IDEOLOGICAL COLLOCATION IN META-WAHHABI DISCOURSE POST-9/11:

A Symbiosis of Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has been submitted for the PhD degree from the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University, UK. I also declare that it has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to answer the following overarching question: How has Wahhabi Islam been ideologically recontextualized across post-9/11 opposing discourses via collocation?

Drawing on a methodological synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA (Baker *et al.* 2008; Salama 2011[1]), I propose a linguistic model for explicating the ideological nature of collocation between two clashing books: Stephen Schwartz's (2002) *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* and Natana DeLong-Bas's (2004) *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. The two books, produced post-9/11, take diametrically opposing stances towards the same socio-religious practice of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism.

First, using WorSmith5, keywords were used to identify the different semantic foci in the two texts, along with their relevant 'macropropositions' (Van Dijk 1980, 1995, 2009b). A small number of keywords were selected for further analysis, and their functions in contributing towards ideologies were investigated by examining their collocates, relying on the concepts of textual synonymy, oppositional paradigms and argumentative fallacies.

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[1] This is a PhD-based paper that I published in 2011 at the Journal of *Discourse & Society* under the title 'Ideological collocation and the recontextualization of Wahhabi-Saudi Islam post-9/11: a synergy of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis'.

Second, the meta-Wahhabi discourses underlying the two texts are analysed by focusing on the discourse processes of *producing*, *interpreting* and *explaining* the patterns of collocations in the texts. Contextual information, such as relevant biographical information relating to the text producers, was taken into account. Additionally, a socio-cognitive approach was used to consider ideological coherence and socio-religious schemas which motivated the ideological use of collocations in both texts. Finally, from a social-semiotic perspective, interdiscursive meanings and the symbolic power invested with the collocating words as religious or political signs are queried.

The findings offered in the present thesis cover methodological and theoretical aspects. First, on a theoretical level, there are findings that relate to how collocation as a micro textual resource can closely interface with other macro discourse and language processes, e.g. ideology, (social) cognition, semiotics and interdiscursivity. Second, on a methodological level, this study has contributed to the presently well-established 'methodological synergy' of corpus linguistics and CDA in a *symbiotic* fashion. This can be recognized in two respects: 1) compared to pure CDA research, the methodological procedure followed in this study (which goes from the quantitative to the qualitative methods) renders the identification of the linguistic phenomenon – collocation – studied in this research far less subjectively identified; 2) the possibility of contextualizing the keywords extracted from one text by conducting a macropropositional analysis (i.e. identifying the topics and themes) in this text.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is about the ways that two book writers use collocations to construct opposing representations of the religious topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism (a form of Islam associated with the 9/11 terrorists[2]). This chapter provides an introduction to my topic of research, Wahhabi Islam, as well as giving an overview of the thesis. It opens with a brief discussion of key concepts that run through the thesis. These concepts will be further elaborated and developed throughout the rest of the thesis. Section 1.3 is a description of the research problem in its politico-religious and linguistic contexts. Section 1.4 sets out the practical and theoretical rationale for this study, with a special focus on the discursive potential for the ideological use of collocation across clashing texts. In section 1.5, the approach taken up in research is explained both theoretically and methodologically; attention is steered towards the corpus method and the theoretical apparatus of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as well as the micro and macro procedures of analysis. In section 1.5, the key concepts that will be theoretically employed in research are introduced in a functional order, i.e. in terms of how they relate to one another. Section 1.6 outlines the research questions that this thesis addresses. Finally, section 1.7 is a brief account of the overall structure of the thesis.

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[2] The September 11 attacks (also referred to as 9/11) were a series of attacks by the militant group al-Qaeda against the United States on 11 September 2001. Nineteen al-Qaeda members hijacked four passenger jet airliners; two of these airliners ploughed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the third airliner into the Pentagon in Virginia, and the fourth into a field near Shanksville in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3000 victims died, along with the hijackers. The co-ordinator of the attack, Osama Bin Laden is still at large. The attacks were a key factor in the US and UK declaring war on Afghanistan in 2001, and arguably Iraq in 2003.

1.2 Key concepts

In the coming subsections I shall present the key concepts in the thesis. Much has been written about these terms, so I focus here on definitions which have proven useful in my own research, rather than giving a full account of the multiple ways that they have been theorized.

1.2.1 Discourse(s), discursive practice and text

Inspired by the poststructuralist Foucauldian position on discourse, Kress offers a definition of both 'discourses' and 'a discourse'. 'Discourses', Kress (1989: 7) writes, 'are systematically-organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution'; Kress (*ibid.*) continues to argue, '[a] discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about'. Further, Blommaert (2005: 2) treats 'discourse' as 'a general mode of semiosis, i.e. meaningful symbolic behaviour'. However, in the present study, the term is used to refer to 'language as a form of social practice' (Fairclough 2001: 16). One important feature of discourse is the potential for generating 'many specific representations' (Fairclough 2003: 124).

Recently, van Leeuwen (2008) has significantly emphasized the Foucauldian (1972) definition of 'discourses' as 'semantic constructions of specific aspects of reality that serve the interests of particular historical and/or social contexts' (Van Leeuwen 2008: vii). Also, relevant here is the concept of 'discursive practice' which involves 'processes of text production, distribution, and consumption' (Fairclough 1992: 78). Further, 'discourse' needs to be differentiated from the term 'text', which was famously defined by Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 1ff) as a 'communicative event' that must meet seven standards of textuality: 'cohesion', 'coherence', 'acceptability', 'intentionality', 'informativity', 'situationality', and 'intertexuality'. However, recent studies have usefully defined 'text' in relation to 'discourse':

1) 'Text is a product of discourse. It is normally used to describe a linguistic record ('a text') of a communicative event. This may be an electronic recording or a written text, which may or may not incorporate visual materials or, in the case of an electronic text, music' (Bloor and Bloor 2007: 7); 2) 'A text is part of the process of discourse and it is pointless to study it in isolation' (Talbot 2007: 10). The term *discourse* is a key concept within the form of analysis that this thesis used, viz. *critical discourse analysis*.

1.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) introduce critical discourse analysis (CDA) as follows:

> Like other approaches to discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis [...] analyses real and often extended instances of social interaction which take a linguistic form, or a partially linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed'.

> (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258)

According to Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 44), there are two underpinning assumptions in the practice of CDA: first, 'analysis should be based on a close engagement with the language of texts'; second, 'language is a context-bound and social phenomenon and can be properly understood only by paying due attention to the social and cultural contexts in which it occurs'. One aspect of critical discourse analysis is to take into account *interdiscursivity*.

1.2.3 Interdiscursivity

A term used by Foucault (1972) and then adopted in CDA by Fairclough (1992, 1995). 'Interdiscursivity', Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 90) argue, 'signifies that discourses are linked to each other in various ways. If we conceive of "discourse" as primarily topic-related (as "discourse on x"), we will observe that a discourse on climate change frequently refers to

topics or subtopics of other discourses, such as finances or health'. However, as Fairclough (1992: 124) argues, interdiscursivity 'applies at various levels: the societal order of discourse, the institutional order of discourse, the discourse type, and even the elements which constitute discourse types'. This may lead us to consider the Foucauldian concept of 'order of discourse': 'the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society, and relationships between them' (Fairclough 1992: 43). Actually, one needs to take insights from both arguments about the principle of 'interdiscursivity'. One more important concept in this context of research is *ideology* or *ideologies*.

1.2.4 Ideology/Ideologies

Reflecting on the vast literature on 'ideology' in the social sciences and the humanities, Threadgold (1986: 16) differentiates between two different ways in which the term is used. The first takes a neutral stance on the negative connotations of ideology: '"ideology" is seen as ubiquitous and the term becomes a description of "systems of ideas or belief" or "symbolic practices"'. The second use of ideology, Threadgold continues to argue, 'preserves the negative connotation and expresses a critique of ideology which sees it as essential to the process of maintaining and supporting domination and asymmetrical power relations' (Threadgold 1986: 16f). Since van Dijk's (1998) definition of 'ideology' serves as an interface between social structure and social cognition in CDA, I prefer to follow his definition: 'ideologies may be very succinctly defined as the *basis of the social representations shared by members of a group*' (Van Dijk 1998: 8; italics in original). In keeping with this focus on members of a group, it is always useful to consider how semantics shifts across different social groups are realized via the concept of *recontexualization.*

1.2.5 Recontexualization

Although Bernstein (1990) coined the concept of 'recontexualization' in a pedagogic context, it has been broadened beyond this context in discourse studies. Bernstein argued that semantic shifts occur 'according to recontextualizing principles which selectively appropriate, relocate, refocus and relate to other discourses to continue its own order and orderings' (Bernstein 1990: 184).

1.2.6 Corpus linguistics

The following two sub-sections focus on a second methodological approach that was utilized in this thesis. McEnery and Wilson (2001: 1) define corpus linguistics as 'the study of language based on examples of 'real life' language use'. Baker (2006) adds that, 'unlike purely qualitative approaches to research', 'corpus linguistics utilizes bodies of electronically encoded text, implementing a more quantitative methodology, for example by using frequency information about occurrences of particular linguistic phenomena' (Baker 2006: 1f). Such information is derived from computer software that can quickly and accurately count, sort and compare very large amounts of data. This can help to reduce the effect of researcher bias, particularly when engaging in critical discourse analysis. However, the interpretation and explanation of quantitative findings from corpus analysis need to be carried out by humans. I have used a corpus method as a way of identifying *collocations* in the data.

1.2.7 Collocation(s)

'Collocation' has been classically seen as a type of lexical cohesion that is achieved through 'the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur' (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 284). However, due to new approaches (such as corpus linguistics) towards text analysis, collocation has been viewed in terms of the idea of extended collocational patterns. A

collocational pattern is 'a strong probabilistic syntagmatic relation between a word and a small set of words, which themselves share a semantic feature' (Stubbs 2001: 64). Further, based on corpus-linguistics studies, two essential aspects of collocation have been emphasized: first, collocational patterns are 'the norm against which individual texts are interpreted'; second, collocations 'often carry cultural connotations: they are a significant component of cultural competence' (Stubbs 2001: 100). However, I prefer to use Bartsch's (2004) working definition of 'collocations', since it draws on both quantitative and qualitative criteria in defining the term: 'Collocations are lexically and/or pragmatically constrained recurrent co-occurrences of at least two lexical items which are in a direct syntactic relation with each other' (Bartsch 2004: 76). In this thesis, two additional terms, which expand on the concept of collocation, are *semantic preference* and *discourse prosody*.

1.2.8 Semantic preference and discourse prosody

These two concepts are closely related, perhaps even inseparable, in the study of collocation. The first to use these terms is Sinclair (1991: 111f); he classified them among the types of 'co-occurrence relations in extended lexico-semantic units': 'semantic preference' is 'the relation, not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words' (for example, the phrase *glass of* collocates with words for cold drinks); 'discourse prosody' is 'a feature which extends over more than one unit in a linear string' (for example, the word *cause* tends to collocate with descriptions of negative events). Significantly, discourse prosodies collectively 'express' the text producer's attitude (say, sympathetic or unsympathetic).

Now, having laid out the key concepts in the present study, let us move on to the research problem in its politico-religious and linguistic contexts.

1.3 Research problem

The research problem this thesis tackles can be captured in the following two statements. First, compared to political research topics, religious topics in general (and Wahhabi Islam in particular) have been notably under-researched in critical discourse analysis (CDA). It should be noted here that the religious topic of Wahhabi Islam has increasingly become controversial worldwide since 9/11; this point will shortly be discussed. Second, in discourse studies there has been scant attention to the interface between lexical collocation and its ideological representations across opposing discursive practices. The research data can be said to be a clear example of such opposing discursive practices. It comprises two clashing texts on Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam in the genre of books. First is *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (2002) by Stephen Schwartz, an American journalist and author, who is critical of Wahhabism and its proponents. The book blames 'Islamic terrorism' on the religious establishment fostered by the Saudi government and also criticizes the Bush administration officials for their associations with Saudi Arabia. Second is *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004) by Natana Delong-Bas, a Georgetown graduate who currently teaches at Brandeis University and Boston College, whom Schwartz labels as 'a Wahhabi apologist' (see further details in Chapter 4).

In what follows I find it necessary to explain the contexts corresponding to the foregoing research problems: the politico-religious context and the linguistic context. However, it should be made clear that the critical literature review offered in Chapter 2 is an important elaboration on the following two contexts of the problem.

1.3.1 Politico-religious context of the problem

As mentioned earlier, compared with political research topics, religious topics have been neglected in CDA. Here, I hope to show how the religious topic of Wahhabi Islam has had a

political impact on American-Saudi relations after 9/11. This is the reason why I focus here on the politico-religious context of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism; that is, I focus on how the religious (Wahhabi Islam) has reshaped the political (American-Saudi relations) since 9/11.

Since such a politico-religious context may be unfamiliar to the reader, be they non-Muslims or otherwise, there needs to be an elaborate section on it in the introductory chapter. The purpose of this section is threefold: first, familiarizing the reader with the epistemological religious frame of 'Wahhabi Islam' and differentiating it from what may be known in the West as 'Wahhabism'; second, explaining the rationale for selecting Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam as the object of research in the present study; third, making explicit my position as an analyst of the textual data in the present context of research. However, also, there is a general analytic purpose behind this section: paving the way for a future linguistic discourse-oriented investigation of texts that tackle Islam-related topics in the US post-9/11.

1.3.1.1 Wahhabi Islam vs. Saudi Wahhabism

At the outset, I would prefer to make a crucial distinction between 'Wahhabi Islam' and 'Wahhabism'. The two concepts are normally confused in western academic circles, either by using both concepts interchangeably or by reducing down 'Wahhabi Islam' to 'Saudi Wahhabism'.[3] 'Wahhabi Islam' encodes the Islamic teachings of the eighteenth-century Muslim scholar Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791 AD) who was born in Najd, what is today known as Saudi Arabia. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is argued to be the agent behind the reformist call for Sunni Islam[4], as embodied in the Quran and in the life of Muhammad,

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[3] One instance is David Commins's (2006) *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.*

[4] Sunni Islam claims to be the continuation of Islam as it was defined through the revelations given to Muhammad (the receiver and transmitter of what Muslims believe is God's message to humankind, as recorded in the Quran, the first principal religious textual source for Muslims) and his life. Theologically speaking, Sunni

the Prophet of Muslims. In other words, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to purify Islamic religion of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Almost the same view is taken up by Louis Corancez (trans. 1995: 13), who regards Wahhabi Islam 'less as a new creed'; rather it is a 'return to Islam in its original simplicity'. He (*ibid.*) argues that it is the tradition of a 'reformed religion', and that 'ethics are its all-important article'.

On the other hand, 'Wahhabism' is a term that was (ideologically perhaps) coined after the name of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. Blanchard (2007a: 15) cautiously uses the term 'Wahhabism' in reference to '[t]he Sunni puritanical movement', which 'has become well known in recent years and is arguably the most pervasive revivalist movement in the Islamic world'. 'In the West', Blanchard (2007b: 22) argues, 'the term has been used mostly to denote the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and which has spread recently to various parts of the world'. Further, Blanchard (2007b: *ibid.*) continues his argument with two important observations: 1) 'In most Muslim nations' believers adhering to Wahhabism prefer to call themselves '"Unitarians" (*muwahiddun*) or "Salafiyyun" (sing. Salafi, noun Salafiyya[5])'; and 2) 'Some Muslims believe the Western usage of the term "Wahhabism" unfairly carries negative and derogatory connotations' (Blanchard 2007b: 22).

Here it should be noted, as Allen (2006) points out, that proponents of 'Wahhabism' defend the movement on the grounds that it is 'Islam in its purest, original form', and declare it to be 'without links to either the Taliban or Al-Qaeda'[6]. A great many serious academics,

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Islam represents only one orientation towards Islam. Hence the following caveat: one should not think of Sunni Islam as mainstream Islam. Sunni Islam derives its label from its being identified with the Sunna (each and every act and saying of Muhammad, recorded as the *Hadith*, and the second principal religious text for Muslims).

[5] According to Blanchard (2007b), 'the term ['Salafiyya'] derives from the word *salaf* meaning to "follow" or "precede," a reference to the followers and companions of the Prophet' (Blanchard 2007b: 22).

[6] Al-Qaeda is the prime suspect of the 9/11 attacks against the US.

Allen continues to argue, take Wahhabism for being 'a puritanical reformist teaching within Islam', with 'political clout in Saudi Arabia', yet with little relevance to 'modern-day events', especially when it comes to the 'driving ideologies of men like the Yemeni Osama Bin Laden, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri, the Afghan Mullah Omar and the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and others who use terror in the name of Islam as a political weapon' (Allen 2006: 20f).

This should lead us into the politico-religious context of 'Wahhabism' as it is realized in Saudi Arabia today. Blanchard (2007a) provides a comprehensive account of this context:

> In the eighteenth century, Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the modern-day Saudi dynasty, formed an alliance with Abd al-Wahhab and unified the disparate tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. From that point forward, there has been a close relationship between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religious establishment. The most conservative interpretations of Wahhabi Islam view Shiites and other non-Wahhabi Muslims as dissident heretics. Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia's ruling royal family began more actively promoting Wahhabi religious doctrine abroad and has since financed the construction of Wahhabi-oriented mosques, religious schools, and Islamic centers in dozens of doctrines. (Blanchard 2007a: 15f)

Based on Blanchard's argument above, I shall use the term 'Saudi Wahhabism' throughout the thesis, whenever the politico-religious context is relevant; and the term 'Wahhabi Islam' will be used only when the religious context of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings is in focus.

Wahhabi Islam is doctrinally opposed to Sufi[7] Islam on purely religious grounds. Indeed, each of the two is a version of Islam, with a distinct socio-religious status in the

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[7] According to Baldick (1989: 15), 'the very word *sufi* has usually been seen as reflecting a Christian influence, being derived from the Arabic word for wool (*suf*), which was the characteristic clothing material of eastern

Muslim world, and thus with a distinct discursive practice. This aspect will be tackled at the macro-level analysis of the research data in due course (see Chapter 8). At this point, it should be noted, however, that the analytic focus in this research context will be strictly placed on the antagonism holding between Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism on the one hand and Sufism on the other for two considerations. First, the conflict between Saudi Sunni Wahhabism and (say, Iranian) Shi'ism[8] is too politically (and, thus, discursively as well as institutionally) pronounced to provide those subtle textual cues for underlying clashing ideologies.[9] 'Ideology', Fairclough (2001: 71) argues, 'is most effective when its workings are least visible'. One authorial realization of such explicit antagonism is the Shi'i writer Vali Nasr, whose book *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future* (2006) is a testimony to it: 'The Shia-Sunni conflict is at once a struggle for the soul of Islam [...] so seemingly archaic at times' (Nasr 2006: 20). So is the case with Yitzhak Nakash's *Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern World* (2006): 'The Al-Sa'ud's adoption of Wahhabi-Hanbali Islam as the religious ideology of Saudi Arabia has had a direct bearing on the inferior status of Shi'is in the state' (Nakash 2006: 44). Second, one of the two text producers in present study – Stephen Schwartz – is a practicing Sufi Muslim, with a counter-Sunni orientation against Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam.

Christian monks, and was taken over by the early mystics of Islam'. 'Other styles of dress', Baldick continues, 'adopted by the Sufis are also anticipated in pre-Islamic Christianity: the patchwork frock made from rags, and the use of the colour of mourning, black for the Christians, dark blue for the Muslims' (Baldick *ibid.*)

[8] Shi'ism (or Shia Islam) is the second largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam ('approximately 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite [...] branch' [Blanchard 2007a: 11]). The term 'Shi'ism' is derived from the Arabic phrase *Shiat Ali*, which means the partisans of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad and the fourth caliph of Muslims after the death of the Prophet). Shia Muslims attribute themselves to the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, but in contrast to other Muslims (such as Sunni Muslims) they believe that Ali Ibn Abi Talib was the first spiritual (infallible) Imam and the true successor to Prophet Muhammad; according to them, the former was appointed by God to be the next Prophet after Muhammad; and that is why, they totally reject the three caliphs of Muslims before Ali.

[9] 'The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and over the nature of political leadership in the Muslim community' (Blanchard 2005: 1, excerpted from CRS Report RS21745, dated 10 February 2005).

Let us offer a summary of the doctrinal tenets of Wahhabi Islam. Kaba (1974: 109) gives one of the most straightforward accounts of the Wahhabi-Islam doctrine as being encapsulated in the expression 'prophethood'. 'The Wahhabi doctrine', as Kaba explains, 'is based on a strong reaffirmation of the central core of Islam that "God is one, He has no partner nor equal to share His almightiness"'. Kaba's implication of this Sunni-Wahhabi view is that 'Muslims should not think that someone may intercede with the judgments or decrees of Allah in order to change them', even Prophet Muhammad himself. Al-Rasheed (2002) has summarized the tenets set by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as follows:

> The reformer [Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] distinguished himself by insisting on the importance of monotheism, the denunciation of all forms of mediation between God and believers, the obligation to pay *zakat* (Islamic tax to the leader of the Muslim community), and the obligation to respond to his call for holy war against those who did not follow these principles. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was concerned with purifying Islam from what he described as innovations and applying strict interpretation of *shari'a*, both of which needed the support of a political authority. He considered cults of saints, the visiting of holy men's tombs and sacrifice to holy men, prevalent not only among Muslims encountered during his travels in Hijaz, Iraq and Syria, as manifestations of *bid'a*. He formulated religious opinions regarding several practical matters. Among other things, he encouraged people to perform communal prayers and abstain from smoking tobacco. (Al-Rasheed 2002: 16f)

As we shall see in Chapter 8, when we do the macro analysis of the different religious-knowledge frames and belief systems in the research data, these tenets starkly contrast with those of Sufi Islam.

Now, let us move from this brief coverage of the politico-religious context of Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam towards the question of 'why have I selected the discourse topic[10] of Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam as the object of research?'.

1.3.1.2 Why Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam?

I have chosen a particularly turbulent moment in the American-Saudi history, spanning the years 2002 (immediately in the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001) to 2004. At this time period a new order of the discourse about Saudi Arabia began to emerge in America. Instead of being discursively represented as part of the history of Saudi Arabia (see, for example, Vassiliev [1997]), Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam began to be the discourse topic (to which the topic of Saudi Arabia and its history became ancillary) of the American media (especially magazines and newspapers). Using the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA), we can offer corpus evidence of such a claim about the topical interest in 'Wahhabism' in America at this period of time in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 below:

SECTION	SPOKEN	FICTION	MAGAZINE	NEWSPAPER	ACADEMIC	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009
PER MIL	0.12	0.01	0.65	0.13	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.50	0.29
SIZE (MW)	81.7	76.6	83.3	79.4	75.3	103.3	102.9	102.6	93.6
FREQ	10	1	54	10	9	3	3	51	27

Figure 1.1: Frequency of the term 'Wahhabism' in the COCA (1990 - 2009)

Prior to coming to the chart in Figure 1.2, it should be noted that we do not have access to the years before 1990 since the COCA was originally launched in 1990 (for further details about the COCA, see Chapter 4). As the frequency chart above shows, the period 2000-2004 had

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[10] I am using van Dijk's (1981: 186ff) notion of 'discourse topic', which is defined in relation to what he calls 'semantic macro-structures', i.e. 'the discourse as a whole, or fragments of it, taken as a "whole"'. According to van Dijk, these 'semantic macro-structures make explicit the important intuitive notion of 'topic of discourse': they specify what a discourse, as a whole "is about," in a non-trivial way, i.e. sentences' (Van Dijk 1981: 197).

the highest frequency of uses of the term 'Wahhabism' in the two modes of American written and spoken English across different genres. Interestingly, it seems that interest in Wahhabism started to decrease in the years 2005-2009. Let us have the same chart on the term 'Wahhabi' in the COCA at the same time period.

CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH AMIRCDA

Mark Davies / Brigham Young University — lists | profile | history | logout

CLICK ON BARS FOR [WAHHABI] IN CONTEXT — (HELP)

SECTION	SPOKEN	FICTION	MAGAZINE	NEWSPAPER	ACADEMIC	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009
SEE SUB-SECTIONS									
PER MIL	0.05	0.00	0.54	0.37	0.44	0.06	0.06	0.51	0.57
SIZE (MW)	81.7	78.8	83.3	79.4	79.3	103.3	102.9	102.6	93.6
FREQ	4	0	45	29	35	6	6	52	53

Figure 1.2: Frequency of the term 'Wahhabi' in the COCA (1990 - 2009)

The chart on 'Wahhabi' in Figure 1.2 also shows a greater frequency of the search term after 2000, but unlike the term 'Wahhabism', this term continues to grow in the period after 2004. This may reflect a post-9/11 American mounting interest in social actors – things or people that are thought to be identified as 'Wahhabi', rather than in the abstract meaning of 'Wahhabism' itself. However, we can barely be sure about the interpretation of this chart on 'Wahhabi' or 'Wahhabism' at this early stage in research.

In what follows I shall explain how this new discourse order came into being. But first, before going into this explanation, it may be useful to quote an important account of the history of Saudi Arabia given by Peter Mandaville (2009):

> Saudi Arabia was founded between the two World Wars as a theocratic monarchy (that is, one governed by religious leaders) based on a political alliance between a princely family (the Sa'ud) and a religious establishment

seeking to purvey an indigenous form of Islam – highly austere and puritanical – known as Wahhabism. With the discovery of vast oil wealth under its deserts, Saudi Arabia was catapulted to a position of geopolitical prominence, establishing a close alliance with the United States that has endured for many years.

<div align="right">(Mandaville 2009: 104f)</div>

Post-9/11, a new order of the media discourse about the American-Saudi relationship began to emerge when a great deal of reports by international centers suggested that the Wahhabi teachings within Saudi domestic schools may foster intolerance of other religions and cultures. A 2002 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicated that 'some Saudi textbooks taught Islamic tolerance while others viciously condemned Jews and Christians ... [and] use rhetoric that was little more than hate literature'.[11] Also, a 2005 report from the Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom cites examples of what its authors call 'hate ideology' taken from a number of Saudi government publications that have been distributed in the US mosques and Islamic centers.[12] More importantly, according to the CRS Report for Congress, the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the '9/11 Commission') claims that 'Islamist terrorism' finds inspiration in 'a long tradition of extreme intolerance' that flows 'through the founders of Wahhabism'. [13] The report further details the education and activities of some of the 9/11 hijackers in the Al Qassim province of Saudi Arabia, which the reports describes as 'the very heart of the strict Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia'. According to the Commission, some Saudi 'Wahhabi-funded organizations', such as the now-defunct Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, 'have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent jihad against non-Muslims'. The Commission, due in part to these

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[11] *Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism, and Terrorism*, Report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Nov. 27, 2002, p. 18.

[12] Freedom House, 'Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques', dated January 2005.

[13] Excerpted from CRS Report RS21695, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*, dated 24 January 2008.

findings, recommended a frank discussion of the relationship between the United States and its 'problematic ally', Saudi Arabia.

Also, significantly, Blanchard (2007b) expounds on the historical moment of 9/11 and its sequential political impact on 'Wahhabism' and Saudi Arabia in a post-9/11 world:

> The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent investigation of these attacks have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. The Al Qaeda terrorist network and its leader, Osama bin Laden, have advocated a message of violence that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this line of puritanical Islam. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the center of Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. (Blanchard 2007b: 21)

Thus, according to Blanchard's argument above, both political and religious actors were involved in the 'terrorist' event, that is, 'Wahhabism' (conceived of as hard-line puritanical Islam), 'Al Qaeda' and 'Osama bin Laden' (as a continuation of Wahhabism), and 'Saudi Arabia' (thought to have harboured Wahhabism). Actually, the whole argument can be said to boil down to the assumption that the 9/11 attacks have been caused by modern 'Saudi Wahhabism' and classical 'Wahhabi Islam'.

Here, let us conclude this subsection with a brief idea about the data of this research without arguing for its being representative of the discourse about Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam and its new order in the US post-9/11; it is a type of discourse which I describe as meta-Wahhabi. In the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) I make a case for how my research data is representative of meta-Wahhabi discourse in the US after 9/11.

1.3.1.3 Position of the analyst

Critical discourse analysis advocates researcher reflexivity, or the acknowledgement that the researcher is part of the research process and can influence its outcomes (see Burr 1995). It is therefore useful for the researcher to attempt to clarify their own 'position' in relation to the research, and reflect on how this position develops and may impact on the research as it progresses. While I am a Sunni Muslim who respects Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and appreciates his religious works on Islamic monotheism (*tawhid*), I have serious troubles with those writings that attempt to ideologically recontexualize his teachings in a way that serves particular social, religious or political contexts. I have tried to maintain a critical distance from my data, be it attacking or supporting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his teachings, in a way that enables my discourse-analytic tools to make visible the implicit assumptions linguistically encoded in the textual data, and reveal how this data has contributed to the resistance or maintenance of Wahhabi discourse in general. My decision to use corpus methods whereby computer software determines salient or frequent aspects of language in the texts, which then need to be accounted for by the researcher, is one way that I have tried to limit my own cognitive and ideological biases from driving the analysis.

Also importantly, in this study, I am not interested in who of the two writers is 'right' or 'wrong' in their arguments but in the way collocational meanings have ideologically worked through two clashing texts around the same discourse topic of Saudi Wahhabism and Wahhabi Islam in the wake of 9/11 in the US. This should lead us to the more textually oriented section below, which addresses the linguistic context of research problem.

1.3.2 Linguistic context of the problem

Here, let us begin by repeating the second statement of the research problem, which has been mentioned in Section 1.3: In discourse studies there has been scant attention to the interface between lexical collocation and its ideological representations across opposing discursive practices. The linguistic context of the research problem can be realized on two levels: one level has to do with how modern linguistics conceives of the status of lexis, while the other is confined to the textual phenomenon of collocation. It should be noted, however, that both levels are closely intertwined. Starting with the general level, in modern linguistic theory, lexis has always been treated as secondary to grammar, on the assumption that grammar is the structure within which words can be systematically realized.

However, Hoey (2005) argues for a new theory of the lexicon, a theory that reverses the classical grammar-word order of language structure: 'lexis is complexly and systematically structured' in a way that renders grammar 'an outcome of this lexical structure' (Hoey 2005: 1). In order for Hoey to achieve such a theoretical undertaking, he paid due attention to the 'pervasiveness of collocation' as a structuring device of sentences. And, to explain collocation, he resorted to 'priming' as the concept that mostly fits the psychological nature of collocation. For him (2005: 8), 'the notion of semantic priming is used to discuss the way a 'priming' word may provoke a particular 'target' word', such as *body* and *heart* versus *body* and *trick*. Hoey writes: 'We can only account for collocation if we assume that every word is mentally primed for collocational use' (*ibid.*). Here comes the second specific level of the problem – collocation. Taking insights from Hoey's foregoing assumption, one may well reach the following formulation: 'Across clashing texts, we can account for a certain politics of meaning if we assume that every word is ideologically primed for collocational use'. Despite the extensive literature on collocation and collocability, be it lexical or grammatical,

scarcely, if ever, has there been a scholarly interest in the imposing discourse-lexis phenomenon of 'ideological collocation' (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2 on the literature review).

Notably, the present gap in research, where the ideologically motivated type of collocation that ever continues to permeate discourse, is by no means at an academic premium. This gap can be observed in the scholarly investigation of collocation in traditional text linguistics and discourse analysis,[14] which draw largely on limited descriptive – rather than critical interpretive – theoretical frameworks. This is where lexical (or grammatical) collocation, once analytically realized within text boundaries, serves no critical-built purpose in discourse; rather, unfortunately, there is a tendency towards explaining the speaker or writer's intention to offer a lexically cohesive version of text, which does not involve decoding the ideological character of certain collocations at discourse level (see Chapter 2). Indeed, the purely micro analysis of collocation has proven to be unduly insensitive to the social context of collocations in relation to the discourse processes of their production, interpretation and explanation. Just let us contemplate, for example, what kind of lexical, conceptual or institutional association there could be between the items *Islamic* and *terrorism* in most Western media discourse; or, in parallel, between the items *American* and *empire* in Arab media discourse.

1.4 Rationale of the study

The rationale behind the present study is twofold. First, on a practical level, the study is intended to investigate how ideological meanings could be actualized as collocations across clashing texts, and seek out an increasing awareness of their being naturalized as dominant

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[14] Taking a linguistic approach to the analysis of discourse, Yule and Brown 'examine how humans use language to communicate and, in particular, how addressers construct linguistic messages for addressees and how addressees work on linguistic messages in order to interpret them' (Brown and Yule 1983: ix). Also, Stubbs (1983) notes that 'discourse analysis' is 'the study of naturally occurring language' (Stubbs 1983: 9).

practices in meta-Wahhabi discourse. This entails a CDA framework which is predicated on four stages of text and discourse analysis (for example, Fairclough 1989 [2001]): (1) 'description', (2) 'production' (3) 'interpretation' and (4) 'explanation'. It should be noted, however, that CDA allows for other theoretical orientations to be incorporated into the analysis at various points. One instance, at the stage of describing the ideological meaning of collocation, is the co-textual analysis of aspects such as 'semantic preference' and 'discourse prosody' (Sinclair 1991; Louw 1993, 1997; Stubbs 1996) as well as 'pragmatic fallacies' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

Also, at the stage of interpreting ideological collocation in meta-Wahhabi discourse, the cognitive notion of 'schema' will be of great interest (see Subsection 8.3.2 in Chapter 8). This may establish why a critical approach towards text analysis should not dissociate the phenomenon of collocation from its wider social and cognitive contexts as well as from the discourse world of the text. Second, on a theoretical level, the study draws scholarly attention to the imperative that the semantics of collocation should be investigated not only in terms of denotative meaning, but connotative meaning as well, especially across opposing discourses. As such, associative meaning (as internalized in the mind of text producers and consumers) would be externalized as a textual cue and trace for a certain ideology.

1.5 Theoretical and methodological approach

The present study develops a composite theoretical and methodological approach; it is generally a blend of quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one hand, the textual phenomenon of collocation necessitates a corpus-based approach, where the corpus method manipulates the research data via certain computational software (see Chapters 3 and 4): frequency of the collocating items of the computed data guarantees the idea of collocability itself, let alone reduces 'researcher bias' (Baker 2006: 10). On the other hand, qualitatively,

the descriptive-diagnostic approach towards the discourse prosody of and semantic preference between the collocating items is essential. Again, within the theoretical framework of CDA, the qualitative approach is important for handling issues of production, interpretation and explanation at the level of discourse (see Chapter 3).

Thus, methodologically, there will be a dyadic procedure for analyzing the research data. This procedure can be realized on two complementary levels of analysis: micro and macro levels. At the micro level, there are two stages: the first stage is the computational identification of collocations using the corpus software WordSmith5 (Scott 2007); the second stage is a description of these collocations in and across the two texts under investigation; the descriptive toolkit is composed of different theoretical strands from lexical semantics and argumentation (see Chapter 3). At the macro level, there are three interrelated CDA stages of discourse processes of producing, interpreting and explaining ideological collocations in the texts under analysis; at this level, analysis draws on theoretical concepts from social cognition and semiotics. This triadic model is intended to unravel the social-semiotic context of the relevant meta-Wahhabi discourse.

1.6   Research questions

The study addresses itself to the overarching question 'How has Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism been ideologically recontextualized across post-9/11 opposing discourses via collocation?'. This question is divided into three sets of answerable sub-questions:

1) How can corpus methods help in identifying collocations that are peculiar to the two texts by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas?

2) How do these collocations contribute towards ideologies across the two texts?

   a) What are the lexical classification schemes that can be realized collocationally in and/or across the texts?

b) What are the pragmatic fallacies that underlie the collocational use in the texts?

3) What are the sociocognitive and social-semiotic contextual factors that underlie the ideological use of collocations in the two texts within meta-Wahhabi discourse?

a) How do the authors' identities and circumstances relate to their use of collocations within meta-Wahhabi discourse?

b) What is the relationship between such collocations and the two meta-Wahhabi discourse communities under examination?

c) In what way can we explain the symbolic power and interdiscursive nature of the collocations running through the texts investigated?

1.7   Thesis structure

Overall, the thesis is composed of nine chapters. Chapter 1 – the present chapter – is a general introduction to the whole thesis. It includes the research problem, which draws attention to the politico-religious and linguistic contexts of the problem; the rationale for the study in terms of theory and practice; the theoretical and methodological approach followed in this study, the key concepts that the research theoretically draws on; and the research questions that the study addresses throughout the whole thesis. Chapter 2 is the critical literature review that is intended to cover topics relevant to the present study, such as the politics of lexical meaning in classical studies on ideology and discourse, collocation, critical discourse analysis (CDA), and corpus linguistics (CL). Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework that this study employs in analysing the research data; the framework covers strands from different disciplines, including linguistic semantics, corpus linguistics, argumentation, cognition, and discourse studies. Chapter 4 is focused on the research methodology; it is mainly concerned

with the research textual data and the procedure (micro and macro) followed in analysing this data. Chapters 5 to 7 appertain to the micro (collocational) analysis of the research data within and/or across the two texts. Chapter 5 focuses on the keyword-based different semantic foci and the opposing representations of 'Wahhabi jihad'; Chapter 6 tackles the opposing representations of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia; Chapter 7 is concerned with the collocation-based (non-)gendered meta-Wahhabi discourses. Chapter 8 is a continuation of the analysis at the macro level; it takes up the analysis of the sociocognitive and social-semiotic contextual factors that determine the production, interpretation, and explanation of the ideological use of collocations in meta-Wahhabi discourse. Finally, Chapter 9 is the conclusion part of the thesis that offers a summary of the study, findings and implications, limitations, and future research.

CHAPTER 2

Critical Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter critically addresses the methodological and theoretical developments of integrating the qualitative approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA) with the quantitative approach of corpus linguistics (CL) in the study of collocation, discourse, ideology and culture. As the main sections show, the chapter covers four main aspects of literature review on the study of collocation and ideology. Section 2.2 tackles the political dimension of the lexical associations as developed in ideology and discourse theories. Section 2.3 focuses on the history of the term 'collocation' and its linguistic investigations since Firth (1957). Section 2.4 discusses the interdisciplinary field of CDA, in terms of its definition, development, theoretical and methodological approaches and limitations. Finally, section 2.5 introduces 'corpus linguistics' (CL) as an emerging applied-linguistics field and its recent integration with CDA, with a focus on the investigation of lexis in general and collocation in particular and their ideological and cultural realizations in discourse.

2.2 Towards a politics of meaning: lexical association, discourse and ideology

Vološinov, the Russian linguist, wrote in 1930, '[e]ach situation, fixed and sustained by social custom, commands a particular kind of organization of audience' (trans. 1973: 97). Out of this view the social perspective towards discourse was born, bringing about a revolution in understanding the way that discourses dialectically interact; and the idea of 'clashing contexts', first proposed by Vološinov (*ibid.*: 79ff), began to emerge. Vološinov reached the conclusion that discourses differ with the kinds of institutions and social practices wherein

they take shape, and with the 'subjective' positions addressers and addressees hold. Since then discourse has been viewed as heterogeneous; a theme that is stressed in Pêcheux's (1975, trans. 1982) *Language, Semantics and Ideology* (see Subsection 2.2.3 below).

In the following subsections I outline an important argument made by Macdonell (1986) that the 'politics of meaning' is largely predicated on the idea that lexical associations are ideologically oriented.

2.2.1 Essential precursors

In order to illustrate Pêcheux's (1982) thesis on the 'ideological sphere' of discursive meanings (see Subsection 2.2.3), Macdonell (1986: 24ff) gives an account of some writings of the time period from 1750-1830, when notable conflicts had arisen then in England. She explains that 'the established church was opposed by both "atheists" and dissenting organizations' (Macdonell 1986: 24). Here, what matters most, according to her, is that within such conflicts words were 'a weapon of struggle'. A good illustration of these lexis-bound conflicts was that of Shelley's[15] *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty* (1817). Macdonell argues that this 'hymn' used words from the 'standard vocabulary of orthodox Christianity ('grace', 'spirit', 'love', 'hope', etc.)'. Even so, it embedded them in phrases where they could derive their meaning from 'unorthodox positions':

> Love, Hope, and Self-esteem, like clouds depart
>
> And come, for some uncertain moments lent.
>
> Man were immortal, and omnipotent,
>
> Didst thou, unknown and awful as thou art,
>
> Keep with thy glorious train firm state within his heart.
>
> (Shelley 1817, cited in Macdonell 1986: 25)

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[1] Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) was one of the eminent English Romantic poets; he is widely considered to be amongst the best lyric poets of the English language. *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty* (1817) is one of his great works, where atheism features as the principal theme.

Macdonell's argument targets the proof of deploying meaning politically against orthodoxy, with Shelley's 'atheistic' (or, rather dissenting) meaning. The point simply consists in bringing the essence of meanings associated with spirituality down to earth in a new defiant fashion.

A continuation of the argument is made by reference to the word *salvation* which, as Macdonell (*ibid.*: 26) maintains, was used in dissenting writings. The new sense (which is politically oriented) was brought in a defiant context, which was free from despotic rule: *Mad tyrants tame, break down the high/whose haughty foreheads beat the sky,/Make bare Thine arm, great King of Kings!/That arm alone salvation brings.*[16] This version, according to Macdonell, is contrastive with another discursive practice that had been previously used as the Anglican missionary hymn 'From Greenland's icy mountains'. In the latter discursive practice, the same word *salvation* was purported to mean 'gaining eternal life through faith in Christ':

> Shall we, whose souls are lighted
> With wisdom from on high:
> Shall we to men benighted
> The lamp of life deny?
> Salvation! O Salvation!
> The joyful sound proclaim,
> Till each remotest nation
> Has learnt Messiah's name![17]

---

[16] As Macdonell (1986: 26) explains, this hymn ('O God of Hosts, Thine ear incline'), which was written 'to be sung at a meeting of 'Friends of Peace and reform', was still in 1749 waiting for God to give 'salvation' in that same dissenting meaning'.

[17] An extract from an Anglican missionary hymn called 'From Greenland's icy mountains' (1817), cited by Macdonell (1986: 25).

The use of the word *salvation* in the above extract reflects the 'orthodox' sense of faith as the path to eternal bliss. Significantly, this is a religious politics of meaning, where there is only one and the same way via which 'salvation' can be secured. The two contexts of 'salvation' clash on the strength of how the operative word (*salvation*) combines differently with other words and expressions in each discourse. Interestingly, the different lexical associations (*souls*, *lighted*, *wisdom*, *lamp* and *Messiah* vs. *tyrants*, *mad*, *haughty*, and *arm*) make a strong case for how the different representations of the two worlds of religion and politics – different ideologies – result in different organization of lexis in discourse. This is what Macdonell (1986: 24ff) has characterized as a shift from ideology to discourse.

2.2.2   From ideology to discourse

Althusser's perceptive 1971 essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' brought about a radical breakthrough in Marxist theory of ideology[18], particularly in respect of the historical shift from ideology to discourse in academia. The essay embodies a reorientation to the study of ideology, basically by emphasizing a 'material-versus-notional' existence of ideology. Althusser writes specifically about 'Ideological State Apparatuses' (ISAs) which promote and distribute various forms of ideology through the dominant context of economic capitalism. He gives an account of apparatuses (i.e. institutions) in capitalist countries such as France and Britain, 'whose operations are largely ideological: the apparatuses of religion, education, the family, the law, the system of party politics, the trade unions, communications and culture' (Althusser 1971: 136f).

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[18] In his main work of political economy, *Capital* (1974), Marx proposed an economic base/superstructure model of society. For him, whilst the 'base' refers to economy as the means of production of society, the 'superstructure' (which is formed on top of the base, comprises that society's ideology, as well as its legal system, political system, and religions. Marx's main argument is that 'the base determines the superstructure'; and because the ruling class controls the society's means of production, the superstructure of society, including ideology, will be determined according to 'what is in the ruling class's best interests'. Therefore, the ideology of a society is of paramount importance, since it confuses the foreign/alienated groups and can create 'false consciousness'.

Based on Althusser's (1971) vision, ideologies exist (materially) in apparatuses forming part of the State, where they are 'unified' or, interconnected by the social conflicts (ultimately 'class conflicts'), 'traversing' those apparatuses. Actually, in focusing on the institutions of ideology, the essay located 'the educational apparatus' (the school and the university) as 'the dominant ideological State apparatus in capitalist social formations' (Althusser 1971: 146). Obviously, then, his argument escapes the abstract of beliefs and meaning as coming from consciousness. To him, by sharp contrast, consciousness is constructed through ideologies. As a result, Althusser (*ibid.*: 152ff) reached the conclusion that ideologies might best be understood as systems of meanings that install everybody in imaginary relations to the real relations in which they live; or, in his words, the 'representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (*ibid.*: 152). Inspired by Althusser's argument about ideologies and the systems of meanings linked to them, many scholars began to think of 'discourse' as being the expression to those systems of meanings. Pêcheux's (1982) theory of discourse was a development of Althusser's (1971) theory of ideology. Such a development brought forward the emergence of the serviceable concept 'meaningful antagonism'.

2.2.3 Meaningful antagonisms and the discursive process

Pêcheux (1982: 111) stated that 'words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to positions held by those who use them'. This led him to follow Althusser's (1971) theory on ISAs; and, as a result, Pêcheux took up the political dimension of the meaning of words in discourses, which is known as the politics of meaning: words do not have a rigid meaning of their own that can be used in the system of language (in Saussure's (1916/1983) terms '*langue*'); the meaning of words change from one discourse to another, and dynamically discourses conflict even against a supposedly common language.

In their online paper, Helsloot and Hak (2007) report Pêcheux's (1969a) contribution to Althusser's 'philosophy course for scientists', where the former analyses how a conflict between two theoretical ideologies develops differently within the fields of physics and biology:

> In physics the "Galilean break" led to a triumph of mechanistic explanations of magnetism and electricity over the animistic experience of wonder. PÊCHEUX draws special attention to the use of the word "dynamic" as opposed to "static," which inaugurates the new field of electrodynamics. Contrastively, in a "transversal analysis," he shows that in biology the opposition between "dynamic" and "static" became connected with the distinction between physiology and anatomy. Here the introduction of the term "dynamic" did not lead to mechanistic interpretations, but to the development of vitalistic perceptions of "forces," which are still conceived as animate.
>
> (Helsloot and Hak 2007)[19]

According to Helsloot and Hak (2007), Pêcheux ascribes this 'divergence' between physics and biology to the discipline-bound 'social practices' associated with each: whereas physics is applied mainly to 'the field of the means of production (e.g. machines)', biology is applied, via medicine, to 'the field of labour humans' (Pêcheux 1969a, cited in Helsloot and Hak 2007).

Further, Helsloot and Hak (2007) outline what they call Pêcheux's (1969b) 'most important' contribution to French discourse analysis; that is, developing tools for conducting empirical studies of discourses, and thus re-evaluating the whole discursive process. This can be realized in the three phases of Pêcheux's 'automatic discourse analysis': the first phase is 'corpus construction', which delineates 'the object of study' and selects 'the set of texts and utterances' that represent the conditions of text production; the second phase is 'linguistic

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[19] Available online: http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/viewArticle/242/535, accessed 15 June 2011.

analysis', which consists of 'rewriting all the sentences' (e.g. 'syntactic parsing according a linguistic theory') of the corups as input for the stage of discourse analysis; the third phase is 'automatic discourse analysis proper', where discourse-analytical approaches can be utilized, but without offering findings; the findings of this form of automatic discourse analysis can be reached only through 'an *interpretation* of the results' of the third stage.

Indeed, it can be said that Pêcheux's main works came to the conclusion that 'discourses are not at all peaceful; they develop out of clashes with one another, and because of it, there is a political dimension to each use of words and phrases in writing and in speech' (Macdonell 1986: 43). Following Pêcheux (1982), Macdonell (1986: 45) argues that 'the meanings of discourses are set up in what are ultimately antagonistic relations'. Macdonell has developed the concept of 'meaningful antagonism' by delineating Pêcheux's (1982) anti-structuralist materialist position on discourse: 'words change their meaning from one discourse to another, and conflicting discourses develop even where there is a supposedly common language' (Macdonell 1986: 45). As such, discursive meanings are not simply contained within linguistic properties. Rather, these discursive meanings are part of what Pêcheux has technically termed as the 'ideological sphere'; and even discourse itself is 'one of ideology's specific forms' (Macdonell *ibid.*).

To substantiate meaningful antagonisms across opposing discursive practices, Macdonell (1986: 48ff) provides an example of how the words '*liberty*', '*rights*' and '*natural*' in the English writings of the 1790s are used in two politically opposing discourses: 1) *The French Declaration of Rights* of 1789 (liberal bourgeois document of the Revolution), translated into two English versions: a) Price's *A Discourse on the Love of our Country* (printed 1790) and b) Paine's Rights of Man (printed 1791); 2) Burke's conservative and anti-revolutionary *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (printed 1790). The extracts cited by Macdonell (*ibid.*: 49) are a characterization of the effects brought about by antagonistic

positions upon the combining of words in each discourse and the politics of meaning therein. Starting with the liberal bourgeois discourse, Macdonell (*ibid.*) demonstrates how, under the influence of the liberal position, this type of discourse views 'liberty' as a 'natural right'. It is the discursive process of liberalism that renders the three terms (*liberty, rights, natural*) bound to each other, and, further metonymically, to 'man' and 'the individual'; and eventually it would make sense in such discursive practice, and probably practices of this sort, to have 'natural' and 'equal' holding as near synonyms:

1- *Liberty* is one of 'the chief blessings of human nature' (Price 1790, p. 11). As a 'natural right', it is one of 'the natural and imprescriptible rights of man' (Declaration of Rights, in Paine 1791, p. 111).

2- *Rights*, in being natural, are 'equal' (Price 1790, p. 21), for 'Men are born ... equal in respect of their rights' (Declaration of Rights, in Paine 1791, p. 111).

3- What is *natural* is what is human and individual: rights that are 'Natural ... appertain to man' from 'his existence' and are 'pre-existing in the individual' (Paine 1791, pp. 48-9).

By contrast, for the conservative discourse, Macdonell (1986: 50) demonstrates how, under the influence of the conservative position, this type of discourse views 'liberty' as a form of 'noble freedom': using the same three terms (*liberty, rights, natural*) in a discursive process that renders them tied to 'inheritance' and that renders 'rights' synonymous with 'privileges':

1- "'Our *liberties*" are "an entailed inheritance". They are inherited as privileges: "We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and an [sic] house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties" (Burke 1793, p. 47).

2- If 'liberties' here can be called by the name of *rights*, that is because 'rights' and 'privileges' are synonymous – 'our nature' and 'our breasts' are 'the great conservatories ... of our rights and privileges' (p. 50).

3- This *natural* conservatory of rights is not the nature of man and the individual; instead, whatever is modelled on familial descent and nature's continuity is *natural*. That "our liberties" are "an entailed inheritance" is "the happy effect of following nature" for it is by "working after the pattern of nature" that "we transmit ... our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives", namely, as a "family settlement" (pp. 47-8)'.

It follows then, as Macdonell (1986: 51) argues, that the meanings of words cannot be changed by the author or the reader; rather, it is the 'struggle of discourses' that changes their meanings; and so 'the combination in which we put words together matters [...]'.

At this point it should be made clear that the main focus of this research is to explore the potential relation between collocation and ideology, and the discursive representations coming out of this relation. As a result, let us see to what extent the study of collocation has been sensitive to the concept of 'struggle of discourses' in Althusser's (1971) theory of ideology and Pêcheux's (1982) theory of discourse on the one hand, and to the concept of 'meaningful antagonism' developed by Macdonell (1986) on the other.

2.3 Collocation and collocability

To date, the scholarly study of 'collocation' in (critical) discourse analysis and text linguistics has been short of demonstrating how there could be a potential 'politics of meaning' in the way words collocate (i.e. collocability) across meaningfully antagonistic discourses. This

concern will be like a thread that runs throughout the following subsections as well as the remaining sections.

2.3.1 Defining collocation: a descriptive limitation

In an attempt to pinpoint the origin of collocation in linguistic theory, Bartsch (2004) writes:

> The first recorded mention of the term collocation in a distinctly linguistic context listed under the entry for 'collocation' in the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED 2nd) dates back to a quotation by Harris of the year 1750:
>
> > 1750 Harris Hermes ii. iv. Wks (1841) 197 The accusative .. in modern languages .. being subsequent to its verb, in the collocation of words.
> >
> > Etymologically, the term goes back to Latin *collocāt-us*, the past participle of *collocāre* 'to place side', from *col- (con-)* 'together' + *locāre* 'to place'. (Bartsch 2004: 28)

Although 'collocation' has been familiar since the pioneering work of Palmer (1938) who was the first to introduce the term in his dictionary, *A Grammar of English Words*, Firth (1957) advanced the word 'collocation' as a technical term so that 'meaning by collocation' has become established as one of his 'modes of meaning' (Firth 1957: 194). Indeed, Firth is credited with 'channelling the attention of linguists towards lexis' (Halliday and McIntosh 1966: 14) in general, and for technically proposing the term 'collocation' in particular. Firth said: 'I propose to bring forward as a technical term, meaning by *collocation*, and to apply the test of *collocability*' (1957: 194).

It should be noted that the Firthian 'company-keeping' principle of collocation has been remarkably influential since 1957. When Firth declared the assumption that 'you shall know a word by the company it keeps' (1957: 179), scholarly attention gravitated towards the psychological aspect of collocation. This can easily be traced in Leech's elaboration on

'collocative meaning' as consisting of 'the associations a word acquires on account of the meanings of words which tend to occur in its environment' (Leech 1974: 20). A similar vision can be readily recognized in the way that both Halliday and Hasan (1976) refer to collocation as nothing but a cohesive device: 'a cover term for the kind of cohesion that results from the co-occurrence of lexical items that are in some way or other typically associated with one another, because they tend to occur in similar environments' (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 287). The problem with such psychology-based definitions is that they tend to isolate the idea of collocability from the social context of discourse, as if it were a mere cognitive practice. Words, in this case, are associated in the mind on the strength of regular encounter in similar textual contexts.

On the other hand, there are text-bound definitions of collocation. One clear instance of this approach is adopted by Sinclair (1991). He has defined collocation as 'the occurrence of two or more words within a short space of each other in a text' (Sinclair 1991: 170). The second textually oriented approach towards collocation has been introduced in a corpus-linguistics study by Stubbs (2001). Stubbs discusses collocation in terms of a formal node-span relation that can be frequently realized in corpora:

> A 'node' is the word-form or lemma being investigated. A 'collocate' is a word-form or lemma which co-occurs with a node in a corpus. Usually it is frequent co-occurrences which are of interest, and corpus linguistics is based on the assumption that events which are frequent are significant. My definition is therefore a statistical one: 'collocation' is frequent co-occurrence.
>
> (Stubbs 2001: 29)

It should be noted that Stubbs' definition of collocation is useful in two respects. First, it offers a rigorous quantitative basis for defining collocability in various corpora. Second, the formal device of the 'node' and its collocating 'span' is a convenient way of looking at how

words are collocationally strung in text. (In the next chapter this point will be meticulously tackled.)

Still, however, text-based definitions of collocations render the phenomenon purely mechanical and ready-made, which is not permanently the case. This can be explained in light of the semantic constraints often imposed on the text-based definitions of collocation.

It can be argued that semantics alone cannot explain the nature of collocation, at least in English. This can be vindicated by Firth (1957), who differentiates between cognitive and semantic approaches to word-meaning on the one hand, and the linguistic feature of collocation on the other: 'Meaning by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the meaning of words. One of the meanings of *night* is its collocability with *dark*, and of *dark*, of course, collocation with *night*' (Firth 1957: 196). This can also be vindicated by Halliday and Hasan's argument about the meaning of collocating pairs, which, in their judgment, is not easy to 'classify in systematic semantic terms' (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 286). Also, this can be clear from Palmer's (1981: 79) concept of 'collocational restrictions': (1) some being wholly based on the item meaning (it is certainly unlikely that someone will read or hear expressions like '*black apples*' or '*The rhododendron passed away*'); (2) some are 'quintessentially collocational', or collocational in the strictest sense, regardless of meaning or range (such as '*addled brains*' and '*sour milk*').

In fact, Lyons (1995: 62) argues against the hypothesis that the collocational range of an expression is wholly determined by its meaning, so that synonyms 'must of necessity have the same collocational range'. The example he deploys in explaining this point is that of *big* and *large*. Lyons makes clear many contexts where '*large*' cannot be substituted for '*big*' without 'violating the collocational restrictions of the one or the other'. The sentence example

he offers is *'you are making a big mistake'*; in no way is *'large'* interchangeable with *'big'*. While it is true that 'you are making a large mistake' is presumably both grammatically well-formed and meaningful, it is collocationally unacceptable (or 'unidiomatic'). However, taking a closer look at another context shows that there is allowance for interchangeability within the same collocational range in the light of potential synonymy between *big* and *large*. For instance, the phrase *a big institute* could unproblematically be written as *a large institute*.

Drawing solely on semantic grounds for explaining collocability could quite often bring in misguided generalizations. For Stillar (1998: 51), collocation involves 'setting expectations', which in his terms means: 'The presence of a particular item creates a greater than random chance that a related item will occur'. A moment's reflection will reveal two important facts about Stillar's view of collocation. First, the basic element of the collocating process consists of the way that certain (lexical) expectations may be set. Second, to Stillar (*ibid.*), collocation is nothing but a property of language as a system, not as a social practice.

It seems that such a reductionist formulation of collocation may lead us to think that collocation is some kind of a linear expectation, and that the restrictively expected linear co-occurrence is encapsulated within a 'syntagmatic relation'. Even if one allows for Stubbs' (2001: 30) reference to the other type of lexical expectation, 'choice' (or, more traditionally, 'paradigmatic relation'), collocability would still be holding only between semantically related words. Not unproblematically, this precludes the interpretation of language as a 'social semiotics': 'a system of meanings that constitutes the 'reality' of the culture' (Halliday 2007: 197).

2.3.2 Semantic preference

Following Sinclair (1991: 112), Stubbs (2001: 65) defines the term 'semantic preference' as referring to 'the relation, not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words'. Later, Sinclair (2004: 33) insightfully views semantic preference as a 'stage removed from the actual words in the text'. Most probably, the reference here relates to the semantic behaviour of words in the real world aside from the textual world itself and its pragmatically motivated meanings. As Sinclair observes, the words 'see' and 'visible' mostly co-occur with the phrase 'naked eye'. Other words, sharing the same environment, occur less frequently, including 'detect', 'spotted', 'perceived', 'read', 'studied', 'apparent', 'evident', and 'obvious'. Roughly, such collocates share a common semantic set of 'visibility'. Hence, it can be argued that the phrase 'naked eye' has a semantic preference for 'visibility'.

Also, Baker (2006: 86) cites the British National Corpus (BNC) as a reference corpus for exemplifying the phenomenon of semantic preference: 'the word *rising* co-occurs with words to do with work and money: e.g. *incomes*, *prices*, *wages*, *earnings*, *unemployment*, etc.'. Demonstrably, then, semantic preference is closely bound up with the concept of collocation, in that it describes a process wherein a particular lexical item frequently collocates with a series of items which belong to a semantic set. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. Cruse (1986: 15ff, 2000: 53ff) has offered a 'contextual-relations' model of word meaning that is semantically revealing of 'syntagmatic disaffinity' (as opposed to 'syntagmatic affinity') between lexical associations, based on their inherent semantic features. This may in turn bring in the question of the 'congruity' of the senses of these lexical associations, even if they fall within the set of collocates of the same node word. It is to this end that the present study is directed: the potential that in one text certain

collocations, rather than being based on universal lexico-semantic features and relations, could be based on the pragmatic motivations driven by certain discourses or worldviews as opposed to others. (This point will be further developed in Chapter 3.) At this point the pragmatic, rather than semantic, features of collocation should be taken into account, especially at discourse level. This should lead us to another important concept, which is equally related to collocation; that is 'semantic prosody', or 'discourse prosody'.

2.3.3 Semantic/Discourse prosody

Although Cruse's (1986, 2000) 'contextual-relations' model of word meaning is useful in terms of detecting potential 'syntagmatic disaffinity' in collocability, it fails to offer a satisfactory coverage of the pragmatic associations in operation. His model efficiently works in relation to the semantic preference in contextual relations of word meaning. Yet, the text producer (speaker or writer) is banished from the picture. This may aggravate the problematic status of 'discourse', as being unmanageably ambiguous. Van Dijk (1997: 4) maintains that the use of 'discourse' 'is not limited to language use or communicative interaction', but it also refers to 'ideas or ideologies'.

Several studies use the term 'semantic prosody' in reference to a 'word' that is 'typically' deployed in a 'particular environment', such that the word takes on 'connotations' from that environment (e.g. Sinclair 1991; Louw 1993, 1997; Stubbs 1996; Hunston 1995). Hunston (2002: 141) cites Sinclair's (1991) example: the semantic prosody of the phrasal verb 'SET in' as usually co-occurring with subjects 'indicating something bad' such as *bad weather, gloom, decline, or rot*'. Louw (1993: 157) introduces the term 'semantic prosody' as 'an evaluative or attitudinal tone a word articulates'; it is the 'consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates'; and this would quite often involve the characteristic of hinting at a 'hidden meaning' (*ibid.*: 160). However, it is not an in-built

property of a word – the same way as connotation is – but results from 'the habitual co-occurrence between the word and a set of words that share similar semantic traits' (Partington 2004: 131). Louw's (1993: 160) typical example in this regard is the word 'utterly'. In his analysis, this word is considered to have a negative semantic prosody because it 'frequently collocates with words with negative meanings'.

Thus, semantic prosody cannot be easily accessed by means of individual introspection or dictionaries; rather, it may be evident through concordancing numerous examples. This may be the reason why Sinclair's (2004) examinations do not often describe semantic prosodies as 'positive' or 'negative', since, for him, the semantic prosody of a word or phrase bears a 'discourse function'. If we take Sinclair's example of the phrase 'naked eye' a little further into analysis, in terms of its semantic prosody, we can see that his analysis of the phrase shows a semantic prosody of 'difficultly': over 85% of the concordance lines of the phrase exhibit a collocation between 'see' with words like 'small', 'faint', 'weak', and 'difficult'.

Based on Louw's (2000: 57) definition of semantic prosody as 'a form of meaning which is established through the proximity of a consistent series of collocates', McEnery *et al.* (2006: 83) refer to semantic prosody as '[t]he collocational meaning arising from the interaction between a given node word and its collocates'. Here, the emphasis is laid upon the pragmatic element as a primary function of semantic prosody; and, most importantly, its realization as collocational meaning. Not surprisingly, then, a word or phrase can carry a covert message because of semantic prosody. In this connection a good example is offered by Stubbs (1996: 188), where 'the word form *intellectuals*' demonstrates a strong negative prosody in the company of collocates such as 'activists, contempt, dissident, hippie, ideology, leftist, leftwing, liberal, students, young'. Interestingly, Stubbs (*ibid.*) continues with the

potentially negative prosody evoked by *intellectuals* in the collocation '*Jewish intellectuals*', which can be suggestive of a 'covert message' of anti-Semitism.

In order for us to know more about such an interactive aspect of meaning, let us focus on Hunston's (2002: 142) account of the features of semantic prosody: (1) it is a 'consequence of the more general observation that meaning can be said to belong to whole phrases rather than to single words'; (2) it can be observed 'only by looking at a large number of instances of a word or phrase'; (3) it 'accounts for "connotation": the sense that a word carries a meaning in addition to its "real" meaning'; (4) it can be 'exploited, in that a speaker can use a word in an atypical way to convey [a] hidden meaning'; (5) it is often 'not accessible from a speaker's conscious knowledge'.

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It is this pragmatic element that makes some scholars prefer the term 'discourse prosody' to 'semantic prosody' (Tognini-Bonelli 1996: 193, 209; Stubbs 2001: 66). In their view, the problem lies with the word 'semantic' as part of the term on the assumption that there needs to be a 'distinction between aspects of meaning which are independent of speakers (semantics) and aspects which concern speaker attitude (pragmatics)'. This renders the term 'pragmatic prosodies', for them, a better choice. Still, however, as they presume, best of all is the term 'discourse prosodies', as it is doubly useful. On one hand, it maintains 'the relation to speakers and hearers', and on the other it emphasizes 'their function in creating discourse coherence'.

Again, problematic is the blurred distinction between the terms 'semantic preference' and 'semantic/discourse prosody': It is 'not entirely clear-cut' (Stubbs 2001: 66). I would, nonetheless, concur with Stubbs' opinion that the case is 'partly a question of semantics versus pragmatics' and that 'the preference-prosody distinction may depend on how delicate the analysis is' (*ibid.*). Indeed, Baker (2006: 87) has raised the issue that there

are some inconsistencies between how the terms 'semantic preference' and 'discourse prosody' are used, making explicit that 'patterns in discourse can be found between a word, phrase or lemma and a set of related words that suggest a discourse'. Another issue has been raised by Hunston (2007: 256) who argues that the view that the semantic prosody of a word 'expresses an evaluative tone, either positive or negative, seems to be a rather simplistic view of attitudinal meaning, since evaluation is basically linked to point of view'. As she (*ibid*.: 258) continues to argue, semantic prosody is tied to the 'phraseology of a word'; 'if the phraseology changes, the semantic prosody becomes different'. This is where qualitative analysis comes in. A CDA perspective would be of overriding importance here.

2.4 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

2.4.1 Definition and scope of CDA

For Kress (1990: 85), CDA is intended to show how 'linguistic-discursive practices' are linked to 'the wider socio-political structures of power and domination'. Similarly, van Dijk (1993: 249) views CDA as focused on 'the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance'. In this way, CDA might be regarded as an extension of 'critical linguistics'. According to Fowler (1996a: 3), 'critical linguistics' emerged from the writing of *Language and Control* (Fowler *et al.* 1979), where an analysis of public discourse was formulated. This analysis was designed to cover the three main interests of critical linguistics outlined by Fowler (1987: 482f): (1) studying texts 'in the context of the social circumstances in which they have been produced'; (2) revealing 'the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt propositions'; (3) challenging 'common sense by pointing out that something could have been represented some other way, with very different significance'. Fowler (1996a: *ibid*.) argues that the tools used for this critical-linguistic analysis was 'an eclectic selection of descriptive categories' drawn from Halliday (e.g. those structures identified as 'ideational

and interpersonal') as well as other linguistic traditions (e.g. 'speech acts or transformations').

Many scholars pay special attention to the term 'critical' as the key word in the complex concept of CDA. Probably, this can hardly be separated from the ideological dimension targeted by critical discourse analysts in general. Fairclough (1992: 9) emphasizes the use of 'critical' as implying 'showing connections and causes which are hidden' as well as implying 'intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged through change'. Weiss and Wodak (2003: 14) shed light on the term 'critical' in CDA; the term, for them, connotes 'critique'[20], which fulfils the function of 'revealing' the way language mediates ideology.

Kress stresses the fact that CDA contrasts in scope with discourse analysis or text linguistics, with their descriptive goals, in that the former had 'the larger political aim of putting the forms of texts, the processes of production of texts, and the process of reading, together with the structures of power that have given rise to them, into crisis' (Kress 1990: 85). Wodak (1996: 17ff) elaborates more on the scope of CDA in terms of the principles that the field works accordingly. She lists eight principles of CDA: (1) 'CDA addresses social problems', (2) 'Power relations are discursive', (3) 'Discourse constitutes society and culture', (4) 'Discourse does ideological work', (5) 'Discourse is historical', (6) 'A need for a socio-cognitive approach', (7) 'Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory', and finally (8) 'CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm'. These principles have been influential, in that they collectively underscore two different domains of CDA: first, 'power and linguistic interactions', where analysis of control over topics, interactions, turn-taking,

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[20] It is noteworthy here to invoke the Marxist sense of 'critique' (where theory and practical action are a unity): 'a theoretical weapon by means of which a self-conscious awareness of oppression is generated as the inducement for social action' (Oakley 1984: 8).

etc. comes into prominence; second, 'power and meaning', where analysis of the linguistic realizations of ideology takes a priority.

Pennycook (2001) explains that the goal of the critical discourse analyst is to 'look in discourse for manifestations of ideology', then he continues to explain that '[t]his approach makes sense for those coming from a linguistic background, for whom language and discourse are elements that need to be related to larger concerns such as society and ideology' (Pennycook 2001: 82f). Even so, Pennycook (2001: 83f) admits that CDA confronts two essential problems. First, the two well-known positions (discourse and ideology as opposed to discourse or ideology) 'have not been sufficiently disambiguated in CDA, which often attempts an eclectic mix of different positions on discourse and ideology'. Second, so much work in CDA 'is not aware of this problem of its truth claims [...] by adhering to a traditional view of ideology, it seems to have few ways of escaping this dilemma'. Pennycook refers to Foucault's study *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings* (1980), in an attempt to bring such problems into perspective, where he points out the Foucauldian explicit rejection of using ideology in favour of discourse. Foucault (1980: 118) strongly objected to the notion of ideology on the grounds that 'it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth'. Perhaps, Pennycook's account of the CDA problem about truth-claims echoes Foucault's firm rejection of ideology.

This may explain why Wetherell (2001: 385) takes issue with the fact that critical perspectives on discourse may render the analyst unsurprised by the data: 'The world is already known and is pre-interpreted' in the eyes of the analyst. That is why critical discourse analysis has been repeatedly accused of being potentially biased. Recently, Widdowson (2007) has alluded to this assumption:

CDA [...] adopts the position that particular textual choices are motivated and focus attention on those which are ideologically motivated, and more particularly when the ideology acts against the interests of the deprived and the oppressed. Now one might raise the question at this point about what it means to say that the choice of a particular expression is motivated. Does it mean that the choice is deliberate? How do we know that unless we consult the person who composed the text? (Widdowson 2007: 71)

Indeed, CDA normally calls into dispute ideas and assumptions that have become taken for granted and self-evident. That is why the analysis, as Widdowson (2007: *ibid.*) puts it, is 'committed to a cause and puts its own ideological agenda up front'. This may be explicit when CDA people address themselves to investigating the 'ideological functions of language in producing, reproducing or changing social structures, relations, identities' (Mayr 2004: 5); or when they study 'the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context' (Van Dijk 2008b: 85).

Let us now see how the lexical level of analysis and its corresponding ideological representations have been incorporated in the theoretical framework of CDA.

2.4.2 CDA: the lexical and the ideological

The dominant school of research into language and ideology is readily recognized in the major works on critical linguistics (Fowler *et al.* 1979; Fowler 1987, 1996a) and CDA (e.g. Fairclough 1989 [2001], 1995). Let us, however, focus on CDA as the mature development of critical linguistics, particularly insofar as the lexical aspect may be ideologically exploited.

Fairclough offers a three-stage model of CDA: (i) '*description* of text', (ii) '*interpretation* of the relationship between text and interaction', and (iii) '*explanation* of the relationship between interaction and social context' (1989: 109 [2001: 91]). In his model,

Fairclough argues that 'in analysing texts, one's focus is constantly alternating between what is "there" in text, and the discourse type(s) which the text is drawing upon' (Fairclough 2001: 92).

In fact, the alternation of focus, as Fairclough (2001: 92f) continues to argue, is reflected in the 'vocabulary', 'grammar', and 'textual structures' of a text. Speaking of 'vocabulary', Fairclough handles the issue in a query-form style, viz. (1) 'What *experiential* values do words have?': a) 'What classification schemes are drawn upon?' b) 'Are there words which are ideologically contested?', 'What ideologically significant meaning relations are there between words', c) 'Is there *rewording* or *overwording*?', and d) 'What ideologically significant meaning relations (*synonymy*, *hyponymy*, *antonymy*) are there between words?'; (2) 'What *relational* values do words have?': a) 'Are there euphemistic expressions?' and b) 'Are there markedly formal or informal words?'; (3) 'What *expressive* values do words have?'; and finally (4) 'What metaphors are used?'.

Fairclough's (*ibid.*) discussion of the above queries helps in explaining the nature of 'ideologically charged vocabulary' in text. Take, for example, the experiential values that words have: 'The aspect of experiential value [...] is how ideological differences between texts in their representations of the world are coded in their vocabulary' (Fairclough 2001: 94). Then, Fairclough (*ibid.*: 95) comments that '[s]ome words are *ideologically contested*, the focus of ideological struggle, and this is sometimes evident in a text'. To his contention, it is useful to 'alternate our focus between the text itself and the discourse type(s) it is drawing upon'. This, according to Fairclough (*ibid.*), may apply to a term like '*socialism*', which cannot in any way be claimed to have the 'one true and "literal" meaning' based on the belief that 'social control should be exercised in the interests of the majority working people in society'. After all, each discourse type would have its own – to use Fairclough's term (2001: 95) – 'veil of semantics', its own politics of meaning, reflected in one text or the other.

Fairclough's CDA model is further consolidated in another publication (1995): a collection of his papers on CDA (1983-1993). In this work, Fairclough is concerned with the ideological importance of the implicit (non-discoursal), taken-for-granted assumptions (presuppositions) upon which 'the orderliness and coherence of texts depend'. More specifically, in his view, the power to control discourse is seen as 'the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including oppositional) practices' (Fairclough 1995: 2). Fairclough makes a point of building up a 'three-dimensional' framework in order to 'map three separate forms of analysis onto one another', and these forms, as he states, comprises (1) 'analysis of (spoken or written) language texts', (2) 'analysis of discourse practice (process of text production, distribution and consumption)', and (3) 'analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice' (*ibid.*: 2). Fairclough argues for the assumption that language/ideology issues ought to figure in the wider framework of theories and analyses of power, where the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony'[21] (Gramsci 1971) could be useful.

This theme can easily be recognized in Fairclough's 'building process', where he builds from the achievements and limitations of explorations of these questions with Marxism, especially Althusser's contributions to the theory of ideology and its development by Pêcheux into a theory of discourse and a method for discourse analysis (see Althusser 1971; Pêcheux 1982). Eventually, Fairclough (1995: 70) argues for a certain assumption: 'a more diverse range of linguistic features and levels may be ideologically invested than is usually assumed, including aspects of *linguistic form* and style as well as "content"'.

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[21] Gramsci (2006: 85) defines 'hegemony' as being characterized by a 'combination of force and consent [...], without force predominating excessively over consent', in an attempt to 'ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority'; and it is in this sense that 'hegemony' can be understood as '*the organisation of consent*' (Barrett 1991: 54, italics in original), and thus as 'the dominance of one particular [discursive] perspective' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 7).

Unfortunately, despite the applicability of Fairclough's (1989 [2001], 1995) CDA model to detecting ideological manifestations in linguistic structure, the model seems to fall short of covering the way that various linguistic features can be ideologically invested or contested across *clashing texts*. Particularly, the way words collocationally cluster in texts could be manipulative, especially if a critical stand is to be taken towards the marked frequencies of the lexical associations at discourse level. Benwell and Stokoe (2006) have been much occupied with the idea of arranging lexico-grammatical choices in CDA: 'In CDA's language analysis, discourse is treated as a system of lexico-grammatical options from which texts/authors make their choices about what to include or exclude and how to arrange them' (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 108).

Another shortcoming in Fairclough's model, and perhaps in most CDA models, is the subjective identification of the linguistic feature(s) to be studied in text. Hardly, if ever, is there a consolidated base (statistical or otherwise) on which the textual phenomena under analysis can be identified. As will be shown in the next chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.4), the research departs theoretically as well as methodologically from the stage of computationally identifying collocations. Thanks to corpus methods, I have kept any subjective intuitions or reflections out of the way when identifying the collocations that will be qualitatively described, interpreted and explained in the present study (for further details see Chapter 3).

Also, Fairclough's model pays scant attention to the cognitive aspect of the ideological representations holding between society and discourse, except for a cursory discussion of 'frames', 'scripts' and 'schemata' (see Fairclough 2001: 131f). The socio-cognitive approach adopted and developed by van Dijk towards the study of discourse has filled in this gap on a variety of topics: 'racism' (Van Dijk 1984, 1987, 1991, 2005, 2007), 'ideology' (Van Dijk 1998), and 'context' (Van Dijk 2008a, 2009a, 2009b). In his preface to *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, van Dijk (1998: vii) points out that 'cognition

should be linked with both discourse and society, thus serving as the necessary interface by which social structure can be explicitly related to discourse structure'. Interestingly, van Dijk's conceptual triangle of discourse-cognition-society affords a comprehensive theoretical account of how to interpret ideology in terms of 'social cognition' by locating it in 'a social context' (1998: 12). As a result, it is important to integrate the sociocognitive approach into Fairclough's model (specifically, the second stage of interpretation), where the lexical aspect as being patterned in discourse is evocative of some internal organization and mental functions of ideologies.

Further, Fairclough's model seems to neglect important rhetorical aspects in the ideological representations of discourse, such as 'fallacies' and *'topoi'*. These aspects may serve in legitimizing or delegitimizing certain discursive practices. The discourse-historical approach developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) handles these aspects by drawing on 'rhetoric and argumentation theory' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 71). I shall be interested in the potential relationship between collocations and pragmatic fallacies when introducing the descriptive toolkit in the theory chapter (see Chapter 3, Subsection 3.5.4).

At this point it may be useful to refer to one discourse type that has been glaringly neglected in CDA, that is, religious discourse. More narrowly, the question of how religion is socially represented in discourse has been barely studied in CDA; and is one of the reasons for the topic of this thesis, which examines meta-religious discourse.

2.4.3   CDA and the social representation of religion

As I said above, this study intends to investigate a meta-religious discourse, more specifically, meta-Wahhabi discourse. The texts to be analysed, using a CDA approach, are the product of this kind of discourse; they are possessed of a polemically religious nature. Unfortunately, it is rare to find CDA research focusing on texts that handle (meta-)religious

topics and the ideologies lying behind their social representations (as realized in religious discourse). Perhaps, one reason for this rarity is the fact that within certain discourse communities critiquing religious discourse topics could be socially sensitive, if not risky. Also, it may be the case that members of certain religious discourse communities cannot question the sacred texts of religion since their belief system is enshrined in those texts that are in turn above any critique. This explains why, rather than discussing 'the *object* of religion' proper, Burris (2003) has had to focus on the '*subjects*' constructing 'the discipline of religious studies':

> [I]f we can no longer discuss what religion is *about*, meaning the *object* of religion, then the manner in which *subjects* construct the discipline of religious studies – the personal and historical contexts which inform *them* – become the focus of attempts to talk about the politics of "religion".   (Burris 2003: 31f)

Another important reason why it is rare to find a CDA approach towards religiously coloured types of discourse is historical. This can tacitly be realized in Fox's account:

> The trend of ignoring religion as a social factor dates back to the foundation of the social sciences, including thinkers such as Comte, Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Voltaire, and Weber (Appleby, 1994, pp. 7-8; Shupe, 1990, p. 19; Turner, 1991). Although the individual understandings of these scholars on religion differed, they all believed that a modern rational scientific age of enlightenment would replace religion as the basis for understanding and running the world.   (Fox 2006: 539)

As a consequence, there has been a scarcity of (critical) discourse analysis on the subject of religion. Certainly, this factor has had its adverse effect on the social representation of religion: religion was taken to be asocial over long periods of academic research. Thus, the social foundation of discourse studies in general and CDA in particular has not been as sensitive to religion as a context of research as it ought to be. Nonetheless, a number of studies have recently brought CDA and religion (or religious aspects) together in research.

However, prior to providing an outline of those studies, let us voice one caveat. Although many of such studies do not explicitly offer a CDA perspective towards the social representation of religion(s), they show deep interest in how religion(s) could be authoritatively politicized in many different social contexts; this is likely to have much bearing on the agenda of critical studies of language and CDA as having 'from the beginning a political project: [...] that of altering inequitable distributions of economic, cultural and political goods in contemporary societies' (Kress 1996: 15).

Mittelstaedt (2002) has touted a framework for understanding the dialectical relationships between religions and markets. The objective of his study is threefold. First, it details the parameters of market activities as being affected by religion and religious institutions (2002: 7f). Second, it discusses the ways in which religion exerts authority over activities of markets; as he argues, the presence of authority is a prerequisite religious influence on markets (*ibid.*: 8ff). Third, religious authority is used as a framework to understanding how the intersection of religion and market operates that dialectically, where each informs and is informed by the other (*ibid.*: 12ff).

In his study *Playing Language Games and Performing Rituals: Religious Studies as Ideological State Apparatus*, Fitzgerald (2003) argues theoretically for the ideological status of religion in academia; and thus he deems religion to be a problematic category that has developed its own peculiar logic. According to Fitzgerald, this theoretical assumption can readily be recognized in 'the constitutional importance of "religion" implied in the juridical separation of church and state', 'the idea that "freedom of religion" is a human right, and 'the institutionalisation of religion in the academy' (Fitzgerald 2003: 210).

Further, Leustean (2005) has investigated the relation between religion and politics, opening up the research questions of 'why religion and politics should be analysed together

and why the relationship between the two should necessitate our attention' (Leustean 2005: 364). Indeed, Leustean has proposed two perspectives towards the investigation of the religion-politics relationship: first, 'the perspective of the relationship between the institutionalised religion and the state: church-state relations, the legal position of churches within the state, the role of churches in political conflicts, democracy and religion, etc.'; second, 'the perspective of the creation of the nation-state and their reciprocal role in the nation and inter-national-building process' (*ibid.*: 367).

Another strand of CDA research on religion has considered how religions or religious groups are represented in discourse. With regard to Islam, for example, Richardson (2004) has studied the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers, analysing 'the ways in which they reproduce anti-Muslim racism' (2004: xvi). Other examples of this work include the édited collection *Muslims and the News Media* (Poole and Richardson 2006) and Baker's (2010) corpus-driven comparison of broadsheet and tabloid news stories about Islam.

In an attempt to assess cognitive approaches in CDA, Wodak (2006) has traced 'the historical roots' of 'anti-Semitic beliefs' in 'Austria', 'Germany', 'France', and 'Italy', with 'religion' (among other things) as a political factor in mind. None the less, religion as a discursive practice has not prominently featured in her analysis. In one study by Mejiuni (2006: 38), bias against the societal status of women has been highlighted in relation to Christianity and Islam. The emphasis was on 'violence against women' to the advantage of men's power, largely by the agency of a contextual distortion of 'the view of God and his will'. The study, however, is a purely content-based analysis; and hardly, if ever, does the linguistic aspect of analysis figure in this study.

One critical-realism-oriented theme about the dialectics 'geography of religion versus religious geography' has prominently featured in an article by Ferber (2006). Importantly, Ferber has reached the conclusion that 'the "spiritual turn" in critical realism [...] could create opportunities for fruitful reflexive dialogue among geographers of religions regarding ontological and epistemological complexities in the study of religion' (2006: 180). Also, Dabbous-Sensenig (2006), using CDA, wrote an article titled 'To veil or not to veil: gender and religion on Al-Jazeera's Islamic Law and Life'. In this article, out of a CDA perspective, Dabbous-Sensenig attempted an analysis of the Muslim dress code (commonly known as *hijab*) on *Al Jazeera*'s religious talk show *A-Shari'a wal Hayat*. Drawing mostly on Fairclough's critical analytical approach to the media, the author examined the micro-level (key linguistic strategies) deployed by participants (among whom is Al-Qaradawy[22]) in order to justify their discursive position concerning the nature of the Muslim dress code. In this instance, the textual (as a micro level) has been correlated with the macro (or, in Dabbous-Sensenig's terms, 'the global') level of the socio-cultural context of *Al-Jazeera* and its societal status in the Muslim world.

Taking Turkey as a case study, Keyman (2007) has set out to critically analyse the tripartite complex of 'Modernity, secularism and Islam'. Perhaps, why Keyman has chosen Turkey as a case study is worthy of note here. As he explains:

> Turkey [as a Muslim society with a strictly secular nation-state] constitutes a sociologically illuminating, theoretically challenging and politically timely case study for an analysis of the increasing complexity and ambiguity embedded in the historically and discursively unsettled relation between secularism and religion. (Keyman 2007: 216)

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[22] Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was born in 1926; he is an Egyptian Muslim scholar, who has published extensively on different areas of religion; his pulicatons are more than 80 books. Also, he has played leading roles in the Islamist movement of Muslim Brotherhood.

Keyman (2007) has made it clear that religion is related to politics in complex and even contradictory ways. An interesting finding in his study is the delineation of the ways in which 'the politics of secularism involved contradictions as it has operated as a political project to control claims and demands for the recognition of their cultural rights' (*ibid.*: 228). Additionally, one PhD dissertation (2007), by Nilsson, has tackled the links between religion and politics in contemporary France as a way of 'rethinking secularization'. The researcher's primary goal is to examine the construction of France as a secular (French: '*laïc*') republic and how French Muslim immigrants reacted to this. Nilsson's theoretical take-off comprised CDA (Fairclough 1992) and discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), with a view to analysing material which includes speeches by the president and prominent ministers, legislative texts and juridical interpretations and police regulations and directives.

While it is true that both Dabbous-Sensenig and Nilsson's CDA-based multi-levelled analysis have usefully probed controversial discourses (socio-religious and politico-religious, respectively), they lacked the comparative element of clashing texts touted by opposing 'discourse communities' (see Chapter 3).

Indeed, studying (meta-)religious discourse in CDA necessitates some sort of safeguard against bias in analysis; a quantitative approach is needed particularly at the stage of identifying the textual phenomenon of collocation in each text. Hence the need for incorporating corpus linguistics into the present context of research, where a meta-religious (i.e. meta-Wahhabi) discourse is under investigation.

2.5 Corpus Linguistics: new horizons in collocation and collocability

2.5.1 Corpus Linguistics (CL)

McEnery and Wilson (2001: 1) define corpus linguistics (CL) as 'the study of language based on examples of "real life" language use'. However, it might be useful here to shed light on

the term 'corpus' itself. In defining 'corpus', Hunston (2002) draws attention to the 'form' and 'purpose' of the term. According to her, the term 'corpus' has always been used by linguists to 'describe a collection of naturally occurring examples of language, consisting of anything from a few sentences to a set of written texts or tape recordings, which have been collected for linguistic study'. However, Hunston (2002: 2) continues to argue that the recent use of the term *corpus* has been reserved for 'collections of texts (or parts of text) that are stored and accessed electronically', and 'designed for some linguistic purpose'; and this specific purpose of the design 'determines the selection of texts'. It is this recent definition of corpus that distinguishes corpus linguistics from purely qualitative approaches in research. Baker (2006: 1f) points out this distinction by emphasizing that corpus linguistics 'utilizes bodies of electronically encoded text, implementing a more quantitative methodology, for example by using frequency information about occurrences of particular linguistic phenomena'.

2.5.2 CDA and CL combined

Traditionally, the discipline of critical linguistics – out of which CDA evolved – was known to be incompatible with CL. In their study *Language and Control*, Fowler *et al.* (1979: 197) pointed out that 'there is no analytic routine through which a text can be run, with a critical description issuing automatically at the end'. Later, Fowler (1991: 68) stressed that 'critical interpretation requires historical knowledge and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines'. This is plausible for the qualitative analyses provided by critical analysts, whose approach is 'especially relevant to detailed analysis of a small number of discourse samples' (Fairclough 1992: 230).

Another dimension of the problem, as Hunston (2002: 110) reflects on the issue, lies in two factors respecting the nature of the corpus itself: (1) 'if a corpus is composed of a

number of texts, corpus search and processing techniques, such as word-lists, concordance lines and lists of collocations, will tend to obscure the character of each text as a text'; (2) 'the corpus treats texts as autonomous entities: the role of the text producer and the society of which they are a part tends to be obscured'. Perhaps, one may add a third factor (3) – particularly in considering a large corpus: 'important features of the context of production may be lost when using such [CL] techniques' (Clark 2007: 124, cited in Baker *et al.* 2008: 275).

This explains why some critical linguists have avoided using corpora and CL techniques in their research. However, there are researchers from both paradigms who have considered the need for combining both CDA and CL. Among those researchers, most of whose works will be proposed in the coming subsections, are Hardt-Mautner (1995), Krishnamurthy (1996), Stubbs (1996, 2001), Caldas-Coulthard and Moon (1999), Hunston (1999), Piper (2000a, 2000b), Koller (2004), Mautner (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009), and Salama (2011).

Hardt-Mautner (1995) draws attention to the fact that corpus-based tools can facilitate research into the discipline of CDA. Her research project deals with newspaper discourse on the European Union; and, in critically analysing the research (sub-)corpora and their self-reference position in relation to their readerships, she (1995: 8) makes use of the 'concordancer' which 'does provide new ways of kick-starting the analysis because it enables researchers to pursue even the most tentative leads'. For example, the lexical item *people* is among the lexical items that Hardt-Mautner (*ibid.*: 9) finds high up on the frequency list in the tabloids as compared with the broadsheets. This has been even clearer with Hardt-Mautner's observation that the '*Sun*'s editorials [...] claim to be speaking for the people'. Hardt-Mautner argues that, with the help of 'computing', it becomes possible to substantiate this 'feeling' of 'That is what the people want', as a typical notion of the paper. Thus, for

Hardt-Mautner, the quantitative evidence 'confirms that there really is a case for regarding the *Sun*'s use of *the people* as distinctive compared to other papers investigated' (*ibid.*).

A corpus-based approach to CDA is argued to be invaluable as an established methodology of doing collocational analysis and frequencies in large corpora (general and specialized), and rather objectively specifying key words in the largest amounts of text. According to Beaugrande (1999), there is a methodological problem for doing CDA, especially when it comes to corpus data:

> Obviously, the methods for doing a 'critical discourse analysis' of corpus data are far from established yet. Even when we have examined a fairly large set of attestations, we cannot be certain whether our own interpretations of key items and collocations are genuinely representative of the large populations who produced the data.   (Beaugrande 1999: 287)

Methodologically speaking, it seems that this problematic status of doing CDA on corpus data, especially large ones, could be easily handled through the automatic analysis of a large number of texts at one time. Such an analysis would certainly be revealing of the 'non-obvious in a single text' (Partington 2003: 7).

Baker (2006: 10ff) spells out the advantages of the corpus-based approach to discourse analysis. First, a corpus-based approach 'reduces researcher bias': using a corpus enables us to 'place a number of restrictions on our cognitive biases'. Second, corpus linguistics is a useful way of handling the '*incremental* effect of discourse': knowledge of 'how language is drawn on to construct discourses or various ways of looking at the world' renders us to be 'more resistant to attempts by writers of texts to manipulate us' by suggesting 'what common sense or accepted wisdom' is. Third, corpus data can 'reveal the presence of counter-examples' (i.e. resistant and changing discourses) which 'are much less likely to be uncovered via smaller-scale studies'. Fourth, corpus linguistics favours

'triangulation': 'using multiple methods of analysis (or forms of data)'; this 'facilitates validity checks of hypotheses', 'anchors findings in more robust interpretations and explanations', and 'allows researchers to respond flexibly to unforeseen problems and aspects of their research' (Layder 1993: 128, cited in Baker 2006: 16).

Further, recently, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 6) have argued that corpus-based approaches have been 'applied to the examination of discourses or ideologies'; and this application has been made in 'political texts' (Flowerdew 1997; Fairclough 2000), 'scientific writing' (Atkinson 1999), and 'newspaper articles' (Van Dijk 1991; Morrison and Love 1996; Charteris-Black 2004). 'Such studies', Gabrielatos and Baker (*ibid.*: 6) continue to argue, 'have shown how corpus analysis can uncover ideologies and evidence for disadvantages'. They provide examples of these studies: 'Hunston's (2002) study of constructions of the deaf, Baker's (2005) examination of gay men, and Mautner's (2007) study of the elderly'. Also, on a socio-political level of CDA, they (*ibid.*) refer to Baker and McEnery's (2005) 'analysis of a relatively small (130,000 words) corpus of British newspapers texts published in 2003'. The study shows 'quantitative evidence of linguistic patterns being repeatedly used in negative constructions of refugees'. Also, recently, Baker *et al.* (2008) have argued for the 'useful methodological synergy' of CDA and CL in the examination of 'discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press'. Similarly, drawing on the traditions of CDA and corpus linguistics, Mautner (2008) has tackled the use of print media as a data source in social science projects. Even more recently, Mautner (2009) has been concerned with the question of 'how corpus linguistics can contribute to CDA'.

Thus, while this composite approach is still in infancy, the studies above suggest that this is a methodological approach that has a great deal of potential. However, there are other studies that have used corpora in facilitating CDA research. This aspect will be elaborated in the coming subsection.

2.5.3 Corpora and the critical study of language

Neither the native-speaker intuition nor normal conscious awareness would always manage to discover the ideological or cultural messages that these patterns of associations implicitly convey, particularly if they are at odds with an overt statement in text. Let us take up two of the three important aspects, mentioned by Fowler (1987: 482f), done by critical linguists (see Subsection 2.4.1 above): (2) revealing 'the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt propositions'; (3) challenging 'common sense by pointing out that something could have been represented some other way, with very different significance'. Hunston (2002) surveys a number of studies, where the role of corpora features strongly in critical linguistics. (Focus, however, will be on those studies that tackle lexical patterns and the messages conveyed implicitly through their use.)

2.5.3.1 Corpora, lexis and ideology

Based on a corpus of texts downloaded from websites, Teubert (2000) studies the language of Euroscepticism in Britain; the corpus built by Teubert draws on a discourse which antagonizes the European Union (EU). According to Hunston (2002: 111), in Teubert's study, some words are identified as 'intuitively or conceptually significant in some texts', whereas the others are the collocates of these words. One of the interesting findings in Teubert's (2000) study is the contrast between what he calls 'stigma' and 'banner' keywords, which, in Teubert's judgment, highlights 'inconsistencies in the Eurosceptics' position'. For example, '*unaccountable bankers* are evidence of the perfidy of Europe, whereas an *independent central bank* is held up as an ideal, yet both *unaccountable* and *independent* indicate institutions which do not answer to a political power' (Teubert 2000: 55, cited in Hunston 2002: *ibid.*).

Hunston (2002: 112) reports another study by Flowerdew (1997), which tackles speeches made by the last British governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten. Through the corpus of Patten's speeches, Flowerdew has reached the conclusion that these speeches have created a mythical picture of Britain as a benevolent colonial power. What matters here is Flowerdew's focus on the collocational information that has worked as evidence for this argument. In Patten's speeches, for example, the words *economy* and *economic* are usually found in positive environments: typical collocates are *choice, freedom, fairness, cheerfulness, success, talent* and *initiative*. As Hunston (2002 *ibid.*) explains, one of the interesting findings brought in by Flowerdew's study is that 'these words not only create a prosody of 'goodness', but also link *economy* to other Western values such as *choice* and *freedom*'.

Further, Hunston (2002: 114) introduces two seminal studies by Piper (2000a, 2000b). In general, Piper's work examines key items such as *lifelong learning* in a corpus of government and EU documents. What captivates Hunston's interest about Piper's work is the latter's 'integration of corpus observation and social theory'. The striking example in Piper's work is collocation: Piper classifies the collocates of key items like 'lifelong learning' into types; and then 'she draws a connection between the collocational behaviour of the word and its social significance' (Hunston 2002: 114). In Piper's (2000b) second study the term *individuals* is investigated in its lexical as well as grammatical contexts; the collocates and the grammatical patterns of the word *individuals* are linked to its semantic roles and to the ideology of the texts comprising the corpus. According to Hunston (2002: 117), Piper (2000b) 'notes that *individuals* has a wider range of usage in a general corpus than in the specialised one'. Based on this analysis, Piper comes up with the finding that lifelong learning is cast as the responsibility of institutions, which must organize it, rather than the individual who will, passively, do the learning. In the last analysis, Piper suggests that 'policy-making discourse does not simply arise from socio-cultural norms, but quite

specifically contributes to them' (Piper 2000b: 24, cited in Hunston 2002: 117). All in all, Piper (2000a, 2000b) has offered the interpretation of *lifelong learning* as a new concept which is still tenable in light of the classification and interpretation of collocates.

Also, Tribble (2006), examining Guardian texts, makes use of keyword lists in order to 'identify which personalities dominate the news agenda over a particular period of time' (Mahlberg 2007: 197). As Mahlberg (2007) explains:

> For the period 1996-2001 he [Tribble 2006] finds *Clinton, Blair, Milosevic, Bush, Clinton's, Gore, Pinochet, Netanyahu, Putin, Hague, Blair's,* a list that 'summarises the heroes, villains and supporting cast in the period immediately before the 11th September attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, from this newspaper's perspective' [...]. A closer look at the collocates of the key words can then 'sort the good guys from the baddies'.

> (Tribble 2006: 165, cited in Mahlberg 2007: 197)

Now, Let us move on to survey other studies that have brought together corpora, lexis and culture.

2.5.3.2 Corpora, lexis and culture

Authors can so easily circulate culture discursively from one text to another. Sperber (1996: 1) said: 'Culture is made up, first and foremost, of such contagious ideas'. One compelling reason for this may be the nature of culture itself. Indeed, words are smooth-going carriers of culture. Loan words, lexical borrowings and transliterations across the world's languages are the living proof of it. Stubbs' work (1996, 2001) could be regarded as one step forward towards studying the cultural messages encoded in the lexis of different corpora. Stubbs (1996: 172) focuses on 'how quantitative techniques of corpus analysis can be used to analyse the meaning and use of cultural keywords'. He studies examples of 'cultural keywords', that is, words with important socio-political facts about a community. This can be

summarized in Stubbs' statement about the bottom-line of his work: 'The main concept is that words occur in characteristic collocatioँns, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody' (Stubbs *ibid.*).

Following Sinclair's (1991: 68f) principle that '[c]orpus analysis shows that one form of a lemma is usually much more common than others', Stubbs draws upon frequency information as a resource for deducing what aspect of a situation the society considers to be most salient. Stubbs (1996), using comparative frequency, notes that in the BBC corpus, from the Bank of English, the abstract word *unemployment* is much more frequent than the personal word *unemployed*. Stubbs (*ibid.*) explains that the word *unemployment* 'applies to areas and populations, rather than to the people who are unemployed'; and this word 'collocates not with references to individual people, but with references to groups and categories of people and to areas, and with quantitative expressions' (Stubbs 1996: 180). Here, frequency is reflective of the collective, as opposed to the individual, concern. Discourse and its community (in this case, public discourse in Britain) is the controlling force which seems to be reiterating the abstract phenomenon of unemployment more than the personal cases of unemployed individuals. Here, the ideological meaning consists in dehumanizing such personal cases by reducing them to mere (impersonal) abstractions.

One interesting finding in Stubbs' (1996) study is the newly emerging collocations as potentially indicative of new concepts and word-meaning changes. Stubbs notes the collocational structures *single parent families* and *unmarried mothers*. To him, such collocational structures 'signal important changes in social structures' (Stubbs 1996: 184). In this case, a new phrase means a new family structure. He further notes the novel collocation *working mother*, which means 'a mother in paid employment outside the home'. For Stubbs (*ibid.*), significantly, this collocational structure marks out a shift in the meaning of the word *work* from its general sense 'doing something' to a new cultural sense 'paid employment'.

The implication in the phrase is that looking after children and doing household chores does not count as 'work'.

There is yet another important finding in Stubbs' study about the strength of collocations in society, particularly those which become fixed and unquestionable (in his terms, 'unanalysed') constructs: '[...] if collocations and fixed phrases are repeatedly used as unanalysed units in media discussion and elsewhere, then it is very plausible that people will come to think about things in such terms' (1996: 195). In this regard, Stubbs offers the two pairs of collocation *falling standards* and *illegal immigrants*. He (*ibid.*) argues that the collocation *falling standards* has become a fixed phrase in the context of discourse about education. This may eventually explain why, in this type of discourse, it would be easier to challenge an alternative phrasing such as 'standards are less high now than they were previously'. The second collocational structure realized between the two words *illegal* and *immigrants* exhibits both a high *t*-score and a high MI-score, which suggests that it is a fixed, 'unanalysed' phrase, i.e. questioned no more by the majority. Thus, the existence of the phrase as strongly collocating makes for the people's acceptance of branding any movement from one country to another under whatever circumstances as negative, with the sweeping generalization 'All immigration is illegal' established as a discursive practice.

Corpus-based studies have contributed to enriching the critical oriented studies in contexts that are socially sensitive. Krishnamurthy (1996) studies words that are typically representative of social conflict: *tribe/tribal*, *ethnic/ethnical* and *race/racial*. The major finding of this study is that such words are used to discursively construct 'otherness', in that they make a dividing line between the groups referred to (or labelled) and the target audience reading the texts they are used in. For example, the word *tribal*, which is evocative of pejorative tribalism, is evidence of racism. Similar studies in this respect are Phillipson (1992: 38f), who notes the deliberate use of 'a range of terms in colonialist discourse' ('we

are a *nation*, they are *tribe'*), and Partington (1998: 74f), who notes a range of words which are used to refer to 'other people', but 'not to ourselves' ('cults', 'extremists', 'fanatics', 'fundamentalists', 'militants').

Caldas-Coulthard and Moon (1999) investigated a newspaper corpus of the *Sun* and the *News of the World*. Their research focus is the modifying adjectives of words such as *man* and *woman*. Hunston (2002: 121) has surveyed the significantly different results coming out of this study: the word *women* being restrictively modified by adjectives that are indicative of 'physical appearance', such as 'beautiful, pretty and lovely'; and man being equally restrictively modified by adjectives that are indicative of 'importance', such as 'key, big, great and main'. Even more interestingly, as Hunston (*ibid.*: 121f) points out, by further investigation (Hunston 1999), the sex-based significant difference is further confirmed by common adjectives like *right*: whereas *right woman* overwhelmingly means 'the right woman for this man', *right man* means 'the right man for the job'. Using corpus evidence, the findings of both studies confirm the culture of a sexist society as reflected in the discourse of popular journalism, or confirm the bias of newspapers that represent men and women unequally. Hence, to Hunston (2002: *ibid.*), the critical interpretation in this context of research goes into two complementary courses: first, a society that bears sexist culture would make use of the populist resources of the media (in this case, newspapers) to maintain and enhance its sexist culture and ideology; second, the discourse of newspapers could perpetuate, if not engineer, the biased construction of gender roles in society.

Adopting a corpus-based approach towards the study of words and phrases in corpora, Stubbs (2001: xv) makes it clear that '[c]orpus data sometimes reveals that forms which are thought not to occur, do occur and are systematically used'. Obviously, then, a corpus may validate the potential for unusual collocations, irrespective of the status of such collocations as idiomatic or not in the language system. This indicates the social-practice-of-

language meaning of discourse. This has been made rather explicit in Teubert's account: 'Corpus linguistics sees language as a social phenomenon. Meaning is, like language, a social phenomenon. It is something that can be discussed by the members of a discourse community' (Teubert 2004: 97f). Williams (1976, cited in Stubbs 2001: 172f) illustrates that the word *culture* itself has a variety of different meanings because of 'semantic extensions in the past'. On this point Stubbs (*ibid.* 173) significantly comments that the different uses of the word *culture* have been realized since the early sixteenth century across many various corpora of 'music, literature and the arts', used such as *sugar-beet culture* and *germ culture.*

Towards the end of the twentieth century significant changes were taking place in the study of collocation. This has been largely made possible thanks to the new technology available for data-processing and corpus-based research. In the present context of research, two of the most critical resources are the computer and the corpus. Detecting whether there are significant frequencies of lexical co-occurrence in text is wholly the realization of the concordance and collocation functions of corpus analysis software like WordSmith (Scott 1999). Also, the same tool could be essential when it comes to the 'tests for significant collocations' in corpus data; this is feasible on certain grounds: 'Three statistical formulae are most commonly used in corpus linguistics to identify significant collocations: the MI (mutual information), *t* and *z* scores' (McEnery *et al.* 2006: 56f). (This point will be fully tackled over the next two chapters.)

Further, reference corpora like the British National Corpus (BNC) greatly help in detecting the subtle connotations of the collocational patterns in one corpus, largely by allowing for examining how collocations work in general British English. This, in turn, would offer a better idea regarding whether the collocates of one discourse community are unusual (say, ideological) or not. A good example is Baker's (2006: 97ff) study of the two terms *bachelor(s)* and *spinster(s)* in the British National Corpus, where '*bachelor* occurs 424

times and *spinster* 140 (the respective plurals occur '82 and 36 times'). Baker's research goal is to 'obtain a better idea of some of the main discourses surrounding unmarried people and the way such discourses are gendered', based on the BNC's representativeness of general British English. As far as collocation is concerned, Baker (*ibid.*: 103f) has shown interest in the fact that the word *habits* strongly collocates with bachelor(s) (with the span set at + 1 to + 5) in phrases like 'a bachelor of fixed habits' and 'a bachelor of somewhat eccentric habits'. Interesting about Baker's study is that it suggests that young bachelors are seen as acceptable and attractive (an important collocate is *eligible*), but older ones are viewed as sad or problematic. On the other hand, spinsters are always viewed as sad.

The recent emergence of corpus linguistics has considerably bridged an intolerable gap in research relating the meaning of a lexical unit by focusing on the unduly neglected aspect of discourse-bound word meanings as pragmatically realized in collocation:

> From a corpus linguistics perspective, the meaning of a unit meaning is what we can glean from the discourse. It is what we can find about how a unit of meaning is being used. More important than the plain usage data are paraphrases of a unit of meaning. They explain to us what this unit means [...]. A whole book can be a paraphrase. All those books about globalisation try to explain to their audiences what *globalisation* means.

> (Teubert and Čermáková 2004: 156)

One observation about Teubert and Čermáková's corpus-based approach to a meaning unit in discourse is the dynamic relation between discourse and an audience, which negotiates its way through the meaning of *globalization*.

Even so, a corpus-based approach, if taken alone, towards the issue of collocability in discourse would be short of covering the whole aspects of evaluative meaning in collocations across opposing discourse communities. In other words, as Biber *et al.* (1998: 9)

emphasize, conclusions from a corpus-based analysis cannot be made from quantitative data alone; an interpretation of the figures in relation to their interactive meanings, i.e. the qualitative analysis of quantitative patterns, must be concomitant with the quantitative results. That is, the quantitative information from a corpus is closely intertwined with potential qualitative analyses of corpus data: the frequency of words and their various patterns, which may well be atypical in the language system, enable us to see unusual co-occurrences of them in real life language use, which in turn leads to descriptions about their meanings and functions. Thus, a corpus-based approach₀essentially entails a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Hence a need for the critical spirit that is readily offered in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

2.6 Conclusion

The overall goal of this chapter can be formulated as follows: surveying the classic and modern studies that are interested in examining the cultural and ideological meanings actualized in lexical associations in general and lexical collocations in particular. Having elaborated on the discourse and ideology theories and their role in the study of lexical associations, I began to focus narrowly on how the use of corpora and corpus methods has been a great aid to the development of critical linguistics and CDA. Finally, besides, this chapter has another important goal of offering terminological explanations of the concepts essential to the critical study of collocation; this is intended to prepare the reader for the next chapter which is devoted to proposing the theoretical model suggested for analysing the research data.

CHAPTER 3

Ideological Collocation: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with outlining a theory of ideological collocation at two complementary levels of representation, text and discourse. This marks a theoretical shift from focus on the overt textual realization of collocation towards the covert representations mediated by the discourse functions of producing, interpreting and explaining collocation. In this way, collocation should be framed beyond the merely descriptive limits of traditional text linguistics (see Chapter 2, Subsection 2.2.1). That is to say, it should be viewed as a textual resource for the discursive construction of social reality.

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This chapter is devoted, then, to laying out a theoretical framework of ideological collocation, which will in turn guide the data analysis. It begins by reflecting on the need for a critical approach towards the study of collocation, in its textual co-text and social (discourse) context. To this end, a number of themes will be tackled. First, the role that corpus linguistics (CL) can play in identifying collocation; second, the toolkit that can be employed in describing collocation and its ideological meanings in text; third, the model that could serve the purpose of producing, interpreting and explaining the discourse(s) that may sustain or resist ideological collocation.

3.2 Collocability: a critical approach

The study of collocation across different discourse communities[23] demands an amalgam of critical discourse-analytic approaches towards collocability as potentially conveying an ideological position. Fairclough (1995, 2010) distinctly demarcates such approaches:

> I am using the term 'descriptive' primarily to characterize approaches to discourse analysis whose goals are either non-explanatory, or explanatory within 'local' limits, in contrast to the 'global' explanatory goals of critical discourse analysis [...]. Where goals are non-explanatory, the objective is to describe without explaining [...]. Where goals are explanatory but 'local', causes are looked for in the immediate situation (e.g. in the 'goals' of the speaker...), but not beyond it; that is, not at the higher levels of the social institution and the social formation, which would figure in critical explanation. Moreover, although 'locally' explanatory descriptive work may seek to identify at least local determinants of features of particular discourses, descriptive work generally has been little concerned with the effects of discourse. [...]. For critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, the question of how discourse cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro structures is at the heart of the explanatory endeavour. (Fairclough 1995: 43, 2010: 45)

Here, Fairclough draws attention to the issue of the 'beyond', where the exploration of discourse in terms of ideology and asymmetrical power relations requires of the analyst not to stop at the limits of *locally describing* the surface structure of the text; but rather to move towards the macro level of discourse by *globally explaining* its processes (i.e. production, distribution and consumption).

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Therefore, the present research is concerned with the study of collocation not only within its textual boundaries, as a textual practice, but as a discursive practice as well. This renders the purely descriptive approaches myopic in vision when it comes to the textual

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[23] The term *discourse community* is further developed later in this chapter.

analysis of collocation. A critical explanatory approach may help uncover the underlying socio-cultural workings of collocation in terms of its ideological representations in discourse. In other words, this kind of approach may explain a certain politics of meaning of collocation as a resource for creating meaningful antagonisms across opposing discourses (see Chapter 2, Subsection 2.2.3).

3.3 Ideological collocation

Investigating the ideological character of collocation necessitates taking the concept (collocation) beyond the descriptive boundaries of text towards an explanatory critical model of discourse.

Chapter two, as a literature review, has offered a survey of the studies (classic and modern) tackling the concept of collocation. The mainstream corpus-based definition tends to present collocation as 'frequent co-occurrence' of lexical items (see Chapter 2, Subsection 2.2.1). The point is many patterns in various texts may manifest *unusual* frequencies of lexical associations. This is particularly so when the words in association exhibit no semantic relation, which may at times create what is known as sense incongruence or semantic clash (see Subsection 3.5.2). In this case there might be a pragmatic context of collocation, which renders one text or another biased in the way that its words characteristically co-occur. Thus, there is some potential for an ideological position in this context (in what may be called *motivated* collocability). A theoretical model of corpus linguistics (which offers an objective quantitative identification of collocations) and critical discourse analysis (which provides a thorough qualitative investigation of collocations) can serve the purpose of showing how the process of collocability could be underlain by an ideological position (for full details see the methodology chapter [Chapter 4, Section 4.3]).

Before explaining the present theoretical model in detail, I shall devote some space for the CDA contribution to the examination of collocation in the present research. To this end, Fairclough's (1989 [2001]) three-stage model of CDA (see Chapter 2, Subsection 2.4.2) serves as a general guideline, particularly at the stage of describing ideological collocation in text. However, it should be noted that I shall introduce some theoretical modifications into Fairclough's tripartite model. The reason for these modifications is threefold. First, the type of discourse investigated in the present research is meta-religious in nature, which entails a treatment that is slightly different from the purely political type of discourse. Second, rather than analyzing a set of textual features, there will be an analytic focus on the textual phenomenon of collocation and its potentially ideological status across opposing discursive practices. Third, the description stage in Fairclough's model is not exhaustive enough as to adequately handle all the different aspects of the pragma-semantic description of the collocating items in the texts designated for analysis. On a theoretical level, the third point is hardly surprising. Speaking of the present CDA procedure, Fairclough (2001) himself stresses that 'the procedure should not be treated as a holy writ – it is a guide and not a blueprint. In some cases, readers using it may find that some parts are overly detailed or even irrelevant for their purposes' (Fairclough 2001: 92).

Now, it is time we picked up the issue of how to *quantitatively* identify collocations, which will be *qualitatively* put through the critical stages of description as well as production, interpretation and explanation.

3.4 Corpus linguistics and corpus-based analysis

Identifying collocation, being part of the study of lexis in general, requires electronic (computational) assistance, since the number of lexical items is too unmanageably large for collocations to be identified manually. Clear (1993: 275) regards 'the identification of

"interesting" [that is, interesting in terms of research target] collocations' from a corpus as 'an information retrieval task'. For him, the corpus is 'an information base' in which there are 'interesting word pairs'. This necessitates a computational tool which achieves what information scientists term 'precision' and 'recall'. Clear (*ibid.*) argues that for collocational analysis a computational tool is indispensable; and this tool should achieve high recall (that is, should pick out all the pairs that the analyst would want to consider, i.e. the interesting pairs) and high precision (that is, should not 'retrieve a large number of pairs which are *not* of interest').

It follows then that there should be a more or less accurate way of identifying relevant (in Clear's terms, 'interesting') collocations. A statistical approach may well serve the purpose of identification here. Arguably, it is appropriate to use corpus tools in determining 'empirically which pairs of words have a statistically significant amount of "glue" between them, and which are hence likely to constitute significant collocations [...]' (McEnery and Wilson 2001: 86).

In Chapter 2, I have touched upon a definition of 'corpus' as part of the term 'corpus linguistics' (CL). Nevertheless, hardly have I done justice to the term. Neither have I provided the characteristics of corpus-based analysis. These points need to be focused here.

A general definition of the term 'corpus' as potentially 'a collection of texts' could be simplistic, if not misleading; for it divorces from context two essential elements: 1) the status of the occurring data in this collection of texts, i.e. ideal or natural; 2) the idea of 'machine readability'. In modern linguistics, on a more technical level, the term 'corpora' is defined as 'large bodies of naturally occurring language data stored on computers' (Baker 2006: 1). Indeed, according to Meyer (2002: 6), the usefulness of corpora in research is that they 'enable linguists to contextualize their analyses of language; consequently, corpora are

very well suited to more functionally based discussions of language'. This aspect of functionality may well be maintained in corpus analysis by offering the co-textual information via an examination of concordances.

A concordance is a list of all the occurrences of a word in a text or corpus in its immediate context, or more precisely, co-text. 'At the centre of each line', Partington (1998: 9) explains, 'is the item being studied (keyword or node)'. He further explains that '[t]he rest of each line contains the immediate co-text to the left and right of the keyword. Such a list enables the analyst to look for eventual patterns in the surrounding co-text, which proffer clues to the use of the keyword item' (*ibid.*). As Hunston (2002: 65) argues, concordance lines 'present information' for the analyst to observe and interpret. It is, then, through the concordance-based analysis that typical patterns and strong associations of words can be investigated at many and various levels. As it will be indicated ahead in this chapter, there is a critical need for this concordance-based analysis in enabling semantic and argumentative aspects of analyzing collocation.

In corpus-based research, the linguist (or the discourse analyst) could contextualize the analysis of language (for example, the analysis of collocating patterns); and the term *corpus*, in this sense, would be more liable to some functional investigation of language use as, say, being ideological. Biber *et al.* (1998: 4) give an account of four essential characteristics of corpus-based analysis: 1) being 'empirical' by analysing the 'actual patterns of use in natural texts', 2) being after a 'large and principled collection of natural texts' (a corpus, as 'the basis for analysis'), 3) making extensive use of 'computers for analysis', and 4) making use of 'both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques'. Thus, in its entirety, this account seems to emphasize the reliability of corpus-based analysis. This can easily be realized in the present context of collocating patterns, where the use of computer enables the analyst to consistently identify and analyse the complexity of the patterns in each text. As

Biber *et al.* (*ibid.*) argue, 'the storage and analysis of a larger database of natural language than could be dealt with by hand'. Now let us move to description as the second stage in the present theoretical model.

3.5 Describing ideological collocation

In the present theoretical framework, the stage of description follows the stage of identification. It has become clear that identifying collocations requires a carefully selected statistic provided by a corpus tool. As it will be shown in the methodology chapter, for the purpose of present research, it is the combination of the MI (Mutual Information) and *t* scores that nicely suits what is idiosyncratic of a certain writer or text as well as what is almost certainly collocational (see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.1.3). Here, the stage of description is intended to be a complement to the stage of identification: both are procedurally combined to constitute the micro level of analysis in the research. Overall, in the present context of research, the stage of description focuses on a formal feature that can be found in text (part of its surface structure), namely, collocation.

However, it should be noted that collocation in this sense is predicated on Sinclair's (1998, 2005) model of the 'extended lexical unit' (see Subsection 3.5.1 below). This is where collocation is meant to be a structure in its own right (hence the term *collocational structure*): the formal composition of collocation (node + a span) is systematically, and sometimes complexly, structured in a corpus, where marked lexico-grammatical choices might prove to be *peculiar* to a particular discourse type that the text draws on, or to a certain discourse community, a member of which is the text producer themselves. Therefore, such peculiarity may well reveal a certain ideological stance in text. This is one of the basic principles upon which the stage of identifying collocations in my research data is based. There should be a reliable method of precisely specifying the collocations that mark such an ideological

peculiarity in the data; or that potentially stand as what Fairclough's (2001: 93) calls 'a trace of and a cue to the way in which the text producer's experience of the natural or social word is represented'. (As will be shown in the methodology chapter, I found this reliable method in corpus linguistics, where a computational tool is enlisted at the micro stage of identifying the potentially peculiar collocations in the texts under analysis [see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.1].)

In the present model, collocational analysis is based on a wide-ranging descriptive toolkit which is aimed at getting at the ideology coded implicitly behind overt collocational structure. It is a rhetorical-linguistic toolkit as it draws on a number of lexico-semantic relations, such as synonymy and opposition, and a list of pragmatic fallacies. In the subsections below, I shall set out the above-mentioned toolkit.

3.5.1 Collocation and extended lexical units

'One of the main theoretical proposals to come out of corpus studies is', writes Stubbs (2007: 177), 'Sinclair's model of extended lexical units'. As Stubbs (*ibid.*) argues, it has become the basis for 'a powerful model of phrasal units of meaning'. Based on Sinclair (1998, 2005), Stubbs (2007: 178) gives an account of the structure of this model of extended lexical units, which is increasingly abstract: 1) 'COLLOCATION', 2) 'COLLIGATION', 3) 'SEMANTIC PREFERENCE', and 4) 'SEMANTIC PROSODY'. Importantly, as Stubbs points out, collocation is the most specific level. Also, I would add, collocation is the basic unit to which the two concepts of 'semantic preference' and 'semantic prosody' strongly relate. (Note that I shall intentionally pass over the term 'colligation' in Sinclair's model, since it is concerned with word-classes and the purely grammatical relation in collocability.) In an earlier study, Sinclair (1966) described the structure of collocation as follows:

We may use the term **node** to refer to an item whose collocations we are studying, and we may then define a **span** as the number of lexical items on each side of a node that we consider relevant to that node. Items in the environment set by the span we will call **collocates**.

(Sinclair 1966: 415, emphasis in original)

In Sinclair's model therefore, collocation is the relation between the node word, which could be the search word in a concordance, and the 'collocates', i.e. the individual word-forms which 'co-occur frequently' with it.

Further, continuing with Stubbs' description of Sinclair's model, semantic preference is concerned with the traditional term 'lexical field', where a class of words (say, the collocates of a node word) 'share some semantic feature'. This can be viewed as the semantics of collocability. Also, in the same model, the semantic prosody (or, as Stubbs [2007: 178] prefers, 'discourse prosody') describes 'the speaker's evaluative attitude'. Again, this can be viewed as the pragmatics of collocability. (A detailed discussion of semantic preference and semantic/discourse prosody is found in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.) The coming subsections will be an elaboration on as well as a critique of both 'semantic preference' and 'semantic prosody' in relation to the concept of *ideological collocation*.

3.5.2 Semantic preference, discourse prosody and collocational preferences

In Chapter 2, I have invoked the definitions of 'semantic preference' and 'semantic [discourse] prosody'. It may be useful here to draw a distinction between the two concepts: while 'semantic preference' is 'the relation, not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words' (Stubbs 2001: 65), 'semantic [discourse] prosody' is 'an evaluative or attitudinal tone a word articulates'; the 'consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates', which often involves a

'hidden meaning' (Louw 1993: 157ff). However, before proceeding any further, one caveat should be made here. What constitutes discourse prosody is not the mere existence of words in a sequence. It is, rather, the collocational structure (node-span) that produces 'the habitual co-occurrence between the word and a set of words that share similar semantic traits' (Partington 2004: 131). It can be argued, then, that collocational meaning arises from the interaction between semantic preference and discourse prosody, with two complementary functions in the picture: the semantic and the pragmatic, respectively. This may explain why in Partington's (2004: 151) judgment 'semantic preference "contributes powerfully" to building semantic [discourse] prosody'.

Even so, when trying to get at the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt collocations in text, it is not enough to describe the semantic preferences or discourse prosodies involved in collocability. Rather, there should be a theoretical model of description that makes explicit how the words collocating together in one text could bear 'semantic clash' (Cruse 2000: 219ff). This may create an inter-collocate sense incongruence. The element of sense incongruence among collocates may be an ideological manifestation of the way in which the text producer is ambivalent about one and the same node word. The collocates of one node word may be identified as coming from a set of different (if not opposing) semantic domains. Just think of a hypothetical scenario, where two clashing texts are argumentatively written about Muslims living in the West post-9/11; the first attacks all such Muslims and the second makes a distinction between extreme jihadist Muslims and civil Muslims. Across these two texts, one is expected to find collocates, or at least, lexical associates of the item *Muslims* that are biased in authorial stance: in one text, Muslims and *terrorists, threatening, murderers, peace-hating, violent*, etc.; in the other, Muslims and *tolerant, peaceful, peace-loving, receptive*, etc.

This hypothetical scenario should reveal the fact that ideologically motivated collocations may not show obvious semantic preferences compared, for example, with the ideology-free hypothetical instance of the node word *drink* and a set of semantically related collocates like *tea, coffee, lemonade, squash*, etc. In fact, the ideological type of collocation could be loaded with what Cruse terms 'co-occurrence preferences', based on the text producer's peculiar lexico-grammatical choices. Let us now elaborate on Cruse's concept of 'co-occurrence preferences' (see below), so that we can see how it may violate the semantic preference in the process of collocation. This can be detected as a type of semantic abnormality in some cases of collocation.

In Cruse (2002: 221), one type of lexical 'abnormality' has been termed 'semantic clash': 'meanings simply do not go together'. In general, according to Cruse, the process of semantic clash occurs where some units of meaning impose 'semantic conditions of some sort on their syntagmatic partners'. Cruse (*ibid.*) calls these imposed semantic conditions '**co-occurrence preferences**', rather than the well-known label 'co-occurrence restrictions'. The important conclusion Cruse draws in this connection is that co-occurrence preferences can be thought of as 'presuppositions of the unit which imposes the conditions'.

Cruse's (*ibid.*) argument has made a strong case for clashes which result from the 'non-satisfaction of collocational preferences'. This can be explained in light of the text-driven process of collocating one item with another. In this case, collocability may be based on a certain presupposition, whereby a node word such as ISLAMIC may manifest a negative discourse prosody in association with the set of collocates *extremism, terror, control, separatism*, etc in one text. The collocation instance at stake is typical of incongruity:

The most serious degree of clash is incongruity. This is when the ontological discrepancy is so large that no sense can be extracted at all, without radical reinterpretation. Since there is not even an inkling of sense, in the worst cases, there is no feeling that the utterance could be corrected. (Cruse 2000: 222)

The issue of 'radical reinterpretation' as an outcome of collocational preference is strongly suggestive of an ideological position at utterance level. At this point, Cruse's 'co-occurrence preferences' could be viewed as contradicting with what is conventionally referred to as 'semantic preference' (see Sinclair 1991: 111). The term is often invoked to explain the collocational link in text between a node word and a set of semantically related words. As Stubbs (2001: 65) points out, when it comes to semantic preference, it is accessible to 'find a semantic label [a semantic descriptor]' for a set of collocating lexical items.

In this argument, there has been an allusion to the pragmatic element of presupposition behind collocational preference, which does not readily allow for a semantic descriptor. There seems to be what O'Halloran (2003: 20) terms *text bias* as 'being a form of semantico-syntactic manipulation'. Of course, 'text bias' can be best recognized in light of the collocational preferences motivated by the text producer; this may allow for the evaluation accompanying certain discourse labels, which frequently appear in the textual vicinity of certain people, things or events in collocation. In fact, collocational preferences are likely to get stereotyped in the form of commonsensical collocations. The natural shift from the mere process of collocation into a state of stereotyping has been usefully introduced by Clear (1993):

I have defined collocation as the mere recurrent co-occurrence in text of word-forms, and stereotyping as the tendency of collocations to develop a life of their own as identifiable piece of a native speaker's lexical hoard. (Clear 1993: 273)

Unlike Clear's above argument, I would rather not confine the collocation-stereotyping transformation to the native speaker's lexical repertoire; but, I think, the peculiar life

developed by collocations (which got stereotyped) tends to be identified with the members who share the same, or similar, social beliefs (see the concept of 'discourse community' in Subsection 3.7.1 below).

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In certain discourses, collocational preferences may draw on negative discourse prosodies via which stereotypes get established. Not surprisingly, then, as McEnery *et al.* (2006: 83) argue, discourse prosodies are more often than not realized as 'typically negative, with relatively few of them bearing an affectively positive meaning'. Eventually, each discourse type may have its own peculiar collocational preferences, which textually bring in different (and, sometimes, opposing) prosodies.

3.5.3 The lexicalization of collocates: classification schemes

In what follows, I shall present two lexico-semantic relations that may govern the 'lexicalization'[24] of collocates in a way that facilitates their contrastive analysis across the data in this research, Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas. This analytic aspect, using Fairclough's (2001: 95) terminology, can be referred to as 'classification schemes': 'which vocabulary is organised in discourse types'. Significantly, Fairclough (*ibid.*: 96) makes clear that a classification scheme constitutes 'a particular way of dividing up some aspect of reality which is built upon a particular ideological representation of that reality'. The two lexico-semantic relations at stake are textual synonymy and opposition. Each would serve as the basis of a classification scheme with a particular discursive function, overlexicalization and relexicalization respectively.

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[24] In exploring the interface between 'discourse semantics' and 'ideology', van Dijk points out that 'it should be emphasized that probably the major dimension of discourse meaning controlled by ideologies is the selection of a word meaning through lexicalization' (Van Dijk 1995: 259). Here, following the same understanding, I focus on how the selection of certain collocates could be controlled by particular ideologies. Also, allowing for opposing discourses, this may also bring in an element of ideology-based *relexicalization* that is instantiated by counter-collocates in and across clashing texts.

At the level of phrasing a set of collocates, I shall hypothetically use terms such as *intratextual overlexicalization* and *inter/intratextual relexicalization* (see Salama 2011). The former is meant to be the discursive function of overuse of collocates in one text (intratextually); the latter is meant to be the discursive function of using oppositional lexical paradigms, either across opposing texts (intertextually) or in the same text (intratextually). Further, the term *inter-collocate* might be used in case the same set of collocates should be used in the two opposing texts, or generally when the collocates in question are examined intertextually across those texts. Finally, it should be noted that the present classification will necessarily make use of both the semantic preferences arising between the node word and the lexical set of semantically related word-forms and the discourse prosodies (and collocational preferences), which represent the discourse function of the collocational structure, that is, the evaluative attitude behind collocation use. Let us now come to the classification schemes of textual synonymy and oppositional paradigms.

3.5.3.1 Textual synonymy and overlexicalization

The different meaning relations between the collocates identified in one text may ideologically represent one aspect of reality about the world we are living in. Behind such an aspect of reality there could lie a belief or a principle or simply an idea. Even beyond the boundaries of one text, this can well be recognized between the different collocates of the same node word in different texts. It is therefore useful, as Fairclough (2001: 95) argues, to 'alternate our focus between the text itself and the discourse type(s) that this text is drawing upon [...]'. Each type of discourse would probably determine how meaning relations should be working in the ideological service of a certain representation of the world. Hence the experiential values loaded upon words in texts. The collocational span on either side of a node word may be packaged in a certain meaning relation that can discursively help in maintaining

or resisting an ideological representation of a belief or an idea. Of course, this systematically occurs intratextually and/or intertextually[25]. Here, our focus is on textual synonymy as a classification scheme via which one text may relay an ideological meaning through collocation.

'The term "synonymy," Jackson (1988: 64) argues, 'derives from Greek, and its two parts (*syn-* + *-nymy*) mean "same + name"'. This may be initially taken as evidence that synonymy deals with sameness of meaning. However, the sameness-of-meaning formula is too loose to unravel the complexity of 'synonymy' or to capture its semantically wide scope. By drawing distinction between synonymy and polysemy, Ullmann (1957: 108) restrictively locates synonymy on the level of sense, rather than on the level of form: whilst 'polysemy' is a matter of 'one name with several senses, "synonymy" is a matter of 'one "sense" with several names'. Nida (1975) is even more explicit in treating synonymy as holding between senses rather than between whole forms or lexemes. He (1975: 98) has observed that 'terms whose meanings overlap are generally called synonymous'. According to him, such terms are bound to be substitutable for each other in at least certain contexts. Still, he poses a necessary restriction, assuming that these synonymous terms are rarely, if ever, 'substitutable for each other in any and all contexts' (*ibid.*). Actually, Nida again makes a point of establishing the phenomenon of synonymy at the sense level, against that of pseudo-synonymy at the form level:

> In most discussions of meaning, synonyms are treated as though the terms overlap, while in reality what is involved is the overlapping of particular meanings of such terms. When one says that **peace** and **tranquility** are synonyms, what is really meant is that one of the meanings of peace, involving physical and/or psychological state of calm, overlaps the meaning of

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[25] It should be noted that intertextual occurrence, here, is derived from the nature of the two texts selected in this research; the texts are created by two single authors, who tackle the same topic differently.

tranquility, also involving physical and/or psychological calm. One is not at this point discussing the meaning of **peace** as the absence of war or the cessation of hostilities. This distinction becomes clear when one compares the common expression **peace conference** with the non-occurring expression **tranquility conference**.   (Nida 1975: 98, emphasis in original)

Significant about the forgoing arguments (sense-based synonymy) by Ullmann and Nida is a textual hidden agenda: the textual emphasis on almost one and the same sense (by using synonymy) could conceivably be a strategy of what Fairclough (2001: 96) terms 'overwording'[26]. According to Fairclough (2001: *ibid.*), overwording 'shows preoccupation with some aspect of reality – which may indicate that it is a focus of ideological struggle'.

From a CDA perspective, Fairclough sees synonymy in a rather pragmatic context of discourse, as part of the discursive process of ideology-making. Fairclough (2001: 80) has discussed the first paragraph of a newspaper editorial titled 'The still small voice of truth' (the *Times* editorial, 20 May 1982), under the following questions: (1) 'What sort of meaning relationship is there between *invasion, evil, injustice, aggression?*'; (2) 'How does their relationship in this text differ from their relationship in discourse types you can think of?'; (3) 'Do you think this text can reasonably be described as 'ideologically creative'?' (*ibid.*). The three questions are framed around the following sentence – the second sentence in the editorial paragraph – italicized in Fairclough's attested version: *Yet at the heart of the matter, it was an evil thing, an injustice, an aggression.* Fairclough (*ibid.*) has observed that the listing of the three expressions ('evil', 'injustice', 'aggression') as attributive of *the invasion of the Falklands* suggests a relationship of 'meaning equivalence' between them. Thus,

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[26] Note that I shall use the terms *overlexicalization* and *relexicalization* in place of Fairclough's (2001) terms 'overwording' and 'rewording' for two reasons. First, the terms *overlexicalization* and *relexicalization* help me to avoid the theoretical problems associated with the term 'word' (for full discussion, see Carter 1998: 4ff). Second, the two terms (*overlexicalization* and *relexicalization*) are more appropriate to the lexemic nature of the collocational environment analysed in this study.

according to Fairclough, *evil*, *injustice* and *aggression* can be 'used interchangeably to refer to the invasion'. In this context of analysis, Fairclough has reached interesting findings:

> In this special sense, we can say they [*evil*, *injustice*, *aggression*] are textual *synonyms*. But they are not synonymous in the meaning system of any discourse type I can think of. Ideologically, this suggests a conflation of political/military acts with morality (*evil*) and legality (*injustice*); *aggression* is already a conventionalized partial expression of this conflation. In the last two sentences of the paragraph, this conflation seems to be 'put to use': the invasion is referred to as (*that*) *evil*, and this slides into general references to evil which are assumed to carry over to the invasion.　(Fairclough 2001: 80f)

Fairclough's analysis has provided important insights into how synonymy should be theoretically reconsidered. First, rather than the language-system-bound synonymy, there is what can be termed 'textual synonymy'. It is a type of synonymy that is (re)produced as a corollary of the fact that synonyms can be ideologically created within texts; and these synonyms might well not be semantically compatible – irreconcilable semantic fields of the <MILITARY> or the <POLITICAL> could be conflated with those of <MORALITY> and <LEGALITY> (see Fairclough's analysis above). Second, the textual position of such synonyms is significant: the present context of analysis has shown the textual synonyms *evil*, *injustice* and *aggression* to be attributive of the same unit in text, *the invasion of the Falklands*. This attributive status has demonstrated the intersubstitutability of the words (*evil*, *injustice*, *aggression*) in question, with a peculiar discourse type in mind (the *anti* type of discourse) – a discourse which runs counter to the invasion of the Falklands. Third, possibly following from the first and second, in considering the ideological creativity of any text in relation to synonymy (among other meaning relations), focus should be altered between the text at stake and the discourse type(s) it is drawing upon. Last, by looking upon textual synonyms, one should not strictly follow the line of argument by semanticists who differentiate between absolute (if there could be any!), partial, or near synonyms (see Lyons

1977, 1995). To me, textual synonyms are synonyms on the grounds that they serve the same discursive ideology-making function of overlexicalization.

Overlexicalization is steadily reflective of certain preoccupations with aspects of reality, where an ever-growing discursive clash of ideologies is at a stake. In sum, as one classification scheme, textual synonyms run intratextually (in one text) to fulfil the discursive function of ideologically overlexicalizing one aspect of reality against another; this textual realization may be frequently actualized in the set of collocates co-occurring with the node word or expression, being the object of ideological focus in text.

However, also at the collocational level, is there not any other way of representation that serves some other discursive function for ideology-making purposes? And, if there is any, how would it work in collaboration with textual synonymy?

3.5.3.2 Oppositional paradigms and relexicalization

The second classification scheme that may suggest an ideological representation at collocation level is what I call *oppositional paradigms*. Roughly they are of two kinds. First, intertextual oppositional paradigms: a set of collocates frequently co-occurring with a node word in one text could constitute a paradigm opposing to another set (with almost the same node word) in another text. For example, hypothetically two newspapers may have different sets of collocates around the subject of *refugees*, depending on whether their political stance is pro- or anti-immigration (e.g. *strain, pest, flood* vs. *diversity, benefit, expertise*). Second, intratextual oppositional paradigms: a set of collocates of a node word within the same text may constitute an oppositional paradigm with one another, depending on the co-text. (So it may also be the case that a single text about 'refugees' could include two sets of collocates, one positive and the other negative.)

Let us start from the premise that each text draws upon different, if not opposing, type(s) of discourse. Thus, as is the case with textual synonymy, alternating the focus between the text and the discourse type(s) it is drawing upon is certainly useful. As a classification scheme, oppositional paradigms work ideologically in or across text(s) to serve the discursive function of what Fairclough (2001: 94) terms 'rewording' (or, as I would prefer to call it, *relexicalization*): 'an existing, dominant, and naturalized, wording [or lexicalization] is being systematically replaced by another in conscious opposition to it'. This is particularly observable, I would argue, through certain oppositional paradigms that may be collocationally actualized in text: 1) **euphemism** vs. **dysphemism**, 2) **specification** vs. **genericization,** 3) **nomination** vs. **categorization,** and 4) **epistemic modality** vs. **categorical assertion.** Let us take each oppositional paradigm in turn.

The first collocation-based oppositional paradigm is **euphemism** vs. **dysphemism.** 'Euphemism', write Allan and Burridge (1991: 3), 'is characterized by avoidance language and evasive expression; that is, Speaker uses words as a protective shield against the anger or disapproval of [...] beings'. Enright (1985: 1) even goes to the extreme that '[w]ords themselves are in an obvious sense euphemisms for what they represent: sticks and stones may break your bones [...]'. In fact, euphemism may be a linguistic medium which realizes 'what Orwell called the "defense of the indefensible"' (Thomas *et al.* 2004: 48). 'Dysphemism' on the other hand, according to Allan and Burridge (*ibid.*), 'is the contrary of euphemism', since in investigating dysphemism 'we examine the verbal resources for being offensive, being abusive [...]'. Thus, words or expressions may be used strategically euphemistically or dysphemistically to avoid or maintain an offensive position. That means in drawing on euphemism or dysphemism there should always be a certain stance towards a person, an event or an object. Likewise, the collocates of node words may ideologically

reword each other (intertextually or intratextually) by standing oppositionally as euphemisms vs. dysphemisms.

The second oppositional paradigm is **specification** vs. **genericization.** This antonymy-based classification scheme is borrowed from van Leeuwen's social-actors theory (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2008: 35f). According to van Leeuwen (*ibid.*), there are two alternative – I would say oppositional – aspects of representing social actors. On the one hand, a set of collocates may constitute a 'specification' case, and be restrictively (or, sometimes, exclusively) classificatory by reference to concrete entities, such as individuals, states, and so forth; and therefore there may be an ideological interest in focusing attention on any of those concrete entities; or, alternatively, drawing public attention towards a certain thing as a discursive strategy of covering up for another party to a conflict or another aspect of reality.

On the other hand, an opposing set of collocates may constitute a case of 'genericization' by subtly figuring in text as noun complexes (Determiner + General Noun), or simply as semantically indeterminate abstract or plural nouns. Such entities can be categorized under Halliday and Hasan's (1976) term 'general nouns': 'a small set of nouns having generalized reference within the major noun classes' (1976: 274). Halliday and Hasan (*ibid.*) give examples of nouns that express a generic function in text: 'human noun' (*people, person, man, girl, etc.*), 'inanimate-concrete-count noun' (*thing, object*), 'fact noun' (*question, idea*), and so forth. One ideological dimension to this class of general nouns can be realized in the textual potential for an interpersonal meaning. As Halliday and Hasan (*ibid.*: 276) argue, these nouns may bear a certain attitude of either 'familiarity' or 'distance' in relation to their object of reference in text: in this case, the writer assumes some right to represent the thing s/he is referring to, 'one personal representation involving either a contemptuous or a sympathetic attitude'. Therefore, according to Halliday and Hasan (*ibid.*), a general noun may be accompanied by an 'attitudinal Modifier', like for example, '*The stupid thing, the lucky*

fellow and so on'. This is how such an evaluative aspect may be ideologically exploited in a fixed pattern of genericized collocates.

The third oppositional paradigm is **nomination** vs. **categorization**. It is another antonymy-based classification scheme that is borrowed from van Leeuwen's social-actors theory (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2008: 40f). Again, the collocates may be realized in or across texts as contrasting social actors in nominated or categorized forms. While the former (nominated) social-actor collocates can be represented in terms of 'their unique identity, by being *nominated*' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 40), the latter (categorized) social-actor collocates can be represented in terms of 'the identities and functions they share with others (categorization)' (*ibid.*). These different representations of collocates or even node words (standing as social actors) across or within texts can reflect the different discourses and ideologies that texts draw on in respect of the collocations actualized therein.

The fourth, and last, oppositional paradigm is **epistemic modality** vs. **categorical assertion**. Simpson (1993: 47) argues that 'modality refers broadly to a speaker's [or writer's] attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence'. I shall not take the broad definition of modality here, since I am concerned with only one modal system that constitutes the present oppositional paradigm; that is, epistemic modality, which is 'possibly the most important regarding the analysis of point of view [and, thus, of ideology]' (Simpson *ibid.*: 48). An epistemic modal word or expression is 'concerned with the speaker's [writer's] confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition expressed' (*ibid.*). Interestingly, Simpson contrasts 'epistemic modality' with Lyons' (1977: 763) account of 'categorical assertions', where the latter express 'the strongest possible degree of speaker commitment' to the (same) truth of a proposition. The important thing about Simpson's argument is that categorical expressions are therefore 'epistemically non-modal': 'Epistemic expressions thus function to distinguish non-categorical assertions from categorical ones by

signalling that the speaker's commitment to the truth of the propositions encoded in the utterance is qualified' (Simpson 1993: 49).

This meaningfully oppositional paradigm between the epistemic modality and categorical expression can be ideologically indicative at collocation level. The collocates of the same (or similar) node words may contrast in terms of this oppositional paradigm on a continuum of the propositional truth expressed in certain contexts. Imagine the frequent co-occurrence of the collocates *may* or *might* vs. *is* or *are* with one node word across two different texts on the same topic. In this case, there seem to be two opposing representations of propositional truth into something, possibly about the node word. Also, speaking of the same case, there appears to be a scale of different authorial attitudes and commitments towards something.

Now, let us move to the second descriptive scheme that can be ideologically exploited at collocation level, that is, pragmatic fallacies as a form of argumentation schemes.

3.5.4 Collocation and argumentation schemes: pragmatic fallacies

Other than the semantic strand of theoretically describing ideological collocation (classification schemes), there could be a rhetorical strand that stands out as an argumentative dimension to collocability in discourse; this will collectively be referred to as argumentation schemes. Thus, with this part introduced into the present theoretical model, a descriptive semantico-rhetorical toolkit is full-fledged. I intend to use this toolkit to critically describe the collocations identified to be used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in the research data; and now it has become initially clear that the description is semantically and argumentatively oriented. However, before tackling the argumentative aspect of collocational analysis, let us first elaborate on the rhetorical aspect of collocation in the present model of description.

Rhetoric, in Aristotle's classic definition, is 'an ability to observe in each case the possible means of persuasion' (*Ars Rhetorica* I.2.1355b25-26). It is hardly surprising that the rhetorical and the political are dialectically inseparable. 'The notion of rhetoric', Wetherell argues (2001: 17), 'comes from ancient studies of political oratory', after all. However, Wetherell continues to argue, rhetoric has a certain 'modern resonance', suggesting that 'discourse is often **functional**' (Potter and Wetherell 1987, cited in Wetherell 2001: 17, emphasis in original). This may lead us into the serviceable concept of 'rhetorical discourse', probably first introduced by Bitzer (1999: 217), where the pragmatics of the rhetorical situation renders discourse argumentative in essence, with the express purpose of persuading or dissuading an Other.

According to Johnson (2000: 154), 'argumentation is the sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments'. By definition, argumentation suggests the imposing presence of persuasion. This is even clear in Johnson's definition of the concept of 'argument': 'An argument is a type of discourse or text – the distillate of the practice of argumentation – in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that support it' (*ibid*.: 168). It can be said that words (and perhaps collocations) matter significantly to the structure of an argument. In discussing what he calls 'the micro-units of arguments', Cox (1990: 11) explains that words are the building blocks of an argument; he makes it clear that words can be argumentatively structured and ordered in discourse and then, I would add, materialize in text. Indeed, Cox (*ibid*.: 12) makes a strong case for the fact that the rationality required for any argument is 'not just a social product but is contingent upon a certain kind of discourse'. It seems, then, that it is discourse that (re)shapes the essence of any argument, and that texts are the communicative channels via which the argument can (probably fallaciously) be realized (as lexical patterns).

In a parallel fashion to Hoey's argument about the lexis-grammar formula (see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.2), one would argue that the lexical-structure (namely, collocational structure) could constitute Cox's argument micro-units, and thereby set up propositional contents. In this connection, what began as an attempt to account ideologically for collocation could turn into 'an exploration of grammatical, semantic, sociolinguistic and text-linguistic [and, in our case, rhetorical] phenomena' (Hoey 2005: 1). The collocational patterns peculiar to one text may manifest rhetorically significant aspects of argumentation in favour of or against a certain ideology (or, what is in argumentation theory known as 'standpoint'). Thus, here, I shall be interested in collocation as a textual resource for constructing, or contributing to, fallacious arguments.

In Hansen (2002), Hamblin (1970) states that a 'fallacious argument [...] is one that *seems to be valid but is not so*' (Hamblin 1970: 12, cited in Hansen 2002: 133; italics in original). Van Eemeren *et al.* (1996: 70) comment that this is 'the standard definition of fallacy'. This could be one of the reasons why one should adopt Hamblin's (1970) definition of 'argumentative fallacy'. A second reason is that this definition has much bearing on the ideological representation that collocations may implicitly encode. However, considering the second reason, one needs to be selective of the fallacies put forward in the literature of argumentation theory. Not every argumentative fallacy is readily recognized at the lexical level in general and the collocational in particular. Therefore, I shall be concerned with those argumentative fallacies that could be realized in the collocational structure of one text.

In fact, it is the discourse-prosody element in the collocational process that may reveal this rhetorical aspect. Therefore, we need to emphasize the pragmatic nature of the argumentative fallacy itself, restricting ourselves to what Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 71) refer to as 'pragmatic fallacies'. Actually, I shall make use of only some of Reisigl and Wodak's series of pragmatic fallacies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 71ff), based on what might best serve

the ideological function of the collocating items in the present context of research. Some of the collocations identified in the textual data stand as the nucleus of an argument that irrationally appeals to a certain emotion or passion or that unjustifiably attack the Other (the antagonist); these collocations can be said to be a clear sign or symptom of the fallacies underlying the whole text (either by Schwartz or by DeLong-Bas). Hence the need to examine not only the collocations *per se*, but to go beyond the concordance lines and home in on the weak links in the whole argument, wherein the designated collocations are recurrently and subtly inserted.

In this connection, in my data I found that there are five pragmatic fallacies – or, more specifically, *ad fallacies* – that could be identified through the analysis of collocations in both texts, so that one aspect of discursive reality can be justified.[27] (Indeed, [pragmatic] *ad fallacies* constitute a category of arguments which 'was first distinguished by the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke (1632-1704)' [Van Eemeren *et al.* 2009: 6].) First, there is what Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 72) refer to as *argumentum ad hominem*: 'a verbal attack on the antagonist's personality and character [...] instead of argumentatively trying to refute the antagonist's arguments'. According to them, this *argumentum ad hominem* does not take account of 'the "facts" of the matter in question', but of attacking 'concealed motives of those who advance an argument'.

The second pragmatic fallacy, discussed by Reisigl and Wodak (*ibid.*: 72), is *argumentum ad misericordiam*, which consists of 'unjustifiably appealing for compassion and empathy in cases where a specific situation of serious difficulties, crisis or plight intended to evoke compassion and to win an antagonist over to one's side is faked or pretended'. Thus, it can be said to be predicated on what van Eemeren (2009: 88) had recently referred to as

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[27] This set of fallacies that I found was not exhaustive. Other researchers working on other texts are likely to find other fallacies being articulated via collocational patterns.

'*appeal to pity*'. The third is the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, which Reisigl and Wodak (*ibid.*) define as 'the misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence [...] for authorities'; and it consists of 'backing one's own standpoint by means of reference to authorities considered to be or passed off as being competent, superior, sacrosanct, unimpeachable and so on'. This echoes Locke's treatment of the *argumentum ad verecundiam* as often occurring when arguers 'draw on someone of eminence, using that person's word as backing for a claim'; and this is what precisely 'gives weight or power to the argument because audience, feeling an appropriate awe in the face of such an eminent authority, would be ashamed to challenge that person's word and hence is led to accept the argument' (Tindale 2007: 128).

The last two pragmatic fallacies that can be identified through analysis of collocation serve the function of legitimizing a certain aspect of reality at the level of discourse are the fallacy of 'hasty generalisation' (or '*secundum quid*') and the fallacy of *petitio principii* (or 'begging the question' or 'circular reasoning'). Reisigl and Wodak (*ibid.*: 73) define the first as 'a generalisation on the basis of a quantitative sample that is not representative'; they argue that this fallacy can take one of two forms, either a *compositio* (i.e. replacing the whole by a part) or a *divisio* (i.e. replacing a part by the whole). The second (*petitio principii*) means that 'what is controversial and in question, and thus to be proved, is presupposed as the starting point of the argumentation' (*ibid.*). A frequently cited example of this pragmatic fallacy is given by Van Eemeren *et al.* (2009: 10): 'God exists because the Bible says so, and the Bible is God's word'. (In the methodology chapter, it will be made clear that there is a close relation between pragmatic fallacies – as defined here – and the discourse prosodies of the designated collocations which reflect each text producer's stance towards the polemic topic of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism [Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.2.3].)

Having presented the micro level of the theoretical model, which involves identifying and describing the ideological meaning(s) of collocation, let us move on to the macro level

that is concerned with the discourse context of ideological collocation; that is, production, interpretation and explanation.

3.6 Producing ideological collocation

The first stage of the present CDA model is text production. However, it should be noted that I shall be concerned specifically with the lexical level of text. Here, two points need to be covered: first, demonstrating how the elements of evaluation, text production and lexis come to interact together socio-cognitively; second, explaining how problematic the position of the text producer may be in terms of the way their lexical items characteristically co-occur or collocate in text.

3.6.1 Evaluation, text production and lexis

Most of the labels that text producers apply to people (including the text producers themselves), objects or events in order to put them into groups or categories vary from one culture to another. In fact, none of them just reflects reality. Rather, they reflect an authorial stance which is evaluative in essence. This may initially explain why evaluation, lexis in discourse and the text producer are inextricably connected.

In their attempt to pinpoint the importance of evaluation, Thompson and Hunston (2000: 6) have mentioned three, though by no means exclusive, functions of evaluation: (1) 'to express the speaker's or writer's [the text producer's] opinion', which reflects the 'value system of that person and their community'; (2) 'to construct and maintain relations between the speaker or writer and hearer or reader'; and (3) 'to organize discourse'. Perhaps, the first function significantly defines evaluation as basically expressive: what the text producer thinks or feels about people, objects or events. This renders both evaluation and ideology closely related. This is made explicit in Thompson and Hunston's argument:

> Every act of evaluation expresses a communal value-system, and every act of evaluation goes towards building up that value-system. This value-system in turn is a component of the ideology which lies behind every text. Thus, identifying what the writer thinks reveals the ideology of the society that has produced the text. (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 6)

Where the issue of evaluation-based ideology arises, the second function of evaluation – maintaining the text producer-recipient relations – comes in: the text producer can be said to be 'exploiting the resources of evaluation of an aspect of a situation as a problem is driven by a particular view-point' (Hoey 1983: 95, cited in Thompson and Hunston 2000: 8). The question here, then, is the evaluative statement of an opinion as though it were a fact. On a socio-cognitive level, this can be explained by means of a clashing discursive competence (see Subsection 3.7.2) that is potentially existent between the text producer and consumer(s). This should lead into the third function of evaluation – organizing discourse. Rather than anything else, I shall be interested in the lexical organization in discourse as ideologically motivated by the evaluative belief-system of the text producer.

Indeed, texts (based on what discourse type they are drawing upon) are characterized by what Bloor and Bloor (2007: 130) call 'lexical sensitivity'. In other words, the discursive force of 'classificatory labels' (*ibid.*) that are systematically evoked against the value-system adopted by text producers, and that purport to upset the *pathos* of text recipients. Thus, for instance, if the text producer collocates one group with labels such as *negro* or *coloured*, there seems to be a textual strategy of offending, say, Africans or black minorities in one discourse community. In this case, the text producer would be drawing upon an anti-black (and thus racist) type of discourse. Certainly, here the production of the text is overlapping with its interpretation. (This overlap will shortly be tackled in Section 3.7.) Let us now move to the second point related to text production, that is, the problematic status of the text producer.

3.6.2 Text producer: a problematic position

In this part, our main concern is the text producer and their problematic position. All authors who write on politically, religiously or socially sensitive issues are likely to encounter disagreements from ideologically opposing audiences. Thus, in the research data the text producers (Schwartz and DeLong-Bas) confront problems resulting from their authorial stances towards the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. At the macro level of analysis, we need to open up the complexity of these author-specific problems, so that we can understand the power behind meta-Wahhabi discourse (anti vs. pro) and how they can be related to the collocational analysis.

When tackling the issue of text production, Fairclough (2001) has shown great interest in the motivation, be it conscious or unconscious, that the text producer might have for producing the text. He draws attention to the problematic status of the text producer (from the perspective of potential recipients of texts). In his model, Fairclough has shown the text producer to have a problematic position in terms of (1) contents, (2) relations and (3) subjects. In what follows, we shall focus on this problematic position of the text producer as put forward by Fairclough (2001: 141ff).

First, the problematic position of the producer occurs in terms of contents, where 'some discrepancy arises between the producer's common-sense (ideological) representations of the world [...] or when the producer's representations come into contact with other incompatible representations' (*ibid.*: 141). Let us imagine a possible scenario of two text producers, the first of which is a member of the board managing a factory and the second is a shop-floor worker. It is highly likely that each of the two would belong to a different, if not opposing, discourse community. Respectively, the two text versions may be realized thus:

[3:1a] *This year's strike was **worse** than last year's.*

[3:1b] *This year's strike was **better** than last year's.*[28]

Obviously, each producer occupies a problematic position in terms of the content of this message in relation to the other. What matters most about the content of this message are the *ideationally* incompatible representations of the 'strike', based on the clashing ideologies emerging between a managerial member in a factory and a shop-floor member. The representations are marked by using the highly evaluative words *worse* and *better*, where the same expression *This year's strike* is textually packaged with contrastive shades of evaluation.

Second, the problematic position of the producer arises in terms of relations, in the sense of 'the social relations between producer and interpreter(s) (addressee, audience)' (Fairclough 2001: *ibid.*). In the imaginary example above, it is the antagonistic institutional framework of management vs. shop floor that creates the problematic position of each text producer in terms of a particular audience. For instance, the managerial audience would not readily accept labelling *This year's strike* as *better than last year's*. After all, on an institutional level, the discourse community of management is likely to be averse to feeling at ease with any strikes at all. The obverse is true, when it comes to the other extreme discourse community of the shop floor, which would welcome, and certainly plan, a strike calling for their presumably usurped rights. Thus, *interpersonally*, each text producer would face the problem of relating himself/herself to a counter audience, which could consist, say, of people who are extremely opposed and others who may be amenable to change their point of view.

Third, the problematic position of the producer arises in terms of subjects. Here comes the social identity of the text producer. The socio-professional roles assigned to each producer in the forgoing example are diametrically different from a certain perspective. They

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[28] This hypothetical example is taken from Cruse (1986: 215).

strongly evoke an elite-proletariat conflict that has had a long history of struggle for power. Here the same social conflict is textually reproduced in the discursive roles performed by the managerial voice as opposed to a shop-floor voice. Interestingly, each voice is representative of a certain category or class of social subjects. The subject position of a suppressive 'manager' is problematically encountered by the subject position of 'workers' on the one hand; on the other, it is the subject position of a riot-making 'worker' that may problematize any encounter with the subject position of 'managers'. Thus, significantly, the lexical organization 'strike' + 'worse' and 'strike' + 'better' issues from two distinct subject positions that may draw on opposing discursive competences; a theme that is tackled in the coming subsection.

3.7 Interpreting ideological collocation

In the present research data, the cognitive context of discourse needs to be analysed at the macro level of interpreting the experiential, expressive and relational values attaching to meta-Wahhabi collocations as used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Fairclough (2001: 117) argues that interpretation, as a CDA procedural stage, is concerned with the discourse processes that give the textual features their values (experiential, relational and expressive). It has become clear now that the textual feature we are interested in is vocabulary at collocation level. It should be noted, however, that the present socio-cognitive model of interpretation is predicated on two constitutive parts of discursive competence, ideological coherence and schemas. But, before coming to discursive competence and its constitutive parts, let us have a preliminary subsection on the important concept of 'discourse community'.

3.7.1 Discourse community

Foucault (1972: 80) subjects discourse to a number of treatments: 'sometimes as the general domains of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and

sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements'. Here, Foucault aptly views discourse as combining (1) theory (discourse in general, i.e. neither a discourse nor discourses), (2) practice (identification of discourses, when talking, for example, of a discourse of neo-liberalism or a discourse 'about' Wahhabism), and (3) structure (focusing on the rule-governed nature of discourse through which one may speak of a 'discourse community').

This may lead us to the concept of 'discourse community' with its discursive regulations and conventions. 'Discourse community' is a term used by Nystrand (1982) and then developed by Swales (1990: 24ff) who defines the term according to six characteristics possessed by the members of one discourse community: 1) having 'a broadly agreed set of common public goals', 2) having 'mechanisms of intercommunication among its members', 3) using 'participatory mechanisms primarily to provide information and feedback', 4) utilizing and possessing 'one or more genres in the communicative furtherance of its aims', 5) having 'acquired specific lexis', and 6) having 'members with a suitable degree of relevant content and discoursal expertise'.

In the realm of discourse studies, the term 'discourse community' is by far more useful than the term 'speech community'. 'A speech community', Corder (1973: 53) explains, 'is made up of individuals who regard themselves as speaking the same language; it need have no other defining attributes'. At discourse level, the usefulness of the term 'discourse community' can be realized if we attempt to detect the crucial differences between 'speech community' and 'discourse community':

> One major difference between a discourse community and a speech community is the degree of conscious participation that takes place. We usually become members of a speech community as an accident of where we were born or happened to find ourselves. With a discourse community, on the other hand, we

may choose to become members by application or invitation, often because we have had a certain type of education, qualification or training. Another difference is that members of a discourse community broadly agree about their means of interaction.

(Bloor and Bloor 2007: 9f)

Thus, unlike a speech community, a discourse community is not confined to language as a system of signs; rather it aptly fits the definition of discourse as 'language as social practice determined by social structures' (Fairclough 2001: 14).

Even so, drawing solely on the term *discourse community* as an 'interpretive repertoire'[29] is unproductive. We need to define the form of knowledge and belief that underlie a discourse community and that render its members discursively competent enough as to share one and the same worldview without necessarily sharing the same language.

3.7.2 Discursive competence

I use term *discursive competence* as an interpretive repertoire in the present model. This term was first proposed and developed by Bhatia (2004: 144ff) as 'a general concept to cover various levels of competence we all need in order to expertly operate within well-defined professional as well as general socio-cultural contexts'. Zhu (2008: 189) maintains that 'discursive competence consists of textual space (textual knowledge), socio-cognitive space (genre knowledge in relation to professional practice) and social space (social and pragmatic knowledge)'. Based on Bhatia's concept of 'discursive competence', Zhu has reached an important conclusion: 'Thus, a text is seen as reflecting the addresser's discursive competence. Discursive competence involves textual competence, and professional and generic competencies' (Zhu 2008: *ibid.*).

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[29] I adapted this term from Wetherell and Potter (1988) and Potter and Wetherell (1995). They view 'interpretive repertoires' as being 'the building blocks speakers [or writers] use for constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes and other phenomena' (Wetherell and Potter 1988: 172). Also, according to them, 'they are available resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions' (Potter and Wetherell 1995: 89).

Discursive competence, as proposed here, consists of two inextricably intertwined components, ideological coherence and schemas.

3.7.2.1 Ideological coherence: knowledge and belief

Ideological coherence is the first component of discursive competence as presented in the current model of interpreting ideological collocation. Coherence is the second standard of textuality proposed by Beaugrande and Dressler (1981):

> A text "makes sense" because there is a CONTINUITY OF SENSES among the knowledge activated by the expressions of the text [...]. A "senseless" or "nonsensical" text is one in which text receivers can discover no such continuity, usually because there is a serious mismatch between the configuration of concepts and relations expressed and the receivers' prior knowledge of the world. We would define this continuity of senses as the foundation of COHERENCE, being the mutual access and relevance within a configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS [...]. The configuration underlying a text is the TEXTUAL WORLD, which may or may not agree with the established version of the "real world" [...], i.e. that version of the human situation considered valid by a society or social group.   (Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 84f)

The above definition of coherence is closely bound up with the concept of 'knowledge', and thus, I would add, 'belief'.

At this point, it is important to stress the discursive authority of knowledge as defined by Foucault: 'Knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice and which is specified by that fact: the domain constituted the different objects that will or will not acquire a scientific status [...]' (1972: 182). It seems then that knowledge accords a certain type of discourse power (which I may term credibility-giving power). Of course, we tend to *believe* more the discourse drawn on by an expert person (a knowing subject) than that by a layperson. Thus, as Hamlyn (1971: 78) rightly said, 'an analysis of the notion of knowledge

must be carried out by reference to such notions as belief, or being sure'. The interrelation between knowledge and belief will be even clearer and stronger, if we pay attention to religious knowledge and its corresponding belief system. Within the realm of religion, knowledge is of factual nature. Schmidt (1973: 218) is profoundly interested in the factual nature of religious knowledge, assuring that on the strength of factual knowledge, religious claims 'have been presented as certain', i.e. as knowledge-based dogmas that 'are to be believed without question'. Only here does the marked difference between religious knowledge and scientific knowledge appear, where the latter type of knowledge tends to be held only tentatively: every belief can be questioned and brought into dispute.

Let us, then, restrict our vision of knowledge (being inseparable from belief) to one assumption: knowledge is potentially an ideological tool of legitimizing a certain belief system. This is particularly true of the cognition of religious discourse-community members, whose knowledge about religion leads eventually to an informed belief system: 'a set of related ideas (learned and shared), which has some permanence, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit some commitment' (Borhek and Curtis 1975: 5). Thus any belief system is underlain by one form of knowledge, which renders beliefs subjective in nature. Beliefs, as van Dijk (1998: 19) argues, are 'the building blocks of the mind'; they are virtually 'all products of thinking'. Indeed, it is knowledge (alongside its discursive power) that informs the social being (individuals or groups) about what should be taken and accepted as true belief. That may explain why knowledge is drawn upon as a resource for 'the construal of relations between abstract entities that are taken to represent the world of human experience.

However, the discourse-based definition of knowledge offered by Foucault (1972) is not restricted to making true beliefs; rather, to him, knowledge is defined by 'the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse' (Foucault 1972: 183). The same is true of the sociology of knowledge. On sociological grounds, Dant (1991) defines knowledge as 'the

construal of relations between abstract entities that are taken to represent the world of human experience, that can be shared by humans through communication and that can be used by them both to understand their experience of the world and to guide their actions' (Dant 1991: 5; italics in original). This may be a good reason why one should roundly dismiss the factual nature of a belief. The so-called factuality of belief is always socio-culturally or socio-politically conditioned to serve an ideological position taken up by individuals and/or groups. After all, there seems to be a contradiction between assertion and belief: 'Assertion is a truth-claim, and belief is a truth-attitude' (Bowel and Kemp 2005: 262). As such, the nature of belief is not so far from being ideological. My argument here revolves around the observation that discourse community members seldom question knowledge-informed beliefs, which produce the coherence ideologically holding among the members of one discourse community. In this way, the fusion of knowledge and belief can eventually create an ideological type of coherence that partially maintains the discursive competence upon which members of the same discourse community draw for communicating and consuming certain meanings.

Now, let us move to the second essential component of discursive competence, schemas, and see how it can contribute to the interpretative model suggested here.

3.7.2.2 Schemas

Schemas (also called schemata, singular schema) are an important interpretative procedure for text interpretation. In many positions, van Dijk (1983: 16) finds it more appropriate to call schemata 'the *superstructure* of the text', since the term 'schemata' is 'too general or too vague' for the purpose of his research. However, I shall retain the term, not least because its general nature suits the purpose of the present research. As van Dijk (*ibid.*) argues, many discourse types seem to 'exhibit a conventional, and hence culturally variable, schematic

structure, an overall form that organizes the macropropositions (the global content of the text)'. Macropropositions are the essential part of the 'semantic macrostructures', or 'what discourses are (globally) about; they are mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker; they embody the (subjectively) most important information of a discourse, express the overall "content" of mental models of events' (Van Dijk 2009b: 68).

It seems here that schemas are culture-based formal representations that may vary from one discourse type to another. In Eggins (2004: 59), Martin (1985: 251) defines the term 'schematic structure' as representing 'the positive contribution genre[30] makes to a text: a way of getting from A to B in the way a given culture accomplishes whatever the genre in question is functioning to do in that culture'.[31] Thus, a schematic structure is first and foremost governed by a context of culture, which might be assumed to contribute to the overall purpose and meaning of a text. Lexis[32], as an essential part of text, is also organized within this context of culture against a particular schematic structure: there could be potential stages in mind about this lexical organization, based on the overall purpose and meaning of the text.

The schematic structure, which cognitively underlies the lexical organization in text, is a component construct of discursive competence. This is particularly so, if we accede to Foucault's (1972) conceptualization of knowledge as being 'the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and

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[30] Genre can be defined as 'an instance of a successful achievement of a specific communicative purpose using conventionalized knowledge of linguistic and discoursal resources' (Bhatia 1993: 16)

[31] To illustrate this point, Eggins (2004: 58f) has offered the example of the staged (or structured) linguistic event of a horoscope genre, with the following predictable stages: (1) General Outlook: 'the astrologer makes a general statement about the period covered by the horoscope'; (2) Uncontingent Predictions: 'general predictions are made about your immediate future'; (3) Contingent Predictions: 'different advice is offered according to the salient category membership of readers' (e.g. *if single, x will happen*); and (4) Advice: 'the astrologer offers advice and warnings'.

[32] For instance, in the same example given by Eginns (*ibid.*) above, one is expected to encounter certain lexical units at each stage of the horoscope genre: General Outlook (*a rosy month, a surprising week*, etc.), (2) Uncontingent Predictions (*to meet with a nice-looking man/a beautiful woman*), (3) Contingent Predictions (*single, married*, etc.), and (4) Advice (*invest wisely*, etc.).

transformed' (Foucault 1972: 182f). Knowledge, then, should be based on the conventional (and cultural) representations in mind that would allow for these discourse processes of defining, applying and transforming concepts. And, after all, the conceptual aspect needs to be lexicalized – or, ideologically, over- or re-lexicalized (see classification schemes in Subsection 3.4.3) – as a textual instantiation. Significantly, however, this discourse process takes place by virtue of the element of prior knowledge as stored in the discourse participant's mind. Indeed, in this regard, the term 'knowledge schema' has been usefully used by Tannen and Wallat (1993):

> We use the term "knowledge schema" to refer to participants' expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world, as distinguished from alignments being negotiated in a particular interaction. Linguistic semanticists have been interested in this phenomenon, as they observed that even the literal meaning of an utterance can be understood only by reference to a pattern of prior knowledge.   (Tannen and Wallat 1993: 60)

Further, the cultural aspect is gradually set into play by rendering this kind of knowledge stereotypical (or, cognitively, schematic) in discourse. This point has been made explicit in Stubbs' (2001: 10) account of the term 'schematic knowledge': 'sets of taken-for-granted knowledge about how the world works'. As such, in addition to ideological coherence, schemas can be an essential component of the discursive competence held by members of the same discourse community.

It has become clear then that in order to analyse the social cognition of the members of a certain religious discourse community, we shall need to understand the corresponding religious schemas and their contribution to the collocational meanings made by these members. In his attempt to answer the question of how 'the religion-as-schema view' relates to the process of 'finding meaning', McIntosh (1995) has put forward the following proposition: 'A schema may shape the individual's reality to be in line with the schema, even

without objective foundation' (McIntosh 1995: 10). In my research data, the cognitive analysis of socio-religious schemas (pro-Wahhabi vs. anti-Wahhabi) will be particularly relevant since I am dealing with a meta-Wahhabi discourse, where religious beliefs are an integral part of a whole social schema about Wahhabi Islam. Indeed, as I shall argue later in Chapter 8, such socio-religious schemas are partially responsible for rendering Schwartz and DeLong-Bas's collocates classificatory (see Chapter 8, Subsection 8.3.2).

Now, it is time we moved to the third stage at the macro level of analysis, where I propose a social-semiotic model for explaining the context of collocations in meta-Wahhabi discourse.

3.8 Explaining ideological collocation

In his CDA model, Fairclough (2001: 135) has made clear that the objective of the stage of explanation is to 'portray a discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them'. Recently, in proposing his dialectical-relational approach, Fairclough (2009) has further elaborated this explanatory model by emphasizing the dialectics constantly holding between the abstract social structures and the concrete semiotic elements, among which are discourses. Interestingly, Fairclough (2009) defines discourses as 'semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world (physical, social or mental) which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors' (Fairclough 2009: 164).

Let us, then, conceive of anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses as being opposing semiotic ways that construct aspects of the world (institutions, attitudes and/or beliefs) of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. This conceptualization of anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourses may call for a social-semiotic approach, so that we can explain two important

aspects. First, this approach explains how a textual feature (such as collocations) can be studied as a material semiotic realization of the two discourse types (anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi). Second, the same approach can be extended further towards the explanations of how other discourses (as semiotic realizations) have interconnected (i.e. interdiscursively), so that these collocations can be ideologically produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. I shall take each aspect of the explanatory model in turn in the coming subsections.

3.8.1 The domain of explanation: words as signs

The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1858-1913) conceived of a science, which he termed 'semiology' (more famously known as 'semiotics'), that *studies the role of signs as part of social life*' (Saussure 1983: 15, italics in original). Thibault (1997) has lucidly outlined this then-new science:

> Saussure sets about defining this new science in terms of a basic distinction between an "internal" "linguistics of the language system [*langue*]," and an "external" "linguistics of speech [*parole*]" (*CLG*: 36-9). He gives theoretical prominence to the first of these as a way of delimiting the object of study. In Saussure's view, the language system is a system of terms related by the purely negatively defined differences that distinguish any given term from the others in the same system.
>
> (Thibault 1997: 6)

Saussure focused particularly on the linguistic sign in a dyadic model of structuralist analysis, with a phonocentric predilection for speech, viz. a 'signifier' (*signifiant*) and a 'signified' (*signifié*). According to him, a linguistic sign is 'a two-sided psychological entity' that is composed of 'a concept [signified] and a sound pattern [signifier]' (Saussure 1983: 66). 'The sound pattern', Saussure continued to argue, 'is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer's psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses' (*ibid.*). Technically, 'signification' is the term used to describe the relation between the signifier and the signified in the Saussurean model.

Social semiotics has developed Saussure's purely structuralist semiotics by bringing it vis-à-vis society; that is, by investigating the interface between social change and semiotic resources: 'As society changes, new semiotic resources and news ways of using existing semiotic resources may be needed' (Van Leeuwen 2005: 26). Although it draws on concepts from Saussure, social semiotics was proposed as a critique of that form of 'mainstream [structuralist] semiotics', which 'emphasizes structures and codes, at the expense of functions and social uses of semiotic systems, the complex interrelations of semiotic systems in social practice' (Hodge and Kress 1988: 1). Therefore, as Thibault (1991) argues, the social semiotic conceptual framework appertains to

> the systems of meaning making resources, their patterns of use in texts and social occasions of discourse, and the social practices of the social formations in and through which these textual meanings are made, remade, imposed, contested, and changed from one textual production or social occasion of discourse to another. (Thibault 1991: 6)

As usch, in delimiting the domain of explaining ideological collocation, I would rather incorporate a social-semiotic approach, which could offer an explanation of discourse structure (part of which is lexis) as being 'a system of meanings that constitutes the "reality" of the culture' (Halliday 2007: 197). This is the higher-level system to which language is related as discourse (as an expression of communication). And, thus, as Halliday (2007: 197) points out, 'the semantic system of language [which I take for discourse] is a realisation of the social semiotic'. An ideal way, I propose, of explaining any part of the semiotic structure of discourse (including its lexical organization) entails a socio-semiotic analysis. Put plainly, in order to portray the lexical structure in discourse as part of the social structure, there needs to be a way to see beyond the arbitrary nature of words, to see them as signs from a social

semiotic perspective, and thus to see how their pragmatic, rather than semantic, signification[33] comes into being.

'Meaning', write Bloor and Bloor (2007: 15), 'is created when a sign occurs in a specific context'. By no means is this confined to visual symbols; rather, it is true of language as well. Detecting the symbolic nature of words as signs could be a proper means of explaining how truth-claims are attached to the lexical associations that may be ideologically invested in texts. In this way, it can be said that an explanatory semiotic toolkit will procedurally be pitted against the arbitrary (or, rather, ideological) symbolic aspect of word meaning and association. 'Symbolic language', according to Silverman (1998: 8), 'makes claims about reality, affirms by positing what is, and asserts truths about the natural, social, and cultural worlds in which we live'. By contrast, he continues to argue, 'the semiotic provides an alternative to the male [sic] affirmative postulates of the symbolic' (Silverman *ibid.*). Thus, a semiotic perspective towards the symbolic nature of words could reveal the underlying significations carried over by the lexis of discourse.

'Semiotics', Carravetta (1998: 24) maintains, 'studies all cultural processes as processes of communication'. Therefore, according to him (*ibid.*), 'each of these processes would seem to be permitted by an underlying system of signification'. In the present explanatory model of word associations, such an underlying system of signification is pragmatic in the Peircean (1938) sense of pragmatics: how (and *not* what) signs (and certainly words) mean to the perception of the interpreter:

> A sign ... [in the form of *representamen*] is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more

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[33] In using the term *pragmatic signification*, I strictly refer to meaning as an outcome of the interaction between the word (as a sign) and discourse participants. This understanding of pragmatic signification is derived from the famous distinction made by C. W. Morris (1938/1970: 6f) between semantics as 'the relationship of signs to what they stand for' and pragmatics as 'the relation of signs to interpreters'.

developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen.

(Peirce 1938-1958, 2.228, cited in Chandler 2007: 29)

Indeed, this necessitates a critical shift from semiosis to semiotics in an attempt to reach what can be called sign consciousness. Lidov (1999) draws a distinction between 'semiosis' and 'semiotics'. For him, whilst semiosis amounts to 'the action of signs, the activities of representing or interpreting', semiotics, as a formal study, is established as being 'rooted in our fluctuating awareness of semiosis in day-to-day experience' (Lidov 1999: 15). A point that was first made clear in Pierce's triadic model of the sign, which stresses the (interactive) nature of 'semiosis' as the interaction between the *representamen*, the *object* and the *interpretant*.

Importantly, a semiotic analysis is intended to reveal sign consciousness, which, as Lidov (1999: 16) has further explained, 'grows as a function of critical thought'; and critical thought 'advances by discipline, by controlling signs'. It follows, then, that to be conscious of a sign (say, a word) is to move from semiosis to semiotics. This brings in what might be understood as a function of the critical use and interpretation of words and their pragmatic significations. Lidov (1999) has offered religious discourse as an illustration of this aspect:

> In the absence of sign consciousness, the signifier and signified can seem equivalent. An insult to the flag is an injury to the nation; a deprecation of my mother is as hideous as a bodily hurt. In semiotically uncritical religious belief, no distinction of kind need occur between the divine being and its signifier; the representation is itself accorded a spiritual status.   (Lidov 1999: 17)

Interesting about Lidov's argument is the potential translucent use of religious terms, where there is no clearly defined boundary between the signified (which is sacred to the members of

a religious discourse community) and its signifier (the sound image enshrined in the religious discourse). Only then would the sign (one realization of it are words and their lexical patterns) be an act of power; it would not be a mere stand-in. This is rightly the case in the religiously technical language pervading religious discourse, wherein the signifying process is based on 'the progressive abstraction of symbols in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic tradition' (Lidov *ibid.*). For instance, in the eyes of Muslim discourse-community members, there is no difference between the signifiers *Allah* or *Muhammad* (as the Prophet of Muslims) in the religious discourse of the Quran or the Hadith Record and their respective signifieds. Indeed, as far as the research data is concerned, a semiotic analysis of the collocations employed by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas may prove helpful in detecting the symbolic power invested with these collocations, which rely on 'unconscious acceptance rather than critical reflection' (Charteris-Black 2009: 99). That can be achieved if we relate this aspect to the broader social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse (see Chapter 8, Subsection 8.4.1).

Now, let us move on to the second important element of the social-semiotic explanatory model of ideological collocation in meta-Wahhabi discourse, that is, interdiscursive context.

3.8.2 Interdiscursive context

Here, I introduce the concept of 'interdiscursivity' as being a crucial part of the social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse. The term *interdiscursivity* can be used to describe an abstract state where different discourses interconnect, and this may be materially realized in text. This meaning of interdiscursivity was influentially introduced by Foucault when he referred to 'discursive formations' (Foucault 1972). Fairclough (1992) elaborates on this point:

> Foucault is suggesting [...] that a discursive formation constitutes objects in ways which are highly constrained, where the constraints on what happens 'inside' a discursive formation are a function of the interdiscursive relations between discursive formations.
>
> (Fairclough 1992: 42f)

Based on Fairclough's argument, if we think of Wahhabi Islam or Wahhabism as an object that has been constituted by many discursive formations, the interdiscursive relations potentially holding between these discursive formations would be particularly significant. Note, however, that Pêcheux (1982) also importantly brings in the concept of 'discursive formation' in a slightly different, albeit useful, vein. To him, a discursive formation is a medium in which 'an ideological formation [...] determines *"what can and should be said"*' (Pêcheux 1982: 111). This nicely dovetails with the possibility that different discourses may potentially intersect as hybridized formations, so that they can ideologically constitute concepts, events, or (if we use Foucault's term) 'objects'.

In this way, we can conceive of the 'object' *Wahhabi Islam* as being interdiscursively constituted. Of course, this does not take away the fact that there could well be other discursive formations that interconnect with the ideological purpose of dismantling the same object (*Wahhabi Islam*). This may explain how new 'orders of discourse' are dynamically changing. Fairclough (1992) uses the term 'orders of discourse' in its Foucaldian sense to refer to 'the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society, and the relationships between them' (Fairclough 1992: 43). In the present interdiscursive context of meta-Wahhabi discourse, our focus is on collocations as either an anti-Wahhabi discursive practice or a pro-Wahhabi one in the textual data (Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas). The question now is 'how can collocations be amenable to interdiscursive analysis within the social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse?'.

This question can be answered if we restrict the definition of discourse to the principle of topicality; that is, '[i]f we define discourse as primarily topic-related, that is a discourse on X, then a discourse on un/employment often refers for example to topics or subtopics of other discourses, such as gender or racism' (Wodak 2008: 3). Wodak (*ibid.*) enlists this definition of discourse as a way of showing how discourses 'are linked to each other'. Actually, this understanding of interdiscursivity is helpful at the lexical level of analyzing collocations within its wider context of discourse. As will be shown in Chapter 8 (Subsection 8.4.2), the collocates of a node word may typically associate with different discourses in a way that reveals the different discursive formations that ideologically support or resist a certain discourse topic (or 'object') within meta-Wahhabi discourse.

Even so, one caveat should be voiced here: the interdiscursive context is only a tiny fraction of the broad social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse at the level of explaining ideological collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. The overall contextual picture consists of the meta-Wahhabi discourse processes of production (including the biographical and institutional elements), interpretation (comprising the cognitive element of discursive competence), and explanation (involving symbolic power and interdiscursivity) (see Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 respectively). Overall, then, the context of meta-Wahhabi discourse should be understood in a broad social sense, as comprising

> the participants of a communicative exchange [or event], their physical and psychological dispositions and the specific knowledge or assumptions about the persons involved, the knowledge of the language and the conventions regarding appropriate use of language, the knowledge of activity-types including communicative intentions and goals, and general background knowledge.   (Fetzer 2007: 14)

Thus, in this way, the collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas are textual cues that are predicated on a broader interdiscursive context of many and various discursive formations,

which are ideologically intended either to defend or to attack Wahhabi Islam, or what is known in the West as 'Wahhabism'.

3.9 Conclusion

In this notably short conclusion, I would want to recapitulate the structure of this chapter. The chapter has undertaken the overall theoretical framework proposed in this study. At the outset, a distinction has been made between the locally descriptive and the globally critical approaches towards collocability and collocation. The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter can be summarized here.

The first stage focuses on *identifying* collocations that are 'peculiar' to the research data; this necessitates a corpus-based approach towards the phenomenon of collocation. Hence, as it will be shown in Chapter 4, the need for intersecting the MI and *t* scores. The second stage is concerned with *describing* ideological collocation via a semantic-rhetorical toolkit that is predicated on textual synonymy and oppositional paradigms on the one hand and pragmatic fallacies on the other (Section 3.5). (Hopefully, the present model of description may assure the role of collocation in partly making up what Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: x) refer to as the 'rhetorical-relational organisation in the discourse semantics'.) The first two stages can be integrated under the methodological procedure of micro analysis (see Chapter 4). The third stage tackles aspects that relate to the *text producer* of ideological collocations in terms of two aspects: 1) the interplay of evaluation, text production and lexis, and 2) the potentially problematic position of the text producer in terms of contents, relations and subjects (Section 3.6). The fourth stage introduces an *interpretative model* that is focused on the concept of discursive competence and its dual structure, ideological coherence and schemas, which explains how members of the same discourse community are pre-equipped to consume textual practices (Section 3.7). The last stage offers

an explanatory model of the social context that shapes and is shaped by textual practices; this social-semiotic model rests on two important elements that can explain the ideological status of collocations in meta-Wahhabi discourse (anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourses): first, the semiotic activity of collocations as signs; and second, the interdiscursive context of the collocating items in the texts under analysis.

Now, having proposed the overall theoretical framework that will be used in analyzing the research data, it is time we demonstrated how this framework will be methodologically operationalized; also, we need to closely recognize the present research data. These two aspects will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

CHAPTER 4

Methodology: Data and Procedure

4.1 Introduction

Chapter four is the methodology chapter in this study. Its overall purpose is threefold. First, it seeks to shed light on the present research data in terms of how it was collected and why it is significant. Second, the chapter makes clear the synergetic procedure of analysis followed in this study. It is synergetic, for it combines both corpus linguistics and CDA. The procedure is composed of two levels of analysis, one relates to the micro analysis of the texts of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in respect of the identification and description of their peculiar collocations (i.e. the overt presentation of ideological collocation), and the other to the macro analysis of their social context in terms of the meta-Wahhabi discourse processes of producing, interpreting and explaining ideological collocations (i.e. the covert representation of ideological collocation).

Thus, to recapitulate, this chapter is to answer the following two methodological questions: First, at the micro level of analysis, how to identify and describe peculiar collocations that are contrastively used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas within meta-Wahhabi discourse? Second, at the macro level of analysis, what are the meta-Wahhabi discourse processes of producing, interpreting and explaining the ideological representations of these collocations across the two texts?

4.2 Research data

The data I use in my research for collocational analysis is selected from the broad genre of books that tackle one discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism (see Chapter 1,

Subsection 1.3.1). The data comprises two books. The first is Stephen Schwartz's *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (2002); the second is Natana DeLong-Bas's *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004). In the following subsections I provide an outline of this research data.

4.2.1 Data collection

The data must be in machine-readable form before it can be subject to corpus analytical procedures. In collecting the research data, the first step was to electronically scan each book (page by page) separately. I could have otherwise keyed it in. Instead, however, scanning has been the ideal choice, at least in my case:

> If existing electronic sources are unavailable, then two other (more time consuming) options present themselves. The first involves converting paper documents by running them through a scanner with Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. For most people this is probably quicker than keying in the document by hand [...]. (Baker 2006: 34)

The next step was to hand-check the scanned data, so that any typographical errors could be corrected. The data was then stored in plain text format; the first book (by Schwartz) contains 116,624 words, while the second (by DeLong-Bas) is 137,626 words in length. In order for both computed texts to be analysed in terms of their collocations, I shall be making extensive use of WordSmith5 (Scott 2007) (see Subsection 4.4.1.1). Now, let us move on to the question why this data is significant.

4.2.2 Data significance: a new discourse order

There needs to be an answer to the question 'why have I selected this particular textual data for my analysis in the present research?'. The answer to this question lies in the fact that the two texts under investigation have staged a new order of the discourse on Wahhabi Islam and

Saudi Arabia in the US after 9/11, specifically, the time period from 2001 to 2004. In the US, after World War II Wahhabi Islam was discursively represented as being part of the history of Saudi Arabia, which was of prime concern to the economic sustenance of America: 'America's interest in Saudi Arabia and its oil should be seen as part of its concern to maintain its superpower position after the Second World War' (Al-Rasheed 2002: 118). This explains why (before 9/11), in an exhaustive study titled *The History of Saudi Arabia*, Alexei Vassiliev (1997) strongly argued that '[t]he key to understanding the Wahhabi ideology [...] lies first and foremost in a study of Arabia society' (Vassiliev 1997: 29). By contrast, after 9/11 Wahhabism (or more accurately, 'Saudi Wahhabism') has become the main discourse topic that determines the socio-political status of Saudi Arabia, not only in the US but in the West as a whole, particularly at the time period spanning 2001-2004 (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 1 [Subsection 1.3.1.2]).

Now, let us revert to the relation between this new discourse order and the textual data in the present research. As we said earlier, this new order of the discourse on Saudi Wahhabism is best represented in two clashing polemical texts. The first text attacks Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia (*The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror*); it was written immediately in the wake of 9/11 in 2002. The second is an academic textbook (*Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*), based on DeLong-Bas's doctoral dissertation, which was then published in book form by the Oxford University Press (OUP) in New York in 2004, as a defence of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia. The book, which is billed by its publisher as the first book-length study of the 18th-century Muslim reformer Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was published as a reaction against the post-9/11 attacks on Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia.

The two books can be regarded as constituting the first textually meaningful antagonism over the discourse topic of Saudi Wahhabism after 9/11. Also, by virtue of these

bestsellers, the two writers have achieved the highest degree of what Teubert (2007) calls 'textual relevance'; in our case, relevance to meta-Wahhabi discourse: 'A given text within a discourse is more relevant than another if it leaves more traces in subsequent texts' (Teubert 2007: 80). However, we need to substantiate these two features (i.e. meaningful antagonism over and textual relevance to meta-Wahhabi discourse) of the research data, which is claimed to be staging a new discourse order on Saudi Wahhabism after 9/11 in the US. Let us take each in turn in the coming two subsections.

4.2.2.1 Authorial conflict and meta-Wahhabi discourse: meaningful antagonism

By its name, meta-Wahhabi discourse suggests a discourse 'about' Wahhabism as introduced in Chapter 1. The idea of 'aboutness' matters significantly in the present context of research, since text producers fall into the two contrastive categories of pros and antis in relation to the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism.

As far as the research data is concerned, there are two authorial voices; each has its own distinct background on the present discourse topic. The first author is Stephen Schwartz, an American journalist and author, who is critical of what he calls 'Wahhabism' and its proponents. He blames 'Islamic terrorism' on the religious establishment fostered by the Saudi government and also criticizes the Bush administration officials for their associations with Saudi Arabia. The other author is Natana DeLong-Bas, a Georgetown graduate who currently teaches at Brandeis University and Boston College. Part of the reason why these two authors are chosen can be attributed to the fact that they have been critical of each other's perspectives on Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism (as I outline below). This has created a meaningful antagonism over the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. Let us trace the realizations of this textual antagonism between the two authors.

On 19 January 2007, Schwartz wrote a famous article under the title 'Natana DeLong-Bas: American Professor, Wahhabi Apologist', which opens with the categorical statement: 'Perhaps no single figure better represents the lamentable situation of Middle East studies (MES) today than Professor Natana J. DeLong-Bas'. He continued with the same categorical statement about DeLong-Bas saying: 'Her [DeLong-Bas's] specialty happens to be Wahhabism, the ultrafundamentalist Islamic sect and state religion in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia'. Schwartz (*ibid.*) further added that 'DeLong-Bas is a professional apologist for Saudi extremism', and that 'she recently reached a depth of mendacity about radical Islam'. Then, Schwartz implicitly accuses her of being an ignorant client of Saudi Arabia:

> In a long colloquy clearly intended to flatter her Saudi patrons, DeLong-Bas claimed that she had been studying the works of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi sect, for a decade, and had read all of them. But she was forced by a persistent Saudi reporter to admit that she had never read the Islamist preacher's correspondence, which critics of Wahhabism and other Saudis consider key to understanding him. She rambled on, claiming that Islamist terror has nothing to do with radical religious interpretations, and with an almost absurd predictability blamed everything wrong in the Muslim and Arab world on the U.S. and Israel. She even described the "democracy" of terrorist groups like Hamas and the Wahhabi agents in Somalia as superior in achievement to U.S. democratization efforts.   (Schwartz 2007)[34]

On the other hand, in an interview with DeLong-Bas[35], she said of Stephen Schwartz: he 'apparently felt that he did not need to read anything that Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab wrote in order to form an opinion about him, his teachings or the movement he inspired. There is not a single reference to any of Sheikh Muhammad's writings or to any other Arabic work in his bibliography'. Then, DeLong-Bas continued to say: 'This is not

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[34] See Schwartz (2007) at http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/3035, accessed 10 January 2010.

[35] The interview is in *Al-Da'wah* Monthly Islamic magazine, No. 21, July 2003. Available online: http://www.saaid.net/monawein/en/4.htm, accessed 10 January 2010.

surprising as Mr. Schwartz neither reads nor speaks Arabic. His information about Wahhabis and Wahhabism comes from a combination of Western travel accounts and from his own personal experiences in Bosnia'. Also, more importantly, in her book *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004), DeLong-Bas laments the fact that post-9/11 Schwartz's book *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (2002) is the most recent example of the assertion that Wahhabism 'has been characterised as Islamo-fascism following the traditions of communism and nazism' (DeLong-Bas 2004: 3).

Thus, it can be said that both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas have been involved a textually meaningful antagonism over Saudi Wahhabism after 9/11; each has been trying to question and contest the other's discourse on Saudi Wahhabism. This has taken the form of two textual practices that are underlain by two competing discourses, that is, Schwartz's anti-Wahhabi discourse and DeLong-Bas's pro-Wahhabi discourse.

Now, let us move to the second feature of the research data, which renders the two writers initiating a new order of the discourse on Saudi Wahhabism in the US post 9/11; that is, textual relevance to meta-Wahhabi discourse.

4.2.2.2 Relevance to meta-Wahhabi discourse: anti- and pro-Wahhabi references

The two texts comprising the research data have triggered off a large number of critiques and reviews of their writers[36]; a feature that highlights the previously mentioned maxim, established by Teubert (2007), of 'textual relevance'. This feature much emphasizes the significance of these texts within meta-Wahhabi discourse in the US post-9/11. Of course, due to space considerations, I cannot cover the whole references made to the authors on producing their books, but I shall be content with the most important of all references.

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[36] The great majority of the critiques and reviews on the two books are not balanced in terms of their critical material; they are either pro or anti in their treatments.

Let us focus here on the different critical sources on the two books. In one review by Clifford Geertz (2003), Schwartz was described as 'a strange and outlandish figure'. In his review, Geertz concluded that the book was founded upon 'a conflation of Wahhabism with Islamism generally'. *New York Times* book critic Richard Bernstein (2002) said The *Two Faces of Islam* demonstrated 'a comprehensive mastery of history and historical connections, as well as a deep humanistic concern for those who have been oppressed by Wahhabi ruthlessness'. However, he also questioned whether Schwartz 'had not overstated its significance compared to other extremist elements in Islam, such as the Iranian role in supporting terrorism'.

On the other hand, one critique of DeLong-Bas' book was afforded by David Commins[37]:

> Natana DeLong-Bas's extensive study of Wahhabism's founding father rejects the conventional idea that the movement is a radical departure from the mainstream of Islam. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab emerges as an original thinker whose views on jihad and women in particular are not extreme or fanatical but scholarly and moderate. By amassing so much evidence for her original interpretation of a rich intellectual vision at the core of Wahhabism, DeLong-Bas opens the way for historians to reconsider and revise the standard, perhaps mistaken, notions about it.[38]

Further, according to Cavdar (2006) in James Madison College, Michigan University, the book contains 'misconceptions and biases' which may 'end up only identifying Islam's merits'. He continues: 'This book unfortunately falls into this trap. Despite its novelty, this study is not a critical account of Wahhabism. Rather, Wahhabi Islam is a response to Western

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[37] David Commins is a Professor of History and an Executive Director of the Clarke Centre for the Interdisciplinary Study of Contemporary Issues at Dickinson College. He had held Fulbright grants to fund Arabic study at Damascus University (1981-82), to research Islamic modernism in Ottoman Syria (1982-83), and to study Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia (2001-02).

[38] Available online: http://www.onlineislamicstore.com/b8596.html, accessed 28 December 2009.

criticism mounted in the post-9/11 era'. On 8 August 2004, immediately after the Oxford

publication of DeLong-Bas's book *Wahhabi Islam* (2004), John Kearney wrote an article in

The Boston Globe under the title 'The real Wahhab'[39], in which he reported a number of anti-

Wahhabi voices vehemently attacking the book:

> DeLong-Bas's critics aren't letting such startling statements pass unchallenged.
> "I'm sad this piece of scholarly trash was published by Oxford," says Khaled
> Abou El Fadl, professor of law at UCLA who writes frequently on Islamic
> jurisprudence. "This doesn't qualify as scholarship – it falls within the general
> phenomenon of Saudi apologetics."

> "DeLong-Bas never challenges the propriety of Abd al-Wahhab's claim
> to absolute authority – the authority to declare the believer and the unbeliever
> (authority God reserves to himself in the Koran) and to impose the most severe
> sanctions on those he disagrees with," says Michael Sells, author of
> "Approaching the Qur'an" and professor of religion at Haverford College. And
> novelist Michael J. Ybarra, reviewing DeLong-Bas's book in The Wall Street
> Journal, points out that "where on earth this [tolerant] form of Wahhabi Islam
> ever existed she doesn't say."   (Kearney 2004, *The Boston Globe*)

Daniel Pipes[40] is another anti-Wahhabi (and probably anti-Islamic) discursive voice. On 25

March 2005, in praise of Schwartz, he wrote an article under the title 'Stephen Schwartz and

the Center for Islamic Pluralism'.[41] In this article, Pipes asserted that 'Schwartz is for many

reasons the right person for this position [the director of the CIP], given his dedication to

fighting the spread of Wahhabism, the Saudi-financed ideology that has acquired such a

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[39] Available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/08/08/the_real_wahhab?pg=full, accessed
9 February 2010.

[40] Daniel Pipes is the director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover
Institution of Stanford University. His bi-weekly column appears regularly in the Jerusalem Post and other
newspapers, including *Die Welt* (Germany), *La Razón* (Spain), *Liberal* (Italy), and *Al-Akhbar* (Iraq). His website
(http://www.danielpipes.org/) is one of the most accessed internet sources of specialized information on the
Middle East and Islam.

[41] Available at http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/03/stephen-schwartz-and-the-center-for-islamic, accessed
10 January 2010.

powerful role internationally, and notably among American Muslims'. Also, in the same article (2005), Pipes has quoted Resid Hafizovic[42], who has favourably commented on Schwartz's book *The Two Faces of Islam* (2002):

> Everybody abhors the consequences [of Wahhabism] and nobody asks about causes. Dr. Enes Karic [a leading Bosnian Islamic author] and I are just now working on a translation of Stephen Schwartz's excellent book *The Two Faces of Islam*, a basic criticism of Wahhabism worldwide. In the book, the author gives information on the terrible things they do. They are fighting not only Russians and Americans, but Muslim traditionalists. Wahhabism is a phenomenon that is difficult to explain. The whole world is facing it and there is no way to stop it. To be frank, I am scared. I am particularly worried by the inertness of the system, which is unable to tackle this kind of a problem.
>
> (Pipes 2005)[43]

Further, on 13 February 2007, in his article 'The Brandeis Justice', Pipes harshly criticized DeLong-Bas whom he has labelled as 'an apologist for al-Qaeda'.[44]

On the other hand, a pro-Wahhabi reference to DeLong-Bas's text can be found in an article that was published in *Al-Ahram Weekly* newspaper, and reviewed by David Wilmsen[45], under the title 'A new opinion of Ibn Abdel-Wahhab'.[46] The article was written on 26 January 2006, in celebration of the release of DeLong-Bas's book *Wahhabi Islam* in paperback by the

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[42] Resid Hafizovic teaches at Faculty of Islamic Studies of Sarajevo University as a full time professor in the fields of Islamic Dogmatics and Comparative Study of Religions. He published both authored and translated texts in the fields of philosophy, theology, comparative religions and comparative mystical philosophy (theosophy).

[43] See the interview at http://www.abrahamic-faith.com/Islam%20exposed/Bosnia beheading.html, accessed 10 January 2010.

[44] See the article at http://www.danielpipes.org/4275/brandeis-university-president-jehuda-reinharz-israel-and-me, accessed 10 January 2010.

[45] David Wilmsen is doing research on Arabic Sociolinguistics (Arabic dialectology) at the American University of Beirut. This is his webpage: http://linguistlist.org/people/personal/get-personal-page2.cfm?PersonID=8724, accessed 10 January 2010.

[46] See the article at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/779/bo6.htm, accessed 10 January 2010.

American University in Cairo Press, 2005, after having been banned for more than seven months by Al-Azhar[47]. In this article, a direct reference is made to DeLong-Bas: '[...] she has accomplished what no western critics of Muhammad Ibn Abdel-Wahhab – and eastern ones too for that matter – have ever attempted: she has actually read his work, all 14 of his books along with his legal opinions'. Also, in the same article, a number of topic-bound extracts from DeLong-Bas's book are quoted. Let us give two important examples here. First, there is a quote on the topic of women's rights:

> As DeLong-Bas points out, "Throughout his writings, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab emphasised the themes of respect, protection, and justice for women." Characteristically, he hewed closely to the "clear teachings of the Quran," indicating that contemporary practice did not, instead holding more with tribal custom. As such, his "was an important contribution to the construction of gender in eighteenth-century Arabia." (Wilmsen 2006)[48]

Second, a quote is provided on the topic of jihad:

> DeLong-Bas writes that "these ... involve the personal habits or practices that Muslims may find inappropriate or offensive but do not result in aggression against Muslims .... In other words, jihad is not appropriate when conducted as an offensive or pre-emptive action or to strike down a group whose personal habits or practices may not be in keeping with one's own interpretation of Islam." (*ibid.* 2006)

It is worth mentioning that *Al-Ahram Weekly* is a governmental newspaper that is issued in Egypt, where the dominant discourse-community members are Sunni Muslims. Politically, it is in the interest of the Egyptian government not to disturb the members of this discourse

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[47]Al-Azhar University in Egypt was founded in 970 as the chief centre of Arabic literature and Sunni Islamic learning; it is also one of the world's oldest degree granting universities.

[48] See web-based *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 26 January 2006, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/779/bo6.htm, accessed 10 January 2010.

community, being the mainstream religious voice in Egypt, especially when it comes to socially sensitive issues that relate to religion, that is, Islam.

Finally, a remarkable study by Richard Bonney (2004), *Jihād: From Qur'ān to bin Laden*, has referred to Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in terms of their opposing stances towards Wahhabism. For example, Booney referred to Stephen Schwartz as an author who 'talks of "Wahhābī obscurantism and its totalitarian state," "fundamentalist fanaticism" as well as describing it as "Islamofascist"' (Bonney 2004: 154). Also, Booney wrote: 'In the most recent discussion of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's views, and the first full analysis of his writings which have not received scholarly analysis to date, Natana DeLong-Bas takes a more measured view' (*ibid.*: 155).

Now, let us move on to the methodological procedure followed in analysing the present research data.

4.3 Procedure

In its entirety, the analytic procedure followed in this research is a synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA. It is intended to answer the overarching question of the thesis: 'How has Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism been ideologically recontextualized across post-9/11 opposing discourses via collocation?'. This can systematically be realized at two complementary micro and macro levels of analysis.

4.4 Micro analysis

At the micro level of analysis there are two stages. One is concerned with the quantitative identification of collocations that are *peculiar* to the texts under analysis by means of a computational corpus tool (see Subsection 4.4.1.1); the other, rather qualitative in nature, is

the first stage of the CDA procedure, where there is a description of the computed collocations in their concordances. Let us have each stage in turn in the following subsections.

4.4.1 Computational identification

This stage is intended to answer research question 2 (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6): how can certain collocates be identified as being peculiar to Schwartz and DeLong-Bas? In what follows we shall see how we can methodologically answer this question.

4.4.1.1 Software package: WordSmith Tools

The software used in the present study is WordSmith Tools (Scott 1999). The software package used in this study is WordSmith Tools version 5, developed by Scott (2007). It is an integrated suite of programmes that enable the researcher to examine how words behave in texts. It provides a wide range of functions relevant to corpus linguistics in the form of an all-in-one suite. Its functions are grouped in three mains categories: Wordlist, Concord and KeyWords. The Wordlist allows the researcher to see a list of all the words or word-clusters in a text, set out in alphabetical or frequency order. The Concord tool allows the researcher to see any word or phrase in context and the KeyWords tool helps in extracting keywords (see the following section) in a text. In Hoey's (2005) note about the corpus[49] he used, special attention is paid to such 'a sophisticated suite of software':

> *WordSmith* (Scott 1999) [...] allows one (among many other things) to concordance any item, to sequence and sort concordance lines and [...] to consult the original texts from which the lines were drawn. It also plots the distribution of a word over the corpus, thereby ensuring that one can take account of the potential distorting effects of the word's occurring with much

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[49] This corpus is made up of just over 95 million words of *Guardian* news and features text, supplemented by slightly more than 3 million words from the British National Corpus (written text) and 230,000 words of spoken data.

greater frequency in any one text. It also provides wordlists for any text or texts and calculates the collocations and key word sequences for any particular word.

(Hoey 2005: x)

4.4.1.2 Keywords and frequency

The first practical step at this procedural stage of computationally identifying the collocations in the textual data is deciding upon the key words in each text. It was decided to use a corpus-driven approach in the first instance by identifying key words in each text. In this study I follow Scott and Tribble's (2006: 55) view of 'key words' as a textual concept: those lexical items of significance to the text at stake, because of their 'unusual [marked] frequency in comparison with a reference corpus of some suitable kind'. In this sense, a keyword is a word which occurs statistically more frequently in one text when compared against another text. Interestingly, as Scott and Tribble (2006: 55f) argue, keyness here is 'a quality words may have in a given text or set of texts, suggesting that they are important'; and these words, they continue to argue, 'reflect what the text is really about, avoiding trivia and insignificant detail' (Scott and Tribble 2006: 56). In this case, it was possible to compare word lists of the two texts against each other, and WordSmith identified those words which were relatively frequent in each. These keywords therefore tell us about potential sites of difference between the two texts – such differences may reflect topic choices (especially if they are lexical words such as nouns or verbs), or they may reveal stylistic choices (especially if they are grammatical words).[50]

The analyst must specify a 'cut-off point' for statistical significance (Log-likelihood). For the purposes of this study, this was set at the p value ≤ 0.00001, which is very small by

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[50]This approach will not tell us about words which may be common to both texts but would not be common when compared against wider language use. For example, a word like *Wahhabi* might be expected to occur many times in both texts – so its frequencies would cancel each other out. However, if either text was compared against, say, a corpus of newspaper articles taken at random, then *Wahhabi* would be likely to be a keyword.

the standards of most social sciences research, although in case of linguistic comparisons actually yields a manageable number of key words. The *p* value is technically known to be 'signifcance level', and it is '*defined before* the analysis' (Gries 2009: 184, italics in original).[51] The keyword list of each text is likely to be more useful than, say, a list of the most frequent words in 'suggesting lexical items that could warrant further examination' (Baker 2006: 125) – in our case words that would be worthy of collocational analysis. Once two lists of keywords (one for each text) have been identified, they must be narrowed down further (by qualitative criteria), in order for the analyst to focus on those which will be most useful in terms of telling us something interesting about ideology.

4.4.1.3 Node words and collocates

Looking at every keyword is beyond the limits of this research, and additionally, keyword analysis can result in diminishing returns – with some keywords functioning in similar ways to others. Therefore, to identify those keywords which will then be subjected to a detailed collocational analysis, one needs to decide upon what Kennedy (1998: 251) has referred to as the 'target term, node word or search item'. I shall use 'node word' as a technical term for those keywords that are elected to be investigated in terms of their collocates in each text. The question now is: what are the criteria of deciding upon node words?

Prior to setting any criteria for selecting the node words in the research data, it should be noted that among the keywords only lexical (not grammatical) words will be considered: more often than not the keyness of lexical words is due to their being inherently relational, because they cannot be established without referring to another text or set of data; and this

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[51] According to Scott (2004), the *p* value is 'that used in standard chi-square and other statistical tests. This value ranges from 0 to 1. A value of 0.1 suggests a 1% danger of being wrong in claiming a relationship, .05 would give a 5% danger of error. In the social sciences a 5% risk is usually considered acceptable. In case of key word analyses, where the notion of risk is less important than that of selectivity, you may often wish to set a comparatively low *p* value threshold such as 0.000001 (one in 1 million) (1E-6 in scientific notation) so as to obtain fewer key words'.

relational aspect is crucial in terms of identifying (opposing) discourses. Indeed, this can be taken as a guideline for any criteria governing the selection of (lexical) keywords. In the present study, there are three criteria for selecting the node words.

The first criterion is quantitative in nature. Using WordSmith5, the elect node word should be indentified to collocate with other words[52], i.e. collocates, in terms of certain collocation statistics, with the default settings: notably the span of ±5 (that is, five words on either side of the node word). It should be noted here that this span has not been arbitrarily set; rather, it was specified as a result of prior qualitative investigations of the concordances of all the designated collocations in this research data, where the range ±5 was identified to be the topmost span. Words which occurred at a span of 6 or 7 words away from the node, were normally too far away to suggest that the two words had any meaningful relationship to each other. Here, the reference made to 'meaningful relationship' is rather technical as it denotes words that are meaningfully related to each other in text, either on the syntagmatic plane or the paradigmatic one; so, these words must be *meaningfully related* in their co-textual environments.

Evert (2009: 1237) argues that the 'association measures' of collocation fall into two major groups: '*effect-size measures* (MI, Dice, odds-ratio) and *significance measures* (z-score, t-score, simple-ll, chi-squared, log-likelihood)'.[53] Interestingly, in order to identify 'strongly associated word pairs', Evert (2005: 21f) applied the significance measure of log-likelihood to a case of the English verb + noun (direct object) co-occurrences in the *British National Corpus* (BNC). Many different phenomena were found: 'fixed idiomatic expressions (*take*

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[52] The collocating words should be viewed as being a textual concept, i.e. as significant to the text at stake, in that they semantically come together with shared discourse prosody in relation to the node word assigned with those collocating words.

[53] According to Evert (2009), effect-size measures aim to 'quantify how strongly the words in a pair are attracted to each other, i.e. they measure statistical association between the cross-classifying factors in the contingency table' (p. 1234); and statistical significance measures are 'based on the same types of hypothesis tests as … chi-squared tests … and likelihood-ratio tests' (p. 1235).

place and *give rise (to))*, support verb constructions and other lexically determined combinations *(make sense, play (a) role, solve (a) problem* [...]), stereotypes and formulaic expressions ([...] *wait (a) minute)'*. Further, free and compositional combinations, which reflect 'facts of life, typical behaviour', were also found, viz. '*(ask (the) Secretary (of State)* and *write (a) letter)'*. Actually, Evert (2005: 137) argues that the log-likelihood association measure offers 'an excellent approximation of the *p*-values of Fisher's test and has convenient mathematical and numerical properties'. However, as he continues to argue, 'the statistical soundness of log-likelihood does not always translate into better performance'; and, as such, '[a] conclusive answer can therefore only come from a comparative empirical evaluation of association measures, which plugs different measures into the intended application' (Evert 2005: 137)

In the present study, in respect of significance measures, WordSmith5 offered results of collocates that are equally significant in terms the *t* score, z score and log-likelihood. Thus, it would be rather redundant to incorporate all three results as evidence for collocability. Only one of these results will therefore be chosen as a significance measure of the collocating items, with a view to giving us 'confidence in claims about the data, so that we may claim statistical significance for our results' (Oakes 1998: 9). Indeed, as I shall shortly argue below, the MI and *t* scores can be suitable association measures of relevant 'aspects of collocativity' in the present study.

Collocational strength can be measured by the MI score. An 'MI score of 3 or higher' is proposed to be 'taken as evidence that two items are collocates' (Hunston 2002: 71). Interestingly, the MI score can be said to best suit the present research purpose as it focuses on the 'more idiosyncratic collocates of a node'; and this indicates that 'the items that have MI values are idiosyncratic instances peculiar to [one] corpus' (Clear 1993: 281). That is, as McEnery and Wilson (2001: 86) argue, if the collocating items are to have 'high positive

mutual information scores', then they are 'more likely to constitute characteristic collocations' than others 'with much lower mutual information scores'. Thus, the MI score asks the question 'how strongly are the words attracted to each other?' (Evert 2009: 1228). Indeed, following the tradition of Church, Hanks and Moon (1994), I shall intersect the two measures (MI and *t* scores) and looking at pairs that have important scores in both measures. This may be explained on the grounds that: 1) 'the *t* test measures the confidence with which we can claim that there is some association' (Church and Hanks 1990, cited in McEnery *et al.* 2006: 57); 2) '*t*-scores tend to show high-frequency [collocating] pairs' (McEnery *et al.*: *ibid.*). Thus, the *t* test asks the question 'how much evidence is there for a positive association between the words, no matter how small effect size is?' (Evert 2009: *ibid.*). Note that '[a] *t* score of 2 or higher is normally considered to be statistically significant' (McEnery *et al.* 2006: 56). Nevertheless, '[f]rom a theoretical perspective', Evert (2005: 82) argues, the *t*-test 'is not applicable to cooccurrence frequency data'. 'It may thus be more appropriate', he (*ibid.*: 83) continues to argue, 'to interpret t-score as a heuristic variant of z-score that avoids the characteristic overestimation bias of the latter' (i.e. rather than strictly as a significance test).

The second criterion for selecting node words, qualitative in nature, is based on the researcher's intuition – which is constituted on the basis of looking at concordances prior to actual analysis – about thematic relevance, where the elect node words constitute a semantic configuration of one theme in each text. For instance, in Chapter 6, a set of node words (alongside their potential collocates) has served the themes of 'Wahhabi Islam' and 'Saudi Wahhabism' as being collocationally realized in each text, with different representations. Also, in Chapter 7 where gender representations across the two texts matter, only gender-specific node words (and their potential collocates) have been considered. The third criterion is linguistically motivated: node words in this study should mainly share a semantic or

grammatical connection between the two texts, such as the node words WAHHABI (used by Schwartz) and WAHHAB'S (used by DeLong-Bas) that have been analysed in Chapter 6. Sometimes they may even be cross-textually identical both in form and meaning, such as the node words JIHAD (Chapter 5) and SAUDI (Chapter 6).

Before coming to the second micro procedural stage of describing collocations, I would like to touch upon the general corpus of American English used in the present study, the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA).

4.4.1.4 The *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA)

The *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA) is the first large, balanced corpus of contemporary American English. It is freely available online.[54] The corpus contains more than 410 million words of text, including 20 million words each year from 1990-2010, and it is equally divided among spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic texts. The interface allows the search for exact words or phrases, wildcards, lemmas, part of speech or any combination of those. In addition, it allows the search for surrounding words (collocates) within a ten-word window. One important feature of the COCA is that it allows the researcher to easily limit searches by frequency and compare by frequency of words, phrases, and grammatical constructions in two main ways: 1) by genre (spoken, fiction, popular, magazines, newspapers, and academic writing), and 2) by time (from 1990 to 2010).

I have deliberately chosen the COCA as a reference corpus through which I can discover two informative aspects about some of the collocations peculiar to my data: 1) their joint frequency in general American English, and 2) their discourse prosodies (positive or negative) in the COCA concordances. The purpose is to compare the specific use of such collocations with their general use in American English. It should be noted here that I shall limit my searches by genre (both

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[54] Available at http://www.americancorpus.org/, last accessed 15 December 2010.

spoken and fiction will be excluded) and by time (only the years from 1990 till 2004 will be included).[55] The COCA is particularly useful in the present research. It is linguistically and culturally compatible with the variety of English used in my data, i.e. American English. Additionally, in choosing the COCA, I make a point of maintaining the socio-cultural context in which two American writers (in this case Schwartz and DeLong-Bas) produced two texts tackling the same discourse topic.

4.4.2 Describing *peculiar* collocations

The second stage at the micro level of analysis aims to answer the following research question: how do the identified collocations contribute towards ideology-making across the two texts under analysis? This stage describes the collocates that have been identified as being peculiar to Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Overall, the stage offers a semantico-rhetorical toolkit via which the analyst can discover whether those peculiar collocations have any ideological meanings in text. A number of different linguistic theories are brought in this context of analysis (see the subsections below). The stage of description is principally concordance-based analysis of the research data. Therefore, before coming to the descriptive toolkit of analysis, let us define the term 'concordance'.

4.4.2.1 Concordance

Methodologically speaking, I find Partington's (1998) description of the term *concordance* quite informative and accurate:

> A concordance, or rather KWIC (KeyWord In Context) concordance, is a list of unconnected lines of text, which have been summoned by the concordance program [in our case, WordSmith5] from a computer corpus, that is a collection

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[55]The reason for limiting the search in the COCA in terms of genre and time is that the two texts under investigation are in the written mode, and they were produced in the years 2002 and 2004, Schwartz and DeLong-Bas respectively.

of texts held in a form which is accessible to the computer. At the centre of each line is the item being studied (keyword or node). The rest of each line contains the immediate co-text to the left and right of the keyword. Such a list enables the analyst to look for eventual patterns in the surrounding co-text, which proffer clues to the use of the keyword item.   (Partington 1998: 9)

One important fact can be gathered from Partington's argument: concordances significantly guide the analyst through how to see the keyword or node word in use, with its co-textual environment open to the analyst's observation. However, as Hunston (2002: 67) notes, whereas concordance lines are a 'useful tool for investigating corpora', they are limited by 'the ability of the human observer to process information'. It is, therefore, the case that the analyst should go beyond the concordance line itself towards a bigger textual stretch of co-text; the broader the co-text is, the more informative the analysis is often expected to be.

4.4.2.2 The classification schemes of collocates

At this point of analysis, I shall be concerned with the question 'what are the lexical classification schemes that can be realized collocationally in and/or across the texts under analysis?'. The focus is on the collocates in their lexical company of the node words in each text. The node words in both texts may be the same, but with different collocates. Alternatively, however, the collocates may be the same in the texts, yet the concordances and their co-textual environments could tell otherwise. At the lexico-semantic level of analysis, I hope to find out how the collocates of the same or similar node words used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas are potentially contrastive. This may be a good starting point towards establishing what Dowling (1999) aptly calls 'the senses of the text'.

In an attempt to extrapolate the potentially contrastive senses of the texts produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas, I shall analyse the lexico-semantic relationships holding between the collocates in the two texts via the two classification schemes of textual synonymy

and oppositional paradigms (see Subsection 3.5.3 in Chapter 3). Hence inter-collocate analysis. This is to reveal respectively the two discourse functions of ideologically overlexicalizing and relexicalizing aspects of the reality about Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism across both texts.

4.4.2.3 Argumentation schemes of collocations

In addition to the lexico-semantic classification schemes among the collocates of the node words identified to be used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas, there can be lexico-rhetorical argumentation schemes in the collocational structure as a whole across the two texts. At this point of analysis, there is an interest in the question 'what are the pragmatic fallacies that underlie the collocational use in the texts in hand?'. A number of pragmatic fallacies can be analytically brought in to the surface of the text at collocation level (see Subsection 3.5.4 in Chapter 3). That is, the way through which the words characteristically co-occurring in one text could reveal a defensive or offensive stance towards the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism and its relevant practices. Thus by means of invalid reasoning Schwartz and/or DeLong-Bas may construct or explode a certain image about Wahhabism, by assigning certain labels or concepts to it (as well as to its typical socio-religious practices) in the form of collocations.

It should be noted that pragmatic fallacies are inextricably linked to the discourse prosodies of the designated collocations which reflect each text producer's stance towards the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism and its socio-religious practices.

4.5 Macro analysis

In this study, the macro level amounts to a critical shift from the co-textual analysis of the collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas towards the contextual analysis of the

discourse type on which those texts draw, that is, meta-Wahhabi discourse. This level of analysis uses a CDA method that handles the discourse processes of producing, interpreting and explaining the ideologically motivated collocations in the two texts. In the procedure followed in this study, the macro level is purely qualitative in approach, unlike the micro level which is a mix of the quantitative approach towards the identification of peculiar collocations in each text and the qualitative approach towards the description of such collocations. As such, this (macro) procedural stage targets the following general research question: what are the sociocognitive and social-semiotic contextual factors that underlie the ideological use of collocations in the two texts within meta-Wahhabi discourse?

4.5.1 Producing ideological collocations

Here the focus is on the identities of the text producers themselves, especially their biographies and the institutional frameworks that have reinforced their discursive voice and enacted their socio-professional roles. Such background information does relate to the text-producer's peculiar use of the identified and described collocates as part of meta-Wahhabi discourse. Thus, the question to answer can be framed as follows: how do the authors' identities and circumstances relate to their use of collocates within meta-Wahhabi discourse?

4.5.2 Interpreting ideological collocations

At this stage, I draw upon a socio-cognitive approach in analysing the discursive competence that stands as a mediating link between the two meta-Wahhabi discourse communities (Sufi vs. Wahhabi-Sunni) and the designated collocations under analysis. More specifically, the analysis targets the dual structure of the discursive competence (i.e. ideological coherence and socio-religious schemas) underlying the different interpretations made by the members of the respective discourse communities. (For a discussion of the concepts 'discourse community' and 'discursive competence', see Subsections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 respectively in Chapter 3.) Thus, this stage addresses the following question: what is the relationship between such collocates and the two meta-Wahhabi discourse communities under examination?

4.5.3 Explaining ideological collocations

Explanation is the last stage of the macro-level analysis. Here, drawing on a social-semiotic approach, I analyse the social context within which the designated collocations have been produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Being part of the two texts under analysis, these collocations can be explained against the anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourses in terms of the symbolic powers invested in their use. Then, I proceed with explaining the interdiscursive context within which the collocations have been produced. Overall, the explanatory model aims at dialectically bringing together the semiotic components of collocations and the discourses arising around (in both texts) on the one hand with the respectively corresponding social structures of symbolic power and ideological legitimation (within meta-Wahhabi discourse) on the other. This can be encapsulated in the following research question: in what way can we explain the symbolic power and the interdiscursive nature of the collocates running through the texts investigated?

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on the research methodology in terms of data and procedure. The research data has been discussed in two respects: first the way data is selected, and second its significance. Regarding data significance, I have set out the two reasons of authorial conflict and textual relevance as a support for this claim. Moving on to the methodological procedure followed in this study, there are two complementary levels of analysis. First, the micro level of analysis encompasses the two stages of identifying and describing the collocates in the data. Second, the macro level of analysis goes beyond the co-text of the designated collocations towards their social context, that is, a shift from the texts under analysis to the discourses upon which they draw for producing, interpreting and explaining ideological collocations. Generally, it can be said that the present methodological procedure (micro and macro) is intended to get at the ideological representations implicitly coded behind the overt collocations in the textual data.

CHAPTER 5

The Two Faces of Islam vs. *Wahhabi Islam*:

Keywords, Macropropositions and JIHAD (part I)

5.1 Introduction

This begins the first of four chapters devoted to the analysis of the research data. Chapter 5 is

intended to be the first part of the micro analysis, where two procedural stages are at work:

first, the identification of keywords and their corresponding semantic macrostructures as well

as node words and their collocates in the data; second, the description of the collocates of the

node word JIHAD in terms of their classification and argumentation schemes (see Chapter 3,

Section 3.5) and the discourse prosodies they reflect in text. Proceeding with the same

descriptive toolkit, the remainder of the node words and their collocates will be analysed in

the next two chapters. Whereas Chapter 6 is devoted to the node words WAHHABI,

WAHHAB'S and SAUDI (and their collocates), Chapter 7 is focused on the gender-specific

node words MAN, WOMAN, etc. (and their collocates).

Thus, this chapter, alongside the next two chapters (6 and 7), addresses two

complementary research questions: 1) How can certain collocational pairs be identified as

being peculiar to the two texts by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas? 2) How do these collocational

pairs contribute towards ideologies across the two texts?

5.2 Keywords: meaningful opposition and textual foci

Table 5.1 below gives the keywords in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas's texts, when they are

compared against each other with the default keyness settings of WordSmith5: statistical test

(Log-likelihood), max. p value (0.00001) and min. frequency (3). Providing only the raw

frequencies of the keywords in each text, Table 5.1 is a rough approximation of two more

statistically detailed tables in the Appendix, Table A1 with the keywords in Schwartz and Table A2 with the keywords in DeLong-Bas. Tables A1 and A2 give other important statistical details such as relative frequency (expressed as a percentage), keyness and p values. The keywords in the two columns are presented in order of keyness scores, that is, the words at the top of the table are therefore stronger in terms of keyness or saliency.

No.	Keywords in Schwartz	Freq. Schwartz	Ref. Freq. DeLong-Bas	Keywords in DeLong-Bas	Freq. DeLong-Bas	Ref. Freq. Schwartz
1	SAUDI	546	61	WAHHAB	1022	43
2	WAHHABI	435	79	MARRIAGE	550	13
3	ARAB	214	23	HADITH	400	11
4	AMERICAN	224	35	QURAN	324	46
5	SAUDIS	135	6	HER	492	45
6	WESTERN	156	17	WOMAN	373	13
7	WORLD	265	73	BECAUSE	532	75
8	JEWISH	128	9	WAHHAB'S	319	14
9	CHRISTIAN	137	13	HE	1441	535
10	OTTOMAN	120	8	NOT	1266	455
11	ISRAEL	116	7	OR	1063	370
12	NEW	174	35	RIGHT	249	22
13	SHI'A	71	0	JIHAD	464	109
14	JEWS	149	29	LEGAL	252	25
15	OIL	84	3	WIFE	206	13
16	ARABS	81	3	HUSBAND	170	6
17	PALESTINIAN	70	2	SEXUAL	155	4
18	REGIME	89	9	HIS	1265	581
19	ISLAMIC	445	262	MAN	270	39
20	MECCA	98	15	CASE	223	25
21	TRADITIONAL	83	9	TAWHID	122	0
22	WAHHABISM	149	48	DIVORCE	129	1
23	COMMUNIST	52	1	INTERPRETATION	170	10
24	HAMAS	46	0	TEACHINGS	158	8
25	IRANIAN	44	0	DISCUSSION	149	6
26	KHOMINI	44	0	MAHR	114	0
27	WE	105	25	PURPOSE	124	2
28	WAR	188	83	GOD	420	119
29	ISRAELI	48	2	INTENT	137	6
30	ARABIAN	51	3	WRITINGS	157	12
31	EMPIRE	63	8	QURANIC	112	2
32	MEDIA	47	3	TALAQ	94	0
33	HISTORY	93	25	CASES	129	8
34	IKHWAN	32	0	LAW	257	56
35	KHWARIJ	30	0	FACT	136	12
36	BUSH	35	1	WOMAN'S	90	1
37	WAHHABIS	204	111	ULAMA	77	0
38	TERRORISM	49	6	CLASSICAL	90	2
39	SHI'AS	29	0	TAYMIYYA	75	19

No.	Keywords in Schwartz	Freq. Schwartz	Ref. Freq. DeLong-Bas	Keywords in DeLong-Bas	Freq. DeLong-Bas	Ref. Freq. Schwartz
40	MOSQUES	57	10	WOMEN	219	49
41	MAWDUDI	28	0	QUESTION	125	14
42	PHILBY	28	0	STATUS	127	15
43	TERRORIST	51	8	GOD'S	137	20
44	CULTURE	40	4	KNOWLEDGE	117	14
45	I	134	63	IJTIHAD	62	0
46	IMPERIAL	30	1	INTERPRETATIONS	77	4
47	PROPHET	82	27	SHIRK	55	0
48	ARAFAT	25	0	MALE	71	3
49	CHRISTIANS	78	25	SHE	165	38
50	SHARIAH	24	0	ANYONE	82	7
51	ISRAELIS	24	0	ABSOLUTE	78	6
52	RULERS	52	11	GENDER	50	0
53	TERRORISTS	28	1	WORLDVIEW	50	0
54	LOBBY	23	0	CONSEQUENTLY	55	1
55	FUNDS	23	0	ANY	216	68
56	SUICIDE	31	2	IJMA	46	0
57	UMMAH	57	15	KITAB	44	0
58	MODERN	41	7	MONOTHEISM	79	9
59	WARS	31	3	ASSOCIATIONISM	42	0
60	ORTHODOX	25	1	EIGHTEENTH	42	0
61	IMPERIALISM	25	1	APPROACH	74	8
62	SADDAM	28	2	METHODOLOGY	41	0
63	STATE	126	66	MASLAHA	39	0
64	NATIONS	24	1	INTERCOURSE	36	0
65	NATO	19	0	JURISTS	42	1
66	PLURALISM	19	0	THEREFORE	118	30
67	SUFI	49	13	CONTEXT	71	10
68	ISLAM	380	300	ISSUES	76	12
69	SUFIS	51	15	INDIVIDUAL	75	12
70	REFUGEES	17	0	SCRIPTURE	55	5
71	PALESTINIANS	28	4	TAQLID	33	0
72	GROUPS	51	17	DISCUSSIONS	51	4
73	TALIBAN	25	3	FIQH	32	0
74	KA'BAH	15	0	OPINIONS	44	3
75	GOVERNMENT	52	19	ACCORDING	106	28
76	NASSER	26	4	OPINION	79	16
77	CHURCHES	14	0	CONTEXTUALIZATION	29	0
78	CATHOLIC	14	0	REASONING	29	0
79	SHAH	18	1	HUMAN	133	42
80	COMMUNISTS	18	1	ALTHOUGH	194	76
81	PROPAGANDA	18	1	BELIEF	87	20
82	SPIRITUAL	35	9	VERSE	63	10
83	CAMPAIGN	40	12	MAN'S	42	3
84	JUDAISM	25	4	VERSES	78	17
85	PLURALIST	13	0	METHOD	26	0
86	MYSTICS	13	0	INTERCESSION	25	0
87	SPIRITUALITY	20	2	INHERITANCE	35	2
88	GROUP	62	28	SO	200	85
89				USE	104	31
90				ANALYSIS	30	1

No.	Keywords in Schwartz	Freq. Schwartz	Ref. Freq. DeLong-Bas	Keywords in DeLong-Bas	Freq. DeLong-Bas	Ref. Freq. Schwartz
91				MEAN	30	1
92				KUFFAR	24	0
93				SEX	34	2
94				SOURCES	69	15
95				ALWAHHAB'S	23	0
96				PASSAGES	23	0
97				ISSUE	70	16
98				HANBALI	45	6
99				FAITH	183	78
100				FEMALE	42	5
101				BELIEFS	52	9
102				SCHOLARSHIP	26	1
103				AUTHORITATIVE	42	6
104				THEMES	31	3
105				CONCLUSION	29	3
106				STUDY	55	14
107				TOPIC	34	5

Table 5.1: Keywords in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas

Granted that both texts tackle the same topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism, the keywords tabulated above may provide insights into the oppositional stances held by the two authors. The keywords in each text could be clues to the different aspects of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism that each author tries to project, although likewise they could indicate aspects which the other is choosing to ignore. However, specifying the keywords in each text and contrasting them in a table is only the first stage of a keyword analysis.

In fact, a good deal of the calculated keywords in each text can be said to be predicated on a number of 'semantic macrostructures' (Van Dijk 1980, 1995, 2009b)[56], which may initially define meta-Wahhabi discourse as being realized by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas, i.e. anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourses respectively. According to van Dijk (2009b: 68), the discursive nature of semantic macrostructures as topics or themes can be 'characteristically expressed in titles, abstracts, summaries and announcements'. In addition to the keywords

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[56] 'Semantic macrostructures' refer to what 'discourses are (globally) about; they are mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker [or the writer]; they embody the (subjectively) most important information of a discourse' (Van Dijk 2009b: 68).

extracted, applying van Dijk's definition to my own texts, which fall within the genre of books, it would be appropriate to identify central topics by analysing the (sub-)titles running throughout the two books. Now, let us first look at keywords in each text, and then focus on those that are thematically relevant at the semantic-macrostructure level of the whole text.

5.3 Keywords and semantic macrostructure in Schwartz

In this section, and the next one, I make hypotheses about what certain keywords are likely to mean prior to conducting more detailed co-textual analyses (via concordances) on them. Among the top 20 keywords with Schwartz are the two lexical items WAHHABI and WAHHABISM. (Interestingly enough, the strongest keyword in DeLong-Bas is a related word: WAHHAB.) In Schwartz, both items (WAHHABI and WAHHABISM) can be said to be 'anthroponyms', that is, 'referring to persons in terms of rough political orientation (often orientational metaphors)' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 51). The object of reference in this context is the proper noun 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' (the eighteenth-century Muslim scholar who is regarded as the founder of the Wahhabi movement). The presence of these two keywords suggests, then, that Wahhabi Islam is an important theme that is tackled by Schwartz.

This fact can further be consolidated if we examine the other lexical items counting among the top 20 keywords in Schwartz. First, the top keyword SAUDI and the fifth keyword SAUDIS are closely related to Wahhabi Islam, since Najd (what is now known as Saudi Arabia) was the genesis of Wahhabi Islam. Second, ARAB, ARABS, and OIL are strongly connected with Saudi Wahhabism, which is typically Islamic and Arab; also oil is the chief economic resource of Saudi Arabia, currently among the world's most important oil producers and exporters. Third, the two keywords ISLAMIC and MECCA are clear references to Wahhabi Islam, as a Muslim movement whose abode is closely related to *Mecca* (see below). Last, the rest of the top 20 keywords, while standing at face value as being separate from

Wahhabi Islam, may have less obvious associations with the term from an authorial perspective; this may be analytically pinned down via the examination of the collocational environment around these keywords: AMERICAN, WESTERN, CHRISTIAN, JEWISH, OTTOMAN, and HAMAS.

Now, let us focus on the rest of the keywords in Schwartz (as opposed to DeLong-Bas). I shall start with the striking cases with the corresponding notably low frequencies in DeLong-Bas. One clear observation in Table 5.1 above is that Schwartz uses more keywords that relate to political aspects than DeLong-Bas does; for example, ISRAEL, OIL, REGIME, HAMAS, LOBBY, WARS, NATO, REFUGEES, IMPERIALISM, BUSH, SADDAM, EMPIRE, GOVERNMENT, NASSER, COMMUNIST, and COMMUNISTS.

It is too early at this point of analysis to decide whether Schwartz is more politically oriented than DeLong-Bas is. We can gain more evidence for this hypothesis when we have conducted a keyword analysis of DeLong-Bas.

A further look at the keywords of Schwartz reveals a focus on national identities: SAUDI, SAUDIS, ARAB, ARABS, ARABIAN, AMERICAN, PALESTINIAN, PALESTINIANS, IRANIAN, ISRAELI, ISRAELIS, WESTERN, and OTTOMAN. Additionally, Schwartz uses a number of keywords which refer to religions: JEWISH, JEWS, JUDAISM, CHRISTIAN, CHRISTIANS, ISLAM, and ISLAMIC. Also similar in nature are the keywords SPIRITUAL and SPIRITUALITY which are associated with religion. Another set of keywords refers to religious figures, denominations or institutions: KHOMINI, IKHWAN, MAWDUDI, PHILBY, ORTHODOX, CATHOLIC, CHURCHES, MOSQUES, SHAH, TALIBAN, SHI'A, SHI'AS, SUFIS, MYSTICS, and WAHHABIS. Importantly, too, the keywords of GROUP, GROUPS and UMMAH (a typically Islamic word that signifies the Muslim nation) could serve a religious

function in discourse: collective terms that are often used to bring together members sharing almost the same religious beliefs.

Clearly, for Schwartz, it can be said that the religious keywords are not focused on Islam alone but extend to both Christianity and Judaism. However, the majority of the keywords do appear to relate to Islam: SAUDI, SAUDIS, WAHHABI, WAHHABIS, WAHHABISM, KHOMINI, ARAB, ARABIAN, ARABS, OTTOMAN, SHI'A, SHI'AS, HAMAS, IKHWAN, MOSQUES, SHARIAH, UMMAH, SUFI, SUFISM, TALIBAN, MECCA, and KA'BA. (The last two, MECCA and KA'BA, are semiotic representations of Islam: MECCA stands for a city in Saudi Arabia wherein the pilgrimage of Muslims takes place, and KA'BA – a cubical building in Mecca – is an iconic representation for one of the most sacred sites in Islam to which Muslims turn in their prayers and conduct pilgrimage.) These terms are focused on Islam and the social construction of the Muslim identity. Interestingly, both aspects, the political and the religious, could be conflated on the pragmatic grounds that religion (in this case Islam) is an object of attraction to politics in certain (Muslim) discourse communities. As Chilton (2004) puts it: 'The generalisation is simply that in certain Muslim states or regions, political discourse will be religious, or contain salient religious elements, though there must be differences of degree that it would be of interest to determine' (Chilton 2004: 175).

Therefore, Schwartz makes use of the following keywords: 1) HAMAS, referring to a militant Islamic group that stands out as an important party to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 2) KHOMINI, a politically revolutionary figure who is known in the Islamic world and is a strongly representative voice of Shiism; 3) IKHWAN, an Arabic transliteration form of the Muslim brotherhood that has a clearly defined political agenda: the formal declaration of Islamic law (*shariah*) as a governance of a broad Muslim community (*ummah*) under the banner of caliphate; 4) HAWARIJ, an Arabic transliteration that literally means 'those who went out' and it is used as a general term that embraces various activist Muslims who, while

having initially supported the fourth caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib, later rejected him; they first emerged in the late 7th century AD; 5) MAWDUDI (known as Abu al-A'la Mawdudi), an influential Muslim thinker, whose interpretative reading of Islam has contributed to shaping the discourses of Muslim thinkers and activists on the Quranic exegesis and the Sunna; 6) PHILBY (known as St. John Philby and also as Sheikh Abdullah), a British explorer, official and author, who joined the British foreign service and was sent on a special mission to Arabia and became the first European to visit the southern provinces on Najd; importantly for some 30 years he was an adviser to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, and dissatisfied with British policy in the Middle East, he resigned (1930) from the foreign service, became a Muslim, and took his Arab name[57]; 7) PLURALISM and PLURALIST, elastic terms that are used in both religion and politics to highlight the integration of different political persuasions or religious convictions into a peaceful co-existence. Schwartz also seems to focus on certain aspects of discourse (e.g. MEDIA, HISTORY, and CULTURE). At this stage though, it is difficult to know how these words are used by Schwartz or why he refers to these concepts more than DeLong-Bas does.

The personal pronouns *I* and WE also appear as keywords in Schwartz. As a keyword in this text, the pronoun 'I' potentially draws attention to the imposing presence of the text producer in his person, which may be regarded as a way of personalizing the text with a potential for the authorial involvement in the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. Thus, appearing as a keyword in text, the first-person pronoun *I* could be indicative of Schwartz personalizing the issue, perhaps as a convert to Islam who assumes the personal knowledge of his new identity as a Sufi Muslim. (Or it could be that Schwartz simply quotes a lot of direct speech from other people.) In principle, on the other side, using the inclusive pronoun WE as a keyword, Schwartz could be adopting an involved stance towards an

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[57] For a meticulous account of St. Philby's biography, see Thesiger and L.P.K's Obituary: H. St. John B. Philby, 1885-1960, *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 126, No. 4 (Dec., 1960), pp. 563-566.

audience. Of course, this does not mean that DeLong-Bas adopts a detached stance; there could be some other strategies, rather than pronominalization, that enhance textual involvement. (The element of authorial personalization and involvement will be much more highlighted in the macro-analysis stage of the text production in Chapter 8.)

Last, let us focus on three other semantically related keywords used by Schwartz: TRADITIONAL, MODERN, and NEW. The first two keywords are a manifestation of a diversified focus, where the binary opposites of *traditional* and *modern* are both handled. Further, the keyword NEW opens up the complexity of recent issues. Perhaps, the keyword HISTORY, previously noted, could be linked to these three keywords. It appears that Schwartz is interested in history and labelling particular time periods more than DeLong-Bas is, although for now, we can only guess at how such words are used by him. At this point we cannot find a ready-made answer to questions such as these. However, investigating the overall semantic macrostructure of Schwartz could be helpful in this connection.

Schwartz's book *The Two Faces of Islam* can be summarized through the following chapter headings. These headings reflect the topics of the book, or, in van Dijk's terms, 'macropropositions'[58]:

M1: Muhammad [the Muslims' Prophet] and the message of Islam

M2: 1,000 years of Islamic expansion

M3: Haters of song: The early Wahhabi movements

M4: The Wahhabi-Saudi conquest of Arabia

M5: Khomeini's Islamic revolution

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[58] I would prefer to retain van Dijk's terminology (macropropositions), since it is useful shorthand for the overall meaning of text. Also, I shall use his abbreviation of the term macroproposition (M) when referring to the topics of each book.

M6: Permanent jihad: The shadow of Afghanistan

M7: Religious colonialism: Wahhabism and American Islam

The macropropositions above map the chapter order of Schwartz's book; they reflect the overall structure of the book, which consists of the following parts: a historical background on Islam in general (M1 and M2), the history of Saudi Wahhabism in particular (M3 and M4), the Iranian model of radical Islamism (M5), and Jihad as an ideology of religious colonialism, with a special focus on Afghanistan, Wahhabism and American Islam (M6 and M7).

One observation here is that several of the keywords used by Schwartz also occur in parts of the overall macropropositional structure of his book: 1) *Saudi* in M4: 'The Wahhabi-Saudi conquest of Arabia'[59]; *Wahhabi* in M3: 'Haters of song: The early Wahhabi movements'; *Islamic* in M2: '1,000 years of Islamic expansion' and M5: 'Khomeini's Islamic revolution'; *Wahhabism* and *Islam* in M7: 'Religious colonialism: Wahhabism and American Islam'. However, the item *jihad*, which appears as a keyword in DeLong-Bas, is also part of the macropropositional structure of constructed by Schwartz (M6). Actually, this is one of the reasons why this item is taken as a node word (JIHAD) in the present study. Also, this should call up attention to the fact that both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas tackle the same discourse topic, and hence the same or similar themes.

By starting from the historical background of Islam and moving specifically towards Wahhabi Islam, Schwartz seems to differentiate between Islam and Wahhabism. This theme is made explicit in the title of his book, 'The Two Faces of Islam', which appears to be predicated on a binary opposition (e.g. one face is good while the other is bad). In this regard,

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[59] Note here that the keywords *Wahhabi* and *Saudi* are so closely related in Schwartz that they appear as a compound adjective in M4 (for a detailed collocational analysis of the expression *Wahhabi-Saudi*, see Chapter 6 [Section 6.3]).

we should not forget that Schwartz has converted to Islam, and he speaks of the Islam that he knows, that is, Sufi Islam as opposed to Wahhabi-Sunni Islam. (In Chapter 8, I shall discuss the religious dichotomy between Sufism and Sunni Wahhabism.)

Having read the whole book, one can say that the global meanings involved in the foregoing macropropositions are controlled by a personal mental model on Schwartz's part. Schwartz has focused on topics which enable him to externalize such mental representations. For example, in M3 he labels Wahhabis as 'haters of song', who regard music as *haram* (i.e. religiously illegal in Islam) in their radically religious worldview; in M4 he constructs the Wahhabi Saudis as invaders of Arabia; and in M7 he presents Wahhabism as being a channel of 'religious colonialism', whose impact has extended to the US in the form of 'American Islam'. Perhaps the last bears the insinuation that Wahhabism exploits religion (in this case, Islam) in the service of the political aspirations of expansionism. Note how Schwartz imports the term 'colonialism' from (meta-)political discourse into (meta-)religious discourse, which indicates tremendous potential for an integration of politics and religion. The empirical evidence of this assumption is realized in the discursively composite expression 'religious colonialism' in M7. Thus, anti-Wahhabi discourse makes a strong case for the emergence of a new kind of colonialism, viz. Wahhabi colonialism.

Thus, Schwartz draws on a cognitive context model that is out of favour with Wahhabi Islam. His negative conceptualization of this religious practice is clear in the semantic representation of the discourse object of Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia, the US, and elsewhere. Now let us move to DeLong-Bas.

5.4 Keywords and semantic macrostructure in DeLong-Bas

Let us start with one important observation. Both texts seem to have the common ground of tackling the major theme of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism, yet there is a crucial difference. This

observation can be made explicit if we have a careful look at the top 20 keywords in DeLong-Bas (Table 5.1).

First, the strongest keyword WAHHAB is a direct reference to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself; the seventh top keyword WAHHAB'S is a pointer to an object of possession, where the nouns following WAHHAB'S are possessed by (or relate to) Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. (Significantly, this may open up the possibility of examining the lexical environment of those nouns possessed by, or related to, WAHHAB'S and their potentially collocational status.) Interestingly, too, the keyword EIGHTEENTH further reflects a textual focus on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, largely because the eighteenth century historically marks his birth and his religious mission in support of Islamic tradition against what he thought unreligious modernisms. Even so, the keywords about Wahhabi Islam in both texts reveal a fundamental difference. On the one hand, Schwartz uses both WAHHABI and WAHHABISM that describe aspects related to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his religious thought; for example, the suffix *-ism* in WAHHABISM has the highly lexicalized meaning of 'doctrinal system of principles' that have to do with 'religion' and 'politics' (see Aronoff and Fudeman 2011: 140f). On the other hand, DeLong-Bas uses both WAHHAB and WAHHAB'S, apparently with a special focus on the identity of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. Thus, at least at this point of analysis, one may presume that Schwartz is not as much interested in the persona of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and what can be attributed to him as DeLong-Bas is. Instead, Schwartz seems concerned with what counts as Wahhabi and the notion of Wahhabism (a notion which is debated amongst Sunni Muslims). The presence of these four related words as key suggests that this would be a prime site for qualitative exploration. However, before this, we will continue to look at the remainder of the DeLong-Bas keyword list.

Second, the keywords HADITH and QURAN are purely academic terms that are typical of Islam; both terms represent the two major resources for *Shariah* (Islamic law), the

former (HADITH) is a corpus of virtually all the acts done and sayings uttered by the Prophet of Muslims, Muhammad, and the latter (QURAN) is the scripture of Muslims; here the keyword HADITH is particularly interesting, for the school of Hadith is the foundational basis of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's academic thought in Islam; and Hadith is a necessary complement to the Quran (at least in the Sunni school of thought). Last, in this respect, the keyword TAWHID bears a special significance. *Tawhid* signifies monotheism in Islam. This is a theme to which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had devoted all his academic life: his reformist call was to revive authentic *tawhid* among the Muslims of his time against what is known as the anti-thesis to *tawhid*, *shirk* or associationism, which are themselves keywords in the text: SHIRK and ASSOCIATIONISM. This can be realized in his famous book *kitab al-tawhid* (the book of monotheism). (Note that both of the transliterated items of KITAB and TAWHID stand out as strong keywords in DeLong-Bas, and so is the keyword MONOTHEISM [see Table 5.1].)

The keyword investigation of Schwartz suggests that he has a politico-religious authorial stance. Conversely, in case of DeLong-Bas, there seems to be no single keyword that suggests any political themes. Rather, instead, she is authorially oriented towards using distinctly technical-religious (namely, Islamic) terms. Consider, for example, the following keywords: 1) GOD and GOD'S as bearing explicit reference to religious meaning, 2) HADITH and QURAN, strictly referring to the religious discourse of Islam – alongside other relevant keywords such as QURANIC, VERSE and VERSES – and SCRIPTURE as a generic term that has a typically religious denotation; 3) FAITH, BELIEF, and BELIEFS, all potentially serving the abstract level motivating a religious practice; 4) JIHAD, denoting a religious war in Islam; and 5) MONOTHEISM as a religion-centred classificatory term that determines the nature of religious belief and the doctrinal structure associated with it. This can be even clearer in the actual presence of opposing concepts such as 'atheism', 'polytheism', and so forth.

Further, DeLong-Bas makes use of a number of transliterations from Arabic into English; these transliterations are all explanatory of the religious discourse of Islam. Schwartz uses some transliterations too although they are fewer in number.

N	Transliterated-form keyword	Arabic form	Meaning
1	HADITH	الحديث	Any saying or act by Muhammad (the Prophet of Muslims).
2	QURAN	القرآن	The central religious Arabic text of Islam, and it is thought by Muslims to be a revelation from Allah to His messenger Muhammad.
3	TAWHID	توحيد	The doctrine of oneness (of God); the concept of monotheism in Islam.
4	MAHR	مهر	A gift given by the groom to his bride upon marriage in Islam.
5	TALAQ	طلاق	A Sunni-Islamic procedure whereby a husband can divorce his wife.
6	ULAMA	علماء	A discourse community of legal scholars of Islam and the Islamic law.
7	IJTIHAD	اجتهاد	A technical term of Islamic law that denotes the process of legislation via autonomous interpretation of the two legal sources in Islam, the Quran and the Sunnah (the latter recorded as Hadith).
8	TAQLID	تقليد	A technical term of Islamic law that stands in theological opposition to *ijtihad*. It refers to imitating or following the tradition of some religious authority without necessarily investigating the scriptural grounds of such tradition.
9	SHIRK	شرك	An authentically Islamic concept of the sin of polytheism.
10	IJMA	إجماع	A technical term of the Islamic law that refers to the consensus reached by the vast majority of Mulsim scholars at one time.
11	MASLAHA	مصلحة	A technical term in Islamic law that represents what may be prohibited or permitted in Islam strictly on the basis of what serves the public's benefit.
12	FIQH	فقه	A technical term that refers to Islamic jurisprudence, which deals with transactive rituals and social legislation as conceived of in Islam.
13	KUFFAR	كفار	A term that literally translates as 'rejecters'; but in its Islamic doctrinal sense, the term refers to persons who does not recognize Allah (strictly as one God) or the prophethood of Muhammad, and thus to any non-Muslim.
14	HANBALI	حنبلى	The adjectival form of one of the schools of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) within Sunni Islam – the other three are *Hanafi, Maliki* and *Shafi'i* – and arguably it is the school of the creed that the Wahhabi and Salafi sects follow within Sunni Islam.

Table 5.2: Transliterated keywords in DeLong-Bas

Let us compare the meanings of those keywords in each text, and see what overall function these transliterations may serve, at least at this stage of analysis.

DeLong-Bas makes use of Arabic-specific transliterations that relate to religion. These are displayed in Table 5.2 above. The transliterations above seem to serve two functions in text, one is ideational and the other is interpersonal. On the one hand, they are a representation of the text producer's experience of the Islamic-Arabic religious legacy and its technical jargon; on the other, they presuppose some sort of authorial involvement in and familiarity with Muslims as a discourse community which has its own cultural Islamic identity. Indeed, the transliterated keywords used by Schwartz show a marked contrast in this regard, where again the political and the religious stand side by side. Table 5.3 below is a realization of this aspect.

N	Transliterated-form keyword	Arabic form	Meaning
1	HAMAS	حماس	The word stands as an acronym for the classical-Arabic expression حركة المقاومة الاسلامية, meaning 'Islamic Resistance Movement'; Hamas is a Palestinian-Sunni paramilitary organization which presently holds a majority of seats in the elected legislative council of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
2	IKHWAN	اخوان	A term meaning 'brethren'; they were located in the Arabia as members of a militant group of religious brothers that took an active role in unifying the Arabian Peninsula under Ibn Saud (1912-1930).
3	KHWARIJ	خوارج	A term that refers to members of an Islamic sect in the 7th and 8th centuries AD. The origin of *Khwarij* lies in the strife over political power over the Muslim community in the years following the death of the Prophet of Muslims (Muhammad). The theology of *Khwarij* was known to be a form of radical Islam. Extreme *Khwarij* considered the vast majority of non-conformist Muslims to be 'unbelievers', who must be killed.
4	UMMAH	أمة	A collective term that literally means 'nation'; it is used in Islamic discourse with a concrete reference to the community of believers as one a Muslim unity, which is supposed to be religiously unified under the Islamic caliphate as an overall religious institution of worldwide Muslims who must be ruled by Islamic law (*shariah*).

Table 5.3: Transliterated keywords in Schwartz

Clearly, DeLong-Bas contrasts with Schwartz in terms of the transliterated keywords used. These keywords bear different ideational and interpersonal functions in text. Ideationally, Schwartz's keywords represent the political-Islamist experience of activist Muslims. Interpersonally, they reflect the authorial involvement in the politically activist Muslims and the textual focus on this denomination. Thus, whereas the transliterated keywords used by DeLong-Bas are strongly evocative of purely technical religious meanings that are constantly circulated among the Sunni Muslim discourse community members, those used by Schwartz evoke the politico-religious meanings circulating the activist Muslim discourse community members. Here comes in another point of interest: each text may be addressed to an audience that opposes the other.

Also, interestingly, a fairly large number of the keywords in DeLong-Bas are concerned with gender, on top of which is the keyword GENDER. This can be realized in both function keywords (HER, HE, HIS, SHE) and content ones (WOMAN, WOMEN, MAN, WIFE, HUSBAND, MALE, FEMALE). Further, there are other related content keywords including MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEX and SEXUAL. These keywords serve as general frames that determine the mutual relation (biological or social) between the keywords explicitly indicative of gender. Thus, one important theme tackled by DeLong-Bas is gender. Comparatively, discussion of gender appears to be remarkably ignored by Schwartz, which indicates a major thematic difference in the present data.

A large number of the keywords in DeLong-Bas ascertain the strong presence of academic discourse and its typically generic feature of argumentation. There is some evidence that DeLong-Bas draws on a type of academic discourse which is diaphonic (double-voiced), with general and religious academic discourses merged. Let us have a closer look at the keywords that capture such a possible diaphonic academic discourse, starting with the general academic keywords: INTERPRETATION, INTERPRETATIONS, DISCUSSION, DISCUSSIONS,

WRITINGS, CASES, APPROACH, METHODOLOGY, CONTEXT, CONTEXTUALIZATION, OPINION, OPINIONS, ANALYSIS, SOURCES, SCHOLARSHIP, CONCLUSION, STUDY, and TOPIC.[60] As for the religious academic keywords in DeLong-Bas, we need to repeat ourselves for the most part: QURAN, HADITH, IJTIHAD, ULAMA, IJMA, MONOTHEISM, ASSOCIATIONISM, MASLAHA, JURISTS, TAQLID, and FIQH. Again, such a diaphonic academic discourse is thematically sidelined by Schwartz.

There is yet another cluster of keywords in DeLong-Bas that is suggestive of an argumentative discourse type. These are all function keywords that mark the transition from one element in the argument into the other: BECAUSE, CONSEQUENTLY, THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH, and SO. Such keywords may be a clue to the possibility that DeLong-Bas is at least more argumentative than Schwartz is.

Last, compared with Schwartz, DeLong-Bas seems to be using a number of significant grammatical keywords that could be informative in the present context of analysis, namely, NOT, OR, ANYONE, and ANY. NOT may bear the function of negating certain claims or deconstructing a particular identity, with a view to emphatically establishing the textual standpoint of DeLong-Bas. However, there may be a different strategy for fulfilling the same purpose on the part of Schwartz; and that will be discovered through further analysis of the collocates accompanying the keywords. OR, on the other hand, could reflect an alternative-making textual resource for, say, constructing some sort of binarism. As regards ANYONE and ANY, nothing interesting can be said but a potential for an air of textual generalization that may target a particular rhetorical effect; the exercise of this rhetorical effect may well be successfully maintained via the pragmatic fallacy of hasty generalization.

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[60] Note that the keyword ACCORDING is yet another important academic-discourse signal, particularly if collocational analysis would prove it to strongly collocate with its typical marker 'to'.

Even so, we still need to investigate the overall semantic macrostructure in DeLong-Bas, so that we can somehow contextualize the thematically prominent keywords discussed so far. In a similar vein, we may summarize DeLong-Bas's *Wahhabi Islam* in the following macropropositions via the (sub-)titles of the chapters in the book:

M1: Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the origins of Wahhabism: The eighteenth-century context

M2: The theology and worldview of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab

M3: Islamic law: Separation of the divine from the human

M4: Women and Wahhabis: In defense of women's rights

M5: Jihad: Call to Islam or call to violence?

M6: The trajectory of Wahhabism: From revival and reform to global jihad.

Like Schwartz, one can observe that some of DeLong-Bas's keywords are part of the macropropositional structure of her book: 1) *Wahhab* (as part of the proper noun Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) in M1: 'Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the origins of Wahhabism: The eighteenth-century context' and M2: 'The theology and worldview of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab'; 2) *jihad* in M5: 'Jihad: Call to Islam or call to violence?' and M6: 'The trajectory of Wahhabism: From revival and reform to global jihad'; 3) *women* in M4: 'Women and Wahhabis: In defense of women's rights'. However, the items *Wahhabism*, *Islamic* and *Islam* (which appears as keywords of Schwartz) are also part of the macropropositional structure set up by DeLong-Bas, respectively M1 and M6, M3, and M5. Actually, this should call attention to the fact that both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas tackle the same discourse topic, and hence the same or similar themes.

These macropropositions show the overall topical structure of DeLong-Bas's book. A chain of themes make up the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism and the relevant aspects that bear on the theological worldview of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Obviously, the socio-religious historical context within which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his theological worldview emerged matters significantly to DeLong-Bas. She has initiated her text with an exploration of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's biography and the origins of his religious movement in Najd in the 18th century (M1), and then developed a specific framework of this Wahhabi theological worldview (M2). This has been followed by a general framework of the 'Islamic law' (M3), then by three interrelated macropropositions that appertain to the issues of women's rights (M4) and jihad (M5 and M6) in Wahhabi Islam.

The phraseology of M4 seems to be interesting, in that the title includes the juxtaposition of the items *Women* and *Wahhabis*; more interestingly, the subtitle in M4 is a statement that bears positive shading: 'In defense of women's rights'. Significantly, this could be taken as an externalization of DeLong-Bas's positive mental representation of Wahhabism as a movement that enhances the position of women in society. As for the issue of jihad, more precisely Wahhabi jihad, for DeLong-Bas, it stands as an independent topic, where the title 'Jihad' is being roughly glossed in the rhetorical-question subtitle 'Call to Islam or call to violence?' in M5. It is a way of pre-empting the assumption that Wahhabi jihad is a call for violence. (Of course, we cannot fully understand this macropropositional analysis of M4 and M5 apart from the micro collocational analysis (of DeLong-Bas) of the node words WOMAN/WOMAN'S and WOMEN/WOMEN'S in Chapter 7 and JIHAD in this chapter.)

The last macroproposition (M6) – 'The trajectory of Wahhabism: From revival and reform to global jihad' – is especially important. It is concerned with the sharp distinction that DeLong-Bas has drawn between the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a reformer and a

revival of Sunnah and Bin Laden's radical call for 'global jihad' (see DeLong-Bas 2004: 272ff). This distinction reflects two opposing mental representations on DeLong-Bas's part. The first has to do with the scholarly image in her mind about the reformer Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; it is a fact that will be substantiated when we investigate the discourse prosodies of the collocates associated with the node WAHHAB'S used by DeLong-Bas (see Chapter 6, Section 6.5). The second mental representation will be projected in the collocation JIHAD ... *Laden* in Subsection 5.5.3 below, where the co-text has constructed bin Laden as the radical voice of offensive and global jihad as opposed to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's moderate voice of defensive and local jihad.

Thus, unlike Schwartz, DeLong-Bas draws on a cognitive context model that is in favour of Wahhabi-Saudi Islam. Her positive conceptualization of this religious practice is clear in the semantic representation of modern Saudi Arabia and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discourse on jihad (see Subsection 5.5.5) and women's rights (see Chapter 7).

Having listed the two sets of macropropositions by examining the chapter headings in the two books, it is possible to make further comparisons between them. It is notable, for example, that both authors refer to 'jihad' (although conceptualize its relationship to Wahhabi Islam in different ways). There are also differences: only DeLong-Bas includes the position of women in her context model; Schwartz refers to America and colonialism, which are absent from DeLong-Bas's model. However, the following subsection outlines an even more interesting aspect of comparing the two semantic macrostructures together, which is useful at showing how the macrostructures in both texts may mirror the mental representations that are well established in the minds of the text producers (see further details in Chapter 8).

5.5 A macropropositionally reversed context model of Wahhabi history

One notable observation about the macropropositional structures constructed by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas is that they significantly contrast in proposing the historical context of Wahhabi Islam. Schwartz has topically initiated his text with the more general historical context of Islam (M1 and M2), then proceeded less generally with the two topics of the 'early Wahhabi movements' (M3) and the Wahhabi-Saudi collaboration which conquered Arabia (M4). By contrast, DeLong-Bas makes her starting point the biography of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his worldview in the 18th century (M1 and M2), and then moves to the general category of Islamic law (M3). On the part of the two writers this reversed order of the historical frameworks of Wahhabi Islam reflects a reversed mental model of the history of the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. This may point us to the writers' opposing frames of mind in terms of the different semantic foci which have been realized in their topical priorities. Obviously, the two writers have different perceptions of the history of Wahhabi Islam as a discourse object. This may raise the question of whether DeLong-Bas is mentally geared towards the persona of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and tries to harmoniously fit him and his teachings into Islam in general; or, on the other side, whether Schwartz conceptualizes Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as unworthy of topical interest and as a person who should be alienated from Islam in general.

Even so, we cannot fully grasp the contrasted semantic macrostructures of both texts and the context model upon which they are sociocognitively constructed without paying attention to the text producers proper and the respective discursive competences that elucidate the transfer of textual messages onto certain discourse communities. (This aspect will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.)

Having briefly outlined the surface differences between the two lists of keywords, I now carry out a more detailed qualitative analysis of some of the keywords, which I choose to be node words (see the criteria of selecting node words in Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.1.4). As I said earlier, this chapter is concerned with the collocational analysis of the node word JIHAD (see below); the rest of selected node words (WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S, SAUDI, and the gender-specific node words) will be analysed in the next two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7).

5.6 Representing JIHAD in meta-Wahhabi discourse

5.6.1 Node words: a general note

With 195 keywords across the two texts (see Table 5.1), it is beyond the scope of this thesis to do justice to them all in the coming qualitative analysis, whether here in this chapter or in the next two chapters. Therefore, I need to focus my analysis on a smaller number which are helpful in revealing the most interesting differences between the two texts and their ideological positions. These keywords will be called node words, and below I describe how they are determined.

In order for a keyword to be a node word, there needs to be a satisfaction of a number of criteria. On the one hand, quantitatively, the keyword must have at least one collocate with an MI score of 3 or more and a t score of 2 or more in both texts (even the text where the word is not key). On the other hand, qualitatively, these collocates must be amenable to the analytic model theoretically proposed and elaborated in Chapter three (Section 3.5) regarding the two classification schemes of textual synonymy and/or oppositional paradigms as well as the argumentation schemes of the pragmatic fallacies potentially underlying the designated collocations. Both schemes (classification and argumentation) have proved crucial, since Schwartz would contrast with DeLong-Bas in terms of using the collocates of these keywords.

As shown in Table 5.1 above, I began with 195 keywords (88 from Schwartz and 107 from DeLong-Bas). Applying the criteria for selecting node words, I first derived collocates for all of these keywords. A considerable number of the keywords (143 keywords) were found to contain no collocates which had an MI score of 3 or above and a *t* score of 2 or above, so these keywords could be rejected as potential node words. With the remaining 52 keywords I began to consider the qualitative criteria for determining node words. While these keywords had collocates with important MI and *t* scores, only a small number of collocates were amenable to the suggested theoretical framework of classification schemes of textual synonymy and oppositional paradigms as well as the argumentation scheme of pragmatic fallacies (see Chapter 3, Subsections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4). For example, this is the case with JIHAD (Schwartz and DeLong-Bas) in this chapter, WAHHABI (Schwartz), WAHHAB'S (DeLong-Bas), SAUDI (Schwartz and DeLong-Bas) in Chapter 6, and gender-specific terms such as WOMAN, MAN, etc. (in one text or both texts) in Chapter 7. Now, let us focus on the node word JIHAD and see how its collocates across the two texts could potentially constitute any contrastive schemes in ideologically interesting ways.

5.6.2 JIHAD: cross-textual collocates

One of the major themes in this chapter is jihad as being a religious practice, which has been decontextualized from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discourse, and then differently recontextualized into both anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses.[61]

There are three reasons why I have identified JIHAD as a node word; they vary methodologically in terms of corpus-based quantitative and qualitative evidence. First, although the term 'jihad' is a keyword in DeLong-Bas, it is also fairly frequent in Schwartz (occurring 464 vs. 109 times respectively [WordSmith5]).[62] Second, given the opposing

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[61] Here I am following van Leeuwen's understanding of discourse as 'the recontexualization of social practice' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 4ff).

discourse types that each text draws on in tackling the same topic, the religiously sensitive issue of jihad in Wahhabi Islam – alongside its political implications – is most likely to constitute one of the central themes in both texts. This point is supported by the fact that the word 'jihad' occurs in the chapter titles of both books. In Schwartz 'Chapter 6: M6: Permanent jihad: The shadow of Afghanistan' and in DeLong-Bas 'Chapter 5: M5: Jihad: Call to Islam or call to violence?'.

Interestingly, the second qualitative reason, while drawing heavily on my own knowledge of the world to do with 'jihad' as a politico-religious concept, can be supported by corpus evidence. As shown in Table 5.4 below[63], JIHAD has been identified to collocate with a number of word-forms (both lexical and grammatical) that significantly contrast across both texts. Third, the designated collocates of JIHAD in both texts are amenable to the contrastive analysis of the classification and argumentation schemes developed in Chapter 3.

SCHWARTZ						DELONG-BAS					
Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score	Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score
JIHAD (total freq. 109)	Afghanistan	95	6	6.09	2.41	JIHAD (total freq. 464)	holy	52	34	7.58	5.71
	against	248	17	6.03	3.81		war	83	35	6.95	5.78
	or	370	8	3.87	2.08		collective	18	8	6.65	2.43
	Muslims	530	6	3.35	2.02		infidels	18	5	6.39	2.21
	is	557	5	3.28	2.01		defensive	31	18	6.09	2.61
							should	258	7	5.12	2.57
							limited	40	13	5.91	2.78
							duty	44	12	5.78	2.77
							States	47	6	5.00	2.17
							against	183	38	5.77	5.64
							defense	41	7	5.69	2.59
							unbelievers	41	5	5.20	2.18
							individual	75	8	4.82	2.55
							Laden	87	12	4.12	2.11
							cases	129	7	3.55	2.04

Table 5.4: Collocates of **JIHAD** in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas

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[62] Note that jihad is the main controversial aspect about Wahhabi Islam in the Western societies, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 event.

63 Table 5.4 is composed of 6 columns for each text: the first column includes the node word (JIHAD in this case), the second displays the collocates of the node word, the third offers the frequency of each collocate in the respective text, the fourth presents the joint frequency of the node word and its co-occurring collocate in text, and the last two columns give the collocation statistics of the MI and *t* scores for each collocational pair.

Obviously, however, compared with DeLong-Bas, the collocational environment of JIHAD is impoverished in Schwartz. This can be empirically explained in view of the fact that JIHAD is more frequent in DeLong-Bas. Again, by no means should this belittle the thematic value of the same item (*jihad*) in Schwartz for the reasons previously mentioned.

Now, let us begin with the collocational environment of JIHAD, produced by Schwartz, as recognized in the concordance below (Figure 5.1). Note that only a representative sample of the concordance lines that repeat the same function in text will be considered, unless emphasis is needed. Also, note that I shall present the concordances of JIHAD in both texts immediately consecutively, so that the contrastive aspects between the collocational environments in each text can be maintained. First, below is the concordance of JIHAD as used by Schwartz:

N	Concordance
1	grim example of the "reformer" Ibn Taymiyyah, who had incited "jihad" against the Islamized Mongols. Turkish scholar Hilmi Ishik
2	Another government cleric, Abdullah Ibn Jabreen, called for a "jihad" against the Shi'a on grounds of their "bad faith." The worst
3	the diabolical conception that led "Afghan Arabs" to launch a "jihad" against America. A text produced by his followers
4	was backed with a fatwa in which Ibn Abd alWahhab ordered "jihad" against the Ottomans. The full import of Ibn Abd
5	in 1732. Although he summoned the Caucasian Muslims to jihad against the Russians, the Naqshbandis credit the real
6	imperial power, while its Indian branch conducted a violent jihad against the same British in the subcontinent. Similarly, the
7	of the Turks in Europe as the opportunity to revive the Wahhabi "jihad" against the Ottomans. He gathered his forces for the
8	expansion. Ibn Abd alWahhab and his followers called for "jihad" against Muslims. In this they imitated the grim example of
9	turned to the Christians for direct military help in their "jihad" against the Turks. During this period, Britain acquired a
10	reinforced by the Wahhabis. Ibn Taymiyyah's encouragement of jihad as a means of dividing Muslims meant a return to the
11	traditional Muslims have often warned against the call to "jihad" between Muslims. Some opponents of Qutbism argue that
12	and the Philippines. His aim was to dramatize the appeal to "jihad" by portraying Muslims everywhere as under attack.
13	"dreamed of his wife in Paradise and Paradise itself, while in the jihad in Afghanistan." A delirious commentary on these themes
14	by the dervishes? And how would the Wahhabis fight their "jihad" in societies where Muslims lived alongside non-Muslims?
15	refused, so he left her to her worldly life." Indeed, once the real jihad in Afghanistan had ended and the Azzam-bin Laden terror
16	as well as from Egypt and other Arab countries, took up the jihad in Afghanistan, a country of which they typically knew
17	nor a neighbor of Arabs. Even more significant, perhaps, the jihad in Afghanistan provided a unique opportunity for the Saudis
18	to abandonment of Islam. The traditional Islamic definition of jihad is war against unbelieving countries in which few or no
19	practices in the Islamic milieu. Joining the worldwide Wahhabi "jihad" is not a matter of filling out a form. One does not have to go
20	satisfied by a piece of land but demands the whole universe ... Jihad is at the same time offensive and defensive . . . The Islamic
21	to Allah on the Day of Judgment ... The reason I want to fight jihad is not because my iman [faith] is strong. Rather, I want to
22	One man's reformer may be another man's murderous bigot. Jihad, or struggle to promote the faith, had been the guiding
23	those dealing with other religions, and those relevant to jihad, or sacred struggle against unbelievers. Although Qur'an and
24	mode, with a work generally known as The Most Strenuous Jihad or Ashadd al-Jihad, calling for sustained resistance to
25	had other places ready in which to continue their illegitimate "jihad." The shadow of Afghanistan continues to darken the world.

Figure 5.1: Concordance of **JIHAD** in Schwartz

Second, here comes the concordance of the same node word JIHAD in DeLong-Bas:

N	Concordance
1	in "Kitab al-Tawhid," simply is not sufficient for a declaration of jihad against unbelievers. In fact, discussions of cases in which
2	movements whose proclaimed goal is to carry out unlimited, global jihad against unbelievers derive inspiration from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab? If,
3	mutually exclusive spheres and his declaration of permanent global jihad against unbelievers are not Wahhabi in origin. Their roots lie in
4	from other countries who had also come from abroad to fight in the jihad against the Soviet Union. As one fellow volunteer described him:
5	lestinians. It was at this point, in 1996, that bin Laden first called for jihad against the United States. This initial call for jihad was limited in
6	to his declarations. A case in point is the famous fatwa declaring jihad against the United States, which was signed not only by bin
7	made clear to bin Laden that the failure of Muslims to continue the jihad against infidels begun in Afghanistan had resulted in a new
8	therefore in 1989 that Al-Qaida was founded in order to continue the "Jihad against infidels" beyond the borders of Afghanistan, as well as to
9	9:29-33 as calls to arms. Notably absent in Qutb's justifications for jihad are the defense of country, checking the aggressive designs of
10	the need to summon unbelievers to Islam prior to engaging in battle, jihad as a collective rather than an individual duty, and some of the
11	sake of state consolidation and accumulation of power in the name of jihad as holy war, he must have been severely disappointed.
12	legal justifications for the mechanics of jihad. Bin Laden calls for jihad as an individual duty; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab upheld jihad as a
13	historical developments, therefore, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab asserted that jihad as a collective responsibility had overtaken jihad as an individual
14	of the Muslim community, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not define jihad as an individual undertaking—fard `ayn—as contemporary
15	This is far more in keeping with the modernist interpretation of jihad as a purely defensive action. Contemporary fundamentalists have
16	to limit the scope and involvement of the Muslim community in jihad as holy war, how can contemporary extremists like Osama bin
17	Laden calls for jihad as an individual duty; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab upheld jihad as a collective duty. Bin Laden requires no justification for jihad
18	for specific individuals serves as a strong reminder of the nature of jihad as a collective duty (fard kifayah) rather than an individual duty
19	to refocus the attention of his followers on the ultimate purpose of jihad—defense of the Muslim community, the winning of converts, and
20	has to do with how it is defined. For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, jihad is always a defensive military action. Here he is synchronous
21	the point of the citation by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was to prove that jihad is a collective duty, not to preach hellfire and brimstone to those
22	Abd al-Wahhab preached monotheism. Bin Laden preaches a global jihad of cosmic importance that recognizes no compromise; Ibn Abd
23	vision of jihad was purely defensive in nature. He legitimated jihad only in cases in which Muslims had experienced an actual
24	as holy war to defend the Wahhabis. However, even this defensive jihad remained limited in scope, as fighting was permitted only against
25	a bridge between Islam and the West. Islamic modernists taught that jihad should be a purely defensive action. They outlined three causes
26	to agree on anything beyond this purpose, such as where the next jihad should occur or who was to lead it. Because the Arab Afghans
27	writings. Firestone's analysis opens with the question of why jihad should occur and what it signifies. He finds that most of the
28	for Muslims of every time and place; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab confined jihad to specific and limited circumstances and contexts. Bin Laden
29	of jihad in aggressive activities directed against others. By limiting jihad to cases that were strictly defensive in nature, he precluded the
30	jihad offensive as well as defensive," Ibn Abd al-Wahhab restricted jihad to cases in which the enemy in question had behaved
31	with non-Muslims. Like the modernists, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad was purely defensive in nature. He legitimated jihad only in cases
32	he believed that the only intent a person should have in carrying out jihad was defense of God and God's community, not the desire for

Figure 5.2: Concordance of **JIHAD** in DeLong-Bas

In the following subsections certain aspects of analysis will be tackled in terms of the collocates of JIHAD across either text, or what can technically be called cross-textual collocates.

5.6.3 JIHAD and moral evaluation legitimation

Let us set out with the aim of explaining the semantics of the religious term JIHAD and its discursive function in both texts. Actually, the term has had different, if not opposing, implications across what Dinham (2009: 65) has recently referred to as 'faith communities':

communities wherein faiths are 'gateways to access the tremendous reserves of energy and commitment of their members [...]'. Jihad is coloured by a diversity of faiths which are ideologically shaped by the common interests of one religious group (held as a discourse community) or another in the Islamic world. However, no single Muslim would deny its existence. This is so because the term is authentically Islamic, enshrined in the Quran; and its discursive status in the Islamic history solidifies a particular knowledge about the life of Muhammad, the Prophet of Muslims, his companions and the caliphs who ruled after his death. Of course, this does not take away the fact that there is a spate of different interpretations associated with jihad, among which are the present two books that are confined in scope to the scholarly interpretation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its current effect. Such interpretations have become increasingly important with the term 'jihad' coming into popular use in the United States in the wake of September 11, 2001. Since then, the term has been employed by politicians to 'conjure up terrifying images of irrational foreigners coming to destroy American freedoms' (Cook 2005: 1).

Now, let us focus on the micro aspect of the collocational environments of JIHAD in both texts. As will be shown by the end of this analysis, Schwartz is less explicit in this regard than is DeLong-Bas, who uses the node word JIHAD in strong collocation with the items *holy* (MI score 7.58 and *t* score 5.71) and *war* (MI score 6.95 and *t* score 5.78). In Figure 5.2, DeLong-Bas appears to typically use this collocation as embedded in the lexical pattern *jihad as holy war* (lines 11 and 16), which is strongly suggestive of a religious discourse of legitimation. In fact, this lexical pattern bears an important function in the text, that is, the discursive construction of 'moral evaluation legitimation' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 109). Let us examine this function in DeLong-Bas and find out whether it has any comparable aspects in Schwartz.

DeLong-Bas attempts to construct a positive presentation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab by suspending any political potential for the moral-evaluation-legitimation jihad in his teachings. To this end, DeLong-Bas brings in a Western argument about the famous religious-political 1744 alliance between Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud towards the foundation of the first Saudi state: the assumption that Ibn Saud had exploited Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on jihad for morally legitimizing military activities for building up the early Saudi state.

This counter-argument is made explicit by DeLong-Bas in the co-text around the collocating items JIHAD + *holy* and *war* in line 11. It is useful to expand this line here: 'If Ibn Saud had expected Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to legitimate all of his military undertakings for the sake of state consolidation and accumulation of power in the name of jihad as holy war, he must have been severely disappointed' (line 11, Figure 5.2). Interesting here is DeLong-Bas's use of the expression *in the name of jihad as holy war*, which suggests the potential for the moral evaluation legitimation of jihad as holy war, particularly at the political level. Here, DeLong-Bas attempts to negate this kind of jihad-bound moral evaluation from the historical alliance between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud who founded the Saudi state.

A similar ideological meaning is encoded in the same expression (*jihad as holy war*) in line 16, where DeLong-Bas argues against the claim that 'contemporary extremists like Osama bin Laden' might use 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's ideology to justify their global jihad against the United States and American interests' (line 16). DeLong-Bas has refuted this claim by explaining that both camps (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab vs. extremists such as bin Laden) are opposed in their definition of jihad. (This aspect of ideological clash will be thoroughly handled in Subsection 5.5.6 on the classification scheme of oppositional paradigms.) Thus, for DeLong-Bas, jihad as holy war is nothing but a protean concept which is subject to contradictory interpretations.

On the other hand, in Figure 5.1, Schwartz exploits the moral-evaluation-legitimation aspect of jihad in Islamic discourse. He focuses on this aspect as a discursive strategy for supporting his claims about the extreme teachings by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in so far as jihad is concerned. Schwartz begins his argument gradually by using the collocation JIHAD + *or*, in which the collocate *or* bears an equative function: it equates jihad with a certain definition or understanding (see lines 22-24 in Figure 5.1). An analysis of the concordance lines of JIHAD and *or* shows that Schwartz uses *or* in order to give a definition of what JIHAD means (to him). The grammatical relationship between the collocates is always JIHAD, optionally followed by a comma, then the word *or*, which is followed by a definition of what JIHAD means.

For example, line 22 reads 'Jihad, or struggle to promote faith, had been the guiding principle throughout a millennium of uninterrupted Islamic expansion'. Here, by using the collocate *or*, Schwartz equates jihad with one kind of struggle, that is, faith promotion; thus, as Schwartz holds, a historical episode of unstoppable Islamic expansion may have been legitimized by moral evaluation – the religious value of faith. Similarly, another aspect of legitimation can be realized in line 23: '[...] jihad, or sacred struggle against unbelievers'. Here, using the same collocate *or*, Schwartz equates the node word JIHAD with another kind of struggle with the following specifications.

First, this struggle is sacred under the assumption that it is based on Quranic principles established by God; here, it should be noted that the adjective *sacred* operates in the same way as the adjective *holy* used by DeLong-Bas; it activates a moral concept, and creates the generalized motive of killing in the way of Allah for the sake of winning martyrdom. Second, it (the struggle) targets unbelievers (in this context, non-Muslims). This may explain why the practice of jihad could itself be taken as a religiously legitimate reason for launching war against other (non-Muslim) communities. In line 24, discursive moral

evaluation legitimation continues through the collocational use of JIHAD + *or*. Again, the collocate *or* functions to equate what Schwartz refers to as 'The Most Strenuous Jihad' with its Arabic-transliteration version '*Ashadd al-Jihad*'. It is a classical type of jihad that Schwartz invokes to sustainably resist what he describes as the 'Wahhabi blandishments'.

Therefore, DeLong-Bas describes Ibn al-Wahhab's notion of jihad as defensive and only against local aggressors whereas Schwartz focused on Wahhabi jihad as an extreme offensive practice which is used globally against the west and non-Wahhabi Muslims in order to argue that Wahhabis despise and fight the Other.

5.6.4 Ideology and prepositional directionality: JIHAD *against* the Other

The word *against* collocates with JIHAD in both texts, and tends to occur in the relationship *jihad against*: Schwartz (lines 1-9 [Figure 5.1]) and DeLong-Bas (lines 1-8 [Figure 5.2]). This seems understandable from the Arabic semantic nature of the term 'jihad' as a 'struggle'. (This Arabic semantic nature of struggling has been made explicit by Schwartz in the co-textual environment of the collocation JIHAD + *or* [see Subsection 5.5.3 above].) It is a kind of struggle that has highly ideological implications of religious *holiness* in Islam, based on a long history of the Islamic conquests made by the Prophet of Muslims (Muhammad) and the following Muslim Caliphs and rulers who had reigned over the Muslim community (*ummah*). It is a fact that finds its way in the moral explanations inhering in the term ('jihad'), as being 'one of the basic commandments of faith, an obligation imposed on all Muslims by God, through revelation' (Lewis 1988: 73). Even so, despite the purely religious nature of the term, it can readily be politicized by different religious and political leaders or groups whose agenda rests on the declaration of jihad *against* the Other – who possesses a counter ideology – in the name of religion.

Obviously, for both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas, the ideological import attaching to the node word JIHAD is encoded in the preposition *against* as a collocate that is directional in function. The prepositional collocate *against* constantly targets a certain party to a (presumably) religious conflict. Let us phraseologically substantiate this ideological aspect in both texts. In Schwartz, the collocation JIHAD *against* appears in the first nine lines: 1) "jihad" had been 'incited' by Ibn Taymiyyah against 'the Islamized Mongols' (line 1); 2) "jihad" is declared by a government cleric, Abdullah Ibn Jabreen, against 'the Shi'a on grounds of their "bad faith"' (line 2); 3) "jihad" is launched by the "Afghan Arabs" against 'America' (line 3); 4) "jihad" was 'ordered' by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab against 'the Ottomans', 'Muslims', and 'the Turks' (lines 4, 8 and 9 repressively); 5) the Caucasian Muslims were summoned to jihad against 'the Russians' (line 5); 6) a violent jihad was 'conducted' against the British (line 6); and 7) 'Wahhabi "jihad"' is presented as a religious practice that had been politically revived against 'the Ottomans' (line 7). Thus, Schwartz's use of the collocation JIHAD + *against* has a revolutionary co-textual meaning, which provokes a negative discourse prosody, in the concordance in Figure 5.1.

In DeLong-Bas, on the other hand, the collocation JIHAD + *against* appears in the first eight lines (lines 1-8 in Figure 5.2) with a special focus on the dichotomy between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of 'defensive' jihad and Osama bin Laden's call for 'global' (or 'universal') jihad. The former kind of Wahhabi jihad is declared only restrictively against offensive 'unbelievers' (line 1); this is further substantiated in the statement following line 1 in the concordance: 'In fact, discussions of cases in which fighting the nonbeliever is permitted are limited in "Kitab al-Tawhid"'. Remember that "Kitab al-Tawhid" (The Book of Monotheism) is Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's most famous and cited work.

Also, DeLong-Bas has strongly argued against the claim that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview of jihad could be global at all. For instance, in the expanded version of line 2, the

lexical expression 'global jihad against unbelievers' is embedded in a question form that has been framed rhetorically against this claim: 'If, as was argued in the previous chapter, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to limit the scope and involvement of the Muslim community in jihad as holy war how do contemporary movements whose proclaimed goal is to carry out unlimited, global jihad against unbelievers derive inspiration from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab?' (line 2). Note here that the negative answer to this rhetorical question can readily be recognized in the meta-textual cross-reference (*as was argued in the previous chapter*) embedded in the conditional dependent clause. In the chapter referred to in the cross-reference, DeLong-Bas argues that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had scholarly contributed to limiting the scope of offensive jihad in the Muslim faith community. Thus, according to the logic proposed by DeLong-Bas, there can be no connection at all between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the activists of contemporary religious movements, whose views on jihad are global in scope. Equally interesting is the fact that in line 3 DeLong-Bas has categorically negated that the 'declaration of permanent global jihad against unbelievers' could be 'Wahhabi in origin'. Here is the expanded version of this concordance line (line 3, Figure 5.2):

Extract 1:

[...] *bin Laden's absolute division of the world into two mutually exclusive spheres and his **declaration of permanent global jihad against unbelievers are not Wahhabi in origin***. *Their roots lie in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, and Sayyid Qutb rather than in the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.* (My emphasis)

Further, according to DeLong-Bas, the latter kind of global jihad is called for by bin Laden against the 'infidels' (lines 7 and 8) among whom are 'the Soviet Union' (line 4) and 'the United States' (lines 5 and 6).

In this connection, there remains one important observation. The previous co-textual information may explain the strong collocation between the items *jihad* and *States* as part of the complex proper noun *the United States* (MI score 5.00 and *t* score 2.17) on the one hand and between the items *jihad* and *Laden* as part of the complex proper noun *(Osama)* *bin Laden* (MI score 4.12 and *t* score 2.11). The importance of this observation can be realized in the broader socio-political context of the cosmic conflict of bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network with the US since 9/11 (see Mandaville 2009: 108f). Thus, as used by DeLong-Bas, the collocation JIHAD + *against* has a mixed discourse prosody: whilst a positive discourse prosody is directed at the Wahhabi (as well as modernist) jihad, a negative discourse prosody is directed against the global jihad adopted by bin Laden and other 'extremists'.

It seems, then, that in each text the node word JIHAD is authorially motivated *against* a certain party, so that a particular aspect of reality about the topic of jihad can be ideologically contested or maintained. Thus, on the one hand, Schwartz presents Wahhabi jihad as a new form of 'religious colonialism' whether in Europe or elsewhere (see Chapter 8 in Schwartz's [2002] *The Two Faces of Islam*). Schwartz's argument is predicated on the assumption that the typical location for this kind of 'jihad' is 'Afghanistan'. The node word JIHAD is identified to collocate strongly with the item *Afghanistan* (MI score 6.09 and *t* score 2.41). The collocation is invariably embedded in the lexical pattern *jihad in Afghanistan* in lines 13, 15, 16 and 17 (Figure 5.1). Actually, here, the collocate *Afghanistan* evokes all the sinister images of *illegitimate jihad* in its violent realizations across the entire world: 'The shadow of Afghanistan continues to darken the world' (line 25 in Figure 5.1). On the other hand, DeLong-Bas defends Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad and argues against the idea of mistaking such a vision for bin Laden's ideology of 'global jihad'.

However, in order to uphold her argument, DeLong-Bas draws upon the classification scheme of the textual synonymy arising between some of the collocates of the node word JIHAD. Let us tackle this aspect in detail in DeLong-Bas.

5.6.5 Textual synonymy and local JIHAD in DeLong-Bas

In DeLong-Bas, the node word JIHAD collocates with the items *defensive, collective* and *limited*. All of the three collocates are used by DeLong-Bas to modify Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's (and the modernist) religious perspective towards the issue of jihad (Figure 5.2).

First, regarding the collocate *defensive*, in line 15, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's view of jihad is presented as being 'far more in keeping with the modernist interpretation of jihad as a purely defensive action'. This suggests that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings about jihad are compatible with those of Islamic modernists, who likewise 'taught that jihad should be a purely defensive action' (line 25). Note that, in support of the same interpretation, line 20 reads 'For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, jihad is always a defensive military action'. Indeed, most explicit about this analogy between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the modernists in terms of the defensive nature of jihad is line 31, which reads 'Like the modernists, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad was purely defensive in nature'; the explicitness of the analogy is textually enacted by the initial comparator *Like*. This meaning is further enhanced by the collocation JIHAD ... *defense*. An interesting example of it can be realized in Figure 5.2, where the last concordance line describes Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's belief that 'the only intent a person should have in carrying out jihad was defense of God and God's community, not the desire for personal rewards or glory'. Also, interestingly, in line 9, DeLong-Bas makes clear that 'the defense of country' is '[n]otably absent in Qutb's justifications for jihad'. In this way, DeLong-Bas has presented Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings as being out of keeping with those of Sayyid Qutb, who is reckoned to be a radical, anti-modernist thinker in political Islam.

Second, regarding the collocate *collective*, in line 10 DeLong-Bas is keen to present Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's jihad as being a 'collective rather than individual duty'; line 13 also restates almost the same meaning: 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab asserted that jihad is a collective responsibility'; more importantly, lines 17 and 18 emphasize the religious meaning of jihad as a 'collective duty', which is technically known in Islamic jurisprudence as *fard kifayah* (as opposed to *fard ayn* or 'individual duty'): in Islam, whereas *fard kifaya* (collective duty) is a duty that is required of only those Muslims who would fulfil certain requirements established by God, be it in the Quran or in the prophetic Sunnah, *fard ayn* (individual duty) is a duty that is required obligatorily of each and every adult Muslim. Of course, the latter duty, if applied to jihad, is often used by extremists to legitimize the universal call on every Muslim on the globe for jihad against the (non-Muslim) infidels. (Note that the collocates *collective* and *individual* will shortly be tackled as a classification scheme that constitutes an intratextual oppositional paradigm between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of (collective) jihad and bin Laden's call for (individual) jihad as presented by DeLong-Bas [see Subsection 5.5.6 below].)

Third, as a continuation of the same aspect of collocation-based textual synonymy utilized by DeLong-Bas, the last collocate of the node word JIHAD is *limited*. Line 28 presents a significant dimension of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's view regarding the scope of jihad in Islam: 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab confined jihad to specific and limited circumstances and contexts' (Figure 5.2). Irrespective of what those circumstances and contexts are, what matters most here is DeLong-Bas's presentation of the Wahhabi vision of jihad as being specific and limited in scope, unlike other views of jihad that are unlimited and unspecific in scope. Importantly, the way DeLong-Bas employed the textual synonymy between the items *limited* and *defensive* (discussed earlier) as collocates of JIHAD is made most explicit in line 24 (Figure 5.2): '[...] this defensive jihad [taught by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] remained limited in scope'. This limited scope of Wahhabi jihad is further reinforced by DeLong-Bas via the

collocational use of JIHAD ... *cases* (see Table 5.4). In line 23, the collocate *cases* is contextually related to the 'purely defensive' nature of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad; such a defensive nature is incarnated in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious legitimation of jihad as being eligible only 'in cases in which Muslims had experienced an actual aggression' (line 23).

Again, in line 29, according to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, jihad is limited to 'cases that were strictly defensive in nature'. Note here the focus on items like *limiting* and *defensive*, which are inseparable from the restricted cases of jihad within Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's field of religious vision. It is a vision of jihad that is more explicitly stated in the text: 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab restricted jihad to cases in which the enemy in question had behaved aggressively toward the Muslim community and then rejected the call to Islam' (line 30 in Figure 5.2). Strikingly, the collocate *cases* (of jihad) is juxtaposed with the generic noun phrase *the enemy*; and, while it is made definite by the article *the*, there is no particular reference in the text for a specific entity – religious, political or otherwise. True the adverb *aggressively* defines a particular context of an offensive party to the Muslim community, but the vague reference to the enemy in question is not demystified nevertheless. Actually, here, DeLong-Bas's suspension of explicitly naming 'the enemy' of 'the Muslim community' subtly contradicts with the collocational use of JIHAD ... *cases*, where the collocate *cases* is a general noun that potentially subsumes countries, groups or individuals.

Thus, here, the collocates *defensive*, *collective* (in its religious sense) and *limited* derive their status as textual synonyms from the fact that such collocates share the same semantic preference in text. It is a semantic preference for locality: DeLong-Bas is keen to qualify the Wahhabi (and modernist) jihad as localized, and not globalized, in scope. Hence DeLong-Bas's collocational preference for these particular items (other than potentially dispreferred collocates) with JIHAD.

In fact, as shown in the forgoing collocational analysis, the locality of Wahhabi jihad has been realized as being defensive (as opposed to offensive), religiously collective (as opposed to individual), and limited (as opposed to unlimited). This analytically necessitates another classification scheme of oppositional paradigms (see Subsection 5.5.6 below). Naturally, the semantic preference for locality reflects DeLong-Bas's collocational preferences, which sustain a positive prosody about the Wahhabi (and generally modernist) jihad.

Overall, then, for DeLong-Bas it can be said that bin Laden is the typical representation of these extreme views of jihad, and is thus the perfect foil for those by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's. This can be readily realized in line 22 (Figure 5.2):

Extract 2:

__Bin Laden__ preaches a __global jihad__ of cosmic importance that recognizes no compromise; __Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's jihad__ was __narrow in geographic focus__, of __localized__ __importance__, and had engagement in a treaty relationship between the fighting parties as a goal. (My emphasis)

I think the above-mentioned expanded concordance line carries the hub of DeLong-Bas's argument about jihad. In this line, DeLong-Bas contrasts bin Laden's radical understanding of jihad as being global, unlimited and uncompromisingly dogmatic with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's modernist understanding of jihad as being local, limited and receptively reconciling. However, this contrastive aspect of representation between bin Laden and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab can best be analysed by drawing on the classification scheme of oppositional paradigms in and across both texts.

5.6.6   Oppositional paradigms and JIHAD: Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas

Another important classification scheme is the oppositional paradigms that arise between certain collocates of the node word JIHAD. This can be realized both intertextually (i.e. between the two texts) and intratextually (i.e. in one of the two texts). Let us begin with the intertextual realization of collocate-based oppositional paradigms.

While Schwartz uses the node JIHAD in collocation with *is*, DeLong-Bas uses the same node with *should* (see Table 5.4). This may be regarded as an oppositional paradigm of categorical assertion vs. epistemic modality. But, in order to delineate this contrastive aspect, we need to investigate the phraseology of each collocation in its respective text. Schwartz uses the item *jihad* in collocation with the categorical existential present verb *is* in Figure 5.1 (concordance lines 18-21).

First, let us begin with lines 20 and 21. In line 20, the collocation (JIHAD + *is*) is part of a quote from Mawdudi's first book *Jihad in Islam* (1927), wherein jihad is defined to be an 'offensive and defensive' measure that is taken against 'non-Muslims'. Here, the intertextual link between Schwartz and Mawdudi is intended to feature the jihadist vision of political Islam as being represented by such a prominent politico-religious activist (Mawdudi), who, despite the different hermeneutic views on the issue, is assertive about the definition of jihad in Islam. Almost the same intertextual element can be seen in line 21, where the collocation (JIHAD + *is*) is part of a quote from Amir Sulaiman's book *The Battlefield: The Safest Place on Earth*. The text, in Schwartz's judgment, offers the same jihadist ideology, and is intended to be assertive in tone about the absolute necessity of jihad against non-Muslims wherever and whenever they are. Obviously, here, Schwartz reveals the radical-Islamist absolutism about the issue of jihad, and makes clear their indiscriminate animosity against non-Muslims.

Second, coming to lines 18 and 19, the collocating items JIHAD and *is* in these two lines are part of the Schwartz text. Line 18 expresses Schwartz's certainty about what the traditional Islamic definition of jihad is: 'The traditional Islamic definition of jihad is war against unbelieving countries in which few or no Muslims live, or in which Muslims are denied religious rights'. Strikingly, although there are a fairly large number of traditional Islamic definitions of jihad, Schwartz couches the definition in the categorical-expression form 'jihad is'. By that he seems to be advertently selective of the previous radical-Islamist views on jihad, and leaves out no textual margins for diversity among the classical schools of thought in Islam on the topic. Also, in this line as well as elsewhere in text, note how Schwartz (unlike DeLong-Bas) has significantly avoided the use of the adjective *holy* which is a typical premodifier of the noun jihad in (meta-)religious discourse. This may give the reader a clue to how Schwartz is concerned more with the political aspect of jihad than with the religious; and this is where he contrasts with DeLong-Bas who seems to be more focused on the religious views of jihad, classical and modernist.

Last in this respect, in line 19, Schwartz focuses on 'Wahhabi "jihad"' in the same collocational categorical-expression form (JIHAD + *is*). Strikingly, this kind of 'Wahhabi' "jihad" is premodified by the attributive adjective *worldwide*, so that the text can exhibit the symptom of Wahhabi rampancy; and that the negative discourse prosody attaching to this 'Wahhabi "jihad"' can insinuate the pragmatic force of imminent threat and danger. Actually, although Schwartz has specified the 'Wahhabi' kind of jihad, he does not provide a technical definition of jihad (neither here nor elsewhere in the text!); rather, he expresses his certainty about the multi-channelled calls for 'Wahhabi "jihad"'. Note also Schwartz's strategy of scare-quoting the item "jihad", particularly when the context relates to Wahhabi Islam (see similar instances in lines 7, 8, 9 and 25 in Figure 5.1). It is a signal that the author is distancing himself from this particular kind of jihad.

The collocation JIHAD + *is* used by Schwartz is framed differently from that by DeLong-Bas through the use of the collocation JIHAD + *should*: the epistemic-modal operator *should* opposes the categorical-expression process *is*. Whereas the former (*should*) renders DeLong-Bas's commitment to the factuality of the proposition about jihad explicitly dependent on her own knowledge of Wahhabi Islam, the latter (*is*) expresses the strongest possible degree of Schwartz's commitment to the truth of the same proposition about jihad, as already shown in the foregoing analysis of the co-text of the collocation JIHAD + *is* used by Schwartz. In fact, Palmer (1990) incorporates the modal auxiliary *should* within the scope of 'epistemic modality'. 'SHOULD', Palmer argues, 'does not express necessity; it expresses rather extreme likelihood, or a reasonable assumption or conclusion'. 'But', he continues to argue, 'it implicitly allows for the speaker [or writer] to be mistaken [...] which allows for the event not to take place' (Palmer 1990: 59).

Now, let us turn to the counterpart collocation (JIHAD + *should*) used by DeLong-Bas and examine its co-text in Figure 5.2. As far as the overall collocational environment of JIHAD + *should* is concerned, DeLong-Bas has epistemically qualified her authorial stance towards the topic of jihad drawing on three frames of knowledge.

In line 25, the epistemic level of modality attaching to jihad depends on the teachings of 'Islamic modernists' as part of the knowledge system of Islam on the whole. Here, DeLong-Bas, unlike Schwartz, commits herself to the modernist Islamic worldview of jihad – which she hails – as 'purely defensive'. Even if we go beyond the concordance line, she seems to draw on this knowledge when it comes to outlining three causes of jihad in the text. In line 26, DeLong-Bas moves on to an opposing knowledge frame that supports a radical worldview of jihad in Islam; a worldview that is typically associated with Al-Qaida network and bin Laden, and that the author argues against in this text. In using the modal collocate *should*, DeLong-Bas has watered down the possible degree of authorial commitment to the

truth of the radical view of questions about the 'right' place for jihad and 'who' is to lead jihad. Here is line 26 with more co-textual information provided:

Extract 3:

> *However, the members of the fledging organization* [Al-Qaida] *were not able to agree on anything beyond this purpose, such as where the next **jihad should** occur or who was to lead it. Because the Arab Afghans represented a variety of ethnicities and nationalities, as well as religious orientations, consensus on the next step in the global jihad against infidels is impossible to reach.* (My emphasis)

This is the same in line 27, where Delong-Bas brings in Reuven Firestone's[64] knowledge frame about the classical meaning of jihad in terms of where it 'should occur' and 'what it signifies': 'Firestone's analysis opens with the question of why jihad should occur and what it signifies. He finds that most of the classical exegetes point to Q 9:5, the so-called sword verse, in order to define the purpose of jihad, concluding that its ultimate goal is to bring people to witness God's unity, pray, and pay the tax' (line 27 in Figure 5.2).

Another intertextual oppositional paradigm can be realized between two collocational pairs: JIHAD and *Muslims* used by Schwartz and JIHAD and *unbelievers* used by DeLong-Bas. Cross-textually, the collocates *Muslims* and *unbelievers* denote religiously opposed social groups. Let us take each in turn. As shown in Figure 5.1, the collocation JIHAD ... *Muslims* is presented in two lines (8 and 11). In line 8, which reads 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers called for "jihad" against Muslims', Schwartz is acutely keen to embed the collocate *Muslims* in the lexical pattern *jihad against*. Both items collocate strongly with each other (MI score 6.03 and *t* score 3.81[see Table 5.4]).

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[64] Reuven Firestone (1952-...) is a Rabbi and a Professor of Medieval Jewish and Islamic Studies. He is also a senior fellow of the Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern California. One of his famous books is *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (1999).

Thus, Schwartz seems to focus on the Wahhabi "jihad" against Muslims, which suggests that Wahhabi Muslims have their own 'self-categorisation' (Turner 1995: 502) that separates them from other non-Wahhabi Muslims. In line 11, the collocation JIHAD ... *Muslims* is set up as part of the argument that Schwartz invokes from what he calls 'traditional Muslims', who according to him, 'have often warned against the call to "jihad" between Muslims'. While Schwartz does not align himself with traditional Islam and regards it as a retroactive form of Islam, he argumentatively draws on it here as a warrant for the conclusion that 'Wahhabism' is the most retrograde and violent expression of Islam.

On the other hand, if we move to DeLong-Bas who makes use of the collocation JIHAD ... *unbelievers*, a different representation of jihad will appear. In Figure 5.2, the first three lines contain the same collocation. Importantly, the collocate *unbelievers* is part of the lexical pattern *jihad against*, which is a strong collocation (MI score 5.77 and *t* score 5.64). Thus, DeLong-Bas focuses on jihad as a 'holy war' that is launched against 'unbelievers', and not Muslims as does Schwartz. The three lines, which present the collocation JIHAD ... *unbelievers*, are concerned with refuting those arguments about Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's call for jihad against unbelievers. This leads us to another intratextual oppositional paradigm between the collocations JIHAD ... *unbelievers* and JIHAD ... *infidels* used by DeLong-Bas.

This oppositional paradigm is predicated on euphemism vs. dysphemism. If we compare the two collocates *unbelievers* and *infidels*, this contrastive aspect will strongly feature at the co-textual level of analysis. Indeed, the item *infidels* is an offensive term for those who have a different religion from the Other (in this case non-Muslims or unbelievers). The term 'infidel' amounts to what is dubbed 'a stigmatising religionym' (Reisig and Wodak 2001: 68), which plays an ideological role in the negative referential identification of the comparatively less evaluative term 'unbeliever'. Indeed, whereas DeLong-Bas uses the collocation JIHAD ... *unbelievers* in relation to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's stance towards jihad

(and towards against whom it should be launched), she uses the collocation JIHAD ... *infidels* in relation to the stance adopted by Al-Qaida jihadists such as Osama bin Laden. Such a dysphemistic representation of Al-Qaida and the ideology of 'global jihad' adopted by its activist members is typically realized in lines 7 and 8, where the collocate *infidels* is strategically selected. (Note that the same collocate has been strategically avoided – by using the collocate *unbelievers* – in the first three lines [Figure 5.2].)

There is yet another intratextual oppositional paradigm between the collocations JIHAD ... *collective* and JIHAD ... *individual* used by DeLong-Bas. Such an oppositional paradigm has been explicitized in line 18: '[...] the nature of jihad as a collective duty (*fard kifayah*) rather than an individual duty (*fard ayn*)'. This line combines both of the contrasted terms, and the relation between them is made explicit by the contrast conjunction *rather than*. The collocational structure of this line is pretty dense; the node word JIHAD collocates strongly with the contrasted adjectives *collective* and *individual* on the one hand and with the modified noun *duty* on the other. This may prove iconic in line 8, whose highly dense collocational surface structure fits the summative function it carries.

Actually, this contrastive aspect relates to DeLong-Bas's ideological perspective towards the issue of jihad in Islam. She offers two opposing worldviews on the issue: the first relates to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who views jihad as being a 'collective duty' or *fard kifayah* (lines 17, 18 and 21); the second relates to bin Laden's view of 'global jihad' as being 'an individual duty' (line 12) or 'an individual undertaking' (line 14) or *fard ayn*. This may explain why DeLong-Bas uses the two words *jihad* and *duty* as a strong collocation (MI score 5.78 and *t* score 2.77). The collocation JIHAD ... *duty* is an essential part of the argument put forward by DeLong-Bas on the dichotomy arising between both Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and bin Laden's vision of jihad (lines 12, 17, 18, 21 in Figure 5.2).

Thus, unlike Schwartz, who is vocally critical of Wahhabi jihad as an extreme worldview that is violent in essence, DeLong-Bas has positioned herself as a defender of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad, a vision that is according to her is nothing but defensive.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter constitutes the first part of the micro analysis of the covert ideologies implicit behind the overt collocational structure in the two books of *The Two faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* by Schwartz and *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* by DeLong-Bas. The chapter can be divided into two main parts. First, I have comparatively examined the two keyword lists of the two books and focused on the different macropropositions in each, so that the different semantic macrostructures can be made clear. That has been exemplified by the context model of Wahhabi history which is reversed across the two texts under analysis. Second, I have conducted an inter-collocate analysis of the node word JIHAD, demonstrating how the collocates of the same node words ideologically contrast across the two texts in terms of classification schemes. The next chapter (Chapter 6) is a continuation of this inter-collocate analysis, but it focuses on different node words, WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI across the same texts.

CHAPTER 6

Wahhabi-Saudi Theocracy vs. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's Scholarliness: Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas (Part II)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter proceeds with the inter-collocate analysis across the research data. The previous chapter (Chapter 5) has initiated this analysis by focusing on the node word JIHAD and its sets of collocates across the two texts in terms of the proposed model of classification and argumentation schemes (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5). Using the same model, the present chapter continues the analysis of the node words WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI and their collocates as they occur in the two texts. As will be shown throughout the chapter, this collocational analysis will reveal the ideological representations of the Wahhabi-Saudi government as a theocracy by Schwartz versus Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious scholarliness by DeLong-Bas.

In Section 6.2, I introduce the keywords WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI, which are taken as the node words suggested for the collocational analysis in this chapter. Section 6.3 focuses on the analysis of the expression *Wahhabi-Saudi* and its role in Schwartz's discursive construction of the Wahhabi-Saudi establishment. Section 6.4 is a continuation of Section 6.3, in that it tackles the analysis of the node word WAHHABI and its corresponding discursive representation of Wahhabi Islam by Schwartz. Section 6.5 is concerned with the analysis of the node word WAHHAB'S and its corresponding discursive representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab by DeLong-Bas. Section 6.6 addresses the collocational analysis of SAUDI as being differently represented in both texts. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter by offering an outline of the main aspects of the analysis of the node words WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI.

6.2 Node words: WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI

Almost the same criteria of selecting the keyword JIHAD as a node word in Chapter 5 apply here in selecting WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI. These terms have been identified to have collocates that may ideologically contrast across both texts in terms of the classification and argumentation schemes described in Section 3.5 (see Chapter 3). These collocates are likewise computed with the collocation statistics of MI score (3 or more) and t score (2 or more).

Table 6.1 below shows the collocates of WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI in both texts. SAUDI and WAHHABI are key in Schwartz while WAHHAB'S is key in DeLong-Bas. Thus, Schwartz seems to foreground 'Wahhabism' as a concept, whereas DeLong-Bas seems to focus more on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as an individual rather than the religious movement he was the founder of. Second, Schwartz's use of the node words WAHHABI and SAUDI reflects negative discourse prosodies which are evoked in the behaviour of their collocates, which is not obviously the case with DeLong-Bas. Actually, I shall elaborate on the first observation here. As for the second observation, it will be covered in Section 6.3 below.

The first observation is predicated on the different textual foci (WAHHABI vs. WAHHAB'S)[65] where an important classification scheme of opposition (categorization vs. nomination) emerges. At collocational level, the use of the node words WAHHABI and WAHHAB'S by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas respectively constitutes an oppositional paradigm of categorization vs. nomination. On the one hand, Schwartz's use of WAHHABI stands potentially as a social-actor-based categorization of Muslim identity. This may serve as a

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[65] It should also be noted that in addition to WAHHABI and WAHHAB'S, the words WAHHABISM and WAHHAB were also found to be keywords in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas respectively (see Chapter 5), although in this chapter, I focus only on WAHHABI and WAHHAB'S as node words, for an analysis of WAHHABISM and WAHHAB would simply repeat the findings for former node words (WAHHABI vs. WAHHAB'S).

'classification category' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 42) via which a certain group is classified according to their religious affiliation in the wider community of Muslims.

		SCHWARTZ						DELONG-BAS				
N	Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score	Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq	MI	T score
1	WAHHABI (total freq. 435)	infiltration	7	6	7.86	2.44	WAHHAB'S (total freq. 319)	writings	157	56	7.29	7.44
		lobby	23	15	7.47	3.85		stance	20	5	6.78	2.21
		cult	19	7	6.64	2.62		teachings	158	27	6.23	5.13
		style	24	8	6.50	2.80		works	85	13	5.96	3.41
		separatism	18	6	6.56	2.42		worldview	50	7	5.95	2.60
		alliance	24	7	6.30	2.61		gender	50	6	5.72	2.40
		ideology	23	7	6.41	2.41		discussion	149	17	5.65	4.04
		extremism	46	12	5.73	2.94		concern	63	6	5.39	2.39
		claims	28	5	5.60	2.19		vision	80	7	5.27	2.58
		Saudi	546	92	5.22	8.43		opinion	79	6	5.06	2.38
		campaign	40	5	5.82	2.17		approach	74	5	4.89	2.16
		regime	89	10	4.90	3.35		interpretation	170	5	3.69	2.06
		jihad	109	14	4.90	3.53						
		control	51	6	4.73	2.15						
		terror	83	6	4.29	2.32						
		power	122	8	4.15	2.67						
		state	126	11	4.11	2.66						
2	SAUDI (total freq. 546)	alliance	24	10	6.34	2.96	SAUDI (total freq. 61)	monarchy	12	7	10.43	2.64
		elite	20	7	6.24	2.61		Arabia	35	16	9.99	3.87
		backed	21	6	5.92	2.92		royal	21	6	9.40	2.45
		regime	89	28	5.92	4.92		family	63	6	7.82	2.44
		ruling	22	6	5.88	2.41						
		citizens	26	7	5.38	2.18						
		rulers	52	10	5.38	3.09						
		society	61	10	4.99	2.91						
		class	35	7	4.95	2.16						
		government	52	7	4.86	2.55						
		power	122	18	4.86	3.86						
		Hamas	46	6	4.82	2.36						
		always	39	5	4.82	2.16						
		authorities	48	7	4.79	2.36						
		crisis	48	9	4.75	3.72						
		state	126	18	4.68	2.13						
		oil	84	15	4.46	2.69						

Table 6.1: Collocates of **WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S** and **SAUDI** in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas

On the other hand, in DeLong-Bas, WAHHAB'S is a typical realization of nomination, where the proper noun *Wahhab* is brought into focus. The label (*Ibn Abd al*)*Wahhab* is the surname of the 18th century Muslim scholar Muhammad Ibn Abd al-

Wahhab. The social roles of categorization and nomination, which are allocated to different social actors, are linguistically realized in the different foci on the keywords WAHHABI and WAHHABISM in Schwartz and WAHHAB and WAHHAB'S in DeLong-Bas.

Now, let us come to the second observation about the evaluative collocational behaviour of the node words WAHHABI and SAUDI across both texts.

6.3   The discursive construction of the Wahhabi-Saudi establishment

In this section I aim to show how Schwartz makes use of the classification scheme of textual synonymy in ideologically representing Wahhabi-Saudi Islam in a certain way. The lexical items, *Wahhabi* and *Saudi* would not appear at first glance to have overlapping meanings, but as analysis will shortly show, they have been used with these overlapping meanings in this text for ideological purposes.

Not only do these words share some of the same collocates used by Schwartz (e.g. *alliance*, *power* and *state*), but they also appear in the node-collocate relation of WAHHABI + *Saudi* used by Schwartz with MI and *t* scores. Further, there seems to be a more or less fixed collocational span: the collocate *Saudi* occurs 67 times at R1 and only once at L1 to the node WAHHABI, effectively meaning that the term *Wahhabi-Saudi* is a typical pattern used by Schwartz. Thus, for Schwartz what is Wahhabi is often linked to what is Saudi.[66] But how can we phraseologically read this kind of strong and certain association between the two items used by Schwartz? Let us, then, have a look at the concordance lines of the expression *Wahhabi-Saudi* in Figure 6.1 below. It should be noted that I have provided a sample of the concordance lines of the designated collocates with *Wahhabi-Saudi* and excluded lines that

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[66] *Wahhabi* and *Saudi* co-occur 92 times out of the total number of occurrences of each: *Wahhabi* counts 435 and *Saudi* 546.

repeat the same collocational function in text. This will be the case with all the concordance

samples to come in this chapter.

N	Concordance
1	merely reproduces the archetypal dual strategy of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance, accommodating the Christian
2	Islam, converge. The hajj was, until the advent of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance, an event where the subtle
3	in Israel coincided with the intensification of the Wahhabi-Saudi campaign for global colonization of
4	into silence. In addition, among the enemies of the Wahhabi-Saudi conspiracy, some of the angriest, most
5	by federal and state authorities—was brought under Wahhabi-Saudi control. The imams were granted
6	in Marbella. Nor could the Iranians forget or forgive the Wahhabi-Saudi demolition of Shi'a mosques and other
7	particularly among the princes.] Resentment of the Wahhabi-Saudi dictatorship over the Two Holy Places
8	for its compromises with the West. Yet their rage at Wahhabi-Saudi duplicity leads them to publicize
9	can survive, and whether we should conspire with the Wahhabi-Saudi establishment to continue propping it
10	the Ottomans, from 1870. This renewed attempt at Wahhabi-Saudi hegemony in the Peninsula was
11	all, an orderly succession to King Fahd. In reality, Wahhabi-Saudi hypocrisy was a greater threat than
12	and aggression had always derived from the Wahhabi-Saudi ideology, and nowhere else. Khomeini
13	among mediocre pseudo-intellectuals. Nor, despite Wahhabi-Saudi incitement against Israel, were any of
14	had fought in Kosovo. Notwithstanding assiduous Wahhabi-Saudi infiltration in Kosovo after the NATO
15	peace, while the Palestinian terrorists and their Wahhabi-Saudi mentors only wanted to destroy Israel.
16	to publicize damaging and verifiable information about Wahhabi-Saudi mischief. Shaykh Hisham Kabbani of
17	in Sarajevo. Front groups interfacing between the Wahhabi-Saudi money movers under federal suspicion
18	of the Taliban-and 310 were directly linked to the Wahhabi-Saudi network. Sources in India, where
19	the areas they seized. The triumphant reassertion of Wahhabi-Saudi power produced the third, and most
20	are characterized by abiding grievances against the Wahhabi-Saudi power structure. Westerners perceive
21	and Bosnian wars, the contradictions facing the Wahhabi-Saudi power were greatly aggravated in 1991
22	that may be described as Wahhabized. The Wahhabi-Saudi power, in addition to its many other
23	were Shi a. Nothing could more shock the holders of Wahhabi-Saudi power in Arabia than the spectre of an
24	like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Wahhabi-Saudi regime played a much greater role in
25	between the capitalist right and the radical left. The Wahhabi-Saudi regime was never moderate, although it
26	contradiction, was the political nature of the Wahhabi-Saudi regime. Wahhabism had created a
27	six months after September 11, the viciousness of Wahhabi-Saudi rule was again dramatized, this time
28	now had more credibility than the jaded and cynical Wahhabi-Saudi ruling class. To note a single symbolic
29	while the "Sudairi Seven" hold to the well-established Wahhabi-Saudi technique of allying externally with the
30	mainstream and traditional Muslims, who resent Wahhabi-Saudi usurpation of control over the Two Holy

Figure 6.1: Concordance of *Wahhabi-Saudi* in Schwartz

Interestingly, the concordance in Figure 6.1 above reveals an overwhelmingly

negative discourse prosody of *Wahhabi-Saudi*. First, as a premodifier, the expression has a

cluster of explicitly negative nouns (occurring one place to the right of *Wahhabi-Saudi*) such

as *alliance, conspiracy, control, dictatorship, duplicity, hegemony, hypocrisy, infiltration,*

mischief, regime, and *usurpation*. Second, other items – again, standing as an object of

modification – connote a Wahhabi-Saudi monolithic structure: 'the Wahhabi-Saudi

establishment' (line 9), 'Wahhabi-Saudi power structure' (line 20), 'Wahhabi-Saudi network'

(line 18), 'Wahhabi-Saudi regime' (lines 24, 25, 26), 'Wahhabi-Saudi ruling class' (line 28),

'Wahhabi-Saudi campaign for global colonization of Islam' (line 3) and 'the Wahhabi-Saudi

ideology' (line 12). (The use of the lexical item 'establishment' in line 9 expresses Schwartz's

ideological opinion, given that the writer identifies with a religious group (Sufi Muslims) that

opposes the power of Saudi-Wahhabi Muslims [for a similar discussion of the ideological use of the term 'establishment', see van Dijk (1995: 261)].)

Also, it seems that Schwartz's negative presentation of 'the Wahhabi-Saudi establishment' takes a radical form in text, where two Wahhabi-Saudi extreme measures have been operationalized: first, in line 6, the Wahhabi-Saudi side is described as acting violently by demolishing the 'Shi'a mosques and other sacred sites in the Two Holy Places'; second, in lines 13 and 15, 'Israel' is victimized by the Wahhabi-Saudi party, being both the agent of 'incitement against Israel' and the 'mentors' of 'the Palestinian terrorists'.

The concordance-based analysis suggests that Schwartz discursively constructs the Wahhabi and the Saudi as being closely related and monolithic. This may be further substantiated if we take a look at the other collocates identified with the node word WAHHABI in Schwartz.

6.4 WAHHABI representation in Schwartz

The same classification scheme of textual synonymy operates ideologically among the collocates of the node word WAHHABI in Schwartz in Table 6.1. The node word WAHHABI attracts different configurations of collocates that have different negatively shaded semantic preferences: 1) the co-occurring words *cult, extremism, jihad, separatism,* and *terror* have a semantic preference for threat; 2) *infiltration* and *lobby* (when used in its political sense as Schwartz does) have a semantic preference for conspiracy and interference; and (3) *regime* and *state* have a semantic preference for imposed control.

This overall collocational picture, where the node word WAHHABI is the focal point of seemingly negative associations, can be phraseologically tested in Figure 6.2 below in the concordance of WAHHABI. All the collocates of WAHHABI are positioned to its right; this is

understandable from the colligational status of the item *Wahhabi* as an attributive adjective in relation to all the co-occurring items, which are nouns. Now, let us examine the co-textual information in the concordance below, where the collocational span is WAHHABI + *collocate*. We shall handle these collocates in terms of their common semantic preferences.

N	Concordance
1	it had always promised. The next phase of the global Wahhabi campaign involved the penetration of Muslim
2	from the Ottomans. Patrons and survivors of the Afghan Wahhabi campaign, thirsty for the opportunity to kill and
3	about world jihad. For the first time since the 1920s, Wahhabi claims to leadership of an Islamic revival had
4	and intellectuals have many reasons to despise Wahhabi control. Libraries are restricted to Wahhabi
5	the decision by which Mecca and Medina came under Wahhabi control. The Hashimites had become deeply
6	is the perversion of Islamic teachings by the fascistic Wahhabi cult that resides at the heart of the Saudi
7	clashes between Iranian Muslims and the apocalyptic Wahhabi cult in Arabia, and would later impel Iraq, ruled
8	become an outstanding figure in the history of the Wahhabi death cult: He was named Osama. How was it
9	their own program for the worldwide expansion of Wahhabi extremism. Khomeini's advent, coming close
10	allies in dealing with Saddam Husayn and with Wahhabi extremism elsewhere in the world. New
11	repressed, cannot today divorce itself from worldwide Wahhabi extremism. One might state as a law of history
12	although exploiting Islam, were former leftists. The Wahhabi ideology has always been about power first. A
13	residents were not the only people concerned about Wahhabi infiltration in the Balkans. In Albania as well as
14	campaign in the Philippines as well as resistance to Wahhabi infiltration in Indonesia. But more importantly
15	Service veteran, when seeking to bring up the issue of Wahhabi infiltration into Kosovo, that the United States
16	authorities revealed the scope of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi "jihad" in the Balkans during the previous
17	up. Mosques in Western countries are permeated with Wahhabi "jihad" rhetoric, encountered the minute one
18	fanatics by assisting bin Laden in further extending the Wahhabi "jihad" abroad. Since then, every country where
19	these activities. Another medium for recruitment to the Wahhabi "jihad" comprised propaganda videotapes,
20	stronger than anyone else." Thus, while the officials of Wahhabi lobby organizations claimed to support federal
21	radical groups for legal support. The effectiveness of the Wahhabi lobby in intimidating mainstream American
22	or Korean Americans. But Saudi money gave the Wahhabi lobby an artificially high level of influence and
23	rule for three-quarters of a century A more extreme Wahhabi regime would not only be extremely unpopular,
24	Europe under Communism—have suffered under Wahhabi rule for three-quarters of a century A more
25	its variety; he did not seek to evade it or cancel it out. Wahhabi separatism, the most extreme version of the
26	had been fooled by Ibn Sa'ud into helping install the Wahhabi state as sovereign over the Two Holy Places.
27	the state form was virtually identical. The dictatorial Wahhabi state also had much in common with the
28	its InterServices Intelligence (ISI) were permeated with Wahhabi-style fundamentalism. The journalist Ahmed
29	recovery of Pearl's corpse, in May 2002, the Pakistani Wahhabi terror group Lashkar-i-Janghvi (Janghvi s Army)
30	as Muslim reformers. Recently, the Uzbek adherents of Wahhabi terror declared, "We ask the Muslims to
31	Saudi relationship with the West? The frontline of the Wahhabi terror war is a long and sinuous one. Even after
32	spreading the word. The sense of impunity enjoyed by Wahhabi terror recruiters in the West is epitomized by
33	no more than 40 percent of the Saudi population are Wahhabi, the cult holds a monopoly on religious life in

Figure 6.2: Concordance of **WAHHABI** in Schwartz

To begin with, I shall focus on collocates which hold a semantic preference for threat. 1) Co-textually the co-occurring words WAHHABI and *extremism* are indentified in a menacing light as being rampant 'worldwide' in lines 10 and 11. So is the case in line 9,

where the phrase 'the worldwide expansion of Wahhabi extremism' makes a strong case for potential threat. 2) WAHHABI *terror* almost bears the same co-textual meaning of threat, yet with more concrete examples of 'Wahhabi terror': 'the Pakistani Wahhabi terror group Lashkar-Janghvi' (line 29), 'the Uzbek adherents of Wahhabi terror' (line 30), and 'The sense of impunity enjoyed by Wahhabi terror recruiters in the West is epitomized by [...]' (line 32).

Indeed, Schwartz's use of such particular examples of 'Wahhabi terror' has been summed up in line 31 in the clause *the Wahhabi terror war is a long and sinuous one*, where such a 'Wahhabi-terror' concept functions as an adjectival noun of the inherently semantically violent term *war* which is presented as being timelessly universal (by the simple present verb *is*), and as being so hopeless a case (by the predicational attributes *long* and *sinuous*); note also how the two nominal groups *the Wahhabi terror war* and *a long and sinuous one* are intensively linked into one relational process in the overall clause, where one nominal group functions as the Subject and the other as Complement: the attributive Complement (*long and sinuous*) is a crucial attribute of the Subject (*the Wahhabi terror war*). 3) In line 25, the collocate *separatism*, in its collocational realization, WAHHABI *separatism*, is defined as being 'the most extreme version of the face of Islam', with the potential threat of Wahhabi-inspired separatist extremism. 4) The item *cult*, textually presented as being Wahhabi in character, adds significantly up to the semantic preference of threat: this kind of 'cult' 'holds a monopoly on religious life' (line 33); the offensively worded expression of 'the Wahhabi death cult' seems to present Wahhabi Islam as having a macabre existence in history out of which a terrorist leader like Osama – 'bin Laden' – was born (line 8); and, last, the 'Wahhabi cult' is qualified as both 'fascistic' and 'apocalyptic' (lines 6 and 7, respectively).

Proceeding with the foregoing analysis, 5) in line 2, the collocate *campaign*, in the collocational pattern WAHHABI *campaign*, contributes to the phraseological build-up of the

semantic preference of threat: the 'Patrons and survivors of the Afghan Wahhabi campaign' have been metaphorically postmodified as being 'thirsty for the opportunity to kill', which conceptually equates such a Wahhabi campaign with a monstrous image; another type of 'Wahhabi campaign' (the global one) has been presented as penetrating the 'Muslim community' (line 1). Thus, connotatively, the 'Wahhabi campaign' constitutes a threat, not only at the local level of a particular Wahhabi Muslim group in Afghanistan, but on a universal level, where the target is to break ranks with the world community of Muslims, as well. 6) The item *"jihad"* (as used by Schwartz) is a special case for a collocate that bears a strong semantic preference for threat. All the instances of the collocation WAHHABI *"jihad"* in the concordance in Figure 6.2 are marked by what is called 'scare quotes'[67], i.e. the author distances himself from the term, suggesting that he does not favour the concept or disagrees with the meanings that are normally ascribed to it. Schwartz describes the Wahhabi "jihad" as taking two distinct, and complementary, forms: one is verbal as introduced in lines 17 and 19 ('Mosques in Western countries are permeated with Wahhabi "jihad" rhetoric' and 'the Wahhabi "jihad" comprised propaganda videotapes', respectively), and the other is military in line 18 ('[...] by assisting bin Laden in further extending the Wahhabi "jihad" abroad') at the mention of the prominent Saudi *mujahid* (holy warrior) Osama bin Laden.

However, line 16 (highlighted in Figure 6.2) perhaps makes the most explicit link between Saudi and Wahhabi as well as emphasizing their ideological agenda (jihad) with the use of the term *the Saudi-backed Wahhabi-Saudi "jihad"*. Note the repetition of the term *Saudi* in this nominal group. Not only is jihad described as 'Wahhabi-Saudi', but it is also 'Saudi-backed'.

Further, the node word WAHHABI has a number of textually synonymous collocates that have a semantic preference for suspicion. 1) The collocate *infiltration*, which is

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[67] Here, I draw on Fairclough's explanation of the term 'scare quotes' (Fairclough 2001: 74f).

characteristically premodified with the item *Wahhabi*, presents Wahhabi Islam as being illegally exported into 'the Balkans' (line 13), 'Indonesia' (line 14), and 'Kosovo' (line 15). 2) The expression WAHHABI *lobby* occurs in different syntactic and semantic contexts: in line 20, the complex Subject *the officials of Wahhabi lobby organizations* is evaluatively attached to the counter-factual verb *claimed*, which casts doubt on the Subject's credibility and integrity; in line 21, *the Wahhabi lobby* takes on the semantic role of agency, i.e. it is the semantic Agent behind *intimidating mainstream America*; in line 22, *the Wahhabi lobby* takes on the role of recipiency, i.e. it stands as the semantic Patient that lies on the receiving end of *an artificially high level of influence*.

The last group of the WAHHABI collocates, *regime* and *state*, also operating as textual synonyms that are utilized by Schwartz, contribute to the overall negative discourse prosody of the node WAHHABI, with a semantic preference for policing. Notably, in Figure 6.2, the concordance lines of both WAHHABI *regime* and WAHHABI *state* reveal extremity, enforced sovereignty and dictatorship – three typical epithets of tightly policing governance. Line 23 presents the Wahhabi regime as being 'more extreme', and then reinforces the more-extreme-Wahhabi-regime image with the evaluative intensifier *extremely*, which clearly incorporates within its anaphorically referential scope the Wahhabi regime itself with the reading 'A more extreme Wahhabi regime would not only be extremely unpopular; [its chances would be limited by the very nature of the Wahhabi clergy]' (line 23)[68]. Line 26 involves a particularly interesting presentation of the Wahhabi state as being 'sovereign over the Two Holy Places'; the expression 'the Two Holy Places' stands for Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with a state (be it Wahhabi or otherwise) to have sovereignty over its territory. Yet, in this context the situation is particularly different, because Mecca and Medina should not be presumably geopolitically demarcated under any

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[68] Text in square brackets refers to expanded concordance line data that is not shown in the figure.

sovereignty; rather, they are for each and every Muslim on earth, not as a territorial property but as a religious symbol that is strongly reminiscent of the Muslims' Prophet (Muhammad) and the so-called heavenly message of Islam. In this sense, Schwartz tends to arouse the Muslim *pathos* against the Wahhabi state with the connotative meaning of Wahhabi-state-enforced sovereignty. Line 27 is even more explicit in its presentation of the Wahhabi state, which is premodified with the negative attribute *dictatorial*.

There is yet another kind of scheme that Schwartz has used in the collocational environment of the node word WAHHABI; that is, argumentation schemes, where some pragmatic fallacies underlie such an environment.

First, in Table 6.1, the item *ideology* is a strong collocate of WAHHABI. Perhaps, the most important concordance line of the collocation WAHHABI *ideology* is line 12, where a persuasive definition of the 'Wahhabi ideology' is presented: 'The Wahhabi ideology has always been about power first'. Whereas the collocation WAHHABI + *ideology* is not inherently fallacious, in this particular concordance line it contributes to the fallacy of hasty generalization (or *secundum quid*). The concept of 'Wahhabi ideology' is persuasively defined to have 'always been about power first' (line 12 in Figure 6.2). Here, Schwartz has predicated his argument solely on the extreme model of bin Laden as a warrant for what the Wahhabi ideology means. Logically, however, we cannot proceed from a specific case (bin Laden in this instance) to the general definition of the Wahhabi ideology as being 'always about power first'. Such a definition has been linguistically couched in a way that enhances its rhetorical purpose as a pragmatic fallacy of hasty generalization. A phrase such as 'X has always been about power first' is difficult to prove or disprove. We would first need to define some agreed-upon criteria regarding how something is 'about power' and then relate this to every action that the accused subject has carried out. Such a task would be very time-consuming and even then, is likely to be a subjective process, resulting in disagreements.

Such a wording, therefore, has a rhetorical and generalizing effect. The semantics of the adverb *always* is not merely confined to the idea of frequency; rather, it should be extended to absolutist frequency, especially if packaged into the present perfect form of the identifying relational Process (BE): *has always been.* Ideologically, this lack of adverbial mitigation – other adverbs of frequency such as *usually*, or even *often*, could have been used otherwise – is an overgeneralization about what the Wahhabi ideology is. The relational present-perfect Process (*has been*) adds to the absolutist existence of the Wahhabi ideology as delineated by Schwartz, where the past is further extended into the present moment, the as-yet meaning of the Wahhabi ideology.

Second, the collocation WAHHABI *control* can be rhetorically explained in terms of two pragmatic fallacies. The first can be shown in the line which reads 'and intellectuals have many reasons to despise Wahhabi control' (Figure 6.2, line 4), where the *petitio principii* fallacy (or begging the question) is detectable. In a circular argument, Schwartz presupposes that intellectuals despise Wahhabi control. Indeed, there should have been a sound argument on whether intellectuals really hate what is assumed by Schwartz to be the 'Wahhabi control', if any. Continuing with the concordance of the node WAHHABI in Figure 6.2 above, the second pragmatic fallacy about the collocation WAHHABI *control* can be detected where the Two Holy Places (Mecca and Medina) are in view; that is, the *argumentum ad misercordiam*. The clearest instance can be found in the line which reads 'Mecca and Medina came under Wahhabi control' (line 5). Here, the *argumentum ad misercordiam* is obviously used with the rhetorical effect of the writer appealing to the Muslim masses that have had a religious reverence for Mecca and Medina. In this context the fallacy works best, mainly because of the expression *under Wahhabi control.* Schwartz seems to arouse the religious *pathos* of the Muslim community against Wahhabi Islam, which is argumentatively presented here as a controlling force of the two holy places of 'Mecca and Medina'. Note here that Schwartz's

claim of this 'Wahhabi control' over or of the Two Holy Places/Mecca and Medina can be debunked in light of the fact that all the world's Muslims are allowed to visit Mecca and Medina, especially when it comes to pilgrimage or hajj.

The third pragmatic fallacy can be noticed in the collocational pattern WAHHABI *style*. It is different from all the other collocational patterns with the node word WAHHABI, in that it is presented as being part of the item *Wahhabi*, morphologically producing the unique compound adjectival form *Wahhabi-style*: a fact that may be understood in view of the relatively high MI score of the collocation WAHHABI + *style* = 6.50 (6 occurrences). Using the nominal group *Wahhabi-style fundamentalism* (line 28), Schwartz presents Wahhabi Islam as being 'inherently fundamentalist'. This renders the standpoint of Wahhabi Islam, against which Schwartz argues, an object of verbal attack.

Thus, instead of reasonably offering a sound argument against Wahhabi Islam or the Wahhabi Muslims, Schwartz verbally attacks it or them. This is known as the *argumentum ad hominem*, wherein no refutation of the standpoint is offered and all that is there is characteristically attributing fundamentalism to Wahhabis. Let us further substantiate this pragmatic fallacy in the concordance of the expression *Wahhabi-style* in Figure 6.3 below:

N	Concordance
1	in Uzbekistan at various levels, primary through university, for growing Wahhabi-style beards or, in the case of women, covering themselves. A
2	Pakistan regime and its InterServices Intelligence (ISI) were permeated with Wahhabi-style fundamentalism. The journalist Ahmed Rashid comments,
3	fourth shock in Islamic relations with the West. The first, the metastasis of Wahhabi-style separatist and nihilist extremism, provided doctrines and
4	and refined Ottoman style. The Saudis would only pay for the erection of Wahhabi-style mosques. The building the Saudis were proudest of, the King
5	caliphate by withdrawing into violent self-purging and criminality in the Wahhabi style, or by spiritual purification and self-defense, as practiced by
6	the Saudi kingdom, out of anxiety that they, having never lived under a Wahhabi-style regime, would stimulate discontent. This hypocritical stance
7	institution had ever staked an exclusivist claim of this kind. In typical Wahhabi style, the creators of the lobby sought to have it both ways. They

Figure 6.3: Concordance of *Wahhabi-style* in Schwartz

Still in the concordance above (Figure 6.3), it seems that the collocation WAHHABI + *style* is underlain by the *argumentum ad hominem*: 1) in lines 1 and 4, the beards on men, the veil on women, and the building of mosques, although a predominant presentation style of most Muslims, are portrayed as being a 'Wahhabi style', i.e. characteristic of Wahhabi Muslims; 2)

in line 3, 'separatist and nihilist extremism' is viewed by Schwartz as being a 'Wahhabi style'; note also that in this context the pragmatic fallacy of hasty generalization (*secundum quid*) also applies, since not every Wahhabi Muslim is a 'separatist and nihilist' extremist. Actually, Schwartz seems to be so confident of the existence of a negative 'Wahhabi style' that in the last concordance line (line 7), he used the evaluative adjective 'typical': 'In a typical Wahhabi style [...]'.

Even so, it may be useful here to have a concordance of the term 'fundamentalism' itself in Schwartz, so that we can trace other parts of the whole argument:

N	Concordance
1	e empire and the caliphate, the stage was set for a new explosion of purism and fundamentalism among Muslims. In addition, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and others
2	haunted by the Iranian example and fear the rise of a new and more fearsome fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia. It is highly doubtful that Saudi rule could be
3	and radicalism, while others had immersed themselves in Wahhabi-influenced fundamentalism and separatism. One variation of Pan-Arab radicalism that
4	ast, where dawn appears. The contradiction between the two faces of Islam, fundamentalism and pluralism, permeates the lives of three representative
5	rible doctrine, the basis had been laid for two and a half centuries of Islamic fundamentalism, and ultimately terrorism, in response to global change. The
6	and the dominant West. The first was the emergence of a stream of Islamic fundamentalism similar to Wahhabism, but originating outside the Arabian
7	r 11, they imported the methods, rhetoric, and characteristic deceit of Islamic fundamentalism into the American public square. Kabbani, for his part, has been
8	heir orbit, but once in power he and his comrades turned their backs on Islamic fundamentalism. As the years went by, Nasser's regime embarked on the brutal
9	Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam—the four horsemen of Islamic fundamentalism—would likely have been proud of bin Laden. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab
10	riod of utter obliviousness on the part of Westerners to the reality of Islamic fundamentalism in that country. The IMU is a classic Wahhabi combat
11	accommodating the Christian powers for security purposes while preaching fundamentalism, fanaticism, and intolerance. In contrast, Abdullah—the
12	l is another's freedom-fighter, but we forget the universal lesson of religious fundamentalism: One man's reformer may be another man's murderous bigot. Jih
13	gime and its InterServices Intelligence (ISI) were permeated with Wahhabi-style fundamentalism. The journalist Ahmed Rashid comments, "Saudi arms and
14	to the defense of human dignity On the other was the ugly visage of Wahhabi fundamentalism, narrow, rigid, tyrannical, separatist, supremacist, and violent.

Figure 6.4: Concordance of *fundamentalism* in Schwartz

Here, based on the concordance of the term 'fundamentalism' above in Figure 6.4, let us examine how Schwartz depicts 'Wahhabism' or what is 'Wahhabi' as being inherently fundamentalist. In line 1, we are presented with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and others, as a product of 'a new explosion of purism and fundamentalism' after the decline and end of the Ottoman caliphate. This representation sounds problematic, in that Schwartz has not warranted this claim by evidence from the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. A similar representation problem appears in line 2, where Schwartz calls readers' attention to 'the rise of a new and more fearsome [compared with 'the Iranian example'] fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia'. Such a claim is predicated on the existence of what Schwartz categorically terms the

'Wahhabi-influenced fundamentalism and separatism', in which '[s]ome Arab intellectuals [...] had immersed themselves' (line 3). The fact is Schwartz has not exemplified such 'some Arab intellectuals'; neither has he explained why fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else should boil down restrictively to 'Wahhabism'.

Also, there appears a lexical pattern of *Islamic fundamentalism* (lines 5-10) in the same concordance (Figure 6.4). This is where Schwartz attempts to create a causal link between 'Islamic fundamentalism' as a general category and 'Wahhabism' as a specific religious movement in Sunni Islam. The clearest instance can be found in line 6, especially the part which reads 'the emergence of a stream of Islamic fundamentalism similar to Wahhabism'. Here, Schwartz makes for a relational link between a particular stream of Islamic fundamentalism and Wahhabism without explaining in what respects they are similar. I have done a concordance search of the term *fundamental** and found that no explanation has been proposed in support of the assumed similar grounds between Wahhabism and fundamentalism.

Another instance lies in line 9 where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud are brought into the scope of explicit reference to revolutionary Islamic writers (namely, Ibn Taymiyyah, Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam), who, according to Schwartz, 'would likely have been proud of bin Laden'. This rhetorically established link can be described as 'Guilt by Association' (Tindale 2007: 4). In our case, the guilt of Islamic fundamentalism is warranted by associating Ibn Abd al-Wahhab with the aforementioned revolutionary social actors, whom Schwartz labels as 'the four horsemen of Islamic fundamentalism' (line 9). Having read the whole book of *The Two Faces of Islam*, I can claim that Schwartz has not even made a comparison between the works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the writings of those figures, so that aspects of similarity in thought (or thought patterns) can be traced.

Finally, line 12 presents an example of intertextuality that can be found in the cliché put forward by Schwartz: 'One man's reformer may be another man's murderous bigot'. But, first, let us have a broader co-text here:

Extract 4:

American journalist Thomas W. Lippman, in a widely read book, declares that Wahhabism "had a therapeutic and invigorating impact upon all of Islam, similar to that of the Reformation on Christianity." We all know the cliché that one man's terrorist is another's freedom-fighter, but we forget the universal lesson of religious fundamentalism: One man's reformer may be another man's murderous bigot.

(Line 12 in Figure 6.4, my italics)

In this example, the word 'reformer' denotes Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself, who is known by his proponents to be a reformer. This denotational meaning can be recognized in Lippman's quote that Schwartz attempts to refute. The implication of Schwartz's refutation can run thus: Wahhabism, as founded by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, is reformative in the eyes of the beholder. Indeed, Schwartz seeks to raise scepticism about Wahhabism. Importantly, here Schwartz's argument has turned into robust representations of (Saudi) Wahhabism in two lines in Figure 6.4: 1) 'the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance [...] preaching fundamentalism, fanaticism, and intolerance' (line 11) and 2) 'the ugly face of Wahhabi fundamentalism, narrow, rigid, tyrannical, separatist, and violent' (line 14). Notably, these representations are not constructed as acts of faith, but rather as self-evident statements of fact.

Overall, then, it can be said that Schwartz takes on an overwhelmingly negative discourse prosody that is typical of his use of WAHHABI and its collocates. Also, it can be said that such a negative prosody has been the outcome of Schwartz's *collocational*

preferences that are anchored in the constantly unfavourable semantic preferences of the collocates appearing with WAHHABI. Now, it is time we moved comparatively on to DeLong-Bas, so that we can investigate the corresponding discourse prosody evoked by the collocational environment of WAHHAB'S with its collocates, as shown in Table 6.1.

6.5 Representing Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in DeLong-Bas

Let us first start with the classification scheme of textual synonyms. One important observation on DeLong-Bas's part is the ideological focus on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself as a religiously academic persona. Now, the question is 'what possibly is the discourse prosody associated with the node WAHHAB'S?'. Figure 6.6 below could help us recognize such discourse prosody.

N	Concordance
1	life change due to a radical conversion. In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's approach, the process of adhering to tawhid
2	religious beliefs and practices might differ. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discussion of jihad includes elements of
3	in this fashion. When read in the context of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's full body of writings, it is clear that it was not
4	are representative of these attempts. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's insistence on peaceful calling to Islam
5	for the marriage relationship alone. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's insistence on the recognition of a broad
6	for jihad against anyone not subscribing to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's interpretation of Islam. Only four out of the
7	for thoughts, words, and deeds. Similarly, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's interpretation and discussion of Islamic law
8	not fit neatly into the classicist category. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's methodological approach is not particularly
9	From Revival and Reform to Global jihad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's narrow and restricted discussion of jihad
10	drive the Muslim to participate in it. In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's opinion, the only worthy intent in any matter
11	effects of his or her behavior on another. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's stance on this issue emphasized the
12	Wahhabi rule on a religious basis. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on jihad stand in marked contrast
13	theological teachings. The question of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's theological teachings formed the heart of the
14	than a belief enforced by the state. In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision, the purpose of the state was to
15	category of contemporary fundamentalists; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad contains elements of both
16	ways. Da'wah: The Call to Faith Although Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of the pursuit of knowledge began with
17	that they would lead followers astray." Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of knowledge emphasized individual
18	with non-Muslims. Like the modernists, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad was purely defensive in
19	as militant, violent, and destructive. In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision, education and debate were the
20	discussion of topics that are absent from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works. The most important of these is the
21	of military action is completely absent in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works. The other major theme of bin Laden's
22	Islam and Politics According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview, knowledge of Islam is the source
23	of property is entirely consistent with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview. It is clear that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
24	of both correct beliefs and practices. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview focused heavily on the theme of
25	right with no means of being enforced. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings make clear his broad respect for
26	the basis of their nonparticipation in battle. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings on jihad reflect the Quranic theme of
27	to be Muslims but do not act the part. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings have inspired a variety of
28	jihad on a global scale are not inherent to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings and that his writings vary
29	the Muslims was aggression. By contrast, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings restrict jihad to situations in which
30	because these themes are missing from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings and worldview that Ibn Taymiyya's
31	behalf of anyone. The differences between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings and those of Ibn Taymiyya with
32	discussions are completely absent from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's written works. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never

Figure 6.5: Concordance of **WAHHAB'S** in DeLong-Bas

Obviously, in light of the above concordance in Figure 6.5, one's hunch about DeLong-Bas's interest in the person of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab – based on the initial

investigation of the keywords and macropropositions in DeLong-Bas (see Chapter 5) – is almost certainly factual. Another hunch that is yet to be tested is DeLong-Bas's attempt to discursively construct the identity of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a certain way. Virtually all the collocates of WAHHAB'S in the concordance lines above have a semantic preference for religious scholarliness, which is in itself positive. For an ideological representation of the scholar Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, DeLong-Bas makes use of the classification scheme of textual synonyms, based on the common semantic preference for scholarliness. Let us tackle the collocate-specific textual synonyms utilized by DeLong-Bas.

To begin with, the three collocates *writings, works* and *teachings* may be classified as textual synonyms with a semantic preference for academic production, which (because of the strong collocate *teachings*) is characteristically religious: the first two collocates of WAHHAB'S (*writings* and *works*) may be said to mark academic production, while the last collocate (*teachings*) is a fundamentally religion-bound term. All of the three collocates contribute to this overall collocational environment of WAHHAB'S, presenting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as being a religious scholar, but now let us handle each of the two elements in terms of their function, i.e. scholarliness and religiousness.

First, going further in text beyond concordance line 27, the collocate *writings* is syntactically positioned as the Agent behind inspiring 'a variety of contemporary reforms'. The Mental Process of cognition *inspire* and its (cognitively produced) Phenomenon *reforms*, which is premodified with the adjective *contemporary*, attach a positive value to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings as an intellectually changing force towards a better status quo. Again, going beyond line 26, the collocate *writings* is found to revolve around the topic of jihad: 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings on jihad reflect the Quranic theme of the value and sanctity of life'. This is obviously to classify those 'writings' as based on the Quran (as the holy book of Muslims and their primary source for legislation), particularly when it comes to the sensitive

issue of jihad as connoting war and violence to the western public's perception. Further, the same collocate of *writings* is positively realized in line 25, where 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings make clear his broad respect for and protection of women'. In this instance, the collocate *writings* reflects Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's personal view of women as requiring respect and protection. Last, in this respect, the collocational pattern WAHHAB'S *writings* is associated with 'Ibn Taymiyya' – a religious authority in Sunni Islam that has reigned supreme in the hearts of Wahhabi-Sunni Muslims – in lines 30 and 31.

Second, the same theme can be detected in the collocate *works* with the node WAHHAB'S (line 21): '[...] military action is completely absent in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works'. Military action is no doubt one major manifestation of extreme *mujahidin* (religious warriors) like bin Laden. Thus, if such a manifestation is absent from the works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, then there must be no association at all between the Wahhabi discourse and any violent effect thought to be thereof. This theme has been even more strongly affirmed in lines 20 and 32. However, we need to provide a bigger stretch of their collocational environments than the concordance lines themselves. Below are the extended versions of lines 20 and 32 (Figure 6.5):

Extract 5:

One final major difference between the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is Ibn Taymiyya's discussion of topics that are absent from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works. The most important of these is the issue of <u>martyrdom</u>.

(My emphasis)

Extract 6:

> [...] *these discussions are completely absent from Ibn Abd al-**Wahhab's** written works.*
> *Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never discussed <u>martyrdom</u> [...]'.* (My emphasis)

Obviously, the two extended versions above collectively argue against the appearance of the discourse topic of martyrdom in the works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, especially if compared with another Sunni scholar like Ibn Taymiyya. This is so, because the religious term *martyrdom* (in Arabic *shihada*) is a title of honour in Islam for any Muslim who would die while waging the so-called holy war (or jihad) against non-believers (i.e. non-Muslims). Thus, the point here harks closely back to the issue of military jihad that DeLong-Bas is discursively acutely keen to negate from the scholarly orientation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Third, the collocate *teachings*, as realized in the collocational pattern WAHHAB'S *teachings*, is shown to be concerned with the issue of jihad (line 12): 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on jihad stand in marked contrast to contemporary fundamentalists, most notably Osama bin Laden'. Thus, here DeLong-Bas makes a point of setting discursive boundaries between 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings' and the 'fundamentalist acts' of bin Laden, so that she may keep those jihad-related teachings away from the so-called extreme *mujahidin*, who are epitomized by bin Laden. Thus, unlike Schwartz (who seems to view "jihad" as being a monolithic structure), DeLong-Bas suggests that there are different views on jihad.

Indeed, significantly, by characteristically co-selecting WAHHAB'S and *teachings*, DeLong-Bas positions Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a religious authority. The term *teachings* has a strong semantic preference for religious leadership in general American English. Evidence of this may be observed in the COCA, where the following collocates of TEACHINGS can be identified: *beliefs, missionaries, churches, scriptures, doctrines, faiths, religions, Christians, Catholics,* and *Muslims*.

Both semantic preferences (scholarly productivity and religious authority) may then be combined by DeLong-Bas to constitute a positive discourse prosody of the node word WAHHAB'S, with a view to constructing the identity of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a religious scholar, or in Islamic terms, a Sheikh. Again, DeLong-Bas uses other collocates of the node WAHHAB'S that may be further classified as textual synonyms with a semantic preference for the scholarly academic perspective of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, namely, *approach*, *discussion*, *interpretation*, *opinion*, *stance*, *vision*, and *worldview*.

First, the collocational pattern WAHHAB'S *approach* significantly appears in a number of lines. 1) The first line 'In Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab's approach, the process of adhering to *tawhid* […]' correlates between such a Wahhabi approach and the process of adhering to *tawhid*; the correlation is of religious value, since *tawhid* (monotheism) is the core of Islamic creed; and, in this sense, if the approach is to be concerned with establishing such a doctrinal process, it should be taken for granted on the part of the Muslim discourse community. 2) The extended line 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's methodological approach is not particularly surprising or shocking because his purpose was to return to the most basic sources of Islam, the Quran and hadith' (line 8) presents Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as being a scholar whose approach is reformist. Such methodological reformism derives its spirit from the two primary sources in Islam, the Quran and Hadith. The co-text of such a collocation, then, is in itself a presupposition of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab's knowledge of these two sources, and attributes some sort of authoritativeness to his approach towards Islamic teachings.

Second, the collocational pattern WAHHAB'S *vision* is realized in a number of lines in Figure 6.5. 1) The extended line 'Bin Laden's vision of jihad clearly belongs to the category of contemporary fundamentalists; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad contains elements of both classical and modernist interpretations of Islam' (line 15) is used to emphasize ideological differences between bin Laden and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. (This is

almost the same as the collocational pair WAHHAB'S and *discussion* in lines 2 and 9.) 2) In lines 16 and 17 the collocation WAHHAB'S *vision* is juxtaposed with the academically prestigious term *knowledge*: respectively, the first version of this vision is presented as pursuing knowledge and the second as being an object of knowledge itself. 3) The line 'Like the modernists, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision of jihad was purely defensive' (line 18) spells out the positive evaluation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as being similar to that of modernists (with the connotations of open-mindedness, receptivity and state-of-the-art awareness). Note the emphatic function carried over by the intensifier *purely*. 4) The line 'In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's vision, education and debate were the preferred methods of gaining adherents' (line 19) shows that DeLong-Bas constructs Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab as being enlightened and intellectual.

Last, the collocational pattern WAHHAB'S *worldview* discursively sets up the academic character of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a unique vein. 1) The line 'According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview, knowledge of Islam is the source of all legitimacy' (line 22) accords Ibn Abd al-Wahhab with a highly religious credibility: what is taken to be legitimate according to his worldview is predicated on the knowledge of Islam, and nothing else. 2) The line '[...] consistent with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview. It is clear that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab does not fit easily and neatly into the traditionalist-classicist category' (line 23) again paints a picture of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a modernist.

It seems then that DeLong-Bas's semantic preferences with WAHHAB'S show a general collocational preference for religious scholarliness in Islam. In this way, for DeLong-Bas, WAHHAB'S constitutes a positive discourse prosody all through its collocational environments in the text. Additionally, DeLong-Bas's references to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings are generally used to portray him in a favourable light – as being respectful to women, against war and violence and valuing life, as well as being a reformer and a scholar. Thus, it can be said that there is a highly positive discourse prosody that is typical of Delong-

Bas's use of WAHHAB'S and its collocates. Also, it can be said that such a positive prosody has been the outcome of Delong-Bas's *collocational preference* that is secured in the constantly favourable semantic preferences of the collocates appearing with WAHHAB'S.

6.6 SAUDI representation: Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas

Now, if we move on to the node word SAUDI as used by both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in Table 6.1, we may notice the following points. First, Schwartz's use of the collocates of SAUDI represents a continuation of the same negative discourse prosody realized by the collocates of WAHHABI; this has been substantiated in the foregoing analysis of WAHHABI and its collocate *Saudi*. Second, the different collocates of SAUDI across the two texts contrast meaningfully in terms of the discourse function of intertextual relexicalization: the collocates used by Schwartz may stand in an oppositional relation to those used by DeLong-Bas. As regards the first observation we can investigate the negative discourse prosody of the collocates of SAUDI as displayed in the concordance in Figure 6.6 below:

N	Concordance
1	was in trouble. In the aftermath of September 11, Saudi Arabia had entered a profound crisis. So far
2	of a new and more fearsome fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia. It is highly doubtful that Saudi rule
3	the more than 200 religious prisoners held in Saudi Arabia in February 2002 were 17 who faced
4	an inevitable breakdown of the Saudi social order. Saudi Arabia urgently needs to turn a new page in
5	A peace agreement without a transformation in Saudi Arabia will always be subject to strains
6	the Sarajevo authorities revealed the scope of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi "jihad" in the Balkans
7	the Khawarij, also anticipated the terrorism of the Saudi-backed Hamas in Israel, which became
8	murderous gang of fanatics bent on imposing Saudi-backed Islamofascism. Propaganda on its
9	because I learned about them in Sarajevo, where Saudi-backed extremists actively sought to subvert
10	Arab and Islamic regimes, suggest that while a Saudi crisis might cause a temporary disruption in
11	display of the intellectual backwardness of the Saudi elite. Less than two months later, the other
12	involved in penetrating the mysteries of the Saudi elite. In 1992, Fahd issued a decree on
13	of rhetoric dominated public discourse in the Saudi kingdom. For example, on February 13 of
14	to secularism. By contrast, the subjects of the Saudi kingdom—like the peoples of Russia and
15	over the impact of political instability in the Saudi kingdom, "if that were to occur"—as if
16	totalitarian terrorism. The arrival of this unstable Saudi middle class made Wahhabism and
17	the emergence of the first mature generation of the Saudi middle class—the Arabian equivalent of the
18	they were cut off from global reality. The young Saudi middle class of the 1970s greatly resembled
19	Western government imposed the corruption of the Saudi monarchy; rather, the sons of Ibn Sa'ud
20	later, international Wahhabism, exported thanks to Saudi oil revenues, appropriated the "Salafi" name
21	and ExxonMobil, in sensitivity toward the Saudi oil elite. Certainly, globalization as
22	of Islamic radicalism ... No doubt what bothers the Saudi regime the most is that the world is also
23	support in the global Islamic community. The Saudi regime finds itself in these difficulties
24	For these reasons, there was little hope that the Saudi rulers would carry out a serious investigation
25	bin Laden's diatribes against Saudi hypocrisy. The Saudi rulers support extremists like bin Laden to
26	Prince Abdullah. In some respects, analyzing the Saudi ruling elite resembles the old methods of
27	As an anti-Wahhabi imam recently expressed it, Saudi society under Wahhabism has thrown away
28	is the source of the hypocrisy rampant throughout Saudi society, most particularly among the
29	of the most bizarre of the many weird incidents in Saudi society, Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Aziz
30	could cause short-term disorder in a collapsing Saudi state, it is highly doubtful that they could

Figure 6.6: Concordance of **SAUDI** in Schwartz

The most explicit instance of the negative discourse prosody of SAUDI by Schwartz can clearly be realized in the use of the *Saudi-backed* collocational pattern, where the Saudi side is presented as evil. In all its concordance lines, this pattern (behaving adjectivally) is shown to premodify negative nouns: 1) in line 6 Wahhabi "jihad" is again backed by the same Saudi side, and this back-up is packaged as being revealed by 'the Sarajevo authorities', which reflects such back-up in a sinister light; 2) in line 7 the complex nominal group *the terrorism of the Saudi-backed Hamas* renders the Saudi side involved with the militant group Hamas, and thus this side is recognized as an accomplice in the acts associated with the group; 3) line 8 presents the Saudi side as backing what Schwartz calls 'Islamofascism'; 4) line 9 makes an explicit reference to Saudi-backed extremists, where there seems to be space for the Saudi side condoning extremism and allowing the perpetration of evil deeds. (Note how such an explicit negative discourse prosody is nearly absent from DeLong-Bas in the concordance of the same node SAUDI in Figure 6.7 below.)

The negative prosody of SAUDI is further maintained by Schwartz via the presentation of Saudi entities (including *Saudi Arabia, Saudi elite, Saudi kingdom, Saudi monarchy, Saudi regime, Saudi rulers, Saudi society,* and *Saudi state*) as being elitist and hence stigmatized social actors. Aside from the order of the items appearing in collocation with SAUDI in Figure 6.6 above, let us begin with the two pairs of collocation SAUDI *rulers* and SAUDI *state*. In line 24 the collocation SAUDI *rulers* is negatively presented as being the actor complicit with the 9/11 'attacks on New York and Washington'. A similar negative representation is found in concordance line 25, where the Material Process *support* is made in relation to the semantic Patient *extremists*, a negative collective term that has been particularized by a notorious jihadist figure associated with Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden.

Also, in the last line of the concordance, the collocation SAUDI *state* stands out as a negative social actor in the circumstantial adjunct *in a collapsing Saudi state*, which is

presented as being the locus of 'disorder'. So is the case with the collocation SAUDI *kingdom* in lines 13 and 15, where the social actor of *Saudi kingdom* is negatively characterized as the locus of 'rhetoric-dominated public discourse' and 'political instability', respectively. The social-actor stigmatization associated with the collocation SAUDI *kingdom* continues in line 14. Here, the semantic congruity between the items *kingdom* and *subjects* activates the prototypical governor-governed relation in a negative light, by using historical parallelism: 'the subjects of the Saudi kingdom – like the peoples of Russia and Eastern Europe under communism – have suffered': the Saudi kingdom (like communist Russia and Eastern Europe) is the Agent that negatively impacts on the governed Patient *subjects* (or, in a parallel fashion, *peoples*) on the receiving end of suffering. There is yet another instance of a stigmatized social actor that is realized in the collocation SAUDI *monarchy,* which is presented as being a source of the nominalized goal *corruption* in line 19: 'the corruption of the Saudi monarchy'.

On the other hand, in DeLong-Bas, as shown in Figure 6.7 below, the same collocational patterns SAUDI *kingdom* and SAUDI *monarchy* serve as social actors, yet in a starkly different vein.

N	Concordance
1	of Muslims throughout the world, including in Saudi Arabia, decried and denounced the
2	a heroes' welcome upon their return to Saudi Arabia. However, the reality at home was
3	the Quran and Sunna as the keys to reform in Saudi Arabia. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's influence
4	Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb, in Saudi Arabia.'" Sayyid Qutb's influence on bin
5	Islam as it is practiced in contemporary Saudi Arabia, yet for the media it has come to
6	all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper
7	There I received volunteers who came from the Saudi Kingdom and from all over the Arab and
8	had entered into with kuffar. He lambasted the Saudi monarchy in a letter: In its foreign policy,
9	soldiers were Muslims. For the Muslim Saudi monarchy to invite non-Muslim American
10	terrorist training and the potential threat to the Saudi monarchy led to joint American and Saudi
11	world was clear to bin Laden. Not only had the Saudi monarchy fallen under American control,
12	position and repent."' The classification of the Saudi monarchy as "not truly Muslim" was a
13	news network CNN, bin Laden criticized the Saudi monarchy for serving as a mere "branch"
14	with the Americans, bin Laden's critique of the Saudi royal family also became harsher and
15	Laden's critiques changed from targeting the Saudi royal family to targeting the United States
16	over the years. Because no one from the Saudi royal family was willing to go to
17	Bin Laden's main criticisms have targeted the Saudi royal family. In the early years, he
18	in 1980 when the Afghan mujahidin pressed the Saudi royal family to send one of their members

Figure 6.7 Concordance of **SAUDI** in DeLong-Bas

First, in line 7 ('There I received volunteers who came from the Saudi Kingdom'), Saudi Arabia is described as a philanthropic source of 'volunteers'. Second, for DeLong-Bas, the social actor of *Saudi monarchy* is regularly constructed as a victim (see lines 8-13). For example consider this expanded concordance (line 12) in Figure 6.7:

Extract 7:

> *Significantly, bin Laden cited the authority of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, in support of his contentions [...]. The classification of the Saudi monarchy as "not truly Muslim" was a particularly prominent theme in Ibn Taymiyya's works but one that was absent from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's.* (Line 12, my italics)

Here, a distinction is made between Ibn Taymiyya[69] who is critical of the Saudi monarchy, and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who is not. As is clear in the expanded line in extract 7 above, the distinction is made by DeLong-Bas, not for anything against Ibn Taymiyya himself, rather it is intended as a shield against the claim that bin Laden derives his extreme views from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works. According to DeLong-Bas, bin Laden takes Ibn Taymiyya's views – 'The classification of the Saudi monarchy as "not truly Muslim"' – on board. Again, this is to sustain DeLong-Bas's motif that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a scholar whose views are far from extremist or radical.

Second, in lines 8 and 13, the *Saudi monarchy* is syntactically encoded as the Target of two negative Verbal Processes, *lambasted* and *criticized*, with the same social-actor Sayer, that is, bin Laden. (Note that the pronoun *He* in line 8 is co-referential with bin Laden.) This, again, renders the Saudi monarchy victimized by a post-9/11 internationally notorious figure of militant jihad. There is an implied message here: the evil side of violent *mujahidin* is set

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[69] Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was a famous Sunni Muslim scholar who was a member of the school founded by Ibn Hanbal; he is alleged to have sought the return of Islam to its sources, the Quran and the Sunnah.

against the opposing (presumably good) side of the Saudi monarchy. Third, the same victimized social actor of Saudi monarchy is presented in two further lines: 1) in line 10, by embedding the *Saudi monarchy* into the expression *to the Saudi monarchy* as a postmodifier of the nominal group *the potential threat*; 2) in line 11, by describing the *Saudi monarchy* as being *under American control*. Thus, according to DeLong-Bas, not only does the Saudi monarchy suffer the hegemony of American control, but it also stands as the target of a possible threat.

Even so, in Figure 6.7, there seems to be a deviation in DeLong-Bas's representation of Saudi monarchy, where the Saudi monarchy is (for the only time in the concordance) depicted as not being victimized: 'For the Muslim Saudi monarchy to invite non-Muslim American troops to fight Muslim Iraqi soldiers was a serious violation of Islamic law' (line 9). But this deviation from DeLong-Bas's representation of the Saudi monarchy can be explained if we go further beyond the concordance line: 'An alliance between Muslims and non-Muslims to fight Muslims was also specifically forbidden by the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' (line 9). Here, DeLong-Bas invokes another discursive voice (that of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab), in order to subject the discourse of politics to the discourse of religion. Indeed, for DeLong-Bas, the 'Muslim Saudi monarchy' is still presented as being a social actor which is victimized by a kind of politics that violates Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab's religious teachings.

Now, let us return to Schwartz with Figure 6.6 above. By coming to the two pairs of collocation of SAUDI *Arabia* and SAUDI *society*, one general observation in the concordance is dominant: both are negatively described. First, Saudi Arabia is described as a place of a 'profound crisis' (line 1), of 'more fearsome fundamentalism' (line 2), of 'religious prisoners' (line 3), and of potential 'strains' (line 5); and note the relatively strong collocation of SAUDI and *crisis* (MI score 4.68) in line 1. Perhaps that would explain why in line 4 *Saudi Arabia* is deontically recommended to 'turn a new page in history'. Second, 'hypocrisy' is described as

being 'rampant' in the Saudi society (line 28) and 'weird incidents' as taking place therein (line 29); and thus, unsurprisingly, in line 27 the Saudi society is claimed to have 'thrown away its ancient traditions of tolerance'.

Here, again, we need to move on to DeLong-Bas, where the concordance lines of the same collocation SAUDI *Arabia* are shown in Figure 6.7 above. DeLong-Bas manifests an authorial position of detachment via a number of discursive strategies. First, in line 4, the use of "report quotes" is an explicit way of muting the authorial voice about Saudi Arabia, what might be called the let-the-other-say-it discursive strategy of detachment. Second, in line 5, *the media* is referenced as a defining source of the interrelation between Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi Islam; note also the use of the vague adjectival premodifier *contemporary*, which denotes an indeterminate historical period that can be associated with Saudi Arabia. Third, in line 6, Saudi Arabia is referenced along with other countries, such as *Iraq*, *Egypt* and *Sudan*, which renders Saudi Arabia as a social actor in association: a discursive process that creates an associate of elements, so that there hardly appears any focus on any of its parts.

Interestingly, however, continuing with the collocation SAUDI *Arabia*, DeLong-Bas may compare nicely with Schwartz in a different way; that is, as a positive point of identification at the locative level. Two instances can prove it. First, in line 3, the prepositional phrase *in Saudi Arabia* stands as a postmodifier of the connotatively positive word *reform*. Second, perhaps less explicitly, in line 2 the collocation SAUDI *Arabia* functions as a social actor that is classified as *home*, with the positive connotations associated with the term. Here, the lexico-semantic relation between Saudi Arabia and the label *home* is that of a generic noun, a relation that is activated by the nominal group *the Saudi public*: '[...] upon their return to Saud Arabia. However, the reality at home was that the Saudi public did not share the euphoria'. This is the case in general American English, where the adjectival

collocates of the node HOME seem to be unfailingly positive. For example, in the COCA, *home* collocates with *free* (150 occurrences), *sweet* (111 occurrences), *safe* (82 occurrences), *alive* (79 occurrences), *happy* (35 occurrences), and *social* (28 occurrences). Note how this case will contrast with the collocational expression *Saudi middle class* used by Schwartz (Figure 6.6). In Schwartz, SAUDI is frequently categorized as *middle class* (lines 24, 25, 26), with the negative connotations of elitism, egoism and class-consciousness. Certainly, this sharply contrasts with the hominess just realized in association with Saudi Arabia in Delong-Bas.

Now, in relation to the node word SAUDI, let us set Schwartz against DeLong-Bas by highlighting one important oppositional paradigm (as a classification scheme of opposition) across the two texts. Here, intertextually, the oppositional paradigm euphemism vs. dysphemism can be realized in DeLong-Bas's use of the expression *Saudi royal family* (concordance lines 14-18 in Figure 6.7) against Schwartz's use *Saudi elite/oil* (concordance lines 11-12 and 20-21 in Figure 6.6). Whereas the collocates *royal* and *family* are dignifying markers that stand for the Saudi rulers, the collocates *oil* and *elite* are denigrating markers of the same Saudi rulers, particularly if we take into account the overall collocational picture investigated earlier. More explicitly, the expression *royal family* is an honorific ruling title of monarchy – a very strong collocate of SAUDI (MI score 10.43) – that has been dysphemisticized by the negative substitute of the elitist rulers in Saudi Arabia, who are implied to be egoistically luxuriating in oil-producing wealth. Thus, Schwartz seems to tarnish such a royal image, which is represented by DeLong-Bas, and relexicalize it discursively. This can be further substantiated by looking at other collocates of SAUDI, which are significantly absent from DeLong-Bas, such as SAUDI *rulers*, SAUDI *state* and SAUDI *regime*.

Here, we may come up with the following semantic domains: *rulers* belongs to the category <IN POWER>, while *state* and *regime* are classed as <GOVERNMENT>. This is to reveal a particular semantic focus on political authority in the lexical environment of the node SAUDI, which is clearly opposite to DeLong-Bas's representation, where the following semantic domains have been identified: *royal* <IN POWER> and *family* <KIN>. Whereas, across both texts, the collocates *rulers* and *royal* fall within the same semantic domain, there remains one fundamental difference based on the overall semantic picture: Schwartz intensifies Saudi power at a governmental level; DeLong-Bas mitigates the same power at a kinship level in the nominal group *royal family*. Let alone the fact that in general American English, the phrase *royal family* is a strongly collocating pattern: in the COCA, the term *royal* is identified to collocate with *family* (1446 occurrences, MI score 4.00). This means that, unlike Schwartz, DeLong-Bas presents the Saudi government in its typical form of association, a form that the language users of American English are mostly familiar with; and thus this government should not be a stranger to the governed subjects in Saudi Arabia.[70]

Interestingly, in this context, it should be noted that while Schwartz uses the collocate *elite* with the node word SAUDI (lines 11 and 12), DeLong-Bas uses *family* with the same node. Investigating the set of collocates with the two words (*elite* and *family*) in the COCA may be a clue to some sort of a recontextualized social actor, that is, the Saudi government as being realized oppositionally across the two texts. The term *elite* collocates with the following domain-specific sets of lexical items in the COCA: 1) professional sports (*runners, swimmers, gymnasts, wrestlers, cyclists*); 2) the military (*troops, divisions, squad, brigade*); 3) class (*educated, wealthy, non-elite, privileged, intellectuals, cadre*).[71] With these

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[70] In this context, Schwartz has clearly defamiliarized the typically collocating use of DeLong-Bas's expression of *royal family* by foregrounding the expression *Saudi (oil) elite* as characteristically co-occurring in his text.

[71] All collocates occur more than 10 times in the COCA.

sets of collocates, the discourse prosody of the item *elite* seems to be underlain by a more or less homogenous conceptual configuration of detachment and exclusiveness.

On the other hand, the item *family* has the following set of collocates in the COCA: *loving* (216), *supportive* (173), *wholesome* (29), *well-connected* (12), and *in-home* (10). Here, the conceptual configuration underlying the discourse prosody of family is also homogenous, yet in stark contrast to that of *elite*; that is, attachment and inclusiveness. Thus, whilst Schwartz presents the social actor of Saudi government as being detached from the governed ordinary masses, as exclusive in orientation, DeLong-Bas has recontextualized such a presentation of the same social actor by positioning it as being attached to those governed masses in the family structure – the royal family structure – and thus as being inclusive in orientation.

6.7 Conclusion

Now, at the end of the inter-collocate analysis of WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI, it has become clear that both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas are ideologically interested in certain aspects of representing Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism. On the one hand, Schwartz squarely focuses on the Saudi state or monarchy as being governed by Wahhabi leaders or followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, that is, a theocracy. His overall discursive representation can be succinctly framed as the Wahhabi-Saudi theocracy and its worldwide threat post-9/11.

On the other hand, DeLong-Bas is basically concerned with the academic stature of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as an Islamic scholar whose religious teachings are strictly reformist. Contrary to Schwartz's view, she has positioned Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious worldview as opposed to the fundamentalist worldview of political Islam, particularly the radical views adopted by Osama bin Laden. Also, DeLong-Bas has opposed Schwartz's representation of the Saudi society as being governed by the ruling royal elite that is

conscious of class divisions. Instead, she presents the reader with a modern Saudi society that is democratically governed by a (non-theocratic) Saudi royal family. Finally, it can be said that the two opposing representations have textually materialized via the collocational preferences ideologically made by each writer in the company of the significant node words of WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI.

Now, let us move on to a rather different collocation-based representation in the present research data; that is, gender representation in meta-Wahhabi discourse, which is the subject matter of Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

Gender Representation in Meta-Wahhabi Discourse: Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas (Part III)

7.1 Introduction

This chapter constitutes the third part of my micro analysis. It proceeds with the collocational analysis conducted on the selected node words in my data. The chapter is focused on gender-related terms, which will go through two phases: 1) specifying the keywords among these terms used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas; 2) analysing the collocates realized with these keywords (displayed as node words in the tables and concordances included in this chapter) in terms of both classification and argumentation schemes (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5), as well as the 'discourse prosodies' (see Subsection 3.5.1) attaching to them.

However, before coming straight to the gender-specific analysis, I shall briefly touch upon the technical terms 'gender' and 'sex'. The two terms are sometimes confused or used interchangeably. 'Sex', as Talbot (1998: 7) argues, 'is biologically founded'; it is 'a matter of genes, gonads and hormones'. 'Gender by contrast', Talbot continues to argue, 'is socially constructed; it is learned' (Talbot 1998: 7). Thus, she concludes that 'people acquire characteristics which are perceived as masculine and feminine' (*ibid.*). It should be noted that the present analysis is not as much focused on revealing any sexist use of language in the two texts as on fathoming out the degree to which gender representation can be integrated into more general political and/or religious representations of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism in the texts.

7.2 Gender-related keywords

Why is gender a focus of my analysis? A quick glance at Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2) shows that DeLong-Bas makes use of fourteen gender-specific keywords, which are in the following order of keyness strength: HER, WOMAN, HE, WIFE, HUSBAND, HIS, MAN, WOMAN'S, WOMEN, MALE, SHE, GENDER, MAN'S, and FEMALE. Even without carrying out a qualitative analysis of these terms, they indicate that, compared with Schwartz, gender appears to be more important to DeLong-Bas. Again by looking at Table 5.1 (Chapter 5), it is clear that Schwartz rarely, if ever, uses any gender-indicative keywords. While Schwartz clearly does use some potentially gendered words such as *he* or *man*, the fact that he *never* uses the term 'gender' (while DeLong-Bas uses this word 50 times) suggests a central difference in terms of focus between the two writers.

This assumption can be made even clearer if we, by considering other keywords in DeLong-Bas, track down other related textual foci. DeLong-Bas uses these keywords: 1) MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, TALAQ (i.e. divorce) and MAHR (i.e. dowry) denote the status of a couple as being conjugally associated or dissociated, and 2) SEXUAL, INTERCOURSE and SEX denote the potential for a biological relation that is probably traditionally taken as a consummating process or a correlate of marriage itself. The latter word is also used to refer to the biological distinction of being male or female. At this stage, we cannot be sure that the latter three words refer to marriage – sex can occur outside marriage, and it can occur between people who in many societies have not been allowed to marry (e.g. gay men or lesbians). However, initial concordance analyses of these words showed that they do refer to sex within married relationships.

Therefore, the above list of keywords indicates that gender and gender relations are an important site of difference between the two authors. Unlike in the previous chapter,

however, when both authors referred to the same concept with different words, here it appears that the difference is more in terms of foregrounding of gender by DeLong-Bas while it is backgrounded by Schwartz. While this means that there is potentially more data to analyse for DeLong-Bas, it does not mean that I can discount Schwartz. As pointed out above, he does refer to gendered terms, and we need to know whether his use of them is along the same lines as DeLong-Bas (only less frequent) or whether he chooses to do something different with them.

Given the fact that both texts are concerned with the representation of Wahhabi Islam as a socio-religious practice, one may find the differential focus on gender in each text to be curious. The relative lack of gender-indicative keywords in Schwartz could be of special significance. But let us first decide which keywords should be taken as the node words to be investigated at the level of gender representation.

7.3 Gender-specific node words

Both qualitative and quantitative criteria are implemented in order to select the node words that are analysed in this chapter. First, the fact that there are so many gender-related keywords in Table 5.1 (Chapter 5) means that there is a quantitative reason for choosing *some* gender-related keywords as node words. Due to space constraints, it is not possible to examine all 20 of the gender-related keywords in Table 5.1, however. Therefore, further quantitative criteria (the same described in Chapter 5 [Subsection 5.5.1]) should be used in order to select a few keywords which are most likely to benefit from close analysis. Therefore, the gender-indicative keyword must have some collocates, and this means that any words not having any collocates with an MI of 3 or more and a *t* score of 2 or more will not be considered as potential node words; also these collocates ought to be amenable to the theoretical model of classification and/or argumentation schemes (see Chapter 5).

Further, it should be noted that, due to the fact that the great majority of gender-indicative terms have appeared as keywords in DeLong-Bas, the same gender-indicative keywords will be subjected to a corpus-linguistic analysis in terms of their semantic preferences and discourse prosodies, if any, as used by Schwartz. This means that I shall examine concordances of such words in order to see how they compare with those used by DeLong-Bas in terms of any potentially gendered language use. Now, it may be clear that the reason for this practical step is the need for a thorough contrastive analysis between the potentially gendered – and thus ideological – use of these terms utilized by Schwartz, even if such terms have not appeared as keywords in the text.

Now, a number of observations need to be made about Table 7.1 below. First, not surprisingly, compared with DeLong-Bas, Schwartz seems to be impoverished in terms of the gender-specific node words; this is understandable from the fact that Schwartz does not use any gender keywords, lexical or grammatical, compared with DeLong-Bas (see Section 7.2). Hence DeLong-Bas is displayed first in the table below. Second, among the gender-indicative keywords in DeLong-Bas, only the twelve words which refer to social actors[72] will be used as node words; other concepts and epithets (such as *sex, sexual, talaq, divorce, intercourse, marriage, mahr*, etc.) that denote a gendered status or relation will not be investigated as node words, since my subsequent concordance analyses found that these words have featured either as collocates of the gender-indicative social-actor node words themselves in Table 7.1 or as an essential part of the co-text surrounding some of the designated collocations in the concordances.

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[72] I use the term 'social actor' in the same sense used by van Leeuwen (1996, 2008, 2009) as referring to 'the participants of social practices' that 'can be represented in the English discourse' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23). It is in this sense that gender-indicative social actors are treated in the present context of collocational analysis. Therefore, analytic focus is laid on gender-indicative terms that appear in the form technically known as 'genderonyms', e.g. 'man', 'woman', etc. (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 49).

	DELONG-BAS						SCHWARTZ					
N	Node Word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score	Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score
1	MAN	should	258	18	4.91	3.74	MAN	who	298	7	5.25	2.18
		woman	373	37	4.87	4.43		was	1,128	8	4.01	3.18
		right	249	18	4.87	3.61						
		wife	206	21	4.50	2.87						
2	MAN'S	right	249	22	6.06	2.20						
3	MEN	women	219	36	7.29	5.26	MEN	and	3,611	17	3.06	3.17
		responsible	72	7	6.86	2.43						
4	MALE	female	42	14	9.25	3.60						
		servant	21	8	9.14	2.45						
		witnesses	25	6	8.62	2.23						
		slave	56	8	7.46	2.22						
		guardian	69	5	7.16	2.22						
5	HUSBAND	wife	206	42	6.86	5.34						
		talaq	94	8	5.72	2.40						
		right	249	15	4.31	2.33						
6	WOMAN	entitled	53	15	6.63	3.70						
		mahr	114	18	4.53	2.53						
		status	127	13	4.37	2.52						
		should	258	11	3.71	2.77						
		marriage	550	35	3.26	3.35						
7	WOMAN'S	consent	36	16	9.43	3.99						
		rights	104	9	7.07	2.98						
		guardian	69	6	6.82	2.22						
8	WOMEN	children	32	7	6.90	2.43						
		gender	50	9	6.48	2.62						
		rights	104	14	5.20	2.38						
9	WOMEN'S	rights	104	15	9.84	3.87						
10	FEMALE	slaves	19	5	9.78	2.23						
		slave	56	8	8.22	2.23						
		or	1,036	14	3.97	2.09						
		is	1,838	6	3.86	2.63						
11	WIFE	maintenance	75	13	6.64	3.28						
		talaq	94	12	5.66	2.59						
12	WIVES	or	1,063	7	4.51	2.14	WIVES	and	3,611	14	4.65	3.04

Table 7.1: Collocates of gender-specific node words in DeLong-Bas and Schwartz

Third, also, the chosen node words are restrictively lexical; there are no such sex-marked grammatical words as *he* or *she*. The reason behind this is twofold: 1) lexical items are inherently relational; and this may prove crucial to the idea of how each text refers to the

other intertextually, let alone the fact that the potential opposition between the two discourses (anti-Wahhabi vs. pro-Wahhabi) may be even clearer; 2) in our case, grammatical keywords are all pronouns that refer to the same gender-related lexical keywords, and this may conceivably lead to a repetition of the collocational analysis of the lexical keywords being pronominally referred to. This, however, does not take away the fact that certain collocates may turn out to be grammatical in nature.

However, by no means does Table 7.1 present a full-fledged picture of the gender-specific lexis used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. In this regard, as we previously hinted, in order to adequately present a full display of the contrastive lexical items across both texts, we need to calculate the overall frequency of Schwartz's lexical items, which appear as node words in text. Table 7.2 gives the overall frequency of these lexical items with their keyness order; and this renders DeLong-Bas a reference corpus to Schwartz.

No.	Word	Freq. in DeLong-Bas	%	Freq. in Schwartz	%	Keyness
1	man	270	0.19	39	0.03	156.90
2	man's	42	0.03	3	---	33.99
3	men	30	0.02	1	---	29.40
4	male	71	0.05	3	---	66.38
5	husband	170	0.12	6	---	164.92
6	woman	373	0.27	13	0.01	362.94
7	woman's	90	0.06	1	---	100.58
8	women	219	0.16	49	0.04	89.48
9	women's	51	0.04	0	---	21.59
10	female	42	0.03	5	---	27.31
11	wife	206	0.15	13	0.01	173.61
12	wives	36	0.04	4	---	24.26

Table 7.2: The frequency of gender-specific terms in DeLong-Bas and Schwartz

The following (sub-)sections comprise the collocational analysis of the node words identified in Table 7.1 and the lexical analysis of their counterpart words used by Schwartz (as compared with those used by DeLong-Bas) in Table 7.2. This will help us examine how

gender is represented in both texts. I shall therefore be interested in the concordances of all the lexical items, used by Schwartz, that have appeared in DeLong-Bas as node words. Basically, the analysis of such lexical items will target the discourse prosodies reflected in their co-textual environments. This enables us to see whether there could be any gendered use of these lexical items as compared with those used by DeLong-Bas.

7.4 Collocation and gender representations: Male vs. Female

The ideological status of collocation as a resource for the gendered use of language is an important theme here. As with the previous chapter, the collocational analyses of node words used by DeLong-Bas (alongside their counterpart lexical items used by Schwartz) will be employed in order to show how the two authors represent issues relating to gender. For the sake of convenience, I shall separate Table 7.1 above into two smaller tables in the coming two subsections: Table 7.3 is for the collocates of male-indicative node words, and Table 7.4 for the collocates of female-indicative node words employed by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas.

7.4.1 Collocational analysis of male social actors

As shown in Table 7.3 below, DeLong-Bas uses node words which reference males, and these male-referring node words have more collocates than used by Schwartz. Such an observation is further enhanced in light of the collocationally impoverished environments of these terms, produced by Schwartz, compared with those by DeLong-Bas.

Before coming to the concordance-based analysis, it should be noted that as with the previous micro-analysis chapters, I do not provide the whole concordance lines of the collocates designated in the company of a certain node word. Rather, in order to be representative I exclude those concordance lines of the same collocation, if they repeat the same contextual function in text (unless emphasis is needed).

DELONG-BAS						SCHWARTZ					
N	Node Word	Collocate	Freq	Joint Freq	MI	T score	Node word	Collocate	Freq	Joint Freq	MI	T score
1	MAN	should	258	18	4.91	3.74	MAN	who	298	7	5.25	2.18
		woman	373	37	4.87	4.43		was	1,128	8	4.01	3.18
		right	249	18	4.87	3.61						
		wife	206	21	4.50	2.87						
2	MAN'S	right	249	22	6.06	2.20						
3	MEN	women	219	36	7.29	5.26	MEN	and	3,611	17	3.06	3.17
		responsible	72	7	6.86	2.43						
4	MALE	female	42	14	9.25	3.60						
		servant	21	8	9.14	2.45						
		witnesses	25	6	8.62	2.23						
		slave	56	8	7.46	2.22						
		guardian	69	5	7.16	2.22						
5	HUSBAND	wife	206	42	6.86	5.34						
		talaq	94	8	5.72	2.40						
		right	249	15	4.31	2.33						

Table 7.3: Collocates of male-indicative node words in DeLong-Bas and Schwartz

As shown in Table 7.3 above, Schwartz uses the node MAN in collocation only with
who and *was*. In Figure 7.1 below, I have chosen concordance lines which reflect how these
collocates are used. Let us begin with the collocation MAN and *was*. The first thing to notice
here is the existential function that *was* bears in text, where the implied reference to a 'man'
existing in the past is clearly the case.

N	Concordance
1	totaling thousands of lashes; at the beginning of 2002 a man in Jeddah was whipped 4,750 times for sexual relations
2	2001, when Khalid Duran, a shy, sensitive 61-year-old man living in Bethesda, Maryland, was threatened with
3	village of Musha, or Qaha, in Upper Egypt. As a young man he was a Western oriented progressive, but he shared
4	an Egyptian schoolteacher, and like Mawdudi, an aspiring man of letters. He was born in the remote village of Musha,
5	seem to have sprung from the brain of a demon, not a man. This was precisely the gambit Ibn Sa'ud made his
6	in dealing with nonMuslims was revealed in India, by a man named Sayid Ahmad Barelvi. This personage had gone
7	of the [house], which stood on raised ground ... This man, who was very tall and powerfully built, stood quite still,
8	Bektashi dervishes. Muhammad Ali Pasha was the ideal man to fight Sa'ud bin Abd al-Aziz, the defiler of the Holy
9	refer to the believers. What I fear most in my ummah is a man who interprets verses of Qur'an out of context. They will
10	calling out "Father, father!" Like Abu Bakr, Umar was a man of balance, who asked Ali to guide him in making
11	declares, "Nor do we say that the wrong action of a man who has belief does not have a harmful effect on him."
12	to recover the bodies they found a number of surprises. A man who had always rejected Islam had decided to accept

Figure 7.1: Concordance of **MAN** in Schwartz

If we go beyond the relevant lines in Figure 7.1 above, one observation should emerge. MAN, by means of the collocating verbal process *was*, is embedded in a narrative framework that has been constructed by Schwartz. The process *was* is relational; it references the social actor 'man' in relation to some point in the past. Thus, here, it seems that the representation of the social actor 'man' serves the interests of particular historical and/or social contexts. The first line is part of a narrative, where 'at the beginning of 2002 a man in Jeddah was whipped [...] for sexual relations'. The second line offers another narrative, yet in a different social setting, that is, Bethesda. Lines 3 and 4 are a continuation of this narrative framework, where the collocation MAN + *was* is packaged as a referential link to Sayyid Qutb, a figure who is known for being an extremist model in political Islam. Notably, in line 4, such a figure has been presented along with comparable models such as Hassan al-Banna and Mawdudi.

In line 5, the node word MAN operates as a textually motivated antonym with the item *demon*: '[...] the brain of a demon, not a man'. The collocating item *was* is positioned at span N + 2, crossing the sentence boundary towards a point in history in which Ibn Saud is negatively portrayed as exercising 'gambits'. In line 6, the collocation between MAN and *was* is presented with a positional variation where the collocate *was* precedes MAN. Here, if we go beyond the concordance line, the item 'man' is presented as the semantic Agent who revealed 'the true face of Wahhabism' as appearing 'outside the Arabian Peninsula'.

Thus, here, Schwartz seems to pursue the process of tarnishing the Wahhabi-Muslim image by historically exemplifying the model of a 'man' who would serve this ideological purpose in the collocational formula MAN + *was*.

The second collocate (*who*) appearing in Figure 7.1 functions as an identity marker of the node word MAN. Yet, this collocation (MAN + *who*) is also embedded in the overall

narrative framework introduced by Schwartz. In line 7, the collocate *who* is placed as the head of the non-restrictive clause *who was very tall and powerfully built*; and it is meant to identify MAN, which is mentioned in the line in a highly specific context.

Despite the fact that MAN is used generically in line 9, it is nonetheless far from being a lexical resource for any representation of gender roles in text. Here, Schwartz imports a text produced by (the Muslims' Prophet) Muhammad into this text, creating an important intertextual link between the Schwartz text and the Prophet's saying *(hadith)*. This intertextuality is rhetorically intended to legitimize Schwartz's worldview. So is the case with the collocation MAN … *who* in the last two lines (11 and 12) in Figure 7.1. In a similar vein, in line 10, Schwartz uses the node word MAN which bears a specific historical reference to Umar Ibn Abd Al-Khattab who shares the same noble features as Abu Bakr: both are men 'of balance'.[73]

The same historical aspect of male-oriented representation by Schwartz can be realized in the collocational environment of the second node word MEN which has the item *and* as the only collocate in text. Figure 7.2 shows a few representative cases of MEN, including it collocating with *and*:

N	Concordance
1	effect on young Muslims has been wholly evil. These men and their acolytes reinforced the extremist
2	Jesus' place). Muhammad, however, became a ruler of men and women. Unfortunately, Muhammad has an evil
3	by their Jewish subjects. Nor did they subject these men and women to persecution, much less death, for
4	Mladic carry out the murder of some 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica. Blood had run in streams
5	union with the same God that alone decides which faith men and women choose. There should thus be no
6	up in the mosque, he was accompanied by a group of men and women unfamiliar to the wider public. These
7	and Albania by Wahhabi terrorists in the late 1990s. Men like al-Rajhi, Mahfouz, and al-Qadi are big players in
8	indicated the consequence of these developments: "Men like [Osama] bin Laden and [Taliban chief] Mullah
9	have gained considerable influence. Many young men wear "Islamic" beards, and numerous young women

Figure 7.2: Concordance of **MEN** in Schwartz

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[73] Umar Ibn Al-Khattab is the second Caliph of Muslims (634-644) following the rule of the first Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634). Both Abu Bakr and Umar are two grand companions *(sahaba)* of Prophet Muhammad; and, to the Sunni-Muslim community, they are on top of the so-called five righteously guided Caliphs.

Here, the collocate *and* phraseologically brings MEN in conjunction with another social actor. One may presume the presence of a cohesive relation at the lexical level between the item *men* and a potential set of other related items. Expanding line 1 has provided further clues to the specific 'men' targeted here: they are 'seditionists' who have had an evil effect on the Muslim community as a whole such as Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna. Lines 2, 3, 5 and 6 contain the pattern *man and women*. But does this pattern constitute any specific gender representation in the text?

In line 2, both men and women are presented as a collectivity under the rule of (Prophet) Muhammad whose image is evil among Westerners, according to Schwartz. This is an insinuation of the politico-religious status of men and women (in Islam) as ruled by the Prophet who is an absolute religious authority. A similar case is there in line 3, where the items *men* and *women* refer to the Jewish collectivity as subjects under the Ottoman rule. Also, in line 5 the items *men* and *women* bear generic references to humans as beings who are free to choose their faith according to one famous religious figure in Sufism, Hallaj.

Further, in the concordance of MEN (Figure 7.2), Schwartz uses the node word MEN in specific reference to certain figures in the last three lines. They are 4 out of the total 9 lines in the whole concordance. 1) In line 7, the item *men* refers to al-Rajhi, Mahfouz and al-Qaida. A similar usage in line 8: 'men like [Osama] bin Laden and [Taliban chief] Mullah Omar'. In the last line the collocate *and* sets up a link between the social actors 'men' (the node word MEN) and 'women' with what van Leeuwen (2008: 10) has termed 'presentation styles', that is, the 'dress' and 'body grooming' of participants in discourse in relation to a certain social practice. The following gives a broader stretch of co-text: 'Walking the streets of Sarajevo today, one might think that the Wahhabis have gained considerable influence. Many young men wear "Islamic" beards, and numerous young women have adopted head and shoulder coverings or hijab'. Although Schwartz makes a distinction between different gendered

behaviours here, the main point he seems to be making is that *both* young men and women have adopted traditional dress-styles. Schwartz does not go on to critique this decision from a gendered perspective.

Here is the bottom-line argument. Irrespective of the narrative content or historical references associated with the node words MAN and MEN used by Schwartz, what significantly matters is the realization that the items *man* and *men* do not particularly contribute to the social construction of gender roles in the text (other than mainly descriptive points made in passing, such as men wear beards and women wear hijabs); rather, *man* and *men* tend to contribute to more general narratives. Schwartz often uses MAN and MEN to refer to specific men as parts of narratives about individuals, rather than referring generically to a class of males. And when he does use MAN and MEN generically, he does not make any explicit reference to gender. Such non-gendered use is embedded as historical narrative into his main counter-argument about the Wahhabi-Saudi ideology. Perhaps, this assumption will be become even clearer in the course of the remaining collocational analysis of the gender-indicative social actors pursued in this chapter.

Now, let us move on to DeLong-Bas to see how she represents the male actors as part the socio-religious practice of Wahhabi Islam. But, prior to coming to DeLong-Bas's representation of gender in Wahhabi discourse, it is important to draw attention to her authorial position, which will be fully tackled in Chapter 8 (the macro-level analysis chapter). Here, DeLong-Bas takes up the position of a mere reporter of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's views on male-female relations as being part of the worldview of Islam. This is one of the major themes addressed in Chapter 4 of her book under the title *Women and Wahhabis: In Defense of Women's Rights*. In the analysis below, I quote numerous examples where DeLong-Bas makes statements about what Ibn Abd al-Wahhab thought about gender relations. Having examined the co-text which occurs before and after such statements, it is clear that DeLong-

Bas is not quoting such statements in order to be critical of them. She reports them, not as acts of faith, but rather as statements of fact. Rather than demonstrating this at every point of analysis, this should simply be borne in mind, and as already noted, I discuss authorial stance in more detail in Chapter 8.

As Table 7.3 has shown, there appear many more male-indicative keywords used by DeLong-Bas than by Schwartz. DeLong-Bas uses relatively frequent references to MAN and two related word-forms, MAN'S and MEN. Additionally, HUSBAND is also key in DeLong-Bas. All such gender-related node words can be semantically subsumed under another node word: MALE. Starting from the concordance of the node words MAN and MEN, used by DeLong-Bas, is the ideal option, since it would make clear the contrastive aspect between the representation of these male actors and the corresponding ones used by Schwartz above. Let us take each in turn. DeLong-Bas uses four collocates of the node word MAN (*should*, *right*, *woman* and *wife* [see Table 7.3]), and they can easily be realized in the concordance below in Figure 7.3:

N	Concordance
1	Should Marry? The expected norm in Islam is that every man and woman should marry. Marriage of a Muslim man to a
2	hadith, he taught that the presence of intimacy between a man and a woman is considered to enter them into a state of
3	by the purported father a questionable obligation. Finally, the man and the woman open themselves to charges of unlawful
4	desire is to be fulfilled. It is expected that every Muslim man and woman will marry and have children. As a
5	of Status The fifth and final condition for marriage is that the man be of equal status to the woman. The phrase "equal
6	meet prior to entering into the marriage contract, and (a) the man has the right to look at his potential wife prior to marrying
7	legal doctrine that this is the only instance in which the man has the right to take back the mahr, indicating that the
8	to overcome his physical difficulty. If during that time the man manages to have sex with his wife at least once, the
9	this duty. The only exception to this rule occurs when the man marries a new wife. If the new wife is a virgin, the man
10	by the Man (Talaq) Talaq is the legal mechanism by which a man may divorce his wife. It is simply a declaration by the
11	in accordance with the Quranic prescription (2:236) that the man owes the woman a "consolation gift" in order to appease
12	inappropriate in his opinion. Furthermore, he stated that the man should not have sex with his wife in such a manner that
13	seriousness. Second, once the talaq has been declared, the man should not leave his wife until she has completed her
14	manner that the "sensation" of either of them is audible. The man should not even talk about what occurs between the two
15	were different.' In deed, he declared that the Muslim man should treat a non-Muslim (dhimmi) woman with the
16	other."' The critical factors in determining whether or not a man should generally remain apart from a woman are whether
17	of the various law schools he found no basis for denying a man the right to look upon the woman he is considering
18	the Quran in this discussion. Yes, the Quran does give the man the right to strike his wife, but Ibn Abd al-Wahhab placed
19	completely alone in each other's company or the right of the man to view the woman in the nude prior to marriage, it
20	every man and woman should marry. Marriage of a Muslim man to a Muslim woman is always preferable.- Muslim men
21	Ibn Abd al-Wahhab concluded that it is not sinful for a man to view the hair of a woman he is considering marrying
22	to the signing of the marriage contract or not allowing the man to see any part of the woman at all prior to the wedding
23	today. In addition to commenting that it is desirable for a man to choose a wife of the same religion (i.e., a Muslim)
24	among his wives. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not allow the man to assign all of his days to one wife and all of his nights
25	the land of the enemy.6 In the case of marriage of a Muslim man to a non-Muslim woman, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab presumed
26	of such sexual relationships by addressing the case of a man who fornicates with a Muslim woman. He taught that any
27	criteria for validity and that the husband will be an honorable man who will treat his wife justly, as well as to try to match
28	of divorce (hilf al-talaq), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that any man who lied about his wife or made false charges against

Figure 7.3: Concordance of **MAN** in DeLong-Bas

Here, I have a preference not to go in the order appearing in the concordance above. I would rather begin with the collocation pair MAN + *should*. For this pair constitutes a significant oppositional paradigm with the collocation pair MAN + *was* analysed earlier in Figure 7.1. The oppositional paradigm can subtly be realized in the absence of the deontic modality of duty from Schwartz's collocational use as opposed to DeLong-Bas. It should be noted that, insofar as gender is concerned, DeLong-Bas uses the term *should* deontically. Whilst Schwartz introduces the male actor 'man' in a way that exhibits no dutiful obligation towards any other social actor, say, 'woman', DeLong-Bas clearly does. As shown in Figure 7.3, the node word MAN is identified to collocate with the modal auxiliary verb *should* in lines 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Here, DeLong-Bas seems to be concerned with the degree of obligation attaching to 'man' as a performer of certain actions towards *his* 'wife' in Wahhabi Islam. Significantly, this is to frame man as being responsible for woman in her specific social status as a wife, and correspondingly woman, in the same specific social status, as being dependent on man in a less specific way of reference – man vs. wife. This point merits further elaboration, however.

In lines 12, 13 and 14 the man, and not the woman, is presented as being the responsible social actor in the conjugal relation. For example, as DeLong-Bas reports, in Wahhabi Islam a man is committed a) not to have sex with his wife in a sensational, audible manner (line 12), b) after divorce (*talaq*) occurs, not to 'leave his wife until she has completed her waiting period', and c) not to talk about what occurs between him and his wife 'in the marriage bed'. Obviously, this representation reflects the dependence of the wife on her husband in Wahhabi Islam according to DeLong-Bas. In line 15, there appears to be an attempt to address issues of equality by referring to the treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim women: '[...] the Muslim man should treat a non-Muslim (*dhimmi*) woman with the same honor as he would a Muslim woman when seeking her hand in marriage'.

However, this reference to equality does not extend to gender equality. Again, the non-Muslim woman (the would-be wife) is presented as an object of choice, and thus an object of responsibility, to the (husband-to-be) man. Also, here the man is characterized as the actor –'seeking her hand in marriage'; the idea that a woman might take an active role in seeking marriage seems to be unlikely. This overall modalized collocational pattern (MAN + *should*) can be contrasted with the categorical collocational pattern (MAN + *was*) used by Schwartz, where the social actor 'man' is presented as a duty-free entity.

Indeed, in DeLong-Bas, the same deontic-modality aspect extends to the collocation pair MAN ... *right* in two forms. First, it is expressed into the grammatical formula 'has the right to' (lines 6 and 7). Second, it is grammaticized into the nominal expression 'right' which bears the deontic meaning of commitment on the part of the social actor 'man'. Again, this complements the gendered discourse type of Wahhabi Islam when it comes to conjugal relations: a woman, who would be transformed into a wife, falls within the scope of male responsibility. The same stereotypical representation could be even more striking if we examine the collocational environment of the pair MAN'S ... *right* in Figure 7.4 below:

N	Concordance
1	time between sexual relations at four days due to the man's legal right to have up to four wives. Logically, a
2	could not possibly pay it. By placing checks on the man's power to deny the woman her right to divorce,
3	made in the woman's presence.""" To further limit the man's right to claim that any pronouncement qualifies
4	is also apparent in his placing limitations on the man's right to demand sex while highlighting the rights
5	is pregnant."' Ibn Abd al-Wahhab further limited the man's right to demand that his wife be returned to him

Figure 7.4: Concordance of MAN'S in DeLong-Bas

Here, interestingly, the male social actor 'man' is presented as possessing the right to perform certain social actions towards 'woman': a) having 'up to four wives' (line 1), b) denying 'the woman her right to divorce' (line 2), c) pronouncing what qualifies as 'an indirect declaration of *talaq* [divorce]' (line 3), d) demanding 'sex' (line 4), and e) demanding the return of 'his wife' to him after divorce (line 5). However, importantly, DeLong-Bas has tempered these

sexist practices in Wahhabi Islam by bringing the foregoing social actions under religious limitations that have been set up by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. This is explicit in lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 with various lexical items – such as *checks, limit, limitations* and *limited,* respectively – being featured prior to the expression *the man's (legal) right.* Here, the man's right is focused in relation to the socially sensitive issues that relate to women, such as polygamy (line 1), denying the right to divorce (line 2), demanding sex (line 4), etc. This may serve to sustain the text's ideology to positively present the scholarly religious image of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion).

Back to the concordance of MAN in Figure 7.3, there remain two important collocates appearing in the lexical vicinity of the node word MAN used by DeLong-Bas, namely, *woman* and *wife.* Except for lines 5, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25 and 26, the collocate *woman* operates in conjunction with MAN through the particle *and* (lines 1, 2, 3 and 4). Here is the detailed picture. First, in lines 1 and 4, both 'man' and 'woman' (and their potential children) are posed as the social actors of an 'expected norm' in Islam, i.e. heterosexual marriage; their social behaviour is thus preconditioned by a religious (Islamic) ritual. Second, lines 2 and 3 are a continuation of such a preconditioning Islamic ritual in two respects: respectively, the first is concerned with what Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, based on a prophetic *hadith,* taught about the element 'intimacy between a man and a woman' initiating each in a state of marriage with the other; the second relates to the 'unlawful sexual intercourse (*zina*)', or the Islamically prohibited extramarital sex, as subjecting any of the couple to punishment. Last, in this regard, line 5 is the most explicit account of the preconditioning Islamic ritual of marriage: the phrase 'the fifth and final condition for marriage [...]' necessitates the presence of 'equal status' between man and woman in order for marriage to take place in Islam.

As a continuation of the collocation MAN …*woman* in Figure 7.3, in line 11, in case of divorce 'man' is committed to providing 'woman' with a 'consolation gift'; this gift is

provided as a way of appeasing the woman for 'her loss' – the loss of her ex-husband. Obviously this is doubly implicative. First, it implies how the divorced wife is socially constructed as being a loser who deserves a consolation gift. Second, it further implies the objectification and passivization of woman as someone who is 'owed' something by a man. An essential part of the objectification process of 'woman' is collocationally actualized in lines 19, 21, 22 and 23. This process has taken either physical or psychological forms. For example, on a physical level, the husband-to-be man is permitted in Islam to view the hair of his wife-to-be prior to marriage (line 21), but not to view her 'in the nude' (line 19) or see 'any part' of her (line 22) until she is contracted as well as ritualized to act as a wife. Actually, the text (as reported by DeLong-Bas) is silent about whether women have, or should have, the same rights as men (e.g. whether or not to view them naked before they are married). The husband-to-be man is urged to 'choose a wife of the same religion (i.e. a Muslim)' (line 23); and this is where the wife-to-be is classified to be a desideratum on the basis of her religion, and not her character. This particular aspect of objectification may go to further extremes where there is a (Wahhabi) Islamic license for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman (line 25), and, more subtly, where a 'Muslim woman' is judged in terms of any act of fornication with a man, irrespective of his religion:

Extract 8:

> *Defined as sexual relations outside of marriage, fornication can take place either between unmarried people or as adultery. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the forbidden nature of such sexual relationships by addressing the case of a **man who** **fornicates** with a Muslim woman. He taught that any man, whether Muslims or non-Muslim, who fornicates with a Muslim woman is to be put to death.*

<div align="right">(Line 26, my emphasis)</div>

Again, here, the reported parts of DeLong-Bas are silent about the possibility of women having equal rights or responsibilities in this respect.

Let us move to the more socially defined role attaching to woman in the text, i.e. *wife*, as a collocate of MAN. In due course, more space will be devoted to WIFE and WIVES in both texts, especially when the discourse representation of the female actors is in focus. But our concern here is the collocate *wife* as viewed in relation to MAN as employed by DeLong-Bas. In line 8, the item *wife*, grammatically packaged as a genitive in the form *his wife*, presupposes the potential dependent status of woman as being defined only by the presence of a husband who is not referred to as a husband, but as a man. The man is a rather autonomous entity; the woman is simply defined by her relationship to a man.

More strikingly, in line 9, the item *wife* is premodified by the word *new*: this adjectival form presupposes the existence of an old wife, even more the social practice of polygamy in (Wahhabi) Islam. Perhaps, the pragmatic implications of *new* – which presupposes the possibility of a Muslim man having more than one wife, and not vice versa – in this context contribute to woman objectification; a man is unproblematically free to choose a new wife and keep the old one, while a woman is denied the same right in Islam. This is made explicit by DeLong-Bas. The relevant part of line 9 in Figure 7.3, if expanded, reads 'a man with four wives would need a four-day cycle in order to fulfil his responsibilities to each wife'. Probably the upshot of this religiously legal right is an asymmetry of gender-specific representation?

Indeed, the same process of objectification is even more religiously consolidated in line 24 where 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not allow the man to assign all of his days to one wife'. Actually, this could be part of the discursive legitimation of polygamy as a socio-religious practice that is grounded in the (Wahhabi) Islamic discourse. The last two lines (27 and 28) perfectly constitute the rhetoric of religious adhortations in the Wahhabi discourse, as reported by DeLong-Bas, via which a man is urged not do any injustice to his dependent wife (line 27), and not to 'lie about his wife' either (line 28). This kind of adhortation draws upon

the patriarchal discourse type, which often moulds women into socially (and perhaps religiously) precast templates. In this understanding, women are constructed as being tender, credulous creatures; and males need to be instructed to treat them well, although not as (social) equals.

Additionally, the word-forms collocating with MAN tend towards a rhetorical representation in Figure 7.3. The collocation pair MAN ... *woman* in line 1 is presented as being part of the pragmatic fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam* (fallacy of authority). Line 1 reads 'The expected norm in Islam is that every man and woman should marry'. Here, the strategic appendage of the phrase *in Islam* onto the nominal group *the expected norm* has imparted the argument with a pseudo-rational complexion (if we accept the metaphor): the inclusion of Islam is an authority for a Muslim who cannot, and would not, be sceptic about 'what is in Islam'. But there are a host of questions to grapple with here. Is this social normalcy really prescribed in Islam? Who is qualified to determine if this is so? Is man-woman marriage itself an obligation in Islam? And, above all, should we excise the present differential social status of Muslim women from the equation in order to maintain what is sacredly enshrined in religious discourse (Islamic or otherwise)?

The same *argumentum ad verecundiam* (authority) is used in line 11 which contains the collocational pair MAN ... *woman*. The whole argument is predicated on legitimizing the social status of a divorced woman via a 'Quranic prescription (2:236)'. Hardly, if ever, would a Muslim discourse-community member question the authoritative source of the Quran: to cite a verse from the Quran is to force an air of certitude and credibility for Muslims. Further, Muslims show a special reverence for the Quran as the holy book revealed to their Prophet Muhammad and as the first authoritative source of legitimation to them. The vast majority of Muslims are likely to be emotionally influenced at the mention of a verse from the Quran.

Perhaps this may explain why the social position of Muslim women is determined by what has been prescribed in the Quran, however ancient it is.

Actually, the authority fallacy – which is predicated on 'what is in Islam' (line 1) or 'what is Quranic' (line 11) – reported by DeLong-Bas sustains the construction of the Muslim women as being dependent on her man in Islam. Whereas the Wahhabi discourse type that DeLong-Bas draws on is part of Islamic discourse as a whole, it is still some form of discourse that recontextualizes marriage in Islam; and perhaps removes us further from the way that marriage was originally conceived of. Marriage is then imbued with a new political import, so that a particular socio-historical context can be served. Now, insofar as the current position of Muslim women is concerned, there needs to be a sceptical reading of the Islamic discourse in general and the Wahhabi in particular.

Now, as part of the representation of male-indicative terms used by DeLong-Bas, let us examine the collocational environment of MEN in Figure 7.5 below:

N	Concordance
1	Islamic teaching that marriage is the norm for all Muslim men and women, as well as the teaching that sexual
2	of Marriage Marriage is the intended norm of life for both men and women in Islam, the legal means by which
3	one in the consideration of permissible contact between men and women who are not as yet married or related to
4	the balance in the rights and responsibilities of both men and women in marriage, so that the man never holds
5	religions, and support ,or a balance of rights between men and women, results in a very different worldview from
6	of faith, he asserted the equal responsibilities of both men and women. He taught that any mature man or
7	or receiving the prayer. Similarly, he expected both men and women to observe the five pillars of
8	of Muslims, both male and female. He held both men and women responsible for correct belief and
9	did so was subject to otherwise male penalties, making men and women equal parties in opposing Islam because
10	on the part of the woman.'" The clear message is that men are responsible for controlling themselves and their
11	sexual liaison with a Muslim woman makes it clear that men are to be held responsible both for their sexual
12	the validity of men interacting with women and men considering women to be trustworthy and appropriate
13	to the contract." If the case is one in which two men married two women and the husbands were sent the
14	the marriage. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab consistently held the men responsible for any problems resulting in the
15	longer control it, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab first declared that men should be held responsible for controlling their own
16	obligations. First, he noted that the Quran commands men to live in kindness and equity with women (Q 4:19

Figure 7.5: Concordance of **MEN** in DeLong-Bas

From Table 7.3, in DeLong-Bas, MEN collocates with *women* and *responsible*. I have a preference to begin by looking at *responsible* which contrasts with Schwartz and his presentation of the same node word MEN.

In all the relevant concordance lines, the deontic modality of duty associated with the male social actor 'men' is not straightforward (to the exclusion of line 15). In this context, the deontic meaning of modality is couched into the grammatical formula '[be] responsible for', where the adjective *responsible* is the operative word. In line 8, DeLong-Bas reports Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious worldview which frames 'both men and women' as being responsible for 'correct belief and practice, the heart of which was a solid foundation of knowledge'. Note, also, how DeLong-Bas in her gender representation is keen to align the religious discourse of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab with democratic discourse on the whole. It is Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who brings 'both men and women' in the scope of responsibility, without privileging one sex on the other. However, it should be said that the word 'both' is the key in this context; it is the element that renders the collocation gendered, and not just stylistic, in use. For the term 'people' could have been used instead of the expression *men and women*.

And, it is as well in this sense that, given their Muslim identity, both sexes are committed to serving a religious cause; there seems to be no difference between the two in this respect, since it is more of a religious than social role that is assigned to both alike. Such a religious role that is assigned to both males and females is formally legitimized in the last line, where a timeless eternal truth is presented as being an authoritative speech-act formulation: '[...] the Quran commands men to live in kindness and equity with women'. Note that, instead of the otherwise reciprocal relation between men and women, it is men who are commanded to live in kindness with women. A more reciprocal phraseology could go like this: '[...] the Quran commands men and women to live in kindness and equity with each other'.

However, lines 10 and 11 are different in their presentation of the collocation MEN *... responsible*. For a wider stretch of co-textual information, let us expand line 11:

Extract 9:

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's prescription of the death penalty for the male participant in a sexual liaison with a Muslim woman makes it clear that **men** *are to be held* **responsible** *both for their sexual activities and for controlling their sexual desires.* (My emphasis)

Here, according to the theological perspective of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab reported by DeLong-Bas, the Muslim-male, not the Muslim-female, actor is to be condemned to death for unlawful sex. Such an unequal treatment of 'men' and 'women' in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discourse (as reported by DeLong-Bas) makes for a Wahhabi gendered worldview. In this context, the Muslim male is held fully responsible for the unlawful sex (as reported by DeLong-Bas) and males are thus constructed as being the active actors, who are advised not to pander to gratifying their 'cardinal desires' in relation to the other sex (women). Here, perhaps in an attempt to appeal to the Western liberal ethos, DeLong-Bas presents Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious discourse as being sensitive to the issue of how men should ethically behave towards women. She reports that it is a kind of discourse that blames only the man for sexual activities.

In the whole concordance of MEN (Figure 7.5), line 15 is a special case at the rhetorical level. Towards this point I shall go beyond the concordance line:

Extract 10:

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab first declared that men should be held responsible for controlling their own sexual desires and then recognized that women generally are vulnerable in the face of male desire. (My italics)

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In its reported form, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's argument is striking. The overall argument structure is predicated on the pragmatic fallacy of hasty generalization about the 'vulnerable' nature of women 'in the face of male desire'. The overgeneralized assumption about the female vulnerability to a male-centric virility has presented 'women' as if they were always in need of protection from oversexed men. This sweeping generalization can be refuted on the grounds that a) not all men are rapists and b) not all women are weak and victims. This has been simplistically put forward as a justification for the forcible self-imposed question 'why should men be responsible for controlling their own sexual desire?', according to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Actually, by reporting this Wahhabi theological view, DeLong-Bas seems to be insensitive to the difference between the eighteenth-century historical context, wherein this view might have socially fit well, and the present historical moment where the man-woman relationship is perceived differently across a whole lot of new (sub-)cultures in the Muslim (or otherwise) communities. Perhaps, here, DeLong-Bas is addressing a Western (especially feminist) audience, with a package of liberal ethos, who might unconsciously take for granted this discourse type, since it ostensibly defends women's rights. However, DeLong-Bas could be criticized from a feminist or post-feminist perspective, as she unproblematically constructs women as being vulnerable to male desire, whereas more recent theories of gender relations may well present a more complex picture. (The issue of recipiency will be tackled in Chapter 8.)

Let us move to the collocation pair MEN ... *women*. Notably, this collocation appears in a fixed phrasal pattern in the overall concordance, that is, 'men and women'. Again, this is part of the Wahhabi worldview presented by DeLong-Bas, where the micro phrasal pattern is part of the macro patriarchal symbolic order in which men come first – a

principle that is famously known as male 'firstness' (Porreca 1984).[74] While the male-firstness ideology cuts across many different discourse types, this does not mean that it should be accepted as a common sense; rather, it should be made visible in those discourse types, however innumerable they may be, so that we may achieve what Reisigl and Wodak (2009) have called 'the prospective critique' which 'seeks to contribute to the improvement of communication' (2009: 88). At least, such (male) firstness should be rectified and not allowed to be a discursively normative practice.[75]

In the text the order of 'men and women' is frequently placed in the lexical vicinity of items like *Islamic* (line 1), *Islam* (lines 2, 7 and 9), *Muslims* (line 8). These items reflect the imposing presence of a religiously legitimizing practice. Perhaps the argument in its entirety derives its warrant from the *pathos* attached to religion, more specifically Islam, in a context where the *argumentum ad mesircordiam* is utilized for justifying the symbolic order wherein Muslim men come first.

Now, on the lexical scale of specificity, it is time we handled DeLong-Bas's use of the male-indicative node word HUSBAND, which is used far less frequently by Schwartz. DeLong-Bas uses the node HUSBAND in collocation with *wife, talaq* and *right*. Here is the concordance of HUSBAND in Figure 7.6 below.

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[74] (Male) Firstness is described as 'given two nouns paired for sex, such as male/female, the masculine word always comes first, with the exception of the pair ladies/gentlemen' (Porreca 1984: 706).

[75] Note also that WordSmith5 has identified a concordance from Schwartz that displays four lines of the lexical pattern *men and women*; this, however low in frequency, reflects the same gendered practice of male-firstness by Schwartz.

N	Concordance
1	valid, although sexual relations are not permitted between the husband and wife. If the suspected pregnancy occurs after the
2	and the cessation of sexual relations in a case in which the husband and wife have been legally separated, whether due to
3	private. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab further underscored the right of the husband and wife to privacy by including in this discussion a
4	how this should be done, Ibn Abd alWahhab commanded both husband and wife to smile and be cheerful with each other, to
5	matter of sexual intercourse a matter for negotiation between husband and wife rather than a position in which the man was
6	before a judge and swear that she has been repudiated by her husband by talaq and has completed her waiting period. If the
7	maintenance. In addition, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab punished the husband by denying him the right to sexual intercourse with his
8	only the maintenance of a middle income. In the event that the husband fails to pay the wife maintenance appropriate to her
9	and divorce for both the husband and the wife. Just as the husband has the absolute right of talaq and the financial
10	If the child is an infant at the time of the khul' divorce, the husband has the right to demand that the child be suckled until
11	the marriage was invalid due to a judicial error or because the husband has declared a talaq against his wife. Even if the
12	woman, and (7) You are forbidden.'" In a case in which the husband informs his wife that she is forbidden, this is
13	a fixed sum for maintenance of the wife, the mahr, which the husband is required to give his wife; authorization to select his
14	prior to the marriage. If both parties are in the middle, the husband should pay his wife the maintenance due to a woman
15	of paying. Thus, he ruled that if both parties are wealthy the husband should pay his wife the maintenance due to a wealthy
16	three possible types of divorce: divorce initiated by the husband (talaq), divorce initiated by the wife (khul'), and divorce
17	(iddah) following the pronouncement of repudiation by the husband (talaq) so that she will not be left destitute, so the wife
18	marriage contracts favorable to them, particularly denying the husband the right to marry additional wives or take on
19	case, the back maintenance remained a debt owed by the husband to the wife. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab strengthened this
20	of the wife alone. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also required the husband to provide maintenance for his minor children, both
21	He cited as proof texts Q 2:233, in which God commands the husband to provide for and clothe his wife and children, and

Figure 7.6: Concordance of **HUSBAND** in DeLong-Bas

The first collocation pair HUSBAND ... *wife* is a reiteration of the male-firstness principle previously indicated. It appears in the fixed nominal group complex *husband and wife* (lines 1-5). This pattern is as monolithically reflective of patriarchal discourse as that of *men and women* previously analysed. The only difference between the two lies in the degree of lexical specificity, where the term *men* corresponds to the more specific term *husband* and *women* to *wife*. Thus, the collocational pattern HUSBAND ... *wife* functions as an emphatic resource for the patriarchal Wahhabi worldview in which woman (and her gendered role as 'wife') is dependent on man (and his gendered role as husband), as I shall demonstrate below.

Also, in the text reported by DeLong-Bas, continuing with the collocation HUSBAND ... *wife*, there seems to be a stereotypical Wahhabi representation of marital relations in Islam. Lines 13, 14 and 15 present the collocate *wife* as being the Goal of the Material Process of 'paying' (or 'giving') and the node HUSBAND as being the actor who is to pay – or, as in line 13, 'give' – the 'maintenance' as the medium through which the paying process can be materially realized. Thus, here, the husband occupies the position of a

provider and the wife the position of a *providee*. Perhaps, with the introduction of the phrasal verb *provide for* into its collocational environment, the last line of the concordance (Figure 7.6) is an explicit realization of this stereotypical Wahhabi representation: 'God commands the husband to provide for and clothe his wife and children' (line 21). However, there is still more to say in this regard at the rhetorical level of representation. One argumentation scheme is brought in, so that the legitimizing process of this stereotypical representation will be maintained. It is the pragmatic fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam*, where the unquestioned authority of God is in operation. If it is God's command that the husband act the role of the provider and the wife the role of the dependent, who dares to disagree?

The second collocation HUSBAND … *talaq* is crucial. The collocate *talaq* is the nominal Arabic transliteration of the English word *divorce*. The Arabic transliteration may well be a clue to the presence of an Islamic worldview, especially if we know that *talaq* is a technical term in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). In Islam the act of divorce is the right of man alone. The classic Islamic ritual is that the wife is typically the divorcee and the husband the divorcer except for one case that is technically termed *khul'*, i.e. the right of woman to divorce or separate from her husband in Islam. In such a case, in order for her to get divorced, the wife must first forfeit her financial rights which she normally gets from the husband, such as dowry and maintenance payments. Actually, while divorce is stated in the Quran, *khul'* derives its legitimacy from the *Sunna*, or the sayings of the Muslims' Prophet. This socio-religious symbolic order is part and parcel of the order of the Quranic discourse wherein the Muslim male is linguistically structured as the predominant semantic Agent of the act of divorce and the Muslim (or non-Muslim) female as the dominated semantic Patient that experiences this act. This Islamic worldview of *talaq* is enhanced and supported by the Wahhabi vision reported by DeLong-Bas, who seems to suspend any authorial evaluation of the issue.

In line 6, *talaq* (in its collocational relation to HUSBAND) is presented as being an instrument via which the husband can repudiate his wife: 'He [Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] also allowed a woman to appear before a judge and swear that she has been repudiated by her husband by talaq'. Interestingly, in this instance, the wife is placed at the receiving end of repudiation and both the husband (in its agentive status) and *talaq* (in its instrumental status) at the transmitting end of the same process of repudiation. The same religiously symbolic meaning is explicitly expressed in lines 16 and 17, in which the collocating term *talaq* is bracketed as a way of technically glossing both the 'divorce initiated by the husband' and 'the pronouncement of repudiation by the husband'.

Thus, in this context, the collocate *talaq* carries over a summative function and, therefore, is typographically marked off from the rest of the concordance lines by two brackets. Also, in line 16, DeLong-Bas reports the three types of divorce in the Islamic law (*Shari'ah*): a) 'divorce initiated by the husband', b) 'divorce initiated by the wife (*khul'*)'[76], and c) 'divorce due to the husband's unsubstantiated accusation that his wife has committed adultery'. DeLong-Bas reports the three types of divorce, as part of the religious worldview of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, to demonstrate the identification between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discourse and the Quran discourse: both are shown to reflect gender balance by assuming that both parties, 'men' and 'women', are equally granted the same right of divorce. However, the third type of divorce in DeLong-Bas's argument is an ideological presupposition; it accommodates the assumption that the sin of adultery is always associated with women. This is reinforced in the significant absence of a corresponding type of divorce where the wife's unsubstantiated accusation that her husband has committed adultery makes divorce possible.

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[76] Note that, while she has openly stated that in the divorce case of *khul'* the wife gives her husband 'some kind of compensation in exchange for her freedom from the marriage (DeLong-Bas 2004: 182), DeLong-Bas has not shown her position on this kind of divorce.

The third, and last, collocate of the node word HUSBAND recognized in Figure 7.6 is the item *right*, which is couched in the structure *the husband has the (absolute) right of/to.* Therefore, in this context, the term *right* shows a process of modalized lexicalization. That is, a certain meaning of modality – in this case 'ability' – has been lexicalized into the noun *right*. Thus, again, it is the husband who is 'absolutely' able to pronounce or make *talaq* (line 9) and who is able to 'demand that the child be suckled until he or she is two years old' (line 10). As uncritically reported by DeLong-Bas, these special prerogatives are assigned to the husband in (Wahhabi) Islam, and encoded in its religious discourse as (absolute) rights that are not open to discussion or negotiation by the wife.

Now, comparatively, let us attempt the analysis of the same social actor HUSBAND as used by Schwartz.

N	Concordance
1	fighting ceased." Wahhabism, which drew a young husband away from his bride, also split families and
2	to send it back to his daughter, along with her husband. For Muslims, the victory at Badr recalls the
3	also had a son on the opposing side. And the husband of one of Muhammad's daughters fought with
4	in war. Her family was wealthy, and her father and husband had died fighting the Muslims. Muhammad
5	she felt happy, after her time mourning for her husband. Aminah is said by the early chronicler Ibn

Figure 7.7: Concordance of **HUSBAND** in Schwartz

Unlike DeLong-Bas, Schwartz presents the gender-indicative term 'husband' in a historical context that ideologically features the 'evils' of Wahhabism. A good example is line 1 which reads: 'Wahhabism, which drew a young husband away from his bride, also split families and villages in Caucasus'. Here, as Schwartz insists, the split of a would-be couple and/or families, which is caused by Wahhabism in a certain place and at a certain time, makes for a well-defined Wahhabi social threat in the future. Again, unlike DeLong-Bas, Schwartz does not care much about a potential gendered use of HUSBAND; rather, he makes use of an ostensibly neutral use of the term in a way that appeals to the commonsensical assumption

that any force that splits a husband from his bride would no doubt be evil. In this context, the force is Wahhabism.

Thus, perhaps, rhetorically Schwartz, here, capitalizes on the *argumentum ad misericordiam* via which an unjustifiable appeal for compassion and empathy arises due to the difficulty and seriousness that befall a couple-to-be at the hands of Wahhabi Muslims. The rest of the lines in the concordance above (lines 2-5) continue with the non-gendered use of HUSBAND in a particular historical context, where the life of the Prophet of Muslims, Muhammad, is the major concern.

The last node word to be investigated in the male-specific representation constructed by DeLong-Bas is MALE. Schwartz only uses MALE three times, although he does make more use of the more specific terms MAN and MEN. Below is the concordance that affords an overall picture of its collocational environments couched by DeLong-Bas.

N	Concordance
1	Abd al-Wahhab's insistence that every Muslim, both male and female, personally read and study the Quran
2	of the Quran should be required for all Muslims, both male and female, he questioned the usefulness and
3	to provide maintenance for his minor children, both male and female. He further required the man to
4	al-Wahhab asserted the need for all believers, both male and female, to acquire individual knowledge of
5	the most important responsibility of Muslims, both male and female. He held both men and women
6	toward God. In the realm of human, specifically male-female, interactions, the most important topics
7	of the spouses, (3) contracting of the marriage by a male guardian (wali), (4) presence of two reliable/just
8	the requirement that a marriage be contracted by the male guardian reflected his belief that men were
9	on its own to constitute a valid marriage. Her male marriage guardian had to handle the legal
10	and the social order. He therefore held both the male marriage guardian and the husband responsible
11	or controls the sexuality of his servant/slave, whether male or female, but because, in a case in which a
12	one who is actually experiencing the desire, whether male or female. That is, the person who would
13	to exist between master and servant/slave, whether male or female, so that what is highlighted are not the
14	be given in marriage, but he also granted the mature male servant/slave permission to marry himself off.,,
15	or female, but because, in a case in which a mature male servant/slave desires to marry himself off, it is
16	noted that a master has the right to marry off a minor male servant/slave without his permission, but he
17	his permission, but he cannot force or coerce a male servant/slave who has reached his majority to
18	of marriage, although it does require two reliable male witnesses for any contract of sale. Although
19	required for a valid marriage is that there be two male witnesses of just and reliable character at the
20	carrying over the Quranic requirement for two reliable male witnesses for the contract of sale to the contract
21	Thus, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab required two reliable male witnesses in order for the marriage to be valid.
22	and caliphs Umar and Ali both required two male witnesses as a condition of marriage, as did Ibn

Figure 7.8: Concordance of **MALE** in DeLong-Bas

DeLong-Bas uses the node MALE in collocation with *female, servant, witness, slave* and *guardian*. The item *female* is the first, and perhaps primary, collocate of MALE in the concordance above in Figure 7.8. The collocation pair MALE ... *female* is realized in two basic formulae: *male and female* (lines 1-5) and *male or female* (lines 11-13). Both formulae are based on what may be peculiarly termed as *orderly general-noun coordination*, with two general nouns coordinated onto each other in a fixed order. Yet, there is one fundamental difference that is derived from the formal distinction between *and* and *or*: whereas the first formula lends itself to the semantic meaning of *additiveness*, the second lends itself to that of *alternativeness*. The two collocation-based formulae, male and/or female, are among the very few instances that reflect DeLong-Bas's authorial stance towards the theme of gender in Wahhabi Islam.

Actually, DeLong-Bas uses the collocational pair MALE ... *female* in both realizations ('male and female' and 'male or female') in lines 1-5 and lines 11-13 in a non-gendered discourse (in the same way as Schwartz): the expressions *male and female* and *male or female* could be deleted altogether or replaced by the neutral term *people*. Perhaps, here, DeLong-Bas is trying to emphasize the existence of some form of equality between males and females in Wahhabi Islam; and therefore she may be implicitly critical of any potential attack that Wahhabi Islam could be sexist. Also, importantly the words *both* (lines 1-5) and *whether* (lines 11-13) emphasize that whatever being said applies to the two sexes and it is therefore potentially a discourse of gender equality.

The collocation MALE ... *guardian* constitutes a significant instance of the gendered representation constructed by DeLong-Bas. Islam stipulates that in order to conclude her marriage, a Muslim woman should have a guardian (*wali*). In this case, a guardian should be a Muslim male; the father is the guardian, and next to the father comes the closest male. Thus, in this context, the collocate *guardian* bears a typically masculine reference; something

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that has perhaps tautologically been explicitized in the node word MALE preceding the collocate *guardian* (lines 7-10). Also, the function of this 'male guardian' is made explicit in the complex expression *male marriage guardian* (lines 9 and 10). Thus, DeLong-Bas's use of collocate *guardian* is sex-marked. Indeed, such a collocational pattern is a cue to the patriarchal discourse in that the responsibility of the always-male guardian in marriage is to help a female in selecting her husband. In this way, the presence of the term *guardian* is in itself a sexist presupposition that a woman cannot choose her husband correctly. Nor can she act on her own as a rational being who is able to decide on a life partner. Similarly, in this social context of marriage which is reported by DeLong-Bas, the same term (*guardian*) is a semantic denigration of women who are constructed to be susceptible to the desires of ill-hearted and evil opportunists.

The same patriarchal practice can be realized in the collocation pair MALE … *witnesses* (lines 18-22). Again, this is closely bound up with the social context of a Muslim marriage; this marriage cannot be legally performed in the absence of two male witnesses. As stated in line 19, the validity of marriage hinges on the performative existence of 'two male witnesses'. The last line of the concordance comes as an explicit reference to this performative aspect: '[...] and caliphs Umar and Ali both required two male witnesses as a condition of marriage'. In this connection one historical fact is worth mentioning: both Umar and Ali, in their capacities as caliphs of Muslims[77], were the politically and religiously legislative authorities for the Muslim community at one time. Likewise, the Quran has prescriptively introduced the same condition of the marriage contract in Islam. So is the case with the penultimate line in Figure 7.8, where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a religious authority 'required two reliable male witnesses in order for the marriage to be valid' (line 21). Again, rather than being a critical reporter of this socio-religious practice, DeLong-Bas takes up the

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[77] The Caliph is the traditional title for the leader of the Islamic community ruled by Islamic law (Shari'ah).

position of a researcher who is concerned with nothing but describing some form of a socio-religious practice in Wahhabi Islam.

Actually, at this point it is useful to investigate the linguistic behaviour of MALE as used by Schwartz. The concordance below reflects a minimal textual focus on the word MALE. However, as I shall explain, it significantly contrasts with DeLong-Bas's use.

N	Concordance
1	in almost all schools and almost every child (male or female) has a story" But such discrimination
2	had 17 wives and hundreds of concubines, and his male offspring totaled 36.) Aside from his affection for
3	ago, a bare minyan, or quorum of 10 confirmed male Jews, meets to hear the cantor or chazzan David

Figure 7.9: Concordance of **MALE** in Schwartz

Again, Schwartz eschews any gendered use of the social actor MALE; its scope of reference is restrictively historical. Such a historical reference is ideologically instrumental, in that it is intended to disparage the image of Saudi Wahhabis. The first two lines are a testimony to it. In line 1, the social actor MALE is associated with that of *female* in an intensifying fashion: 'every child (male or female)'. Here, Schwartz argues that all children are systematically indoctrinated by Wahhabi clerics to hate the Shi'a children. It is interesting that Schwartz refers to both males and females here, although it is difficult to confidently interpret why he has done so. One interpretation could be that he is simply stressing how *every* child is indoctrinated, so the use of '(male or female)' is a rhetorical strategy for emphasis. A second interpretation is that he is specifically referencing the fact that it is not just males who are indoctrinated, but females as well – e.g. this is (ironically) one area where Wahhabi Islam is fully committed to gender equality.

As a continuation of this argument, Schwartz refers to the 'male offspring' (which totalled 36) of Ibn Saud, who, Schwartz reports, 'had 17 wives and hundreds of concubines'. This offers a grotesque portrayal of Ibn Saud as benefiting from hegemonic masculinity, caring about nothing but gratifying his physical desires regardless of the dignity of the

female, whether a wife or a concubine. The last line in the concordance above (Figure 7.9) is a mere historical reference to 'male Jews', with no gendered use intended by Schwartz. All in all, then, Schwartz's use of the gender-indicative term MALE operates in a political context, wherein the Saudi-Wahhabi image is being tarnished. This contrasts with DeLong-Bas's representation of the same social actor, which seems to be neutrally operating in the social context of marriage, divorce, etc. in Wahhabi Islam.

Let us now move on to the second half of the story, where I shall be concerned with the representation of the female actors as used by both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Again, it is through the collocational analysis of these female actors that the ideological aspect of representation will be linguistically explained.

7.4.2 Collocational analysis of female social actors

The first thing to observe about the two authors' use of female actors is the disproportionate distribution of the female-actor node words in Table 7.4 below. As shown in the Table, while DeLong-bas makes use of seven female actors taken as node words (WOMAN, WOMAN'S, WOMEN, WOMEN'S, FEMALE, WIFE, and WIVES), Schwartz uses only WIVES. However, as we mentioned earlier (Section 6.3), sometimes it is important to display the other corresponding female actors represented by Schwartz in their concordances, so that comparison could be possible, and thus ideologically motivated differences may be accessed (see the raw frequencies of all the female-actor node words in both texts in Table 7.2 in Section 7.3).

N	DELONG-BAS						SCHWARTZ					
	Node Word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score	Node word	Collocate	Freq.	Joint Freq.	MI	T score
1	WOMAN	entitled	53	15	6.63	3.70						
		mahr	114	18	4.53	2.53						
		status	127	13	4.37	2.52						
		should	258	11	3.71	2.77						
		marriage	550	35	3.26	3.35						
2	WOMAN'S	consent	36	16	9.43	3.99						
		rights	104	9	7.07	2.98						
		guardian	69	6	6.82	2.22						
3	WOMEN	children	32	7	6.90	2.43						
		gender	50	9	6.48	2.62						
		rights	104	14	5.20	2.38						
4	WOMEN'S	rights	104	15	9.84	3.87						
5	FEMALE	slaves	19	5	9.78	2.23						
		slave	56	8	8.22	2.23						
		or	1,036	14	3.97	2.09						
		is	1,838	6	3.86	2.63						
6	WIFE	maintenance	75	13	6.64	3.28						
		talaq	94	12	5.66	2.59						
7	WIVES	or	1,063	7	4.51	2.14	WIVES	and	3,611	14	4.65	3.04

Table 7.4: Collocates of female-indicative node words in DeLong-Bas and Schwartz

From the concordance below in Figure 7.10, we can see at a glance that DeLong-Bas is interested in the female actor WOMAN (whose collocates are *entitled, mahr, status, should,* and *marriage*) in the social context of marriage, particularly as based on the scholarly worldview of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This is clear from the frequent mention of the proper name 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' in the company of marriage-specific terms. For example, *Ibn Abd al-Wahhab ... WOMAN ... mahr* (i.e. dowry) (lines 3, 7, 16); *children ... Ibn Abd al-Wahhab ...* WOMAN (line 14); *Ibn Abd al-Wahhab ...* WOMAN *... marriage* (line 19); *Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's ...* WOMAN *... marriage* (line 24); WOMAN *... marriage ... Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.*[78]

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[78] Note, here, that I am following a particular notation: CAPITALS refer to the node word itself (WOMAN) and *italics* refer to the items collocating with the node word.

N	Concordance
1	"equivalent" mahr, that is, the mahr that would be paid to a woman of comparable status, beauty, and disposition. The
2	support during the waiting period was an absolute right of the woman, regardless of her social status. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
3	of disposing of her, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab maintained that the woman remained entitled to the equivalent mahr, even if she
4	to appease her for her loss. If the mahr was not specified, the woman is entitled to half of the equivalent mahr. Here, again,
5	realizing that they were doing so with the wrong woman, each woman is entitled to receive her mahr and then must observe
6	the marriage by the time the imperfection is discovered, the woman is entitled to her mahr, either what was designated in
7	forced. If she was forced, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that the woman is entitled to mahr from her rapist as "the blood money
8	hands, obligating him to abide by her declarations. The woman remained entitled to maintenance during her waiting
9	of the waiting period or before another marriage, the woman should not be given in marriage until the suspicion of
10	period is suspended. Once the grieving period is over, the woman should wait for a menstrual cycle and then begin her
11	outside of marriage, he taught that both the man and the woman should be punished if they either confessed to the act
12	for which the man always bears responsibility. However, the woman should not always be held accountable for her
13	Marry? The expected norm in Islam is that every man and woman should marry. Marriage of a Muslim man to a Muslim
14	will bear his children, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also noted that the woman should preferably be a virgin possessed of both a
15	itself, is to be a matter of negotiation for the couple. The woman should not be pressed for sex more often than she is
16	Ibn Abd al-Wahhab cited the manumission of a slave woman as a potential mahr because legally speaking the man
17	Rather, it addresses what is appropriately due to the woman as a result of the marriage taking place, thereby
18	honor. It was for this reason that Muhammad required that a woman be given in marriage only with the permission of her
19	Ibn Abd al-Wahhab declared that if only the man and the woman are present at the marriage the woman is to be
20	to the marriage and she had been a deflowered but unmarried woman. Again it was her status as a deflowered woman that
21	fault of hers. Had the man lived, his intent was to marry the woman and consummate the marriage. His death should not
22	al-Wahhab confirmed this right in his discussion of what the woman and her marriage guardian should do in cases in which
23	pay it. By placing checks on the man's power to deny the woman her right to divorce, he made divorce by the woman a
24	al-Wahhab's legal reasoning. The case questions whether a woman is entitled to a mahr upon marriage. According to the
25	entitled to a mahr upon marriage. According to the Quran, a woman is entitled to a mahr upon marriage as a gift. The
26	second type of invalid condition would be one that denies the woman her rights in marriage. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab specifically
27	the marriage would not only mean the loss of the mahr for the woman, but she would also lose her right to maintenance,
28	who is then responsible for demanding that the man pay the woman her mahr because both she and her marriage guardian

Figure 7.10: Concordance of **WOMAN** in DeLong-Bas

The first collocation to demarcate such a Wahhabi worldview, as reported by DeLong-Bas, is WOMAN ... *entitled*, where the entitled object is the marriage gift as traditionally known in Islam, i.e. *mahr*. Thus, the pattern is 'a/the woman is entitled to *mahr*' runs prominently in text, mapping out all the different cases where a woman has a legal right – made by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a scholar – to *mahr* (see lines 4-7 and lines 24 and 25). The general case, where a woman is entitled to *mahr*, is upon marriage; it is known not only in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's worldview, but in Islam in general. Perhaps, this theme is stated by DeLong-Bas in line 25, wherein the expression 'According to the Quran' introduces the theme, and thus renders it factual to Muslims.

However, the most interesting case of '*mahr* giving' can be recognized in line 7, which reads 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that the woman is entitled to her *mahr* from her rapist as "the blood money of virginity"'. I think this particular line strongly reflects a

Wahhabi sexist use of language, where the virginity of a woman (if this not a contradiction in terms) is materially equated with the so-called 'blood money'. Even if DeLong-Bas herself seems to be non-evaluative of this image, it should be made clear that it tends towards a semantic denigration of the woman who is raped and then compensated on a material, rather than psychological, level – the recompense made by the rapist is money. Actually, there is nothing suggested by DeLong-Bas as a way of compensation for psychologically paying the woman's dignity back and reclaiming her lost honour. Additionally, the concept of punishment of rape (other than paying what counts to a fine), seems to be absent.

There is yet another interesting line of the collocation WOMAN ... *entitled*, viz. line 8: 'The woman remained entitled to maintenance during her waiting period'[79]. Again, DeLong-Bas seems oblivious to this gendered co-text of the collocation WOMAN ... *entitled*. This is probably so, since it is the view of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose teachings are defended by DeLong-Bas. In this line, it is the biological, rather than social, status of woman that determines her right to maintenance from man. In this case, the maintenance is entitled only during the waiting period of the woman. The same gendered aspect of language is reflected in a number of the lines in which the collocation WOMAN + *should* appears (lines 9-15). The biological state of 'waiting period' (line 9) and 'menstrual cycle' (line 10) summates the felicity conditions of the deontic modality of *should*, whose scope governs and restricts the behaviour of woman in the Wahhabi teachings. However, in this connection, it should also be said that the waiting period in Islam could be a measure for protecting the man by precisely specifying when the woman should or should not be entitled to maintenance after divorce.

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[79] DeLong-Bas argues that the waiting period is 'set at the completion of three menstrual cycles' and that 'the man should not leave his wife until she has completed her waiting period' (2004: 172). The waiting period is specified as a verse in the Koran, although the Koran does not explain why. One interpretation of the waiting period is that it ensures that a man will not marry a woman while she is pregnant with another man's child.

More generally, the node word WOMAN is integrated as part of a highly restricted scope of modality; it is the deontic function realized by the modal *should*. Woman in this modal sense is packaged as obliged to perform a certain role or answer a certain description. For example, in line 13, a woman is deontically situated as a party to the social institution of marriage, as wife. Also, in line 14, a woman is deontically situated as a virgin, defined by her biological state, as a preferable state in possession of 'a charitable nature and beauty'. Again, this seems to be an implicit assumption that is taken for granted by DeLong-Bas, since it is a premise in the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Defining woman in terms of such purely physical characteristics may be recognized as being part of a Wahhabi worldview in which women are held eligible for a certain social role mainly through features that relate to their bodies, rather than to their minds.

Thus far, DeLong-Bas has exploited the classification scheme of the textual synonymy between the collocates *should* and *entitled*; the former as an explicit modal and the latter as a lexicalized form of modality. Actually, both realizations are underlain by one and the same meaning: 'to have the right to …'. Within the Wahhabi worldview, which is articulated by DeLong-Bas, a woman is given rights only when she is constrained discursively. The teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, deriving their authoritative status from the wider Islamic discourse, tend to (de-)legitimize such rights. This is even clearer in the concordance of the second female actor WOMAN'S in Figure 7.11 below:

N	Concordance
1	the woman herself, is not valid and the marriage is void. Thus, the woman's consent to the marriage was insufficient on its own to
2	marriage." In the event that there is a dispute about whether the woman's consent has been given, he followed majority opinion in
3	marriage.6' In looking at the full discussion of the necessity of the woman's consent to any marriage contracted for her, it is clear that
4	Ibn Abd al-Wahhab noted as the most important element the girl/woman's consent. In his opinion, it was the girl/woman who
5	contracting the marriage as an administrative requirement and the woman's consent as an absolute substantive requirement. While
6	consent is to be determined. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that the woman's consent may be either verbal or silent. Silent consent
7	to be valid. In his opinion, a marriage contracted without the woman's consent is never valid (sahh). Similarly, he taught that
8	for the duration of the marriage. He further required the woman's consent to the marriage in order for it to be recognized as
9	required, this did not in any way negate the requirement of the woman's consent to the marriage. Thus, although the guardian has
10	permitted .611 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's absolute requirement of the woman's consent was a departure from the teachings of the other
11	Similarly, he taught that once given, even if only by hinting, the woman's consent is considered binding and dissolution of the
12	in which it is expressed is clearly defined it is not clear how the woman's consent is to be determined. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught
13	of an administrative process. The more substantive issue of the woman's consent could not be fulfilled by anyone other than the
14	invalidated on the basis of the wife's nonvirginity means that the woman's financial rights remain intact. She is still entitled to her
15	The man, of course, retains the option of divorcing her, but her woman's financial rights again remain intact during her waiting
16	these provisions. All of these prohibitions serve to protect the woman's financial rights in marriage."' Ibn Abd al-Wahhab forbade
17	about which woman was actually married. He believed that the woman's financial rights should never be held hostage to errors
18	clear from this discussion that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab supported the woman's financial rights in marriage even in cases in which there
19	being a political leader was not a sufficient criterion to become a woman's marriage guardian. Recognizing the possibility of a
20	he turned to the hadith for clarification. The requirement of the woman's marriage guardian contracting the marriage for her in the
21	taught that any marriage contracted by someone other than the woman's marriage guardian, even if it is the woman herself, is not
22	of equality between the spouses and the necessity of the woman's marriage guardian contracting the marriage should give
23	can go to the father and this only when the father is acting as the woman's marriage guardian. Otherwise, the full dower was to go to
24	al-Wahhab believed that this was such a serious violation of the woman's rights that he declared the marriage itself, as well as the
25	it is clear that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought above all to protect the woman's rights in marriage so that, whether the marriage is
26	this distinction between mahr and dowry in order to protect the woman's rights. Perhaps in recognition of the continued practice of

Figure 7.11: Concordance of **WOMAN'S** in DeLong-Bas

There are three collocates of WOMAN'S: *consent*, *rights* and *guardian*. All these collocates contribute to the restrictive socio-religious practice of the Wahhabi discourse that is reproduced by DeLong-Bas. Across lines 1-13, the collocational pattern WOMAN'S + *consent* constructs woman as being a party to the marriage contract in its Islamic form. At first glance, the woman's consent in these lines seems to be part of a 'democratic' discourse, wherein women marry of their own volition. However, this claim may be refuted in view of the other two collocates of WOMAN'S, *rights* and *guardian*.

The collocate *rights* is predominantly qualified by the adjective *financial*, which evokes an economic discourse, to the extent that the reader may conceive of woman's rights as being exclusively economic (see lines 14-18 in Figure 7.11). Significantly, other potential modifiers from the non-economic domain – such as the emotional, social, and political domains – are absent from DeLong-Bas. Here lies a certain ideological presupposition: women's nature is inclined mostly towards economic needs. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's reported

worldview in this regard makes a strong case for the assumption that a women's top priority need is economic maintenance. This is quite expected within Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious worldview since it is part of a much bigger Islamic worldview, which accommodates a dependent socio-economic status of women in marriage. This assumption is further established in the co-text of the collocation pairs WIFE ... *maintenance* and WIFE ... *talaq* in the concordance in Figure 7.12 below.

N	Concordance
1	to her marriage guardian. A returned woman is a wife against whom a talaq has been declared, even if this
2	owed and continuing in the marriage or divorcing the wife by talaq, guaranteeing her the financial rights of this
3	of the husband can demand that the son repudiate his wife by talaq only if his father is a just man. The husband
4	"hold her fast. He also allowed the man to assign to the wife his right of talaq. In doing so, the man placed the
5	income. In the event that the husband fails to pay the wife maintenance appropriate to her status, Ibn Abd
6	MAINTENANCE. The man's responsibility to pay his wife maintenance is subject to several considerations,
7	as the length of time during which a man is to pay his wife maintenance following a divorce-a legal argument that
8	parties are in the middle, the husband should pay his wife the maintenance due to a woman of middle income. If
9	claims that in his heart he did not intend to repudiate his wife the talaq is invalidated. However, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
10	for providing him with a fixed sum for maintenance of the wife, the mahr, which the husband is required to give his
11	if both parties are wealthy the husband should pay his wife the maintenance due to a wealthy woman, such as
12	money. Thus he upheld the absolute right of the wife to maintenance, regardless of changes in the
13	marriage, the husband is responsible for providing his wife with maintenance (nafaqah), which includes, but is

Figure 7.12: Concordance of **WIFE** in DeLong-Bas

I shall not spend any time analysing the second collocation (WIFE ... *talaq*), since it almost repeats the same function as that of the collocation HUSBAND ... *talaq* discussed earlier in Subsection 7.4.1 above. Only, in this connection, shall I pay attention to the fact that WIFE ... *talaq* interrelates with the micro-topic of economic maintenance (in Arabic, *nafaqah*). For instance, the issue of the 'financial rights' that a divorced wife is entitled to (by *talaq*) thematically appears in line 2. More important, however, is the collocation WIFE ... *maintenance* in Figure 7.12. The economic dependence of the wife on the husband or the man is easily recognized through this collocation which is embedded in the fixed lexical pattern of *the/a husband/man/man's ... pay his wife maintenance* (lines 5-8 and 11); the same meaning is realized in the last line in which the clausal construct 'the husband is responsible for

providing his wife with maintenance' features the theme of the female economic dependence on the male actor (line 13).

Certainly, this implies a dependent existence of the female actor within the social institution of marriage in Wahhabi Islam. Even if DeLong-Bas has not made this aspect explicit, the reporting of the practice in a collocational pattern makes it deeply entrenched into the Wahhabi religious discourse itself. Actually, a testimony to the women's dependence on a male actor ('the guardian') in Wahhabi Islam can be realized in the collocation WOMAN'S ... *guardian* (lines 19-23). Interestingly, the nominalized form *marriage* is invariably inserted in between the collocating items in the fixed lexical pattern *a/the woman's marriage guardian*.

By itself, the term *guardian* marks a heavily gendered patriarchal order in Islamic discourse. The default is pragmatically established as 'male guardian', when it comes to woman's marriage in Islam; there is no 'female guardian'. The great majority of schools of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) in Islam go to the extreme that the marriage contract is invalid if the male guardian of the wife-to-be (father, elder brother, or uncle) is non-existent. Only would a Muslim woman be given the right to get married through such a guardian, who must by default be male, and who can enact the legal process of marriage. It is some sort of symbolic order that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as a Muslim scholar, had unconsciously inherited as religious commonsense, as taken-for-granted knowledge; and this type of commonsensical worldview and unquestioned knowledge is now reproduced by DeLong-Bas.

However, DeLong-Bas hedges this kind of representation in the last three lines. Here, she presents Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as being the protector of woman's rights (lines 25 and 26). Note that, unlike the case in lines 14-18 (Figure 7.12), the collocate *rights* is used in this context without any modifiers that restrict rights to certain domains of meaning. Thus, Ibn

Abd al-Wahhab, in this sense, is constructed as a protector of all kinds of woman's rights. Similarly, in line 24, DeLong-Bas reports Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to have believed that there would be 'a serious violation of the woman's rights' in case the husband stipulates that 'the wife not receive her *mahr* until sometime after the marriage is consummated'.

Actually, this aspect of mitigation by DeLong-Bas continues with the collocational pattern WOMEN'S + *rights* in Figure 7.13 below:

N	Concordance
1	reading of the Quran to legislation expanding women's rights and access to public space. Bin Laden's
2	his concern for gender balance and the protection of women's rights. These themes also demonstrate how he
3	of such principles. Consequently, the assertion of women's rights and their protection was an important
4	position here is consistent with his protection of women's rights in general and his opposition to practices
5	reached their majority but included minor women. Thus, women's rights were to be applied equally on the basis
6	or ritualism and his broad theme of the protection of women's rights, particularly where matters of marriage
7	Abd al-Wahhab addressed two spheres with respect to women's rights and responsibilities: the sphere of
8	life and writings reflect a concern for women and women's rights reminiscent of Muhammad. Like
9	come to define Wahhabism for Western human and women's rights activists and Muslim feminists alike, the
10	for the defense of Islam, and the status of women and women's rights in Islam. The practical application of his

Figure 7.13: Concordance of **WOMEN'S** in DeLong-Bas

The collocate *rights* has strongly associated with the node word WOMEN'S (MI score 9.84). This suggests that DeLong-Bas uses the two collocating items idiosyncratically. Hence, there must be a vested interest in using this type of collocation. This interest is not far from our previous understanding of the mitigating function that has been realized in the lexical pattern *protect the woman's rights*, where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is presented in the positive shading of protective agency: he is the Actor of the Material Process *protect* in the last two lines in Figure 7.11. Here, in Figure 6.13, the same function holds with the collocation WOMEN'S + *rights*.

In line 1, DeLong-Bas subtly presents the discourse topic of 'women's rights' as being the inspiration of the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings have inspired a variety of contemporary reforms, from a context- and value-oriented reading of the Quran to legislation expanding women's rights' (line 1). Thus, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab

takes up the social role of a legislator's of women's rights; and here, this kind of representation renders gender as an issue that may be used for enhancing the image of the Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Actually, the same kind of instrumental gender representation persists in the following lines in the concordance. The collocation WOMEN'S + *rights* stands as the object of nominal groups that share a semantic preference for care and appreciation: 1) 'the protection of women's rights' (lines 2 and 6), 2) 'his protection of women's rights' (line 4), 3) 'with respect to women's rights' (line 7), and 'a concern for women and women's rights' (line 8). Further to this is the last line in the concordance (line 10), where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's theological and legal writings are presented as being thematically focused on the 'status of women and women's rights in Islam'. Thus, it could be said that DeLong-Bas's argument revolves around what can be called an instrumental gender representation that is used in defense of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself.

Importantly, the great majority of these collocational patterns in Figures 7.11 and 7.13 are predicated on the pragmatic fallacy of *argumentum ad misericordiam*, where the gender issue of women's rights (in its collocational form) is rhetorically used in appealing for empathy in cases where the plight of the suppressed woman is intended to evoke compassion for women's rights, particularly on the part of a Western audience who might harbour certain stereotypes against Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and against a perceived Wahhabi contempt for women. It is this Western audience that DeLong-Bas, by using terms like 'women's rights', may be appealing to; and so she is borrowing from Western feminist discourse here. Now, for the sake of a complete picture on gender representation by DeLong-Bas, let us focus on the collocates of WOMEN as they appear in the concordance below in Figure 7.14.

N	Concordance
1	Muhammad, "Do not kill expert shaykhs or children/infants or women." Contrary to prior scholars, who believed that this verse
2	It appears in a discussion of who is not to be killed during jihad (women, children, youths who have not reached maturity, and
3	who were liable to punishment, and noncombatants, including women, children, the elderly, the handicapped, slaves, and
4	to rule on matters of inheritance, he defended the rights of women. For example, when asked about the right of those
5	balance of power within marriage. His recognition of the rights of women to be educated, to be considered proper business
6	or invisible citizens. On the contrary, he not only recognized women as individuals with rights and responsibilities, but he also
7	the booty. People benefiting from this practice included slaves, women, and children. The justification for this gift is to provide for
8	analysis of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings about women and gender has ever been undertaken. In addition, no
9	human rights, insisting on strict gender segregation, forbidding women access to public space, and subjugating them by
10	Islamic law, education, missionary work (da'wah), jihad, and women and gender—were relevant not only for reforming and
11	It especially created public space and a balance of rights for women, as well as a legal methodology for indigenous reform
12	values is nowhere more apparent than in his teachings about women and his construction of gender. His vision of gender
13	as an armed struggle for the defense of Islam, and the status of women and women's rights in Islam. The practical application of

Figure 7.14: Concordance of **WOMEN** in DeLong-Bas

There are three important collocates of WOMEN as the concordance displays in Figure 7.14 above: *children*, *gender* and *rights*.

The first collocational pair is WOMEN and *gender* (lines 8, 9 and 10). Let us begin with line 10, in which DeLong-Bas focuses on the collocate *gender* as a theme in the theology of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The female-actor node word WOMEN is used collectively as a concrete realization of the abstract concept 'gender'. According to DeLong-Bas, part of the reformative vision of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is the amelioration of women's status in a society which was biased against women, and which was thus in need of the Wahhabi reform. The point here is how it is that DeLong-Bas reconstructs a certain past with a presently gendered stance against women in order to defend the currently untenable status of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the post-9/11 West. This can be further explained in light of the other two collocational pairs of WOMEN and *gender* in lines 8 and 9.

However, I would prefer to proffer part of the paragraph that includes the two instances of this collocation, basically for a wider scope of co-text that goes beyond the individual concordance lines (note that the collocations are featured in bold):

Extract 11:

> *Wahhabism in the contemporary era is largely portrayed as misogynist, denying women their human rights, insisting on strict **gender** segregation, forbidding **women** access to public space, and subjugating them by considering them inferior to men. Women under Wahhabi regimes are assumed to have second-class citizenship, if not slave status. Critics of Wahhabism point to extreme examples like the Taliban and Saudi Arabia's requirement that women wear the full burqa' or abaya covering them from head to toe, leaving barely enough room to breathe; the ban on women driving or being recognized as heads of households; and the Taliban's forbidding women to go to school, work, or seek medical care as evidence of Wahhabism's oppression, suppression, and repression of women in accordance with an extremely conservative interpretations of Islamic law. All of these **stereotypes** and images are assumed to be based on the conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam despite the **fact** that no systematic analysis of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings about **women** and **gender** has ever been undertaken.* (My emphasis)

The collocation WOMEN ... *gender* constitutes a discourse topic around which DeLong-Bas sets up her argument. The argument opens with the truth claim that 'Wahhabism in the contemporary era is largely portrayed as misogynist, denying women their human rights, insisting on strict gender segregation, forbidding women access to public space, and subjugating them by considering them inferior to men'.

DeLong-Bas uses two *fallacies of certitude* (my term) in order to rebut this truth claim. First, she assumes that such a contemporary view of Wahhabism as 'misogynist' is a stereotypical representation of Wahhabism itself; this frames DeLong-Bas's categorical

judgement that there are 'oversimplified, automatic interpretations'[80] made by those who adopt the contemporary view of Wahhabism. Second, DeLong-Bas makes a factual presupposition that so far there has been 'no systematic analysis of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings about women and gender has ever been undertaken'. Perhaps, what aggravates the second fallacy of certitude is the use of the highly evaluative adjective 'systematic' as part of the warrant.

This shows that DeLong-Bas uses the gender issue as a defense mechanism of Wahhabi Islam. The same is true in the case of the other two collocates of the node word WOMEN in Figure 7.14, that is, *rights* and *children*. The first collocation WOMEN and *rights* reiterates the same function of the previously discussed collocation of WOMEN'S + *rights* in Figure 7.13. For example, in lines 4, 5 and 6 (Figure 6.14), the gender strand of defending and recognizing the rights of women is juxtaposed with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as an agent that has activated such processes in his theological writings. Also, the collocation WOMEN and *children* are presented as being among the helpless social actors to whom Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, following the tradition of the Prophet of Muslims, had long paid special attention at the time of jihad (see, for instance, the first three lines in Figure 7.12).

Now, we are in a position to move to Schwartz, so that we can see how he may contrastively represent the two female-actor items WOMAN and WOMEN. Let us begin with the item WOMAN.

N	Concordance
1	in public life (the deputy speaker of the Majlis [parliament] is a woman); there is limited freedom of the press the fact that some
2	four credible eyewitnesses—and libel against the honor of a woman. For adultery, no more than 100 lashes, and for libel, only 80
3	when the father of Andaleeb Takafka, a 20-year-old Palestinian woman who blew herself up at a Jerusalem bus stop in April 2002,
4	town. In the taking of Ta'if, it is said that the Wahhabis "killed every woman, man, and child they saw, slashing with their swords even
5	a demonstration for the education of the populace: the stoning of a woman in Uyaynah accused of "fornication." Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had

Figure 7.15: Concordance of **WOMAN** in Schwartz

[80] This is Fowler's (1996b) definition of stereotypes as 'oversimplified, automatic interpretations' that 'inhibit understanding' (Fowler 1996b: 26).

Perhaps, a quick look at the concordance of WOMAN in Figure 7.15 above would reveal how the issue of gender is utilized in the negative representation of Wahhabism. Schwartz, in line 4, making a reference to a particular historical event, features a quote (by an unknown source) including the statement that the Wahhabis 'killed every woman, man, and child they saw [...]'. Although the reference seems general, it designates a whole family structure (i.e. woman, man and children) that is dismantled by the Wahhabis; this reflects a highly negative discourse prosody in the representation of the Wahhabis in relation to the full gamut of human social actors, on top of whom is 'woman'. The second interesting instance in this regard is line 5, wherein a *fatwa* issued by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab dictates 'the stoning of a woman', who was 'accused of fornication'. Here, Schwartz condemns the severity of the Wahhabi fatwa in terms of the internationally recognized human rights. He has particularly targeted the female social actor WOMAN as a way of eliciting the *pathos* of the masses against Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The question here is: why has Schwartz been silent about the male-actor party? He does not justify this conspicuous absence of the male actor MAN in his citation. It is difficult to give a definite interpretation because Schwartz does not make the gender difference explicit, but perhaps Schwartz here is making an implicit criticism of Wahhabism based on gender inequality.

Also, the use of the female social actor WOMAN is significant in line 2. Here, Schwartz makes clear that the 'Quran prescribes flogging as an Islamic punishment' for the two 'crimes' of 'adultery' and 'libel against the honor of a woman'. What is important here is Schwartz's shift from focusing on what is already prescribed in the Quran as part of Islamic law to on what is actually in practice in the Saudi Kingdom, which, according to Schwartz, 'has routinely delivered sentences totalling thousand lashes'. The special focus is those weak women who are helpless in the face of such severe non-Quranic Saudi sentences. Further to this is the narrative introduced in line 3 about the '20-year-old Palestinian who blew herself

up' under the influence of what Schwartz calls 'The terrible outcome of Wahhabi involvement in the Middle East conflict'. According to Schwartz, then, woman has been directly or indirectly abused by Wahhabism and the Saudi kingdom.

Finally, in this respect, Schwartz holds a comparison between the different political statuses of woman in Saudi Arabia and in Iran. As he maintains, compared to Saud Arabia, 'women are active in public life'. Schwartz provides an example in Iran: '(the deputy speaker of the *Majlis* [parliament] is a woman)' (line 1). Then, it seems more obvious that Schwartz is critical of Wahhabi Islam by explicitly commenting on its gender inequality, although this appears to be a rare case, rather than the norm. It is worth mentioning here that Iran could also be criticized for a poor record on women's rights – particularly since 1979. So while women's rights in Saudi Wahhabi Islam may appear 'worse' than Iranian Shi'i Islam, from other perspectives, both countries have a long way to go.

Let us continue this kind of female-actor representation of WOMEN by Schwartz in the concordance below in Figure 7.16.

N	Concordance
1	School Number 31 in Mecca took the lives of fourteen young women, leaving dozens more badly burned. The March 11 tragedy could
2	take, legitimately. God made them yours. Why don't you enslave their women? Why don't you wage jihad? Why don't you pillage them?"
3	in a mosque in Riyadh, calling for the enslavement of the Jewish women of Israel, once Palestinian victory was achieved. Referring to
4	of a Wahhabi bigot, Hamd ibn 'Abd al-Muhsin, who demanded that women who drive automobiles in Saudi Arabia be charged as prostitutes
5	the drafting of petitions to the king and recommended that Saudi women boycott American consumer goods. He was aggrieved by the
6	of extreme Shariah punishments, a ban on music, the covering of women, and above all the rejection of Sufism. The Chechen national
7	through university, for growing Wahhabi-style beards or, in the case of women, covering themselves. A number of teachers and administrators

Figure 7.16: Concordance of **WOMEN** in Schwartz

The above concordance delineates Schwartz's ideology about how the female social actor WOMEN is physically abused and ideologically manipulated by the Wahhabi-Saudi activists and clergymen. Most blatant of all is line 1, where what Schwartz calls the 'viciousness of Wahhabi-Saudi rule' caused a dramatic incident of the death of 'fourteen young women' and the burning of 'other dozen women'.

Also, in lines 2 and 3, some Wahhabi-Saudi clerics are reported by Schwartz to be encouraging the enslavement of Jewish women as part of the process of jihad in Palestine. Here, Schwartz draws attention to the fact that Wahhabi-Saudi clerics are not only biased against Muslim women, but also against all women on the massive human scale. Thus, it is a form of an extended Wahhabi stereotype against women on the whole. As a continuation of this Wahhabi stereotype, Schwartz brings in another example of what he categorizes as 'a Wahhabi bigot', who 'demanded that women who drive automobiles in Saudi Arabia be charged as prostitutes and punished by flogging' (line 4). In line 5, Schwartz highlights the Wahhabi ideological manipulation of women by urging them to 'boycott American consumer goods', which suggests the imposing presence of a religiously patronizing discourse. The male Sheikhs exercise power on women, even when it comes to doing their shopping; further, this reflects an ideological presupposition that only women are the agent of consumerism in Saudi Arabia; the discursive regulation of the fatwa was not addressed to men, but to women.

One last aspect of the WOMEN representation in relation to the Wahhabi-Saudi hegemony as spelt out by Schwartz can be realized in the last two lines in Figure 7.16. These lines are concerned with what van Leeuwen (2008) terms 'presentation style' (i.e. the dress and body grooming requirements for participants in discourse), which may be ideologically associated with social actors. Here, Schwartz focuses on the ideological presentation in the 'Wahhabi-style' (line 7) of women covering (lines 6 and 7). To him, the Wahhabi-Saudi ideology manifests itself in the social identity of the Wahhabi women, and is assiduously made to extend to all Muslim women. Thus, again, these are further cases where Schwartz attacks Wahhabism for its treatment of women.

Now, let us go back to DeLong-Bas, where the social actor FEMALE is concerned.

N	Concordance
1	occurred outside of marriage. He further forbade the purchase of a female slave or servant with the expectation of gaining sexual favors
2	it is well known that this was truncated and that having sex with her [a female slave] is not by marriage and not by possession of the right
3	it is preferable for a man to withdraw from sexual relations with his female slave, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab recognized the permissibility of and
4	manumission in the case of a proposed marriage between a female slave and her master.¹⁰ Here again, he showed genuine concern
5	apparent in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discussions of sexual relations with female slaves. Although some law schools asserted that sexual
6	refers to the potential sexual relationship between a master and his female slaves. The wording of this third scenario suggests that Ibn Abd
7	by condemning the practices of rape and sexual relations with female slaves and servants. This, again, marked a major departure from
8	Although some law schools asserted that sexual intercourse with female slaves was permissible, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab strongly disagreed,

Figure 7.17: Concordance of **FEMALE** in DeLong-Bas

There are two major word-forms of the same item (*slave* and *slaves*) that DeLong-Bas characteristically uses in the company of FEMALE. Thus, it seems that she is focused on the status of female slave(s) in Wahhabi Islam. But, how is this aspect represented by DeLong-Bas? Of course, based on the previous collocation instances that have been analysed hitherto, one can predict that such a kind of representation will have much bearing on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself or on his theological teachings in relation to the female social actor.

Viewing the two collocating items FEMALE and *slave(s)* as a whole entity, one can come up with the discourse topic of 'female slavery' in the worldview of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Examining the individual concordance lines, we can see that DeLong-Bas focuses on 'sexual relations' between female slaves and their masters. Here, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is presented as being the scholarly voice who opposed such 'sexual relations'. It is interesting that DeLong-Bas seems to use the term 'sexual relations' in preference to other terms (although she refers to 'practices of rape and sexual relations' in line 7). DeLong-Bas makes clear that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 'forbade the purchase of a female slave [...] with the expectation of gaining sexual favors' (line 1), and that he condemned 'the practices of rape and sexual relations with female slaves' (line 7). Also, she introduces discussions of the sexual relations with female slaves put forward by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (lines 5 and 6). Line 2 is a citation by DeLong-Bas of a Quranic verse that supports the same view. In line 3, she reports Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's preference of a man withdrawing 'from sexual relations with his female slave'. In the last

line, DeLong-Bas underscores Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's strong disagreement with any of those Islamic-law schools that 'asserted that sexual intercourse with female slaves was permissible' (line 8). However, it should be noted that here DeLong-Bas does not explicitly say that slavery in itself is wrong, or that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would have been a better man had he tried to abolish slavery.

Again, DeLong-Bas uses WIVES as another female social actor in featuring a positive representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in terms of gender. Insofar as gender is concerned, the significance of the term WIVES can generally be recognized as part of a semantic scale of lexical specificity which, as Simpson (1993) argues, may be semantically postulated as a 'consist-of configuration': all wives are women. Yet, there could be a pragmatic scale of specificity as well.

Now back again to DeLong-Bas's use of WIVES. The item *or* is the only collocate of this node word as is clear in Figure 7.18:

N	Concordance
1	to provide clarity, not to single out female adherents or wives or daughters of adherents as being especially open
2	denying the husband the right to marry additional wives or take on concubines, while denying the same
3	or country, or that the husband will not marry additional wives or take a concubine."' It is very significant that Ibn
4	right to stipulate that her husband not marry additional wives or take a concubine was a source of great power
5	(Q 4:19 and 2:228). Men are not entitled to abuse their wives, physically or emotionally, by demonstrating
6	of those who are in his charge, namely, his wife or wives, so that his rights do not translate into an abuse of

Figure 7.18: Concordance of **WIVES** in DeLong-Bas

It is important to note here that the particle *or* has the semantic function of *alternativeness*. Thus, the node word WIVES is presented as being an alternative of the social actor, or the social action, that follows the collocate *or*. That is to say, the semantic scope of choice is wider in the present context. But how is this gender-specific pattern of WIVES + *or* utilized by DeLong-Bas? In line 1, DeLong-Bas presents Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's view as being balanced in terms of gender, since he 'does not single out female adherent or wives or

daughters of adherent as being especially open to criticism'. Note the frequent use of *or*, which suggests an ampler scope of choice, plus the Wahhabi sympathy with the female actors in DeLong-Bas's representation.

Also, in lines 2 and 3, the collocation WIVES + *or* is equally interesting. DeLong-Bas reports Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as denying the husband the right to 'marry additional wives or take on concubines/a concubine'. This should depict Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a positive light as a scholar who would fight against the sexual exploitation of women. The anti-sexist representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab continues in the last two lines, when DeLong-Bas refers to the classic views of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in two complementary veins. First, according to him, men do not have any right to 'abuse their wives'. Here, this meaning is asserted in DeLong-Bas's use of the collocate *or* as a negative marker of all the potential ways of wife abuse, be it physical or emotional, which renders the meaning of *or* functionally akin to that of *and*. Second, as DeLong-Bas puts forward the argument by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, since the man has the prerogative of divorce, he 'should reflect a superior benevolent treatment of [...] his wife or wives' (line 6). While DeLong-Bas attempts to represent Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a non-sexist light, more contentious issues are glossed over. So DeLong-Bas does not problematize the fact that divorce is only the prerogative of men, or note the lack of female agency in statements like 'treatment of women'.

Now, if we move on to the other side of the argument by Schwartz regarding the use of the node word WIVES, we can see that the collocate *and* stands as an oppositional paradigm to that of *or*, which is used by DeLong-Bas with the same node word. The question now is: what kind of oppositional paradigm is there between the two texts in using *or* versus *and* with the node word WIVES across the two texts?

N	Concordance
1	rose to prominence in the 19th century. Ibn Sa'ud had 17 wives and hundreds of concubines, and his male offspring
2	regime, it seems to have become common for the wives and children of combatants to be dragged off to live
3	Ibn Sa'ud and his cohort for women produced armies of wives and concubines, as well as an enormous dynasty of
4	if they did not follow him, they should all be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions

Figure 7.19: Concordance of **WIVES** in Schwartz

The collocate *and* has the semantic function of *addition*; it may add some social actor on to the female social actor WIVES, for example as a way of intensification. Ideologically Schwartz makes use of the additive function of the collocate *and*, alongside its collocating node word WIVES, as an intensifying marker of the negatively sexist representation of three political actors, viz. 'Ibn Sa'ud' (lines 1 and 3), 'combatants in Afghanistan' (line 2), and 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' (line 4). Let us take each in turn.

Schwartz presents Ibn Sa'ud as being a hegemonic male who 'had 17 wives and hundreds of concubines' (line 1), and whose voracious demand for women 'produced armies of wives and concubines' (line 3). Here, there seems to be a strongly negative discourse prosody of the term *wives* which is linked to large quantities and also the term *concubines*, which implies the objectification of women. This negative discourse prosody sustains hegemonic masculinity on the part of Ibn Sa'ud, who, being on top of the power hierarchy in Saudi Arabia, can combine a startling number of wives and concubines. In line 2, Schwartz capitalizes on the collocation WIVES + *and* in a way that renders the wives and the children of combatants under the Taliban regime forced to lead the terrible life of a 'jihad community': '[I]t seems to have become common [under the Taliban regime] for the wives and children of combatants to be dragged off to live in "jihad" communities'. This can be taken as another form of exploiting women in their social roles as being hapless wives of the mujahidin of Taliban, who are, as Schwartz maintains, the modern products of Wahhabi Islam.

Similarly, exploiting the intensifying effect of the same collocation (WIVES + *and*) in the lexical pattern *wives and daughters*, both female actors, Schwartz tries to disparage the scholarly image of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The latter is reported to have had an opinion that 'all Muslims had fallen into unbelief and that if they did not follow him [Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] … their wives and daughters [should be] violated' (line 4). Obviously, this kind of representation reveals a negative co-textual presentation, which is suggestive of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's savagery, according to Schwartz.

Thus, Schwartz's use of the collocation WIVES + *and* versus the collocation WIVES + *or* offers an oppositional paradigm of starkly different representations across the two texts. Drawing on gender representations, the first intensifies the negative impact of Wahhabi-Saudi actors and the second attempts (not always successfully) to dilute any such potential negative impact.

7.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, one can assume that, in their texts, both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas manifest gender representations of male and female social actors in meta-Wahhabi discourse. Yet, each is keen to employ this representation in a way that serves a particular authorial standpoint, based on the dichotomy realized in Chapters 5 and 6 between anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses. It is a dichotomy which has resulted in different representations in each text: whereas Schwartz is very much concerned with how Wahhabism seems to be practiced, DeLong-Bas writes mainly about Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings and theory – not so much how it has been interpreted. Further, DeLong-Bas seems to have two discourses on 'women': 1) women and men are equal and 2) women have special rights and are protected under Wahhabi Islam. These discourses are somewhat contradictory, however. On the other hand, Schwartz seems to be drawing on a discourse which represents Wahhabi women as

oppressed, although this is rarely articulated. His discourse contradicts both of DeLong-Bas's two discourses on women. Still, however, Schwartz mainly draws on a kind of invisible discourse, where he generally views gender issues as irrelevant.

Closely related to these aspects is the ideological collocational behaviour of the gender-indicative actors in both texts. It has become clear now that such a collocational behaviour is embedded into a larger representation of the Wahhabi-Saudi social actors in the research data. This may not be any surprising, since the macro topic of both books is Wahhabi Islam and the modern Saudi state in its royal form.

Even so, for the sake of a full-fledged analytic view, we need to go well beyond the textual analysis of collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Equally important are the relevant macro processes of producing, interpreting and explaining how these collocations could be part of meta-Wahhabi discursive practices, which underlie the two texts under analysis. Actually, this is what the next chapter (Chapter 8) is all about.

CHAPTER 8

The Social Context of Ideological Collocation in Meta-Wahhabi Discourse: Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas (Part IV)

8.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the macro analysis of the research data. It focuses on the meta-Wahhabi discourse processes of producing, interpreting and explaining ideological collocations produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. At this macro level of analysis, the chapter addresses the following primary research question: How do the collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas relate to the social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse?

In order to tackle this question, I draw on a purely qualitative approach that operates on social-semiotic and cognitive levels, depending on the meta-Wahhabi discourse processes under investigation. Section 8.2 brings vis-à-vis the two text producers (Schwartz and DeLong-Bas), in terms of their different biographies and opposing institutional frameworks. Section 8.3 delineates the cognitive procedure of the discursive competences underlying the (Sufi) anti-Wahhabi and (Sunni) pro-Wahhabi discourse communities. Section 8.4 addresses the explanatory model of meta-Wahhabi collocations utilized by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in relation to the symbolic power behind the use of these collocations and the interdiscursive meanings associated with them.

8.2 Schwartz vs. DeLong-Bas

It is useful to initiate the macro analysis of the social-semiotic context of meta-Wahhabi discourse, where ideological collocation has been actualized, with the text producers. Two important aspects need to be covered here: 1) the biographical elements appertaining to each text producer and 2) the opposing institutional frameworks associated with each. As will

shortly be shown in the subsections below, drawing on a number of web-based sources (e.g. blogs, articles, reports, interviews, and reviews), I gleaned the contextual information on the two authors and the institutional frameworks through which they are discursively empowered and enacted.

8.2.1 A biographical note

Starting with Stephen Schwartz, I should make clear that I partially draw on Schwartz's biography at the Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP)[81]. Clearly, such a biography offers only the 'sanctioned' picture of Schwartz's life, and we can only rely on what is there – we do not know whether any details relevant to this study were omitted from such a biography.[82]

Stephen Schwartz was born in 1948 in Columbus. He has had a journalistic career, notably as a staff writer for the San Francisco Chronicle for ten years. Schwartz is the founder and Executive Director of the CIP in Washington DC. Among his well-known publications are *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (2002); *Sarajevo Rose: A Balkan Jewish Notebook* (2005); *Is It Good For the Jews? The Crisis of America's Israel Lobby* (2006); and *The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony* (2008).

Post-9/11, 2001, Schwartz's writings began to focus on Islam, and more specifically on Saudi Wahhabism as a form of Sunni Islam, in worldwide newspapers: e.g. *The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times* and *The Toronto Globe and Mail*. His journalistic reporting voice on Islamist fundamentalism has led to recurrent appearances on Fox News as well as on television shows such as CNN's Talk Back Live and MSNBC Dateline. Schwartz's first visit to Yugoslavia trigerred his serious investigation of Islam in

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[81] See at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/, accessed 30 December 2009.

[82] We must also place a certain amount of trust in that the stated facts in the biography are accurate, although it is possible to verify most details from other sources.

1990. It was then that he set out to do research on the history of Jews in the Balkans and forged relations with Balkan Islamic leaders. Thereafter, during the 1990s, Schwartz continued his research on the Balkan comparative religion. Also, he took part in short missions in Bosnia-Hercegovina for the International Federation of Journalists.

In addition to the biographical information on the CIP website, we can add other details about his life from other sources. According to Schwartz[83], his father was Jewish and his mother Protestant, although his family was not religious. His mother was a member of the Communist Party; therefore, Schwartz was initially a Communist and supporter of the Soviet Union. Yet, later on in College, his views began to shift, favouring a Trotskyist[84] view of Marxism over Stalinism – the political regime named after Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union (1929-1953), who ruled with absolute dictatorship (Schwartz *ibid.*). Schwartz's exposure to Islam began with 'the study of Sufism during his early radical years, and he now describes himself as a disciple of Ibn Arabi'[85] (Schwartz 2003).

Unfortunately, compared with Schwartz, there is hardly any biographical information on Delong-Bas, the author of *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004), that can be easily found. Therefore, I shall draw on the few sources available. On 21 December 2006, the London daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* published an interview with Natana DeLong-Bas.[86] At the time, DeLong-Bas was teaching in the Department of Theology at Boston College and in the Department of Near East and Judaic Studies at Brandeis University.

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[83] See Schwartz (2003) at http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=19665, accessed 30 December 2009.

[84] Trotskyism is the theory of Marxism advocated by Leon Trotsky, who considered himself an orthodox Marxist. His political orientation distinctly differed from that of Stalinism, since he assured the need for an international proletarian (i.e. working-class-specific) revolution based on 'democratic' principles.

85 Ibn Arabi is Sheikh Muhyiddin Muhammad Ibn Ali (1165-1240) who is considered to be one of the most important Sufi masters.

[86] See the interview at http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/3012, accessed 30 December 2009.

She is the author of *Notable Muslims: A Biographical Dictionary* (2004) and co-author of *Women in Muslim Family Law*, with John L. Esposito (2001). She has served as an editor for and contributor to *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (2003), *The Encyclopedia of the Qur'an* (2004) and *The Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (2004). She is a public speaker on Islam, Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. She has been introduced in her book *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004) as 'a senior research assistant at Georgetown University's Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding in the United States, Washington, DC'. (In the coming subsection, the Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding will be contrasted with the Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) which was founded by Schwartz.)

DeLong-Bas's book (*Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*) is taken from her doctoral dissertation on Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Branfoot (2006: 97) points out that 'The research [made by DeLong-Bas on Wahhabi Islam] is based on study of the full corpus of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings in King Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh'; and it is further 'supported by other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materials in Arabic and a wide command of secondary sources in Arabic and western languages' (Branfoot *ibid.*). This may initially establish why DeLong-Bas is acutely keen to focus on the academic persona of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the example analysis of the collocational profile of WAHHAB'S (see Chapter 6). The positive discourse prosody of the node WAHHAB'S is obviously realized in the co-textual environment of its collocates (*teachings, works, writings, interpretation*, etc.) as employed by DeLong-Bas, who capitalizes on the religious scholarly identity (or Sheikhhood) of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

As has been shown in the previous chapters, each author draws on discourses that oppose each other, and each one of them issues from a different mindset. The most striking linguistic realization of this discursive clash can be manifested in those lexical associations, which occur in the two texts. As we have noticed in Chapter 6, all the collocates used by

Schwartz promote a negative prosody of the Wahhabi-Saudi religious institution; and, contrastively, those collocates appearing in the vicinity of the node word WAHHAB'S in DeLong-Bas promote a positive prosody of the scholar Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Now, let us focus on the second important aspect with regards to the meta-Wahhabi discourse process of production, that is, the different institutional frameworks via which the two text producers were discursively enabled.

8.2.2 Opposing institutional frameworks

Of analytic interest is the fact that each author is the product and agent of different cultural and institutional backgrounds. As previously stated, Schwartz is the Executive Director of the Centre for Islamic Pluralism (known as CIP). The centre has its own website with information related to its mission, activities, contact information, contributions and memberships, and affiliates.[87] Based on personally contacting Schwartz, I knew that CIP was founded by Schwartz himself, and that it was conceived in 2004 and began real work in 2005.[88] According to the website, the CIP was founded in 2004 in Washington, DC as a public charity with no funding sources declared; its general mission is to 'challenge the dominance of American Muslim life by militant Islamist groups'. Towards this mission, the CIP has had activities including print media, conferences, publications (papers, newspapers, books, and regular journals), and outreach to the international Muslim community.

In his article 'Stephen Schwartz and the Center for Islamic Pluralism'[89], Pipes (2005) argues that the CIP is 'a Muslim anti-Islamist organization'. He continues to argue that Schwartz is the right person to occupy the position of the CIP directorship, mainly because of

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[87] Available at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/, accessed 30 December 2009.

[88] This information is based on an email contact between me and Schwartz on 6 February 2010 at 23:06.

[89] Available at http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/03/stephen-schwartz-and-the-center-for-islamic, accessed 30 December 2009.

'his dedication to fighting the spread of Wahhabism, the Saudi-financed ideology that has acquired such a powerful role internationally, and notably among American Muslims'. Actually, the CIP has a religious air of Sufi Islam, with a counter stance against the Sunni-Islam 'Saudi Wahhabism' (see the coming Section [8.3] for a complete discussion of the religiously doctrinal opposition between Sufi Islam and Sunni Islam). Schwartz himself associates 'Wahhabism' with 'totalitarianism' (Schwartz 2002: 96, 104, 196-97, 276).

Likewise, DeLong-Bas has been institutionally empowered by the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU). The Center has a website that introduces the academic research and publications, programs, and news and events associated with the CMCU.[90]One can find the following information at this website. The Center was founded in 1993 by an agreement between the *Foundation pour L'Entente entre Chretiens et Musulmans*, Geneva and Georgetown University to build stronger bridge of understanding between the Muslim world and the West as well as between Islam and Christianity. The Center's mission is alleged to improve relations between the Muslim world and the West and enhance understanding of Muslims in the West.

The geographic scope and coverage of the Center includes the breadth of the Muslim world, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, as well as Europe and America. Since its foundation, the Center has become internationally recognized in the field of Muslim-Christian relations. In 2005, the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU) received a gift of $20 million dollars from Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, a globally renowned businessman and investor, to expand the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding.

There are two observations about the ACMCU. First, it is part of an academic institution (Georgetown University), which has imparted DeLong-Bas with a scholarly voice, so that she can put across a particular message about Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia to what

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[90] Available at http://cmcu.georgetown.edu/, accessed 9 February 2010.

is traditionally known as the Christian West. Second, this academic institution has been funded by a Saudi Prince (Alwaleed Bin Talal). Note that the Center was renamed the 'Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding' (ACMCU). DeLong-Bas's presence at the Center is thus indicative of her positive stance towards what is often referred to as 'Saudi Wahhabism'.

Also, importantly, if we compare the two institutional frameworks (CIP vs. ACMCU) in terms of their respective assigned mission, we may well understand the diametrically different ideological functions employed by each of them. Whilst the CIP makes a point of disconnecting the West (particularly the US) from Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, the ACMCU is acutely keen on connecting the two. On a macro level of analysis, this can elucidate the clashing textual messages, constructed by the two writers (Schwartz and DeLong-Bas), which have been linguistically actualized in the form of differently connoted collocates with the same, or similar, node words across the two texts.

Each text has been made to ideologically serve the institutional context by which it was constrained. Also, each text has been underlain by a particular discourse type about Wahhabism or Wahhabi Islam, provided it should be ideologically congruent with the same institutional framework. Hence meta-Wahhabi discourse in its bifurcated voice, anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses. Actually, as shown in the micro-analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), a typical realization of such a bifurcated discursive voice can be textually manifested in the collocations that have been ideologically formed and shaped within the institutional constraints of both the CIP and the ACMCU.

8.3 Opposing meta-Wahhabi discursive competences

Interpreting the ideological status of the collocations produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas requires an in-depth awareness of the meta-Wahhabi discursive competences that cognitively underlie the two types of discourse, anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi. These discursive competences are sociocognitive models upon which members of anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourse communities draw in interpreting and consuming the meaning of collocations in one way or the other in text. As introduced in Chapter 3 (Subsection 3.7.2), discursive competence has two constituents that will be tackled and applied to the research data as an interpretive procedure. The first constituent of discursive competence is ideological coherence, which is in turn the outcome of combining religious knowledge and the counter belief systems predicated on this knowledge (Subsection 8.3.1). The second constituent is the socio-religious (anti- and pro-Wahhabi) schemas and their effect on the immediate context of collocation (Subsection 8.3.2).

8.3.1 Ideological coherence: religious knowledge and belief systems

Here, analytic focus is on the first constituent of the meta-Wahhabi discursive competence, that is, the role of the conceptual notion of coherence as potentially being an outcome of the combination of religious knowledge (Sufi or Sunni) and the belief system associated with each; hence the term *ideological coherence.*

However, before coming directly to ideological coherence, I need to make clear that I am following the text-linguistics tradition of defining coherence. Significantly, in this tradition, coherence 'subsumes the procedures whereby the elements of knowledge are activated such that their conceptual connectivity is maintained' (Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 3ff). The conceptual realization of coherence draws basically on the sociocognitive perception made by discourse participants of the Other; it is a perception that might well

result in 'stereotypes': 'beliefs to the effect that all members of specific social groups share certain traits and characteristics' (Baron and Byrne 1997, cited in Pennington 2000: 95). As such, it can be said that there are two essential elements in the make-up of coherence: knowledge and belief systems. This makes a strong case for the interrelationship between coherence and ideology. Note here that ideology is not used in its negative sense; ideology is taken here as 'a description of "systems of ideas or belief" or "symbolic practices"' (Threadgold 1986: 16).

Back to the original concept, it can be said that ideological coherence is used as a conceptual resource for interpreting the anti-/pro-Wahhabi discursive competence – an important step towards an understanding of the overall meta-Wahhabi 'context models'[91] underlying the texts of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. The main argument is to explain how ideological coherence is an essential constituent of meta-Wahhabi discursive competences; this can be achieved by emphasizing the discursive role that religious knowledge plays in constituting counter belief systems, which are sustained by two typically opposing discourse communities, Wahhabi Sunnis vs. Sufis. Therefore, here, the main hypothesis is that ideological coherence is based on this interplay between religious knowledge and counter belief systems.

To begin with, meta-Wahhabi discourses disseminate different religious knowledge frames, although, as Chittick (2000) argues, there seems to be one common axiomatic principle between these discourses, among others; that is, 'Islam's theological axiom, *tawhid*': 'God is one, but the world is many' (Chittick 2000: 25).

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[91] The term 'context model' has been introduced into discourse studies by van Dijk (2009a, 2009b), who confirms that '*contexts are not some (part of a) social situation, but a subjective mental model of such a situation*' (Van Dijk 2009a: 7, italics in original). According to van Dijk, context model 'plays a central role in the mental processes involved in the production and reception of discourse' (Van Dijk *ibid.*).

Here, it is worth mentioning that Schwartz has converted to Islam, more specifically to Sufi Islam. He pictures himself as a kind of Naqshbandi Sufi[92]. In his acknowledgments, Schwartz wrote, 'I owe even more to Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani of the Most Distinguished Naqshbandi Order of Sufis, very beloved teacher and friend, whose companionship freed my heart, may the blessings of merciful Allah [...] always be upon him' (Schwartz 2002: 288f). Further, in his article 'Why I chose Islam instead of Judaism'[93]Schwartz explains that 'Catholic spirituality led him to his earliest contacts with Sufism through the writings of the Catalan preacher and philosopher Ramon Llull, who explicitly took the Sufis as his model in his style of religious exposition'. Schwartz continues to argue that he 'researched the interfaces between Sufism and shamanism in north central Asia'. Afterwards, influenced by a volume title *The Zohar in Moslem and Christian Spain*, Schwartz began to develop a serious interest in Judaism in 1979 in Paris (*ibid.*). 'At the end of 1997, in Sarajevo', Schwartz says, 'I recognized Islam as the religion in which I believed [...]. I made *shahada*, the Islamic profession of faith'; and he openly declared his break with his earlier communist ideas since '[c]ommunism fought against God; I finally could not accept that' (*ibid.*). However, Schwartz openly declares that he found moderation, simplicity, and wisdom in Sufi Islam: 'In Sufi Islam, in particular, I found the wisdom of popular religion from Bosnia to Kazakhstan, Morocco to Indonesia' (*ibid.*).

As Islamic doctrines, Sufi Islam and Sunni (and thus Wahhabi) Islam contrast on the religious grounds of belief. This should lead us into spelling out the doctrinal conflict between Wahhabi Islam and Sufi Islam. Kaba (1974: 109) explains the core of the Wahhabi doctrine: 'God is one, He has no partner nor equal to share His almightiness'. Kaba's implication of

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[92] This relates to the Naqshabdani-Haqqani Sufi Order of America; it is some sort of a religious repertoire of the 'teachings, practices and events of the Most Distinguished Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Order which is led by 'Mawlana Shaykh Nazim Adil al Haqqani, Grand Shaykh of the Tariqa' (see [http://naqshbandi.org/], accessed 11 February 2010).

[93] The article is available at http://www.jewcy.com/dialogue/can_jews_and_muslims_get_along, accessed 10 January 2010.

this Wahhabi view is that 'Muslims should not think that someone may intercede with the judgments or decrees of Allah in order to change them', even (Prophet) Muhammad himself. Actually Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had long put forward the tenets of his Sunni reformist call (or *da'wah*) in his famous book *Kitab At-Tauhid* (The Book of Monotheism) (trans. 1996).

The most important of these tenets are: 1) '*At-Tauhid* (The Oneness of Allah)' (p. 17); 2) 'Fear of *Shirk* (Polytheism)' (p. 32); 3) 'No animal sacrifice for Allah in a place where sacrifice is made for other than Allah' (p. 55); 4) 'To vow to other than Allah is an act of *Shirk*' (p. 57); 5) 'To seek Refuge in other than Allah is a part of *Shirk*' (p. 58); 6) 'Excessive dogma in the righteousness [sic] people is the root cause of infidelity' (p. 78); 7) The condemnation of worshipping Allah at the Grave (p. 82); 8) 'Exaggeration in the Graves of the Righteousness Persons extends them to become idols' (p. 86); 9) 'It is of *Shirk* to perform a deed for worldly reasons'; 10) 'Recognizing the Grace of Allah, yet denying it is disbelief' (p. 138); 11) 'One should not say "My Slave"' (p. 162); 12) 'The forbiddance of taking Oaths frequently' (p. 176); and 13) 'None asks Intercession of Allah before His creation' (p. 183). (Note that I mentioned only the tenets that contrast directly with those of Sufism.)

Unlike the Wahhabi doctrine, the Sufi doctrine would entertain the religious belief that someone (thought to be of special relation to God) is spiritually eligible to intercede between Allah and His worshippers[94]; and this is what Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was against in his reformist call. This means that Sufis (including Schwartz himself) have more or less precast anti-Wahhabi mental representations. This may explain Schwartz's discursive animosity towards the Wahhabi creed and its religious knowledge; and hence his anti-Wahhabi approach, based on a Sufi religious knowledge that feeds into his discursive practice and that can be said to motivate the anti-Wahhabi collocations permeating his text. So are the Sufi

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[94] For a detailed discussion of this point, see W. C. Chittick (2000) *Sufism: A Short Introduction.*

discourse-community members, who have been developing commonsensical assumptions about Wahhabi Islam as a form of anti-Sufi knowledge. A clash of religious creeds is to ensue then. Religious knowledge is supposed to generate ideological coherence on the part of each discourse community, where the inhabiting members are developing expectations about the Other, be they the Wahhabis or the Sufis. This form of religious knowledge has been naturalized as part of the mentalities of discourse consumers, who would unconsciously find it unproblematic to consume collocations such as WAHHABI *extremism* on the one hand or WAHHAB'S *vision* on the other.

At this point we can say that both Schwartz and DeLong-Bas have produced the collocations identified and described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 based on a potential ideological coherence that the respective anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourse-community members mentally possess. It is a kind of coherence that gets cognitively consolidated in the form of counter belief systems, which are based on Sufi and Sunni religious knowledge frames. Members of the same religious discourse communities, who share the same religious knowledge and therefore have similar beliefs in or against Sunni-Wahhabi Islam, are expected to develop mental models that are compatible with positive or negative collocates with, say, the forgoing example node words of WAHHABI and SAUDI. It is this element of ideological coherence that drives writers or authors to be mutually exclusive in their collocational use when it comes to the same discourse object or event. One instance is Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who has been an object of controversy for different discourse communities – on top of all are Sunnis vs. Sufis – particularly since 9/11.

Of course, this does not take away the fact that there could be some variations in the degree of belief among the same members of a religious discourse community; but we are in no position to offer any typologies of, or boundaries between, the same members within one religious discourse community. Even so, the fact remains that certain collocations, rather than

others, are more ideologically appealing to members belonging to one religious discourse community. Thus, we can define ideological coherence as the cognitive blend of (religious) knowledge and beliefs upon which certain discursive practices (say, subjective collocations) are accepted as common sense among the members of a social group.

However, ideological coherence leaves the question of how religious knowledge comes into being unanswered. A useful cognitive term that may be used in explaining this aspect is *schema*, the focus of the coming subsection.

8.3.2   Meta-Wahhabi socio-religious schemas and classificatory collocates

Meta-Wahhabi schemas[95] constitute the accumulated cultural and religious knowledge (Wahhabi or Sufi) and the structured experiences about the different religious communities that discourse participants (producers and consumers) bring to any interaction with the biased lexical co-occurrences. Hence, I would prefer to coin the term *socio-religious schema*. The term is useful in that it captures the nature of religious beliefs as being socially conditioned in a way that renders them uncontested among certain discourse-community members. Such an uncontested social status of religious beliefs cannot be maintained unless they become an integral part of everyday rituals performed by the members of a religious community; only then would beliefs incrementally develop a stable mental existence in the minds of the practising members, thereby taking the form of a fixed schema.

Part of the reason why I have described these schemas as socio-religious is the fact that this kind of schematic structure is so mentally entrenched that it tends to be deterministically classificatory of the 'Other' on social and religious levels; for example, by motivating negative or positive attitudes about the members of other groups or, more strikingly, by ex-communicating members of the same or different religious groups. In his

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[95] For a detailed discussion of the concept 'schema', see the theory chapter (Chapter 3, Subsection 3.7.2.2).

book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim (2008) has strongly emphasized the classificatory nature of religious beliefs, and charted its social consequences: 'All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups' (Durkheim 2008: 37).

Indeed, based on Durkheim's argument, meta-Wahhabi discourse is socio-religiously underlain by two opposed schemas, anti-Wahhabi schema vs. pro-Wahhabi schema; and each tends to motivate certain classifications of the counter religious community members. These classifications can be collocationally actualized in texts; this would certainly have a discourse effect on the recipients of the classificatory collocates permeating those texts. It looks as if there is a baggage of socio-religious beliefs and values that shape the positive or negative response towards these kinds of collocates and that set up the recipients' expectations about them. For example, in using the collocational patterns of WAHHAB'S + *approach*, *vision*, *writings*, etc., DeLong-Bas draws on a certain socio-religious schema about Wahhabi Islam via her exposure to the discourse of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the relevant institutions inside Saudi Arabia. It can be said that this schema has been conditioned in light of the interface between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's discourse and the social setting of Saudi Arabia as being realized in an institutional form. As an acknowledgement, DeLong-Bas assured that:

> The search for this book [*Wahhabi Islam* (2004)] was made possible by unprecedented access to these source materials generously provided by the King Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as facilitated by its Director General, Dr. Fahd al-Semmari, and H.R.H Faisal bin Salman. (DeLong-Bas 2004: 291f)

This socio-religious schema has had its impact on DeLong-Bas's evaluation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is an evaluation that has been linguistically realized in the positive collocates of

WAHHAB'S that were given earlier and analysed at the micro level in Chapter 6. The whole set of the collocates used by DeLong-Bas with WAHHAB'S has the ideological import of classifying Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a 'scholar' rather than, say, an 'imposter'.

On the other hand, in using the collocational patterns of WAHHABI + *control, extremism, infiltration,* etc., Schwartz seems to draw on a different socio-religious schema about Wahhabi Islam, perhaps through the anti-Wahhabi Sufi knowledge and experiences which have systematically forged his worldview of what he thinks is the pernicious effect of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Wahhabis on the whole. This anti-Wahhabi schema does take a linguistic realization in Schwartz's derogatory classifications about Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. For example, this is clear in the semantic denigration that is imposing in Schwartz's representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as being 'the first exemplar of totalitarianism' (Schwartz 2002: 74).

Also, the anti-Wahhabi schema takes an extreme linguistic form in Schwartz's derogatory characterization of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as 'the first exemplar of a bumpkin from an obscure village in a distant district nobody had ever heard of' (*ibid.*: 133). So is the case with the discourse-community members who possess similar socio-religious and political schemas. For certain discourse-community members, it is this socio-religiously collective schemas, which may be anti- or pro-Wahhabi, that ideologically motivate word combinations in discourse. Such combinations are so frequently recurrent in the meta-Wahhabi discourse that the choice of one of their constituents appears to trigger the selection of one or more other constituents in their immediate context. Also, it is the same schemas (anti- or pro-Wahhabi) that motivate the avoidance of using the lexical items that are incompatible with the favourable context model for one discourse community. This two-statement assumption needs to be put into contextual perspective, however.

Different religious knowledge systems of, say Sunni or Sufi, Islam are the main components of what we have referred to as socio-religious schemas; and the respective community members who draw cognitively on them in generating and construing the frequent co-selection of classificatory words that frame one discourse as advocating or contesting Wahhabi Islam. Thus, the collocates permeating the discourses on Wahhabi Islam, and which accompany the key concepts in these discourses, cannot be treated as natural; rather, they are sociocognitively conditioned in a way that naturalizes them, that makes them appear to be commonsensical; that is, to be *ideologically coherent* (see Subsection 8.3.1). This is where ideological collocations can be predicated on pragmatic fallacies, or where these collocations themselves can be pragmatic fallacies (as shown in Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

Now, we are in a position to move to the last stage of the macro analysis of the research textual data, that is, the explanatory stage of meta-Wahhabi discourse.

8.4 Explaining meta-Wahhabi ideological collocations

It is time that we focused on the macro model of explaining how the covert ideology, be it anti-Wahhabi or pro-Wahhabi, is encoded implicitly behind the overt collocations that have been identified, described, produced and interpreted in Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. The explanatory model is twofold. First, it handles the social-semiotic status of the collocating items in text and the religion-based signifying process of certain words. Second, it pinpoints the global meanings of meta-Wahhabi interdiscursivity in their collocational realizations as used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas.

8.4.1 Collocation and symbolic power: semiological or factual?

Each of the two texts under investigation seems to draw on a distinct type of semiosis, viz. the symbolic actions of words (signifiers) and the religious and/or political meanings (signifieds) associated with them. The point here is to look at collocations in a way that raises what Lidov (1999: 15) calls 'sign consciousness', which is developed as 'a function of the critical use of signs'. This point seems well justified in view of what Vološinov (1973) terms 'an ideological sign': 'Every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow, of reality, but it is also itself a material segment of that very reality' (Vološinov 1973: 11). As part of ideological signs, the targeted signifiers here are node words that have been used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in the company of certain collocates. Thus far, the meaning of the same node words has proved different (if not opposing) across both texts due to their different collocates, particularly in terms of the semantic preferences and discourse prosodies involved. Yet, drawing insights from Barthes's (1972: 110ff) binary opposition 'semiological system' vs. 'factual system', we need also to demonstrate how collocational differences may be underlain by a semiological (or motivated), rather than factual (or universal), meaning.

Taking the two node words WAHHABI (used by Schwartz) and WAHHAB'S (used by DeLong-Bas) as *signifiers* that have some sort of religious or political *signifieds*, one may presume the following: in order for one term to ideologically collocate with any set of words inside text, there needs to be a semiotically uncritical religious belief (a lack of sign consciousness). Only then would 'words and images' have 'magic powers' (Lidov 1999: 17). Lidov (*ibid.*), providing examples from the biblical history of Moses and the idols as well as of Abraham and the goat he sacrificed instead of his son, explains that sign unconsciousness occurs in a religious community when its members fail to make any distinction between the religious *signified* and its *signifier*. This may currently explain why a long time ago Foucault

insisted that we should give the authority of the signifier a poststructuralist re-think; or, in his own terms, 'abolish the sovereignty of the signifier' (Foucault 1971: 22).

An important analytic resource for explaining the subjective meaning, which ideologically underlies meta-Wahhabi discourse as recognized here, lies in the fixed code or structure that is responsible for the unconscious construction and interpretation of biased collocations in their symbolic realizations as signs. Adopting an explanatory semiotic approach towards meta-Wahhabi discourse, this can be explained by focusing on the associative link between the signifiers (namely, WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S, SAUDI, and so on) and their signifieds (textually actualized in the negative or positive discourse prosodies triggered in the different collocates co-occurring with the node words) in a particular discourse community (specifically, anti-Wahhabi/Saudi or pro-Wahhabi/Saudi) and at a particular moment of history (in this context, post-9/11).

A good example of this uncritical signifying process, where the *signifier* holds a religious sovereignty, can be found in the representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a religious scholar, or Sheikh, in DeLong-Bas. In an attempt to debunk the argument that the 9/11 event should not be separated from the classic teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, DeLong-Bas draws on the symbolic power vested with the name 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' which signifies a highly religious value for a pro-Wahhabi (Sunni) discourse community. In such a community, the name conceptually signifies a whole barrage of images: a bearer of religious knowledge, a *bid'ah* [96] fighter, a religious reformer, to mention a few. The set of collocates used by DeLong-Bas (*writings*, *teachings*, *works*, *discussion*, *vision*, etc.) is an explicit realization of such images. On the other hand, in the representation of what is Wahhabi ('Wahhabism') as a monolithic religious establishment that harbours terrorism and "jihad", Schwartz draws on the

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[96] In Islam, *bid'ah* is innovation or novelty without roots in the traditional practice, *sunnah*; and thus it bears negative connotations in the Sunni-Muslim community.

same symbolic power vested with Wahhabism for an anti-Wahhabi – in our case, the Sufi – discourse community (see Kaba's [1974: 109] in Subsection 8.3.1) . In such a community, the term 'Wahhabism' conceptually signifies a host of images: terrorism, extremism, control, religious domination, etc. The set of collocates used by Schwartz is an explicit realization of such images.

Additionally, let us use Peirce's (1931-1958) model of the sign in explaining the religious significations of the typically Islamic node word JIHAD as used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. As Chandler (2007: 29ff) points out, the Peircean model is triadic in structure: a) the '*representamen*' is 'the form which the sign takes', b) an '*interpretant*' is 'not an interpreter but rather the *sense* made of the sign', and c) an 'object' is 'something beyond the sign to which it refers (a *referent*)'. As a continuation of the micro analysis of JIHAD (see Chapter 5), let us offer in Figure 8.1 below the different religious significations of the sign JIHAD:

Interpretant: Sense

(Political war vs. Religious strife)

Representamen: Sign form   Object: Referent

(the expression 'Wahhabi jihad')   (Non-Islamic practice vs. Islamic practice)

Figure 8.1: The semiotic triangle of the religious sign 'Wahhabi jihad'

In the collocation analysis of JIHAD in Chapter 5, the collocates realized differently by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas have constructed opposing ideological meanings of *Wahhabi jihad*. Taken as a linguistic sign, this expression can be explained in terms of its semiotic activity (semiosis) in both texts. As shown in Figure 8.1 above, the representamen *Wahhabi jihad* has triggered different interpretants in the two texts. To Schwartz, and perhaps to the

members of the anti-Wahhabi discourse community, this kind of jihad has a political, rather than religious/Islamic, meaning. The anti-Wahhabi meaning-making of the representamen (*Wahhabi Jihad*) has been actualized in the use of two collocates of JIHAD by Schwartz, e.g. *Afghanistan* and *against* (*Muslims*); and this has in turn constructed a more or less fixed object (or referent) out of Wahhabi jihad as being a 'non-Islamic practice'. It is to this understanding that Schwartz, alongside most anti-Wahhabi members, is geared: Wahhabi jihad is constantly referred to as 'a non-Islamic practice' (for a detailed discussion see Chapter 5).

Proceeding with Figure 8.1 above, on the other hand, to DeLong-Bas, and probably to the members of pro-Wahhabi discourse community, the same kind of jihad (Wahhabi jihad) has a religious, rather than political, meaning. The pro-Wahhabi meaning-making of the same representamen has also been actualized in the use of two classification schemes (synonymous and oppositional) of collocates drawn upon by DeLong-Bas: 1) *holy* and *war* have ideologically constructed the religious sense or interpretant of Wahhabi jihad as 'striving in the way of Allah', and 2) *collective, individual, defensive, defense* and *limited* have ideologically separated the representamen *Wahhabi jihad* from the potential political sense or interpretant of (bin Laden's) 'extreme offensive jihad'; instead, these collocates have (ideologically again) associated this representamen with the religious sense or interpretant 'religious/Islamic strife'. This may suggest that DeLong-Bas has had a doubly ideological meaning about the representamen *Wahhabi jihad*, an ideological complex so to speak. Thus, the general meaning-making of the sign or expression *Wahhabi jihad* is referentially established by DeLong-Bas as an 'Islamic practice' (again, for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 5).

Thus, by and large, we can say that the different collocational meanings across both texts are ideologically motivated in that they build on a fixed symbolic order, whose religious

or political significations are not factual in essence; rather, they have a semiological status that is marked/unmarked to the members of one discourse community.

Further, on the level of explanation, other than the symbolic power semiotically associated with the node words in both texts, there is what might be called meta-Wahhabi interdiscursivity; that is, global meanings about the Wahhabi discourse are ideologically established via the use of collocations by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas.

8.4.2 Ideological collocation and meta-Wahhabi interdiscursivity

Explaining the ideological collocations produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas necessitates the investigation of the meta-Wahhabi discourses that the two texts have drawn upon in producing these collocations. That would in turn bring in the global interdiscursive meanings associated with the collocations analysed so far, or what we might call meta-Wahhabi interdiscursivity. However, let us first briefly explain the concept of interdiscursivity as it is used here.

By its name the term *interdiscursivity* refers to the idea that different discourses interconnect in various ways. One of these ways, as Wodak (2008: 3) suggests, could run as follows: 'If we define discourse as primarily topic-related, that is a discourse on X, then a discourse on un/employment often refers for example to topics or subtopics of other discourses, such as gender or racism'. However, if we allow for the more general Foucauldian concept of discourses, the scope of interdiscursivity will broaden beyond topics or themes to include a whole domain or field, such as religious or political discourse. Both understandings complement each other, and I shall make use of the two.

The collocational pairs investigated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 can be said to be predicated on different topics and/or discursive domains that come into play in text.

Obviously, for the most part these collocations are relevant to Wahhabi discourse which is necessarily connected with Islamic discourse in general; and, if we go further above the discoursal scale, both of these discourses are part of the more general level of religious discourse. This will in turn create a new interdiscursive meaning. In our case, collocations in each text have played a key role in the constitution of this emerging (interdiscursive) meaning, which is part of political or religious meta-Wahhabi discourse. Let us point out two things here. First, meta-Wahhabi discourse is the outcome of different discourses: Wahhabi, religious (Islamic), and/or political. Second, this kind of discourse is political, in that it is focused on either attacking or supporting Wahhabi Islam and legitimizing (or not) the scholarly position of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

The concrete basis of this interdiscursive meaning can be found in the collocational analysis conducted in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. It has been empirically proved that, across both texts, the relation between the node words (WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S, SAUDI, WOMAN, MAN, etc.) and their collocates are ideological in nature, i.e. collocations are intended to legitimize a certain perspective on the Wahhabi discourse (linguistically and/or rhetorically) by drawing on certain classification and argumentation schemes that underlie these collocations. Actually, the interesting point, here, is the fact that the node words are parts of Wahhabi discourse, which attract collocates of various (sometimes interrelated) discourses – Islamic, religious, political or otherwise. This has in turn produced a type of hybrid discourse, that is, meta-Wahhabi discourse, which ideologically bifurcates into anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses.

Before coming to the actual instances of collocation in the previous two chapters, I need to make clear that individual lexical items (node words or collocates) derive their discursive status from their phraseology in the concordances. For example, even within one and the same text, the node word WOMAN may belong to different discourses depending on

the overall co-text in the concordance. So are the collocates of a node word, which may well belong to different discourses. Let us cite some of the example collocations, analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, so that we can specify how they contribute to an interdiscursive meaning.

While the node words WAHHABI (used by Schwartz) and WAHHAB'S (used by DeLong-Bas) are explicit references to the (Islamic) Wahhabi discourse, their collocates belong to different discourses in each text. Schwartz uses the collocates of WAHHABI (*lobby, separatism, alliance, ideology, regime, power,* and *state*) in reference to political discourse. This kind of collocation has created a composite type of discourse, i.e. political-Wahhabi (or politico-religious) discourse. Schwartz has exploited the hybridity of this discourse type in attacking Wahhabi Islam and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The collocations are deployed in such a way as to focus on the political agenda of Wahhabism, rather than constructing a religious image of Wahhabi Islam. Thus, Schwartz's negative interdiscursive meaning has been instantiated by the collocating items of WAHHABI. On the other hand, the collocates of WAHHAB'S (*writings, works, discussion, approach,* and *interpretation*) are used by DeLong-Bas in reference to an academic discourse. This kind of collocation has created a composite type of discourse, i.e. academic-Wahhabi (or academic socio-religious) discourse. Likewise, DeLong-Bas has exploited the hybridity of this discourse type in defending Wahhabi Islam and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The collocations are deployed in such a way as to construct the scholarly position of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, rather than featuring the political-Islamist aspect of the Wahhabi movement itself. Thus, DeLong-Bas's positive interdiscursive meaning has been instantiated by the collocating items of WAHHAB'S.

Now, let us use another example collocation that features an interesting comparison between the two texts under analysis, that is, the node JIHAD and the different collocates across the two texts. However, since the term JIHAD is a typical reference to the Quranic

discourse[97], we need first to shed light on the sacred status of this discourse type in the different Muslim discourse communities, so that we can see how Quranic discourse has great potential for persuading the members of these communities. Muslims regard the Quran as the holy book that had been revealed to their Prophet Muhammad from Heavens; that is, it is a divine source for them. The Quran is the main constitution and guide for each and every Muslim, at least ideally. It is also the first primary source for legislation in Islam; and Islamic law (*shariah*) is to a great extent the final aggregate of this 'holy' discourse. No Muslim is allowed to question the Quran's wording or its verse-and-chapter order. Even so, the interpretation of the Quran, and not the Quran itself, may differ from one religious sect to the other, depending on how they perceive it as well as on what ideology this sect might have. For all these considerations the Quran reigns supreme in the hearts of all Muslims.

Back to the node word JIHAD, the term strictly refers to Quranic discourse, but is associated with collocates that refer to different discourses across both texts. However, we need to spell out one caveat here: both texts use the term JIHAD as part of the Wahhabi discourse. Schwartz uses JIHAD in collocation with the items *Afghanistan* and *Muslims*. Co-textually, these items are used with a political reference to 'extreme Muslims' in Afghanistan (see Chapter 5). Here, there appears to be a Quranic-political discourse; again, this negative interdiscursive meaning has been channelled through the collocating items of JIHAD. For DeLong-Bas, the collocates of JIHAD refer to different discourses depending on the context of use. For instance, the collocates *war*, *infidels* and *unbelievers* are derived from the Quranic discourse. At first glance this may indicate no interdiscursivity, since both the node and its collocates are typical intertextual references to the Quran; but this is not the case. As we said earlier, while JIHAD makes an explicit reference to the Quran, DeLong-Bas uses the term in a

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[97] Using the arabiCorpus tool online (at http://arabicorpus.byu.edu/index.php), I managed to calculate the number of occurrences of the term jihad and its word-forms in the Quranic discourse: 15 occurrences, 17.74 instances per 100,000 words in Quran.

more specific discourse – Wahhabi discourse. After all, she restrictively discusses the notion of 'Wahhabi jihad'. Thus, the foregoing collocations are predicated on a Wahhabi-Quranic discourse. Importantly, the religiously employed collocates *collective (kifaya)*, *individual ('ayn)* and *duty (fard)* are all technical references to the discourse of Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)*. Here, based on these collocations, there emerges a combination of two discourses, eventually yielding the Wahhabi-Islamic discourse. Looking at the two sets of collocates, the final conclusion is that DeLong-Bas creates an interdiscursive meaning that integrates Wahhabism within Islam.

There are yet other interesting collocational pairs within the gender discourse in Wahhabi Islam. This is particularly so with DeLong-Bas who pays meticulous attention to the topic of gender in the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Schwartz has been mostly concerned with non-gendered references to different social actors, including *man/men, woman/women, husband, wife*, etc. Actually, in this regard, gender-specific node words used by Schwartz will not be considered, because their collocates are function words; they do not refer to any specific discourse. However, DeLong-Bas's collocational pairs are focused on an interdiscursive relation between two discourses: the first is a composite Wahhabi-gender discourse, which is based on the gender node words (MALE, FEMALE, MAN, WOMAN, etc.); the second is a combination of Quranic and Islamic discourses.

Here, DeLong-Bas draws on two interdiscursive orders, depending on the gender-specific collocations analysed in Chapter 7. First, the gendered Wahhabi and Islamic discourses are realized in the following collocations: a) MAN, MAN'S, HUSBAND, WOMAN'S and WOMEN + *rights*; b) WOMAN + *mahr* and *marriage*; c) WOMAN'S + *guardian* and *consent*; d) MALE and FEMALE + *slave(s)* and *servant*; e) WIFE + *maintenance*. Second, the gendered Wahhabi and Quranic discourses are realized in the following collocations: a) MALE + *witness*; b) WOMAN'S and WIFE + *talaq*. Again, DeLong-Bas

exploits this aspect of collocation-based interdiscursivity in integrating the Wahhabi discourse into Islamic discourse.

8.5 Conclusion

Chapter 8 focuses on the macro-level analysis of the ideological collocations identified and described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In this macro analysis of the data, the chapter follows a dual approach that is both social-semiotic and sociocognitive: whilst the two stages of producing and explaining ideological collocation in meta-Wahhabi discourse draw on the social-semtiotic approach, the stage of interpreting such collocations draws largely on the sociocognitive approach.

Overall, in this chapter I tried to pin down the broad social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse with a special focus on the discursive practice of ideological collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. To this end I have attempted three primary questions: 1) 'how are the ideological collocations used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas produced?'; 2) 'how are they interpreted among the different members of discourse communities?'; and 3) 'how are they explained?'. The chapter has covered aspects that constituted the social context underlying the two texts under macro analysis: a) the text producers' biographies and opposing institutional frameworks; b) the opposing discursive competences underlying anti- and pro-Wahhabi discourse communities; c) the social-semiotic model explaining meta-Wahhabi ideological collocations.

Now, coming to the end of the macro-analysis chapter (Chapter 8), it is time to summarize the whole thesis and discuss the findings and implications therein. This is the focus of the coming conclusion chapter (Chapter 9). Also, in the same chapter, other aspects of the present study will be covered, such as limitations, recommendations and future research.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this conclusion chapter is to offer an overview of the whole thesis; the overview rests on six pillars. First, an overall summary is introduced with the purpose of recapitulating the central idea of the thesis in terms of the research problem and the methodological procedure and theoretical framework proposed for tackling this problem. Second, an array of the findings and implications coming out of the thesis is offered with a focus on the textual phenomenon of collocation in relation to concepts that lie in different areas of study, e.g. semantics, sociology, cognition and rhetoric. Third, based on the findings and implications, a definition of *ideological collocation* is put forward. Fourth, a number of recommendations are suggested as to how collocation should be critically investigated in discourse studies. Fifth, the limitations of the study are presented. Sixth, prospective research proceeding from the current study is finally outlined.

9.2 Summary of results

This research addressed the following overarching question: How has Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism been ideologically recontextualized across post-9/11 opposing discourses via collocation? The data selected for this analysis of ideological collocation are two books that take oppositional stances and were consecutively produced in the US on the same discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism and its bearings on the 9/11 event. The first is Stephen Schwartz's *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (2002); the second is Natana DeLong-Bas's *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*

(2004). The main results associated with the overarching question in this study have been reached by answering a number of related sub-questions.

The first sub-question was concerned with how corpus methods can help in identifying collocations that are *peculiar* to Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Towards this end, I devised a method which involved identifying keywords and then selecting a small number of these words, based on those which were thematically related to each other and satisfied criteria for collocation with other words. I followed Church, Hanks and Moon (1994) who argue that it may be useful to intersect the two measures of MI and *t* scores and look at pairs that have high scores in both measures. This is so, because 'the *t* test measures the confidence with which we can claim that there is some association' (Church and Hanks 1990, cited in McEnery *et al.* 2006: 57), while the MI score measures values that are 'idiosyncratic instances peculiar to' to each of the two texts under analysis (Clear 1993). I feel that this method was successful in providing me with a way of identifying a small set of relevant collocates in the data, which served as a springboard for a more detailed qualitative analysis.

The second sub-question ran as follows: How do the collocations designated for analysis contribute to ideologies across the two texts? The answer to this sub-question constituted the micro analysis, where the linguistic-rhetorical description of the collocations identified computationally was applied to the collocates in the texts under investigation. First, the textual synonymy realized in one text between the collocates of one node word was found to ideologically create intratextual overlexicalization of a certain aspect of reality. Second, the oppositional paradigms holding among the collocates co-occurring with the same or similar node words in or across texts ideologically created intra/intertextual relexicalization of a certain aspect of reality. I selected these oppositional paradigms based on the lexico-semantic relations potentially holding between the collocates in or across the texts; for example, **euphemism** vs. **dysphemism, specification** vs. **genericization, nomination** vs.

categorization, and **epistemic modality** vs. **categorical assertion**. Rhetorically, the argumentation scheme of pragmatic fallacy was applied to the collocations that are predicated on or contribute to fallacious arguments in the same texts. It should be noted that these collocation-based (pragmatic) *ad* fallacies are specified according to the collocational relations found in the research data; for example, *argumentum ad hominem* (i.e. personally attacking the Other), *argumentum ad misericordiam* (i.e. unjustifiably appealing for pathos), *argumentum ad verecundiam* (i.e. misplaced appeal for authorities), *secundum quid* (i.e. hasty generalization), etc. The primary result coming out of answering this research sub-question lies in the fact that the two texts under analysis have had a collocation-based recontexualization of the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism on both linguistic and rhetorical levels of text analysis. The ideological meanings encoded into the texts have been – to use Fowler's (1996: 40ff) terms – '*habitualized*' and '*legitimated*' in the overt collocational structure of both texts.

The third sub-question was formulated as follows: What are the sociocognitive and social-semiotic contextual factors that underlie the ideological use of collocations in the two texts within meta-Wahhabi discourse? Being complex, this sub-question has been split into three more elementary forms of sub-questions: a) 'how do the authors' identities and circumstances relate to their use of collocations within meta-Wahhabi discourse?'; b) 'what is the relationship between such collocates and the two meta-Wahhabi discourse communities under examination?'; c) 'in what way can we explain the symbolic power and interdiscursive nature of the collocations running through the texts investigated?'. The answers to these sub-questions covered three respective aspects, which have constituted the macro level of analysis in the present research (see Chapter 8). First, I focused on the text producers in terms of their biographies and the opposing intuitional frameworks via which each has been enacted to produce these ideological collocations (Section 8.2). Second, I pinned down the interpretive

procedure of anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discursive competences that have motivated the collocational use in each of the two texts (Section 8.3). At this point, two constituents of the meta-Wahhabi discursive competences were operationalized: a) the ideological coherence (as comprising different Sunni and Sufi religious knowledge frames and antagonistic belief systems) that are mutually accessible or exclusive among the anti-Wahhabi and the pro-Wahhabi discourse-community members; b) the socio-religious schemas that those members draw upon in accepting or rejecting the classificatory collocates permeating the texts of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Third, I employed a model that explains the social-semiotic realizations of collocations within the texts in two respects: a) the symbolic power invested with the collocating words as signs that, despite being pragmatically motivated, appears to be fixed in collocational relations that are employed by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas; b) the interdiscursive meanings underlying these collocating words in the wider social context of meta-Wahhabi discourse (Section 8.4).

Again, one important result arising out of tackling these three macro sub-questions is the fact that the overt ideological collocations running antagonistically across the texts systematically correspond to a covert sociocognitive structure that has motivated the use of these collocations in both texts. As demonstrated in the social-semiotic analysis of such collocations in Chapter 8 (Subsection 8.4.1), the collocating items in both texts have been too far from being neutral and factual; rather, they are subjective and motivated by means of anti- or pro-Wahhabi schemas of religious belief systems and knowledge frames. This has imbued the two texts with an air of (de-)legitimation of what has been socially constructed as Wahhabi Islam or Saudi Wahhbism in the two texts produced post-9/11.

Indeed, this should bring us back to the overarching question posited at the outset of this section: How has Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism been ideologically recontextualized across post-9/11 opposing discourses via collocation? The answers to the foregoing sub-

questions put forward throughout this study, and the results thereof, can collectively explain how collocation could be an ideological resource for recontextualizing Wahhabi Islam/Saudi Wahhabism across opposing discourses post 9/11 in the US.

The scope of this study involved three micro strands of collocational analysis. These strands have been determined, given the quantitative (computational) and qualitative (thematic and linguistic) criteria in deciding upon the node words in Chapter 4 (Subsection 4.4.1.3).

The first micro strand of collocational analysis in this study was based on the node word JIHAD and its collocates in Schwartz (*Afghanistan, against, or, Muslims* and *is*) as well as in DeLong-Bas (*holy, war, collective, infidels, defensive, should, limited, duty, States, against* and *defense*) (see Chapter 5). The collocational analysis of JIHAD ran either within or across the two texts in a way that demonstrated the opposing representations of 'Wahhabi jihad' in these texts. For example, it was noticed that while DeLong-Bas was interested in emphasizing the moral evaluation legitimation of the Wahhabi jihad (e.g. the collocational pattern JIHAD + *holy war*), Schwartz was keen to capitalize on this aspect of legitimation in a way that separated Wahhabi jihad from Islamic jihad – the former being the extreme version of the latter (Islamic jihad) (e.g. the collocational pattern JIHAD + *or* and its co-textual environment in Figure 5.1 [Subsection 5.6.6]). Another aspect of the collocation-based representation of jihad in the two texts was displayed in an oppositional light: DeLong-Bas emphasized the 'locality' and 'defensiveness' of Wahhabi jihad (e.g. the collocates *defensive, collective* and *limited*); Schwartz focused on the 'global' and 'offensive' nature of this kind of jihad (e.g. the collocates *Afghanistan, against* and *Muslims*).

The second micro strand of collocational analysis was based on the node words WAHHABI and SAUDI used by Schwartz and their collocates (respectively, *infiltration, lobby, cult, separatism, power*, etc. and *alliance, elite, regime, rulers*, etc.) as well as WAHHAB'S

and SAUDI used by DeLong-Bas and their collocates (respectively, *writings, stance, teachings, works, worldview,* etc. and *monarchy, Arabia, royal,* and *family*). Overall, this collocational analysis has revealed opposing meta-Wahhabi representations in the two texts. Whereas Schwartz presents a Wahhabi-Saudi theocracy (monolithically established in Saudi Arabia) that is religiously 'dogmatic' and 'fundamentalist' in approach, DeLong-Bas focuses on the scholarly position of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a visionary religious reformer, whose main concern was to purify the monotheistic creed of Islam at his time (see Chapter 6).

The third, and last, micro strand of collocational analysis was based on the gender-specific node words of MAN, MAN'S, MEN, MALE, HUSBAND, WOMAN, WOMAN'S, WOMEN, WOMEN'S, FEMALE, WIFE, and WIVES and their collocates in DeLong-Bas and the node words MAN, MEN and WIVES and their collocates in Schwartz (see Chapter 7). Insofar as the theme of gender is concerned, one striking observation was that while the collocational environment displayed by DeLong-Bas has prominently featured gendered representations in the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in particular and in Islam in general, that offered by Schwartz has hardly exhibited any such representations.

However, in no way did this belittle the gender-based collocational analysis in the whole data; suffice it to consider the critical presence-counter-absence representations of the theme of gender therein. DeLong-Bas made a point of presenting the reader with a positive image of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a scholar who paid meticulous attention to the theme of gender in his religious works (e.g. the collocational patterns WOMEN ... *gender*) and to other relevant issues. One good example is the issue of marital life and its duties and responsibilities. It was textually revealed in a way that constructed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a scholar who was committed to defending the rights of helpless women; this was realized via the following collocational patterns: a) MAN ... *should, woman, right,* and *wife*; b) MEN ...

women and *responsible*; c) MALE ... *female*; d) HUSBAND ... *wife, talaq* and *right*; e) WOMAN ... *mahr, status, marriage* and *consent*; f) WOMEN ... *children* and *rights*; g) WOMEN'S ... *rights*; h) WIFE ... *maintenance* and *talaq*. On the other hand, Schwartz made use of the gender-related node words of MAN, MEN, and WIVES and their collocates in such a way as to continue with the negative representation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and some powerful Saudi social actors. For example, as shown in Chapter 7 (Subsection 7.4.2), in using the collocation WIVES + *and* in the lexical pattern *wives and daughters*, Schwartz tried to disparage the scholarly image of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was reported to have had the opinion that 'all Muslims had fallen into unbelief and that if they did not follow him [Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] ... their wives and daughters [should be] violated' (line 4 in Figure 7.19). Similarly, using the collocation WIVES + *and*, Schwartz portrayed Ibn Sa'ud as being a hegemonic male who 'had 17 wives and hundreds of concubines' (line 1 in Figure 7.19), and whose voracious demand for women 'produced armies of wives and concubines' (line 3 in Figure 7.19).

Thus, in this study, the scope of collocational analysis is tripartite in structure; and it corresponds with the three micro-analysis chapters – Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The analysis is predicated on three major themes that are concerned with the opposing representations of Wahhabi-Saudi Islam and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: 1) Wahhabi jihad (the node word is JIHAD); 2) Saudi-Wahhabi theocracy vs. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious scholarliness (the node words are WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI); 3) Wahhabi gender representations (the node words are MAN, MEN, MALE, WOMAN, FEMALE, WIVES, etc.).

Now, let us discuss the wider implications for the theories and methods used in investigating the interface between collocation and ideology across opposing discourses in this study. This is the focus of the coming section (Section 9.3).

9.3 Theoretical and methodological implications

9.3.1 Corpus linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA)

I do not claim any unprecedented finding about combining CDA and CL. As I showed in Chapter 2, recently there has been a plethora of research that draws on a methodological synergy of CDA and CL. However, here I can claim a genuine contribution towards this methodological synergy itself; this has been feasible by creating a symbiotic blend of quantitative and qualitative criteria that provided reliable grounds for identifying and describing the linguistic phenomenon – collocation – in my textual data.

Generally, in CDA studies the linguistic description of a certain text is normally taken as a premise; the analysis is barely interested in, or sensitive to, offering objective criteria for identifying (and thus describing) the textual phenomena in their research. Rather, what significantly matters are aspects such as text description and production, on the one hand, and discourse interpretation and explanation on the other. Contrary to this, in the present study, I was keen on starting from the stage of objectively identifying the collocations in my data drawing on computational software (WordSmith5 [Scott 2007]).

This has been of great value to the subsequent stages in the methodological procedure in the study, including description, production, interpretation and explanation. The reasons can be attributed to the fact that, in identifying the collocations that will be further qualitatively investigated, I kept away any potential bias on my part as a Sunni Muslim, who may have some sympathy with (Sheikh) Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Rather than pre-selecting a set of words that I thought would be interesting to analyse, I instead used corpus procedures to identify those words that were significantly frequent in each text when compared against each other. I then chose a small number of words to focus on, based upon further quantitative criteria (although I also made some qualitative judgements about thematic

relevance, which were based upon noting sets of words which showed grammatical or semantic links between the two books). It is unlikely that I would have chosen these words, had I not used corpus procedures. My method thus suggests a template for studying collocation in future research which is similarly composed of two (contrastive) texts or corpora.

Another genuine contribution towards this methodological synergy is its application to the genre of research data I used, which is very rare in the two disciplines of CDA and CL; that is, meta-religious texts with political implications. The two books analysed in the present study tackle the religious topic of Wahhabi Islam and its political associations with the 9/11 attacks against the US. These books were written particularly to elucidate the political/religious nature of the movement of Wahhabism, which was founded by the eighteenth-century Muslim scholar Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (see Chapter 1). As such, in the present study, the methodological synergy of CDA and CL has been operationalized at the level of a kind of religious and political discourse. This has been clear in the research where keywords varied between religious and political discourses (see Chapter 5). For example, SHI'A, HAMAS, MOSQUES, KOMINI, PROPHET, SHARI'AH, LOBBY, SUFI, REFUGEES, TALIBAN, and CATHOLIC in Schwartz; and HADITH, QURAN, TAWHID, GOD, QURANIC, and SCRIPTURES in DeLong-Bas. The same is true of certain collocates; for example, the collocates of the node word JIHAD in both texts: *Afghanistan* and *Muslims* in Schwartz and *holy*, *infidels*, *States* (referring to the US), *unbelievers* and *Laden* in DeLong-Bas.

The analysis of religious or meta-religious texts from a CDA standpoint brings with it unique considerations – for example, the fact that religious texts are believed to be the words of God, which has implications for how the discourses within and about them are interpreted and negotiated; and so is the case for meta-religious texts within which the

believed-to-be-words-of-God texts are *intertextually* embedded. The aim of my thesis was not

to challenge either of the standpoints taken by Schwartz or DeLong-Bas (although my

analysis did involve looking at pragmatic fallacies), nor to be critical of people who maintain

or produce religious discourse, but was instead more concerned with investigating how the

two authors use collocates to create meta-Wahhabi discourses that are oppositional to each

other. More explicit judgements are left to the reader to make and are beyond the remit of this

thesis.

9.3.2 Methodological symbiosis of keywords and macropropositions

One important implication that comes out of the foregoing method of combining CL and CDA

is the theoretical need for contextualizing keywords. In the present study this implication has

been rendered plausible by contextualizing the keywords of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas into

their respective macropropostional contents or 'macropropositions' (i.e. the main topics or

themes realized as the chapter titles in the two books). In order to achieve this end, the present

study has developed a methodological synergy of the corpus method of extracting keywords

and the (CDA) sociocognitive approach (Van Dijk 1998, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b). As

demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 and 5.3), drawing on van Dijk's (2009b: 68)

sociocognitive approach, I managed to merge keyword analysis with an analysis of 'semantic

macrostructures'; that is, with a study of 'global meanings, topics or themes', or what van

Dijk sometimes refer to as 'macropropositions'. According to van Dijk (2009b: *ibid.*), these

are 'what discourses are (globally) about [...] they represent the meaning or information most

readers will memorize best of a discourse'.

Thus, a macropropositional analysis can ideally contextualize the keywords in their

text, where it is likely that these highly frequent words are part of the main topics or themes of

the respective text or discourse. Actually, in our case, this has been most helpful, since the

analysed research data are books, whose genre dictates the existence of titles and subtitles (potentially standing as macropropositions). Interestingly, van Dijk has made this aspect explicit: 'Discursively, topics or themes that are characteristically expressed in titles, abstracts, summaries and announcements' (Van Dijk 2009b: *ibid.*).

The methodological combination of corpus method and van Dijk's sociocognitive approach has revealed the different semantic foci made by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas and the opposing mental representations that each author draws on in producing their texts. The keywords extracted from the two texts and the major topics and themes around which each of these texts revolves reflected the different subjective representations of the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam. The two authors tended to focus on certain keywords and macropropositions that best serve the way they perceive this discourse topic. One can confidently say that this kind of methodological integration between keyword extraction and the sociocognitive approach is symbiotic in essence: just as keywords are beneficial to the examination of macropropositions in one text, macropropositions are essential for the contextualization of keywords in the same text.

9.3.3 Collocation and ideology

It could be said that the most important finding in this study is the demonstration that collocation is a textual resource for ideological representations across opposing discourses. Only can this be feasible should we take the concept of collocation beyond its limited descriptive meaning in text towards its global interpretive meaning in discourse: the study of collocational meaning as being contested among clashing texts and opposing discourses. As shown in the present study, writers employ collocations (consciously or not) either to defend their standpoint or to attack a counter standpoint. Therefore, texts that tackle the same discourse topic, but draw on opposing discourses, are highly likely to abound with collocates

that reflect the author's attitudes and beliefs towards certain node words; these node words could be markers of the authorial standpoint itself. Hence, the same or similar node words in clashing texts may well characteristically co-occur with different ideology-laden collocates.

Analysing ideological collocations demands new theoretical and methodological approaches. Indeed, the present study has offered one like approach; it is a synergy of corpus linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). On the one hand, CL provides computational software (e.g. WordSmith Tools [Scott 1999]) that can objectively identify strongly and certainly co-occurring words (i.e. collocations) in texts; in this study, I have made use of WordSmith5 (Scott 2007) in identifying the collocations 'peculiar' to the textual data via the MI (Mutual Information) score. This collocation statistic focuses on the 'idiosyncratic collocates of a node' in a way that features the instances of collocation that are peculiar to one text other than the other (Clear 1993: 281). However, the MI score was intersected with another collocation statistic that guaranteed the certainty of the collocability of the co-occurring items, viz. the *t* score. Together, both scores brought in 'strong' and 'certain' collocations in the data. This step proved vital to the computational identification of the collocations that are probably motivated by authorial stances of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas. Hence these collocations may represent a unique stylistic feature of each writer. I believe that by adopting two different criteria (MI and *t* score), I have created a robust way of identifying collocates, which is a methodological insight that could be extended to other collocate-based research.

On the other hand, CDA has offered a qualitative approach, whereby the collocations (identified as being *peculiar* to each text) can be critically examined. Linguistically, the collocates in or across texts are employed ideologically to single out one aspect of reality (the author's stance towards the discourse topic) by *overlexicalizing* it via textual synonyms that cluster around this aspect of reality (realized as node words) in one

text. Moreover, collocates are utilized ideologically to reverse a counter aspect of reality (again, authorial stances) by *relexicalizing* this aspect via oppositional paradigms against the counter aspect of reality (node words). For example, by dysphemisticizing/euphemisticizing, specifying/genericizing, or modalizing/asserting collocates either in the same text or across clashing texts.

Thus, the collocate-bound ideologies across these clashing texts can be analyzed by linguistically uncovering the different social classification-systems of reality. Also, rhetorically, the co-occurring words in text may be predicated on a certain pragmatic *ad* fallacy; for example, the collocate-node relation may be established in a way that appeals to the *pathos* of a certain discourse community or that attacks a social actor in their person; hence the collocation-based *argumentum ad misericordiam* and *argumentum ad hominem*, respectively. As such, likewise, collocations could be the nuclei of fallacious arguments that ideologically defend or attack a certain standpoint in text.

9.3.4 Collocation and tone: alarmist vs. pacific

Generally, it can be said that lexical cohesion, including reiteration and collocation, systematically reveals authors' tones or polytones towards certain topics, especially in journalistic writing (for a detailed discussion, see Salama 2006). In the present study, collocations stand as a revelatory indicator of the authors' distinct tones of writing about the discourse topic of Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism. The authorial contrasting tones towards this discourse topic spring from the interplay of the semantic preferences and discourse prosodies of the collocations in texts. This interplay of semantic preferences and discourse prosodies has revealed Schwartz's alarmist tone towards Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism; the same interplay has equally revealed DeLong-Bas's pacific tone (which runs counter to

Schwartz's) towards the same discourse topic. This can be exemplified by one collocation instance.

As shown in Chapter 6, Schwartz presents us with 'Wahhabi Islam' as being 'a global threat' and 'Saudi Wahhabism' as being 'a dictatorship that harbours conspiracy and religious patronizing'. In this text, the node word WAHHABI (and its collocates) reflects an overwhelmingly negative discourse prosody that is constituted by the combination of three semantic preferences: 1) the collocates *cult, extremism, jihad, separatism* and *terror* have a semantic preference for threat; 2) *infiltration* and *lobby* for conspiracy and interference; and 3) *regime, power* and *state* have a particularly critical semantic preference for a tightly policed status of Saudi Wahhabism. In contrast to Schwartz's alarmist tone, Delong-Bas has had a pacific tone towards Wahhhabi Islam. DeLong-Bas's use of the node word WAHHAB'S (and its collocates) reflects a highly positive discourse prosody, where the collocates *writings, works, teachings, vision, interpretation, approach, discussion,* etc. have a semantic preference for religious scholarliness. This semantic preference targets the Muslim scholar Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his receptive religious teachings in Islam.

9.3.5 Collocation and cognition

It is a serious limitation in text linguistics that collocation is viewed as being a mere cohesive relation, which can readily be recognized at the lexico-semantic level in text (e.g. Halliday and Hasan 1976: 286). I think this has mistakenly isolated collocation from the realm of cognition. At the cognitive level, one finding in this study is that collocates can trigger readerly desired or undesired conceptual images that are associated with their node words. As demonstrated in Chapter 8, the collocations produced by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas are underlain by religious knowledge systems (Sunni vs. Sufi) and the corresponding beliefs that eventually constitute what I called *ideological coherence*. Ideological coherence is an

essential component of the meta-Wahhabi discursive competences, whereby the respective (anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi) discourse-community members accept or reject certain collocates of node words such as WAHHABI, WAHHAB'S and SAUDI in the textual data. The second component of meta-Wahhabi discursive competences is socio-religious schemas and the cognitive role they play in rendering the collocates of these node words classificatory of what is 'Wahhabi' or 'Saudi' for Schwartz (and for the anti-Wahhabi discourse-community members at large), and of who is 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' or what is 'Saudi' for DeLong-Bas (and for the pro-Wahhabi/Saudi members in general).

9.3.6 Collocation and semiotics

One important theoretical implication in this study is that ideological collocation should be seen as a signifying process, where the node words are signifiers whose religious, political, or otherwise signifieds can be actualized in the form of motivated collocates. Thus, the words that seem at face value to be co-occurring in symbolically arbitrary lexical relations in text may well be just the collocational preferences made by the text producer. The symbolic power vested with this kind of collocation renders it commonsensical to the text consumers who are unaware of the semiological (motivated) lexical associations in one discourse, and hence who unconsciously treat them as being factual universal associations. This may explain the hegemonic meanings of certain symbolically established collocations in one religious discourse community.

In this regard, a good example collocation can be taken from Chapter 8, where the way that DeLong-Bas has selected collocates of WAHHAB'S (*writings, works, teachings, vision, interpretation, approach, discussion*, etc.) that are part of the chains of symbolic religious signifieds of the signifier 'Ibn Abd al-Wahhab' for the pro-Wahhabi (Sunni) discourse-community members. So is the case with Schwartz's selection of the collocates of

WAHHBAI (*cult, extremism, separatism, infiltration, power, regime*). These collocates are part of the chains of symbolic religious and political signifieds evoked by the signifier 'Wahhabi' for the anti-Wahhabi (say, Sufi) discourse-community members.

9.3.7 Collocation and interdiscursivity

Importantly, the present study has opened up the possibility that collocations could be a rich textual resource for recognizing interdiscursivity. This finding draws on the principle of topicality proposed by Wodak (2008: 3) in recognizing how discourses may interconnect: 'If we define discourse as primarily topic-related, that is a discourse on X, then a discourse on un/employment often refers for example to topics or subtopics of other discourses, such as gender or racism'. As shown in Chapter 8, the collocates of a node word may typically associate with different discourses in a way that renders the node word itself crossing over these different discourses.

One collocation instance that exemplifies interdiscursivity is DeLong-Bas's use of the node word JIHAD and its collocates. The collocates of JIHAD draw on different discourses such as religious, namely, Islamic (*collective* and *individual*) and political (*States* and *Laden*) discourses. As demonstrated in Chapter 8 (Subsection 8.4.2), this collocation-based interdiscursivity serves an important function: it demarcates Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's religious worldview of jihad as being 'limited' and 'defensive' from bin Laden's political-Islamist view of jihad as being 'global' and 'offensive'.

Another example is DeLong-Bas's use of gender-specific node words and their collocates, where there are two forms of collocation-based interdiscursivity. First, the gendered Wahhabi and Islamic discourses are realized in the following collocations: a) MAN, MAN'S, HUSBAND, WOMAN'S and WOMEN + *rights*; b) WOMAN + *mahr* (i.e. dowry) and *marriage*; c) WOMAN'S + *guardian* and *consent*; d) MALE and FEMALE + *slave(s)* and

servant; e) WIFE + *maintenance*. Second, the gendered Wahhabi and Quranic discourses are realized in the following collocations: a) MALE + *witness*; b) WOMAN'S and WIFE + *talaq*.

9.4 Towards a definition of *ideological collocation*

Having offered the findings as well as the theoretical and methodological implications of the present study, I am now in a position to tout an empirically tested definition of *ideological collocation*. Ideological collocation is *a hegemonic discursive practice that is textually instantiated in the form of frequent lexical co-occurrences on sociocognitive and social-semiotic grounds, and that is therefore deemed to be a potential site for power struggle, biased cognitions and contested representations across and/or within clashing texts and opposing discourses* (also see Salama 2011: 338).

9.5 Recommendations

Based on this study, there are two primary recommendations. First, I recommend that the study of collocation should be extended beyond the descriptive limits of text linguistics and brought into the wider scope of discourse studies. This necessitates composite approaches that draw on the integration of different academic perspectives, such as (critical) linguistics, critical sociology, social cognition, rhetoric and corpus linguistics. Second, it is highly recommendable that a balanced specialized corpus of texts (spoken and written) on post-9/11 Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism should be built.

This corpus should range over different genres. Also, the corpus should not be geopolitically limited to the US; rather it should include texts that were produced outside of the US (e.g. Western or Arab countries) on the same topic. A corpus like this will certainly facilitate discourse studies on critical areas of representing the Other in an American and

Western context in the wake of the historic event of September 11. Further, it may stand as a reference corpus against which specific texts can be compared for future research purposes.

9.6 Limitations

There are two main limitations that I find in the present study. The first has to do with the non-existence of participant observation, especially at the institutional level; and the second relates to the lack of a topic-specific corpus on Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism as produced in the US after 9/11. Let us take each in turn.

With regard to the first limitation, participant observation, if conducted, could have been a great asset to the context of this research on the recontexualization of post-9/11 Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism in the US; the chance of travelling to Saudi Arabia and the US could have been revealing so many contextual factors, especially at the institutional level of text production. In Saudi Arabia, I could have visited King Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh, where DeLong-Bas managed to get full access to the scripts and books by and on Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Also, had I visited Saudi Arabia, I might have gained more insights into how accurate are Schwartz's accounts of the current 'Saudi-Wahhabi government'. Further, it could have been equally beneficial to the context of my research if I had visited the US for the participant observation of the institutions for which the producers of the research data have worked: Schwartz at the Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) and DeLong-Bas at the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Chirstian Understanding (ACMCU). Additionally, there in the US, I could have been able to visit places where Sufi American Muslims, like Schwartz, are settled, and have some interviews with them about Wahhabi Islam and modern Saudi state. Also, it would have been equally interesting to carry out a CDA which looks at production and reception in more detail; for example, by interviewing people of various religious identities who would read the

books to see what they thought of them and whether they were aware of the collocational patterns that have been investigated.

As for the second limitation in the present study, the lack of a topic-specific specialized corpus on Wahhabi Islam/Wahhabism in the US since 9/11 till 2004 (the period of time when this discourse topic was a peak in the US print media, newspapers and magazines [see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1.2, for corpus evidence]). A specialized corpus of this sort would have certainly offered a wider scope of potentially ideological collocations across many and various genres and text types; and, it would have precisely pinpointed how far the present theoretical model of analysing ideological collocation can be generalized. Also, such a specialized corpus would have made it possible for the research to develop the suggested theoretical model for analysis, based on the rich and diverse data in terms of the different registers and authors included into the corpus.

9.7 Future research

For future research, I would suggest that the same theoretical model of analysing ideological collocation be applied to different kinds of discourse, such as political discourse, including presidential speeches, policy documents, parliamentary talks, etc. This may be a good chance for recognizing the potential for ideological collocations in different texts and discourses as well as testing the applicability of the present theoretical model to different data.

Also, the study of the collocation-based ideological representations needs to be further investigated from different approaches in CDA, alongside corpus methods, especially the sociocognitive approach (Van Dijk 1998, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b) and the discourse-historical approach (DHA) (Resigil and Wodak 2001, 2009). As for van Dijk's sociocognitive approach, I have already demonstrated how the investigation of 'keywords' and 'macropropositions' can be useful in detecting the meaningful oppositions between the two

texts and the macrosemantic structures related to each (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2). However, the same sociocognitive approach can also be useful in explaining the 'context model' underlying the collocational use in each of the two texts under analysis. 'Context models', according to van Dijk (2009a: viii), 'explain how and why language use is socially, personally and situationally variable'. Thus, this approach can explain how and why collocational use, being part of language use, is 'socially, personally and situationally variable' and the corresponding ideological meanings conveyed by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas.

On the other hand, the DHA can offer a space for further investigating the ideological representations potentially associated the structure of Schwartz and DeLong-Bas's use of collocations, in terms of the node words and their collocates. This can be formulated in the following questions. 1) How do collocates stand out as 'referential strategies' and 'predicational strategies' in text? 2) How can collocations rhetorically contribute to the emergence of certain 'topoi' in text? 3) What are the 'persectivations' or discourse representations that collocations trigger in text? 4) How can collocations be 'intensifying strategies' or 'mitigating strategies' in text? (for explanations of the technical terms in quotes, see Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 45ff).[98]

9.8 Conclusion

The present thesis is an attempt to bring together two important theoretical and methodological frameworks that are in vogue within applied linguistics at the moment, viz. critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL). The two disciplines are readily symbiotic in academia. Whereas CDA is much oriented towards qualitative approaches in

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[98] Note here that the term 'strategy' is technically used by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) as 'a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44).

discourse studies, CL basically offers a quantitative method towards further qualitative investigations. Again, the thesis can best be viewed in light of the present scholarly turn of triangulation, where academic research places a premium on interdisciplinarity. Different, yet complementary, methods and approaches are brought together in the study of language. This study is no exception to this academic state of affairs. It has brought in focus different methods and approaches in the investigation of the potential relationship between the text-linguistics phenomenon of collocation and the socio-political notion of ideology. To achieve this purpose, this phenomenon is analysed not only within the micro boundaries of the textual data in terms of semantic preference and discourse prosody, but also within two diametrically opposing discourse worlds, anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi. The latter aspect has been realized at the macro level of producing, interpreting and explaining collocations as meta-Wahhabi discursive practices.

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APPENDIX

N	Keyword	Freq. in Schwartz	%	RC. Freq. in DeLong-Bas	RC. %	Keyness	P-value
1	SAUDI	546	0.46	61	0.04	534.22	0.0000000000
2	WAHHABI	435	0.37	79	0.06	336.88	0.0000000000
3	ARAB	214	0.18	23	0.02	212.21	0.0000000000
4	AMERICAN	224	0.19	35	0.03	188.37	0.0000000000
5	SAUDIS	135	0.11	6	---	169.06	0.0000000000
6	WESTERN	156	0.13	17	0.01	153.86	0.0000000000
7	WORLD	265	0.22	73	0.05	151.43	0.0000000000
8	JEWISH	128	0.11	9	---	144.98	0.0000000000
9	CHRISTIAN	137	0.12	13	---	141.94	0.0000000000
10	OTTOMAN	120	0.10	8	---	137.79	0.0000000000
11	ISRAEL	116	0.10	7	---	136.43	0.0000000000
12	NEW	174	0.15	35	0.03	126.32	0.0000000000
13	SHI'A	71	0.06	0	---	111.14	0.0000000000
14	JEWS	149	0.13	29	0.02	110.47	0.0000000000
15	OIL	84	0.07	3	---	109.06	0.0000000000
16	ARABS	81	0.07	3	---	104.58	0.0000000000
17	PALESTINIAN	70	0.06	2	---	93.74	0.0000000000
18	REGIME	89	0.08	9	---	90.19	0.0000000000
19	ISLAMIC	445	0.38	262	0.19	84.70	0.0000000000
20	MECCA	98	0.08	15	0.01	83.25	0.0000000000
21	TRADITIONAL	83	0.07	9	---	81.99	0.0000000000
22	WAHHABISM	149	0.13	48	0.03	73.14	0.0000000000
23	COMMUNIST	52	0.04	1	---	72.69	0.0000000000
24	HAMAS	46	0.04	0	---	72.00	0.0000000000
25	IRANIAN	44	0.04	0	---	68.87	0.0000000000
26	KHOMINI	44	0.04	0	---	68.87	0.0000000000
27	WE	105	0.09	25	0.02	67.63	0.0000000000
28	WAR	188	0.16	83	0.06	61.82	0.0000000000
29	ISRAELI	48	0.04	2	---	60.78	0.0000000000
30	ARABIAN	51	0.04	3	---	60.32	0.0000000000
31	EMPIRE	63	0.05	8	---	58.39	0.0000000000
32	MEDIA	47	0.04	3	---	54.54	0.0000000000
33	HISTORY	93	0.08	25	0.02	54.25	0.0000000000
34	IKHWAN	32	0.03	0	---	50.09	0.0000000000
35	KHWARIJ	30	0.03	0	---	46.95	0.0000000000
36	BUSH	35	0.03	1	---	46.86	0.0000000000
37	WAHHABIS	204	0.17	111	0.08	46.38	0.0000000000
38	TERRORISM	49	0.04	6	---	46.12	0.0000000000
39	SHI'AS	29	0.02	0	---	45.39	0.0000000000
40	MOSQUES	57	0.05	10	---	44.97	0.0000000000
41	MAWDUDI	28	0.02	0	---	43.82	0.0000000000
42	PHILBY	28	0.02	0	---	43.82	0.0000000000
43	TERRORIST	51	0.04	8	---	42.77	0.0000000000
44	CULTURE	40	0.03	4	---	40.69	0.0000000000
45	I	134	0.11	63	0.05	39.82	0.0000000000
46	IMPERIAL	30	0.03	1	---	39.34	0.0000000000
47	PROPHET	82	0.07	27	0.02	39.31	0.0000000000

N	Keyword	Freq. in Schwartz	%	RC. Freq. in DeLong-Bas	RC. %	Keyness	P-value
48	ARAFAT	25	0.02	0	---	39.13	0.0000000000
49	CHRISTIANS	78	0.07	25	0.02	38.48	0.0000000000
50	SHARIAH	24	0.02	0	---	37.56	0.0000000000
51	ISRAELIS	24	0.02	0	---	37.56	0.0000000000
52	RULERS	52	0.04	11	---	36.48	0.0000000001
53	TERRORISTS	28	0.02	1	---	36.35	0.0000000001
54	LOBBY	23	0.02	0	---	36.00	0.0000000001
55	FUNDS	23	0.02	0	---	36.00	0.0000000001
56	SUICIDE	31	0.03	2	---	35.87	0.0000000001
57	UMMAH	57	0.05	15	0.01	33.86	0.0000000030
58	MODERN	41	0.03	7	---	32.85	0.0000000070
59	WARS	31	0.03	3	---	31.89	0.0000000134
60	ORTHODOX	25	0.02	1	---	31.87	0.0000000135
61	IMPERIALISM	25	0.02	1	---	31.87	0.0000000135
62	SADDAM	28	0.02	2	---	31.57	0.0000000163
63	STATE	126	0.11	66	0.05	30.78	0.0000000259
64	NATIONS	24	0.02	1	---	30.39	0.0000000324
65	NATO	19	0.02	0	---	29.74	0.0000000466
66	PLURALISM	19	0.02	0	---	29.74	0.0000000466
67	SUFI	49	0.04	13	---	28.90	0.0000000731
68	ISLAM	380	0.32	300	0.21	28.21	0.0000001061
69	SUFIS	51	0.04	15	0.01	27.41	0.0000001617
70	REFUGEES	17	0.01	0	---	26.61	0.0000002465
71	PALESTINIANS	28	0.02	4	---	24.60	0.0000007030
72	GROUPS	51	0.04	17	0.01	24.12	0.0000009010
73	TALIBAN	25	0.02	3	---	23.73	0.0000011075
74	KA'BAH	15	0.01	0	---	23.48	0.0000012617
75	GOVERNMENT	52	0.04	19	0.01	22.13	0.0000025491
76	NASSER	26	0.02	4	---	22.02	0.0000026934
77	CHURCHES	14	0.01	0	---	21.91	0.0000028527
78	CATHOLIC	14	0.01	0	---	21.91	0.0000028527
79	SHAH	18	0.02	1	---	21.56	0.0000034288
80	COMMUNISTS	18	0.02	1	---	21.56	0.0000034288
81	PROPAGANDA	18	0.02	1	---	21.56	0.0000034288
82	SPIRITUAL	35	0.03	9	---	20.20	0.0000041455
83	CAMPAIGN	40	0.03	12	---	21.09	0.0000043780
84	JUDAISM	25	0.02	4	---	20.75	0.0000052369
85	PLURALIST	13	0.01	0	---	20.35	0.0000064598
86	MYSTICS	13	0.01	0	---	20.35	0.0000064598
87	SPIRITUALITY	20	0.02	2	---	20.34	0.0000064720
88	GROUP	62	0.05	28	0.02	19.66	0.0000092342

Table 1A: Keywords in Schwartz

N	Keyword	Freq. in DeLong-Bas	%	RC. Freq. in Schwartz	RC. %	Keyness	P-value
1	WAHHAB	1022	0.73	43	0.04	959.26	0.0000000000
2	MARRIAGE	550	0.39	13	0.01	569.84	0.0000000000
3	HADITH	400	0.29	11	---	405.24	0.0000000000
4	QURAN	324	0.23	46	0.03	396.35	0.0000000000
5	HER	492	0.35	45	0.04	363.14	0.0000000000
6	WOMAN	373	0.27	13	0.01	362.94	0.0000000000
7	BECAUSE	532	0.38	75	0.06	314.27	0.0000000000
8	WAHHAB'S	319	0.23	14	0.01	295.97	0.0000000000
9	HE	1441	1.03	535	0.45	292.69	0.0000000000
10	NOT	1266	0.90	455	0.39	273.11	0.0000000000
11	OR	1063	0.76	370	0.31	242.62	0.0000000000
12	RIGHT	249	0.18	22	0.02	186.28	0.0000000000
13	JIHAD	464	0.33	109	0.09	180.48	0.0000000000
14	LEGAL	252	0.18	25	0.02	179.36	0.0000000000
15	WIFE	206	0.15	13	0.01	173.61	0.0000000000
16	HUSBAND	170	0.12	6	---	164.92	0.0000000000
17	SEXUAL	155	0.11	4	---	158.42	0.0000000000
18	HIS	1265	0.90	581	0.49	156.99	0.0000000000
19	MAN	270	0.19	39	0.03	156.90	0.0000000000
20	CASE	223	0.16	25	0.02	149.69	0.0000000000
21	TAWHID	122	0.09	0	---	149.16	0.0000000000
22	DIVORCE	129	0.09	1	---	147.56	0.0000000000
23	INTERPRETATION	170	0.12	10	---	146.27	0.0000000000
24	TEACHINGS	158	0.11	8	---	141.57	0.0000000000
25	DISCUSSION	149	0.11	6	---	140.78	0.0000000000
26	MAHR	114	0.08	0	---	139.38	0.0000000000
27	PURPOSE	124	0.09	2	---	134.19	0.0000000000
28	GOD	420	0.30	119	0.10	130.76	0.0000000000
29	INTENT	137	0.10	6	---	127.09	0.0000000000
30	WRITINGS	157	0.11	12	0.01	124.13	0.0000000000
31	QURANIC	112	0.08	2	---	119.92	0.0000000000
32	TALAQ	94	0.07	0	---	114.92	0.0000000000
33	CASES	129	0.09	8	---	109.26	0.0000000000
34	LAW	257	0.18	56	0.05	107.82	0.0000000000
35	FACT	136	0.10	12	0.01	101.76	0.0000000000
36	WOMAN'S	90	0.06	1	---	100.58	0.0000000000
37	ULAMA	77	0.06	0	---	94.13	0.0000000000
38	CLASSICAL	90	0.06	2	---	93.89	0.0000000000
39	TAYMIYYA	75	0.05	19	0.02	91.69	0.0000000000
40	WOMEN	219	0.16	49	0.04	89.48	0.0000000000
41	QUESTION	125	0.09	14	0.01	83.92	0.0000000000
42	STATUS	127	0.09	15	0.01	82.95	0.0000000000
43	GOD'S	137	0.10	20	0.02	79.03	0.0000000000
44	KNOWLEDGE	117	0.08	14	0.01	75.89	0.0000000000
45	IJTIHAD	62	0.04	0	---	75.79	0.0000000000
46	INTERPRETATIONS	77	0.06	4	---	68.52	0.0000000000
47	SHIRK	55	0.04	0	---	67.23	0.0000000000
48	MALE	71	0.05	3	---	66.38	0.0000000000
49	SHE	165	0.12	38	0.03	65.44	0.0000000000
50	ANYONE	82	0.09	7	---	62.16	0.0000000000
51	ABSOLUTE	78	0.06	6	---	61.51	0.0000000000

N	Keyword	Freq. in DeLong-Bas	%	RC. Freq. in Schwartz	RC. %	Keyness	P-value
52	GENDER	50	0.04	0	---	61.12	0.0000000000
53	WORLDVIEW	50	0.04	0	---	61.12	0.0000000000
54	CONSEQUENTLY	55	0.04	1	---	58.76	0.0000000000
55	ANY	216	0.15	68	0.06	57.84	0.0000000000
56	IJMA	46	0.03	0	---	56.23	0.0000000000
57	KITAB	44	0.03	0	---	53.78	0.0000000000
58	MONOTHEISM	79	0.06	9	---	52.57	0.0000000000
59	ASSOCIATIONISM	42	0.03	0	---	51.34	0.0000000000
60	EIGHTEENTH	42	0.03	0	---	51.34	0.0000000000
61	APPROACH	74	0.05	8	---	50.55	0.0000000000
62	METHODOLOGY	41	0.03	0	---	50.12	0.0000000000
63	MASLAHA	39	0.03	0	---	47.67	0.0000000000
64	INTERCOURSE	36	0.03	0	---	44.00	0.0000000000
65	JURISTS	42	0.03	1	---	43.41	0.0000000000
66	THEREFORE	118	0.08	30	0.03	41.98	0.0000000000
67	CONTEXT	71	0.05	10	---	41.89	0.0000000000
68	ISSUES	76	0.05	12	0.01	41.58	0.0000000000
69	INDIVIDUAL	75	0.05	12	0.01	40.65	0.0000000000
70	SCRIPTURE	55	0.04	5	---	40.64	0.0000000000
71	TAQLID	33	0.02	0	---	40.34	0.0000000000
72	DISCUSSIONS	51	0.04	4	---	39.93	0.0000000000
73	FIQH	32	0.02	0	---	39.11	0.0000000000
74	OPINIONS	44	0.03	3	---	36.17	0.0000000001
75	ACCORDING	106	0.08	28	0.02	36.03	0.0000000001
76	OPINION	79	0.06	16	0.01	35.47	0.0000000003
77	CONTEXTUALIZATION	29	0.02	0	---	35.45	0.0000000003
78	REASONING	29	0.02	0	---	35.45	0.0000000003
79	HUMAN	133	0.10	42	0.04	35.43	0.0000000003
80	ALTHOUGH	194	0.14	76	0.06	35.14	0.0000000005
81	BELIEF	87	0.06	20	0.02	34.56	0.0000000012
82	VERSE	63	0.05	10	---	34.34	0.0000000017
83	MAN'S	42	0.03	3	---	33.99	0.0000000026
84	VERSES	78	0.06	17	0.01	32.69	0.0000000079
85	METHOD	26	0.02	0	---	31.78	0.0000000143
86	INTERCESSION	25	0.02	0	---	30.56	0.0000000295
87	INHERITANCE	35	0.03	2	---	30.35	0.0000000331
88	SO	200	0.14	85	0.07	30.17	0.0000000367
89	USE	104	0.07	31	0.03	30.16	0.0000000369
90	ANALYSIS	30	0.02	1	---	29.40	0.0000000560
91	MEAN	30	0.02	1	---	29.40	0.0000000560
92	KUFFAR	24	0.02	0	---	29.34	0.0000000579
92	SEX	34	0.02	2	---	29.24	0.0000000610
94	SOURCES	69	0.04	15	0.01	28.99	0.0000000699
95	ALWAHHAB'S	23	0.02	0	---	28.11	0.0000001115
96	PASSAGES	23	0.02	0	---	28.11	0.0000001115
97	ISSUE	70	0.05	16	0.01	27.97	0.0000001203
98	HANBALI	45	0.03	6	---	27.45	0.0000001583
99	FAITH	183	0.13	78	0.07	27.41	0.0000001619
100	FEMALE	42	0.03	5	---	27.31	0.0000001706
101	BELIEFS	52	0.04	9	---	26.60	0.0000002473
102	SCHOLARSHIP	26	0.02	1	---	24.79	0.0000006360

N	Keyword	Freq. in DeLong-Bas	%	RC. Freq. in Schwartz	RC. %	Keyness	P-value
103	AUTHORITATIVE	42	0.03	6	---	24.56	0.0000007181
104	THEMES	31	0.02	3	---	22.29	0.0000023373
105	CONCLUSION	29	0.02	3	---	20.23	0.0000068644
106	STUDY	55	0.04	14	0.01	19.53	0.0000098910
107	TOPIC	34	0.02	5	---	19.51	0.0000099894

Table A2: Keywords in DeLong-Bas