

A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis of the Ideological
Representations and Legitimation in the Salafi Discourse in
Saudi Arabia (1980-2000)

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{يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ ۚ وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَتَاؤُ قَوْمٍ عَلَىٰ آلَا
تَغْدِلُوا ۚ اغْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَىٰ ۚ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ} قرآن
كریم. سورة المائدة، آية ٨.

{O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as just witnesses; and let not the enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. *Be just*: that is nearer to piety; and fear Allah. Verily, Allah is Well-Acquainted with what you do} Holy Qur'an; Chapter 5: 8.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to those who seek justice for the way to justice is only one whereas truth may have different ways.

To my father Gamaan and my mother Alyiaa, who supported me and taught me to avoid dealing with others unjustly.

To my wife: Muneerah who, despite her health problems shared happy and sad moments with me. She is now staying with my elderly parents helping them.

To my son Khalid who is taking care of the whole family (my parents, his mother and my other children) while I am away working on this thesis.

To my daughters Sumayyiah and Sarah and my son Sultan who are waiting for me anxiously to bring them glad tidings about my work on this thesis.

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the ideological representations of the Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia from 1980 to 2000. It attempts to answer the following overarching question: To what extent and how is Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s-1990s homogenous?

Utilizing a composite of methodological tools from CDA; DHA (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2007), social actor theory (van Leeuwen 1996, p. 32-70; 2008, pp. 23-54), corpus linguistics (Baker *et al.* 2008) and argumentation theory (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), I examine the most salient discursive features of semantic foci, social actor representation and argumentation schemes in religious discourses of two Saudi Salafi strands. I have built two corpora composed of the writings of two prominent Saudi Salafi writers that reflect religious discourses in Saudi Arabia of two Salafi strands; religiously based Salafi discourse as exemplified in the writings of AbdulAziz Ibn Baz and politically-oriented Salafi discourse as exemplified in the writings of Safar Alhawali.

The whole thesis is based on analysing keywords utilizing collocates, word clusters and concordance-based analysis to identify similarity and/or differences in the ideological representations of the two aforementioned Salafi strands. Results show that the two Salafi writers share some ideological representation (both theological and political). However they have different ideological representations that are politically motivated such as Alhawali's negative representations of the West and the American-led Allied forces during the Gulf Crisis.

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(مَنْ لَا يَشْكُرُ النَّاسَ لَا يَشْكُرُ اللَّهَ)

حديث كريم رواه ابو هريرة

Abu Hurrairah narrated that the Prophet of Islam said: (He who does not show his gratitude to people and thank them (for their help) is not thankful to Allah).

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List of Abbreviations

acc.	accusative
adj.	adjective
adv.	adverb
CDA:	Critical discourse analysis
def.	definite
DHA:	Discourse historical approach
fem.	feminine
gen.	genitive
imp.	imperative
indef.	indefinite
masc.	masculine
n.	noun
nom.	nominative
pl.	plural
sing.	singular
voc.	vocative

Part one

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

This study is concerned with the context of modern Saudi Arabia in the period 1980-2000 focussing particularly on the Salafist discourses of two influential Saudi writers, AbdulAziz Ibn Baz and Safar Alhawali (see 1.3.7 below). I use a combination of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics techniques in order to compare the discourses contained within the writings of these two influential men. I am particularly interested in how the two writers used language to represent the ‘other’ in a way that legitimates their own position and delegitimizes the position of their opponents (for more information about ‘othering’ see Said 1978). This chapter offers an introduction to the topic of my study. I shall start by stating the research problem (in section 1.2) followed by section 1.3 which provides some relevant historical and politico-religious background with a special focus on the main tenets and the evolution and rise of the General Islamic awakening (Salafist) trends in Saudi Arabia. In section 1.4, I delineate the aim and scope of the study. Section 1.5 introduces the position of the analyst and section 1.6 outlines the approach of the study. Section 1.7 gives the rationale for the study. I state my research questions in section 1.8 and, finally, I give a brief account of the thesis structure in section 1.9.

1.2 Research problem

This research is intended to problematize what I refer to as Salafist discourses in modern Saudi Arabia (1980-2000). In Arabic, the word ‘سلف’ (*salaf*) means one’s predecessors. In Islamic Law, the concept of *Salafism* has a variety of meanings, all of which refer to the early form of Islam as practiced by the so-called *pious predecessors* (considered to be superior in

religious status). The appellation *pious predecessors* refers to the companions of the prophet Mohammad, their successors and the immediate followers of the successors (Haddad, 2004), who lived in the first two centuries of the Hijra calendar¹ (Salafism is further detailed in section 1.3.7 below). However, reading through modern Salafi writings such as those of Ibn Baz (see Section 1.3.7 below), this appellation may indicate most of the medieval religious leaders. This difference in interpretation of the term leads us to the problem addressed in this research (Salafism).

First though, a distinction between the concepts ‘Salafi’ and ‘Salafist’ needs to be drawn academically. Whereas the concept ‘Salafi’ denotes the actual teachings of the Salaf, ‘Salafist’ strictly designates the ideological process of recontextualizing these teachings towards political, religious or social ends. Salafism is a movement among Sunni Muslims and is sometimes seen as related to or even synonymous to Wahhabism (an extremely conservative branch of Islam), although many Salafists object to the association (Roy, 1994, pp. 118-119).

Unfortunately, the dominant type of research on Salafism is confined to content analysis which is focused only on historical accounts of Salafist trends in Saudi Arabia or thematic descriptions of religious beliefs of the Salafist factions with no or at best slight reference to the discursive aspects of the texts produced by modern Saudi Salafist writers.

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11² many western writers such as Oliveti (2001) and Arab writers such as Haddad (2004) have blamed those tragic events on Saudi Salafism, which has been seen as a collective puritanical movement in Islam. I would argue that this is

1. The Hijrah calendar or Islamic calendar is used in reference to the emigration of the Prophet of Islam from Makka to Medina in 622 AD. This emigration is taken as the starting point of the Hijrah calendar.

2 On September 11, 2001, members of the militant Sunni Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda hijacked four American Airlines passenger planes, flying two of them into the Twin Towers in New York City and another into the Pentagon. Passengers in the fourth plane fought the terrorists and the plane crashed into a field. Almost 3,000 people died as a result of the attacks. The leader of al-Qaeda was Osama Bin Laden, a member of a wealthy Saudi family, who had been raised as a Salafi Muslim. He was killed by American forces in Pakistan on May 2, 2011.

a problem because such writers tend not to make reference to distinctions within the Salafist tradition itself and thus make an over-generalisation which negatively characterizes innocent people. Part of my aim in this thesis is to raise awareness of heterogeneity within Salafism by contrasting the discourse of two Salafi leaders from Saudi Arabia.

1.3 Political and religious context

In this section I provide information about Saudi Arabia, my home country from which my data originates from. Saudi Arabia is a country in the Middle East, which contains the world's largest oil reserves. It was founded in 1932 by Abdul-Aziz, although its creation began in 1902 with the capture of the city of Riyadh by King Abdul-Aziz and his followers (Al-Farsy, 1990).

The Saudi government is an Islamic religious monarchy. The king complies with Sharia (Islamic) law based on the Qur'an (the religious text of Islam) and the Sunnah (the sayings and doings of the Prophet of Islam). There are no political parties or national elections, and power is handed down through the descendants of the Royal family, with approval of religious leaders who are known as the 'علماء' ('*olama*; ulama or religious leaders).³

Following the teachings of Mohammad ibn AbdulWahhab, the majority of Saudis exercise a strictly monotheistic norm of worship. Ibn AbdulWahhab is a religious reformer (1703 -1792) who is considered to be the founder of the Najdi⁴ religious movement that mostly conforms to the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal⁵ and Ibn Taymiyya⁶. In collaboration with Mohammad Ibn Saud –the founder of the first Saudi state (1745-1811) (Vassiliev, 1998), the Najdi movement flourished in Najd (Niblock, 2006) despite successive attacks

3. 'ulama' is the Arabic word for those who possess knowledge and, in this context, religious knowledge (see the glossary).

4. The Arabic adjective 'Najdi' is derived from the noun Najd which denotes the central region of Saudi Arabia.

5. Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad is the founder of a religious-legal school called Hanbalism in the ninth century.

6. Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad (1263-1328) is a medieval jurist and theologian (Lacroix, 2009) who adhered to the Hanbali School.

promulgated by the Ottomans and their allies in the area (Vassiliev, 1998). Such collaboration between the religious and the political elements can also be traced in the second (1843-1865), and then the modern (established in 1932), Saudi states. The teachings of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab and his followers will be sketched out in the following section.

1.3.1 The main tenets of the Najdi religious movement

The followers of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab assert that they follow the ‘السلف الصالح’ (*’assalaf ’aṣṣāliḥ*; pious predecessors)⁷ (see Section 1.3.7), in all aspects of their faith and ritual practices such as prayers, performing ‘حج’ (*haḡḡ*; pilgrimage), paying ‘زكاة’ (*zakat*; alms) etc. Following the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and some aspects of the ‘حنبلي’ (*hanbali*; Hanbali) School⁸ of jurisprudence, the teachings of the Najdi movement were mostly based on avoiding ‘جاهلية’ (*ḡahiliyyah*; the situation of ignorance) that closely resembled the life of pre-Islam Arabs.

Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab and his followers instruct that any valid religious judgment is to be based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and on the ‘إجماع’ (*’iḡmā’*; the consensus) of the pious predecessors. Additionally, he and his followers advocate ‘التوحيد’ (*’attawḥeed*; Oneness of Allah –or Islamic Monotheism) as perceived from ‘القرآن’ (*’alqur’ān*; Qur’an) and ‘الحديث’ (*’alḡadith*; Prophetic traditions).

The concept of Islamic monotheism consists of three tenets. The first tenet is ‘unity of Lordship’. The original Arabic term for ‘Lordship’ is ‘الربوبية’ (*Arrabūbiyyah*) which is derived from the word ‘رب’ (*rab*; Lord). The followers of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab, as well as all other Muslim factions such as the Sufis and Salafis, stress the unity of Lordship which indicates that Allah is the creator of the world.

7. Translation and transliteration schemes are detailed in Section 3.3.2.

8. The Hanbali School is one of major four canonical schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam; the other three are ‘شافعي’ (*ṣāfi’i*; Shafīi), ‘مالكي’ (*maliki*; Maliki) and ‘حنفي’ (*ḡanafī*; Hanafī).

The second tenet is 'توحيد العبادة' (*tawḥeed 'al'luhiyyah*; unity of worship). According to Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab and his followers, this indicates that all Muslims should single out Allah as the only one to worship, i.e. not to include other figures and objects alongside Allah in their worship. Any innovative worshipping practice, which is not mentioned in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, is considered 'بدعة' (*bid'ah*; impermissible religious practice), that could lead to 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) (Abdul-Wahhab, 1996). In this respect, it is considered that those (mostly Sufis and Shiites) who include other figures and even objects alongside Allah in their worship are not only 'مبتدعة' (*mobtadi'ah*; innovators of religious practices), but also practicing 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism), and more specifically violators of the concept of the Unity of Worship.

The third tenet of monotheism is 'توحيد الأسماء والصفات' (*tawḥīd 'ala'sama' waṣifat*; unifying Allah in His names and attributes). This category of monotheism is based on the conviction that Allah has the excellent and perfect names and attributes. In order to adhere to this tenet, Muslims should call on Allah by His names and attributes taking into consideration the 'إثبات' (*'iṭbāt*; confirmation) of these names and attributes i.e. attesting to all Allah's names and attributes as reported in the Qur'an and confirmed by the prophet. The followers of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab confirm that the '*'iṭbāt*' of Allah's names and attributes requires neither 'تحريف' (*tahrīf*; altering) their expression or meaning, nor 'تعطيل' (*ta'ṭīl*; nullifying) these names and attributes i.e. denying any of them. They also confirm that Muslims should neither compare those names and attributes to any human characteristics by assigning to Allah the attributes that belong to His⁹ creatures, 'تشبيه' (*tašbīh*; similitude) nor modify their essence by 'تكيف' (*takyyīf*; assigning them to a certain form) (Abdul-Wahhab, 1996). 'الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر' (*'al'ḥisbah*; enforcement of religious laws) or 'الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر' (*'al'amr bilma'arūf wa 'annahī 'an 'amlonkar*; commanding right and forbidding vice) is a

⁹ As a practising Muslim I use the conventional way of referring to Allah with a first initial capital when using the third person pronoun.

very important religious concept in the Najdi religious movement. It is a well established concept¹⁰ in Islam and forms one of the official religious institutions in Saudi Arabia.

After sketching some of the main tenets of the Najdi religious reforms, I move on to outline the religious and political uprisings that took place in Saudi Arabia in the period between the 1920s and the 1970s as a means of providing a historical contextualisation of my own period of analysis.

1.3.2 Religious and political unrest in Saudi Arabia

Beginning in 1901, AbdulAziz (1876-1953) attempted to reclaim the Najd territory from which his family had been displaced since 1890 when the Al Rashid conquered Riyadh. He was successful in 1902, recapturing the city and becoming King of Saudi Arabia (Figure 1.1 shows a political map of the region).

Figure 1.1 Map showing Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries (source Google Maps 2013).



The ‘إخوان نجد’ (*‘ihwān naǧd*; the brethren of Najd)¹¹, provided AbdulAziz with ascetic military force (Habib, 1978). They were nomadic supporters and advocates of the Najdi

10. For more information about the ‘الحسبة’ (*‘alhisbah*; enforcement of religious laws) in Islam, see Cook (2000).

religious movement who were encouraged by AbdulAziz to move to ‘هجر’ (*hiġar*; settlements) (Habib, 1978). They were part of King AbdulAziz’s army during his wars that resulted in annexing the different areas of modern Saudi Arabia to Najd. However, the alliance between AbdulAziz and the *’ihwān* was not to last.

Though the *’ihwān* of Najd adhered to the teachings of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab, which maintain that it is the prerogative of the ruler to determine when conditions warrant jihad (holy war) (Commins, 2006), their call for continuous *jihad* did not halt. The *’ihwān*’s loyalty to AbdulAziz started to decrease as he prohibited them from plundering areas they considered to be the abodes of infidels. The conflict between AbdulAziz and the *’ihwān* was elevated as they accused him of increased contact with the British and introducing modern ‘satanic’ inventions such as the telegraph and automobile (Habib, 1978). The *’ihwān* were eventually subdued by AbdulAziz and his forces in the Battle of Sibila in March 1929 and subsequently the chieftains of the rebels who had their own political agendas were imprisoned (Habib, 1978; Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007).

The period from the 1930s until the mid 1970s did not witness any religious uprisings in Saudi Arabia except that of the puritanical protest which was led by Prince Khalid bin Musaid in the mid-1960s, in opposition to King Faisal’s¹² policies of incremental modernization (Dekmejian, 1994). Some episodes of secular nationalist unrest appeared in the 1950s and 1960s where the most noticeable was that of the Saudi nationalist uprising among the workers in the oil sector.

The Saudi nationalist movements (referred to as ‘Labour Movements’) started to influence the workers of the then joint American-Saudi petroleum company (ARAMCO) in

11. In order to differentiate the ‘إخوان’ (*’Ihwan*; the brethren) from the Egyptian ‘الإخوان المسلمون’ (*’al’ihwan ’almoslimūn*; Muslim Brotherhood), they are sometimes called the ‘إخوان نجد’ (*’ihwān naġd*; the brethren of Najd).

12. AbdulAziz died in 1953 and his second son, Saud became King in 1953 until 1964. In 1964, AbdulAziz’s third son Faisal became the king and remained in power until 1975.

the 1950s and 1960s (Commins 2006; Fandy, 2001). They were inspired by the socialist reforms of Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt between 1956 and 1970, who espoused Pan-Arabism, wanting to unite the people and countries of the Arab World. Pan-Arabism is closely connected to the idea of Arab Nationalism, or the idea that Arabs constitute a single nation. Other movements, such as the communist ‘بعث’ (*ba‘t*; renaissance –Baath) Parties in Syria and Iraq had also inspired Saudi nationalist movements (Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007; Mordechai, 1993; Sager, 2005). However, the Saudi nationalist movement was not successful as the Saudi rulers relied on religious beliefs (incorporated within social structures) to thwart such movements and retain social control.

The conflict between Egypt’s president Abdel Nasser and King Faisal –the third king of Saudi Arabia between 1964-1975– made the latter, who relied on religious forces, host members of Egyptian and Syrian Muslim *Brotherhood* parties after they were expelled from their countries (Vassiliev, 1998). Most of these members were well trained academics and job seekers (see Section 1.2.3 below). After arriving in Saudi Arabia, they were employed at universities and schools where they constituted the backbone of the newly established Saudi education system (Alotaibi, 2007; Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007).

Under the influence of the aforementioned religious activists alongside the traditional and official religious institution, two religious Salafi-oriented¹³ trends developed; one was pragmatic, political and elitist, representing the mainstream Islamist movement called ‘الصحوة’ (*‘aṣaḥwah* ‘*al’islamiyyah*; the Islamic awakening) or simply ‘الصحوة’ (*‘aṣaḥwah*; the awakening) –it is also written as Sahwah in some western sources such as Hegghammer and Lacroix (2007). The other trend was an isolationist, pietistic and low-class Islamist movement (referred to as rejectionists). The first *Islamic Awakening* trend emerged clearly during the 1980s (Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007) whereas the second type of Islamist movement played

13. The term ‘salafi’ refers to the early form of Islam that was practiced by the pious predecessors (see Section 1.3.7 below).

an important role in the constitution of a militant group that seized the Muslims' holiest mosque of Makkah in 1979 (Commins, 2006).

1.3.3 The siege of the Grand Mosque in Makkah

On 20 November 1979 (shortly after the Islamic revolution in Iran) a group of Islamic militants led by Juhayman Alotaibi (born in 1940) seized the Grand Mosque in Makkah (the Haram) for two weeks (Cummins 2006; Hegghammer, 2008). His main claims were more or less the same as those of the early *'ihwān*; anger at the increased and continuous contact with what his group considered as infidels, and he also criticized television programs shown in Saudi Arabia that he claimed were against the values of Muslims. The siege of the Grand Mosque ended on 4 December 1979 and as a result Juhayman and the other militants were imprisoned. He and some others were executed on 9 January 1980. Then, almost 10 years after the siege of the Grand Mosque, a new episode of political and military turmoil in the Gulf region occurred.

1.3.4 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

Saddam Hussein the president of Iraq, who had been at war with neighbouring Iran (see Figure 1.1) for almost a decade, launched an attack on Kuwait shortly after the war with Iran ended. On August 2, 1990, he invaded and occupied Kuwait. Subsequently, Iraqi troops were forced out of Kuwait by American-led allies, in what was known as the Gulf War, code-named Operation Desert Storm by the Americans. Despite the fatwa issued by AbdulAziz Ibn Baz (see below) allowing American-led troops to come to Saudi Arabia, the presence of the American military in Saudi Arabia angered some religious leaders who believed that they had come to occupy the land of Muslims. Safar Alhawali (see below) was one of the most prominent religious leaders who opposed the presence of the American-led troops in Saudi Arabia (Fandy, 1998). These religious leaders adhere to the tenets of the religious awakening

trends in Saudi Arabia. In the following section I shall sketch out the Islamic awakening trend and its main tenets.

1.3.5 The rise of the Sahwah

The trend of the Islamic awakening prevailed just after Juhayman's movement was thwarted. The 1980s witnessed a clear emergence of Islamic awakening as a response that could be guided by both religious and political opposition to the Khomeini's revolution in Iran and the Afghani '*jihad*' against Russia. It flourished among the students in the different Saudi schools and universities under the influence of Islamic activists who included either the advocates of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab's teachings or the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brothers who started to come to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. Despite the fact that the religious teachings and the official curricula of religious courses in Saudi Arabia are mostly based on the teachings of Mohammad ibn AbdulWahhab, the Sahwah movement is largely moulded with the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. It is worth noting that both Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brothers adhere to the teachings of Sayyid Qutb.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is an Egyptian intellectual whose writings range from literary to religious dimensions. His religious writings were prominent in moulding the Sahwah movement. His influence on the modern Islamic movements, not only in his home country, Egypt, (Hanafi, 1988), but the Muslim world at large, is profound (Naseerah, 2007). In Saudi Arabia, adherents to Sayyid Qutb (referred to as Qutbis) drew attention to his books such as 'معالم في الطريق' (*ma'ālim fi 'aṭṭarīq*; Milestones), 'المستقبل لهذا الدين' (*'almustaqbal li hāda 'addīn*; The Future is for this Religion), 'في ظلال القرآن' (*fi ṣilal 'alqur'ān*; Under the Patronage of Qur'an) etc. These books were given high priority to be celebrated and distributed even in the schools of the Ministry of Education.

Although Sayyid Qutb did not go to Saudi Arabia, his younger brother Mohammad Qutb (1919–present) is another important figure who did settle in Saudi Arabia. Mohammad

worked as a teacher in the Um al-Qura University in Makkah. He, along with his brother Sayyid, published and theorized the main tenets of the modern Islamic awakening movement. Mohammad had great influence on his students including one of the writers who is the main focus of this thesis, Safar Alhawali (see below) who was his advisee in both MA and PhD programs in the 1980s. And, as Alotaibi (2007) notes, Muslim Brotherhood activists in Saudi Arabia incorporated the ideas of Sayyid Qutb into the Salafi Najdi religious backgrounds. In the following section I delineate the main tenets of the Sahwah.

1.3.6 Main tenets of Sahwah

The major tenets of the Sahwah movement are composed of the aforementioned tenets of the Najdi religious reforms (section 1.3.1) that were advocated by the official religious leaders as well as the advocates of Ibn AbdulWahhab's teachings and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and his younger brother Mohammad Qutb that were incorporated into the teachings of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab. The two important concepts, which were primarily advocated by the adherents of Sayyid Qutb, are 'الحاكمية' (*alḥākimiyyaha*; sovereignty of Allah) – or unifying Allah in His sovereignty – and 'الجاهلية' (*'alġāḥliyyah*; ignorance or the religious state of Arabs before Islam). The first of these two concepts appeared in the writings of Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979), a famous Indian Islamist author, who is considered by some modern researchers to be the founder of modern radical political Islamic movements (Aldayyani, 2007a). The concept of '*ġahliyyah*' refers to the status of religious ignorance and barbarism of the Arabs in the pre-Islamic era. Sayyid and Mohammad Qutb developed these two concepts in a number of their books. In a book called 'Milestones', Sayyid Qutb defines sovereignty as not limited to mere legal injunction, but includes the principle of administration, its system and its modes (S. Qutb, 2001). In this respect, most of those who quoted him considered all Muslim states to be not bearing the mark of Islam, and hence are states of 'ردة' (*riddah*; apostasy). Most religious leaders who adhere to the tenets of the

religious awakening trend use the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ongoing situation in Palestine as sign of weak Arab and Muslim countries that should be changed into more powerful states.

The concept 'جاهلية' (*ġāhiliyyah*) means ignorance or barbarism which is usually used to describe the state of the Arabs in the pre-Islamic period. Mohammad Qutb published a book using the term 'جاهلية' (*ġāhiliyyah*) in its title; 'جاهلية القرن العشرين' (*ġāhiliyyat 'alqarn 'al'isrīn*; *The Ignorance of the Twentieth Century*) (1980). This concept is one of the common concepts that the writers of the Sahwah have used to denounce all modern Muslim and non-Muslim communities (Alnadi, 2007). This concept means that if these communities are indulging in ignorance and barbarism, then serious corrective action needs to be taken by the 'believers' using whatever means necessary to restore the previous status of the 'الأمة' (*'al'omah al'islāmiyyah*; Muslim nation).

The concept of 'الولاء و البراء' (*'alwalā' wa albrā'*; loyalty and disavowal) is also repeatedly mentioned in the books of Sahwah writers. It means that believers should have a friendly relationship amongst themselves and at the same time should show hostility against 'others' who are either infidels or not true believers i.e. Muslims that are considered to have deviated from the right path (Alotaibi, 2007).

As indicated above the Sahwah movement is Salafi-oriented. The writers of this movement (adherents to Ibn AbdulWahhab' teachings and the advocates of Sayyid Qutb's ideas) tried to base their teachings on the early writings of the Salaf¹⁴ thinkers such as the aforementioned Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. In the following sections I shall write about the concept of Salafism in Saudi Arabia.

14. 'Salaf' is the Arabic word for predecessors.

1.3.7 Salafism and prominent Saudi Salafis

As I have stated in section 1.2 above, the appellation *Salafis* refers to *pious predecessors* (superior in religious status) who belong to the three generations of the early Muslims. They are also called 'القرون الأولى' (*'alqorūn 'al'olā*; the early generations) or 'القرون المفضلة' (*'alqorūn 'almofaḍalah*; the best generations). Modern Salafis usually claim that they strictly follow the religious ritualistic practices and beliefs of the first three generations of Muslims (or the pious predecessors). They always refer to the Qur'anic verses and the Prophetic traditions and adhere to the literal interpretations and explications of these sacred texts as mentioned in the writings and sayings of the early religious leaders who belong to the first three generations. This is based on Prophetic traditions (Hadiths) such as:

Narrated Zahdam bin Mudrab: I heard Imran bin Husain saying, "The Prophet said, 'The best people are those living in my generation, then those coming after them, and then those coming after (the second generation) [...]'” narrated in *Sahih Bukhari, Volume 3, Book 48, Number 819*.¹⁵

This form of religious practice in Islam is called Salafism (also see Section 5.5.2).

In Saudi Arabia, the Salafis are the followers of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab (see Section 1.3 above). These include religious leaders and Sheikhs such as AbdulAziz Ibn Baz and Safar Alhawali.

1.3.7.1 Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz

One important traditionalist Salafi is AbdulAziz Ibn Baz (1912-1999) (henceforth Ibn Baz) who was one of the most prominent Saudi official religious leaders. He was active in publishing books and giving religious lectures in different Saudi cities. He worked in several official positions and under his leadership in the Islamic University of Medina, Ibn Baz encouraged his students to preach the main tenets of the Najdi religious movement (see

15. *Sahih Bukhari* is a voluminous work by Albukhari (commonly referred to as Imam Albukhari 810 – 870). It is a collection of Prophetic Hadiths that are called 'sound' Hadiths. The translation of this Hadith is available on: <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/048-sbt.php> Accessed on 31/03/2013.

Section 1.3.1 above) and engage in 'الحسبة' (*'alḥisbah*; enforcement of religious laws) (Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007). He became the Grand Mufti¹⁶ in 1993 and engaged himself with issuing 'فتوى' (*fatwā*; religious dicta). Before that, he issued many fatwas (including allowing American troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia during the second Gulf War in 1991, and banning women from driving, which may be his most well-known ruling). He published many books regarding theological issues such as monotheism, pilgrimage and other pillars of Islam. The publications of Ibn Baz are made accessible on a website run by his advocates.¹⁷

1.3.7.2 Safar Alhawali

Safar Alhawali (born 1950) is a professor in the Muslim creed (*'aqidah*; العقيدة) at the department of Creed at Um Al-Qura University. Fandy (2001) characterizes Safar Alhawali (henceforth Alhawali) as being concerned with protecting his country and his culture from foreign domination and defending Islam against what he believes is the onslaught of secular Euro-American traditions. Alhawali became a well-known intellectual and distinguished figure not only in Saudi Arabia but the Arab world at large in the late 1980s and 1990s. His five cassettes about the Sufis in the Hijaz area (western region of Saudi Arabia) were widely distributed – 'الرد على الخرافيين' (*'arrad 'ala 'alḥoraḥiyyīn*; Refutation of Mysticism) (Alotaibi, 2007). His previous academic work is of great importance to modern Salafis as he discussed the concept of secularism and this was the focus of his MA thesis that was supervised by Mohammad Qutb. One of his books, which has been highly quoted by religious leaders, is 'ظاهرة الإرجاء في العالم الإسلامي' (*ẓāhirat 'al'iraḡa' fī 'al'ālam 'al'islāmi*; The Phenomenon of

16. The Grand Mufti is the highest official religious leader who is entitled to issue religious dicta (fatwa; فتوى).

17. The website of ibn Baz: <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/books/list>.

'Irjā' in the Islamic World)¹⁸. This book was his PhD thesis which was also supervised by Mohammad Qutb in 1985.

The aforementioned book alongside Alhawali's 'مقدمة في تطور الفكر الغربي والحداثة' (*moqaddimah fi taṭawwor 'alfikr 'alġarbi walḥadaṭah*; An Introduction to the development of Modern Western Thought and Modernism) are considered to be one of the early revival attempts to confront the secular and modernization process in Saudi Arabia. Alhawali's political views about the American-Israeli phenomenon occupied most of his books specifically during the second Gulf war; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which led to the war between Saddam Hussein's troops and the allied forces led by the United States (Fandy, 1998) whereas Ibn Baz (the Grand Mufti in Saudi Arabia –see above) issued a fatwa allowing such troops to defend the country. Alhawali's writings were made accessible on his website¹⁹ and other websites devoted to religious teachings such as Saaid.net.²⁰

1.4 Aim and scope of the study

The aim of this study is to investigate Salafist discourses during the period 1980-2000. As I have noted earlier, Salafism is often seen in simple terms as a united religious movement, as well as being associated with violent acts. I wish to problematize this hegemonic representation by comparing the discourse of two Salafi leaders, Ibn Baz and Alhawali. Towards this end the study draws on a composite discourse analytic approach that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Having stated the aim and scope of studying Saudi-Salafi discourses, I now turn to my personal position.

18. The concept of 'Irjā' is linked to 'إيمان' ('*iman*; faith) in Islam. It means both delay and hope. Faith in Islam is a tripartite concept. It is composed of the following elements; believe with intention, vocalizing believe (i.e. accompanied with utterance/s) and action or performance of duties of worship –prayers, observing fasting during the days of Ramadan... etc (Awaji, 2001). *Morjia'ah* (the plural of *Morj'a*) are those who believe that it suffices for an individual to be a believer if s/he accomplishes the first two elements. But Salafis instruct that all the three elements of faith are supposed to be accomplished.

19. Alhawali's website: <http://www.alhawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.cat&categoryID=2>.

20. Alhawali's page on Islam.net: <http://saaid.net/Warathah/safar/k.htm>.

1.5 Position of the analyst

Baxter (2003, pp. 59-60) advocates the employment of self-reflexivity in research, which involves being clear about one's own position. Researchers should also be self-aware about the fictionality and textuality of the research process. Therefore, in this section I provide some relevant background information for the reader to explain my own interest in this topic, and how my experiences have given me certain insights which potentially can aid my research but may also influence my perspective.

I am a Sunni Muslim who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. I was brought up to believe that Islam is connected to peace and human welfare. In 1979, when I was a student at intermediate school, armed Islamist dissidents took over the Grand Mosque at Makkah (Mecca) in Saudi Arabia.²¹ Despite (or perhaps due to) the fact that those who carried out the siege were captured and publicly beheaded, this incident was followed by incremental Islamisation in the country (as well as extremist attacks aimed at toppling the Saudi monarchy) that resulted in the so-called Islamic general awakening or simply the Sahwah (detailed in 1.3.5 above). As part of this, new terms started to appear such as 'سلف' (*salaf*; Salafis) and 'السلفية' (*'assalafiyyah*; Salafism). I witnessed the rise of Sahwah in the 1980s.

I have worked for almost 18 years in a college that was nearly controlled by some Salafi individuals during the 1990s and several years of the first decade of this century. During these years, I experienced difficulties with Salafis for two reasons; to some Salafis, I was a graduate of a 'non-Islamic' department (English and European Languages) and I have no beard. Most Salafis present themselves as Allah's proxies, arguing that their opinions are derived directly from the word of Allah. I have always sought to understand the Salafis' arguments and position towards the 'Other'. In this study I do not intend to judge the Salafi

21. Their goal was to institute a theocracy in preparation for an apocalypse. Some of their followers were students of religion at the Islamic University of Medina.

writings²² as right or wrong. I instead want to show how recent writers in Saudi Arabia have recontextualised Allah's words, particularly in relation to ideologies, argumentation and representations of the 'Other'.

1.6 Approach of the study

In this study, I intend to carry out a critical discourse analysis of the key texts produced by two prominent Saudi Salafis in the period before 9/11. It is through the analysis of these writings in terms of their ideological representations that variation in Salafist discourse in contemporary Saudi Arabia can be pinpointed. For the purposes of my research, I use the term *discourse* to mean:

“a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action, socially constituted and socially constitutive, related to a macro-topic and linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89).

Following van Dijk (1998, p. 8), I define Ideology as ‘the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group’. ‘Ideologies help establish and maintain asymmetric power relations that exist through discourse’, and ‘function as a means of transferring power relations more or less radically’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88).

I use the triangulatory approach of Discourse Historical Analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) which is based on a broad and multi-faceted concept of ‘context’ that considers the immediate language or text-internal cotext²³ and co-discourse, intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, genres and discourses, as well as the context of situation and the broader socio-political (and religious) and historical context. I shall be focusing mainly on

22. Here I refer to the sacred Salafi texts, the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

23. Cotext ‘is used to refer to the linguistic environment which precedes or follows a concrete text location (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000).

how social actors are represented in Salafi texts, and how various argumentation schemes are used to legitimize particular ideologies.

In order to maintain critical distance from my data, I am using corpus methods that incorporate software to determine salient argumentative and/or linguistic aspects that contribute to the negative or positive presentations of social actors. This is described in more detail in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

1.7 Rationale of the study

The devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks set off a chain of events that resulted in further devastation on a wide scale. Two countries were invaded and suffered huge structural and human losses; viz. Afghanistan and Iraq. A large amount of literature on Islam and fundamentalism has appeared, and above all, books and writings that link terrorism to Islam in general and Saudi Salafis/'Wahhabi' in particular were published. These books range from polemics which link extremism to Salafism and Saudi Arabia such as Haddad (2004) and Oliveti (2001) to the more academic writings that try to explain the main tenets and history of Salafism such as Hegghammer (2008, 2009) and Fandy (2001) (see Chapter 2 section 2.2.2 for more details).

On the one hand, none of these writings have been conducted from a CDA perspective which indicates the importance and rationale for this study. On the other hand, the texts under investigation belong to a context that is of major importance for the contemporary world: Saudi Arabia contains the two most sacred Mosques in Makkah and Medina which make Saudi Arabia in the eyes of most Muslims to be the abode of Islam. And on a different plane, Saudi Arabia contains one of the World's largest Oil reserves; an important economic means for the whole world. Saudi Arabia is also associated with the 9.11 attacks, due to the fact that this was Bin Laden's birthplace. It is thus important that academic

research attempts to understand the complex discourses that influence the direction that Saudi Arabia takes, as well as presenting a clearer picture of the nation to the outside world.

The methods I use for this study, to the best of my knowledge, have never been applied to study Salafism in Saudi Arabia. These methods are designed to answer the research questions that I outline in the following section.

1.8 Research questions

This study responds to the following overarching question: To what extent and how is Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s-1990s homogenous? In order to address this question, I shall consider the following sub-questions:

1. What do concordance and collocational analyses of keywords and frequent words in the two corpora of the Salafi discourse reveal about:
 - a. Themes/macro topics;
 - b. The representations of social actors (nominational strategies);
 - c. Argumentation indicators?
2. What argumentation schemes are employed in the texts to legitimize certain hegemonic meanings?
3. How can the findings in 1 and 2 be explained in relation to Saudi social and politico-religious contexts?

1.9 Thesis structure

After setting the scene and the context of the study and giving a general introduction to the thesis in this introductory chapter, I carry out a critical review of relevant and related research in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological framework that I utilize to answer the research questions. Chapter 4 is the first of five chapters of analysis. It is devoted to examining the semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz's corpus and comparing their usages to that

of Alhawali's. In turn, in Chapter 5, I examine Alhawali's semantic foci keywords compared to Ibn Baz. Chapter 6 is devoted to investigating the representations social actors in both Ibn Baz and Alhawali's corpora. Chapter 7 examines arguments in both corpora. Chapter 8 concludes the analyses of my data where I provide explanations of the results obtained in the previous analysis chapters utilizing the social, political and religious contexts. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.

CHAPTER 2: Critical Review of Literature

2.1 Introduction

It is useful to start this chapter by stating the main difference between two relevant types of religious writings: first, writings about religion that focus on religion(s) and faith communities without taking a religious perspective, which I label as ‘meta-religious discourse’. Second, writings via which religious authors represent their semantic foci, ideological representations and legitimations. The second one I call religious discourse proper.

This chapter aims to describe and justify the quantitative and qualitative approaches deployed in analysing my research data. It also brings together critical discourse studies (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL) as a way of analysing discourse and ideological representations. First, it (in section 2.2) evaluates (critical) religious studies identifying the gaps that such studies have failed to bridge. In section 2.3, I introduce critical discourse analysis approaches that could be used in analysing religious discourses. Section 2.4 introduces the field of corpus linguistics that will be employed in order to identify analytical foci, argument indicators and social actor representations. In section 2.4, I outline previous studies that have already attempted to combine CL and CDA, which have helped to provide frameworks for the way I intend to carry out the analysis of this study. Finally, section 2.5 concludes this chapter pointing out the points of departure for conducting this study. Let us first start with studies on religion.

2.2 Studies on religion

It is possible to view some types of writing about religion as oscillating between two extremes, one that advocates and preaches the teachings of a religion such as AbdulWahhab

(1996). The other extreme is established on the rejection of the religion, and includes atheist writings such as Dawkins (2006) and Hitchens (2007). However, some texts on religion do not aim (explicitly at least) to convince readers of the existence (or not) of God. Instead, they aim to investigate religion from a more objective or distanced perspective²⁴. One such field is Religious Studies, and it is thus worthwhile examining what Religious Studies scholars have had to say about Salafism.

2.2.1 Religious studies

Religious Studies encompasses a wide range of approaches, and Segal (2006) introduces nine possible ways of studying religion that emanate from eight disciplines; anthropology, economics, literature, phenomenology, philosophy, psychology, sociology and theology whereas the ninth approach is the comparative method. Such research tries only to describe and explain the beliefs of the religion under consideration with no obvious critical stances.

Some researchers in religious studies have attempted to introduce critical aspects into their work. For example, Mittelstaedt (2002) proposes a framework called *religious authority* that could account for the relationships between religion and religious institutions and economic markets. Mittelstaedt concludes that the effects of religion on markets are multiple, including direct and indirect effects such as when theology becomes public policy which could impose market regulations.

Additionally, Fitzgerald (2003) has tried to investigate the ideological status of religion in academia. Although such studies and approaches could yield fruitful results in understanding how religions could affect, in one way or another, people's lives, they do not offer a perspective which is more closely based on critical analysis of discourse from a

24. However, post-structuralists would reject the claim that an 'objective' perspective is ideologically neutral, as the unbiased research is in itself a 'discourse of science through which a particular version... of human life is constructed'. Thus, the desire to be objective could be seen as a 'position' or stance in itself (Burr, 1995, p. 160).

linguistically-oriented perspective in order to examine representations of religions and religious communities.

As I intend to study the Salafi discourses, it is useful here to outline the studies that considered Salafism (see Section 1.3.7 in Chapter 1). The following section delineates the type of studies that tackle Salafism and Saudi Salafis.

2.2.2 Studies on Salafism

Many writers have studied Salafism and Saudi Salafis including Aldayyani (2007a, 2007b), Allen (2006), Alotaibi (2007), Curtin Winsor (2007), DeLong-Bas (2004), Fandy (1998, 2001) Haddad (2004), Hegghammer (2008, 2009), Hegghammer and Lacroix (2007), Oliveti (2001) and Schwartz (2002). However, rather than being text-based analyses of Salafism, these writers tend to give more or less historical accounts of Salafism, although some of them also try to explain Salafi main tenets and beliefs. With the exception of those writers who are Arabs such as Fandy and Haddad or those who can read Arabic such as Delong-Bas, the writers of the above studies have depended largely on translations and previous works about Salafism and Sunni Islam or interviews with some Salafis interceded with interpreters.

Some Muslim and Arab writers, such as Haddad (2004), who takes up a Sufi (mystic) perspective, aims to deprecate the Salafi traditions, having a sectarian ideology. Such writers tend to focus on controversial aspects of Salafism, such as the veneration and seeking the help of dead holy men. For example, Haddad (2004, pp. 27-30) takes the case of a Salafi fatwa, presenting it out of context, in order to denounce the Salafi tradition. Another deprecatory action of Haddad is his attempt to denounce Abu Bakr al-jazairi, a Salafi religious leader who worked in the Islamic University of Almadenah, Saudi Arabia, and taught in the Prophet's mosque in Almadenah.²⁵ Salafism also attracted the attention of

25. For example, Haddad (2004, p. 88) mentions that al-jazairi wrote a book about the Prophet and confirmed a false story about the Prophet being misled by Satan. However when I read the original Arabic book, it appears that al-jazairi (2003, p. 99) denies that the Prophet was misled by the Satan.

western writers during the 1990s when it started to spread in Europe, but their writings were general in scope and focussed on radicalism where much of the research was carried out by anthropologists (Meijer, 2009). Meijer (ibid.) notes that the scope and focus of the research on Salfism changed after 9/11. He adds that ‘a lot has been said and written on Salafism and Wahhabism, but much of this has been through the prism of “security studies” or books that play on the popular view that equates Wahhabism with violence’ (2009, p. 2).

The writings on Salafism have thus tended to be based either on descriptive accounts of its history or have focussed on controversial issues surrounding its belief-system, and thus there is little research which has been carried out with a critical analysis of religious Salafist discourse; this holds for both the so-called ‘sacred/canonical texts’ created by members of a faith community and other meta-religious texts. The second type of texts may explain the ‘canonical texts’, which are thought to legitimize certain practices of individuals and religious/political institutions, or even define the relationships between members of a faith community and outsiders.

Generally, research under the remit of religious studies does not use a critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA) perspective, considering issues such as power relations in religious discourses or the way that religious leaders represent the ‘other’ or the ‘self’ in their teachings (in spoken or written forms). However, one group which does attempt to consider the role of discourse in religion is based in Manchester (Green & Searle-Chatterjee, 2008), using an approach called Critical Religious Studies.

2.2.3 Critical religious studies

The so-called Manchester approach to religious studies is used to critically study religious discourse. In their introduction, Green and Searle-Chatterjee (2008) write that their main aim is to assess the global consequences of (mis)understanding political practice and social identities wrought through the language of religion. Based on the Foucauldian notion

of the term *discourse*, they consider the language of ‘religion’ as discourse. They address issues of (a) power, giving an ‘inclusive’, but general in essence, ‘concept of power as the ability to influence the bodies and minds of other men and women, typically by means of superior access to physical, cultural, or human resources’, and (b) classifying ‘others’ and naming the ‘self’ (2008, pp. 8-12).

Researchers using the Manchester approach have addressed topics ranging from traditional to modern presentations of the ‘self’/‘insiders’ and the ‘other’/‘outsider’ as realized linguistically in the discourses of (sub)faith communities (Alexander, 2008; Christmann, 2008; Green, 2008; Gregory, 2008; Hirst, 2008; Klutz, 2008). However, despite taking a critical perspective, the writers of the articles collected in Green and Searle-Chatterjee (2006) do not conduct their analysis from the perspective of critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis or their forefathers, systemic linguistics or Bakhtinian discourse analysis etc., although Green and Searle-Chatterjee mention these approaches in their introduction. There is only a small reference in Klutz (2008) that acknowledges the use of some analytical tools from CDA along with collocational analysis.

The concept of critique, in the Manchester approach, remains vague; neither critical theories, ideologies, nor the analysts’ positions, for example, are clearly addressed; a problem that may continue to persist in the critical religious studies that could be attributed to the sensitivity of criticizing religious discourses and, also may be because some researchers adhere, or at least belong to, the religions under investigation (see Section 2.3 below).

Moreover, writers in Green and Searle-Chatterjee (2008) only describe the way that social actors are/were presented in religious discourses. They neither explain nor critique nominations or hegemonic religious representations in the texts they analyzed. Additionally, none of the studies presented in Green and Searle-Chatterjee (*ibid.*) addresses Salafi discourse or modern Islamic religious trends. In this study, I wish to take an alternative

approach to the analysis of religious discourse, by examining a topic (Salafi discourse) which has not been subjected to critical analysis, and by using a critical discourse analysis framework. The following section therefore considers critical discourse analysis and its contribution to the study of social actors.

2.3 Critical Discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a well-established field (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011) in studying discriminatory/racist, prejudiced, anti-Semitic discourses (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1996) and political discourse (P. A. Chilton & Schaffner, 2002; Wodak, 2009). It emerged in the early 1990s (Wodak & Meyer, 2009a). CDA has developed an important agenda that potentially has social significance to the world today (Michael Stubbs, 1997). It is a collective effort that aims at emancipation and enlightenment. A key aim of CDA is to show how unequal and unfair power relations are maintained, how certain voices or positions are legitimated and others are ignored or oppressed. CDA is not against 'power' per se, but is concerned with abuses of power.

There are a number of 'schools' within CDA which differ from each other in terms of their actual methods used and their analytical foci, but generally all the schools stress the importance of combining an analysis of linguistic features within a text in order to identify discourses or ideologies with consideration of various types of social context in order to fully explain and evaluate the findings. Analysis in CDA takes place on multiple inter-connected levels and may involve examination of processes of text production (under what conditions was a text created and for what reasons) and reception (who consumed the text and how was it responded to). Furthermore, analysis can involve examination of intertextuality (the ways that texts can refer, explicitly or not, to other texts) and interdiscursivity (the ways that discourses can relate to or refer to each other, e.g. by supporting or competing).

The term 'critical' is considered by many scholars as a key concept in CDA. Fairclough (1992, p. 9) considers that the term 'critical' involves 'showing connections and causes which are hidden'. He (ibid.) also stresses that the term 'critical' implies 'intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged through change' (1992, p. 9). Wodak and Meyer (2009b, p. 7) state that 'critical theories, thus CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection'.

CDA has tended to focus on politically-oriented texts e.g. political speeches and debates, policy documents, newspaper editorials, advertising etc. and, hence, CDA studies on religious discourses in general and more specifically on Islam are rare. This may perhaps simply reflect the interests of CDA practitioners, although Salama (2011, p. 49) writes that 'within discourse communities critiquing religious discourse topics could be socially sensitive, if not risky'. He also adds that 'members of certain religious discourse communities cannot question the sacred texts of religion since their belief system is enshrined in those texts that are in turn above any critique' (2011, p. 49). And in order to account for intertextuality and interdiscursivity (from religious texts and discourses), I would add that analysing religious discourses per se critically requires immense knowledge about the history and origins of beliefs and rituals of the religion(s) and faction(s) involved. Readings in the different developments of faiths and beliefs of the different factions during different historical epochs is required in order to explore intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Thus religious-oriented CDA requires a great deal of knowledge about religious context and history, yet people involved in CDA tend to work in the field of applied linguistics, (or to a lesser extent sociology or politics) rather than religious studies.

Also, CDA originated within Europe and tends to be practised by westernised scholars in English-speaking contexts, although there is also CDA work in other European

languages like German. However, CDA studies on Arabic data (religious or otherwise) are presently very rare.

The above points could possibly explain the rarity of CDA studies on religious discourse in general and Islamic discourses in particular. However, rather than investigating religious discourse per se, there are a few studies that investigated the representation of religion and religious groups (i.e. investigating meta-religious discourses i.e. discourses that revolve around religion and religious communities rather than religious writings produced by religious leaders in any of the religious communities). But these attempts have tended to not incorporate CDA perspectives though (see below).

Hukam Sing and Thuraisingam (2011) have tried to investigate the role of language, as a means for reconciliation, in keeping religion relevant to both individuals and societies in the context of postmodernity. They studied religious sermons from three major faiths in Malaysia (Islam, Christianity and Buddhism), two sermons from each religion. They investigated the language used in sermons in terms of modes, quotations (intertextuality), vocabulary and phrases, personal narratives, religious meaning systems, norms and values and social context. Their eclectic approach is a mash of tools from both CDA adopted from Fairclough's framework of analysing language and power (2001) and the sociological theory of human activity (activity theory). However, they have tried to generalize their results to all three religions ignoring the ideological role of different sectarian beliefs that may have moulded the ideological stances of the preachers.

Rizwan (2011) has investigated the Pakistani Shiites' liturgical gatherings (called the 'majlis' which is derived from the Arabic word 'مجلس' (*mağlis*) which means gathering) to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein (the son of Imam Ali and the grandson of the Prophet of Islam). The commemoration is conducted in Urdu. Rizwan, utilizing a CDA methodology to explore the ideology behind the sermons in liturgical eulogies, has concluded

that in such sermons, preachers 'discursively produce the ideological mental paradigms which echo basic injunctions of Shi'ah [Shiite] Islam. The pathos of Imam Hussain's [Hussein] tragedy issues out of Shi'ahs' [Shiites] belief that an imam' is infallible (2011, p. 26) [the spellings of Hussain's and Shi'ahs are in original].

Recently, Hjelm (2013), on a purely theoretical basis, suggests implementing CDA methods in the critical sociology of religions. In this article, Hjelm (*ibid.*, p. 1) discusses the relevance of CDA to a critical sociology of religion in three major areas: first, 'the concept of discourse and its different meanings'. Second, he 'examines what being 'critical' means in the context of discourse analysis and constructs a framework for doing practical CDA'. Finally, he discusses CDA as a foundation for a critical sociology of religion'.

In the Arabic context, Alharasi (2003) advocates implementing new approaches to Arabic texts, trying to open the way for studying discourses in Arabic texts utilizing CDA approaches. Alharasi has two objectives. First, he aims at shedding light on some basic concepts in western critical theory. Second, he proposes a thesis that could develop Arabic critical theories. Alharasi' paper, to the best of my knowledge, is the first paper written in Arabic that draws on CDA methodology. He first problematizes modern Arabic theories of criticism, adding a new perspective that takes into consideration marginalized sub-cultures which, according to him, incorporate religious and ethnic minorities in Arab countries. Alharasi (2003) suggests that CDA approaches could be usefully operationalized in some areas of investigations that include religious discourses and the representation of women in Arabic colloquial proverbs. But Alharasi does not provide any sort of analysis that could support his claims.

Al-Ali (2006) has studied religious affiliations and displays of masculine power in the wedding invitation genre in Jordan. Drawing on two analytic frameworks: genre analysis, and critical discourse analysis, he (*ibid.*, p. 691) concludes that 'religious affiliation and

masculine kinship authority not only construct and shape text component selection but also color the lexical choices and naming practices.'

Another set of studies have investigated the representation of Islam in the media, using a CDA perspective. One notable example is Richardson's (2004) study that focussed on the representation of Islam and Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers. His main goal is to analyse 'the ways in which' broadsheet newspapers 'reproduce anti-Muslim racism' (2004, p. xvi). Additionally, the edited collection of papers in Poole and Richardson (2006, p. 1) have examined 'the role and representation of Muslims in the news media in both British and international contexts' drawing 'on a variety of research methods' and analysing 'diverse national and international media to make more general comments on the manner which Islam and Muslims are represented, and *misrepresented*, in the news media' [italics in original] (see Section 2.6 below for other studies which have investigated the representation of Islam and Muslims or faith communities in Islam using corpus tools).

Moving away from the few CDA studies on religious discourse for the moment, other CDA studies have focused on the representation of social actors within certain discourse communities such as Reisigl and Wodak (2001). Their objective was to investigate the discursive production, enactment and reproduction of racist and antisemitic discourses. They have provided 'a critical synopsis of various scientific explanations that point to economical, social, cultural, social psychological and cognitive roots of racist, antisemitic and ethnic prejudices' (2001, p. xi) (for more information about the DHA of Wodak and her colleagues in the Vienna school see Section 2.3.2 below).

Two related CDA approaches that were operationalized to investigate the representation of social actors include van Leeuwen's sociosemantic categories (van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008) and the discourse-historical approach (henceforth DHA) developed by Wodak and her colleagues in the Vienna school (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak,

1996, 1999, 2001, 2007, 2009) (for more information on van Leeuwen's sociosemantic categories and the DHA see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2). As stated above, CDA involves the linguistic analysis of texts, but it also takes analysis beyond the text to consider issues of political and social context in order to give full interpretations and explanations of the findings obtained. Let us start with the studies that utilized van Leeuwen's sociosemantic categories (1996, 2008) of representing social actors.

2.3.1 The representation of social actors: Sociosemantic categories

In my own analysis I am particularly interested in how social actors are represented within Salafi discourse. This focus on social actors is inspired by my concern that the way that humans are represented through language can have extremely important consequences, inspiring people to behave in certain ways, sometimes violently. In particular I am concerned with negative representations or 'othering' whereby an 'out' group is represented as possessing negative qualities ('they are less than human'), internally consistent qualities ('they are all the same') and as being distinct from an in group ('they are not like us'). I wish to see whether Salafi discourse contains such types of social actor representation and if this is consistent across the two different Salafi leaders whose texts I am examining.

The approach taken by van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) focusses on how language can be used to represent social actors (participants in clauses) who can be represented as subjects or objects or excluded altogether via the use of grammatical systems. Van Leeuwen shows various types of representation via a hierarchically structured diagram of different sociosemantic categories, that can be grouped together (1996: 66). See Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 Van Leeuwen's (1996, p. 66) social actor representation diagram.

For example, at the first level of the diagram a distinction is made between representations that include (actually refer to) social actors and those that exclude (e.g. background or suppress) them. Inclusion is divided into categories of personalisation and impersonalisation, while impersonalisation is divided into abstraction and objectivation, and so on. Each of those categories has different linguistic realisations. For example, a category like relational identification is realised by referring to a social actor through the use of nouns like *brother*, *co-worker*, etc – the person is represented through their relation to someone else. On the other hand a category like physical identification involves language that refers only to some sort of physical aspect of a person e.g.: *a blonde*, *a hunk*, *a cripple*.

pronoun/noun, grammatical role, activated/passivated, personal/impersonal, named/classified and specific/generic. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2008) refer to the referential or nomination discursive strategy as one of several discursive strategies that could be used by discourse producers in representing social actors (several of their referential or nomination categories appear to be borrowed from van Leeuwen's (1996) approach).

Many other studies draw on van Leeuwen's (1996, 2008) sociosemantic categories. For example, Caldas-Coulthard (2003) has investigated cross-cultural representation of 'otherness' in media texts. She utilized some sociosemantic categories of van Leeuwen (1996). Salama (2011) has borrowed two oppositional paradigms from van Leeuwen's social-actors theory, namely, specification vs. genericization and nomination vs. categorization. He has used an antonymy-based classification scheme of his analysis of some ideological collocations in the meta-Wahhabi discourses (see pp. 37-8 in this thesis).

The prominent approach that incorporated some aspects of the sociosemantic categories in their approach is the Viennese school that developed the discourse historical approach (DHA). This leads us to the second approach that I utilize in analysing the research data (see Chapter 3 for more information about the methods employed in this thesis).

2.3.2 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)

DHA is one of the salient approaches that provide a toolkit for researchers to investigate the positive self- and negative other-presentation within discourse. The DHA has been operationalised to analyse antisemitic discourses as in Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and more recently to analyse discourses on climate and global warming (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). DHA combines a number of other approaches together. For example, it has a particular focus on the consideration of historical context when attempting to interpret and explain discourses found in texts. Richardson and Wodak (2009) have also utilized the DHA in tracing the

histories of discourses of the far right wing groups that support ‘jobs for the natives’ in the UK and Austria. As well as this, it relies on the identification of topoi and argumentative fallacies (taken from rhetorical analyses) in texts. Additionally, as described above, DHA has drawn on social representation theory, to include reference to referential or nomination strategies. It also considers predication, perspectivation and mitigation/intensification (for more information about the DHA, see Section 3.2.2.7).

Other critical discourse analysts have successfully extended it to examine discourses in different political and cultural contexts. For example, Unger (2009) has used the DHA to investigate the discursive construction of Scots in educational and bureaucratic discourses as well as the discourses of ordinary people.

Also, Brindle (2009) has studied some racist representations in a white supremacist web forum using the DHA. He investigated argumentation employed by the white supremacists utilising certain words such as ‘*ago*’ and ‘*remember*’ to locate argumentation in his data. But he does not refer to such words as argumentative indicators, per se, as helping to indicate arguments, nor does he refer to argumentation schemes in his analysis (See Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 for more information about arguments and argumentation indicators and schemes). More recently KhosraviNik (2010) has attempted to systematise CDA analytical categories in the representation of social actors by incorporating ‘some of the widely applied CDA analytical categories used in the discourse-historical approach (DHA), including referential, predication, and argumentative strategies’ as well as using ‘some elements from the socio-semantic approach of van Leeuwen on the representation of social actors’(ibid. p. 57).

In the Arabic context, Suleiman (2008) has extended the DHA and applied it to Arabic data. He has utilised DHA as a “transdisciplinary” problem-oriented theoretical approach (Suleiman 2008, p. 39) in his analysis of Arab-Palestinian political discourse. He

has augmented the DHA with functionalising the religious concept of 'at-Taqiyya' as part of his culture-centred approach that, according to him, is the best access point to further understand the 'East' and the 'self'. The 'at-Taqiyya' or 'التقية' (*'attaqiyyah*; safeguarding the self in eminent dangers) is a religious concept, which could be associated with lying, that is mostly employed in real life situations by the Shiite branch of Islam. However, employing it in a purely Sunni context is not always a successful tool for analysis as it always associated with Shiite form of Islam.

In what follows I introduce some concerns that have been raised against CDA and the efforts of CDA scholars to ameliorate this field of social research utilizing corpus tools. After that, I present some studies that investigate the representation of Islam combining CDA and CL.

2.3.3 CDA: Voicing some concerns

Despite CDA being an academic perspective rather than engaging in polemic, it could still be criticised. CDA researchers tend to eschew scientific objectivity and are instead interested in carrying out socially-committed research, based on real-life problems of power inequality that they feel strongly about. However, drawing on CDA alone could be problematic in the sense that bias on the part of researchers may impact on the way that the analysis is carried out. Critics of CDA, such as Widdowson (1995) and Stubbs (1997), outline a number of potential problems associated with it. Stubbs (1997) introduces 11 questions related to data and theory in CDA. The most relevant issue to the present study is that which relates to the collection and analysis of data.

Stubbs (1997) asserts that the methods of data collection and analysis are inexplicit and restricted to text fragments that could be biased. This could result in CDA researchers 'cherry-picking' texts or parts of texts which demonstrate clearly disempowering discourses

in order to demonstrate a social problem, while perhaps ignoring other similar texts or parts of the same texts that offer a contesting perspective. For example, we could claim the British press is biased against a certain social group by selecting 100 articles which show clear bias. But we could have ignored 10,000 other articles which present a more balanced or even positive picture. While negative bias exists, it is not the full story.

Additionally, Widdowson (1998, p. 148) claims that in CDA, 'Your analysis will be the record of whatever partial interpretation suits your own agenda'. Such criticisms may have been a catalyst for some CDA scholars and researchers, such as Fairclough (2000), to use a corpus linguistics approach in order to resolve the problem of collecting and analysing representative data.

2.4 Corpus Linguistics and its contribution to CDA studies

Corpus linguistics involves the analysis of large collections of naturally occurring texts or corpora (see 3.2.1) which is aided by the use of certain software packages such as WordSmith tools (Scott, 1999) which are able to carry out complex calculations on language data. This often involves making statistical comparisons based on word frequency or word order, as well as presenting linguistic data in ways that make it easier for a human researcher to identify linguistic patterns and trends. Important concepts within corpus linguistics are wordlists, keywords, collocations and concordances (described in more detail in the following chapter). These are techniques of analysis which facilitate the work of researchers and allow them to investigate linguistic phenomena in a large amount of data.

Recently corpus linguistics has offered quantitative methods that have contributed to reducing 'researcher bias' (Paul Baker, 2006, p. 12). One of the earliest studies that combined CL and CDA is Hardt-Mautner (1995). Corpus tools are also used and advocated by a number of researchers such as Baker et al. (2008), and Mautner (2007, 2009). Combining

CDA with corpus linguistics helps researchers to handle large amounts of data as well as enabling critical discourse analysts to broaden their empirical base (Mautner, 2009, p. 123). Corpus linguistics software, Mautner adds, (ibid.) offers both quantitative and qualitative perspectives on textual data, computing frequencies and measures of statistical significance, as well as presenting the data extracts in such a way that the researcher can assess individual occurrences of search words, qualitatively examine their collocational environments, describe salient semantic patterns and identify discourse functions. The methodological synergy between CL and CDA has been successful in a number of studies including Baker et al. (2008) who have used such synergy in the examination of discourses about refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press. In what follows I introduce some relevant studies that incorporate corpus linguistics tools in analysing discourses about religion.

Studies that use corpus linguistics tools to investigate discourses about Islam include Baker (2010) who used the corpus-driven approach to investigate news stories about Islam before and after the 9/11 attacks on America. He investigated the representation of Islam and Muslims in an 87 million word corpus of British newspaper articles covering the period between 1999 and 2005. He compared broadsheet and tabloid news using keywords, collocates and concordance analyses. The results (Baker 2010, p. 310) indicate that the ‘tabloids tended to focus more on British interests, writing about Muslims in a highly emotional style, in connection with terrorist attacks and religious extremism, focussing on a small number of high-profile Muslim “villains” whereas ‘the broadsheet covers more stories about Muslims engaged in wars.’

Salama (2011) has studied ideology by examining collocation in meta-Wahhabi discourse in the period after the 9/11 attacks on America. He utilized corpus linguistics and CDA methodologies in order to propose a linguistic model for explicating the ideological nature of collocation between two clashing discourses. He selected a small number of

keywords for further in-depth investigation of their collocates relying on the concepts of textual synonymy, oppositional paradigms and argumentative fallacies. In addition to his use of the socio-cognitive approach to investigate the ideological coherence and socio-religious schemas that could motivate the ideological use of collocations in his research data, Salama has also utilized a social-semiotic perspective to investigate interdiscursive meanings and the symbolic power invested with the collocating words as religious or political signs.

And more recently, Baker et al. (2013) have expanded Baker's (2010) study on the role that the British national press has played in representing Muslims and Islam particularly in the years following the 9/11 attacks on America utilizing corpus tools. The early analysis chapters of their book focus on keywords which characterise the whole corpus, then individual newspapers, then change over time, while later chapters focus on various aspects made salient in light of certain keywords. This includes the use of collectivisation strategies like *Muslim community* and *Muslim world*, gender differentiating strategies (e.g. Muslim women as wearing the veil, Muslim men as prone to radicalisation), the representation of different levels of belief (e.g. *extreme* vs. *moderate* vs. *devout*) and the demonization of Muslims who were seen to be unjustly deserving of government benefits.

However, as I have stated earlier, Salafi discourses have never been studied, to the best of my knowledge, from a CDA perspective, nor have they come under any sort of investigation utilizing corpus tools. This leads us to the final section of this chapter, namely, the conclusion.

2.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to introduce a survey of research that are concerned with religious studies as well as some studies on Salafism that are aimed at accounting for this

religious phenomenon in Islam. I have also covered studies that have been aimed at reading religious discourses critically.

Apart from Rizwan (2011) and Hukam Sing and Thuraisingam (2011) none of the studies, that I have outlined above, has ever investigated Arabic or English Salafi or other religious discourses. The studies on religious discourse proper must navigate many pitfalls as I have indicated above. Rizwan (2011) and Hukam Sing and Thuraisingam (2011) have not addressed the issues of semantic foci that distinguish religious discourses, representing ‘the Other’, or argumentation schemes that are mostly utilized to legitimate authorial stances. They have not also utilized corpus linguistics tools as their data are limited which would raise the problem of their possible bias in selecting data that serve their preconceived agendas. This constitutes the following point of departure: I shall be studying Salafist discourses (religious discourses per se) critically utilizing corpus tools to locate the most salient semantic foci, representations of social actors and argumentation schemes in the research data.

In order to achieve the previously mentioned goal I use an eclectic approach utilizing corpus linguistics tools combined with some aspects of CDA methodology that I aim to analyse an Islamic religious discourse proper (Salafism). The next chapter will address the methodological framework that I intend to use in this thesis which is hoped to bridge the gaps in CDA studies of religious discourses.

CHAPTER 3: Methodological framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to shed light on the methods and data employed in this thesis in order to analyze the Salafi ideological representation in two corpora designed for this purpose. The analysis in this thesis has two major parts. First, I base my analysis on the most salient ideological representations via keyword analysis in both corpora which would enable me to capture the major differences in semantic foci, representations of social actors and argumentation schemes as well as points of agreements of both Salafi writers. Second, on a macro level, this thesis seeks to provide an explanation of results produced. Thus, this chapter also sheds light on how I shall explain and relate my results to socio-political and religious contexts. In section 3.2 I outline the relevant aspects of the two methodological frameworks that I use; corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis. As the form of CDA that I employ is based on the Discourse Historical Approach, I also include a sub-section on argumentation theory as this is an area from which DHA has borrowed. After outlining the frameworks employed, I then describe how I collected and transcribed my data in section 3.3. Then in section 3.4 I describe how I shall apply various techniques and procedures to my data in order to answer my research questions. Finally, section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Methodological framework

In this study I shall also combine corpus linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) methodologies. As shown in section 2.4 the synergy between them is encouraging as it involves triangulating quantitative and qualitative methods. I shall first expand on the description of corpus linguistics given in chapter 2, paying greater attention to the techniques within CL that I shall be using in this thesis.

3.2.1 Corpus linguistics

A corpus can be defined as a collection of naturally occurring examples of language, although more recently it has been used to refer to collections of (or parts of) texts that are stored and accessed electronically (Hunston, 2002). Corpora are collected in order to be representative of a particular language variety²⁶, and corpus builders attempt to ensure that they create corpora that are sampled from a range of representative sources, with no single text skewing the data. For that reason, similar-sized samples of texts are often collected, rather than whole texts. Corpora that aim to represent a whole language variety may be hundreds of millions of words in size such as the British National Corpus (BNC) and The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). Corpora which are based on more restricted types of language (such as British weather reports) may, quite legitimately, be much smaller.

Corpus linguistics involves the analysis of corpora which is aided by the use of software packages which are able to carry out complex searches and calculations on language data. This often involves making statistical comparisons based on word frequency or word order, as well as presenting linguistic data in ways that make it easier for human researchers to identify linguistic patterns and trends. Important concepts within corpus linguistics are wordlists, keywords, collocations and concordances. These are techniques of analysis which facilitate the work of researchers and allow them to investigate linguistic phenomena in a large amount of data.

3.2.1.1 Keyness

A keyword is simply 'a word that appears in a text or a corpus statistically significantly than would be expected by chance when compared to a corpus which is larger or of equal size'

26. This is true of a representative corpus. However other corpora such as the two Salafi corpora under investigation in this thesis are not designed to be representative of a language variety. They are rather designed to be representative of the type of the writings of each Salafi writer chosen for critical discourse analysis.

(Paul Baker, Hardie, & McEnery, 2006, pp. 97-98). In order to obtain keywords, wordlists are generated first for two corpora (the second corpus is considered as the comparator or reference corpus), and then frequencies of all of the words in the two wordlists are compared against each other using a statistic such as the chi-squared or log likelihood statistical test in order to determine which words occur significantly more often in the target corpus (Paul Baker, 2006, p. 125). Keywords can be useful in revealing the 'aboutness' of a particular corpus, and can provide an initial focus for analysts which is based on actual salience rather than what an analyst may 'feel' is important. In my study, I use keywords to identify different lexical foci between the two types of Salafi discourse I have collected. This gives an indication of the different topics that are prevalent in each type of discourse, as well as giving me an idea of which social actors are referred to, and the sorts of words which are used as part of argumentation strategies. However, these keywords, once identified, will be examined in more detail via collocation and concordance analyses (see the following sections).

3.2.1.2 Collocation and word clusters

When words tend to co-occur next or near each other in naturally occurring language use, they are called collocates (Firth, 1957). The frequent co-occurrences of two words in a text may indicate a relationship that can be ideological, as Stubbs (1996, p. 172) points out: 'words occur in characteristic collocations, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody.' Stubbs (*ibid.*, p. 195) argues that 'if collocations and fixed phrases are repeatedly used as unanalysed units in media discussion and elsewhere, then it is very plausible that people will come to think about things in such terms.' In my own study, I shall examine collocates of the keywords I have identified, in order to get a better idea of the meanings attached to them. It is worth noting here that in cases where a keyword is very frequent, occurring say, thousands of times, it can be helpful to also examine frequent word clusters. A word cluster is simply a fixed sequence of words

(sometimes called an n-gram, where n stands for the number of words in the sequence). While collocates can often identify salient relationships between words, word clusters can help to show their most frequent contexts.

Corpus software can quickly identify lists of collocates or clusters in a text or corpus, although such lists may not tell us anything about the actual use of the collocates or clusters and what they achieve in the research data. This would need to be identified through concordance-based analysis.

3.2.1.3 Concordance

A concordance is a list (usually in a tabular form) of all of the occurrences of a particular word, phrase or collocational pair within its immediate context – usually a few words to the left and the right of the search term (Paul Baker, 2006, p. 71). Concordances can be sorted alphabetically to the left or right of the search term in order to enable similar linguistic structures to be more easily identified. Additionally, concordance lines can be expanded if more context is required. I shall therefore rely on the analysis of concordance lines in order to investigate the context that keywords and their collocates occur in. This will help me to better explain why certain patterns appear in the writings of one author, compared to the other.

Having described some of the techniques from corpus linguistics that I shall be employing in this study, next I shall outline the aspects of CDA that I shall use.

3.2.2 Aspects of CDA applied in my study

The representation of social actors is one of the main themes in this study. I shall utilize two major aspects of the sociosemantic categories proposed by writers within CDA such as Fairclough, van Leeuwen and Wodak, namely personalization and impersonalization as nominational strategies, and argumentation schemes that are used as legitimating strategies.

3.2.2.1 Social actor theory

Following Halliday (2004) social actors are the Participants in social processes (Fairclough, 2003) or social practices (van Leeuwen, 2008). According to Fairclough (2003, p. 145) social actors are usually Participants in the clause but they may be located within the Circumstances²⁷, in which he confirms that “not all Participants are social actors as in ‘the car hit Mary’, ‘the car hit a rock’ – both ‘Mary’ and ‘a rock’ are objects of the verb (i.e. Participants), but only ‘Mary’ is a social actor”. In this study I use some of the sociosemantic categories of van Leeuwen (1996, p. 32-70; 2008, pp. 23-54) (detailed below) to focus on the representation of ‘the Other’ as opposed to in-group representations. The aim of CDA analysis is to investigate social inequality which could be ‘expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use’ (Wodak, 2001b, p. 2). A focus on ‘the Other’ then, is in keeping with the aims within CDA. And while both of the religious leaders I am examining are Salafis, during my early examinations of keywords I found it notable how each one tended to focus on a different type of ‘Other’, and further investigation indicated that an analysis of ‘the Other’ would help to reveal the ideological stances of each leader. Therefore, the boundaries of the two Saudi Salafi strands could be realized more obviously by examining representations of social actors who belong to the out-group rather than the Salafi in-group. In what follows I shall outline aspects of van Leeuwen’s social actor representation framework that will be used in my own analysis.

3.2.2.2 Sociosemantic categories

As described in section 2.3.1, Van Leeuwen (1996 pp. 32-70; 2008, pp. 23-54) proposes an approach²⁸ that tackles the representation of social actors in terms of inclusion and exclusion. His main aim is to establish a sociological and critical relevance of his linguistic categories by developing an inventory that could account for the representation of social actors in

27. This follows Halliday’s concept of ‘Circumstance’ (Halliday, 2004, pp. 259-280)

28. This has been slightly changed from his previous approach (van Leeuwen, 1996).

English. He identifies two reasons for drawing up such inventory; first, ‘the lack of bi-uniqueness of language’ where ‘the agency, for instance, as a sociological concept, [...] is not always realized by linguistic agency, by the grammatical role of ‘agent’[...] it can also be realized in many other ways, for instance, by possessive pronouns’ (van Leeuwen, p. 23). Van Leeuwen’s second reason for his sociosemantic inventory is based on the assumption that meanings are subject to cultural and historical linguistic change.

3.2.2.3 Nominal strategies

Van Leeuwen’s approach is composed of twenty one possible ways (organised hierarchically) in which social actors can be represented in discourse. The first two levels of sub-division are inclusion and exclusion. Exclusion involves processes like passivisation and backgrounding – or ways in which social actors become ‘unmentioned’ in various ways. In the early stages of my data analysis I was open to including any or all of van Leeuwen’s categories which appeared in my analysis. However, it became clear that certain categories occurred more often than others, and due to reasons of time and word limits I have instead focussed on those which appeared most frequently and appeared to be most clearly related to the construction of ‘the Other’, namely the inclusion category which is further subdivided into personalization and impersonalization. These two sub-categories actually cover the majority of the other categories in van Leeuwen’s system (see Figure 2.1), and are described in more detail in the following two sub-sections.

3.2.2.4 Personalization

Personalization is the representation of social actors as human beings by means of abstract or concrete nouns which have the semantic feature +human. This category of the sociosemantic inventory can involve representing social actors by *indetermination* which refers to the representation of social actors as unspecified, anonymous individuals or groups.

Indetermination could also be realized by aggregation (i.e. collectivization which represent social actors as groups) as in ‘many believe’ or ‘someone says’.

Though nomination involves representation of social actors ‘in terms of their unique identities, by being nominated’, it can also be ‘titulated either in the form of honorification, the addition of standard titles, ranks, etc., or in the form of affiliation, the addition of personal or kinship relation terms’. Various levels of formalisation can thus be used to nominate social actors.

Identification occurs when social actors are referred to ‘in terms of what they, more or less permanently, or unavoidably, are’. Van Leeuwen distinguishes three types of identification: a. Classification (which is socially and culturally variable) occurs when social actors are identified according to the different classes of people in a given society (according to wealth, age, religion etc.); b. Relational identification is the representation of social actors in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations to each other. Finally, physical identification relates people to their physical features.

3.2.2.5 Impersonalization

Impersonalization is the representation of social actors by means of abstract or concrete nouns which lack the semantic feature +human. Van Leeuwen identifies two types of impersonalization: a. Abstraction which involves the representation of social actors in terms of a quality assigned to them; and b. objectivation that involves representation of social actors by means of reference to a place (spatialization), or a thing closely associated either with their person (somatization) or with the action in which they are represented as being engaged (utterance autonomization, instrumentalization).

In the following subsection I address issues that relate to the circumstances of this thesis – using a categorisation system developed with the English language grammatical system on Arabic data.

3.2.2.6 Applicability of the sociosemantic categories to Arabic data

Though Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 23) states that his approach is designed to investigate how the Participants of social practice can be represented in English discourse, his sociosemantic inventory can also be applied to Arabic texts. It is also worth noting that despite the fact that lexicogrammatical and discourse-level linguistic systems, and nominal group may slightly differ in the case of Arabic, i.e. in some specific instances of linguistic realizations, the application of this approach as a whole can be extended to Arabic texts.

One example of the differences between English and Arabic in the linguistic realization of the sociosemantic categories and the categories themselves is nomination of social actors by affiliation. In English, representation of social actors by nomination in terms of affiliation (relational identification) involves the addition of personal or kinship markers to the designated social actor as in, quoting the example of Van Leeuwen, “Auntie Barbara” while linguistic realization of this category in Arabic occurs by adding the word ‘بن/ابن’ (*’ibn /bin*; the son of) or ‘بنت’ (*bint*; the daughter of) between the two names (see Section 3.3.2 for translation and transliteration conventions in this thesis). This is in the case of adding the father’s name (or even the mother’s name in rare, mostly negative, instances as in the following vocative case ‘يا ابن السوداء’ (*ya ’ibn ’assawdā*; oh you, the son of the black mother), but if the affiliation is familial or tribal, then the addition of ‘ال’ (*’al*; the), or the modern usage of ‘آل’ (*’āl*; the family or the house of) is necessary before the last name, ‘العتيبي’ (*’al’otaibi*; the Otaibi –member of the tribe of ’otaibah), or ‘آل سعود’ (*ālsa’ud*; a member of the family of Saud or the house of Saud).

In the first case, there are two types of changes: first the addition of the Arabic definite article ‘ال’ (*’al*; the) at the beginning of the tribe’s name, then it undergoes slight linguistic change (morphophonemic); the addition of the vowel /i/ and the deletion of /ah/ in the case of ‘عتيبة’ (*’otaibah*), both morphophonemic changes occur at the final segment of the name of the tribe. But the addition of *’āl* involves no changes at all. Moreover, nomination in

Arabic can also involve names of places where the social actor(s) originally come from or even having lived in that specific place for sometime or a lengthy period; a person who lived or came from the city of Makkah could be nominated as ‘المكي’ (*almakki*) as in: *Mohammad ibn Sa‘id almakki*; *almakki* is a reference to the city of ‘مكة’ *Makkah* where the last two phonemes, /a/ and /h/, were omitted and a morpheme that indicates affiliation which is composed of the long vowel / ī / is attached at the end. Van Leeuwen’s approach considers this last point as a type of identification by classification which involves reference to the social actors in terms of age, gender or provenance and so forth.

In Arabic people can also be nominated with reference to their children; ‘أبو/أبي/أبا’ (*‘abul’abil’aba*; the father of – nom., gen., and acc. respectively) and ‘أم’ (*‘um*; the mother of) followed by the name of the son or the daughter. The second type of nomination is widely spread in some parts of modern Arab countries where people avoid calling their wives by their names, while in the case of ‘the father of’, people mostly use the name of the older son as a semiformal nomination –names of daughters are also used if the father or the mother does not have a son. But people tend to use the name of the husband’s father as a hypothetical son’s name even if the first child is a girl. Clearly then, while many of the van Leeuwen’s social actor categories hold up in Arabic, their linguistic realizations are likely to be different.

For my approach, I am interested in examining the representation of ‘othered’ social actors in Salafi discourse, and therefore van Leeuwen’s approach is useful to me. However, it is also important to be able to show how such representations are legitimated, based on the arguments that authors use to justify them. Therefore, I need to combine van Leeuwen’s approach with the Discourse Historical Approach.

3.2.2.7 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)

DHA is a well-known approach to critical discourse analysis developed by Wodak and her colleagues in the Vienna school (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 1996, 1999, 2001a,

2007). Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) state that DHA is a three-dimensional approach; firstly, identifying the topics of the discourse under consideration, then investigation of discursive strategies follows and finally examination of linguistic means (as types) and the specific context-dependant linguistic realization (as tokens) takes place.

Reisigl and Wodak (2001) mention five important discursive strategies that 'are involved in the positive self- and negative other-presentation'; referential or nomination (of which several strategies are borrowed from van Leeuwen's approach (1996) mentioned above), predication, argumentation, perspectivation and mitigation/intensification strategies upon which the following five questions are constructed:

1- How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?

2- What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

3- What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

4- From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? And,

5- Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or are they mitigated? (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 93)

The approach (DHA) revolves, more or less, around the aforementioned questions which resonate in all the authors' publications about DHA (Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Wodak, 1996, 1999, 2001a, 2007).

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 44), a discursive strategy is 'a more or less accurate and a more or less intentional plan of (discursive) practices adopted to a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic aim' i.e. 'a systemic way of using language'.

Following the pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), Reisigl and Wodak introduce argumentation in their own approach. They define the notion of discourse as linked to, *inter alia*, ‘the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view’ (2009, p. 89). They provide rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing. When these rules are violated, fallacies occur. Thus they have provided a (non-exhaustive) list of argumentative fallacies which are based upon Aristotle’s rhetoric (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) (e.g. straw man fallacy and ad arguments; *argumentum ad hominem* and *argumentum ad baculum* etc.). Part of DHA involves identifying when text producers use argumentative fallacies and *topoi* e.g. in order to legitimate a particular negative representation of a social actor. In the following section I outline the aspects of argumentation theory which occur in DHA and are thus relevant to my own thesis.

3.2.3 Argumentation

It is useful to start this section by defining argumentation. According to Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 1), argumentation is ‘a verbal, social, and ‘rational’²⁹ activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint’. The aim of using argumentation in this analysis is to identify the arguments via which Salafi writers try to legitimate their stances (see Section 3.2.2.3 below). As I have mentioned in the previous section, following Reisigl and Wodak (2001), argumentation can be seen as one of the discursive strategies that text producers may use in their different representations. I also use the concept of argumentation schemes as an analytical tool via which arguments can be discerned (see Section 3.2.3.2 below). In order to assess the

29. Defining arguments as rational could be problematized as not all arguments are rational. In addition, we might query what ‘rational’ means in every culture; as what might be rational in one culture might not be in another.

acceptability of an argument, we need to identify fallacies and topoi which I shall write about below.

3.2.3.1 Fallacies and topoi

A topos (pl. topoi) is a persuasive strategy or rule which connects an argument to a claim or conclusion. Topoi are thus broad beliefs which help to maintain an argument without actually constituting the argument itself.

A topos can be further described as being part of an argumentation scheme that belongs to the premises and it is the formal warrant that connects the argument with the conclusion (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Rubinelli, 2009; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008). It could also be defined as an arrangement of knowledge, as a discursive resource where arguments for satisfying a conclusion can be discerned without the topoi themselves being considered as part of the argument (Brindle, 2009; van Der Valk, 2000). For example, a topos of authority (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p. 79) ‘is based on the conclusion rule: X is right ... because A (=an authority) says that it is right). A topos of responsibility (ibid. p. 78) states ‘because a person... is responsible for... specific problems, it or they should act in order to find solutions to these problems.’

On the other hand, a fallacy is a form of argumentation which appears convincing but is logically flawed because it uses poor reasoning (see Reisigl and Wodak (2001, pp. 71-74). An argument can be fallacious even if its conclusion is true. For example, the fallacy of unqualified authority occurs in cases where a person with insufficient expertise on a matter is quoted as being a legitimate authority on a subject (such as when famous sports-persons are used in adverts to endorse non-sports-related products as being better than their rivals, or when an expert physicist is asked to make moral pronouncements, because of their expert status even if such pronouncements are reasonable). Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 79) note that it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between topoi and fallacies.

Identifying a topos or a fallacy in argument(s) could be handled easily, yet, a need to satisfactorily evaluate and analyze the whole argument –whether fallacious or not–, taking into account the argument structure, seems more adequate and could do justice to arguments intended to present standpoints in religious discourse. And in case of multiple/complex arguments when a text producer may either introduce a constellation of arguments that may constitute a conclusive defence of a standpoint – coordinative argumentation –, or arguments supporting other arguments – subordinative argumentation– (van Eemeren et.al., 2002), the need to present the argumentation structure schematically is even greater. Moreover, we may encounter arguments with unstated premises or conclusions (enthymemes) which deductive logic may fail to account for (Walton & Reed, 2005). In order to account for such argumentation complexity, argumentation schemes are introduced as tools that can best identify topoi and evaluate and analyze arguments (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Frans van Eemeren, et al., 2002; F. H. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Walton, 2005; Walton, et al., 2008; Walton & Reed, 2005).

3.2.3.2 Argumentation schemes

Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones, like argument from expert opinion, that have proved troublesome to view deductively or inductively (Walton, 2005). They are more or less conventionalized ways of achieving or promoting a transfer between an explicit premise and the standpoint (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). These argumentation schemes help to ‘identify and evaluate common types of argumentation in everyday discourse’ (Walton, et al., 2008, p. 11). In this respect, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) distinguish between three major categories of argumentation schemes: causal argumentation, symptomatic (sign) argumentation and argumentation based on comparisons (argument from analogy). Though

this classification is broad, it can help identify the main argumentation scheme(s) in the research data.

Religious discourse is argumentative in nature. The aim of using argumentation schemes in my analysis is to critically analyze argumentations that permeate the data of this study as well as identify patterns of reasoning in the Salafi discourse. As Walton et al. (2008) note, most argumentation schemes are defeasible even after an argument has been accepted, and they might later be rejected as new evidence is taken into consideration. Argumentation schemes, thus, can help researchers to critically analyze religious texts and identify fallacies and topoi. Arguments can be traced in a corpus by means of certain lexical elements that serve as indicators. Argumentative indicators (phrases or words) introduce or put forward a standpoint. They may, also, refer to argumentative moves which may include ‘to my mind’, ‘the way I see it’ etc. (Frans van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Henkemans, 2007; F. H. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).

To give a brief example from my data, an argumentation scheme by sign could be used by Salafi writers who are utilizing Qur’anic verses as the words of Allah, which according to all Muslims, are inherently correct and true. Based on a preliminary corpus analysis, I found that some of these Qur’anic verses and other Prophetic traditions (the highest divine and human authorities in Islam) have been quoted by both Salafi writers whose writings are under examination in this thesis. Additionally they include some of the writings of medieval Salafi religious leaders. Such quotes are used for the purpose of legitimating their stances.

3.2.3.3 Legitimation

According to Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 91) there are four categories of legitimation: ‘1) ‘authorization’, legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority is vested; 2) ‘moral evaluation’, legitimation by

reference to discourses of value; 3) rationalization, legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the social knowledges that endow them with cognitive validity; and 4) mythopoesis, legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions.’ He (ibid.) also distinguishes between subcategories of authority legitimation: custom (conformity and tradition), authority (personal and impersonal such as laws) and commendation (expert and role model).

Particularly relevant for my thesis, in terms of legitimation, is the way that the Salafi authors have used religious quotes in their writings. This leads to a discussion of recontextualisation in the following subsection.

3.2.3.4 Recontextualization

Fairclough defines recontextualization as ‘the appropriation of elements of one social practice within another’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 32). Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 90) point out that transferring given elements to a new context involves two processes; first a decontextualization process, then a recontextualization process takes place. They also indicate that the extracted elements are inserted in a new context and can gain new meanings. Linell (1998) gives three types of recontextualization which are intratextual, intertextual and interdiscursive while Bernstein states that ‘recontextualizing principles’ ‘selectively appropriate, relocate, refocus and relate to other discourses’ which causes semantic shifts to occur (Bernstein, 1990, p. 184). Recontextualization includes interdiscursivity that, as Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 90) say, connotes reference to topics or subtopics of other discourses. They (ibid., p. 90) add that intertextual connections to past and present texts ‘are established in different ways: through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through reference to the same events; by allusions or evocations; by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next and so on.’

Towards the end of this chapter I shall discuss how I shall bring the corpus and CDA methods mentioned so far together in order to answer my research questions. But before that, this is a good place to discuss the data itself in more detail.

3.3 Data

Using the corpus analysis tool WordSmith 4 (Scott 2004)³⁰, I shall quantitatively analyze the data under investigation from a corpus linguistic perspective in order to identify salient linguistic features which will then be subjected to qualitative analysis using techniques and categories from CDA. First, I shall describe the data.

3.3.1 Collecting the corpus

The data that will be analyzed in this study are books and booklets written by two famous Saudi-Salafi writers in the 1980s and 1990s. I have chosen to focus on AbdulAziz Ibn Baz and Safar Alhawali. These writers are two of the most prominent religious leaders from that period, belonging to two different strands of Salafism (Fandy, 1998, 2001; Meijer, 2009).

I have chosen this period because, as described in Chapter 1, important political and religious changes took place during this time, beginning with the siege of the Grand Mosque in 1979, which could be seen as the beginning of the rise of the Sahwah and the increasing power of Salafism in Saudi Arabia. I choose the end of the century as my ‘cut-off’ point because the 9/11 attacks resulted in an increased global scrutiny of Salafism, which has generally been interpreted (at least in the West), as responsible for the 9/11 attacks. I therefore want to focus on the period leading up to 9/11 in order to investigate what the nature of Saudi Salafi discourse actually was at that point, whether it was unified or conflicted, and whether it advocated the sorts of violent attacks which resulted in 9/11.

30. WordSmith was chosen for its flexibility and my own familiarity with its use. While newer versions of WordSmith Tools are available, I found that version 4 works best with Arabic corpora.

I base my selection of the data for the present study on the following criteria:

- 1- All the selected books or booklets are written by two prominent Saudi-Salafi writers representing the two types of Salafi strands under investigation;
- 2- All the selected books or booklets address socio-religious issues and also make reference to in and out groups in various ways; and
- 3- Accessibility: the texts selected for this study were either used as sources for other booklets and brochures that were distributed for free in mosques, public health care units, barber saloons and other public places and/or have been made accessible via the internet on popular websites exclusively designed for religious teaching.³¹ All of the texts are written in Arabic, and the analysis has been carried out on the original Arabic texts rather than translations. However, I provide English translations as part of my analysis, for the purposes of clarity.

Using these criteria, I collected all electronically accessible texts for each text producer. I chose five books and booklets for each author that are available on the authors' websites. Table 3.1 shows the text producers, the titles of their books and word counts:

Table 3.1: The data used for this study

N	Safar Alhawali	Words	AbdulAziz Ibn Baz	Words
1	An introduction to the Western intellect and Modernism; مقدمة في تطور الفكر الغربي والحدائق	7472	Criticizing Arab Nationalism; نقد القومية العربية	12028
2	Unraveling the Ordeal to Enlighten the Scholars of the (Islamic) Nation; كشف الغمة عن علماء الأمة	30729	Importance of Religious Knowledge in Defeating Destructive Ideas ; أهمية العلم في محاربة الأفكار الهدامة	5248
3	A statement about the incidents (the second Gulf Crisis); بيان للأمة عن الأحداث	5918	The True and the Erroneous Creed; العقيدة الصحيحة وما يضادها	4223
4	Secularism: its Origin, Development and affects on the Islamic World; العلمانية نشأتها وتطورها في الحياة الإسلامية	147931	A Collection of fatwas (part one) Monotheism and Other Related Issues; مجموع فتاوى (الجزء الأول) التوحيد وما يتعلق به	77413
5	Nationalism; القومية	3984	A Collection of fatwas (part two) Monotheism and Other Related Issues; مجموع فتاوى (الجزء الثاني) التوحيد وما يتعلق به	31629
Total		196034		130541

31 The books of Safar Alhawali were made accessible on his website: <http://www.alhawali.com/>, and the books of AbdulAziz ibn Baz are downloadable from his website: <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/>.

This has resulted in two Arabic corpora. Alhawali's collection of texts is about 196,000 words and Ibn Baz's is 130,500 words in size. The individual texts vary somewhat in size (from between ca. 4000-15000 words). Using equal-sized samples would have reduced the size of the corpus and made patterns harder to spot and generalisations more difficult to make. Therefore, I am using the full texts, but have tried to take into account the differing sizes into my analysis by considering dispersion. For example, if a particular linguistic pattern occurs due to its appearance in one large text only, then this is noted accordingly and accounted for as being due to that specific text rather than being generalized across the whole writings of that author. As I have indicated above, my data is Arabic which necessitates translations of analysed parts into English.

Once the files were gathered, they needed to be prepared for use with the corpus tool. All the books and booklets were initially Microsoft Office Word documents that were changed into Plain Text files (*.txt files) in order to make them readable to WordSmith. Next I needed to make some adjustments to the Arabic texts to take account of conjoined words. I separated the one-letter word 'ج' (*wa*; and) from the words that follow it. There were almost 35,000 (17,867 in Ibn Baz's corpus and 17,215 in Alhawali's corpus) occurrences of the one-letter word 'ج' (*wa*; and) all of which were written with no spacing separating it from the following words and would thus be identified by WordSmith as one word. However, there were some cases when 'ج' (*wa*) is part of a word and comes in the initial position. Thus, each case had to be analysed manually and separated only if required. The following section describes in more detail issues surrounding translation and transliteration of the Arabic data that I was working with.

3.3.2 Translation and transliteration of Arabic data

The analysis in this thesis is concerned with Arabic data. I carry out the analysis on the Arabic data, although for English readers who do not know Arabic well I provide a

translation of the analysed data. Translation involves communicating the meaning of one language by representing it in a second language. All keywords, collocates and word clusters are translated into their English equivalents based on preliminary concordance analyses of the Arabic texts. As is the case with most religious writings, quotations (sometimes lengthy) from sacred texts, and Qur'an and Prophetic traditions, are used for different authorial purposes. These texts have undergone many different interpretations in the past centuries. Most of these quotations are utilised by and sometimes interpreted differently by different authors to suit different beliefs. It is noteworthy here to indicate that there are some translations published by reliable sources such as the Ash'arite version of Qur'an by Yusuf Ali (2009) which was first published in 1934. Another translation of the meanings of the Qur'an that reflects the Salafi interpretation is the Saudi sponsored translation by Al-Hilali and Khan (1997) which is also available online.³² As there are multiple possible ways of translating these sayings, I have chosen the Salafi translation of Al-Hilali and Khan's (1997) of the Qur'anic verses found in Salafi writers' texts. For example, I chose Al-Hilali and Khan's (1997) Salafi translation of the following Qur'anic verse {الرَّحْمَنُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ اسْتَوَى} which, according to the explications of the Salafis, could be translated literally as {The Most Gracious (Allah) rose over (Istawa) the (Mighty) Throne (in a manner that suits His Majesty)}. However, other translations such as that by Yusuf Ali (2009) bear the Ash'arites' ideology. Thus according to the Ash'arites, as reflected by Yusuf Ali's translation, the previous Qur'anic verse is translated as {(Allah) Most Gracious is firmly established on the throne (of authority)} (see Section 8.3.2 for more information about the Salafi-Ash'arites differences).

Additionally, I have tried to keep the original Arabic terms that indicate some Salafi concepts which do not have any cultural equivalents in the target language (English). I have thus transliterated and translated them into English. Transliteration involves the conversion of

32. This Saudi sponsored translation is available on <http://www.qurancomplex.org/default.asp?l=eng>
Among the many websites that provide the translations of Qur'an is the following:
<http://www.searchtruth.com/search.php>

a written text from one script into another. An example of how I combine transliteration and translation is the term 'الحاكمية' (*'alḥakimiyyaha*; sovereignty of Allah). Here I first give the Arabic term, then in italics, the transliterated term employing letters used in the English writing system in order to represent the sound that the Arabic word would make if spoken. Finally, after the semicolon I give the English translation or meaning of the word. For the transliteration, I follow the DIN 31635 standard for the transliteration of the Arabic alphabet (see appendix C).³³

It is noteworthy that Alhawali utilized translated quotes from different English sources. In this case I refer to the original English text then compare the Arabic version to that of the original to examine any noticeable differences that could be utilized by the (anonymous) translator(s) (Alhawali is notably unable to read or speak English) to achieve certain ideological ends. It is also noteworthy here to give some notes about my use of the different forms of brackets that appear in the translation of analysed texts.

I write three dots enclosed in square brackets [...] to indicate that the concordance line is taken from a lengthy and verbose paragraph(s) as I omit some repeated sentences and phrases in the original Arabic version. I also use square brackets to write my own comments on the translation from English into Arabic when the Salafi author directly quotes from English sources as we shall see in the analysis of Alhawali's writings in Chapters 4, 5 and 7. Additionally I use square brackets to provide some words from the co-text that could help relate the concordance line or excerpts to the texts they belong to e.g. 'we [the missionaries]'. These words or phrases mostly appear in square brackets at the start of some concordance lines in both versions, Arabic and English.

33. The DIN 31635 standard for the transliteration of the Arabic alphabet is available on the following link: <http://transliteration.eki.ee>.

I use round brackets to either give some hints or definitions of difficult religious or Arabic concepts to help readers to understand concordance lines and other excerpts such as the word 'Zakat' (regular charity). I also use round brackets to provide words and phrases that could explain the meanings of keywords, collocates or word clusters that appear in tables, figures or concordances. An example from the research data is the word 'صلى' (*ṣalla*) which literally means 'prayed', however it occurs in my data as part of an optative phrase which means 'may Allah send His blessings on' (detailed below). As for the brackets that exist in the original texts I prefer to keep them as they appear in the translation. Curly brackets {...} always indicate Qur'anic verses and a small asterisk indicates the end of a Qur'anic verse and the beginning of another one. The Arabic writing system is another issue that needs special attention. Unlike the English writing system which shows each word separately, Arabic may include two or more words together. This is because the Arabic writing system reflects the morphological structure of Arabic which is substantially more complex than that of English, and as a result some pronouns as well as the definite article are always attached to verbs and nouns (some of which are keywords in this thesis). I call such phrases 'one-word phrases', for example, the definite article 'الـ' (*'al*; the), is always attached to its following noun as in the Arabic word 'الرسول' (*'alrasūl*: the messenger).

There are some other examples that show the morphological complexity of the structure of Arabic words such as 'فأسقيناكموه' (*fa'asqainakomūh*) which would be rendered into a whole phrase containing 7 words if translated into English as in '*and then we made you drink it*'. WordSmith deals with such one-word Arabic phrases as single lexical units, although I have translated them into English as multi word units. Some of these words may occur as keywords or collocates. When translating keywords, and collocates or any other salient words, I provide some other grammatical information that could give their meanings clearly in English. Such information is put between brackets, so for example 'يا' or 'يا أيها'

would be translated as (O... –vocative) or ‘محمدا’ (*mohamadan*; Mohammad –acc.) and so forth.

It is also noteworthy here that some of the keywords and collocates in the research data are homographic in nature such as ‘سلم’ (*silma*; peace, *salima*; be saved, *sullam*; ladder, or *sallam*; to say peace be with/(may Allah) send His peace (on him)) and ‘صلى’ (*ṣala*; exposed to the blaze of/*ṣalla*; prayed/(may Allah) send His blessings (on him)). In Arabic writing system, the short vowels /a/, /o/ and /i/ are indicated by diacritics. Also, gemination (or elongation of a consonant sound) in the Arabic writing system is indicated by the diacritic *ش* which is placed on the letter representing the geminated consonant. However, these writing system rules were not always followed by the authors who created my data.

In analysing polysemous words, I point out the different meanings of such words therein as in Chapter 6 section 6.2. The homographs as well as polysemous words in Arabic show one of the shortcomings of WordSmith (and probably other software packages) as they are not identified by such software packages as distinctive words. However, readers of Arabic should be able to successfully recognize the geminated consonants or the other diacritics that represent the short vowels depending on the linguistic context. Another difficulty of translating search words or concordances is that some morphological changes in some Arabic words are not obvious as these changes are indicated by diacritics which are mostly not used in the two corpora. However speakers of Arabic can successfully identify them as in the social actor indicating keyword ‘عباده’ (*ibadoh/ibadah/ibadih*; His servants/worshippers – nom., acc. and gen. respectively)³⁴ in Ibn Baz. The three forms of this keyword can only be identified from the co-text (see criterion 5 on p. 72 below).

34. The case markers in Arabic are normally indicated by short vowel suffixes; -o for nominative, -i for genitive and -a for accusative, but there are substantial exceptions to this rule (Ryding, 2005, p. 54) –for more information about case inflection in Arabic morphology, see chapter 7 in Ryding (2005).

Having identified the nature of my data, I now turn to describe the procedures of analysis in this thesis.

3.4 Methods

This section first covers the corpus techniques that were used in order to identify keywords. I then go on to show how they will be analysed using other corpus techniques (namely collocation and concordance analyses), and how I shall identify features pertinent to CDA and argumentation theory. I end the chapter by discussing how I shall carry out the analysis of the religious and socio-political context in order to explain my findings.

3.4.1 Computational identification: Analysing keywords

In the following section I outline the method that I shall use to computationally identify the semantic foci that reflect the topics, social actor representation and the argumentation markers that indicate argumentation schemes in the two Saudi-Salafi corpora. I take keywords as the starting point of my analysis in this thesis. For the purpose of comparing the writings of the Salafi authors in these two corpora, using Mike Scott's WordSmith suite of tools (2004), wordlists of both corpora were generated and their relative frequencies were compared against each other and subjected to log-likelihood tests using WordSmith's default cut-off point for statistical significance, to generate keyword lists for each corpus. As I have indicated above, I use frequency information as a way of identifying potential argumentation indicators. I also derive keywords in order to compare semantic foci and social actor representations between the two sets of Salafi texts. A detailed analysis of the keywords via collocates and concordance lines will help me to identify self and other representations in my data, as well as pinpoint argumentation schemes and indicators.

A preliminary investigation of collocates and concordance lines of these keywords enabled me to group them according to three broad types:

1. Keywords which reveal the semantic foci of the texts
2. Keywords which refer to social actors
3. Keywords which are argumentation indicators

Some keywords can have multiple functions so may be grouped under more than one category. Carrying out a detailed analysis of all the keywords found is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I utilized some criteria to reduce these keywords to a manageable number (the criteria are mentioned in the beginning of the relevant chapters). In analysing the three types of keywords I use collocational and concordance-based analyses as well as word clusters.

3.4.2 Collocational analysis

After generating keywords and selecting a smaller number for analysis, I first attempt to consider their collocates in order to get a better idea of the meanings attached to them. In order to limit the number of collocates obtained for each keyword, and to focus on those which are most salient, I use the following criteria in identifying collocates : a) collocates of the keywords are generated (utilizing the default settings of Wordsmith) within the span of ± 5 and MI score of 3 or higher which can be ‘taken as evidence that’ the ‘two items are collocates’ (Hunston, 2002, p. 71); b) all collocates should occur in at least three texts or more in each corpus to be included in the analysis; and c) if keywords have other word-forms, their collocates are grouped under each word-form and only one collocate that has the highest MI score of each word-form is selected for the analysis.

After selecting the collocates based on the criteria above, I then try to investigate the sort of association (positive or negative) held between the keywords and their collocates. However, in some cases there may be hundreds or even thousands of occurrences of keywords such as the keyword ‘الله’ (*’allah*; Allah) (4253 times in Ibn Baz and 994 times in Alhawali) (see Chapter 4) and a collocate such as ‘سلم’ (*sallam*; may (Allah) send His peace

(upon him)) which occurs 872 in Ibn Baz and 97 times in Alhawali's corpus. This huge number of occurrences of keywords and collocates turns concordance-based analysis into a daunting experience. Thus, before concordance-based analysis of such search words I examine how keywords occur in their most frequent word clusters which will enable me to capture the most prominent use of the search words in the respective corpus. The next step is concordance based analysis.

3.4.3 Concordance-based analysis

Although I use collocates and word clusters, these techniques do not really give the contexts that words occur in, rather, they focus on the most salient and/or frequent patterns. Therefore I use concordance based analysis as the first qualitative step in analysing keywords and their related collocates and word clusters. Due to the fact that the concordance lines need to be translated into English, and often each one is several lines long (in order to give enough context for the meaning to be understood), it is not possible to go through each concordance line in detail. So I first attempt to classify similar concordance lines together, based upon the relationship between a word and its collocate. Then I choose a smaller number of concordance lines that are intended to be representative of either the most typical relationship between a collocational pair (or cluster), or, in cases where there is a wider range of relationships, I choose a variety of concordance lines in order to demonstrate this.

3.4.4 Semantic foci

As described in section 3.4.1, the keywords are categorised into three different groups: semantic foci, social actors and argument indicators. The semantic foci keywords help me to identify the 'discourse type' (Partington, 2010, p. 88) of each corpus. Here I use discourse type to refer to the ways in which texts can be labelled according to their topic or theme. For example, Chilton (2004) refers to political discourse, Williams and Chrisman (1993) talk of colonial discourse, while Hajer (1997) mentions environmental discourse. I examine a small

set of these semantic foci keywords from each corpus, using the corpus techniques described above. Relative frequency is only one (important) aspect of understanding the differences between the two authors though. I thus examine concordances, collocates etc. of the chosen keyword as it is used by both authors, including the author who under-uses it (although in such cases I may need to directly rely on concordance analyses as there may not be many collocates due to the word's low frequency in that corpus). In some cases, concordance lines need to be further expanded in order to fully understand the meaning behind the appearance of particular keywords in certain contexts.

The analysis of semantic foci keywords could lead to the identification of topics and the different argumentation schemes with which social actors are being associated for legitimization purposes in the corpus data, and this is noted where it occurs.

3.4.5 Social actor representation

Second, the keywords which refer to social actors will be examined in order to identify in-group and out-group representations. The analysis of social actor representation will focus on identifying particular nominational strategies. I especially focus on two major categories; personalization and impersonalization. The first can be linguistically identified through the linguistic choices made by text producers such as 'personal or possessive pronouns, proper names, or nouns and adjectives. It can also be realized in nominating social actors using titles of honorification.

Classification, which is socially and culturally variable, is another form of nomination in my data. Social actors can be identified according to their religions (i.e. religionym (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 116) such as Muslims, Christians or Jews), their religious factions (Sunni, Shiite, Sufis etc.) or their intellectual affiliation to (mostly modern literary) theories and movements – 'حديثي' (*ḥadaṭī*; modernist); 'بعثي' (*ba'ī*; an advocate of Baath socialist party/of or pertaining to Baath party).

The second type of nominal strategies is impersonalization. It involves reference to social actors by abstraction and objectivation. Abstraction is the representation of social actors in terms of a quality assigned to them. Objectivation is the representation of social actors by means of reference to a place (spatialization) or with the action in which they are represented as being engaged (for example, utterance autonomization as in ‘the report says’). Nomination by impersonalization could be used to ‘background the identity/role of social actors’. It can also add ‘impersonal authority to an action or quality of social actor and positive/negative connotations to an action or utterance of social actor’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 47).

The previously delineated discursive strategies are forms of positive self-representation and negative other-representation that contribute to the religious discrimination between individuals within the same faith communities and instigating the enmity between adherents of other religions/religious factions preventing dialogues that could lead discussants to mutual understanding of the diverse positions of each other. It is the intention of this thesis to focus on the different Salafi representations of the ‘Other’.

3.4.6 Argumentation schemes

Thirdly, the keywords which refer to argument indicators will be examined in order to identify particular arguments, argumentation schemes, topoi and fallacies. After locating arguments utilizing the argumentation indicators, identification of argumentation schemes then takes place. I shall first show the structure of the argument under consideration (premises, warrants, conclusions or even defeasible arguments such as those with unstated premises or conclusions – enthymemes), and then argumentation schemes can be identified. Evaluation of argumentation schemes via critical questions will be the next step which may result in the identification of topoi or fallacies (see Chapter 3 section 3.2.3). In religious discourse, arguments might be used ideologically to introduce and legitimize standpoints vis-

à-vis representations of social actors, or to refute the standpoints of others. However explanation of such representations can be done via analyzing religious and socio-political contexts, which is discussed in the following section.

3.4.7 Analyzing religious and socio-political contexts

Having identified how the various argumentative schemes and social actor representations in the texts contribute towards Salafi discourses, an important aspect of CDA is to both explain and evaluate these discourses, by relating the discourses to the wider context. The historical, religious (and sometimes social and political) context that modern Salafi groups draw on is vast. Using the triangulatory approach of the DHA (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) the context of situation is elaborated on by considering interlinks between texts and discourses the two Salafi text producers draw on when providing arguments utilized in negative/positive representations of the ‘Other’ – as well as utilizing previous canonical, religious, texts and discourses about topics i.e. taking into account interdiscursivity and intertextuality. Biographies of the two text producers and their institutions are also considered as context-relevant information. I also draw on my knowledge of religious sacred texts (Qur’an and Prophetic traditions) and other religious writings that pertain to the findings in Chapters 4-7. Finally, I consider historical factors as part of context, based partly around elaboration of some of the historical context of Saudi Arabia that was provided in Chapter 1.

3.5 Conclusion

So far I have delineated the quantitative and qualitative methodologies proposed for the analysis in this thesis in terms of methods and data. I have shown how I shall begin the analysis at the corpus level in order to identify salient words that are most distinctive of the differences between the two authors under examination. The remaining analyses are involved in explaining why such words appear as keywords, by first considering co-text via collocates,

clusters and concordances, and then to show how such words relate to social actor representation and argumentation, using more qualitative measures that require closer reading of texts. A final level of explanation involves relating the findings in the texts to contexts outside the corpus – the identities of the authors, their religious and political beliefs and Saudi Arabia's history and politics.

This section ends Part 1 of the thesis. Part 2 consists of the analysis itself, starting with Chapter 4.

Part Two

CHAPTER 4: Examining Ibn Baz's semantic foci keywords across both corpora

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of five quantitative and qualitative analysis chapters of the research data. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to deriving the keywords in the two corpora of the writings of Sheikh AbdulAziz Ibn Baz and Sheikh Safar Alhawali, as well as analysing keywords which relate to topics or semantic foci. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on social actor representation and argumentation respectively. Chapter 8 is devoted to explaining the findings in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 in relation to Saudi social and politico-religious contexts. This chapter and the next one respond to research question 1 (a): What do concordance and collocational analyses of keywords and frequent words in the two corpora of Salafi discourse reveal about themes/macro topics? Answering this question contributes to answering the overarching question: To what extent and how is Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s -1990s homogenous?

As described in Chapter 3, each of the Salafi corpora is comprised of five texts consisting of the writings of the text producers. For the purpose of comparing the two sets of data, using Mike Scott's WordSmith suite of tools (2004), wordlists of both corpora were generated and their relative frequencies were compared against each other and subjected to log-likelihood tests using Wordsmith's default cut-off point for statistical significance, to generate keyword lists for each corpus. The comparison resulted in 224 (Table A1 in Appendix A) keywords for Ibn Baz's corpus and 199 (B1 in Appendix B) keywords for Alhawali's corpus. In order to focus on keywords that were more widely representative of authorial choice rather than being due to a topic briefly but repetitively mentioned in a single specific text, I only focus on keywords that occurred in at least three texts from one author.

However, if any of the selected keywords in Tables A1 and B1 (Appendices A and B respectively) occurs more prominently in any of the texts, a notice will be provided therein.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show only the semantic foci keywords (ordered by keyness score) in both Salafi corpora. Both Tables are an abridged version of two more detailed tables (appendices A and B: Tables A2 and B2 respectively) that show the keywords along with their translations in English, number of texts that contain the keyword and other important statistical details such as frequencies, percentages, keyness, and p values. The two sets of keywords are selected according to the procedure described in Chapter 3 section 3.4.1.

Table 4.1 Semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz

N	keyword	Eng. trans.	F	F. Alhawali	N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	F	F. Alhawali
1	الله Allah		4253	994	28	أمر (Allah has) ordained		47	8
2	مجدده the Glorified		809	8	29	العزيز the Exalted in power,		46	8
3	جل the Majestic		424	18	30	بالحق truly/ with the truth		37	4
4	عز the Exalted in Mighty		363	11	31	الاستغاثة beseeching for help		28	1
5	الصلوة the blessings/ the prayer		289	18	32	النار the Hell-fire		58	17
6	تعالى the Exalted		477	151	33	الشريعة the Sharia Law		34	4
7	الله to Allah		267	74	34	شهادة testimony		22	0
8	الدعوة the call (to)		216	45	35	التحذير warning		31	3
9	السلام the Peace/ the peace/ Islamic salutation		255	78	36	العلم knowledge (about Allah)		225	183
10	الشرك associationism, polytheism		131	15	37	طاعته obeying Him		25	1
11	بالله in/ with/ by Allah		173	41	38	الحكم arbitration (according to Islamic Law)		30	3
12	الحق the True/ right		242	94	39	ولي Wali (Lord, God, Protector, Helper)		36	6
13	علا the Most High		76	0	40	كريم the most Generous		20	0
14	الهدى the guidance/ the right path		67	3	41	السلامة security		24	1
15	الباطل the falsehood		71	5	42	العاقبة (blessed) end		29	3
16	بإحسان followed them exactly (in faith)		51	0	43	سبيله His/ his path/ way		23	1
17	العظيم the great/ the Great		84	15	44	جواد Magnanimous		19	0
18	دينه His/ his religion		73	11	45	وحده (He) Alone		91	50
19	صفاته His attributes		42	0	46	دين religion		126	85
20	البدع the religiously impermissible innovative practice and beliefs		63	8	47	شر evil		38	9
21	العبادة the worship		120	51	48	دعوة call (to Allah)		55	21
22	الإسلام Islam		337	271	49	بالدعوة via the call (to Allah)		24	2
23	القيامة the (Day of) Resurrection		45	4	50	الآخرة the Hereafter		63	28
24	رب Lord, may		61	13	51	المنكر Al-Munkar (polytheism and disbelief and all that is wrong and Islam has forbidden)		33	7
25	ربه his Lord		40	3	52	الأصنام idols		23	2
26	الصفات the attributes (of Allah)		46	6	53	هدى guidance		34	8
27	المستقيم straight (way)		34	2	54	طاعة obedience (submission to Allah)		42	14

Table 4.2 Semantic foci keywords in Alhawali

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	F.	F.Baz	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	F.	F.Baz
1	أوروبا	Europe	263	4	24	العسكرية	the military (def. adj. fem.)	47	0
2	الخليج	the Gulf	161	1	25	المعاصر	contemporary	47	0
3	الغرب	the West	181	6	26	الحديثة	the modern	54	1
4	النظرية	the theory	120	0	27	الماضي	the past	44	0
5	الثورة	the revolution	115	0	28	الديني	the religious (def. adj. masc.)	57	2
6	الفكر	the intellect/ the thinking	120	3	29	الصليبية	the Crusades	51	1
7	الدينية	the religious (def. adj. fem./pl)	104	1	30	الدين	the religion	554	222
8	الغربية	the western	110	2	31	العالمية	the (...) World War/the international	55	2
9	الأوروبية	the European	92	0	32	تاريخ	history (indef.)	59	3
10	الحرب	the war	112	9	33	العصور	ages	48	1
11	الصراع	the conflict	65	0	34	المعاصرة	the modern	40	0
12	عصر	era	83	4	35	السياسي	the political (masc. adj./the politician	39	0
13	السياسة	politics	82	4	36	منطقة	region	49	2
14	العقل	mind	116	13	37	عسكرية	military (indef. adj. fem.)	36	0
15	الأوروبي	European (sing. adj. masc.)	55	0	38	المسكري	the military (def. adj. masc.)	35	0
16	السياسية	the political (adj. pl.)	67	2	39	دينية	religious (indef. adj. fem./pl.)	33	0
17	الغربي	the western (pl. adj. masc.)	67	2	40	النصرانية	Christianity	51	4
18	التاريخ	the history (def.)	107	12	41	الوطنية	patriotism	30	0
19	الوسطى	the middle (ages)	59	1	42	المادية	materialistic/materialism	42	2
20	حركة	movement	58	1	43	التاريخي	the historical	29	0
21	الحركة	the movement	57	1	44	الفكري	intellectual	36	1
22	الاجتماعي	the social (contract)	56	1	45	الحضارة	civilization	45	3
23	إسرائيل	Israel	83	7					

Taking into consideration that the corpora are drawn from the writings of two prominent Saudi Salafi authors written in the 1980s and 1990s, the semantic foci keywords tabulated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 above may give insights into the interests of the two Salafi writers. The first striking result is that Ibn Baz's keywords appear to be more religiously focussed in nature, referring to Allah, Islam and related concepts. On the other hand, Alhawali's keywords appear to be more politically-based, focussing on countries, concepts like politics and the military. Second, many of the semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz are also mentioned, though on a smaller scale, in Alhawali whereas Alhawali's semantic foci keywords are rarely mentioned in Ibn Baz. For example, of the 54 Ibn Baz keywords, only six of them (11%) are never mentioned by Alhawali, whereas of the 45 Alhawali keywords, 14 of them (31%) are never mentioned by Ibn Baz. This result suggests that while both authors refer to religion to various degrees in their writing, Alhawali appears to be much more politically oriented than Ibn Baz. I shall address the semantic foci in both corpora as indicated by the keywords tabulated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As stated above, I shall focus my

analysis on a small representative number of keywords that reveal the most salient ideological differences between the two corpora.

In order for a semantic foci keyword to be included in the analysis, it should satisfy the following quantitative and qualitative criteria:

- 1- Based on a preliminary concordance analysis, all the semantic foci keywords are classified into categories according to their meanings. The top three keywords (ordered by keyness score in the main corpus in order to compare the actual use of the selected keywords in the two corpora) in each category are selected for the analysis provided they satisfy criteria 2-5 below.
- 2- A keyword must occur at least five times in both corpora before it can be considered for detailed analysis, so that I am able to compare its usage across both corpora.
- 3- If there were more than three keywords in a single category, then the keywords that occur most frequently in the reference corpus are selected for the analysis in order to allow for a fuller qualitative comparison between the two corpora (8 keywords were selected for analysing theological semantic foci).
- 4- Keywords that belong to the same lemma or word-form are tabulated and grouped under a key term (written in small capitals) and their frequencies are added together. If they occur in the reference corpus and have other word-forms, they are, also, referred to and included in the analysis.
- 5- Arabic words that are homographic or polysemous are not identified by Wordsmith as such. Thus, they needed to be first discerned via concordance lines. If more than 50% of the concordance lines do not indicate a single meaning (e.g. a religious or political meaning), they will not be included in the analysis as their keyness is questionable.

Having stated the criteria for selecting keywords, I shall analyze Ibn Baz's theological semantic foci in Chapter 4 followed by Chapter 5 which considers Alhawali's politically oriented semantic foci.

4.2 Theological semantic foci in the Salafi Corpora

Table 4.1 above shows a set of mainly theological³⁵ keywords³⁶ in Ibn Baz's corpus. Based on a preliminary concordance-based analysis, I have carried out a classification of these keywords as follows: Firstly, more than one-third of Ibn Baz's keywords indicate divinity in Islam. These keywords refer to Allah who is (seen as) the ultimate authority and the core concept of divinity in Islamic teachings and theology. The second set of theological keywords indicates monotheism and what Ibn Baz deems to be impermissible religious practices. The third type of keywords in Ibn Baz is related to Islam, as the true faith, and Islamic religious practices. The final set of the theological keywords refers to the 'final return'. Table 4.3 shows this classification of the theological semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz (for simplicity I have only provided the English translations of words, but see Table 4.1 for the original Arabic words).

Table 4.3 Categories of semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz

Category	Keywords
Allah	Allah, the Glorified, the Majestic, the Exalted in Mighty, the Exalted, to Allah, the Peace, in/with Allah, the Most High, the Great, His attributes, Lord, his Lord, the attributes (of Allah), the Exalted in power, Wali (Lord, God, Protector, Helper), Magnanimous, (He) Alone, His attributes, truly, with the Truth, (Allah has) ordained, the True/ right, the call to (Allah), call (to Allah), obedience (submission to Allah), Allah's knowledge, (Allah has) guided, (Allah's) guidance, knowledge (about Allah),
Monotheism and impermissible religious practices and beliefs	associationism, polytheism, the religiously impermissible innovative practice and beliefs, beseeching for help, arbitration (according to Islamic Law), idols, the falsehood, the worship, His attributes, the attributes (of Allah), followed them exactly (in faith),
Islam	Islam, God's decree (Sharia), the guidance, the right path, arbitration (according to Islamic Law), straight (way), His/his path/way, obeying Him, testimony,
The final return	the (Day of) Resurrection, the Hell-fire, warning, (blessed) end, the Hereafter

29. Here I define theological as opposed to political keywords as those terms that explicitly refer to religious concepts and bear no apparent political or otherwise meanings. The classificatory schemes of the lexical keywords in Ibn Baz are based on a preliminary concordance.

30. The English translations of all the keywords in this chapter and the following chapters are provided based on a preliminary concordance analysis.

Having stated the most prominent theological semantic foci in Ibn Baz, I now give a detailed analysis of a selection of the theological semantic foci in Ibn Baz as compared to Alhawali's.

Application of the criteria in Section 4.1 above resulted in the selection of 8 theological semantic foci keywords. Table 4.4 below shows the selected theological semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz and their frequencies in both corpora.

Table 4.4 Selected theological semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz

	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Freq.	F. Alhawali
Divinity	1	بِالله/بِشَاءِ	Allah/ to Allah/ in, with, by Allah	4693	1109
	2	مُجَدِّدُهُ	the Glorified	809	8
	3	تَعَالَى	the Exalted	477	151
Monotheism and impermissible religious practices and beliefs	4	الشِّرْك	(the) polytheism/ associationism	131	15
	5	الْبِدْع	the religiously impermissible innovative practice	63	8
Islam	6	الإِسْلَام	Islam	337	271
The final return	7	الْآخِرَة	the Hereafter	63	28
	8	النَّار	the Hell-fire	58	17

First, let us first consider the core concept of divinity in Islam: Allah.

4.2.1 Divinity

The theme of divinity in Islam revolves around the concept of Allah. Table 4.5 below contains three forms of the key term 'ALLAH': 'الله' (*'allah*; Allah), 'لله' (*lillah*; to Allah) and 'بِالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) which occurred 4253, 267 and 173 times respectively (4693 times collectively).³⁷ Alhawali also uses these forms of the key term 'ALLAH': 'الله' (*'allah*; Allah) 994 times, 'لله' (*lillah*; to Allah) 74 times and 'بِالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) 41 times (amounting to 23.37%, 27.71% and 23.69% of the occurrences in Ibn Baz). The larger number of occurrences of the key term 'ALLAH' in Ibn Baz's writing reveals a greater theological emphasis by Ibn Baz as compared to Alhawali's (see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 for more information on the transliteration scheme for Arabic words used in this thesis).

31. I write the key term 'ALLAH' in small capitals in order to denote all various forms of the keyword 'Allah': 'الله' (*'allah*; Allah), 'بِالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) and 'لله' (*lillah*; to Allah).

Table 4.5 Keywords that refer to 'الله', 'Allah' in Ibn Baz

	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Freq.	F. Alhawali
Divinity	1	ياالله/الله	Allah/ to Allah/ in, with, by Allah	4693	1109
	2	سبحانه	the Glorified	809	8
	3	تعالى	the Exalted	477	151

Table 4.3 also shows two other theological keywords that are closely linked to the key term 'ALLAH'. These keywords are 'سبحانه' (*subḥanahu*; the Glorified)³⁸ (809 occurrences), 'تعالى' (*ta'āla*; the Exalted) (which collocate with each other – MI score 5.043). The second keyword 'سبحانه' *subḥanahu*; the Glorified) also collocates with the keyword 'الله' (*lillah*; to Allah) (MI score 3.893). In terms of critical discourse analysis, these other two keywords indicate positive predication strategies, although it is interesting that the terms themselves are also frequently used alone to refer to Allah, their collocation with Allah being so strong that they actually become synonymous for Allah. As further indication of the interchangeability of these three keywords, Table 4.6 shows how they also appear in clusters, reinforcing each other.

Table 4.6 Word clusters that contain the different forms of the key term 'ALLAH' and the keywords 'سبحانه' (*subḥanahu*; the Glorified) and 'تعالى' (*ta'āla*; the Exalted) in Ibn Baz

N	Clusters	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts	
1	الله سبحانه	Allah, the Glorified	232	5	2-word Clusters
2	الله تعالى	Allah, the Exalted	67	4	
3	ياالله سبحانه	in' with Allah, the Glorified	13	4	
4	الله سبحانه	to Allah, the Glorified	13	4	
5	سبحانه و تعالى	the Glorified and the Exalted	114	5	3-word Clusters
6	الله سبحانه و	Allah, the Glorified and	76	5	
7	الله سبحانه في	Allah, the Glorified in	14	3	
8	الله سبحانه قد	verily, Allah, the Glorified	13	4	
9	الله سبحانه و	to Allah, the Glorified and	6	3	
10	ياالله سبحانه و	in Allah, the Glorified and	5	3	
11	الله سبحانه و تعالى	Allah, the Glorified and the Exalted	39	4	4-word Clusters
12	سبحانه و تعالى و	the Glorified and the Exalted and	21	3	
13	قال سبحانه و تعالى	the Glorified and the Exalted said	17	3	
14	كما قال الله سبحانه	as Allah, the Glorified, said	14	5	

32. I capitalize all names and attributes of Allah, following the traditional way of referring to Him in Islamic discourse.

As these three keywords all refer to Allah, in order to avoid redundancy, I shall only analyze the key term ‘ALLAH’ and its variant forms. Let us now move to the analysis of the key term ‘ALLAH’.

4.2.1.1 The construction of ‘Allah’ in both corpora

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to do justice to all the occurrences of the key term ‘ALLAH’ due to time and space restrictions. Therefore I shall first consider the collocates of the term ‘ALLAH’, then word clusters and finally, I shall carry out a concordance-based analysis of some representative examples of the term.

To reiterate from Chapter 3 (section 3.4.2), I use the following criteria in identifying collocates of keywords in this analysis: a) collocates of the keywords are generated (utilizing the default settings of Wordsmith) within the span of ± 5 and MI score of 3 or higher which can be ‘taken as evidence that’ the ‘two items are collocates’ (Hunston, 2002, p. 71); b) all collocates should occur in at least three texts or more in each corpus to be included in the analysis; and c) if keywords have other word-forms, their collocates are grouped under each word-form and only one collocate that has the highest MI score of each word-form is selected for the analysis.

Wordsmith initially identified 130 collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in Ibn Baz and 20 collocates in Alhawali. However applying the above criteria resulted in the identification of 6 collocates of ‘الله’ (*‘allah’*; Allah) across both corpora (3 collocates in each corpus) that could reveal the most prominent uses of this key tem and what semantic foci are associated with it. Table 4.7 below is a simplified version of two more elaborated tables that contain the collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in both corpora along with their translations in English and other important statistical details (see Tables A6 and B5 in Appendices A and B respectively). The Joint column indicates how often the pair of words co-occur in the relevant corpus.

Table 4.7 Collocates of ‘ALLAH’ in both corpora

N	keyword Eng. trans.	Collocates Eng. trans.	Joint	MI	Corpus
1	الله Allah	لَيَنْصُرَنَّ verily (Allah) will aid	7	5.652	Ibn Baz
2	الله in/ with Allah	الْيَوْمِ (the Last) Day	5	12.743	
3	الله to Allah	الْخَالِصُ the pure	11	8.646	
4	الله Allah	سَلَامٌ (may Allah send His) peace (upon him)	106	7.751	Alhazali
5	الله in/ with Allah	لا no	6	4.004	
6	الله to Allah	الْحَمْدُ praise	9	10.453	

Some of the collocates in Table 4.7 indicate positive association between these collocates and the different forms of the key term ‘ALLAH’ (e.g. the concepts relating to aid, pure, peace and praise). However, collocates 2 and 5 are not immediately suggestive of any positive semantic association. Analysis of clusters and concordances will reveal more about these two collocates. Let us first consider the collocates of the keyword ‘الله’ (‘*allah*’; Allah) in Ibn Baz.

4.2.1.2 The collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in Ibn Baz

The first collocate of ‘ALLAH’ in Ibn Baz tends to occur within a phrase which is a direct quote from Qur’anic verses. The verb ‘ينصر’ (*yanşur*; aid) in the phrase ‘لَيَنْصُرَنَّ’ (*layanşuranna*; verily (Allah) will aid) starts with the assertive particle ‘لا’ (*la*) and ends with the geminated ‘نْ’ (*nna*) that indicates confirmation which occurs 7 times. This construction is equivalent to ‘verily... will’ in English. Initially I could claim that this collocational environment indicates the certainty and confirmation of the ‘aid’ that is expected from ‘Allah’. However, the contextual environment in the following concordance lines (Concordance 4.1) reveals more (note that I shall choose only a sample of the concordance lines that indicate the most typical function of a linguistic construction in the corpus):

Concordance 4.1 Concordance of 'لَيَنْصُرَنَّ' (*layanşuranna*; verily (Allah) will aid)³⁹

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] فَعَدَّ اللَّهُ سِجَاتِهِ لِلنَّاصِرِينَ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَالتَّوَابِ فِي الْآخِرَةِ، قَالَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: {وَلَيَنْصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَن يَنْصُرُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَنَفْعِي عَزِيزٌ * الَّذِينَ إِذَا مَكَتَهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أُقْبِلُوا إِلَى الصَّلَاةِ وَ آتَوْا الزَّكَاةَ وَ أَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ نَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ * اللَّهُ عَاقِبَةُ الْأُمُورِ } [...], وَعَدَهُمْ جَلَّ وَ عَلا بِالنَّصْرِ، وَ هُوَ يَعِدُ النَّصْرَ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَ التَّمَكُّنَ فِيهَا وَ النَّصْرَ وَ الرِّضَى مِنَ اللَّهِ سِجَاتِهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ</p> <p>[...] indeed Allah, the Glorified, has promised to aid those (Muslims) who do good deeds in this world as well as reward them (Paradise) in the Hereafter. Allah, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, said: {Verily, Allah will aid those who aid His (Cause). Truly, Allah is All-Strong, All-Mighty * Those (Muslim rulers) who, if We give them power in the land, (they) enjoin the five compulsory congregational prayers, pay the Zakat (regular charity), enjoin Al-Ma'ruf (i.e. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do), and forbid Al-Munkar (i.e. disbelief, polytheism and all that Islam has forbidden)* And with Allah rests the end of (all) matters (of creatures)}, [...]. The Majestic and the most High has promised to provide them with aid which includes victory and power in land and on the Day of Resurrection they win the satisfaction of Allah, the Glorified.</p>
2	<p>[...] يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنَّ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَ يَثْبُتْ أَقْدَامُكُمْ } وَ قَالَ تَعَالَى: {وَلَيَنْصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَن يَنْصُرُهُ [...] وَ قَالَ تَعَالَى: (وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَ عَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيُخْلِفَنَّهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا خَلَفَ النَّبِيُّ مِنْ قَبْلِهِ [...] يَتَّبِعُوا لِيَ لَا يُرْكَعُوا بِي سَبْعًا) [...] قَالَ مَالِكُ بْنُ أَنَسٍ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ فِي هَذَا الْمَعْنَى: (لَنْ يَصْلَحَ آخِرُ هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ إِلَّا مَا أَصْلَحَ أَوَّلُهَا)</p> <p>[...] O you who believe! If you aid (in the cause of) Allah, He will aid you, and make your foothold firm} and (Allah) the Exalted said {Verily, Allah will aid those who aid His (Cause) [...] and the Exalted said: {Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the land, as He granted it to those before them [...] (provided) they (believers) worship Me and do not associate anything (in worship) with Me}. In this respect Malik Ibn Anas, may Allah have mercy on him, said: (The last (people) of this nation will not be granted success unless they follow (in all good deeds) the early Salaf)</p>
3	<p>[...] يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنَّ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَ يَثْبُتْ أَقْدَامُكُمْ } وَ قَالَ عَزَّ وَ جَلَّ: {وَلَيَنْصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَن يَنْصُرُهُ [...] وَ قَالَ سُبْحَانَهُ: {وَأَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَ لَا تَفَرَّقُوا } [...] وَ الْآيَاتُ فِي هَذَا الْمَعْنَى كَثِيرَةٌ. وَ لَكِنْ مَا دَامَ أَنَّ الْقَادَةَ إِلَّا مَنْ نَاءَ اللَّهُ مِنْهُمْ، يَصْلِحُونَ الْبَهْدَى وَ التَّوَجِيهَ مِنْ غَيْرِ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ وَ سُنَّةِ رَسُولِهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَ سَلَّمَ [...] فَيُتَّبِعُهُمْ لَنْ يَجِدُوا صَرِيحًا لِلخُرُوجِ مِمَّا هُمْ فِيهِ مِنَ التَّخَلُّفِ وَ التَّنَاحُرِ فِيمَا</p> <p>[...] O you who believe! If you aid (in the cause of) Allah, He will aid you, and make your foothold firm} and (Allah) the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said {Verily, Allah will aid those who aid His (Cause) [...] and the Glorified said {And hold fast, all of you together, to the Rope of Allah (i.e. this Qur'an), and be not divided among yourselves} [...] But so long as Muslim leaders, except those who Allah has guided, seek guidance and directions from sources other than the Book of Allah (Qur'an) and the Sunnah of His messenger, may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, [...], they will not find means to get rid of backwardness and disputes between them</p>

As indicated by the above concordance lines (Concordance 4.1), the collocate 'لَيَنْصُرَنَّ' (*layanşuranna*; verily (Allah) will aid) is part of Qur'anic verses that are utilized by Ibn Baz to support his Salafî views regarding success (victory and succession (to the present rulers)) in life on Earth (Lines 1 and 3) and winning satisfaction and paradise in the Hereafter (Line 2), which, as Ibn Baz claims, is granted to those who follow the commandments of Allah. Thus, a positive religious semantic relation links the collocate 'لَيَنْصُرَنَّ' (*layanşuranna*; verily (Allah) will aid) with the keyword 'Allah'. This collocate indicates that Ibn Baz characterises Allah as a powerful God who can grant success (victory and dominance in life on Earth and Paradise in the Hereafter provided Muslims follow His commandments). Let us now move to delineate the collocate of 'بِالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah).

39. For the translation and transliteration conventions and other symbols used in thesis, see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 and Appendix C.

The second (as well as the third) form of the key term 'ALLAH' is preceded with a one-letter preposition. The preposition that is attached at the beginning of the keyword 'الله' ('*allah*; Allah) is 'بـ' (*bi*; in/with). The collocate of (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) is 'اليوم' ('*al'āhir*; the Last Day) which also co-occurs with the word 'الأخير' ('*al'āhir*; the Last Day)) (MI score 12.799). They are mostly used together as shown in Concordance 4.2 which again gives the most typical cases of the collocation.

Concordance 4.2 Concordance of the collocate 'اليوم' ('*al'āhir*; the Last Day)

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] و يقول سبحانه : (وَمَا أُحِثُّكُمْ فِيهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ فَحُكْمُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ يُلْجَأُ إِلَيْهِ رَبِّي عَلَيْهِ تَوَكَّلْتُ وَالْيَوْمَ آخِرُ) [...] رد الناس اليهما [الكتاب و السنة] عند التنازع [...] ثم ذكر هذا شرطاً للإيمان قبل سبحانه: (إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَ الْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ) ثم ذكر أنه خير للعباد في العاجل و الآجل و أحسن عقابه [...]</p> <p>[...] and the Glorified says: {And in whatsoever you differ, the decision thereof is with Allah (He is the ruling Judge). (And say O Muhammad to these polytheists:) Such is Allah, my Lord in Whom I put my trust, and to Him I turn (in all of my affairs and) in repentance.} [...] (Allah) referred people to them [the Qur'an and the Sunnah] to judge in any dispute, then He mentioned that as a condition of faith as He, the Glorified, said: { if you believe in Allah and in <u>the Last Day</u>.} then He mentioned that sooner or later this is better and good end (for the worshippers) [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] قال تعالى : (لَا تَجِدُ قَوْمًا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَ الْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ يُوَادُّونَ مَنْ حَادَّ اللَّهَ وَ رَسُولَهُ وَ لَوْ كُنُوا آبَاءَهُمْ أَوْ أَبْنَاءَهُمْ أَوْ إِخْوَانَهُمْ أَوْ عَشِيرَتَهُمْ) و [...] شرع دعائها [القومية] يقول : أقصوا الذين عن القومية ، [...] حتى تتركوا مصالحكم و تستردوا أمانكم ، و كأن الإسلام وقف في طريقهم ، و حاد بينهم و بين أمجادهم ، هذا و الله هو الجهل و التائب [...]</p> <p>[...] the Exalted said: {You (O Muhammad) will not find any people who believe in Allah and <u>the Last Day</u>, making friendship with those who oppose Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad), even though they were their fathers or their sons or their brothers or their kindred (people)}. And the law of the advocates [of (Arab) nationalism] determines that separation between the religion [Islam] and nationalism will guarantee well-being and regain your [Arabs] glorious and honourable past as if Islam is an obstacle that obstruct them [Arabs] to regain their past glory. By Allah, this is ignorance and mystification of the truth [...]</p>
3	<p>العقيدة الصحيحة تلخص في : الإيمان بالله ، و ملائكة ، و كتبه ، و رسله ، و اليوم الآخر ، و بالقدر خيره و شره ، فهذه الأمور الستة هي أصول العقيدة الصحيحة التي نزل بها كتاب الله العزيز ، [...] و أئمة هذه الأصول الستة في الكتاب و السنة كثيرة جداً ، فمن ذلك قول الله سبحانه : (لَيْسَ الْبِرُّ أَنْ تُولَؤُوا وَجْوهَكُمْ قِبَلَ الْمَشْرِقِ وَ الْمَغْرِبِ وَ لَكِنَّ الْبِرَّ مَنْ آمَنَ بِاللَّهِ وَ الْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَ الْمَلَائِكَةِ وَ الْكُتُبِ وَ الرُّسُلِ)</p> <p>The correct creed is embodied in the following: belief in Allah, His Angels, His Books (scriptures and revelations of Allah to all His messengers), His messengers, the Last Day and the Divine Preordainment (good and bad). The previous six particles are the fundamentals of the true creed that were sent down in the honourable Qur'an [...] there are many indications of these six fundamentals in the Qur'an and the Sunnah such as what the Glorified said: {It is not Al-Birr (piety, righteousness, and each and every act of obedience to Allah, etc.) that you turn your faces towards east and (or) west (in prayers); but Al-Birr is (the quality of) the one who believes in Allah, the <u>Last Day</u>, the Angels, the Book, the Prophets}</p>

The phrase 'اليوم الآخر' ('*al'āhir* 'al'āhir; the Last Day) is mentioned by Ibn Baz in Line 3 as one of the six articles of faith (belief in Allah, His Angels, His Books, His messengers, the Last Day and the Divine Preordainment - good and bad). According to Ibn Baz the six articles of faith epitomize the correct creed (Line 3). The phrase 'اليوم الآخر' ('*al'āhir* 'al'āhir; the Last Day) appears in the Qur'anic 4-word cluster 'بِالله و اليوم الآخر' (*billah wa 'al'āhir*; in Allah and the Last Day) that occurs 5 times in 3 texts of Ibn Baz's corpus and is always preceded by words derived from the trilateral root 'أ م ن' (*ā-ma-na*, to believe/have

faith in)⁴⁰. This cluster (in Lines 1 and 2) could be interpreted as being ideologically deployed by Ibn Baz to legitimate his stances vis-à-vis two other themes. In Line 1 Ibn Baz mentions that Muslims should, in matters of disputes, refer to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam (i.e. Islamic Laws (Sharia) as opposed to man-made laws) which according to his explication of the Qur'anic verses (Line 1) is a requisite of faith in Allah and the Last Day. And Line 2 indicates Ibn Baz's negative representation of nationalism which, according to him, opposes belief in Allah and the Last Day. His negative representation of Arab nationalism shows that the semantic foci in Ibn Baz's corpus are not always theological. Here Ibn Baz engages himself in politics (for more information about Ibn Baz's representations of social actors see Section 6.2). Let us expand Line 2 for further clarification:

Figure 4.1 Expanded version of Concordance line 2 in 4.2

هؤلاء القوميون يدعون إلى التكتل حول القومية العربية مسلمها وكافرها [...] ويقولون: إن نظامها لا يفرق بين عربي وعربي، وإن تفرقت أديانهم، فهل هذا إلا مصادمة لكتاب الله، ومخالفة لشريع الله، وتحد لحدود الله [...] ونظام القومية يقول: كلهم أولياء مسلمهم وكافرهم والله يقول: (شَرَعَ لَكُمْ مِنَ الدِّينِ مَا وَصَّى بِهِ نُوحًا وَالَّذِي أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ وَمَا وَصَّيْنَا بِهِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَمُوسَى وَعِيسَى أَنْ أَقِيمُوا الدِّينَ وَلَا تَتَفَرَّقُوا فِيهِ) [...] وقال تعالى: (لَا تُجِدُ قَوْمًا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ يُوَادُّونَ مَنْ حَادَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلَوْ كَانُوا آبَاءَهُمْ أَوْ أَبْنَاءَهُمْ أَوْ إِخْوَانَهُمْ أَوْ عَشِيرَتَهُمْ) (وشرع [...] دعائها [القومية] يقول: أفصوا الذين عن القومية، وافصلوا الذين عن الدولة، وتكتلوا حول أنفسكم وقوميتكم، حتى تتركوا مصالحكم وتستردوا أمجادكم، وكان الإسلام وقف في طريقهم، وحال بينهم وبين أمجادهم، وهذا والله هو الجهل والتبئيس [...] وقد أوجب الله على المسلمين: أن يتكاتفوا ويتكتلوا تحت راية الإسلام، [...] و وعدهم على ذلك النصر والعز والعاقبة الحميدة [...])
These (Pan Arab) nationalists propagate that all Muslim or non-Muslim Arabs should be gathered as one race (under the banner of Pan Arab nationalism) [...] they say that nationalism views all Arabs to be equal despite the fact that they have different religions. This is a sheer contradiction to Allah's Book (Qur'an) and His Sharia and transgressing the limits that Allah has ordained [...]. Additionally, it (nationalism) considers all Arabs to be friends supporting each other whereas Allah said: {He (Allah) has ordained for you the same religion (Islamic Monotheism) which He ordained for Noah, and that which We have revealed to you (O Muhammad), and that which We ordained for Abraham, Moses and Jesus saying you should establish religion and be not divided therein} [...] and the Exalted, also said: {You (O Muhammad) will not find any people who believe in Allah and the Last Day, making friendship with those who oppose Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad), even though they were their fathers or their sons or their brothers or their kindred (people)}. And the law of the advocates [of (Arab) nationalism] determines that separation between the religion [Islam] and nationalism will guarantee well-being and regain your [Arabs] glorious and honourable past as if Islam is an obstacle that obstruct them [Arabs] to regain their past glory. By Allah, this is ignorance and mystification of the truth [...] and Allah has made it obligatory for Muslims to gather and support each other under the banner of Islam, [...] and consequently He (Allah) has promised to render them victorious and powerful and will grant them blessed end [...]

In the above extract Ibn Baz continues to present Arab nationalism and its advocates negatively. He claims that Arab nationalists want to separate religion from the state and make Muslims and non-Muslims as brothers neglecting the Islamic faith which are secular concepts

40. I follow the traditional grammar text books in writing the roots of Arabic words in disconnected letters.

that all Salafis reject. Ibn Baz thus utilizes a Qur'anic verse in order to legitimate his rejection of Arab nationalism.

The last word form of the key term 'ALLAH' is preceded with the preposition 'لِ' (*li*; to). This one-letter preposition usually 'predicates the concept of belonging in both concrete and abstract senses' (Ryding, 2005, p. 371). The collocate that co-occurs with the word form 'لِلَّهِ' (*lillah*; to Allah) is the adjective 'الْخَالِصُ' (*'alḥālīṣ*; the pure) (MI score 8.646). Concordance 4.3 shows 3 concordance lines of the contextual environment of the collocate 'الْخَالِصُ' (*'alḥālīṣ*; the pure).

Concordance 4.3 Concordance of the collocate 'الْخَالِصُ' (*'alḥālīṣ*; the pure)

N	Concordance
1	<p>و العبادۃ : هي طاعته سبحانه و طاعة رسوله محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم [...] و قل عز و جل : { فَاعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ * إِلَّا اللَّهُ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ } [...] و الآيات في هذا المعنى كثيرة ، و كلها تدل على : وجوب إفراد الله بالعبادة ، و معلوم أن الدعاء بتواضع من العبادة ، فلا يجوز لأحد من الناس أن يدعو إلا ربه ، و لا يستعين و لا يستغيث إلا به ، [...]</p> <p>And the worship is obeying Him, the Glorified, and His messenger, Muhammad, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him [...] and the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said: {So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the pure religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only} [...] and the Qur'anic verses about this issue are many that all indicate the obligation of worshipping Allah alone. And it is known that all types of supplication are part of worship, thus, according to these Qur'anic verses, it is impermissible for all people to supplicate to and neither seek nor beseech the help from other than Allah [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] معنى لا إله إلا الله [...] لا معبود بحق إلا الله [...] و هو الذي دل عليه كتاب الله سبحانه في مواضع من القرآن الكريم [...] و في قوله عز و جل : { تَزِيلُ الْكَتَابَ مِنَ اللَّهِ الْغَزِيرِ الْخَكِيمِ * } إنا أنزلنا إليك الكتاب بالحق فأعبد الله مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ * إِلَّا اللَّهُ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ و الذين اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِهِ أَوْلِيَاءَ مَا نَعْبُدُهُمْ إِلَّا لِيُقَرِّبُونَا إِلَى اللَّهِ زُلْفَى { المعنى أنهم يقولون ما نعبدهم إلا ليقربونا إلى الله زلفى ، فرد الله عليهم تلك بقوله سبحانه : { إِنْ أَشَاءَ يُخَذِّمُ بَيْنَهُمْ فِي مَا هُمْ فِيهِ يَخْتَلِفُونَ إِنْ أَشَاءَ لَا يَهْدِي مَنْ هُوَ كَاذِبٌ كَرَّارٌ } .</p> <p>[...] 'no God but Allah' [...] means that no one deserves to be worshiped except Allah [...] and this what the Book of the Allah, the Glorified, indicates in many verses in the Glorious Qur'an [...] and in the following utterance of the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic: {The revelation of this Book (the Qur'an) is from Allah, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. Verily We have sent down the Book to you (O Muhammad) in truth: So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the pure religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only. And those who take Auliya (protectors, helpers, lords, gods) besides Him (say): "We worship them only that they may bring us near to Allah." } that is they say that we worship them only to bring us near to Allah, but Allah, the Glorified, rejected that and said: {Verily Allah will judge between them concerning that wherein they differ. Truly, Allah guides not him who is a liar, and a disbeliever}.</p>
3	<p>حقيقة هذه العبادة : هي إفراد الله سبحانه بجميع ما تعبد العباد به من دعاء ، و خوف ، و رجاء ، و صلاة ، و صوم ، و زعيم ، و نذر ، [...] و غالب القرآن الكريم نزل في هذا الأصل العظيم ، كقوله سبحانه : { فَاعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ } [...] فتجاهدة أن لا إله إلا الله تقتضي : إخلاص العبادة لله وحده و تقيها عما سواه ، و هذا هو معنى لا اله الا الله 1</p> <p>The real meaning of this worship is to single out Allah, the Glorified, in all forms of worship such as supplication, fear (of Allah), hope (for His mercy), prayer, fasting, sacrifice (slaughtering animals for His sake) and making pledges (to make charitable acts for the sake of Allah), [...] and most of the Qur'anic verses that were sent down about this great principle such as the following utterance of the Glorified: {So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the pure religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only} [...] and the testifying that 'there is no God but Allah' necessitates the sincerity of dedicating the worship for Allah alone. That is the meaning of 'there is no God but Allah' [...]</p>

All the lines in Concordance 4.3 indicate the concept of 'عبادة' ('*ibadah*; worship) which is modified by the adjective 'الخالص' ('*alḥālīṣ*; the pure) which occurs in Ibn Baz's corpus as he quotes the following Qur'anic verses:

{قَاعْبُدِ اللَّهَ مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ * أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ وَالَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِهِ أَوْلِيَاءَ مَا نَعْبُدُهُمْ إِلَّا لِيُقَرِّبُونَا إِلَى اللَّهِ زُلْفَىٰ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَحْكُمُ بَيْنَهُمْ فِي مَا هُمْ فِيهِ يَخْتَلِفُونَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي مَنْ هُوَ كَاذِبٌ كَفَّارٌ} سورة الزمر، الآيات ٣-٢.

{So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only* Surely the pure religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only. And those who take Auliya (protectors, helpers, lords, gods) besides Him (say): "We worship them only that they may bring us near to Allah." Verily Allah will judge between them concerning that wherein they differ. Truly, Allah guides not him who is a liar, and a disbeliever.} Holy Qur'an 39:2-3.⁴¹

The above Qur'anic verse is utilized by Ibn Baz to delineate the concept of 'worship' (Lines 1 and 3) which he links to the meaning of essential Islam with the phrase 'no God but Allah' (Line 2). This phrase constitutes the first half of the first pillar of Islam (there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is His messenger).⁴² Thus the third form of the key concept 'ALLAH' is linked to other semantic foci, viz., the first pillar of Islam and the concept of 'pure worship'. In Line 2, Ibn Baz recontextualizes the Qur'anic verses above which indicate that people should sincerely adopt the servitude of Allah and avoid polytheism. Such recontextualization contributes to the Salafi representation of divinity as related to worship.

So far, we have seen the three forms of the key concept 'ALLAH' as used by Ibn Baz. The key term 'ALLAH' in all its three forms are used in recontextualized different theological semantic foci that contribute to Ibn Baz's Salafi construction of divinity in Islam. Allah is represented as helping people who help his cause, rewarding them both in their life and in death. Ibn Baz also creates a strong association between belief in Allah and belief in 'the last day', implying that the two are mutually inclusive but separate from nationalist ideology, which he views negatively. Finally, Ibn Baz describes worship of Allah as the pure religion

41. (39:2-3) indicates that these Qur'anic verses are number 2-3 in Chapter 39.

42. In the Sunni Islam the pillars of Islam are as follows: 1- Testimony; to witness that there is no god but Allah and Mohammad is his messenger, 2- Performing the five daily prayers, 3- Fasting during the days of the month of Ramadan (of the Muslim calendar), 4- Alms-giving (zakat), and 5- Performing pilgrimage by bodily and financially able adult Muslims.

(thus implying that anything else is impure). Now let us look at how ‘Allah’ is represented by Alhawali.

4.2.1.3 The collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in Alhawali

Table 4.7 above contains three collocates for the three forms of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in Alhawali. These collocates are ‘سلم’ (*sallam*; (may Allah send His) peace (upon him) (MI score 7.751), ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) (MI score 4.004)) and ‘الحمد’ (*’alḥamdu*; praise) (MI score 10.453). While these collocates are different to the collocates of ‘ALLAH’ for Ibn Baz, an initial glance at how they are used in the Alhawali texts suggests that like the collocates for Ibn Baz, they are used in formulaic phrases that represent Allah positively as looking kindly on people who are favoured by the authors. So while Ibn Baz uses phrases like ‘verily Allah will aid’, Alhawali uses phrases like ‘may Allah send His peace upon him’.

Let us first consider the collocate ‘سلم’ (*sallam*; (may Allah) send His peace (upon him)). This collocate is of polysemous and homographic nature.⁴³ It occurs 97 times where 90 occurrences indicate the religious meaning ‘سلم’ (*sallam*; may (Allah) send His peace (upon him)). This is always mentioned by Alhawali after referring to the Prophet of Islam as shown in Concordance 4.4.

43. ‘سلم’ could either, without gemination, be transliterated as ‘*salīma*’, (be saved), or ‘*siilm*’, (peace n.). However, the consonant /l/ could be geminated as in ‘سلم’ ‘*sollam*’ (ladder) or ‘*sallama*’ which could be used as a verb that indicates Muslim salutation (to say ‘*’assalāmo ’alaikom*’, ‘peace be with you’). Also, ‘*sallam*’ could be the past tense of ‘*yosallim*’, to submit. In addition, ‘*sallam*’ could be used parenthetically with other words including ‘*salla*’ (صلى) after names of prophets as in the following religious optative construction: ‘صلى الله عليه وسلم’ (*salla ’allahu ’alaihi wa sallam*; may Allah send His blessings and *peace* upon him) (for more information on homographs and polysemous words in my Data see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2).

Concordance 4.4 Concordance of the collocate 'سلم' (sallam; (may Allah) send His peace (upon him))

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] أنها [العلمانية] باختصار: نظام طاغوتي جاهلي يتنافى مع لا إله إلا الله [...] وقال ابن كثير رحمة الله عند تفسير قوله تعالى: ((فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى يُحَكِّمُوكَ فِيمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ [...] النساء: 65. يقسم الله بنفسه الكريمة المقدسة أنه لا يؤمن أحد حتى يحكم الرسول صلى الله عليه و سلم في جميع الأمور [...] ، مراده من ذلك بيان أن الجاهلية صفة تلحق كل من حكم بغير ما أنزل الله، وليست فترة تاريخية انتهت بظهور الإسلام [...]</p> <p>In short, indeed it [secularism] is a despotic (a tyrant worshiped as an idol besides Allah) and ignorant (pertaining to pre-Islamic ignorant Arab) system that contradicts 'no God but Allah' (Islamic monotheism), [...] and this is indicated in Ibn Kathir's explication -may Allah have mercy on him- of the following utterance of the Glorified: [But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them [...] Holy Qur'an 4:65. Ibn Kathir said that Allah is swearing by His Glorious and Holy Self that none can claim faith unless s/he subordinates him/herself in all affairs to the judgement of the messenger -may the blessings and <u>peace</u> of Allah be upon him- [...]. Ibn Kathir's aim of his explications is to show that 'aljahiliyyah' (pre-Islamic status of ignorant Arabs) is an appellation that is used to describe all those who refer to other than Allah's Laws that He sent down. And it is not a description of a period that was before Islam [...]</p>
2	<p>و يقارن المستشرق الأمريكي بودلي بين النصرانية و الإسلام في ذلك قائلا: (لو أن القديس بطرس عاد إلى روما لامتأ عجباً من الطقوس الضخمة و ملابس الكهنوت المزركشة و الموسيقى الغربية في المعبد المقرونة باسمه [...])، و لكن إذا ما عاد محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم إلى أي مسجد من المساجد المنتشرة بين لندن و زنجبار، فإنه سيجد نفس الشعائر البسيطة التي كانت تقام في مسجده في المدينة).</p> <p>And in his comparison between Christianity and Islam, the American orientalist Bodley says: (If St. Peter returned to Rome, he might be puzzled by the gorgeous ritual, by the gaudy vestments and the strange music in the temple associated with his name [...]. But if Mohammad, 'may the blessings and <u>peace</u> of Allah be upon him', dropped into any Mosque between London or Zanzibar, he would find the same simple rites as in his <i>brick and palm-beamed house of worship</i> [my italics: the translator used the word 'mosque' in Medina).</p>
3	<p>[...] و الحمد لله أن المسلمين أفقوا إلى حد كبير، فجد ما حدث في أفغانستان أو الفلبين أو البوسنة و الهرسك و غيرها؛ جعل المسلمين يشعرون بضرورة الولاء الإسلامي. [...] جعلت المسلمين يشعرون بأننا أمة واحدة في آمالها و آلامها؛ لأنها واحدة في عقيدتها و قبلتها و كتابها و سنة نبيها صلى الله عليه و سلم و في كل الأواصر و الروابط، و لا يوجد أمة أوغل وأعمق في التاريخ من هذه الأمة؛ لأنها فوق كل القوميات و العنصريات و العصبية.</p> <p>[...] and all praise is due to Allah that all Muslims are wide-awake to a large extent. We deem the incidents that happened in Afghanistan, Philippines, or Bosnia and Herzegovina and others, made Muslims feel the necessity of being loyal to Islam, [...] [these incidents made Muslims feel that we are one nation in its hopes and pains, because it (Muslim nation) is one nation in its creed, its qiblah (prayer direction towards Makkah), its Book (the Qur'an) and the Sunnah of its Prophet, may the blessings and <u>peace</u> of Allah be upon him, and it is one nation in all bonds and relationships. There is no other nation that is deeply rooted in history than this Muslim nation, because it rejects nationalism, racism and all sorts of bigotry.</p>

In all the occurrences, the collocate 'سلم' (sallam; (may Allah) send His peace (upon him)) is used with the keyword 'الله' ('allah; Allah) in the optative construction 'صلى الله عليه و سلم' (salla 'allahu 'alaihi wa sallam; may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him) which, according to the teachings of Islam, is said in paying due respect to the Prophet of Islam as the following Qur'anic verse tells:

{إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَمَلَائِكَتَهُ يُصَلُّونَ عَلَى النَّبِيِّ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا صَلُّوا عَلَيْهِ وَسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا} سورة الأحزاب اية ٥٦.

{Allah sends His Salat (Blessings) on the Prophet (Mohammad), and also His angels (ask Allah to bless and forgive him). O you who believe! Send your Salat on (ask Allah to bless) him (Mohammad), and (you should) greet (salute) him with the Islamic way of greeting (salutation i.e. 'السلام عليكم' ('assalāmo 'alaikom; peace be on you))} (33:56).

In these concordance lines, Alhawali asks Allah to bestow peace upon the Prophet of Islam for reasons which go beyond mere worship for its own sake. In Line 1 (Concordance 4.4), Alhawali declares that secularism, as a non-Islamic system, is opposed to the teachings of the Qur'an that made it clear for Muslims to subordinate themselves in all affairs to the judgment of the Messenger of Islam (i.e. to the Laws of Islam –Sharia). Here the collocate 'سلم', which is, also, an indicator of argumentation and a social actor, is ideologically recontextualized to refute secularism calling Muslims to adhere to the Sharia Laws that were sent down to the Prophet of Islam instead. In this respect, we can start to see the different dispositions of both writers regarding 'adherence to the Laws of Sharia'.

Ibn Baz has recontextualized following the Sharia of Islam in all disputes with no reference to secularism per se, utilizing faith in Allah and 'اليَوْمِ الْآخِرِ' ('*alyawm 'al'āḥir*; the Last Day) to legitimate his stance of rejecting the man-made laws, instead arguing that Muslims should refer to the Islamic Laws (Sharia) instead. On the other hand, Alhawali's recontextualization of adherence to the Sharia is further extended by recontextualizing Ibn Kathir's explication of the Qur'anic verse 4: 65 who, according to Alhawali, stated that the 'الجاهلية' ('*alḡahiliyyah*; ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) is an appellation that describes adherence to other than the Sharia of Allah in all times rather than a description of a specific period before Islam. This is done by Alhawali to include secularism as opposing the Sharia in order to legitimate his stance and refutation of secularism.

In Line 2, Alhawali utilizes Bodley's (1946, p. 343) comparison between the ritualistic practices of modern Muslims and Christians. Alhawali adds the collocate 'سلم' (*sallam*; (may Allah) send His peace (upon him)) to the quote from Bodley (1946) which may give the impression that Bodley himself used this collocate. In this line we find two important religious social actors (St Peter and Mohammad) in two religions (Christianity and Islam), who belong to two different historical epochs, and are hypothetically projected to modern

time by means of anachronism that, according to van Leeuwen (2008: 50), is used to naturalize ideological discourses. Bodley's argument is ideologically recontextualized by Alhawali to legitimize his negative stance towards the change of rites in Christianity made by the Church and the practice of Islamic rites by modern Muslims that 'resembles' Islamic ritualistic practice during the life of the messenger of Islam. Such recontextualization helps Alhawali to construct the idea of an ideal Muslim community (or nation) which is further developed in Line 3 in Concordance 4.4 above.

In concordance line 3, Alhawali gives a list of examples of how Islam constitutes one nation, including the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam, Mohammad, who is positively represented via the phrase 'may Allah send His peace upon him'. Thus the phrase 'may Allah send His peace upon him' is generally used by Alhawali as a way of showing respect for various figures, but mainly Mohammad.

The second collocate I shall consider in this section is 'لَا' (*lā*; no). The Arabic phrases that contain the negative particle 'لَا' (*lā*; no) and the key term 'ALLAH' are usually used in religious expressions such as the 4 and 7-word clusters in Table 4.8, which occur in both corpora that compose the research data of this study.

Table 4.8 Word clusters that contain 'لَا' (*lā*; no) and the key term 'ALLAH' in both corpora

N	Clusters	Eng. trans.	Freq	Texts	Corpus
1	لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ	there is no God but Allah	25	2	Alhawali
2	لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ	there is no God but Allah	40	3	Ibn Baz
3	حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ	(no) strength and no power (save by Allah)	17	4	Ibn Baz
4	لَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ	no strength and no power, save by Allah	12	2	Ibn Baz

In all the clusters in Table 4.8, the particle 'لَا' (*lā*; no) that indicates absolute negation is used in close proximity with the key term 'ALLAH'. In clusters 1 and 2, it is used with the word form 'الله' (*'allah*; Allah) as in 'لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ' (*lā 'ilaha 'illa 'allah*; there is **no** God but Allah) and with the word form 'بالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) as in clusters 3 and 4 that contain the

exceptive construction that has two-part formation of the negative particle ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) as in ‘لا ... و لا’ (*lā ... wa lā*; no ... and no). This two-part negative construction is usually used in religious expressions indicating absolute negation (Ryding, 2005, p. 646) which could be translated into English as ‘neither... nor’ or literally as ‘no... and no’ as in ‘لا حول و لا قوة إلا بالله’ (*lā ḥawla wa lā qowwata ’illa billah*; there is **no** strength and **no** power, save by Allah). The negative particle ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) in the two-part construction is the target in this analysis, because it is the collocate of the second word form ‘بالله’ (*billah*; in/with/by Allah). Concordance 4.5 below shows lines that repeat the same function of the collocate ‘لا’ as used with the word form ‘بالله’ (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) in Alhawali.

Concordance 4.5 Concordance lines of the collocate ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) in Alhawali.

N	Concordance
1	<p>و الخلاصة [...] أن الواجب على الأمة أن تعرف الواقع [في السعودية أثناء أزمة الخليج عامي 1990-1991] على حقيقته [...] لاسيما وقد جاء على لسان أكثر من مسؤول في هذه البلاد و غيرها أن المنطقة دخلت في نفق مظلم لا يعلم نهايته إلا الله و حقاً نطق، فقد كنا نظن أن الأمة قد استقرت في القاع و أنه ليس وراء واقعا من سقوط ، فإذا بهذا القاع السحيق يفتح فاه لتدخل في نفق عميق و لا حول و لا قوة إلا بالله.</p> <p>in short [...] the [Muslim] nation should realize the actual state of affairs [in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Crisis in 1990-1991][...] particularly when more than one official in this country [Saudi Arabia] and other countries who truly stated that the whole region has entered into a dark tunnel that no one knows its end but Allah. We thought that the [Muslim] nation has resided in a deep abyss and will not fall any further, but suddenly this abyss opened into a further deeper tunnel and there is no strength and no power, save by Allah</p>
2	<p>إن أمة تعيش حالة الحرب الشاملة يجب أن تكون أبعد الناس عن التلو و الترف [...] فهي في رباط دائم و ثور متوالية ، و لا قوة لها إلا بالله [...] ، و على أهل العلم و الدعوة أن يكونوا قدوة للناس [...] فإن الله سبحانه و تعالى لم يعلق وعده بالنصر و النجاة و الإعلاء و العزة لمن اتصف بالإسلام بل خص به أهل الإيمان كما في قوله تعالى : (إِنَّا لَنَنْصُرُ رُسُلَنَا وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَ نَوْمِ يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ)</p> <p>A nation [Muslim nation] that is under a total war should eschew entertainment and luxury [...] it is in a continuous territorial wars, and has no power, save by Allah [...] it is a requisite on the people of [religious] knowledge and call to Allah to set themselves as good examples to ordinary people [...] because Allah, the Glorified and the Exalted, did not promise victory, safety of Hell-fire, superiority and glory to those who are Muslims, indeed He dedicated them [safety of Hell-fire, superiority and glory] to people of faith [among Muslims] as the Exalted said: Verily, We will indeed make victorious Our Messengers and those who believe (in the Oneness of Allah - Islamic Monotheism) in this world's life and on the Day when the witnesses will stand forth, (i.e. Day of Resurrection)</p>
3	<p>و هذا [جهل اهداف التبشير] ما اضطر القس زويمر -رئيس مؤتمر القدس التبشيري- إلى إيضاح ذلك فقال: "أيها الإخوان الأبطال، و الزملاء الذين كتب الله لهم الجهاد في سبيل المسيحية و استعمارها لبلاد الإسلام، [...] و إنما مهمتكم أن تخرجوا المسلم من الإسلام ليصبح مخلوقاً لا صلة له بالله، و بالتالي لا صلة تربطه بالأخلاق التي تعتمد عليها الأمم في حياتها</p> <p>and [the unawareness of the goals of the missionaries] obliged priest Zwemer- the Chairman of the Missionary Council in AlQuds [Jerusalem]- to say: Dear brave brothers and colleagues whom God chose to struggle for Christianity and its colonization of the Muslim land [...] your only mission is to drive a Muslim out of Islam in order to make him a faithless creature that has no relation with Allah, and consequently will be with no morals that nations depend on in their lives</p>
4	<p>إن الواقع السياسي المعاصر الذي تنعكس عليه الصورة الحقيقية للجاهلية الأوروبية ليؤخر بالدلائل القاطعة و البراهين القوية و يعج بالمتناقضات الصارخة و الظواهر الغريبة التي تنذر مجتمعة بالمصير المشؤم والنهاية المروعة لعالم لا يؤمن بالله و لا يحتكم إلى شريعته</p> <p>indeed the reality of modern politics that reflects the real picture of the Europeans jahilyyah (ignorance) that is replete with strong evidence and cogent proofs, and is full of gross contradiction and manifestations of Western life that foretell the inauspicious destiny and the terrifying end of a world that has no faith in Allah and does not enjoin His Sharia</p>

Line 1 shows that the collocate ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) is used twice in the 7-word cluster ‘لا حول و لا قوة’

‘لا حول و لا قوة إلا بالله’ (*lā ḥawla wa lā qowwata ’illa billah*; **no** strength and **no** power, save by Allah). This

religious two-part absolute negative formation (no ... and no....) usually occurs towards the end of describing (and a rejection of) a negative situation/action which indicates a concession of the human weakness as compared to the Divine strength and power. In Line 1, Alhawali uses this absolute negation after describing the state of affairs in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991) where he, from a political Salafi perspective, includes all Muslim countries as one nation that 'has no power except by Allah'. In line 1, he quotes more than one Saudi official who claim the whole region has entered a 'dark tunnel'. This idea of the 'Muslim nation' in trouble is further developed in Line 2.

Line 2 (Concordance 4.5) shows the negative particle 'لا' (*lā*; no) preceding the word 'قوة' (*qowwah*; power) and followed by the exception particle 'إلا' (*'illa*; but, except, save) forming the phrase 'لا قوة لها إلا بالله' (*lā qowwata laha 'illa billah*; it [Muslim nation] has no power save by Allah). It is used after describing what Alhawali considers as the status quo of the Muslim nation ('under a total war and in a continuous territorial wars') which is followed by an explanation of 'power' ('victory, safety of Hell-fire, superiority and glory') which is 'dedicated only [...] to people of faith [among Muslims]'. Here, the religious phrase 'لا قوة لها إلا بالله' (*lā qowwata laha 'illa billah*; it [Muslim nation] has no power save by Allah) is a modified version of the 7-word cluster (the last cluster in Table 4.8) which, from a political Salafi perspective, is recontextualized to victimize 'the Muslim nation' that has no power and is 'under total' and in 'continuous territorial wars'. According to Alhawali, this war takes many shapes that fulfil the objectives of a plan of conspiracy against Muslims as in Line 3.

In Line 3, the collocate 'لا' (*lā*; no) and the word form 'بالله' (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) are used together with the word 'صلة' (*ṣilah*; relation) forming the phrase 'لا صلة له بالله' (*lā ṣilat laho billah*; [creature that] has no relation with Allah) which occurs in a reported speech. Alhawali uses a direct quote from a speech of the American missionary Zwemer (1867-1952) who, is quoted as declaring that the main purpose of the missionaries among Muslims is to

make Muslims faithless creatures that have *no* relation with ‘Allah’; a further development of this theme of victimizing Islam and Muslims. Line 3 occurs in a book written by Alhawali that discusses Secularism. Under the subtitle ‘Missionaries’, Alhawali concurs that the process of secularization of Islamic communities started with such missionaries as indicated by the extended version of Concordance line 3.

Figure 4.2 Extended version of Concordance line 3 of the collocate ‘لا’ (*lā*; no)

[...] بدأت المخططات لإخراج الأمة الإسلامية من دينها، وتحويلها من قوميات وجودها، وحملها [...] على العلمانية وانتقلت جيوش الغزو في ثلاثة أجنحة كبرى هي:

1- قوى الاحتلال المباشر. 2- المستشرقون. 3- المبشرون كما يسمون.

[...] 3- المبشرون: كما أن للمستشرقين والمبشرين أهدافاً مشتركة، فإن لهم وسائل متماثلة، ويمكن القول بأن ميدان المستشرقين الأساس هو الثقافة والفكر، بينما يركز المبشرون جهودهم في الفواحي الاجتماعية والتربوية. وليس غريباً أن يجهل المسلمون الدوافع الحقيقية للتبشير، فقد كان يجهلها بعض أتباع الإرساليات التبشيرية أنفسهم، إذ لم يكن الجميع يدركون أبعاد الخطة الجديدة ومراميها [...]. وهذا ما اضطر القس زويمر رئيس مؤتمر القس التبشيري - إلى إيضاح ذلك فقال: "أيها الإخوان الأبطال، والزملاء الذين كتب الله لهم الجهاد في سبيل المسيحية واستعمار هذا البلاد الإسلام، [...] وإنما مهمتكم أن تخرجوا المسلم من الإسلام ليصبح مخلوقاً لا صلة له بالله، وبالتالي لا صلة تربطه بالأخلاق التي تعتمد عليها الأمم في حياتها [...] لقد قمنا أيها الإخوان - في هذه الحقبة من الدهر من ثلث القرن التاسع عشر إلى يومنا هذا [وقت ما من النصف الأول من القرن العشرين] على جميع برامج التعليم في الممالك الإسلامية ونشرنا في تلك التربوع [...] والكنائس والجمعيات والمدارس المسيحية الكثيرة، التي تهيم عليها الدول الأوروبية والأمريكية [...].

[...] the plans, that aim to drive the Muslim nation out of Islam, deprive it from the fundamentals of its existence and force it to adopt secularism, started. And the armies of invading [the Muslim World] united in three main wings: 1- Forces of direct occupation [of Muslim land]. 2- Orientalists. 3- The so called ‘missionaries’.

[...] 3- Missionaries: As the orientalists and missionaries have shared interests, they also share means. It could be said that the arena of orientalism is culture and intellect whereas the missionaries exert their efforts in the social and educational aspects. It is not surprising that Muslims are unaware of the real objectives of missionaries; indeed some of the missionaries are also unaware of these objectives because few of them know the dimensions and objectives of the new plan. And this obliged priest Zwemer- the Chairman of the Missionary Council in AlQuds [Jerusalem]- to say: Dear brave brothers and colleagues whom God chose to struggle for Christianity and its colonization of the Muslim land [...] your only mission is to drive a Muslim out of Islam in order to make him a faithless creature that has no relation with Allah, and consequently will be with no morals that nations depend on in their lives. [...] Dear brothers, we [the missionaries] — controlled all educational programs in all Islamic States during the period from the last 30 years of the 19th century till today [sometime in the first half of the 20th century]. We distributed [...] Churches and many Christian Associations and schools that are controlled by European and American countries [...].

Thinking about interpretations of Alhawali’s description of how missionaries aim to turn Muslims away from Allah, it is possible that this passage could exacerbate and perpetuate antagonism between his readers and the Western countries as colonial powers. The theme of ‘the evil West’ continues to be projected in Alhawali as in Line 4 in Concordance 4.5.

The last Line in Concordance 4.5 shows that the collocate ‘لا’ (*lā*; no) is used with verb ‘يؤمن’ (*yo’min*; believe/have faith) followed by the word form ‘بالله’ (*billah*; in/with/by Allah). Alhawali uses the phrase ‘لا يؤمن بالله’ (*lā yo’mino billah*; has no faith in Allah) to

indicate a faithless world which, according to him, does not enjoin the Sharia of Allah. This 'faithless world', Alhawali continues to negatively project, 'reflects the real picture of the European ignorance' which eventually will have 'inauspicious destiny' and a 'terrifying end'. The word 'جاهلية' (*ġahiliyyah*: ignorance) in the phrase 'الجاهلية الأوروبية' (*'alġahiliyyiah 'alorobiyyiah*; European ignorance) is significant as it is a recontextualization of a Qur'anic concept indicating the judgement and norms of life of the pre-Islamic days which are rejected by Islam:

{أَفَحُكْمَ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ يَبْتَغُونَ وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللَّهِ حُكْمًا لِّقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ} سورة المائدة اية ٥٠ .

{Do they then seek the judgement of (the days of) Ignorance (the conventions of the pre-Islamic period of Ignorance)? And who is better in judgement than Allah for a people who have firm Faith} Holy Qur'an 5:50.

Using the word '*'alġahiliyyiah*' (ignorance of pre-Islamic days) in this context to describe modern Europe consolidates and perpetuates Alhawali's negative image of Europe.

Alhawali uses the collocate 'لا' (*lā*; no) with the words 'قوة' (*qowwah*; power), 'صلة' (*ṣilah*; relation) and 'يؤمن' (*yo'min*; believe/have faith) in order to construct the relationship between humans and God as one where God is all-powerful and humans need to cement their relationship with God by always believing in Him. These descriptions of 'Allah' are, from a political Salafi perspective, ideologically recontextualized to reject the status quo of the 'Muslim nation' which is, according to Alhawali, weak and being dominated by the West. Alhawali accentuates the war and conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world (Lines 2 and 3), and he negatively represents European culture as being in a state of '*ġāhiliyyah*' (ignorance) (Line 4).

The last collocate of the key term 'ALLAH' that will be considered here is 'الحمد' (*'alḥamdo*; praise) which collocates with the word form 'الله' (*lillah*; to Allah) creating a positive representation of 'Allah' as a God who is to be praised. This collocation is an intertextual reference in that it is derived from many Qur'anic verses such as the second verse

in the first Chapter in the Qur'an: 'الحمد لله رب العالمين' ('*alḥamdo Lilahi rabbi 'al'alamīn*; all praise is due to Allah the Lord of the 'al'alamīn (the worlds: mankind, jinn and all that exists). It is also used at the beginning of the Muslim daily prayers, so will be familiar to all Muslims. It is an acknowledgement of the favours of Allah and a satisfactory indication about a present or previous status or a condition based on the belief that everything that happens is caused by Allah. It is usually uttered in conversation between Muslims such as asking a Muslim 'How are you?' The expected and the most usually used response is 'الحمد لله' ('*alḥamdo lillah*; all praise is due to Allah) which indicates that this Muslim is well. However, this phrase could be recontextualized in the different situations as shown by the concordance lines (Concordance 4.6) of 'الحمد' ('*alḥamdo*; praise) in Alhawali.

Concordance 4.6 Concordance lines of the collocate 'الحمد' ('*alḥamdo*; praise) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	<p>فَاتَّبَعَتِ السُّورِيُّونَ الَّذِينَ يَرْبِطُهُمُ بِالْعِرَاقِ رَابِطَةُ الْقَوْمِيَّةِ وَالْبَيْعِيَّةِ هُم - أَيْضاً - دَخَلُوا ضَمَنَ الْجَيْشِ الَّتِي دَخَلَتْ إِلَى الْعِرَاقِ وَكَتَلَتْ مِنَ الْعِرَاقِيِّينَ مَا كَثُرَتْ! فَهَذِهِ نِعْمَةٌ - وَ الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ فَبِعِزَّتِهِ كَانُوا يَتَقَاتَلُونَ فِي لُبْنَانَ، وَ مِنْهُمْ مَنْ يُؤَيِّدُ عُونَ، وَ مِنْهُمْ مَنْ يُؤَيِّدُ شَمْعُونَ أَصْبَحُوا يَتَقَاتَلُونَ بِتَقْسِيمِهِ وَ جِهَاتِهِ لَوَجْهِهِ، فَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ لِأَنَّ الْقَوْمِيَّةَ الْعَرَبِيَّةَ فِي حَالَةِ احْتِضَارٍ.</p> <p>The Syrian Baathis (adherents of the Socialist Baath Party) who have nationalist and Socialist bonds with Iraq were also among the armies (American-led coalition force in the Operation Desert Storm) that invaded Iraq and killed many Iraqis. This is a grace (from Allah) -and praise is due to Allah. After they fought each other in Lebanon when some of them supported Aoun (the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and a Lebanese Prime Minister 1988-1990 who is backed by Saddam Hussein in the Civil war that started 1975 and ended in 1990) and some others supported Chamoun (Lebanese Christian leader -supported by Syria), they were face to face in a battle killing each other. So all praise is due to Allah, because Arab Nationalism is dying</p>
2	<p>إِنْ احْتَمَلَ الْكُوَيْتِ تِلْكَ الْفَتْنَةَ الَّتِي فَصَمَتْ ظُهُرَ الْبَغِيرِ - سَيَنْتَهِي بِشَكْلٍ مَا وَ حِينَهَا سَتَلْتَكِ هَذِهِ الْقُوَى لَتَصْحِيحٍ وَ ضَعْفًا تَحْتَ كَمَا أَلْمَحُوا مَرَارًا وَ صَرَحُوا، فَمَاذَا أَعَدَدْنَا لَذَلِكَ؟ وَ هَذَا الْإِعْدَادُ لَنْ يَكْلِفَنَا وَ لَنْ يَضِيرَنَا فَإِنَّ كَتَى اللَّهِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ الْقِتَالَ فَلِلَّهِ الْحَمْدُ وَ الشُّكْرُ، وَ لَنَا مِنْهُ الْأَجْرُ إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ. وَ إِنْ كُنْتَ الْآخَرَى كَانَ الْجَوَابُ حَاضِرًا وَ الزَّدَادُ سَرِيعًا.</p> <p>The invasion of Kuwait -the straw that broke the camel's back- will end soon in a way or another, then these Forces (American-led coalition force in the Operation Desert Storm) will start to rectify our status as they alluded to and declared many times. What have we prepared for that? Indeed taking the measures (for the coming war against us) will neither cost much nor harm us. If Allah sufficed for the believers in the fighting, to Allah all praise is due, and, Allah willing, we expect His reward (in the Hereafter). And if they attack us, then our response will be fast and efficient.</p>
3	<p>وَ نَتِجَةُ ذَلِكَ [رَفْضُ الْإِسْلَامِ لِلْكَنِهَوْتِ] الطَّبِيعِيَّةِ هِيَ أَنَّ الصُّغَيَانَ الْفَطِيحَ الَّذِي مَارَسَهُ الْكَنِيسَةُ، وَ كَانَ أَحَدَ أَسْبَابِ الْعِلْمَانِيَّةِ، لَا وَجُودَهُ فِي تَارِيخِ الْإِسْلَامِ. فَالصُّغَيَانَ الدِّينِيَّ، ذَلِكَ الَّذِي [...] وَ يَقِيمُ مَحَاكِمَ الْإِنْتِقَاشِ لَتَصِيدَهُمْ [الْمُخَالَفِينَ]، لَا يَوْجِدُ لَهُ - وَ شَ الْحَمْدُ - تَطْيِيرَ فِي تَارِيخِنَا الْإِسْلَامِيِّ</p> <p>and one of a natural consequences for [the rejection of priesthood by Islam] is that the horrible tyranny of the Church, which was one of the reasons of the evolution of secularism, does not exist in Islam. And praise is due to Allah that the religious tyranny, that [...] held the Inquisition to hunt them [people who have different religious views/ faiths], did not exist in the history of Islam.</p>

All the concordance lines show that the collocate 'الحمد' ('*alḥamdo*; praise) is used parenthetically along with the word form 'الله' (*lillah*; to Allah) indicating that Alhawali is describing a satisfactory condition or state of affairs. In Line 1, Alhawali recontextualizes the phrase 'الحمد لله' ('*alḥamdo lillah*; all praise is due to Allah) to show his satisfaction when two opposing Socialist countries that adhere to the Pan-Arab nationalistic ideologies; namely, Syria and Iraq (see Chapter 1) are involved in a direct deadly combat (during the Gulf Crisis 1990-1991) after they were using the conflicting forces in Lebanon as proxies (in the Lebanese civil war 1975-1990). To Alhawali, such dramatic killing is a grace from 'Allah' and an indication of the fall of the Pan-Arab nationalist movement. He views the Gulf crisis as both bad and good which is a sheer contradiction which may indicate his rejection of both the Allied forces and Arab nationalists.

In Line 2 Alhawali warns against the American-led coalition force in Operation Desert Storm, which, according to him, after the war ends, will turn to practice pressure on 'Us' to rectify 'Our status'. In response to such a 'threat', Alhawali suggests a type of preparation that, according to him, will empower the country (Saudi Arabia) against any aggressive attempt by the Western Allies (and more prominently the USA) to hinder the Islamization of the Saudi society. The phrase 'الحمد لله' ('*alḥamdo lillah*; all praise is due to Allah) is preceded by a recontextualization of the following Qur'anic verse:

{وَكَفَى اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ الْقِتَالَ} سورة الاحزاب، اية ٢٥.

{Allah sufficed for the believers in the fighting} Holy Qur'an 33:25.

Thus, Alhawali uses the collocate 'الحمد' ('*alḥamd*; praise) in a hypothetical situation expecting Allah's help. The last concordance line in Concordance 4.6 shows that Alhawali recontextualized 'الحمد' ('*alḥamd*; praise) in a negative representation of the 'Other' (the Christian Church), reminding Muslims that in the past the Church used Inquisitions to hunt people who opposed it and had different religious views/faiths.

So far I have delineated the collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in both corpora. The overall picture of the collocates in Ibn Baz helps to reference a powerful ‘God’ to whom the pure religion is to be dedicated, along with the idea that Muslims should refer to Qur’an and the Sunnah of His prophet (Sharia) in all disputes. However, Ibn Baz also refers to Allah as part of a strategy to justify a negative representation of Arab nationalism.

Similarly, though on a different scale, Alhawali uses the collocates of the key term ‘ALLAH’ in different theological and political contexts as well as in negative representations of the ‘Other’ (see Chapter 6 Section 6.3) to legitimate his stance towards Secularism, Arab nationalism and the American-led coalition force in the Operation Desert Storm (see p. 92). Let us now turn to examine the other semantic foci as indicated by the keywords in Ibn Baz.

4.2.2 Polytheism

Polytheism or associationism in Islam means that worshipping Allah involves the association of other deities with Him. The semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz that indicate this theme are shown in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9 Semantic foci keywords that indicate ‘الشرك’ (*‘ašširk*; polytheism) in Ibn Baz

	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Freq	F. Alhawali
Monotheism and impermissible religious practices and beliefs	1	الشرك/ شرك	the polytheism, the associationism/ polytheism, associationism	131	15
	2	البدع	the religiously impermissible innovative practice	63	8

The keyword ‘الشرك’ (*‘ašširk*; the polytheism) and its variant word form ‘شرك’ (*širk*; polytheism) are two forms of one noun that indicates one of the predominant themes in Ibn Baz: (the) polytheism. The first of these two word forms is preceded with the Arabic definite article ‘الـ’ (*‘al*; the) which, according to the Arabic writing system, is attached at the beginning of the noun. The /l/ sound in ‘الـ’ (*‘al*; the) has undergone a regressive assimilation where this sound is assimilated to the /š/ in ‘širk’ and in effect the /š/ sound is geminated as indicated by the highlighted letters (*‘ašširk*). Both forms are used in Ibn Baz. The first form

‘الشرك’ (*’ašširk*; the polytheism) is predominantly used by Ibn Baz (131 times) in all five texts, whereas the word form ‘شرك’ (*širk*; polytheism) is less popular, occurring 28 times in 3 texts only (collectively 159). First, I shall consider the keyword ‘الشرك’ (*’ašširk*; the polytheism).

Polytheism as the opposite concept of ‘التوحيد’ (*’attawhīd*; monotheism) is seen by Ibn Baz as a contradiction to the message of Islam that is based on monotheistic beliefs. In order to identify why and how this concept is used by Ibn Baz, I shall first examine its context of usage by considering its collocates. Table 5.10 below shows that the keyword ‘الشرك’ (*’ašširk*; polytheism) has 5 collocates.

Table 4.10 Collocates of ‘الشرك’ (*’ašširk*; polytheism) in Ibn Baz

N	Collocates	Eng. trans.	F.	Joint F.	MI
1	الأَكْبَر	the major	27	20	9.527
2	الْخُرَافَات	superstitions/ unrealities	19	6	8.297
3	الْكُفْر	infidelity/ rejection of Islam	30	5	7.375
4	الْبِدْع	impermissible innovations in religious practices	63	6	6.568
5	بِالله	in/ with/by Allah	173	9	5.696

The first collocate ‘الأَكْبَر’ (*’a’akbar*; the major) is a classificatory theological term which indicates that Ibn Baz distinguishes between different types of polytheism (see Concordance 4.8 below). The last collocate ‘بِالله’ (*billah*; in/with/by Allah) is also a keyword (see Table 4.3 above). In the Arabic writing system the preposition ‘بِ’ (*bi*; with/in) is attached at the beginning of the word ‘الله’ (*’allah*; Allah) forming a prepositional phrase (‘بِالله’ (*billah*; in/with/by Allah)) and is consequently identified by WordSmith as one word. This keyword comes in the prepositional phrase that indicates either faith as in ‘الإيمان بالله’ (*’al’iman billah*; belief/faith in Allah) or polytheism as in ‘الشرك بالله’ (*’ašširk billah*; associating others with Allah in worship). The later meaning is the theme of this section which is associated with negative collocates such ‘الخرافات’ (*’alhurafat*; superstitions) and ‘البدع’ (*’albida*; impermissible innovations in religious practices).

Concordance 4.7 Concordance lines of 'الخرافات' ('*alḥurafat*; superstitions), 'الكفر' ('*alkufri*; infidelity) and 'البدع' ('*albidā*'; impermissible innovations in religious practices) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] ولكن الشيخ و أنصاره يدعون الناس إلى الحق: [...] ينهونهم عن الباطل، [...] و يزجرونهم عنه حتى يتركوه ، و كذلك جد في إنكار البدع و الخرافات حتى أزالها الله سبب دعوته [...]]</p> <p>[...] but the Sheikh [Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab] and his proponents call people to the right path [...] and dissuade them from believing in falsehood, as well as reproach them till they abandon it [falsehood]. In addition, he made every effort in disapproving of impermissible religious practices and superstitions till Allah eradicated them because of his [Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab] call [...]</p>
2	<p>و من العقائد المضادة للعقيدة الصحيحة في باب الأسماء و الصفات عقائد أهل البدع : من الجهمية ، و المعتزلة ، و من سلك سبيلهم في نفى صفات الله عز و جل [...]]</p> <p>There are also other erroneous beliefs that contradict the true creed in aspect of Allah's names and attributes. These are the beliefs of the people of impermissible religious practices such the Jahmites, the Mu'tazilites and those who followed their way in nullifying the names and attributes of Allah, the Majestic and Exalted in Mighty, which resulted in not ascribing perfection to Him, the Glorified [...]</p>
3	<p>و من أبرز هؤلاء الدعاة المصلحين الإمام الشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب [...] أعادت للإسلام في الجزيرة العربية قوته و صفاء و نفوذه و طهر الله به الجزيرة من الشرك و البدع ، و هداهم به إلى الصراط المستقيم.</p> <p>One of the most prominent reformers of Islam is the Imam and the Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab [...]. [His call to monotheism] rendered Islam, in the Arab Peninsula, to be powerful, clear from polytheism and victorious. And because of him, Allah has purified the Peninsula from polytheism and impermissible religious practices, and guided them [people in the Arab Peninsula] to the straight path.</p>

The lines in Concordance 4.7 show how Ibn Baz positively represents monotheists and negatively represents polytheists. For example, he describes Sheikh Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who led a call to monotheism, as a 'prominent reformer of Islam' (line 3). Analysis of a concordance of the keyword 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; polytheism) shows that it is usually used with three adjectives: 'أكبر/الأكبر' ('*akbar/al'akbar*; major/the major) which appears as one of the collocates of 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; polytheism), 'أصغر/الأصغر' ('*ašgar/al'ašgar*; minor/the minor) and 'خفي/الخفي' ('*ḥafiy/alḥafiy*; concealed/the concealed). Thus, according to Ibn Baz, 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; polytheism) could be classified into three subcategories; 'الشرك الأكبر' ('*ašširk 'al'akabr*; major polytheism), 'الشرك الأصغر' ('*ašširk 'al'ašgar*; minor polytheism) and 'الشرك الخفي' ('*ašširk 'alḥafiy*; concealed polytheism). Concordance 4.8 below gives three examples of concordance lines of the three different categories of polytheism.

Concordance 4.8 Concordance of 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; polytheism) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] فمن عنى به [حكم المرئد] حق العناية عرف نواقض الإسلام، وأسباب الردة، وأنواع الكفر و الضلال. والنوع الثاني: الشرك الأصغر وهو ما ثبت بالنصوص تسميته شركاً، لكنه لم يبلغ درجة الشرك الأكبر [...] and whosoever study it [the religious ruling of apostasy] diligently would know all issues that contradict Islam and lead to apostasy, the types of disbelief and error. And the second subcategory is the lesser polytheism as confirmed by the sacred texts and identified as polytheism, but is not as grave as the major polytheism [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] فبين سبحانه في هذه الآية أن عبادة غيره من الأنبياء والأولياء أو غيرهم هي الشرك الأكبر وإن سماها فاعلموها بغير ذلك و قال تعالى: (وَالَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِهِ أَوْلِيَاءَ [...]) [...] Allah then clearly delineated in this verse that worshipping others such as prophets and pious men and the like is major polytheism even if those who practice such worship name it otherwise, the Glorified said: {And those who take Auliya' (protectors, helpers, lords, gods) other than Allah [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] قالوا بلى يا رسول الله قال (الشرك الخفي) يقوم الرجل فيصلي فيزين صلاته لما يرى من نظر رجل إليه) خرجه الإمام أحمد [...] they said: O, messenger of Allah tell us, he said (the concealed polytheism is when a man stands up to pray then he starts to make his prayer as perfect as possible (showing off) because he sees another man looking at him), this Hadith is narrated by Imam Ahmad [...]</p>

The concordance analysis of the word 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism/associationism) shows one aspect of Ibn Baz's representation of the 'other'. Ibn Baz considers those who do not align themselves with core concepts of monotheism as deviating from the right path (the notion of social actor representation will be discussed in Chapter 6).

Ibn Baz, also, uses the indefinite noun 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism), though on a smaller scale, to more or less explicate the meanings of polytheism. Despite the fact that the word 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) does not have any collocates, concordance analysis (Concordance 4.9 below) shows that Ibn Baz continues to expound the concept of polytheism.

Concordance 4.9 Concordance of 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism/associationism) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] و غيره من أنواع العبادة، و عبادتهم <u>شرك</u> بالله عز و جل. فالكاهن من يزعم [...] [...] and any other types of worship. And worshipping them is considered <u>associating others</u> with Allah, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, (i.e practicing polytheism). Thus, a priest who claims [to know some of the unseen] [...]
2	[...] في هذه الآية أن دعاءهم غيره <u>شرك</u> به عز و جل كما أوضح سبحانه [...] [...] [Allah has elucidated] in this Qur'anic verse that calling onto any deity other than Him (to cure someone or to bring him/her close to Allah) is <u>associating others</u> with Allah, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, (i.e practicing polytheism) as the Glorified expounded [...]
3	[...] و الأشجار و الأصنام و غيرها ، <u>شرك</u> بالله عز و جل ينافي العبادة [...] [...] [calling onto deities other than Allah (to cure someone or to bring him/her close to Allah) such as] trees, idols and other [dead individuals and objects] is <u>polytheism</u> that contradicts (the pure) worship [of Allah] [...]
4	[...] أو ما أشبه ذلك ، فهذا شرك خفي ، لكنه <u>شرك</u> أصغر. فالتمح بهذا أن الشرك [...] [...] or the like, which is concealed polytheism but it is considered as minor <u>polytheism</u> . Thus, it becomes clear that polytheism is [...]
5	[...] أنواع ثلاثة ، و الحقيقة أنه نوعان : <u>شرك</u> أكبر ، و <u>شرك</u> أصغر. فالشرك [...] [...] D68[polytheism] is classified into three subcategories, but, in fact, it is of two main categories: Major <u>polytheism</u> and minor polytheism. Thus the [major] polytheism [is][...]
6	[...] النوعين السابقين : <u>شرك</u> أكبر ، و <u>شرك</u> أصغر ، و إن سمي خفياً فالشرك يكون [...] [...] [is either of] the two previously mentioned subcategories: Major polytheism and minor <u>polytheism</u> , though it is called concealed [polytheism]. Thus polytheism could be [...]

In his explanation of polytheism, Ibn Baz attempts to outline what contradicts the pure worship that should be dedicated to Allah alone (concordance lines 1, 2 and 3).

As I have illustrated above (see Concordance 4.8), Ibn Baz uses the adjectives 'أكبر' (*'a`kbar*; major) 'أصغر' (*'ašgar*; minor) and 'خفي' (*hafiy*; concealed) to denote three subcategories of polytheism, the fifth concordance line indicates that Ibn Baz limits these subcategories to two broad categories: major and minor. This is further explicated by the expanded version of concordance line 6 in Concordance 4.9 which sums up the classificatory scheme of polytheism that Ibn Baz advocates. Let us consider the expanded version of this concordance line in Figure 4.3:

Figure 4.3 Expanded version of concordance line 6 in Concordance 4.9

و بما ذكرنا يعلم أن الشرك الخفي لا يخرج عن النوعين السابقين: شرك أكبر، و شرك أصغر، و إن سمي خفياً. فالشرك يكون خفياً و يكون جلياً. فالجلي: دعاء الأموات و الاستغاثة بالأموات و النذر لهم، و نحو ذلك. و الخفي: ما يكون في قلوب المنافقين يصلون مع الناس، و يصومون مع الناس، و هم في الباطن كفار يعتقدون جواز عبادة الأوثان و الأصنام، و هم على دين المشركين. فهذا هو الشرك الخفي الأكبر [...] الشرك الخفي الأصغر، كالذي يقصد بقراءته ثناء الناس، أو بصلاته أو بصدقته

And according to what I have mentioned earlier, polytheism is limited to the two previously mentioned subcategories: Major polytheism and minor polytheism, though it is called concealed [polytheism]. Thus polytheism could either be concealed or observable. An example of the observable (polytheism) might be calling onto dead individuals, beseeching their help or making vows – to do charitable acts devoted to the dead individuals near their graves – (to cure someone or to bring success or to bring him/her close to Allah) and so forth. Concealed polytheism is what resides in the hearts of hypocrites; they pray with Muslims and observe fasting (during Ramadan), but in fact they are infidels as they believe that it is permissible to worship idols or they believe in the religion of polytheists. This is called concealed major polytheism. [...] Concealed minor polytheism happens when someone, for example, recites Qur'an, performs a prayer or gives charity in order that people praise him/her

The above expanded version of concordance line 6 indicates that Ibn Baz differentiates between observable and concealed subcategories of polytheism. He uses the adjective ‘خفي’ (*hafi*; concealed) to denote both major and minor types of polytheism: ‘Concealed major polytheism’ is an equivalent term for hypocrisy. It describes the behaviour of people who are infidels, according to Ibn Baz, whereas the observable major polytheism is the practice of the polytheists of worshipping idols. The lesser degree of polytheism is further classified into subcategories; either concealed or observable minor subcategories of polytheism, which, as Ibn Baz continues to describe, are the insincere performance of Islamic ritual duties (i.e. all the forms of worship should be devoted to Allah alone).

So far I have delineated the perspective of polytheism in Ibn Baz, who has quite a complex understanding of the concept, splitting it into various categories (concealed or observable major and minor categories of polytheism). Notably, all are represented negatively. These negative representations are limited to religious practices within Islam (see Chapter 8 section 8.5 for an explanation of the political views of Ibn Baz). However, Alhawali extends these categories, using different categorical terms to discuss polytheism in Christianity and western societies, as shown below.

4.2.3 Polytheism in Alhawali

The keyword in Ibn Baz 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism) and its indefinite form 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) are also used by Alhawali, though on a smaller scale: 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism) occurs 15 times in one text and 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) occurs 11 times in two texts as compared to the higher occurrences of these words in Ibn Baz: 131 times in 5 texts and 28 times in 3 texts respectively. Despite the limited number of occurrences of these two terms that refer to polytheism, it is useful to examine how Alhawali constructs the concept of polytheism – does he construct it in the same way as Ibn Baz (just less frequently), or does he employ a different construction?

The words 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism) and its indefinite form 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) do not collocate with any other word in Alhawali's corpus, however, below are two Concordances (4.10 and 4.11) that show some selected concordance lines that indicate the use of 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism) and its indefinite form 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism) by Alhawali.

Concordance 4.10 Concordance of 'الشرك' ('*ašširk*; the polytheism/associationism) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] ومن نواقض الإسلام العشرة - غير <u>الشرك</u> الذي هو الناقض الأكبر والذي لا شك أن العلمانية نوع منه كما سيأتي- ناقضان [...] and in addition to polytheism , which is the greatest invalidator and, no doubt, it includes secularism as I will explain later, there are 10 invalidators of Islam, two of them are as follows [...]
2	[...] وحسب هذا المبدأ نصب رجال الدين أنفسهم انداداً لله تعالى و أوقعوا أتباعهم في <u>الشرك</u> الأكبر (أَخَذُوا أَخْيَارَهُمْ وَرُءُفَاتِهِمْ أَرْبَابًا مِّنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ) [...] and according to this principle, the clergymen set up themselves rivals to Allah, the Exalted, and made their followers commit major polytheism : (They (Jews and Christians) took their rabbis and their monks to be their lords besides Allah (by obeying them in things which they made lawful or unlawful according to their own desires without being ordered by Allah) [...]
3	[...] الخ. و الواقع أن كلا النوعين من <u>الشرك</u> مردهما إلى أصل واحد ، وهو تحكيم غير الله [...] etc... But in fact, both types of polytheism have the same root which is arbitration to the man-made laws rather than to the Sharia of Allah [...]
4	[...] النتائج السيئة للعلمانية على الإنسان: وليست عاقبة هذا <u>الشرك</u> هي الخلود المؤبد في النار فحسب بل إن أتباعه [...] bad [results of secularism] on humans: The final return of this type of polytheism is not only dwelling in Hell-fire forever but [...]
5	[...] المهم أن النتيجة المنطقية لذلك هي <u>الشرك</u> بالله، و هل هناك صورة من صور [...] the important issue is that the logical end for that is polytheism (associating others with Allah). Is there any other manifest form of polytheism other than [...]

Alhawali's above definition of polytheism goes along with the general Salafi interpretation. However, he extends the concept of polytheism which is the invalidator of Islam to include secularism as indicated by concordance line 1. Thus, secularism is seen as infidelity that not only leads to the destruction of the humans but makes them dwell in hell forever (line 4). Alhawali (in Line 2) quotes a Qur'anic verse (9:31) that delineates the practices of the followers of the rabbis and monks in both Judaism and Christianity: The rabbis and monks make things lawful or unlawful according to their desires that contradict Allah's revelations (the Holy Scriptures). Thus their followers who obey these religious leaders in such matters take them as their Lords besides Allah as the Qur'anic verse quoted by Alhawali tells:

{اَتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْبَابًا مِّن دُونِ اللَّهِ} سورة التوبة ، اية ٣١ .

{They (Jews and Christians) took their rabbis and their monks to be their lords besides Allah (by obeying them in things which they made lawful or unlawful according to their own desires without being ordered by Allah)} (Holy Qur'an 9:31).

So while both Ibn Baz and Alhawali view polytheism as bad, Alhawali connects this trait to two other religious groups that he constructs as the Other – Jews and Christians. Thus, for Alhawali, reference to polytheism helps to legitimate his opposition to these other religions. For Ibn Baz, polytheism is only discussed in relation to Muslims. In concordance line 3, Alhawali claims that there are two types of polytheism (described in more detail below in Concordance 4.11) which are the logical consequence (Line 5) of taking the man-made Laws as a means of arbitration rather than the Sharia of Allah.

Alhawali continues to explicate his Salafi views of polytheism using the indefinite noun form 'شرك' (*širk*; polytheism):

Concordance 4.11 Concordance of شرك (širk; polytheism) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] (الإرادة و القصد) و (الطاعة و الاتباع). أما شرك الإرادة و القصد فهو الوجه [...] (will and intention [to worship other than Allah]) and (obeying [other than Allah] and following [other than His Sharia]). Polytheism by will and intention in worship is dedicating [...]
2	[...] أعني شرك الطاعة و الاتباع - إنه شرك في عبادة الله و أن كان الذين يمارسونه [...] I mean polytheism by obeying [other than Allah] and following [other than His Sharia] is associating others in worshipping Allah even if those who practice it [...]
3	[...] أمراً و نهياً في العقيدة أو الفروع هو شرك أكبر بالله تعالى، سواء أ جاء ذلك [...] altering the Sharia of Allah, ordering people to believe or not in creed matters or in any other religious aspects, is major polytheism i.e. associating partners with Allah, the Exalted, whether such altering comes in the form of [...]
4	[...] يقع حتماً في شرك الطاعة و الاتباع و هو شرك أعظم، لتنافيه مع توحيد الألوهية [...] [and whosoever does so] eventually commits polytheism by obeying [other than Allah] and following [other than His Sharia] which is the most evil type of polytheism that contradicts the unity of worship [...]

The classificatory scheme of polytheism in Ibn Baz (major and minor whether concealed or observable) indicates pure Salafi religious perspective (Abdul-Wahhab, 1996). However, Alhawali, from a different Salafi perspective, uses other terms to classify polytheism. Line 1 in Concordance 4.11 reveals that Alhawali differentiates between two types of polytheism: Polytheism of 'الإرادة و القصد' ('*al'iradah wa 'alqaṣd*'; 'will and intention' [to worship other than Allah]) and 'الطاعة و الاتباع' ('*ṭṭa'ah wa 'alittiba*'; obeying [other than Allah] and following [other than His Sharia]). In such a classificatory scheme, Alhawali rephrases the previously mentioned classification of major polytheism in Ibn Baz to broaden the scope of polytheism to encompass any possible human activity. Let us consider the expanded version of concordance line 1 that indicates Alhawali's classificatory scheme:

Figure 4.4 Expanded version of concordance line 1 in Concordance 4.11

<p>[...] و على هذا تسطيع القول بأن الشرك - تذب البشرية الأكبر و مدار الصراع بين الأمم و الرسل - هو عبادة الطاغوت مع الله أو من دونه في أمرين متخالفين: (الإرادة و القصد) و (الطاعة و الاتباع).</p> <p>أما شرك الإرادة و القصد فهو التوجه إلى غير الله تعالى ينسب من شأنه التعبد كالصلاة و القرابين و التذوق و الدعاء و الاستدانة تبعاً للمداجة الجاهلية القائمة: ((مَا تَعْبُدُهُمْ إِلَّا لِيُقَرِّبُوا إِلَى اللَّهِ زُلْفَى)) [الزمر: 3] و طاغوت هذا النوع هو الصنم أو الوثن أو الجنى أو الطوطم... إلخ.</p> <p>و أما شرك الطاعة و الاتباع فهو التمرد على ترحم الله تعالى و حتى تحكمه في شؤون الحياة بعضها أو كلها، و هو مفروق الطريق بين الإسلام و الجاهلية، كما أنه السمة المشتركة بين الجاهليات كلها على مدار التاريخ، و به استحدث أن تسمى جاهلية مهما بلغ شأنها في الحضرة و المعرفة: ((أَفَكُمُ الْجَاهِلِيَّةُ يَوْمًا)) [المائدة: 50] ((أَأَلِهٌ مُّشْرِكَةٌ تَرْعَا لَهُمْ مِنَ الشَّيْءِ مَا لَمْ يَدْنُ بِهِ اللَّهُ)) [الشورى: 21] و طاغوت هذا النوع هو الزعماء و الكهنة و الكبراء و الأنظمة و الأوضاع و التقاليد و الأصناف و التواتين و الدستير و الأهواء... إلخ.</p>	<p>And consequently, we can say that polytheism – the humans' gravest sin and the cause of the conflict between the messengers of Allah and their nations – is the worship of 'طاغوت' (<i>tagūt</i>; false deities / false leaders / false judges) either along with Allah or without Him in two related issues: (will and intention) and (obeying and following).</p> <p>Polytheism by 'will and intention' is dedicating some of the rites of worship to other than Allah, the Exalted, such as slaughtering animals, making vows (to do charitable acts) supplication and beseeching help, which according to the naivety of the ignorant nations (in the previous eras) who say: (We worship them only that they may bring us near to Allah) (39:3). The 'طاغوت' (<i>tagūt</i>; false deities / false leaders / false judges) of this type of polytheism could be idols, the Jinni or the totem ... etc.</p> <p>Polytheism by 'obeying and following' (obeying other than Allah and following other than His Sharia) is the rejection of the Sharia of Allah, the Exalted, or even the rejection of the supremacy of it over some or all aspects of life. Thus, polytheism is the marking difference between Islam and ignorance and the distinguishing feature of all ignorant nations throughout history. It is the cause that such nations deserved to be called ignorant no matter how civilized and knowledgeable they are, [Allah said]: (Do they then seek the judgement of (the days of) Ignorance?) (5:50) and (Or have they partners with Allah (false gods) who have instituted for them a religion which Allah has not ordained?) (42:21). The 'طاغوت' (<i>tagūt</i>; false deities / false leaders / false judges) of this type of polytheism could be leaders, priests, great men of a society, systems, traditions, costumes, man-made laws, constitutions and desires... etc.</p>
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After quoting Ibn Qayyim (1292-1350) and Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), two Salafi leaders, Alhawali defines 'polytheism' as the worship of 'طاغوت' (*tagūt*; false deities, false leaders or false judges) which, according to him, is the greatest invalidator of Islam and caused by arbitration to the man-made laws rather than the Sharia of Allah.

Polytheism by 'will and intention' means holding a firm will and intention to worship deities other than Allah which is seen as infidelity (a major polytheism according to Ibn Baz). This is a purely religious concept that both writers (Ibn Baz and Alhawali) condemn. However, Alhawali's second type of polytheism, i.e. polytheism by 'obeying and following', which could also be considered a major type of polytheism as described by Alhawali himself, is, nevertheless, widening the scope of polytheism to include issues other than religious rituals.

The word 'طاغوت' (*tagūt*; false deities/false leaders/false judges) is a key concept in the expanded concordance line 1 (Figure 4.4). Alhawali claims that each type of polytheism

has a different ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*) that polytheists worship. The ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*) of the first type of polytheism, Alhawali continues to explicate, is idols, the Jinni, the totem etc..., which are deities of polytheism in religions other than Islam. The word ‘totem indicates’ Alhawali’s inclusion of Totemism (Ancestors and animal worship) as a non-Salafi definition of polytheism. The first two types of the ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*), viz., idols and Jinni, are also mentioned in the Qur’an:

{وَاذْكُرْ إِسْرَافِيئِيلَ رَبِّ اجْعَلْ هَذَا الْبَلَدَ آمِنًا وَاجْنُبْنِي وَبَنِيَّ أَنْ نَعْبُدَ الْأَصْنَامَ} سورة ابراهيم اية ٤٥ .

{And (remember) when Ibrahim (Abraham) said: "O my Lord! Make this city (Makkah) one of peace and security, and keep me and my sons away from worshipping (idols)} (14:45)

{قَالُوا سُبْحَانَكَ أَنْتَ وَلِيِّنَا مِنْ دُونِهِمْ بَلْ كَانُوا يَعْبُدُونَ الْجِنَّ أَكْثَرُهُمْ بِهِمْ مُؤْمِنُونَ} سورة سبأ اية ٤١ .

{They (the angels) will say: "Glorified be You! You are our Wali (Lord) instead of them. Nay, but they used to worship the jinn⁴⁴; most of them were believers in them."} (34:41).

Indeed, Alhawali’s explication of the ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*) of polytheism by ‘will and intention’ is not incongruent with the Salafi tradition of examining major polytheism as all these are forms of dedicating rituals to other than Allah.

The ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*) of polytheism by ‘obeying [other than Allah] and following [other than His Sharia] is a religious concept that is politically oriented to include forms of any dominating powers in any society; leaders, priests, great men of a society, systems, traditions, costumes, man-made laws, constitutions and desires. Thus, the concept ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*) is recontextualized by Alhawali to include all forms of dominating powers in a society, that could lead to encompass every aspect of social life under the umbrella of the Sharia, creating a rift between what Alhawali considers as ‘ignorance’ and Islam, i.e. Islamization of every social aspect of human life. It might be sarcastic to say that Alhawali wants his readers to obey and follow him in all his teachings which may make him included under what he labelled as ‘طاغوت’ (*tagūt*).

36. The Arabic noun ‘Jinn’ is the plural of ‘Jinni’. This is similar to the English ‘genie’.

Both Ibn Baz and Alhawali represent polytheism negatively. In addition, they, from different Salafi perspectives, recontextualize it utilizing different arguments. Ibn Baz's representation and classification of polytheism are oriented towards the rituals and aspects of worship that contradicts Islamic monotheistic beliefs; refocusing the Salafi explications of the types of polytheism. Ibn Baz's projection of the monotheistic beliefs does not open a dialogue with other Saudis (Sufis and Shiites) who have different views concerning polytheistic practices in Islam, which could result in suppression to such minorities. Alhawali recontextualizes polytheism to include secularism, also linked to Judaism and Christianity. He represents 'طاغوت' (*taḡūl*) to include all dominating powers in a society i.e. following other than the religiously guided Sheikhs which might lead to the imposition of Salafi political interpretations of Islam on the society.

As indicated above, whenever 'polytheism' is mentioned, it could also indicate the opposite concept 'monotheism' in the sense that negating the former affirms the latter. The second semantic focus in Ibn Baz that I want to look at is the concept of monotheism.

4.2.4 Monotheism

As indicated in Chapter 1, the concept of Islamic monotheism consists of three subcategories or principles; first, the unity of Lordship which refers to the belief that Allah is the Creator and the Sustainer of the world; second, unity of worship indicates that all Muslims should see Allah as the only one to worship, and third, unifying Allah in His names and attributes which indicates that Muslims should call on Allah by His names and attributes as they appear in the Qur'an without changing their meanings (Abdul-Wahhab, 1996).

The first of these three subcategories of monotheism is not always a problematic issue in Islam as all Muslims agree that Allah is the Creator and the Sustainer of the world. However the other two types of monotheism have caused divisions in Islam. Part of the concept of the unity of worship in Islam is the concept of 'دعاء' (*do 'ā'*; supplication). In this

respect, Sufis and Shiites visit graves of pious men to make supplications and seek their help to intercede with Allah. This has caused fissures and conflicts between the Salafis and their opponents; the Shiites and Sufis.

The last of the three monotheistic categories i.e. unifying Allah in His names and attributes, has also caused conflicts among the different medieval Sunni schools of theology such as ‘المعتزلة’ (*‘almu‘tazilah*; the Mu‘tazilites) and their descendants; ‘الأشاعرة’ (*‘al’aša‘irah*; Ash‘arites) and ‘الماتريدية’ (*‘almaturidiyyah*; Maturidites) who sought to understand the principles of ‘العقيدة الإسلامية’ (*‘al‘aqīdah ‘al‘islamiyyah*; Islamic creeds) through a dialectical method: for example, they use arguments rather than literal interpretations of sacred texts to understand the names and attributes of Allah. It is noteworthy here that these differences between the Salafi and Ash‘arites’ conceptions in the names and attributes are not taught to ordinary people. However, they occasionally appear in the religious writings of both Sunni factions (Ash‘arites and Salafis).

The major conflict between the Salafis and the previously mentioned theological schools occurs in the monotheistic category of ‘Allah’s names and attributes’ where these schools reject the Salafi literal interpretations of Allah’s names and attributes (the Salafi concepts of names and attributes of Allah are detailed in section 4.2.3.2 below). The following sub sections address these two thematic foci in Ibn Baz.

4.2.4.1 Unity of worship

A keyword that relates to the concept of unity of worship in Ibn Baz is ‘الاستغاثة’ (*‘al‘istigāṭah*; beseeching for help) (28 occurrences). Let us consider the concordance lines of the keyword ‘الاستغاثة’ (*‘al‘istigāṭah*; beseeching for help) in Concordance 4.12.

Concordance 4.12 Concordance of ‘الاستغاثة’ (*‘al‘istigāṭah*; beseeching for help) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] و السجود و الطواف والذبح و النذر و الخوف و الرجاء و <u>الاستغاثة</u> و الاستعانة والاستعاذة و سائر أنواع الدعاء. و [...] and prostration, circumambulation, sacrifice (slaughtering an animal for the sake of Allah), making pledges (to make charitable acts for the sake of Allah), fear (of Allah), hope (for His mercy), <u>beseeking for</u> (His) <u>help</u> , asking for (His) <u>help and guidance</u> , seeking (His) protection and all other sorts of supplication, and [...]
2	[...] كما يفعل المشركون في كل زمان مع أصنامهم و أولئهم، في التعظيم و الدعاء و <u>الاستغاثة</u> ، و التمسح و التبرك و طلب المدد. [...] and as the polytheists do in all eras for their idols: adoring them, calling onto them, <u>beseeking for</u> (their) <u>help</u> and seeking their blessing and support.
3	خلق [الله] الثقلين ليعبدوه، دون كل ما سواه ، و ليخصوه بالدعاء و <u>الاستغاثة</u> ، و الذبح و النذر وسائر العبادات، وقد بعث [...] [Allah] has created mankind and jinn to worship Him alone, and to single Him out in supplication, <u>beseeking for help</u> (from Him alone), sacrifice (slaughtering animals for His sake), making pledges (to make charitable acts for the sake of Allah) and all other worships, and [He] has sent [...]
4	[والعبادة هي طاعته و طاعته] رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم كما سلف ، و يدخل فيها الدعاء و <u>الاستغاثة</u> ، و الخوف ، و الرجاء والذبح والنذر كما يدخل فيها [...] [and worship means obeying Him and] His messenger, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, as I indicated earlier. Worship includes supplication, <u>beseeking for help</u> (from Allah), fear (of Allah), hope (for the mercy of Allah), sacrifice (slaughtering an animal for the sake of Allah) and making pledges (to make charitable acts for the sake of
5	[...] الملاذ من كل شر وهذا كله خطأ و ضلال و شرك أكبر فإن الدعاء و <u>الاستغاثة</u> و الاستجارة و جميع العبادات يجب إخلاصها لله [...] seeking refuge [with the Prophet] of every evil which is wrong and manifest error and major polytheism. Indeed supplication, <u>beseeking for help</u> , seeking refuge and all other forms of worship should be dedicated to Allah alone [...]

In all the concordance lines in Concordance 4.12 above, the keyword ‘الاستغاثة’ (*‘al’istigāṭah*; beseeching for help) is constructed as a form of worship which, according to Ibn Baz, is supposed to be dedicated to Allah alone as indicated ostensibly in concordance lines 3, 4 and 5. Concordance line 1 reveals that the keyword ‘الاستغاثة’ (*‘al’istigāṭah*; beseeching for help) is one sort of ‘دعاء’ (*do‘ā*; supplication) which, according to Ibn Baz, is ‘عبادة’ (*‘ibadah*; worship). Thus, beseeching for help from pious dead individuals including Prophets, either by calling onto them or going to their graves and beseech their help, is considered by Ibn Baz to be a violation of monotheism and precisely a sheer contradiction of the unity of worship; ‘manifest error and major polytheism’ (concordance line 5 in Concordance 4.12).

The thematic focus discussed in this section is linked to the concept of polytheism presented in section 4.2.2 above in the sense that confirming monotheistic beliefs indicates the rejection of polytheism. So far I have delineated the Salafi concept of polytheism as opposed to monotheism, in the following section I focus on the third category of monotheism which is unifying Allah in His names and attributes.

4.2.4.2 Unifying Allah in His names and attributes

The Arabic word for monotheism does not exist as a keyword in Ibn Baz's corpus, nor is it particularly frequent in either corpus⁴⁵; however, there are a number of other keywords including 'صفاته' (*ṣifātoho*; His attributes), which when examined in detail, are connected to monotheism. Concordance 4.13 below shows 3 selected lines of the keyword 'صفاته' (*ṣifātoho*; His attributes).

Concordance 4.13 Concordance of 'صفاته' (*ṣifātoho*; His attributes) in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>و من الإيمان بالله أيضا : الإيمان بأسمائه الحسنی و صفاته العلی الواردة في كتابه العزيز ، و الثابتة عن رسوله الأمين من غير تحريف و لا تعطيل و لا تكيف و لا تمثيل ، بل يجب أن تمر كما جاءت بلا كيف ، مع الإيمان بما دلت عليه من المعاني العظيمة التي هي أوصاف لله - عز وجل - يجب و صفه بها على الوجه اللائق به من غير أن يتشابه خلقه في شيء من صفاته ، كما قال تعالى : (ليس كمثله شيء و هو السميع البصير)</p> <p>and part of the faith in Allah as well is the belief in His excellent names and His perfect attributes that are mentioned in His glorious Book and reported in the Sunnah of His honest Prophet without altering, nullifying or comparing His attributes to human characteristics. It is mandatory [on Muslims] to believe in them as they were reported [in the sacred texts] without questioning, and they should believe in their [names and attributes] great meanings which describe Allah - the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic-m and He should be described with these attributes in a manner that suits Him, where He does not resemble any humans in His attributes as the Exalted said: {There is nothing like Him; and He is the All-Hearer, the All-Seer}</p>
2	<p>[...] و الواجب على المسلم أن يسلك في هذه الآيات و ما في معناها من الأحاديث الصحيحة الدالة على أسماء الله و صفاته مسلك أهل السنة و الجماعة و هو الإيمان بها ، و اعتقاد صحة ما دلت عليه و إثباته له سبحانه على الوجه اللائق به من غير تحريف و لا تعطيل و لا تكيف و لا تمثيل ، و هذا هو المسلك الصحيح الذي سلكه السلف الصالح و اتفقوا عليه</p> <p>[...] and a Muslim should follow the path of the people of Sunnah [Prophetic Traditions] and the Community [consensus of the majority of Muslims] who believe that these Qur'anic verse and sound Hadiths that indicate the names and attributes of Allah and confirm that they [names and attributes] are for Him, the Glorified, in a manner that suits Him without altering, nullifying or comparing His attributes to human characteristics. And this is the correct belief that the pious Salaf followed and agreed upon</p>
3	<p>و النوع الثاني : توحيد الأسماء و الصفات ، و هو أيضا من جنس توحيد الربوبية ، قد أقرؤا به و عرفوه و توحيد الربوبية يستلزمه ؛ لأن من كان هو الخالق الرزاق و المالك لكل شيء ، فهو المستحق لجميع الأسماء الحسنی و الصفات العلی ، و هو الكامل في ذاته و أسمائه و صفاته و أفعاله ، لا شريك له ، و لا تشبيه له ، و لا تدركه الأبصار و هو السميع العليم ، كما قال سبحانه : (ليس كمثله شيء و هو السميع البصير)</p> <p>and the second type [of monotheism] is unifying Allah in His names and attributes which is a sub-category of the unity of Lordship that They [Arab atheists] acknowledged and recognized. The unity of Lordship entails it [unifying Allah in His names and attributes] because whoever becomes the Creator, the All-Provider and the Possessor of everything, is the one who deserve all the excellent names and perfect attributes. So, He is absolutely perfect in Himself, names and attributes, and His actions. He has no partner, and there is nothing like Him. No vision can grasp Him and He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower, as the Glorified said: {There is nothing like Him; and He is the All-Hearer, the All-Seer}</p>

Concordance 4.13 shows three concordance lines via which Ibn Baz expounds on the Attributes of Allah which is a sub-category of monotheism in Islam. This sub-category of monotheism is based on the conviction that Allah has the excellent and perfect names and attributes where Muslims are ordered by Allah to call on Him by His names as indicated by the following Qur'anic verse taken from the same text that contains concordance line 2:

{وَلِلَّهِ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَىٰ فَادْعُوهُ بِهَا وَذَرُوا الَّذِينَ يُلْحِدُونَ فِي أَسْمَائِهِ}

37. The word 'monotheism' ('*attawheed*; التوحيد) occurs 26 times in ibn Baz and 7 times in Alhawali.

{And (all) the Most Beautiful Names belong to Allah, so call on Him by them, and leave the company of those who belie or deny (or utter impious speech against) His Names} (7:180).⁴⁶

In Lines 1 and 3, Ibn Baz, repeats the statement in the Qur'an that Allah has the excellent names and perfect attributes and none can excel Him. Line 2 indicates that the monotheistic belief in Allah's names and attributes requires 'إثبات' ('*itbāt*'; the confirmation) of Allah's names and attributes without 'تحريف' (*tahrīf*; altering) their expression or meaning or 'تعطيل' (*ta'ṭīl*; nullifying them) i.e. denying all or some of them. He also states that Muslims should neither compare those names and attributes to any human characteristics by assigning to Allah the attributes that belong to His creatures, 'تشبيه' (*tašbīh*; similitude), nor modify their essence by assigning them to a certain form; 'تكيف' (*takyyīf*; framing).

So far I have delineated two semantic foci (polytheism and monotheism) in Ibn Baz that are reflected and indicated by the keyword 'polytheism' ('*ašširk*; الشرك). These two themes constitute an integral part of the Salafi creed which were recontextualized by Ibn Baz as they were mentioned by many Salafi leaders including Ibn Taymiyya⁴⁷ (2004) who wrote a large amount of literature on these issues refuting 'المعتزلة' ('*almu'tazilah*; the Mu'tazilites) and their descendants; 'الأشاعرة' ('*al'aš'a'irah*; Ash'arites) and 'الماتريدية' ('*almaturidiyyah*; Maturidites). Ibn Baz, on the one hand, appears to have refocused attention on the Salafi concepts of the names and attributes of Allah. Ibn Baz's major concern is to refute the polytheists' practices of using intercessors with Allah in their worship. The practice of the Shiites who take the twelve Imams and the Sufis who take Auliya (friends of Allah according to the Sufi's interpretations of Auliya) as intercessors with Allah are refuted by Ibn Baz. On the other hand, Alhawali's recontextualization of polytheism mainly includes reference to secularism and obeying those who are in power. I now turn to sketch out how the two writers represent Islam.

46. (7:180) indicates that this Qur'anic verse is number 180 in Chapter 7.

47. Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad (1263-1328) is a medieval Salafi jurist and theologian (Lacroix, 2009) who adhered to the Hanbali School of jurisprudence.

4.2.5 Islam

Words which refer directly to Islam are used by both writers, though each from a different Salafi perspective. The keyword ‘الإسلام’ (*‘al’Islam*; Islam) in Ibn Baz (337 occurrences) is also considerably used by Alhawali (271 occurrences). Both writers use this word in all five texts in each corpus. However, Alhawali uses other words that belong to the lemma ‘إسلام’ (*‘islām*; Islam): ‘بالإسلام’ (*bil’islām*; with Islam), ‘الإسلامي’ (*‘al’islāmi*: the Islamic –sing. masculine) and ‘الإسلامية’ (*‘al’islāmyyah*; the Islamic –sing. fem.). Table 4.11 below shows the collocates of the key concept ‘ISLAM’ and other related words in both corpora. To reiterate from the start of this Chapter, only collocates that occur in 3 texts and more will be included in the analysis and if the keyword has other forms, only one collocate for each word form is included in the analysis.

Table 4.11 Collocates of the keyword ‘الإسلام’ (*‘al’islām*; Islam) in Ibn Baz and Alhawali

N	Keyword	Eng. trans	F.	Collocates	Eng. trans	F.	Joint	MI	
1	الإسلام	Islam	337	ابن	the son of	116	17	5.539	Ibn Baz
2				تيمية	Taymyyia	19	16	8.062	
3				رحمه	may (Allah) have mercy on him	88	8	4.850	
4	بالإسلام	with Islam	16	أن	indeed, verily	1605	5	4.380	Alhawali
5	الإسلام	Islam	271	كما	as	583	11	3.770	
6	الإسلامي	Islamic (sing. Masc.)	178	العالم	World	305	76	8.100	
7	الإسلامية	Islamic (sing. Fem.)	210	الأمة	nation	131	33	7.877	

The collocates of ‘الإسلام’ (*‘al’Islam*; Islam) in Ibn Baz are all limited to the nomination of the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya, a well-known medieval Salafi scholar, which could indicate a link between Ibn Baz and Ibn Taymiyya (analysis of social actors will be carried out in Chapter 6). The collocate ‘رحمه’ (*rahimahu*; may (Allah) have mercy on him) also indicates the positive use of a parenthetical (optative) phrase that is usually used after the nomination of people who have died. This collocate always occurs as part of the above fixed phrase. After generating a concordance of the collocate ‘رحمه’ (*rahimahu*; may (Allah) have mercy on him), all the collocates of Islam in Ibn Baz appear in one phrase as in

Concordance 4.14 below; viz., 'شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله' (*ṣayḥ 'al'Isām 'ibn Taymiyya raḥimahu allah*; the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him):

Concordance 4.14 Concordance of the collocate 'رحمه' (*rahimahu*; may (Allah) have mercy on him) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] ما أوضحه شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله في تفسير الاستواء بالعلو فوق العرش [...] [....] as the Sheikh of <u>Islam Ibn Taymiyya may (Allah) have mercy on him</u> , explicated 'استواء' (<i>istwaa'</i> ;) as 'He rose over the Throne (really in a manner that suits His Majesty)' [...]
2	[...] ما ذكره شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله إذ يقول : العبادة : اسم جامع لكل ما يحبه الله و يرضاه من الأقوال و الأعمال الظاهرة و الباطنة ، و هذا يدل على أن العبادة تقتضي : الاتقياء التام لله تعالى ، أمراً و نهياً [...] [...] what the Sheikh of <u>Islam Ibn Taymiyya may (Allah) have mercy on him</u> , mentioned that 'worship is a comprehensive term that comprises all that Allah loves and pleases Him including apparent and hidden sayings and deeds'. This indicates that 'worship requires the complete submission to Allah in obeying His orders, avoiding what He has prohibited [...]
3	[...] و لا ريب أن الدعوة إلى القومية العربية من أمر الجاهلية ، لأنها دعوة إلى غير الإسلام [...] و عقبتها تمزيق التمل و غرس العداوة و التنحاة في القلوب ، و التفريق بين القبائل و الشعوب قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله : (كل ما خرج عن دعوى من نسب أو بلد أو جنس [...] ، فهو من عزاء الجاهلية [...] [...] and no doubt that calling to Arab nationalism is as sort of jahiliyyah (ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) , because it is a call to other than Islam [...] which consequently results in dividing [the Muslim nation] encouraging hostility [...] and discrimination among tribes and nations. The Sheikh of <u>Islam Ibn Taymiyya may (Allah) have mercy on him</u> , said: Any call to other than (Islam) such as the call to familialism, racism, patriotism [...] is a form of <i>jahiliyyah</i> (ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) [...]

All the lines in Concordance 4.14 show that Ibn Baz is referring to Ibn Taymiyya's works. In Line 1, Ibn Baz quotes Ibn Taymiyya as explaining the Salafi, literal concept of the Qur'anic word 'استوى' (*'istawa*; 'He (Allah) rose over (the Throne really in a manner that suits His Majesty). This is a Salafi stance that is opposed by the Ash'arites' interpretation of 'استوى' (*'istawa*) which is '(Allah) established Himself firmly', and consequently they believe that Allah exists everywhere (for more explanation on this disagreement between the Salafis and Ash'arites see Chapter 8 section 8.3.2).

Line 2 indicates that Ibn Baz recontextualizes Ibn Taymiyya's Salafi definition of 'worship' in Islam. Additionally, Ibn Baz recontextualizes Ibn Taymiyya's views concerning the call to familialism, racism and patriotism, in order to refute Arab nationalism (Line 3).

Despite the fact that the keyword 'الإسلام' (*'al'Isām*; Islam), in Ibn Baz, collocates only with the nomination of Ibn Taymiyya, a look at some representative lines (Concordance 4.15) reveals further aspects of the actual use of this keyword.

Concordance 4.15 Concordance of 'الإسلام' ('al-Islam; Islam) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] و تعاليمه، فالواجب على أبناء الإسلام بدلا من التحمس للقومية والمناصرة لدعاتها : أن يكرسوا جهودهم [...] and its teachings, and instead of enthusiastically advocating pan Arab nationalism and supporting its advocates, the sons of Islam should devote their efforts to [...]
2	[...] مما وقع فيه الكثيرون من المنتسبين إلى الإسلام من الغلو في الأنبياء الصالحين و البناء على قبورهم و اتخاذ المساجد [...] the practices of those who claim Islam such as glorifying prophets and saints and construct building on their graves taking them as places of worship (mosques) [...]
3	[...] و أن نترحم عليهم ، و أن نعرف أنهم أئمة الإسلام و دعاة الهدى ، و لكن لا يحملك ذلك على التعصب و التقليد الأعمى [...] and you should call onto Allah to have mercy on them, you should also know that they are the Imams of Islam who guided people to the right path. But this should not lead you to fanaticism and blindly imitate them [...]
4	[الأيمان] و بالتدبر خيره و شره على طريقة أئمة الإسلام في توحيد الله ، و إخلاص العبادة له جل و علا ، و في الإيمان بأسماء الله و صفاته [...] [believe] in the divine will and decree of Allah (good and bad) following the monotheistic steps of the Imams of Islam , and dedicating the worship to Allah, the Majestic and the Most High, alone, and believe in His names and attributes [...]
5	[...] أن الاحتفال بالموالد ليس من دين الإسلام ، بل هو من البدع المحدثات التي أمرنا الله و رسوله بتركها و الحذر منها [...] indeed celebrating the birthday (of the Prophet of Islam) is not part of the obligatory duties of Islam . It is an innovation of religious practices that Allah and His messenger ordered us to abandon and avoid [...]
6	[...] و أبي حنيفة النعمان وغيرهم و من بعدهم من أئمة الهدى ، كشيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية ، و العلامة ابن القيم و الحافظ ابن كثير [...] and Abu Hanifah Alnuman and others, and their followers the Imams who guided people to the true path of Islam such as the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymyyia, the scholar Ibn Alqayyim, and the Hafidh Ibn Kathir [...]
7	[...] ترك الإشراك كله: صغيره وكبيره فالشرك الأكبر ينفي التوحيد ، و ينفي الإسلام كليا. و الشرك الأصغر ينفي كماله الواجب فلا بد من ترك [...] abandoning all forms of (major and minor) polytheism. Because major polytheism negates monotheistic beliefs and Islam , and minor polytheism negates the perfection of monotheism. Thus we should avoid [...]

Ibn Baz represents Islam as a family (Line 1) whose sons are instructed to reject pan Arab nationalism and support what Ibn Baz believes to be the cause of Islam, following the guidance of the Salafi Imams (Lines 3, 4 and 6). Among others, Ibn Baz positively nominates the following Salafi Imams (Line 6): Abu Hanifah (699-767), the founder of the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, the Sheikh of Islam, Ibn Taymyyia (1263-1328), Ibn Alqayyim (1292-1350), and Alhafidh Ibn Kathir (1301-1373). Nomination of such medieval Imams is a theme that reflects Ibn Baz's adherence to the Salafi monotheistic beliefs, viz., avoiding polytheism (Line 7). In addition, Ibn Baz states that Muslims should believe in Allah's names and attributes (Line 4) following those Salafi medieval Imams. This supports the previously delineated theme of monotheism in section 4.2.4 above.

As regards Alhawali's construction of Islam, he uses other words that relate to the lemma 'إسلام' ('islam; Islam) considerably: 'الإسلام' ('al-islam; Islam – 271 occurrences), 'الإسلامي' ('alislami: the Islamic –adj. sing. masc. - 178 occurrences) and 'الإسلامية' ('al-islamyyiah: the Islamic –adj. sing. fem. - 210 occurrences). Table 4.11 also shows these words and their collocates in Alhawali.

The collocates of the words 'الإسلام' ('*al'islam*; Islam) and 'بالإسلام' (*bil'islam*; with Islam) are grammatical words that are classified in this thesis as argumentation indicators which may not reveal any semantic foci (argumentation is discussed in Chapter 7). The collocates of the other two adjectives (that stem from the same lemma: 'إسلام' ('*islam*; Islam)) are nouns that indicate the Islamic world and the identity of Muslim nation as opposed to the non-Islamic world or non-Muslims, the West for example; thus constructing two opposing worlds. This could be further investigated using concordance-based analysis of the word 'الإسلام' ('*al'islam*; Islam) in Alhawali.

Concordance 4.16 Concordance of 'الإسلام' ('*al'islam*; Islam) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	<p>[المبشرون والمستشرقون] ولكن كان هناك تفكير ذكي اتعظ بالهزائم العسكرية المتلاحقة التي مني بها الغرب، ونقب عن السر العظيم لصالحية المسلمين وانتفاضتهم المناهضة، و وجد السر فعلاً إنه الإسلام نفسه ولا شيء سواه. و وضع خطته الخبيثة بناءً على هذه النتيجة، خطة لا تقوم على إبادة المسلمين ولا على إحتلال أراضيهم، وإنما تقوم على إبادة الإسلام نفسه واقتلاعه من نفوس أبنائه و ضمائرهم</p> <p>[orientalist and missionaries] but there was always an intelligent thinking [thinkers] who learned lessons from the consecutive military defeats of the West. It [thinking; thinkers] has searched for the great secret that reveals the solidarity of Muslims and their sudden uprising [against Crusaders and Western colonial powers]. It [thinking; thinkers] found the secret; it is nothing but Islam itself. It [thinking; thinkers] put its aggressive plan; a plan that is not intended to eradicate Muslims or occupy their land, but its main goal is to exterminate Islam and eradicate it from the minds and the hearts of the sons of Islam</p>
2	<p>و ائقنى هذين [محمد عبده 1849-1905) و عبدالرحمن الكواكبي (1849-1902)] عدد من الكتاب و الصحفيين المشهورين من أديباء الإسلام و غيرهم ، يطالبون بضرورة فصل الدين عن السياسة</p> <p>a number of suspected writers and journalists, who allegedly claim Islam, and others, who followed the steps of these two writers [Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), an Egyptian religious and liberal reformer, and Abdul Rahman Alkawakibi (1849-1902), a Syrian author], call for the necessity to disconnect religion from politics</p>
3	<p>هل من الإستعانة أن يكون أغراض نزول القوات المستعان بها في أرض الإسلام حماية أمن دولة اليهود كما صرح بذلك زعماء امريكا</p> <p>as declared by the leaders of America that one of the aims of having their forces, that we sought to help us, in the land of Islam (Saudi Arabia) is to protect the Jewish State (Israel), will you still consider this as part of seeking their help...</p>
4	<p>[المستشرقون أدمغة الحملات الصليبية الحديثة] تم جندوا آلاف المخطوطات و مئات المؤسسات الثقافية المختلفة لمعركة استئصال الإسلام، و عكفوا في صوامع البحث يديران الصراع المرير بخبث و دهاء</p> <p>then they [orientalist: the think tank of modern Crusades] recruited thousands of manuscripts and hundreds of different cultural institutions in the battle of eradicating Islam. They then, devoted their time assiduously, in research institutions, to wickedly and slyly manage the agonistic conflict</p>
5	<p>حيث أن حيازة كتب شيخ الإسلام محمد بن عبد الوهاب و كذلك شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية تعد تهمة في العراق و الذي يحصل عليها من السفارة السعودية يأخذها كاشساري الثلاث بانفرار</p> <p>because owning the books of the Sheikh of Islam Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, and the those of the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymyyya as well, is considered a guilt in Iraq, and those who obtain them from the Saudi embassy would run away as thieves</p>
6	<p>ما يؤكد أنها كانت جزءاً من المخطط اليهودي للصليبي للقضاء على الإسلام، بل إنه من المؤكد أن الدعوة إلى العنصرية إنما ظهرت أصلاً من أفكار المستعمرين</p> <p>which confirms that it is part of the Jewish and the Crusaders' war to eradicate Islam. Indeed, it is rather certain that the call to use the Slang stemmed only from the ideas of the Colonizers</p>
7	<p>بل تقوم بين حضارات) لقد كان الحوار (الصراع) بين المسيحية و الإسلام محتتماً على الدوام منذ القرون الوسطى بصورة أو أخرى</p> <p>indeed, it rather exists between cultures....). Since the medieval centuries, certainly the dialogue (the conflict) between Christianity and Islam was always unpleasantly vehement in a way or another</p>

Islam is constructed in Alhawali as the victim of external threats (particularly a Judeo-Christian attempt to eradicate Islam) in Lines 1, 3, 4 and 6. In addition to external threats, Alhawali reports other examples of ‘internal threats’: some suspected writers and journalists, who allegedly claim adherence to Islam, call for the separation between religion and politics (Line 2) as well as abolition of classical Arabic. They advocate using Arabic slang instead (Line 6). Thus, according to him, the religious enmity between Christianity and Islam is continuous (Line 7).⁴⁸ The word ‘الحوار’ (*‘alḥiwār*; the dialogue) is followed by the bracketed word ‘الصراع’ (*‘alṣirā*; the conflict). Alhawali thus draws the attention of his audience to what he considers to be an inevitable confrontation between the West and the ‘Muslim world’ (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4 in Chapter 5).

Alhawali refers to the 1991 war against Iraq (Line 3) drawing the attention of his audience to what he believes is the major purpose of the American troops that came to ‘the land of Islam’, Saudi Arabia: their purpose is not to fight back the Iraqi troops and free Kuwait, but, according to Alhawali, it is to protect the ‘Jewish State’ (Israel).’ Although as indicated in Line 5, Alhawali opposes the Iraqi regime, confirming that they made it unlawful for their citizens to obtain the Salafī books of both Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Taymyyia, he abhors the idea that King Fahad (the fourth king of Saudi Arabia between 1982-2005) sought the help of the American troops against Iraq (the ambivalent stances of Alhawali towards Iraq is further investigated in Chapter 5, Section 5.3). This description of Saudi Arabia as the land of Islam having non-Muslim military troops whose aim is to protect the Jewish State (Israel) could be seen as an attempt to instigate his audience against both the US troops and the Saudi leaders, utilizing the enmity between the Palestinians and Israel.

48. Taking the co-text into our consideration, we find Alhawali is quoting a report by the senior advisor to the American President Johnson in 1964 (see Section 5.2.1 in Chapter 5).

This more politically-oriented construction of Islam as under attack, from both without and within, is different from that of Ibn Baz whose construction of Islam revolves more around monotheistic beliefs and practices.

A final theme emerging from the keywords list of Ibn Baz is the ‘Hereafter’. Both authors write about this theme and, in what follows, I shall describe how it is used in Ibn Baz and Alhawali.

4.2.6 The final return

The last semantic focus revealed by the keyword list in Ibn Baz is the ‘final return’. Table 4.12 shows 2 keywords that indicate this theme in Ibn Baz along with their frequencies in both corpora.

Table 4.12 Keywords that indicate the ‘final return’ in Ibn Baz

	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Freq	F. Alhawali
The final return	1	الآخرة	the Hereafter	63	28
	2	النار	the Hell-fire	58	17

Both writers use the same set of words to indicate the concept of life after death. However, Alhawali uses them relatively less often.

For Ibn Baz, the keyword ‘الآخرة’ (*‘al’āḥirah*; the Hereafter) collocates with the antonym ‘الدنيا’ (*‘adduniya*; this world) (MI score: 9.790, joint frequency: 48). Using such an antonym may indicate Ibn Baz’s representation of two opposing worlds; the ephemeral world of doing; ‘الدنيا’ (*‘adduniya*; this world) and the eternal world of reward/punishment ‘الآخرة’ (*‘al’āḥirah*; the Hereafter). Concordance 4.17 presents 5 concordance lines of Ibn Baz’s actual use of the keyword ‘الآخرة’ (*‘al’āḥirah*; the Hereafter).

Concordance 4.17 Concordance of the keyword 'الأخرة' ('al'āhīrah; the Hereafter) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] والذين يصابون بالعلم، أيضاً كان أن يقل على كتب الله، [...] ومن تيسر القرآن صالبا للهدى أعزده الله، [...] وهكذا السنة المطهرة [...]، فقد وعد الله سبحانه بالنصر للعاملين في الدنيا والآخرة، قال عز وجل (وَلْيُصِرْزِرْ اللَّهُ مِنْ يَصْرِزُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ * الَّذِينَ إِنْ مَكَّدْهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ لَمُكَّدُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتُوا الزَّكَاةَ [...] وَهُوَ عَاقِبَةُ الْأُمُورِ) ، فقد وعد الله سبحانه وتعالى في هاتين الآيتين، الذين يعملون للحق، و يقيمون الصلوة، و يؤدون الزكاة لمستحقها [...] بالنصر، و هو يعم النصر في الدنيا والتكليف فيها و النصر و الرضى من الله سبحانه يوم القيامة [...]</p> <p>[...] and any student of [religious] knowledge should, wherever he is, commence willingly to study the Book of Allah [...]. Whoever studied the Book of Allah seeking [Allah's] guidance, Allah will endue him with power and honour [...] and so for the purified Sunnah [...], indeed Allah has promised to help those who help to establish Islam in this life, and reward them in the <u>Hereafter</u>, for He, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, said: {Verily, Allah will help those who help His to establish (Cause). Truly, Allah is All-Strong, All-Mighty}. Those (Muslim rulers) who, if We give them power in the land, (they) enjoin prayers [i.e. to perform the five compulsory congregational Salat (prayers) (the males in mosques)], to pay the Zakat [...]. And with Allah rests the end of (all) matters (of creatures). Thus, in these two Qur'anic verses, Allah has promised to endue power and honour to those who work to establish Islam, enjoin prayers and pay the Zakat [alms] to those in need both in this life (give them power and honour) and in the Day of Judgement (Allah will be pleased with them) [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] فبين سبحانه في هذه الآيات أن من اتبع هداة لم يضل ولم يشق بل له الهدى و السعادة في الدنيا والآخرة و من أعرض عن ذكره لله المعيشة المضنك [...]</p> <p>[...] Allah shows in these Qur'anic verses that whoever follow His guidance he will neither go astray, nor will be distressed. Indeed, he will be guided to the true path and gain happiness in this life and the <u>Hereafter</u>. And whosoever turns away from His message (i.e. neither believes in Qur'an nor acts on its teachings) verily, for him is a life of hardship [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] و من حاد عن سبيله باء بالخيبة و الندامة، و خسرت الدنيا والآخرة، فلو كان دعاة الترمية يقصرون بدعوتهم إلبيا لتعظيم الإسلام و خدمته، و رفع شأنه، لما [...]، و غضبوا من صوت دعاة الإسلام إذا دعوا إليه [...]</p> <p>[...] and whosoever does not followed His right path, will draw on himself unsuccess and remorse, and he loses both this world and the <u>Hereafter</u>. Thus, if the advocates of nationalism aim at glorifying and serving Islam, they would not be displeased with those who call for Islam [...]</p>
4	<p>[...] لأن الكفر و المعاصي هما سبب كل بلاء و شر في الدنيا والآخرة، و أما توحيد الله و الإيمان به و برسله و صاعته و صاعته رسله [...] عز الدنيا والآخرة، و النجاة من كل مكروه [...]</p> <p>[...] because infidelity and sins are behind every distress and evil both in this world and the <u>Hereafter</u>, but monotheism and belief in Allah and His messengers and obeying Him and His messengers [...] [lead to] success in this life and in the Hereafter and salvation in calamities [...]</p>
5	<p>[...] فاحذروا أيها المسلمون ما حذركم الله منه، و ابشروا إلى ما أمركم به بخلاص و تسلموا من كل شر في الدنيا والآخرة، و من أعظم الطاعة لله التحاكم إلى شريعته و الرضى بحكمها [...]، عما يقول الله عز وجل: (فَرَى رَيْبًا لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى يُخْلُوكَ فِيمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَجْعَلُوا فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَرْجًا مِمَّا قُتِلُوا وَيُسَلِّمُوا سَلِيمًا) [...]</p> <p>[...] O Muslims, beware of what Allah has warned against, and set out to sincerely obey His commandments, you will be save of all evil both in this world and the <u>Hereafter</u>. And part of the greatest obedience to Allah is to refer to His Sharia for judgement (in all dispute) and become pleased with any Shana's judgement following the saying of the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic [Qur'anic verse]:-{But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them, and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) with full submission} [...]</p>

The collocate 'الأخرة' ('al'āhīrah; the Hereafter) is represented in Ibn Baz as the ultimate goal of any Muslim who should strive and please Allah to gain success in both this world and the Hereafter. Line 3 indicates that Ibn Baz's recontextualizes criticism of (Pan Arab) nationalists who, according to him, do not follow the right path of Allah. Thus, they will bring on themselves failure and remorse and eventually lose both this world and the Hereafter. Line 4 indicates Ibn Baz's negative representation of infidelity and sins, as opposed to monotheistic beliefs, which as he claims 'are the cause of distress and evil'. In Line 5, Ibn Baz encourages Muslims to avoid man-made laws, and instead refer to the Sharia of Allah for judgment (in all disputes). In this last line, he warns Muslims that dissuasion from the Sharia of Allah is the cause of evil in both this world and the Hereafter.

The second keyword in Ibn Baz that refers to the ‘Hereafter’ is ‘النار’ (*‘annar*: the Hell-fire). Again it collocates with an oppositional term ‘الجنة’ (*‘alġannah*; Paradise) (MI score: 9.263). Concordance 4.18 shows 5 concordance lines of Ibn Baz’s use of the keyword ‘النار’ (*‘annar*; the Hell-fire).

Concordance 4.18 Concordance of the keyword ‘النار’ (*‘annar*; the Hell-fire) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] قَالَ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: (مَنْ مَاتَ وَهُوَ يَدْعُوهُ تَدَا دَخَلَ النَّارَ) خَرَجَهُ الْبُخَارِيُّ فِي صَحِيحِهِ، وَالأَحَادِيثُ فِي هَذَا الْمَعْنَى كَثِيرَةٌ، وَ هَذَا هُوَ مَعْنَى لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ، فَإِنْ مَعَهُ لَا مَعْبُودَ حَقَّ إِلَّا اللَّهُ [...] [...] the messenger of Allah -may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him- said: (He who dies associating anything with Allah would enter the Hell-fire). This Hadith is narrated by Albukhari in His collection of Sound Hadiths. There are many Hadiths in this respect which is meaning of 'there is no God but Allah' i.e. there is no diety that deserves worship except Allah [...]
2	[...] فَتَرَأَى عَلَى كُلِّ مُؤْمِنٍ أَنْ يَحْتَرِ ذَلِكَ، [...] وَقَالَ فِيهِ سُبْحَانَهُ أَيْضًا: {إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُغْفِرُ أَنْ يُشْرَكَ بِهِ وَيُغْفِرُ مَا سِوَهُ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ يَشَاءُ}. فَمَنْ مَاتَ عَلَيْهِ فَبِهِ مِنْ أَهْلِ النَّارِ جُزْأً، الْجَنَّةُ عَلَيْهِ حَرَامٌ، وَ هُوَ مُخَلَّدٌ فِي النَّارِ أَيْدِ الْأَيَادِ تَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ. [...]Thus every believer should avoid that [polytheism], [...] Allah the Glorified said (Verily, Allah forgives not that partners should be set up with Him (in worship), but He forgives except that (anything else) to whom He wills). So whoever believes in deities other than Allah and dies will certainly be in Hell-fire. He (polytheist) will not enter the Paradise, and will dwell forever in Hell-fire, we seek refuge in Allah from that.
3	[...] وَأَنْتَ [الرَّوَصِيَّة] مَكْتُوبَةٌ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَتَضَعُ لِنُشْرِيحِ دِينَ لَمْ يَذَنْ بِهِ إِشْرًا! وَقَدْ قَالَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: ((مَنْ قَالَ عَلَيَّ مَا لَمْ أَقُلْ فَيَتَّبِعُوا مُتَعَدِّ مِنَ النَّارِ)) وَقَدْ قَالَ مَعْتَرِي هَذِهِ الرَّوَصِيَّةُ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مَا لَمْ يَقُلْ، وَ كَذَبَ عَلَيْهِ كَذِبًا صَرِيحًا خَطِيرًا [...] [...] and it [the will of Commandments] is fabricated and ascribed to the Messenger –may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him-. It includes rituals that Allah has never allowed! The Prophet –may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him- said: (Whoever (intentionally) ascribes to me what I have not said then (surely) let him occupy his seat in Hell-fire) and, indeed, the liar who fabricated this Commandment, has ascribed something that the Messenger of Allah did not say [...]
4	[...] وَالْعَقْدَةُ الْكُفْرِيَّةُ الْمُضَادَّةُ لِلْعَقِيدَةِ الصَّحِيحَةِ، [...] مَا يَحْتَكِدُهُ الْمَلَاحِدَةُ فِي هَذَا الْعَصْرِ مِنْ اتِّبَاعِ مَا رَكِبَ وَتَبَيَّنَ وَ غَيْرَهُمَا، مِنْ دَعَاةِ الْإِلْحَادِ وَ الْكُفْرِ: [...] وَ مِنْ أَصُولِهِمْ إِنْكَارُ الْمَعَادِ، وَ إِنْكَارُ الْجَنَّةِ وَ النَّارِ، وَ الْكُفْرُ بِالْأَدِينِ كُلِّهَا، وَ مِنْ نَظَرٍ فِي كُتُبِهِمْ وَدَرَسَ مَا هُمْ عَلَيْهِ عِلْمٌ ذَلِكَ يَقِينًا، وَ لَا رَيْبَ أَنَّ هَذِهِ الْعَقِيدَةَ مُضَادَّةٌ لِجَمِيعِ الْأَدِينِ السَّمَاوِيَّةِ، وَ مُنَاقِضَةٌ بِأَهْلِهَا إِلَى أَسْوَأِ الْحَوَاقِفِ فِي النَّبَاِ وَ الْآخِرَةِ [...] [...] and the infidelious doctrines (the doctrines of infidels) that oppose the true Islamic creed [are] the doctrines of the modern atheists who are the followers of Marx and Lenin and other propagandists of atheism and infidelity [...]. and part of their [atheists] tenets are the rejection of the final return, Paradise, Hell-fire, and all religions and whosoever reads in their books will realize that, and no doubt that their doctrines oppose all divine religions, and would lead atheists to the most awful ends in this life and in the Hereafter [...]
5	[...] فِي يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ] فَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ يَفُوزُونَ بِالْجَنَّةِ، وَ الْكَافِرُونَ تَعْلُو وَجُوهُهُمُ النَّارَ وَ الْعَذَابُ، وَ النَّارُ تَكُونُ مِثْلَ مِثْوَاهِهِمْ وَ مَصِيرِهِمْ. وَ فِي هَذَا الْمَعْنَى يَقُولُ سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى: (وَعَذَابُ اللَّهِ الَّذِي أَنْتُمْ أَنْتُمْ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَ عَذَابُهُمْ أَشَدُّ مِنْ نَارِ السَّمَاءِ) [...] [...] (in the Day of resurrection) the believers will win Paradise and there appear on the infidels' faces the signs of humiliation and remorse, and the Hell-fire will be their abode and destination, and in this respect, the Glorified and the Exalted says: {Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the land, as He granted it to those before them, and that He will grant them the authority to practise their religion which He has chosen for them (i.e. Islam). And He will surely give them in exchange a safe security after their fear (provided) they (believers) worship Me and do not associate anything (in worship) with Me}.

Hell-fire is constructed by Ibn Baz as the abode of the wrong-doers in all lines in Concordance 4.18. The wrong-doers in Ibn Baz are polytheists (Line 2) (also described as people who associate anything with Allah in their worship (Line 1), those who lie and fabricate Prophetic Hadiths (Line 3), atheists (Line 4) and infidels and those who associate others with Allah in worship i.e. polytheists (Line 5). In Line 3, Ibn Baz recontextualizes a Hadith (Prophetic Tradition) that includes the keyword ‘النار’ (*‘annar*: the Hell-fire) to refute certain mystic beliefs and reject a leaflet called ‘the Will of Commandment’ that was ascribed

to the Messenger of Islam. Considering more co-text of concordance line 3, we find Ibn Baz's refutation of this leaflet which was written by an anonymous writer of a Prophetic Commandment attributed to someone Called Sheikh Ahmad, the Custodian of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina (second Islamic holiest city in Saudi Arabia):

Figure 4.5 Expanded version of line 3 in Concordance 4.18

فقد اطلعت على كلمة منسوبة إلى الشيخ أحمد خادم الحرم النبوي الشريف بعنوان: (هذه وصية من المدينة المنورة عن الشيخ أحمد خادم الحرم النبوي الشريف) [...] قال فيها [...] و من لم يكتبها و يرسلها حرمت عليه شفاعتي يوم القيامة ، و من كتبها و كان فقيراً أغناه الله ، أو كان مريضاً قضى الله دينه [...] و لو فرضنا أن الشيخ أحمد المذكور [...] زعم أنه رأى النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم في النوم أو اليقظة ، و أوصاه بهذا الوصية ، لحظنا يقيناً أنه كاذب ، [...] لوجه كثيرة منها 1- أن الرسول صلى الله عليه و سلم لا يرى في اليقظة بعد وفاته صلى الله عليه و سلم ، و من زعم من جهلة الصوفية أنه يرى النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم في اليقظة ، أو أنه يحضر المولد أو ما شابه ذلك ، فقد غلط أفرح الخطل [...] و أنها مكذوبة على رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم و متضمنة لتشريع دين لم يأن به الله! و قد قال النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم: ((من قال علي ما لم أقل فليتبوأ مقعده من النار)) و قد قال مفتري هذه الوصية على رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم ما لم يقل فانتبهوا أيها القراء و الإخوان ، و إياكم و التصديق بأمثال هذه المفتريات ، و أن يكون لها رواج فيما بينكم ، فإن الحق عليه نور لا يلتبس على طالبه ، فاطلبوا الحق بنبله ، و استأخوا أهل العلم عما أشكل عليكم

Verily, I have read a letter attributed to Sheikh Ahmad, the Custodian of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. It was given the following title: (This is a Commandment from the Prophet, Narrated on the Authority of Sheikh Ahmad, the Custodian of the Holy Mosque in Medina). [...] The writer of this leaflet said: '[...] and whoever does not write it [the Commandment] or send it to others, will be deprived of my [the Prophet's] intercession with Allah to save him in the Day of Resurrection, and anyone, who is poor and in debt, writes it, Allah will make him rich, and Allah will pay all his debts.' [...] and if we assumed that the above mentioned Sheikh [...] claimed that he, in a dream or in reality, saw the Prophet, may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, and gave him this Commandment, certainly we know that he is a liar [...]. The case is so, because of many reasons such as: 1- The Prophet, may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, cannot be seen in reality after his death, and anyone who is destitute of knowledge amongst the Sufis, claims that he sees the Prophet or asserts that the Prophet attends the celebrations of his birth and so forth, makes a serious error [...]. And it [the will of Commandments] is fabricated and ascribed to the Messenger –may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him-. It includes rituals that Allah has never allowed! The Prophet –may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him- said: (Whoever (intentionally) ascribes to me what I have not said then (surely) let him occupy his seat in Hell-fire) and, indeed, the liar who fabricated this Commandment, has ascribed something that the Messenger of Allah did not say. Thus, dear readers and brothers: Beware [these liars], and I urge you not to believe in such lies, and do not communicate them to others. Indeed, the path is illuminated for the seekers of truth. You should accept only religious knowledge that is based on evidence [from Qur'an and the sound Prophetic sayings] and ask the scholars of religion about any religious issue you are uncertain of

Ibn Baz disagrees with the mystic beliefs of some Sufis who claim that they can see and communicate with the Prophet of Islam after his death and that they can beseech him for help. Ibn Baz recontextualizes the Hadith that contains the keyword 'Hell-fire' to legitimate his stance towards these Sufi beliefs. The phrase 'من جهلة الصوفية' (*min ġohalat 'aṣoḥfiyyah*; some ignorant individuals amongst the Sufis) reveals one aspect of social actor representation by aggregation. In Lines 4 and 5, Ibn Baz continues to delineate the in/out group construction (i.e. the believers vs. infidels and modern atheists who are the followers of Marx and Lenin and other propagandists of atheism and infidelity) (see Chapter 6 for more detailed analysis of Ibn Baz's representation of social actors).

Line 4 of Concordance 4.18 shows Ibn Baz's stance towards other religions. He uses the term 'الأديان السماوية' ('*al'adyān 'assamāwiyyah*; divine religions) to indicate the three monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions i.e. Judaism, Christianity and Islam, making them as one front opposed by modern atheism that would lead atheists to the most awful ends in this life and in the Hereafter. In positively representing Islam, Christianity and Judaism as being connected and in opposition to atheism, Ibn Baz shows a very different stance towards Christianity and Judaism to Alhawali, who views such religions as wanting to destroy Islam.

Moving on to the other author, as noted above, Alhawali also uses these 'final return' keywords, though on a smaller scale. The 'النار' ('*annar*; the Hell-fire) and 'الآخرة' ('*al'āḥirah*; the Hereafter) occur 17 and 28 respectively. These two words are mostly used in one of Alhawali's books discussing secularism. Concordance 4.19 shows 4 concordance lines that reflect the actual use of the word 'النار' ('*annar*; the Hell-fire) in Alhawali.

Concordance 4.19 Concordance of the keyword 'النار' ('*annar*; the Hell-fire) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] عاقبة هذا الشرك هي الخلود المؤبد في النار فحسب، بل إن أتباعه يُصلون نار الضياع و التمزق في هذه الدنيا [...] [...] the result of this polytheism (secularism) is not only dwelling in Hell-fire forever, but secularists will suffer from being lost and ripped apart [...]
2	[...] فإنه خير لك أن تفقد عضوا من أعضائك من أن يلقى جسدك كله في النار. و انطلاقاً من ذلك حرمت الزواج على رجال الدين [...] [...] and it is better for you (in order to save yourself from God's punishment) to lose one of your organs, rather than being put in Hell-fire . Based on that, the [Church] made it unlawful for clergymen to get married [...]
3	[...] و قصد حرمانهم من كل خير في الدنيا، و ابتلاهم بحرمانهم من النار التي هي ضرورية جداً للإنسان. [...] and he (Zeus) intended to deprive them from all good things in this world, he also punished them by hiding the fire from them which is a necessity for all humans.
4	[...] التي هي ضرورية جداً للإنسان، و لكن (بروميثوس) سرق النار من السماء أو من مصنع (هيفايستوس) إله النار و الحرف و بخاسة الحداة [...] [...] which is a necessity for all humans, but Prometheus stole fire from heaven or from the factory of Hephaestus the god of fire and craftsmen, especially blacksmiths [...]

Alhawali uses the word 'النار' ('*annar*) in two senses: the first is religious and pertaining to the punishment in the Hereafter (Hell-fire) and the second is to indicate the fire that humans use. As indicated by Line 1 in Concordance 4.19, Alhawali uses the word 'النار' ('*annar*; the Hell-fire) to claim that secularism is a type of polytheism which 'not only leads secularists to dwell in Hell-fire forever, but they will suffer from being lost and ripped apart' in this life. In

the second concordance line, Alhawali criticizes the Church's decision that obliged clergymen not to get married as in the expanded version of Line 2:

Figure 4.6 Expanded version of concordance line 2 in Concordance 4.19

<p>فألفعة مثلاً- خلق إنساني نبيل [...] و دعت إليه الأديان كافة، لكن الكنيسة بالغت في تصورهما لهذا الخلق، حتى حرمت ما أحل الله، [...] و ذلك بابتداعها الرهبانية و تغييرها الشديد من المرأة لذاتها، فتعاليمها تقول عن النظر المجرد: إذا نظرت عينك إلى معصية فاقطعها، فإنه خير لك أن تفقد عضواً من أعضائك من أن يلقي جسدك كله في النار. و انطلاقاً من ذلك حرمت الزواج على رجال الدين معتقدة أن رجل الدين لا يجوز له أن يهبط إلى مستوى أخلاق الشعب، و يشاركهم في الاستمتاع بالنسأ [...] هذا من الوجهة النظرية، أما الواقع العملي فشيء مختلف تماماً، فقد كانت الأديرة ميادين للفجور و مواخير للذنوب، و كان للبابوات و القساوسة من الحشيفات و الحظايا ما لا يكون لدى الملوك النبويين، و تولي منصب البابوية عدد من الأبناء غير الشرعيين لبعض الأبناء و الكرادنة [...]</p>	<p>Chastity, for example, is a noble human trait that all religions invited people to have. However, the Church exaggerated in conceptualizing this human trait. It [the Church] forbade what Allah made lawful [...] because it invented monasticism and extremely estranged the woman for only being a female. The teachings of the Church say the following about the mere looking at a woman: if your eye looked at a sin (i.e. a woman) pull it out because it is better for you (in order to save yourself from God's punishment) to lose one of your organs, rather than being put in <u>Hell-fire</u>. Based on that, the [Church] made it unlawful for clergymen to get married. This decision is based on the belief that clergymen should not fall to the level of ordinary people and share them the same despicable pleasure! [...] this is from the theoretical perspective. However what happened in reality was completely different. Monasteries were brothels and places for immorality. The Popes and priests had more mistresses and concubines than kings had. Indeed some of those who had Papal position were illegitimate sons of some Popes and Cardinals (senior priests in the Roman Catholic Church) [...]</p>
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Monasticism is the target of Alhawali's criticism of the Church. He is alluding to the following Qur'anic verse that is concerned with Christian monks:

{ثُمَّ قَفَّيْنَا عَلَىٰ آثَارِهِم بِرُسُلِنَا وَقَفَّيْنَا بِعِيسَى ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْإِنْجِيلَ وَجَعَلْنَا فِي قُلُوبِ الَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوهُ رَأْفَةً وَرَحْمَةً وَرَهْبَانِيَّةً ابْتَدَعُوهَا مَا كَتَبْنَاهَا عَلَيْهِمْ إِلَّا ابْتِغَاءَ رِضْوَانِ اللَّهِ فَمَا رَعَوْهَا حَقَّ رِعَايَتِهَا فَآتَيْنَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْهُمْ أَجْرَهُمْ وَكَثِيرٌ مِنْهُمْ فَاسِقُونَ} سورة الحديد اية ٢٧.

This Qur'anic verse could be translated as:

{Then, We sent after them Our Messengers, and We sent 'Isa (Jesus) - son of Maryam (Mary), and gave him the Injeel (Gospel). And We ordained in the hearts of those who followed him compassion and mercy. But the **monasticism which they invented** for themselves, We did not prescribe for them, but (they sought it) only to please Allah therewith, but they did not observe it with the right observance. So We gave those among them who believed their (due) reward; but many of them are Fasiqun (rebellious, disobedient to Allah)}. Holy Qur'an 57:27.

But Alhawali adds his explication of the monasticism to further denounce the Church (see footnote 49 below). He claims that part of monasticism is to ban marriage for clergymen (which is not true for all Christian denominations). Banning marriage for clergymen, as Alhawali claims, caused moral denigration to the extent that some of those who were

appointed as Popes were illegitimate children of other Popes and priests who had sex with the many mistresses and concubines they had. The last two lines (3 and 4) are actually part of the same sentence and are from Alhawali's discussion of 'fire' in Greek Mythology which, according to him, is one of the reasons that led the scholars of the West to firmly believe in the defeat of God as indicated by the following quotes taken from the co-text of concordance line 4:

[...] هكذا رسخ في النفسية الأوروبية شعور متأصل بأن كل طفر للإنسان في مجال العلم والمعرفة إنما هو هزيمة لإرادة الإله [...] ، و حتى بعد أن تخلت أوروبا عن عبادة زيوس و جوبيتر، و رفضت عبادة إله الكنيسة معتقدة عبادة (الطبيعة) .
[...] Thus, a feeling is established in the minds of the Europeans that any success in science or knowledge is considered a defeat of the God's will, [...] And even after the Europeans had deserted worshipping Zeus and Jupiter, they refused to worship the God of the Church, and instead they worship nature.

Alhawali continues to criticize the Church as indicated by his use of the word 'الآخرة'

('al'āhīrah; the Hereafter) as indicated by the concordance lines in Concordance 4.20:

Concordance 4.20 Concordance of the keyword 'الآخرة' ('al'āhīrah; the Hereafter) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] فبمت الكنيسة من قول المسيح: "مملكتي ليست من هذا العالم" -إن كان قائلها أن الدنيا و الآخرة [...] صمدان لا يجتمعان، المتيا مملكة الشيطان [...] و عمل الإنسان فيها لتحسين أوضاعه المعاشية [...] كلها أعمال دنسة بمنهج الشيطان ليصرف الإنسان عن مملكة المسيح الخالدة (الآخرة)، و الفقر و شغل العيش - حسب المفهوم الكنسي - هما مفتاح الملكوت الضامن. [...] [...] the Church interpreted the following saying of Christ-if he really had said it: "my kingdom is not part of this world" that the life and the Hereafter [...] are two opposing and conflicting worlds; this life is the kingdom of the Satan [...] and the human efforts to improve his living [...] are all profane that were dictated by Satan to dissuade humans from the eternal Kingdom of Christ (the Hereafter), and, according to the Church, poverty and destitution of good means of living are the needed key to enter the Kingdom of Christ [...]
2	[...] ما يبعث الآن هو أن مهزلة صكوك الغفران قد ساعدت بصفة مباشرة على هدم التعاليم الدينية من أساسها، و الاستهتار بكل المعتقدات و الأصول الإيمانية بجمليتها، و أسهمت في انتشار فكرة إنكار الآخرة و الجنة و النار التي لا يقوم دين بغيرها [...] [...] what concerns us here is the farce named 'Indulgence' (full or partial remission of temporal punishment granted by the Church) which directly contributed to destroying the religious teachings (in Christianity) and ridiculing all beliefs and the fundamentals of faith. It also contributed to the widely spread denial of the Hereafter, Paradise and Hell-fire that all religions are based on [...]
3	[...] و نستطيع أن نستعرض بعض ملامح الأدب و الفن في ذلك العصر (عصر النهضة الأوروبية) معتمدين على بحوث و تحليلات بعض المفكرين الأوروبيين. فجد أن أبرزها ما يلي: [...] 2- الاهتمام بالحياة الدنيا و الوجود الإنساني فيها: و ذلك الاهتمام نشأ رد فعل لتركيز الكنيسة على عالم الآخرة و حصر كل النشاط الفكري و الفني لاتباعها في مجال الحديث عن الثنوت و القديسين و الملائكة و المعجزات، و كبت المشاعر و الأحاسيس الإنسانية أي كأنه ما لم تكن في حدود دائرتها اللاهوتية [...] [...] and we can have a look at some of the features of literature and arts in that era (Renaissance) as indicated by researches and analyses of some European intellectuals. These are the most prominent features: [...] 2. The interest in worldly life and the existence of human: this interest emerged as a reaction to the emphasis on the Hereafter by the Church and the restriction it imposes on the intellectual and artistic activities of its followers on Trinity, saints, Angels and miracles. It was also emerged as a reaction to suppression of human feelings whatsoever unless they are within the theological boundaries of the Church [...]
4	لو أن الكنيسة رباتية حقاً لكان أول عمل عملته بعد انقضاء عهد الاضطهاد المرير هو البحث عن ذاتها هي، بيعت الإنجيل الأصلي ونشره [...] كان في إمكانها أن تنقذ الامبراطور [...] غير أن الذي حصل فعلاً هو أنه لا الكنيسة كانت مؤمنة جادة تعلم في هداية الناس ابتغاء مرضاة الله والدار الآخرة، و لا قسطنطين كان مؤمناً جداً يريد أن يخلص عن عنقه ربة الوثنية [...] [...] If the Church had been really holy, the first thing that it should have attempted to do, after the period of oppression, is to search for its role in life. This could happen through reviving and publishing the real Bible [...] Also, the Church was able to influence the emperor to become Christian [...] But what happened was different; neither the Church was faithful and serious to guide people to the right path to please Allah and gain success in the Hereafter nor Constantine the Great was a good believer who wanted to get rid of paganism [...]

In all four Concordance lines, Alhawali blames the practices of the people of the Church that, according to him, led to the rejection of Christianity. In Line 1, Alhawali suspects that Jesus had ever said ‘my kingdom is not part of this world’. However, he continues to criticize the Church claiming that its explanation of the words of Jesus made Christians think only of the Here-after and consequently live in poverty and destitution. Alhawali’s target in Line 2 is *Indulgence* (full or partial remission of temporal punishment granted by the Church) which, as he claims, contributed directly to the rejection of the fundamental religious concepts of the Hereafter, Paradise and Hell-fire and eventually lead to the rejection of religions. Thus Alhawali blames the Church for the rejection of not only Christianity but all religions. He also blames the Church (Line 3) for the evolution of literary movements (without mentioning any) that made the worldly life (which seems that he is against them) as their core concept. He claims that these movements appeared as a reaction to the Church’s emphasis on the Here-after, the restrictions it imposed on intellectual and artistic activities and suppression of human feelings. In Line 4, Alhawali blames both the Church⁴⁹ and the first Roman Emperor (306 to 337), who converted to Christianity, for not being faithful to the true Christianity. Thus, the semantic foci indicated by the keywords that refer to the ‘final return’ are recontextualized by Alhawali, in order to criticize the Church, Western thinking and secularism.

4.3 Conclusion

So far I have delineated the theological semantic foci in Ibn Baz. I have also examined how Alhawali refers to the same concepts, because he uses some of the theological semantic foci keywords in Ibn Baz with considerable frequency, and it is useful to compare and contrast how each Saudi Salafī writer represents and legitimates his stances towards the

49. Alhawali seems not to differentiate between the different Christian factions and he usually links Christianity to Catholicism.

same semantic foci. The findings in this chapter could be summarized as follows: First, comparing the keywords in the two corpora revealed the accentuation of a major difference regarding the semantic foci, namely, Ibn Baz's theological and Alhawali's political thematic foci. Secondly, both writers seek to use the key term 'ALLAH' in well-known Islamic idiomatic structures which help to legitimate their texts. Thirdly, they also use intertextual quotes from other Islamic authentic texts to align their writings to the Islamic authentic texts – a form of legitimation via conformity (further detailed in sections 7.4, 7.5, 8.3 and 8.5). The two sacred texts, the Qur'an and the Sunnah are extensively used by Ibn Baz and, on a smaller scale, by Alhawali. Additionally, both writers use intertextual quotes from texts written by medieval Salafī religious leaders. All intertextual quotes are recontextualised by both writers to legitimate the arguments that appear therein.

Fourthly, despite the different authorial stances towards polytheism, it is represented negatively by both authors as it, according to the two authors, opposes Islamic monotheistic beliefs. However, from a religious ritualistic authorial stance, Ibn Baz rejects polytheism, whereas Alhawali's dislike of polytheism stems from a politically oriented authorial stance which suggests a step towards the politicizing of Islam. The theme of politicizing Islam will be further investigated in Chapter 5 when we look more closely at Alhawali's keywords.

Chapter 5: Examining Alhawali's politically-oriented semantic foci keywords across both corpora

5.1 Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis that was initiated in the previous chapter. It analyzes a selection of Alhawali's more politically focussed semantic foci keywords and the different ideological legitimization and representation strategies that appear therein. As in the last chapter, for the purpose of comparing Alhawali's writing to that of Ibn Baz's, I shall also consider Ibn Baz's use of some keywords that occur in both Salafi corpora. The selection of such keywords is based on the quantitative and qualitative criteria outlined at the start of Chapter 4. To reiterate from Chapter 4, the present chapter responds to research question 1(a): What do concordance and collocational analyses of keywords and frequent words in the Salafi corpora reveal about themes/macro topics? Answering this question contributes to answering the overall question: To what extent and how is Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s -1990s homogenous?

As I have indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, I utilized a classificatory scheme, based on a preliminary investigation of collocates and concordance analysis, that enabled me to classify these keywords according to their functions (see Tables B1-4 in Appendix B). To remind the reader, Table 5.1 shows the semantic foci keywords in Alhawali's corpus.

Table 5.1 Semantic foci keywords in Alhawali's corpus

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	F.	F.Baz	N	Key word	Eng. trans.	F.	F.Baz
1	أوروبا	Europe	263	4	24	المسكينة	the military (def. adj. fem.)	47	0
2	الخليج	the Gulf	161	1	25	المعاصر	contemporary	47	0
3	الغرب	the West	181	6	26	الحديثة	the modern	54	1
4	النظرية	the theory	120	0	27	الماضي	the past	44	0
5	الثورة	the revolution	115	0	28	الديني	the religious (def. adj. masc.)	57	2
6	الفكر	the intellect/ the thinking	120	3	29	الصلبية	the Crusades	51	1
7	الدينية	the religious (def. adj. fem. pl.)	104	1	30	الدين	the religion	554	222
8	الغربية	the western	110	2	31	العالمية	the (...) World War/the international	55	2
9	الأوروبية	the European	92	0	32	تاريخ	history (indef.)	59	3
10	الحرب	the war	112	9	33	العصور	ages	48	1
11	الصراع	the conflict	65	0	34	المعاصرة	the modern	40	0
12	عصر	era	83	4	35	السياسي	the political (masc. adj./the politician	39	0
13	السياسة	politics	82	4	36	منطقة	region	49	2
14	العقل	mind	116	13	37	عسكرية	military (indef. adj. fem.)	36	0
15	الأوروبي	European (sing. adj. masc.)	55	0	38	المسكينة	the military (def. adj. masc.)	35	0
16	السياسية	the political (adj. pl.)	67	2	39	دينية	religious (indef. adj. fem./pl.)	33	0
17	الغربي	the western (pl. adj. masc.)	67	2	40	النصرانية	Christianity	51	4
18	التاريخ	the history (def.)	107	12	41	الوطنية	patriotism	30	0
19	الوسطى	the middle (ages)	59	1	42	المادية	materialistic/materialism	42	2
20	حركة	movement	58	1	43	التاريخي	the historical	29	0
21	الحركة	the movement	57	1	44	الفكري	intellectual	36	1
22	الاجتماعي	the social (contract)	56	1	45	الحضارة	civilization	45	3
23	إسرائيل	Israel	83	7					

Let us now consider in greater detail the politically oriented semantic foci in Alhawali.

5.2 Politically oriented semantic foci in the Salafi Corpora

Utilizing preliminary concordance-based analysis, I was able to classify the semantic foci keywords in Alhawali into six categories as shown in Table 5.2. As before, for simplicity, only the English translations are given in this table.

Table 5.2 Categories of semantic foci keywords in Alhawali's corpus

N	Categories	Keywords
1	Locations and nationalities	Europe, the Gulf, the West, the western (pl. adj. fem), the European (pl. adj. fem), European (sing. adj. masc.), the western (pl. adj. masc.), Israel, region
2	Military and wars	the war, the conflict, the military (def. adj. fem.), the Crusades, the (...) World War/ the international, military (indef. adj. fem.), the military (def. adj. masc.)
3	Periods of time	the (...) century, era, the history (def.), the middle (ages), history (indef.), ages, contemporary, the modern, the past, the historical
4	Politics	the revolution, politics, the political (adj. pl.), the social (contract), movement, the movement, the political (masc. adj.)/ the politician, patriotism
5	Mind and abstract terms	the theory, the intellect/ the thinking, mind, materialistic/materialism, intellectual, civilization
6	Religion	the religious (def. adj. fem. pl.), the religious (def. adj. masc. pl.), the religion, religious (indef. adj. fem. pl.), Christianity

Based on a preliminary concordance analysis, I first observed that the keywords in the first category (Locations and nationality) indicate two different and, according to Alhawali's perspective, opposing worlds (see below). Of the 9 keywords in this category, only 2 refer to Arab countries or areas (the in-group), viz., 'الخليج' ('*alḥalīġ*; the Gulf) and 'منطقة' (*manṭiqah*; region). The remaining keywords in this category indicate the out-group, namely the West and Israel.

Secondly, the keywords in category 2 (Military and wars) relate to both historical and modern wars that, as Alhawali claims, had or are having negative consequences on the 'Muslim/Arab world'. 'العالمية' ('*al'ālamīyyah*; world/international) is used by Alhawali to refer to the First and Second World Wars (25 out of 36 occurrences) and 'الصليبية' ('*aṣṣalībīyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades) is also used to refer to the medieval wars on the 'Muslim world'. The other three keywords are all derivatives of the word 'عسكر' ('*askar*) which could be translated into English as 'army, military or troops'. All the three derivatives indicate (possible) military invasions or confrontations between the West and Arab and/or Muslim countries (detailed below).

The keywords in category 3 (Periods of time) indicate themes that intersect with the themes in the above two categories, namely, 'Locations and nationalities' and 'Military and wars'. For example, according to Alhawali, the Arab (Muslim) lands were scenes of both historical (Crusades) and modern (colonial) wars. The rest of the keywords in categories 4-6 indicate themes that refer to Alhawali's reflections on political, social and religious life in the West. The keyword 'الثورة' ('*alṭawrah*; the revolution), in category 4 (Politics), often indicates the French revolution (49 times out of 115) or the industrial, scientific and knowledge revolutions against the Church in the West (26 times collectively). It also refers to the Islamic revolution in Iran (6 times). The rest of the occurrences of this keyword refer to communist (3 times) and other revolutions. Category 6 (Religion) contains 4 keywords that are derived from the same root. These keywords are 'الدين' ('*'addīn*; the religion) (554 times), 'الديني' ('*al-dīnī*;

(*'addīni*; the religious – def. adj. masc.) (47 times), 'الدينية' (*'addīniyyah*; the religious –def. adj. fem./pl.) (104 times) and 'دينية' (*dīniyyah*; religious – indef. adj. fem./pl.) (33 times).

As previously noted, due to time and space restrictions, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to do justice to all the keywords. Thus I utilize the criteria I have introduced in Chapter 4, Section 4.1, to narrow down the scope of the analysis to the most prominent political thematic focus in the Salafi corpora. Table 5.3 shows the selected keywords for the analysis.

Table 5.3 Political semantic foci keywords in Alhawali's corpus⁵⁰

	Category	N	Keyword Eng. trans.	Freq.	F. Baz	Keyness	P
External threats	Locations and Nationalities	1	الغرب the West	181	6	137.282	7.3E-16
		2	إسرائيل Israel	83	7	48.076	2.9E-13
	Politics	3	السياسة politics	82	4	58.38	5.5E-14
		4	السياسية the political	67	2	53.697	1.1E-13
	Military invasion	5	الحرب the war	112	9	66.356	2.4E-14
	Construction of history	6	القرن century	134	8	89.417	4.7E-15
	Mind	7	العقل mind	116	13	57.56	6.1E-14
Religion		8	الدينية the religious	104	1	96.293	3.3E-15
		9	الدين the religion	554	222	42.784	1.2E-12

Table 5.3 shows 9 of Alhawali's semantic foci keywords classified into 6 categories. The categories 'Locations and nationalities' and 'Politics' could be grouped together to indicate one major theme, namely 'External threats'. Although the category 'Military invasion' could be classified under the theme 'external threats' or 'Construction of history', I prefer to deal with it separately as it requires a more detailed analysis as shown below. It is also noteworthy that the keywords 'الغرب' (*'algarb*; the West) and 'إسرائيل' (*'isra'īl*; Israel) indicate Alhawali's representation of social actors using various strategies identified by van Leeuwen (1996). These keywords involve strategies of impersonalization (referring to humans via an abstract concept), spatialization (referring to people via the country or region that they live in) and collectivization (referring to all the individuals of one country/region as being in a single group). I debated whether to investigate these keywords in the following chapter which looks at social actors, but have focused the social actor chapter on less abstract cases of social

50. The keyword 'الصليبية' (*'aṣaleebiyyah*; crusades) is also worth investigating here, but it does not satisfy the criteria I used for choosing the semantic foci keywords in the analysis. However, based on collocational analysis, it emerged as a collocate of the keyword key term 'WAR' (MI score 10.997 and joint freq. 25). Thus, I will include it in the analysis of the key term 'WAR' (see Section 5.4.1 below).

actors which involve personalization. Therefore, I discuss these two keywords in this chapter as semantic foci indicators rather than as social actors, although I acknowledge the overlap.

To reiterate from the selection of keywords criteria that I have outlined in Chapter 4, keywords that belong to the same lemma or word-form and occur in the reference corpus (in this Chapter Ibn Baz's corpus) are tabulated and included in the analysis. Thus each of the categories 'Politics' and 'Religion' contains two sets of keywords each of which are derived from one root: 'السياسة' ('*assiyasah*'; politics), 'السياسية' ('*assiyasiyyah*'; political) (occurring collectively 264 times in Alhawali and 6 times in Ibn Baz) and 'الدين' ('*addīn*'; religion) 'الدينية' ('*addīniyyah*'; religious) (occurring collectively 611 in Alhawali and 224 in Ibn Baz). However, these two sets of word forms occur as keywords in Alhawali's corpus. Additionally, the keyword 'الدين' ('*adīn*'; the religion) is also used by Ibn Baz with considerable frequency (222 times). Let us now examine the selected keywords in each category in greater detail.

5.3 External threats 1: Locations, nationalities and politics

As I have indicated in Chapter 4 (section 4.2.1.3), so far, Alhawali's most prominent thematic foci appear to be based on negatively representing the West. Ideologically, this serves to legitimate his stance towards what he believes to be western dominance over Muslim/Arab countries. Alhawali seems to be consistent in his views towards the West as an aggressor towards Muslim countries (see Section 5.4 below). As I have indicated above, based on a preliminary concordance analysis, I found that many keywords indicate one major theme in Alhawali, namely that of external threat. The first two keywords in Table 5.3 that indicate external threat are 'الغرب' ('*alġarb*'; the West) (181 times in Alhawali and only 6 in Ibn Baz) and 'اسرائيل' ('*isra'īl*'; Israel) (83 times in Alhawali and 7 in Ibn Baz). Additionally, 'السياسة' ('*assiyasah*'; politics) and 'السياسية' ('*assiyasiyyah*'; political) occur collectively 149 times in Alhawali's texts and 6 times in Ibn Baz's. The huge difference of occurrences of these four

keywords in both sets of texts (413 times collectively in Alhawali and 19 in Ibn Baz) shows Alhawali's reliance on and interest in these threat-evoking keywords. Let us take each keyword in turn, starting by sketching collocational profiles for each.

5.3.1 The key term 'WEST' in Alhawali's corpus: Western civilization as an enemy of Islam

The keyword 'الغرب' (*'algarb*; the West) has no collocates. However, Alhawali uses two related word forms which do have collocates.⁵¹ These word forms are 'الغربي' (*'algarbi*; western -adj. masc.) and 'الغربية' (*'algarbiyyah*; western -adj. fem.). Table 5.4 shows the collocates of these word forms.

Table 5.4 Collocates of the key term 'WEST' in Alhawali's corpus

Word forms	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts	Joint	MI
الغربي	western (adj. masc.)	67	التي	which/that	1230	3	8	4.25
الغربية	western (adj. fem.)	110	الحضارة	civilization	45	3	12	8.892
			أوروبا	Europe	263	3	9	5.93

The collocates of the key term 'WEST' do not, at face value, bear any negative connotations that could mark the association between them and the key term 'WEST'. However concordance based analysis of these collocates reveals more about Alhawali's actual use of them. The word form 'الغربية' (*'algarbiyyah*; western -adj. fem.) and its collocate 'أوروبا' (*'oroba*; Europe) constitute the 2-word cluster 'أوروبا الغربية' (*'oroba 'algarbiyyah*; Western Europe) that occurs 7 times across 3 texts and suggests that he occasionally is more specific about which countries he means when referring to the West. But examining the collocates of the key term 'WEST' via concordance-based analysis could reveal more about Alhawali's actual use in terms of ideology. I shall choose the lines that combine both the word forms of the key term 'WEST' and their collocates, then I shall choose a small number of representative examples that illustrate how the keyword is most typically used. Let us now examine the collocates of the key term 'WEST' each in turn.

51. It is noteworthy here that I only include in the analysis the collocates that occur in three texts or more.

Concordance 5.1 Concordance of the collocate 'التي' ('allati: that/which) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>نبذة عن المجتمع الشيوعي: كان ما سبق لمحة عن البهيمية الهابطة و المعيشة الضنك و الحياة النكد التي يصلى سعيها المجتمع الغربي المعاصر، و هي سحابة مظلمة تغطي سماء أوروبا كلها، [...] و ترسل صواعقها و تواظفها على كل ركن من أركانها، و لكن الرفاق في موسكو يزعمون أن ذلك الوجه الكئيب خاص بالمجتمعات البورجوازية، [...]</p> <p>An overview of the communist society: The previous notes were only a preview about the low subhuman, hard wretched and painful life that excruciates modern western society. It is (life in western society) a gloomy cloud that covers the sky all over Europe, [...] It sends its sudden and severe attacks to every corner of Europe. But the comrades in Moscow claim that such gloomy face of life is peculiar to the bourgeois societies, [...]</p>
2	<p>و لئن كانت كتب أرسطو بمنزلة النور الصغيرة التي نفتت منها أوروبا في انفلاتها من سجن الكنيسة المظلم فإنها لم توصلها إلى بر الأمان، بل إلى نفق الجاهلية الإغريقية التي لم تخرج منه إلا إلى صحراء القلق والضيق التي يصطنى الإنسان الغربي المعاصر بتهيبها.</p> <p>And if the books of Aristotle were a small window that Europe used to escape from the gloomy prison of the Church, nevertheless they did not take them to a safe land. On the contrary, they led them to the tunnel of the Greek ignorance through which it (Europe) went to the desert of anxiety and destruction that excruciate the western individual.</p>
3	<p>التناقضات الصارخة في الفكر الأوروبي: إن ولادة أوروبا في ظل الحروب الصليبية وشعورها بذاتها من خلقتها هو الذي يفسر تلك التناقضات الصارخة التي يعيشها الفكر الغربي متمثلة في هذه المعادلات الصعبة تحصب صليبي على الإسلام من بطرس النساك إلى كلوس. يواريه داخلياً تمرد كامل على دين الصليب.</p> <p>The stark contradictions in western thinking: Indeed the birth of Europe and the realization of itself through the Crusades can explain the stark contradictions in the western thinking that are resembled in the difficult formula: The Crusaders' hatred of Islam from the days of Peter the Hermit till Klaus that goes along with a complete revolution against the religion of the Cross (Christianity).</p>

The collocate 'التي' ('allati: that) is a singular relative pronoun in Arabic. It relates the clause that follows it to an antecedent clause. This collocate and the word form 'الغربي' ('algarbi; Western –adj. masc.) occur 8 times jointly. As appears in the lines above, Alhawali describes negative situations using the relative pronoun 'التي' ('allati: that) to assign them to the West. In Line 1, Alhawali constructs western society as low, subhuman, hard, wretched and painful. In Line 2 Alhawali claims that people in the West tried to avoid the restrictions of the Church through Aristotle's books but fell into Greek ignorance which led them to anxiety and destruction. He never clarifies what he means by this. Through a series of linked metaphors e.g. 'gloomy cloud', 'gloomy prison', 'tunnel of ignorance', 'desert of anxiety' lines 1 and 2 show how Alhawali negatively represents life in the West. Particularly in line 2, westerners are conceptualised as prisoners although their escape via Greek philosophy leads them into a desert. This view of western society as flawed seems to be a recurrent theme in Alhawali's writings which appears in my analysis of different keywords of Alhawali's corpus (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.1.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.1 and 6.3 and Section 7.5 in Chapter 7).

In Line 3, Alhawali tries to justify the contradictions in his claims about the West being both fanatically religious (Crusaders) and also secular. In both cases Alhawali claims that the West is the enemy of Islam. This is shown in the cotext that immediately precedes Line 3.

Figure 5.1 Expanded version of Line 3 of the collocate 'التي' ('*allati*; that) in Alhawali's corpus

<p>وإجمالاً: ولدت أوروبا ولادة جديدة، ووجد لديها لأول مرة في تاريخها الشعور بأنها أمة واحدة تواجه عدواً أبدياً هو الإسلام، وكانت طفولتها في ذلك العصر الذي سمي "عصر النهضة" أو الانبعاث الذي تمكنت ألا تجعله يبدأ تاريخياً بمعرفة الدين الرباني واكتشاف حضارته العظمى، بل بلحظة الإبحار العكسي إلى الجاهلية الإغريقية واكتشاف أرسطو.</p>
<p>To sum up, Europe was reborn. And for the first time in its history, Europe had the feeling that it is one nation that faces one eternal enemy which is Islam. The so called 'the Enlightenment age' is the early stage of the European development or the point of origins that Europe deliberately did not make it historically start by knowing the Godly religion and discovering its greatest civilization, on the contrary, Europe made it start with the moment of sailing against the tide towards Greek ignorance and the discovery of Aristotle's books.</p>

Aside from the fallacious hasty generalization about western hatred of Islam, Alhawali continues to reiterate his negative representation of the West and western culture (for detailed discussion about fallacies in Alhawali's argumentation see Section 7.5 in Chapter 7).

The other two collocates in Table 5.4 of the word form 'الغربية' ('*algarbiyyah*; western –adj. fem.) are 'أوروبا' ('*oroba*; Europe) and 'الحضارة' ('*aḥḍarah*; civilization) (joint frequencies 12 and 9 respectively). Let us examine each in turn.

Concordance 5.2 Concordance of the word form 'الغربية' ('*algarbiyyah*; western –adj. fem.) and its collocate 'الحضارة' ('*aḥḍarah*; civilization) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>يقول التقرير (للمستشار الأول للرئيس الأمريكي جونسون سنة 1964م) (... يجب أن ندرك أن تلك الخلافات بين إسرائيل والعرب، لا تقوم بين دول أو شعوب بل تقوم بين حضارات). [...] (إن غلبة الحضارة الغربية في الشرق - وهي العدو القديم للحضارة الإسلامية - قد أورت العرب المسلم الشعور بالضعف والمهانة والصغار أمام طغيان تلك الحضارة التي يمتثلها ويحترمها في نفس الوقت).</p> <p>The report (by the senior advisor to the American President Johnson in 1964) says: We must realize that the Israeli-Arab conflicts are not between countries or nations but between cultures) [...] (the prevalence of the <u>western civilization</u> in the East -which is the old enemy of Islamic civilization- made the Arab Muslim inherit the feeling of inferiority, humiliation and insignificance in the presence of the inundation of that (western) civilization that he abhors and admires at the same time).</p>
2	<p>لقد استسلم المسلمون لنوم طويل محتجين بالقدر، فلم يوقظهم إلا هدير الحضارة الغربية وهي تلك معانهم وتقدم حصونهم، [...] وفي لحظة الانهيار والانتهاز هذه، قال المستشرقون [...] والمبشرون وأنابليز إن الدين [...] هو سبب التأخر والجمود في العالم الإسلامي [...]</p> <p>Verily the Muslims had submitted themselves to a very long lethargy, claiming that this is their destiny, however they were woken up by the uproar of <u>western civilization</u> destroying their fortresses and invading their fortifications. And in this moment of dazzlement and perplexity (because of western power) the orientalists [...], missionaries and their tails (henchmen amongst Muslims) say: Islam is the reason for underdevelopment and imperviousness in the Muslim world [...]</p>
3	<p>و فيما كانت الأوضاع تنحدر إلى الهاوية، تلقت الأمة ضربة عنيفة من يد نابليون - ملية الحضارة الغربية الكافرة - أيقظتها هذه الضربة من نومها، و لكنها أفقدتها صوابها.</p> <p>As (the Muslim nation) was falling to an inferior status, it received a violent strike by Napoleon (French Emperor 1804-1815) -the front row of the irreligious <u>western civilization</u>. This strike awakened it (the Muslim nation) from its lethargy, however this strike made the Muslim nation lose its way.</p>

After claiming that the West considers Islam to be its eternal enemy (Concordance 5.1), Alhawali constructs what he believes to be the antagonism and war between Islamic and Western civilizations. In Line 1 Alhawali utilizes a report (by the senior advisor to the American President Johnson in 1964) to lend support to his claims about western enmity towards Islamic civilization.⁵² In Line 2, Alhawali claims that western civilization attacked and destroyed Muslim fortresses. Alhawali also claims that Napoleon's military invasion of Egypt and Syria (1798–1801) is the first attack of the irreligious western civilization on the Muslim land (Line 3) that later invaded Arab lands. Alhawali does not provide any further information about the British involvement in helping the Ottomans defeat the French because he is concerned to show the enmity between the West and the East rather than showing their collaboration (for more information see Matar, 1999).

The word form 'الغربية' ('*algarbiyyah*; western –adj. fem) and its collocate 'الحضارة' ('*aḥaḍarah*; civilization) are used by Alhawali in association with events that indicate historical wars and invasions initiated by some western countries on the Arab lands. His major claim here is that those wars and miseries resulted from western civilization. Lines 2 and 3 indicate Alhawali's exposition of the early military contact between some European countries (such as France) and the Arab countries that were under the Ottoman Empire, namely the events that took place during the 18th and 19th centuries.

Moving forward in history (i.e. to the last quarter of the previous century), Alhawali starts to use the word form 'الغربية' ('*algarbiyyah*; western –adj. fem) with the collocate 'أوروبا' ('*oroba*; Europe) as shown in Concordance 5.3 below.

52. Alhawali is not quoting directly from a translation of the report by the senior advisor to the American President Johnson. He quotes from a book (The Battle of Islam; Past and Modern Time –no date) written by Mohammad Mahmoud Alsawwaf (1914-1992) who is an Iraqi religious leader and one of the founders of Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. It is thus difficult to ascertain whether the senior advisor to President Johnson was accurately represented here which makes this a recontextualization at best –and very possibly a reformulation or construction.

N	Concordance
1	<p>لقد حرصت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية على تطويق الاتحاد السوفيتي و العالم الإسلامي بسلسلة من الأحلاف العسكرية و السياسية منها حلف (الناتو) الذي يشمل <u>أوروبا الغربية</u> و حلف (السنكو) الذي يشمل دول الشرق الأوسط [...] [...]</p> <p>The United States of America wanted eagerly to enclose the Soviet Union and Muslim World with a chain of military and political allies such as NATO that includes <u>Western Europe</u> and CENTO (Central Eastern Treaty Organisation also known as the Baghdad Pact which was dissolved in 1979) that includes the states of the Middle East [...]</p>
2	<p>و في عدد آخر بتاريخ 21/12/1410 هـ يقول كاتب آخر هو مدير المركز العربي لبحوث التنمية والمستقبل بالقاهرة عن تحديات أوروبا: (يتزايد القلق في <u>أوروبا الغربية</u> و جنوب أوروبا بشكل خاص و فرنسا تحديداً من تطور يطلقون عليه المد الإسلامي، و تطور آخر يسمونه التغيير الديمغرافي و التطوران حادثان في شمال أفريقيا).</p> <p>And in another issue dated 21/12/1410 H. (15/07/1990) another writer, who is the director of Arabic Centre for Research-Development and Future in Cairo, says about the challenges that face Europe: (Concern increases in <u>Western Europe</u>, especially in southern Europe and more specifically in France, about the Islamic expansion and the demographic change that both exist in north Africa).</p>
3	<p>إن أي باحث نزيه لا يستطيع أن ينكر مآثر الدولة العثمانية و مزاياها التي تستحق الثناء و التقدير، فهي التي جعلت المد الإسلامي في أوروبا الشرقية يبلغ مداه بعد أن فقد المسلمون بلادهم في <u>أوروبا الغربية</u> بسقوط الأندلس، و هي التي كسرت الكماتمة الأوروبية التي كادت تطبق فكها على العالم الإسلامي، و لم تتمكن من ذلك إلا بعد انهيار الدولة العثمانية.</p> <p>Verily any respectable researcher cannot deny glorious deeds and the merits of the Ottoman Empire that deserve to be valued and praised because it made the Islamic expansion reach the highest of its range in eastern Europe after the Muslims lost their lands in <u>Western Europe</u> when Al-Andalus fell. The Ottoman Empire stopped the European dangers that were about to devour the Muslim world which took place after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.</p>

With the rise of United States of America as a superpower in the world after WWII, Alhawali claims that during the Cold War (between the United States and the Soviet Union), the United States started to surround the Muslim World and the Soviet Union with its military allies (such as NATO and CENTO (Line 1)). Western Europe is viewed as one of these allies of America, responsible for threatening Muslim countries via military alliances.

Alhawali (Line 2) tries to legitimate his stance towards Europe utilizing a quote from the director of Arabic centre for Research development and Future in Cairo. However, he does not provide the name of the director of the Arabic centre in any part of the relative text which brings into question the veracity of his claims here (see p. 131 and for more details about Alhawali's argumentation strategies see Chapter 7). Alhawali tries to show that Western Europe countries are worried because of the expansion of Islam and demographic change in northern Africa. This could indicate that Alhawali tries to represent Western Europe countries as monitoring Arab countries.

Again, Alhawali tries to support his claims about Western Europe and their enmity to Islam. Line 3 shows Alhawali's historical accounts of Western Europe. He positively

constructs the Ottoman Empire as protecting Islam and at the same time negatively constructs Western Europe as the enemy. Additionally, Alhawali tries to evoke the memories of his audience about the medieval Muslim state, Al-Andalus, in Western Europe (in parts of what are today called Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, and France).⁵³

To sum up, Alhawali uses the key term 'WEST' to discursively construct a negative image of western civilization claiming that it is irreligious and excruciates (torments) western people. He also claims that western civilization wants to destroy Islam by evoking memories of historical wars and the military invasions of Arab lands by some western countries. In so doing, Alhawali, defames both the West and western civilization which contributes to polarization of the world into two antagonist sides i.e., the west vs. Islam. This, as Baker et al (2013, pp. 130-5) note on the construction of 'the West' and 'the Muslims' by British newspapers, could reify these terms and present them as in conflict with each other.

Having delineated the thematic focus of Alhawali that is indicated by his use of the key term 'WEST', I now turn to see the actual use of the word and its derivatives as used in Ibn Baz's writings.

5.3.2 The key term 'WEST' in Ibn Baz's corpus: Protection of Muslim society

The key term 'WEST' occurs only 10 times in Ibn Baz's corpus: The word form 'الغرب' ('*algarb*'; the West) occurs 6 times whereas each of the other word forms, 'الغربية' ('*algarbiyyah*'; western –adj. fem) and 'الغربي' ('*algarbi*'; Western –adj. masc.), occur twice. Let us examine examples of each word form.

53. For more information about Al-Andalus, see the link below:
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001144/114426eo.pdf>.

N	Concordance
1	<p>لقد ذكرنا من الأدلة الشرعية والواقع الملموس ما يدل على تحريم الاختلاط و اشتراك المرأة في أعمال الرجال ما فيه كفاية [...] ، و لكن نظرا إلى أن بعض الناس قد يستفيدون من كلمات رجال الغرب و الشرق أكثر مما يستفيدون من كلام الله و كلام رسوله صلى الله عليه و سلم و كلام علماء المسلمين ، رأينا أن نقل لهم ما يتضمن اعتراف رجال الغرب و الشرق بمضار الاختلاط و مفاسده لعلهم يقتنعون بذلك [...]</p> <p>Verily, I have mentioned enough Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions that prohibit the mixing between women and men (in offices and jobs), but due to that some people (Muslims) may learn from what the men of the West or the East have said more than learning from the words of Allah and the messenger of Allah, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, the words of Muslim religious leaders, I felt the need to report some of the writings of the men of the West and the East that include confessions of harming effects and heinous acts of the mixing between men and women that may convince them (some Muslims) [...]</p>
2	<p>و نتيجة لتلك الاقل التي نشأت في المجتمعات في كل مكان [المشاكل النفسية والاجتماعية عند غير المسلمين نتيجة ضعف الإيمان]، و نشأ عنها تصرفات عجيبة من الشباب و غيرهم في الغرب و الشرق، بعضها يضحك التكل، و شر البلية ما يضحك، [...]</p> <p>And as a result of those disturbances [psychological and social problems among non-Muslims who have no faith] that evolved in every society. Additionally, some strange behaviours evolved among young men and others in the West and the East, some of which may even cause the mother who is bereaved of her child to laugh, and indeed the worse of distress is what may cause laughter [...]</p>
3	<p>قال عز و جل : {يا أيها الذين آمنوا لا تأكلوا أموالكم بينكم بالباطل} [...] فهذا يبين لنا أن نظام الإسلام في المال نظام متوسط ، لا مع رأس المال الغاصم من الغرب و أتباعه ، و لا مع الشيوعيين الملحد الذين استباحوا الأموال و أهدروا أهلها ، لم يبالوا بهم و استعبدوا الشعوب و قسروا عليها [...]</p> <p>The Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said: {O ye who believe! Eat not up your wealth among yourselves in vanity} [...] thus these (rules in the Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions) indicate that the Islamic financial system is a moderate system. It neither aligns itself with the unjust capitalism of the West and its advocates nor with the communism of the atheists who made lawful to appropriate the wealth of people and ruin them. They even did not care about them. they enslaved nations and ruin them [...]</p>

Ibn Baz utilizes the word form 'الغرب' ('*algarb*; the West) to positively represent Islam as a religion that protects society. In Line 1 (Concordance 5.4), Ibn Baz tries to lend support to his argument about his rejection of what he calls 'mixing between men and women in offices and jobs'. He utilizes the writings of 'رجال الغرب' (*riḡāl 'algarb*; men of the West) as well as writings of the East (implied to be non-Muslims also), noting that such writers have noted harmful effects when men and women work together. Ibn Baz thus selectively refers to writers who are against sexual equality. The West is constructed here as harmful to people then because of the potential transfer of its practices (such as sexual equality) to the Arab and Muslim countries.

Line 2 shows another way that Ibn Baz conceives of Islam as a guide to stable life whereas, according to him, people in the West or the East (who are not Muslims and lack faith) engage in strange behaviours that can cause 'a bereaved mother to laugh'⁵⁴, for

54. This is an Arabic idiom that is used when strange things happened.

example. However, reading the co-text of concordance line 2, Ibn Baz does not provide any further information about the strange behaviors that he refers to, nor does he give any concrete evidence to back up the claim about such behaviors. On the contrary, Ibn Baz uses the idiomatic phrase ‘make bereaved mothers to laugh’ which means that even a mother who is so sad (because she lost a child) may laugh at the behaviors of the people in the West that Ibn Baz claims to be strange and funny. In Line 3, Ibn Baz refers to the financial system in Islam. He positively represents the Islamic fiscal system and negatively represents capitalism and communism. He claims that capitalism is unjust and communists confiscate the wealth of people whereas the Islamic financial system protects people’s wealth. The other word forms of the key term ‘WEST’ are also used by Ibn Baz in a defensive mode against what he claims to be possible dangers that threaten Muslims (see Concordance 5.5).

Concordance 5.5 Concordance lines of the word forms ‘الغربي’ (*‘algarbi*; Western –adj. masc.) and ‘الغربية’ (*‘algarbiyyah*; western –adj. fem) in Ibn Baz’s corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] بل إن أحد الكتاب من هذه العصبة [القوميين العرب] وجد الوجه الذي يطالع به الناس ليقول : إن الإسلام جنى على العرب ، و إن اللغة العربية قد انتشرت أبعد مما انتشر الإسلام ، و إن الإسلام - لأنه عالمي - ضار بالقومية العربية. و ضاهر أن هذا الكلام بقصع النظر عن بطالته ، إنما يروج لحساب الاستعمار الغربي منه و التشرقي على السواء ، [...]]</p> <p>[...] even one of the writers who belongs to this gang [Arab nationalists], was shameless enough to say that Islam incurred bad consequences on Arabism and Arabic had spread widely far more than Islam. He also claimed that Islam -because it is international- is pernicious to Arab nationalism. Aside from the contradictory nature of what he said, this writer makes propaganda for both Western and Eastern colonialism, [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] اختارت جماعة منهم ممن انطلى عليهم سحر هذه الحضارة؛ لإكمال تعليمهم في الخارج في الجامعات الأوروبية و الأمريكية و غيرها حيث يواجهون هناك بسلسلة من الشهوات و الشهوات على أيدي المستشرقين و الملحنيين [...] و حيث يواجهون الحياة الغربية بما فيها من تسخ و تبدل و خلاعة و تنكف و مجون و إباحية [...] و الواجب التصديق من نطاق الابتعاث إلى الخارج و حصره في علوم معينة لا تتوافر في الداخل [...]]</p> <p>[...] a group of them (Saudis) who were under the fake charming influence of this civilization (Western civilization), chose to pursue their education abroad in European, American and other universities where they are faced with a chain of lustful desires and doubts created by orientalists and atheists [...]. Additionally, they (Saudi students) will face the Western life that contains degeneration, debasement, wantonness, shamelessness, fragmented social bonds and licentiousness [...] thus it is obligatory duty to restrict sending students abroad to a smaller scale and limit it to certain areas of knowledge that are not available inside (Saudi universities) [...]</p>

According to Ibn Baz, occupation of Muslim lands by Western (and/or Eastern) powers is a threat which made him claim that the writings of Arab nationalists’ are mere propaganda that promotes colonialism (Line 1). In Line 2, Ibn Baz presents Western life negatively. He claims

that degeneration, debasement, wantonness, shamelessness, social fragmented bonds and licentiousness are all features of Western life that may affect Saudis who study abroad. Thus he calls for limits on sending students to study abroad, saying they should only study sciences that are not available in Saudi universities (he does not expand on why such subjects are taught in western countries but not Saudi Arabia).

Therefore, the two Salafi writers hold more or less negative conceptions about the West. However, these conceptions are crucially different in one way. While Alhawali, from a politically oriented Salafi perspective, extensively condemns the West and western civilization based on his claims about the eternal enmity between the West (including the Crusaders –see below) and Islam, Ibn Baz’s conception (from a religious Salafist perspective) of the West is less obvious and mostly limited to his view that westerners engage in social behaviours or ideologies that he deems to be wrong and against the teachings of Islam. Ibn Baz’s pointing out Western/Eastern colonialism (Concordance 5.5, line 1) is an indication that he is also able to construct the West as dominating Arab countries. However, only one case like this was found, compared to the many cases in Alhawali. Let us now turn to examine the other keyword in Alhawali that refers to external threats, i.e. ‘إسرائيل’ (*‘isra’īl*; Israel).

5.3.3 Israel in Alhawali’s corpus

The other keyword that indicates external threat is ‘إسرائيل’ (*‘isra’īl*; Israel). It occurs 83 times in Alhawali and 7 times in Ibn Baz. This keyword does not have any collocates in Alhawali which may indicate that he uses this keyword to refer to a range of different contexts (fragmented semantic foci). Alhawali also uses other word forms of the key term ‘ISRAEL’ viz., ‘الإسرائيلية’ (*‘al’isra’īliyyah*; Israeli – def. adj. fem. 7 times) and ‘اسرائيلية’ (*‘isra’īliyyah*; Israeli – indef. adj. fem. 4 times). However, the actual use of these word forms and their thematic function in Alhawali could be revealed via including more co-textual information

using concordance-based analysis. Concordance 5.6 shows some selected examples that indicate how the keyword is most typically used by Alhawali.

Concordance 5.6 Concordance lines of the keyword 'إسرائيل' ('*isra'īl*; Israel) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	[جريدة القبس الكويتية] إن التقارير التي ترد من واشنطن إلى وزارة الخارجية في إحدى الدول العربية تؤكد أن الخطة اليهودية تعضي بأن تكون <u>إسرائيل</u> و قبل عام (2010م) أكبر دول المنطقة بعد مصر من حيث الإمكانيات الديمغرافية (السكانية)، فليس اليهود السوفييت وحدهم هم الذين يتدفقون على الدولة العبرية بل إن الغالب الأمريكي سينتجبه [the Kuwaiti 'Alqabas Newspaper'] the reports, that come from Washington to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one of the Arab countries, confirm that the plan requires that before 2010, <u>Israel</u> should be the largest country in demographic capabilities (population) after Egypt, because not only the Russian Jews will flow into the Hebrew State (Israel), the American overpopulation will go there too, [...]
2	[EIR FEETURE] تخطط حكومات أمريكا و روسيا و بريطانيا <u>لحرب عربية إسرائيلية</u> جديدة في الشرق الأوسط و يريد السوفييت و الأمريكيين و الإنجليز قيام تحالف عسكري سياسي بين <u>إسرائيل</u> و سوريا [...], و رغم أن صدور بعض الإشارات و الدلالات البعيدة عن هذا الهدف إلا أن السينات الانجلو أمريكية و السوفيتية كانت تستهدف منذ مدة طويلة قيام دولتي <u>إسرائيل</u> الكبرى و سوريا الكبرى و تهيئتهما لتصبحا قوتى إقليمية كبرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط. [EIR FEETURE -spelling in the original] The U. S., Soviet, and British governments are planning a new <u>Arab-Israeli war</u> in the Middle East. The Soviets and Anglo-Americans want to make a military and political alliance between <u>Israel</u> and Syria [...] Despite appearances to the contrary, it has been longstanding Anglo-American and Soviet policy to make a Greater <u>Israel</u> and a Greater Syria into the Middle East's regional superpowers.
3	[...] إن أمريكا لن تسمح أبداً لأعداء <u>إسرائيل</u> الذين أقسموا على النيل منها بتحقيق أغراضهم. و يتابع نيكسون مفاخر <u>إسرائيل</u> كأنه يهودي في العالم تعصباً. لقد بهرت <u>إسرائيل</u> العالم كله بكل ما أجزته خلال 40 عاماً من الحرب و سدهت العالم بما تستعين أن تنجزه في 40 سنة من السلام ص-292. [...] United States of America will never allow the enemies of <u>Israel</u> who vowed to attack it (Israel) to achieve their goals, then Nixon continues to boast, as if he were the most zealous partisan Jewish in the world, saying: <u>Israel</u> astonished the world with what it accomplished in forty years of war, it will astonish the world with what it can accomplish in forty years of peace (Nixon 1988, p. 292 – page number is in the Arabic translation)
4	إن أي مؤرخ أو باحث يلقي نظرة سريعة فاحصة على الحقبة التي شهدت ميلاد الدين النصراني، سيرى أن منطقة حوض البحر الأبيض كانت كموج بعقائد و أفكار متباينة تذكر منها: 1- الديانة اليهودية: و هي ديانة مغلقة خاصة بأسياد بني <u>إسرائيل</u> ، لكنها تتميز بأنها ديانة سموية لها كتاب مقدس، و موطنها فلسطين، حيث ولد المسيح وأرسل. Verily any historian or researcher who investigates the era that witnessed the birth of Christianity would clearly see that the Mediterranean Basin was replete of heterogeneous faiths and ideas such as: 1- Judaism: It is a closed religion for the Children of <u>Israel</u> , but its distinctive feature is that it is Divine religion (an Abrahamic religion) that has a Holy Book. It existed in Palestine where Christ was

With the exception of Line 4, all the lines indicate that Alhawali, utilizing quotes from different sources, uses the keyword 'إسرائيل' ('*isra'īl*; Israel) to refer to a possible military threat to Arab countries. In line 1, Alhawali utilizes a quote from the Kuwaiti Alqabas newspaper to lend support to his claim about Israel being a growing threat to the Arab countries. In line 2, Alhawali uses a quote from 'EIR FEETURE'⁵⁵. He also mentions 'a new Arab-Israeli war as being planned by the 'the Russian and the Anglo-American superpowers (see below). In these 3 lines, Alhawali describes a claimed conspiracy against Arab countries. He claims that the superpowers are planning to kindle a new war in the Middle East which

55. The questionable spelling of 'EIR FEETURE' exists in the original text where this concordance line is found. After I searched for this magazine I found that it most likely refers to the Feature articles section in the 'Executive Intelligence Review' which was founded in 1974 (see also footnote 93 in Chapter 7).

would result in making two superpowers there: Greater Israel and Greater Syria. Alhawali also (Line 3) quotes Nixon (the 37th president of the United States) reporting that ‘the United States of America is protecting Israel’ which, according to Alhawali as well as most Saudis, is an enemy. In the last line, Alhawali positively refers to the historical appellation ‘the children of Israel’ representing Judaism as one of the Divine religions (Abrahamic religions).

The keyword ‘إسرائيل’ (*’isra’īl*; Israel) is used predominantly (74 out of 83 times) in one of Alhawali’s texts that was published during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Alhawali was against the presence of the American-led Allies troops in Saudi Arabia claiming that they came with huge numbers to destroy Islam and Saudi Arabia. Alhawali uses ‘إسرائيل’ (*’isra’īl*; Israel) as a possible threat that would collaborate with the West to destroy Islam (see Section 4.2.5 in Chapter 4). It is noteworthy here that after the defeat of the Iraqi troops none of the claims of Alhawali has ever happened. However he did not say or write statement showing his false conceptions till the moment of writing this thesis. The theme that Islam is being targeted by the West is recurrent in Alhawali’s writings (see Chapter 4, Chapter 6 section 6.3 and Chapter 7 section 7.5.3, as well as below). The definite adjective ‘الإسرائيلية’ (*’al’isra’īliyyah*; Israeli) collocates with ‘القوات’ (*’alqowāt*; the (military) forces) in one text of Alhawali’s writings that I mentioned above (MI score 11.510) which shows that this word form is also used by Alhawali as an indication of an external threat. Let us now consider concordance lines of the definite adjective ‘الإسرائيلية’ (*’al’isra’īliyyah*; Israeli) (Concordance 5.7).

Concordance 5.7 Concordance lines of 'الإسرائيلية' ('*al'isra'iliyyah*; Israeli) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	[EIR FEETURE] إذ تمكن <u>القوات الإسرائيلية</u> من اختراق الخطوط العريية من فترة 2/3 ساعات بالمقارنة مع فترة 6 ساعات التي استغرقتها <u>القوات الإسرائيلية</u> لإختراق الخطوط المصرية عام 1967م، و ستعتمد <u>القوات الإسرائيلية</u> في باقي الفترة إلى تطهير الإقليم الأردني، [EIR FEETURE] Israeli forces would break through Arab lines in two to three hours, compared to the six hours it took the Israeli forces to crack Egyptian lines in 1967. The Israeli forces then, in the rest of the period, will aim to mop up the Jordanian territory.
2	[EIR FEETURE] و أن تحاول <u>القوات الإسرائيلية</u> التجاوز إلى عمق العراق أو دخوله مطلقاً حيث من المتوقع قطع خطوط <u>القوات الإسرائيلية</u> في الأردن، إضافة إلى أن <u>إسرائيل</u> ليست لديها القدرة على التعامل مع المناطق العراقية المأهولة بالسكان، و ربما ترى <u>إسرائيل</u> مناسباً توجيه ضربة عسكرية لحقول النفط العراقية شمال العراق... الخ. [EIR FEETURE] Israeli forces will try to penetrate very far into Iraq, if at all, since their (Israeli forces) supply lines could be cut in Jordan. Israel has no capacity to deal with Iraq's populated areas. On the other hand, an Israeli force may choose to strike the oil fields in northern Iraq etc..
3	[نشرته صحيفة صائدي تايمز في عددها الصادر في 9/2/1975م] أنجز مجلس الأمن القومي في الولايات المتحدة دراسة تفصيلية لخطّة سرية للغاية وضعتها وزارة الدفاع لغزو حقول النفط السعودية في حال نشوب حرب أخرى في الشرق الأوسط ينجح عنها خطر نفطى عربي جديد، [...] تقود هذا الهجوم تسع كتائب مشاة محمولة جواً من قاعدتها في ولاية نورت كارولينا و بحماية جوية إلى الظهيران في الخليج عن طريق القاعدة الجوية الإسرائيلية في "حتسريم" و تستولي كتائب المشاة على حقول النفط في الظهيران [...] [published in Sunday Times in 9/2/1975] The Security national Council published a detailed study of a top secret plan made by the Department of Defense (the Pentagon) to invade the Saudi oil wells in case another war starts in the Middle East that could lead to a new Arab oil embargo, [...] This attack is lead by a group of nine infantry battalions carried by air from North Carolina to Dhahran (a major administrative center for the Saudi oil industry located in Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia) protected by the Israeli Air Force Base in Hazerim (an Israeli Air Force Base located in al-Naqab (Negev) desert). The nine infantry battalions will seize the oil field in Dhahran [...]

In the first 2 lines of Concordance 5.7, the collocate 'القوات' (*'alqowāt*; the (military) forces) precedes the word form 'الإسرائيلية' (*'al'isra'iliyyah*; Israeli –def. Adj.). These two words as well as 'Israeli Air Force' in Line 3 refer to the Israeli military capabilities that are introduced by Alhawali to indicate what he claims to be a direct threat. Here Alhawali writes about some war scenarios that he claims happened during the presence of the American-led troops in Saudi Arabia (during the Gulf Crisis in 1990). Alhawali also uses the indefinite adjective 'إسرائيلية' (*'isra'iliyyah*; Israeli) 4 times in the same manner. He uses this word 3 times to form the phrase 'حرب عربية إسرائيلية' (*ḥarb 'arabiyyah 'isra'iliyyah*; Arab-Israeli war) as indicated by Line 2 in Concordance 5.6 above to instigate the Saudis against what he believes to be Western (and/or American) domination over the 'Muslim world'.

Ibn Baz, on a smaller scale, also uses the key term 'ISRAEL' which will enable me to compare the occurrences of the key term 'ISRAEL' in the two corpora, as demonstrated in the following section.

5.3.4 Israel in Ibn Baz's corpus

The word 'إسرائيل' (*'isra'īl*; Israel) collocates with 'بني' (*bani*; the children of) (MI score 12.923). Both words indicate a religious appellation of the Israelites (ancient Hebrew people).

Ibn Baz also uses other forms of the word 'إسرائيل' (*'isra'īl*; Israel). He uses the word 'إسرائيلية' (*'isra'īliyyah*; of Israelites) (one time) to indicate Jewish narratives. He also uses the word form 'إسرائيلي' (*'isra'īli*; Israeli) (one time) to indicate a member of old Hebrew people.

Unlike Alhawali, Ibn Baz uses the key term 'ISRAEL' mostly in connection with religious issues. However, concordance-based analysis could reveal more about Ibn Baz's use of the term (see Concordance 5.8).

Concordance 5.8 Concordance lines of 'إسرائيل' (*'isra'īl*; Israel) in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Concordance
1	وكتب آخر من هذه العصاة (القوميين العرب) يطلب منا بإلحاح : أن ننسى التاريخ ؛ [...] ونسى هذا الغر أن اليهود في كبد الشرق الأوسط ، أقاموا دولتهم بإمداد من التاريخ المرحى ، وأنهم جعلوا اسم إسرائيل علما عليها ، إنه حلال للناس جميعا أن يستصحبوا تاريخهم في كفاحهم ، أما نحن المسلمين فحرام علينا أن نذكر فصلا من هذا التاريخ [...] Another writer who belongs to this gang (Arab nationalists) insists that we forget the history (of Islam) [...]. This inexperienced heedless person has forgotten that the Jews, inspired by their history, established their state and made the name <u>Israel</u> to mark it. Is it lawful for all people, in their struggle, to remember their histories whereas it is not allowed for Muslims to remember even one chapter of their history [...]
2	[...] فقال عز وجل: {لئن الذين كفروا من بني إسرائيل على لئني نأؤدّ ويعسى ابن مرّة ذلك بما عصوا وكثروا يتعصّبون * كانوا لا يذكّرون عن ملّكم فقلّوا لئن ما كانوا يتعلّون}. [...] and then the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said: {Those among the <u>Children of Israel</u> who disbelieved were cursed by the tongue of Dawud (David) and Isa (Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary). That was because they disobeyed (Allah and the Messengers) and were ever transgressing beyond bounds. They used not to forbid one another from Al-Munkar (wrong, evil-doing, sins, polytheism, disbelief) which they committed. Vile indeed was what they used to do}. Thus no Muslim who has true faith in his Lord to commit the sin made by the disbelievers from among the <u>Children of Israel</u> who did not reject Al-Munkar (wrong, evil-doing, sins, polytheism, disbelief) [...]
3	[...] وصدق فيهم قوله سبحانه فيما ذكر في بني إسرائيل : {وَجَعَلْنَا مِنْهُمْ إِمَّةً يَهْدُونَ بِأَمْرِنَا لَمَّا صَبَرُوا وَكَانُوا بِآيَاتِنَا يُوقِنُونَ} صدق هذا في أصحاب الرسول صلى الله عليه و سلم و فيمن سار على سبيلهم ، صابروا أئمة و هداة و دعاة للنحو ، و أعلاما يقتدى بهم [...] the words of the Glorified about the <u>Children of Israel</u> became true about them (the companion of the Prophet of Islam): {And We made from among them (Children of Israel), leaders, giving guidance under Our Command, when they were patient and used to believe with certainty in Our Signs}. This Qur'anic verse is true about the companions of the messenger, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, and those who followed them. They became Imams and teachers of the truth (Islam) who were distinguished men who inspired Muslims [...]
4	[...] وتفسير القومية العربية هذا التفسير الكفور الكنود (إن الإسلام ليس إلا نهضة عربية، فاز بها هذا الجنس العظيم في القرون الوسطى)، هو حرب أخرى ضد الإسلام ، إنه لجدير أن يسمى هؤلاء بأنباع القومية العبرية لا العربية. أليسوا يعملون لمصلحة الاستعمار و إسرائيل ؟ [...] And such rejectionist and ungrateful interpretation [of Islam] by Arab nationalists is another war against Islam (Islam is only an Arabic rise achieved by this great race [Arabs] in the medieval centuries). Verily these (Arab nationalists) are supposed to be named the advocates of Hebrew rather than Arab nationalism. Aren't they work for the interests of colonialism and <u>Israel</u> ? [...]

In Lines 1 and 4, Ibn Baz uses the key term 'ISRAEL' to refer to modern Israel whereas in concordance lines 2 and 3, he uses the key term 'ISRAEL' as an appellation that refers to the ancient Hebrew people as mentioned in the Qur'an. In line 1, he quotes from an Arab nationalist who apparently calls for people to forget the history of Islam. The case of Israel is

held up as an example of how other religions have benefited from remembering their history, while Ibn Baz contrasts Islam, saying that Muslims are not even allowed to remember one chapter of their own history. Islam is thus constructed as oppressed, in comparison to other religions like Judaism.

The semantic focus in Line 2 is about ‘الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر’ (*‘al’amr bilma‘rof wannahi ‘an almunkar*; commanding right and forbidding vice) as an Islamic doctrine mentioned in the Qur’an. Ibn Baz uses the Qur’anic verse about the behaviour of the disbelievers among the Children of Israel in order to legitimate his stance about commanding right and forbidding vice. Line 3 praises the companions of the Prophet utilizing what he believes to be the likeness between them and those pious religious leaders among the Children of Israel who were praised in the Qur’an. Finally, in Line 4, Ibn Baz associates modern Israel with colonialism⁵⁶ which is a clear indication that he considers modern Israel as an enemy.

The two Salafi writers use the key term ‘ISRAEL’ in different political and religious thematic foci. On one hand, Alhawali utilizes the different word forms of ‘ISRAEL’ to construct what he claims to be a possible external (Israeli as well as American) threat to Saudi Arabia. As I have indicated above, the word forms of ‘ISRAEL’ occur mostly (74 out of 83 times) in one of his texts that was published and distributed during the Gulf Crises in 1990. On the other hand, Ibn Baz uses the word forms of the key term ‘ISRAEL’ in different theological semantic foci. Less often, Ibn Baz uses ‘ISRAEL’ to construct an external threat (Israel and colonialism) using the phrase ‘حرب أخرى على الإسلام’ (*ḥarb ‘oḥrā ‘ala ‘al’Islam*; another war on Islam), as in Concordance 5.8, line 4. This leads us the next thematic focus as indicated by the keywords in Table 5.3.

46. Colonialism, in my view, is used as a euphemism for military aggression and occupation of foreign lands which resulted in atrocities, genocides and oppression of natives.

5.4 External threats 2: Military invasion and the Crusader States

The selected keyword that indicates military threat in Alhawali (Table 5.3) is ‘الحرب’ (*‘alḥarb*; the war), (112 occurrences). This word is also used in Ibn Baz, on a much smaller scale (9 times). There are 8 possible word forms in Arabic of the key term ‘WAR’: ‘الحرب’ (*‘alḥarb*; the wars –sing. def. n.), ‘الحروب’ (*‘alḥarūb*; the wars –pl. def. n.), ‘حرب’ (*ḥarb*; war –indef. sing. n.), ‘حروب’ (*ḥarūb*; wars –indef. pl. n.), ‘حربي’ (*ḥarbi*; military/warlike – indef. masc. adj.), ‘الحربي’ (*‘alḥarbi*; the military/the warlike – def. masc. adj.), ‘حربية’ (*ḥarbiyyah*; military/warlike –indef. fem. adj.), and ‘الحربية’ (*‘alḥarbiyyah*; military/warlike – def. fem. adj.). Wordsmith allows for the possibility to search for all these word forms at one time by adding asterisks at the beginning and the end of the root as follows: *حرب* (**ḥarb**; *WAR*). Table 5.5 shows all word forms of the key term ‘WAR’ and number of occurrences in both Salafi corpora.

Table 5.5 Number of occurrences of the key term ‘WAR’ in both corpora

N	Word form	Eng. trans	Alhawali	Ibn Baz
1	الحرب	the war	112	9
2	الحروب	the wars	47	4
3	حرب	war	45	4
4	حروب	wars	6	2
5	الحربية	the military/ the warlike	3	0
6	حربي	military/ warlike	1	0
7	الحربي	the military/ the warlike	1	0
TOTAL			215	19

The only word form of the key term ‘WAR’ that is not used in Alhawali is ‘حربية’ (*ḥarbiyyah*; military or warlike –indef. fem. adj.). The total number of the occurrences of the key term ‘WAR’ is almost 11-fold greater in Alhawali than it is in Ibn Baz (215 and 19 occurrences respectively). The first three word forms in Table 5.5 occur more prominently in Alhawali (and on a smaller scale in Ibn Baz) than the other word forms of the key term ‘WAR’. An initial observation of Table 5.5 is that the most frequent word forms of the key term ‘WAR’ in Alhawali’s corpus are the definite⁵⁷ nouns ‘الحرب’ (*‘alḥarb*; the war – n. sing.) and ‘الحروب’

57. Definiteness in Arabic is indicated by attaching the prefix ‘ال’ (*‘al*; the) to the noun ‘حرب’ (*ḥarb*; war).

(*'alḥorūb*; the wars – n. pl.) which occur 112 and 47 times respectively, whereas the indefinite forms of the key term 'WAR' are less frequent in Alhawali's corpus; (*'ḥarb*; war) 45 occurrences and (*'ḥarūb*; wars) 6 occurrences). This could indicate that Alhawali refers to specific war(s). This observation is further supported by investigating collocates and clusters of the key term 'WAR'. Let us first examine threat indicating words in Alhawali's corpus.

5.4.1 Wars and military invasion in Alhawali

The word forms of the key term 'WAR' in Alhawali collocate with *'al'alamiyyah*; world) (MI score 9.515 and joint freq. 23) and *'aṣalībiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades) (MI score 10.997 and joint freq. 25).⁵⁸ Both collocates are keywords in Alhawali's corpus (with keyness scores of 42.272 and 43.81 respectively). Having keywords collocating with each other may indicate the pervasiveness of the theme that these keywords together indicate i.e. 'World wars and the Crusades'. The definite plural form of the key term 'WAR', namely *'alḥorūb*; the wars) is part of the phrase *'alḥorūb alṣalībiyyah*; Crusades) which is also a 2-word cluster in Alhawali (25 occurrences in four of Alhawali's texts) (note that I only include the clusters that occur in three texts or more). Table 5.6 shows the clusters that include the singular definite noun *'alḥarb*; the war).

Table 5.6 Clusters that contain the singular definite noun *'alḥarb*; the war) In Alhawali's corpus

N	Cluster	Eng. trans.	Freq.
1	الحرب العالمية الثانية	World War II	13
2	الحرب العالمية الأولى	World War I	9
3	بعد الحرب العالمية	after the World War	7
4	الحرب العالمية	World War	23

As indicated by Table 5.6, the keyword *'alḥarb*; the war) occurs in 4 clusters indicating the first and second World Wars. However, a concordance based analysis shows more about the actual use of this keyword (Concordance 5.9).

58. I applied the criteria in Section 4.2.1.1 and only one collocate is used for each word form of the key term 'WAR'.

Concordance 5.9 Concordance of the keyword 'الحرب' ('*alḥarb*; the war) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] ثم جاءت الروح الصليبية كامة في مدافع نابليون، التي تضمنت على أول محاولة ضخمة من أوروبا الحديثة لاستئصال ثقافة الإسلام [...] كما أن الواقع التاريخي يؤكد أن هذه الحرب لن تنتهي، وأن الذي خدع بعض المستعثرين هو اختلاف فصولها ومظاهرها</p> <p>[...] then the spirit of the Crusades appeared in the army of Napoléon, which shows us the first largest attempt to eradicate Islam [...] the historical reality confirms that this <u>war</u> [between Europe and Islam] will never end, and those who were made inattentive were deceived by the new shape this [war] took.</p>
2	<p>[...] في الحرب العالمية الأولى كانت البداية عندما اتفق فيما يسمى اتفاقية سايكس بيكو على تقسيم الخلافة العثمانية بين دول الغرب، فجاءت الحركة القومية العربية وجيش جيوشا وحاربت مع الإنجليز ضد الدولة العثمانية [...] وبانتهاء الحرب العالمية انتهت الخلافة العثمانية تماماً، وتمزق العالم الإسلامي [...]</p> <p>[...] the start was during World War I when the Western countries made the Sykes–Picot Agreement to divide the Ottoman Caliphate between the Western countries, then the Movement of Arab Nationalism started to mobilize people (ammies) and assisted the English troops against the Ottoman Empire [...] with the end of the World <u>War</u>, the Ottoman Caliphate vanished completely, and the Muslim World was ripped apart [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] وفي شهر مارس 1976م أي قبل 15 سنة إلا قليلاً نشرت جريدة الأنباء الكويتية ترجمة لمقال نشر في إحدى المجلات الأمريكية، [...] ابتداءً المقال بتأكيد أنه: ليس أمام الحكومة الأمريكية إلا خياران: إما الانهيار الاقتصادي، وإما الاستيلاء على المملكة العربية السعودية [...] ثم يقول: بعد الاستيلاء على السعودية سيبدأ محاكمات مجرمي الحرب و سيطبق قوانين العقوبات التقليدية في البلاد [...]</p> <p>[...] nearly 15 years ago, in March 1976, the Al-Anba Kuwaiti newspaper published a translation of an article appeared in one of the American magazines, [...] the article started with a confirmation that the American government has only two choices: either an economic recession or invading Saudi Arabia [...]. Then it [the article] says: after invading Saudi Arabia we will start a legal prosecution of the <u>war</u> criminals and apply the traditional laws in that area [...]</p>
4	<p>[...] قبل أقل من إسبعين نشرت مجلة (EIR FEETURE) مقالات في غاية الغموض ونقل ترجمة بعض ما جاء فيها: [...] إن هذه الدول [أمريكا وروسيا وبريطانيا] تأمل في حدوث أزمة بترولية جديدة كذلك التي حدثت في عام 1976 [...] وربما كان أحد أهم أهداف الحرب هو خلق سابقة استخدام الأسلحة الكيميائية والقوية (في حرب تحرير الكويت 1990-1991) وفي هذا الخصوص يجب عدم تجاهل المؤسسات العنصرية السوفيتية والبريطانية والأمريكية التي تتطرق بقلق شديد نحو التكاثر السكاني العربي [...]</p> <p>[...] we will report the translation of some extremely serious articles published by 'EIR FEETURE' nearly two week ago: [...] These countries [America, Russia, and Britain] hope that a new Oil Crisis, like the one in 1976, happens [...]. And one of the most important goals of the <u>war</u> might be using nuclear and chemical weapons (in the Gulf War 1990-1991), and in this respect we should not ignore the Soviet, British and American racist institutions that are extremely worried about the increasing growth of Arab population [...]</p>

Alhawali conceives of the modern wars that are apparently intended by the Europeans to dominate the Arab World as a continuation of the medieval Crusades (Line 1) whose aim, according to Alhawali, is to eradicate Islam. Alhawali then claims that the collaboration between the Arab nationalistic movement and English troops resulted in the elimination of the Ottoman Caliphate and consequently the 'Muslim World' was ripped apart (Line 2) and divided between the French and the English colonials according to the Sykes–Picot Agreement but Alhawali does not mention that this was in response to the Ottomans declaring war against Britain and France. In Lines 3 and 4, Alhawali continues to victimize and represent the 'Us' (the Gulf countries) by selectively reporting translated articles (as a form of legitimation). Introducing quotes from such translated articles, Alhawali claims to make clear that the aims of the Gulf war are to invade Saudi Arabia and possibly use

chemical and nuclear weapons by the ‘Other’ (Allied Western forces). Alhawali thus utilizes the keyword ‘الحرب’ (*‘alḥarb*; the war) to lend support to his claims about the heedlessness of Muslims and the hostility of the West whose wars are mere continuation of the Crusades to eradicate Islam which is further consolidated by actual use of the other keyword ‘الحروب’ (*‘alḥorūb*; the wars) and its collocate ‘الصليبية’ (*‘aṣalebiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades), which is also a keyword for Alhawali.

The theme of ‘the Crusade and Crusader States’ becomes obvious in the cluster that combines ‘الحروب’ (*‘alḥorūb*; the wars) and ‘الصليبية’ (*‘aṣalebiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades) in Alhawali (both are used in Arabic to indicate ‘the Crusades’). Concordance 5.10 shows some representative concordance lines of the collocate ‘الصليبية’ (*‘aṣalebiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades).

Concordance 5.10 Concordance of the keyword ‘الصليبية’ (*‘aṣalebiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades) in Alhawali’s corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] إن ولادة أوروبا في ظل الحروب <u>الصليبية</u> وشعورها بذاتها من خلالها هو الذي يفسر تلك التناقضات الصارخة التي يعيشها الفكر الغربي متمثلة في هذه المعادلات الصعبة تعصب صليبي على الإسلام من بطرس الناسك إلى كلاوس.</p> <p>[...] indeed the birth of Europe and the realization of itself through the <u>Crusades</u> can explain the stark contradictions in the Western thinking which are resembled in the Crusaders' hatred of Islam from the days of Peter the Hermit till Claes.</p>
2	<p>إذا تصورنا ذلك [التغيرات التي تريد أمريكا إحداثها] أتركنا خطراً كبيراً يهدد المنطقة في حالة تدمير العراق وإحلال التحالف الشيعي محله (إيران- سوريا-العراق) [...] أما باكستان فكثير من قادة جيشها الكبار شيعة ومعهم إخوانهم الغادياتية والبريلوية). إنها مصيبة عظمى لو أصبح هذا القوس الكبير قوساً رافضياً يهودياً توجهه <u>الصليبية</u> الغربية المتحالفة.</p> <p>If we imagined that [the changes that America want to make] we realize the hazard that threatens the Middle East when the Iraqi regime is destroyed and replaced by Shiite allied forces (Iran-Syria-Iraq) [...] as for Pakistan, most of its military leaders are Shiite supported by their brothers; the Gadyanis (Ahmadis) and Barehvis (Sufis). Indeed it is a Calamity if this huge crescent (surrounding the Sunnis) becomes Rafidi (Shiite) and Jewish controlled by allied Western <u>Crusaders'</u> States.</p>
3	<p>الحروب <u>الصليبية</u> [...] كانت خططها عسكرية بحتة و هدفها تدمير الكيان الإسلامي بالقوة. و الحروب <u>الصليبية</u> الاستعمارية كانت خططها تقوم على هدف القضاء على الإسلام، و لكن بواسطة احتلال أراضيها احتلالاً مباشراً [...]</p> <p>The plan of the Crusaders [...] was of a military nature and its major goal is to severely destroy Islam. But the plan of [modern] colonialist <u>Crusaders</u> was to eradicate Islam by directly occupying the land of Muslims [...]</p>
4	<p>إن العلاقة بين البلاد الإسلامية و بين أوروبا خاصة -بصفاتها مهد العلمانية- لا يمكن أن تدرس بغير الحروب <u>الصليبية</u>. فهذه الحروب أضفت على تلك العداوة الأبدية الراسخة مظهراً جديداً [...]</p> <p>Indeed the relationship between Muslim countries and Europe -as the abode of secularism- cannot be studied without considering the <u>Crusades</u>. These Crusades gave a new shape to the everlasting, deep-rooted hostility [...]</p>

In Line 1 (Concordance 5.10), Alhawali claims a connection between the Crusaders and modern Western thinking that embodies the hatred of Islam from the days of Peter the Hermit

until Willy Claes who was Secretary General of NATO in the mid-1990s. In Line 2, Alhawali combines the Shiite and Jewish people as controlled by allied Western Crusaders' States. According to Alhawali, the medieval Crusades and what he sees as 'modern' Crusades (colonial powers) have one common aim which is to destroy/eradicate Islam (Line 3). As we have seen before, Alhawali represents Europe as both the abode of secularism (Line 4) and as being home to religious Crusaders whose aim is to eliminate Islam - a contradiction that has the ideological effect of increasing the amount of distance and difference between 'the Muslim world' and 'the West'. Thus, Alhawali makes a strong link between the medieval Crusaders and modern western foreign policy, characterising the two as the same. The West is thus represented as *always* hostile to Muslim countries, both historically and currently. War is something that the West does towards Muslim countries, in other words. Let us move on to examine the war indicating words in Ibn Baz's corpus.

5.4.2 Wars and military invasion in Ibn Baz

The key term 'WAR' is also used in Ibn Baz. He uses only three forms of this key term, viz., 'حرب' (*ḥarb*; war), 'الحرب' (*'alḥarb*; the war), and 'الحروب' (*'alḥarūb*; the wars) that are represented and recontextualized differently for different legitimization purposes. The first observation about the key term 'WAR' in Ibn Baz is that it has no collocates and is not used in any frequent clusters. This could be due to the limited number of occurrences of this key term (19 occurrences – see Table 5.5). However, a concordance based analysis of 'WAR' could reveal more about how Ibn Baz uses it (concordance 5.11).

Concordance 5.11 Concordance of the key term 'WAR' in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Concordance
1	[...] إن هؤلاء الناس [القوميون العرب] يقولون في صراحة: إن الإسلام ليس إلا نهضة عربية، فاز بها هذا الجنس العظيم في القرون الوسطى، [...] وتفسير القومية العربية هذا التفسير الكفور الكنود، هو <u>حرب</u> أخرى ضد الإسلام، [...] verily, these groups [Arab nationalists] declare that Islam is only an Arabic renaissance achieved by this great race [Arabs] in the medieval centuries, [...]. And such rejectionist and ungrateful interpretation [of Islam] by Arab nationalists is another <u>war</u> against Islam, [...]
2	[...] فعليك [الداعية إلى الإسلام] أن تحكم شرع الله في العبادات وفي المعاملات، [...] وفي السلم و <u>الحرب</u> ، ومع العدو والصديق، وفي الجنائيات وفي كل شيء، دين الله يجب أن يحكم في كل شيء [...] thus you [the caller to Islam] should refer to the Sharia of Allah in the acts of worship, business transactions [...] in peace, during <u>war</u> , with foes, with friends, in capital offences and in everything. The religion of Allah (Sharia) should be referred to in every aspect (of our life) [...]
3	[...] وقد استمر الشباب المسلم في عطاء الخير المتجدد في <u>الحروب</u> الصليبية في الشام والأندلس وغيرها من المواقف التي يتصادم فيها الحق بالباطل حتى اليوم، [...] and verily, the Muslim youths continued to benevolently exert their efforts during the <u>Crusades</u> in Syria, Al-Andalus (Spain) and other situations where where the truth continuously collides with the falsehood, [...]
4	[...] وكان تخريب الدرعية والقضاء على دولة آل سعود في عام 1233 هـ. فمكت الناس في نجد في فوضى، و قتل [...] ثم في عام أربعين بعد المائتين و ألف اجتمع شمل المسلمين في نجد على الإمام تركي بن عبد الله بن محمد بن سعود، [...] و الصفقت الفتن التي بينهم بعد <u>الحروب</u> الطويلة التي حصلت على أيدي المصريين و أعوانهم [...] and the destruction of Diriyah (the home town of the Saudi Royal Family located) and the toppling down of the Saudi State was in the year 1233 H. (1818), and people in Najd (central region of Saudi Arabia) were in chaos and fighting each other [...] then in 1240 H. (1824) the Muslims (people in Najd) reunited and gathered around Imam Turki bin Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Saud (the founder of the second Saudi State 1824–1891) [...] and consequently the discords between them ceased after the long <u>wars</u> , that were caused by the Egyptians and their complicit partners (Mohammad Ali Pasha's invasion of Najd), [...]

Unlike Alhawali's recontextualizations of the key term 'WAR' that promote polarization between Western countries and the Muslim world, Ibn Baz uses it to define different threats that target or have targeted Islam and Muslims (Lines 1, 3 and 4). In his refutation of the Arab nationalistic view of Islam (Line 1), Ibn Baz uses the indefinite noun 'حرب' (*ḥarb*; war) in a metaphorical sense considering such a definition of Islam as a war (among other wars) against Islam. The definite noun 'الحرب' (*'alḥarb*; the war) in Line 2 is used to refer to one of the different aspects of life that, according to Ibn Baz, should be governed by the Sharia (in this context, the translation of the Arabic definite noun 'الحرب' (*'alḥarb*; the war) becomes indefinite in English). In this case then, Ibn Baz is not referring to any specific war.

Ibn Baz recontextualizes the definite plural noun 'الحروب' (*'alḥorūb*; the wars) (Lines 3 and 4) to achieve different ends. First, the definite plural noun 'الحروب' (*'alḥorūb*; the wars) is modified by the adjective 'الصليبية' (*'aṣalebiyyah*; pertaining to the Crusades) (Line 3) where both indicate 'the Crusades' that Ibn Baz considers as one of the situations where falsehood

collides with the truth. Expanding Line 3 could reveal more clues of how Ibn Baz utilizes the ‘Crusades’.

Figure 5.2 Extended version of Concordance line 3 of the key term ‘WAR’ in Ibn Baz

<p>[...] و الشباب في أي أمة من الأمم هم العمود الفقري الذي يشكل عنصر الحركة و الحيوية إذ لديهم الطاقة المنتجة، و العطاء المتجدد، و لم تنهض أمة من الأمم غالباً إلا على أكتاف شبابها الواعي و حماسه المتجددة. [...] و لقد استمر الشباب المسلم في عطاء الخير المتجدد في الحروب الصليبية في الشام و الأندلس و غيرها من المواقع التي يتصادم فيها الحق بالباطل حتى اليوم، فعاظمت تلك الحماسة أعداء الإسلام، حيث سعوا إلى وضع العراقيل في طريقهم، أو تغيير اتجاههم، [...] أو بتأليب بعض الحكومات عليهم. كل هذا قد يؤدي بالتالي إلى ظهور حركات تتسم بطابع الوقوف من المجتمع و القيادات، موقفاً قاسياً و مضاداً، قد يصل إلى نوع من المواجهة في بعض الأحيان، أو العمل السري الذي قد يخالطه ما يشينه، أو يغير من مجراه الطبيعي</p> <p>Islamic movements and the role youths: [...] and the youths, that are the backbone of any nation, constitute the [basic] element of activity and vivacity because they possess the productive energy and continuous exertion of efforts. Mostly, all nations rose up on the shoulders of their conscious youths and their rejuvenated enthusiasm. [...] and verily, the Muslim youths continued to benevolently exert their efforts during the <u>Crusades</u> in Syria, Al-Andalus (Spain) and other situations where the truth continuously collides with the falsehood. Such enthusiasm vexed the enemies of Islam who vehemently attempted to impede the progress of the Muslim youths or divert the direction of their attention [...] or incite some governments against them. Consequently all these [are reasons that] may lead to the emergence of new movements [among the Muslim youths] that could hold harsh and opposing attitudes towards the society and the leaders. Such attitudes could lead to confrontation or the evolution of secret movements that could be led astray.</p>

In the above extract, Ibn Baz claims that the enemies of Islam have the malevolent intention of destroying Islam which is an indication of Ibn Baz’s construction of external threat. The term ‘الحروب الصليبية’ (*‘alḥorūb ‘aṣalebiyyah*; Crusades) is utilized by Ibn Baz to positively represent Muslim youths who, according to him, always benevolently exert efforts that displease the enemies of Islam. In his representation of the ‘Other’, Ibn Baz anonymizes a group of people (the enemies of Islam) who, according to him, are blamed for Muslim youths taking extreme attitudes towards society and rulers (the representation of social actors will be detailed in Chapter 6).

In Line 4, Ibn Baz uses the plural definite noun ‘الحروب’ (*‘alḥorūb*; the wars) modified by the adjective ‘الطويلة’ (*‘alṭawīlah*; the long) to describe some disruptive historical events in Najd (the central region of modern Saudi Arabia) in the years 1818-1824, after the military invasion led by Mohammad Ali Pasha of Egypt. According to Ibn Baz, such long wars ceased after the Muslims [people of Najd], united around one Imam/ruler (Imam Turki bin Abdullah

the founder of the second Saudi State 1819 - 1891). Ibn Baz, from a Salafist political perspective, conceives of the Egyptian attacks as destroying the government that is based on the religion of Islam. He recontextualizes the disruptive historical events (1818-1824) to superficially address the early stage of establishing the second Saudi State reducing it to gathering the people (of Najd) by the Imam/ruler. Here, Ibn Baz clearly shows his support to what he believes to be the legitimate Muslim ruler (see Section 8.3.4 for more explanation of the Salafi creed about the Imam/ruler).

To sum up, despite the fact that Alhawali and Ibn Baz mention ‘wars against Islam’ both writers represent the concept differently. On the one hand, Alhawali tries to construct (an Israeli/western) danger that surrounds Islam and Arab/Muslim lands. He, from a politically Salafist ideological perspective, claims that the West (as well as Israel) not only aim to invade Arab lands but destroy Islam (i.e. instigating the public against what he claims to be western political and military enmity towards Arabs and Islam). He also links the first Gulf Crisis in 1990 (and any possible coming wars) to colonialism and medieval Crusades. On the other hand, Ibn Baz (less frequently) refers to a less clearly-defined set of enemies of Islam which can refer to Arab Nationalists, Crusaders or the Egyptian army of Mohammad Ali Pasha – during his invasion of Najd - and his collaborates). One aspect that both Salafi writers share is that they utilize the key term ‘WAR’ in historical contexts, which leads us to the next section that tackles the construction of the past in the Salafi corpora.

5.5 The construction of the past

Table 5.3 shows the keyword ‘القرن’ (*‘alqarn*; century – def. sing. n.) that indicates the category ‘Periods of Times’ in the Salafi corpora. It is noteworthy here that the word ‘القرن’ (*‘alqarn*) is polysemous. It could be translated into English as ‘the century’, ‘the generation’ or ‘the horn’ depending on the cotext. However I shall only include the word forms that

indicate periods of time. There are other possible Arabic word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ such as the indefinite singular noun ‘قرن’ (*qarn*; century/generation), the indefinite dual nouns ‘قرنين/قرنان’ (*qarnān/qarnayn*; two centuries/generations –nom. and acc. respectively) and their definite counterparts ‘القرنين/القرنان’ (*‘alqarnān/‘alqarnayn*; the two centuries/generations –nom. and acc. respectively), the indefinite plural noun ‘قرون’ (*qorūn*; centuries/generations) and its definite counterpart ‘القرون’ (*‘aqorūn*; the centuries/generations). Table 5.7 shows the word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ that both Salafi writers use in their texts. It is worth noting here that I only include the word forms that exist in three or more of the Salafi texts in each corpus. Also, the English translations are based on a preliminary concordance analysis of these word forms.

Table 5.7 Word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ in both Salafi corpora

N	Word forms	Eng. trans.	F. Alhawali	F. Baz
1	القرن	the (...) century	134	8
2	القرون	the centuries/generations	57	9
3	قرون	the centuries/horns	26	0
4	قرن	the centuries/generations	10	0

Table 5.7 contains 4 word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ as used by the two Salafi writers in their texts. The most frequent word form is ‘القرن’ (*‘alqarn*; the century), occurring 134 times in Alhawali and 8 times in Ibn Baz. Let us now consider these word forms in both Salafi texts and how each writer uses them to achieve ideological ends.

5.5.1 The construction of the past in Alhawali: Europe as a source of evil

One of Alhawali’s most prominent thematic foci is demonizing the West (see Section 5.2 above and elsewhere in this thesis). In his writings about the past, Alhawali also represents the West. The only word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ that have collocates in Alhawali are ‘القرن’ (*‘alqarn*; the century) and ‘القرون’ (*‘alqorūn*; centuries).

There are 11 collocates of the word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) and 6 collocates of the word form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; centuries) (see Table B6 in Appendix B). I shall consider only the collocates 'مطلع' (*maṭla*; (the) beginning of) that collocates with the word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) (MI score 9.6846, Joint frequency 9) and 'الوسطى' ('*alwostā*; (the middle) that collocates with word form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; centuries) (MI score 11.074, joint frequency 37). The rest of the collocates will not be included in the analysis because they occur in less than 3 texts of Alhawali's corpus. The collocates listed above, at face value, bear no positive or negative meanings. Thus I shall turn to concordance-based analysis of the word forms 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; centuries) and their collocates (see Concordance 5.12).

Concordance 5.12 Concordance of the word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) and its collocate 'مطلع' (*maṭla*; (the) beginning (of) in Alhawali's corpus.

N	Concordance
1	<p>أما الفكر فقد تأثر الشيخ محمد عبده بفلسفة كومت العقلية [...] و معلوم تأثر كل زعماء الفكر في مطلع هذا القرن بالشيخ من قريب أو بعيد.</p> <p>Regarding his thinking the Sheikh Mohammad Abduh (an Egyptian religious leader 1849 - 1905) was influenced by the rational philosophy (positivism) of Auguste Comte (French philosopher 1798 – 1857). And at the beginning of this century (20th), it is known that all (Muslim/Arab) intellectual leaders were, more or less, under the influence of the Sheikh (Mohammad Abduh).</p>
2	<p>و مرت في مطلع هذا القرن حقبة مظلمة، راجت فيها سوق الأفكار الموبوءة و المذاهب المنحرفة، حتى أظهر أعداء الإسلام تفاؤلهم بأن هذه الأمة ستلطف أنفاسها عما قليل.</p> <p>And the beginning of this century (20th century) was a dark time where the poisoned ideas and distorted movements were in vogue, to the extent that the enemies of Islam were optimistic that this nation is dying very soon.</p>
3	<p>و لذلك فإن المجتمع الغربي منذ مطلع القرن العشرين قد تخلى حقيقة عن الدين [...] و أصبح (الدين) لا يعني سوى واحد من أمرين: الطقوس المتحجرة [...] أو اللامبالاة الساخرة [...]</p> <p>Thus, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the western society, in fact, abandoned religion [...] The religion [in the West] means either outmoded rituals [...] or sarcastic carelessness [...]</p>
4	<p>وضع القارة الأوروبية في مطلع القرن العشرين وعلى المستوى العام بقيت في أوروبا إلى مطلع القرن العشرين بقايا من الأوضاع الاجتماعية الموروثة و شيء من القيم الشاذية [...]</p> <p>Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century: Generally, till the beginning of the twentieth century, there (in Europe) remained few traditional principles and faded values [...]</p>

Philosophy, according to Salafis as well as most Muslim (medieval and modern) religious leaders,⁵⁹ is not true guidance. Thus Alhawali accuses the Egyptian religious leader (Sheikh Mohammad Abduh) of being under the influence of the French philosopher Auguste Comte's positivism rather than being influenced by the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Alhawali (Line 1) represents both the Egyptian religious leader and western philosophy negatively. Additionally, he attacks all Arab intellectuals (religious or otherwise) who lived at the beginning of the 20th century as being under the influence of Sheikh Mohammad Abdu who was under the influence of Comte. Line 2 shows Alhawali's resentment of political and social movements in the Arab/Muslim countries at the early stage of the twentieth century. He claims that the period was full of corruption and decadence to the extent that the enemies of Islam (in the West) anticipated the fall of what he calls the 'Muslim nation'. In Line 3, Alhawali represents Europe as non-religious which contradicts his previous representation of Europe as religiously fanatic (see Section 5.4.1 above). In Line 4, Alhawali also claims that (traditional) values faded in Europe. The plural word form of the key term 'CENTURY' 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; the centuries) collocates with 'الوسطى' ('*alwosṭā*; (the middle), which both compose the 2-word cluster 'القرون الوسطى' ('*alqorūn 'alwosṭā*; the Middle Ages) that occurs 37 times in 3 of Alhawali's texts (see Concordance 5.13).

59. Debate about philosophy is deep rooted in the history of Islam. Here is one example: Ibn Rushd (also called Averroes, 1126-1198) is one of the Muslim philosophers and religious leaders who wrote summaries and commentaries on both Aristotle and Plato's works. For more information see the following links: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/45595/Averroes> and <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/>. Additionally, Algazali (also known in the West as Algazel c. 1058 – 1111) wrote extensively on philosophy and refutation of philosophy. See <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-ghazali/>.

Concordance 5.13 Concordance of the cluster 'القرون الوسطى' ('*alqorūn 'alwasṭā*; the Middle Ages) in Alhawali's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] انتصر العلم الحديث على خرافات الكنيسة و أساطير <u>القرون الوسطى</u> الأوروبية و هدم أساليب البحث و طرق الاستنباط المدرسية التقليدية كان ذلك بلا ريب نصراً كبيراً للإنسانية في كل مكان، و فتحاً جديداً في عالم المعرفة و النور. لكن هذا النصر و الفتح اختفيا تحت ركام الاستغلال البشع لما أنجزه الإنسان من تقدم في المعرفة [...] [...] the victory of science over the fables of the Church and the myths of European <u>middle ages</u> and the abolition of the research methods of the traditional school was, undoubtedly, a great victory of humanity and a new horizon of light and knowledge. However, such victory and new horizon of knowledge disappeared underneath heaps of repugnant abuse of human progressive achievements in knowledge [...]</p>
2	<p>أولاً: نظرية الكنيسة و نظام الإقطاع - على الرغم من أن الكنيسة لم تحاول تغيير بنية المجتمع المسيحي أو تنظيم بعض مجالات الحياة على الأقل، فقد كان لها أثر فعال في اقتصاد <u>القرون الوسطى</u> من الوجبة النظرية. أقربت الكنيسة النظام الإقطاعي السائد، بل أصبحت مؤسسة من مؤسساته التالية، و أقرت الإسطهاد الفظيع الذي كان يتعرض له أرقاء المجتمع رغم تنافيه مع تعاليم الإنجيل [...] First: The Church's theory and feudalism: - Despite that the Church did not try to change the structure of the Christian society or, at least, organize some aspects of life, it, from a theoretical perspective, had effective influence on the economy of the <u>middle ages</u>. The Church acknowledged the prevalent feudal system. Indeed feudalism became one of the Church's established institutions. Additionally, the Church acknowledged the hideous oppression that used to be practiced against the slaves in the society despite the fact it contradicts the teachings of the Bible [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] فالنزعة الإنسانية (في أوروبا) مدينة كلياً للحضارة الإسلامية، و لا ينحصر ذلك في الأثر الأدبي -اقتباس أبرز ممثلها و هو دانتي من أبي العلاء و ابن طفيل- بل يشمل العصر كله، حتى أن الإمبراطور فردريك الثاني و هو أكبر أباطرة <u>القرون الوسطى</u> بإطلاق، و يعتبر لدى بعض المفكرين أول المحدثين ورائد النهضة، كان يتكلم العربية [...] Thus the humanistic attitude (in Europe) is in great debt to Islamic civilization. It is not only limited to literary works - the borrowings of Dante (1308 - 1321), who is the most famous representative literary figure in Europe , from Abi Alalaa (an Arab blind philosopher, writer and poet 973-1058) and Ibn Tufail (also known as Abubacer Aben Tofail, an Islamic philosopher who lived in Andalusia -modern Spain)1105 – 1185) - but indeed it includes the whole era to the extent that Frederick II (1194 – 1250) who is the most prominent and powerful Emperor in the <u>middle ages</u> and considered by some intellectuals to be one of the first founders and pioneers of [European] Renaissance, was able to speak Arabic [...]</p>

Alhawali continues to represent Europe negatively and reminds his audience of the greatness of Islamic civilization during the Middle Ages. In Line 1, Alhawali insinuates that modern Europeans abuse science. In Line 2, he returns to criticise the Christian Church claiming that it supported feudalism (and even slavery) in the Middle Ages. The last line shows Alhawali's conception of European civilization that, according to him, borrowed humanism from Islamic civilization during the Middle Ages (note that this is at odds with his discussion about the West).

To sum up, the thematic focus in this section is about Alhawali's representation of Europe during the Middle Ages. He utilizes the key term 'CENTURY' to construct a negative image of Europe during the Middle Ages which serves as the bases of Alhawali's Salafist negative presentation of modern Europe. At the same time, he positively represents medieval Islamic civilization. Thus, as appears in the concordance lines above, Alhawali's construction

of the past is limited to a negative representation of Europe and his claims about the European enmity to Islam as well as constructing an idealised, advanced image of Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages. This is potentially a powerful strategy as it helps to justify and strengthen current opposition to ‘the West’. If the West can be demonstrated as always having being an enemy of Islam, then any current problems are perhaps less likely to be viewed as resolvable, temporary or atypical. Instead, they are simply another manifestation of a continuous pattern.

Ibn Baz also uses the key term ‘CENTURY’ to construct the past, but his perception of the past differs from Alhawali’s. Let us examine the limited occurrences of the key term ‘CENTURY’ in Ibn Baz’s corpus that could help show the difference between the two Salafi writers in their construction of the past.

5.5.2 The construction of the past in Ibn Baz’s corpus: The best generations and suitability of Islam in modern times

As I have indicated above, Ibn Baz uses two word forms of the key term ‘CENTURY’ that indicate the ‘Periods of Times’ namely, ‘القرن’ (*’alqarn*; the century) (8 times) and ‘القرون’ (*’alqorūn*; centuries/generations) (9 times). ‘القرن’ (*’alqarn*; the century) collocates with the word ‘عشر’ (*’ašar*; -teenth) (MI score 12.426 and joint frequency 7) that is used in Arabic to refer to the second part of the compound numbers from 11-19. This could indicate that Ibn Baz refers to centuries from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries in both Hijra (Islamic) or Gregorian calendars. Let us move on to consider ‘القرن’ (*’alqarn*; the century) in Ibn Baz’s corpus.

N	Concordance
1	<p>(نواقض الإسلام) الرابع : من اعتقد أن هدي غير النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أكمل من هديه ، [...] فهو كافر [...] و يدخل في القسم الرابع من اعتقد أن الأنظمة و القوانين التي يسنها الناس أفضل من شريعة الإسلام [...] أو أن نظام الإسلام لا يصلح تطبيقه في <u>القرن العشرين</u> [...] [...] (Nullifiers of Islam) Fourth: Whoever believes that guidance other than that of the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, is superior to his [...] is infidel [...] This include those who believe that man-made laws and legislations are better than the Islamic Sharia [...] or those who believe that Islamic legislation is not suitable for the twentieth <u>century</u> [...]</p>
2	<p>كلمة تحذيرية حول إنكار رشاد خليفة للسنة المطهرة [...] 4- ادعاؤه أن الأخذ بالسنة و كتابتها و جمع الأحاديث في <u>القرنين</u> التالي والثالث كان سببا في سقوط الدولة الإسلامية. [...] لذا فقد رأيت من الواجب توضيح أمره و كشف حقيقة للمسلمين لئلا يغتر أحد بكلامه أو يتخدع بأرائه [...] [...] A warning letter about Rashad Khalifa's (an American-Egyptian Qur'anist 1935–1990) rejection of the purified Sunnah: [...] 4- He claims that relying on the Sunnah and collection of the Hadiths in the second and third <u>centuries</u> was a major reason that caused the fall of the Islamic Caliphate [...] Thus I realised that it is an obligatory duty to expose him in front of Muslims so that no one will be misled or deceived by his ideas [...]</p>
3	<p>و من أبرز هؤلاء الدعاة المصلحين الإمام الشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب مجدد <u>القرن</u> الثاني عشر الهجري رحمه الله الذي وفقه الله لقيام بدعوة إصلاحية عظيمة أعادت للإسلام في الجزيرة العربية قوته و صفاءه و نفوذه و طهر الله به الجزيرة من الشرك و البدع [...] [...] One of the most prominent reformers is the Imam Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab (1703 – 1792). He is the reformer of the twelfth Hijra <u>century</u> (18th century), may Allah have mercy upon him. Allah gave him success to start a great reforming call that brought back the strength and purity of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. Additionally, Allah used him (Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab) to <u>purify the Peninsula from polytheism and impermissible religious innovations</u> [...]</p>
4	<p>أن أول من دعا إلى القومية العربية في أواخر <u>القرن</u> التاسع عشر الميلادي ، هم الغربيون على أيدي بحاثات التبشير في سوريا ، لينفصلوا الترك عن العرب ، ويفرقوا بين المسلمين ، ولم تزل الدعوة إليها في الشام و العراق ولبنان تزداد وتتم [...] [...] Verily, the first people who called for Arab nationalism in the late nineteenth <u>century</u> are the westerner missionaries in Syria in order to separate between Arabs and Turks and divide the Muslims. The call to it (Arab nationalism) is still increasingly developing in Cham (Syria) Iraq and Lebanon [...]</p>

The word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) is used by Ibn Baz for different purposes. In Line 1, he uses it to refer to 'nullifiers of Islam'. Nullifiers of Islam are those beliefs that, according to Muslim religious leaders, go against Islam and whoever amongst Muslims agrees with or believes in them becomes infidel. Ibn Baz, as a Salafist (as well as most Muslim religious leaders), claims that believing that Islamic legislations are not suitable for the twentieth century is infidelity, ergo, Ibn Baz argues that Islamic legislation is relevant for the present-day.

Line 2 indicates Ibn Baz's refutation of the claims of the Qur'anist Rashad Khalifa about the Sunnah of the prophet of Islam which is considered by all Muslims to be the second source (after the Qur'an) of the Sharia.⁶⁰ Ibn Baz also uses the word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) in reference to associationism and impermissible religious innovations. He

60. There are four sources of Sharia in Islam: the Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam, consensus of Muslim jurists and Analogical deduction.

represents Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab as a religious reformer whose efforts, according to Ibn Baz, helped purify Islam from polytheistic practices. Line 4 shows Ibn Baz's rejection of Arab nationalism. He attributes initiation of Arab nationalism to western missionaries whose aim, according to Ibn Baz, is to fight the Turks.

Although Ibn Baz's use of the word form 'القرن' ('*alqarn*; the century) (in Line 1) does not signify history as he is writing about the century he lived in, it signifies his conception of the continuity of time as regards the Sharia. Basically all Salafists acquiesce to the idea of the suitability of the Sharia laws to be applicable in all aspects of life in all times and places. However such a conception of continuity neglects some Salafists' rejection of new social, political and technological developments. Such resistance is evidently reflected in some Salafists' rejections of any new social or technological developments and later they reluctantly acquiesce. Examples of such reluctance to acquire new developments include the rejection of girls' education by some Salafists immediately after the royal decree in 1960 as recorded by Alwashmi (2009) and the rejection of satellite television channels in the early 1990s (Alomar, no date). Let us now turn to investigate the second word form of the key term 'CENTURY' used by Ibn Baz.

The definite plural form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; the generations) collocates with the word 'المفضلة' ('*almofaḍalah*; the best/preferred) (MI score 13.536 joint frequency 7). The collocate 'المفضلة' ('*almofaḍalah*; the best/preferred) is an Arabic passive participle which functions as an adjective, that holds a positive semantic preference, to modify the word form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; generations). The collocability of the word form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; the generations) and the word 'المفضلة' ('*almofaḍalah*; the best/preferred) could be explained by the 2-word cluster 'القرون المفضلة' ('*almofaḍalah 'almofaḍalah*; the best generations) that occurs 7 times in 3 of Ibn Baz's texts. Let us now examine the co-textual environment of the word form 'القرون' ('*alqorūn*; the generations).

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] لا يجوز الاحتفال بمولد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم [...] لأن ذلك من البدع المحدثّة، تكون رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لم يفعلها [...] ولم يفعلها أيضا التابعون لهم بإحسان في <u>القرون</u> المفضلة وهم أعلم الناس بالسنة، [...]]</p> <p>[...] It is religiously not permissible to celebrate the birth day of the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him [...] because such celebration is an impermissible religious innovation and the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, did not do it [...]. The followers of the companions, who were from the best <u>generations</u>, who knew the Sunnah better than any other people, did not do it [...]</p>
2	<p>إن دعوة الإمام الشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب رحمه الله هي الدعوة الإسلامية التي دعا إليها رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وصحابته الكرام و <u>سلف هذه الأمة الصالح</u> [...] لأنها أثمرت ثمرات عظيمة لم تحصل على يد مصلح قبله بعد <u>القرون</u> المفضلة، وذلك لما ترتب عليها من قيام مجتمع يحكمه الإسلام [...]]</p> <p>Verily, the call of the Imam Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab (1703 – 1792), may Allah have mercy upon him, is the same call that Allah's messenger, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, his noble-hearted companions and <u>the pious predecessors of this (Muslim) nation</u> invited people to [...] because it resulted in many great effects that had never happened before by any religious reformer since the best <u>generations</u>. The case is so, it (the call of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab) resulted in establishing a society that is governed by Islam [...]</p>
3	<p>و قال (محمد الغزالي حول التومية) أيضا في كتابه المذكور (مع الله) صفحة 347 ما نصه [...] لماذا يلقي الإسلام هذا الهوان كله؟ و الجواب : عند الاستعمار الذي يجر خلفه ضغائن <u>القرون</u> الأولى ويضع نصب عينه ألا تقوم للإسلام قائمة في بلاده [...]]</p> <p>And Mohammad Algazali (an Egyptian religious leader 1917–1996) wrote in his previously mentioned book (With Allah) page 374: [...] Why Islam is so oppressed? The answer is only known by colonialism (colonialists), who are caused by the grudges of the early <u>centuries</u>, decided that Islam should not resist its enemies in its own country [...]</p>

The cluster 'القرون المفضلة' ('*almoḥaḍḍalah* 'almoḥaḍḍalah; the best generations) appears in Lines 1 and 2. In the Salafi discourses, this cluster is commonly used to refer to the 'السلف الصالح' ('*assalaḥ* 'aṣṣāliḥ; the pious predecessors) (see Section 1.3.6 in Chapter 1). It is a recontextualization of many Prophetic traditions (Hadiths) including the following:

روى زهْدَمُ بْنُ مُضَرَّبٍ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ عِمْرَانَ بْنَ حُصَيْنٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا قَالَ: قَالَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: (خَيْرُكُمْ قُرْبِي ثُمَّ الَّذِينَ يَلُونَهُمْ ثُمَّ الَّذِينَ يَلُونَهُمْ) صحيح البخاري.

Narrated Zahdam bin Mudrab: I heard Imran bin Husain, may Allah be pleased with both of them, saying, "The Prophet said, 'The best people are those living in my generation, then those coming after them, and then those coming after (the second generation) [...]' narrated in Sahih Bukhari, *Volume 3, Book 48, Number 819*.⁶¹

In Line 1, Ibn Baz rejects the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet of Islam which is a common Sufi practice. He claims that such celebration is an impermissible religious

61. Sahih Bukhari is a voluminous work by Albukhari (commonly referred to as Imam Albukhari 810 – 870). It is a collection of Prophetic Hadiths that are called 'sound' Hadiths. The translation of this Hadith is available on: <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/048-sbt.php>. Accessed on 31/03/2013.

innovation because the Prophet of Islam and the best generations did not perform such religious rituals. Thus, he uses reference to the ‘best generation’ to legitimate his rejection of celebration of the birthday of the Prophet of Islam. Ibn Baz, in Line 2, links the religious reforms of Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab to what he and the Salafis believe to be the best generations; ‘السلف الصالح’ (*’assalaf ’aṣṣāliḥ*; the pious predecessors). Line 3 indicates ‘the Other’. Ibn Baz quotes the Egyptian religious leader Alghazali who claims a relation between Islam being oppressed to colonialists and the grudges they carry from the early centuries. Alghazali refers to the Crusades and the early confrontation between Muslims and the people in the West. However, the confrontation between the Muslims and the West goes back to the early wars and the establishment of Al-Andalus (see footnote 53).

The past in Ibn Baz’s texts is thus connected to themes such as polytheism, Sufi impermissible religious practices (celebrating the birthday of the Prophet of Islam), and Arab nationalism which seem to be recurrent in Ibn Baz’s texts (see Chapter 4 sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.4, Chapter 6 sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.3.1.1 and Chapter 7 section 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.2). It is also connected to nullifiers of Islam and the protection of the Sunnah which was collected in the second and third Hijra centuries (corresponding to 8th and 9th centuries). Ibn Baz, in these semantic foci, projects the Salafists’ conception of the ritualistic religious practices (such as celebrating the birthday of the Prophet of Islam.) that, as he claims, are not known during the time of ‘السلف الصالح’ (*’assalaf ’aṣṣāliḥ*; the pious predecessors). Thus we may conclude that Alhawali’s use of the key term ‘CENTURY’ is limited to demonizing the West and modern Arabic/Muslim culture that he claims to be under the influence of western philosophy, whereas Ibn Baz is mostly concerned with the religious practices of ‘السلف الصالح’ (*’assalaf ’aṣṣāliḥ*; the pious predecessors). Let us move on to examine the construction of mind and religion in both corpora.

5.6 Mind in the Salafi corpora

The keywords that indicate the category ‘Mind’ in Alhawali’s corpus are ‘العقل’ (*‘al‘aql*; the mind) (116 occurrences in Alhawali and 13 in Ibn Baz). The keyword ‘العقل’ (*‘al‘aql*; the mind) also has other word forms that occur in both corpora. It is derived from the trilateral verb ‘ع ق ل’ (*‘a qa la*; to understand). Table 5.8 below contains 7 word forms of the key term ‘MIND’ that are used in the Salafi corpora. The translation of these word forms are based on a preliminary concordance analysis.

Table 5.8 Word forms of the key term ‘MIND’ in the Salafi corpora.

N	Word form	Eng. trans	F. Alhawali	F. Baz
1	العقل	the mind	116	13
2	العقلية	the logical/ the mentality (adj. pl./n. sing.)	31	6
3	العقلي	the logical (def. sing. adj.)	29	1
4	العقول	the minds	17	10
5	عقلية	logical/ mentality (adj./n.)	13	0
6	عقلي	logical (indef. Sing. adj.)/ my mind	3	1
7	عقليات	mentalities	1	0
total			210	31

Two of the word forms of the key term ‘MIND’ are used in the two Salafi corpora carrying different meanings. The word form ‘العقلية’ (*‘al‘aqliyyah*; the logical/mentality) is used 7 times by Alhawali as a definite noun that could be translated into English as ‘mentality’ and 24 times to indicate the adjective ‘logical’ whereas this word form is used in Ibn Baz as a definite adjective bearing the meaning ‘logical’. The indefinite word form ‘عقلية’ (*‘aqliyyah*; logical/mentality) is also used twice in Alhawali as an indefinite noun carrying the meaning ‘mentality’ and 11 times as an indefinite adjective meaning ‘mental’. Additionally, the word ‘عقلي’ (*‘aqli*) is used 3 times in Alhawali as an indefinite adjective meaning ‘logical’ and once in Ibn Baz as a noun meaning ‘my mind’. Now, I turn to examine the word forms of the key term ‘MIND’ in each Salafi corpus.

5.6.1 'Mind' in Alhawali's corpus

The word forms of the key term 'MIND' neither have collocates nor occur in word clusters in Alhawali, so let us consider the co-textual environment of these words in Alhawali.

Concordance 5.16 Concordance of the word forms of the key term 'MIND' in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] قدمت جيوش الاحتلال العسكري إلى العالم الإسلامي تتودعا <u>عقلييات</u> غير العقلية البربرية الصليبية، فهي تتمتع بقسط كبير من الذكاء والخبت، و هي تحرف لفظاً أن لها مهمة أعظم من مهمة أجدادها [...]</p> <p>[...] The armies of the invaders came to the Muslim world led by <u>mentalities</u> that are different from the barbaric Crusaders' <u>mentality</u>. They enjoy much of shrewdness and wickedness. They also know that their mission is greater than that of their forefathers [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] إن بدعة كهذه (صكوك الغفران) لن تمر في التاريخ مرور الكرام [...] و تثير ردود فعل بعيدة الأثر، لاسيما وقد ظهرت في الفترة التي اتصلت فيها أوروبا بنور الإسلام، و أخذت <u>العقول</u> النائمة تتلمس مكانتها في الحياة [...]</p> <p>[...] verily, an (impermissible religious) innovation of this kind (Indulgence: full or partial remission of temporal punishment granted by the Church) will surely not pass as if nothing had happened [...] and it should cause long lasting reactions especially it (Indulgence) appeared in the period that Europe was in contact with the light of Islam, and the sleeping <u>minds</u> (of the medieval Christians) started to take their places in the course of life [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] وتعالى أصوات الباحثين و الفلاسفة، منادية بأن <u>العقل</u> هو الحكم الوحيد و <u>العقل</u> هو كل شيء [...]. و القضاء والصلب و الرهبانية... إلخ، كلها أباطيل مضللة و عقائد مردولة [...]</p> <p>[...] researchers and philosophers started to call that <u>mind</u> is the only arbiter and <u>mind</u> is everything [...] and Atonement, Crucifixion and Monasticism are false conceptions that mislead people and despicable beliefs [...]</p>
4	<p>هذا كله غير حدثات ماركس التي حققت كل ما قبلها [...] ثم جاء عصر انتالين و تبنى اتحاد الكتاب السوفيت آراءه الأكثر حداثة، و هكذا إنه <u>العقل</u> البشري المحدود الضعيف الذي يتحول كل مرحلة من مراحله أنها نهاية التاريخ [...]</p> <p>[...] In addition, the modernism of Marx (Karl Marx a German philosopher 1818 –1883) that denigrated all previous intellectual works [...] then came the time of Stalin (Joseph Stalin, one of the leaders of the Soviet Union 1878–1953) whose more recent modernist ideas were adopted by The Soviet Writers' Union and so forth. Indeed it is the weak and limited human <u>mind</u> which imagines that any of its stages is the end of history [...]</p>
5	<p>و الرومانسية هي ارتداد صوفي، و لكن موضوعه ليس الرب كما في رهبانية النصاري بل الطبيعة، و هي لا تهدف إلى التوجيه <u>العقلي</u> للناس عن طريق حكمة القدماء، بل إلى الإمتاع العاطفي الذي يجعل الذات محور العالم، إنها مزيج من اليأس الرهباني، والهروب من الواقع الذي كلما تقدمت المعرفة <u>العقلية</u> أظهرت أنه أكثر قسامة وكثافة.</p> <p>Romanticism is a a mystic retrogression, however it revolves not around God as is the case in Christian Monasticism on the contrary its topic is nature. Its goal is not <u>mental</u> guidance of people via old wisdom. Its goal is emotional gratification that makes the self to be the centre of the world. Verily it is a mixture of monastic despair and escape from reality that becomes more depressing and gloomy whenever human <u>mind</u> achieved some progress in knowledge.</p>

To reiterate from Chapter 3, I classify all concordance lines according to their functions (mostly themes) in the relevant texts, then I choose one or two lines that are representative of the overall picture, typically being used with the same function. Thus, concordance 5.16 only shows examples of concordance lines that repeat the same function that is indicated by the search words (the different word forms of the key term 'MIND') in Alhawali. Firstly, in Line 1, Alhawali uses the indefinite plural noun 'عقلييات' (*aqliyyāt*; mentalities) to negatively represent the western armies (as shrewd and wicked) that invaded the 'Muslim world' in the

18th and 19th centuries. He links them to the medieval Crusades claiming that their mission (to eradicate Islam) this time is more difficult than that of the Crusaders (see Section 5.4.1 above). He also uses the singular definite noun ‘العقلية’ (*‘al‘aqliyyah*). Alhawali uses the indefinite plural (mentalities) to represent anonymous people whom he claims to be leading attacks on Islam whereas he uses the definite singular noun (the mentality) to describe the Crusaders. Alhawali, from a Salafist political perspective, uses these two different word forms (plural vs. singular) in order to accentuate what he claims to be the wickedness of the direct menace threatening Islam in modern times. Secondly, Alhawali, in Lines 2-5, uses different word forms of the key term ‘MIND’ to represent religious and cultural lives in the West.

Alhawali, in Lines 1 and 2, nominates social actors (medieval Crusaders and some western leaders) via abstraction using word forms of ‘MIND’ (see Section 6.3 in Chapter 6 for more details about Alhawali’s representation of social actor). In Line 2, Alhawali compares the religious life in medieval Europe to Islam recontextualizing the Salafi term ‘بدعة’ (*bid‘ah*; impermissible religious innovation) to represent *Indulgence* (full or partial remission of temporal punishment granted by the Church) negatively. He claims that after Europe contacted the Muslim world the ‘sleeping minds’ (medieval Christians) saw the light and rejected ‘*Indulgence*’. Alhawali continues by claiming that the Church’s teachings (Atonement, Crucifixion and Monasticism) are false and caused researchers and philosophers to reject religious teachings of the Church and depend mainly on ‘mind’ (Line 3) (see p. 119 and footnote 49). Alhawali then continues to negatively represent the human mind claiming that it is weak and limited (line 4) as manifested in the developments of modernist economic and political theories from Marx and Stalin. In Line 5, Alhawali turns to attack the literary movements in Europe. He claims that romanticism seeks to achieve emotional gratification rather than guiding people to learn old wisdom. Romanticism, according to Alhawali, is a sort

of monastic despair. Alhawali claims that romanticism, as a human achievement in Europe, is a kind of escaping from the gloomy reality that resulted from the achievements of the human mind that he claims to be weak and limited. In all the concordance lines (Concordance 5.16) Alhawali uses the different forms of the key term 'MIND' to represent the West via three major semantic foci: the negative representations of the teachings of the Church, political and economic theories (modernism) and the 18th century literary romanticism, i.e., demonizing the West. Having explicated the semantic foci introduced by the key term 'MIND' in Alhawali, I now turn to examine Ibn Baz's use of this key term.

5.6.2 'Mind' in Ibn Baz's corpus

Ibn Baz' use of the key term 'MIND' is limited (collectively 31 times) as compared to that of Alhawali (collectively 210 times). He uses the word forms 'العقل' ('*al'aql*; mind) (13 times), the definite plural 'العقول' ('*al'oqūl*; the minds) (10 times), the adjective 'العقلية' ('*al'aqliyyah*; logical) (6 times) and the adjectives 'العقلي' ('*al'aqli*; the mental -def. sing. adj.) and 'عقلي' ('*aqli*; my mind) (once each). The word forms of the key term 'MIND' in Ibn Baz do not have any collocates. They also do not occur in any recurrent word clusters. Instead, let us now see how Ibn Baz uses them via concordances.

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] و هكذا رسالته الموسومة بـ (التكمية) [...] و بين فيها عقيدة أهل السنة بأدلتها النقلية و العقلية [...] و كل من خالف أهل السنة فيما اعتدوا في باب الأسماء و الصفات فبته يقع و لا بد في مخالفة الأدلة النقلية و العقلية [...]</p> <p>[...] and so is his book titled <i>Arrisalah Attadmoriyyah</i> (a book written about the names and attributes of Allah by Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval Salafi religious leader 1263–1328)) [...] He explained in it the beliefs of the Sunnis providing evidences from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions as well as logical proofs [...] And whoever opposes the beliefs of the Sunni, he/she should contradicts evidence from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions as well as logical proofs [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] ثم يبين (الله) الأدلة في مواضع كثيرة ، عندما يتأملها المؤمن يعرف أن الدليل النقلى مزيد بالدليل العقلى المشاهد المصوم ، و لهذا نكر سبحانه بعد قوله : (يا أيها الناس اعبدوا ربكم) الحجة على ذلك قال : (الذي خلقكم و الذين من بينكم نعلمكم تتقون) ، و المعنى أن هذا الخالق لنا هو المستحق أن نعبد نكره خلقنا [...] then (Allah) plainly states evidences in the Qur'an in many Chapters that when a believer takes into consideration will realize that the Qur'anic evidence is supported by perceptible and felt logical proofs, and for this reason the Glorified mentioned after this Qur'anic verse {O mankind! Worship your Lord (Allah)} the following proof {Who created you and those who were before you so that you may that ye may have the chance to learn righteousness} which means that the Creator deserves to be worshipped because He created us [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] كما قال سبحانه و تعالى : (و لا تحسبن الله غافلاً عما يفعل الظالمون إنما يؤخرهم ليوم تشخص فيه الأبصار) [...] هناك جزاء و حساب ، و قد قامت على هذا الأدلة من القرآن و السنة ، و إجماع الأمة ، و العقول الصحيحة [...]</p> <p>[...] as the Glorified and the Exalted said {Consider not that Allah is unaware of that which the Zalimun (polytheists, wrong-doers) do, but He gives them respite up to a Day (of the Judgment) when the eyes will stare in horror.} there will be punishment and reward that are based on evidences from Qur'an and the Sunnah (Prophetic traditions), the consensus of the Muslim nation and sound minds [...]</p>
4	<p>[...] لا ريب أن الدعوة إلى أن تكون القومية العربية هي الرابطة الأولى بين العرب ، دعوة باطلة لا أساس يؤيدها ، لا من العقل و لا النقل ، بل هي دعوة جاهلية إنحائية يهدف دعمها إلى محاربة الإسلام [...]</p> <p>[...] No doubt that advocating Arab nationalism to be the only bond that unites Arabs is false and baseless. Neither mind helps to prove it nor evidences from Qur'an and Prophetic traditions support it. On the contrary, it is an atheist and <i>Jahili</i> (ignorant i.e. pertaining to the pre-Islamic era) call that aims to fight Islam [...]</p>

Ibn Baz uses the word forms of the key term 'MIND' referring to the mind as evidence that supports his claims and religious conceptions. In Line 1, Ibn Baz introduces one of the books (*Arrisalah Attadmoriyyah*; A Letter to the People of Tadmor (a city located in northeast Damascus –also called Palmyra) of the medieval Salafi religious leader (Ibn Taymiyya). In his book, Ibn Taymiyya introduces the Islamic Sunni monotheistic concept in the names and attributes of Allah which confirms that all Muslims should believe and use them in their prayers as they were reported in Qur'an and Prophetic traditions.⁶² He claims that the Salafi conception of the names and attributes is supported by evidences from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions as well as logical proofs and anyone who rejects this Sunni belief is

62. According to the Salafi belief in Allah's names and attributes, Muslims, in all forms of their worship (including supplications and beseeching Allah's help) should call on Him by His names and attributes (see Section 4.2.4.2 in Chapter 4).

contradicting these logical proofs as well as the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions. In Line 2, Ibn Baz introduces two parts of one Qur'anic verse that reports another Islamic belief in worshipping Allah and believing that He is the Creator. Ibn Baz builds a causal relationship: worshipping Allah is based on the belief that He is the Creator. He also continues to say that this belief which emanates from the Qur'an (Line 2) is also supported by perceptible logical proofs that are reported in Qur'an. Ibn Baz uses the word form 'العقول' ('*al' oqūl*; the minds), in Line 3, to represent believers who have faith in the Hereafter. He says that there will be punishment and reward in the Hereafter which, according to him, is reported in the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions and approved by all Muslims as well as sound minds. Line 4 introduces Arab nationalism as one of the thematic foci of Ibn Baz (see Section 4.2.6 in Chapter 4). He rejects the claim that Arab nationalism unites Arabs claiming that neither mind nor evidence from Qur'an and Prophetic traditions supports it. He also claims that advocating Arab nationalism is a war against Islam.

Both Salafi writers use the key term 'MIND' differently. On the one hand, Alhawali uses the key term 'MIND' to represent the West negatively in different political/religious foci. He uses it to represent what he claims to be the western direct menace to Islam. He also represents western religious (Church) and other cultural aspects negatively. On the other hand, Ibn Baz uses the key term 'MIND' as a legitimization strategy to lend support to his stances in different semantic foci: the Salafi version of faith in Allah's names and attributes, the concepts of creation of humans and their worship of Allah, the reward and punishment in the Hereafter (theological semantic foci) and rejection of Arab nationalism (political semantic focus). These concepts are argued to be supported as logically proven and believed by those who have sound minds. Thus, on the surface, Ibn Baz occasionally seems to incorporate aspects of language perhaps more typically associated with scientific discourse in his

rhetoric. However, these examples tend to *claim* that something is logically proven rather than *showing* that it is so. Let us now move to examine how each writer represents religion.

5.7 Religion in the Salafi corpora

The keywords that indicate religion in Alhawali are the definite noun ‘الدين’ (*‘addīn*; the religion) and the adjective ‘الدينية’ (*‘addīniyyah*; the religious – sing./pl. fem.). However there are other word forms of the key term ‘RELIGION’ (Table 5.9) that indicate religion in both corpora.

Table 5.9 Word forms of the key term ‘RELIGION’ in the Salafi corpora.

N	Word form	Eng. trans.	F. Alhawali	F. Baz
1	الدين	the religion	554	222
2	الدينية	the religious (def. adj. sing./pl. fem.)	105	1
3	دين	religion	85	126
4	الديني	the religious (def. Adj. sing. masc.)	59	2
5	دينية	religious (indef. adj. sing. fem/ pl.)	33	0
6	دينهم	their religion	27	38
7	ديني	religious (indef. adj. sing. masc.)	12	0
8	دينه	His/his religion	11	73
Total			886	462

There are 8 word forms of the key term ‘RELIGION’ that are used in the Salafi corpora under investigation. Table 5.9 shows these word forms and their relative frequencies in each corpus. The definite noun ‘الدين’ (*‘addīn*; the religion) is the most frequent word form of the key term ‘RELIGION’ that both Salafi writers use (554 times in Alhawali and 222 times in Ibn Baz). Notably, Ibn Baz uses the indefinite noun ‘دين’ (*dīn*; religion) with a higher frequency (126 times) than Alhawali (85 times). Also, both writers use the word form ‘دينهم’ (*dīnahom*; their religion) with relatively low frequencies (38 times in Ibn Baz and 27 times in Alhawali).⁶³ The rest of the word forms are either used by Ibn Baz with a very low frequency – once and twice for definite adjectives ‘الدينية’ (*‘addīniyyah*; the religious – sing. pl. fem.) and ‘الديني’

63. ‘دينهم’ (*dīnahom*; their religion) could indicate the religion of ‘the Other’. However when I examined this word form in both corpora I found that Ibn Baz uses it in all the occurrences to indicate Islam (see below) whereas Alhawali uses it to refer to both Islam and more noticeably Christianity.

(*'addīni*; the religious –sing. masc.) respectively - or do not occur in Ibn Baz – the indefinite adjective forms *'دِينِيَّة'* (*dīniyyah*; religious – sing. pl. fem.) and *'دِينِي'* (*'addīni*; religious –sing. masc.). It is noteworthy that some of the word forms in Table 5.9 are keywords in both corpora (detailed more below). This could be due to that the texts in both corpora being composed of religious writings and talking about religion. This result could also indicate that both writers use different word forms to write about religion from different Salafi perspectives to achieve different goals (see below). Additionally, my corpora are not lemmatized which results in having many word forms that belong to the same lemma as keywords in either of the Salafi corpora as shown in Table 5.10 below.

Table 5.10 Word forms of the key term 'RELIGION' that are keywords in both corpora

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Texts	Freq.	RC. Freq.	Keyness	P	
1	دِينِه	His/his religion	4	73	11	80.31568	8.05E-15	Baz
2	دِين	religion	5	126	85	33.80208	3.18E-09	
3	الدِينِيَّة	the religious (def. adj. sing./pl. fem.)	4	104	1	96.29324	3.31E-15	Alhawali
4	الدِينِي	the religious (def. Adj. sing. masc.)	4	57	2	44.16547	7.62E-13	
5	الدِين	the religion	5	554	222	42.78454	1.18E-12	
6	دِينِيَّة	religious (indef. adj. sing. fem/ pl.)	5	33	0	33.55122	4.02E-09	

With the exception of the word forms *'دِينِي'* (*'addīni*; religious –sing. masc.) and *'دِينِهِمْ'* (*dīnahom*; their religion), all other word forms are keywords in either Salafi corpus as shown in Table 5.10. The indefinite noun *'دِين'* (*dīn*; religion) and *'دِينِه'* (*dīnah*; His/his religion) are keywords in Ibn Baz whereas the rest of the word forms are keywords in Alhawali. However taking the total frequency of the word forms of the key term 'RELIGION' into consideration there exists a significant difference between the collective occurrences of these word forms in both corpora (log likelihood score 19.41) which indicates that 'RELIGION' overall is a key term in Alhawali. Let us now move on to investigate the word forms of the key terms 'RELIGION' in Alhawali.

5.7.1 'Religion' in Alhawali's corpus

Let us first examine the collocational profile of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali. Table 5.11 shows the collocates of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali.

Table 5.11 Collocates of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali

Word form	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts	Joint	MI
الدين	the religion	554	رجال	(clergy)men	123	3	72	7.69441
			شيء	thing	199	3	10	4.15231
			عن	about	1215	3	54	3.97515
الديني	the religious (adj. masc.)	57	الإصلاح	the reform	33	3	8	9.70346
			حركة	movement	58	3	8	8.88987
دين	religion	85	أو	or	936	3	7	4.10834

There are 6 collocates (Table 5.11) of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali. The collocate 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men) (MI score 7.694 joint freq. 72) is also a keyword in Alhawali (keyness 66.161). Both this collocate and the keyword 'الدين' (*'addīn*; the religion) compose the Arabic annexation construct 'رجال الدين' (*riḡāl 'addīn*; clergymen) which is a 2-word cluster in Alhawali (69 times in 3 texts). This annexation construct has a negative connotation and is always used in the Salafī discourses to nominate religious leaders in religions other than Islam (see Section 6.3.1.1 in Chapter 6).

The collocates of 'الديني' (*'addīni*; the religious -adj. masc.) are 'الإصلاح' (*'al'islāḥ*; the reform) and 'حركة' (*ḥarakah*; movement) (MI scores 9.703 and 8.889 respectively). 'حركة' (*ḥarakah*; movement) is also a keyword in Alhawali (keyness 50.673). Both collocates occur 8 times jointly with the keyword 'الديني' (*'addīni*; the religious -adj. masc.). The collocability of these words could be explained by the 3-word cluster 'حركة الإصلاح الديني' (*ḥarakat 'al'islāḥ 'addīni*; the movement of religious reform) (8 times) which denote the efforts of Martin Luther (a Christian German monk 1483 – 1546) and other European theologians in the Middle Ages. The previous collocates and word clusters of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali indicate Christianity. This result supports other results (explicated above and elsewhere in this thesis) that indicate the focus of Alhawali's writings on the 'Other'. Let us

now move to explore more of Alhawali's use of the different word forms of the key term 'RELIGION' via selected concordance lines.

Concordance 5.18 Concordance of the word forms of the key term 'RELIGION' in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] و لأول مرة في تاريخ الإنسان أصبح النزاع بين الذكاء الصرف و القيم الخلقية قضية حياة أو موت، [...] هذا قليل من كثير من النتائج السيئة التي جلبها الصراع المستلزم بين دين أوروبا و علمها، و دفع إليها التعصب المقيت من قبل دعاة اللادينية في مجال مفروض فيه أن يكون أعظم طريق إلى الله و أقوى دافع إلى خشية.</p> <p>[...] and for the first time in the human history, the conflict between human intelligent mind and moral values became an issue of life and death [...] these are only few of the bad consequences that appear as a result of the sinister conflict between the religion of Europe (Christianity) and the science (of Europe) which was caused by the repugnant bigotry of the advocates of irreligion in an aspect that is should be the greatest path to Allah and the most compelling factor to fear Him (i.e. science causes people to know and fear Allah).</p>
2	<p>[...] و هذا يقودنا إلى معرفة مدى التسخ الذي وصلت إليه البيئة الأوروبية و الانهيار الديني و الخلق الذي اجتاحتها؛ فكانت بيئة ملانسة لتفريخ أفكار فرويد و نقلها مما دفعها إلى تسخ أعظم.</p> <p>[...] this leads us to realize the huge debasement and the moral and religious collapse in the Europe. Thus it was suitable abode that allowed the ideas of Freud (Austrian neurologist 1856 – 1939) to germinate which caused more (religious and moral) debasement.</p>
3	<p>[...] و ليس تمة شك في أن مصر الحديثة التي يريدها كرومر هي دولة لا دينية لا صلة لها بالإسلام و حكومتها ستكون على الشروط الذي مر آنفاً (الغاء الشريعة الإسلامية) [...]</p> <p>[...] and there is no doubt that modern Egypt advocated by Cromer (a British diplomat and colonial administrator 1841–1917) is a non religious and non Islamic state. Additionally, its administration will be based on the condition that I have cited above (abolition of Islamic Sharia) [...]</p>
4	<p>مواجهة أوروبا للإسلام: أما الإسلام فإنه لما كان الرومان عامة يعدون كل ما عداهم من الشعوب برابرة، و لما كان البابوات و رجال الكنيسة يحضون الإسلام وثنية فقد اتفق الموردان في النظرة القتمة إلى العالم الإسلامي، و امتزجت العنصرية القديمة بالحدت الديني الجديد.</p> <p>Europe confronts Islam: As for Islam, all Romans considered all other nations (including Muslims) to be barbarians, and the Popes and clergymen considered Islam to be atheism. They (the Romans and Christians) both had gloomy perspective about the Muslim world, and thus old bigotry is mixed with the new religious grudge.</p>
5	<p>[...] أما حركة الإصلاح الديني فلم تولد مع "لوتر" و "كالن"، بل لها جذور عميقة الصلة بالإسلام لا يستطيع أي باحث أوروبي أن يغفلها مهما قل من شأنها، و منها (حركة تحطيم الصور والتماثيل) التي اجتاحت الامبراطورية البيزنطية في أوائل القرن الثامن الميلادي [...]</p> <p>[...] The movement of religious reforms (in Europe) did not start with the efforts of "Luther (Martin Luther a German monk and a religious reformer 1483 – 1546) and "Calvin" (John Calvin a French theologian and religious reformer 1509 –1564). On the contrary the religious reformation (in Christianity) is deeply related to Islam to the extent that no European researcher can neglect no matter how far he/she trivializes this relation. This deeply rooted relation includes the movement of destroying images and idols (Iconoclasm) that spread throughout the Byzantine Empire in the early years of the 8th century [...]</p>

As is the case of his writings that defame the West, Alhawali continues to use the key term 'RELIGION' to construct a negative image of Europe (see all the sections above and Chapters 4, 6 and 7). Alhawali, in Line 1, uses the indefinite keyword 'دين' (*dīn*; religion) with the keyword 'أوروبا' (*'oroba*; Europe) (keyness 233.322) to form the annexation construct 'دين أوروبا' (*dīn 'oroba*; the religion of Europe) which means the religion of Europeans, i.e. Christianity. The previous annexation construct is also followed by 'و علمها' (*wa 'ilmiha*; and its science) meaning 'and the science of Europe'. As with keywords like 'West' and 'Israel',

Alhawali represents Europeans by 'Europe' which is a collectivising and impersonalising strategy (see Alhawali's representations of social actors in Chapter 6). Alhawali claims that there was a conflict between science and religion in Europe that was, according to him, caused by the repugnant bigotry of the advocates of irreligion. Alhawali here actually sides with the Church, though he defames it. This ambivalent stance of Alhawali could not be due to his rejection of irreligion only, but could be caused by his fondness of the concept of religion in general. This is explained by the Salafi belief about religion as a means to know Allah and fear Him which occurs in the following Qur'anic verse:

{ إِنَّمَا يَخْشَى اللَّهَ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ الْعُلَمَاءُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ غَفُورٌ } سورة فاطر، آية ٢٨.

{It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves that fear Allah. Verily, Allah is All-Mighty, Oft-Forgiving} Holy Qur'an 35: 28

In Line 2, Alhawali returns to denigrate Europeans claiming that Europe was religiously and morally debased which was suitable abode for the ideas of Freud, which according to Alhawali are against religion, to germinate. Alhawali, in Line 3, reminds his readers of the British occupation of Egypt. He nominates Cromer (the British colonial administrator) as against Islam advocating a non religious state in Egypt and abolishing the Sharia. In another attempt (Line 4) to represent Europeans negatively, Alhawali tries to characterise Europe as an eternal enemy of Islam recalling the racist views of the Byzantine Empire toward others, including Muslims which, according to Alhawali, continues in a form of religious bigotry by the Popes and priests towards Muslims. Line 5 shows Alhawali's attempt to shed light on the genesis of religious reforms in Christianity. He claims that the beginnings of such reforms were not due to efforts of religious reformers such as Martin Luther (a German monk and a religious reformer 1483 – 1546) and John Calvin (a French theologian and religious reformer 1509 –1564) but due to the early contact between Muslims and the Christians which resulted in destroying images and idols (Iconoclasm) in the Byzantine Empire in the early years of the 8th century.

Alhawali uses the different keywords that belong to the lemma ‘RELIGION’ to further construct a negative image of Europe recalling what he believes to be the historical enmity between Europe and Islam. His negative representation of Europe and claims about such enmity contributes to constructing two opposing worlds (Europe vs. the Muslim world). Let us now see how Ibn Baz uses the key term ‘RELIGION’.

5.7.2 ‘Religion’ in Ibn Baz's corpus

As I have noted earlier, the word forms ‘دين’ (*dīn*; religion –indef. n.) and ‘دينه’ (*dīnah*; His/his religion) are keywords in Ibn Baz (keyness 33.802 and 80.315 respectively). Ibn Baz also uses the word form ‘الدين’ (*‘addīn*; the religion) 222 times. He also uses other word forms of the key term ‘RELIGION’: ‘الدينية’ (*‘addīniyyah*; the religious –def. sing. pl./fem. adj.) and ‘الديني’ (*‘addīni*; the religious –def. sing. masc. adj.) that occurs only once and twice respectively). Let us first consider the collocational profile of the key term ‘RELIGION’ in Ibn Baz.

The key term ‘RELIGION’ collocates with 36 words some of which are keywords in Ibn Baz. Due to time and space restrictions, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine all these collocates. Thus based on the criteria I have provided in Chapter 4 (section 4.2.1.1) Table 5.12 shows the selected collocates for analysis. It is an abridged version of a more detailed table (see Table A7 in Appendix A).

Table 5.12 Collocates of the word forms of the key term ‘RELIGION’ in Ibn Baz

N	Word form	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts	Joint	MI
1	الدين	the religion	222	الخالص	the pure	11	4	11	9.19973
2	دين	religion	126	الإسلام	Islam	337	4	27	6.37515
3	دينه	His/his religion	73	يُعلِّي	raise the prestige of (His word and make it) superior	6	3	5	10.5413
4	دين	religion	126	حتى	till	234	3	6	4.73146
5	دينهم	their religion	38	المسلمين	Muslims	226	3	7	6.73339

Unlike Alhawali, whose collocates of the key term ‘RELIGION’ indicate a religion other than Islam (viz. Christianity), Ibn Baz’s collocates indicate Islam. The first collocate indicates a

specific form of Islam, i.e. ‘الْخَالِصُ’ (*‘alḫaliṣ*; the pure) which occurs jointly with ‘الدين’ (*‘adīn*; the religion) 11 times in 4 texts (MI score 9.199). As indicated by the diacritics, the word is part of a Qur’anic verse (see below). The collocates ‘الإسلام’ (*‘al’islam*; Islam) and ‘المسلمين’ (*‘almoṣlimīn*; Muslims) clearly indicate the religion of Islam. The collocate ‘يُعلي’ (*yo ‘li*; raise the prestige of (His word and make it) superior) bears a positive association with religion (Islam). Some of these collocates are also used in clusters by Ibn Baz.

Ibn Baz uses the key term ‘RELIGION’ in 54 clusters (see Table A8 in Appendix A). Table 5.13 contains only 6 examples of word clusters that contain the key term ‘RELIGION’ in Ibn Baz.

Table 5.13 Examples of clusters that contain the key term ‘RELIGION’ in Ibn Baz

N	Cluster	Eng. trans	Freq.	Texts
3-word clusters	1	في الدين و	27	3
	2	في دينه و	23	3
	3	في دين الله	18	3
4-word clusters	3	الله مُخْلِصًا لَه الدِّين	11	4
	4	خَيْرًا يَفْقَهُ فِي الدِّين	6	3
	5	دِينَهُ وَيُعَلِّي كَلِمَتَهُ	5	3
7-word clusters	6	الله مُخْلِصًا لَه الدِّين إِلَّا اللهُ الدِّينُ	11	4

Clusters 3 and 6 are parts of one Qur’anic verse tackling the issue of worship in Islam (see Section 4.2.1.2 in Chapter 4). The cluster ‘في دين الله’ (*fi dīni ‘illah*; in the religion of Allah) (cluster 3 in Table 5.13) bears a positive association between the religion and Allah utilizing the grammatical annexation construct. It associates the religion with Allah which in the Islamic context means the religion of Islam. Cluster 4 introduces the religious theme of knowledge in Salafist texts. It is part of the following prophetic tradition:

روى معاوية: سَمِعْتُ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَقُولُ: {مَنْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ بِهِ خَيْرًا يُفَقِّهُهُ فِي الدِّينِ، وَإِنَّمَا أَنَا قَاسِمٌ وَاللَّهُ يُعْطِي، وَلَنْ تَزَالَ هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةُ قَائِمَةً عَلَى أَمْرِ اللَّهِ، لَا يَضُرُّهُمْ مَنْ خَالَفَهُمْ، حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ} صحيح البخاري، كتاب العلم، المجلد الأول رقم ٣ رقم الحديث ٧١.

Narrated Muawiya: I heard Allah's Apostle saying: (If Allah wants to do good to a person, He makes him comprehend the religion I am just a distributor, but the grant is from Allah. (And remember) that this nation (true Muslims) will keep on following Allah's teachings strictly and they will not be harmed by any one going on a different path till Allah's order (Day of Judgment) is established." Sahih Bukhari, Knowledge, Volume 1, Book 3, Number 71.⁶⁴

Ibn Baz recontextualizes this prophetic tradition to indicate what Ibn Baz believes to be the knowledge in the religion and its importance in Islam. He encourages his fellow Muslims to learn about the religion. Cluster 5 is 'دينه و يعلي كلمته' (*dīnahu wa yo'li kalimatahu*; (may Allah render) His religion (victorious) and raise the prestige of (His word) and make it superior). Ibn Baz uses this cluster 5 times in an optative construction which always occurs in Ibn Baz's conclusions. This cluster is also frequently used as a fixed phrase in Friday sermons. The words and phrases between brackets are not shown in the Arabic version of the cluster. However, Arabic readers could infer some of the missing parts if they pertain to grammatical rules (see Chapter 3 for translation conventions used in this thesis). The optative construction that includes cluster 5 is provided above. It constitutes one of the features of any Islamic religious writing that starts with an introduction (proem). The proem starts with the *basmallah* i.e. saying 'In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful' then is followed by praising Allah which is a recontextualization of the first verse in the Qur'an in the opening Chapter (Praise is due to Allah the Lord of mankind and jinn). The proems usually contain prayers of success mostly pertaining to the themes in the writing followed or are concluded by Calling Allah to send His blessings and peace upon His messenger (Mohammad).

The last cluster I want to consider in this analysis is cluster 6 which is used by Ibn Baz as part of the following Qur'anic verses:

{إِنَّا أَنْزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ فَاعْبُدِ اللَّهَ مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ * أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ وَ الَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِهِ أَوْلِيَاءَ مَا نَعْبُدُهُمْ إِلَّا لِيُقَرِّبُونَا إِلَى اللَّهِ زُلْفَى { ايه ٢-٣ سورة الزمر.

64. The translation of this Hadith is available on the following link: <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/003-sbt.php>.

These two Qur'anic verses could be translated as:

{Verily We have sent down the Book to you (O Mohammad) in truth: So worship Allah (Alone) by doing **religious** deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only* Surely the religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only. And those who take Auliya' (protectors, helpers, lords, gods) besides Him (say): "We worship them only that they may bring us near to Allah."} Holy Qur'an 39: 2-3.

Ibn Baz tries to legitimate his stance towards certain ritualistic practices. He recontextualizes these Qur'anic verses (11 times) in different topics that have one major theme, namely, reporting the worship of Allah and rejecting what Ibn Baz believes to be associationism or polytheistic practices i.e. refutation of some Sufi and Shiites' worshipping practices such as beseeching help from dead saints (see the subsections in 4.2 in Chapter 4). Additionally, Ibn Baz utilizes the key term 'RELIGION' to achieve different legitimization purposes. Let us consider some concordance lines that repeat the same function.

Concordance 5.19 Concordance of the key term 'RELIGION' in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Concordance
1	<p>الأمر الثالث (في الدعوة): بيان الأمر الذي يدعى إليه [...] وهو الإسلام وهو دين الله الحق [...] وينحل في ذلك الدعوة إلى الإيمان بكل ما أخبر الله به ورسله [...] والأخذ بما شرع الله في الطهارة والصلاة [...] والحرب والسلام وفي كل شيء لأن دين الله عز وجل دين شامل [...]</p> <p>The third issue (in calling for Islam): Callers for Islam should make it clear [...] it is Islam the true religion of Allah [...] Calling to Islam includes inviting people to believe in all that Allah and His apostles told [...] and perform what Allah has ordained in purification and prayers [...] peace and war and in everything, because the religion of Allah is complete</p>
2	<p>فقال: يا شيخنا يا شيخنا على دين الله ورسوله، وعلى الجهاد في سبيل الله [...] وتوافد الناس إلى الدرعية من كل مكان [...] ورتب الدروس في الدرعية في العقائد، وفي القرآن الكريم [...] العلوم العربية، والتاريخية، وغير ذلك من العلوم النافعة</p> <p>[...] and then he (Mohammad Ibn Saud the founder of the first Saudi state 1744–1818) said: O Sheik (Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, a Salafi religious reformer 1703–1792) I will give you the oath of allegiance on the basis of the religion of Allah and His messenger and making the Jihad for Allah's sake [...] and people from different parts of the region then came to Diriyah (in central Saudi Arabia) [...] he then started courses in creed, Qur'an [...] Arabic, history and other beneficial fields of knowledge [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] وقد يقع فيها (الاحتقالات بالموالد) [...] الشرك الأكبر، وذلك بالغلو في رسول الله [...] والاستغاث به [...] واعتقد أنه يعلم الغيب، [...] وقد صح عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: ((إياكم والغلو في الدين فإمّا أهلك من كان قبلكم الغلو في الدين)) [...]</p> <p>[...] and Muslims could commit major polytheism in (the celebrations of the prophet's birthday). This could happen in exceeding the proper bounds in the belief of the apostle of Allah [...] beseeching his help [...] and believing that he knows the unseen [...]. Truly, it was narrated in a sound Hadith that the apostle of Allah, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him said: (Beware of exceeding the proper boundaries in the religion, indeed those nations before you were destroyed by exceeding the proper boundaries in the religion) [...]</p>
4	<p>بل عقيدة الوهابية: هي التمسك بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم [...] ما كان عليه السلف الصالح، وثمة الدين والهدى، أهل الفقه والفتوى في باب معرفة الله، وإثبات صفات كماله ونعوت جلالة، التي نطق بها الكتاب العزيز، وصحت بها الأخبار النبوية [...]</p> <p>The beliefs of Wahhabis involves the strict adherence to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His apostle, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him [...] and following the pious predecessors, the Imams of the religion and guidance who are the people of jurisprudence and Fatwas in knowing Allah and confirming the perfect attributes of the Majestic that were reported in the glorious Qur'an and sound Prophetic traditions [...]</p>
5	<p>[...] ولما كن عمل الدين [...] وصيغ الحيدة بتقاليد جامعة ومعلومة واضحة، ورض الصقوف على إحسان مشترك، ودفعها إلى مصير واحد، فإن الاستعمار استهدف إقصاء الدين عن أفق البلاد كلها، وتكوين أجيال غريبة عنه، إن لم تكن كارهة له [...]</p> <p>[...] and when the religion aims to [...], mould life with known and comprehensive traditions, unite people and make them share the same feelings and destiny, colonialism (colonialists) aims to exclude the religion from life and prepare new generations who do not know it or rather hate it [...]</p>

Ibn Baz utilizes the key term 'RELIGION' in theological and (occasionally) political themes. Line 1 indicates Ibn Baz's concept of Islam as the true religion. Line 2 is about the political theme of 'بيعة' (*bai'ah*; oath of allegiance) to the ruler or religious leader. Line 2 indicates the start of the coalition between the Salafi leader Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab (1703-1792) and the political leader Mohammad Ibn Saud (the founder of the first Saudi State (1744-1818). Although Ibn Baz's writings are mostly theological, in this Line, he writes about the establishment of the first Saudi State from a Salafist perspective which supports making oaths of allegiance between both religious and political leaders.

In Line 3, Ibn Baz refers to what he believes to be polytheistic practices of the Sufis when they celebrate the birthday of the prophet of Islam. He claims that such practices might fall in the category of greater polytheism by exceeding the religious proper bounds in the belief in the Prophet of Islam. Ibn Baz utilizes a prophetic tradition about exceeding the proper religious bounds and recontextualizes it to include some of the beliefs about the Prophet of Islam such as beseeching his help and believing that he knows the unseen.

In his defence of 'wahhabism', Ibn Baz claims that it is a strict adherence to the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam. Additionally he claims that 'wahhabism' is also following the teachings of the 'السلف الصالح' (*'assalaf 'aṣṣāliḥ*; the pious predecessors). Here Ibn Baz legitimates what he calls 'wahhabism' as being Salafist and based on the teachings of Qur'an and the Prophet of Islam. Finally, Ibn Baz opposes colonialism, projecting it as aiming to exclude religion from the lives of Muslims.

In this section we have seen that both Salafi writers (Ibn Baz and Alhawali) utilize the key terms 'MIND' and 'RELIGION' in different semantic foci. Safar Alhawali seems to be concerned with negative representations of Christianity and (medieval and modern colonial) western threats (including Israel) whereas Ibn Baz's representation of both mind and religion

is mostly concerned with articulating concepts and belief in and about Islam that are viewed as correct, and more precisely the Salafist form of Islam.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter ends the analysis of the semantic foci in both Salafi corpora. The main theme in this chapter is semantic foci keywords in Alhawali's writings. Collocational profiles (if there were any) for the semantic foci keywords in both corpora have been sketched out followed by cluster and concordance-based analyses.

In the previous chapter we saw that Ibn Baz's semantic foci keywords appear to be mostly theological which reflect his conception towards ritualistic practices marked by his recontextualizations of Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions as well as Salafi leaders' writings. He also tries to refute the Sufi and Shiites' practices that he believes to be against the true teachings of Qur'an and Prophetic traditions. On the other hand, Alhawali's semantic foci are more overtly political. Alhawali from a political Salafist perspective draws the attention of his readers to what he believes to be an external western menace that threatens both Muslim and Arab countries and has been doing so for centuries. Additionally, Alhawali repeatedly defames western political, social and religious lives.

It is also noteworthy, that Ibn Baz writes, on a smaller scale though, about some political themes. He tries to refute Arab nationalism that was supported and perpetuated by Abdul Nassir of Egypt and his allies (the Baath regimes) in Iraq and Syria (for more information on Arab-Israeli Conflict see Rea and Wright (1997)). He also shares (to a lesser extent) some of Alhawali's views concerning colonialism and the West (see Chapter 8 for more explanation).

Both Salafi authors write also about social actors and utilize arguments in their writings which will be the foci of Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.

Part Three

Chapter 6: Social Actor Representation of “the Other” in both Salafi Corpora

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the analysis of the Salafi corpora. It brings together an aspect of analysis that was touched on in part in the previous two chapters: social actor representations. It responds to research question 1(b): What do concordance and collocational analyses of keywords and frequent words in the two corpora of Salafi discourse reveal about representations of social actors (nominational strategies)?

Based on further examination of keywords and utilizing van Leeuwen’s social actor theory, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 tackle the representation of social actors in both Salafi corpora respectively. Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.1 are dedicated to analysing the representation of ‘the Other’ in Ibn Baz’s corpus and Alhawali’s corpus respectively. Finally, section 6.4 concludes this chapter. Let us first examine the representation of social actors in both Salafi corpora.

6.2 Social actor representation: Ibn Baz’s keywords

This section focuses the analysis on the keywords that indicate social actors, some of which were briefly presented in Chapters 4 (pp. 73-93) and 5 (pp. 124-146). Table A3 (Appendix A) shows 75 keywords that indicate social actors in Ibn Baz which I have grouped into five categories as shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Categories of social actors in Ibn Baz (derived from keywords)

N	Category	Key word
1	The Prophet of Islam and other prophets	(may) the blessings (of Allah be upon him), messenger, His messenger, the messenger, the messengers, His messengers, messenger (accusative), the prophet, (may) peace (of Allah be upon him), Mohammad, our Prophet, his family, His Prophet, Mohammad (accusative)
2	The Salaf 1: The Companions of the Prophet	son of, (may Allah) be pleased (with him), his (the Prophet) companions, the father of (accusative), the father of (nominative), (may Allah be pleased) with him, his (the Prophet) companions, the companions of the Prophet, (may Allah be pleased) with them, Hurairah, Omar
3	The Salaf 2: The successors of the companions of the Prophet	son of, (the pious) ancestors, the father of (accusative), the Imam, (may Allah have) mercy (upon him), Muslim, the father of (nominative), the successors of the companions of the Prophet, the sheikh, Imams, pious (ancestors), Alawzaee, Malik, their followers
4	General Social actors	the people of, (they, those who) believed, O, (those, people) (vocative), O, (vocative), the Sunnah (of the Prophet of Islam)/ the Sunnis, indeed they are, all, His servants, His worshippers, servant, worshipper, the servants of Allah/ His worshippers, to them, the Muslims (accusative), with them, that you may, from you, they, to His servants/worshippers, others, the father of (nominative), 'althaqalain (the humans and the jinn (genies)), who (plural), other, you were, to you, the believers, 'alealameen (mankind, jinn and all that exists), the Jinn, the teachers/ propagandists, His creatures, his patrons/ advocates, after them, to the people of, upon you (plural)
5	The Other	teachers/ propagandists, the people of, polytheists (accusative), polytheists (nominative), friends of God (religious status in Sufi orders)

It is worth noting here that when translated into English some of the keywords in Table 6.1 become multi-word units. This is because the Arabic writing system reflects the morphological structure of Arabic which is substantially more complex than that of English, and as a result some pronouns as well as the definite article are always attached to verbs and nouns (some of which are keywords in this thesis). The definite article 'ال' ('*al*; the), for example, is always attached to its following noun as in the Arabic word 'الرسول' ('*alrasūl*: the messenger). In the case of pronouns as in 'عنه' ('*anho*; with him), in the first line in category 2 in Table 6.1, the pronoun 'هـ' (*h*; him) is preceded with a preposition 'عن' ('*an*: with) which, in all the occurrences, is part of the optative and glorification phrase 'رضي الله عنه' (*raḍiya 'allahu 'anho*; may Allah be pleased with him).⁶⁵ There are also some keywords such as 'لعباده' (*li'ibadih*) that contain the preposition 'لـ' (*li*; to), the noun 'عباده' ('*ibadih*; His servants/worshippers –gen.)⁶⁶ in addition to the pronoun 'هـ' (*h*; His) making the prepositional

65. The case is so with its plural form 'عنهم' ('*anhom*; with them) in the optative phrase 'رضي الله عنهم' (*raḍiya 'allahu 'anhom*; may Allah be pleased with them).

66. For this specific example see footnote 33.

phrase ‘to His servants/worshippers’ (see Section 3.3.2 for an overview of the Arabic writing system and the translation conventions of the keywords into English in this thesis).

There are also some keywords that appear in two categories such as ‘teachers/propagandists’ which is a translation of one Arabic word ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*). Such keywords have been placed in two categories because they are used by Ibn Baz to indicate two meanings depending on the noun that follows it. The first meaning indicates those who teach Islam and thus the word ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*; teachers) refers to the in-group social actors. Second, if the following noun indicates other teachings such as atheism then the meaning of the word becomes ‘propagandist’ in English and at face value it indicates ‘the Other’. The case is the same with the keyword ‘the people of’ (see below). I classified the keywords ‘other’ and ‘others’ in the category ‘General social actors’ in Ibn Baz as they do not belong to the category ‘The Others’. The case is so, because Ibn Baz uses these two words to refer to anonymous social actors as in ‘other Muslims’ and ‘the other person’ which do not refer to the category ‘The Other’.

As indicated by Table 6.1, there are five categories of social actors in Ibn Baz. Let us have a brief look at these categories and see how they are sociosemantically represented (van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008). It should also be noted that, although the key term ‘ALLAH’ could be categorized as a social actor, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 4, in my data it appears more as an important Islamic theme that is associated with different semantic foci and has already been examined.⁶⁷ Thus it will not be included in the analysis in this chapter.

The largest category of social actors (in terms of the number of word types) indicates general social actors who are mostly anonymously nominated by personalization via

67. The case of religious deities raises interesting questions for social actor theory and CDA in general. Such deities are often conceived of as omnipotent, causing everything to happen yet are unseen by humans (requiring faith to believe in their existence). Thus, their actions are relayed second-hand by humans or through religious texts that they are supposed to have dictated to humans. Additionally, some religious people may view it as inappropriate to analyse deities in terms of them being ‘social actors’. Indeed, carrying out CDA from a religious stance raises its own issues, particularly if a religion does not condone certain forms of criticism.

categorization (such as ‘الناس’ (*’annas*: the people), ‘الجن’ (*’alġinn*; genies)) by means of both functionalization (such as ‘عباده’ (*’ibadoh*; His worshippers –nom.) and identification by classification such as the religionym (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 116) ‘المسلمين’ (*’almoslimīn*; the Muslims –acc.).⁶⁸ Here, Ibn Baz refers to general (or ordinary) social actors that are sometimes not given any active role in his texts other than performing what he believes to be ordained by Allah. They are passive and assigned to a certain role as in ‘عباده’ (*’ibadoh*; servants/worshippers) whose primary role in this life is to worship Allah. The keyword ‘السنة’ (*’assonnah*; the Sunnah of the Prophet/Sunnis) has more than one meaning in Ibn Baz’s texts. But what concerns us here is the sense that indicates social actors i.e. ‘the Sunnis’. It refers to the Sunnis (as opposed to the Shiites or Sufis) which is sometimes preceded by the word ‘أهل’ (*’ahl*; the people of). Aggregating a group of social actors within Muslim communities (defining the in-group social actors) is an othering strategy which focuses the attention of Ibn Baz’s readers to those who are different from Sunnis which indicates Ibn Baz’s polarization of Muslim societies into two opposing groups, namely, the Sunnis as opposed to the Sufis or Shiites.

The second largest category in Table 6.1 indicates the Prophet of Islam and other prophets. The social actors in this category are positively represented by nomination as realized by the proper name ‘محمد/محمدا’ (*mohammad/mohammadan*; Mohammad –nom. and acc. respectively), and by categorization (such as ‘رسول’ (*rasūl*; messenger), ‘رسله’ (*rosolih*; His messengers) which all are mostly followed by the honorific optative construction ‘صلى الله عليه/عليهم و سلم’ (*ṣalla ’allahu ’alaihi/’alaihim wa sallam*; may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him/them) (see Section 4.2.1.3).

The categories that indicate the two types of the Salaf, viz., the companions of the Prophet of Islam and their successors, also constitute a large segment of the social actors

68. Another form of categorisation which runs across all the sets of words in Table 6.1 is relational identification (van Leeuwen 1996: 54-55). For example, ‘عباده’ (*’ibadoh*; His worshippers) also suggests that the worshippers have a relationship to Allah.

represented in Ibn Baz. The social actors in this category are mostly represented by nomination, either by their proper names such as ‘عمر’ (*‘omar*; Omar –a famous companion of the Prophet and the second Caliph in Islam), ‘الأوزاعي’ (*‘al’awza’ī*; Alawzaee a Salafi medieval religious leader) or by honorification by means of affiliation using words that indicate kinship such as ‘بن’ (*bin*; the son of) or a cognomen such as ‘أبو/أبي’ (*‘abo/’abi*; the father of – nom. and acc. respectively). Nominating medieval (Salafi) social actors, mostly followed by optative constructions such as ‘may Allah have mercy on him’ that show respects being paid to them, indicates Ibn Baz’s interests in the Salafi teachings that he adheres to (see Section 7.4).

All of the categories mentioned so far designate in-group social actors who, when I examined their concordance lines, were found to be mostly positively represented. However, a smaller set of social actor words (some of which are mentioned in the sacred texts of Islam) in Ibn Baz fall under the category that I have labeled as the ‘Other’. All of the social actors in this category are represented by categorization by means of identification viz., they are identified by categorizing them in terms of what they are. Examples of these nomination strategies are ‘المشركون/المشركين’ (*‘almošrikūn/’almošrikīn*; the polytheists –nom. and acc. respectively) and functionalization such as ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists). The last strategy indicates that the social actors (the Other) are engaged in an activity that is determined by the meaning of the following noun (see Section 6.2.1.1 below).

It is this last category that I wish to concentrate on, as the construction of ‘the Other’, I presume, on the one hand, can help to reveal Ibn Baz’s ideological stance more clearly to delegitimize certain social (religious) practices associated with ‘the Other’ (such as those rituals of Sufis and Shiites detailed in Section 6.2.1.1 below). These rituals are practiced by what the two Salafi authors deem to be ‘the Other’ (Sufis and Shiites), some of whom are Saudis. Additionally, the aim of CDA analysis is to investigate social inequality which could be ‘expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use” (Wodak, 2001b,

p. 2). On the other hand, the aim of the analysis in this thesis is to define the boundaries of the two Saudi Salafi strands which could be realized more obviously in representing social actors who belong to the out-group rather than the in-group.

It is worth noting here that, due to space and time restrictions, I shall detail only the analysis of the top two keywords that indicate the ‘Other’ utilizing the following criteria.

1- Only keywords that occur at least five times in the reference corpus are considered for detailed analysis, so that I am able to compare the representation of social actors that are indicated by these keywords across both corpora.

2- If there were more than two keywords that indicate ‘the Other’, then the keywords that occur most frequently in the reference corpus are selected for the analysis in order to include the most frequently used (theological/political) keywords in the reference corpus.

3- Keywords that belong to the same lemma or word-form are tabulated and grouped under a key term (written in small capitals) and their frequencies are added together. And if they occur in the reference corpus and have other word-forms, they are also referred to and included in the analysis.

4- Arabic words that are homographic or polysemous are not identified by Wordsmith as such. Thus, they needed to be first discerned via concordance lines. If more than 50% of the concordance lines do not indicate a single meaning (e.g. a religious or political meaning), they will not be included in the analysis as the keyness of such words might be uncertain.

5- Keywords that I have presented in earlier chapters (such as ‘المشركون’ (*‘almošrikūn*; polytheists) will not be included in the analysis in order to avoid repetition. Now let us consider the representation of the ‘Other’ in both corpora.

6.2.1 The representation of the ‘Other’ in Ibn Baz

There are four social actors in the category ‘Other’ in Ibn Baz. Applying the criteria for selecting keywords for analysis that I have stated above, I shall delineate the

representation of the social actors that are indicated by the keywords that refer to the ‘Other’ in Ibn Baz, namely, ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) and ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of). And for the purpose of comparing the two corpora that comprise my research data, I shall also examine how they are represented in Alhawali. Let us first start with the representation of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists).

6.2.1.1 The representation of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) in Ibn Baz and Alhawali

As is the case with explicit ideological (religious and political) texts (van Dijk, 2011), there is an explicit representation of both the in-group and out-group social actors. The keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists –indef.) refers to two types of social actors, the identity of which is distinguished by the noun which follows the word, functioning as part of an annexation/genitive construction.⁶⁹ In Arabic, indefinite words become definite when used in genitive structures (Ryding, 2005, p. 160). The connotation (positive or negative) of the second noun determines whether this keyword means teachers or propagandists. There are four possible Arabic word forms of the ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists –indef.), namely, ‘داعي/داعية’ (*da ‘i/ da ‘yah*; teacher/propagandist –indef.), ‘الداعي/الداعية’ (*‘adda ‘i/ ‘adda ‘yah*; the teacher/propagandist –def.)⁷⁰, ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists –indef.) and ‘الدعاة’ (*‘addo ‘āh*; the teachers/propagandists – def.). However, Ibn Baz mainly uses the last two of the possible forms of this keyword, viz., ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists – indef.) and ‘الدعاة’ (*‘addo ‘āh*; the teachers/propagandists – def.). Let us first examine the collocates of these two word forms:

69. Genitive (or annexation) constructions in Arabic occur when two nouns are ‘linked together in a relationship where the second noun determines the first by identifying, limiting, or defining it, and thus the two nouns function as one phrase or syntactic unit’ (Ryding, 2005, p. 205).

70. The word forms ‘داعي’ (*da ‘i*; –indef. sing.), ‘الداعي’ (*‘adda ‘i*; –def. sing.) could also mean to cause or ‘calling to’. Also, the word form ‘الداعي’ (*‘adda ‘i*; the teacher –def. sing.) is mostly used by the Ismailites (a branch of Shiite Islam mostly concentrated in Najran, southern Saudi Arabia) to indicate a high rank religious status whose historical job is to call people for the teachings of Ismaili faction. Thus it is not expected to be used by the Salafis. However, the word forms ‘داعية’ (*da ‘yah*; teacher –indef. sing.) and ‘الداعية’ (*‘adda ‘yah*; the teacher –def. sing.) are used to nominate a Sunni religious preacher.

Table 6.2 Collocates of ‘teachers/propagandists’ (*do ‘āh*; دعاة) in Ibn Baz

keyword	Eng. trans	Freq.	Collocate	Eng. trans	Freq.	Joint	MI
دعاة	teachers/ propagandists	49	الهدى	guidance	67	5	7.347
			الحق	the truth (Islam)	242	8	6.173
الدعاة	the teachers/ propagandists	44	هؤلاء	these	59	5	7.686
			إلى	to	1104	11	4.598
			أن	truly	1605	10	3.920

As shown in Table 6.2, the plural word forms of the key term ‘TEACHERS/PROPAGANDISTS’ have 5 collocates. The indefinite keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) is jointly used in genitive constructions with the definite collocates ‘الهدى’ (*‘alḥoda*; the guidance) and ‘الحق’ (*‘alḥaq*; the truth i.e. Islam) making the phrases ‘دعاة الهدى’ (*do ‘āt ‘alḥoda*; the teachers of (the) guidance) which occurs 5 times, and ‘دعاة الحق’ (*do ‘āt ‘alḥaq*; the teachers of the truth/Islam) which occurs 8 times. These two collocates suggest positive associations (guidance, the truth i.e. Islam), which are used by Ibn Baz to represent the in-group social actors. The definite form of the key term ‘TEACHERS/PROPAGANDISTS’ has 3 grammatical words that, at face value, do not appear to carry any positive or negative meanings. It is worth noting here that all the occurrences of ‘الدعاة’ (*‘addo ‘āh*; the teachers/propagandists – def.) are also used to represent in-group social actors which makes the meaning of this keyword in English to be ‘the teachers’.

Because this word has two meanings, the collocates in the table above have tended to be used with the positive meaning of the word, rather than contributing towards the construction of ‘the Other’, and this was backed up when I examined concordances of these collocational relationships. Therefore, a collocational analysis is not appropriate here in order to examine how Ibn Baz constructs the Other with this keyword. Instead, I have focused on a concordance based analysis of the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) as it refers to social actors who are considered by Ibn Baz as the ‘Other’. An examination of concordance lines showed that ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) is used in a genitive construction with ‘القومية’ (*‘alqawmiyyah*; nationalism) (9 times), ‘الشيوعية’ (*‘aššīyo ‘iyyah*; communism) (3 times)

‘الماسونية’ (*‘almāsoniyyah*; Masonry) (2 times), ‘الإلحاد’ (*‘al’ilhād*; atheism) (3 times), ‘الاختلاط’ (*‘al’ihtilāṭ*; mixing –between men and women in jobs etc.) (2 times), and ‘الوثنية’ (*‘alwaṭaniyyah*; paganism), ‘النار’ (*‘annār*; Hell-fire) and ‘الزيغ و الضلال’ (*‘azzayḡ wa ‘aḍalāl*; deviation (from the truth) and error) (once each). Concordance 6.1 below shows five concordance lines of the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) that were chosen in order to demonstrate how Ibn Baz constructs the Other.

Concordance 6.1 Concordance of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] ما يعتقد المتأخرون في هذا العصر من اتباع ماركس ولينين وغيرهما من دعاة الإلحاد والكفر، سواء سماوا ذلك اشتراكية أو شيوعية أو بعثية أو غير ذلك [...] [...] the doctrines of the modern atheists who are the followers of Marx and Lenin and other propagandists of atheism and disbelief, whether they named that Socialism, Communism or Baathism or whatsoever [...]</p>
2	<p>و من تأمل أحوال أهل العلم [...] ككُتبي العباس بن تيمية رحمه الله [...] نعم من تأمل أحوالهم، و فتح الله عليه بهم ما قلوا و ما كتبوا رأى [...] العلوم الصحيحة [...] و يتضح له أن من خالفهم من دعاة الزيغ و الضلال، ليس عندهم إلا التبهات الباطلة، و الحجج الزائفة and whosoever studies the biographies of the people of [religious] knowledge such as Abi Alabaas Ibn Taymyyia, may Allah have mercy on him, [...]. Indeed whosoever studies their biographies, and Allah guided him to understand what they had written, will realize [...] the authentic knowledge' [...] and he will also realize that their opponents from among the propagandists of deviation (from the truth) and error, only produce erroneous suspicions and false arguments</p>
3	<p>و هنا شبهة يذكرها بعض دعاة القومية أحب أن أكشفها للقارئ، و هي أن بعض دعاة القومية زعم أن النهي عن الدعوة إلى القومية العربية و التحذير منها يتضمن تنقص العرب وإنكار فضلهم [في نشر الإسلام] ... and here is a suspicious claim mentioned by the propagandists of (Arab) nationalism which I would like to expose to the readers: some propagandists of (Arab) nationalism claim that banning and warning against nationalism implicitly includes defaming Arabs and denying their contribution [in the spread of Islam]</p>
4	<p>[...] قد بعث الله بكتابه العظيم، و الرسالة العامة التي أوضح بها كل شيء، ثم يأتي دعاة الماسونية الذين يريدون أن يردوا الناس إلى الأحوال البهيمية، [...] (Mohammad) whom Allah sent with Qur'an and the general message that includes every aspect of life, whereas the propagandists of Masonry want us to revert to the animalistic life [...]</p>
5	<p>[...] قد وقفوا في إظهار الحق وبيان أدلته، وأوضحوا ما يتعلق بدعوة التوحيد، و الرد على دعاة الوثنية، و عبادة القبور، وبرزوا في هذا السبيل، وكنوا على النهج المستقيم، نهج السلف الصالح [...] [...] (the previous Salafi leaders) were rightly guided to make the truth prevail showing the indicative Qur'anic Sunnah proofs. They explicated the monotheistic beliefs and refuted the claims of the propagandists of paganism and worshippers of graves. They were prominent in this respect. They followed the guidance of the rightly guided pious predecessors [...]</p>

The genitive constructions in all the lines are the linguistic realization of the representation of ‘the Other’ by personalization via categorization of those who advocate non-Islamic ideologies. ‘دعاة الإلحاد’ (*do ‘āt ‘al’ilhād*; propagandists of atheism) in Line 1 is a representation by categorization of those whom Ibn Baz claims to propagate non-Islamic ideologies, whether Socialist, Communist or the ideologies of the Baath parties in Iraq and Syria which Ibn Baz sees as being coated in Arab nationalism (see below). Here, Ibn Baz

groups many social actors under one very general category (atheists) using hypotactic grammatical structures, i.e. sentences with connective particles. The disjunctive ‘أو’ (*‘aw*; or) ‘indicates an option between two or more elements’ and that option ‘may include all elements’ (Ryding, 2005, p. 418). ‘أو’ (*‘aw*; or) is used by Ibn Baz to include indiscriminately all options he introduces, viz. ‘اشتراكية’ (*‘iṣṭarākiyyah*; socialism), ‘or’ ‘شيوعية’ (*ṣhiyū‘iyyah*; communism) ‘or’ ‘بعثية’ (*ba‘ṭhiyyah*; Baathism).⁷¹ In doing so, Ibn Baz associates all these social actors with atheism and disbelief. Additionally, he uses the additive particle ‘و’ (*wa*; and) in order to represent the atheists in greater detail: ‘and some of their [atheists] fundamentals include denying the Hereafter (and)⁷² Paradise and Hell-fire and disbelief in all religions’. This is an explicitly negative representation as it associates them with what Ibn Baz claims to be atheists and disbelievers (Marx and Lenin), thus presenting them as ‘Others’ who are seen as being lost and opposing the true Muslim creed.

Nationalism (Line 3) is the most common word used by Ibn Baz in the genitive constructions with the negative meaning of the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists). All the occurrences of this genitive construction ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) + ‘القومية’ (*‘alqawmiyyah*; nationalism) appear in one text of Ibn Baz carrying the title ‘Refuting (Arab) Nationalism’. Arab nationalists are constructed by Ibn Baz as deviating from what he considers to be the right path and calling for erroneous beliefs that oppose the ‘pure teaching of Islam’ (for a detailed explanation of the representation of Arab nationalism see Chapter 8).

Lines 2, 4 and 5 (Concordance 6.1) also refer to the ‘Others’ who are viewed as straying from Allah and Islam. All lines include representation of social actors by personalization via categorization using the genitive construction; the noun ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) modified by another noun that indicates the category of social actors.

71. In Arabic ‘أو’ (*‘aw*; or) is always put before each noun that is used as an option whereas it appears before the last noun in the English translation of concordance line 1 (see Chapter 3 for the translation conventions used in this thesis).

72. In Arabic, the additive particle ‘و’ (*wa*; and) is used within sentences to link clauses, phrases, and words which is different from English where a comma is used to separate each item (for more details see Chapter 18 in Ryding (2005)).

Propagandist of deviation (from the truth) and error (Line 2), propagandists of Masonry (line 4) and propagandists of paganism and worshippers of graves (the latter implies some Sufi and Shiite practices) (line 5) are all negatively represented as people who have deviated from the right path. Although lines 2 and 5 refer to the ‘Others’ who are astray, they are also used to indicate the job of the (in-group) pious religious leaders who are viewed as rightly guided in refuting the ‘claims’ of the worshippers of false gods. In summary, then, Ibn Baz uses the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) to negatively represent ‘the Other’ (especially nationalists) who he believes to be against the teachings of Islam. Now let us look at how the other author, Alhawali, uses the same word ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) to represent social actors.

Alhawali uses the words ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) (33 times) and ‘الدعاة’ (*‘addo ‘āh*; the teachers/propagandists) (13 times). Alhawali also uses other word forms of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) as shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Word forms of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) in Alhawali

N	Word		Freq.	Texts
1	دعاة	propagandist	33	3
2	الدعاة	teachers/propagandists	13	5
3	دعاتها	its propagandists	4	1
4	الداعي	the propagandist/causing	2	1
5	لدعاة	for the propagandists	1	1
6	لدعاتها	for its propagandists	1	1

Alhawali uses 6 word forms of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) 56 times in total. However, based on a preliminary concordance analysis, it appears that except for the words ‘الدعاة’ (*‘ddo ‘āh*; the teachers/propagandists) and ‘الداعي’ (*‘addā ‘i*; causing), all the word forms are used to indicated propagandists. The word forms ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists) and ‘لدعاة’ (*lido ‘āt*; for the propagandists/teachers of) appear in genitive constructions to denote different sorts of social actors whose identities are revealed by the meaning of the second noun. These keywords have no collocates in Alhawali. A concordance-based analysis shows how he uses them though.

I shall mainly focus on the most frequently used genitive constructions that denote ‘the Other’ which is ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*; propagandist) (33 times). Alhawali uses ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*; propagandist) to represent different social actors from those in Ibn Baz by personalization via categorization and mostly by means of association. It is used in Alhawali in genitive constructions with ‘اللا دينية’ (*‘alladiniyyah*; irreligion) (5 times), ‘التغريب’ (*‘attaḡreeb*; westernization) (4 times), ‘العلمانية’ (*‘al‘ilmāniyyah*; secularism) (2 times). Alhawali includes ‘الديمقراطية’ (*‘addimoḡraṭiyyah*; democracy) and ‘الإلحاد’ (*‘al‘ilḥād*; atheism) under secularism (each of which is mentioned once) in one of his texts that is mainly written to criticize secularism. Additionally, Alhawali uses the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*; propagandist) with the nouns ‘التفرنج’ (*‘attafarnoḡ*) (once), which is also translated into English as ‘westernization’ and ‘العصرية’ (*‘al‘aṣriyyah*; modernity) (once). Concordance 6.2 shows the range of different ways that Alhawali uses these nouns in genitive constructions with ‘دعاة’ (*do‘āh*; propagandist).

Concordance 6.2 Concordance of ‘teachers/propagandists’ (*do‘āh*; دعاة) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] أما المهزلة التاريخية العظمى (صكوك الغفران)، [...] فلا يستطيع أحد من أعداء الإسلام أو <u>دعاة</u> الطمأنينة [...] أن يزعم أنها وجدت في التاريخ الإسلامي [...]. فهذه المهزلة الأضحوكة لم يعرفها المسلمون حتى في أخط وأحلك عصورهم حين فشا الجهل [...]</p> <p>[...] as for the greatest historical farce (Indulgence: full or partial remission of temporal punishment granted by the Church), [...] no one of the enemies of Islam or <u>propagandists</u> of secularism [...] can claim that it has occurred in the history of Islam [...], Muslims have never known this funniest farce even during their darkest ages when ignorance of religion prevailed [...]</p>
2	<p>[...] كان الأزهر [...] قلعة إسلامية يحسب لها أعداء الإسلام كل حساب، [...] ولذلك ظل الأزهر سجين طويلة محط المقت و مصب اللعنات من قبل <u>دعاة</u> التغريب و اللادينية، حتى جعلوه رأس المشاكل الثقافية في مصر و العقبة الكئود في سبيل النهضة!</p> <p>the Azhar (a religious educational institution in Cairo, Egypt) was a huge religious educational institution that instigated the fears of the enemies of Islam [...] thus (the Azhar) was for many years the target of hatred by the <u>propagandists</u> of westernization (of Muslim countries) and irreligion to the extent that they made it the cause of all cultural problems and an obstacle that hindered development in Egypt!</p>
3	<p>[...] ثم جاء الجيل المستعبد للغرب معلناً عداوته للثقافة الإسلامية و اللغة العربية، و أشهر زعمائه أحمد لطفي السيد، و زميله و رفيق عمره عبد العزيز فهمي، و زوج أخته إسماعيل مطهر، ثم صديقه الحميم طه حسين. [...] لقد كان كل <u>دعاة</u> العامية أناساً مشبوهين و صلتهم بالدوائر الاستعمارية واضحة. و ذلك ما يؤكد أنها كانت جزءاً من المخطط اليهودي الصليبي للقضاء على الإسلام [...]</p> <p>[...] then the West-enclaved generation appeared declaring their enmity to the Islamic culture and Arabic Language. From amongst their leaders are Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayyed (an Egyptian intellectual 1872-1963), his colleague and close friend Abdul Aziz Fahmi (an Egyptian politician 1870-1951), and his brother in law Ismaeel Mazhar (1891-1962) and then his close friend Taha Hussein (an Egyptian writer an intellectual 1889-1973) [...] indeed all the <u>propagandists</u> of using the colloquial [Egyptian Colloquial instead of Classical Arabic] were suspected individuals and their connections with the colonial powers are obvious, which confirms that it was part of the Judo-crusaders' plan to eradicate Islam [...]</p>
4	<p>[...] أما فكره [لطفي السيد] فكان متأثراً جداً بداروين و مل و روسو و أسرايهم من الغربيين، و كان مع كل ناعق من <u>دعاة</u> التفرنج و العصرية. [...]</p> <p>[...] as for his [Lutfi El-Sayyed (an Egyptian intellectual 1872-1963)] intellectual writings, he was under the influence of Darwin, Mill (John Stuart), Rousseau and this sort of Westerners, and he used to support every offensive <u>propagandist</u> of westernization and modernity [...]</p>

Line 1 (Concordance 6.2), which also includes an insinuation of a negative representation of Christianity, indicates that Alhawali uses a hypotactic grammatical structure (sentences with the particle 'أو' ('aw; or) that functions as an additive (see Ryding, 2005, p. 418) to create an association between the 'enemies of Islam and the propagandists of secularism'. In Line 2, Alhawali constructs the Egyptian religious educational institution 'the Azhar', as a target of the propagandists of westernization of Muslim countries and the propagandists of irreligion.

Lines 3 and 4 indicate a different way of representing social actors by nomination in Alhawali. The social actors in Line 3 are not only the 'propagandists of using the colloquial (Egyptian) instead of classical Arabic' who are negatively represented by Alhawali, but rather, as he claims, the 'enemies of Islamic culture'. He explicitly links them to the European colonial powers. In addition, Alhawali represents them as part of what he calls 'the Judeo-Christian plan to destroy Islam'. Further some social actors become points of identification in Alhawali. Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayyed, an Egyptian intellectual (1872-1963), Abdul Aziz Fahmi (an Egyptian politician 1870-1951), Ismaeel Mazhar (1891-1962) and Taha Hussein (an Egyptian writer and intellectual 1889-1973) are all identified by nomination and presented negatively as examples of a generation enslaved by the West and enemies of Islamic culture and Arabic.

The representation by nomination via association (Line 3) of such social actors is linguistically realized by the use of possessive pronouns (his colleague, his close friend) and by the possessive pronouns and familial relationship (his brother in law) which may suggest that Alhawali wants his audience to think that such social actors as connected to each other by familial relationships and friendships rather than being important writers and intellectuals (i.e. guilt by association). In Line 4, the negative representation of social actors by association is further developed. Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayyed is projected to be under the influence of western thinkers. Additionally Alhawali accuses him of being supportive of every 'offensive' propagandist of westernization and modernity.

The differences in usage of ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; propagandists) between the two writers then can be thus summarized. Both writers use the term negatively, to refer to people who they see as ideologically against their own point of view. But Ibn Baz refers to such people more in terms of their role in attacking religion itself (such people are atheists or nationalists), whereas Alhawali tends to construct them more as culturally threatening and thus also “linguistically threatening” – involving westernization or even changing the language that people speak. Additionally, while Alhawali tends to nominate individuals such as Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayyed, it is worth noting here that Ibn Baz is less specific in naming social actors (this point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, section 8.5.1). Having stated the different representations of two Salafi writers of social actors indicated by the keyword ‘دعاة’ (*do ‘āh*; teachers/propagandists), I now move on to sketch how each writer uses the keyword ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of).

6.2.1.2 The representation of ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of) in Ibn Baz and Alhawali

The keyword ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of) is also used in genitive constructions in Ibn Baz to represent many social actors by categorization. Let us first examine the collocates of ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of) in Ibn Baz (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 Collocates of ‘أهل’ (*‘ahl*; the people of) in Ibn Baz⁷³

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	F	Collocate	Eng. trans.	F.	Joint	MI
1	أهل	the people of	244	الجماعة	Majority	21	16	8.383
2				العلم	the religious knowledge	225	93	7.501
3				السنة	the Sunnah	142	33	6.670
4				الإيمان	the faith	135	20	6.021
5				البدع	the impermissible innovative religious practices and beliefs	63	9	5.968
6				الكتب	Book	110	9	5.164
7				الباطل	falsehood	71	5	4.948

The first four collocates in Table 6.4 refer to the in-group social actors. The first and the third collocates are usually used in the 4-word cluster ‘أهل السنة و الجماعة’ (*‘ahlu ssunati*

73. Following the traditional way of writing in Islamic texts I capitalized the collocates ‘Majority, Sunnah and Book’. These collocates refer to well known categorized social actors.

walġama'ah; the people of the Sunnah and the Majority) which refers to the Sunnis as opposed to the Shiites or any other Sufi order. This cluster is used 16 times across three of Ibn Baz's texts. The collocate 'العلم' (*'al'im*; the religious knowledge) is usually used to indicate the people of religious knowledge or scholars of religion. The social actors categorized as 'أهل الإيمان' (*'ahlu 'al'imān*; people of faith) (the fourth collocate in Table 6.4) belong to an inner circle of Muslims as 'إيمان' (*'imān*; faith) usually refers to a higher status in Islam which is a recontextualization of many Qur'anic verses including the following:

{قَالَتِ الْأَعْرَابُ آمَنَّا قُلْ لَمْ تُؤْمِنُوا وَلَكِنْ قُولُوا أَسْلَمْنَا وَلَمَّا يَدْخُلِ الْإِيمَانُ فِي قُلُوبِكُمْ وَإِنْ تُطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ لَا يَلِفْكُمْ مِنْ أَعْمَالِكُمْ شَيْئًا إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ {سورة الحجرات اية ١٤ .

{The desert Arabs say, "We believe (i.e. we have Faith)." Say, (unto them, O Mohammad) "You have no faith; but you (only) say, 'We have submitted our wills to Allah (i.e. we became Muslims), For not yet has Faith entered your hearts. But if you obey Allah and His Messenger, He will not belittle aught of your deeds: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful} I (Holy Qur'an 49:14).

The remaining collocates indicate the 'Other' which is mostly represented negatively. As well as the collocates above, an examination of concordance lines reveals that additionally Ibn Baz uses 'أهل' (*'ahl*; the people of) with nouns such as 'الجاهليہ' (*'alġahiliyyah*; ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) (10 times) and 'الشرك' (*'ašširk*; polytheism) (twice). 'الجاهليہ' (*'alġahiliyyah*; ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) is a collocate of 'أهل' (*'ahl*; the people of) in only two texts of Ibn Baz (MI score 6.603).⁷⁴ I included it in the analysis of social actor representation because it is associated with polytheism which is one of the major semantic foci in Ibn Baz. It is also used by Alhawali (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.2) which makes it more plausible to see Ibn Baz's actual use of this word as compared to that of Alhawali regarding social actor representation. Concordance 6.3 shows these collocates and the social actors designated as the other in Ibn Baz.

74. Table 6.3 shows only the collocates of 'أهل' (*'ahl*; the people of) in three and more of the texts that comprise the Salafi corpus of Ibn Baz.

Concordance 6.3 Concordance of 'أهل' ('ahl; the people of) in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Concordance
	[...] و من العقائد المضادة للعقيدة الصحيحة في باب الأسماء و الصفات عقائد أهل البدع : من الجهمية ، و المعتزلة ، و من سلك سبيلهم في نفي صفات الله عز و جل [...] [1]
1	[...] and some of the erroneous beliefs that contradict the authentic Islamic creed, in the aspect of Allah's names and attributes, are the beliefs of the people of impermissible religious innovative practice and beliefs such as the Jahamites, the Mu'tazilites and those who followed their way in nullifying the names and attributes of Allah, the Majestic and Exalted in Mighty [...] [2]
2	[...] و قال سبحانه: (و لا يُؤتاهم بغيري إلا جنتك بالحق و أحسن تفسيراً) قال بعض السلف : هذه الآية عامة لكل حجة يأتي بها أهل الباطل إلى يوم القيامة. [...] and the Glorified said: {And no example or similitude do they bring (to oppose or to find fault in you or in this Qur'an), but We reveal to you the truth (against that similitude or example), and the better explanation thereof} and some of the (religious scholars of) the Salaf said: This Qur'anic verse is general and suitable to refute all arguments that are brought up by the people of falsehood till the Day of Resurrection. [3]
3	[...] اتعلق بالأموات و الملائكة و الجن و غيرهم من المخلوقات ، و دعاهم و الاستعانة بهم و تحر ذلك من عمل أهل الجاهلية المشركين ، و من اتبع الشرك بالله سبحانه فأوجب تركه و الحذر من ذلك [...] [...] depending on dead people, angels, the Jinn (the genies) and other creatures, calling on to them and seeking their protection etc... All these are the practices of the people of Jahiliyyah (the pre-Islamic days), who were polytheists, which are the worst aspects of associating others with Allah, the Glorified. Thus All Muslims should beware of and avoid these practices [...] [4]
4	[...] و منها قوله تعالى : {و لا تُجادلوا أهل الكتاب إلا بآتي هي أحسن} و أهل الكتاب : هم الكفرة من اليهود و النصارى ، فلا يجوز جدالهم إلا بآتي هي أحسن [...] [...] and another example: Allah, the Exalted, said: {And argue not with the people of the Book, unless it be in (a way) that is better (with good words and in good manner). The people of the Book are the infidels who are the Jews and Christians. Thus it is not permissible to argue with them (invite them to Islamic Monotheism) unless in a good manner [...] [5]
5	[...] و أصبح أهل الحق في سائر الأمصار الذين عرفوا كتبهم [الشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب و تلاميذه] ، [...] يتشرون دعوتهم ، و يستعينون بما أنفوا في هذا الشأن على خصوم الإسلام و أعداء الإسلام في كل مكان، من أهل الشرك و البدع و الخرافات [...] [...] and the people of truth in every country who read their books [Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and his disciples] advocated their call (to monotheism) and seek the help of such books to refute the arguments of the enemies of Islam who are the people of polytheism, impermissible innovative religious practice and beliefs and superstitions [...] [6]

The concordance lines in Concordance 6.3 above designate 5 different social actors that are represented by means of personalization via categorization negatively in Ibn Baz. In personalizing social actors, Ibn Baz uses the collocates 'البدع' (*albida*; the impermissible innovative religious practices and beliefs) (Line 1), 'الباطل' (*albatil*; the falsehood) (Line 2), 'الجاهلية' (*aljahiliyyah*; the ignorance of pre-Islamic days) (Line 3), 'الشرك' (*asširk*; the polytheism) (Line 5). These nouns carry negative associations such that when they are used with the keyword 'أهل' ('ahl; the people of) negative meaning are associated with the social actors that these words designate. In line 1, the Other is constructed negatively as having erroneous beliefs that contradict Islamic creed. Additionally, the Other is referred to as engaging in *innovative* practices, which is seen as *impermissible* (also referred to in line 5). In line 2, a Qur'anic verse is referred to as being suitable in refuting arguments of 'the people of falsehood'. Thus, Ibn Baz advocates that such people need to be defeated, although via rhetorical (rather than physical) means.

As for the noun 'الكتاب' ('*alkitāb*; the Book) which, in Ibn Baz, refers to any of the Holy Scriptures (in the Abrahamic religions) and when he uses it with 'أهل' ('*ahl*; the people of) it refers to the Jews and Christians who have varying (positive or negative) Qur'anic representations depending on certain historical and Qur'anic contexts. In Line 3, the people of the Book (Jews and Christians) are represented negatively as disbelievers of Islam. However, according to Ibn Baz who based his argument on the Qur'anic verse 29:46, Muslims should argue with them in a good manner (Line 4), which continues the theme in line 2 of Ibn Baz advocating that his followers defeat 'the Other' via argument (see Section 7.5.2). Now let us investigate the use of the word 'أهل' ('*ahl*; the people of) in Alhawali.

The word 'أهل' ('*ahl*; the people of) has no collocates in Alhawali so again I have relied on concordance based analysis. Concordance 6.4 shows a sample of cases of this word being used by Alhawali.

Concordance 6.4 Concordance of 'أهل' ('*ahl*; the people of) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] و قال رحمه الله في تفسير قوله تعالى: ((أَفَكُمُ الْجَاهِلِيَّةُ يَبْخُونَ وَمِنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللَّهِ حُكْمًا لِقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ)) [المائدة:50]: ((ينكر الله تعالى على من خرج عن حكم الله [...] كما كان أهل الجاهلية يحكمون به من الضلالات والجهالات، مما يضعونها بأرائهم وأهوائهم [...]) [...] and in his explication of following Qur'anic verse: {Do they then seek the judgement of (the days of) Ignorance? And who is better in judgement than Allah for a people who have firm Faith}(Holy Qur'an 5:50), Ibn Kathir's (1301-1373), may Allah have mercy on him, said: Allah, the Glorified, rejects that people adhere to other than the Sharia of Allah [...] such as the practice of the people of Jahiliyyah (the pre-Islamic days) who referred to the laws of misguidance and ignorance which they invented based on their opinions and desires [...]
2	[...] وهذا هو الفارق الجوهرى الأول فى المسألة بين الإسلام والنصرانية المحرفة، [...] و لذلك جاءت دعوة النبى صلى الله عليه وسلم أهل الكتاب مناسبة لمقتضى الحال التى كانوا عليها، من عبادة الأفراد وتقدس المخلوقين [...] [...] and this is the first essential difference in this issue [authoritarian priesthood] between Islam and the distorted Christianity [...] and for that reason [the control of people's lives by priests] the invitation that the Prophet (of Islam), may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him, directed to the people of the Book to Islam was appropriate to their situation as they worshipped individuals (priests) and Sanctified the created ones (humans) [...]
3	[...] وفى بداية الأمر علينا أن نستحضر فى أذهاننا الصورة الساخرة التى وصف بها المؤرخون المسلمون ديانة الإفرنج الصليبيين [...] ومنها: تبرج النساء وخروج غالبيهن عن الحشمة والحياء، [...] فملت إليهم (أي إلى الفرنسيين) نفوس أهل الأهواء من النساء الأسافل [...] [...] at the start we should conceptualize the sarcastic description made by the Muslim historians of the cuckolding behaviour of the French Crusaders [...] such as allowing their women to flaunt themselves where most of these women show themselves indecently and shamelessly [...] some Muslim women [in Egypt] liked them (the French Crusaders [due to their behaviour with their women]). these women are from among the people of whom (those follow their desires) who belong to the lowest class [...]
4	[...] و كذلك عرفهم صلى الله عليه وسلم من أدلة التوحيد والنبوة والمعاد والرد على جميع فرق أهل الكفر والضلال [...] [...] and [the Prophet] may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him, taught them (Muslims) the indications and proofs of monotheism, prophethood, the final return and refuting all arguments of all the factions of the people of infidelity and error [...]

Both Ibn Baz and Alhawali use 'الجاهلية' (*'alġahiliyyah*; the ignorance, i.e. the pre-Islamic days) and 'الكتاب' (*'alkitāb*; the Book) to refer to the same social actors but for different legitimization purposes. In Line 1, the historical 'أهل الجاهلية' (*'ahlu alġahiliyyah*; the people of ignorance – in the pre-Islamic days) are also represented negatively as inventing laws based on their opinions and desires. Alhawali therefore is disapproving of people following their own desires in preference of those set out by Allah.

In Islam the 'أهل الكتاب' (*'ahlu alkitāb*; the people of the Book) are always used to represent both Jews and Christians. However, Alhawali uses 'أهل الكتاب' (*'ahlu alkitāb*; the people of the Book) in Line 2 to mainly mean the Christians representing Christianity as a distorted religion. Another nomination of the Christians also appears in Line 3, viz., the crusaders. Here Alhawali negatively represents some Muslim women (in Egypt) as people of whom who belong to the lowest class of the society because, according the historians quoted by Alhawali, these women imitated and liked the crusaders. These women are categorically represented and associated with the French crusaders (men) who are also represented negatively as engaging in cuckolding behavior. Another representation by categorization is in Line 4 where Alhawali negatively represents all factions who he sees as against Islam, considering them to be the people of infidelity and error.

Therefore, both Salafi authors use the word 'أهل' (*'ahl*; the people of) to negatively represent different types of social actors who according to Salafis belong to 'the Other' by personalization via categorization. However, Alhawali and Ibn Baz differ in using the genitive construction 'أهل الكتاب' (*'ahlu alkitāb*; the people of the Book). While Ibn Baz refers to the Jews and Christians utilizing a Qur'anic verse to state that Muslims should argue with them in a good manner, Alhawali uses the same genitive construction to mainly mean the Christians representing Christianity as a distorted religion and equating them with the Crusaders. So far I have outlined the representation of social actors in Ibn Baz with a special

focus on the representation of the ‘Other’. Now let us turn to examine the representation of social actors in Alhawali.

6.3 Social actor representation: Alhawali’s keywords

This section is devoted to analysing the representation of social actors in Alhawali. Table B3 (Appendix B) shows 37 keywords that indicate social actors in Alhawali. Based on preliminary collocational and concordance-based analyses, I have classified them according to their functions into seven categories as shown in Table 6.5. It is worth mentioning that the category ‘the Other’ is referred to by different keywords that also fall under other categories in Table 6.5. Some of these social actors have already been discussed in Chapter 5 so will not be examined here.

Table 6.5 Categories of social actors in Alhawali

N	Categories	Keywords	
1	General social actors	the human, mankind, the researchers, the world	
2	Countries and nationalities	the American (feminine)/(Unites States) of America, America, the United, Egypt, Iraq, the regime, the (United) States (of America), the governments/the countries, the American (adj. masculine), Israel, Soviet (Union), France, the government/the country, the union/Union	The Other
3	Locations	Europe, the West, the (Christian/Western/Crusaders) World, European, the Western (societies/countries/Europe)	
4	Religion	(clergy)men, the Jewish, the Pope, the Churches	
5	abstraction	communism/communist	
6	Names and personal pronouns	I, Hussein	
7	In-group social actors	Christ, Egypt, Iraq, Arab/Arab (world)/Arabic/Arabian (Gulf), Turkey, Muslim (World/society), the Gulf	

Unlike Ibn Baz’s (mostly positive) theological categories of social actors, we first observe that nearly all of the keywords in Alhawali refer to social actors anonymously in political terms with the exception of the categories labeled ‘Religion’ and ‘Names and personal pronouns’. Second, the majority of social actors in the categories above are represented by Alhawali as ‘the Other’ which mostly refer to the West and Western countries, whereas the in-group social actors are far less in number (seven keywords only). Taken collectively, the

relative frequency of all keywords relating to ‘the Other’ is 5.2% in Ibn Baz and 72.8% in Alhawali, indicating that Alhawali is much more concerned with ‘the Other’ than Ibn Baz.

Some keywords are used by Alhawali to represent two or more types of social actors as in ‘the world’ which is used to represent opposite and conflicting ‘worlds’ as in ‘Muslim/Arab/Christian/Crusaders’ World’ or just simply the whole world. Thirdly, most of the keywords carry metonymical references (see below). Despite the fact that ‘Christ’ is an important Christian figure, I have included him in category 7 that shows in-group social actors. The case is so, because ‘Christ’ is considered by Alhawali, as is the case in Islam, as a messenger of Allah where all Muslims should believe in him and his message as indicated in many Qur’anic verses such as the following:

{قُولُوا آمَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَمَا أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْنَا وَمَا أُنْزِلَ إِلَىٰ إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَإِسْمَاعِيلَ وَإِسْحَاقَ وَيَعْقُوبَ وَالْأَسْبَاطِ وَمَا أُوتِيَ مُوسَىٰ وَ عِيسَىٰ وَمَا أُوتِيَ النَّبِيُّونَ مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ لَا نُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَحَدٍ مِنْهُمْ وَنَحْنُ لَهُ مُسْلِمُونَ} سورة البقرة، آية ١٣٦.

{Say (O Muslims), "We believe in Allah and that which has been sent down to us and that which has been sent down to Abraham, Ishmael, Isāc, Jacob, and to Al-Asbat [the offspring of the twelve sons of Jacob], and that which has been given to Moses and **Jesus** [Christ], and that which has been given to the Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and to Him we have submitted (in Islam)}. Holy Qur’an 2:136.

A concordance examination of the keyword ‘أنا’ (‘ana; I) in category 7 found that this word was not used by Alhawali to directly project what he thinks or believes.⁷⁵ In all the cases of this word, Alhawali uses ‘I’ to quote (mostly western) writers writing or speaking about their views. Let us first have a brief look at Alhawali’s representations of the social actors, after which I shall select examples that show the most prominently used sociosemantic categories.

In the first category ‘General social actors’, Alhawali anonymously represents three social actors by personalization via categorization (‘the human’ and ‘mankind’) and functionalization (as in ‘researchers’). Based on a preliminary concordance analysis,

75. Unlike English, the pronoun ‘I’, as well as other pronouns that indicate the subject (or object) in Arabic, could be incorporated into the verb inflectional suffixes (Ryding, 2005, p. 63). Such inflections appear as part of the verb that could not be recognized by WordSmith as separate words.

Alhawali also uses 'the researchers' argumentatively (see Section 7.5 below). Most of the social actors in the second (the largest category) and the third categories are metonymically represented by Alhawali. They are represented by impersonalization by means of objectivation via spatialization such as 'the (United States of) America', 'Israel', 'Soviet (Union)', 'Europe' and 'the West'. This particular way of representing social actors indicates a major difference between the two writers as there were no spatialization keywords in Ibn Baz. In the fourth category, Alhawali uses other nomination strategies that represent social actors in other religions, namely, Christianity and Judaism. The sociosemantic representations of the social actors in category 4 (Table 6.5) are categorization ((clergy) men), classification via religionym (the Jewish), functionalization (the Pope) and impersonalization via objectivation (the Churches). Another representation of social actors by impersonalization is shown in category 5 where Alhawali represents communists by means of abstraction (see below).

The only representation of social actors by nomination in the Table 6.5 is 'Hussein'. There are actually three key figures that are represented by this nomination in Alhawali: two political leaders, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1937-2003) and King Hussein of Jordan (1935-1999), who is nominated by honorification (see p. 207), and one main intellectual, Taha Hussein (an Egyptian influential writer 1889-1973). Alhawali's representation of the in-group social actors therefore varies between nomination (Christ) to personalization by means of categorization (Arab) and objectivation via spatialization (Arab world and Muslim world). Now let us consider how Alhawali represents 'the Other' as compared to Ibn Baz.

6.3.1 The representation of the 'Other' in Alhawali

As I have indicated above, the keywords that indicate 'the Other' in Alhawali outnumber those that indicate the in-group social actors (81% of the social actor keywords indicate 'the

Other'). This indicates Alhawali's interest in representing the 'Other' more than in-group social actors, when compared to Ibn Baz. Table 6.6 below shows these keywords.

Table: 6.6 Keywords that indicate 'the Other' in Alhawali

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	F	F. Baz	Keyness	N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	F	F. Baz	Keyness
1	أوروبا	Europe	263	4	233.322	14	الدول	the governments/ the countries	115	10	65.642
2	الغرب	the West	181	6	142.034	15	الأمريكي	the American	69	1	61.514
3	الأمريكية	the American, (Unites States) of America	137	1	129.309	16	الأوروبي	the European	55	0	55.921
4	أمريكا	America	137	4	110.289	17	الغربي	the western	67	2	53.697
5	العالم	the world; (Christian/ Western/ Crusaders') World	305	52	109.48	18	إسرائيل	Israel	83	7	48.076
6	دول	governments/ countries	96	0	97.615	19	البابا	the Pope	42	0	42.702
7	الغربية	the Western (societies/ countries/ Europe)	110	2	95.467	20	السوفيتي	Soviet	40	0	40.668
8	المتحدة	the United/ United	93	0	94.564	21	فرنسا	France	40	0	40.668
9	الأوروبية	the European (feminine)	92	0	93.547	22	الدولة	the government, the country	112	20	38.392
10	الشيوعية	communism/ communist	124	6	88.502	23	الاتحاد	the union, Union	36	0	36.601
11	النظام	the regime	88	1	80.353	24	الكنائس	the Churches	29	0	29.484
12	الولايات	the (United) States (of America)	77	0	78.293	25	أنا	I	29	0	29.484
13	رجال	(clergy)men	123	12	66.161	26	حسين	Hussein	45	3	28.828

Some of the keywords in Table 6.6 have already been seen in Table 5.1 when we considered the semantic foci keywords of Alhawali. In Chapter 5, we have already considered keywords, *the West* and *Israel*, which were classified as semantic foci although during the analysis it emerged that Alhawali sometimes constructed them as social actors. As the analysis of these words (and similar words like *America*) has already been undertaken, it is not the intention of this chapter to replicate the contents of Chapter 5.

Therefore, based on the criteria in Section 6.2 above, the keywords 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; (clergy) men) and 'الشيوعية' (*'aššyo 'iyyah*; communism/communist) were selected for the analysis. Let us take each in turn.

6.3.1.1 The representation of 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; (clergy) men) in Alhawali and Ibn Baz


The keyword 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men) occurs in 4 of Alhawali's texts (123 times), but he extensively uses it in one text that is devoted to discussion of 'Secularism' (115 times). 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men) is an indefinite noun that is usually used in annexation constructs with other nouns where the second noun identifies the first (in this case 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men)). The only collocate of the keyword 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men) in Alhawali is 'الدين' ('*addeen*; the religion) (MI score 7.694). Both the keyword 'رجال' (*riḡāl*; men) and its co-occurring collocate (joint frequency 72) make the Arabic nominal phrase 'رجال الدين' (*riḡālo 'addeen*; the men of religion) which is usually translated into English as 'clergymen'.

Concordance 6.5 Concordance of 'رجال الدين' (*riḡālo 'addeen*; clergymen) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	[...] سبق القول بأن الكنيسة تملك الإقطاعيات برقيتها، وأن بعض رجال الدين كان يملك الآلاف من الأرقاء، غير أن ذلك لم يقع الكنيسة، بل أرغمت أتباعها على العمل المجاني في حقولها وفي مشروعاتها، لاسيما بناء الكنائس والأضرحة [...] <p>[...] I have said that the Church owns fiefdoms and the slaves who live on them and that some clergymen used to own thousands of slaves. But that was not sufficient in the eyes of the Church, it obliged its followers to work as labor in its fields and projects without payment, especially in building churches and graves (of holy men) [...]</p>
2	وقد أدرك أتباع دينه هذه الحقيقة وكانت إحدى دوافع اعتناقه للإسلام يقول: (الوسيلة هي إحدى كبريات المسائل التي فاق بها الإسلام جميع الأديان، إذ ليس بين الله وعبده وسيط ولا نبي في الإسلام قسوسة ولا رهبان، [...]). إن الإسلام ليس فيه شيء اسمه رجال دين أصلاً، بل إن هذه الكلمة المحدثه لا يستعملها إلا مغرض مضلل أو ساذج مخدوع. [...] <p>Étienne Dinet (French Orientalist painter 1861-1929) realized this fact [Muslims do not take human individuals as a means of access to Allah] which is one of the issues that motivated him to embrace Islam. He says: (The Islamic concept of "Wasilah" [i.e. seeking the way to approach to Allah] is one of the greatest Islamic concepts that distinguish Islam from other religions. There are no intercessors between Allah and His worshiper. Additionally, there are neither priests nor monks in Islam, [...]). Indeed, clergymen do not exist in Islam. This newly imported denomination [clergymen] is only used by people who have agendas against Islam or those who blindly follow them [...]</p>
3	وكان من الأسس الباطلة التي بنى عليها رجال الدين مبررات وجودهم مبدأ "التوسط بين الله والخلق"، الذي يقتضي ألا يذهب الإنسان إلى رجل الدين ليطلبه كيف يريد الله، بل ليعبد الله بواسطته، [...]، وحسب هذا المبدأ نصب رجال الدين أنفسهم أنداداً لله تعالى وأوقعوا أتباعهم في الشرك الأكبر (اتخذوا محبتهم و رهبنتهم أرباباً من دون الله) {التوبة: 31} <p>And among the invalid principles that clergymen used to legitimate their positions in the Church is the principle of intercession between Allah and His creatures. This principle requires that people do not go to the clergyman to teach him how to worship Allah, but to worship Allah through him, [...], based on this principle, the clergymen set up themselves rivals to Allah, the Exalted, and made their followers commit greater polytheism {They (Jews and Christians) took their rabbis and their monks to be their lords besides Allah (by obeying them in things which they made lawful or unlawful according to their own desires without being ordered by Allah)} Holy Qur'an 9:31</p>
4	[...] فالتكبرياء يقوم بينهم على هذا التوسط فرجل الدين هو الواسطة، فممكن الاستغفار إلا عن طريقه، ولا يمكن الصدقة إلا عن طريقه! حتى إنه يفسر كثيراً من الصلوات وأمر الناس عند الموت، وعند الميلاد، وعند الزواج، وأمر كثيرة لا بد أن يقوم بها القسيس، وإن لم تفعل لأي إنسان فإنه بعد محروماً من الجنة، ومن ذلك احتكارهم لقراءة وتفسير الإنجيل. فممكن لأحد أن يقرأ الإنجيل أو يفسره إلا رجال الدين، ويقرءونه باللغة القديمة، وليس باللغات المعاصرة واللهجات المحلية التي كانت في أوروبا. <p>[...] The Catholics' religion is based on intercession and the clergyman is the intercessor. Thus, seeking forgiveness and charity giving should be through him! (he controls every aspect) to the extent that he initiates many rituals that concern people's life, death, marriage and many other aspects that if not initiated by priests for individuals they are considered deprived from God's paradise. Additionally, they control reading and explicating the Gospel. No one is able to read or explicate it, but the clergymen. They read it in an old language and not in the modern European languages and dialects.</p>

The men who are represented in Concordance 6.5 are the 'clergymen' in Christianity that Alhawali categorically and ideologically represents negatively. Line 1 represents clergymen

as well as the Church as having an ardent desire to enslave people. Utilizing the words of Alphonse-Etienne (aka Nasreddine) Dinet (a French Orientalist painter 1861-1929) about Islam, Alhawali draws a comparison (Line 2) between Islam and Christianity, denouncing clergymen whom he also describes as monopolizing access to the Bible (Line 4). Alhawali’s rejection of such appellation to be ascribed to Muslim Sheikhs (Line 2) reveals his negative stance towards Christianity and clergymen. In Line 3 Alhawali quotes a Qur’anic verse to further denounce clergymen who, according to him, set up themselves as rivals to Allah, which he labels as resulting in polytheism. Additionally, Alhawali uses the keyword ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) in annexation constructs with other nouns that denote Christian social actors, namely, ‘الكنيسة’ (*’alkaneesah*; the Church) and ‘اللاهوت’ (*’allāhūt*; theology) as indicated by the following extracts:



In the first extract, Alhawali accuses men of the Church as well as members of Monasteries (clergymen) of engaging in immoral conduct. He further negatively intensifies his claim by adding that ordinary (not religious) individuals refrain from doing such acts. Alhawali is vague by not naming the acts that such individuals carry out but instead refers to them as ‘immoral conduct’. In Section 6.2.1.2 above, Alhawali is also vague in his projection of the cuckolding behavior of the crusaders. It is likely that he does not describe the ‘sexual acts committed by the men of the Church and the crusaders’ because revealing such acts is socially and religiously unacceptable in Islam (see Section 8.6 in Chapter 8 for more

information on morality in the West). But the mere mention of such behavior makes it reasonable to his audience to reject not only the teachings of the Church but the West as a whole as being involved in such undesirable (to him) sexual behavior. Additionally, he (in the second extract) uses the keyword ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) to denote the people of the Church (theologians) as oppressing Enlightenment intellectuals such as Voltaire (French philosopher 1694-1778), although as shown in other sections (e.g. 5.3.1), Alhawali has also been critical of western philosophical movements which reveals a contradiction in Alhawali’s stance towards the Enlightenment intellectuals.

While the keyword ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) is mostly used by Alhawali to denigrate social actors in Christianity, Ibn Baz uses the word ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) 12 times to denote different social actors (as shown in the sample of concordance lines in Concordance 6.6).

Concordance 6.6 Concordance of ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] فأفضله [العلم الشرعي] وأعظمه وأشرفه ما يتعلق بالله وأسمائه وصفاته، و هو علم العقيدة، [...] و يلتحق بذلك علم السيرة النبوية، و التاريخ الإسلامي، و تراجم رجال الحديث و أئمة الإسلام، و يلتحق بذلك كل ما له صلة بهذا العلم.</p> <p>[...] and the best and the most honourable [amongst the fields of religious knowledge] is what pertains to Allah’s names and attributes which is the field of Creed [...] in addition, the Prophetic hagiography, Islamic history, and the hagiographies of the <u>men</u> of Hadith (Prophetic tradition reporters) and Muslim Imams and all fields that pertain to it.</p>
2	<p>و أوجه نصليحني أيضا إلى أقوام من المسلمين يعيشون بينهم [من لا يحكم شرع الله]، و قد علموا الدين، و شرع رب العالمين، و مع ذلك لا زالوا يتحاكمون عند النزاع إلى رجال يحكمون بينهم بعبادات و أعراف، [...] مشابهيين في ذلك صنيع أهل الجاهلية الأولى.</p> <p>and, also, I advice some Muslims who live with those [who, in matters of dispute, do not refer to the Sharia Laws]. Despite they have studied Islam and the Sharia of Allah, they still, in matters of dispute, refer to <u>men</u> who refer to costumes and traditions, [...] which reflect the behaviour of the people of pre-Islamic era.</p>
3	<p>[...] و يقرؤون تلك الأوراد في مجالس الذكر، أو في المساجد بعد صلاة المغرب، زاعمين أنها قريبة إلى الله، كقولهم: بحق الله، رجال الله، أعيوننا بعون الله، و كونوا عوننا بالله [...] أن هذه الأدعية و أنواع الاستغاثات التي يبتئها في بئئها في سؤالك، كلها من أنواع الشرك الأكبر لأنها عبادة لغير الله، و طلب لأمر لا يقدر عليها سواه</p> <p>[...] they read such prayers in a place with others or in Mosques after the Maghrib (the sun set prayer) claiming that such prayers bring them close to Allah. In these prayers they say: Oh <u>men</u> of Allah, by the right of Allah, provide us with the help of Allah and be our supporters [...]. Verily, such prayers and the types of beseeching help that you mentioned in your question are all considered different kinds of major polytheism, because they are types of worshipping other than Allah and requesting matters that no one can do but Allah</p>
4	<p>و لقد أحسن الكاتب الإسلامي الشهير: أبو الحسن الندوي في رسالته المشهورة: (اسمعوها مني صريحة: أيها العرب) حيث يقول [...] : (فمن المؤسف المحزن المخجل أن يقوم في هذا الوقت في العالم العربي، رجال يدعون إلى القومية العربية المجردة من العقيدة و الرسالة، [...]. إنها جريمة قومية تبرز جميع الجرائم القومية، التي سجلها تاريخ هذه الأمة، [...].</p> <p>Verily, the great Islamic (Indian) writer AbulHasan Nadvi (1913-1999) did well in his famous letter (A Frank Call to the Arabs). He said [...] : it is shamelessly sad that in this stressful time in the Arab World, some <u>men</u> call for Arab nationalism disregarding the Islamic message and Creed, [...]. It is the most devastating among the nationalistic crimes in the history of this (Muslim) nation, [...]</p>

Ibn Baz uses the noun ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) in annexation constructions to represent both in- and out-group social actors. Line 1 (Concordance 6.6) shows Ibn Baz’s positive representation of the medieval reporters of the Prophetic Hadiths whose hagiographies, according to Ibn Baz

as well as the Salafi religious leaders, are an integral part of the religious knowledge. In Line 2, Ibn Baz, from a Salafi standpoint, rejects the reference to Laws other than the Sharia. He uses the indefinite plural noun ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) as opposed to Allah that connote negative meaning (i.e. the divine vs. the human). In Line 3, the association between men and Allah is not as positive as it appears to be. On the contrary, Ibn Baz rejects beseeching help from individuals nominated by Sufis as ‘رجال الله’ (*riḡāl ’allah*; the men of Allah). He considers such Sufi practices to be major polytheism (detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). In Line 4 in Concordance 6.6, Ibn Baz negatively represents those who call for Arab nationalism quoting Nadvi’s (an Indian Islamic writer 1913-1999) call to the Arabs. Nadvi sarcastically blames some (Arab) men who call for Arab nationalism rather than Islam.

Therefore, both authors utilize the word ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) to represent different sorts of social actors. On the one hand, Alhawali is mostly concerned with the discursive construction of social actors in other religions, mainly clergymen in Christianity, negatively representing them as engaging in immoral sexual conduct. In his discussion of the Church and its theologians, Alhawali claims that they oppressed Enlightenment intellectuals. Such oppression, according to Alhawali, forced people in the West to abandon religion (Christianity) and adopt secularism (for more discussion of Alhawali’s representation of the Church and the West see Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.5 in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Thus Alhawali represents the Western world as full of corruption and immorality and consequently, whatever comes from the West is viewed as evil. On the other hand, Ibn Baz uses the word ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) to represent both in-group and out-group social actors. The in-group social actors are medieval Salafists (Hadith reporters and the Imams of Muslims) whose hagiographies are recommended by Ibn Baz to be studied as part of what he claims to be the noble (religious) knowledge. The other type of social actors denoted by the word ‘رجال’ (*riḡāl*; men) in Ibn Baz are negatively represented as rivals to Allah in the Sufi rituals and those who call for Arab nationalism.

Let us now consider Alhawali's use of the other keyword that is eligible for analysis in this section, i.e. 'الشيوعية' ('*ʿaššyo 'iyyah*; communism/communist).

6.3.1.2 The representation of 'الشيوعية' ('*ʿaššyo 'iyyah*; communism/communist) in Alhawali and Ibn Baz

The keyword 'الشيوعية' ('*ʿaššyo 'iyyah*) is used to mean either 'communism' (noun: 67 times) or 'communist' (adjective: 48 times) in Alhawali's texts. He uses both word forms to represent the 'Other' by means of impersonalization via abstraction (communism) or by means of personalization via categorization (communist) as in Concordance 6.7.

Concordance 6.7 Concordance of 'الشيوعية' ('*ʿaššyo 'iyyah*; communism/communist) in Alhawali

N	Concordance
1	يقول جارودي (فيلسوف وكاتب فرنسي 1913-2012) [...] "هذه الحقيقة التاريخية" (أن الدين انعكاس لشقاء فعلي) هي التي يلخصها ماركس في تعبير مقتضب "الدين أفيون الشعوب" [...]. ترى الشيوعية أن الفكر البشري انعكاس للواقع المادي، فالعادة هي الأساس الوحيد و عنها ينبثق الفكر و تبتثق المشاعر والأحاسيس، و من هذه المشاعر الذين نشأ. Garaudy (French philosopher and writer, 191-2012) says: 'this historical fact (that religion is a mere reflection of a real misery) is epitomized by the following paraphrased statement of Marx "Religion is the opium of the people" [...]. Thus, communism considers human intellectual activity as a reflection of the materialistic world. The material is the sole base of life from which intellect, feelings and emotions emanate. And religion itself emanates from these feelings.
2	[...] والنظرية الشيوعية دين رسمي متعصب لا يقبل الجدل ولا يسمح بالمنافسة، وكل شيء في الدولة الشيوعية لابد أن ينبثق من العقيدة الماركسية و يتمسك معها، فالعلم يجب تسخير لتثبيت الفكر المادي [...] و الأدب و الفن لابد أن يلتزما بما سمي الواقعية الاشتراكية. [...] و هكذا في كل شيء تريد الشيوعية أن تفرض نفسها عقيدة [...] فهي فكرة جاهلية متكاملة تقابل تماماً الدين بمفهومه الحقيقي الشامل [...] and communism is an intolerant official religion that does not accept discussion or competition. Every activity in the communist country should reflect the Marxist creed and should not contradict it as well. Science should be deployed in the furtherance of the materialistic intellect [...]. Additionally, literature and arts should be confined within the boundaries of the so called socialist realism [...] so; communism wants to impose itself in every aspect of life as a creed [...]. it is a complete <i>jahili</i> (ignorant) idea that confronts the real conclusive meaning of religion
3	[...] أما على الصعيد التطبيقي، فإن الشيوعية تحصر الشرور كلها - منذ بدء الخليقة إلى الآن - في علة واحدة هي الملكية الفردية، ولذلك فإنهم يؤمنون إيماناً أعمى بأن القضاء على الملكية الفردية [...] كفيل بتحقيق الجنة الأرضية، و إزالة كل الشرور و المساوئ التي يعج بها التاريخ و لا تستثني الشيوعية من ذلك شيئاً حتى المرأة فإن الشيوعية الجنسية و الإباحية المطلقة هدف صريح من أهداف الثورات الشيوعية في كل مكان [...] [...] practically, communism confirms that all evils -in all ages- exist as a result of 'private property'. Such convection made them blindly believe that abolition of private property [...] will result in a utopia and eliminate all evil and sufferings of humanity. Communism excludes nothing, even women, to the extent that sexual communism and absolute licentiousness are explicit goals of all communist revolutions [...]
4	و أما حلف وارسو فيضم الاتحاد السوفيتي وأوروبا الشرقية الشيوعية على اختلاف أجناسها و أعراقها التي أصبحت كتلة واحدة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية التي انتهت عام (1945م). [...] فلما ظهر المعسكر الشرقي الاشتراكي اندمجت الفكرة الاشتراكية في الحركات القومية و الوطنية (في العالم العربي) -لأنها كلها مستوردة من الغرب- فقامت الثورة المصرية و حُلّ بها جمال عبدالناصر من فكرة وطنية إلى فكرة قومية Regarding the Warsaw pact, it includes the Soviet Union and the communist countries in Eastern Europe despite the fact that these countries belong to different races and ethnicities which became one block after the Second World War that ended in 1945 [...]. After the emergence of the Socialist Eastern bloc, communism (in the Arab World) was incorporated into nationalistic and patriotic movements - because these ideas were all imported from the West- and when the Egyptian revolution took place, Abdul Nasser (the president of Egypt between 1956 and 1970) changed it from Egyptian patriotic into Pan Arab nationalistic revolution

In his representation of 'الشيوعية' ('*ʿaššyo 'iyyah*; communism) by means of impersonalization via abstraction, Alhawali (Line 1) quoting Roger Garaudy (French philosopher and writer

1913-2012), tries to show how 'communism', in opposing the notion of religion, actually ends up being a religion in itself to its followers, thus it is hypocritical. Additionally, he (Line 2) tells his readers that 'Communism' is a religion and the 'communist' countries control every aspect of their citizens' life. Communism, according to him, is intolerant and a *ḡahili* concept i.e. ignorant and belongs to pre-Islamic thinking (the concept of ignorance ('*alḡahiliyyah*')) is detailed in Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.3). Alhawali continues to represent communism negatively in lines 3 and 4. He claims that communism ignores moral values which, according to him bear the immoral values and disgrace of the *ḡahiliyyah* (i.e. values of the pre-Islamic era) and tries to establish absolute immoral societies (Line 3) as opposed to societies that follow religious moral values using a threat indicating word, 'revolution', to legitimate his stance towards communism (see below). Expanding concordance line 3 (Figure 6.2) reveals more about Alhawali's views of communism and what he believes to be a call to sexual communism and the absolute moral decadence of societies.

Figure 6.2 Expanded version of concordance line 3 in Concordance 6.7

و أما على الصعيد التطبيقي، فإن الشيوعية تحصر الشرور كلها - منذ بدء الخليقة إلى الآن - في علة واحدة هي الملكية الفردية، ولذلك فإنهم يؤمنون إيماناً أعمى بأن القضاء على الملكية الفردية، و قبض الدولة على وسائل الإنتاج كفيل بتحقيق الجنة الأرضية، و إزالة كل الشرور و المساوئ التي يحج بها التاريخ، و لا تستثني الشيوعية من ذلك شيئاً حتى المرأة فإن الشيوعية الجنسية و الإباحية المطلقة هدف صريح من أهداف التورات الشيوعية في كل مكان، فالزواج ينتج الأسرة، و الأسرة في نظرهم أعدى أعداء المجتمع اللاتقي، لأنها تحتم على المرأة أن يملك و يدخر، و الملكية الفردية تقليد إقطاعي استغلالي، إن لم يتم القضاء عليه انتكس المجتمع إلى طور تاريخي أدنى [...]

[...] practically, communism confirms that all evils -in all ages- exist as a result of 'private property'. Such conviction made them blindly believe that abolition of private property [...] will result in a utopia and eliminate all evils and sufferings of humanity. **Communism** includes everything (in the causes of human sufferings), even women, to the extent that sexual communism and absolute licentiousness are explicit goals of all communist revolutions. The case is so, because they believe that marriage establishes family which they consider to be the worst enemy of classless societies. They also believe that marriage demands people to own properties and save money and individual property is an exploitive feudal tradition that if not abolished would cause societies to relapse to a primitive historical epoch [...]

Here Alhawali demonizes communism and represents it as rejecting marriage (a baseless claim) and destroying the basic unit of societies, the family. As in Section 6.3.1.1 above,

Alhawali stresses moral values in order to denigrate communism and the West (further discussed below and in Chapter 8, section 8.5).

In the last concordance line, Alhawali continues to polarize the world by trying to establish a link between the Arab communist and socialist countries (such as Iraq, Syria, South Yemen)⁷⁶ and the Eastern bloc that includes the Soviet Union and the communist countries in Eastern Europe. Additionally, he claims that communism incorporates nationalistic and patriotic movements because they are all imported from the West. Alhawali's last claim of demonizing communism and communists escalates polarization between the West and the Arab world as well as his negative representation of the West as a source of communism, nationalistic and patriotic movements (for Alhawali's representation of the West, see Section 5.3.1). All the lines in Concordance 6.7 thus indicate that Alhawali, from a political point of view, tries to demonize communism and communist countries as well as the West, while constructing the two as having similarities (both are constructed as sexually amoral) (for more information about sexual morality in communism see Field (2007)). Now, let us move to Ibn Baz's representation of communism.

Ibn Baz also uses the word 'الشيعية' ('*aššyo 'iyyah*; communism) as a concept that contradicts Islam. Concordance 6.8 shows such 4 cases.

76. South Yemen is also called The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. It is a socialist state which was established after the British troops left the country in 1967. It was united with north Yemen to form the State of modern Yemen in 1990.

Concordance 6.8 Concordance of 'الشوعية' ('aṣṣyo 'iyyah; communism/communist) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] و بما ذكرناه من الأدلة القرآنية ، و إجماع أهل العلم يعلم السائل و غيره ، أن الذين يدعون إلى الاشتراكية أو الشيوعية أو غيرهما من المذاهب الهدامة المناقضة لحكم الإسلام ، كفار ضلال [...] Based on the previous Qur'anic verses, and the consensus of the people of knowledge (religious leaders), the questioner and others will realize that those, who call for communism or any other subversive doctrines that oppose Islamic Sharia, are apostates and astray [...]
2	ما حكم الذين يطالبون بتحكيم المبادئ الاشتراكية و الشيوعية ، [...] و الجواب : [...] و قد أجمع العلماء على أن من زعم أن حكم غير الله أحسن من حكم الله ، [...] فهو كافر [...] What is the Islamic opinion regarding those who call for arbitration according to the principles of socialism or communism ? [...] the answer to this question: [...] All religious leaders confirm that anyone claims that any law is better than the Sharia of Allah [...] becomes an apostate [...]
3	و لا طريق للتخلص منها [المحن التي تصيب الأمة الإسلامية] و القضاء عليها إلا بعرضها على هذا الميزان العظيم الكتاب و السنة [...]، فإذا تقدم دعاة الشيوعية و الاشتراكية المنكرون لوجود الله (لتقديم حججهم) [...] فارجعوا (أيها المسلمون) إلى كتاب الله و افروا من آياته ما يرشد إلى دلائل وجوده سبحانه [...] The only means to get rid of and eliminate [the calamities that afflict the Muslim nation] is to examine them critically according to the perfect rules of Qur'an and the Sunnah [...] Thus if the propagandists of communism and socialism, the atheists, proceed (to present their argument), you (Muslims) read the Qur'anic verses that guide you to the indicative signs of His existence, the Glorified [...]
4	[...] كما أخبر جل و علا في كتابه العظيم أنه الحكيم العليم القادر على كل شيء جل و علا ، و في هذا أبلغ رد على دعاة الشيوعية و الدهرية و الاشتراكية [...] As the Majestic and the Most High (Allah) informed us in His glorious Book that He is the All-Wise, the All-Knower and has power over all things, the Majestic and the Most High. This is the most profound reply to the propagandists of communism , the <i>dahriyyah</i> (a pre-Islamic atheistic doctrine) and socialism [...]

In the first two lines, Ibn Baz negatively represents people who call for communism as apostates (having abandoned a religion) and of being astray. Also, Ibn Baz represents communism by associating it with other doctrines that he believes to be subversive and opposing Islam. In Lines 3 and 4, Ibn Baz represents those who advocate communism by personalization via categorization. He uses 'الشوعية' ('aṣṣyo 'iyyah; communism) in annexation constructions with the plural noun 'دعاة' (*do 'āh*; propagandists). Additionally, he allocates them in the category 'atheists' as indicated by Line 3 where he offers his advice to return to Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam in order to reject communism and socialism. In Line 4, we can spot two types of Ibn Baz's negative representation of those who call for communism. He represents them by categorization (propagandists of communism) and by association with both the advocates of socialism and the *dahriyyah* (a pre-Islamic atheistic doctrine) whose adherents are negatively represented in the following Qur'anic verse:

{وَقَالُوا مَا هِيَ إِلَّا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا وَمَا يُهْلِكُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ وَمَا لَهُم بِذَلِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَظُنُّونَ}

{And they say: "There is nothing but our life of this world, we die and we live and nothing destroys us except Ad-Dahr (time). And they have no knowledge of it: they only conjecture} Holy Qur'an 45:25.

Both Salafī writers thus represent communism and communists negatively, but each one uses different representation strategies. Alhawali uses both impersonalization via abstraction and personalization by means of categorization whereas Ibn Baz only uses personalization via categorization. Another difference is that Ibn Baz seems to be preoccupied with those social actors who call for communism in the Muslim World as he deems them to be apostates, whereas Alhawali's representation is focused on communism and communists from outside Muslim-majority countries as a threat to societies. In addition, Alhawali connects communism, nationalistic and patriotic movements with the West which is part of a tendency of Alhawali to relate all what he believes to be negative with the West (for more details on the representation of the West in Alhawali see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1). Ibn Baz seems to be offering advice to his readers on how to argue with propagandists of communism (lines 3 and 4) which could be linked to his earlier advice about only arguing "in a good manner" with the people of the Book.

The categorization strategies that both authors used contribute to ideologically constructing two opposing groups of social actors and most notably the out-group that was negatively constructed. This may lead to polarizing the Muslim/Arab societies in the case of Ibn Baz (constructing, via grammatical annexation structures using *the people of* and *men of*, the Shiites and Sufis' practices negatively) and, to a large extent, Alhawali's categorization of the West leads to polarizing the world into mostly the enemies of Islam and the oppressed Muslim/Arab counties which eventually could lead to the rejection of the modernization of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, such polarization (between 'the West' and 'the Muslims') could, as Baker et. al. (2013, pp. 130-5) note, lead to reify these terms and present them 'the West' and 'the Muslims' as in conflict with each other.

The above negative representations of 'the Other' reveal the Salafists' fear and rejection of any western intellectual/industrial or otherwise development. Further, these

representations show their inclination to lead the society to live within the boundaries of their ideological interpretations of the Muslims' sacred texts.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to apply the sociosemantic categories of van Leeuwen (1996; 2008, pp. 23-54) that he utilized in analysing the representation of social actors in English voicing the caveat that social actors representation may differ in some aspects of his categories due to cultural and societal conventions in nominating social actors. However, as I have pointed out in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2.6) that there may be some differences in the category 'nomination by affiliation', the rest of the categories found in the Salafi corpora fit neatly into van Leeuwen's sociosemantic categorization scheme.

In general, both Salafi writers employ different sociosemantic categories in their representation of social actors. Such representation strategies involve both personalization and impersonalization. They utilize the sociosemantic categories of categorization and classification via religionym (Sunnis vs. Shiites and Sufis which serve as ways of polarizing Saudi society) as well as functionalization which indicates the Salafi writers' perception of the social actors referred to. Additionally, both Salafi writers represent some social actors by nomination using honorification titles. But Ibn Baz utilizes nomination by honorification to represent medieval social actors positively (mainly Salafi religious leaders showing his reverence and adherence to their teachings) whereas Alhawali uses the same sociosemantic category to represent modern political social actors (King Hussein of Jordan, and the Iraqi president 'Saddam Hussein') often in a way that represents them as responsible for political actions that resulted in instability of the Arab and Gulf states.

In their representation of 'the Other', both Salafi writers use categorization that serve their legitimization purposes in representing what they believe to be good or bad (Muslim vs. non-Muslim categories for example). Ibn Baz, on the one hand, represents 'the Other' by

categorization selecting theological terms (polytheists, friends of God, and propagandists of doctrines that he conceives of as opposing Islam). On the other hand, Alhawali, additionally, represents ‘the Other’ by impersonalization by means of objectivation via specialization (metonymical references) and abstraction. The metonymical references in Alhawali further develop the divide between two opposing worlds (the West vs. the Muslim and/or the Arab Worlds). As I have noted earlier (section 5.3.1), this form of categorization of social actors as Baker et al (2013, pp. 130-5) note on the construction of ‘the West’ and ‘the Muslims’ by British newspapers, could reify these terms and present them as in conflict with each other. These representations of social actors are all deployed in argumentations that both salafi writers use for different legitimization purposes that I shall explore in the following chapter.

Chapter 7: Argumentation in the Salafi corpora: Ideological legitimization

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to analysing arguments and argumentation schemes that both Salafi writers deploy to legitimate their stances vis-à-vis their representations of social actors as well as the thematic foci they address in their texts. It responds to the following sub-questions:

- 1(c) What do concordance and collocational analyses of keywords and frequent words in the two corpora of Salafi discourse reveal about argumentation indicators? And;
2. What argumentation schemes are employed in the Salafi corpora to legitimize certain positions?

Answering these questions contributes to answering the overarching question: To what extent and how is Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s -1990s homogenous? In identifying arguments I use Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (2004) typology of schemes (see below). I refer to *ideological legitimization* in the title of this chapter, as I am interested in the ways in which the writers from different Salafist ideological perspectives try to persuade and/or convince their audience of certain standpoints concerning religious/politico-religious issues via appeal to their religiously-moulded (Salafi) collective religious, political and moral conceptions of the world.

To reiterate from Chapter 3, Arguments can be classified according to various argumentation schemes. Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones, like argument from expert opinion, that have proved troublesome to view deductively or inductively (Walton,

2005). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) distinguish between three major categories of argumentation schemes: causal argumentation, symptomatic (sign) argumentation and argumentation based on comparisons (argument from analogy). Though their classification scheme is broad, it can help identify the main argumentation schemes in the research data. For example, examples of argumentation scheme by sign could be found by writers utilizing Qur'anic verses as the words of Allah, which according to Muslims, are inherently correct and true.

In order to identify arguments in a corpus, I shall first look for certain lexical elements that serve as indicators. Argumentative indicators (phrases or words) introduce or put forward a standpoint. As explained in section 3.2.3.2 they may also refer to argumentative moves which may include phrases like 'to my mind', 'the way I see it' etc. (van Eemeren et al. 2007; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). In Arabic such indicators may include words like 'لذلك' (*lidālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that) and 'لأن' (*le'anna*; because) that indicate causality or the word 'موقف' (*mawqef*; standpoint/point of view) that could introduce standpoints of opponents. In religious texts, words such as 'ثبت' (*tabata*; it became firm (that the Prophet said)) and 'صح' (*ṣaḥḥa*; it was narrated in a sound Hadith)⁷⁷ indicate warranting arguments utilizing the sayings of the Prophet of Islam.

Therefore, in order to trace arguments in the research data, I shall identify and examine keywords that are likely to indicate arguments as the starting point in the analysis. Additionally, I use collocates and word clusters to further analyse argumentative keywords. The main reason behind using keywords is to search for the most salient arguments which

77. In the field that is called 'the sciences of Hadith' or the study of Prophetic traditions, the Hadith is either accepted or rejected based on the evaluation of the 'سند' (*sanad*; chain of reporters), i.e. the individuals who report the Hadith and the 'متن' (*matn*; the text of the Hadith) or the wording of the Hadith utilizing a number of criteria and principles that concern the credibility of the reporters of the Hadiths and the texts authenticity. Based on such principles the Hadiths are then classified into seven categories each of which is further classified into different types. For more information see the following link: <http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Hadith/Ulum/>.

distinguish the two Salafi authors when they are compared together. I also use word clusters in order to narrow down the scope of analysis to the most commonly used argumentation schemes in the research data. After locating arguments, the identification and evaluation of argumentation schemes will then take place, based on critical evaluation of argumentation schemes (via critical questions, see below) which may result in identifying *topoi*⁷⁸ or fallacies⁷⁹. Let us now move to examine the keywords that indicate arguments in both corpora.

7.2 Identifying key argumentation indicators in the Salafi corpora

Of the 224 keywords in Ibn Baz and 199 keywords in Alhawali, there seem to be fewer keywords that, at face value, indicate argumentation than those which indicate semantic foci or social actors. Based on my own observation of some keywords and a preliminary investigation of collocates and concordance lines of keywords in both corpora, I was able to identify two sets of keywords that indicate arguments in the research data (see Tables 7.1 and 7.3 below).⁸⁰ In order for a keyword to be selected as an argumentative indicator, I specified that it must be used to indicate argumentation in at least 50% of its occurrences. To avoid repetition of analysis, any keywords that I have presented in earlier analyses (such as ‘Allah’ and ‘messenger’, even if they appear to have argumentative functions) will not be included in the analysis of this chapter. It is worth noting here, as I have stated in Chapter 4, that the capitalized ‘He’ refers to ‘Allah’ following the traditional way of referring to ‘Him’ in Islamic discourses. The translations of the keywords are based on a preliminary concordance

78. A *topos* (pl. *topoi*) is a persuasive strategy or rule which connects an argument to a claim or conclusion. *Topoi* are thus broad beliefs which help to maintain an argument without actually constituting the argument itself (see 3.2.3.1).

79. A fallacy is a form of argumentation which appears convincing but is logically flawed –See Reisigl and Wodak (2001, pp. 71–74) and section 3.2.3.1 in this thesis.

80. Tables 7.1 and 7.3 are abridged versions of two more detailed tables (Tables A3 and B3 in Appendices A and B respectively) that show the keywords along with their translations in English, the number of texts that contain the keyword and other statistical details such as percentage frequencies, and p values.

analysis (see Section 3.3.2 for translation conventions followed in this thesis). Let us move to consider the keywords that indicate argumentation in Ibn Baz.

7.2.1 Argumentation indicators in Ibn Baz

Keywords in Ibn Baz that indicate argumentation are tabulated in Table 7.1 below. These keywords are mostly lexical and carry religious meanings. Although these words are key in Ibn Baz, a few are also quite frequent in Alhawali’s texts such as ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) (1,100 times in Ibn Baz and 195 times in Alhawali), ‘السنة’ (*’assonnah*; the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam)⁸¹ (142 times in Ibn Baz and 35 times in Alhawali), and ‘فقال’ (*faqala*; then He/he said) which occurs 85 times in Ibn Baz and 30 times in Alhawali.

Table 7.1 Argumentation indicators in Ibn Baz

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Freq.	F. Alhawali	Keyness
1	قال	He/he said	1100	195	1129.327
2	قوله	His/his saying	221	1	395.1075
3	الآية	the Qura'anic verse/ till the end of the Qura'anic verse	129	5	199.8372
4	الآيات	the Qura'anic verses	138	14	174.8027
5	الأحاديث	Hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet of Islam)	83	4	124.3767
6	السنة	the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam	142	35	120.9175
7	فتوابع	therefore it is obligatory (for Muslims) to	46	0	84.65556
8	رواه	(this Hadith is) narrated by	56	3	82.39207
9	فقال	then (He/he) said	85	30	54.91756
10	الأدلة	the indications (from Qura'an and Prophetic traditions)/ proofs	54	10	54.06848
11	ثبت	it became firm (that the Prophet said)	46	6	53.56055
12	حديث	Hadith	48	9	47.76144
13	لقول	because (He/he) said	24	0	44.16569
14	لأن	because	158	110	39.72014
15	المصحيحين	the two most authentic books of Hadiths	25	1	38.5453
16	آيات	Qura'anic verses	31	4	36.23737
17	صح	it was narrated in a sound Hadith	33	5	36.21875
18	دلت	indicated (fem. Sing. and pl.)	26	2	35.46952
19	بذلك	hence/ by that means	147	105	34.95971
20	دل	indicated (masculine Sing.)	27	3	33.23123

Table 7.1 contains different types of keywords that indicate argumentation in Ibn Baz which I have divided into three categories:

1. Keywords (verbs and nouns) that indicate *narration* of canonical texts (7 keywords)

81. As I have indicated in section 6.2, the keyword ‘السنة’ (*’assonnah*; the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam) could also refer to the social actors ‘the Sunnis’ if it is preceded with the word ‘أهل’ (*’ahl*; the people of). Both keywords occurred jointly (33 times) referring to the Sunnis. The rest of the occurrences (108 times) indicate the Sunnah of the Prophet and once was used to indicate ‘علماء السنة’ (*’olamā’ ’assonnah*; the Sunni religious leaders).

2. Keywords that refer to canonical texts (8 keywords)
3. Grammatical and other keywords (5 keywords)

Table 7.2 shows the categories of the argument-indicating keywords in Ibn Baz (I have only provided the English translations of the words – see Table 7.1 for the original Arabic words).

Table 7.2 Categories of keywords that indicate argumentation in Ibn Baz

N	Categories	Keywords
1	Verbs and nouns that indicate narration from canonical texts	He/he said, His/his saying, (this Hadith is) narrated by, then (He/he) said, it became firm (that the Prophet said), because (He/he) said, it was narrated in a sound Hadith,
2	Nouns that denote canonical texts	the Qura'anic verse/ till the end of the Qura'anic verse, the Qura'anic verses, Hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet of Islam), the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam, the indications (from Qura'an and Prophetic traditions)/ proofs, Hadith, the two most authentic books of Hadiths, Qura'anic verses
3	Grammatical and other keywords	therefore it is obligatory (for Muslims) to, because, indicated (fem. Sing. and pl.), hence/ by that means, indicated (masculine Sing.)

Most of the keywords in the categories above show Ibn Baz’s focus on using keywords that carry religious meanings. The keyword with the highest keyness score is ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) (1100 times). In religious texts, this keyword may indicate reporting the sayings of ‘Allah’, the Prophet of Islam or someone else. It is derived from the root ‘ق و ل’ (*q w l*; to say)⁸². There are three other keywords that are derived from the same root. These keywords are ‘قوله’ (*qawlaho*; His/his sayings), ‘فقال’ (*faqāla*; then He/he said) and ‘لقول’ (*leqawl*; because (He/he) said). It seems that Ibn Baz uses the key term ‘SAY’ to introduce Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions to ideologically legitimate his stances (detailed below).

There are other words such as ‘تقول’ (*taqūl*; she says) that are derived from the same root but will not be considered here as they are not keywords and occur in fewer than three texts. Additionally, the keyword ‘قل’ (*qol/qalla*; you say –imp./to be rare) (91 occurrences) is also used by Ibn Baz but it is not included in the analysis as it is homographic in nature. This word is used by Ibn Baz in two different senses. The first meaning that this word bears in Ibn

82. I follow the traditional grammar text books in writing the roots of Arabic words in disconnected letters.

Baz is 'قل' (*qalla*; to be rare) which is not argumentative (6 occurrences). Secondly, the form of this word that is derived from the root 'ق و ل' (*q w l*; to say) occurs in Ibn Baz as parts of different Qur'anic verses that are introduced by other word forms of the key term 'SAY'. Thus in order to avoid redundancy it will not be included in the analysis. Let us now move to sketch out some other argumentative keywords in Ibn Baz.

The keyword 'فالواجب' (*falwāğib*; therefore it is obligatory (for Muslims) to), in category 3 in Table 7.2, is derived from the root 'و ج ب' (*wa ġa ba*) which basically means 'to be necessary'. Ibn Baz also uses some other keywords that are derived from the same root. These keywords are 'الواجب' (*'alwāğib*; the obligatory (duty)) (keyness score 43.859), 'أوجب' (*'awğaba*; ((Allah) made ... obligatory) (keyness score 45.708) and 'وجوب' (*wağūb*; obligation) (keyness score 41.061). All these terms indicate religious 'injunctions' in Islamic Sharia where they are lesser, in degree, than the 'فرض' (*fard*; an ordinance enjoined by Allah). The denial of the first is a sin that, according to Muslim religious leaders,⁸³ could be forgiven by Allah whereas the denial of the second is infidelity which is a grave sin that is viewed within Islam as going completely against Islam. 'لأن' (*li'anna*; because) and 'لقول' (*liqawl*; because (He/he) said) indicate causality which argumentatively may indicate cause and effect forms of argument. Let us now consider the keywords that indicate the presence of arguments in Alhawali.

7.2.2 Argumentation indicators in Alhawali

The keywords in Ibn Baz (with the exception of 'فالواجب' (*falwāğib*; therefore it is obligatory to) and 'لقول' (*liqawl*; because (He/he) said) are also used by Alhawali, though on a smaller scale. In contrast to Ibn Baz, the keywords that indicate arguments in Alhawali (Table 7.3) do not overtly appear to bear any religious meanings.

83. An exception in rejecting or not doing the obligatory duties is that the Kharijite faction (modern Kharijite faction is called Ibadite who live in Oman and the Nafusa Mountains in Libya) see it as infidelity.

Table 7.3 Argumentation indicators in Alhawali

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	F.	F. Ibn Baz	Keyness
1	كما	as	583	1	580.49
2	إن	indeed/if	750	192	163.557
3	لكن	but	315	60	100.997
4	يمكن	may	154	17	77.139
5	بل	rather/even/however	485	140	72.498
6	لذلك	therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that	136	17	62.826
7	نتيجة	result	70	6	40.231
8	موقف	standpoint/point of view	50	2	37.562
9	الباحثين	the researchers	34	0	34.567
10	أنا	I	29	0	29.484
11	تقول	(she/it/they -fem. pl.) say(s)	57	6	29.367

Preliminary concordance analysis revealed that the keywords 'لذلك' (*lidālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that)⁸⁴ and 'نتيجة' (*natīḡah*; result) indicate causality. The keyword 'موقف' (*mawqif*; standpoint/point of view) is used by Alhawali to introduce the standpoint of people he views as opponents. Of the 50 occurrences of the keyword 'موقف' (*mawqif*; standpoint/point of view), Alhawali uses it to denote the standpoints of the Church (10 times), America (2 times), Europe (3 times), the Soviet Union (once), Freud (an Austrian psychiatrist 1856-1939) (4 times), Iraq, Iran and Kuwait (altogether 5 times) and modern sciences and philosophy (5 times). He uses these standpoints either to support his own viewpoint or refute the stances of his opponents. The keywords 'الباحثين' (*'albahīṭīn*; the researchers –acc.) and 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they –fem. pl.) say(s)) indicate that Alhawali seems to have used another form of appeal to authority other than that of Ibn Baz, who has tended to quote Allah (shown below and elsewhere, see Chapter 4).

'الباحثين' (*'albahīṭīn*; the researchers –acc.) is predominantly used by Alhawali in one text refuting secularism (30 times). His use of 'الباحثين' (*'albahīṭīn*; the researchers –acc.) is not always used in argumentation scheme from authority (symptomatic argumentation). Alhawali generally uses the word 'الباحثين' (*'albahīṭīn*; the researchers –acc.) to refer to

84. The keyword 'لذلك' (*ledālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/to that) does not always indicate causality. Alhawali uses it also to indicate the meaning 'to that' as indicated by the English translation based on a preliminary concordance analysis of the keyword (see Section 7.5 below). It is worth noting here that even Ibn Baz uses the same word to indicate argumentation only 4 times (out of 17 times).

unspecified researchers rather than naming them in his refutations of secularism. In two of his texts, the keyword 'الباحثين' ('*albahithīn*; the researchers –acc.) is pre-modified by its collocate 'بعض' (*ba'd*; some) (joint frequency 8 and MI score 7.504) which anonymously aggregates 'researchers'. This type of personalization (i.e. aggregation), van Leeuwen (2008, p. 37) writes, 'is used to regulate practice and manufacture consensus opinion'. The use of the collocate 'بعض' (*ba'd*; some) could also be considered as a form of the category 'indetermination' which, according to van Leeuwen (ibid, p. 40), 'endows social actors with a kind of impersonal authority, a sense of unseen, yet powerfully felt coercive force'. Alhawali also uses other word forms of the keyword 'الباحثين' ('*albahithīn*; the researchers –acc.) such as the singular form 'الباحث' ('*albahith*; the researcher) (14 times) and the plural form in nominative case 'الباحثون' ('*albahithūn*; the researchers –acc.) (8 times). These word forms are used in different social actor representations such as aggregation as in the plural forms of the word or anonymously classifying social actors.

'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they say(s) – fem. pl.) is a verb derived from the root 'ق و ل' (*q w l*; to say). It carries a suffix that indicates a feminine grammatical subject. Nouns, in Arabic, are classified as either masculine or feminine. Words like 'reports'⁸⁵, newspaper(s), and 'study/studies' are all treated as feminine nouns. Verbs that either follow or precede such nouns therefore have the feminine affix. Of the 57 occurrences of the keyword 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they say(s) - fem. sing./pl.), Alhawali argumentatively uses it 17 times quoting studies and theories, 7 times quoting the media (articles in newspaper and magazines), 7 times non-Islamic religious texts and institutions (such as the Torah, Acts of the Apostles and the Church) and 4 times utilizing quotes from famous westerners including the murder mystery novelist Agatha Christie and the movie star Marilyn Monroe (described in more detail below).

85. The singular form of 'reports' is treated as masculine in Arabic.

Alhawali also uses some other forms of the reporting key term ‘SAY’ in Ibn Baz as indicated by Table 7.1 above which include ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) (195 times) and ‘فقال’ (*faqala*; then He/he said) (30 times) and ‘قل’ (*qol/qalla*; you say –imp./to be rare) (21 times). However, of the 21 occurrences of the word ‘قل’ (*qol/qalla*; you say –imp./to be rare), Alhawali uses it 9 times denoting the meaning ‘to be rare’ which is not argumentative. The rest of the occurrences of this word are used by Alhawali as part of Qur’anic verses that are introduced by other reporting words derived from the root ‘ق و ل’ (*q w l*; to say). All these occurrences are used as warrants in Alhawali’s arguments. He also uses the keyword ‘الباحثين’ (*‘albahitīn*; the researchers –acc.) in the same manner. Let us now explore some of these keywords in more detail in order to examine argumentation schemes in both corpora. I shall present the argumentation schemes in both corpora (Section 7.3), and then I shall evaluate them critically in Sections 7.4 and 7.5.

7.3 Argumentation Schemes in the Salafi Corpora:

Both Salafi writers use argumentative keywords that indicate schemes relating to authority and causality. On the one hand, Ibn Baz uses keywords (in categories 1 and 2 in Table 7.2) that refer to Islamic canonical texts which reveal Ibn Baz’s focus on religious authority. He also uses words such as ‘فالواجب’ (*falwāğib*; therefore it is obligatory to) and ‘لقول’ (*leqawl*; because (He/he) said) that indicate causality. On the other hand, Alhawali uses keywords such as ‘لذلك’ (*lidālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that) and ‘نتيجة’ (*natīğah*; result) which could also be translated as ‘as a consequence or consequently’ that indicate causality. He also uses keywords that indicate arguments from authority, viz., ‘الباحثين’ (*‘albahitīn*; the researchers –acc.) and ‘تقول’ (*taqūl*; (she/it/they say(s) fem. sing./pl.). These two schemes (causality and authority/argumentation scheme from sign), as they are indicated by keywords, seem to be the most salient forms that are used in the texts of the two Salafi authors revealing their authorial stances. Let us look at each argumentation scheme and then

evaluate these arguments based on critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346) that would reveal the (un)acceptability of the arguments and the ideological stances of each Salafī writer. It is worth noting here that I subject the unacceptable arguments only to the critical evaluation. I shall start with the argumentation in Ibn Baz.

7.4 Ideological legitimation (1): Argumentation schemes in Ibn Baz

As I have indicated above, Ibn Baz seems to rely heavily on both Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions to warrant his arguments and legitimate his stances vis-à-vis his representations of social actors as well as the thematic foci addressed in his texts. The key term ‘SAY’ as shown above contains 4 keywords, viz., ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) (frequency 1100, keyness score 1129.327), ‘قوله’ (*qawlaho*; His/his sayings) (Freq. 221, Keyness 395.107), ‘فقال’ (*faqāla*; then He/he said) (Freq. 85, keyness 54.917) and ‘لقول’ (*leqawl*; because (He/he) said) (Freq. 24, keyness 44.165). Due to space and time restrictions I shall only analyze the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) as it is the highest in both keyness and frequency.

The key concept ‘SAY’ collocates with 82 words (see Table A9 in Appendix A). Of the 82 collocates, the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) collocates with 61 words. These collocates could be categorized as follows:

- 1) Collocates that are apparently parts of Qur’anic verses or indicate the Qur’an. The collocates that are parts of the Qur’an are written with diacritics that are mostly used in writing Qur’anic verses in the texts of Ibn Baz and Alhawali.
- 2) Collocates that indicate three types of grammatical subjects: Allah, the Prophet of Islam and some other names and references to Salafī religious leaders.
- 3) Grammatical and other words that indicate none of the above.

These categories of collocates are presented in Table 7.4 below:

Table 7.4 Categorized collocates of ‘قال’ (qala; He/he said) in Ibn Baz

categories	Collocates of ‘قال’ (qala; He/he said)
Qur'an	therefore worship Me, We have sent down, verily, (what) has been revealed (to you (O Mohammad) from your Lord), We have sent, A Book (revelation), verily (Allah) will aid, (did) you not, (if) you (were to) ask them, (it was) incumbent (upon Us), upon Us, they will certainly say, help, that, if (you) were to, false deities, (that) you (may) obtain mercy, end, believers (accusative), this, I (Allah), All-Hearer, created, with full submission, you (mankind) worship, Jinn (genies), (Allah) wills (that something be done), your Lord, the Qur'anic verse/ till the end of the Qur'anic verse, (those) who believed, O (vocative), O (another form of vocative), that He/he
Allah	the Exalted, the Exalted in Mighty, the Majestic, the Most High, the Glorified, other than Him/him
Prophet	the Prophet, messenger, (may Allah send) His peace (upon him)
Salaf	Alhafidh (a higher status of religious leaders in Sunni Islam), (may Allah) have mercy on him, the father of, Malik, Sheikh, the son of, (may Allah) be pleased with him, Imam, (may Allah be pleased) with him
Other collocates	that you may, yes/ best, I said, as, you say (imperative), verily, as, indeed, to you, for this reason, those

Based on a preliminary concordance analysis, all the collocates in the category ‘Qur’an’ were found to be parts of Qur’anic verses. It is also worth mentioning here that nearly all the collocates in this category are written with diacritics either on or under the letters that stand for the phonemes comprising these collocates. Let us first take the collocate ‘فَاعْبُدُونِ’ (fa‘bodūn; therefore worship Me) as an example that indicate Qur’anic verses in Ibn Baz:

Concordance 7.1 Concordance of the collocate ‘فَاعْبُدُونِ’ (fa‘bodūn; therefore worship Me) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	وَقَالَ تَعَالَى : {وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ مِنْ رَسُولٍ إِلَّا نُوحِي إِلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا فَاعْبُدُونِ} ، وَقَالَ عَنْ نُوحٍ and the Exalted said: {And We did not send any Messenger before you (O Muhammad) but We revealed to him (saying): La ilaha illa Ana [none has the right to be worshipped but I (Allah)], therefore worship Me (Alone and none else)} and He said about Nuh (Noah)
2	وَقَالَ تَعَالَى : {وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ مِنْ رَسُولٍ إِلَّا نُوحِي إِلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا فَاعْبُدُونِ} وَقَالَ سُبْحَانَهُ : and the Exalted said: {And We did not send any Messenger before you (O Muhammad) but We revealed to him (saying): La ilaha illa Ana [none has the right to be worshipped but I (Allah)], therefore worship Me (Alone and none else)} and the Glorified said
3	وَقَالَ تَعَالَى : {وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ مِنْ رَسُولٍ إِلَّا نُوحِي إِلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا فَاعْبُدُونِ} وَقَالَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ and the Exalted said: {And We did not send any Messenger before you (O Muhammad) but We revealed to him (saying): La ilaha illa Ana [none has the right to be worshipped but I (Allah)], therefore worship Me (Alone and none else)} and the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said
4	يَقُولُ تَعَالَى : {وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ مِنْ رَسُولٍ إِلَّا نُوحِي إِلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا فَاعْبُدُونِ} ، وَيَقُولُ سُبْحَانَهُ and the Exalted says: {And We did not send any Messenger before you (O Muhammad) but We revealed to him (saying): La ilaha illa Ana [none has the right to be worshipped but I (Allah)], therefore worship Me (Alone and none else)}, and the Glorified says

All the lines above indicate that the collocates ‘فَاعْبُدُونِ’ (*fa‘bodūn*; therefore worship Me) is part of a Qur’anic verse that is preceded either by ‘و قال تعالى’ (*wa qala ta‘āla*; and the Exalted said) (Lines 1, 2, 3, 4) or ‘يقول تعالى’ (*yqolo ta‘āla*; the Exalted says) which refer to Allah. The noun collocates of the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) in ‘Allah’, ‘the Prophet’ and ‘Salaf’ categories are always grammatical subjects. They hold an argumentative authoritative relation with the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said). Below (Concordance 7.2) are examples of these categories. Due to space and time restrictions, I shall present only one concordance line as an example of one collocate that has the highest MI score in each category, i.e. ‘الحافظ’ (*alhafiz*: Alhafidh: a higher status of the scholars of Hadith) (joint freq. 10 and MI score 5.838), ‘تعالى’ (*ta‘āla*; the Exalted) (joint freq. 242 and MI score 5.624) and ‘النبي’ (*‘annabi*; the Prophet) (joint freq. 37 and MI score 3.999):

Concordance 7.2 Examples of noun collocates of the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	<p>[...] ولهذا قال عز وجل: {يا أيها الذين آمنوا لا تأكلوا أموالكم بينكم بالباطل} و قال النبي عليه الصلاة والسلام: ((كل المسلم على المسلم حرام دمه وماله وعرضه)) [...]</p> <p>[...] and therefore the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said: {O ye who believe! Squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity} and the Prophet, may Allah's blessings and peace be upon him, said: (The whole of a Muslim for another Muslim is inviolable: his blood, his property, and his honour) [...]</p>
2	<p>قد دل القرآن الكريم والسنة المطهرة على أن العبادة حق لله وحده ، وأنه لا يدعى إلا الله ، ولا يستعان إلا به ، كما قال تعالى : {إِنَّكَ تُعَبِّدُ وَإِنَّكَ تُشْتَعِبُ} و قال تعالى : {وَأَنَّ الْمَسَاجِدَ لِلَّهِ فَلَا تَدْعُوا مَعَ اللَّهِ أَحَدًا} و قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : ((الدعاء هو العبادة)) [...]</p> <p>Verily the Holy Qur'an and the purified Sunnah of the Prophet indicated that 'worship is to be dedicated to Allah Alone' and no one can be invoked or beseech his help but Allah, as the Exalted said: { You (Alone) we worship and You (Alone) we beseech for help} and the Exalted said: {And the mosques are for Allah (Alone): so invoke not anyone along with Allah} and the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, said: (Supplication is (a form of) worship) [...]</p>
3	<p>[...] و قال موفق الدين ابن قدامة رحمه الله [...] قول رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم حجة ، [...] و قال الحافظ ابن كثير رحمه الله في تفسير قوله تعالى : {الْمُخْذَرُّ الَّذِينَ يُخَالِفُونَ عَنْ أَمْرِهِ أَنْ تُصِيبَهُمْ فِتْنَةٌ أَوْ يُصِيبَهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ} أي : عن أمر رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ، و هو سبيله و منهجه و طريقته [...]]</p> <p>[...] and Mwaffaq Addeen Ibn Qudamah, may Allah have mercy upon him, said [...] and the sayings of the messenger of Allah are competent authority, and Alhafidh Ibn Katheer, may Allah have mercy upon him, said in his explication of the following saying of the Exalted (i.e. The Qur'anic verse) {And let those who oppose his commandment beware, lest some Fitnah (disbelief, trials, afflictions, earthquakes, killing, overpowered by a tyrant) should befall them or a painful torment be inflicted on them}, his commandment is the Messenger's (Muhammad) Sunnah - legal ways, orders, acts of worship and statements [...]</p>

Lines 1 and 2 indicate that Ibn Baz is utilizing Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions in warranting his arguments. This is also reflected by the keywords in categories 1 and 2 (Table

7.4 above) which denote narrations of Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions. According to Muslims the Qur’anic verses are the words of Allah who is the highest divine authority in Islam, whereas the Prophetic traditions are the words that were said by the Prophet of Islam who is the highest human authority in Islam. In order for this warrant to be effective, we have to accept the premise that both the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions are inherently true. This indicates that Ibn Baz, in his arguments, tends to appeal to Allah and the Prophet of Islam as the highest religious authority. As well as referring to Allah and the Prophet, Ibn Baz quotes others. In Concordance 7.2, line 3 nominates one of the influential medieval religious leaders. In this line, Ibn Baz quotes Ibn Kathir (1301–1373 a medieval Salafi religious leader and historian, well known for his explications of the Qur’an). The nomination of Alhafidh is also used by Ibn Baz when quoting other medieval Salafi religious leaders such as Alhafidh Ibn Rajab (1335-1393 a medieval Salafi religious leader who advocated the Hanbali jurisprudence school. He is also known for his commentaries on some books of Hadith and Alhafidh Aldhahabi (1274–1348) a medieval Salafi religious leader, who advocated the Shafi’i jurisprudence school and a leading figure in the study of Prophetic traditions. Additionally, Ibn Baz quotes another medieval religious leader (Line 3), Mwaffaq Addeen Ibn Qudamah (1147-1223) who is an advocate of the Hanbali jurisprudence school and anti-rationalist and speculative theological views. The inclusion of such names in Ibn Baz’s texts indicates his reliance on the books of the medieval Salafi religious leaders. However Ibn Baz’s reliance on Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions is more frequent than his quoting of medieval Salafi leaders. This is demonstrated by taking word clusters in Ibn Baz’s writing into consideration.

There are 143 clusters that include the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said): 56 2-word clusters, 45 3-word clusters, 36 4-word clusters and 6 7-word clusters. All these clusters indicate that Ibn Baz relies heavily on quoting sacred texts (Qur’an and Prophetic traditions). Table 7.5 below shows the five top frequent clusters in each type:

Table 7.5 Word clusters that contain the keyword ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) in Ibn Baz’s corpus

	N	Word	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts
3-word clusters	1	و قال تعالى	and the Exalted said	123	4
	2	قال عز و	the Exalted in Mighty and ... Said	111	5
	3	قال تعالى و	the Exalted said and	92	4
	4	و قال سبحانه	and the Glorified said	82	4
	5	قال سبحانه و	the Glorified and said	80	5
4-word clusters	1	قال عز و جل	the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said	111	5
	2	و قال عز و	and the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic) said	62	4
	3	و سلم أنه قال	(may Allah send His blessings) and peace (upon him) that he said	55	3
	4	و قال سبحانه و	and the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	47	4
	5	كما قال عز و	as the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic) said	40	4
7-word clusters	1	النبى صلى الله عليه و سلم قال	the Prophet, may Allah send His peace and blessings upon him, said	23	4
	2	قال النبى صلى الله عليه و سلم	(said) the Prophet, may Allah send His peace and blessings upon him	22	3
	3	الله عليه و سلم أنه قال من	(may) Allah send His blessings and peace upon him said	21	3
	4	و قال صلى الله عليه و سلم	and (the Prophet), may Allah send His peace and blessings upon	17	3
	5	لقول النبى صلى الله عليه و سلم	because of the saying of the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him (i.e. Hadith)	7	3

The cluster that is the highest in frequency is ‘و قال تعالى’ (*wa qala ta’āla*; and the Exalted said) (123 times). Two word clusters were not included in Table 7.5 as otherwise the list of clusters would have been much longer. However, it is worth noting that the most frequent 2-word cluster that contains the reporting verb ‘قال’ (*qala*; He/he said) and refers to Allah is also ‘قال تعالى’ (*qala ta’āla*; the Exalted said) (194 times, see Table A10 in Appendix A) which is similar to the cluster ‘و قال تعالى’ (*wa qala ta’āla*; and the Exalted said). The difference is only the addition of the additive particle ‘و’ (*wa*; and) (see below). All the clusters in Table 7.5 indicate reference to Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions which are mostly used by Ibn Baz to warrant his arguments as in Concordance 7.3 below.

Concordance 7.3 Examples of concordance of word clusters that contain the keyword ‘قال’ (qala; He/he said) in Ibn Baz

N	Concordance
1	[...] كدعائه والاستغاثة به ، و طلبه المدد و الشفاء للمرضى ، و النصر على الأعداء ، و نحو ذلك من أنواع العبادة ، و الله سبحانه أوجب على عباده أن يخصوه بالعبادة ، [...] ، كما قال عز وجل : { وَ مَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنْسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ } [...] such as invoking him [the Prophet and he is dead] beseeching his help, invoking him for support, ask him to heal from illnesses and grant victory on enemies and other worshipping practices. Allah made it obligatory for His servants (worshippers) to invoke Him Alone [...], as the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said : { And I (Allah) created not the jinn and mankind except that they should worship Me (Alone)}
2	[الإيمان بأسماء الله وصفاته] هي أوصاف لله - عز وجل - يجب وصفه بها على الوجه التلق به من غير أن يتشابه خلقه في شيء من صفاته ، كما قال تعالى : (ليس كمثله شيء و هو السميع البصير) و قال عز وجل : (فَلَا تُشْرِكُوا بِاللَّهِ الْأَمْثَالُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَعْلَمُ وَأَنْتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ) [Belief in Allah and His names and attributes] they are attributes for Allah, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, which should be used to when describing Him in a manner that suits Him without comparing Him to His creatures, as The Exalted said {There is nothing like Him; and He is the All-Hearer, the All-Seer} and the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said {So put not forward similitudes for Allah (as there is nothing similar to Him, nor He resembles anything). Truly! Allah knows and you know not}
3	[دعا الأموات من الأنبياء وغيرهم] و هذه الأعمال هي أعمال من مات على الشرك بالله عز وجل ، و هكذا الأعمال المبتدعة التي لم يأذن بها الله [...] كما قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : ((من أحدث في أمرنا هذا ما ليس منه فهو رد)) متفق على صحته [invoking dead prophets and others] and these are worshipping practices of those who were associating other with Allah, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, till they died . And these are the religiously impermissible innovative practices that Allah did not allow (His creatures) to do [...] as the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, said : (Whosoever innovate sny worshipping practice that is not (in agreement) with Islam, will have it rejected). This is sound Hadith that is narrated by Bukhari and Muslim
4	أما الصلاة و السلام على رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم فهي من أفضل القربات ، و من الأعمال الصالحات ، كما قال الله تعالى : {إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَمَلَائِكَتَهُ يُصَلُّونَ عَلَى النَّبِيِّ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا صَلُّوا عَلَيْهِ وَسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا} و قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : ((من صلى على واحدة صلى الله عليه بها عشرا)) regarding invoking Allah to send His blessings and peace upon the Prophet is one of the best deeds that bring us closer to Allah, and one of the righteous and good deeds as Allah, the Exalted, said {Allah sends His Salat (Graces, Honours, Blessings, Mercy) on the Prophet (Muhammad), and also His angels (ask Allah to bless and forgive him). O you who believe! Send your Salat on (ask Allah to bless) him (Muhammad), and (you should) greet (salute) him with the Islamic way of greeting} and the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, said : (whoever invokes Allah to send His blessings on me once, Allah, in return, blesses him/her ten times)

All lines in Concordance 7.3 indicate that Ibn Baz utilizes both Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions in his arguments. Lines 1 and 3 are refutations of ritualistic practices of some Sufi and Shiites (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), such as invoking or beseeching the help of prophets and other dead individuals, utilizing a Qur’anic verse (Line 1) and a Prophetic tradition (Line 3) to legitimate his stance towards such practices that he conceives to be religiously impermissible. In Line 2, Ibn Baz uses two Qur’anic verses to support his stance concerning the names and attributes of Allah. He invites Muslims to describe Allah by His attributes in a manner that suits Him. The last line indicates Ibn Baz’s opinion towards invoking Allah to send His blessings and peace upon the Prophet of Islam. He uses a Qur’anic verse and a Prophetic tradition to support his claim that such invocation is one of the best deeds that brings Muslims close to Allah. Let us now take the most frequent cluster

in Table 7.5 to capture the most frequent and salient argumentation scheme that appears in Ibn Baz's writings.

As part of Islam, Muslims believe that the Qur'an is the words of Allah who is the ultimate authority in Islamic faith. Hence all Qur'anic verses are inherently viewed as true in Islam. In Ibn Baz's corpus, the Qur'anic verses are indicated by the reporting keywords such as 'قال' (*qala*; He said) and the keywords that refer to 'Allah' (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). As I have indicated above, such keywords tend to co-occur with each other ('قال' (*qala*; He said) and 'تعالى' (*ta'āla*; and the Exalted). The 3-word cluster 'و قال تعالى' (*wa qala ta'āla*; and the Exalted said) (123 times) and the 2-word cluster 'قال تعالى' (*qala ta'āla*; the Exalted said) (194 times) are the most frequent of all the clusters in Ibn Baz that contain the verb 'قال' (*qala*; He/he said). The linguistic structure of these two types of clusters above is simply put forward as follows: reporting verb 'قال' (*qala*; He said) + the grammatical subject 'تعالى' (*ta'āla*; the Exalted) which functions as the agent in the structure. The addition of the additive particle 'و' (*wa*; and) signifies that Ibn Baz uses hypotactic structures in order to put forward a constellation of warrants in one argument which could be seen as coordinative argumentation. The word 'تعالى' (*ta'āla*; the Exalted) is one appellation that is used to talk about 'Allah' who is the ultimate authority in Islam. In order to narrow down the scope of analysis and capture the most frequent and salient form of argumentation schemes in Ibn Baz, let us move to concordance-based analysis of the 3-word cluster 'و قال تعالى' (*wa qala ta'āla*; and the Exalted said).

In order to choose the concordance lines for more explanations and further analysis of the argumentation scheme(s), I shall present only the arguments that pertain to the semantic foci discussed in Chapter 4. I shall present each concordance line including more of the context in order to show the whole argumentation thread. By argumentation thread I mean the linguistic chunks (whole sentences) that arguments appear in, starting from the premise going

through the warrant(s) and ending up with the conclusion. Argumentation threads, in my data, normally occupy larger linguistic chunks than those included in concordance lines. They may also include a constellation of arguments – coordinative or subordinative argumentation (see below and Chapter 3). Let us move on to the first argument I want to consider here.

7.4.1 True beliefs and worship practices

In his defense of what he assumes to be true guidance of Allah, Ibn Baz introduces his arguments either to reject the beliefs and worship rituals practiced by some Muslims (mostly Sufis and Shiites) who do not adhere to the Salafī version of Islam or to support his views regarding certain theological aspects such as the particles of faith (see Section 7.4.3 below). Let us consider his first argument in the expanded version of concordance line 1 (see Appendix D for Concordances D1 and D2 that indicate arguments in both Salafi corpora):

Figure 7.1 Argumentation thread 1 (beliefs and ritual practices)

<p>من العقائد المضادة للحق ما يعتقد بعض المتصوفة: من أن بعض من يسمونهم بالأولياء يشاركون الله في التدبير، ويصرفون في شئون العالم، و يسمونهم بالأقطاب والأوتاد والأغوات، وغير ذلك من الأسماء التي اخترعوها لأنفسهم، وهذا من أقبح الشرك في الربوبية، وهو شر من شرك جاهلية العرب؛ لأن كفار العرب لم يشركوا في الربوبية وإنما أشركوا في العبادة، وكان شركهم في حال الرخاء، أما في حال الشدة فيخلصون لله العبادة، كما قال الله سبحانه: (فَإِذَا رَكِبُوا فِي الْفُلِكِ دَعَوْا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ فَلَمَّا نَجَّاهُمْ إِلَى الْبَرِّ إِذَا هُمْ يُشْرِكُونَ) أما الربوبية فكانوا معترفين بها لله وحده، كما قال سبحانه: (وَلَيْنَ سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَهُمْ لَيَقُولُنَّ اللَّهُ)، وقال تعالى: (كُلُّ مَنْ يَرْزُقُكُمْ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ أَتَمَنُّ بِمِلْكِ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَنْ يُخْرِجُ الْخَبْثَ مِنَ الْغَيْثِ وَيُخْرِجُ الْغَيْثَ مِنَ الْخَبْثِ وَمَنْ يُخْرِجُ الْأَمْرَ فَسَيَقُولُونَ اللَّهُ فَقُلْ أَفَلَا تَتَّقُونَ) والآيات في هذا المعنى كثيرة. أما المشركون المتأخرون فزادوا على الأولين من جهتين، إحداهما: شرك بعضهم في الربوبية، والثانية: شركهم في الرخاء والشدة، كما يعلم ذلك من خالطهم وسبر أحوالهم، ورأى ما يفعلون عند قبر الحسين والبنودي وغيرهما في مصر، وعند قبر العبدروس في عدن، والهادي في اليمن وابن عربي في الشام، [...] وغيرها من القبور المشهورة التي غلت فيها العامة وصرفوا لها الكثير من حق الله عز وجل، [...] ونسأله سبحانه أن يرددهم إلى رتددهم، [...].، وأن يوفق قادة المسلمين وعلماءهم لمحاربة هذا الشرك والتضاء عليه [...]</p>	<p>Some other beliefs that oppose the true guidance of Allah are that of some Sufis: [Some Sufis] belief that the so called 'Aulliya' (friends of God) share Allah in disposing the affair of all things in the world. They name them 'the poles', the pillars, 'the aid providers' (ranks of Sufi saints) and other names they invented for their gods, which is more repugnant form of polytheism (that opposes the Unity of Lordship). It is even more wicked than the polytheistic beliefs of the ignorant Arabs in the pre-Islamic era. The case is so, because those Arab infidels (in the pre-Islamic period) did not practice polytheism that opposes the Unity of Lordship, but practiced the form of polytheism that opposes the Unity of worship. In addition, they practiced polytheism during times of comfort, but during times of hardships they sincerely worship Allah making their faith pure for Him Alone, as Allah, the Glorified, said: {And when they embark on a ship, they invoke Allah, making their Faith pure for Him only: but when He brings them safely to land, behold, they give a share of their worship to others}. Also, they do not contradict the Unity of Lordship as they confirm that Allah is their Lord, as the Glorified said: { And if you ask them who created them, they will surely say: "Allah"}, and the Exalted said: {Say (O Muhammad): "Who provides for you from the sky and the earth? Or who owns hearing and sight? And who brings out the living from the dead and brings out the dead from the living? And who disposes the affairs?" They will say: "Allah." Say: "Will you not then be afraid of Allah's punishment (for setting up rivals in worship with Allah)?"}. And there are plenty of Qur'anic verses that indicate such meanings. However, modern-day polytheists added two aspects to the old form of polytheism: they associate others with Allah in His Lordship and commit polytheism in times of both comfort and hardship. This is known about them (modern-day polytheists) to those who live with them and explored their style of worship and saw what they did near the grave of 'Alhussein', and Albadaawi and other graves of Sufi saints in Egypt, Alahdarouse in Aden, Alhadi in Yemen, Ibn Arabi in Cham (Damascus), [...] and some other famous graves that common people exceeded the limits and perform rituals of worship that are His right (i.e. these rituals are supposed to be conducted to Allah Alone), [...] we pray to Allah to help them (Some Sufis) to regain their senses and guid Muslim political and religious leaders to the right path in order to fight and eradicate this type of polytheism [...]</p>
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In the above expanded version of concordance line 1, we first observe the premise ‘*Some other beliefs that oppose the true guidance of Allah are that of some Sufis*’ which indicates Ibn Baz’s negative stance towards some mystic beliefs that he believes are in opposition to the ‘true guidance of Allah’. Second, Ibn Baz uses two of the argumentation schemes in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) typology: by analogy and by sign. Using analogy to compare the mystic practices of modern-day Sufis to polytheistic practices of the Arabs in the pre-Islamic era, Ibn Baz uses the elative (gradation) form of the adjective ‘شر’ (*šarr*; wicked) and the word ‘من’ (*men*; than) that could be translated into English as ‘more wicked than’. He warrants his comparison with a Qur’anic verse that is introduced by the phrase ‘كما قال الله’ (*kama qala ‘allahu sobḥanh*; as Allah the glorified said) which is always used in Islamic discourses to introduce Qur’anic verse that indicate appeals to divine authority. This takes us to the second argumentation scheme used by Ibn Baz: argumentation scheme from sign.

In the expanded version of Line 1 (argumentation thread 1), Ibn Baz introduces his argument using ‘كما قال الله سبحانه’ (*kama qala ‘allahu sobḥanh*; as Allah, the Glorified said). He also uses another Qur’anic verse which is introduced by ‘و قال تعالى’ (*wa qala ta ‘āla*; and the Exalted said). Ibn Baz concludes his argument by invoking Allah to guide those whom he believes to practice polytheism and the Muslim political and religious leaders to fight and eradicate these Sufi ritualistic practices.

Utilizing a group of argumentation schemes, as I have indicated above, warranting his arguments with Qur’anic verses (refuting the mystic beliefs of the Sufis about their saints), Ibn Baz seeks to legitimate his stance towards such beliefs without introducing the Sufis’ arguments and explanations of such practice. In other words, Ibn Baz does not engage with the beliefs of the Sufis or their reasons for their beliefs. He, on the contrary, starts from a pre-conceived assumption, namely, the Salafist ideological perspective which rejects the

previously mentioned mystic practices (see below). Line 2 further develops Ibn Baz's arguments and shows the Salafist perspective toward such practices, though he does not name any Sufi or Shiite social actors.

Figure 7.2 Argumentation thread 2 (the Salafi definition of worship)

والعبادة : هي طاعته سبحانه وطاعة رسوله محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم ، بفعل ما أمر الله به ورسوله ، وترك ما نهى الله عنه ورسوله وعن إيمان بالله ورسوله ، وإخلاص
 لله في العمل ، مع غاية الحب لله . وكمال الذل له وحده **كما قال تعالى** : { وَاقْضَىٰ رَبُّكَ أَلَّا تُعْبُدُوا إِلَّا إِلَهُهُ } أي أمر وأوصى بأن يعبد وحده **وقال تعالى** : { الْخَشْيَةُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ *
 الرَّحْمَنُ الرَّحِيمُ * مَا إِلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ } أي أن سبحاته بهذه الآيات أنه هو المستحق لأن يعبد وحده ، ويستعان به وحده ، وقال عز وجل : { فَاعْبُدْ اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ
 لَهُ الدِّينَ * أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ } **وقال تعالى** : { فَادْعُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْكَافِرُونَ } **وقال تعالى** : { وَرَأَى الْمُسْتَجِدَّ اللَّهُ فَلَا تَدْعُوا مَعَ اللَّهِ أَحَدًا } والآيات في هذا المعنى
 كثيرة ، وكلها تدل على : وجوب إفراد الله بالعبادة ، ومعلوم أن الدعاء بأنواعه من العبادة ، فلا يجوز لأحد من الناس أن يدعو إلا ربه ، ولا يستعين ولا يستغيث إلا به ، عملاً
 بهذه الآيات الكريمة ، وما جاء في معناها وهذا فيما عدا الأمور العادية ، والأسباب الحسية ، التي يقدر عليها المخلوق الحي الحاضر ، فإن تلك ليست من العبادة ، بل **يجوز**
بالنص (القرآن والسنة) والإجماع (علماء السلف) أن يستعين الإنسان بالإنسان الحي القادر ، في الأمور العادية التي يقدر عليها ، [...] .

And the worship is obeying, Him the Glorified, and obeying His messenger Muhammad, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him. It is doing what Allah and His messenger ordered us to do and refrain from committing what Allah and His messenger forbid holding faith in Allah and His messenger. It is the sincere worship of Allah making faith pure to Him Alone. Worship is also the ultimate devotion of love to Allah and the complete submissiveness to Him Alone **as the Exalted**: {And your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him} which means that He ordered and enjoined on us to worship Him Alone, **and the Exalted said**: {So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only}, **and the Exalted said**: {So, call you (O Muhammad and the believers) upon (or invoke) Allah making (your) worship pure for Him (Alone) (by worshipping none but Him and by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only and not to show off and not to set up rivals with Him in worship), however much the disbelievers (in the Oneness of Allah) may hate (it)}, **and the Exalted said**: {And the mosques are for Allah (Alone): so invoke not anyone along with Allah}, and the Qur'anic verses about this issue are many that indicate the obligation of worshipping Allah Alone. And **it is known that all types of supplications are part of worship**, thus, according to these Qur'anic verses, **it is impermissible for all people to supplicate to and neither seek nor beseech the help from other than Allah** in order to fulfil the obligation indicated by the previously mentioned Qur'anic verses and other verses that bear the same meanings. However, it is not considered as a form of worship if someone takes proper means to seek the help of living human beings who are present in normal issues they can do. On the contrary it is permissible as indicated by both **sacred texts (Qur'an and Prophetic traditions) and the consensus of the (Salafi)**

Ibn Baz uses a group of Qur'anic verses to warrant his definition of the concept of worship. He then moves on to his conclusion and stance towards the types of supplication that are usually practiced by some Sufis and Shiites to invoke and beseech the help of dead humans such as the Prophet of Islam, his grandson 'Alhussein' or any other saints, considering such practices as forms of worship. He concludes that such practices are impermissible in Islam. Additionally, Ibn Baz uses both the sacred texts and the consensus of religious leaders as an authority to legitimate his Salafi stance towards the religiously permissible beseeching of help from individuals who are alive and present provided that such help is in worldly issues that those individuals are capable to provide.

In order to evaluate the arguments that appear in the schemes above, we need first to consider the structures of the arguments that appear therein, and then utilize some critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346). Let us first restructure the arguments in argumentation threads 1 and 2:

Figure 7.3 Arguments structures in argumentation threads 1 and 2 in Ibn Baz

Arguments structures in Ibn Baz (argumentation threads 1 and 2)			Schemes
Premises	1	Some beliefs of some modern-day Sufis oppose the true guidance of Allah. These beliefs are similar to/even worse than the polytheistic beliefs of the ignorant Arabs in the pre-Islamic era	Analogy / Sign
	2	Worship is obeying Him, the Glorified, and obeying His messenger Muhammad/All types of supplications are part of worship	
Warrants	1	The similarity between some Sufi beliefs and Arabs infidels in the pre-Islamic era/ Qur'anic verses introduced by 'as Allah, the Glorified said' and 'and the Exalted said'	
	2	Qur'anic verses introduced by the phrases 'as the Exalted said' and 'and the Exalted said'	
Conclusions	1	Muslim political and religious leaders should fight and eradicate the Sufi and Shiite polytheistic beliefs and rituals	
	2	It is impermissible for all people to supplicate to and neither seek nor beseech the help from other than Allah	
Relations	Relation in argument 1 from analogy: Similarity between the infidels' practices in the pre-Islamic era and those of modern-day Sufis and Shiites. Symptomatic relation is that Qur'anic verses are the words of Allah that, according to Muslims' belief, are inherently true		

Ibn Baz uses two types of argumentation schemes (analogy and sign) warranting his argument from analogy by the comparison he draws between some beliefs of some modern-day Sufis and Shiites and the beliefs of the Arab infidels of the pre-Islamic era as well as supporting the same argument symptomatically (using Qur'anic verses). In his exposition of the meaning of worship, Ibn Baz utilizes Qur'anic verses to lend support to his argument. Now let us examine Ibn Baz's argument from analogy that seems to be faulty.

7.4.1.1 Critical evaluation of argumentation thread 1 in Ibn Baz

The Qur'anic verses utilized by Ibn Baz in his argumentation scheme by sign are all related to the arguments they intend to support. However this argumentation scheme by analogy is problematic. The argumentation from analogy (in argumentation thread 1 – true belief and worship) could be evaluated using some critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346). These questions are as follows:

1. Are there differences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the force of the similarity cited?
2. Is A true (false) in C1?
3. Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which A is false (true)?⁸⁶

It could be argued that Ibn Baz's argument from analogy regarding the practices of the pre-Islam infidels and modern Sufis and Shiites undermines the force of the similarity between the two types of the social actors – modern Sufis/Shiites and the pre-Islam infidels. First, regardless of the practices of both types of faith communities (Sufis and Shiites) that might be doubtful from the Salafist perspective⁸⁷, the Infidels rejected the message of the Prophet of Islam whereas the Sufis acquiesce to it and all other Islamic practices and rituals as well as accepting that there is 'no God but Allah and Mohammed is His messenger'. This phrase is the first pillar of Islam and anyone believes in it thus becomes a Muslim. Second, the Arab atheists in the pre-Islamic era used to worship idols whereas modern Sufis (as well as other Muslims) reject such atheist practices. Ibn Baz here could be guilty of basing his argument on a fallacious faulty analogy (Walton et. al. 2008, p. 51). However, it is noteworthy here that it is only the aspect of analogy that could be fallacious in argumentation thread 1 whereas the rest of the argument Ibn Baz uses about singling out Allah in the forms of worship 1 (about the true belief and worship) conforms with the Qur'anic verses cited in Figure 7.1 above.

Now let us move on to the expanded version of line 3 (Concordance D1 in Appendix D) in order to see how causality and symptomatic schemes are also used by Ibn Baz in his refutation of Arab nationalism.

⁸⁶. C means Case and A means Base premise.

⁸⁷. These practices may include beseeching help from dead pious individuals at their graves and circumambulation around their graves.

7.4.2 Arab nationalism: Rejection of the Sharia

In what follows Ibn Baz tries to establish a connection between the rejection of Sharia and the Arab nationalistic movement utilizing two forms of argumentation schemes (causality and sign). Figure 7.4 below contains Ibn Baz's arguments from both causality and sign that he uses to legitimate his stance towards Arab nationalism.

Figure 7.4 Argumentation thread 3 (Arab nationalism)

الوجه الرابع : من الوجوه الدالة على بطلان الدعوة إلى القومية العربية أن يقال : إن الدعوة إليها و التكتل حول رأيها يفضي بالمجتمع و لا بد إلى رفض حكم القرآن؛ لأن القوميين غير المسلمين لن يرضوا بحكم القرآن ، فيوجب ذلك لزعماء القومية أن يتخذوا أحكاما وضعية تخالف حكم القرآن ، حتى يستوي مجتمع القومية في تلك الأحكام ، و قد صرح الكثير منهم بذلك كما سلف ، وهذا هو الفساد العظيم ، و الكفر المستبين و الردة السافرة ، كما قال تعالى : (قُلْ وَ رَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى يُخْشَوُكَ فِيمَا تُسَبِّحُونَ بِحَمْدِ رَبِّهِمْ أَلَّا يَجِدُوا فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَرْجًا مِمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَ يُسَأَلُوا تَسْلِيمًا) و قال تعالى : (أَفَحُكْمَ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ يَنْتَوُونَ وَ مِنْ أَحْسَنَ مِنْ اللَّهِ حُكْمًا لِقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ) و قال تعالى : (وَ مَنْ لَمْ يُخْشَ اللَّهَ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ) و قال تعالى : (وَ مَنْ لَمْ يُخْشَ اللَّهَ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ) .

The fourth viewpoint: One of the viewpoints that also indicate the rejection of the nationalists' call is that it could be said that calling to it (Arab nationalism) and gathering people under its banner will definitely lead [Muslim] society to reject arbitration to Qur'an (Sharia laws), because the [Arab] nationalists who are not Muslims will not be satisfied with the Sharia laws. Hence, [pan Arab] nationalism leaders will take man-made laws that contradict Sharia in order to make all people in their community equal. Verily a lot of them [leaders of Arab national parties] declared that they will rule according to man-made laws as indicated earlier. Doing so is a tremendous corruption, obvious infidelity and blatant apostasy, as the Exalted said: {But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them, and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) with full submission} and the Exalted said: {Do they then seek the judgement of (the days of) Ignorance? And who is better in judgement than Allah for a people who have firm Faith} and the Exalted said: {And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, such are the Kafirun (i.e. disbelievers - of a lesser degree as they do not act on Allah's Laws)} and the Exalted said: {And whosoever does not judge by that which Allah has revealed, such are the Zalimun (polytheists and wrong-doers - of a lesser degree)} and the Exalted said: { And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed (then) such (people) are the Fasiqun [the rebellious i.e. disobedient (of a lesser degree)] to Allah }

Ibn Baz combines both causality and sign schemes in his refutation of Arab nationalism.

According to Ibn Baz, if nationalist leaders rise to power, then rejection of the Sharia laws will occur. For this argument to be effective, the reader needs to understand and accept that the rejection of Sharia laws would have negative consequences. Yet Ibn Baz does not rely solely on argumentation scheme from causality; he, from a Salafist perspective, depends largely on authoritative Qur'anic verses that obligate Muslims to refer to Sharia Laws. He uses the clusters 'كما قال تعالى' (*kama qala ta'āla*; as the Exalted said) (one time) and 'وقال' (*wa qala ta'āla*; and the Exalted said) (4 times) to introduce his arguments, using argument by sign.

Ibn Baz claims that adopting Arab nationalism will eventually lead (Muslim/Arab and more specifically Saudi) society to reject Sharia. He explains that by predicting that the non-Muslim Arab nationalists will not approve of Sharia laws, which could consequently force Arab nationalist leaders in Arab and Muslim countries to reject Sharia and adopt man-made laws. It is worth noting here that non-Muslim Arabs are still a minority in the Arab countries and none of them was/is a head/president of any of the Arab states or in a position to force Muslim societies to adopt any type of laws. Additionally, Ibn Baz introduces his argument from causality with a hypothetical phrase that contains the passive form of the verb say, 'أن يقال' ('*an yoqāl*'; that it could be said), assuming that others may share the same views with him about Arab nationalism and their aim to reject the Sharia. He introduces the argument from causality to begin another argument (from sign) using the warrant 'Verily many of them [leaders of Arab national parties] declared that they will rule according to man-made laws' to lend support to his claim about the Arab nationalists' rejection of the Sharia. Reconstructing these arguments gives more insights about the argumentation schemes they appear therein.

Figure 7.5 Reconstruction of argumentation thread 3 in Ibn Baz

Arguments structures in Ibn Baz (Argumentation thread 3)		Schemes
Premises	Adoption of Arab nationalism leads to adoption of man-made laws and rejection of Sharia/ Adoption of man-made laws is a tremendous corruption, obvious infidelity and blatant apostasy	Causality / Sign
Warrants	Non-Muslim [Arab] nationalists will not be satisfied with the Sharia laws/ A lot of Arab nationalist leaders declared that they will take man-made laws instead of the Sharia/ Qur'anic verses introduced by 'as the Exalted said' and 'and the Exalted said'	
Conclusions	(Unstated conclusion) Muslims (Saudis) should reject Arab nationalism	
Relations	Symptomatic relation: Declarations of Arab nationalist leaders are highest authority in Arab Nationalist parties/ Qur'anic verses are the words of Allah that, according to Muslims' belief, are inherently true Causal relation in argument: Adopting Arab nationalism leads to the rejection of Sharia	

In argumentation thread 3, Ibn Baz uses two arguments from sign and an argument from causality in defence of his negative standpoint towards Arab nationalism. His argument from causality is inserted between two arguments from sign which Ibn Baz uses to support his claim that Arab nationalism is a tremendous corruption, obvious infidelity and blatant

apostasy. Ibn Baz uses two types of authorities as reliable sources: the alleged declarations of Arab national leaders and Qur'anic verses. Thus, according to Ibn Baz, adoption of Arab nationalism leads to the rejection of Sharia which, according to the Qur'anic verses such as those in Figure 7.4 is infidelity and apostasy. However these arguments need further examination utilizing some critical questions which is the aim of the next subsection.

7.4.2.1 Critical evaluation of argumentation thread 3 in Ibn Baz

As I have indicated in Section 7.4.2 above, the argument from causality (in argumentation thread 3) starts with the hypothetical phrase 'ان يقال' (*'an yoqāl*; that it could be said). Ibn Baz uses this phrase via which he introduces his argument from causality claiming that adoption of Arab nationalism eventually leads to the rejection of Sharia laws. He explains his claim by predicting that non-Muslim Arab nationalists will not approve of Sharia laws, which will force Arab nationalist leaders to adopt man-made laws rather than Sharia. In order to provide more critical analysis of Ibn Baz's argument from causality, I shall use the following critical questions:

1. Is the evidence cited strong enough to warrant the causal generalization?
2. Are there other causal factors that could interfere with the production of the effect in the given case? (Walton 1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346).

The causal claim that Ibn Baz introduces is as follows: 'because the [Arab] nationalists who are not Muslims will not be satisfied with the Sharia laws'. He concludes that '[pan Arab] nationalism leaders will take man-made laws that contradict Sharia in order to make all people in their community equal'. However, adoption of man-made laws in the Arab countries is not due to Arab nationalist movement alone, but due to the secular movements as well. Additionally, Ibn Baz's causal claim is superficial. Adoption of man-made laws in the

Arab countries has a long and complex history. It could be as a result of ‘colonialism’.⁸⁸ In Egypt, for example, taking man-made laws started with French occupation of Egypt in 1798 (Alsinaidi, 1986). Man-made laws were further implemented in Egypt during the British occupation till the Egyptian revolution in 1952 (Ibid. 1986). Thus, the causal relation cited by Ibn Baz is not strong enough to warrant that adoption of Arab nationalism leads to the rejection of Sharia. Ibn Baz could be accused of using a slippery slope fallacy (Walton et. al, p. 186), i.e. Ibn Baz uses Arab Nationalists having power in the Arab countries as a slippery slope to the end of Sharia.

Again Ibn Baz continues to symptomatically lend support to his causal claim (mentioned earlier) by quoting Arab nationalist leaders: ‘verily many of them [leaders of Arab national parties] declared that they will rule according to man-made laws as indicated earlier.’ This is an argumentation by sign i.e. utilizing the declarations of the leaders of Arab National parties as an authentic and reliable source. However, Ibn Baz neither names any of these leaders nor mentions any authentic source of his quote. Instead he collectively aggregates Arab nationalist leaders utilising the pre-modifying phrase ‘الكثير منهم’ (*’alkaṭīr minhom*; a lot of them). The questions that are intended to critically evaluate the symptomatic argumentation scheme are introduced in Walton (1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346):

1. What is the strength of correlation⁸⁹ of the sign with the event signified?
2. Are there other events that would more reliably account for the sign?

Aggregation of social actors (in our case Arab nationalist leaders) serves the aim of ‘regulating practice and manufacturing consensus opinion’ (van Leeuwen, p. 37), and ‘endows social actors with a kind of impersonal authority, a sense of unseen, yet powerfully

88. The concept of ‘colonialism’ is a euphemism as it conceals the atrocities that were committed during the military occupations of the third world.

89. Correlation is not intended to indicate statistical correlation in this context.

felt coercive force' (Ibid., 2008, p. 37). But such aggregation mystifies the Arab nationalist leaders whom Ibn Baz quotes. Such aggregation undermines the strength of using them as a reliable source. Additionally Ibn Baz at the end of his quote claims that he mentions such quotes earlier but reading the relevant text he does not mention any of them and/or their quotes throughout the whole text. Thus Ibn Baz could be accused of fallacious appeal to authority (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 77).

7.4.3 Particles of faith: Sacred Books of Judaism and Christianity

Argument 4 in Figure 7.4 shows Ibn Baz's stance towards the Scriptures. Utilizing the symptomatic scheme, Ibn Baz introduces belief in Sacred texts of other Abrahamic religions:

Figure 7.6 Argumentation thread 4 (faith in Sacred Books)

<p>و هكذا الإيمان بالكتب يجب الإيمان إجمالاً بأن الله سبحانه أنزل كتباً على أنبيائه و رسله ، لبيان حقه و الدعوة إليه ، كما قال تعالى : (لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ) الآية ، <u>وقال تعالى : (كان الناس أمة واحدة فبعث الله النبيين مبشرين و منذرين و أنزل معهم الكتاب بالحق ليحكم بين الناس فيما اختلفوا فيه) الآية . و يؤمن على سبيل التفصيل بما سمي الله منها كالتوراة و الإنجيل و الزبور و القرآن</u></p> <p>and in the same manner is the <u>belief in Scriptures. It is obligatory (on Muslims) to generally believe that Allah, the Glorified, sent down Books to His prophets and messengers</u> to state His rights (of true worship) and to call people to them, <u>as the exalted said</u>{ Indeed We have sent Our Messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance (justice) that mankind may keep up justice... till the end of the Qur'anic verse, <u>and the Exalted said:</u>{Mankind were one community and Allah sent Prophets with glad tidings and warnings, and with them He sent down the Scripture in truth to judge between people in matters wherein they differed till the end of the Qur'anic verse. <u>We should specifically believe</u> in those <u>Books that Allah named (in the Qur'an) such Torah, Gospel, Psalms (the Holy Book of Dawud (David)) and the Qur'an</u></p>

In the above concordance line, Ibn Baz continues to project and explicate his stance towards believing in the Scripture utilizing Qur'anic verses that are the words of Allah, according to Muslims' belief (particles of faith), and thus seen as inherently true. Let us first reconstruct the arguments in argumentation thread 4.

Figure 7.7 Reconstruction of Ibn Baz's arguments in argumentation thread 4

Arguments structures in Ibn Baz (argumentation thread 4)		Schemes
Premises	Scriptures (Torah, Gospel, Psalms (the Holy Book of Dawud (David)) and the Qur'an) were sent down from Allah to his prophets and messengers/ The Scriptures contain Allah's rights of (true worship)	Sign
Warrants	Qur'anic verses introduced by 'as the Exalted said' and 'and the Exalted said'/ Allah named those Holy Books in the Qur'an	
Conclusions	It is obligatory (on Muslims) to generally believe that Allah, the Glorified, sent down Books to His prophets and messengers/ We should specifically believe in those Books that Allah has named in Qur'an: Torah, Gospel, Psalms (the Holy Book of Dawud (David)) and the Qur'an	
Relations	Symptomatic relation: Qur'anic verses are the words of Allah that, according to Muslims' belief, are inherently true.	

The most prominent scheme which is, from a Salafist ideological perspective, used by Ibn Baz is the symptomatic scheme utilizing the authority vested in Qur'an as the words of Allah which, according to Muslims, are inherently true. These argumentation schemes are utilized by Ibn Baz to legitimate his stances towards the semantic foci and social actor representations that these schemes appear in.

To sum up, Ibn Baz's arguments are mainly theological. Despite the fact that Ibn Baz uses all the three types of argumentation schemes in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), as I have demonstrated above, the symptomatic scheme is most frequently used by Ibn Baz in his arguments. Ibn Baz's use of symptomatic schemes signifies his great reliance on, from a Salafist perspective, powerful and legitimate tools in his arguments, viz., Qur'anic verses which are seen by Muslims as inherently true. The argument threads are shown utilizing the cluster 'و قال تعالى' (*wa qala ta'āla*; and the Exalted said) that indicate argumentation by sign. However, Ibn Baz uses schemes by analogy and causality. He extensively uses arguments from sign that are based on the power invested in Qur'anic verses: according to Muslims they are inherently true as they are the words of Allah. Thus his use of such arguments is a means of legitimating his stances about his representation of social actors and semantic foci. Ibn Baz's argument from analogy and causality can be shown to be fallacious as I have indicated above. I shall now turn to explicate the argumentation schemes in Alhawali.

7.5 Ideological legitimization (2): Argumentation schemes in Alhawali

I have indicated above (Section 7.2.2), Alhawali uses argumentation indicators that bear meanings of causality and reveal Alhawali's reliance on quoting authority. These argumentative keywords are 'لذلك' (*lidālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that) and 'نتيجة' (*natīğah*; result) that indicate causality and 'الباحثين' ('*albahitīn*; the researchers –acc.) and 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they fem. pl.) say(s)) that indicate authority. The keyword 'لذلك' (*lidālik*; therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that) is not always used by Alhawali to indicate argumentation. Of the 136 occurrences of this keyword, Alhawali uses it 54 times indicating 'to/for that' which does not bear any argumentative meaning (see footnote 83). Additionally, one of the aims of the analysis in this chapter (and this thesis as well) is to compare the use of the argumentative keywords in both corpora that comprise the research data. Thus it will not be included in the analysis.

As I have indicate earlier (Section 7.2.2 and Chapter 4), the reporting keyword 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they fem. sing./pl) say(s)) is used by Alhawali to quote studies and modern theories, media articles, non-Islamic religious texts and institutions and famous westerners. Although, Alhawali, more or less, uses the same forms of the reporting word 'SAY' in Ibn Baz, his use of the keyword 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they fem. pl.) say(s)) marks the difference between the two Salafi writers under scrutiny in this thesis. Due to space and time restrictions, the selected word for analysing argumentation schemes in Alhawali is the keyword 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they fem. pl.) say(s)) that at face value indicates quoting authority.

After reading the concordance lines of the keyword 'تقول' (*taqūl*; (she/it/they fem. pl.) say(s)), it became clear that Alhawali uses it argumentatively in 3 major threads (for the meaning of thread in this thesis see above) that intersect with Alhawali's semantic foci I have presented in Chapter 5. These threads are intended to support Alhawali's attempt to defame the West and western social life including Christian religious views and what Alhawali

conceives to be the western aggressive intentions towards the ‘Muslim world’. In what follows I shall present the argumentation threads that are indicated by the keyword ‘تقول’ (taqūl; (she/it/they fem. pl.) say/says) in addition to the other word forms of the word ‘SAY’ that appear therein. Due to Alhawali’s verbose and lengthy exposition as well as the complex nature of his arguments I shall first outline his arguments (starting with premises) for each argumentative thread in Concordance lines D2 (Appendix D) then I shall evaluate every argument immediately after I outline them.

7.5.1 Western woman and social life: A Salafist perspective

In the first argumentative thread, Alhawali tries to negatively represent social life in the West.

He puts forward a set of arguments starting his argument thread with the following argument:

Figure 7.8 Argument 1 in argumentation thread 1 (Western women and social life)

<p>ولكن المرأة الغربية المنكوبة إذ تحاول الرجوع إلى البيت و وظيفة الأمومة لا تستطيع، لأن المشكلة اتسع نطاقها إلى درجة تتعذر معها العودة الحقيقية، ولو حصل شيء من ذلك فإن المجتمع الذي تعود الانحلال و الاختلاط يستنكره و يابأه، بل أصبح الزواج رغم هشاشته مصدر إزعاج للقائمين على تلك المجتمعات فقد طلعت الصحافة الغربية يوما بخبر يقول: "انزعجت السلطات التعليمية في اسكتلندا بسبب موجة الزواج التي تعصف بالمدرسات، فقد تبين أنه من خلال عام (1960م) عينت 1563 مدرسة في اسكتلندا، و في نهاية العام الدراسي تركت ألف منهن الوظيفة للزواج، و قالت السلطات إن الزواج يهدد النظام المدرسي".</p> <p>But the afflicted western woman, who tries to settle down in her home and revert to being a mother, is unable to do so. The case is so, because the problem has reached the limits that make it impossible to return to (her real role in life, i.e. being a mother). If something like that (going back to settle in a house and perform her real role as a mother) happens, the society that has accustomed to and practiced moral debasement and the mixing between men and women, would refuse it. Additionally, marriage, though not based on solid grounds, became a cause of discomfort to people in authority in those (western) societies. The western press, in one day, published a piece of news that <u>says</u>: 'the Scottish educational authorities are annoyed because of the wave of marriages that blow away female teachers (from teaching). It has been known that during the year 1960 there were 1563 female teachers appointed in schools, and 1000 of them left their jobs to get married by the end of the Academic year. The authorities <u>said</u> that marriage threatens the school system'.</p>	
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Debasing the values of the western societies, Alhawali claims that western society and its educational system oppress women. He starts his premise by constructing western woman as ‘afflicted’. The premise stems from an unstated assumption which is a preconceived ideological Salafist perception of woman’s role in life, i.e., a woman’s role should only involve household chores and bringing up children. Alhawali denounces western societies warranting his argument with what the western press *says* about western societies which is a case of argumentation scheme by sign. Alhawali presents the western press as an authority, i.e. western press publishing news about western societies, thus seen by Alhawali as a reliable

source (although it is perhaps ironic that he uncritically uses western sources in order to be critical of the West). Alhawali aggregates a set of unnamed sources using the plural form ‘newspapers’ which, according to van Leeuwen (2008, p. 37) ‘is used to regulate practice and manufacture consensus opinion’. In the above excerpt (Figure 7.8) Alhawali writes about Scottish educational authorities whom he projects as being against marriage because married women stop being teachers. Alhawali uses this as an example to show the degeneracy of western culture as being against marriage.

Alhawali uses argument 1 to establish a situation which he conceives of as being oppressive of women in order to go further and present another argument (coordinative argumentation) based on the initial unstated premise in Figure 7.8. Thus after introducing argument 1 above, he uses a second argument to further negatively represent the West as forcing women to seek revenge:

Figure 7.9 Argument 2 in argumentation thread 1 (Western women and social life)

و حيل ذلك [عالم المرأة الغربية]: ماذا في وضع المرأة أن تقول؟ يأتي شيء تواجه المجتمع النكد الذي يلهب ظهرها بالسياسة، و يقطع عليها طريق العودة إلى قوتها، ليس هناك إلا أحد سبيلين: إما الانتقام من هذا المجتمع الخدام بترويعه و تكبير صفوه، كما جاء في **التقرير الذي نشرته الصحف** من أنه بلغت عدد سرقات المتاجر الكبيرة في إنجلترا خلال عام (1960م) نحو (32194) سرقة، [...] و الغريب أن (60%) من هذه السرقات ارتكبتها نساء جاوزن سن البلوغ، و (30%) ارتكبتها ذكور أقل من السابعة عشرة، و **تقول** الإحصائيات: إن كل السرقات من النساء لم يكن في حاجة للمال، نعم إنها ليست الحاجة للمال، و لكنها الرغبة في الانتقام و تفريغ السخط. و أما الانتقام من نفسها بالانتحار كما فعلت الممثلة الشهيرة مارلين مونرو، التي كتبت قبيل انتحارها نصيحة لبذات جنسها **تقول** فيها: "احذري... احذري من كل من يخدعك بالأضواء... إني أتحسن امرأة على هذه الأرض... لم أستطع أن أكون أم... إني امرأة أفضل البيت... الحياة العائلية السريعة على كل شيء... إن سعادة المرأة الحقيقية في الحياة العائلية الشريفة الظاهرة، بل إن هذه الحياة العائلية فهي رمز سعادة المرأة بل الإنسانية، و **تقول** في النهاية: لقد ظلمني كل الناس... و أن الحمل في السينما يجعل من المرأة سلعة رخيصة تنقذه مهما نالت من المجد و الشهرة الزائفة".

And to reject that [western woman being repressed]: what could a woman do? How could she face such unjust society that lashes her back fiercely [a metaphor meaning that society is oppressing her] and prevents her from going back to her original nature [marriage and fostering children]. There is no means to [face such society] but to do either of the following: To take revenge against this unjust society by terrorizing it and causing disturbances as written in **a report published in newspapers** that shoplifting from grand stores during 1960 reached around 32194 cases, [...]. It is so strange that 60% of shoplifting was committed by adult women whereas 30% of such crimes were committed by males under the age of 17. The statistics **says**: All female shoplifters weren't in need of money, but they sought revenge against society. Or they seek to inflict punishment on themselves by committing suicide as the famous actress Marilyn Monroe did. She wrote a piece of advice to her fellow women before committing suicide. She **says**: beware of glory... beware all those who try to pull your leg by the glamour of fame... I am the most miserable women on earth... I could not be a mother... I am a woman that prefers staying in my home... and the honourable family life to everything else. Truly, woman's real happiness is in the purified and honourable family life. Indeed, such family life is not only the symbol of woman's happiness but indeed it is the symbol of happiness to all humanity. She finally **says**: 'All people dealt with me unjustly..., and working in movie industry makes the woman a cheap and worthless commodity despite her glory and unreal fame'.

Warranting his arguments with news reports, statistics and a piece of advice that is attributed to the actress Marilyn Monroe, Alhawali utilizes the verbs ‘written’ and ‘says’ to introduce such warrants to conclude that western women are oppressed. Alhawali also continues to

develop his argumentation thread to denounce the West. He uses some more statistics to warrant his arguments:

Figure 7.10 A report and statistics used by Alhawali as warrants (argument 3: Western women and social life)

و ليس غريباً أن تؤكد الإحصائيات العالمية أن نسبة محاولات الانتحار عند النساء أكثر منها عند الرجال، يقول تقرير كتبه أحد الأطباء الاجتماعيين في فيينا: وقد لوحظ أن النساء أكثر محاولة من الرجال، ففي عام (1948م) كان عدد المحاولات في النساء (381) وهذا يوافق (58.61%) من المجموع، وفي عام (1956م) كان العدد (590) أي بنسبه (56.73%)، وفي عام (1959) كانت النسبة (55.92%)، كما لوحظ أن نسبة المحاولات في الفتيان و الفتيات الذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين (14) عاماً و (20) عاماً ترتفع باستمرار، فعند الفتيان كانت النسبة في عام (1948م) - (6.5%)، وفي عام (1956م) (6.53%)، وفي عام (1959م) (6.81%)، و أما عند الفتيات فالتصاعد مخيف، ففي عام (1948م) حاولت (50) فتاة الانتحار، وهذا يشكل نسبة (7.69%) من مجموع محاولات الانتحار في ذلك العام، وفي عام (1956م) حاولت (89) فتاة الانتحار، وهذا يشكل نسبة (8.55%) وفي عام (1959م) حاولت (150) فتاة الانتحار، وهذا يعني نسبة (14.20%) وهذا يعني أن كل تسعة أيام توجد ست محاولات انتحار، أربع منها من جانب الفتيات، و اثنتان من جانب الفتيان.

It is not very unfamiliar that international statistics confirms that attempts to commit suicide increased among women as compared to men. A report written by one of the 'social' physicians in Vienna says: and it has been noticed that women attempt to commit suicide more than men. In 1948 there were 381 suicidal attempts committed by women which constitute 55.61% of the total attempts. In 1956 the number increased to 590 attempts that mean 56.73% and in 1959 the percentage was 55.92%. It is also noticed that the percentage of suicidal attempts is increasingly growing among young males and females whose ages range from 14 to 20. The percentage of the cases of committing suicide increased among young males as it was 6.5% in 1956 and became 6.81% in 1959. However the rates of committing suicide among young females were increasing terribly. In 1948, 89 young females tried to end their lives which constitute 8.55% of the total number of suicidal attempts and in 1959 another 150 young females tried to commit suicide which means 14.20% of the total suicidal attempts. Thus we can conclude that every 9 days there were 6 attempts to commit suicide where 4 of these attempts are made by young girls whereas two are made by young boys.

Last but not the least, Alhawali uses another warrant to lend support to his claims about women's status in the West based on statistics that were attributed to an unnamed 'social' physician, which again could be seen as a fallacious appeal to authority (detailed below).⁹⁰ Alhawali thus attributes some information supported with statistics (using the topos of numbers) to writing from unnamed individuals about people attempting to commit suicide.

Alhawali's projection of women's status in the West is one form of his appeal to moral justification as a kind of moral legitimization of his (Salafist) stance towards western social life. This type of argumentation permeates Alhawali's Salafist writings as I have shown in Section 7.5 above. Alhawali uses all the above three arguments to lend support to one standpoint which is about what he conceives of as the unjust western society that

90. The social actor 'أحد الأطباء الاجتماعيين' ('ahad 'al'atibba' 'a'ijtmā'iyīn; one of the social physicians) is a strange nomination that appears in Alhawali's text which is originally taken from another writer (Mustafa Alsibaie 1915-1964 the founder of Syrian branch of Muslim Brotherhood). I tried to find the quote in the original text (Alsibaie, 1999), but I did not find the whole quote. This might be due to that edition 7 of the book is the only available one whereas Alhawali quoted it from edition 4, as indicted in his list of references, which is not available (the first edition was published in 1984). However, the appellation 'social physician' could possibly be a misnomer that refers to family physician or social worker which again is unnamed rendering his Alhawali's argument into fallacious appeal to authority (see below).

oppresses women – coordinative argumentation (van Eemeren et.al, 2002). These arguments could be reconstructed as follows:

Figure 7.11 Reconstruction of Alhawali’s arguments about the values of western societies (thread 1)

	N	Arguments structures in Alhawali (thread 1)	Schemes
Premises		Woman's primary role is limited to house chores and bringing up children (unstated premise)/ Western women cannot go back to practice their prime role/ Western educational system opposes marriage (social life in the West is decayed)	sign / causality
	1	Western women need to do something to show their rejection of oppression	
	2	It is not unfamiliar that western women attempt to commit suicide	
	3	Because western society refuses that women go back to practice their primary role in life (house chores and bringing up children)/ The western press 'says'	
Warrants	1	A report published in newspapers introduced by the verb 'says'/ Statistics (numbers and percentages)/ Social oppression of women in the west causes women to commit suicide and shoplifting	
	2	A report published by a 'social' physician in Vienna introduced by the verb 'says'/ Statistics (numbers and percentages)	
	3	Western Society is accustomed to and practiced moral debasement and the mixing between men and women/Western women are oppressed and deprived from performing their prime role	
conclusions	1	Women take revenge against the western unjust society by terrorizing it and causing disturbances (shoplifting and committing suicide)	
	2	Number of women who tend to commit suicidal is double the number of men in the West	
	3	Symptomatic relationships: 1 & 2 Western press knows better about western society, hence it is inherently reliable source. 2- Statistics and Marilyn Monroe 'say': Statistics gives scientific precision and Marilyn is a famous actress who before she ended her life advised women to stay at home and not to mix with men/ 3- 'Social' physician's report in Vienna/ Statistics. Causal relationships: 1- Moral debasement and mixing between men and women in the west cause women not to go back to practice their primary roles. 2- Western society oppresses women which causes them to shoplift and commit suicide.	

As appears in Figure 7.11, Alhawali puts his arguments in two argumentation schemes (by sign and causality) to represent western social life. For evaluation of these two schemes, I shall subject them to some critical questions.

7.5.1.1 Critical evaluation of argumentation thread 1 in Alhawali

As indicated in the previous section, Alhawali utilizes two schemes: argumentation schemes from sign and by causality. In order to evaluate these schemes I use some critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346). Let us start with argumentation from sign (symptomatic argumentation). In order to evaluate the argumentation scheme by sign in Alhawali, I use the questions that I have introduced earlier:

1. What is the strength of correlation of the sign with the event signified?
2. Are there other events that would more reliably account for the sign?

Answering the above questions reveals the following: Alhawali, in arguments 1 and 2 about western societies, uses the plurals 'الصحافة الغربية' (*'alṣaḥāfah 'algarbiyyah*; western

newspapers) in argument 1 and 'الصحف' (*'lṣoḥof*; newspapers) in argument 2 (aggregation of 'newspapers') as reliable sources of information about the West, but no specific source is mentioned though, making the report difficult to verify. Aggregation of 'newspapers' is intended to 'regulate practice and manufacture consensus opinion' (2008, p. 37). The mere aggregation of 'newspapers' is dubious as it anonymously presents western newspapers as a whole that covers one event (female teachers in Scottish schools apparently left their jobs to have children) or publishes a report about shoplifting committed by western women. In both cases, Alhawali aims to make generalizations about western society as a whole. It is worth noting that the example given to support argument 1 (western women cannot go back to their role of raising children) is counter-productive as the women in the example about Scottish schools are all apparently allowed to leave their jobs. Additionally, Alhawali, in argument 2, quotes the film actress Marilyn Monroe who committed suicide. She was an actress rather than an expert on gender relations, suggesting that there is a fallacious appeal to authority here – Monroe's fame is used to legitimate the quote, rather than any research-based qualifications to justify her being able to speak on behalf of women in general.

Also, it is questionable that Monroe actually said the words that Alhawali attributes to her.⁹¹ And in selecting a single quote from one actress, Alhawali is using a cherry-picking fallacy. He could, for example, have used other quotes attributed to Monroe (which do not fit so well with Salafi ideology) such as "I have too many fantasies to be a housewife", "Sex is a part of nature, I go along with nature" and "If I'd observed all the rules, I'd never have got anywhere."⁹² Additionally, he could have quoted from other types of women rather than cherry-picking one quote from one woman.

91. Alhawali does not give the source of the Monroe quote, and when I tried to find it online, I only found it being used a few times by some Muslims who were using it in a similar way to Alhawali, in blogs and forums to claim that Western women were oppressed and unhappy. I could not find any reference to the quote in other web pages, although there are numerous websites about Monroe, many which include lists of quotes from her. This lack of verifiability of the quote suggests that this could be a fallacy of false attribution in addition to fallacious appeal to authority and cherry-picking.

92. http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/m/marilyn_monroe.html

Similarly, in argument 3, Alhawali quotes a report attributed to an unnamed ‘social’ physician in Vienna. In addition to the fact that it is unusual to use the appellation ‘social’ physician, Alhawali quotes an unknown individual to draw conclusions about suicide rates among women in Vienna in the years 1948-1959. As Alhawali does not provide full references for the facts and figures he cites, it is difficult to verify their authenticity – this could be referred to as a false attribution fallacy, where an advocate appeals to an irrelevant, unqualified, unidentified, biased or fabricated source in support of an argument (see footnote 90 above). However, as well as quoting unqualified authorities such as Monroe, Alhawali relies on the topos of numbers claiming that 60% of shoplifting is carried out by women and the rate of suicidal attempts among western women was increasing (quoting a report attributed to an unnamed ‘social’ physician from Vienna in the years 1948, 1956, 1959).

Alhawali uses a causality argument here – claiming that the (supposedly) high rate of female shop-lifting is attributed to the oppression of women in western society. The questions that critically account for the argumentation scheme by causality are as follows:

1. Is the evidence cited strong enough to warrant the causal generalization?
2. Are there other causal factors that could interfere with the production of the effect in the given case?

There is no evidence given to demonstrate how the oppression causes shop-lifting – so, assuming the facts are true, this is a case of ‘correlation not causation’ or the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p. 73). Additionally, Alhawali does not quote figures about other sorts of crime so his focus on one type of crime (shop-lifting) is another example of the fallacy of incomplete evidence (cherry-picking).

To summarize, Alhawali, in argumentation thread 1, presents 3 arguments that constitute a conclusive defence of his standpoint vis-à-vis social life in the west (coordinative argumentation). I have demonstrated above that his arguments (in both schemes: by sign and

from causality) are fallacious. I also have pointed out that he relies on topos of numbers. The above three arguments of Alhawali could also be classified as appealing to the fallacy of hasty generalization or ‘secundum quid’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 73) as he generalises his conclusion about western social life based on an unrepresentative sample. Furthermore, Alhawali uses false attributions to legitimate his arguments by not providing full sources relating to the people he quotes. Let us now move to Alhawali’s arguments about religious life and Christianity in the West.

7.5.2 The Church and the Salvation ‘theory’

Unlike Ibn Baz who invites his Muslim audience to argue with the people of the Book (Christians and Jews) in a ‘good manner’ (see Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1.2), Alhawali, in a purely theological discussion of the Salvation theory in Christianity, denounces the Church. Utilizing an argumentation scheme by analogy, he makes a comparison between the Islamic conception of sins and the Church’s concept of original sin (argumentation thread 2).

Figure 7.12 The Church and the original sin (argumentation thread 2)

<p>[...] فإن التصور الإسلامي يقرر و يؤكد حقيقة عظمى و قاعدة جلية تضمنها قوله تعالى: ((أَلَا تَرَىٰ وَرَأَىٰ لِرَبِّهِمْ أَهْلًا مِّمَّنْ * وَ أَنْ لِّئِنْ لَإِنْسَانٌ إِلَّا مَآ سَعَى)) [النجم:38-39] فلا يؤخذ الله تعالى أحداً بذنب غيره مهما كانت الصلة بينهما [...] إنه - حسب قاعدة العدل الرباني - لا يجوز أن يؤخذ أحد غير آدم بخطيئته، حتى ولو كان ابن الشيطان الذي أغواء بالخطيئة - فضلاً عن أن يكون ابن الله - كما تقول الكنيسة تعالى الله عن ذلك علواً كبيراً أو أحداً من بني آدم. و بذلك خلا التصور الإسلامي من الأفكار و النظريات التي ابتدعتها الكنيسة باعتبارها من مستلزمات الخطيئة. [...] و كان علماء المسلمين أسبق من فلاسفة عصر التنوير و اتباع مدرسة النقد التاريخي في هذا المضمار، يقول أحدهم: (...) ففسبوا الإله الحق - سبحانه - إلى ما يألف أسقط الناس و أقلهم أن يفعلوا بمملوكه و عبده [...] و نسبوه إلى أقيح الغنم، حيث زعموا أنه سجن أنبياءه و رسله و أوليائه في الجحيم بسبب خطيئة أبيهم. و نسبوه إلى غاية السفه حيث خلصهم من العذاب بتمكينه أعداءه من نفسه حتى قتلوه و صلبوه [...] و بالجملة فلا نعلم أمة سبّت ربها و معبودها و إلهها بما سبّت به هذه الأمة، كما قال عمر رضي الله عنه: [[إنهم سبوا الله مسبة ما سبه إياها أحد من البشر]] [...]]</p>	<p>[...] and the Islamic conception of (sins) states and confirms a noble reality and a splendid principle that is included in the following Qur’anic verse, Allah said: {That no burdened person (with sins) shall bear the burden (sins) of another, And that man can have nothing but what he does (good or bad)}. 53-38-39. Thus Allah, the Exalted, will not punish one with the guilt of another no matter how closely they are related [...]. Verily – according to the divine justice – it is not permissible to punish any individual because of the sin of Adam, even if this individual is the son of the Satan who persuaded Adam to commit the sin let alone the son of God –as the Church says, Glorified and Exalted be He! High above (the great falsehood that they say) – or any of the sons of Adam (humans). Thus Islamic conception [of sins] does not include the ideas and theories that were invented by the Church which are considered to be inevitable consequences of the (original) sin [...]. Muslim scholars (religious leaders) preceded (had the precedence over) the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the advocates of historical criticism in this respect [criticizing the Church’s concepts of the original sin]. One of them [the philosophers and the advocates of historical criticism] says: (... they [the people of the church] attributed to the true God – the Exalted – what the most morally depraved and insignificant individual could attribute to his own slave! [...] They also attributed the worst form of injustice to Him when they claimed that he imprisoned His prophets and messengers and His close pious worshippers in Hell-fire because of their father’s sin. They attributed foolishness to Him as they claimed that He granted them salvation [from the sin] by enabling His enemies to kill and crucify Him [...]). Generally we do not know any nation that execrated their Lord whom they worship like this nation [Christian nation], as Omar [the second Caliph in Islam], may Allah be pleased with him, said: (Verily they execrated Allah with a vilification that no single human has ever attributed to Him) [...]</p>
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The analogy in the above figure is between two different and opposing concepts of sin in Christianity and Islam. Alhawali introduces how each concept is characterised in each religion by the verb ‘تقول’ (*taqūl*; it (the Church) says) trying to lend support to his argument symptomatically. First, he introduces the Islamic concept of sins by a Qur’anic verse which is seen by Muslims as inherently true. He also utilizes the words of the Muslims’ second Caliph (Omar 634 –644) as another warrant to support his argumentative denigration of the Church. However, in order to introduce the standpoint of Church that regards the salvation theory, Alhawali does not refer to any Christian sacred texts. On the contrary Alhawali utilizes the verb ‘says’ to generally introduce the Church’s standpoint. Additionally, he quotes one of the advocates of the school of historical criticism without naming him. In these two argumentation schemes (by sign and analogy), Alhawali’s rejection of Salvation theory in Christianity is not brought up to establish a dialogue with the people of the Church. It is used here to denounce the Church which explains Alhawali’s exclusion of Christian social actors, instead personalizing the Church, i.e. representing the people of the Church by spatialization (for more information about spatialization and Alhawali’s representation of social actors see Sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.3). This suggests that Alhawali is not addressing ‘the Other’ in his writings but has another type of addressees in mind (his fellow Muslims in general and more specifically Saudis). This argumentative thread could be reconstructed as follows:

Figure 7.13 Reconstruction of Alhawali's argumentation of the original sin (Argumentation thread 2)

	N	Arguments structures in Alhawali (thread 1)	schemes
Premises	1	Islamic conception of sins reflects the divine justice and is free from the ideas and theories that were invented by the Church/ Muslim scholars (religious leaders) rejected the Church's theories of the original sin before the advocates of historical criticism did/ Christians say bad things about Allah	Sign/ analogy
Warrants	1	Qur'anic verse/ the Church says/ Muslim scholars (religious leaders), the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the advocates of historical criticism reject the original sin/ Omar, [the second Caliph in Islam] said	
Conclusions	1	The Church is wrong/ Islamic concept of sins is right/ Muslim religious leaders are aware of these facts and better than the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the advocates of historical criticism	
Relations		Symptomatic relationships: Qur'anic verses that are the words of Allah which, according to Muslims, are inherently true/ Muslim religious leaders are people of true religious knowledge thus they are considered by Muslims to be reliable / Enlightenment philosophers and the advocates of historical criticism who reject the concept of Original sin belong to the western culture and know western Christian culture better, thus they are reliable sources of knowledge in this respect / Omar (the second Caliph) is reliable religious authority and a source of reliable knowledge. Relationship for arguments from analogy: Using analogy to point differences between Islamic concept of sin and the original sin in Christianity/ Pointing similarity: Elites in both Cultures (Islam vs. Christianity) reject the Church's theory of the original sin/ Pointing differences: Muslim religious leaders rejected original sin theory before western elites did.	

The construction of Alhawali's argument concerning the original sin in Christianity shows his major aim of denouncing the West. Alhawali also continues to use the symptomatic scheme in order to negatively represent the West seeking to support his arguments via appeal to 'studies' that he presents as an authority. Within the symptomatic argumentation scheme, Alhawali introduces an argument from analogy that is deployed to undermine the efforts of western Enlightenment philosophers and advocates of historical criticism.

Alhawali compares two types of social actors who lived in two different historical epochs; medieval Muslim religious leaders and modern Enlightenment philosophers and advocates of historical criticism. These social actors are seen as being similar in that both rejected the Church's theory of the Original sin. Alhawali uses the evaluative hyperbolic adjective 'أسبق' ('*asbaq*; had the precedence over) to attribute and record the priority of the Muslim religious leaders in criticizing the concept of the Original sin. The hyperbolic adjective 'أسبق' ('*asbaq*; had the precedence over) is neither used to introduce the criticism of the Original sin chronologically nor to value the contribution of Western philosophers. On the contrary, it is used to undermine the efforts of the Enlightenment philosophers and the advocates of historical criticism and to positively represent Muslim religious leaders. In so doing, Alhawali tries to legitimate his negative stance toward the west. Next, I shall include

more of Alhawali's arguments about the West and what Alhawali claims to be the onslaught on the Arabian Peninsula.

7.5.3 Political enmity: Invasion of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula

Alhawali tries to represent the 'Other' (the West) to his readers as wanting to destroy Islam and invade the 'Muslim World' as I have presented above and in Chapters 4 and 5. Again, considering statistics and some western newspaper reports as an authentic and reliable source, Alhawali includes, in his arguments, reference to studies to support his stance of what he believes to be the evil intention of the West (represented mainly in United States) towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Below I present an argumentation thread that is used by Alhawali to support his negative stance towards the United States.

Figure 7.14 United States Invades the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula (argument 1 in Argumentation thread 3)

3- برامج لاحتلال الخليج والجزيرة

[...] وفي ظل تلك الأوضاع المتقلبة و الإدارة الأمريكية الضعيفة ظهرت دعوات قوية في أمريكا لتتخذ ضعفاً بلادها و تنذر أمتها بالخطر المحدق إن لم تعد العدة كاملة لإحتلال الخليج. كما **صح** بعضهم أو لحماية أمن الخليج كما **يعتقد** الكثيرون. و تشير هنا إلى بعض المترجم المتداول في الأوساط العربية منها، [...] 1- **دراسة عسكرية استراتيجيّة** نشرتها مجلة فورتنون الأمريكية في مايو 1979م بعنوان "التدخل العسكري في منابع النفط، الاحتمالات و الخطط" و مما ورد فيها ص 4: "إن نزاعاً بين العراق و الكويت أو السعودية نابعاً من الخلافات القائمة منذ زمن حول الأراضي هو خطر حقيقي". ثم **تقول** الدراسة: - "لقد أوضح كل من براون و بريجنسكي - مساعدا الرئيس كارتر لشؤون الأمن القومي - مؤخراً أن الولايات المتحدة ستتخذ خطوات من بينها استخدام القوات العسكرية لحماية مصالحها في العربية السعودية".

3- Scenarios to invade the Gulf and the [Arabian] Peninsula
[... and in the light of unstable political conditions [in the Middle East] and the weak American administration, some serious proposals appeared in America criticising the American weakness and warning the American nation of the dangers if they do not prepare their troops to invade and occupy the Gulf as some of them **stated** or to protect the Gulf as most of them **justified**. I present here some of the translated reports (into Arabic): [...] 1- **A military strategic study** published by 'Fortune' in May 1979 titled 'Military intervention of Oil Wells: Possibilities and plans'. In page 4 there appears an indication that 'there could be a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait or Saudi Arabia over the long lasting problematic territories which emerge to be a real threat'. Then the study **says**: 'Both Brown and Brzezinski - Assistants to the President (Jimmy Carter) for National Security Affairs - have recently declared that the United States will take measures including military intervention to protect its interests in Saudi Arabia'.

Alhawali puts forward the following premise: United States is planning to invade Saudi Arabia. He presents some extreme proposals that he claims American leaders are making using warrants that include statements attributed to some unidentified social actors and are introduced by the words 'stated' and 'justified' that both carry the meaning 'to say' (using the

symptomatic argumentation scheme – explained further below). Additionally, he uses the verb ‘says’ to introduce another warrant; ‘military strategic study’. Alhawali warrants his argument quoting two well known individuals (Brown and Brzezinski - Assistants to the United States President (Jimmy Carter 1977–1981) for National Security Affairs). Quoting such high rank officials in the Carter’s administration, as people in the position to know the plans and policies of the United States, serves Alhawali’s purpose to support his claim about the intentions of the United States to occupy oil wells⁹³ (see Section 7.5.3.1 below for critical view of this and the following arguments).

Alhawali also continues to project the American and British press as collaborating in the war against Saddam Hussein (the president of Iraq 1979 – 2003) by demonizing him. Additionally, Alhawali continues to support his claims about American and Israeli war in the Middle East.

Figure 7.15 American and British press and the war against Iraq (argument 2 in Argumentation thread 3)

<p>و بالنظر بشكل عابر للصحافة الأمريكية و البريطانية يلاحظ أنه قد تم بناء الأساس الدعائي للحرب من خلال تصوير صدام حسين كجميع في المنطقة و تولت وسائل الإعلام العربية العزف على وتر التهديدات التي أطلقها صدام ضد إسرائيل و قامت هذه الوسائل في الوقت نفسه بالتغاضي عن التهديدات الإسرائيلية لمختلف الدول العربية. و في مقال آخر تقول المجلة نفسها (EIR FEETURE): إسرائيل تجهز لقيام حرب أخرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط لإيجاد حل نهائي للمشكلة العربية... و هذا يعني فيما يبدو الحرب ضد العراق و دول أخرى و تدمير الأردن. و تسخر من مزاعم يوتش أنه يسعى للسلام في المنطقة قائلة: هذا هراء فالولايات المتحدة ملتزمة بقيام حرب في الشرق الأوسط و ربما كان الشيء الوحيد الذي لم يتحدد هو تاريخ إنذلاعها، أما الإسرائيليون فهم مستعدون للحرب و إما يُسمى بالحل النهائي. و قالت ربما كانت هناك أو ستكون على الأرجح إتفاقات جديدة بين القوى في إسرائيل و حافظ الأسد، أو شيء من هذا، و إذا ما تم وضع القضايا الهامشية جانباً فإن إسرائيل مبرمجة حالياً باتجاه الحرب و الذين يقولون غير ذلك إما أغبياء أو كاذبون، إن ذلك هو طبيعة المسألة و أصلها.</p> <p>Reading through the American and British press quickly, we observe that the campaign for the war [on Iraq] is based on demonizing Saddam Hussein. And the western media started to repeat the threats that Saddam expressed towards Israel and at the same time this [western] media neglected the Israeli threats against the different Arab countries. And in another article the same magazine (EIR FEETURE – spelling in the original text) says: "Israel is preparing for <i>another</i> war in the Middle East to make a final solution to the Arab problem ... This means a war, presumably against Iraq and other states, and the destruction of Jordan. It also ridicules Bush's (George H. W.) claims that he is seeking to establish peace in the region (Middle East). It says: "Bunk. The United States government is committed to a war in the Middle East to achieve what is called the final solution. The exact date is the only thing that's open to question." It also says: "There may be, and probably will be, new agreements between forces in Israel and Hafez al-Assad (Syrian president 1971 – 2000), things of that sort. But, the side issues aside, Israel is presently programmed for war. Those who tell you that this is not true are either foolish, or are lying. That's the nature of the situation."</p>
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93. It is noteworthy here that the study was published almost 10 years before the Gulf crises after which this argument was written by Alhawali (see below).

In the argument above (Figure 7.15), Alhawali utilizes two argumentation schemes: symptomatic and argument from analogy schemes. The context of this argumentation thread is during the military invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime in 1990 (for further information see below and Chapter 8). In the argument from analogy, Alhawali utilizes the American and British media to warrant his argument, though as above, not naming any specific media organization. He writes about the coverage of the American and British newspapers of the war accusing them of bias, comparing what he believes to be exaggeration of Saddam's threats to Israel. He also reports their negligence of the Israeli threats of launching wars against different Arab countries. Alhawali also uses argument from sign utilizing translated (into Arabic) articles from a magazine named 'EIR FEETURE'⁹⁴. In this argumentation scheme, Alhawali warns his readers of possible threats that feed directly into demonizing the west making association between Israel and America.

Comparing Alhawali's quotes to the source article in the 'EIR', I found that either Alhawali paraphrases the translation of the article or the translator was paraphrasing during the process of translation. The following is the first paragraph of the original article:

Figure 7.16 Screenshot of the first paragraph of the original article from the 'EIR'

Israel is preparing for war. The state of Israel is now marshaled, in preparation for a war, which, from one standpoint, might be described as Israel's attempted "final solution" to the Arab problem. This means a war, presumably against Iraq and other states, and the destruction of Jordan.

The translation of the paragraph in the above screenshot in Alhawali's quote reads:

إسرائيل تجهز لقيام حرب/أخرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط لإيجاد حل نهائي للمشكلة العربية... و هذا يعني فيما يبدو الحرب ضد العراق و دول أخرى و تدمير الأردن.

94. The spelling of 'EIR FEETURE' exists in the original text where this argument is found. However after I searched for this magazine I found that he refers to the Feature articles section in the 'Executive Intelligence Review' which was founded in 1974. He precisely refers to the Feature article that was issued on July 20, 1990 (see also footnote 54 in Chapter 5). The article is edited from the oral remarks made on July 2, 1990 by the political activist and the founder of 'EIR', Lyndon LaRouche. The EIR is quoted as being criticised by the editor-in-chief of the *Washington Times* as "an anti-Semitic potpourri of disinformation, factoids, rumor, gossip, loony tunes and an occasional fact." (de Borchgrave, Arnaud (August 27, 2002). "Thinking the unthinkable". *Washington Times*: p. A.15.)

The above Arabic version could be translated as follows:

Israel is preparing for *another* war *in the Middle East to make* a final solution to the Arab problem ... This means a war, *seemingly* against Iraq and other states, and the destruction of Jordan (see Figure 7.15).

The translation of the Arabic version shows an addition of the word 'أخرى' ('oḥrā; another) in the first sentence. Additionally, the underlined sentence is paraphrased as shown in my translation of the Arabic text in Figure 7.15. It is noteworthy that Alhawali introduces his argument utilizing the verb 'تقول' (taqūl; it says) which indicates a direct quote from the Article. However, quoting turns out to be adding the word 'أخرى' ('oḥrā; another) as well as paraphrasing the second sentence in the source text utilizing the phrase 'لإيجاد' (li'iğād; to make) and translating the adverb 'presumably' that indicates a presumption into 'فيما يبدو' (fima yabdo; seemingly).

Despite the fact that the author of the source text (in the excerpt above) builds an argument to lend support to the major claim that appears in the title 'Israel is now preparing for a Mideast war', the translator or Alhawali tries to change what is probable into a seemingly inevitable event. Here Alhawali could be accused of committing the 'straw man fallacy' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 73). This is done by twisting the argument in the source text by means of re-lexicalization – replacing the equivalent Arabic words that are supposed to transfer the meanings of the source text with ideologically-laden ones or introducing words that are not available in the source text in order to achieve desired (biased) effects in the target text that serve the agenda of the producer of the translation or Alhawali himself.

Figure 7.17 reconstructs and summarizes the argumentation schemes used by Alhawali in an argumentative thread about western political enmity (premises, warrants and conclusions are numbered according to the number of arguments in each thread).

Figure 7.17 Reconstruction of Alhawali's arguments about political enmity (argumentation thread 3)

	N	Arguments structures in Alhawali (thread 3)	Schemes
Premises	1	There are some scenarios proposed by some Americans to invade the Gulf and Arab Peninsula/ Israel intends to wage a war against Iraq and other Arab countries and it intends to destroy Jordan.	Sign / analogy
	2	The western media repeatedly published the threats that Saddam expressed towards Israel and neglected the Israeli threats against the different Arab countries/ The claims of Bush (George H. W.) to establish peace in the region (Middle East) are not sincere.	
Warrants	1	A military strategic study published by 'Fortune' in May 1979 quoting statements of 'Brown and Brzezinski - Assistants to the President (Jimmy Carter) for National Security Affairs.	
	2	Reading through western press 'EIR FEETURE (spelling in the original text) says:	
conclusions	1	United States had the intention to invade Saudi Arabia before the Gulf Crisis in 1990-91(Unstated conclusion)/ Israelis are ready and willing to launch the war against Arab countries and are ready for what is called the final solution.	
	2	Western media have double standards and are biased/ Bush's claim of establishing peace in the Middle East is not true	
relations		Symptomatic relations: A military strategic study published by "Fortune" (which is considered authentic source by Alhawali) quoting two US senior officials, namely, Brown and Brzezinski - Assistants to the President (Jimmy Carter) for National Security Affairs who represent the American administration (who are considered official authorities). Relation for argument from analogy: Pointing out differences in media coverage.	

Alhawali denounces the western media via comparing its coverage of the threats of Saddam Hussein to Israel to that of Israel to Arab countries (using the argumentation from analogy scheme). He utilizes a study in 'Fortune' quoting the assistants to the President Jimmy Carter to National Security to lend support to his arguments on the basis that these sources are true and representative of the western press (symptomatic schemes). I shall now turn to critically examine Alhawali's arguments in argumentation thread 3 that he utilizes to lend support to his claims about western political enmity to Muslim countries.

7.5.3.1 Critical evaluation of argumentation thread 3 in Alhawali

Alhawali quotes from some unreliable sources in the West (especially in the United States) to lend support to his arguments from sign and analogy. He tries to tell his audience about perceived threats to Saudi Arabia. The critical questions I use to account for these forms of schemes are mentioned in Section 7.5.1.1 and elsewhere in this Chapter. Let us start with Alhawali's arguments from sign.

The declarations of high rank officials such as the assistants to the President Jimmy Carter to National Security are significant in indicating American political views towards Saudi Arabia. However, these statements were published in 1979, i.e. almost 11 years before

Operation Desert Storm launched by the American-led Coalition force against Iraq after which the text that contains this argument was published (for further explanation about the political and military contexts of the presence of the Coalition troops in Saudi Arabia see Section 8.5.2 in the next chapter). Alhawali uses such quotes to reject the presence of the troops of the United States and its allies in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm. This undermines the correlation strength of the quotes of the two American officials as they belong to Carter's Administration (Democratic Party) whereas the 1st war against Iraq took place during the administration of George H. W. Bush who was a Republican president of the United States from 1989 to 1993. Alhawali here could be accused of utilizing the fallacy of false attribution (unqualified authority) as well as using the topos of danger (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 77) in claiming that American troops will invade Saudi Arabia and occupy the Gulf region. Thus the religiously packed political decision of allowing such troops to come to Saudi Arabia is claimed to be wrong and, according to Alhawali, should result in invading the 'abode of Islam'. Alhawali continues by stressing claims that Israel is backed by the West and is willing and ready to launch a war on Arab countries.

In the second symptomatic argument (Figure 7.15), Alhawali refers to the American and British press collectively (representation by aggregation) as collaborating to demonize Saddam Hussein. He claims that they only publish the threats of Saddam Hussein towards Israel whereas they neglect the threats declared by Israel towards Arab countries. Again, without naming any actual sources, Alhawali aggregates American and British newspapers 'to manufacture' a Saudi (or perhaps Muslim) negative 'consensus opinion' (van Leeuwen 2008, p. 37) towards United States and Britain. Additionally, Alhawali quotes from another source 'EIR FEETURE' of questionable authority (see footnote 93 above) to unequivocally introduce further external threats. Alhawali here as I have indicated elsewhere in this

Chapter, has fallen into the fallacy of appealing to an unqualified authority as well as hasty generalization which render his arguments in argumentative thread 3 to be fallacious.

Among the threats that Alhawali's argumentation thread 3 contains is that Israel is ready to launch a war against some Arab states including its aim to destroy the north neighbouring country of Saudi Arabia; Jordan, which means that Israel will be threatening the northern borders of Saudi Arabia. He also includes a quote that ridicules Bush's (George H. W.) claims that he is seeking to establish peace in the region (Middle East) to further demonize the United States. In addition to quoting an unqualified authority, Alhawali bases his argument on the topos of danger to incite his audience against United States and its allies.

In summary, Unlike Ibn Baz, Alhawali uses most of his arguments in political argumentative topics to reject what he believes to be the Western dominance over Muslim countries as well as warning Muslims that westerners have aggressive aims towards Muslim countries. Additionally, he introduces arguments that denounce both social and religious life in the west. Alhawali claims that women in the west are oppressed trying to lend support to his arguments symptomatically as well as utilizing arguments from both analogy and causality. He also denounces the Church by means of criticising Salvation theory making the Church responsible for such teachings. Thus Alhawali uses all the three forms of schemes of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) in his arguments that are introduced by the different word forms of the verb 'to say' quoting unqualified sources as well as utilizing some other fallacious arguments such as the fallacies of incomplete evidence and hasty generalization as well as some topoi such as the topos of danger.

The argumentation schemes utilized by both authors reveal some aspects of stereotypical patterns (Walton, 2005) of the Salafist reasoning. Despite the fact the Salafi discourses as exemplified in the writings of Ibn Baz and Alhawali, belong to the same geopolitical area and are mostly based on the Salafi teachings of Mohammad Ibn

AbdulWahhab who depended largely on the teachings of the medieval Salafi religious leaders, they nevertheless differ in their patterns of reasoning. On the one hand, the patterns of reasoning in Ibn Baz's arguments are mostly theological. As I have explicated above, Ibn Baz's symptomatic argumentation schemes tend to be warranted by Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions. The nomination of medieval religious leaders in his arguments reveals another aspect of Ibn Baz's reasoning, namely, a reincarnation of medieval religious Salafi reasoning and explications of the Sacred texts. Additionally, Ibn Baz's argument from analogy via which he compares modern mystic practices to those of pre-Islamic polytheists, is further supported by other Qur'anic verses. Regarding Ibn Baz's argument from causality (his rejection of Arab nationalism), it is also religiously justified; adoption of Arab nationalism is viewed as leading to the rejection of the Sharia (religious laws). Hence, reasoning in Ibn Baz's corpus is mostly moulded with the medieval Salafi conception of Islam as well as marked with reference to Qur'anic verses (and in some cases Prophetic traditions) in all forms of arguments; symptomatic, analogical and causal argumentation schemes.

On the other hand, Alhawali's argumentation schemes indicate a different direction of the Salafist patterns of reasoning which might also indicate an emerging change in Salafi discourse and an evolution of a new politically motivated Salafist strand within the Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia. As we have seen in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Alhawali's semantic foci and sociosemantic categories are marked with his many negative politico-religious representations of the West, though he shares some of the religious thematic foci with Ibn Baz. This is also evident in his legitimization strategies in this chapter. Apart from his argument about the original sin (which is basically based on analogy –Islam vs.

Christianity)⁹⁵, Alhawali's symptomatic schemes are based on quoting non-religious sources (most of which are reports from newspapers, magazines and military and political studies) to support his politically motivated claims. Also, Alhawali utilizes statistics and numbers (to give an impression that his arguments are scientifically based). This is also another mark that indicates a shift in Salafi discourse towards politically motivated arguments. Additionally, both authors tried to regulate practice and manufacture consensus opinion. Thus, we may conclude that stereotypical patterns of reasoning in the Salafist discourses (as exemplified in Alhawali's writings) are incorporating attempts at scientific reasoning (though not accurate and in some cases lacking in veracity) and are becoming politically oriented.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I tried to quantitatively identify and critically analyse the arguments and argumentation schemes in both Salafi corpora under investigation. I utilized the keywords in both corpora in order to identify the most salient key argumentation indicators that distinguish the two Salafi authors when compared against each other. Additionally, I used analysis of frequent clusters to narrow down the analysis to a manageable number of argumentative keywords as well as focussing on analysing concordance lines, including more of the linguistic co-text, to qualitatively account for the arguments that appear therein. And in order to critically evaluate the argumentation schemes in all threads I used critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346) that help to reveal the (un)acceptability of the argument and ideological stances taken by Ibn Baz and Alhawali. Additionally, I used argumentation schemes as analytical tools that could reflect the stereotypical patterns of the Salafi reasoning.

95. In his argument about the original sin in Christianity, Alhawali basically compares Christianity to Islam supporting his argument from analogy with another symptomatic scheme quoting a Qur'anic verse (a warrant), and the words of the Muslims' second Caliph (as a Salafi religious authority).

Both Salafi writers present arguments to lend support to their stances in relation to their (politically oriented/religiously based) semantic foci and representations of social actors: Alhawali is more concerned with western social and religious life and political enmity, whereas Ibn Baz focuses on pure theological issues in Islam. Their arguments can be classified under the three schemes of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004). Their arguments from sign that are based on Qur'anic verses are related to the topics they intend to support. However, other symptomatic signs in Alhawali, as I have shown above, are fallacious, because he relies on unqualified authorities or makes hasty generalizations.

The arguments from analogy in argumentation thread 1 in Ibn Baz's corpus and in argumentation threads 2 and 3 in Alhawali's are both fallacious. Both writers make the fallacy of faulty analogy which could stem from the Salafist stereotypical perspective of 'the Other'. On the one hand, Ibn Baz, in his argument from analogy, perceives of 'the Other' (Sufis and Shiites) as practicing polytheistic rituals without addressing their arguments for carrying out such rituals. On the other hand, Alhawali's arguments from analogy, that stem from a Salafist politically oriented stereotypical perspective, are concerned with undermining the efforts of western advocates of historical criticism who criticised the Church's theory of Salvation as well as collectively accusing the western media of bias, without providing convincing evidence. Both authors also use fallacious arguments from causality in their argumentation threads (3 in Ibn Baz and 1 and 3 in Alhawali) as again, they do not provide enough evidence to support their arguments: Ibn Baz employs the fallacy of faulty causation when he tries, from a Salafist perspective, to justify his rejection of Arab nationalism. Alhawali, from his Salafist perspective, tries to denounce western social life. He also has used the fallacy of faulty causation.

Finally, the two Salafi authors (without discussing their opponents' arguments) initiate their arguments from a Salafist (political or religious) perspective in order to refute,

defame or reject their opponents' social/religious practices. In so doing, both authors try to dissuade their audience from following, accepting or adhering to what they believe to be non-Islamic teachings and practices and/or opposing what they represent as the true teachings of Islam. Such argumentative moves appear to legitimate the authors' stances vis-a-vis the semantic foci (delineated in Chapters 4 and 5) and their representations of social actors (detailed in Chapter 6). Additionally, their arguments from sign (quoting Qur'anic verses, prophetic tradition and other Salafī writings) contribute to the process of legitimizing their stances via impersonal authority vested in the quoted texts as well as help to achieve conformity (legitimation via conformity) with the medieval Salafī mainstream of writings. The argumentation schemes reflected the stereotypical patterns of reasoning of both Salafist writers. These reasoning patterns could also show the difference between the authors as well as indicate the emergence of the politically oriented Salafism.

In order to better understand why certain semantic foci, representations and arguments occur in the writings of these two authors, as we have seen in chapters 4-7, we need to move beyond corpus analysis and take into consideration political and religious contexts which constitute the major focus of the next chapter.

Part Four

CHAPTER 8: Explanations of the results in Context

8.1 Introduction

This Chapter concludes the five chapters that analyse the Salafi discourses. It seeks to answer the following research question: How can the findings in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 be explained in relation to Saudi social and politico-religious contexts?

In order to address this question, I use the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) which is triangulatory in nature (see Section 3.4.9 in Chapter 3). In the DHA, the context of a situation is elaborated on by considering links between texts and discourses. In this case I link the discourses that the two Salafi text producers draw on to discourses found in other canonical, religious texts i.e. taking into account interdiscursivity and intertextuality (see Section 3.2.3.4). In addition to drawing on my own knowledge of the context of situations in Saudi Arabia, I refer to the biographies of the two text producers and their institutions which are considered as context-relevant information (see Section 1.3.7 in Chapter 1).

There are three types of analyses in my thesis, namely, semantic foci, social actor representation and argumentation analyses of the writings of Sheikh Ibn Baz and Sheikh Safar Alhawali. In section 8.2 I provide a summary of results found when analysing Ibn Baz's corpus followed by explanations of these findings in section 8.3 and its subsections (8.3.1-8.3.4). Section 8.4 gives a summary of the analysis of Alhawali's corpus followed by two subsections explaining these results in context, namely, sections 8.5.1 and 8.5.2. Section 8.6 brings together explanations of the representations of sexual morality in the West from the Salafi perspectives in both corpora. I have grouped explanations of the findings about the Salafi representations of sexual morality in the West and Islam in one separate section

because the Salafi writers have more or less the same stance towards these two themes. However they differ slightly in respect to the motives behind such representations. Before I start summarizing the findings of analysing the two Salafi corpora, it is worth noting that neither of the Salafi writers mentions each other in their writings that compose the research data. This may indicate no direct antagonism or enmity between the two, although equally, there is no obvious support of the other's position either. Let us first start with a summary of the findings in Ibn Baz's corpus.

8.2 Summary of findings 1: Ibn Baz

The themes in Ibn Baz's writings (Chapter 4) are mostly theological. There are four interrelated theological semantic foci in Ibn Baz that are salient in his writings. Firstly, the concept of divinity through which Ibn Baz has projected Allah as the powerful 'God' to whom the pure religion is to be dedicated, calling on Muslims to refer to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of His prophet (Sharia) in all disputes. Secondly, in his negative representation of polytheism, Ibn Baz recontextualizes quotes from the sacred texts and previous (medieval) Salafi writings and explications of the types of polytheism. His classification and presentation of polytheism are oriented towards rituals and aspects of worship that he conceives of as contradicting Islamic monotheistic beliefs. Ibn Baz also writes about monotheism recontextualizing the Salafi explications of the names and attributes of Allah.

Thirdly, although Ibn Baz's construction of Islam revolves around monotheistic beliefs and rituals, he occasionally writes about what he considers to be the enemies of Islam which results in an interpretation of his writings as political at times. Additionally, Ibn Baz appears to share some political views that Alhawali holds (Chapter 5) which include his rejection of Arab nationalism and colonialism. Ibn Baz's final theological theme is 'the final

return' through which he represents two opposing states: punishment (Hell-fire) and reward (paradise).

There are five categories of social actors in Ibn Baz, four of which belong to the in-group whereas the social actors in the fifth category are considered 'the Other'. These categories are as follows: 'The Prophet of Islam and other prophets', two types of Salaf, namely 'The companions of the Prophet' and their successors, 'General social actors that all belong to the in-group social actors, and finally 'the Other'. It is notable that the in-group social actors outnumber those who belong to the out-group, namely of the 75 keywords that were derived from Ibn Baz's corpus, only 6.6% of them refer to 'the Other'. This may reflect Ibn Baz's interests in the in-group rather than attacking or representing 'the Other'.

In terms of 'the Other', Ibn Baz refers to Arab nationalists and the Auliya (friends of god in the Sufi and Shiite beliefs). Ibn Baz also represents social life in the West negatively claiming that moral denigration permeates the social life there without specifying the moral values that are debased (see Section 8.6 below). Additionally, he represents social actors by personalization via categorization, selecting theological terms such as polytheists and propagandists of doctrines that he conceives of as opposing Islam as well as classification via religionym and functionalization. Additionally, Ibn Baz utilizes nomination by honorification to represent medieval social actors (mainly Salafi religious leaders). These representations are deployed in Ibn Baz's corpus in different argumentation schemes (discussed in the following paragraph). All the sociosemantic categories in Ibn Baz create the difference between the in-group social actors and 'the Other' (i.e. the 'Us vs. 'the Other').

Ibn Baz utilizes arguments (mostly argumentation from sign) to legitimate his stances towards both the semantic foci he addresses and the social actors involved. His arguments are mainly theological, relying on quoting from powerful in-group others, which are signified by clusters such as 'و قال تعالى' (*wa qala ta'āla*; and the Exalted said) which indicates Qur'anic

verses (arguments from sign) that, according to Muslims, are seen as inherently true. Additionally he uses arguments from analogy to refute the ritualistic practices of some Sufis and Shiites when they beseech help from dead holy men. He compares such practices to those of the early Arab polytheists. These results could be grouped under different themes that epitomize Ibn Baz's pursuit (from a Salafi perspective) towards the perfection of religious rituals and beliefs. These themes include impermissible innovation of religious practices and unifying Allah in His names and attributes.

8.3 Ibn Baz: Perfection of religious duties (Religiously based Salafism)

The semantic foci and representations in Ibn Baz's corpus could be reformulated as follows: 'Religiously impermissible innovation of ritualistic practices', 'pure ritualistic practices that include his 'refutation of associationism', 'unification of Allah's names and attributes' and the 'political stance and rejection of Arab nationalism and colonialism'. Let us take each in turn.

8.3.1 Innovation of religious rituals: Oneness of Worship vs. Associationism

According to Salafis, any form or rituals of worship should be based on Qur'anic verses or prophetic traditions. While Salafism is the principal form of Islam that is practised in Saudi Arabia, the country is also home to Sufis (who mostly live in the Hijaz area of Saudi Arabia such as Jeddah, Makkah and Medina) and Shiite factions (the Twelvers who live in eastern Saudi Arabia and Ismailis (also called Makramis) who live in Najran – in the southern province of Saudi Arabia - and another Shiite minority, living in Medina, called the Nakhawila). These minority groups have ritualistic practices that Ibn Baz and all Salafis reject and deem to be impermissible religious practices.

Some rituals of some Sufis and/or Shiites that include beseeching help from pious dead individuals are treated by Salafis as 'بدعة' (*bid'ah*; impermissible religious innovation)

that Muslims should avoid. Such practices did occur during the period when Ibn Baz was writing his texts as the Sufis in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries have never ceased celebrating the Prophet's birthday till the time of writing this thesis. There were also some calls to oppose the Salafis' rejection of the celebration of the Prophet's birthday. Ibn Baz mentions in his corpus that Sheikh Salih Mohammad Jamal,⁹⁶ on 26-12-1984 in the newspaper *Al-nadwah*⁹⁷ issue 7854, criticized the Salafi rejection of the Prophet's birthday.⁹⁸

There are other religious practices that Sufis and Shiite share and are deemed by Ibn Baz and other Salafis to be impermissible. These include the Shiites and Sufi's beseeching of help from Alhussein the grandson of the Prophet of Islam (the mosque of Alhussein is a famous shrine in Cairo, Egypt).

Another form of what Ibn Baz conceives of to be impermissible religious innovation as well as a form of polytheism (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.2) is the Sufi and Shiites' beseeching of help from pious individuals such as the Prophet of Islam and famous members of his descendants including his daughter Fatima and her son Alhussein. The last two individuals mark the Shiites' practice that includes veneration of Fatima and her son Alhussein as well as his father Ali Ibn Abi Talib (the cousin of the Prophet of Islam and the husband of Fatima).⁹⁹ Ibn Baz's rejection of seeking the help of such individuals collides with the Shiites' beliefs. The Salafi perspective that rejects such veneration of holy men

96. Sheikh Salih Mohammad Jamal is a Saudi citizen who is from the holy city of Makkah where some of the modern Saudi Sufi minority exists.

97. *Al-nadwah* ceased publishing on 27-11-2011 and was replaced by a newspaper called 'Makkah.

98. I searched for the Article that was refuted by Ibn Baz, but as *Al-nadwah* newspaper ceased publishing it was so difficult to get a copy from the archives. However, another Salafi writer named Altwaijiri refuted the article of Sheikh Salih Mohammad Jamal in a book called 'Refuting the Thesis of the Misguided Writer' (Altwaijiri, 1987).

99. According to the Shiites (mostly the twelvers who live in Iran and some parts of the Gulf States including Saudi Arabia), Ali Ibn Abi Talib is the heir and the legitimate Imam and successor of the Prophet of Islam. The Sunni Muslims including the Salafis hold a different view towards Ali Ibn Abi Talib which makes him the fourth Caliph (after Abu Bakr Alssiddeeq, Omar Ibn Alkhattab and Othman Ibn Affan respectively) and one of the elite companions of the Prophet of Islam.

underlines Ibn Baz's rejection of ritualistic practices of Sufis and Shiites. He conceives of such practices as violating the monotheistic belief of the unity of worship.

The existence of critiques of the Salafi rejection of celebrating the Prophet's birthday and beseeching help from Sufi and Shiites' saints as well as the presence of Sufi and other minority groups in Saudi Arabia helps to explain why Ibn Baz voices his concerns about these practices – as a Salafi he wants to dissuade others within his own country from following practices that he feels are erroneous. Another relevant piece of context which helps to explain Ibn Baz's focus on impermissible religious practices relates to the Shiite Islamic revolution in 1979 which was led by Khomeini. In this revolution, Khomeini used his religious status called 'آية الله' ('*ayatuallah*; AyatuAllah –the Shiite highest religious authority) to instigate the Twelvers in Iran to revolt against their Shah. There were concerns in the Arab countries that this might instigate Islamists and extend uprisings to other Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. Thus, Ibn Baz, in his role as a religious leader, including his official role as Grand Mufti, would be expected to uphold the traditions of Salafism and set an example which would promote stability and help to cement the power base of the existing leaders (at the time) in Saudi Arabia. He is also expected to warn Muslims, especially Sunnis, to beware of the Shiites' religious practices and show that these practices are erroneous.

In terms of intertextuality and interdiscursivity which include, as Reisigl and Wodak (2009) point out, explicit reference to a topic or main actor, Ibn Baz utilizes discourses of previous Salafi religious leaders such as Ibn Taymiyyah. It is worth considering whether Ibn Baz's discourses around impermissible religious innovation and polytheism are original and thus unique to himself or whether he is drawing, explicitly or not, on other sources. In fact, prohibiting innovations in ritualistic practices is evident in the writings of old and modern Salafis. Ibn Taymiyyah's (1263-1328) efforts in such prohibition are evident and had been expounded in his book 'العبودية' ('*al'obodiyyah*; Servitude/worship) (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2003).

Additionally, Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab's call in the eighteenth century is also based on rejecting veneration and beseeching help from dead holy men, including the Prophet of Islam and his descendants, which are mostly practiced by Sufi and Shiite factions in Saudi Arabia. Aljizani (a Saudi religious clerk and a professor in the Islamic University in Medina) (2010) makes such continuity clear when he proposes that prohibition of ritualistic practices is the rule unless Qur'anic verses of Prophetic traditions report the opposite. The title of his book is as follows: 'Investigating and confirming that the Basic Rule in Worshipping Practices is Prohibition', which recapitulates the Salafist conception of the Sufi and Shiites' innovations of ritualistic practices.

Thus while others have criticised the practices of Sufis and Shiites, Ibn Baz recontextualizes the same rejection in the context of being the officially sanctioned religious leader of a country that may have been under threat from an uprising which could have spread from nearby countries.

Another constituent of Islamic monotheism, according to Ibn Baz, is unifying Allah in His names and attributes. Ibn Baz tackles the belief of Allah's names and attributes refuting some Sunni factions such as the Ash'arites which is the theme of the following section.

8.3.2 Unifying Allah in His names and attributes

As in his representation of associationism (and consequently monotheism), Ibn Baz holds a Salafī stance towards the names and attributes of Allah. He tends to preserve the literal interpretations of Allah's names and attributes that are mentioned in the sacred texts. In doing so, Ibn Baz recontextualizes the Salafī writings about the attributes and names of Allah such as those of Ibn Taymiyyah and Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab. The Ash'arites (who nowadays live mostly in Egypt and some other Muslim countries) hold an opposing view of the names and attributes of Allah that are often seen as heretical by the Salafis. The

disagreement between Salafis and the Ash'arites stems from the adherence of the first faction to the literal interpretation of the sacred texts that contain Allah's names and attributes.

The Salafis and Ash'arites believe that Allah has the most excellent names and attributes as inferred from the following Qur'anic verse: {وَلِلَّهِ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَىٰ فَادْعُوهُ بِهَا} which could be translated as: {And (all) the Most Beautiful Names belong to Allah, so call on Him by them}. However they disagree in the interpretation of the names and attributes that appear in the sacred texts. The Salafis, on the one hand, adhere to the literal interpretations of these names and attributes and do not attempt to go further in analysing them, which could lead them to altering their meanings. On the other hand, the Ash'arites attempt to interpret such names and attributes as metaphors. An example of such disagreement is their interpretation of the attribute of 'Highness' in the following Qur'anic verse: {الرَّحْمَنُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ اسْتَوَى}. The meaning of the this Qur'anic verse, according to the Salafis, could be translated literally as {The Most Gracious (Allah) rose over (Istawa) the (Mighty) Throne (in a manner that suits His Majesty) which indicates that they believe that Allah is above His creatures. They interpreted it as 'He rose upon the throne', i.e. Allah rose over His Throne which, according to Salafis, is in the highest heaven. They say so without any further explanation using the phrase 'in a manner that suits Him'. However, the Ash'arites explicate the Qur'anic verse metaphorically as Allah has the ultimate authority which could be translated as {(Allah) Most Gracious is firmly established on the throne (of authority)}. In doing so, the Ash'arites, according to Salafis, reject the 'Highness' of Allah and thus they nullify the attribute of Allah's Highness.

As I have noted in Chapter 4, the Sunni religious leaders, including the Salafis, tend not to teach such disagreement between the Sunni factions that pertains to the beliefs in Allah's names and attributes to ordinary people. However, on 25-11-1987 (issue 3383) the newspaper Asharq Al-awsat (Middle East) published an article by Muhyi al-Din Alsafi titled 'من أجل أن نكون أقوى أمة' (*min 'ağl 'n nakūn 'aqwā 'ommah*; In Order that We Become the

Strongest Nation) which was according to Ibn Baz, dedicated to outlining the idea that there is no obvious disagreement between the Salafis and the Ash'arites' beliefs in the names and attributes of Allah. Ibn Baz here considers Muhyi al-Din's attempt to disregard the Salafi beliefs. He refutes the Ash'arites' faith utilizing quotes from Ibn Taymiyyah's writings and claims that the Salafi faith is true warning against what he believes to be erroneous creed. In this example of Ibn Baz's writings, he recontextualizes the Salafi writings refocusing the attention of his audience on the Salafi faith in the names and attributes of Allah.

As described in Chapter 1, it is also notable that in the 1960s, a number of people from Egypt and other Arab countries emigrated to Saudi Arabia to find work. Some of these people had a non-Salafi religious education and held the Ash'arites' faith (some of them also held the Sufi beliefs such as the veneration of holy men). Taken within such a context then, Ibn Baz's warnings against such beliefs could be interpreted as concern that his own beliefs might be threatened if larger numbers of people coming into his country continued to hold different beliefs, and possibly influence others. He recontextualizes the writings of the medieval Salafi religious leaders in order to refute the Ash'arites. In doing so, Ibn Baz claims to protect the people's faith from what he believes to be distortion of faith by the Ash'arites.

As for Ibn Baz's political views, they can be recapitulated into two dominant themes: Opposing Arab nationalism and colonial domination over the Arab/Muslim countries and the person that Muslims should take as their ruler. Let us take each in turn.

8.3.3 Opposing foreign domination over Muslim countries and Arab nationalism

Ibn Baz also shares some of Alhawali's political views concerning colonialism and Arab nationalism. This makes his representations not purely religious, although Ibn Baz tends to frame his rejection of colonialism and Arab nationalism inside religious discourse that helps to legitimate his stances. In the case of colonialism, Ibn Baz, using a religious focus, claims that a domination of non-Islamic forces over Muslim lands would lead to a loss of religion.

Domination of non-Islamic forces over Muslim lands is/was thus used by Ibn Baz as a threat-evoking strategy to legitimate his negative stance towards Arab nationalism.

The Arab nationalists in Saudi Arabia were mostly the workers of the then joint American-Saudi petroleum company (ARAMCO) (Fandy 2001) who participated in political unrest which took place in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s (see Chapter 1 section 1.3.2). They were inspired by Arab nationalism that was supported and perpetuated by Abdul Nassir of Egypt and his allies (the Baath regimes) in Iraq and Syria. The war between Arab nationalist leaders and the Saudi monarchy started in the 1950s (Commins 2006; Fandy, 2001). Ibn Baz opposed Arab nationalism claiming that the movement was based around propaganda and constituted a war against Islam. He constructed Arab nationalists negatively claiming that they deviate from what he considers to be the right path. He also claimed that they call for erroneous beliefs that oppose the 'pure teaching of Islam'. In doing so, Ibn Baz demonstrated that he is supportive of the Saudi monarchy which relied on religious forces (Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007; Mordechai, 1993) in their wars including that against Arab nationalists.

It is historically relevant that the establishment of the first Saudi State (1744–1818) started with an alliance that was formed between the prince of Diriyah Mohammad Ibn Saud and the religious reformer Sheikh Mohammad Ibn AbdulWahhab. This type of politico-religious alliance also forms one of the cornerstones of the constitution of the second (1818–1891) and third (modern) Saudi States and was also found within the relationship between Ibn Baz and the Saudi monarchy in the 1990s. The relationship between the monarchy and religious leaders in Saudi Arabia is thus cemented in centuries of tradition. This politico-religious alliance helps to explain Ibn Baz's negative stance, politically speaking, towards Arab nationalists who oppose the Saudi monarchy as well as his rejection of colonial domination over Muslim land including Saudi Arabia. As Grand Mufti (the highest religious

authority in Saudi Arabia), Ibn Baz is expected to support the Saudi monarchy which could also explain some of the other semantic foci in Ibn Baz such as his representation of 'الحروب' ('*alḥorūb*; the wars) during the disruptive events in the years 1818-1824 and his concept of the Imam/ruler (see Chapter 5 section 5.4.2). The next section shows the Salafī concept of Imam/ruler and Ibn Baz's representation of the disruptive historical events (1818-1824) in Najd (the central region of Saudi Arabia).

8.3.4 The conception of the ruler/Imam in apolitical Islam

The concept of the Imam/ruler in Salafī Islam is crucial to understanding Ibn Baz's representation of political themes in his writings. It stems from Qur'anic verses such as:

{يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ فَإِنْ تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي شَيْءٍ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَحْسَنُ تَأْوِيلًا} سورة النساء آية ٥٠

This Qur'anic verse could be translated as follows:

{O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Mohammad), and **those of you (Muslims) who are in authority**. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you believe in Allah and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination} 4:50.

This Qur'anic verse and other Prophetic traditions call Muslims to obey rulers provided that this ruler is Muslim. They also stipulate that they should not obey the ruler if he orders them in matters that dissatisfy Allah. Accession to power by rulers in Sunni Islam should take place via 'الشورى' ('*aššorā*; mutual counselling), i.e., people agree on one Muslim to be the ruler which is based on the Qur'an (verse 38 in Chapter 42 or 'الشورى' ('*aššorā*; mutual counselling) :

{وَالَّذِينَ اسْتَجَابُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَى بَيْنَهُمْ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنفِقُونَ} سورة الشورى آية ٣٨

This verse could be translated as:

{And those who answer the Call of their Lord [i.e. to believe that He is the only One Lord (Allah), and to worship none but Him Alone], and perform the five daily prayers, **and who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation**, and who spend of what We have bestowed on them} 42:38.

However, since the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), accession to the throne is actually based on inheritance rather than mutual counselling where religious leaders acquiesce to the ruler who has the ultimate power. Most modern Salafis acquiesce to any Muslim ruler regardless of the way he ascends the throne. They call him the legitimate Imam. Most Salafis believe that obedience to legitimate Muslim rulers (or ‘ولي الأمر’ (*wali ’al’amr*; the ruler/the guardian)) is mandatory for all citizens. Most Salafis do not commit themselves to politics that, according to them, is the responsibility of the Imam/ruler. They also believe that if such a ruler makes mistakes or deals unjustly with his people, then ‘نصيحة’ (*naṣiḥah*; advice) should be given to him privately rather than publishing critiques or denouncing him publicly which may instigate the public against the ruler.

Such concessions to the ruler could explain Ibn Baz’s stance towards the Saudi monarchy which is supportive rather than contesting of the monarchy. In his representation of political matters such as Arab nationalism or the disruptive historical events (1818-1824) in Najd after the military invasion led by Mohammad Ali Pasha of Egypt ended the first Saudi State (1744-1818), Ibn Baz writes his opinion in a manner that shows his loyalty to the Imam as the legitimate ruler. For example, he recontextualizes the disruptive historical events (1818-1824) to superficially address the early stage of establishing the second Saudi State reducing it to gathering the people (of Najd) by the Imam/ruler. Here, Ibn Baz clearly shows his support of what he believes to be the legitimate Muslim ruler. Hence, Ibn Baz’s political stances are theologically bound and also strongly linked to a sense of loyalty to the Saudi monarchy and desire to maintain the status quo which is not completely recognized by the politically oriented strand of Salafism, as in Alhawali’s writings. In what follows, I try to tackle Alhawali’s semantic foci and his representations of social actors starting with a brief summary of the findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

8.4 Summary of the findings 2: Alhawali

Alhawali shares some of the theological views of Ibn Baz such as the dangers of ‘Polytheism’ and the existence of ‘Hell-fire’ for those who deviate from what he believes to be the true teachings of Islam. However, he is mostly concerned with political issues, as shown by the semantic foci of his writings. These themes tend to be concentrated on protecting Islam from what Alhawali deems to be threats or enemies who he sees as wanting to destroy Islam and invade Muslim/Arab countries. Unlike Ibn Baz, the most prominent theme in Alhawali’s corpus is ‘External threats’ that are focused on western and Israeli military invasions of the Arab/Muslim countries (Crusades and colonial wars). The construction of the ‘Past’ in Alhawali’s corpus is limited to a negative representation of Europe and his claims about longstanding European enmity to Islam as well as constructing an idealised, advanced image of Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages. Alhawali uses the key term ‘Mind’ to negatively represent the teachings of the Church, political and economic theories (such as communism) and the 18th century literary romanticism, i.e., demonizing the West. He also uses the key term ‘RELIGION’ to construct a negative image of Europe recalling what he believes to be the historical enmity between Europe and Islam. It is also worth noting here that Alhawali represents western religious and moral values negatively considering the West to be void of any moral value, although at times he is not very specific about those values (detailed in section 8.6 below).

Alhawali’s semantic foci involve representation of social actors that mostly belong to the out-group. As I have noted above and in Chapter 6, the representation of social actors in Alhawali is mostly concerned with ‘the Other’ (81% of the social actors in Alhawali belong to the Other). Alhawali uses both personalization and impersonalization categories to represent social actors. He chooses sociosemantic categories that represent social actors collectively and anonymously by means of personalization via categorization (e.g. ‘the

human' and 'mankind') and functionalization (as in 'researchers'). He also metonymically represents 'the Other' by means of objectivation via spatialization (impersonalization) such as 'Europe' and 'the West'. Alhawali also uses categorization such as 'clergymen' and classification via religionism such as 'the Jewish'. Abstraction is another means that Alhawali uses to represent social actors such as 'communism'. Finally, Alhawali uses nomination strategies to represent political and literary figures such as Saddam Hussein and Taha Hussein respectively. As is the case with Ibn Baz's referential strategies, Alhawali's sociosemantic categories serve to create the difference between the positively represented in-group social actors (Us) from the negatively represented social actors that he deems to be 'the Other'.

Alhawali's representations are introduced with argumentation schemes that he utilizes for the purpose of legitimation. His argumentation schemes included the three schemes introduced by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (2004): causal argumentation, symptomatic (sign) argumentation and argumentation based on comparisons (argument from analogy). The following sections address Alhawali's different political and theological representations by considering the context within which he was writing.

8.5 The West and western enigma: Politically oriented Salafism

As I have shown in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, there are two major aspects of the West that Alhawali aims to represent negatively. These aspects are western religious and social lives as well as what Alhawali believes to be the political and military aggressions on the Muslim/Arab countries. It is helpful here to reiterate (from Chapter 1) some tenets of the political Salafi trend that emerged clearly in the 1980s and were in vogue in the 1990s.

As I have noted in Chapter 1 (section 1.3.4), some advocates of the Islamic awakening trend in Saudi Arabia have incorporated some of Sayyid Qutb's (1906-1966)

religious and political views into the Salafi Najdi backgrounds (Alotaibi 2007). Mohammad Qutb (1919–present), who is the brother of Sayyid Qutb, moved to Saudi Arabia and worked as a lecturer in Um al-Qura University in Makkah where he supervised both the MA and PhD theses of Alhawali. The brotherhood ideologies and political views are embodied in the writings of Sayyid Qutb and his brother Mohammad which include ‘الحاكمية’ (*alhakimiyyaha*; sovereignty of Allah) – or unifying Allah in His sovereignty – and ‘الجاهلية’ (*ġahiliyyah*; ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) (for more details on the tenets of Sahwah see Chapter 1 section 1.3.6). Now let us move to consider Alhawali’s politically oriented representations.

8.5.1 Religious and Social life in the West

Despite the fact that Alhawali did not use many terms that constitute the cornerstones of the religious awakening movement in his writings, he nevertheless incorporated them in his representation of the West. He represented the Church and clergymen negatively. He also claimed that clergymen carried out immoral conduct. Additionally, he claimed that the Church and clergymen distorted Christianity which consequently caused people in the West to adopt secularism and political, economic and literary theories (such as communism and romanticism). These theories, according to Alhawali, are against the teachings of Islam. Social life in the West was also projected negatively by Alhawali. Western women were represented negatively, for example as undertaking acts of shoplifting and committing suicide because they are oppressed.

All the above negative representations of the West serve Alhawali’s aim of demonizing the West and western thinking calling it modern ‘جاهلية’ (*ġahiliyyah*; ignorance of the pre-Islamic days).¹⁰⁰ But why would Alhawali focus so much of his writing in doing so? Saudi Arabia started to modernise after the rapid increase of oil revenues in the 1960s and

100. The word ‘modern’ does not carry any positive connotation. On the contrary, it refers only to contemporary Europe.

1970s. Around this time, some Saudis (both males and females) started to study in rich western countries which had good reputations for excellence in education.

Some Saudis who studied in the West started to work in different jobs in education, industry, medicine and other professional sectors. They embarked on modernising social life in Saudi Arabia. Some of them started to call for equality between men and women, based on what they had experienced when they had studied abroad. In hospitals and the media sector (Saudi official TV channels and radio), women began to work side by side with men. There were calls that women should be allowed to drive cars which was thwarted by a fatwa issued in 1990 by the Grand Mufti (AbdulAziz Ibn Baz) that bans women from driving cars.

Alhawali also brought in his refutation of westernization of the country (Saudi Arabia) the experience of modernizing Egypt that took place in last decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the last century. He warned his audience about what he considers to be extreme modernists who were under the influence of western thinkers. Among these Arab modernists is Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayyed (Egyptian intellectual 1872-1963) who, among others, were used as examples by Alhawali to warn Saudis against modernization of their country that, according to him, is against the values of Islam and even involves changing the language that people speak.

Additionally, Alhawali claimed that Arab nationalist/socialist parties had been under the influence of the West.¹⁰¹ Thus Alhawali includes Arab nationalists in those whose call for modernizing Arab countries to be contributing to changing religious, political and social norms in Arab/Muslim countries.

Alhawali, like Ibn Baz is a religious leader, but whereas Ibn Baz is strongly linked to the Saudi monarchy, Alhawali was one of the leaders of the Committee for the Defense of

101. The West, according to Alhawali, is comprised of the non-Islamic states in the West including communist countries.

Legitimate Rights (CDLR) created in 1993, which openly challenged the Saudi monarchy. Instead, Alhawali has been a leader of the 'awakening' movement in Saudi Arabia. Rather than focussing his message around warning Saudis about Shiites and others who might threaten the status quo, Alhawali would contest the current monarchy, which he associates at times with being too complicit with western modernising trends. The modernization process of Saudi Arabia (and other Arab/Muslim countries) is considered by Alhawali as a precursor of a new colonial phase and invasions of Arab and Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia. Next, I give an explanation of Alhawali's representation of external hazards that threaten Saudi Arabia and the Arab/Muslim countries at large.

8.5.2 The Crusades and the Crusader states: Protecting Islam and the abode of Islam

Alhawali's representation of the West is ambivalent. Sometimes he claims that the West rejected religion and has adopted secularism. But in other parts of his writings, he represented the West as religiously fanatic and wanting to destroy Islam. Alhawali uses the term 'Crusades' and 'Crusader states' in order to remind his readers of the historical devastating wars that, according to him, were initiated by Western countries against Muslims during the Middle Ages, as well as linking the historic concept of crusaders to modern-day western political policy (for an accessible introduction to Crusades see Runciman (1951)).

Alhawali's stance toward western countries could be explained if we take the political context in Saudi Arabia into our consideration. On the one hand Saudi Arabia, as a major oil producing country, has a close relationship with the United States of America. On the other, there is a continuous support of the United States and other western countries provided to Israel. The latter has been in an ongoing struggle with Palestine since the early 20th century, forming part of a wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Safar Alhawali, as a religious leader, is not at ease with the Saudi-United States close relations. He has thus envisaged the US support to Israel as a crusaders' onslaught on the Arab and Muslim countries.

Additionally, on the 2nd of August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait which forced Saudi Arabia to seek the military assistance of the United States. The presence of the American and Allied troops in huge numbers also served as a catalyst for Alhawali to represent the West as conducting a new crusade against the Arab countries in his writings. Hence, Alhawali represented the western countries as pursuing an old religious antagonism against Islam.

It is noteworthy that Ibn Baz was not concerned in his writings with Saudi diplomatic relations with the United States of America or with American support to Israel. And, as I have indicated above, Ibn Baz opposed Arab nationalists' movements and rejected their political agendas. Ibn Baz's position here stems from his Salafi conception of the Imam/ruler where individuals should acquiesce to him and support his decisions (see Section 4.3.4 above). It is also noticeable that Arab nationalists were in a war with the Saudi monarchy and, according to Ibn Baz himself, they intended to disregard the Sharia laws should they rule. Ibn Baz is part of the government as the highest religious authority in the country and he is expected to reject Arab nationalism and support the Saudi monarchy.

Alhawali adheres to the Ideas of Sayyid Qutb and his brother Mohammad who supervised the two academic theses of Alhawali (see Chapter 1 section 1.3.7.1). Sayyid Qutb's ideas are based on his rejection of what he believed to be weak and non-Islamic stances of modern rulers of the Arab countries. While the two authors are identified as Salafi, their other allegiances influence their stances, indicating that there is not a single set of political tenets that unite all Saudi Salafis. With that said, one area of agreement was in their criticism of the morality of the West. Let us consider explanations for this in the section below.

8.6 Morality in the West

While both Salafī writers have differed to an extent in terms of their foci, arguments and aims, one way that they are similar is that they have sought moral legitimation by representing morality in the West negatively. Words that indicated the West were not salient in Ibn Baz's corpus. However, they appear when I compared the uses of the key term 'WEST' in Alhawali to that in Ibn Baz's corpus. As I have pointed above and elsewhere in this thesis, while Alhawali extensively demonizes the West, Ibn Baz's representation of the West was less obvious. The latter rejected foreign domination (Western/Eastern colonialism) over Arab countries (see Section 8.3.3 above). Ibn Baz also wanted to limit sending Saudi students to Western countries only to study sciences that are not available to students in Saudi universities.

Ibn Baz claimed that Saudis studying in western universities might like and imitate what he believed to be denigrated moral values of the West. Additionally, he claimed that some western writers warned against the mixing between men and women. He also claimed that in the West strange behaviours are exhibited by young men because they lack faith. As described above, the fact that people who had studied abroad wanted to instigate sexual equality in Saudi Arabia helps to explain why Ibn Baz focussed on characterising the West as amoral in his writing. Ibn Baz as a Salafī religious leader believed he should warn his Saudi fellows not to acquire the moral values of the West as he deemed them against the teachings of Islam in order to keep the status quo of the traditional and religious social values of Saudi Arabia.

Alhawali's negative representation of the moral values of the clergymen and the medieval crusaders as well as in modern western countries is motivated by his negative stance toward secularism and modern western domination over Arab/Muslim countries. He attributed the rejection of religion by people in the West to what he believes to be the

immoral behaviours of clergymen. As I have indicated in section 8.5.1 above, the incremental modernization of Saudi Arabia following western civilization was seen by Alhawali as a precursor of westernizing and secularizing Saudi Arabia, hence the abode of Islam would be dominated by western 'non-religious' and 'جاهلي' (*ġahili*; of/relating to ignorance of the pre-Islamic days) civilization. Alhawali as a Salafi religious leader is expected to hold a negative stance towards both modernizing and 'secularizing' the abode of Islam, Saudi Arabia.

Thus while both writers disapprove of the West, there is a difference in the amount of focus they give to this subject (with Alhawali having it as a main focus). Additionally, Ibn Baz appears to be more concerned about Saudi people copying certain western ways, while Alhawali constructs the west as a potential invader of Muslim countries. This could be attributed to the fact that Alhawali, in his politically motivated negative representations of the West, was under the influence of the two Qutbis: Sayyid Qutb and his brother Mohammad who was the supervisor and mentor of Alhawali in his higher studies.

8.7 Conclusion

This chapter concludes the previous 4 chapters dedicated to analysing the Salafi discourses in terms of semantic foci, representation of social actors and argumentation schemes. The main goal of the present chapter is to provide explanations of the results obtained in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 utilizing religious, political and social contexts. I have introduced explanations of the findings in three major areas; 1) the religiously based ritualistic practices that are aimed towards the perfection of the religious duties from the Salafist perspective; 2) external hazards that both Salafi writers felt threatening Islam and Arab and Muslim countries as well as religious and social lives in the West and; 3) the moral values in the west.

In their different representations, the agendas of two Salafi authors meet in wanting to protect Salafi Islam and the bode of Islam and keeping the Saudi status quo of religious and

social conducts that are based on strict interpretations of the sacred texts (Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions). However, they diverge in their politically motivated representations of the West and western morals. While Ibn Baz, in his politically motivated negative representation of Arab nationalism, supported the Saudi monarchy, Alhawali rejected the Saudi decision that allowed the American-led troops to come to Saudi Arabia based on a fatwa issued by Ibn Baz. Each of the two opposing stances towards the Saudi monarchy stems from different Salafist perspectives (one focussed more on theological aspects and maintaining the status quo in Saudi Arabia, the other more openly politically-focused, contesting the status quo in Saudi Arabia and explicitly anti-western) as I have indicated above.

After this summary of the most important findings, it is time now to move to the final concluding chapter in this thesis. Chapter 9 will focus on methodological implications and limitations of the study as well as recommendations for future research in studying religious discourses critically.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This conclusion chapter aims to address and reflect on the findings made in the earlier analysis chapter. Section 9.2 provides brief summaries to the research questions stated in Chapter 1. Following this, in section 9.3, I consider the methodological implications raised by the work undertaken in this thesis. In section 9.4 I critically reflect on the limitations of this thesis which is followed by recommendations for future research in section 9.6. The thesis closes with some concluding remarks in section 9.5.

9.2 Saudi Salafists: Ibn Baz vs. Alhawali

It is not the intention of this section to rewrite sections 8.2 and 8.4 in Chapter 8 or the results from the previous analysis chapters. Rather, I only intend to point out the Saudi Salafis' major general differences and/or similarities that have emerged over the analysis chapters (4-8). Sketching out the differences or similarities in the writings of the two strands of the Saudis Salafism could serve as a starting point for researchers to draw the boundaries of Salafism worldwide. It was an intention of this thesis to draw attention to the fact that Salafis do not consist of a single united group with shared goals but that a more diverse set of discourses revolve around different conceptualizations of Salafism.

Before briefly summarizing the similarities/differences in the Salafi strands in Saudi Arabia, it is worth repeating that the work in this thesis is based on keyword comparisons between two corpora consisting of the writings of two Salafi leaders in Saudi Arabia. The keyword analysis was designed to contrast the most salient discursive features between the two writers. I have distinguished between three types of keywords, viz. semantic foci keywords, keywords that indicate social actors and argumentation indicators.

In the semantic foci chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), I compared the use of keywords for the analysis of each chapter in both Salafi corpora. I distinguished between theological foci (mainly referring to Allah, the prophet and other aspects of religion) and political foci (which involved references to countries and ideologies). Ibn Baz's keywords tended to consist of the former, while Alhawali's involved the latter. While Ibn Baz tends to recontextualize the Salafi creeds regarding the main tenets of the Salafi movement of Ibn AbdulWahhab, Alhawali's focus is mostly politically motivated towards negative representations of the West.

However, Ibn Baz shares some political views that Alhawali holds (Chapter 5) which include his rejection of both Arab nationalism and colonialism which is motivated by his support to the Saudi monarchy against Arab nationalists' regimes in Egypt, Syria Iraq and Yemen. Alhawali shares some of the theological views of Ibn Baz such as being against the concept of 'Polytheism' while emphasising the punishment of 'Hell-fire' for those who do not adhere to his religious views. However, Alhawali is mostly concerned with political issues that are shown in the semantic foci of his writings (Chapter 5). These themes are mostly focussed on protecting ('the abode of') Islam of what Alhawali deems to be the enemies in the West who want to destroy Islam and invade Muslim/Arab countries.

Regarding social actors representation, most of the social actors in Ibn Baz belong to the in-group which could be interpreted to be typical of religious discourses which nominate religious figures (the Prophet of Islam and his companions as well as the Salaf). On the contrary, the social actors in Alhawali's corpus are mostly politically motivated indicating 'the Other'.

While 81% (out of 37) of Alhawali's social actor keywords refer to 'the Other', only 6.6% (out of 75) social actor keywords indicate 'the Other' in Ibn Baz's corpus. Also, when comparing the two Salafi authors in their use of certain selected social actor keywords (as in

sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.1 in Chapter 6), both writers differ even in using the same appellations utilized to designate certain social actor. For example both Salafi writers use the words, 'دعاة' (*do 'āh*; teachers/propagandists) and 'أهل' (*'ahl*; the people of) (these are keywords in Ibn Baz) to represent the 'Other'. Each Salafi writer uses them to represent different social actors though. Ibn Baz's representations of the 'Other' are, by and large, related to polytheism and people who claim to be Muslims but hold what he feels are non-Islamic beliefs or engage in non-Islamic practices. On the hand, Alhawali is mostly concerned with demonizing the West as a potential military invader and coloniser (as opposed to Ibn Baz's view of the West as more implicitly transmitting unwanted cultural values to Saudis who study there). Despite the fact that the above Salafi negative representations of the 'Other' contribute to polarizing Saudi and/or Muslim society, Alhawali's representations of the 'Other' contribute more to the reification and polarization of two 'Worlds' (the West vs. 'the Muslim World'). These representations are developed in the writings of both Salafi authors utilizing argumentation schemes that I have analyzed using certain keywords as lexical indicators to locate them in the two Salafi corpora.

The keywords that serve as argumentation indicators vary in the Salafi corpora both on the linguistic level and in the significance of their meanings. On the one hand, a reliance on Qur'anic verses, Prophetic traditions and the early Salafis' writings has strongly influenced the choice of argumentation indicators in Ibn Baz's writings. On the other hand, Alhawali's argumentation-indicating keywords mostly do not bear any mark that indicates religious sacred texts or the writings of the Salaf. Additionally, Alhawali's symptomatic arguments are mostly based (perhaps surprisingly) on the writings of western individuals.

It is perhaps surprising to discover how easy it was to identify aspects of fallacious reasoning in the writings of both authors, particularly considering their status as important leaders. Across the writers I found fallacious appeals to (unqualified) authority, cherry-

picking, false attribution, correlation not causation, hasty generalization and the straw man fallacy. Alhawali's use of sources that were vague or of dubious authority to back up his arguments was especially noteworthy. However, perhaps it is due to the status of the writers that their writings have not received this level of scrutiny before. As leaders, their proclamations are meant to be read as truths, rather than critically questioned by their followers.

While the argumentative strategies are flawed, these texts were probably not intended to be seen as authoritative in an 'academic' sense then. Indeed, Ibn Baz's highly frequent use of recontextualising quotes from the Qur'an and other important Islamic writings automatically lends credibility to believers who are not expected to question their veracity. Instead, they function more as polemics, and perhaps work better in terms of promoting emotional rather than rational responses in their readers, especially through use of social actor representation. In terms of rhetoric, on the other hand, Alhawali's use of language employs numerous 'othering' strategies including impersonalization, spatialization and collectivization. 'The West' is thus constructed as an aggressive, invading opposition. And Alhawali recontextualises the concept of the crusader, to imply that westerners have historically always being the enemy. Rhetorically, this is a powerful strategy in that it indicates continuous and longstanding animosity. Also, unlike Ibn Baz, Alhawali appears to be relying on evidence based argument.

To sum up, the two Salafi writers share some Salafi aspects in their representations that aim to maintain the status quo of the religious beliefs and/or rituals and social norms of Saudis which is noticeable in their rejections of innovations of religious rituals such as the Shiites and Sufis' veneration and beseeching help from dead saints. Both writers also reject modernizing aspects of the society such as women driving cars.

While both writers reject colonialism and any form of foreign domination over Muslim countries, they differed in some of the politically motivated representations. While

Ibn Baz was supportive of the Saudi monarchy, Alhawali contested them specifically in seeking the help of the United States of America against the Iraqi troops that invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Thus, while my approach has highlighted similarities between the two writers, it has also shown that there are important differences that could be taken to mean that the Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia is not as homogenous as deemed to be by some western and Arab writers. As I have indicated in Chapter 8, the differences between the two writers can be largely explained by considering the social position, connections and influences that each one has within Saudi Arabia, as well as the sorts of expectations assigned to people holding their respective roles within that society.

Now let us turn to consider the implications that resulted from applying the qualitative and quantitative methods used in this thesis.

9.3 Implications

I do not claim by any means that I have reinvented the synergetic approach that combines CDA with CL. However, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first large scale study that from a critical discourse perspective attempts to study religious discourse per se and more specifically Arabic religious discourse of Salafis. Additionally, what distinguishes my contribution in this thesis is that it opens the way for critical discourse analysts to embark on a mission of analysing religious discourses critically. As noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, religious texts have tended not to be subjected to critical discourse analysis. There are most likely good reasons for this as such research is likely to be seen as blasphemous if the end result is a rejection of texts that hold sacred status in a particular religion. However, I would argue that it is possible to critically examine texts that have recontextualised aspects of such sacred writings without falsifying the religion per se. Indeed, as a Muslim, this research has not changed my continued belief in the sanctity of the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions.

Thus, I argue that a CDA of religious texts can be carried out from within a religious perspective and that 'critical' is different from 'criticize'.

Bringing CDA and CL together in investigating religious discourses *per se* and more specifically the Salafi discourses is another contribution of this thesis as it paves the way to critical discourse analysts to utilize the synergetic approaches of CDA and CL to investigate Arabic discourses (religious or otherwise). And as I have indicated earlier, religious writings (especially in Islam) pose a problem for critical discourse analysts: they are linguistically manifested, at least in the research data of the present study, in a hybrid of manifold recontextualizations of Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions by different historical and modern religious leaders in different religious factions –Ash'arites vs. Salafi interpretation of the names and attributes of Allah is only one example. Without taking the side of any faction utilizing corpus linguistic tools has helped me to begin my analysis with a relatively objective set of foci – the keywords - which have allowed me to investigate the different ideological representations in the two strands of Salafism in Saudi Arabia.

In this thesis, I have also implemented the analysis of argumentation schemes as part of an eclectic CDA approach. Argumentation schemes, which are used for different authorial legitimization purposes, connect three types of analysis: semantic foci and sociosemantic categories using the triangulation in the DHA to explain the results in context. The aim of adopting the typology of argumentation schemes in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) is to critically evaluate Salafi arguments utilizing some critical questions adopted from Walton (1995, p. 142) and cited in Walton et. al. (2008, pp. 309-346) as well as to show the stereotypical patterns (Walton, 2005) of the Salafists' reasoning. And in order to locate arguments in the research data, I have utilized argumentation indicators which facilitated the search of arguments in my data utilizing corpus tools. Thus a further unique aspect of my research is in combining a set of existing methods and tools for analysis in a way that, to the best my knowledge, has not been attempted before. Such a combination could be considered

as a possible method for other researchers who are interested in comparing two related ideological or religious based positions.

Finally, the focus on Arabic language presents another set of implications for research. It is still the case that both in corpus linguistics and in critical discourse analysis, the greatest amount of work takes place on the English language (or related European languages), and from within ‘western’ contexts. The analysis of Arabic-language texts resulted in challenges, in terms of translating texts to English, working with corpus tools that are normally used with English texts, and taking into account grammatical and morphological aspects of Arabic that differ from English. I have dealt with these challenges as they arise, although as the following section will indicate, Arabic itself perhaps poses some potential limitations for this study.

9.4 Limitations

In analysing the theological aspects of the data the eclectic synergetic approach of CDA and CL utilized in this thesis provided me with a working framework to carry out analysis, allowing me to answer the research questions that I set. However, after embarking on the analysis of the research data, it is important to acknowledge some limitations regarding the corpus linguistics tool utilized in this thesis. The nature of the research data may have played a crucial role in the emergence of such limitations. What I have dealt with in this thesis is religious discourse per se that has both theological (mostly in the writings of Ibn Baz and to a lesser degree in the writings of Alhawali) and non-theological (mostly in political writings in Alhawali’s corpus) natures.

First, collocational analysis did not enable me to reveal any positive or negative semantic preference in the nomination of social actors in Alhawali’s corpus (however in other cases they fit well in the analysis) but this problem is solved utilizing concordance-based

analysis which revealed more about the negative meanings that are associated with those social actors. For example, the word form 'الدعاة' ('*addo 'āh*; the teachers/propagandists – def. pl.) is used to represent in-group social actors which makes the meaning of this keyword in English to be 'the teachers'. This word has two meanings, the collocates tend to be used with the positive meaning of the word, rather than contributing towards the construction of 'the Other'. Therefore, a collocational analysis is not appropriate here in order to examine how Ibn Baz constructs the Other with this keyword. Instead, I have focused on concordance-based analysis and needed to differentiate the homographs by hand. The form 'الدعاة' ('*addo 'āh*; the teachers/propagandists – def. pl.) was identified as a keyword, used more by Ibn Baz, which resulted in me analysing it. However, once the two meanings of the words are disambiguated, it is doubtful whether the 'propaganda' sense of the word would have been key for Ibn Baz. Had I been able to use an Arabic semantic tagger which annotated words in order to disambiguate meaning, it is possible that a different set of keywords would have emerged. Similarly, a tool which could split conjoined Arabic words (such as words which contain articles in them), and then identify lemmas of words might also alter the sorts of keywords produced.

It is noteworthy here that while WordSmith 4 was able to process the right-to-left writing system of Arabic, it is not designed to recognize homographs and homophones which are only realized by speakers of Arabic (native or otherwise) and so researcher intervention was required on my behalf.

A further limitation of this study is concerned with the data collected. I have only focused on written data produced by the two authors. However, both authors also made speeches, that exist as recordings and if analysed could contribute to a clearer understanding of Salafism in Saudi Arabia and further consolidate the results obtained in this study. I did not choose to include this spoken data in my thesis as it would have required too much time

in terms of transcription and preparation. Thus my findings should only be limited to the comparison of the written output of the two writers. Analysing spoken data of the two Salafi strands (that I focused on in this thesis) would be one recommendation for future research that I shall consider in the next section.

9.5 Recommendations and future Research

I would recommend the replication of this study on other religious discourses in different religions. With regards to Islam there are many religious discourses within different Islamic factions that could be identified via CDA techniques. Examples of these are the modern ‘الجهاديون’ (*‘alġidiyyūn* ; Jihadi Salafists or the Jihadists) and other Salafi factions in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, ‘الأحباش’ (*‘al’ahbāš*; the Ahbash –a Sufi faction that claims to be Sunni Ash’arites in Lebanon), the different Shiite factions specifically the militant ‘حزب الله’ (*hizb ullah*; Hizb Allah) which is a faction of the Shiite twelvers in Lebanon (this faction adheres to the teachings of the Iranian Ayatu Allah the Sistani who lives nowadays in Iraq) and the newly evolved Shiite factions; ‘الحوثيون’ (*‘alḥuṭiyyūn*; the Huthis) in Yemen and ‘المهديون’ (*‘almahdawyīn*; the Mahdis –a faction of Shiite Twelvers who believe in 12 Imams and 12 Mahdis –Saviors) that started to appear in the late 1990s in Iraq.

Also, other non-religious discourses in Arabic (political or otherwise) need to be investigated utilizing a combination of CDA and CL methods. I would also suggest that argumentation schemes are to be considered in further investigations of discourses.

Building diachronic corpora in Arabic that reflect the different aspects of social, political or religious lives as well as literary works in the different historical epochs (pre-Islamic, early Islamic, Umayyad’s or the Abbasid’s eras and so on)¹⁰² are legitimate targets of investigations. Building such corpora is of prime importance to understanding the different linguistic and other phenomena (political, social, religious and so forth).

¹⁰² Umayyads (661-750) and Abbasids (750-1258) are two dynasties that ruled the Islamic empire.

9.6 Concluding remarks

Now, we have reached the final word of this conclusion chapter. In this thesis I have utilized the synergetic approach that combines both CDA and CL in addition to bringing into the analytic tools the argumentation schemes from the argumentation theory. With this amalgam of approaches, I hope that I have shed light on the Salafī discourses in Saudi Arabia and pointed out the different ideological discursive strategies employed by the two Salafī authors in their representations. A major intention of this thesis was to demonstrate that, like many other religions, Salafism is not necessarily experienced in a homogenous way but is instead shaped by the interests of individuals and the political, historic and social contexts that they live in.

This thesis is also hoped to open the way for future research to investigate and compare religious discourses across different factions, both within strands of Islam or within other religions across the world. And while religious discourse poses unique challenges for critical discourse analysis research, I hope that this thesis has indicated that they are not necessarily insurmountable.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1 Keywords in Ibn Baz¹⁰³

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	Freq.	%	F. Alhawali	% Alhawali	Keyness	P
1	الله	Allah	5	4253	3.255337	994	0.504043996	3803.249023	1.49391E-20
2	و	and	5	17867	13.6757831	17215	8.729495049	1973.226563	1.09699E-19
3	سبحانه	the Glorified	5	809	0.61922586	8		1409.837524	3.07177E-19
4	عليه	upon him	5	1398	1.07005906	351	0.177987367	1181.897949	5.28908E-19
5	قال	He/he said	5	1100	0.84196347	195	0.098881871	1129.327026	6.08777E-19
6	صلى	blessings (be upon him)/ (he) prayed	5	876	0.6705091	90	0.045637786	1107.981567	6.45802E-19
7	سلم	(may Allah's) peace (be upon)	5	872	0.66744738	97	0.049187392	1075.768066	7.07582E-19
8	إلا	except/ unless	5	515	0.39419198	0		948.8884888	1.04469E-18
9	له	for/to Him/him	5	387	0.29621806	3		680.6802368	2.95816E-18
10	جل	the Majestic	5	424	0.32453864	18		648.805542	3.44252E-18
11	عز	the Exalted in Mighty	5	363	0.27784794	11		580.4790649	4.90196E-18
12	الصلاة	(may) the blessings (of Allah be upon him)/the prayer	5	289	0.22120676	18		413.4133606	1.46471E-17
13	قوله	His/his saying	5	221	0.16915811	1		395.1074524	1.69895E-17
14	بعد	after/ yet	5	209	0.15997305	1		373.1136169	2.05142E-17
15	رسول	messenger	5	270	0.20666375	28	0.014198423	339.875	2.79549E-17
16	تعالى	the Exalted	5	477	0.36510598	151	0.076570064	339.1069641	2.81665E-17
17	النبي	the prophet	4	225	0.17221979	21	0.010648817	292.0751648	4.65427E-17
18	به	with Him/him/ it	5	570	0.43629014	255	0.129307061	288.5444031	4.85064E-17
19	بن	son of	5	265	0.20283664	48	0.024340153	268.4516602	6.20769E-17
20	رسوله	His messenger	5	233	0.17834316	34	0.017240942	259.9049377	6.93925E-17
21	أهل	the people of	5	244	0.18676281	40	0.020283461	258.9854431	7.02468E-17
22	رضي	(may Allah) be pleased with him	5	182	0.13930667	18		232.3206329	1.02562E-16
23	ما	what	5	1413	1.08154034	1189	0.602925897	222.8648834	1.18751E-16
24	الله	to Allah	5	267	0.20436748	74	0.037524402	210.0124969	1.4671E-16
25	الرسول	the messenger	5	161	0.12323283	15		209.0583954	1.49122E-16
26	الدعوة	the call (to)	4	216	0.1653310	45	0.022818893	203.4159851	1.64523E-16
27	الآية	the Qur'anic verse/ till the end of the Qur'anic verse	4	129	0.09873934	5		199.8371887	1.75406E-16
28	السلام	the Peace/ the peace/ the Peace/ peace / Islamic salutation	5	255	0.19518244	78	0.039552748	186.1885834	2.26957E-16
29	الآيات	the Qur'anic verses	5	138	0.10562814	14		174.8026581	2.86588E-16
30	أيضا	too	5	108	0.08266550	3		174.2516479	2.89979E-16
31	الشرك	associationism/ polytheism	5	131	0.10027019	15		159.7037048	4.02759E-16

103. The unusual numbers in column P. could be read as follows: for example 1.49391E-20 indicates that the first digit of the number (1) is located in the 20th place after the decimal point i.e. 0.0000000000000000000149391 and so forth.

32	محمد	Mohammad	5	233	0.17834316	78	0.039552748	157.878006	4.20831E-16
33	بإله	in/with Allah	4	173	0.13241788	41	0.020790547	151.0360565	4.99035E-16
34	نبينا	our Prophet	4	87	0.06659165	1		150.1987	5.09901E-16
35	آله	His family	4	102	0.07807297	7		142.8763885	6.19853E-16
36	الحق	the True/ true/ right	5	242	0.18523195	94	0.047666132	142.7099609	6.22704E-16
37	إنَّ	indeed	5	108	0.08266550	10		140.45784	6.63066E-16
38	علا	the Most High	3	76	0.05817202	0		139.8762207	6.74054E-16
39	آمنوا	(they/ those who) believed	5	88	0.06735707	3		138.6416321	6.98195E-16
40	المعنى	the meaning	5	104	0.07960382	10		133.8149567	8.04458E-16
41	أيها	O you.. (vocative)	5	104	0.07960382	11		130.0518646	9.02761E-16
42	يا	O.. (vocative)	5	156	0.11940572	40	0.020283461	129.4469604	9.20034E-16
43	الأحاديث	Hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet of Islam)	5	83	0.06352996	4		124.3766632	1.08373E-15
44	السنة	the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam/ the Sunnis	5	142	0.10868983	35	0.017748028	120.9175339	1.21834E-15
45	الرسل	the messengers	5	98	0.07501129	11		120.246788	1.24698E-15
46	من	from	5	3948	3.02188348	4734	2.400547743	116.1447983	1.44328E-15
47	إنَّ	if	4	77	0.05893744	4		113.9173737	1.56735E-15
49	ألا	not to	5	61	0.04669070	0		112.2648544	1.66874E-15
48	أنهم	indeed they are	5	61	0.04669070	0		112.2648544	1.66874E-15
51	جميعا	all	5	65	0.04975238	1		110.2798386	1.80244E-15
50	عباده	His servants/ worshippers	5	65	0.04975238	1		110.2798386	1.80244E-15
52	أصحابه	his (the Prophet) companions	4	68	0.05204865	2		109.0186539	1.89488E-15
53	إن	if/indeed	5	58	0.04439443	0		106.7428284	2.07835E-15
54	عنه	with him	5	221	0.16915811	106	0.053751174	102.5393066	2.48468E-15
55	الهدى	the guidance/ the right path	5	67	0.05128322	3		101.5890045	2.59097E-15
56	كثيرة	many	5	149	0.11404778	51	0.025861414	98.98375702	2.91525E-15
57	الباطل	the untruth	5	71	0.05434491	5		98.87672424	2.9297E-15
58	عبد	servant/ worshiper	5	149	0.11404778	53	0.026875587	95.60716248	3.42134E-15
59	صديقه	his (the Prophet) companions	5	69	0.05281407	5		95.47122955	3.44409E-15
60	بإحسان	in a benevolent way	5	51	0.03903648	0		93.85842896	3.73004E-15
61	يعلم	know(s)	5	87	0.06659165	14		93.059021	3.88357E-15
62	عليهم	upon them	5	190	0.14543005	88	0.044623613	92.09111023	4.08095E-15
63	العباد	the servants of Allah/ His worshippers	5	67	0.05128322	5		92.0736084	4.08464E-15
64	أمر	issue	5	142	0.10868983	51	0.025861414	90.30308533	4.48222E-15
65	لهم	to them	5	252	0.19288617	147	0.074541718	88.0959549	5.05354E-15
66	العظيم	the great/ the Great	5	84	0.06429538	15		85.63043976	5.81263E-15
67	فالأوجب	and the obligatory duty	3	46	0.03520938	0		84.65556335	6.15472E-15
68	رواه	narrated by	4	56	0.04286359	3		82.39207458	7.05939E-15
69	دينه	His/his religion	4	73	0.05587575	11		80.31568146	8.05204E-15
70	الناس	the people	5	396	0.30310684	304	0.154154301	79.64291382	8.41337E-15
71	السموات	the heavens (skies)	5	48	0.03674022	1		79.5899353	8.44273E-15

72	نبيه	His Prophet	5	51	0.03903648	2		78.85894775	8.86222E-15
73	قل	you say (imperative)	5	89	0.06812249	21	0.010648817	77.88813782	9.46343E-15
74	صفاته	His attributes	5	42	0.03214769	0		77.29343414	9.8588E-15
75	يجوز	it is lawful to	5	83	0.06352996	18		76.37981415	1.05102E-14
76	يوم	the day of	5	110	0.08419634	36	0.018255115	75.95294952	1.08343E-14
77	البدع	the religiously impermissible innovative practices	5	63	0.04822154	8		74.08189392	1.24235E-14
78	يصلح	direct (you/us) to do righteous good deeds	5	51	0.03903648	3		73.73503876	1.27517E-14
79	المسلمين	the Muslims	5	226	0.17298522	138	0.069977939	73.12379456	1.33588E-14
80	السلف	the pious ancestors	4	60	0.04592527	7		72.67344666	1.38309E-14
81	بهم	with them	5	91	0.06965334	25	0.012677164	71.98025513	1.46021E-14
82	ابن	son of	5	116	0.08878887	43	0.02180472	71.58994293	1.50617E-14
83	أبي	the father of (acc.)	4	61	0.04669070	8		70.88607788	1.59405E-14
84	الإمام	the Imam	5	62	0.04745612	9		69.26620483	1.82395E-14
85	لعلكم	that you may	5	37	0.02832058	0		68.09098816	2.01916E-14
86	رحمه	(may Allah have) mercy (upon him)	5	88	0.06735707	25	0.012677164	67.93598938	2.04696E-14
87	منكم	from you	4	41	0.03138227	1		67.01797485	2.22248E-14
88	مسلم	Muslim	4	78	0.05970286	19		66.90700531	2.24504E-14
89	الكريم	the glorious/ the Generous/generous	5	73	0.05587575	16		66.76600647	2.27415E-14
90	أن	indeed	4	36	0.02755516	0		66.2505188	2.38495E-14
91	هم	they	5	187	0.14313378	109	0.055272434	65.43347931	2.5758E-14
92	العبادة	the worship	3	120	0.09185055	51	0.025861414	64.29320526	2.87776E-14
93	لعباده	to His servants/worshippers	4	34	0.02602432	0		62.56962585	3.43065E-14
94	يدعو	(he/it) calls to	5	70	0.05357949	16		62.45573425	3.47201E-14
95	أخبر	told	5	49	0.03750564	5		61.94148636	3.66726E-14
96	غيرهم	others	5	82	0.06276454	24	0.012170076	61.90923691	3.67999E-14
97	أبو	the father of (nom.)	4	59	0.04515985	10		61.64088821	3.78821E-14
98	نهى	forbade	4	33	0.02525890	0		60.72919083	4.18921E-14
99	بما	with what/ wherewith	5	200	0.15308426	127	0.064399987	60.31658554	4.38936E-14
100	الصحابة	the companions of the Prophet	5	48	0.03674022	5		60.29718781	4.39908E-14
101	الإسلام	Islam	5	337	0.25794699	271	0.137420446	60.05727768	4.52171E-14
102	الصحبة	the sound Prophetic Hadiths	5	52	0.03980191	7		59.83603668	4.63887E-14
103	القيامة	the resurrection day	4	45	0.03444396	4		59.17208862	5.01571E-14
104	التابعين	the successors of the companions of the Prophet	4	32	0.02449348	0		58.88876343	5.18896E-14
105	الأمور	the issues	5	86	0.06582623	29	0.01470551	57.87039948	5.88181E-14
106	رب	Lord/ may	5	61	0.04669070	13		56.69029617	6.84809E-14
107	لكم	to you	5	61	0.04669070	13		56.69029617	6.84809E-14
108	الحمد	praise	5	67	0.05128322	17		55.96645355	7.54762E-14
109	عنهم	with them	5	74	0.05664117	22	0.011155903	55.20428848	8.3911E-14
110	الشيخ	the sheikh	5	113	0.08649261	52	0.026368501	55.18482971	8.41424E-14
111	فقال	then He/he said	5	85	0.06506080	30	0.015212596	54.91756439	8.74091E-14
112	أنمة	Imams	4	40	0.03061685	3		54.90044403	8.76241E-14

114	ربه	his Lord	4	40	0.03061685	3		54.90044403	8.76241E-14
113	الأدلة	the proofs	4	54	0.04133275	10		54.06848145	9.89798E-14
115	الصفات	the attributes (of Allah)	4	46	0.03520938	6		53.56055069	1.06892E-13
116	ثبت	it became firm	4	46	0.03520938	6		53.56055069	1.06892E-13
117	أحسن	more suitable/ best	4	62	0.04745612	15		53.41001511	1.09399E-13
118	المبين	obvious	5	29	0.02219721	0		53.36754227	1.1012E-13
119	ذلك	that	5	990	0.75776714	1086	0.550695956	52.6259613	1.23804E-13
120	رحمة	mercy	5	56	0.04286359	12		51.8814621	1.3992E-13
121	كتاب	book/ the Book (the Qur'an)	5	143	0.10945525	82	0.041581094	51.36889267	1.52677E-13
122	إليه	to Him/him	5	192	0.14696089	130	0.065921247	51.14474487	1.58744E-13
123	القرآن	the Qur'an	5	102	0.07807297	47	0.023833066	49.7303009	2.05532E-13
124	صحيحه	in his book of sound Hadiths	3	27	0.02066637	0		49.68677139	2.07247E-13
125	المستقيم	straight (way)	5	34	0.02602432	2		49.15423203	2.29873E-13
126	شرع	(has) ordained/ the canonical law of Islam (Sharia)	4	47	0.03597480	8		49.00533676	2.36784E-13
127	جميع	all	4	135	0.10333187	78	0.039552748	47.90705872	2.9743E-13
128	حديث	Hadith	4	48	0.03674022	9		47.76143646	3.06972E-13
129	لا	no/ not	5	1506	1.15272450	1786	0.905656576	47.59189987	3.18603E-13
130	خير	good	5	94	0.07194960	42	0.021297634	47.55235291	3.214E-13
131	العزیز	the Exalted in power/	5	46	0.03520938	8		47.48233795	3.26433E-13
132	لما	when	5	173	0.13241788	116	0.05882204	46.99156952	3.64842E-13
133	إنّ	indeed	3	25	0.01913553	0		46.00604248	4.62264E-13
134	يوفقنا	(to) grant us success	3	25	0.01913553	0		46.00604248	4.62264E-13
135	بالحق	truly/ with the truth	5	37	0.02832058	4		45.94203186	4.69738E-13
136	أنزل	sent	5	96	0.07348045	45	0.022818893	45.82517624	4.83801E-13
137	أوجب	made obligatory	4	32	0.02449348	2		45.70882416	4.98368E-13
138	الحذر	caution	4	41	0.03138227	6		45.65147018	5.05764E-13
139	التقلين	the humans and the jinn	3	24	0.01837011	0		44.16568756	7.61517E-13
142	أمرنا	ordered us/ (our) guardian	4	24	0.01837011	0		44.16568756	7.61517E-13
141	لقول	because of his words	4	24	0.01837011	0		44.16568756	7.61517E-13
140	شيئا	thing	5	31	0.02372806	2		43.99154663	8.02032E-13
143	الواجب	the compulsory (duty)	3	52	0.03980191	13		43.85921478	8.34763E-13
144	الاستغاثة	beseeking for help	3	28	0.02143179	1		43.84391403	8.38661E-13
145	النار	the Fire	5	58	0.04439443	17		43.73765182	8.66418E-13
146	الصالح	pious	4	39	0.02985143	6		42.52970123	1.28911E-12
147	القادر	Almighty	5	37	0.02832058	5		42.51114655	1.29756E-12
148	محمد	Mohammad (acc.)	5	23	0.01760469	0		42.32534409	1.38638E-12
149	أرسل	sent	5	30	0.02296263	2		42.27819061	1.41021E-12
150	بصيرة	discernment	4	30	0.02296263	2		42.27819061	1.41021E-12
151	إخلاص	sincerity	4	27	0.02066637	1		42.0749855	1.51937E-12
152	الذين	who (plural)	5	261	0.19977496	218	0.110544868	41.79287338	1.69043E-12
153	غيره	other	5	91	0.06965334	44	0.022311807	41.76208878	1.71062E-12
154	الشرع	Allah's decree	4	34	0.02602432	4		41.06169891	2.27176E-12
156	كنتم	you were	4	34	0.02602432	4		41.06169891	2.27176E-12
157	وجوب	obligatory duty	4	34	0.02602432	4		41.06169891	2.27176E-12
155	أنزلنا	(We have) sent down	4	22	0.01683927	0		40.48501205	2.93331E-12

158	ربهم	their Lord	3	22	0.01683927	0		40.48501205	2.93331E-12
160	شهادة	testimony	3	22	0.01683927	0		40.48501205	2.93331E-12
159	إليك	to You/you	4	26	0.01990095	1		40.30871201	3.18616E-12
161	التحذير	warning	4	31	0.02372806	3		39.80407333	4.09158E-12
162	لأن	because	5	158	0.12093657	110	0.05577952	39.72013855	4.27435E-12
163	العلم	religious knowledge	5	225	0.17221979	183	0.092796832	38.84576797	7.03076E-12
164	الصحيحين	the two books of sound Hadiths	3	25	0.01913553	1		38.54529953	8.51927E-12
165	طاعته	obeying Him	3	25	0.01913553	1		38.54529953	8.51927E-12
166	التحاكم	arbitration	3	30	0.02296263	3		38.15133667	1.11822E-11
167	المشركين	polytheists (acc.)	3	30	0.02296263	3		38.15133667	1.11822E-11
168	الإيمان	faith/ belief	5	135	0.10333187	89	0.0451307	37.90844345	1.33992E-11
169	ولي	the guardian of	4	36	0.02755516	6		37.89933014	1.34934E-11
170	المؤمنين	the believers	4	47	0.03597480	13		36.99022293	2.99212E-11
171	كريم	generous/ most Generous	4	20	0.01530842	0		36.80437088	3.6273E-11
172	السلامة	security	3	24	0.01837011	1		36.78497314	3.70362E-11
174	هريرة	Hurairah (a companion of the Prophet of Islam)	4	24	0.01837011	1		36.78497314	3.70362E-11
173	العاقبة	(blessed) end	4	29	0.02219721	3		36.504673	5.0914E-11
175	حرم	(has) forbidden/ made unlawful	4	48	0.03674022	14		36.33013535	6.32334E-11
176	آيات	Qur'anic verse	5	31	0.02372806	4		36.23736954	7.14294E-11
177	صح	it was narrated in sound Hadith	3	33	0.02525890	5		36.21875	7.32428E-11
178	العالمين	mankind/ jinn and all that exists)	5	40	0.03061685	9		36.02213669	9.67517E-11
179	عرف	knew	5	38	0.02908601	8		35.55543137	2.12587E-10
180	دلت	indicated/ informed	4	26	0.01990095	2		35.46952438	2.52092E-10
181	سبيله	His/his path/way	3	23	0.01760469	1		35.02799606	7.36403E-10
182	السماء	the heaven (sky)	4	19	0.01454300	0		34.96406555	4.33766E-10
184	جواد	magnanimous	3	19	0.01454300	0		34.96406555	4.33766E-10
186	خييرا	good/ better	4	19	0.01454300	0		34.96406555	4.33766E-10
185	بذلك	hence	5	147	0.11251693	105	0.053244088	34.95970535	4.41294E-10
183	وحده	alone	5	91	0.06965334	50	0.025354328	34.92723083	4.97905E-10
187	دين	religion	5	126	0.09644308	85	0.043102354	33.80208206	3.17665E-09
188	المشركون	polytheists (nom.)	3	25	0.01913553	2		33.78020859	3.24564E-09
189	فهذا	and this	4	40	0.03061685	10		33.73631668	3.38644E-09
190	الجن	the Jinn	3	35	0.02678974	7		33.67798996	3.57854E-09
191	دل	indicated/ informed	5	27	0.02066637	3		33.23122787	5.25789E-09
192	شر	evil	5	38	0.02908601	9		33.17198181	5.51103E-09
193	أعلم	know(s) better	3	31	0.02372806	5		33.11885834	5.74468E-09
194	الدعاة	teachers/ propagandists	3	44	0.03367853	13		32.97714233	6.40018E-09
195	بيان	to make (something) evident	4	55	0.04209817	21	0.010648817	32.96923447	6.43818E-09
196	دعوة	call	5	55	0.04209817	21	0.010648817	32.96923447	6.43818E-09
198	كتابه	His/his book	5	95	0.07271502	56	0.028396847	32.61661911	8.30038E-09
197	بالدعوة	the call to the true religion	3	24	0.01837011	2		32.09682846	1.1743E-08
199	الأخرة	the hereafter	5	63	0.04822154	28	0.014198423	32.06490326	1.1986E-08
200	خلقه	His creatures	4	43	0.03291311	13		31.65966988	1.54451E-08

201	حجة	plea against/argument/ pilgrimage	3	26	0.01990095	3	31.60539055	1.59657E-08
202	التواصي	recommend one another to...	3	17	0.01301216	0	31.2834816	1.93722E-08
203	الحافظ	Alhafidh (a higher status of the scholars of Hadith)	4	17	0.01301216	0	31.2834816	1.93722E-08
206	أنصاره	his patrons	3	17	0.01301216	0	31.2834816	1.93722E-08
204	المنكر	the evil	4	33	0.02525890	7	30.74622345	2.64829E-08
205	الأصنام	idols	3	23	0.01760469	2	30.41987801	3.18697E-08
207	بعدهم	after them	3	23	0.01760469	2	30.41987801	3.18697E-08
210	لأهل	to the people of	4	23	0.01760469	2	30.41987801	3.18697E-08
209	شاء	will (that something be done)	4	42	0.03214769	13	30.35300827	3.30901E-08
208	علمه	taught him	4	29	0.02219721	5	30.05491447	3.90736E-08
211	رسله	His messengers	4	25	0.01913553	3	29.98752403	4.05588E-08
212	إذا	if	4	27	0.02066637	4	29.91103363	4.23084E-08
213	هدى	guidance	4	34	0.02602432	8	29.80052185	4.49616E-08
214	عمر	Omar	4	37	0.02832058	10	29.60105133	5.01514E-08
215	الأوزاعي	Alawzaee	3	16	0.01224674	0	29.44320297	5.46549E-08
216	جميعاً	all	4	16	0.01224674	0	29.44320297	5.46549E-08
219	رسولاً	a messenger (acc.)	4	16	0.01224674	0	29.44320297	5.46549E-08
218	فبين	and (He/he) clarified	3	16	0.01224674	0	29.44320297	5.46549E-08
217	كلام	speech	5	48	0.03674022	18	29.28578568	5.95274E-08
220	عليكم	upon you	3	41	0.03138227	13	29.05761337	6.73327E-08
221	مالك	Malik	4	30	0.02296263	6	28.86632919	7.46246E-08
222	الأولياء	friends of God (religious status in Sufi orders)	3	22	0.01683927	2	28.74989891	7.94295E-08
223	أتباعهم	their followers	5	22	0.01683927	2	28.74989891	7.94295E-08
225	طاعة	obedience	3	42	0.03214769	14	28.54162598	8.87809E-08
224	أكمل	made perfect/ continued	4	33	0.02525890	8	28.38845825	9.63306E-08

Table A2 Keywords that indicate semantic foci in Ibn Baz

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Texts	Freq.	%	F. Alhawali	% Alhawali	Keyness	P
1	الله	Allah	5	4253	3.25534	994	0.50404	3803.249	1.49E-20
2	سبحانه	the Glorified	5	809	0.61923	8		1409.8375	3.07E-19
3	جل	the Majestic	5	424	0.32454	18		648.80554	3.44E-18
4	عز	the Exalted in Mighty	5	363	0.27785	11		580.47906	4.90E-18
5	الصلاة	(may) the blessings (of Allah be upon him)/ the prayer	5	289	0.2212	18		413.41336	1.47E-17
6	تعالى	the Exalted	5	477	0.36511	151	0.07657	339.10696	2.82E-17
7	الله	to Allah	5	267	0.20437	74	0.03752	210.0125	1.47E-16
8	الدعوة	the call (to)	4	216	0.16533	45	0.02281	203.41599	6.23E-16
9	السلام	the Peace/ the peace/ Islamic salutation	5	255	0.19518	78	0.03955	186.18858	2.27E-16
10	الشرك	associationism/ polytheism	5	131	0.10027	15		159.7037	4.03E-16
11	بالله	in/with/by Allah	4	173	0.13242	41	0.02079	151.03606	4.99E-16
12	الحق	the True/ right	5	242	0.18523	94	0.04766	142.70996	2.59E-15
13	علا	the Most High	3	76	0.05817	0		139.87622	6.74E-16
14	الهدى	the guidance/ the right path	5	67	0.05128	3		101.589	8.05E-15
15	الباطل	the falsehood	5	71	0.05434	5		98.876724	2.93E-15
16	بإحسان	followed them exactly (in faith)	5	51	0.03904	0		93.8584289	3.73E-15
17	العظيم	the great/ the Great	5	84	0.0643	15		85.63044	5.81E-15
18	دينه	His/his religion	4	73	0.05587	11		80.315681	9.86E-15
19	صفاته	His attributes	5	42	0.03215	0		77.293434	9.86E-15
20	البدع	the religiously impermissible innovative practice and beliefs	5	63	0.04822	8		74.081894	1.24E-14
21	العبادة	the worship	3	120	0.09185	51	0.02586	64.293205	2.88E-14
22	الإسلام	Islam	5	337	0.25794	271	0.13742	60.057278	2.30E-13
23	القيامة	the (Day of) Resurrection	4	45	0.03444	4		59.172089	5.02E-14
24	رب	Lord, may	5	61	0.04669	13		56.690296	6.85E-14
25	ربه	his Lord	4	40	0.03062	3		54.900444	8.76E-14
26	الصفات	the attributes (of Allah)	4	46	0.03521	6		53.560551	1.07E-13
27	المستقيم	straight (way)	5	34	0.02602	2		49.154232	2.37E-13
28	شرع	(Allah has) ordained	4	47	0.03597	8		49.005337	2.27E-12
29	العزیز	the Exalted in power	5	46	0.03521	8		47.482338	3.26E-13
30	بالحق	truly/ with the truth	5	37	0.02832	4		45.942032	2.93E-12
31	الاستغاثة	beseeking for help	3	28	0.02143	1		43.843914	8.39E-13
32	النار	the Hell-fire	5	58	0.04439	17		43.737652	8.66E-13
33	الشرع	the Sharia Law	4	34	0.02602	4		41.061699	4.70E-13
34	شهادة	testimony	3	22	0.01683	0		40.485012	7.03E-12
35	التحذير	warning	4	31	0.02372	3		39.804073	4.09E-12
36	العلم	knowledge (about Allah)	5	225	0.17221	183	0.09279	38.845768	8.52E-12

37	طاعته	obeying Him	3	25	0.01913	1		38.5453	8.88E-08
38	التحاكم	arbitration (according to Islamic Law)	3	30	0.02296	3		38.151337	1.34E-11
39	ولي	Wali (Lord/ God/ Protector/ Helper)	4	36	0.02756	6		37.89933	1.35E-11
40	كريم	the most Generous	4	20	0.01531	0		36.804371	3.63E-11
41	السلامة	security	3	24	0.01837	1		36.784973	5.09E-11
42	العاقبة	(blessed) end	4	29	0.02219	3		36.504673	7.36E-10
43	سبيله	His/his path/way	3	23	0.0176	1		35.027996	3.18E-09
44	جواد	Magnanimous	3	19	0.01454	0		34.964066	4.34E-10
45	وحده	(He) Alone	5	91	0.06965	50	0.02535	34.927231	4.98E-10
46	دين	religion	5	126	0.09644	85	0.0431	33.802082	6.44E-09
47	شر	evil	5	38	0.02908	9		33.171982	5.51E-09
48	دعوة	call (to Allah)	5	55	0.04209	21	0.01064	32.969234	1.17E-08
49	بالدعوة	via the call (to Allah)	3	24	0.01837	2		32.096828	3.91E-08
50	الآخرة	the Hereafter	5	63	0.04822	28	0.01419	32.064903	1.20E-08
51	المنكر	Al-Munkar (polytheism and disbelief and all that is wrong and Islam has forbidden)	4	33	0.02525	7		30.746223	2.65E-08
52	الأصنام	idols	3	23	0.0176	2		30.419878	3.19E-08
53	هدى	guidance	4	34	0.02602	8		29.800522	2.88E-14
54	طاعة	obedience (submission to Allah)	3	42	0.03214	14		28.541626	1.12E-11

Table A3 Keywords that indicate social actors in Ibn Baz

N	Key word	Eng. trans.	Texts	F.	%	F. Alhawali	% Alhawali	Keyness	P
1	الصلاة	(may) the blessings (of Allah be upon him)/ the prayer	5	289	0.221206	18		413.41336	1.46E-17
2	رسول	messenger	5	270	0.206663	28	0.01419	339.875	2.80E-17
3	النبي	the prophet	4	225	0.172219	21	0.01064	292.07516	4.65E-17
4	بن	son of	5	265	0.202836	48	0.02434	268.45166	6.21E-17
5	رسوله	His messenger	5	233	0.178343	34	0.01724	259.90494	6.94E-17
6	أهل	the people of	5	244	0.186762	40	0.02028	258.98544	7.02E-17
7	رضي	(may Allah) be pleased with him	5	182	0.139306	18		232.32063	1.03E-16
8	الرسول	the messenger	5	161	0.123232	15		209.0584	1.49E-16
9	السلام	(may) peace (of Allah be upon him)	5	255	0.195182	78	0.03955	186.18858	2.27E-16
10	محمد	Mohammad	5	233	0.178343	78	0.03955	157.87801	4.21E-16
11	نبينا	our Prophet	4	87	0.066591	1		150.1987	5.10E-16
12	آله	his family	4	102	0.078073	7		142.87639	6.20E-16
13	أمنوا	(they, those who) believed	5	88	0.067357	3		138.64163	6.98E-16
14	أيها	O, (those, people) (vocative)	5	104	0.079603	11		130.05186	9.03E-16
15	يا	O, (vocative)	5	156	0.119405	40	0.02028	129.44696	9.20E-16
16	الرسل	the messengers	5	98	0.075011	11		120.24679	1.25E-15
17	أنهم	indeed they are	5	61	0.04669	0		112.26485	1.67E-15
18	جميعا	all	5	65	0.049752	1		110.27984	1.80E-15
19	عباده	His servants, worshippers	5	65	0.049752	1		110.27984	1.80E-15
20	أصحابه	his (the Prophet) companions	4	68	0.052048	2		109.01865	1.89E-15
21	عنه	with him	5	221	0.169158	106	0.05375	102.53931	2.48E-15
22	عبد	servant, worshiper	5	149	0.114047	53	0.02687	95.607162	3.42E-15
23	صحابه	his (the Prophet) companions	5	69	0.052814	5		95.47123	3.44E-15
24	عليهم	upon them	5	190	0.14543	88	0.04462	92.09111	4.08E-15
25	العباد	the servants of Allah, His worshippers	5	67	0.051283	5		92.073608	4.08E-15
26	لهم	to them	5	252	0.192886	147	0.07454	88.095955	5.05E-15
27	الناس	the people	5	396	0.303106	304	0.15415	79.642914	8.41E-15
28	نبيه	His Prophet	5	51	0.039036	2		78.858948	8.86E-15
29	المسلمين	the Muslims	5	226	0.172985	138	0.06997	73.123795	1.34E-14
30	السلف	the pious ancestors	4	60	0.045925	7		72.673447	1.38E-14
31	بهم	with them	5	91	0.069653	25	0.01267	71.980255	1.46E-14
32	ابن	son of	5	116	0.088788	43	0.0218	71.589943	1.51E-14
33	أبي	the father of (acc.)	4	61	0.04669	8		70.886078	1.59E-14
34	الإمام	the Imam	5	62	0.047456	9		69.266205	1.82E-14
35	لعلكم	that you may	5	37	0.02832	0		68.090988	2.02E-14
36	رحمه	(may Allah) have mercy (upon) him	5	88	0.067357	25	0.01267	67.935989	2.05E-14
37	منكم	from you	4	41	0.031382	1		67.017975	2.22E-14
38	مسلم	Muslim	4	78	0.059702	19		66.907005	2.25E-14
39	هم	they	5	187	0.143133	109	0.05527	65.433479	2.58E-14
40	لعباده	to His servants/worshippers	4	34	0.026024	0		62.569626	3.43E-14
41	غيرهم	others	5	82	0.062764	24	0.01217	61.909237	3.68E-14
42	أبو	the father of (nom.)	4	59	0.045159	10		61.640888	3.79E-14

43	الصحابة	the companions of the Prophet	5	48	0.03674	5		60.297188	4.40E-14
44	التابعين	the successors of the companions of the Prophet	4	32	0.024493	0		58.888763	5.19E-14
45	عنهم	with them	5	74	0.056641	22	0.01115	55.204288	8.39E-14
46	الشيخ	the sheikh	5	113	0.086492	52	0.02636	55.18483	8.41E-14
47	أئمة	Imams	4	40	0.030616	3		54.900444	8.76E-14
48	التقلين	the humans and the jinn	3	24	0.01837	0		44.165688	7.62E-13
49	الصالح	pious	4	39	0.029851	6		42.529701	1.29E-12
50	محمدا	Mohammad (acc.)	5	23	0.017047	0		42.325344	1.39E-12
51	الذين	who (plural)	5	261	0.199775	218	0.11054	41.792873	1.69E-12
52	غيره	other	5	91	0.069653	44	0.0223	41.762089	1.71E-12
53	كنتم	you were	4	34	0.026024	4		41.061699	2.27E-12
54	إليك	to You/you	4	26	0.019901	1		40.308712	3.19E-12
55	المشركين	polytheists (acc.)	3	30	0.022962	3		38.151337	1.12E-11
56	المؤمنين	the believers	4	47	0.035974	13		36.990223	2.99E-11
57	هريرة	Hurairah	4	24	0.01837	1		36.784973	3.70E-11
58	العالمين	mankind, jinn and all that exists	5	40	0.030616	9		36.022137	9.68E-11
59	المشركون	polytheists (nom.)	3	25	0.019135	2		33.780209	3.25E-09
60	الجن	the Jinn	3	35	0.026789	7		33.67799	3.58E-09
61	الدعاة	teachers, propagandists	3	44	0.033678	13		32.977142	6.40E-09
62	خلقه	His creatures	4	43	0.032913	13		31.65967	1.54E-08
63	الحافظ	Alhafidh (a higher status of the scholars of Hadith)	4	17	0.013012	0		31.283482	1.94E-08
64	أنصاره	his patrons, advocates	3	17	0.013012	0		31.283482	1.94E-08
65	بعدهم	after them	3	23	0.017604	2		30.419878	3.19E-08
66	لأهل	to the people of	4	23	0.017604	2		30.419878	3.19E-08
67	رسله	His messengers	4	25	0.019135	3		29.987524	4.06E-08
68	عمر	Omar	4	37	0.02832	10		29.601051	5.02E-08
69	رَسُولًا	a messenger (acc.)	4	16	0.012246	0		29.443203	5.47E-08
70	الأوزاعي	Alawzaee	3	16	0.012246	0		29.443203	5.47E-08
71	جميعًا	all	4	16	0.012246	0		29.443203	5.47E-08
72	عليكم	upon you	3	41	0.031382	13		29.057613	6.73E-08
73	مالك	Malik	4	30	0.022962	6		28.866329	7.46E-08
74	الأولياء	friends of God (religious status in Sufi orders)	3	22	0.016839	2		28.749899	7.94E-08
75	أتباعهم	their followers	5	22	0.016839	2		28.749899	7.94E-08

Table A4 Argumentation indicators (keywords)

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	F.	%	F. Alhawali	% Alhawali	Keyness	P
1	قال	He/he said	5	1100	0.842	195	0.0989	1129.3	6.09E-19
2	قوله	His/his saying	5	221	0.1692	1		395.11	1.7E-17
3	الآية	the Qur'anic verse/ till the end of the Qur'anic verse	4	129	0.0987	5		199.84	1.75E-16
4	الآيات	the Qur'anic verses	5	138	0.1056	14		174.8	2.87E-16
5	الأحاديث	Hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet of Islam)	5	83	0.0635	4		124.38	1.08E-15
6	السنة	the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam	5	142	0.1087	35	0.0177	120.92	1.22E-15
7	فالأوجب	therefore it is obligatory (on...) to	3	46	0.0352	0		84.656	6.15E-15
8	رواه	(this Hadith is) narrated by	4	56	0.0429	3		82.392	7.06E-15
9	فقال	then (He/he) said	5	85	0.0651	30	0.0152	54.918	8.74E-14
10	الأدلة	the indications (from Qur'an and Prophetic traditions)/ proofs	4	54	0.0413	10		54.068	9.9E-14
11	ثبت	it became firm (that the Prophet said)	4	46	0.0352	6		53.561	1.07E-13
12	حديث	Hadith	4	48	0.0367	9		47.761	3.07E-13
13	لقول	because (He/he) said	4	24	0.0184	0		44.166	7.62E-13
14	لأن	because	5	158	0.1209	110	0.0558	39.72	4.27E-12
15	الصحيحين	the two most authentic books Hadiths	3	25	0.0191	1		38.545	8.52E-12
16	آيات	Qur'anic verse	5	31	0.0237	4		36.237	7.14E-11
17	صح	it was narrated in a sound Hadith	3	33	0.0253	5		36.219	7.32E-11
18	دلت	indicated (fem. Sing. and pl.)	4	26	0.0199	2		35.47	2.52E-10
19	بذلك	hence/ by that means	5	147	0.1125	105	0.0532	34.96	4.41E-10
20	دل	indicated (masc. sing.)	5	27	0.0207	3		33.231	5.26E-09

Table A5 Word clusters of the key term 'ALLAH' and the keywords 'سبحانه' (*subḥanahu*; the Glorified) and 'تعالى' (*taʿaala*; the Exalted) in Ibn Baz

	N	Word clusters	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts
2-word clusters	1	قال تعالى	the Exalted said	194	5
	2	قال سبحانه	the Glorified said	157	5
	3	قوله تعالى	His words, the Exalted	58	3
	4	قوله سبحانه	His words the Glorified	57	4
	5	يقول سبحانه	the Glorified says	27	4
	6	فبين سبحانه	then the Glorified showed	12	3
	7	هو سبحانه	He, the Glorified	10	3
	8	فقال سبحانه	and the Glorified said	9	3
	9	فهو سبحانه	because He, the Glorified	9	3
	10	له سبحانه	To Him, the Glorified	9	3
	11	أوضح سبحانه	the Glorified explicated	7	3
	12	فرد الله	Allah has referred (....) to/ Allah has replied	7	3
	13	نسأله سبحانه	we pray to Him, the Glorified	6	4
3-word clusters	14	الله تعالى في	Allah, the Exalted in	7	3
	15	الله سبحانه في	Allah, the Glorified in	14	3
	16	الله سبحانه قد	indeed, Allah, the Glorified has	13	4
	17	الله سبحانه و	Allah, the Glorified and	76	5
	18	إلى الله سبحانه	to Allah, the Glorified	21	3
	19	أمر الله سبحانه	Allah, the Glorified, ordered	9	3
	20	أن الله سبحانه	that Allah, the Glorified	28	4
	21	بأنه سبحانه و	in Allah, the Glorified and	5	3
	22	بأن الله سبحانه	is that Allah the Glorified	7	3
	23	به سبحانه و	in/with Him, the Glorified and	6	4
	24	ثم قال سبحانه	then the Glorified said	5	3
	25	سبحانه ذلك بأن	the Glorified that (something) is	5	3
	26	سبحانه في كتابه	the Glorified, in His Book	7	3
	27	سبحانه في هذه	the Glorified in this	17	4
	28	سبحانه و تعالى	the Glorified and the Exalted	114	5
	29	سبحانه و قد	the Glorified, and (something) has indeed	6	4
	30	سبحانه و لا	the Glorified and not	7	3
	31	سبحانه و لقد	the Glorified and indeed	7	3
	32	سبحانه و ما	the Glorified and what	23	4
	33	سبحانه يا أيها	the Glorified: (O... Those	13	3
	34	فإن الله سبحانه	and then indeed Allah, the Glorified	5	3
	35	فبين سبحانه في	and then the Glorified showed in	5	3
	36	في قوله تعالى	in His words, the Exalted	11	3
	37	قال الله تعالى	Allah, the Exalted said	22	3
	38	قال الله سبحانه	Allah, the Glorified, said	22	5
	39	قال تعالى و	the Exalted said: (and	92	4
	40	قال تعالى يا	the Exalted said: (O..	8	3
	41	قال سبحانه في	the Glorified said in	12	3
	42	قال سبحانه و	the Glorified (and the Exalted) said	80	5
	43	قوله تعالى و	in His words, the Exalted and	24	3
	44	قوله سبحانه و	in His words the Glorified and	27	3
	45	قوله سبحانه يا	in His words the Glorified: (O..	5	3
	46	كما قال الله	as Allah has said	30	5
	47	كما قال تعالى	as the Exalted said	49	4
	48	كما قال سبحانه	as the Glorified said	54	5
	49	لأن الله سبحانه	because Allah, the Glorified	14	4

4-word clusters	50	الله سبحانه و	to Allah, the Glorified and	6	3
	51	له سبحانه و	to Him the Glorified and	7	3
	52	من الله سبحانه	from Allah, the Glorified	7	3
	53	نسال الله العافية	we seek refuge in Allah	9	3
	54	نسال الله أن	we pray to Allah that	7	3
	55	نساله سبحانه أن	we pray to Him, the Glorified, that	6	4
	56	و الله سبحانه	and Allah, the Glorified	13	3
	57	و أسأل الله	and I pray to Allah	16	4
	58	و قال تعالى	and the Exalted said	123	4
	59	و قال سبحانه	and the Glorified said	82	4
	60	و قوله تعالى	and in His words the Exalted	13	3
	61	و قوله سبحانه	and in His words the Glorified	24	3
	62	و يقول سبحانه	and the Glorified says	13	4
	63	يقول سبحانه و	the Glorified (and the Exalted) says	17	4
	64	الآية و قال تعالى	the Qur'anic verse and the Exalted said	7	4
	65	الطاغوت و قال تعالى	(<i>taghut</i>), viz., idols and Jinni. And the Exalted said	5	3
	66	الله سبحانه و تعالى	Allah, the Glorified and the Exalted	39	4
	67	إلى الله سبحانه و	to Allah, the Exalted and	9	3
	68	بأنه و اليوم الآخر	in Allah and the Last Day	5	3
	69	تعالى و ما أرسلنا	the Glorified (says/said) and whosoever (from among the messengers) We sent	7	4
	70	تعالى يا أيها الناس	the Exalted (says/said) O.. All people	6	3
	71	سبحانه ذلك بأن الله	the Glorified that Allah is	5	3
	72	سبحانه في هذه الآيات	the Glorified in these Qur'anic verses	5	3
	73	سبحانه في هذه الآية	the Glorified in this Qur'anic verse	12	3
	74	سبحانه و تعالى في	the Glorified and the Exalted in	11	4
	75	سبحانه و تعالى و	the Glorified and the Exalted and	21	3
	76	سبحانه يا أيها الذين	the Glorified; (O.. Those who	10	3
	77	فبين سبحانه في هذه	and the Glorified showed in this	5	3
	78	في قوله تعالى و	in His words the Exalted and	8	3
	79	قال تعالى و لقد	the Exalted said: (indeed	11	4
	80	قال تعالى و ما	the Exalted said: (and whatsoever	22	4
	81	قال تعالى و من	the Exalted said: (and whosoever	8	4
	82	قال سبحانه و تعالى	the Glorified and the Exalted said	17	3
	83	قال سبحانه و لقد	the Glorified said: Indeed	6	3
	84	قال سبحانه و ما	the Glorified said: Whatsoever/whosoever	11	3
	85	قوله تعالى و من	His words the Exalted: And those	5	3
	86	كما قال الله سبحانه	as Allah, the Glorified, said	14	5
	87	كما قال تعالى و	as the Exalted said and	27	4
	88	كما قال سبحانه و	as the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	23	5
	89	و قال تعالى و	and the Glorified said and	58	4
	90	و قال تعالى يا	and the Exalted said: O..	5	3
	91	و قال سبحانه و	and the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	47	4
	92	و قوله سبحانه و	and His words the Glorified and	17	3
	93	و يقول سبحانه و	and the Glorified and (the Exalted) says	7	3

Table A6 Collocates of the key term 'ALLAH' in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	keyword	Eng. trans.	F.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	F.	Texts	Joint	MI
1	الله	Allah	4253	لَيُصْرَرَنَّ	(Allah) will certainly aid	7	4	7	5.6525679
2				رَسُول	messenger	270	5	269	5.4243755
3				يُقَرِّبُونَا	that they may bring us near (to Allah)	10	3	16	5.3306398
4				شُفَعَاؤُنَا	our intercessors (with Allah)	10	3	15	5.2375307
5				لِكِتَاب	to the book of	9	4	11	4.9420748
6				بِسْمِ	in the name of	5	3	6	4.9156027
7				لِشَرَع	the Sharia of (Allah)	6	3	7	4.8749604
8				عِنْدَ	with/near (Allah)	13	3	15	4.8590188
9				مَعَاذِ	Muaath (a companion of the Prophet of Islam)	8	3	9	4.8224931
10				أَصْحَابِ	the people of/ the companion of (the Prophet of Allah)	30	4	33	4.7900715
11				صَح	it was narrated in a sound Hadith	33	3	36	4.7780991
12				بِحَمْدِ	glory to (Allah)	16	3	17	4.7400308
13				رَضِيَ	(may Allah) be pleased (with him/her)	182	5	177	4.6839323
14				رَحْمَهُ	may (Allah have) mercy (upon)	88	5	89	4.66887
15				أَنْ	indeed, that	18	4	18	4.6525679
16				أَسْأَلُ	pray that	18	4	18	4.6525679
17				يُحْكَمُ	(Allah will) judge between them	18	3	18	4.6525679
18				أَعْبُدُوا	(you pl.) worship (v. imperative)	15	4	15	4.6525679
19				بِكِتَابِ	with the Book (of Allah)	13	3	13	4.6525679
20				هَؤُلَاءِ	these (people)	13	3	13	4.6525679
21				فَاعْبُدِ	and (you sing.) worship (imperative)	12	4	12	4.6525679
22				فَنَسْأَلُ	hence we pray to Allah (that)	11	3	11	4.6525679
23				نَعْبُدُهُمْ	we worship them	10	3	10	4.6525679
24				تَنْصُرُوا	(if you) help (in the cause of Allah)	9	3	9	4.6525679
25				يَبْتَغُونَ	seek	9	3	9	4.6525679
26				يَخْتَلِفُونَ	(they) differed	9	3	9	4.6525679
27				بِأَنَّ	that	8	4	8	4.6525679
28				فَحُكْمُهُ	the decision thereof (is with Allah)	8	3	8	4.6525679
29				يَعْبُدُونَ	they worship	8	3	8	4.6525679
30				يُنصِرُهُ	aid Him	8	4	8	4.6525679
31				أَتُنَبِّئُونَ	do you inform Allah (that)	7	3	7	4.6525679
32				رَسُولُ	messenger (nom.)	7	3	7	4.6525679
33				لَيَقُولَنَّ	they will surely say	7	3	7	4.6525679
34				رِضْوَانِ	(may Allah) be pleased (with them)	6	3	6	4.6525679
35				سَمَى	(Allah has) named (that)	6	3	6	4.6525679
36				صِرَاطِ	the (straight) way (of Allah)	6	3	6	4.6525679
37				وَفَقَهُ	(may Allah) guide him	6	3	6	4.6525679
38				اتَّبَعُوهُمْ	followed them (exactly in Faith)	5	3	5	4.6525679
39				الْأَمْثَالِ	(So put not forward) similitudes (for Allah)	5	3	5	4.6525679
40				الْأُمُورِ	the affairs	5	3	5	4.6525679
41				بِإِحْسَانٍ	(followed them) exactly in Faith	5	3	5	4.6525679

42	بشرع	with the Sharia (of Allah)	5	3	5	4.6525679
43	تَضَرَّبُوا	(So) put (not) forward (similitudes for Allah)	5	3	5	4.6525679
44	رَضِيَ	(Allah) is well-pleased (with them)	3		5	4.6525679
45	فَسَيَقُولُونَ	they will say	5	3	5	4.6525679
46	صلى	(may Allah) send his blessings (upon him)	876	5	872	4.6459656
47	نسال	we pray (to Allah that)	30	3	29	4.6036587
48	النبي	the Prophet	225	4	212	4.5667071
49	تَنَازَعْتُمْ	(you pl.) differ	15	3	14	4.5530324
50	فَرُدُّوهُ	refer it (to Allah)	15	3	14	4.5530324
51	اتَّقُوا	fear (v. pl. imperative)	13	3	12	4.5370908
52	دُونِ	besides (Allah)	22	4	20	4.5150647
53	ذَلِكَ	that	11	4	10	4.5150647
54	لِقَوْلِ	because (Allah/the Prophet) has said	24	3	21	4.4599228
55	رَسُولًا	a messenger (acc.)	16	3	14	4.4599228
56	فرد	then (Allah) has replied	8	3	7	4.4599228
57	معبود	worthy of worship	8	3	7	4.4599228
58	كتاب	Book	143	5	125	4.4584808
59	عائشة	Aysha (the youngest wife of Prophet Mohammad)	7	4	6	4.4301758
60	لنبيه	to His Prophet	7	3	6	4.4301758
61	أوجب	(Allah) made obligatory	32	4	27	4.4074554
62	هريرة	Hurairah (a companion opf the Prophet and a famous reporter of Hadith)	24	3	20	4.3895335
63	رحمهم	(may Allah) have mercy upon them	18	3	15	4.3895335
64	بعثه	(Allah) has sent him	12	4	10	4.3895335
65	فطر	(Allah's Fitrah -Allah's Islamic Monotheism- with which He) has created (mankind)	6	3	5	4.3895335
66	يُدَبِّرُ	dispose (all affairs)	6	3	5	4.3895335
67	أُمَّةٍ	nation	17	3	14	4.3724604
68	عبد	the servant of/ the first of a compound the name 'Abdu Allah'/ worshipped (v.)	149	5	122	4.3641367
69	رحمة	mercy	56	5	45	4.3370662
70	سنة	(the) way (of Allah)/ year/ the Sunnah of the Prophet	125	5	92	4.2103457
71	خَبِيرٍ	(Allah is) Well-Acquainted (with what you do)	7	3	5	4.1671414
72	يُرِيدُ	(He/he) wants	7	3	5	4.1671414
73	حرم	prohibited	48	4	34	4.1550684
74	روي	it was reported that	17	3	12	4.1500678
75	إِنَّ	indeed	108	5	74	4.1071339
76	جواد	Most Magnanimous	19	3	13	4.1050801
77	دين	religion	126	4	86	4.101553
78	بعث	sent	46	4	31	4.0832024
79	الخطاب	Alkhatab (the second name of a companion(s) of the Prophet of Islam)	12	3	8	4.0676055

80		زُلْفَى	Near to (Allah)	9	3	6	4.0676055
81		شيخ	Sheikh	20	4	13	4.0310798
82		كريم	generous, most Generous	20	3	13	4.0310798
83		نبيه	His prophet	51	5	33	4.0245371
84		الرسول	The messenger	161	3	104	4.0220909
85		الصحيحين	The two books of sound Hadiths	25	3	16	4.0087118
86		شرع	the Sharia of (Allah)	46	3	30	4.0048699
87		عباد	servants, worshippers	24	4	14	3.8749604
88		محمدا	Mohammad (acc.)	23	4	13	3.8294458
89		أنزل	sent down	96	4	53	3.795526
90		الصحابة	the companions	48	4	26	3.7680454
91		إله	God	74	3	40	3.7650428
92		يا	O.. (vocative)	156	5	79	3.6709466
93		رسوله	His messenger	233	5	105	3.5026274
94		بن	the son of	265	5	117	3.4730842
95	بِالله	اليوم	(the Last) Day	6	3	5	12.74336
96		الآخر	the Last (Day)	15	3	5	11.421431
97		قوة	(there is no) strength (and no power, save by Allah)	173	3	14	8.6872425
98		حول	(there is no strength and no) power (save by Allah	173	3	14	7.8316326
99		الإيمان	faith	173	4	14	6.0027442
100		الشرك	associationism,/polytheism	173	3	9	5.4087071
101		إلا	but	173	3	23	4.7873383
102	الله	الخالص	the pure (religion)	11	4	11	8.6461372
103		الأمثال	(So put not forward) similitudes (for Allah)	5	3	5	8.6461372
104		تَضَرَّبُوا	(So) put (not) forward (similitudes for Allah)	5	3	5	8.6461372
105		الحمد	praise	67	5	63	8.5573282
106		مُخْلِصًا	(doing religious deeds) sincerely (for Allah's sake only)	12	4	11	8.520606
107		للمتقين	Al-Muttaqeen (those who fear Allah much (who abstain from evil deeds and perform all kinds of good deeds)	9	3	8	8.4762125
108		لرسوله	to His messenger	15	3	13	8.4396868
109		الدين	the religion	13	4	11	8.4051294
110		رَبِّ	the Lord of	11	3	8	8.1867056
111		نَهَوْا	(those who were) ordered not to do...	7	3	5	8.1607103
112		العالمين	the Alamin (mankind, jinn and all that exists) (part of a Qur'anic verse)	12	3	7	7.8685298
113		عَاقِبُهُ	end	9	3	5	7.7981405
114		العالمين	the Alamin (mankind, jinn and all that exists)	40	3	22	7.7836409
115		إخلاص	performing worship practices sincerely (for Allah's sake alone)	27	3	14	7.6986046
116		وحده	Alone	91	4	46	7.6619048
117		المُنْكَرِ	vice	12	3	5	7.3831029

118	رب	Lord of	61	3	22	7.1748314
119	العاقبة	the (blessed) end	29	3	8	6.7881565
120	العبادة	the worship	120	3	30	6.6461372
121	ألا	not to	61	4	11	6.1748314
122	الصلوة	blessings/ prayer	289	4	36	5.6411366
123	السلام	the Peace/ peace / Islamic salutation	255	4	28	5.4591389
124	فلا	do not	97	3	7	4.8535795
125	العبادة	the worship	120	3	8	4.7392468
126	يعلم	knows	87	3	5	4.5251217
127	الدين	the religion	222	4	12	4.4366841
128	أما	and then	184	3	7	3.9299302
129	سبحانه	the Glorified	809	5	30	3.8930321
130	له	to Him/him	387	4	13	3.7503872

Table A7 Collocates of the key term 'RELIGION' in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	Word form	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	F.	Texts	Joint	MI
1	الدين	the religion	222	الخالص	the pure	11	4	11	9.19973
2				فَاعْبُدْ	So worship (Allah)	12	4	11	9.0742
3				مُخْلِصًا	sincerely	12	4	11	9.0742
4				يَفْقَهُه	(Allah) makes him know (the religion)	7	3	6	8.97733
5				خيرًا	(to be) good/faithful	19	3	6	7.53676
6				يوم	day	110	4	28	7.22572
7				بإحسان	followed them exactly (in faith)	51	3	12	7.11226
8				ألا	Surely	61	4	11	6.72842
9				له	to Him/him	387	4	30	5.51043
10				بعد	after	209	3	13	5.19281
11				الله	to Allah	267	4	12	4.72399
12				بل	rather	140	3	6	4.65541
13				فقد	indeed	138	3	5	4.41313
14				الذي	that	365	3	12	4.27294
15				المسلمين	Muslims	226	3	7	4.1869
16				إلى	to Him/him	1104	4	33	4.1356
17				كان	was	289	3	8	4.0248
18				به	with him	570	3	13	3.74535
19				هذا	this	703	3	16	3.74235
20	دين	religion	126	الإسلام	Islam	337	4	27	6.37515
21				الحق	the true (guidance)	242	3	15	6.00489
22				الله	Allah	4253	4	86	4.38886
23	دينه	His/his religion	73	يعلي	raise the prestige of (His word and make it) superior	6	3	5	10.5413
24				كلمته	His word	10	3	8	10.4824
25				ينصر	(may Allah) render (His religion) victorious	16	3	7	9.61167
26				الفقه	jurisprudence	29	3	7	8.75369
27				المسلمين	Muslims	226	3	9	6.15407
28				حتى	till	234	3	6	5.51892
29				أن	that	1605	3	25	4.79982
30				عليه	on him	1398	3	17	4.44263
31				به	with it	570	3	6	4.23446
32	دين	religion	126	حتى	till	234	3	6	4.73146
33	دينهم	their religion	٣٨	المسلمين	Muslims	226	3	7	6.73339
34				الناس	the people	396	3	7	5.92421
35				على	on him	1779	3	8	3.94937
36				عن	about	827	3	6	4.63943

Table A8 Clusters of the key term 'RELIGION' in Ibn Baz

	N	Word clusters	Eng. trans.	Freq.	Texts
3-word clusters	1	في الدين و	in the religion and	27	3
	2	في دينه و	in His/his religion	23	3
	3	في دين الله	in the religion of Allah	18	3
	4	الدين ألا لله	religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake	11	4
	5	الله الذين الخالص	the pure religion is for Allah only	11	4
	6	له الدين ألا	religion is for (Allah alone). Surely	11	4
	7	لهم دينهم الذي	to them their religion that	11	4
	8	مخلصاً له الدين	by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake	11	4
	9	في دينهم و	in their religion and	9	3
	10	و دين الحق	and the religion of the truth	8	3
	11	الفقه في دينه	comprehending the religion	7	3
	12	أن ينصر دينه	(may Allah) render His religion victorious	7	3
	13	دين الإسلام و	the religion of Islam and	7	3
	14	ينصر دينه و	(may Allah) render His religion victorious and	7	3
	15	يفقهه في الدين	makes him comprehend the religion	6	3
	16	دين الحق و	the religion of truth and	5	3
	17	دينه و يعلي	His religion and raise the prestige	5	3
	18	من دين الإسلام	from the religion of Islam	5	3
	19	ألا الله الذين	Surely (the pure) religion is for Allah (only)	11	4
	20	الله الذين الخالص	the pure religion is for Allah only	11	4
	21	الذين الخالص و	the pure religion and	9	4
4-word clusters	22	الدين ألا الله الذين	(by doing) religious deeds (sincerely for Allah's sake). Surely the (pure) religion	11	4
	23	الله مخلصاً له الدين	(worship) Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake	11	4
	24	بإحسان إلى يوم الدين	followed them exactly (in faith) till the Day of judgement	11	3
	25	له الدين ألا الله	to Him the (pure) religion. Surely (the pure religion) is for Allah (Alone)	11	4
	26	مخلصاً له الدين ألا	by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake. Surely	11	4
	27	أن ينصر دينه و	may (Allah) render His religion victorious and	7	3
	28	خيراً يفقهه في الدين	(if Allah wants to do) good (to a person), He makes him comprehend the religion	6	3
	29	دينه و يعلي كلمته	(victorious) and raise the prestige of His word and make it superior	5	3
	30	ينصر دينه و يعلي	(may Allah) render His religion victorious and raise the prestige (of His word) and make (it) superior	5	3
	31	دينهم الذي ارتضى لهم	their religion which He has chosen for them	8	4
	32	ألا الله الذين الخالص	Surely the pure religion is for Allah only	11	4
	33	الله الذين الخالص و	the pure religion is for Allah only and	9	4
7-word clusters	34	الله مخلصاً له الدين ألا الله الذين	(worship) Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely (the pure) religion is for Allah (only)	11	4

35	فَاعْبُدِ اللَّهَ مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ	(worship) Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely (the pure religion) is for Allah (only)	11	4
36	مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ	by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the pure religion is for Allah only	11	4
37	لَهُ الدِّينُ أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ وَ	for Allah's sake only. Surely the pure religion is for Allah only and	9	4
38	إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ حُنَفَاءَ	(And they were commanded) not, but that they should worship Allah, and worship none but Him Alone (abstaining from ascribing partners to Him	7	1
39	أَمْرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ	(And) they were commanded not, but that they should worship Allah, and worship none but Him Alone (abstaining from ascribing partners to Him	7	1
40	فِي دِينِهِ وَالثَّبَاتِ عَلَيْهِ وَ أَنْ	(comprehending His/his religion and sincere adherence (to its teachings)	7	2
41	الْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ	This day, I have perfected your religion for you, completed (My Favour) upon you	6	1
42	أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي	I have perfected your religion for you, completed My Favour upon you	6	1
43	نِعْمَتِي وَ رَضِيتُ لَكُمُ الْإِسْلَامَ دِينًا وَ	(I have) completed My Favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. But	6	2
44	يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ بِهِ خَيْرًا يُفْقَهُهُ فِي الدِّينِ	(if Allah) wants to do good to a person, He makes him comprehend the religion	6	3
45	الدِّينَ أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ وَ الَّذِينَ	religious deeds (sincerely for Allah's sake only). Surely the pure religion is for Allah only and those who	5	2
46	الْمُسْلِمِينَ لِلْفَقْهِ فِي دِينِهِ وَ الثَّبَاتِ عَلَيْهِ	All Muslims comprehending the religion	5	2
47	أَنْ يَنْصُرَ دِينَهُ وَيُعْلِيَ كَلِمَتَهُ وَ	(may Allah) render His religion victorious and raise the prestige of His word and make it superior and	5	3
48	دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي وَ رَضِيتُ	(I have perfected) your religion for you, completed My Favour upon you, and have chosen	5	1
49	عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي وَ رَضِيتُ لَكُمُ الْإِسْلَامَ دِينًا	(I have) completed My Favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion	5	1
50	عَزَّ وَ جَلَّ الْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ	the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic (said): This day, I have perfected your religion for you	5	2
51	لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي وَ	(I have perfected) your religion for you, completed My Favour upon you, and	5	1
52	لِلْفَقْهِ فِي دِينِهِ وَ الثَّبَاتِ عَلَيْهِ وَ	to comprehending His/his religion and sincere adherence to its teachings and	5	2
53	لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ وَ الَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ	the pure religion is for Allah only. And those who take (Auliya' -protectors, helpers, lords, gods-besides) (Him)	5	2
54	مَنْ يَبْتَغِ غَيْرَ الْإِسْلَامِ دِينًا فَلَنْ يُقْبَلَ	And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted (of him)	5	2

Table A9 Collocates of the key term 'SAY' in Ibn Baz's corpus

N	word form	Eng. trans.	F.	collocate	Eng. trans.	F.	Joint	MI
1				فَاعْبُدُون	therefore worship Me	10	8	6.281617
2				أَنْزَلْنَاهُ	We have sent down	9	7	6.240975
3				لَقَدْ	verily	12	9	6.188508
4				أَوْحِيَ	(what) has been revealed (to you (O Mohammad) from your Lord)	8	6	6.188508
5				أَرْسَلْنَا	We have sent	19	14	6.162973
6				كِتَابٌ	A Book (revelation)	14	10	6.118119
7				لَيَنْصُرَنَّ	verily (Allah) will aid	7	5	6.118119
8				أَلَمْ	(did) you not	7	5	6.118119
9				سَأَلْتَهُمْ	(if) you (were to) ask them	7	5	6.118119
10				حَقًّا	(it was) incumbent (upon Us)	7	5	6.118119
11				عَلَيْنَا	upon Us	7	5	6.118119
12				لَيَقُولُنَّ	they will certainly say	7	5	6.118119
13				نَصْرٌ	help	7	5	6.118119
14				ذَلِكَ	that	11	7	5.951469
15				لَئِنْ	if (you) were to	10	6	5.86658
16				الحافظ	Alhafidh (a higher status of the scholars of Hadith)	17	10	5.838011
17				الطَّاغُوتِ	false deities	16	9	5.77347
18				تُرْحَمُونَ	(that) you (may) obtain mercy	9	5	5.755548
19				عَاقِبُهُ	end	9	5	5.755548
20				الْمُؤْمِنِينَ	believers (acc.)	11	6	5.729076
21	قال	He/he said	1100	السميع	All-Hearer	11	6	5.729076
22				هَذَا	this	21	11	5.67066
23				لَعَلَّكُمْ	that you may	37	19	5.64202
24				تَعَالَى	the Exalted	477	242	5.624563
25				خَلَقْتُ	I (Allah) created	14	7	5.603545
26				تَسْلِيمًا	with full submission	11	5	5.466042
27				اعْبُدُوا	you (mankind) worship	16	7	5.4109
28				نعم	yes/ best	14	6	5.381153
29				الْجِنِّ	Jinn (genies)	14	6	5.381153
30				قلت	I said	19	8	5.355618
31				يَشَاءُ	(Allah) wills (that something be done)	12	5	5.340511
32				كما	as	514	206	5.284421
33				رحمه	(may Allah) have mercy on him	88	35	5.273397
34				عز	the Exalted in Mighty	363	130	5.122087
35				أبو	father of	59	21	5.11322
36				قل	you say (imperative)	89	31	5.082008
37				جل	the Majestic	424	145	5.055534
38				مالك	Malik	30	10	5.018583
39				لقد	verily	76	24	4.94058
40				يا	O (vocative)	156	48	4.903106
41				شيخ	Sheikh	20	6	4.86658
42				رَبِّكَ	your Lord	20	6	4.86658

43			حيث as	47	13	4.749396
44			أيها O (another form of vocative)	104	26	4.603545
45			علا the Most High	76	18	4.525543
46			سبحانه the Glorified	809	187	4.490444
47			أنه that He/he	348	80	4.48253
48			ابن son of	116	25	4.389421
49			إن indeed	108	23	4.37222
50			الآية the Qur'anic verse/ till the end of the Qur'anic verse	129	27	4.347206
51			إليك to you	26	5	4.225034
52			لهذا for this reason	48	9	4.188508
53			رضي (may Allah) be pleased with him	182	32	4.095751
54			النبي the Prophet	225	37	3.999218
55			سواه other than Him/him	37	6	3.979054
56			الإمام the Imam	62	10	3.971277
57			آمنوا (those) who believed	88	14	3.951469
58			الذين those	261	38	3.823567
59			رسول messenger	270	38	3.774657
60			عنه with him	221	31	3.769839
61			سلم (may Allah send) His peace (upon)	872	117	3.705726
62	فقال	then He/he said	يا O (vocative)	156	12	6.597003
63			له to him	387	9	4.871178
64			سبحانه the Glorified	809	9	3.807371
65			رسول messenger	270	5	4.542555
66			سلم (may Allah send) His peace (upon)	872	10	3.851186
67	قوله	His/his saying	أيها O (vocative)	104	14	6.025846
68			تعالى the Exalted	477	64	6.021085
69			يا O (vocative)	156	16	5.633528
70			آمنوا (those) who have faith	88	9	5.629424
71			جل the Majestic	424	33	5.235404
72			سبحانه the Glorified	809	57	5.091825
73			عز the Exalted in Mighty	363	24	5.000067
74			الذين those	261	14	4.69838
75			تَعْبُدُوا you worship	19	5	6.992931
76			معنى the meaning (of)	46	8	6.395369
77			منها from it/them	129	14	5.715058
78			ألا not to	61	6	5.573156
79			الآية till the end of the Qur'anic verse	129	9	5.077629
80			الآيات the Qur'anic verse	138	7	4.617761
81			ذلك that	990	31	3.921842
82			كما as	514	15	3.820197

Table A10 Clusters of the key term 'SAY' in Ibn Baz's corpus

	N	Eng. trans	Eng. trans	Freq.	Texts
2-word clusters	1	الله قال	(...) Allah said	17	3
	2	إذ يقول	because He/he said	5	3
	3	أن قال	(till) He/he said	11	3
	4	أن يقال	(it) could be said	13	3
	5	أن يقول	(till) He/he says	12	3
	6	أنه قال	that He/he said	74	3
	7	بقوله تعالى	in His saying the Exalted	6	3
	8	ثم قال	then He/he said	21	5
	9	حيث قال	because He/he said	11	3
	10	ذلك بقوله	that in His/his saying	6	3
	11	ذلك قوله	that His/his saying	13	3
	12	سلم قال	(may Allah send His blessings and) peace (upon him) said	33	4
	13	فقال سبحانه	and then the Glorified said	9	3
	14	فقال له	and he said to him	9	3
	15	في قوله	in His/his saying	34	4
	16	قال الإمام	the Imam said	10	3
	17	قال الحافظ	Alhafidh (a higher status of the scholars of Hadith) said	10	3
	18	قال الله	Allah said	75	5
	19	قال النبي	the Prophet said	27	3
	20	قال إن	He/he said: Indeed	11	3
	21	قال أبو	the father of (...) said	14	3
	22	قال أهل	the people of (...) said	6	3
	23	قال تعالى	the Exalted said	194	5
	24	قال جل	the Majestic (and the Most High) said	11	3
	25	قال سبحانه	the Glorified said	157	5
	26	قال صلى	(the Prophet/messenger may Allah) send His blessings (and peace upon him) said	20	3
	27	قال عز	the Exalted in Mighty (and the Majestic) said	113	5
	28	قال عليه	(the Prophet/messenger may Allah's blessings and peace be) upon him said	13	3
	29	قال في	He/he said in	30	3
	30	قال لا	He/he said: No	16	3
	31	قال له	he said to him	12	3
	32	قال من	He/he said: whosoever	43	4
	33	قال و	He/he said: And	20	3
	34	قول الله	the saying of Allah	9	4
	35	قوله تعالى	the saying of the Exalted	58	3
	36	قوله سبحانه	the saying of the Glorified	57	4
	37	قوله عز	the saying of the Exalted in Mighty (and the Most High)	24	3
	38	قوله و	His/his saying and	18	4
	39	كما قال	as He/he said	203	5
	40	لقول الله	because Allah has said	11	3
	41	لقول النبي	because the Prophet has said	7	3
	42	لهذا قال	because of that He/he said	9	3

	43	ما قاله	what He/he said	12	3
	44	ما يقول	what He/he says	5	3
	45	معنى قوله	the meaning of His/his saying	8	3
	46	من القول	including saying	6	3
	47	منها قوله	including His/his saying	14	3
	48	و قال	and He/he said	438	5
	49	و قالوا	and they said	14	3
	50	و قوله	and His/his saying	76	4
	51	و يقول	and He/he says	39	4
	52	و يقولون	they say	6	3
	53	يقول الله	Allah says	7	3
	54	يقول سبحانه	the Glorified says	27	4
	55	يقول في	He/he says in	8	3
	56	يقول و	He/he says: and	8	3
3-word clusters	57	و قال تعالى	and the Exalted said	123	4
	58	قال عز و	the Exalted in Mighty and ... Said	111	5
	59	قال تعالى و	the Exalted said and	92	4
	60	و قال سبحانه	and the Glorified said	82	4
	61	قال سبحانه و	the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	80	5
	62	سلم أنه قال	that (the Prophet may Allah send) His peace (upon him) said	55	3
	63	كما قال سبحانه	as the Glorified said	54	5
	64	كما قال تعالى	as the Exalted said	49	4
	65	كما قال عز	as the Exalted in Mighty said	41	4
	66	و سلم قال	(may Allah send His blessings) and peace (upon him) said	33	4
	67	كما قال الله	as Allah said	30	5
	68	قوله سبحانه و	His saying, the Glorified and	27	3
	69	قوله تعالى و	His saying, the Exalted and	24	3
	70	و قوله سبحانه	and His saying the Glorified	24	3
	71	أنه قال من	that He/he said: whosoever ...	23	3
	72	قوله عز و	His saying, the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic)	23	3
	73	قال الله تعالى	Allah, the Exalted, said	22	3
	74	قال الله سبحانه	Allah, the Glorified, said	22	5
	75	قال النبي صلى	the Prophet (may Allah send His) blessings (on him) said	22	3
	76	الآية و قال	till the end of the Qur'anic verse and He said	20	4
	77	قال صلى الله	he (may) Allah (send His) blessings (upon him) said	20	3
	78	و قال صلى	he (may Allah send His) blessings (upon him) said	17	3
	79	يقول سبحانه و	the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	17	4
	80	قال عليه الصلاة	he may the blessings (and peace of Allah be) upon him) said	13	3
	81	و قوله تعالى	and His saying, the Exalted	13	3
	82	و يقول سبحانه	and the Glorified says	13	4
	83	قال سبحانه في	the Glorified said in	12	3
	84	و قال عليه	and he, (may the blessings and peace of Allah be) upon him, said	12	3
	85	في قوله تعالى	in His saying, the Exalted,	11	3
	86	قال جل و	the Majestic and (the Most High) said	11	3
	87	و قوله عز	and His saying, the Exalted in Mighty,	10	3
	88	و جل قل	(Allah the Exalted in Mighty) and the Majestic said	9	3

4-word clusters	89	و لهذا قال	and for this reason He/he/they said	9	3
	90	الله و قال	Allah and said	8	3
	91	رسول الله قال	the messenger of Allah said	8	3
	92	قال تعالى يا	the Exalted said O (vocative)	8	3
	93	الآية و قوله	till the end of the Qur'anic verse and His saying	7	3
	94	ذلك و قال	that and He/he said	7	4
	95	لقول النبي صلى	because the Prophet (may Allah send) His blessings (and peace upon him) said	7	3
	96	و قال و	and He/he said and	6	3
	97	و كما قال	and as He/he said	6	3
	98	انه قال إن	that He/he said verily	5	3
	99	ثم قال سبحانه	then the Glorified said	5	3
	100	سلم كما قال	(may Allah send His (blessings and) peace (upon him) as He/he said	5	3
	101	قوله سبحانه يا	His saying (i.e. Qur'anic verses), the Glorified, O ya (vocative)	5	3
	102	قال عز و جل	the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic said	111	5
	103	و قال عز و	and the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic) said	62	4
	104	و قال تعالى و	and the Exalted said: And	58	4
	105	و سلم انه قال	that (the Prophet/messenger may Allah send His blessings) and peace (upon him) that he said	55	3
	106	و قال سبحانه و	and the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	47	4
	107	كما قال عز و	as the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic) said	40	4
	108	كما قال تعالى و	as the Exalted said: And	27	4
	109	قوله عز و جل	His saying, the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic	23	3
	110	كما قال سبحانه و	as the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	23	5
	111	قال النبي صلى الله	the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him, said	22	3
	112	قال تعالى و ما	the Exalted said: And whatsoever	22	4
	113	سلم انه قال من	that (the Prophet/messenger may Allah) send His peace (upon him) said: Whosoever	21	3
	114	قال صلى الله عليه	he (the Prophet), may Allah send His blessings (and peace upon him) said	20	3
	115	قال سبحانه و تعالى	the Glorified and the Exalted said	17	3
	116	و قال صلى الله	and (the Prophet), may Allah send His blessings (and peace upon him), said	17	3
	117	و قوله سبحانه و	and in His saying, the Glorified and (the Exalted)	17	3
	118	قال الله عز و	Allah the Exalted in Mighty and the Majestic, said	15	3
	119	قال عليه الصلاة و	he (the Prophet of Islam), may Allah's blessings and (peace) be upon him, said	13	3
	120	و قال عليه الصلاة	and he (the Prophet of Islam), may Allah's blessings (and peace) be upon him, said	12	3
	121	قال تعالى و لقد	the Exalted said: And verily	11	4
	122	قال جل و علا	the Majestic and the Most High said	11	3
	123	قال سبحانه و ما	the Glorified said: And whatsoever/whosoever	11	3
	124	كما قال الله عز	as Allah, the Exalted in Mighty (and the Majestic), said	9	3
	125	و قوله عز و	and His saying (i.e. Qur'anic verses), the Exalted in Mighty and (the Majestic),	9	3
	126	في قوله تعالى و	in His saying, the Exalted: And	8	3
	127	قال تعالى و من	the Exalted said: And whosoever	8	4
	128	كما قال سبحانه و	as the Glorified and (the Exalted) said	8	4
	129	لقول النبي صلى الله	because the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings (and peace	7	3

		upon him) said		
130	و يقول سبحانه و	and the Glorified (and the Exalted) says	7	3
131	قال سبحانه و لقد	the Glorified said: Indeed	6	3
132	الطاغوت و قال تعالى	(taghut), viz., idols and Jinni. And the Exalted said	5	3
133	سلم أنه قال إن	that (the Prophet (may Allah) send His peace upon him said: Indeed	5	3
134	قوله تعالى و من	in His saying, the Glorified: And whosoever	5	3
135	و سلم كما قال	(the Prophet/messenger may Allah) send His peace (upon him) as He/he said	5	3
136	و قال تعالى يا	and the Exalted said: O..	5	3
137	يا رسول الله قال	O messenger of Allah, he said	5	3
7-word clusters	138	النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم قال	the Prophet, may Allah send His peace and blessings upon him, said	23 4
	139	قال النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم	(said) the Prophet, may Allah send His peace and blessings upon him	22 3
	140	الله عليه و سلم أنه قال من	(may) Allah send His blessings and peace upon him said	21 3
	141	و قال صلى الله عليه و سلم	and (the Prophet), may Allah send His peace and blessings upon him, said	17 3
	142	لقول النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم	because of the saying of the Prophet, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him (i.e. Hadith)	7 3
	143	قال تعالى و ما أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ	The Exalted said: And We sent not before you (as Messengers) any but	5 3

APPENDIX B

Table B1 Keywords in Alhawali

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	F.	%	F. Baz	% Baz	Keyness	P
1	كما	as	5	583	0.2956	1		580.49	5E-18
2	كانت	(she/it) was/were	5	600	0.3043	49	0.0375	353.31	2E-17
3	الإنسان	the human	4	368	0.1866	19	0.0145	257.73	7E-17
4	التي	which	5	1230	0.6237	329	0.2518	250.18	8E-17
5	كان	(he/it) was	5	1113	0.5644	289	0.2212	237.6	9E-17
6	أوروبا	Europe	5	263	0.1334	4		233.32	1E-16
7	الحياة	life	5	394	0.1998	33	0.0253	229.16	1E-16
8	إن	indeed, if	5	750	0.3803	192	0.147	163.56	4E-16
9	الخليج	the Gulf	5	161	0.0816	1		153.4	5E-16
10	الغرب	the west	5	181	0.0918	6		142.03	6E-16
11	المنطقة	the region	3	135	0.0685	0		137.28	7E-16
12	هي	she/it	5	635	0.322	169	0.1294	129.97	9E-16
13	الأمريكية	the American/ (Unites States) of America	5	137	0.0695	1		129.31	9E-16
14	النظرية	the theory	3	120	0.0609	0		122.03	1E-15
15	الثورة	the revolution	4	115	0.0583	0		116.94	1E-15
16	التطور	the development	3	113	0.0573	0		114.91	2E-15
17	المسيح	Christ	3	151	0.0766	6		113.65	2E-15
18	أي	or	5	333	0.1689	61	0.0467	111.29	2E-15
19	أمريكا	America	4	137	0.0695	4		110.29	2E-15
20	العالم	the world	5	305	0.1547	52	0.0398	109.48	2E-15
21	البشرية	mankind	4	123	0.0624	2		108.25	2E-15
22	أن	indeed	5	3287	1.6668	1605	1.2285	105.16	2E-15
23	أيضاً	too	5	148	0.075	8		102.11	3E-15
24	الذي	which/that/ who	5	995	0.5046	365	0.2794	101.53	3E-15
25	لكن	but	5	315	0.1597	60	0.0459	101	3E-15
26	الفكر	the intellect/ the thinking	5	120	0.0609	3		99.336	3E-15
27	دول	governments/ countries	5	96	0.0487	0		97.616	3E-15
28	الدينية	the religious	4	104	0.0527	1		96.293	3E-15
29	الغربية	the western	4	110	0.0558	2		95.468	3E-15
30	المتحدة	the United/ United	3	93	0.0472	0		94.565	4E-15
31	الأوروبية	the European	3	92	0.0467	0		93.548	4E-15
32	تلك	that	5	226	0.1146	33	0.0253	92.961	4E-15
33	الإنسانية	The human	3	90	0.0456	0		91.514	4E-15
34	جديدة	new	4	98	0.0497	1		90.309	4E-15

35	القرن	century	3	134	0.0679	8		89.418	5E-15
36	الشيوعية	communism	3	124	0.0629	6		88.502	5E-15
37	الآن	now/ the present time	5	123	0.0624	6		87.58	5E-15
38	كلها	all	5	95	0.0482	1		87.32	5E-15
39	فكرة	idea	4	117	0.0593	5		86.433	6E-15
40	في	in	5	5531	2.8047	2982	2.2825	86.019	6E-15
41	مصر	Egypt	4	108	0.0548	4		82.665	7E-15
42	الواقع	occurring/ actuality	3	150	0.0761	14	0.0107	82.619	7E-15
43	العراق	Iraq	4	122	0.0619	7		82.528	7E-15
44	النظام	the system/ regime	3	88	0.0446	1		80.353	8E-15
45	يكن	be	5	149	0.0756	15	0.0115	78.774	9E-15
46	الولايات	the (United) States of America	3	77	0.039	0		78.293	9E-15
47	يمكن	may	5	154	0.0781	17	0.013	77.139	1E-14
48	إذ	suddenly/ as/ when	4	157	0.0796	19	0.0145	74.147	1E-14
49	بل	rather,/even/ however	5	458	0.2322	140	0.1072	72.498	1E-14
50	ظل	remain, endure, continue (masculine)	5	91	0.0461	3		71.478	2E-14
51	منذ	since	4	121	0.0614	10		70.768	2E-14
52	لاسيما	particularly	4	78	0.0396	1		70.423	2E-14
53	نفسه	itself/himself	5	180	0.0913	28	0.0214	70.209	2E-14
54	الطبيعي	the natural	3	83	0.0421	2		69.123	2E-14
55	الحرب	the war	5	112	0.0568	9		66.357	2E-14
56	رجال	men	4	123	0.0624	12		66.161	2E-14
57	الصراع	the conflict	5	65	0.033	0		66.09	2E-14
58	خلال	during, through	4	85	0.0431	3		65.779	2E-14
59	الدول	the governments,/ countries	5	115	0.0583	10		65.642	3E-14
60	نفسها	itself/herself	5	115	0.0583	10		65.642	3E-14
61	البشري	the human	4	64	0.0325	0		65.073	3E-14
62	بين	between	5	606	0.3073	220	0.1684	63.582	3E-14
63	الفكرة	the idea	4	71	0.036	1		63.492	3E-14
64	خاصة	specially	5	116	0.0588	11		63.354	3E-14
65	حين	when	5	123	0.0624	13		63.234	3E-14
66	لذلك	therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that	4	136	0.069	17	0.013	62.827	3E-14
67	الشرق	the East	4	99	0.0502	7		61.971	4E-14
68	الأمريكي	the American	3	69	0.035	1		61.515	4E-14
69	الوجود	presence	3	74	0.0375	2		60.424	4E-14

70	الكبرى	the greater	3	67	0.034	1		59.539	5E-14
71	عصر	era	3	83	0.0421	4		59.303	5E-14
72	أصبح	he/it became (masculine)	4	87	0.0441	5		58.814	5E-14
73	السياسة	politics	3	82	0.0416	4		58.381	6E-14
74	العقل	mind	3	116	0.0588	13		57.56	6E-14
75	الأولى	the first/ the early	5	132	0.0669	18	0.0138	57.263	6E-14
76	تماماً	exactly	4	56	0.0284	0		56.938	7E-14
77	الجديد	the new	3	64	0.0325	1		56.579	7E-14
78	يعد	consider./deem/ prepare	5	64	0.0325	1		56.579	7E-14
79	الأوروبي	European	3	55	0.0279	0		55.921	8E-14
80	أية	any	5	54	0.0274	0		54.904	9E-14
81	نظام	system./regime	3	82	0.0416	5		54.304	1E-13
82	الحقيقة	the truth./ fact	5	128	0.0649	18	0.0138	54.232	1E-13
83	المسياسية	the politics	4	67	0.034	2		53.698	1E-13
84	الغربي	the western	3	67	0.034	2		53.698	1E-13
85	أصبحت	she/it became (fem.)	5	72	0.0365	3		53.536	1E-13
86	كذلك	also, as well	5	133	0.0674	20	0.0153	53.385	1E-13
87	التاريخ	the history	5	107	0.0543	12		53.069	1E-13
88	أمام	facing, in front of	3	71	0.036	3		52.601	1E-13
89	الفرنسية	the French	4	51	0.0259	0		51.854	1E-13
90	الحال	the case	5	59	0.0299	1		51.656	1E-13
91	الوسطى	the mid/ middle	4	59	0.0299	1		51.656	1E-13
92	قائلاً	saying that	3	59	0.0299	1		51.656	1E-13
93	حركة	movement	4	58	0.0294	1		50.673	2E-13
94	مرحلة	a stage	4	49	0.0248	0		49.82	2E-13
95	الحركة	the movement	4	57	0.0289	1		49.691	2E-13
96	فحسب	only	3	57	0.0289	1		49.691	2E-13
97	قبل	before	5	177	0.0898	38	0.0291	49.338	2E-13
98	الاجتماعي	the social	3	56	0.0284	1		48.709	3E-13
99	إسرائيل	Israel	3	83	0.0421	7		48.077	3E-13
100	أكثر	more	5	185	0.0938	42	0.0321	47.962	3E-13
101	الأقل	(at) least/ the least	4	47	0.0238	0		47.786	3E-13
102	العسكرية	the military	3	47	0.0238	0		47.786	3E-13
103	المعاصر	modern	3	47	0.0238	0		47.786	3E-13
104	مع	in addition,/and	4	513	0.2601	195	0.1493	47.028	4E-13
105	العربي	the Arab,/Arabic	5	65	0.033	3		47.018	4E-13
106	واحدة	one	5	89	0.0451	9		46.927	4E-13

107	الحديثة	the modern	4	54	0.0274	1		46.748	4E-13
108	يبدو	seem	3	54	0.0274	1		46.748	4E-13
109	الماضي	the past	3	44	0.0223	0		44.736	6E-13
110	النفسية	the psychological inclination	3	44	0.0223	0		44.736	6E-13
111	اليهودي	the Jewish	4	44	0.0223	0		44.736	6E-13
112	الديني	the religious	4	57	0.0289	2		44.165	8E-13
113	الصليبية	pertaining to the Crusades	4	51	0.0259	1		43.81	8E-13
114	مثلاً	for example	5	51	0.0259	1		43.81	8E-13
115	الدين	the religion	5	554	0.2809	222	0.1699	42.785	1E-12
116	لها	for it/her	5	310	0.1572	101	0.0773	42.706	1E-12
117	البابا	the Pope	4	42	0.0213	0		42.702	1E-12
118	حرية	freedom	4	42	0.0213	0		42.702	1E-12
119	العالمية	world	5	55	0.0279	2		42.272	1E-12
120	مبدأ	principle	4	41	0.0208	0		41.686	2E-12
121	يستطيع	can, have the ability to	3	79	0.0401	8		41.62	2E-12
122	تاريخ	history	5	59	0.0299	3		41.484	2E-12
123	ليست	not	3	92	0.0467	12		41.237	2E-12
124	العصور	ages	3	48	0.0243	1		40.88	2E-12
125	السوفيتي	Soviet	3	40	0.0203	0		40.669	3E-12
126	المعاصرة	Modern,/contemporary	5	40	0.0203	0		40.669	3E-12
127	فرنسا	France	3	40	0.0203	0		40.669	3E-12
128	معظم	most	3	40	0.0203	0		40.669	3E-12
129	أنها	indeed she/it is	5	208	0.1055	57	0.0436	40.445	3E-12
130	الخاصة	the special	3	53	0.0269	2		40.384	3E-12
131	نتيجة	result	4	70	0.0355	6		40.232	3E-12
132	هذه	this	5	868	0.4402	395	0.3023	40.084	4E-12
133	الأحداث	the incidents	4	39	0.0198	0		39.652	4E-12
134	السياسي	the political/ the politician	3	39	0.0198	0		39.652	4E-12
135	ظالت	remain, endure,/continue (fem.)	3	39	0.0198	0		39.652	4E-12
136	يتحدث	speak(s) (about)	4	38	0.0193	0		38.635	8E-12
137	ظهرت	appeared	4	60	0.0304	4		38.439	9E-12
138	الدولة	the government/ country	3	112	0.0568	20	0.0153	38.393	9E-12
139	جهة	side/perspective	4	81	0.0411	10		37.734	2E-11
140	العملية	practical	3	37	0.0188	0		37.618	2E-11
141	موقف	stand point/ point of view	5	50	0.0254	2		37.562	2E-11
142	منطقة	region	3	49	0.0248	2		36.625	4E-11

143	الاتحاد	the union/ Union	3	36	0.0183	0		36.602	5E-11
144	المرحلة	the stage	5	36	0.0183	0		36.602	5E-11
145	عسكرية	military	3	36	0.0183	0		36.602	5E-11
146	عملية	operation/ process	3	36	0.0183	0		36.602	5E-11
147	وضع	put	5	65	0.033	6		35.999	1E-10
148	الجديدة	the new	3	48	0.0243	2		35.689	2E-10
149	العسكري	the military	3	35	0.0177	0		35.585	2E-10
150	مشكلة	problem	3	35	0.0177	0		35.585	2E-10
151	صورة	picture	3	60	0.0304	5		34.95	5E-10
152	الحكومة	the government	3	56	0.0284	4		34.906	5E-10
153	القوة	the power/the force	3	56	0.0284	4		34.906	5E-10
154	القديمة	the old	5	47	0.0238	2		34.754	8E-10
155	أثر	preferred	3	47	0.0238	2		34.754	8E-10
156	الباحثين	researchers (acc.)	4	34	0.0172	0		34.568	1E-09
157	ناحية	side	3	34	0.0172	0		34.568	1E-09
158	تعد	consider/ prepare/ promise	5	41	0.0208	1		34.074	2E-09
159	فقط	only	5	55	0.0279	4		34.028	3E-09
160	مهما	whatsoever	5	55	0.0279	4		34.028	3E-09
161	حد	extent	5	66	0.0335	7		33.855	3E-09
162	الوحيد	the only	3	46	0.0233	2		33.822	3E-09
163	حدث	happened	5	46	0.0233	2		33.822	3E-09
164	عندما	when	4	79	0.0401	11		33.724	3E-09
165	جزءاً	part	3	33	0.0167	0		33.551	4E-09
166	دينية	religious	5	33	0.0167	0		33.551	4E-09
167	لم	not, never	5	808	0.4097	377	0.2886	32.941	7E-09
168	يعيش	live(s)	4	32	0.0162	0		32.534	9E-09
169	هناك	there	5	141	0.0715	35	0.0268	32.18	1E-08
170	تحت	under	4	100	0.0507	19	0.0145	32.128	1E-08
171	تطور	developed (v.)/ development	3	31	0.0157	0		31.518	2E-08
172	شيئاً	thing	5	85	0.0431	14	0.0107	31.495	2E-08
173	تكن	is/are	5	63	0.0319	7		31.423	2E-08
174	العلاقات	the relationships	3	38	0.0193	1		31.174	2E-08
175	بأن	that/ indeed	5	216	0.1095	69	0.0528	31.096	2E-08
176	فقد	already	5	356	0.1805	138	0.1056	30.672	3E-08
177	النصرانية	Christianity	5	51	0.0259	4		30.543	3E-08
178	فكان	and (something/someone) was/were	4	51	0.0259	4		30.543	3E-08

179	الأزمة	the crises	4	30	0.0152	0		30.501	3E-08
180	المقدس	the holy	3	30	0.0152	0		30.501	3E-08
181	الوطنية	patriotism	3	30	0.0152	0		30.501	3E-08
182	المادية	materialistic/ materialism	3	42	0.0213	2		30.11	4E-08
183	التاريخي	the historical	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5E-08
184	الكنائس	the churches/ Churches	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5E-08
185	أنا	I	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5E-08
186	تركيا	Turkey	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5E-08
187	مجلس	council	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5E-08
188	تقول	(she/it) says	3	57	0.0289	6		29.368	6E-08
189	لدى	at/ upon	5	57	0.0289	6		29.368	6E-08
190	الفكري	intellectual	4	36	0.0183	1		29.247	6E-08
191	جانب	side	3	41	0.0208	2		29.188	6E-08
192	البحث	research	3	53	0.0269	5		29.021	7E-08
193	الحضارة	civilization	3	45	0.0228	3		28.828	8E-08
194	حسين	Hussein	3	45	0.0228	3		28.828	8E-08
195	الوقت	time	4	81	0.0411	14	0.0107	28.674	8E-08
196	الإسلامي	Islamic	4	178	0.0903	54	0.0413	28.586	9E-08
197	يرى	consider	5	75	0.038	12		28.529	9E-08
198	تقريباً	almost	5	28	0.0142	0		28.467	9E-08
199	جزء	part	3	28	0.0142	0		28.467	9E-08

Table B2 Keywords that indicate semantic foci in Alhawali's corpus

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	Freq.	%	F. Baz	% Baz	Keyness	P
1	أوروبا	Europe	5	263	0.1334	4		233.32	1.00E-16
2	الخليج	the Gulf	5	161	0.0816	1		153.4	5.00E-16
3	الغرب	the West	5	181	0.0918	6		142.03	6.00E-16
4	النظرية	the theory	3	120	0.0609	0		122.03	1.00E-15
5	الثورة	the revolution	4	115	0.0583	0		116.94	1.00E-15
6	الفكر	the intellect/ the thinking	5	120	0.0609	3		99.336	3.00E-15
7	الدينية	the religious (def. adj. fem. pl)	4	104	0.0527	1		96.293	3.00E-15
8	الحرب	the war	5	112	0.0568	9		66.357	2.00E-14
9	الصراع	the conflict	5	65	0.033	0		66.09	2.00E-14
10	عصر	era	3	83	0.0421	4		59.303	5.00E-14
11	السياسة	politics	3	82	0.0416	4		58.381	6.00E-14
12	العقل	mind	3	116	0.0588	13		57.56	6.00E-14
13	الأوروبي	European (sing. adj. masc.)	3	55	0.0279	0		55.921	8.00E-14
14	السياسية	the political (adj. pl.)	4	67	0.034	2		53.698	1.00E-13
15	الغربي	the western (pl. adj. masc.)	3	67	0.034	2		53.698	1.00E-13
16	التاريخ	the history (def.)	5	107	0.0543	12		53.069	1.00E-13
17	الوسطى	the middle (ages)	4	59	0.0299	1		51.656	1.00E-13
18	حركة	movement	4	58	0.0294	1		50.673	2.00E-13
19	الحركة	the movement	4	57	0.0289	1		49.691	2.00E-13
20	الاجتماعي	the social (contract)	3	56	0.0284	1		48.709	3.00E-13
21	إسرائيل	Israel	3	83	0.0421	7		48.077	3.00E-13
22	العسكرية	the military (def. adj. fem.)	3	47	0.0238	0		47.786	3.00E-13
23	المعاصر	contemporary	3	47	0.0238	0		47.786	3.00E-13
24	الحديثة	the modern	4	54	0.0274	1		46.748	4.00E-13
25	الماضي	the past	3	44	0.0223	0		44.736	6.00E-13
26	الديني	the religious (def. adj. masc. pl.)	4	57	0.0289	2		44.165	8.00E-13
27	الصليبية	pertaining to the Crusades	4	51	0.0259	1		43.81	8.00E-13
28	الدين	the religion	5	554	0.2809	222	0.1699	42.785	1.00E-12
29	العالمية	the (...) World War/ the international	5	55	0.0279	2		42.272	1.00E-12
30	تاريخ	history (indef.)	5	59	0.0299	3		41.484	2.00E-12
31	العصور	ages	3	48	0.0243	1		40.88	2.00E-12
32	المعاصرة	the modern	5	40	0.0203	0		40.669	3.00E-12
33	السياسي	the political (masc. adj.) the politician	3	39	0.0198	0		39.652	4.00E-12
34	منطقة	region	3	49	0.0248	2		36.625	4.00E-11
35	عسكرية	military (indef. adj. fem.)	3	36	0.0183	0		36.602	5.00E-11
36	العسكري	the military (def. adj. masc.)	3	35	0.0177	0		35.585	2.00E-10
37	دينية	religious (indef. adj. fem. pl.)	5	33	0.0167	0		33.551	4.00E-09
38	النصرانية	Christianity	5	51	0.0259	4		30.543	3.00E-08
39	الوطنية	patriotism	3	30	0.0152	0		30.501	3.00E-08
40	المادية	materialistic/materialism	3	42	0.0213	2		30.11	4.00E-08
41	التاريخي	the historical	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5.00E-08
42	الفكري	intellectual	4	36	0.0183	1		29.247	6.00E-08
43	الحضارة	civilization	3	45	0.0228	3		28.828	8.00E-08

Table B3 Keywords that indicate social actors in Alhawali's corpus

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	F.	%	F. Baz	% Baz	Keyness	P
1	الإنسان	the human	4	368	0.1866	19	0.014543	257.73474	7.14E-17
2	أوروبا	Europe	5	263	0.13336	4		233.32214	1.01E-16
3	الخليج	the Gulf	5	161	0.08164	1		153.40109	4.70E-16
4	الغرب	the west	5	181	0.09178	6		142.03424	6.35E-16
5	الأمريكية	the American (fem.)/(Unites States) of America	5	137	0.06947	1		129.30927	9.24E-16
6	المسيح	Christ	3	151	0.07657	6		113.65211	1.58E-15
7	أمريكا	America	4	137	0.06947	4		110.28928	1.80E-15
8	العالم	the world	5	305	0.15466	52	0.0398019	109.48082	1.86E-15
9	البشرية	mankind	4	123	0.06237	2		108.24721	1.96E-15
10	دول	governments/ countries	5	96	0.04868	0		97.615776	3.11E-15
11	الغربية	the western	4	110	0.05577	2		95.467979	3.45E-15
12	المتحدة	the United/ United	3	93	0.04715	0		94.56472	3.60E-15
13	الأوروبية	the European	3	92	0.04665	0		93.547707	3.79E-15
14	الشيوعية	communism/ communist	3	124	0.06287	6		88.502434	4.94E-15
15	مصر	Egypt	4	108	0.05476	4		82.665268	6.94E-15
16	العراق	Iraq	4	122	0.06186	7		82.527977	7.00E-15
17	النظام	the regime	3	88	0.04462	1		80.35331	8.03E-15
18	الولايات	the (United) States of America/states	3	77	0.03904	0		78.29303	9.21E-15
19	رجال	men	4	123	0.06237	12		66.161026	2.41E-14
20	الدول	the governments/ the countries	5	115	0.05831	10		65.642349	2.53E-14
21	الأمريكي	the American	3	69	0.03498	1		61.514648	3.84E-14
22	الأوروبي	European	3	55	0.02788	0		55.921146	7.60E-14
23	الغربي	the western	3	67	0.03397	2		53.697906	1.05E-13
24	إسرائيل	Israel	3	83	0.04208	7		48.0769	2.87E-13
25	العربي	Arab/Arab (world)/Arabic/Arabian (Gulf)	5	65	0.03296	3		47.018147	3.63E-13
26	اليهودي	the Jewish	4	44	0.02231	0		44.735939	6.47E-13
27	البابا	the Pope	4	42	0.02129	0		42.702316	1.21E-12
28	السوفيتي	Soviet	3	40	0.02028	0		40.668713	2.70E-12
29	فرنسا	France	3	40	0.02028	0		40.668713	2.70E-12
30	الدولة	the government/the country	3	112	0.05679	20	0.0153084	38.392731	9.44E-12
31	الاتحاد	the union/ Union	3	36	0.01825	0		36.601551	4.54E-11
32	الباحثين	researchers (acc.)	4	34	0.01724	0		34.567993	1.19E-09
33	الكنائس	the churches/ Churches	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484173	5.35E-08
34	أنا	I	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484173	5.35E-08
35	تركيا	Turkey	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484173	5.35E-08
36	حسين	Hussein	3	45	0.02281	3		28.828354	7.62E-08
37	الإسلامي	Islamic/Muslim (World)	4	178	0.09026	54	0.0413328	28.586121	8.67E-08

Table B4 Keywords that serve as argumentation indicators in Alhawali's corpus

N	Keyword	Eng. trans.	Texts	F.	%	F. Baz	% Baz	Keyness	P
1	إن	indeed, if	5	750	0.3803	192	0.147	163.56	4.00E-16
2	لكن	but	5	315	0.1597	60	0.0459	101	3.00E-15
3	يمكن	may	5	154	0.0781	17	0.013	77.139	1.00E-14
4	بل	rather,/even/ however	5	458	0.2322	140	0.1072	72.498	1.00E-14
5	لذلك	therefore/because of that/based on that/(to/for) that	4	136	0.069	17	0.013	62.827	3.00E-14
6	نتيجة	result	4	70	0.0355	6		40.232	3.00E-12
7	موقف	stand point/ point of view	5	50	0.0254	2		37.562	2.00E-11
8	الباحثين	researchers (acc.)	4	34	0.0172	0		34.568	1.00E-09
9	أنا	I	3	29	0.0147	0		29.484	5.00E-08
10	تقول	(she/it) says	3	57	0.0289	6		29.368	6.00E-08

Table B5 Collocates of the key term 'ALLAH' in Alhawali's corpus

N	keyword	Eng. trans.	F.	Collocates	Eng. trans.	F.	Texts	Joint	MI
1	الله	Allah	994	بإذن	with His/his permission	8	3	8	7.623642445
2				رحمه	(may Allah have) mercy (upon him)	25	4	25	7.623642445
3				صلى	(may Allah send His) blessings (upon him)	90	5	90	7.623642445
4				رضي	may Allah be) pleased (with him)	18	3	14	7.261072159
5				النبي	the Prophet	21	3	15	7.138215542
6				ابن	son of	43	3	23	6.720939636
7				رحمة	mercy	12	3	6	6.623642445
8				عبد	the servant of/ the first of a compound the name 'Abdu Allah'/ worshipped (v.)	53	3	16	5.895721912
9				رسوله	His messenger	34	5	10	5.858107567
10				ذكر	(he) mentioned	35	3	9	5.664284229
11				محمد	Mohammad	78	3	17	5.425703049
12				كتاب	Book/book	82	5	15	5.172980785
13				سنة	(the) way (of Allah)/ year/ the Sunnah of the Prophet	160	5	25	4.945570469
14				قال	He/he said	195	3	25	4.660168171
15				أمر	He/he ordered	51	3	6	4.536179543
16				إلا	except	514	4	52	4.318457603
17				عند	near/as	137	4	13	4.2260499
18				تعالى	the Exalted	151	4	14	4.192592621
19	له		74	الحمد	praise	17	4	9	10.45375347
20	بأنه		41	لا	no	1787	3	6	4.004830837

Table B6 Collocates of the key term 'CENTURY' in Alhawali's corpus

N	key term	Eng. trans	F.	collocates	Eng. trans	F.	Texts	Joint	MI
1	القرن	the century	134	مطلع	(the) beginning of	16	3	9	9.684579849
2				الماضي	last	44	2	17	9.142686844
3				هذا	this	1058	2	13	4.167971134
4				الميلادي	the Gregorian	7	2	6	10.29226303
5				عشر	tenth	88	2	62	10.00941944
6				التاسع	ninth	37	2	30	10.2120924
7				الثامن	eighth	23	2	20	10.31302166
8				السابع	seventh	17	2	10	9.749120712
9				العشرين	twentieth	20	2	19	10.44065475
10				قد	indeed	690	1	8	4.084202766
11				الرابع	fourth	22	1	8	9.055223465
12	القرون	centuries	57	الوسطى	the middle	59	3	37	11.07466507
13				الأولى	first	132	2	7	7.510815144
14				كانت	(they/it) were	600	2	5	4.84096384
15				طيلة	all	13	1	7	10.85476971
16				على	on	2563	1	12	4.009199142
17				كان	(it) was	1113	1	7	4.434971333

Appendix C

Transliteration¹⁰⁴

Arabic letter shape	Transliteration Symbol
ء	'
ب	b
ت	t
ث	ṭ
ج	ǧ
ح	ḥ
خ	ḫ
د	d
ذ	ḏ
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	š
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	'
غ	ǧ
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
ه	h
و	w
ي	y

Short vowels:¹⁰⁵

fathah	◌َ	a
kasrah	◌ِ	i
ḍammah	◌ُ	o

Long vowels:

ā
ī
ū

¹⁰⁴ I follow the DIN 31635 standard for the transliteration of the Arabic alphabet (available on the following link: <http://transliteration.eki.ee>).

¹⁰⁵ The round characters resemble the Arabic letters that take the diacritics around it to indicate short vowels.

Appendix D

Concordance D1 Expanded Concordance lines of Argumentation threads in Ibn Baz

N	Expanded Concordance lines (argumentation threads 1-4)
1	<p>من العقائد المضادة للحق ما يعتقد بعض المتصوفة : من أن بعض من يسمونهم بالأولياء يشاركون الله في التدبير ، ويتصرفون في شئون العالم ، و يسمونهم بالأقطاب و الأوتاد و الأغوات ، و غير ذلك من الأسماء التي اخترعوها لألهتهم ، و هذا من أقبح الشرك في الربوبية ، و هو شرك جاهلية العرب؛ لأن كفار العرب لم يشركوا في الربوبية و إنما أشركوا في العبادة ، و كان شركهم في حال الرخاء ، أما في حال الشدة فيخلصون لله العبادة ، كما قال الله سبحانه : (فَإِذَا رَكِبُوا فِي الْفُلْكَ دَعَوْا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ فَلَمَّا نَجَّاهُمْ إِلَى الْبَرِّ إِذَا هُمْ يُشْرِكُونَ). أما الربوبية فكانوا معترفين بها لله وحده ، كما قال سبحانه : (وَلَمَّا سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَهُمْ لَيَقُولُنَّ اللَّهُ) ، و قال تعالى : (قُلْ مَنْ يَرْزُقُكُمْ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ وَ الْأَرْضِ أَمَّنْ يَمْلِكُ السَّمْعَ وَ الْأَبْصَارَ وَ مَنْ يُخْرِجُ الْحَيَّ مِنَ الْمَيِّتِ وَ يُخْرِجُ الْمَيِّتَ مِنَ الْحَيِّ وَ مِنْ يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ فَسَيَقُولُونَ اللَّهُ فَقُلْ أَفَلَا تَتَّقُونَ) و الآيات في هذا المعنى كثيرة. أما المشركون المتأخرون فزادوا على الأولين من جهتين ، إحداها : شرك بعضهم في الربوبية ، و الثانية : شركهم في الرخاء و الشدة ، كما يعلم ذلك من خاطهم و سبر أحوالهم ، و رأى ما يفعلون عند قبر الحسين و البدوي و غيرهما في مصر ، و عند قبر العبدروس في عدن ، و الهادي في اليمن و ابن عربي في الشام ، [...] و غيرها من القبور المشهورة التي غلت فيها العامة و صرفوا لها الكثير من حق الله عز و جل [...]</p> <p>Some other beliefs that oppose the true guidance of Allah are that of some Sufis: [Some Sufis] belief that the so called 'Aulliya' (friends of God) share Allah in disposing the affair of all things in the world. They name them 'the poles', the pillars', 'the aid providers' (ranks of Sufi saints) and other names they invented for their gods, which is more repugnant form of polytheism (that opposes the Unity of Lordship). It is even more wicked than the polytheistic beliefs of the ignorant Arabs in the pre-Islamic era. The case is so, because those Arab infidels (in the pre-Islamic period) did not practice polytheism that opposes the Unity of Lordship, but practiced the form of polytheism that opposes the Unity of worship. In addition, they practiced polytheism during times of comfort, but during times of hardships they sincerely worship Allah making their faith pure for Him Alone, as Allah, the Glorified, said: {And when they embark on a ship, they invoke Allah, making their Faith pure for Him only: but when He brings them safely to land, behold, they give a share of their worship to others}. Also, they do not contradict the Unity of Lordship as they confirm that Allah is their Lord, as the Glorified said:{ And if you ask them who created them, they will surely say: "Allah"}, and the Exalted said: {Say (O Muhammad): "Who provides for you from the sky and the earth? Or who owns hearing and sight? And who brings out the living from the dead and brings out the dead from the living? And who disposes the affairs?" They will say: "Allah." Say: "Will you not then be afraid of Allah's punishment (for setting up rivals in worship with Allah)?"}. And there are plenty of Qur'anic verses that indicate such meanings. However, modern-day polytheists added two aspects to the old form of polytheism: they associate others with Allah in His Lordship and commit polytheism in times of both comfort and hardship. This is known about them (modern-day polytheists) to those who live with them and explored their style of worship and saw what they did near the grave of 'Alhussein', and Albadawi and other graves of Sufi saints in Egypt, Alaidarouse in Aden, Alhadi in Yemen, Ibn Arabi in Cham (Damascus), [...] and some other famous graves that common people exceeded the limits and perform rituals of worship that are His right (i.e. these rituals are supposed to be conducted to Allah Alone) [...]</p>
2	<p>و العبادة : هي طاعته سبحانه و طاعة رسوله محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم ، بفعل ما أمر الله به و رسوله ، و ترك ما نهى الله عنه و رسوله و عن إيمان بالله و رسوله ، و إخلاص لله في العمل ، مع غاية الحب لله . و كمال الدل له وحده كما قال تعالى : { وَ قَضَىٰ رَبُّكَ أَلَّا تَعْبُدُوا إِلَّا إِلَٰهًا } أي أمر و أوصى بأن يعبد وحده وقال تعالى : {الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ * الرَّحْمَنُ الرَّحِيمُ * مَالِكُ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ * إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَ إِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ} أبان سبحانه بهذه الآيات أنه هو المستحق لأن يعبد وحده ، و يستعان به وحده ، و قال عز و جل : {فَاعْبُدِ اللَّهَ مُخْلِصًا لَهُ الدِّينَ * أَلَا لِلَّهِ الدِّينُ الْخَالِصُ} وقال تعالى : {فَادْعُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ وَ لَوْ كَرِهَ الْكَافِرُونَ} وقال تعالى : { وَ أَنَّ الْمُسَاجِدَ لِلَّهِ فَلَا تَدْعُوا مَعَ اللَّهِ أَحَدًا } و الآيات في هذا المعنى كثيرة ، و كلها تدل على : وجوب أفراد الله بالعبادة ، و معلوم أن الدعاء بأنواعه من العبادة ، فلا يجوز لأحد من الناس أن يدعو إلا ربه ، و لا يستعين و لا يستغيث إلا به ، عملاً بهذه الآيات الكريمة ، و ما جاء في معناها و هذا فيما عدا الأمور العادية ، و الأسباب الحسية ، التي يقدر عليها المخلوق الحي الحاضر ، فإن تلك ليست من العبادة ، بل يجوز بالنص (القرآن و السنة) و الإجماع (علماء السلف) أن يستعين الإنسان بالإنسان الحي القادر ، في الأمور العادية التي يقدر عليها ، [...]</p>

And the **worship is obeying, Him the Glorified, and obeying His messenger Muhammad**, may Allah send His blessings and peace upon him. It is doing what Allah and His messenger ordered us to do and refrain from committing what Allah and His messenger forbid holding faith in Allah and His messenger. It is the sincere worship of Allah making faith pure to Him Alone. Worship is also the ultimate devotion of love to Allah and the complete submissiveness to Him Alone **as the Exalted**: {And your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him} which means that He ordered and enjoined on us to worship Him Alone, **and the Exalted said**: {So worship Allah (Alone) by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only. Surely the religion (i.e. the worship and the obedience) is for Allah only}, **and the Exalted said**: {So, call you (O Muhammad and the believers) upon (or invoke) Allah making (your) worship pure for Him (Alone) (by worshipping none but Him and by doing religious deeds sincerely for Allah's sake only and not to show off and not to set up rivals with Him in worship), however much the disbelievers (in the Oneness of Allah) may hate (it)}, **and the Exalted said**: {And the mosques are for Allah (Alone): so invoke not anyone along with Allah}, and the Qur'anic verses about this issue are many that indicate the obligation of worshipping Allah Alone. And **it is known that all types of supplications are part of worship**, thus, according to these Qur'anic verses, **it is impermissible for all people to supplicate to and neither seek nor beseech the help from other than Allah** in order to fulfil the obligation indicated by the previously mentioned Qur'anic verses and other verses that bear the same meanings. However, it is not considered as a form of worship if someone takes proper means to seek the help of living human beings who are present in normal issues they can do. On the contrary it is permissible as indicated by both **sacred texts (Qur'an and Prophetic traditions) and the consensus of the (Salafi) religious leaders** [...]

الوجه الرابع : من الوجوه الدالة على بطلان الدعوة إلى القومية العربية أن يقال : إن الدعوة إليها والتكتل حول رايها يفضي بالمجتمع ولا بد إلى رفض حكم القرآن؛ لأن القوميين غير المسلمين لن يرضوا تحكيم القرآن ، فيوجب ذلك لزعماء القومية أن يتخذوا أحكاما وضعية تخالف حكم القرآن ، حتى يستوي مجتمع القومية في تلك الأحكام ، وقد صرح الكثير منهم بذلك كما سلف ، وهذا هو الفساد العظيم ، والكفر المستبين والردة السافرة ، كما قال تعالى : (فلا وربك لا يؤمنون حتى يحكموك فيما شجر بينهم ثم لا يجدوا في أنفسهم حرجا مما قضيت ويسلموا تسليما) وقال تعالى : (أفحكم الجاهلية يبغون ومن أحسن من الله حكما لقوم يوقنون) وقال تعالى : (ومن لم يحكم بما أنزل الله فأولئك هم الكافرون) وقال تعالى : (ومن لم يحكم بما أنزل الله فأولئك هم الفاسقون) .

The fourth viewpoint: One of the viewpoints that also indicate the rejection of the nationalists' call is **that it could be said that calling to it (Arab nationalism) and gathering people under its banner will definitely lead [Muslim] society to reject arbitration to Qur'an (Sharia laws), because the [Arab] nationalists who are not Muslims will not be satisfied with the Sharia laws**. Hence, [pan Arab] nationalism leaders will take man-made laws that contradict Sharia in order to make all people in their community equal. **Verily a lot of them [leaders of Arab national parties] declared that they will rule according to man-made laws as indicated earlier**. Doing so is a tremendous corruption, obvious infidelity and blatant apostasy, **as the Exalted said**: {But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them, and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) with full submission} **and the Exalted said**: {Do they then seek the judgement of (the days of) Ignorance? And who is better in judgement than Allah for a people who have firm Faith} **and the Exalted said**: {And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, such are the Kafirun (i.e. disbelievers - of a lesser degree as they do not act on Allah's Laws)} **and the Exalted said**: {And whosoever does not judge by that which Allah has revealed, such are the Zalimun (polytheists and wrong-doers - of a lesser degree)} **and the Exalted said**: { And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed (then) such (people) are the Fasiqun [the rebellious i.e. disobedient (of a lesser degree)] to Allah}.

و هكذا الإيمان بالكتب يجب الإيمان إجمالا بأن الله سبحانه أنزل كتباً على أنبيائه و رسله ، لبيان حقه و الدعوة إليه ، كما قال تعالى : (لقد أرسلنا رسلنا بالنبيات و أنزلنا معهم الكتاب و الميزان لنقوم الناس بالقسط) الآية ، وقال تعالى : (كان الناس أمة واحدة فبعث الله النبيين مبشرين و منذرين و أنزل معهم الكتاب بالحق ليحكم بين الناس فيما اختلفوا فيه) الآية . و نؤمن على سبيل التفصيل بما سمى الله منها كالنوراة و الإنجيل و الزبور و القرآن [...]

and in the same manner is the **belief in Scriptures. It is obligatory (on Muslims) to generally believe that Allah, the Glorified, sent down Books to His prophets and messengers** to state His rights (of true worship) and to call people to them, **as the exalted said** { Indeed We have sent Our Messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance (justice) that mankind may keep up justice... till the end of the Qur'anic verse, **and the Exalted said:** {Mankind were one community and Allah sent Prophets with glad tidings and warnings, and with them He sent down the Scripture in truth to judge between people in matters wherein they differed till the end of the Qur'anic verse. **We should specifically believe in those Books that Allah named (in the Qur'an) such Torah, Gospel, Psalms (the Holy Book of Dawud (David)) and the Qur'an**

Concordance D2 Expanded Concordance lines of Argumentation threads in Alhawali

	N	Expanded Concordance lines (argumentation threads 1-3)
Argumentation thread 1	1	<p>و لكن المرأة الغربية المنكوبة إذ تحاول الرجوع إلى البيت و وظيفة الأمومة لا تستطيع، لأن المشكلة اتسع نطاقها إلى درجة تتعذر معها العودة الحقيقية، و لو حصل شيء من ذلك فإن المجتمع الذي تعود الانحلال و الاختلاط يستنكره و ياباه، بل أصبح الزواج رغم هشاشته مصدر إزعاج للقائمين على تلك المجتمعات فقد طلعت الصحافة الغربية يوماً بخبز يقول: "انزعجت السلطات التعليمية في اسكتلندا بسبب موجة الزواج التي تعصف بالمدرسات، فقد تبين أنه من خلال عام (١٩٦٠م) عينت ١٥٦٣ مدرسة في اسكتلندا، و في نهاية العام الدراسي تركت ألف منهن الوظيفة للزواج، و قالت السلطات إن الزواج يهدد النظام المدرسي".</p> <p>But the afflicted western woman, who tries to settle down in her home and revert to being a mother, is unable to do so. The case is so, because the problem has reached the limits that make it impossible to return to (her real role in life, i.e. being a mother). If something like that (going back to settle in a house and perform her real role as a mother) happens, the society that has accustomed to and practiced moral debasement and the mixing between men and women, would refuse it. Additionally, marriage, though not based on solid grounds, became <u>a cause of discomfort to people in authority in those (western) societies</u>. Western newspapers, in one day, published a piece of news that says: 'the Scottish educational authorities are annoyed because of the wave of marriages that blow away female teachers (from teaching). It has been known that during the year 1960 there were 1563 female teachers appointed in schools, and 1000 of them left their jobs to get married by the end of the Academic year. The authorities said that marriage threatens the school system'.</p>
	2	<p>و حيال ذلك [ظلم المرأة الغربية]: ماذا في وسع المرأة أن تفعل؟ بأي شيء تواجه المجتمع النكد الذي يلهب ظهرها بالسياط، و يقطع عليها طريق العودة إلى فطرتها، ليس هناك إلا أحد سبيلين: إما الانتقام من هذا المجتمع الظالم بترويجه و تعكير صفوه، كما جاء في التقرير الذي نشرته الصحف من أنه بلغت عدد سرقات المتاجر الكبيرة في إنجلترا خلال عام (١٩٦٠م) نحو (٣٢١٩٤) سرقة، [...]، و الغريب أن (٦٠%) من هذه السرقات ارتكبتها نساء جاوزن سن البلوغ، و (٣٠%) ارتكبتها ذكور أقل من السابعة عشرة، و تقول الإحصائيات: إن كل السارقات من النساء لم يكن في حاجة للمال، نعم إنها ليست الحاجة للمال، و لكنها الرغبة في الانتقام و تفريغ السخط . و أما الانتقام من نفسها بالانتحار كما فعلت الممثلة الشهيرة مارلين مونرو، التي كتبت قبيل انتحارها نصيحة لبنات جنسها تقول فيها: "احذري المجد... احذري من كل من يخدعك بالأضواء...إني أتعس امرأة على هذه الأرض... لم أستطع أن أكون أما... إني امرأة أفضل البيت... الحياة العائلية الشريفة على كل شيء... إن سعادة المرأة الحقيقية في الحياة العائلية الشريفة الطاهرة، بل إن هذه الحياة العائلية لها رمز سعادة المرأة بل الإنسانية، و تقول في النهاية: لقد ظلمني كل الناس...، و أن العمل في السينما يجعل من المرأة سلعة رخيصة تافهة مهما نالت من المجد و الشهرة الزائفة".</p>

And to reject that [western woman being repressed]: what could a woman do? How could she face such unjust society that lashes her back fiercely [a metaphor meaning that society is oppressing her] and prevents her from going back to her original nature [marriage and fostering children]. There is no means to [face such society] but to do either of the following: To take revenge against this unjust society by terrorizing it and causing disturbances as written in **a report published in newspapers** that shoplifting from grand stores during 1960 reached around 32194 cases, [...]. It is so strange that 60% of shoplifting was committed by adult women whereas 30% of such crimes were committed by males under the age of 17. The statistics **says**: All female shoplifters weren't in need of money, but they sought revenge against society. Or they seek to inflict punishment on themselves by committing suicide as the famous actress Marilyn Monroe did. She wrote a piece of advice to her fellow women before committing suicide. She **says**: beware of glory... beware all those who try to pull your leg by the glamour of fame... I am the most miserable women on earth... I could not be a mother... I am a woman that prefers staying in my home... and the honourable family life to everything else. Truly, woman's real happiness is in the purified and honourable family life. Indeed, such family life is not only the symbol of woman's happiness but indeed it is the symbol of happiness to all humanity. She finally **says**: 'All people dealt with me unjustly..., and working in movie industry makes the woman a cheap and worthless commodity despite her glory and unreal fame'.

و ليس غريباً أن تؤكد الإحصائيات العالمية أن نسبة محاولات الانتحار عند النساء أكثر منها عند الرجال، **يقول** تقرير كتبه أحد الأطباء الاجتماعيين في فيينا: و قد لوحظ أن النساء أكثر محاولة من الرجال، ففي عام (١٩٤٨م) كان عدد المحاولات في النساء (٣٨١) و هذا يوافق (٥٨,٦١%) من المجموع، و في عام (١٩٥٦م) كان العدد (٥٩٠) أي بنسبه (٥٦,٧٣%)، و في عام (١٩٥٩) كانت النسبة (٥٥,٩٢%)، كما لوحظ أن نسبة المحاولات في الفتيان و الفتيات الذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين (١٤) عاماً و (٢٠) عاماً ترتفع باستمرار، فعند الفتيان كانت النسبة في عام (١٩٤٨م) - (٦,٥%)، و في عام (١٩٥٦م) (٦,٥٣%)، و في عام (١٩٥٩م) (٦,٨١%)، و أما عند الفتيات فالتصاعد مخيف، ففي عام (١٩٤٨م) حاولت (٥٠) فتاة الانتحار، و هذا يشكل نسبة (٧,٦٩%) من مجموع محاولات الانتحار في ذلك العام، و في عام (١٩٥٦م) حاولت (٨٩) فتاة الانتحار، و هذا يشكل نسبة (٨,٥٥%) و في عام (١٩٥٩م) حاولت (١٥٠) فتاة الانتحار، و هذا يعني نسبة (١٤,٢٠%) و هذا يعني أن كل تسعة أيام توجد ست محاولات انتحار، أربع منها من جانب الفتيات، و اثنتان من جانب الفتيان.

It is not very unfamiliar that international statistics confirms that attempts to commit suicide increased among women as compared to men. A report written by one of the 'social' physicians in Vienna **says**: and it has been noticed that women attempt to commit suicide more than men. In 1948 there were 381 suicidal attempts committed by women which constitute 55.61% of the total attempts. In 1956 the number increased to 590 attempts that mean 56.73% and in 1959 the percentage was 55.92%. It is also noticed that the percentage of suicidal attempts is increasingly growing among young males and females whose ages range from 14 to 20. The percentage of the cases of committing suicide increased among young males as it was 6.5% in 1956 and became 6.81% in 1959. However the rates of committing suicide among young females were increasing terribly. In 1948, 89 young females tried to end their lives which constitute 8.55% of the total number of suicidal attempts and in 1959 another 150 young females tried to commit suicide which means 14.20% of the total suicidal attempts. Thus we can conclude that every 9 days there were 6 attempts to commit suicide where 4 of these attempts are made by young girls whereas two are made by young boys.

[...] فإن التصور الإسلامي يقرر و يؤكد حقيقة عظيمة و قاعدة جليبة تضمنها **قوله** تعالى: ((الَّا تَرَوْا وَازْرَءَ وَزَرَ آخَرَى * و أَن لَّيْسَ لِلْإِنسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَى)) [النجم: ٣٨-٣٩] فلا يؤاخذ الله تعالى أحداً بذنب غيره مهما كانت الصلة بينهما [...]. إنه - حسب قاعدة العدل الرباني - لا يجوز أن يؤاخذ أحد غير آدم بخطيئته، حتى و لو كان ابن الشيطان الذي أغواه بالخطيئة -فضلاً عن أن يكون ابن الله- كما **تقول** الكنيسة تعالى الله عن ذلك علواً كبيراً أو أحداً من بني آدم. و بذلك خلا التصور الإسلامي من الأفكار و النظريات التي ابتدعتها الكنيسة باعتبارها من مستلزمات الخطيئة، [...]. و كان علماء المسلمين **أسبق** من فلاسفة عصر التنوير و اتباع مدرسة النقد التاريخي في هذا المضمار، **يقول** أحدهم: (... فنسبوا الإله الحق - سبحانه - إلى ما يأنف أسقط الناس و أقلمه أن يفعله بمملوكه و عبده [...]. و نسبوه إلى أقبح الظلم، حيث زعموا أنه سجن أنبياءه و رسله و أوليائه في الجحيم بسبب خطيئة أبيهم، و نسبوه إلى غاية السفه حيث خلصهم من العذاب بتمكينه أعداءه من نفسه حتى قتلوه و صلبوه [...]). و بالجملة فلا نعلم أمة سبّت ربها و معبودها و إلهها بما سبّت به هذه الأمة، كما **قال** عمر رضي الله عنه: [[إنهم سبوا الله مسببة ما سبه إياها أحد من البشر]] [...].

[...] and the Islamic conception of (sins) states and confirms a noble reality and a splendid principle that is included in the following Qur'anic verse, Allah **said**: {That no burdened person (with sins) shall bear the burden (sins) of another, And that man can have nothing but what he does (good or bad)}. 53:38-39. Thus Allah, the Exalted, will not punish one with the guilt of another no matter how closely they are related [...]. Verily – according to the divine justice – it is not permissible to punish any individual because of the sin of Adam, even if this individual is the son of the Satan who persuaded Adam to commit the sin let alone the son of God –as the Church **says**, Glorified and Exalted be He! High above (the great falsehood that they say) – or any of the sons of Adam (humans). Thus Islamic conception [of sins] does not include the ideas and theories that were invented by the Church which are considered to be inevitable consequences of the (original) sin [...]. Muslim scholars (religious leaders) **preceded (had the precedence over)** the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the advocates of historical criticism in this respect [criticizing the Church's concepts of the original sin]. One of them [the philosophers and the advocates of historical criticism] **says**: (... they [the people of the church] attributed to the true God – the Exalted – what the most morally depraved and insignificant individual could attribute to his own slave! [...]. They also attributed the worst form of injustice to Him when they claimed that he imprisoned His prophets and messengers and His close pious worshippers in Hell-fire because of their father's sin. They attributed foolishness to Him as they claimed that He granted them salvation [from the sin] by enabling His enemies to kill and crucify Him [...]). Generally we do not know any nation that execrated their Lord whom they worship like this nation [Christian nation], as Omar [the second Caliph in Islam], may Allah be pleased with him, **said**: (Verily they execrated Allah with a vilification that no single human has ever attributed to Him) [...]

٣- برامج لاحتلال الخليج والجزيرة
[...] وفي ظل تلك الأوضاع المتقلبة و الإدارة الأمريكية الضعيفة ظهرت دعوات قوية في أمريكا تنتقد ضعف بلادها و تنذر أممتها بالخطر المحدق إن لم تعد العدة كاملة لإحتلال الخليج. كما **صرح** بعضهم أو لحماية أمن الخليج كما **يعلمها** الأكثرون. و تشير هنا إلى بعض المترجم المتداول في الأوساط العربية منها، [...] ١- **دراسة عسكرية استراتيجية** نشرتها مجلة فورتشن الأمريكية في مايو ١٩٧٩م بعنوان "التدخل العسكري في منابع النفط، الاحتمالات و الخطط" و مما ورد فيها ص ٤: "إن نزاعاً بين العراق و الكويت أو السعودية نابعاً من الخلافات القائمة منذ زمن حول الأراضي هو خطر حقيقي". ثم **تقول** الدراسة: - "لقد أوضح كل من براون و بريجنسكي - مساعدا الرئيس كارتر لشؤون الأمن القومي - مؤخراً أن الولايات المتحدة ستتخذ خطوات من بينها استخدام القوات العسكرية لحماية مصالحنا في العربية السعودية".

3- Scenarios to invade the Gulf and the [Arab] Peninsula

4 [...] and in the light of unstable political conditions [in the Middle East] and the weak American administration, some serious proposals appeared in America criticising the American weakness and warning the American nation of the dangers if they do not prepare their troops to invade and occupy the Gulf as some of them **stated** or to protect the Gulf as most of them **justified**. I present here some of the translated reports (into Arabic): [...] 1- **A military strategic study** published by the American 'Fortune' in May 1979 titled 'Military intervention in Oil Wells: Probabilities and plans'. In page 4 there appears an indication that 'there could be a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait or Saudi Arabia over the long lasting problematic territories which emerge to be a real threat'. Then the study **says**: 'Both Brown and Brzezinski - Assistants to the President (Jimmy Carter) for National Security Affairs – have recently declared that the United States will take measures including military intervention to protect our interests in Saudi Arabia'.

و بالنظر بشكل عابر للصحافة الأمريكية و البريطانية يلاحظ أنه قد تم بناء الأساس الدعائي للحرب من خلال تصوير صدام حسين كبيع في المنطقة و تولت وسائل الإعلام الغربية العزف على وتر التهديدات التي أطلقها صدام ضد إسرائيل و قامت هذه الوسائل في الوقت نفسه بالتغاضي عن التهديدات الإسرائيلية لمختلف الدول العربية. و في مقال آخر تقول المجلة نفسها (EIR FEETURE) : إسرائيل تجهز لقيام حرب/ أخرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط لإيجاد حل نهائي للمشكلة العربية... و هذا يعني فيما يبدو الحرب ضد العراق و دول أخرى و تدمير الأردن. و تسخر من مزاعم بوش أنه يسعى للسلام في المنطقة قائلة: هذا هراء فالولايات المتحدة ملتزمة بقيام حرب في الشرق الأوسط و ربما كان الشيء الوحيد الذي لم يتحدد هو تاريخ إندلاعها، أما الإسرائيليون فهم مستعدون للحرب و إما يُسمى بالحل النهائي. و قالت ربما كانت هناك أو ستكون على الأرجح إتفاقات جديدة بين القوى في إسرائيل و حافظ الأسد، أو شيء من هذا، و إذا ما تم وضع القضايا الهامشية جانباً فإن إسرائيل مبرمجة حالياً باتجاه الحرب و الذين يقولون غير ذلك إما أغبياء أو كاذبون، إن ذلك هو طبيعة المسألة و أصلها.

5

Reading through the American and British press quickly, we observe that the campaign for the war [on Iraq] is based on demonizing Saddam Hussein. And the western media started to repeat the threats that Saddam expressed towards Israel and at the same time this [western] media neglected the Israeli threats against the different Arab countries. And in another article the same magazine (EIR FEETURE – spelling in the original text) says: "Israel is preparing for *another* war in the Middle East to make a final solution to the Arab problem ... This means a war, presumably against Iraq and other states, and the destruction of Jordan. It also ridicules Bush's (George H. W.) claims that he is seeking to establish peace in the region (Middle East). It says: "Bunk. The United States government is committed to a war in the Middle East to achieve what is called the final solution. The exact date is the only thing that's open to question." It also says: "There may be, and probably will be, new agreements between forces in Israel and Hafez al-Assad (Syrian president 1971 – 2000), things of that sort. But, the side issues aside, Israel is presently programmed for war. Those who tell you that this is not true are either foolish, or are lying. That's the nature of the situation."

Appendix F

Glossary

Islamic terms and figures	Explanations
Al-Albani (' <i>al'albani</i> ; الألباني)	Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999) is Syrian (Albanian origin) Hadith scholar who was a staff member of the Islamic University at Medina. He later was considered to be the founder of a movement called Al-Albani's movement which adheres to the medieval school of Hadith.
Alhakimiyyah (الحاكمية; 'alḥakimiyyah)	A religious concept developed by Said Qutb which means Sovereignty of God
Alhisbah ('alhsibah; الحسبة)	The Salafi Group that practices surveillance (vigilantism) and enforcement of practicing the principles of religion, but without anticipating any worldly rewards, which was later developed as official institution called the religious police or the so called 'هيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر' (<i>Hay'at 'al'amr bilma'arūf wa 'annahi 'an 'amlonkar</i> ; the Committee for Commanding Right and Forbidding Vice).
Aljahiliyyah (الجاهلية; 'alġāhliyyah)	Ignorance or the religious state of Arabs before Islam
Ash'arites (الأشاعرة; 'al'aṣṣā'irah)	Adherents of Abu Alhasan Alashari (874-936) who was a follower of Mu'tazilite school (see Mu'tazilites below). Abu Alhasan Alashari rejected his ideas before death. However, his followers till modern days still seek to understand the basics of Islamic creed (specially in the Muslims creed of the names and attributes of Allah) based on dialectical and speculative theology (i.e. rationalisation and reasoning).
Brethren of Najd (إخوان نجد; 'ikwān najd)	The Bedouin who depended on plundering as a means of living in the days of draught and later accepted the fundamentals of Orthodox Islam of the Hanbali School as preached by Abd-al-Wahhab, they fought with AbdulAziz in his wars in Arabia and revolted against him, but they were subdued in the Battle of Sibila in 1929.
Dahriyyah (الدهرية; 'addahriyyah)	a pre-Islamic atheistic doctrine
Divine religions (الأديان السماوية; 'al'adyān 'assamāwiyyah)	The religions that Muslims believe they were sent by Allah to humans which are mostly used to indicate the three monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions i.e. Judaism, Christianity and Islam
Hadith (الحديث; 'alḥadīth)	The Prophetic Traditions
Hanbali School of jurisprudence (المذهب الحنبلي; 'almadḥhab 'alḥanbali)	one of major four canonical schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam; the other three are 'شافعي' (šafi'i; Shafi'i), 'مالكي' (maliki; Maliki) and 'حنفي' (ḥanafī; Hanafi)
Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad	The founder of a religious-legal school called Hanbalism in the ninth century (see Hanbali School of jurisprudence).
Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad	A medieval scholar of religion (d. 1328) who adhered to the Hanbali School of jurisprudence. He is sometimes referred to by as the Sheik of Islam.
Irjā' (إرجاء)	The concept of 'Irjā' is linked to 'إيمان' (' <i>iman</i> ; faith) in Islam. It means both delay and hope. Faith in Islam is a tripartite concept. It is composed of the following elements; believe with intention, vocalizing believes (i.e. accompanied with utterance/s) and action or performance of duties of worship –prayers, observing fasting during the days of Ramadan etc... . Morjia'ah (the plural of Morj'a) are those who believe that it suffices for an individual to be a believer if s/he accomplishes the first two elements.

Islamic awakening (الصحوۃ الإسلامية; 'alṣahwah al'islamiyyah)	Islamic general awakening (revivalist) movement started in the 1970s and became manifest in the 1980s after thwarting Juhaiman's revolt. It is also called Sahwah.
Maturidites (الماتريدية; 'almaturidiyyah)	The followers of Abu Mansur Almatudidi (853-944 in Uzbekistan). They (as well as the Ash'arites) base their beliefs on speculative theology.
Monotheism (التوحيد; 'attawḥīd)	Unity of Lordship, Unity of Worship and Unity of Allah's Names and Attributes –understanding these concepts is essential to understanding the different Sunni factions, because they were a source of clashes and disputes between the different Islamic sects and factions both in the past and modern times.
Mu'tazilites (المعتزلة; 'almu'tazilah)	An Islamic school of theology (flourished in the 8 th and 10 th centuries) who sought to understand Islamic creed based on reason and later relied on logic. There are two schools of Islamic theology who are considered the descendants of the Mu'tazilites; 'الأشاعرة' ('al'aṣā'irah; Ash'arites) and 'الماتريدية' ('almaturidiyyah; Maturidites).
Particles of faith	Faith in the Sunni Islam is to belief in Allah, His Angels, His Books, His messengers, the Last Day and the Divine Preordainment - good and bad.
Pilgrimage (حج; ḥağ)	The fifth of pillar of Islam which is performed during the twelfth month of the Hijra calendar called 'ذو الحجة' (<i>dolhiğğah</i>).
Pillars of Islam	In the Sunni Islam the pillars of Islam are as follows: 1- Testimony; to witness that there is no god but Allah and Mohammad is his messenger, 2- Performing the five daily prayers, 3- Fasting during the days of the month of Ramadan (of the Muslim calendar), 4- Alms-giving (zakat), and 5- Performing pilgrimage by bodily and financially able adult Muslims.
Qutbis	Adherents of Said Qutb (1906-1966) who is an Egyptian literary and religious figure.
Qutbism	A general term given to the modern political Islamic movements that are based on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb
Sahawists	Religious figures of the Islamic Awakening trend such as Safar Alhawali whose efforts and opposition to the Saudi government were salient in the 1990s.
Salafi	The followers of the early pious predecessors (superior in religious status) who belong to the three generations of the early Muslims.
Sayyid Qutb	The spiritual founder of Qutbism that has profound influence on most modern political Islamic movements.
Shiites	The second largest faction of Islam (approximately 10-13% of Muslim population) most of which are 'الإثني عشرية' ('al'ithay 'aṣriyyah; the Twelvers) who mostly live in Iran, some parts of Uraq and some Gulf States such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Twelvers believe in 12 infallible Imams -divinely granted freedom from sins and errors. The rest are 'الزيدية' ('azzaydiyyah; Zaidis (in Yemen) and other Shiites factions such as 'الإسماعيلية' ('al'isma'iliyyah; Ismailis) (in Najran, Saudi Arabia) and the newly evolved Shiite factions; 'الحوثيون' ('alḥuṭiyyūn; the Huthis) in Yemen and 'المهديون' ('almahdawyīn; the Mahdis –a faction of Shiite Twelvers who believe in 12 Imams and 12 Mahdis –Saviors) that started to appear in the late 1990s in Iraq. Although the Shiite factions differ to a large extent all of them believe that Ali Ibn Abi Talib (the cousin and the son in law of the Prophet of Islam) is the legitimate successor of the Prophet of Islam.

Sufis/Sufism (الصوفية; 'aṣofīyyah)	A group of mystic orders (congregations gathered around a master) praying to reach what they call purity. They venerate and take Auliya (friends of Allah according to the Sufi's interpretations of Auliya) as intercessors with Allah.
Sunnah/Sunnis	The sayings and doings of the Prophet of Islam as reported in the books of Hadith (Prophetic traditions) is called the Sunnah of the Prophet or simply the Sunnah. However, the appellation 'sunnah' is used to refer to the Sunnis or the people of Sunnah that constitute the largest branch of Islam (as opposed to the Shiites).
The people of Hadith (أهل الحديث; Ahlulḥadīth)	People of the Prophetic traditions that opposes the use of reason in religious ruling, calling for direct and exclusive reliance on the Qur'an and the Sunnah