimilar religions and cultures.³² Robinson argues that Indian Muslims were always different from their Hindu counterparts in terms of religion, culture and civilization; therefore, Muslim communities were bound to become a separate nation.³³ A famous historian Aziz also supports this argument by saying: “the Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious, but it was the clash of two civilizations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources and different concepts of art”.³⁴ Sayeed has used the metaphor of two parallel but not-mixable rivers for Hindus and Muslims.³⁵ This view is commonly referred to as “two-Nations theory”.

While this model has its own strengths, it does not clarify that: if religion was the main factor behind Muslim separatism, then how come almost all the leading religious parties and clerics could oppose the idea of Pakistan? The top Muslim clergy including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (Congress), Maulana Muhammad Hassan Madni (Jamiat Ulma-e-Hind) and Maulana Maududi (Jamaat-e-Islami) had rejected the idea of Muslim nationalism by equating it to a

³¹ Sumit Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

³² Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, *Hindutva; who is a Hindu?* (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969) and Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

³³ Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*.

³⁴ Khursheed Kamal Aziz, *The making of Pakistan: A study in nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 143.

³⁵ Sayeed, *The Formative Phase*.

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“curse”.³⁶ Similarly, Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari of Majlis-e-Ahrar – another dynamic Muslim religious party in northern India – also opposed the theory that Indian Muslims constituted a different nation. All the first rank Muslim clerics blamed Muslim League leaders to protect the British Raj and called the Hindu-Muslim conflict “nothing more than friction between two brothers over the distribution of their father’s property”.³⁷

The two-Nations theory has been further explained by different schools of thought, such as the Instrumentalists interpreting it through socio-economic and political factors.³⁸ The proponents of this approach say that during the early period of British rule, the Muslims lagged far behind in comparison to Hindus in educational, economic, political, administrative and professional fields.³⁹ As Muslim elite’s domination over society was threatened, they tried to mobilise their own community behind them through manipulating identity symbols; religious and linguistic.⁴⁰ It is worth mentioning that again, the “instrumental role of religion” is emphasized in dividing both groups – as this approach focuses on identity as a tool used by the individuals, groups or elites for obtaining material benefits.⁴¹ In so doing, this approach points its fingers at the Muslim elite/aristocrats in minority Muslim provinces as an exploiting class, who made use of religion for securing their own political and economic interests – Jinnah’s westernised personality is presented to substantiate this argument, who was to become the first Muslim Governor General of Pakistan. Jalal argues that Jinnah was a political strategist who played the majority Muslim province card originally to secure the best position in a united India; actually

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³⁶ Ian Talbot, “Back to the future? Pakistan, history and nation building,” in Charles Kennedy, ed., *Pakistan at the Millennium* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 65:95 and Syed Anwar Hussain, *Pakistan: Islam, politics, and national solidarity* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).

³⁷ Salil Misra, *A Narrative of Communal Politics, Uttar Pradesh, 1937-39* (California: Sage publications Inc., Thousand Oaks), 235.

³⁸ Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974) and “Elite group, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia” in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp, eds., *Political Identity in South Asia* (London, Curzon Press, 1979).

³⁹ Louis Dumont, “Nationalism and Communalism”, in *Religion, Politics and History in India* (Paris: Mouton De Gruyter, 1970), 98:99.

⁴⁰ Azad, *India wins freedom*.

⁴¹ David A. Lake, and Donald S. Rothchild, *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 6.

1 he never wished to leave the federation but ended up having to do so.⁴² An objection can be
2 raised against this “elitist” explanation that why were political leaders from minority Muslim
3 provinces so sure that they could control the state affairs in majority Muslim provinces after
4 partition? And were not the Muslim political elite in majority provinces concerned about
5 disruption to their own status?
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12 Jalal’s thesis explaining the reasons behind Jinnah’s advocacy for a separate home-land in
13 contrast to his previous ideals of Indian nationalism, is also viewed from different angles.
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15 While this article does not deny the impact of contemporary political and constitutional issues
16 on Jinnah’s stance to change from a staunch nationalist to a communalist, it suggests that
17 Jinnah’s political trajectory can also be viewed by way of an inherent cognitive modelling
18 inside Jinnah, he developed after being denied a wishful status in Congress party. This
19 argument is supported by analysing the discursive reproduction of Jinnah’s inner thoughts. He
20 used familial metaphors while defending his own as well as a general communalist stance
21 adopted by the Muslims: “we are glad we are communalists. Instead of waiting at other’s door,
22 if you want to create self-respect and self-reliance, organise yourself.”⁴³ Also, his statement
23 that “Muslims have no home and no place to call their own” gives a clue that besides other
24 objective realities, his outward rejection to work with Congress was also a result of being
25 rebuffed by the Congress leadership.⁴⁴
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45 Dhulipala categorically rejects Jalal’s argument and says that Pakistan was never created in a
46 vacuum, rather it was purposefully imagined and popularly accepted in minority Muslim
47 provinces as an ideal Islamic state of Medina.⁴⁵ He explains to the extent that contemporary
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54 ⁴² Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge
55 University Press, 1985).

56 ⁴³ Jinnah’s public address, 16 May 1937 cited in Waheed Ahmad, *The Nation’s voice: Towards Consolidation,*
57 *Vol. 1: Speeches and Statements of M.A. Jinnah, 1935-40* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1992), 150.

58 ⁴⁴ Jinnah’s address at the Muslim Students’ Conference at Karachi, 11 October 1938. *Ibid.*, 294.

59 ⁴⁵ Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a new Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial*
60 *North India* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 501.
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1 Pakistan's crisis also owes to its inability towards fulfilling those imagined Islamist ideals.
2 Devji also seems to be supporting this argument when he uses the term "Muslim Zion" to
3 describe the sacrifices of millions of people who abandoned their homelands to settle in the
4 promised land of Pakistan.⁴⁶
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10 This article does accept that the ideology of being a distinct group and the desire for having a
11 separate homeland, had gained enormous public support in the minority Muslim provinces –
12 however, this article doubts the role of religion as the *only* catalyst for widening the gap
13 between both communities who sustained their religious differences for centuries. Dhulipala
14 himself admits that "two-Nations theory", itself was divided between pro-Congress and pro-
15 League clergy. It implies that there are certainly some other complexities embedded within the
16 construction of this ideology – a few of which this article has attempted to present by way of
17 theorization that how both communities *perceived* each other in familial terms.
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30 I argue that Jalal's thesis of an "accidental" creation of Pakistan or a "purposeful" selection of
31 an Islamic state (Dhulipala and Devji theses) *can also* be explained as a Muslim communalism
32 conceptualized upon by the masses in terms of a family fissure that underwent a political
33 mobilizational process under the leadership of Jinnah, who himself was trying to situate his
34 own position as a new family-head of Muslim family after losing a more or less similar position
35 in Congress family. Conceived this way, Muslim identity politics was transformed into an
36 irresistible social force. The role of Jinnah can be explained as an articulator of the ideology
37 that had already been constructed in peoples' minds, especially in the minority Muslim
38 provinces.
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60 ⁴⁶ Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (London: C. Hurst, 2013).
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There is another Subaltern school of thought blaming the British rulers for fostering and concretizing the communal identities between both sister-communities for their political gain.⁴⁷ Pandey suggests that the Muslims in south Asia were linguistically and culturally so diverse, that they could not identify a water-tight “Muslim” identity for themselves only by shared beliefs or religion.⁴⁸ While fully agreeing to the notion that due to an assimilation process spanning over centuries, both religions are severely fragmented along caste and sectarian lines in the Subcontinent and the identification of these groups through strict ethno-religious markers is difficult – this article suggests that the picture of holding the British as sole responsible for constructing religious antipathies, is also incomplete. This position does not explain convincingly that why such “constructed” religious identity could not bring the same hostility against the British Christians, who were at the helm of power-play; as the identities once constructed are difficult to be deconstructed. I argue that British Christians could not be absorbed into local population according to the indigenous principles of caste and hierarchy, what Muslims did centuries ago. Therefore, the local people could not put the same amount of intensity into their rivalry against Christian “outsiders”. Subsequently, the Muslim-League leaders were ready to work under the British masters but did not digest Hindu-Congress rule in 1937. Similarly, the Hindus began to feel contempt against Muslim neighbours for their beef-eating habit, but the same practice by the British outsiders remained acceptable to them. Moreover, how could this supposedly constructed religious identity fade away so quickly after Partition and failed to maintain the unity between Muslim Pakistanis and Muslim Bangladeshis (former East Pakistan) – who separated again in 1971 on ethno-linguistic grounds.

⁴⁷ A school pioneered by Ranajit Guha. See for a detailed discussion: Ranajit Guha, *An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth Century Agenda and its Implications* (Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1988).

⁴⁸ Gyanendra Pandey, *The Colonial Construction of Communalism in North India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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2 Interestingly, the Hindu India then helped the cause of Muslim Bengalis against their own West
3 Pakistani Muslim brethren.⁴⁹
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6 *Literature Explaining the Post-Partition Conflict*

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10 The Post-Partition conflict between both nation-states is also explained in terms of ideological
11 differences stemming from this two-Nations theory. Stephen Cohen had identified the vitality
12 of an anti-Indian approach for Pakistani policy makers, which constantly urges them to
13 strengthen themselves militarily.⁵⁰ While asserting Pakistan's pursuance for Kashmir as a
14 religious mission, Cohen also takes a notice of the paradoxical religious character of Pakistani
15 society by saying that Pakistanis are not in favour of an orthodox Islamic state. In fact, due to
16 conflict prone nature of India-Pakistan relations, scholars such as Ganguly and Fair hold
17 Pakistan's revisionist, expansionist and greedy agenda responsible for spreading its territorial
18 and ideological expansionism in the region.⁵¹ Ganguly also mentions the presence of firm
19 ideological beliefs that do not let Pakistan to back-off from Kashmir cause. Paul and Siddiqa
20 define Pakistan as a "Garrison" and "Warrior" state run by a handful military elite for serving
21 their own as well as extra-regional agendas.⁵² There seems to be an intellectual agreement
22 among many scholars that military regimes in Pakistan pursue their own institutional interests
23 and therefore regard permanent enmity with India as *raison d'etre* for their existence. However,
24 from a Pakistani standpoint, it is the "fear" of Indian hegemonic designs that prompts Pakistan
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52 ⁴⁹ Hafeez Malik, *Dilemmas of national security and cooperation in India and Pakistan* (London: MacMillan
53 Press Springer, 1993).

54 ⁵⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, *The idea of Pakistan* (Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 69-72.

55 ⁵¹ Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse* and Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (Oxford
56 University Press, 2014).

57 ⁵² Tahzha V. Paul, *The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world* (Oxford University Press, 2014) and
58 Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc., The politics of Military's Economy in Pakistan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson
59 Centre for International Scholars, 2007).
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1 to adopt security seeking behaviour.⁵³ Admittedly, this pro-Pakistani model can partly explain
2 a state's defensive approach for its survival but does not put forward a plausible explanation
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4 for an adventurous and extra-aggressive Pakistani stance against India.
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8 In fact, regardless of civil or military regimes, Pakistan has always pursued policies that must
9 be diametrically opposite to Indian policies. Jaffrelot has used the metaphorical conception of
10 husband-wife relations to describe India-Pakistan troublesome dyad: "The story of a divorce
11 that went wrong".⁵⁴ While analysing Pakistan's military's paranoia to fight India to the end,⁵⁵
12 Fair does not focus much on the public mentality that loves the Army as the only powerful
13 institution capable of competing and defeating India. Pakistan's ambitious behaviour against
14 India *can also* be interpreted as the outcome of an interactive process between mass psychology
15 and the political culture, only to be executed by the political elite. In fact, it is politicians in
16 Pakistan not men-in-uniform who gain more by anti-Indian rhetoric,⁵⁶ and the leaders in both
17 states try to acquire nuclear supremacy only to bolster their own individual popularity.⁵⁷ It
18 implies that political elite capitalize upon the popular sentiments already found in each country
19 against the other. This article proposes that the development of such popular urge to compete
20 each other must be examined apart from considering it merely a statist project that cannot
21 explain Pakistan's extra-adventurous attitude against a country ten times bigger than his own.
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44 Nevertheless, Ganguly has pointed out the cognitive and affective biases arising from the
45 ideological differences that drive Pakistan to challenge India even after nuclear deterrence.⁵⁸
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51 ⁵³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the geostrategic environment: A study of foreign policy* (UK: Palgrave
52 Macmillan, 1993) and Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan the garrison state: origins, evolution, consequences, 1947-2011*
53 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).

54 Christophe Jaffrelot, *A history of Pakistan and its origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 113.

55 Fair, *Fighting to the End*, 7.

56 Ahmad Faruqui, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* (Ashgate
57 Publication, Limited, 2005).

58 Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Un-ending: India-Pakistan tensions since 1947* (Columbia University Press, 2002),
127-38.

⁵⁸ Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse*, 13.

1 This article fully accepts the presence of certain cognitive biases among masses as well as
2 political leaders on both sides, which contribute towards the construction of their emotional
3 national agendas aimed at letting each other down. By using the theoretical framework of
4 conceptual mapping, this article examines how these cognitive biases are constructed through
5 the early socialization in a family setting.
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11 **How Ideology and the Nation draw on the “Family”? A Theoretical Framework**

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18 An ideology is a set of certain normative beliefs and values; the systems of ideas and ethical
19 ideals which can impact the formation of politico-economic theories and resultantly their action
20 plans.⁵⁹ In political science, the term ideology is synonymous to the term political ideology that
21 refers to a political belief system providing a social movement, institution or class with
22 doctrines, myths, and symbols that how a society or nation should work.⁶⁰ However, an
23 ideology is further explained in terms of a worldview⁶¹ – the imagined existence (or idea) of
24 things as it relates to the real conditions of existence.⁶² These normatively imbued ideas or
25 conceptual maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe including
26 particular representations of power relations.⁶³ One of the core characteristics of an ideology is
27 its power over cognition that influence peoples’ evaluations of the political situations.⁶⁴
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42 Moreover, the main elements of the concept of ideology are the underlying cognitive
43 assumptions of belief, or the total structure of the mind including the conceptual apparatus –
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50 ⁵⁹ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University
51 Press, 1996).

52 ⁶⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk, "Ideology and discourse analysis." *Journal of political ideologies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 115-
53 140.

54 ⁶¹ Manfred B. Steger and James Paul, "Levels of subjective globalization: Ideologies, imaginaries,
55 ontologies." *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 12, no. 1-2 (2013): 17-40.

56 ⁶² Louis Althusser, "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. Lenin and philosophy and other essays." *Trans.*
57 *Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press* 1270186 (1971).

58 ⁶³ Manfred B. Steger, "Ideologies of globalization." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 11-30.

59 ⁶⁴ Willard A. Mullins, "On the concept of ideology in political science." *American Political Science Review* 66,
60 no. 2 (1972): 498-510.
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1 an ideology is unconsciously motivated, passionately held, and emotionally committed.⁶⁵

2 Therefore, ideologies can be explained as a manifestation of the unconscious motivational
3 processes; pre-packaged units of interpretation, as opposed to the view that political
4 convictions always reflect independent and biased thinking.⁶⁶ One could easily infer from the
5 above discussion that the compositional structure of an ideology is considerably of a socio-
6 cognitive nature – which, in turn, is also reproduced in political discourse.
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10 This article argues that the family-level morals and beliefs are mapped onto group-level
11 political ideas – something which can be explained effectively with the help of cognitive
12 neuroscience research. The idealised family experiences become the source of the construction
13 of peoples’ ethical and political behaviour while conceptualizing their group and nation.⁶⁷ To
14 that end, the institution of family can also shape the construction of peoples’ conflict
15 ideologies, which are then mapped onto their interpersonal, intergroup as well as interstate
16 conflicts. Lakoff explains how people reason about the abstract concepts (say intergroup
17 conflict) in terms of their more concrete knowledge based in day-to-day experiences (say
18 family conflict).⁶⁸ Accordingly, people may use the dynamics and metaphors used within more
19 mundane family conflicts to reason about relatively more difficult and abstract intergroup
20 conflict situations.
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42 Apparently, the ideological beliefs seem to stem from an individual’s personality traits and
43 needs, and therefore the utility of purely psychological explanations declines sharply when
44 making comparisons across different societies. Here, culture being a group concept, acts as an
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52 ⁶⁵ Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The elements of the concept of ideology." *Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (1987): 18-38.

53 ⁶⁶ John T. Jost, Ledgerwood Alison and Curtis D. Hardin, "Shared reality, system justification, and the relational
54 basis of ideological beliefs." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 1 (2008): 171-186.

55 ⁶⁷ George Lakoff, *Moral politics: How conservatives and liberals think*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
56 Press, 1996). George Lakoff is the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics
57 at the University of Berkeley. He is the founding senior fellow at the Rockridge Institute, which specializes in
58 applying cognitive linguistics to the use of framing in political discourse. Cognitive linguistics is the systemic,
59 scientific approach within the cognitive sciences to the study of how we understand.

60 ⁶⁸ Ibid.

1 intermediary in the relationship between individual perceptual tendencies and a group's
2 political orientation. I propose that the sociological and anthropological understandings of the
3 concept of culture-as-worldview – shared belief systems irreducible to their individual
4 adherents that once established become highly resistant to change – could offer a solution to
5 these apparent inconsistencies.⁶⁹ Culture affects the mental programming of its adherents and
6 thus determine their collective behaviour.⁷⁰ Simply put, human psyche and culture are
7 inseparable and co-construct each other. The effects of culture on collective action and political
8 life are generally indirect, therefore, it is necessary to investigate how culture interacts with,
9 shapes, and is shaped by interests and social institutions.⁷¹ Examining a specific culture and
10 associated emotions within it, can reveal important political strategies key actors adopt.
11 Considering these theoretical findings, this article has probed into the local institution of joint
12 family for its cultural significance and emotional impact over peoples' cognition that influence
13 their evaluation of the political situations.

14 As the earliest learning of living, relationships, conflict, authority and being governed is inside
15 the family; these primary formative experiences contribute towards informing peoples' ideas
16 and perceptions, to deal with the similar situations in the wider domains of their future life. The
17 dynamics of the family models idealized and practised by the majority population give an
18 insight of how a particular group conceptualizes and reacts to certain political situations. People
19 idealize in terms of their most-loved family models – which are deeply imbedded in their
20 psyche through early socialization – that how their society and nation should work. Different
21 family structures and types are idealized in different parts of the world; joint-family system

22 ⁶⁹ Anthony J. Marsella, "Culture and Conflict: Understanding, Negotiating, and Reconciling Conflicting
23 Constructions of Reality." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 29, no. 6 (2005): 651-73.

24 ⁷⁰ Gustav Jahoda, *Crossroads between culture and mind: Continuities and change in theories of human nature*
25 (Harvard University Press, 1993).

26 ⁷¹ Sheri Berman, "Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis (Book Review)." *Comparative Politics* 33, no.
27 2 (2001): 241-44.

1 being the most desirable in the Indian Subcontinent as compared to more nuclear family models
2 within western societies.
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5 As available literature has it, the two-Nations theory manifests that both communities,
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7 especially the Muslims, had conceptualized (consciously) about their own community and
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9 future nation-state as an ideal Islamic state, which would be free of Hindu majoritarian rule.
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11 While I do not reject this assertion in completely, what only I suggest is an additional
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13 examination of the “unconscious” conceptualization of this phenomenon by both communities
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15 for understanding the deep-rooted passions found in their mutual relations. This argument is
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17 backed by the psycho-culturalists such as Lagace that: “Thoughts and feelings occur and are
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19 manifested both consciously and unconsciously”.⁷² The psychoanalysts such as Herbert adds
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21 that: “Often-times, people are not consciously aware of some of the most significant
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23 motivations and attitudes that shape their thinking and behaviour”.⁷³ These unconscious factors
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25 can be traced through clues that people give in an indirect way and usually they are in a
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27 symbolic form. A few of these crucial clues or signals have been analysed in this article for
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29 understanding the cognitive components of the conflict ideology imbued in two-Nations
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31 theory.
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40 From the standpoint of this article, the concept of “National Community” needs to be re-
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42 examined in relation to the institution of family. A National community is quite old concept,
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44 and it existed much before it was named so. People used to identify themselves in terms of
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46 family, lineage group, tribes, and clans. With the passage of time, the growth of means of
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48 communication and the growing relations among different groups had generated the concept
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50 of commune of families, tribes or clans – which can be regarded as the beginning of the
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57 ⁷² Robert O. Lagacé, "Psychocultural Analysis, Cultural Theory, and Ethnographic Research." *Behavior science*
58 *notes* 1, no. 3 (1966): 165-199.

59 ⁷³ Hendin Herbert, Willard Gaylin and Arthur C. Carr, *Psychoanalysis and social research: The psychoanalytic*
60 *study of the non-patient*. Vol. 530 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965).
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1 conceptualization of “national community” or “nation” as defined in the modern terms where
2 family remained the unit-cell of this concept.
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5 Anderson has pointed out that we cannot experience the nation directly, therefore, we imagine
6 it in terms of some community which is necessarily imaginary.⁷⁴ Nation is an abstract concept;
7 therefore, it is thought upon by people in relation to more understandable or concrete concepts.
8 Therefore, the “operational code” behind the conceptualization of a nation can be de-coded by
9 exploring into the concrete and daily-based concepts that people usually rely upon to visualize
10 their ideal community. Connor affirms that a national community is envisioned on the model
11 of a family and goes so far as to define the nation as “the fully extended family”.⁷⁵ He suggests
12 that the nation works its magic through “familial metaphors”.⁷⁶ It becomes more evident when
13 we see people across the world conceptualizing their nation-states in terms of familial
14 metaphors: e.g. Mother India, and Mother Russia.
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29 The “type” of family-model cherished and respected by people is important as it impacts deeply
30 on running a nation’s affairs. Such metaphorical understanding of the nation-as-family directly
31 informs peoples’ political worldview in a very direct but an *unconscious* way.⁷⁷ The idealized
32 family models produce certain moral systems for running a nation and the functionality of the
33 state. The individual actors map these moralities onto the societal/national domain by mentally
34 engaging themselves with the nation-as-family metaphor, which facilitates reasoning about
35 their abstract political world in term of more concrete and daily-based world experiences i.e.
36 family life.
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56 ⁷⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London:
57 Verso, 1983).

58 ⁷⁵ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 202.

59 ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 94.

60 ⁷⁷ Lakoff, *Moral politics*.

The Mechanism of Conceptual Mapping

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3 Cognitive neuroscience supports the assertion that people conceptualize nation on the same
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5 cognitive patterns as they conceptualize other abstract entities through cognitive modelling or
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7 metaphors, which are called “conceptual metaphors”.⁷⁸ Our basic cognitive strategy is to think
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9 for newer and difficult problems in connection with the simpler and previously resolved
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11 problems, which remain intact while conceptualizing about “nation”. As discussed by Lakoff
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13 and Johnson, metaphors are (unconsciously) used to set up parallels between difficult and easy
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15 concepts.⁷⁹ They have problem-solving functionality to solve an ill-understood phenomenon
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17 by recalling a better-understood phenomenon. For example, when people say that “don’t waste
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19 your time”, they (unconsciously) use the metaphor of money for time, which should not be
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21 wasted.
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28 The mechanism of “conceptual-mapping” explains how family-level concepts are mapped onto
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30 group-level political stance and clarifies how people can reason about abstract ideas in forms
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32 of more concrete, mundane knowledge through “conceptual metaphor”. Many conceptual
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34 metaphors are automatically acquired based on every-day experiences, primarily at the early
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36 stages of life when basic neural patterns are being formed and strengthened in the mind.⁸⁰ The
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38 conceptual structures (known as “frames” and “scripts”) are mental structures, we use to
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40 understand the difficult situations. No one sees or hears these mental structures, but they shape
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42 the way we view the world. They are part of what scientists refer to as the “cognitive
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44 unconscious” inaccessible to the conscious mind, but at play in our decisions, our actions and
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58 ⁷⁸ Hogan, *Understanding nationalism*, 124.

59 ⁷⁹ Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*.

60 ⁸⁰ Ibid.

1 the way we process data.⁸¹ This mental processing helps people understand difficult concepts
2 (abstract ones) in terms of easy concepts (the concrete ones).
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5 The conceptual metaphor itself consists of mapping between elements of a source domain
6 (concrete or daily-based concepts) and elements of a target domain (abstract concepts).⁸² For
7 example, we use the source domain of money (a concrete one; visible and touchable) to target
8 the concept of time (an abstract one; invisible and untouchable). On the same pattern, the
9 abstract concept of life is usually understood by using the metaphor of journey – life is a
10 journey. Now, as the nation, politics, governance, and group conflict are highly abstract
11 domains of cognition, the people employ certain conceptual metaphors when reasoning about
12 them. Correspondingly, the development of their political attitudes, ideologies, and action-
13 plans are influenced by the conceptual structures and institutions they use.
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28 Interestingly, the conceptual metaphors have always been used to explain international politics,
29 even by the structural theorists. For example, when realism talks about survival of the fittest in
30 an international system, it conceptualizes (unconsciously) states as animals. For example, it
31 uses the source domain “animals have survival instinct” to target that ‘states have a survival
32 instinct’. Waltz stated that: “[states] are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own
33 preservation and at, maximum, drive for universal domination”.⁸³
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45 ***Theoretical Relevance for India-Pakistan case***

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48 This article argues that the Subcontinental cultural arrangements need to be considered
49 properly while examining the impact of conceptual metaphors over peoples’ political
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56 ⁸¹ George Lakoff. "Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters To the Global
57 Interdependence Initiative." 1999, Retrieved at:

58 https://frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF_GII/metaphorical_thought.pdf

59 ⁸² Ibid.

60 ⁸³ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (NY: McGraw Hills, 1979), 118.
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1 cognition. The selection, generation, and social generalization of such conceptual metaphors
2 are greatly influenced by the cultural norms. The concept of cognitive modelling cannot be
3 universalized as all the conceptual metaphors cannot have the same cultural legitimacy in this
4 part of the world. For instance, in the Indian Subcontinent and many other regions having hot
5 climate, the conceptual connectivity of “affection” is with coolness rather than warmth.
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7 Therefore, the mother’s affection is often described as cool shades/shelter; “*Manwaa’n*
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thandyean chhanwaa’n” which means “mothers provide you with the cool shelters”. The
metaphor of “warm breeze” might appeal people in the colder regions, but it was never
motivating for the Subcontinental people for having long spells of scorching summers. A
famous saying used by Punjabi mothers wishing their sons goes like: “*Ja Puttar tenu Tati hwa*
na lgy (go son, god save you from the hot breeze). Different animals and birds can have entirely
different characteristics attached to them in different regions. For example, an owl is
metaphorically used to represent a foolish person in the Subcontinent, whilst it is a symbol of
wisdom in many western societies. Similarly, monkey is revered as symbol of power in India,
which may not be conceptualized more than a naughty animal in the western countries.

Accordingly, the metaphor of “nation-as-mother” is widely accepted throughout the Asian
Subcontinent, but the “nation-as-lover” is not appreciated much. While people think of family
to imagine a nation, the ideal family structure is also determined by their culture. Consequently,
while the nuclear family setup may appear as a norm practiced by millions in both India and
Pakistan, the joint-family ethos are still regarded by people as an “ideal” family type. These
joint-family ethos are then used by people as conceptual metaphors and contribute towards
visualizing about nation and state. So, if people in the Subcontinent use the domain-source of
joint-family to reason about (or target) the concepts such as nation, state and national conflict,
then the cultural images, dynamics, morals, beliefs and human behaviours stemming from the
institution of joint-family can help understand their conflict ideologies at macro level.

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Certainly, an All-India Hindu-Muslim conflict was a highly abstract phenomenon for local people, which was automatically (but unconsciously) conceptualized in terms of easier concept such as family-level conflict. A persistent obsession for each other and an enormous amount of emotions involved in this conflict support the idea that the institution of family did inspire the construction of conflicting political ideas of both groups. The ordinary people as well as key political actors mapped the patterns (scripts or frames) of their family conflicts onto their intergroup conflict, which became even more visible when both groups underwent a split due to host of other material factors; such as fight over control of socio-economic, and political resources. The institution of family is still serving the purpose of source domain (obviously unconsciously as per Lakoff's assertion) for people on both sides to make sense of their mutual relations.

On the eve of British departure, while many Indian people conceptualized their future nation as one joint family (Gandhi's and Congress party's vision), some groups (Jinnah's Muslim League's vision) demanded a separate homeland as they had conceptualized themselves in terms of "wronged members of the family". They had situated themselves in this position after being denied a proper representation in the central power according to their own wishes. In fact, the contest between Muslim League and Indian National Congress revolved around a power-sharing formula *within* a united Indian setup, as both parties never rejected the scheme of a federal structure for the Indian constitution, which shows a strong desire on their part to remain in a joint-setup.⁸⁴ While admitting the significance of the contemporary socio-economic and politico-religious factors in dividing both groups, this article examines the mechanism of how people developed such familial and emotional responses to the situations created due to these material factors.

⁸⁴ Katharine Adeney, *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 34.

1 For our theoretical purpose, it is appropriate to reiterate that people in the Indian Subcontinent
2 use fictive kinship for relating themselves with the people of same ethnic backgrounds and
3
4 treat them as far-cousins. For example, when Punjabi people from different regions and
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6 religious backgrounds (Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, or Christian) meet each other, they often
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8 exchange the sentence: *Tu mera Pujabi Bhra ayn* (you are my Punjabi brother). Here, ethnicity
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10 and kinship overlap in a rather direct and operational way, as Horowitz asserts that the ethnicity
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12 always builds on the kinship.⁸⁵ Therefore, we can categorize Pakistani-Punjabis as a “split-
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14 ethnic group”, who parted ways from his ethnic brothers to join his religious brothers having
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16 different ethnicities such as Baloch, Sindhi or Pashtun. Similar was the case with Bengalis, as
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18 Muslim Bengalis had to side with Pakistanis by abandoning their Hindu ethnic brothers in the
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20 West-Bengal in India. As already explained, the ethnic groups exhibit the characteristics of a
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22 large family, these split-ethnic groups also exhibited the behaviour of divided family branches.
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24 The conflictual and cooperative patterns observed in their family settings were also mapped
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26 onto their ethnic relations.⁸⁶ Moreover, the cultural (indigenous) images associated with these
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28 family patterns provided them with the ready-made templates to deal with their conflict.
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37 From a psychoanalytic theoretical perspective, the inability of both nations to escape their past
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39 and to establish normal relationships can be explained through Freud’s view of the “family as
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41 the unconscious prototype of all human groups”. It is what Erikson refers to when he speaks of
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43 “those configurational analogies between family life and national mores”, which seem of
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45 utmost relevance while explaining the emotional behaviour of both nations.⁸⁷
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58 ⁸⁵ Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 61.

59 ⁸⁶ See for a similar debate: Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 59.

60 ⁸⁷ Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), 316.

Two-Nations Theory explained in Familial Terms

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4 This article analyses the particularly “familistic” language used by both parties while
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6 expressing their feelings about Partition, their mutual conflicts, and their distinct identity in
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8 relation to each other. Evidently, the language used by common people and the political leaders
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10 in both countries is deeply related to their family dynamics. The language is always directly
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12 connected to the unconscious conceptual systems and metaphors.⁸⁸ How we talk matters; one
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14 can learn a lot about how people frame situations from how they talk. It is also appropriate to
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16 mention here that both Hindi and Urdu languages have a similar speaking script.
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18 People can easily understand each other’s national language and enjoy T.V dramas and films
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20 from an “enemy” country.
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26 This section examines the two indigenous terms (or conceptual metaphors) widely used by
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28 people on both sides to memorise the history of Partition. These are “*Qaum*” and “*Batwara*”.
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30 The term *Batwara* is widely used to epitomize the incident of Pakistan-India partition; a term
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32 which is indigenously reserved for the event of assets distribution between blood
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34 brothers/cousins at the time of a family-split. Similarly, the term *Qaum* was/is commonly used
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36 to categorize Hindus and Muslims as distinct nations, which was/is originally used to represent
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38 the *Biradari/Jati*/lineage group in the Subcontinent. I argue that both these terms serve the
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40 purpose of conceptual-mapping and cognitive-modelling for both the groups, situating their
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42 identity in contrast with each other. One could also infer that the images associated with these
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44 indigenous terms guided both groups conceptualize each other in terms of opposing family
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46 branches; and to develop a certain political ideology on the pattern of their family-conflict
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48 dynamics – the dynamics that require to compete and defeat the other branch of family at any
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50 cost.
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60 ⁸⁸ Lakoff, *Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy*.
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Reconceptualizing Nation or “Qaum” as Biradari (Jati)

The two-Nations theory is generally attributed to famous Muslim ideologues such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The term two-Nations theory is a literal translation from an Urdu term “*Do-Qaumi Nazria*”, where the word *Qaum* stands for the nation.⁸⁹ Here, the term ‘*Qaum*’ needs to be re-explained as it serves more than one context. The original connotation of the term “*Qaum*” attracts our attention to postulate that both groups had conceptualized their future nations according to the indigenous meanings attached to the term *Qaum*, which are of an extended family, a *Biradari*.

For centuries, the basic usage of the word *Qaum* has been to represent *Biradari (Jati)* in the Indian Subcontinent. The terms *Qaum, Biradari and Jati* are interchangeable, which can be translated as “brotherhood” – a group of people with common descendant; a sort of large paternal family group.⁹⁰ Sadly, there is no other appropriate word in the Urdu language to translate the English word “nation” other than *Qaum*. For that reason, the term *Qaum* was mainly understood by translating it as the “nation” and the traditional context of this term (of *Biradari* or patrilineage group) has been grossly over-looked; otherwise it could provide the academics with an alternative view to interpret two-Nations theory because of its indigenous conceptualization by people in terms of their most dominant social institutions.

It is believed Sir Syed Ahmad Khan coined the term *Qaum* used in *Do-Qaumi Nazria* (two-Nations theory) to describe Muslims as a distinct nation in the strict sense of a modern nation-state. He is widely believed as a champion of two-Nations theory in the late nineteenth century by famously indicating at the numerical supremacy of Hindus in a joint future of Hindu-Muslim

⁸⁹ Here “Do” means two; “Qaumi” means national; and “Nazria” means theory. However, the word “Qaum” has double meanings. The indigenous meaning is of *Biradari or Jati* (an extension of families, lineage group; brotherhood). It is argued therefore, that *Do-Qaumi Nazria* could also be conceptualized as “two *Biradari* theory”, apart from the rigorous sense of two modern nation-states.

⁹⁰ Alavi, *Kinship in west Punjab villages*.

1 communities. He said: “it would be like a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the
2 other only one”.⁹¹ It was his response to a Congress’ president Badruddin Tayabji’s letter.
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4 Interestingly, Tayabji was also a Muslim who requested Syed Ahmad Khan to support
5 Congress’ cause. However, a discourse analysis of Syed’s speeches reveals that he
6
7 conceptualized *Qaum* according to its indigenous meanings explained above i.e. *Biradari*. He
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9 neither conceived this concept in the rigorous sense of a modern nation-state, nor did he use
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11 the word *Qaum* to claim a non-Indian Muslim identity and demanding a separate state.
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16 In fact, these modern western concepts of the nation, nationalism, state, and communalism
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18 were quite unfamiliar in the Indian Subcontinent up till the late nineteenth century – and ideally
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20 these foreign concepts were to be digested by the local people after situating them along with
21
22 their indigenous and mundane concepts. Devji and Lelyveld support this argument by saying
23
24 that Syed Ahmad Khan was against the country wide Muslim organizations and he never
25
26 mentioned Muslim solidarity across the borders, and even disapproved of Muslim Ottoman
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28 Caliphate’s claim for being commander of the faithful throughout the world.⁹² In his famous
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30 speech made in 1883, Syed categorically and metaphorically said that India is a “home” to the
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32 Muslims as it is for the Hindus:
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38 “Just as the high caste Hindus came and settled down in this land once, forgot where
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40 their earlier home was and considered India to be their own country, the Muslims also
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42 did exactly the same thing – they also left their climes hundreds of years ago and they
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44 also regard this land of India as their very own”.⁹³
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47 On 27 January 1884, while addressing to a reception in his honour, Sir Syed spoke to the people
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49 of Gurdaspur and presented the idea of a secular Hindustani nationalism while opposing the
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51 territorial nationalism in the following words:
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54 لاہور ادب ترقی مجلس ناشر، ”پنجاب نامہ سرفر کا سرسید“ کتاب کی صاحب علی اقبال سید
55 جاذب کی شہریوں کے پورگ ورداس دن 1884 جنوری 27 ہے کہ لکھا پر 132 صفحہ کے

56 ⁹¹ Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Syndics of the Cambridge Univ Press, 1972), 129-30.

57 ⁹² Devji, *Muslim Zion*, 54 and David Lelyveld, *Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*
58 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978), 21.

59 ⁹³ Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*. CERJ Series in Comparative Politics
60 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 47.
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سید کولرنے صاحب سر سید بوڈے دی تے جواب کا اسد تقبالا یہ خط یہ میں سکول ڈسٹرکٹ سے
 1 ک تابوں پرانی میں تارہ خون پرانی ”فرمایا نے انہوں کے یا۔ پیش نظر یہ کہ قومیت ہندوستانی
 2 والوں رہنے کے لکم ایک اطلاق کا قوم کہہ نہیں دیے تھے اب اور گا ہو سنا اور دیے کہا میں
 3 لوگ مذتلف کے ایران ہیں جاتے کہ ہے قوم ایک لوگ مذتلف کے افغانستان ہے۔ ہوتا پر
 4 رہنے کے ملک اور کسی سوا کے ہندوستان تم کہ یا مسلمان۔ اور ہندو اے ہیں کہ ہلاتے اپرانی
 5 ہوتے نہ ہیں دفن تم میں سرزمین اسی ہو؟ رہتے نہ ہیں دونوں تم پر سرزمین اسی کہ یا ہو؟ والے
 6 ملک اس بہی جو عیسائی اور مسلمان ہو؟ جاتے نہ ہیں جلائے پر مرگھٹ کے زمین سر اسی ای
 7 ہے۔“ قوم ہی ایک سے اے تبار اس ہیں رہتے میں
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10 ‘We must have heard and read in the history and history books, and, still we see that
 11 the word “qaum” applies on the people living in one country. Different people living in
 12 Afghanistan are said to be one “qaum”. Similarly, different type of people living in Iran
 13 are called “Irani”. O’ Hindu and Muslim! Are you people living in any else country
 14 than Hindustan? Are you not buried in the soil of this country or cremated on the
 15 cremated grounds of this country? The Mussalman or Christian who live in this country
 16 comprise one qaum (nation) in this respect.’⁹⁴
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19 He refused to accept the idea that different religious communities in India belong to different
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21 *Qaums* and referred to all the religious groups as one broader family-group; the *Qaum*.
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24 On 2nd February 1884 in Lahore, Sir Syed had a meeting with a Hindu delegation led by Lala
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26 Singh Lal, which also included secretary Hindu Sabha Lala Ram Krishan and secretary Arya-
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28 Samaj Lala Jeevan Das. Sir Syed thanked the delegation and said:
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31 رائے میری کہہ کہ یوں ہے نہ ہیں درست میں رائے میری وہ ہے کہ یا اسد تعمال ہندو لفظ جو نے آپ
 32 تہیں اپنے والا رہنے کا ہندوستان شخص ایک پر بلکہ ہے نہ ہیں نام کا مذہب کسی یہ میں
 33 میں کہہ کہ اس باوجود کو مجھ آپ کہہ ہے اف سوس نہایت مجھے پس ہے۔ سکتا کہہ نہ ہند
 34 کہہ گے ہوں جانتے یقیناً کو بات اس آپ سمجھتے۔ نہ ہیں ہندو ہوں والا رہنے کا ہندوستان
 35 کام کرمل ہاہم اسلام اہل اور ہنود اہل کہہ ہے ضروری بات یہ لائے کے رقیبت کی ہندوستان
 36 قومیں دو باشندے کے ملک ایک سے خیال کے مذہب صرف کہہ نہ ہیں اب زمانہ وہ صاحب بوکر رہیں۔
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‘The word “Hindu” which you use is not correct according to my opinion because it is
 not the name of any religion. Every person living in Hindustan can claim to be a Hindu.
 I am extremely sorry that you do not consider me as a “Hindu” despite the fact that I
 live in Hindustan. You must know that how important it is for the progress of Hindustan
 that Religiously Hindus and Muslims should work together. Sahibo! (Respected
 people)! The time is gone when people could be considered separate nations on the
 basis of religion only’.⁹⁵

Here, Syed Ahmad Khan had opposed the notion of a territorial nation-state based upon
 difference of religions. He even said that everyone who lives in the Indian territory was a

⁹⁴ Syed Iqbal Ali, *Sir Syed ka Safarnama Punjab* (Lahore: Majlis-e-Taraqa-i-Adab), 132.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 200.

1 “Hindu” regardless of his personal religious faith. He defined “Hindu” as a person living in
2 Hindustan (India).
3

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5 One could surmise that tracing of their racial roots to a wider Muslim world could partly be a
6 source of prestige for the Muslims, but the source-domain to conceptualize themselves as a
7 different nation (or *Qaum*) was deeply imbedded in its indigenous sense of a lineage group.
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9 Syed Ahmad did not present Muslims and Hindus as two distinct nations, but as two
10 communities destined to work together to build “one” Indian nation. It explains that the
11 ideology presented by him did not bear even the minute traces of separatism or nationalism
12 based upon religion. It was aimed at demanding a balance of electoral representation between
13 both communities.⁹⁶ In his 1883 speech, he stressed again:
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24 “... my Hindu brethren and Muslim co-religionists breathe the same air, drink the water
25 of the sacred Ganga and the Jamuna, eat the products of the earth which God has given
26 to this country, live and die together (....) I say with conviction that if we were to
27 disregard for a moment our conception of Godhead, then in all matters of everyday life
28 the Hindus and Muslims really belong to one nation (*Qaum*)⁹⁷ I have always said
29 that our land of India is like a newly wedded bride whose two beautiful and luminous
30 eyes are the Hindus and the Musalmans; if the two exist in mutual concord the bride
31 will remain for ever resplendent and becoming, while if they make up their mind to see
32 in different directions the bride is bound to become squinted and even partially blind.⁹⁸
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38 Here, Syed Ahmad Khan used the bride-as-nation metaphor to conceptualize the future Indian
39 nation to whom both Hindus and Muslims were equally important and responsible for
40 maintaining her beauty and charm. Furthermore, in the following speech, he explained how
41 both communities had produced a mixed culture and language after living together for
42 centuries, which was no less than blood relations. Again, the language used by him is densely
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56 ⁹⁶ Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox*, 48.

57 ⁹⁷ Shan Muhammad, ed., *Writings and Speeches of Syed Ahmad Khan* (Bombay, Nachiketa Publications, 1972),
58 160.

59 ⁹⁸ Vishwanath Prasad Varma, *Modern Indian Political Thought, 7th ed.* (Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1980),
60 430 cited in Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox*, 48-49
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familistic. He pointed out that even the Urdu language associated only with Muslims was born in India.

A year later in 1884, he declared that: “Do not forget that Hindus and Muslim are words of religious significance otherwise Hindus, Musalmans and Christians who live in this country form one nation (qaum) regardless of their faith.”⁹⁹ He also said that Hindus and Muslim mingled their blood and gave rise to a new culture made of both: “the blood of both have changed, the colour of both have become similar (....) we mixed with each other so much that we produced a new language – Urdu, which was neither our language, nor theirs”.¹⁰⁰

It can be ascertained that the two-Nations ideology put forward by one of the top political/nationalist ideologues such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had conceptualized the future position of Muslim community in terms of a separate family branch within a wider Indian family-domain: A Muslim *Biradari* to live side by side with a Hindu *Biradari* in the grand Hindustani *Biradari*. Even to date, the term “*Qaum*” is used to identify peoples’ *Biradari* in Pakistan. In official records, for example, a Pakistani national is registered as Mr. X [Religion: Islam/Christianity/Hindu or Sikh; *Qaum*: Rajput/Jat or Arayeen (one’s lineage or *Biradari*)]. The term *Qaum* is also replaceable with peoples’ *Jati* in India.¹⁰¹

Significance of the term “Batwara”

An overwhelming number of people across much of the Indian Subcontinent remember the event of partition as *Vibhajan* or *Batwara* rather than freedom (*Azadi*).¹⁰² They do not assume the tragic incident of partition just as the creation of two nation-states, but the meanings and

⁹⁹ Muhammad, *Writings and Speeches of Syed Ahmad Khan*, 266.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁰¹ The Indian term *Jati* has its equivalent in Urdu language as *Biradari* and *Zat*. The terms *Zat* and *Biradari* are more common in Pakistani setting. Usually, in Hindi language, the sound of Urdu words with Zzzz are replaced by Jjjj; so, the terms *Zat* and *Jat* or *Jati* are just a matter of pronunciation. By saying *Jati*, I do not mean caste-system or Varna (literally, ‘colour’) in Hinduism; the four sweeping social/traditional categories i.e. *Brahmin*, *Ksatryia*, *Vaisya*, and *Sudra*. The institution of *Biradari* or *Jati* is second only to the extended family, as a pervasive social dimensions of identity; a group of families with a common descendant.

¹⁰² Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2000), 30.

1 feelings they attach to this tragedy can be imagined by a single word i.e. ‘*Batwara*’. *Batwara*
2 is an indigenous term used across the borders to describe the event of “parting ways” between
3
4 blood brothers or cousins after the distribution of their ancestral property – that usually creates
5
6 bad blood among kin relations and engage them in a sort of an intimate rivalry full of emotions,
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8 resentment, repentance and competition of prestige.¹⁰³ Surprisingly, people still use the
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10 metaphor of *Batwara* (consciously or unconsciously) to conceptualize India-Pakistan partition
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12 as if it were a divide between fraternal family members. The term *Vibhajan* also carries the
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14 similar meanings i.e. fragmentation or segmentation of a kinship or lineage group.
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20 Arguably, an academic investigation remains incomplete if it translates local terms in other
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22 languages without considering their contextual sense – as the meanings and the fantasies people
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24 attach to different words in different cultures can be crucial while examining them in the
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26 political discourse. On that account, the literal translation of the term “*Batwara*” as “partition
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28 of British India” into two nation-states cannot give outsiders the exact intensity and the familial
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30 character this term carries. The indigenous images of harmonious family, painful split, asset
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32 distribution and emotional rivalry, attached to the term *Batwara* can open new vistas for
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34 understanding India-Pakistan relations in terms of a “parting of ways” between two family
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36 branches. The use of this term explains how emotionally people on both sides are concerned
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38 about Partition and their post-Partition relations. The metaphorical understanding of Partition
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40 as *Batwara* still produces familistic images into peoples’ minds and informs their future
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42 political trajectory against each other.
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50 **The Implications of Conceptualizing Nation as Family**

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53 In inter-national relations, nation-as-family metaphor is always conceptualized while dealing
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55 with other nations. For its emotional impact and inferential effects, the source domain of family
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60 ¹⁰³ Kadir, *Perceiving the enemy differently*.
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1 is almost certainly the most powerful for modelling the nation.¹⁰⁴ The nation-as-family
2 metaphor acts as a cognitive bridge connecting individual's family-level intimate experiences
3 of membership and authority to abstract national-level politics.¹⁰⁵ This metaphor is utilized
4 around the world in different languages; commonly used by politicians and plays an important
5 role during political cognition.¹⁰⁶ Hence, the citizenship is commonly construed in terms of
6 family membership e.g. a member of Pakistani, Indian or American family.¹⁰⁷ The citizens are
7 also referred to as family children e.g. the term *Qaum ke sapoot* is used in Pakistan which
8 means "sons of the nation". Also, the state-land is conceptualized as a home: the German
9 "*Vaterland*" (literally: father land), Russian "*Mat Rossiya*" (literally: mother Russia), and
10 Indian "*Bharat Mata*" (literally mother India) are a few of many examples.

11 On the same pattern, political leaders across the world are viewed to be the head of the national
12 family. The very concept of the "founding fathers" is also derived from the institution of family.
13 So, the leaders are bestowed upon the indigenous labels reserved for senior family members,
14 such as elder brother/sister or father/mother. German chancellor Angela Merkel is called "*Mutti*
15 *Merkel*" (literally: mom Merkel). Recently, Donald Trump has been dubbed as "*Big daddy*
16 *Trump*".¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Mr. Gandhi was literally called *Bapu* (the father), while Jawaharlal
17 Nehru was named as *Chacha* Nehru.¹⁰⁹ Nehru was given the kin-label of "*Chacha*" for being
18 younger to Gandhi, which literally means "Father's younger brother". It explains how deeply
19 the familial terms are rooted in the Subcontinental politics.

20 The metaphor of family is recalled to memory especially when a national level group undergoes
21 a fissure, as it was in the case of Hindu-Muslim conflict – an argument supported by the usage

22 ¹⁰⁴ Hogan, *Understanding the Nationalism*, 154.

23 ¹⁰⁵ Lakoff, *Moral politics*.

24 ¹⁰⁶ Andreas Musolff, "Metaphor scenarios in public discourse." *Metaphor and symbol* 21, no. 1 (2006): 23-38.

25 ¹⁰⁷ See Lieven, *A Hard Country* for a detailed discussion. The author argues how Pakistani people conceptualize
26 their nation-state in terms of a large *Biradari* (lineage group) and situate it within other nation-states by
27 perceiving them as the other *Biradaris* in the world..

28 ¹⁰⁸ Retrieved at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/esther-rapeport/trump-as-uncastrated-primal-father>

29 ¹⁰⁹ Sailaja Krishnamurti, "Uncles of the Nation: Avuncular Masculinity in Partition-era Politics." *South Asian*
30 *History and Culture* 5, no. 4 (2014): 1-17.

1 of densely familistic language by mainstream leaders. The majority party led by Gandhi made
2 use of familial terms such as “brothers” and “united-family” to keep the integrity of Indian
3 union intact and to avoid partition. India has always been analogized as a mother land (*Bharat*
4 *Mata*) and referred to as “she”. A famous Indian writer, poet and journalist Bankim Chandra
5 Chattopadhyay personified India as mother Goddess and this metaphor inspired millions in the
6 Asian Subcontinent during the colonial period. He writes:
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14 “The mother that used to be, that is now, and that will be. Worship mother India, for
15 we are all, offspring of one mother... brothers all”.¹¹⁰
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19 I argue that although the metaphors such as mother-India and brothers-from-same-mother (for
20 Muslims) used by the Congress leaders can be justified as their sincere efforts to dilute the
21 Muslim separatist tendency, this metaphorical conception of mother-child relations impacted
22 upon the development of a deeply wounded psyche of neglected children among the Muslims.
23 The Muslim population, by using the same familial lens, had developed a feel that the Hindus
24 had self-proclaimed the status of the eldest children of mother India just because of their
25 numerical majority. This provides us with an alternative view of understanding of how the
26 Muslims adopted an entirely different political path and developed so intense a competitive
27 urge against their Hindu siblings (metaphorically speaking). One could also construe that such
28 minority groups tend to leave the home-state and may start a sibling rivalry after acquiring a
29 new home-state.
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47 Sadly, conceptualizing populations or nations in terms of intimate familial relations can also
48 bring incalculable violence when such groups part ways. This partly explains the acts of
49 brutality committed by Hindu-Muslim communities at the time of Partition, because both were
50 conceptualizing their own future nation in terms of “mother”. Such a conceptualization brought
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59 ¹¹⁰ Abhijit Chowdhury, “Internalising the Concept of National Movement in India: Some Problems of
60 Cognition” (with a reference to Tagore-Gandhi Debate), cited in Hogan, *Understanding the nationalism*, 159.
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terrible misfortunes in a region where mothers are worshipped as goddesses, and violence can be legitimized and even glorified in the name of defending one's mother.¹¹¹ In fact, the separation of north western parts into another state of Pakistan was regarded by many Indians as amputation of their mother's limbs. Mr. Gandhi's oft-used metaphor for Partition "slicing of a baby into two halves" is also contextual as Gandhi considered both communities as his children. However, the Muslims had begun to feel that Gandhi had softer corner for his real sons (the Hindus) and started conceptualizing him as a stepfather.¹¹²

Two-Nations Ideology after Partition: Nations-as-Cousins Conceptualization

Viewing through the familial prism created in this article, the pre-partition Hindu-Muslim conflict can be viewed as a wrestling between both communities to win over the Indian family-headship and resources after the British departure. However, as per local family dynamics, peoples' inability to live peacefully as one unit leads to a separation between family branches. After they split, these branches usually develop grievances against each other for being wronged in terms of distribution of assets. Similarly, many Pakistanis conceptualize themselves in terms of Jinnah's sons, who was wronged by Gandhi and Nehru. On the same conceptualizing pattern, the majority of Indians regard Gandhi and Nehru as father-figures and believe that Jinnah is the villain responsible for the partition of Indian family. Such a metaphorical conceptualization makes both nations fictive cousins and engage them in a revenge-seeking competition to right the wrong done to their respective fathers. On that account, the Kashmir Conflict has acquired the status of an ancestral property dispute between both nations – never to be given up by either party as per indigenous norms associated with the inheritance disputes.

¹¹¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *The Home and the World*, transl. Surendranath Tagore (NY: Penguin reprint ed., 1985), cited by Hogan, *Understanding nationalism*, 160.

¹¹² Sultan Muhammad Shah, *The memoirs of Aga Khan: World enough and time* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1954), 231.

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When there is a family split, the integrity or oneness of family shatters and parting family members strive hard to get their own identity; an identity that must be different from the previous one. Similarly, the separatist groups always try to establish their own “distinct” identity, an identity that could not associate them with the groups they sought partition from. Therefore, such groups always focus on the minute differences that could prove them entirely different from the other groups.¹¹³ On that account, certain Muslim groups behaved in the same manner when they felt that they were being made to leave the united Indian family. By all accounts, both communities were quite similar to each other – therefore, the “religion” factor came to surface with much intensity between both the groups as it was among a very few dissimilar elements between them. For both the infant nations, it was only by embracing the totality of religion that they could escape the burden of their shared past. Therefore, they tried to adopt every possible identity after Partition that could prove them different from each other.

The conceptual framework of family-rivalry allows us to analyse the behaviour of both states in terms of a prestige-competition between two individuals or persons. It would not be out of context to mention here that “Nation as a person” is also a very popular metaphor in international relations.¹¹⁴ Thereupon, India conceptualizes itself as a “big” brother in the region – a stance strengthened by his massive numerical, economic, and military strength. However, such an Indian claim is persistently challenged by Pakistan as he also conceptualizes himself in familial terms – a younger brother who was robbed of his wishful right in the united Indian family. The rejection of such an Indian claim also owes to Pakistani resentment over Indian inability to fulfil the indigenous responsibilities associated with the character of a big brother; such as an extension of care, sacrifice, and nurturance to younger ones. On the other hand,

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¹¹³ Anton Blok, "The narcissism of minor differences." *European Journal of Social Theory* 1, no. 1 (1998): 33-56.

¹¹⁴ Lakoff, *Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy*.

1 India perceives Pakistan as a disobedient younger sibling who brought bad name to the family
2 by disintegrating its unity.
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5 By means of similar theoretical considerations found in this article, the Punjab province in
6 Pakistan can also be examined in terms of a self-proclaimed big brother representing Pakistani
7 family – a status earned due to its numeric superiority and the overwhelming presence in
8 Pakistani parliament and military. Now, as per indigenous responsibilities associated with the
9 role of an eldest son, Punjab-Pakistan believes it as his duty to settle scores with India on the
10 behalf of entire Pakistani family.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, it is akin to the leading role once claimed by
11 Hindu majority in the British India.
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22 **Conclusion**

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27 This article does not claim that a psycho-cultural paradigm is the only method capable of
28 analysing two-Nations theory in its entirety. However, given the specific socio-psychological
29 and cultural milieu of the Asian Subcontinent, this approach presents an alternative and original
30 account of how to examine the emotional components of this political ideology causing an
31 unending rivalry between both nations. Such a paradigm shift not only contributes to the
32 historiography of the Indian Subcontinent, but it can also break new theoretical grounds for
33 further investigation in the fields of conflict studies and emotions in International Relations –
34 by inquiring into *how* the political and conflict ideologies can be influenced by the most basic
35 and emotional institutions in a specific society. The dominant family models may produce
36 certain moral systems, which can directly inform individual actors' worldview; effecting their
37 political choices.
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52 The criss-crossing of kinship groups in the Indian Subcontinent bind Hindus and Muslims in a
53 large network of extended families. One can easily find Muslims who trace their lineages with
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58 ¹¹⁵ This argument is endorsed by Lieven, *Pakistan; a hard country*, from a different perspective. He argues that
59 Punjabis consider themselves superior to other groups in Pakistan, thus self-assumed the status of the guardian
60 of the state. They think of themselves in terms of a competitor to Indian state itself.
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1 Lord Rama, and there are many common castes within both communities. Moreover, people in
2 the Indian Subcontinent tend to establish family relations with their neighbours by using kin
3 labels. They even use the metaphor of *Sanjhi Kndh* (common wall) to express their intimate
4 bonds with their neighbours. Even the leaders representing the hard-line Hindu organizations
5 such as Hindu Mahasabha used the metaphor of “common wall” to recall the history of unity
6 between both communities.¹¹⁶ The intimate bonds developed through the nearness of daily life
7 also tied different religious communities of British India into a fictive kinship structure before
8 they underwent partition in 1947.
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10 One can easily find overlap between Hindu-Muslim relations to that of family relations in the
11 Subcontinent. It is not to assert that both groups always lived peacefully without having any
12 religious clashes. In fact, even after centuries of the assimilation of Muslims into Indian
13 territory and conversion of local Hindus to Islam, the factors of “original inhabitants” and
14 “prior occupation of territory” kept on playing their roles in constructing their mutual relations.
15 But it is also true that the phenomenon of prior occupation, itself, stems from the ranks of
16 families,¹¹⁷ So, their inter-communal relations were always a mere reflection of the hostility
17 expressed in the interfamilial relations in the Indian Subcontinent.
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19 This article has reconceptualized the two-Nations theory – a theory that has conventionally
20 explained the Hindu-Muslim split and their ongoing conflicts by considering them as two
21 distinct nations purely on their ethno-religious and civilizational divergence. This article has
22 focused on the socio-cognitive components of this political cum conflict ideology for impacting
23 the construction, articulation, transmission, and mobilizational process of this ideology.
24 Therefore, using the theoretical mechanism of conceptual-mapping that explains how people
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¹¹⁶ Madan Mohan Malaviya’s speech at Uttar Pradesh’s Hindu Sabha Conference, 18 April 1936, Cited in Misra, A Narrative of Communal Politics, 294.

¹¹⁷ Weiner Myron, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

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make sense of difficult political situations in terms of easier and mundane ideas, this article finds that the indigenous institution of joint-family influences peoples' political choices in conflict situations. The perceptions, concepts, and beliefs learned inside this most emotionally powerful institution are mapped onto the way the local people conceptualize their self, group, national and international identities. Hence, the political ideology developed during Hindu-Muslim conflict, engaged disputants in an unending rivalry full of emotions. The findings of this article help us to understand the emotionally-charged atmosphere between both nations from a fresh perspective; other than the typical explanations holding tragic mass murders at the time of Partition as the only reason behind their continued conflict. These findings can also explain that the ruthless violence involved in the Partition incidents, itself, was an outcome of conceptualizing the future nations by people in terms of familial metaphors.

This article also concludes that the majoritarian status was not the *only* reason behind Hindu community's desire to control the future setup of united India, but such claims over the ownership of India were based on being there first; for being more indigenous than their Muslim counterparts – as explained by Erikson, such conceptual mapping is derived from the rivalry between older and younger siblings.¹¹⁸ Therefore, near the British departure, the Hindus, the original inhabitants or prior occupants; the older siblings – claimed their natural right of power (family-headship) for being *Dharti Ma ke sapoot* (sons of the soil). The Muslims were referred to as *Lutery* (the invaders) by ignoring the fact that mostly Muslims were also the original inhabitants of the soil. Thus, the Muslims' demands for an equal status at par with their senior Hindu siblings were met with refusal for being the immigrants and the younger siblings. Whenever prior ownership is contested by a claim to equality, the contradiction is not easily reconciled either in systems of child rearing or in political systems.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the

¹¹⁸ Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 412.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

1 emotional characteristics associated with the local family conflicts also surfaced and reflected
2 in the political discourse.
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5 Now, Pakistan presumes himself as a wronged brother/cousin of India; a victim nation. As per
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7 Pakistani conceptualization, India is the villain state who wronged Pakistan at the time of
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9 partition and occupied Kashmir by trickery. The triangle of Nehru, Mountbatten, and his wife
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11 Edwina is often quoted to sensationalize the story.¹²⁰ Accordingly therefore, Pakistan must act
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13 heroically to take its ancestral land back from India. It will settle scores with India and bring
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15 psychological and moral victory to Pakistanis. However, from an Indian perspective, India
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17 should be respected as a big brother by all the South Asian states including Pakistan. Indians
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19 conceptualize Pakistan as a mischievous child in the Subcontinental family who first caused
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21 breach in family unity and who is now disturbing the regional peace and should be punished
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23 accordingly.
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60 ¹²⁰ See Akbar, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*.
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