Language and Narrative Empathy

An Empirical Stylistic Approach to Readers' Engagement with Characters

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the

same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

Abstract

Language and Narrative Empathy: An Empirical Stylistic Approach to Readers' Engagement with Characters. A thesis submitted by Carolina Fernandez-Quintanilla in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Linguistics and English Language, Lancaster University, in June 2018.

Narrative empathy, broadly understood as the sharing of characters' perspective and emotional experiences, is thought to be often involved in readers' engagement with characters. A number of claims have been made in the literature about the potential effects of particular narrative techniques on readerly experiences of empathy. However, most of these discussions are based on narratological hypotheses, and empirical work in the area has been rather thin. This study seeks to understand the role of textual, but also readerly, factors in readers' empathetic (or otherwise) engagement with characters.

I take a qualitative linguistic approach that combines stylistic-narratological textual analysis and empirical reader-response research. I analyse some short stories by Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano, and focus on narrative techniques which have been regarded as being somehow involved in either empathetic or non-empathetic reader responses — point of view, speech and thought presentation, emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques. I also consider readerly factors such as contextual appraisal (including moral evaluation) and the reader-character relationship. The empathy potential of these textual and non-textual phenomena is then considered in the light of what readers report. I conducted two focus group discussions with readers who shared their experiences of the characters after reading three stories. Through thematic analysis (using Atlas.ti), I relate readers' self-reported involvement with characters to insights from textual analysis and scholarly claims.

While my findings support some of the assumptions in the literature, they also problematise some claims about the direct effects of textual cues. I argue for a nuanced approach that accommodates the interaction between textual and readerly phenomena, and conclude that narrative empathy is a highly flexible and context-dependent phenomenon given the complex interplay between textual and readerly factors. The main contributions of the study are to do with (i) the value of the focus on language (a stylistically-informed approach to the stimulus texts and a linguistically-aware approach to readers' responses), (ii) the gathering of empirical data on readers' responses through focus groups, and (iii) the in-depth qualitative analysis of these responses, whereby I map out the complex interplay between textual and readerly factors, and develop a typology of potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses.

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Quién sabe si, como en una carrera de relevos,
unos mueren avivándole el alma a otros para que ciertas tareas sigan realizándose...
En nuestro caso, la hermosa tarea de mantener la literatura social vivita y coleando
para así provocar la reflexión acerca de los venires y devenires del 'bicho humano'.
Vives y vivirás en cada una de las palabras que conforman ese librito final de mi tesis,
ya que tú me inspiraste a investigar lo que esas páginas recogen.
Seguiré, con más fuerza que nunca, escribiendo acerca de ti y la literatura de compromiso, y
trabajando y sintiendo con tus maravillosos relatos.

Nunca te irás de este mundo. Respiras con nuestros pulmones.
Un abrazo eterno,
Carolina

Who knows whether, as in a relay race, some people die
and in so doing they enliven other people's soul so that certain tasks keep being done...
In our case, the beautiful task of keeping social literature alive and kicking
so as to stir reflection about the comings and goings of the 'human bug'.
You live and will live in every word that makes up this thesis,
since it was you who inspired me to investigate what these pages collect.
I will, with more strength than ever, keep writing about you and socially committed
literature, and will keep working on and feeling with your wonderful stories.

You will never leave this world. You breathe through our lungs.
An eternal hug,
Carolina

[*Farewell email sent to Galeano a day after his death in April 2015*]

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1. Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Topic and focus of the study

This project aims to investigate the role of textual and readerly factors in readers' empathetic (or otherwise) engagement with characters. One of the concerns of the fields of stylistics, narratology and literary studies is the study of readers' involvement with story-world characters. Reader-character engagement has been investigated across disciplines under a variety of terms and concepts. As van Lissa, Caracciolo, van Duuren and van Leuveren put it,

> [t]he question of audiences' attitude towards fictional characters looms large in the study of narrative in literature and other media (Eder, Jannidis and Schneider, 2010). Readers and scholars commonly talk about 'identification' or use metaphors such as 'closeness' and 'distance' (Eder, 2006) or 'putting oneself in a character's shoes' for the experience of relating to a fictional being. (2016, p. 43)

One such form of engagement with characters is *empathy*, which involves vicariously experiencing or mentally simulating characters' own experiences. Narrative empathy is a psychological process whereby readers, as recipients of narrative texts, understand and come to share characters' internal states and experiences (see 2.2 and 2.6.1 for definitions). Within the topic of narrative empathy, my focus is on the role of certain *textual and readerly factors* in facilitating empathetic and non-empathetic responses to characters.

The motivation to conduct this study was, first of all, a personal interest in finding out more about the experience of empathy with characters when engaging with narratives. A further motive was to address a series of claims that have been made in the literature,

mainly by narratologists and literary scholars, about the potential of certain *textual devices* to influence readers' empathetic engagement with characters (see Keen, 2006). In the literature the role of readerly, non-textual factors is emphasised to different degrees. My argument is that while textual devices can influence narrative empathy, the research scope should be broadened to include the complex interaction between textual and readerly factors. So, even if the debate sometimes centres on the issue of textual effects, I defend the view that narrative empathy is not dependent on textual devices alone.

More broadly, the topic of narrative empathy is interesting and worthy of study for different reasons: (i) empathy has lately received widespread attention both inside and outside academia; (ii) empathy is regarded as an important social ability for interpersonal understanding, and (iii) empathy is thought to be often involved in recipients' engagement with characters.

First, empathy has become a key topic of discussion in recent years, both inside and outside academia. As philosopher Amy Coplan captures it:

> The concept of empathy has received an enormous amount of attention in the past few decades, appearing in the popular press, political campaigns, and in the study of a wide range of topics, including autism spectrum disorders, psychopathy, political ideologies, medical care, ethics and moral development, justice and the court, gender differences, *engagement with art* and the media, therapeutic methods in clinical psychology, mirror neurons, and theory of mind. Given its central role in so many discussions and debates, it's safe to conclude that whatever empathy is, it's important (2011a, pp. 3-4, my emphasis)

Regarding the current academic interest in empathy, one century after the birth of the concept (see 2.1), empathy has gained widespread attention at the hands of a community of researchers from disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, biology, anthropology, literary and film theory (Stueber, 2012, p. 55). The investigation of narrative empathy inevitably spans multiple disciplines, so I draw on fields that have contributed to the understanding of the phenomenon of empathy, both when it comes to empathy with real-world people and empathy with story-world characters. Thus, my work borrows and integrates insights from linguistics, literary studies, narratology, philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Second, empathy enables us to understand and experience (what we perceive are) another person's internal states. As a social ability, empathy is considered an important epistemic tool for social cognition (Stueber, 2012, p. 55) since it provides us with knowledge about another person's inner states, thus facilitating interpersonal understanding. This, in turn, makes empathy an essential mechanism for communication (Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 5).

Third, the topic of empathy has of late sparked a great deal of interest in discussions of fiction, characterisation and reader response (Wales, 2011, p. 133), and "holds a central place in some conceptions of narrative" (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 208). Most importantly, several scholars support the view that empathy is often involved in the engagement between readers of narratives and characters (Coplan, 2004; Keen, 2006). What is more, van Lissa et al. (2016, p. 43) highlight that empathetic perspective taking

has recently been regarded as the main psychological mechanism that underlies our experience of relating to fictional characters.

1.2 Eduardo Galeano

In order to examine the role of textual and readerly factors in readers' empathy with characters, I use a set of stories that were written by the Uruguayan journalist and writer Eduardo Galeano. These stories are used for textual analysis (Chapter 4) and empirical work with readers (Chapter 6). This section justifies my choice of working with his stories, and then provides some background information about the author and his work.

There are several reasons behind my choice of working with Galeano's texts in this project. First, I am an enthusiastic reader of his work. Second, as I read his stories I myself got involved with the characters in rather emotional ways, and so the curiosity to understand the phenomenon of emotional engagement in general and empathy in particular became my research focus. Third, I witnessed how his texts were used by demonstrators during the 15-M social movement[1] in 2011 and afterwards in Spain (my home country). Extracts from Galeano's texts were often used on protest placards to denounce the existing social order. Thus, at the time of starting this project I thought that his work was relevant to studying recipients' engagement, given its impact on my immediate social context.

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[1] The 15-M movement involved protests against unemployment, welfare cuts, the Spanish political system, and the power of banks and corporations. It defended the basic rights of home, work, health and education.

Born in Montevideo in 1940, Galeano started working as a newspaper cartoonist[2] and then had a long-standing career as journalist and writer. After working as editor in several newspapers, he went into exile for twelve years (1973-1985) during the period of dictatorships in Uruguay and Argentina. He settled in Spain until he went back to Uruguay in 1985. He became better known to the general public after 2009, when the former president of Venezuela Hugo Chávez gave a copy of Galeano's most popular work (*The Open Veins of Latin America*, 1971) to the then USA president Barack Obama. After Galeano's death in April 2015, I hope that working with his texts shall contribute to keeping his literary legacy alive while adding to the rather scarce scholarship on his work (see below).

Galeano extensively published narrative works of both fiction and non-fiction — his oeuvre includes over thirty works from different genres (see below). Galeano's lifelong career as a writer falls under the category of *socially committed* or *socially engaged* literature (Cuddon, 1998, p. 139). The most distinctive feature of his writings is perhaps its strong defence of human rights through an all-present attitude of protest and resistance towards all kinds of oppression and power abuse. His work addresses wide-ranging topics such as the situation of Latin America (e.g., poverty, loss of identity), the unequal economic development between the South and the North, global politics and economics, international power relations, colonialism and post-colonialism, the mass media, etc.

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[2] He has illustrated some of his own works (Lovell, 2004), including *The Book of Embraces*, from which the data under analysis is taken.

In his writings Galeano presents his ideological slant, often through pungent social criticism, to address social problems. This communicative endeavour has been seen as the author's contribution to "the literary articulation of a political project" which seeks the "construction of a cultural and political alternative" (Gräbner, 2010, p. 93) against a backdrop of "anti-capitalist and anti-colonial liberation struggles" (Gräbner, 2010, p. 98). Galeano often resists dominant ideologies and discourses by taking the perspective of the marginalised and giving voice to alterity (Larsen, 1990).

The short narrative texts that make up the dataset for analysis (see 4.1) reflect some of Galeano's socio-political concerns, such as freedom of speech, or abuses and injustices committed during colonial and dictatorial times. Importantly, this pervasive element of social critique and its underlying values might shape the type of responses being elicited, since the resulting (non-)empathetic responses to characters might be closely tied to readers' moral and socio-political evaluation of story-world events. This is why I consider *ideological point of view* (Fowler, 1996) as a relevant textual factor (see 3.2.2.1), but also *contextual appraisal* and *moral evaluation* (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Cuff, Brown, Taylor and Howat, 2016) as readerly factors (see 3.1.3 and 3.1.4).

Regarding earlier research, Galeano has received relatively little attention from scholars; however, part of his oeuvre has been examined within literary studies (see, e.g., Fischlin, 1993; Palaversich, 1995). One possible reason for this scarce scholarly attention is that his work defies easy categorisation (Wood, 1997, p. 336). His work is problematic "in terms of categorization and critical study" since he is a combination of essayist, journalist and historian "whose writing has an undeniably literary quality" (Wood, 1997, p. 335). Lovell

highlights Galeano's writing talent and "versatility as an essayist, journalist, novelist, historian, and social and political commentator" (2004, p. 216). Some research has been published that focuses "either on his subjective view of history or on the political aspect of his writing in exile" (Wood, 1997, p. 337). My thesis is a contribution to academic research on Galeano's work from a linguistic stylistic perspective.

1.3 Justification of research

My aim is to investigate the role of textual and readerly factors in narrative empathy. Previous research, both theoretical and empirical, has considered the links between textual devices and (non-)empathetic responses. Regarding theoretical work, one of the key contributions to this area is work by narratologist Suzanne Keen (2006, 2007). Her work gathers scholars' views on the empathy potential of what she calls "empathetic narrative techniques" (see 2.7.1). As far as empirical work is concerned, however, only three studies to date have considered the role of certain textual (and sometimes non-textual) phenomena in generating empathetic effects in readers — László and Smogyvári (2008), van Lissa et al. (2016), and Kuzmičová, Mangen, Støle and Begnum (2017) (see 2.7.2). The term *empirical* is used to refer to work that collects and analyses extra-textual data on readers' responses (Whiteley and Canning, 2017).

Even though there have been attempts to identify linguistic features that might trigger empathetic effects (Wales, 2011, p. 133), "we know relatively little about the textual strategies that can encourage recipients to empathise with a character" (Caracciolo, 2013). Given that research on the connection between textual devices and empathetic effects has been rather thin, some scholars have called for further empirical work (see

Keen, 2006; László and Smogyvári, 2008; Sklar, 2009; van Lissa et al., 2016). My study is a response to this call, and hopes to advance the level of current knowledge on the influence of textual and readerly factors in (non-)empathetic reading experiences.

1.4 Research questions

The research questions under investigation in my study are the following:

1. To what extent and how does Galeano use narrative techniques in his stories that have been associated with the potential elicitation of readers' empathy with characters?

2. How do readers engage with characters in a selection of Galeano's short stories?
   2.1 To what extent and in what ways is there evidence of empathetic responses?
   2.2 To what extent and in what ways do narrative devices play a role in readers' (non-)empathetic engagement with characters?
   2.3 To what extent and in what ways do readerly factors play a role in readers' (non-) empathetic engagement with characters?

3. What is the interplay between textual and readerly factors in readers' empathetic and non-empathetic engagement with characters?

1.5 Theoretical background

This project belongs in the discipline of literary stylistics (also known as literary linguistics), which aims at investigating the role that language plays in bringing about particular interpretations of literary texts (Short, 1993, p. 8). Stylistics aims to "be precise, analytical and verifiable" regarding the linguistic choices in texts that underlie effects and responses in readers (Toolan, 2014, p. 15). A central concern in stylistics is the

investigation of the dynamic interaction between textual aspects and readerly aspects in the process of reception of literary texts. As Schneider puts it, "the reading of literary texts is a process in which textual information interacts with the reader's knowledge structures and cognitive procedures" (2001, p. 607). This idea is at the core of the two theoretical perspectives I draw on — cognitive stylistics and cognitive narratology.

My work is theoretically informed by the two neighbouring research areas of stylistics and narratology. In particular, this project draws theoretically from a combination of cognitive stylistics and cognitive narratology. During the last twenty years *cognitive approaches* to narrative and literature have emerged — these apply ideas from fields such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology, psycholinguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind to the study of (literary) stories (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 8). In what follows I review the theoretical positions from which my work draws to understand readers' interaction with texts and their engagement with characters.

1.5.1 Cognitive stylistics

Cognitive stylistics is taken to be at the crossroads of linguistics, literary studies and cognitive science (Semino and Culpeper, 2002, p. ix). Cognitive stylistics derives from traditional literary stylistics — whereas the latter prioritises the textual component (i.e., relationship between form and function, effect and interpretation), the former emphasises that "the mental component of the meaning creation process should be included" (Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro, 2010, pp. 7-8). The shift of emphasis toward the mental dimension of reading can be related to the influence from other disciplines (Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro, 2010, p. 8), and so cognitive stylistics applies models

from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology to the study of literature (Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro, 2010, p. 7).

Similarly, the discipline of *cognitive poetics* applies insights from cognitive science to literary reading (Stockwell, 2013, p. 266); that is, it applies "our latest best understanding of language and mind to literature" (Stockwell, 2015, p. 234; see Stockwell, 2002, for an introduction). The term 'cognitive poetics' originated in Reuven Tsur's work (see 1987, 1992; Stockwell, 2015, p. 234), but the term has expanded to include the application of cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics to the study of literary reading (Harrison and Stockwell, 2014, p. 189). The term 'cognitive poetics' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'cognitive stylistics' (Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro, 2010, p. 8) (see, e.g., Stockwell, 2015).

My study can be described as taking, broadly speaking, a *cognitive stylistic theoretical approach* since it conforms to what West (2016) considers to be central features of cognitive stylistics, particularly its object of study and its methodology.

Regarding the object of study, cognitive stylistics seeks to investigate *readerly experience* (West, 2016, p. 110). My study examines one type of readerly experience, in particular readers' experiences of narrative empathy. Cognitive stylisticians consider that readerly experience is a product of both (i) "the words on the page" or the textual features which function as stimuli for responses, and of (ii) "the reader's cognitive faculties" which shape the way in which the reader experiences the text (West, p. 110). Empathy, as one

of the psychological processes involved in readers' interaction with stories, engages readers' cognitive functions in different ways (see chapters 2 and 3).

Concerning methodology, those working within cognitive stylistics use a methodology that combines cognitive psychological accounts of how the human mind works and in-depth stylistic analysis of the linguistic features of the text(s). Cognitive stylistics aims to explain recipients' reactions (i.e., thoughts, interpretations and emotions) "in a principled way by referring both to the literary artifact's language and to what we know about the human mind and how it functions in its experience of the external world" (West, p. 110). I draw on several disciplines (i.e. social neuroscience, social and developmental psychology, and philosophy of mind) in order to account for how the psychological phenomenon of empathy works (see Chapter 2). At the same time, I conduct a close linguistic analysis of the narrative-stylistic devices in Galeano's stories which could potentially have an effect on narrative empathy (see Chapter 4). Finally, when it comes to gathering data about readerly experience, cognitive stylisticians can "investigate what real readers say about their experiences in reading literary texts" (West, 2016, p. 110). In this respect, I gather real readers' responses to characters and look for evidence of (non-)empathetic engagement (see Chapters 5 and 6).

1.5.2 Cognitive narratology: Caracciolo's (2014) model of experientiality

Stylisticians have traditionally drawn on the field of narratology (see, e.g., Shen, 2005, 2014). More particularly, cognitive stylistics is theoretically informed not only by cognitive linguistics but also by narratology (Shen, 2014, p. 192). I draw on narratologist Marco Caracciolo's (2014) cognitive narratological model of experientiality because it

holds great explanatory power to analyse two central aspects of narrative empathy — (i) readers' attribution and enactment of characters' experience as two reading strategies which are key to empathetic engagement, and (ii) the interaction between textual features and readers' experiences[3]. These two aspects are further explained below.

Caracciolo's (2014) model grew out of the realisation that previous work by narratologists such as Palmer (2004) and Zunshine (2006) focused only on "the reader's attribution of mental states to the characters", and so it did "not seem to devote special attention to the reader's *engagement* with consciousness proper" (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 110, my emphasis). Caracciolo theorises that when readers engage in narrative reading (what he calls *the story-driven experience*) there is a network of relationships that involves two tensions or interactions: (i) a tension between consciousness-attribution and consciousness-enactment, and (ii) an interaction between the text (*textual design*) and readers' past experiences (*readers' experiential background*) (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 23).

In his model of readers' experiential engagement with characters' consciousness Caracciolo distinguishes between two reading strategies:

- *Consciousness-attribution*, whereby the reader attributes an experience to a character, and which involves a third-person stance (p. 49).
- *Consciousness-enactment*, whereby the reader enacts or mentally simulates the character's experience, and which involves a first-person empathetic stance (p.

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[3] Several theoretical approaches exist within cognitive poetics that account for "how general knowledge and experience are deployed as a central factor in the particularities of a literary reading", such as text world theory or schema theory. The difference between the models is to do with the ways in which they explain the selection of knowledge since readers do not bring all of their knowledge to bear when reading (Stockwell, 2009, p. 6).

149). Consciousness-enactment always occurs together with consciousness-attribution, but not the other way round (p. 118-119).

Consciousness-enactment should be regarded as a tension because it always involves some element of consciousness-attribution; however, "in enacting a character's experience readers imaginatively 'try it on' without completely giving up their third-person perspective" (p. 49). Because consciousness-enactment involves a first-person empathetic stance, it creates a tension between undergoing an experience in the first person[4] and attributing an experience to a character in the second or third person (p. 110).

Consciousness-enactment is synonymous[5] with empathy in Caracciolo's model: "empathy is a form of imaginative engagement where people 'enact' the emotional experience that they, at the same time, attribute to a fictional character" (p. 66). Put differently, consciousness-enactment is dependent on our ability to empathise with other people by mentally simulating their experiences (p. 142). Caracciolo thus links the cognitive underpinnings of consciousness enactment to simulative mechanisms (p. 25). In a nutshell, when we empathise with a character we mentally simulate the experience that we attribute to the character (see 2.2.6).

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[4] This means that the self-other differentiation which is so central to empathy (see 2.2.5) generates "an intersubjective tension between being oneself (attributing an experience to another subject) and being another (enacting his or her experience)" (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 49). As I show in Chapter 6, this tension is linguistically realised in my participants' accounts through sudden shifts in the use of personal pronouns.

[5] Indeed Caracciolo uses the terms *empathising* and *enacting* interchangeably, as in "we can enact the experience of another person in real life too — that is to say, empathise with him or her" or in "readers may empathise with them [characters] — or enact their consciousnesses" (p. 113).

The other tension in Caracciolo's (2014) model concerns the interaction between the text and readers' experiences. Central to his model is the idea that readers respond to stories on the basis of their experiential background (p. 23). Caracciolo defines the notion of *readers' experiential background* as "a repertoire of past experiences and values that guides people's interaction with the environment" (p. 4). This experiential repertoire is made up of different levels or regions: (1) bodily experience, (2) perception, (3) emotion, (4) higher-order cognitive functions (i.e. long-term memory, propositional imagination, conceptual thought, language and narrative understanding), and (5) socio-cultural practices (i.e. beliefs, values, social structures, cultural conventions) (pp. 56-63). The diversity of readers' experiential backgrounds is reflected in how widely diverse their responses to stories are (p. 23). Empathy engages these regions in readers' experiential background. As will be noted in Chapters 2 and 3, empathy is a high-order cognitive process since it may involve simulation, inferential work, imagination, perspective taking, the retrieval of memories, and contextual appraisal.

There are two psychological processes involved in the interaction between text and readers' experience: (i) mental simulation or empathy (see above), and (ii) the activation of past experiences (p. 5). *Experience* is key in embodied and situated approaches to cognition, which emphasise "the subject's experiential history of interaction with the environment (Varela et al., 1991; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)" (Caracciolo, 2013, para. 13). Such experiential history has been shown to play "a role in discourse and narrative comprehension through the activation of memories of past experiences (or "experiential traces", see Pecher and Zwaan, 2005)" (Caracciolo, 2013, para. 13). I also take an embodied view of cognition.

Caracciolo acknowledges that the lack of empirical testing of his model is a limitation of the model itself (2014, p. 12). However, he justifies why the lack of empiricism is not a flaw in the model: any empirical research needs theoretical back-up, and so he conceives of his speculative model as paving the way for empirical work (2014, p. 12). He rightly points out that empirical research may (dis)confirm hypotheses stemming from any theoretical model, "but it cannot by itself *replace* the theoretical model; all it can do is encourage scholars to advance a new model, or revise existing ones" (2014, p. 13, original emphasis). My work provides some empirical grounding for Caracciolo's model.

1.6 Scope and methodology

This section delineates the boundaries of my study. In order to investigate the influence of certain textual and readerly factors in narrative empathy, I consider how readers interact with the characters in Galeano's stories. In this sense, I explore (i) verbally mediated empathy that takes place (ii) during or shortly after reading narratives.

Regarding the stimuli that may induce empathy in an observer, visual and auditory cues (e.g., facial and bodily expressions, tone of voice, etc.) are often used in experiments[6], but cues may also come from the verbal written medium. The scope of my study is limited to *verbally mediated empathy* (Hoffman, 2000); that is, experiences of empathy which arise in reading verbal narratives. My study focuses on experiences of narrative empathy that are brought about in the process of reading verbal mono-modal narrative

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[6] For example, creating a scenario where the subject observes a loved one in pain (Singer and Lamm, 2009). These experiments may or may not be accompanied by verbal communication.

texts in print (i.e., where characters' experience is communicated through written language). This excludes narrative texts in other media (see 2.6.1). Therefore, I use, interchangeably, medium-specific terms such as 'authors' and 'writers'; 'texts', 'narratives' and 'stories'; and 'readers' and 'recipients'.

Moreover, my study considers reader responses *while or shortly after reading*. Some researchers look into the long-term effects of reading; for instance, the ways in which texts may bring about changes in a reader's mind or life (see Sections 2.7.1 and 5.1). In contrast, other researchers look at more short-term reactions. I am interested in readers' engagement with characters at the moment of reading — called "short-term effects" in Kuzmičová et al. (2017) — even though I access readers' experiences indirectly in their after-reading discussion (see 5.1 and 5.2).

Regarding methodology, I take a qualitative research approach and use research methods from empirical stylistics (see 5.1). Qualitative research seeks to understand participants' individual experiences (i.e. their behaviours, emotions, beliefs, values, etc.) from the *perspective of study participants* themselves (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2011, p. 10, emphasis in the original). Qualitative research is underpinned by an interpretive paradigm. Interpretivism allows the researcher to understand issues from the perspective of participants, and thus "to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008, p. 4, as cited in Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2011, p. 9). Thus, I sought to understand readers' perceptions and experiences of characters from their perspective, and to examine how their responses relate to claims made in the literature about potential textual effects.

I take an empirical stylistic approach to narrative empathy which combines two elements:

1) *Stylistic-narratological textual analysis*. In order to address RQ1 (see 1.4), I analysed some short stories by Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano by focusing on some narrative techniques that are thought to be involved in empathetic reader responses. In my analysis (see Chapter 4), I identified the potential of the stories to (dis)invite empathy with characters, especially the linguistic potential for empathy of point of view, characters' discourse and emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques.

2) *Empirical reader response research*. The empathy potential of these storytelling devices was then considered in the light of what readers reported. In order to address RQ2 (see 1.4), I conducted two focus group discussions with Spanish readers who shared their experiences with characters after reading three of Galeano's short stories. After that, thematic analysis was conducted with the aid of qualitative analysis software (Atlas.ti). Here I relate insights from the analysis of the stories (and associated claims from the literature about potential textual effects) to readers' self-reported engagement with characters, and I examine the textual and readerly factors that seem to be involved in such responses.

1.7 Thesis overview

This final section provides a brief chapter-by-chapter summary[7] of the thesis, which is organised into the following chapters:

Chapter 2 introduces my conceptual framework of (narrative) empathy. It discusses the complexities around defining *empathy*, and provides the definition which I use for the purposes of this research project. The second half of the chapter dwells on narrative reading, where I define narrative empathy and review earlier approaches to its study.

Chapter 3 establishes empathy as a context-dependent phenomenon, and focuses on some factors that could modulate experiences of empathy — factors that revolve around the reader as potential empathiser, and textual factors that have been associated in the literature with empathy effects. Finally, I explore point of view presentation, characters' discourse presentation, characters' emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques. I examine these from a linguistic perspective and discuss their empathy potential.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the analysis of the linguistically-induced potential for empathy of a selection of Galeano's stories (see RQ1). I introduce the data under analysis and provide the reasons for my data choice. I outline the analytical framework which is to be applied in the stylistic analysis of the stories. Then, I present my analysis, which focuses especially on (i) the ways in which characters, as potential targets of

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[7] N.B. At the end of each chapter I provide an interim summary which comments on the picture so far and signals the next stage of my argument.

empathy, are linguistically shaped by the above narrative techniques, and (ii) the empathy potential of these storytelling devices. Finally, I discuss my findings in relation to Research Question 1.

Chapter 5 introduces the methodological approach that underpins the reader-response element of my project (see RQ2), and justifies the decisions that shaped the study. I explain how my focus-group study sits in between experimental and naturalistic paradigms. Later on, I document the data-collection process step by step, and justify my choices. The final section presents my approach to data analysis, including qualitative analysis software (Atlas.ti) and my coding scheme.

Chapter 6 presents my analysis of readers' responses. First, I provide an overview of the group discussions. Then, I present my analysis of potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses, which ranges from explicit to implicit potential evidence. The second half of the chapter presents my analysis of the role of textual and readerly factors in readers' involvement with characters — the findings are discussed according to the different empathy patterns that were observed. I also present other responses that participants reported during the group discussions.

Chapter 7 presents my conclusions. I discuss my findings in relation to Research Questions 2 and 3. After that, I discuss the significance and implications of my findings, the contributions and limitations of my study, and suggest possible directions for further research.

2. Chapter 2. (Narrative) empathy

2.0 Orientation to Chapter 2

This chapter provides a selective review of the literature on the phenomenon of empathy with both real-world and story-world individuals. First it examines interpersonal empathy; that is, the psychological process whereby we grasp and vicariously experience what we perceive are the mental states of people around us. Then it focuses on narrative empathy; in other words, the process whereby recipients of narrative texts come to share what they perceive are characters' psychological states. I use the terms *mental states* and *psychological states* broadly to include emotions, thoughts, beliefs, values, intentions and desires (Cooper, 2006; Reber, Allen and Reber, 2009; Stueber, 2012). Although the emotional component is central to empathy, some scholars consider that empathy may encompass any mental state, and so may not be restricted to emotional experiences (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 130) (see 2.2 for further discussion). My study thus regards mental states as including both cognitive and emotional processes.

The chapter starts with an account of the historical roots of the concept of empathy, and shows the (highly problematic) variety of uses of the term (2.1). After that it provides the definition of empathy that I use for the purposes of this study (2.2), which I justify by outlining the criteria that scholars have used in an attempt to set clear boundaries around empathy and a few related psychological processes which are often conflated with it (2.3). The next section (2.4) provides a brief discussion of the relationship between real-world empathy and narrative empathy. The second half of the chapter zooms in on *narrative reading* specifically (2.5). I first consider what characters are and

what is involved in the process of characterisation (2.5.1), and discuss the notion of

mind-modelling (2.5.2). Then, I briefly consider the kind of experiences which may be

involved in the course of reading, including responses to characters (2.5.3). After that I

introduce the notion of narrative empathy, and I establish how it is being used within

the context of my research (2.6). Finally, I review some of the ways in which narrative

empathy has been studied to date (2.7).

2.1 Origins of the concept and multiple uses of the term

The most basic etymological meaning of *empathy* is that of "feeling into" — being

empathetic is "to know, sense or enter into (*em*) the feelings (*pathos*) of the other"

(Howe, 2013, p. 13). Before moving on to a full explanation of empathy, I provide a brief

snapshot about the origins of the concept and its scientific study. In short, the concept

of empathy originated in philosophical aesthetics and was later on adopted in

psychology[8] (see Coplan and Goldie, 2011; and Stueber, 2013, for detailed historical

outlines of the development of the concept of empathy).

At the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, the term *Einfühlung* (meaning "feeling into")

originated in German philosophical circles at the hands of the aestheticians Robert

Vischer and Theodor Lipps (Coplan and Goldie, 2011, p. xii; Stueber, 2013, para. 2). Lipps

used the term to refer to the process of "imaginatively projecting oneself into another's

situation" (1903, as cited in Batson, 2009, p. 6) in an attempt to explain not only how we

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[8] Research on empathy has been conducted by social and developmental psychologists such as Eisenberg and Strayer (1987); Batson (1991, 2009); Eisenberg (2000) and Hoffman (2000). These psychologists are interested in the "perceptual, affective, and cognitive mechanisms" involved in empathy (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 82). Within the field of social neuroscience, see Singer et al. (2004); Lamm, Batson and Decety (2007); Singer and Lamm (2009); and Singer and Decety (2011).

experience aesthetic objects, but also how we understand other people's mental states (Coplan and Goldie, 2011, p. xii). It was Lipps' notion of *Einfühlung* as aesthetic projection that would soon after be taken as the basis of the concept of empathy by British psychologist Edward Titchener (Batson, 2009, p. 6). Titchener coined the English term *empathy* by adapting the previously mentioned German noun *Einfühlung*, and thus introducing it into the English language (Keen, 2006, p. 209; Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 3). Interestingly, then, the concept was first used to account for the ways in which a person relates to an art object, and only later did empathy come to be used to describe how people relate to other people (Harrison, 2008, p. 256).

The term *empathy* has been put to a variety of uses in contemporary scholarship. The lack of a standard definition of empathy (Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 3) has been a longstanding problem within empathy research (Coplan, 2011b, p. 40). Singer and Lamm go as far as to say that "there are almost as many definitions of empathy as there are researchers in the field" (2009, p. 82). Being a complex construct, empathy is taken to comprise different psychological processes, such as (N.B. Only the phenomena in bold in the two lists following are included in my definition (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3)):

(A) **Feeling what someone else feels**
(B) Caring about someone else
(C) Being emotionally affected by someone else's emotions and experiences, even though not necessarily experiencing the same emotions
(D) Imagining oneself in another's situation
(E) **Imagining being another in that other's situation**
(F) **Making inferences about another's mental states**
(G) Some combination of the processes described in (A)-(F)

(Coplan, 2011a, p. 4)

The many conceptualisations of empathy populating the literature pose challenges when reviewing other studies since it becomes difficult to keep track of the mental states and processes scholars are actually referring to when discussing empathy (Coplan, 2011b, p. 4). Batson also addresses the conceptual diversity being invoked with the term *empathy*, and points out that the term is nowadays being used to refer to eight distinct phenomena:

> (1) **Knowing another person's internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings**
> (2) Adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an observed other
> (3) **Coming to feel as another person feels**
> (4) Intuiting or projecting oneself into another's situation
> (5) **Imagining how another is thinking and feeling**
> (6) Imagining how one would think and feel in the other's place
> (7) Feeling distress at witnessing another person's suffering
> (8) Feeling for another person who is suffering
>
> (Batson, 2009, pp. 4-8)

Whether or not all these processes (A-F and 1-8) are different components of empathy is a matter of debate. Zaki and Oschner (2012) suggest that research on empathy has revolved around what they call three main *interrelated facets* of empathy. These are (i) affective/emotional empathy or experience sharing (i.e., taking on, resonating with or sharing the emotions of others); (ii) cognitive empathy, perspective taking or mentalising (i.e., drawing inferences about and understanding others' mental states); and (iii) prosocial or empathic concern (i.e., the motivation to help others as a result of (i) and (ii)) (Zaki and Oschner, 2012, p. 676). In keeping with the view that empathy is an overarching, umbrella concept that includes different processes, some researchers have opted for broad definitions (see for instance de Waal, 2009). As I show below, this all-

encompassing conceptualisation is problematic because it fails to narrow down the object of study.

Even though the different processes above (A-F and 1-8) are sometimes taken to be empathy, some scholars propose that they are *not* different components of empathy. According to this view, the previously mentioned processes refer to distinct psychological phenomena such as emotional contagion, motor mimicry, sympathy, self-oriented and other-oriented perspective taking, and personal distress. While these phenomena are related, each of them is "a conceptually distinct, stand-alone psychological state" (Batson, 2009, p. 3) with different functions, mechanisms and effects (Coplan, 2011a, p. 4). As a result, Coplan rejects making empathy into "a catch-all term" (2011b, p. 43). In my study I endorse philosopher Amy Coplan's (2004, 2011a, 2011b) narrow conceptualisation of empathy. Thus, my definition excludes processes such as emotional contagion and motor mimicry, sympathy, self-oriented perspective taking, and personal distress (see 2.3 for a brief account of each process).

2.2 Criteria for defining empathy

As shown above, there is a great deal of conceptual diversity surrounding empathy. Given the lack of an "all-time and universally valid definition" of empathy, it is recommended that researchers working in the area determine some landmarks to make sure that the object of study is the same or at least has essential features in common (Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 3). Batson opines that empathy researchers ought to clarify the labelling scheme they are adopting and use it consistently (2009, p. 8).

Now I provide the definition of empathy which I use for the purposes of this research project. I specify the criteria which I follow when it comes to delineating the extremely fuzzy phenomenon of empathy. To this end I present *a narrow conceptual framework of empathy* (see Coplan, 2004, 2011a, 2011b) which attends to a set of criteria used by empathy researchers — some of which are, by the way, points of contention within current debates. Regarding terminology, I use the customary term *empathiser* to refer to the observer who empathises with another, and *target* to refer to the object of empathy (i.e., that with whom one empathises).

The following definition has been developed out of a number of sources (Coplan, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Cuff et al., 2016; de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012; Gallagher, 2012). Eventually I use this definition to define narrative empathy (see 2.6.1), where I adapt the wording to accommodate the reader as empathiser and the character(s) as target(s) of empathy. For the purposes of this research project,

> Empathy is both an affective and a cognitive process which involves an other-oriented (emotional) response and perspective taking that does not necessarily result in any behavioural outcomes. The empathiser grasps and vicariously experiences the target's perceived mental state while being aware that the target is the source of the response. Empathy is a form of simulation whereby the empathiser forms a representation of the target's state, and re-enacts the target's mental state and activity in his/her own mind by adopting their perspective.

As will be shown below, researchers give different degrees of emphasis to the emotional dimension of empathy. Even though the understanding and sharing of the target's *emotional* states and experiences is generally agreed to be central to empathy, some scholars consider that empathy may be "directed at *any* mental state" (Caracciolo, 2014,

p. 130, original emphasis). Thus, in discussions of empathy some scholars address affective states (i.e., emotions) exclusively, whereas others speak more broadly about a wider range of mental states (i.e., cognitive states such as beliefs, values or intentions). For this reason I keep my definition as flexible as possible to accommodate the grasping, and vicarious experiencing, of different mental states (e.g., emotions, thoughts, beliefs, values, intentions, desires, etc.). In what follows I break down, for expository convenience, the characteristics that are considered to be fundamental to empathy in the scholarly literature.

2.2.1 Empathy is both an affective and a cognitive process

In the literature the question arises whether empathy is affective or cognitive. As a result, empathy has actually been broken down into *affective empathy* and *cognitive empathy*, and the two have sometimes been studied independently from each other. Affective or emotional empathy involves the ability to understand and *share* the feelings of others (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012, p. 676; Burke, Kuzmičová, Mangen and Schilhab, 2016, p. 21). Cognitive empathy is less straightforwardly defined in the literature. It is regarded as the ability to understand other people's feelings (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 4), draw inferences about their mental states (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012, p. 676) and take their psychological point of view (Burke et al., 2016, p. 21). Cognitive empathy, then, seems to point in the direction of mindreading, mentalising and perspective taking. However, in some scholars' views, taking into account *only the cognitive element* becomes problematic because one might end up equating empathy with mindreading (see de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012, pp. 304-305, footnote 5). The affective dimension is particularly central since empathy is mostly regarded as an *emotional event* (Cuff et al.,

2016, p. 4), and so a common definition of empathy is "coming to feel the same emotion that another person feels" (Batson, 2009, p. 5). In line with this view, de Vignemont and Jacob's *affectivity condition* requires that both target and empathiser experience some affective state (2012, p. 304), thus distinguishing empathy from mindreading[9].

After reviewing a corpus of definitions of empathy, Cuff and colleagues observe that some definitions of empathy take into account only the cognitive component, others only the affective dimension, and many definitions incorporate both (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 4). The interaction between the affective and the cognitive dimensions is widely recognised in the literature (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 4). Strayer suggests that "the affective component is the content of empathy, whereas the cognitive component is the process via which this content is formed" (1987, as cited in Cuff et al. 2016, p. 4). Be that as it may, the intertwining of emotion and cognition[10] is acknowledged when empathy is viewed as a multidimensional process, rather than a state (Morrell, 2010, pp. 55-62, as cited in Marzano, Scardigno and Mininni, 2015, p. 298). Therefore it seems safe to conclude that both affective and cognitive[11] dimensions are at work in experiences of empathy since their interaction is widely acknowledged in the scientific literature.

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[9] Mind reading involves coming to believe that the other person is in some psychological state without experiencing what they experience; that is, we ascribe a certain state to the other person without sharing it (de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012, p. 305).

[10] Sanford and Emmott use the term *hot cognition* to capture the ways in which "emotion and feeling interact with cognitive activities", and for them cognition itself involves "acts of perceiving, understanding and thinking" (2012, p. 191).

[11] Regarding *narrative* empathy, Keen states that "narrative empathy invoked by reading must involve cognition, for reading itself relies upon complex cognitive operations" (2006, p. 213).

2.2.2 Empathy involves an other-oriented (emotional) response and perspective taking

Empathy is other-directed since it involves an understanding of the other in their circumstances (Gallagher 2012, p. 376). This has been called the *imagine other perspective* (sic) (Batson 1991, as cited in Batson 2009, p. 7), and involves a focus on the other's feelings and thoughts (Singer and Lamm 2009, p. 90). If an emotional response is involved, this is seen necessarily as other-oriented, meaning that the empathiser's emotions are more to do with the target's experience than with the empathiser's. Empathy, then, is taken to require other-oriented responses and perspective taking, whereby a person represents the other person's situation from the other's point of view and tries to simulate their experiences as if he/she were the target individual (Coplan, 2011a, p. 10). An other-oriented form of perspective taking distinguishes empathy from self-oriented perspective taking, which involves imagining oneself being in the target's situation (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 90) (see 2.3.3 for a brief discussion of self-oriented perspective taking).

The actual role of perspective taking (i.e., adopting another's point of view) in experiences of empathy is also a matter of debate. Perspective taking (also called 'role-taking' by social and developmental psychologists) involves "using the imagination to undergo a shift from one's own cognitive perspective to the cognitive perspective of the target individual" (Coplan, 2004, p. 144). Coplan regards perspective taking as one of the cognitive processes we draw on to achieve empathy (2004, p. 143). Perspective taking, thus, might be *one of the means* to get to understand another's inner state, but there may be other means. Reading the other's facial expression might enable us to

understand his/her mental states without the need for perspective taking (Besel and Yuille, 2010, as cited in Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5). Cuff and colleagues consider that, when lacking facial or verbal emotional cues, an observer might resort to perspective taking, imagination or memory, and so the observer might make inferences from previous personal experiences (2016, p. 5) (see 2.2.6 on the central role of imaginative perspective taking in reenactive empathy).

2.2.3 Empathy does not necessarily result in any behavioural outcomes

In discussing empathy, one needs to distinguish between (i) the (emotional) response which results from perceiving or attributing inner states to another person, and (ii) the behaviour or types of action which might follow from the former. Regarding (ii), empathy is often associated with pro-social and altruistic motivations which result in other-oriented helping behaviour (for evidence on the link between empathy and prosocial behaviour see, e.g., Batson (1991), Eisenberg (2000), Singer and Lamm (2009); see also section 2.7.1(c) for a brief discussion of the empathy-altruism hypothesis).

It has been debated whether empathy has any behavioural outcomes. There is some consensus that empathy *does not necessarily* result in prosocial responses (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6; Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 84). In fact, we can empathise with another person "without experiencing concern for her well-being" (Coplan, 2004, p. 145). The distinction between empathy and sympathy becomes relevant at this point. Sympathy, or empathic concern, is usually associated with feeling concern for the other's well-being, and is coupled with a desire or impulse to help (Coplan, 2004, p. 145). Sympathy is an emotional response consisting of "feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or the

needy other (rather than feeling the same emotion as the other)" (Eisenberg, 2000, p. 678) (see 2.3.2 for a brief discussion of sympathy).

2.2.4 The empathiser grasps and vicariously experiences the target's perceived mental state

In experiences of empathy the empathiser's response is triggered by what he/she *perceives* or infers is the mental state of the target. This representation of the target's state means that interpretative processes are always involved in empathy (Hollan, 2012b, p. 83). In fact, "empathy thrives on how the empathic person *presupposes* that the other feels, not on how he actually feels" (Stalnaker 1999, as cited in Vreeke and van der Mark 2003, p. 180, original emphasis). The empathetic response therefore results from what the empathiser understands the other's emotional state or situation to be; that is, what the empathiser thinks the target feels or would be expected to feel in a given situation (Decety, 2010, p. 258). In Keen's words, empathy involves "mirroring what a person might be expected to feel in that condition or context"; that is, "we feel what we believe to be the emotions of others" (2006, p. 208). However, the literature does not clarify whether, and the extent to which, this understanding is conscious.

An important question in current empathy debates concerns the degree of accuracy of such mental-state attributions; that is, the extent to which the empathiser's perception matches the target's perception of his/her internal state (Batson, 2009, p. 10). This issue has been differently labelled as *affective matching* (Coplan, 2011a) or *affective congruence* (Cuff et al., 2016).

Since emotion ascription is often involved, the question arises whether and to what extent the respective feelings (target's and empathiser's) have to be similar. For instance, the empathiser might end up feeling an emotion which is quite different from the one being experienced by the target. Affective matching depends, among other things, on the empathiser's ability to accurately infer the target's emotion in context. This ability, in turn, depends on the extent to which the target expresses their emotional experience, be it through body language, facial expression, verbal language, or any of the resources for the communication of emotion (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5). Context plays a crucial role — circumstances might need to be considered in order for the empathiser to judge the target's mental states because, even when the target's response is observed directly, the target's expression may be ambiguous (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 209).

Scholars have found a way around the issue of affective matching — *similarity of emotion* settles the problem for most researchers. This is what de Vignemont and Jacob call the *interpersonal similarity condition*; that is, the target's and empathiser's affective states have to "stand in some similarity relation" (2012, p. 306). It is generally agreed, then, that the empathiser's emotion does not have to be a perfect match of the target's (Cuff et al. 2016, p. 148). Rather, target's and empathiser's emotions need to be qualitatively the same although they may vary in degree and intensity (Coplan 2004, p. 144; Coplan 2011a, p. 6). Thus, the respective internal states must be similar but need not be identical (Cuff et al. 2016, p. 7) since it is unlikely that the respective emotions are exactly the same (Stotland et al., 1978, as cited in Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5). These isomorphic feelings distinguish empathy from sympathy, since sympathetic emotions

(e.g., sorrow, concern) are only felt by the sympathiser and are not the same as the target's (see 2.3.2).

2.2.5 The empathiser is aware that the target is the source of the response

All empathy scholars agree that a distinction between self and other has to be maintained during empathetic experiences. This means that the empathiser is able to distinguish between his/her own affective states and the target's (Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 6). The empathiser must know that the source of his/her emotional response is external (i.e., the target) (Coplan, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Singer and Lamm, 2009; Cuff et al., 2016). The empathiser is therefore aware that their feeling results from perceiving the target's emotion (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6), and so the empathiser consciously attributes the emotional state to the target (Gallagher, 2012, p. 359).

Crucially, a self-other distinction allows the empathiser to simulate the target's experiences "without losing the ability to simultaneously experience his or her own separate thoughts, emotions, and desires" (Coplan, 2004, p. 144). If this condition of self-other distinction[12] is not met, the experience would be closer to emotional contagion (Decety and Lamm, 2006; de Vignemont and Singer, 2006) since the empathiser would believe that the feeling is his/her own (Cuff et al. 2016, p. 6) (see 2.3.1 for a brief discussion of emotional contagion).

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[12] Even though scholars point towards the need for a clear sense of one's own separate identity (Coplan, 2004, p. 143), evidence from neuroscience suggests that some degree of self-other merging is necessary (Cuff et al. 2016, p. 6). See Kaufman & Libby's (2012) notion of 'experience-taking', in which self-other boundaries become blurred.

2.2.6 Empathy is a form of simulation

Empathy is a form of simulation whereby the empathiser forms a representation of the target's state, and re-enacts the target's mental state and activity in his/her own mind by adopting their perspective. Empathy is commonly discussed together with the notion of theory of mind. *Theory of mind (ToM)* refers to the "ability to understand that others have beliefs about the world that are different from [our] own, and a consequence of running [our] ToM is that [we] impute certain beliefs about the world to others" (Stockwell, 2009, p. 139). In other words, ToM refers to our ability to infer other people's mental states which cause action, such as beliefs and desires, intentions and emotions (Baron-Cohen, 2001, p. 169; Burke et al., 2016, p. 10). ToM enables us (i) to ascribe mental states to another person and, (ii) on that basis, to make inferences which predict and explain that person's actions (Marraffa, n.d., para. 1).

In the current ToM debate within cognitive science and philosophy of mind, both 'theory theory' and 'simulation theory' use the concept of empathy to account for the way in which we get to know what other people think and feel (see Stueber, 2006). Advocates of theory theory argue that we are able to imagine other people's internal states by drawing on our own folk psychological principles of what people generally are likely to think and feel (Batson, 2009, p. 9). Simulation theorists, on the other hand, argue that we can understand other people's mental states by projecting ourselves into their situation (Batson, 2009, p. 9). When we put ourselves in the shoes of another, we "project ourselves imaginatively into another person's perspective by simulating their mental activity using our own mental apparatus" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 85).

Broadly speaking, I take a simulation-based approach to empathy in line with philosophers Amy Coplan (2004, 2011a, 2011b) and Karsten Stueber (2006, 2012, 2013), and cognitive narratologist Marco Caracciolo (2014).

Empathy as a form of simulation is embedded within current neuroscientific debates about the role of mirror neurons. Neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese and others have associated empathy with mirroring or resonance processes which allow us to use our own motor system as a model to understand others' actions (Gallagher, 2012, p. 355). The same applies to our ability to understand other people's emotional states — "to understand what another person is feeling, we simulate his feelings using our own affective programs" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 85).

Within this line of research it has been proposed that shared neural representations are activated when we try to understand other people's actions and mental states (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 84). These shared representations provide the empathiser with a simulation of the target's corresponding sensorimotor or mental states (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 84). Put differently, when we observe others performing actions or experiencing sensations a representation of those actions or sensations is activated in our mind (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 213). Findings from neuroscience show that sharing others' emotions activates neural structures which are also active when we experience that emotion first-hand (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 81). This shared representations account has become "the dominant neuroscientifically motivated approach to understanding the mechanisms underlying empathy" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 82).

Within the simulation approach, some scholars conceive of two kinds of empathy —
basic empathy and *reenactive empathy* — depending on the extent to which our
imaginative perspective-taking skills are involved. Basic empathy refers to "the basic
level of neuronal resonance phenomena" which gets automatically activated when we
observe other people's bodily actions and expressions (Stueber, 2012, as cited in
Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 6). This perceptual phenomenon is connected to
the mirror neuron system (Stueber, 2006, p. 147).

However, basic empathy is not enough when it comes to understanding others in
complex social situations (Gallagher, 2012, p. 358). Both philosopher Stueber and
neuroscientist Decety argue that something else is necessary; namely *reenactive*
empathy. This mechanism involves a higher-order simulation of the other person's
mental states (Gallagher, 2012, p. 358) which enables us to grasp their thoughts, beliefs,
desires and so on by putting ourselves mentally in their shoes. That is, we imagine the
situation that the other person is facing, and we try to re-enact their thought processes
in our own mind (Stueber, 2012, p. 60).

The simulationist view of empathy regards our imaginative perspective-taking abilities
as central to experiences of empathy. Simulation theorists consider that understanding
other people involves "resonance phenomena that engage our cognitively intricate
capacities of imaginatively adopting the perspective of another person and re-enacting
or recreating their thought processes" (Stueber, 2013, para. 16). In short, when we
empathise we form a representation of the target's psychological states and we simulate

or reconstruct the target's experience and mental activity by adopting their perspective (Coplan, 2011a, pp. 5-6).

2.3 Related psychological phenomena

Examining the above definitional criteria is helpful when it comes to distinguishing empathy from a range of psychological processes which are regarded as being somehow related to but functionally distinct from empathy — emotional contagion and motor mimicry, sympathy, self-oriented perspective taking, and personal distress. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that although they are different phenomena, they might occur together with empathy since the latter is "simply one part of a large spectrum of a person's possible vicarious responses towards others" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 82).

The similarity between empathy and some of these processes is that they involve some kind of affective change induced in the observer. The differences between empathy and these processes boil down to conditions such as (i) whether the response involves shared feelings which are similar to the target's, (ii) whether there is some degree of self-other differentiation, or (iii) whether the resulting response is other-oriented (for a fuller account of the similarities and differences between empathy and these processes see, e.g., Batson, 2009, and Coplan, 2011a, 2011b). Table 2.1 provides a summary of these differences:

Table 2.1. *Distinguishing empathy from other related psychological processes*

Psychological processes	Does it involve shared feelings which are similar to the target's?	Does it involve self-other differentiation?	Does it involve an other-oriented response?
Empathy	yes	yes	yes
Emotional contagion	yes	no	n/a
Sympathy	no	yes	yes
Self-oriented perspective taking	n/a	n/a	no
Personal distress	n/a	n/a	no

In the following I briefly comment on the similarities and differences between empathy and each process in turn.

2.3.1 Emotional contagion and motor mimicry

Emotional contagion, or primitive empathy, is defined as the "tendency to automatically mimic and synchronise expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person's and, consequently, to converge emotionally" (Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, 1993, p. 96). Emotional contagion sometimes involves motor mimicry, but not always — mimicry may occur without any emotional component and, similarly, emotional contagion may occur without motor mimicry being involved (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 83). An example of emotional contagion is when a new-born baby starts crying when it hears another baby crying. Examples of mimicry would be the mirroring of affective facial expressions such as a smile or a frown. Emotional contagion and motor mimicry can contribute to empathetic responses but they may not be "necessary nor sufficient processes for the experience of empathy" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 84).

Both empathy and emotional contagion involve sharing another person's emotions, but there is an important difference. Emotional contagion involves little or no self-other differentiation (Coplan, 2004, p. 145); that is, the person who catches another's emotions is not aware that the source of the emotions is *that other person* instead of him/herself. Differently put, in emotional contagion there is no "discrimination between one's own feelings and those of the other" (de Waal, 1996, p. 80).

2.3.2 Sympathy or empathic concern

The terms *empathy* and *sympathy* are commonly "used interchangeably in everyday speech" (Wales, 2011, p. 133), and their definitions remain entangled both in popular and academic usage (Keen, 2013, para. 10). Even though they often occur simultaneously (Coplan, 2004, p. 145), it is important to keep them apart. A great deal of confusion has arisen from the fact that both terms have been used by some scholars to label the same phenomenon[13] — "feeling for another who is suffering" — an emotional response which has been labelled as *sympathy*, *pity* or *compassion* (Batson, 2009, p. 8).

Sympathy shares two of empathy's features: it involves self-other differentiation, and it is an other-oriented response since sympathetic emotions are related to the target's emotions (Coplan, 2004, p. 145). But there is a significant difference: whereas empathy involves feeling *as* the other, sympathy is about feeling *for* the other (Hein and Singer, 2008, p. 157). As noted earlier, empathy involves sharing the other person's emotional

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[13] The blurring of the lines between empathy and sympathy might date back to the eighteenth century. The philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith used the concept of sympathy to explain a range of psychological processes, including the process by which we get to experience other people's emotions. This suggests that they sought to "get the concept to do multiple duty" (Coplan and Goldie, 2011, p. xi).

experience, meaning that both empathiser and target are in the same or a similar emotional state (Gallagher, 2012, p. 358). In contrast, sympathy involves being in a different affective state (Gallagher, 2012, p. 359), usually sorrow or concern (Eisenberg, 2000, p. 678). Therefore, sympathy is often regarded as being more concerned with the sympathiser's feelings towards the target than with the actual sharing of emotions (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 2).

2.3.3 Self-oriented perspective taking

Perspective taking, which is central to my conceptualisation of empathy, refers to "an imaginative process through which one constructs another person's subjective experience by simulating the experience of being in the other's situation" (Coplan, 2011a, p. 9). There are two varieties of perspective taking: an "imagine-self" or self-oriented perspective, and an "imagine-other" or other-oriented perspective (Batson, 2009, p. 7). An "imagine-self" perspective is about imagining oneself in the other person's situation, whereas an "imagine-other" perspective involves a focus on the other person's feelings and thoughts (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 90). These two kinds of perspective taking have sometimes been conflated in the literature "despite empirical evidence suggesting that they should not be"[14] (Batson, 2009, p. 7).

In self-oriented perspective taking, "I imagine what it's like for *me* to be in *your* situation" (Coplan, 2011a, p. 9, original emphasis). Coplan regards such a form of perspective taking as *pseudo-empathy* (2011b, p. 54) because "people often mistakenly

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[14] Cognitive neuroscientist Decety and collaborators have found that the neurological underpinnings of self-oriented and other-oriented forms of perspective taking are different (see Coplan, 2011a, p. 14, footnote 51).

believe that it provides them with access to the other person's point of view when it does not" (Coplan, 2011a, p. 12). The reason is that engaging in self-oriented perspective taking might lead to mistakes in prediction and attribution. Self-oriented perspective taking may prevent other-oriented emotional responses and might even lead to personal distress (Coplan, 2011a, p. 10). As Singer and Lamm put it, "imagining oneself in a potentially harmful situation might (...) trigger a stronger aversive response than imagining someone else in the same situation" (2009, p. 90) (see 2.3.4 below on personal distress).

2.3.4 Personal distress

Another psychological process which differs from empathy is personal distress. When encountering another person's suffering, the observer can experience a self-centred "aversive distress response" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 84) which may result in a withdrawal response (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 92). These feelings of unease, discomfort and anxiety have been called *empathy* (Krebs, 1975) *empathic distress* (Hoffman, 1981) and *personal distress* (Batson, 1991) according to Batson (2009, p. 7).

Personal distress differs from empathy and sympathy in that the observer's response is self-oriented rather than other-oriented. In experiences of personal distress we focus more on our own emotional state than the target's (Batson, 2009, p. 10), and so personal distress does not involve a sympathetic, altruistic motivation. Rather, feelings of personal distress, anxiety and uneasiness can result in a selfish motivation to reduce

such distress[15] (Batson, 2009, p. 11; Singer and Lamm 2009, p. 90). Whether personal

distress is brought about or not when witnessing another person's suffering depends on

the observer's ability for emotional regulation[16] and self-other differentiation.

Having laid down the conceptual framework of empathy to be used in this research

project, I now turn to the relationship between real-world and narrative empathy. This

will set the ground for the remainder of the chapter, which deals with issues around

narrative reading, characters, readerly responses and, finally, narrative empathy.

2.4 Real-world empathy vs. narrative empathy

Traditionally there has been a divide between the disciplines that study interpersonal

empathy or empathy with others in real-world scenarios (i.e., cognitive science, social

and developmental psychology, philosophy of mind) and the disciplines that examine

narrative empathy or empathy with story-world (and often fictional) characters (i.e.,

philosophical aesthetics, cognitive psychology, film studies, literary criticism) (Harrison,

2008, p. 256). This segregation has led to a situation where "an integrated account of

the relationship between narrative and interpersonal empathy has not been fully

realised" (Harrison, 2008, pp. 256-257). Even though such a task falls outside the scope

of my study, it seems relevant to mention one potential area of controversy surrounding

narrative empathy. This section briefly reports on discussions around potential

differences and similarities in experiences of empathy depending on whether the targets

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[15] Experiencing personal distress in response to narrative "usually interrupts and sometimes terminates the narrative transaction: the distressed responder puts the book down, leaves the theater, or turns off the transmission" (Keen, 2013, para. 3).

[16] Emotional self-regulation is key in the helping professions (e.g. doctors, nurses, counsellors, etc.), where high emotional arousal of other-oriented emotions may hinder the capacity to help effectively (Batson, 2009, p. 11).

of empathetic responses are real-world or story-world (possibly fictional) beings. Even though the characters in my dataset are non-fictional (see 4.1), the following discussion about recipients' responses to (fictional) narratives helps me further establish my position regarding the status of narrative empathy.

At its most basic level, empathy involves the grasping and sharing of mental states, including emotional experiences (see 2.2). With regard to emotions, there are contrasting views on the differences and similarities between the kind of emotions we experience when engaged with real persons and the kind of emotions we experience in relation to fictional characters. Those who think there are fundamental differences between the two kinds of emotions take the ontological status[17] of characters as non-existent beings as the basis of their argument. Following this direction, some philosophers argue that "characters do not exist at all" (Eder, Jannidis and Schneider, 2010, p. 8). The *paradox of emotional response to fiction* refers to the view that

> since fictional characters do not exist, and we know this, it seems we cannot, despite appearances, literally have towards them bona fide emotions — ones such as pity, love, or fear — since these presuppose belief in the existence of the appropriate objects (Levinson, 1990, p. 79)

In other words, "the 'paradox of fiction' questions whether genuine emotion can be felt in response to a fictitious character or event" (Dadlez, 1997; Hjort and Laver, 1997; as cited in Keen, 2013, para. 5). In this view, real-life cases of emotional arousal are regarded as being different from fictional cases, the latter resulting in so-called *quasi-*

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[17] There are several positions regarding the ontological or existential status of characters; e.g., semiotic, philosophical, and cognitive accounts (see 2.5.1).

emotions[18]. A proposed solution to the paradox is that "existence beliefs are not necessary for emotional responses (e.g. Peter Lamarque, who argues that we 'mentally represent' characters or events rather than 'believe' in them)" (Harrison, 2008, p. 272). In this respect, my position regarding the ontological status of characters is that taken by cognitive theories, which consider characters as "representations of imaginary beings" in the minds of text recipients (Eder et al., 2010, p. 8). I will have more to say about the study and perception of characters in 2.5.1.

These arguments on narrative emotions might have implications for the status of narrative empathy depending on whether one considers empathetic emotions to be empathy proper or quasi-empathy. My take on this issue is that the empathetic emotions which readers experience while reading are *fully-fledged empathy*. Our capacity for simulation (see 2.2.6) allows us to be moved emotionally by story-world events and characters' experiences, and so the emotions generated while reading literature are *actual* emotions: "we do not feel *fictional* sadness, or *imaginary* melancholy, or *pretend* laughter during literary experiences" (Stockwell, 2015, p. 238, original emphasis). Neuroscientists Decety and Jackson state that empathy is a natural capacity to understand other people's feelings "whether one actually witnessed his or her situation, perceived it from a photograph, *read about it in a fiction book*, or merely imagined it" (2004, p. 71, my emphasis). In our everyday lives we can thus experience empathetic responses with real others who are either physically present or absent when we learn about them through texts, images or any other medium.

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[18] Walton (1978) considers that quasi-emotions result from our beliefs about what is fictionally the case. Our fear in horror films is "only make-believedly true" because we think the monsters make-believedly exist and so we end up experiencing quasi-fear (as cited in Schneider, n.d., para. 10).

Regarding narrative, fictional or imagined others, for some researchers the fact that people rely on imagination when responding emotionally to narrative (including fictional) entities does not make narrative empathy any different from real-life empathy. Some argue that "there is little functional difference between empathy for a real, fictional, or absent person" (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5; see also Nomura and Akai, 2012). In fact, audiences respond emotionally and physiologically to fictional events as if they were real (Nell, 1988; Gerrig, 1998; as cited in Nomura and Akai, 2012, p. 304), and may experience strong emotional responses to fictional texts despite being fully aware of their fictive status (Frijda, 2007, p. 10). As Mar, Oatley, Djikic and Mullin put it, because empathy

> can entail the imagination of another's emotion, rather than strictly the observation of an emotion, empathy can easily be applied to fictional characters created through our imagination in interaction with a narrative (2011, p. 824)

My approach to narrative empathy thus hinges on the widely acknowledged assumption that empathy can be a response to cues about a story-world, fictional or imaginary person, and so empathetic experiences while reading are fully fledged empathy (see Decety and Jackson, 2004; Pelligra, 2011; Singer and Lamm, 2009; as cited in Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5).

2.5 Narrative reading

This section highlights important considerations in the study of narrative reading, such as characters and characterisation (2.5.1), mind-modelling (2.5.2), and readers' responses

and experiences when engaging with stories and their inhabitants (i.e., characters) (2.5.3).

2.5.1 Characters and characterisation

The process of "reading involves *a personal relationship* between natural people out in the world and virtual people inside the world of the text"; that is, characters (Stockwell, 2009, p. 137, emphasis added). Characters are not only central to stories but also an important source of readers' responses (Eder et al., 2010, p. 46). Given that story characters are the targets of narrative empathy, characters and characterisation are fundamental to my study. For my purposes, *characterisation* is understood as the way in which characters are (i) textually constructed and (ii) perceived and interpreted by readers. In this section I discuss important points around the notions of character and characterisation — what characters are, the link between characters and language, the relationship between characters and real people, and what the process of characterisation involves. In the final part of the section I review Culpeper's (2001) model of characterisation.

What characters are

Characters can be defined as "fictive persons or fictional analoga (sic) to human beings" (Eder et al., 2010, p. 7). Characters may fulfil a range of criteria such as being animate, being human-like, and having person status, and they may fulfil or deviate from these criteria to different extents (Eder et al., 2010, p. 10). At its very core, however, a character is a fictional being to which recipients ascribe the ability to act and think (Eder et al., 2010, p. 10). Thus, characters have some essential properties — corporeality, psyche and

sociality — which relate to how we perceive human beings in the real world (Eder et al., 2010, p. 13). *Corporeality* refers to readers' ascription of body and mind to characters; that is, an outer appearance and inner states. *Psyche* refers to readers' attribution of mental states to characters, such as thoughts and perceptions, aims and feelings (see 2.5.2). *Sociality* refers to the social relationship and interaction of characters with their environment, which gives rise to social roles. These three properties may be ascribed to characters as more stable or dynamic features (Eder et al., p. 13).

Several disciplines have been concerned with the analysis of characters since the 19th century: literary studies, theatre studies, film and media studies, communication studies, history of art, philosophy and psychology (Eder et al., p. 5). There are four dominant paradigms when it comes to the analysis of character: (i) hermeneutic approaches, (ii) psychoanalytic approaches, (iii) structuralist and semiotic approaches, and (iv) cognitive theories (Eder et al., p. 5). My work falls within the last paradigm:

> Cognitive theories, which have been established since the 1980s, centre on modelling in detail the cognitive and affective operations of information processing. In these approaches, characters are regarded as text-based constructs of the human mind, whose analysis requires both models of understanding text and models of the human psyche (Eder, Jannidis and Schneider, 2010, p. 5)

The position taken by cognitive theories is the one that best accommodates a cognitive stylistic study of narrative empathy because of its two-fold concern with understanding both textual and readerly phenomena. Regarding the ontological or existential status of characters, four positions can be established, ranging from semiotic theories where characters are signs or structures of texts, to philosophical accounts where characters

are seen as either abstract objects or, in a more extreme view, as beings that do not exist whatsoever (Eder et al., p. 8). The most relevant for my purposes is, once again, the position of cognitive approaches, which "assume that characters are representations of imaginary beings in the minds of the audience" (Eder et al., p. 8). This is, in McIntyre's words, "the view currently dominant within stylistics" (2014, p. 150).

These are not unimportant considerations because "what one takes character to be will influence what one says about characterisation" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 94). The definition of character one uses entails a certain ontological stance (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 117), and so will determine the way characters are analysed (Eder et al., p. 8). In this thesis characters are regarded as mental representations in the reader's mind which are shaped by a combination of textual linguistic input and readers' background knowledge and experiences. The interaction between these aspects will be explored below when surveying Culpeper's (2001) model.

Language and characters

In analysing and interpreting characters, the analyst is confronted with the question of "how characters can be understood, interpreted and experienced, and *by which stylistic devices they are shaped*" (Eder et al., p. 4, my emphasis). My study is concerned with the stylistic devices which shape the characters in Galeano's short stories, and so my data is made up of language-based texts (i.e., the semiotic code is written language rather than sounds or images). Within the field of stylistics it is assumed that linguistic choices in texts contribute to characterisation. So much so that language is thought to be key to characterisation since characters are what readers infer from the words on the page —

textual linguistic choices guide readers' interpretation of characters (van Peer, 1988, p. 9).

Characters and real people

It is generally agreed that recipients resort to knowledge about people in the real world when understanding fictional characters (Eder et al., p. 7). This is a staple assumption behind Culpeper's (2001) work — we "attempt to interpret characters, despite their imaginary status, in large part with knowledge about people acquired through our real life experiences" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 95) — an idea that is supported by empirical evidence (see Gernsbacher et al., 1992; Graesser et al., 1994). However, there are important differences between fictional beings and real people which give rise to differences in the way we infer characteristics from either (Culpeper, 2001, p. 145). Some of these are:

- *Fictionality*: Because characters are constructed in fictional texts they owe their existence to the text. In contrast, if a real person is represented in a (non-) fictional text they do not owe their existence to such text (Eder et al., p. 11).

- *Communicative mediation*: Culpeper highlights that, given the discourse framework of literary works, where characters are part of an act of communication between author and reader, character behaviours acquire a greater relevance and significance than those of people in the real world (2001, p. 145). Characters are textually constructed and (re)presented, and so readers can "shift their attention from the level of what is represented (…) to the level of presentation" (Eder et al., p. 11). This has implications for the emotional reactions of recipients since they can react to characters themselves, to their

(re)presentation, to the meanings they convey, to the intentions of the text producer, or to the potential effects they may have (Eder et al., p. 16) (see 2.5.3 for a discussion of artefact vs. fictional emotions).

- *Ontological incompleteness*: Characters are ontologically incomplete, so if any information about them is missing from the text the information remains unavailable to recipients (Eder et al., 2010, p. 11). Of course, readers may fill the gaps by resorting to prior knowledge. Culpeper makes a similar point stating that fictional character behaviours are complete (2001, p. 145) whereas we never gain a complete behavioural record of the people around us (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017 p. 96).

- *Knowledge sources*: Another important difference is to do with the knowledge sources we resort to when encountering characters. Recipients can draw on knowledge about real people and the actual social world, but also on knowledge about characters and fictional worlds. This matter is also addressed below.

The process of characterisation

Eder, Jannidis and Schneider (2010, p. 32) define characterisation as

> the process of connecting information with a figure in a text so as to provide a character in the fictional world with a certain property, or properties, concerning body, mind, behaviour, or relations to the (social) environment. From the perspective of reception, this distribution of information about a character corresponds to processes of understanding the character: textual cues or signs activate inferences based on different kinds of knowledge about reality as well as about media and communication.

On that account, characterisation can be seen as "a process to which both the text and the recipient contribute" (Eder et al., p. 34). Characterisation is a *dynamic process* whereby recipients ascribe properties (or character traits) to characters in the course of reception (Eder et al., p. 30) and in so doing recipients form impressions of characters in their minds (Culpeper, 2001, p. 2). The specific ways in which all of this might be achieved is discussed next.

Culpeper's (2001) cognitive stylistic model of characterisation

The theoretical perspectives introduced in the introductory chapter (see 1.5) try to describe the interaction between textual information and readers' mental processes and previous experience. I also draw on a specific model — Culpeper's (2001) cognitive stylistic model of characterisation — to further understand and examine the interaction between text and reader. This model falls within the subfield of cognitive stylistics, which "as outlined in Semino and Culpeper (2002), approaches characterisation by combining linguistic analysis with cognitive considerations in order to shed light on the construction and comprehension of fictional characters" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 93). Culpeper's (2001) model is, thus, the basis for my analytical exploration of characters and characterisation techniques in Galeano's short stories (Chapter 4), and my participants' perceptions of characters (Chapter 6).

Also useful is Ralph Schneider's (2001) model, which offers an account of how readers construct mental models of characters as they read. Both Culpeper (2001) and Schneider (2001) are so-called *mixed models* of characterisation. In explaining how readers understand characters, both models articulate the integration between textual

information and information from readers' knowledge (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 103).

Jonathan Culpeper (2001) proposes a theory of characterisation in which he sets out to investigate how the language of texts creates particular impressions of characters in readers (p. 1). It is worth noting at the very start that Culpeper's model was developed for analysing character and characterisation in drama (in particular the dialogue of plays) (p. 1), and so our data differs — he focuses on drama while I focus on narrative. Even though a great deal of Culpeper's insights are applicable to narrative, some of his discussion is not fully suitable for analysing my data. For example, an important difference between narrative and drama is that in the former the intervening narrator may guide readers' perceptions of character, whereas in the latter "characters are not typically filtered through narrators" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 93). To tackle this issue I draw on other sources when relevant to make the analytical tools workable for my purposes. For instance, Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla (2017) extend the scope of the discussion on characterisation to narrative, and include some useful considerations to analyse how narrators may contribute to characterisation.

Interaction between textual cues and readers' prior knowledge

Culpeper's (2001) model of characterisation is very much suited to my own approach to readerly experiences of empathy because it puts forward that characterisation is a process that results from a combination of readers' prior knowledge and textual

information[19]. When we form cognitive representations about anything in the real world there are two potential information sources: the external stimuli and our prior knowledge (p. 27). When reading texts, the external stimulus is the raw text, whereas prior knowledge is to do with "the past knowledge and experience stored in the mind", which is held in long-term memory (p. 28). Thus, two processes are involved when we form cognitive representations, such as impressions of characters:

> Cognitive processes that are primarily determined by an external stimulus have been referred to as 'bottom-up' or 'data-driven' processes, while cognitive processes that are primarily determined by the application of past knowledge have been referred to as 'top-down' or 'conceptually-driven' processes (see, for example, Eysenck and Keane 1990) (Culpeper, 2001, p. 28)

Even though impressions of characters result from the interaction between the knowledge stored in the reader's mind and the incoming textual information[20] (p. 56), I now discuss the first of these two aspects, and will come back to textual information in 3.2.2.4, where I examine a number of textual factors that may be involved in empathy.

The role of prior knowledge

Prior knowledge is thought to play a key role in forming impressions of characters. In order to explain how readers draw on their real-world knowledge Culpeper's model is informed by cognitive psychological theories, especially social cognition (p. 47). In what follows I discuss the role of schemata, impression formation and attribution in shaping character inferences. For reasons of space, my review is necessarily a simplified account

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[19] The interplay between readers' background and textual features is also key in Caracciolo's (2014) model (see 1.5.2), which considers the relationship between textual design and readers' experiential background. Both models (Culpeper's and Caracciolo's) take a cognitive stance on their respective object of study: they both draw on cognitive theories to understand and hypothesise about recipients' interpretations.

[20] Schneider's (2001) account of characterisation is rather similar: "characterisation occurs when readers combine knowledge stored in their long-term memory (i.e. prior world knowledge) with textual knowledge accumulated in their working memory" (McIntyre, 2014, p. 152).

of Culpeper's discussion (for a fuller account of the complexities behind these notions see Culpeper, 2001, chapters 2 and 3).

(Social) schemata

In information processing it is thought that schemata might be the basis of top-down (or conceptually-driven) cognitive processes (p. 64). Schemata can be defined as "structured bundles of generic knowledge" (p. 28). Schemata are assumed to be inactive in our mind until they are cued and made active in the interpretative process (p. 67). Active schemata lead to expectations which guide our processing (p. 65). Our schematic knowledge "shapes how we view, remember, and make inferences about new information" (p. 64), and so "schema-based expectations guide perception, memory and inference toward schema-relevant information, and often toward schema-consistent information" (p. 65). As a consequence, people "more easily pay attention to, memorise and recall information that is consistent with expectations derived from their schemata" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 99).

Text comprehension involves "finding a configuration of schemata that offers an adequate account of the information in the text" (p. 82). So when it comes to text comprehension "schemata enable us to construct an interpretation, a representation (...) in memory that contains more than the information we receive from the text" (p. 66). This means that extra pieces of information can be supplied by our schematic knowledge, which allows for additional inferencing (p. 66). Therefore, text comprehension requires inferencing processes, thus generating information which is not explicitly given in the text (p. 66). Differences in comprehension can be the result of

differences in the schemata held by different people (p. 68). People who belong to the same culture might share similarities in schemata (Emmott, 1997, p. 71); however, because people undergo different experiences in their lives they end up forming different schemata (Culpeper, p. 68).

Social schemata are involved when we make inferences regarding people around us. Social cognition has looked into "how people categorise others, how these categories (often referred to as schemata) contain generalised or stereotypic information, and how this information is used in social inferencing" (p. 71). When perceiving others, we tend to perceive people as members of social groups rather than as individuals (p. 75). Culpeper suggests three groups of social categories that we use when perceiving others, which are based on different types of information. *Personal categories* include knowledge about people's interests, preferences, habits, traits and goals (p. 75). *Social role categories* refer to knowledge about people's social functions such as kinship roles, occupational roles, and relational roles, and any individual may belong to several at the same time (p. 76). Finally, *group membership categories* are those to do with knowledge about social groups based on sex, race, class, age, nationality or religion (p. 76). Connections between these three groupings are contained within social schemata (p. 76). Culpeper regards social schemata as networks of relationships between categories, and so "when a category is activated, so too is the network of which it is part" (p. 77).

Regarding characterisation, social schemata explain "the basis of knowledge-based inferences about characters, inferences which can 'fill out' an impression of character and be manipulated for particular effects" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p.

99). In forming impressions of characters, readers can resort to two different kinds of top-down knowledge: real-life knowledge about people, and also knowledge about fictional characters (p. 87). Similarly, Eder, Jannidis and Schneider (2010) elaborate on the types of knowledge recipients can draw on to make inferences about characters: person schemata (or social schemata) on the one hand, and character schemata on the other. First, social knowledge includes:

> person schemata; images of human nature; social categories; prototypes and stereotypes; knowledge of patterns of social interaction; groups and roles; folk psychology and sociology; the dynamics of social cognition; attribution and the interpretation of behaviour (e.g., the so-called fundamental attribution error); the knowledge of prototypical persons and last, but not least, the self-image of the reader (Eder et al., 2010, p. 14).

In addition, recipients can activate their media and narrative knowledge about fictional worlds, which includes:

> an awareness that is guided by the rules and aims of communication as well as media-specific knowledge of genres, modes of narrative, character types, dramaturgical functions, aesthetic conventions, star images, contexts of production, intertextual references, and individual popular characters (Eder et al., 2010, p. 14).

Knowledge about fictional character types thus includes dramatic role knowledge and genre knowledge since certain genres (e.g. tragedies, comedies, detective stories, etc.) typically include a set of dramatic roles (Culpeper, p. 87).

Impression formation

In developing impressions, a different emphasis may be placed on top-down and on bottom-up processes, thus leading to different types of impressions (p. 83). When top-down processing applies (i.e. when prior knowledge comes into play) we form *category-*

based or schema-based impressions, which entail simplification. In contrast, when more emphasis is given to bottom-up processing (i.e. the incoming textual information) the result is a *person-based impression*. In this case, "the impression is made up of the individual attributes of the target person" (83), and so the impression is richer, more complex and personalised (i.e., piecemeal integration).

Attribution

Culpeper uses attribution theories as an explanatory framework for character inferencing (p. 153). He sets out to answer questions related to (a) how readers form relationships between characters' actions and their motivations as well as characters' behaviour and their personality, and (b) what makes some character behaviours more informative than others (p. 113). Attribution theories are well suited for that task since they aim to explain how we infer personality aspects in real life (pp. 113-114). Within social psychology the term *attribution* refers to processes whereby we try to extract causal and personality information from behaviour (p. 115). Attribution theories try to account for how we infer causes and motivations (p. 144) since typically these have to be inferred from observable behaviour (p. 115).

Correspondent inference theory (e.g., Jones and Davis, 1965; Jones and McGillis, 1976; Jones, 1990) aims to "identify the factors that render behaviour informative about an underlying disposition" (p. 116). A *correspondent inference* is made when "there is a degree of correspondence between a person's behaviour and their disposition" (p. 116). Correspondence is scalar — behaviour can vary in the degree to which it is informative

about a person's disposition and so inferences can be more or less correspondent. Some factors can increase or decrease correspondence (see Culpeper, pp. 116-118):

- *Intentionality*. Reasons for behaviour should be attributed to the person's disposition only when the behavioural consequences are regarded as having been intended. However, intentionality is problematic in Culpeper's view: it all depends on "what the interpreter understands the doer's intentions to be, rather than on what the doer's intentions actually are" (p. 119).

- *Freedom of choice/action*. A freely chosen behaviour should be more informative than behaviours which respond to external constraints.

- *Causal ambiguity*. The fewer the reasons for a behaviour the more we can be certain of the cause of the behaviour.

- *Social desirability*. Unusual behaviours and their effects are usually more informative.

Culpeper also draws on covariation theory (Kelley, 1967, 1972, 1973) to explain inferences based on behaviour. Whereas correspondent inference theory focuses on the validity of inferences about someone's disposition by ruling out situational sources of interference, covariation theory focuses on the validity of inferences about someone's environment by ruling out person-based sources of interference (pp. 126-127). Covariation theory attempts to explain how people "decide whether the cause [of a particular behaviour] is located in the person or in the environment" (p. 127). Depending on these internal and external causal *loci*, three possible attributions can be made: a *person* attribution, a *stimulus* attribution, or a *circumstance* attribution (p. 127).

Attribution can be thought of as a scale. At one end is the "kind of careful analysis" described by correspondent inference theory and covariation theory. At the other end "we get by with inferences based on limited information and on our past experience" (p. 136), which would require less cognitive work. Because people tend to take inferential paths which require the least cognitive demands, people resort to causal schemata. *Causal schemas* contain "knowledge about the causes of particular effects" (p. 143). These causal schemas developed by people allow them to "make an attribution on the basis of a single observation with no covariation information at all" (p. 136). These causal schemata are used when people have only partial information.

Different perceiver biases are thought to affect processes of attribution. Empirical evidence suggests that people have a tendency to underestimate the role of contextual factors, so people make correspondent inferences about a person's disposition on the basis of behaviour despite situational constraints (p. 137). This gives rise to a number of perceiver biases such as the fundamental attribution error and the actor-observer bias. The *fundamental attribution error* refers to "the tendency to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behaviour" (Ross, 1977, p. 183, as cited in Culpeper, p. 137). A possible explanation for the fundamental attribution error is that behaviour is perceptually more salient than other situational factors (p. 138).

The *actor-observer bias* refers to the fact that perceivers make different attributions depending on whether they take the role of actor or observer (p. 138). The *actor-observer effect* is to do with the tendency of actors to attribute their actions to the

situation, while observers tend to attribute the observed person's actions to personal dispositions (Jones and Nisbett, 1972, as cited in Culpeper, p. 138). Interestingly the actor-observer bias contains the fundamental attribution error (p. 138). The actor-observer bias can be explained in terms of differences of perspective (p. 139). Augoustinos and Walker (1995, p. 82) state that:

> Observers see the actor acting, but don't see the situation. The actor is salient; the situation is not. Actors, though, don't see themselves acting. They see the situation around them, and are aware of responding to invisible situational forces. Thus, when actors and observers are asked to explain the same event, they give different accounts because different facets of the same event are salient to them.

Most relevantly, scholars have suggested a link between the actor-observer bias and point of view (see Graumann, 1992). Pollard-Gott (1993, p. 506) suggests a link with fictional viewpoint:

> By manipulating point of view and available information, a novel can affect the salience of the various characters and the features of their situations. Increasing the salience of a character's environment or situation will lead the reader-observer to adopt the character's stance to a greater degree and appreciate the myriad mitigating circumstances that seem to govern the character's behaviour (as cited in Culpeper, p. 147)

Point of view could thus be linked to the actor-observer bias. When seeing the fictional world through the eyes of a character, the reader "becomes more of an actor in that world than an observer of it" (p. 147). Three mechanisms can bring readers closer to characters (including character-narrators): first-person narration, internal narration, and a good deal of characters' speech and thought presentation (p. 148).

Thus, if readers are given the internal viewpoint of a character they are likely to attribute character states and behaviours to the context (i.e. contextual explanations for behaviour) (p. 148). In contrast, those characters whose point of view is not adopted in the story (i.e. external viewpoint) are seen by readers in their role of observers, and so they are likely to attribute character states and behaviour to the characters' disposition or personality (i.e. dispositional explanations for behaviour) (p. 148). Hence, readers' perceptions of characters might be manipulated through point of view presentation (p. 149). These insights promise to have important implications for character perception and empathy, and will be further explored in Chapter 6.

2.5.2 Mind-modelling

In 2.2.6, it was mentioned that empathy is often discussed in relation to the notion of Theory of Mind (ToM). On the basis of our ToM ability, we infer and attribute mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, etc.) to other people. In other words, the cognitive phenomenon of mind attribution is underpinned by the function of our Theory of Mind (Nuttall, 2015a, p. 26). Attributing mental states to others "is closely related to our experience of empathy (Hooker et al., 2008)", empathy being stimulated by mental-state cues around us (Nuttall, 2015a, p. 27). The inference and attribution of characters' mental states is "crucial to our understanding of the causality of the events portrayed, and their contribution to a plot" (Nuttall, 2015a, p. 24).

The notion of mind-modelling was developed by Stockwell (2009) as a literary-specific term which is an alternative to the 'Theory of Mind' term used in psychology in order to accommodate the fictionality boundary of literature (p. 140). A precursor to the use of

'mind-modelling' is the important work of Zunshine (2003, 2006) on mind-reading. Mind-modelling refers to our ability to "imagine other people to have a consciousness like our own, and [to] fill in further details about their lives, thoughts and perspectives" (Stockwell, 2015, p. 240). When applied to the context of literary reading, the notion of mind-modelling captures the process whereby "readers imagine versions of authorial, narratorial, and character minds" and establish relationships with them (Stockwell, 2015, p. 240). Readers imagine, model, or mentally construct what is happening inside characters' minds (i.e., their beliefs, knowledge, feelings, motivations, perspective, etc.) "on the basis of the text-driven information" provided in the text (Stockwell, 2015, p. 240; Stockwell, 2009, p. 140).

2.5.3 Emotional experiences in narrative reading

The scope of my study is limited to experiences of narrative empathy in the process of reading mono-modal narrative texts in print (i.e., written language), thus excluding narrative texts in other media (see also 2.6). This involves what Hoffman (2000) calls *verbally mediated empathy* since empathy with an absent other (i.e., a story character) can be triggered by a third party's (i.e., the author's) verbal statements (Blair, 2005; Polasheck, 2003; as cited in Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5). This section deals with the kinds of emotional experiences that may be involved *in the course of* reading narratives[21]. Considering readerly emotional responses paves the way for my subsequent discussion of the notion of narrative empathy (2.6 onwards) since reader emotions are likely to take centre stage in experiences of empathy.

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[21] See Mar et al. (2011) for an overview of emotions at different stages of reading: before, during and after reading. The scope of my discussion is limited to emotional arousal *during* reading.

Emotion has been an important topic within the study of literature (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 195). Although it is assumed that recipients experience emotions while reading, the very nature of emotion itself has been much debated (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 191). It might even be the case that there is no agreement in the literature regarding how to define and classify emotion since there are a great number of competing theories of emotion (Langlotz, 2017, p. 517). Research into emotion is being conducted within disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, computer science, neuroscience and philosophy (Whiteley, 2016, p. 508).

Sanford and Emmott (2012) categorise emotion theories into (i) cognitive appraisal theories and (ii) somatic feeling theories. Cognitive appraisal theories highlight "the role of an experiencer's judgement (appraisal) in assessing the emotion-stimulating situation" (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 191). In other words, these appraisal theories of emotion suggest that emotions arise when the experiencer evaluates the relevance of a given situation to his/her goals and plans, desires and expectations (Whiteley, 2016, p. 508). Somatic feeling theories of emotion draw attention to "the role of an experiencer's body (…) in producing an emotion, either automatically or with less emphasis on intervening judgements than in appraisal theories" (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, pp. 191-192). Yet another contribution comes from social psychological theories of emotion, which emphasise the role of emotions in our interpersonal relationships with others. These models regard emotions as a form of communication with others (Parkinson, 1995, p. 25, as cited in Whiteley, 2016, p. 509) because they elicit responses from others (Decety, 2010, p. 261). Hence, emotions are states of mind that can be regarded as

intrapersonal and interpersonal communication systems and, according to Decety, the

phenomenon of empathy encompasses both such dimensions (2010, p. 261).

A useful account of emotion is that outlined by Langlotz (2017), who draws on work by

Planalp (1999). Emotions are seen as "complex evaluative processes consisting of five

interacting components", which I summarise below (see Langlotz, 2017, pp. 517-520):

- *Objects/causes/eliciting events*. Certain causes stimulate emotions, and so emotions are *about* something.
- *Appraisal processes*. Appraisal theories regard emotions as being triggered by stimuli, but are also accompanied by cognitive processes of evaluation. This situation-specific appraisal "takes into account an agent's goals within a specific situation as well as how relevant the situation is to his/her life and survival" (p. 518). Thus, "the emotional appraisal of a stimulus" depends on "its degree of interference with goal achievement and on its impact for the agent's well-being" (p. 518).
- *Physiological changes*. Appraisals are accompanied by physiological changes in the agent's body.
- *Action tendencies/action/expression*. Emotions create a range of action tendencies (e.g., fight or flight in the case of fear). This also includes the "communicative dimension of expressing emotions" (p. 519).
- *Regulation*. The four previous components of the emotion process — stimuli, appraisal processes, physiological changes, action tendencies — might be regulated (e.g., through techniques such as relaxation).

In short, emotions can be seen as dynamic and complex phenomena which combine

"processes of stimulation, appraisal, physiological arousal, action tendencies and actions

— including emotional communication — and potential acts of regulating these

processes" (Langlotz, p. 520). A final point worth mentioning is that emotions vary in

terms of "quality or valence (positive vs. negative), intensity, and duration" (Langlotz, p.

520).

Readers' emotional responses to narrative have been given increasing attention in research areas such as cognitive stylistics (Whiteley, 2016, p. 507), empirical literary studies (Wales, 2011, p. 10) and narrative comprehension[22] (Emmott, 2005, p. 351). As Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro (2010, p. 14) point out, it was only fairly recently — in the 1980s — that attention began to be given to the affective dimension of the reception of discourse (i.e., readers). Cognitive stylistics has of late revitalised the interest in the role of affect in responses to literature (see Nørgaard, Busse and Montoro, 2010, pp. 13-15, for a fuller discussion of stylistic approaches to emotion).

A wide spectrum of emotions might be involved in the process of narrative reading. Reader emotions have been classified in a number of ways depending on whether or not they are a reaction to what happens within the story-world (i.e., events and existents). For example, Dijkstra et al. (1994) distinguish between *artefact* emotions and *fictional* emotions. Artefact emotions may be about the artefact (i.e., the literary text), such as admiration for the author or appreciation of the text itself; or about the story-world, such as suspense, surprise or curiosity (see also Schneider, 2005, p. 136). In contrast, fictional emotions are "caused by a 'diegetic effect' — the effect of 'becoming part of' the fictional world" (Langlotz, 2017, p. 541). Fictional readerly emotions may be closely related to the emotions experienced by characters themselves (Dijkstra et al., 1994, p. 139), and so empathetic emotions fall under this category.

In a similar vein, Oatley (1994) has developed a taxonomy of emotions that arise from reading, where he distinguishes between emotions that occur outside and inside the

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[22] See Sanford and Emmott (2012, chapter 8) for an overview of approaches to research into emotion in relation to reading.

"membrane of the text". The former are regarded as *aesthetic* emotions while the latter are called *narrative* emotions. So-called narrative emotions are the most relevant for my investigation of narrative empathy since they derive "from one's inferences and understanding of story characters" (Mar et al., 2011, p. 826). Mar et al. (2011) update Oatley's (1994) taxonomy and offer an account of the emotions which arise when we enter narrative worlds. They consider five types of emotion — sympathy, identification, empathy, relived emotions and remembered emotions — some of which may be experienced simultaneously. These emotions might be evoked "both directly through the events and characters depicted and through the cueing of emotionally valenced memories" (Mar et al., 2011, p. 818). The remainder of this section comments on empathy (as it is my main focus) and identification (as it is necessary to distinguish it from empathy).

In Mar et al.'s account, empathy depends on readers' perception of characters and their mental states (2011, p. 827). Readers' perception and inferences of characters, their situations and mental states will determine the emotional experiences that are attributed to characters. Readers' empathetic engagement with characters subsumes an array of emotions depending on these perceived or inferred mental states. As a result, different types of empathetic emotions might be activated when responding to characters. According to Hogan, "it seems that joy, hope, relief, fear, pity, disappointment, and anger are the major types of empathic emotion activated in response to characters in a narrative" (2003, as cited in Schneider, 2005, p. 136). The types of emotion readers might empathetically experience when encountering fictional characters depend on a number of factors that will be addressed in Chapter 3.

As noted earlier, empathy is often conflated with related phenomena such as sympathy (see 2.3.2), but also empathy is commonly taken to be synonymous with *identification* in academic and non-academic contexts alike (Coplan, 2004, p. 147). The notion of identification is commonly found in discussions of recipients' responses to fictional characters in visual and written narratives.

The term *identification* becomes an issue among some empathy scholars given that it is seen as a rather loose concept. Whereas Oatley (1994) had previously explained empathy in terms of identification, Mar et al. regard empathy as being separate, although closely related, to identification (2011, p. 823). Mar et al. define identification as the experience of imagining ourselves to be in the character's situation (2011, p. 823; see Gaut, 1999, p. 203, for a similar definition; see 2.3.3 on self-oriented perspective taking). In contrast, Schneider describes it as readers' sharing of personal traits with characters (2005, p. 136) and, similarly, Stockwell refers to it as readers' recognition of aspects of their own self-aware personality in characters (2009, p. 138; see Eder et al., 2010, p. 47, for a similar definition). Other scholars use the term identification to refer to emotional contagion (Coplan, 2004, p. 147).

The term *identification* is used in such different ways that some scholars avoid using it altogether (Coplan, 2004, p. 147). For instance, Schneider (2005, p. 136) prefers the term *empathy* over *identification*:

> cognitive-psychological investigations of emotion have shown that 'empathy' is the more adequate term, since it captures a person's ability to mentally represent another person's situation as well as to evaluate the relevance and

desirability of that situation and its potential outcomes (Zillmann, 1991) (Schneider, 2005, p. 136).

As an alternative to identification, Sanford and Emmott use the notion of *autobiographical alignment* to refer to the possibility that "a reader's ability to empathise is facilitated by sharing the characteristics of the character" since it is sometimes assumed that "readers who have the same autobiographical characteristics as characters may be able to relate better to those characters" (2012, p. 211). However, it is unclear what the relationship between empathy and identification is. As Keen wonders, whether empathy or identification with a character occurs first is an open question (2006, p. 214; 2007, p. 169). Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind the conceptual differences between empathy and identification.

2.6 Narrative empathy: Readers' empathy with characters

As noted in the introductory chapter, narrative empathy has recently been given a great deal of attention as one of the psychological processes involved in reading and, more specifically, as one of the psychological processes that underlies readers' engagement with characters. Narrative empathy is thought to play a fundamental role in recipients' experiences of fictional worlds because it enables us to understand and vicariously undergo the emotional states that we attribute to characters.

Several scholars support the view that empathy is often involved in the engagement between readers of narratives and characters (see Coplan, 2004; Keen, 2006). Van Lissa et al. (2016, p. 43) highlight that empathetic perspective taking has recently been

regarded as the main psychological mechanism that underlies our experience of relating to fictional characters (see also Gaut, 1999; Mellmann, 2010; Keen, 2013). Below I discuss how narrative empathy has been defined in earlier studies, and I explain how it is being used in the context of my research.

2.6.1 Defining narrative empathy

Narratologist Suzanne Keen, who is one of the key theorists in this research area, defines narrative empathy as "the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of another's situation and condition" (2013, para. 2). Narrative empathy, therefore, comprises experiences of empathy with characters which are brought about not only by written narratives but also by narratives in other media. However, my scope is more limited — I will be using the term "narrative empathy" in a narrower sense to refer only to *readers' empathy with the characters of verbal mono-modal narratives in the process of narrative reading*. Readers of comics or graphic novels, as well as hearers or viewers who may experience empathy through films, plays or conversations, are outside my scope.

In reading narratives, we get to know characters' perspectives, experiences and mental states through verbal accounts given by authors. Hoffman calls it *verbally mediated empathy* when empathy occurs in such narrative reading situations because the other person's state is conveyed through language, and so language becomes the only cue about the target's states (2000, p. 49). The textual cues that could potentially influence readerly empathy with the "word-wrought inhabitants of fictional worlds" (Keen, 2007, p. ix) will be briefly addressed in Section 2.7.1 and much more fully in Chapter 3.

My definition of narrative empathy builds on my earlier definition of empathy (see 2.2). Here the character is placed in the role of target while the reader is placed in the role of empathiser. I draw on work by Caracciolo (2014), Coplan (2004, 2011a, 2011b), Cuff et al. (2016), de Vignemont and Jacob (2012), Gallagher (2012), and Keen (2006, 2013). For the purposes of this research project,

> Narrative empathy involves a character-oriented (emotional) response and perspective taking. The reader forms a mental representation of the character's situation and mental state(s) while maintaining a self-other distinction. In this way the reader re-enacts, simulates or imaginatively experiences in a first-person way what they perceive is the character's mental state and mental activity. The resulting response is congruent with the reader's perception and understanding of what the character's experience must be like.

Now I briefly unpack the above definition. When a reader empathises with a character, the reader *adopts the character's psychological perspective*, and ends up imagining the character's situation from the latter's viewpoint (see 2.2.2). The reader *forms a mental representation of the character's mental states* through direct perception (when cues about internal states are explicit), or through inference and imagination (when such cues are implicit) — that is, some form of appraisal is involved (see 2.2.4). In this process the reader ascribes or attributes[23] particular mental states to the character.

Once the reader mentally represents the character's mental states, the reader may come to feel what they infer the character feels or might feel. The reader thus infers what it must be like to experience what the character is experiencing (see 2.6.2 below). In this

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[23] In Caracciolo's words, in the process of narrative empathy readers "enact the emotional experience that they, at the same time, attribute to a fictional character" (2014, p. 66).

way the reader *re-enacts, simulates or imaginatively experiences in a first-person way what they perceive is the character's mental state and mental activity*. This vicariously felt response is similar in kind to the character's internal state but may come in different degrees of intensity (see 2.2.4). Chapter 6 will show the ways in which these phenomena get realised in language when readers articulate their empathetic engagement with characters.

2.6.2 The 'what-it's-like' dimension

At the core of my definition of narrative empathy is the reader's appreciation of what the character's experience feels like (or might feel like) to the character him/herself. Importantly, empathy involves "the ability to understand adequately others' way of evaluating and experiencing situations" (Marzano et al., 2015, p. 298). This sub-section draws on notions from narratology to understand how we might come to grasp the *experiential feel of characters' experience* (redundancy intended).

Crucially, stories are "always bound up with human experience" (Caracciolo, 2013, para. 10) since they are "accounts of what happened to particular people — and of what it was like for them to experience what happened — in particular circumstances and with particular consequences" (Herman, 2009, p. 2). Narrative empathy can make it possible for readers to get insights into and vicariously feel what it is like for characters to experience the story-world.

A central feature of narrative for Herman is the *what-it's-like dimension* since stories represent what it is like for characters to undergo story-world events (2009, p. 21). At its

very core, narrative is concerned with "qualia", a notion from philosophy of mind which refers to "the sense of 'what it is like' for someone or something to have a particular experience" (Herman, 2009, p. 14). In Caracciolo's view, stories have the potential to convey *qualia*; that is, the phenomenal qualities and properties of experience (2014, p. 24). Stories may make it possible for readers to get a sense of the *what-it's-like-ness* of characters' experience; that is "the subjective, qualitative 'feel' that arises from characters' coping with the physical and social world" (Herman, 2009, p. 111). This can be facilitated through the way in which stories represent the impact of story-world events on the mind(s) experiencing such events (Herman, 2009, p. 137). Key here is the potential of textual strategies to prompt inferences that enable this experiential understanding (see 3.2).

In this respect, the notion of *experientiality* becomes highly relevant. According to Caracciolo (2013, para. 8, para. 15), the concept of experientiality (first introduced by Fludernik, 1996) has been interpreted in two ways: (i) the textual representation of characters' experiences and psychological processes, and (ii) the experiences and psychological processes undergone by recipients of narratives (Caracciolo, 2013, para. 6; Caracciolo, 2014, p. 3). Regarding the latter, experientiality could be regarded as the potential of narratives to trigger experiential states and responses in readers (Caracciolo, 2013, para. 13), and so experientiality emerges from the interaction between texts and readers' past experiences (2013, para. 6). Narrative empathy, writes Caracciolo, seems to be "crucial to bridge the gap between the textual and the readerly pole of experientiality" (2013, para. 15) because it enables an experiential interaction between readers and characters.

2.6.3 Criticism against narrative empathy

The notion of narrative empathy has not been without criticism within earlier scholarship

and creative practice. For instance, Keen documents that empathy went into eclipse

because it

> received brisk challenge from high modernist quarters. The disdain of Bertolt
> Brecht for empathy (and his advocacy of so-called alienation effects), the
> embrace of difficulty by modernist poets, and the dominance of New Criticism,
> which taught students to avoid the affective fallacy, all interfered with the
> integration of empathy into literary theory until recently (2006, p. 210).

Stockwell also addresses the "New Critical prohibitions on discussing the intentional and

psychological fallacies in literary reading" (2013, p. 265). The position of New Criticism

against the *intentional fallacy* resulted in "a neglect of questions of deliberateness,

artistic choice, creativity, authority and credibility", whereas the avoidance of the

affective fallacy meant that questions of readerly engagement have remained implicit

until recent times (p. 266). New Criticism placed an emphasis on the informativity of

texts (*logos*) while ignoring aesthetics (*pathos*) and ideological positioning (*ethos*).

However, during the second half of the 20th century European stylistics took a new

direction away from those prohibitions towards the analysis of *pathos* and *ethos* (p. 265),

and so the discipline of stylistics now regards "readerly effects, emotions and

significances in literary engagement" (i.e., the psychological fallacy) as a legitimate

object of study.

Along similar lines, Burke et al. report that 20th-century literary theorists "shied away

from considering the first-person experience of reading", and when they theorised

about the reading act, they did so with the *ideal* (i.e., *model*, *competent*) reader in mind (2016, p. 11). For these theorists, empathy with characters "was mostly seen as the epitome of the naïveté ascribed to non-professional readers, and thus not worthy of academic study" (2016, p. 11). The situation has radically changed nowadays and scholars from different disciplines are paying increasing attention to the psychological processes involved in reading.

Apart from the above-mentioned neglect of the phenomenon of narrative empathy itself, there is scepticism about the actual role of empathy in narrative engagement. Philosopher Noël Carroll presents several arguments against the view that empathy plays an important role in readers' experiences with characters (see Coplan, 2004, footnote 47, for references). He argues that "we do not typically take up characters' points of view or simulate characters' psychological states"; instead, we often have an observer position rather than taking the point of view of the participant in the situation (Coplan, 2004, p. 147). The reasons Carroll presents are to do with readers' emotions not always matching those attributed to characters; the differences in kind and amount of information readers and characters have; and the possibility that what readers prefer and desire regarding narrative outcomes is at odds with characters' own preferences and desires (Coplan, 2004, pp. 147-148). These possibilities might lead to characters' and readers' emotional experiences being rather different (i.e., not affectively congruent), thus ruling out empathy with characters. These are valid arguments that ought not be ignored in discussions of narrative empathy, and should be taken into account when analysing real readers' responses.

2.7 An overview of narrative empathy research

Narrative empathy has become an object of theoretical as well as empirical enquiry. In what follows I discuss different approaches to narrative empathy — Keen's (2006) theoretical approach in sub-section 2.7.1, and empirical approaches by László and Smogyvári (2008), van Lissa et al. (2016), and Kuzmičová et al. (2017) in sub-section 2.7.2.

2.7.1 Keen's (2006) theory of narrative empathy

Keen's (2006) theory of narrative empathy is considered one of the key works in the area of narrative empathy research. It is a contribution to rhetorical narratology, the latter being concerned with effects on readers (Keen, 2013, para. 12). Below I report on the three main elements of her theory, namely (a) empathetic narrative techniques, (b) authorial strategies for empathy, and (c) the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

(a) Empathetic narrative techniques

The key motivator for my study is that it has been suggested in the literature that particular narrative devices, such as certain modes of narration or particular characterisation techniques, have the potential to foster and/or hinder readers' empathy with characters. As Keen herself writes, "a variety of narrative techniques have been associated with empathy by narrative theorists and discourse processing experts carrying out empirical research into literary reading" (2006, p. 216). She theorises readers' responses by gathering scholars' views on the empathy potential of these so-called "empathetic narrative techniques", and discusses the alleged potential of the

techniques in the light of both theoretical proposals and empirical findings (see Keen, 2006, pp. 215-220; 2007, pp. 92-99, for a fuller account).

Despite the fact that "some attempts have been made to try and identify particular linguistic features or devices which may encourage empathetic effects" (Wales, 2011, p. 133), Keen (2006) concludes that no narrative technique *per se* has yet been proven to facilitate readers' empathy, and argues that narrative techniques work alongside many other variables (see 3.2.1). Chapter 3 presents an overview of the different narrative techniques that have been associated with empathetic effects, and will examine the many factors that may interact with the empathy potential of narrative devices.

(b) Authorial strategies for empathy

As noted immediately above, Keen concludes that no narrative technique has been shown to facilitate empathy with characters (2006, p. 216). As an alternative, she offers "a more coarse-grained typology of novelistic strategies for empathy, one that also concerns the social circumstances of a novel's production and reception" (Burke et al., 2016, p. 12). Keen theorises that authors of narratives may use three strategies for eliciting empathy (i.e., *strategic empathy*) in particular audiences (2006, p. 215):

> *Bounded strategic empathy* operates within an in-group, stemming from experiences of mutuality, and leading to feeling with familiar others. *Ambassadorial strategic empathy* addresses chosen others with the aim of cultivating their empathy for the in-group, often to a specific end. *Broadcast strategic empathy* calls upon every reader to feel with members of a group, by emphasising common vulnerabilities and hopes through universalizing representations.

Bounded strategic empathy addresses in-group members (2013, para. 12), and so readers who do not belong to the group (i.e. outsiders) might be left out (2006, p. 224). Unfortunately, Keen does not provide any concrete examples in this respect. *Ambassadorial strategic empathy* addresses members of "more temporally, spatially, or culturally remote audiences" (2013, para. 12), examples being "appeals for justice, recognition, and assistance" — such as Mulk Raj Anand's *Untouchable* (1935), which was written for an English-speaking readership outside of India's caste system (2006, p. 224). Finally, broadcast strategic empathy is employed by postcolonial novelists (e.g., Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiongo) in an attempt to embrace the universality of human experience and "extend readers' sense of our shared humanity" (2006, p. 224; 2013, para. 12). Thus, these strategies[24] differentiate readers with regards to their identity and belonging.

(c) Empathy-altruism hypothesis

Researchers have recently focused on the psychological effects of engaging with fiction, and attention has been given to the potential role of reading fiction in the development of empathic skills (van Lissa et al., 2016, p. 45). Empathy, write Decety and Meyer, "plays a crucial role in moral development, motivating pro-social behaviour and inhibiting aggression towards others" (2008, p. 1053). Following this line of investigation, some narrative empathy researchers have focused on the so-called *empathy-altruism*

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[24] Burke et al. summarise these strategies as follows: "bounded empathy (within an in-group), ambassadorial empathy (addressing a specific audience outside an in-group), and broadcast empathy (addressing anyone outside an in-group)" (2016, p. 12).

hypothesis[25], which is about the relationships between reading novels, experiences of narrative empathy and altruism (Keen, 2006, p. 208). Novel reading is seen as a "stimulus to the role-taking imagination and emotional responsiveness of readers" (Keen, 2007, p. vii), and so empathetic reading experiences are regarded as leading to sympathy and altruism (Keen, 2006, p. 214).

Empathy is regarded as having the potential to be a "morally improving experience" (Keen, 2006, p. 208) that motivates altruistic action, thus "resulting in less aggression, less fickle helping, less blaming of victims for their misfortunes, increased cooperation in conflict situations, and improved actions on behalf of needy individuals and members of stigmatised groups" (Keen, 2007, p. vii). These speculations make connections between experiences of empathy and "outcomes of changed attitudes, improved motives, and better care and justice" (Keen, 2006, pp. 207-208).

Although Keen remains critical towards the link between narrative empathy and pro-social behaviour (2013, para. 12), several empirical studies seem to provide support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Burke et al. (2016) review a number of studies[26] whose findings suggest that exposure to fiction is correlated with positive measures of social ability, the development of empathy and the reduction of prejudice (see Burke et al., 2016, pp. 15-20, for a full discussion).

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[25] Harrison reports that this hypothesis was proposed by Batson, and holds that "altruistic behaviors are motivated by imagination and emotion, adopting another person's perspective and feeling 'other-oriented' emotions like compassion" (2008, p. 258).
[26] Burke et al. (2016) review studies by Mar et al. (2006), Djikic, Oatley and Moldoveanu (2013), Johnson (2013), Koopman (2015), and Kidd and Castano (2013).

2.7.2 Other approaches to narrative empathy

To the best of my knowledge, only a small number of studies have empirically investigated the role of certain textual (and sometimes readerly) factors in the elicitation of empathy with characters: László and Smogyvári (2008), van Lissa et al. (2016), and Kuzmičová et al. (2017). By *empirical research* I mean work that collects and analyses extra-textual data on readers' responses (Whiteley and Canning, 2017).

László and Smogyvári (2008)

The study by László and Smogyvári (2008) started from the hypothesis that narrative empathy may be influenced by the relationship between readers' and characters' group identity (p. 113). Following on from Liu and László's (2007) proposition of the suitability of narrative empathy to "explore relations between group identity and historical representations", the authors suggest that narratives of historiography and historical novels tend to make use of Keen's notion of *bounded strategic empathy* (see 2.7.1 (b)). According to them, bounded strategic empathy "may serve the goals of the readers' own group by strengthening group identity and facilitating prosocial behaviour towards group members" (2008, p. 116).

They used two versions of a Hungarian short story in which the group identity of the main characters differed: Hungarian for the in-group and Slovak for the out-group (due to historical rivalry) (p. 118). After reading the story, participants (48 Hungarian participants in a classroom situation, but unspecified as to whether secondary or higher education) filled in a questionnaire consisting of scales of liking and empathy. Then they

were asked to recall and write down the story[27], and finally they filled in a questionnaire on identification with nation (p. 118). Half of the participants read the "Hungarian" version of the story whereas the other half read the "Slovak" version.

They tested three psychological models of group identification: (a) infrahumanisation, that is, "the tendency of people to perceive their own group as more human in comparison to out-groups" (Leyens et al., 2000)"; (b) mentalisation, whereby people more easily attribute mental states and take the perspective of in-group members; and (c) linguistic inter-group bias, which occurs when "in-group members describe their own positive behaviour abstractly, whereas they tend to describe similar behaviour of the out-group in concrete terms," which relates to dispositional versus situational attribution respectively (László and Smogyvári, 2008, pp. 116-117; see 2.5.1 on attribution).

The results did not match the researchers' expectations: no significant differences were found between the two versions regarding empathy with characters and readers' national identification (p. 119). László and Smogyvári also considered correlations between the scales of empathy, national identification and liking. Whereas national identification did not correlate with the other variables, narrative empathy and liking did correlate with each other. Narrative empathy also showed a significant correlation with the frequency of recalled secondary emotions and mental states (p. 121). The authors conclude that "subjects who felt more empathy with the characters recalled more secondary emotions and mental states, i.e., 'humanised' the characters more

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[27] This method is called the *narrative recall paradigm*, which is "based on the assumption that narrative recall carries also the experiential aspects of the text processing and thereby enables a fine grained analysis of meaning construction" (László & Smogyvári, 2008, p. 118).

independently of the characters' in-group or out-group affiliations" (p. 123). This result is in line with the theory of infrahumanisation, which "implies that more empathy is directed to people to whom we ascribe more secondary emotions and mental states" (p. 123).

The authors analysed the mental states that participants attributed to characters in their own recalls. They had hypothesised that in these recalls more secondary emotions would be attributed to the in-group Hungarian characters (in keeping with the infrahumanisation theory) and also that more mental states would be attributed to the in-group Hungarian characters (in line with the mentalisation theory). However, no significant differences were found between the readers of the two versions regarding emotion and mental state attribution (p. 119). In conclusion, in this study readers' and characters' group identity did not result in significant differences in empathetic effects.

van Lissa et al. (2016)

The second study which has empirically tested the effects of narrative devices on readers' empathetic engagement with characters was conducted by van Lissa, Caracciolo, van Duuren and van Leuveren (2016). They investigated the role of narrative perspective, and addressed the question of whether first-person narration has more potential to elicit empathy and trust than third-person narrative (p. 43). Their participants (76 Dutch high-school students) read the first chapter of *Hunger*, by Knut Hamsun, which deals with a first-person narrator who might invite ambivalent ethical evaluations and thus might "challenge readers rather than straightforwardly invite empathic responses" (p. 44). Two versions of the story were used — first-person

(possibly unreliable) narration and third-person narration with internal focalisation. Their questions were mostly quantitative but they also included two open-ended questions about attitude and trust which were then analysed qualitatively.

Contrary to their predictions, they found that narrative perspective did not affect empathy for the protagonist: "our study indicates that first-person narrative and [third-person] internal focalisation are equally likely to trigger (or not trigger) empathic responses" (van Lissa et al. 2016, p. 59). However, they found that narrative perspective did have effects on trust: "reading the text in the third-person perspective significantly increased trust for the character compared to the first-person perspective" (p. 53). They connect this result to narrative (un)reliability: "readers in the first-person condition might have been more distrustful of the narrator", whereas "the narrator's authoritativeness in the third-person text may have indirectly validated the character's actions, translating into a higher degree of trust for him" (p. 53). There was another important finding to do with the age of participants: "only for older participants did narrative perspective influence the amount of perspective-taking for the character" in the first-person perspective condition (p. 53). They explain this with reference to developmental psychology, which indicates that "mature perspective-taking abilities are very much under development in adolescence" (p. 53).

Relevantly to my own study, they conclude that

> Further research is needed to shed light on these issues, but the evidence presented here does question assumptions about the direct effects of textual strategies on narrative empathy. Indeed, one of the lessons that can be drawn from our experiment is that literary scholars tend to overestimate the effects of textual cues on readers' responses (van Lissa et al., 2016, pp. 60-61)

In short, in this study readers' empathy was not affected by narrative perspective (i.e., first-person vs. third-person narration).

Kuzmičová et al. (2017)

The study by Kuzmičová, Mangen, Støle and Begnun (2017) aimed to explore "the stylistic underpinnings of the hypothesized link between literariness and empathy" (p. 137). The authors address previous experimental findings that suggest that *literary* fiction fosters empathy, interpersonal skills and pro-social behaviour *to a greater extent* than both non-fiction and popular fiction (see pp. 138-139 for a discussion of the observed effects of different genres). However, the reviewed studies did not describe the experimental textual stimuli in terms of their stylistic properties, and so "it is impossible to determine specifically which of the many stylistic features characteristic of literary fiction (...) ought to be hypothesized as more likely than others to elicit empathy" (p. 139).

The authors aimed for a "more nuanced, stylistically informed account of the hypothetical nexus of literature and empathy" (p. 140). They manipulated the degree of *foregrounding* in the stimulus text because foregrounding is seen as a distinctive characteristic of literary[28] texts. They used two different versions of Katherine Mansfield's short story *The Fly* (translated into Norwegian), one version being the original story which is rich in foregrounding, and the other version being a "non-literary" version

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[28] Regarding the attempt to operationalise 'literary' vs. 'non-literary' versions of each story, it may be useful to consider the objections that have been raised to distinctions between literary and non-literary language (see, e.g., Simpson, 1997, pp. 7-19; Jeffries and McIntyre, 2010, p. 2).

where foregrounding had been reduced (see p. 142 for a description of the different types of manipulation that were carried out).

This qualitative text manipulation experiment sought to consider "participants' subjective empathic responses" to redress this absence in earlier quantitative studies (p. 141). Participants (37 students at a Norwegian university) were asked to mark striking passages while reading (see Sikora et al., 2011). Then participants were asked to select three of their marked passages and elaborate, in writing, on the ways in which the passages were striking. Later on, participants took a post-process questionnaire that measured transportation and narrative engagement. Finally, participants completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test[29] (RMET), which is used to measure theory of mind skills.

Participants' elaborations were coded for "explicit markers of empathic response" (p. 143; see p. 144 for their coding categories). The authors had hypothesised that the literary version would elicit more empathetic elaborations than the non-literary version, in line with the available evidence from previous research. However, they found that the non-literary version of the short story actually elicited more explicitly empathetic responses than the literary version. They link this finding with the possibility that the literary version elicited a more aesthetically distanced reading (see pp. 147-149). Their findings thus fail to confirm "the widespread hypothesis that a literary style elicits more empathy than a more popular one" (p. 149).

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[29] The RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) includes a series of photographs portraying human eyes, and each photograph is meant to express an emotion. Participants are asked to choose the correct emotion from a multiple-choice setup (Kuzmičová et al., 2017, p. 138).

In view of the few empirical studies that have been conducted to date, further research and evidence are needed regarding the role of particular textual cues and readerly factors in readers' empathetic engagement with story characters (Keen 2006, p. 216; Caracciolo, 2013, para. 15).

2.8 Concluding remarks

This chapter has introduced my conceptual framework of (narrative) empathy. It has also discussed important considerations in the study of narrative reading, such as character(isation) and emotional experiences. Finally, it has considered narrative empathy in light of both theoretical and empirical approaches.

The following chapter addresses other key aspects of empathy that have not been addressed yet, such as the role of trait (i.e. dispositional) and state (i.e. contextual) influences; the automatic and controlled processes that can be involved; and the stimuli, both textual and non-textual, that can trigger and block empathy.

3. Chapter 3. Potential factors affecting empathetic responses: Readerly and textual dimensions

3.0 Orientation to Chapter 3

After establishing the central features of (narrative) empathy in the previous chapter, the present chapter focuses on the two elements involved in the phenomenon of narrative empathy — (i) readers as recipients of stories (i.e., potential empathisers), and (ii) story characters as the result of textual linguistic choices (i.e., potential targets of empathy). Both of them are associated with a number of factors that could modulate the experience of narrative empathy.

This chapter establishes empathy as a highly context-dependent phenomenon, and explores the variety of factors that are regarded in the literature as having the potential to influence the experience of (narrative) empathy to different degrees. Section 3.1 discusses a series of factors that could determine how people experience empathy, and for my purposes, how readers (as recipients of narrative texts) experience empathy with characters. In particular, I consider the role of dispositional empathy (3.1.1), the differences between automatic and controlled empathy (3.1.2), and three specific control mechanisms — contextual appraisal (3.1.3), moral evaluation (3.1.4), and the observer-target relationship (3.1.5).

Section 3.2 focuses on a set of textual cues that are regarded in the literature as having the potential to influence narrative empathy. Section 3.2.1 outlines the repertoire of techniques associated with empathetic effects in Keen's (2006) theory of narrative

empathy. Section 3.2.2 introduces my linguistic approach to the textual cues potentially involved in narrative empathy. The final sections (3.2.2.1-3.2.2.4) examine four textual phenomena that scholars identify as potentially facilitating and/or preventing empathy with characters — point of view presentation, characters' discourse presentation, characters' emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques.

I describe the empathy potential of these readerly and textual factors as "triggers" when they tend to facilitate empathy, and as "barriers" when they tend to block empathy. Thus, I call these factors *potential triggers and/or barriers for empathy*. The reason for my use of *and/or* is that the same phenomenon may facilitate empathy for some people and may simultaneously block it for other people, depending on a range of circumstances. Hence I keep the wording as flexible as possible so as to accommodate all the possibilities.

3.1 The readerly dimension of narrative empathy

Empathy researchers have pinpointed a number of factors that could modulate empathy. In processes of narrative empathy, the reader, as potential empathiser, is the recipient of the textual stimuli. This section focuses on some of the factors which can affect readers' experiences of empathy — namely dispositional factors (3.1.1); automatic, bottom-up processes and controlled, top-down processes (3.1.2); and three specific top-down influences; namely contextual appraisal (3.1.3), moral evaluation (3.1.4), and the observer-target relationship (3.1.5).

3.1.1 Dispositional empathy: Variability in empathic skills

The complex psychological phenomenon of empathy results from an interaction between trait (dispositional) and state (contextual) factors, as evidence from psychology suggests (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6). Trait, or dispositional, empathy refers to how empathetic a person is, and so individuals differ in their empathic skills. Trait empathy is an ability which is considered to be more or less stable over time (i.e. it is a stable personality trait), and so the trait view holds that some people are more empathetic than others (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6). Variability in empathic skills is accounted for in terms of anatomical differences, genetic and developmental factors[30], and other factors such as gender[31] and education (see Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6, for further references) or imaginative abilities (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 91). Even culture can influence experiences of empathy as a social phenomenon: "empathy is always shaped through cultural codes, which differently emphasise, modulate, and train the capacity to 'feel into' another person's emotions" (Engelen and Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 4; see also Hollan, 2012a).

One of the common ways to measure individual differences in trait or dispositional empathy is the use of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index test (IRI) (Davis, 1980), which takes into account several dimensions of empathy and involves self-reports. The IRI test

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[30] Evidence suggests that people with Theory of Mind deficits, such as people on the autistic spectrum, have difficulties with empathy (Montgomery et al., 2016, p. 1933).

[31] An issue that arises in the literature is whether sex and gender determine the capacity to *experience* empathy or the tendency to *express* empathy. Baron-Cohen (2004) supports the view that the capacity to experience empathy varies according to sex and gender. However, as reported by Singer and Lamm, "there has been a longstanding debate about whether women actually possess more empathy, as expressed by higher scores in various self-report measures, or whether the different questionnaire scores can be explained by social desirability and demand effects" (2009, p. 91).

includes four subscales[32] which measure what Davis (1980) regards as different facets of empathy:

- The *perspective taking scale* measures our tendency to imagine and adopt another person's psychological point of view (Davis, 2009, para. 6; Davis, 1983, pp. 113-114).

- The *fantasy scale* involves our tendency to imaginatively transpose ourselves into the feelings of fictional characters in books, films and plays (Davis, 1983, p. 114).

- The *empathic concern scale* measures other-oriented feelings of concern and sympathy for unfortunate others (Davis, 1983, p. 114).

- The *personal distress scale* assesses our tendency to feel self-oriented unease, discomfort and anxiety when facing distressed others (Davis, 2009, para. 6; Davis, 1983, p. 114).

Even though the IRI test has been adapted to several languages other than English, its validity has been questioned and, as a result, other empathy questionnaires have been developed (e.g. the *Empathy Quotient* (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004); see Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) regarding the unsuitability of the IRI test because it equates empathy and sympathy[33]; see also Nomura and Akai (2012) regarding the fantasy[34] scale). It is relevant to mention that the IRI test (either the original or modified versions of it) has sometimes been used in the empirical study of literature tradition in

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[32] Each of these scales contains 7 items which are rated on a 5-point scale from 0 ("does not describe me well") to 4 ("describes me well").

[33] As a reminder, my definition of (narrative) empathy excludes the last two items (i.e., empathic concern and personal distress) (see 2.3.2 and 2.3.4).

[34] In 2.4, I presented arguments for the view that there is little functional difference between empathy with real-world and story-world beings.

order to measure readers' self-reported dispositional empathy (see László and Smogyvári, 2008; Sklar, 2009; and van Lissa et al., 2016).

3.1.2 Automatic and controlled empathy

In any given situation, empathy can result from automatic, bottom-up[35] processes or controlled, top-down processes (Cuff et al., 2016, pp. 149-150). Automatic empathy is regarded as a "basic perception-based form of empathy" (Zahavi, 2012, p. 81) which is activated when the empathiser receives the stimulus information or bottom-up stimulation (Singer and Lamm, 2009) (see *basic empathy* in 2.2.6). Evidence from neuroscience suggests that empathy is automatically activated when we *perceive* an emotional other (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan and Frith, 2004). The term *perceive* is emphasised here because "the key element to consider in the presence of an emotionally laden stimulus is that of perception and understanding in the observer, rather than actual emotionality in the target" (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 148). However, the issue of whether automatic empathy itself can remain "untainted by context and evaluation" and other forms of top-down modulation remains an open question (Hollan, 2012b, p. 83; see also Zahavi, 2012).

Empathy does not only happen automatically — in Singer and Lamm's words, empathy "is not a purely sensory-driven process in which affective states are induced in the observer solely by means of bottom-up processes" (2009, p. 88). Importantly, empathy can also be subject to control through a number of top-down processes (see below).

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[35] I borrow the terms *bottom-up* and *top-down* from the psychological literature. Bottom-up processes are stimulus-driven and involve attention and perception, whereas top-down processes involve appraisal of the situation drawing on relevant knowledge (Eysenck and Keane, 2015, p. 637).

Empathy can be controlled in several ways: an existing empathetic response can be modulated by being either (i) inhibited or (ii) amplified, or it can be (iii) generated through imagination in the absence of bottom-up stimulus information (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 91). Regarding (i) the inhibition[36] of empathy there is ample agreement in the literature that people can "learn to inhibit or override the automatic nature of the empathic response" (Hollan, 2012a, p. 72). De Waal states that empathy requires both a filter (enabling us to select what we react to) and a turn-off switch (2009, p. 213; see also Baron-Cohen, 2011). When (iii) there is no stimulus information, an observer can infer the other person's internal states through the use of contextual information, affective memory, and self-other projection (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 91) as well as general knowledge (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5; see 2.2.2).

The majority of empathy models from neuroscience endorse the importance of top-down influences on empathy (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 90). Cuff and colleagues (2016, p. 150) report that

> Empathy is a state of mind that we can reflect upon, control, and modify (Hodges and Wegner, 1997), using methods such as reframing (altering one's perspective or cognitions), suppression (not thinking about the situation), and exposure control (avoiding emotional situations); all of these require cognitive effort (Hodges and Biswas-Diener, 2007).

Recent neuroscientific findings suggest that a few top-down processes are responsible for shaping and regulating empathetic responses — attention[37], the perspective adopted (see 2.2.2), contextual appraisal and the relationship between empathiser and

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[36] The term *dyspathy* is used by Cameron (2013) to refer to "whatever stops or inhibits empathy" (p. 3); that is, any "inhibiting factors that resist, block or deny empathy" (p. 2).
[37] Empathy might be impeded by inattention and indifference (Keen, 2006, p. 213).

target (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 89). These findings "document the flexibility of the human mind in responding to others and show that empathy is not an all-or-none phenomenon" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 89). The role of perspective taking has already been addressed in 2.2.2, 2.2.6, and 2.3.3. In what follows I discuss how empathy can be modulated through contextual appraisal of the situation (3.1.3), moral evaluation (3.1.4), and the observer-target relationship (3.1.5).

3.1.3 Top-down influences: Contextual appraisal

Working alongside dispositional factors (see 3.1.1) are state influences, which are to do with the context or the situation in which the target is situated. Whether or not someone responds empathetically to a certain stimulus may in large part depend on the context, and so empathetic arousal may be situation-specific (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 6). Neuroscientific evidence[38] suggests that knowledge about the context in which the target's experiences occur is one form of top-down cognitive appraisal which can regulate empathy (Lamm, Batson and Decety, 2007, p. 56). This sub-section examines contextual appraisal as an important top-down mechanism which might influence experiences of empathy.

Since empathy involves grasping the target's mental states, information about the target's context and situation is needed. Empathy becomes a higher-order cognitive process "if it includes some assessment by an observer of another individual's situation,

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[38] Evidence indicates that affective vicarious pain can be modulated by contextual factors, some of which are processed by high-level cognitive systems (de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012, p. 302). For example, there was reduced activity in the affective component of vicarious pain depending on *fairness perception* when the person in pain (i.e. the target) had been previously unfair to participants (Singer et al., 2006), or in the case of experiment participants who believed that the target's pain was the result of a useful medical treatment (Lamm, Batson, and Decety, 2007).

that is, how their emotions and actions are situated" (Davis, 1994, 2007, as cited in Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 209). In fact empathy depends on our understanding of the other person's context, including perceptual, historical and cultural aspects (Gallagher, 2012, p. 377). For instance, the empathiser might observe the target crying or in pain, and this alone might be enough for automatic empathy, but an understanding of the target's broader context, his/her actions and emotional states *in that context* is essential to empathise (Gallagher, 2012, p. 377). Hollan's example helps to illustrate this matter:

> We may know from the rapid breathing, flushed face, and squinted eyes that someone might be angry, but depending on where we are and when, that anger might be motivated by shame, frustration, hostility, or any of a number of other possible emotional states. We can sort through these various possibilities only by knowing a great deal about the angry person's personal and cultural background (...) Such background knowledge is essential to knowing *why* a person is angry, not just that they *are* angry (2012a, pp. 70-71, original emphasis)

Regarding this background knowledge of the target, the philosopher Peter Goldie (1999, 2002) argues that when the empathiser engages in perspective taking the empathiser brings "a characterisation of the target individual to bear on her imaginative process, a characterisation encompassing factors about the target's character, emotions, moods, dispositional tendencies, and life experience" (as cited in Coplan, 2004, p. 146). Empathy requires the observer to "think and feel how it is to be someone else (...) in the rich complexity of that other person's experience, from their perspective, in the situation" (Cameron, 2013, p. 6). In 2.2.6 I discussed empathy as a form of simulation whereby the empathiser *re-enacts* the target's mental states and *mental activity*.

Empathising with another enables us to know what it is like for the target to experience their mental states (see 2.6.2 on the *what-it's-like* dimension). We thus engage in making inferences about the ways in which the target him/herself evaluates and experiences events (Marzano et al., 2015, p. 298). Some scholars emphasise the role of this contextual information to grasp *how (*Morton, 2011) and *why* (Hollan, 2012a) the target acts and feels the way they do.

Regarding empathy with characters, in order for readers to imagine and mentally simulate characters' experience, the textual information available to readers about the characters' situation becomes crucial. Key here is the issue of what type of inferences narrative texts can potentially trigger. In Chapter 4 I analyse the textual cues which are available in Galeano's stories about the characters themselves (i.e. their actions, emotions, beliefs, values, goals, life experiences, etc.) and their situation. These cues may lead to a range of different inferences and interpretations which might be relevant to modulating empathy.

3.1.4 Top-down influences: Moral evaluation

Another important aspect of contextual appraisal is concerned with moral evaluation, which deserves close attention as it is highly relevant to my study due to the nature of my data. Galeano's social commentary might engage readers morally and might invite different types of reader-character involvement and positioning depending on how empathy-worthy the characters are in the eyes of readers on a moral basis.

Empathy seems to be morally sensitive and thus underpinned by moral judgements (Zillmann, 2006). Empathy is never neutral (Hollan, 2012a, p. 72) since it can be affected by moral evaluations, which are considered a form of socio-cultural[39] mediation and thus a type of top-down modulation (Hollan, 2012b, p. 83). Empathy can be inhibited or suppressed in certain moral situations since experiences of empathy are "always embedded in moral contexts that strongly affect both the likelihood of their display and how they are experienced" (Hollan, 2012a, p. 71). In the following I focus on the moral component of the *experience* of empathy rather than its expression.

Target perception and evaluation is a relevant aspect that falls within the contextual appraisal of a situation (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 89). Within target evaluation the scientific literature mentions *(un)fairness perception* (Singer et al., 2006; see footnote 38 above) and *blame allocation* (Cuff et al., 2016) as likely to influence empathetic responses. In the case of narrative empathy, target perception and evaluation refers to how readers perceive and evaluate characters as potential targets of empathy. Moral positions adopted towards other people can render them "as undeserving of attention or perceived as morally repugnant", and thus "the possibility of automatic empathising is closed down and the avoidance of more deliberate empathy is socially and ideologically sanctioned" (Bandura, 2002, as cited in Cameron, 2013, p. 15).

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[39] The potential influence of moral values is captured in Caracciolo's (2014) mapping of readers' experiential background, particularly in the region of *socio-cultural practices*. He describes the latter as "the socio-cultural scaffolding of our encounters with the world, people and artefacts", including "our beliefs, values, social structures, cultural conventions (…) and so on" (p. 59).

Readers' ethical experiences and positioning while reading are of interest to stylistics and narratology (Whiteley, 2014, p. 393). Rhetorical narratology considers that narrative techniques position readers in relation to authors, narrators and characters, and that "these positionings influence and guide the readers' ethical and emotional experiences" (Whiteley, 2014, p. 393). Rhetorical narratology (e.g., Booth, 1988; Phelan, 1996) examines the "devices through which narrative texts construct value-effects and elicit the reader's ethical engagement" (Korthals Altes, 2005, p. 142).

The reader's position is influenced both by the language of the text (see 3.2.2.1 on ideological viewpoint) and by the reader's own personal characteristics, values and beliefs which are brought to their interpretation of the text (Whiteley, 2014, p. 398). The moral stance presented in narratives is to do with reflections on "human action and character; conflicting drives, desires, and choices evolving in time *offered for the readers' appreciation or judgement from different perspectives*" (Korthals Altes, 2005, p. 142, emphasis mine). As a result, the ethical and emotional implications of readers' positioning vis-à-vis characters correlate with "the degree of support, acquiescence or resistance in the reading" (Stockwell, 2009, p. 160).

Stockwell also addresses the ethics[40] of reading, or the ideological positioning that readers adopt in the process of literary reading (2013, p. 263; see also Stockwell, 2009, pp.160-167). Within this ethical dimension of reading, Stockwell proposes that texts have prototypical or *preferred responses*, a notion which he borrows from sociolinguistics, which are context-dependent (p. 268). In Stockwell's words, "most literary works have an

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[40] Stockwell defines ethics as follows: "in crude terms ethics is always the comparative difference between what is and an alternative world" (2013, p. 270).

encoded, text-driven preferred response" (p. 269), since many of them portray an explicit ideology, political point or moral positioning. For example, literary works such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* or *Gulliver's Travels* foreground a particular ethical dimension, and are "ethically pointed" (p. 270). In his view, "readers assume that there is a preferred reading of a literary text, which they impute to the author's intention" (p. 269). In order to analyse[41] readerly ethical positioning, "it is essential to observe and analyse *how* that positioning has occurred, and how the text's imagined minds and the reader's actually situated mind have arrived at a certain place" (274). I analyse my participants' ethical evaluation and positioning in Chapter 6.

A useful framework to examine readers' positioning towards characters is Breithaupt's (2012) three-person model of empathy. In Galeano's stories the story-world scenarios of conflict present one character that can be seen as victim, another character that can be seen as villain, and all the while the reader is placed in the role of observer (Breithaupt, 2012, p. 89). In this observer role the reader might choose to take sides with either (or both) characters. Side-taking ultimately involves a choice between different positions since the reader chooses to view the story-world situation from the perspective of the chosen side(s) (p. 88).

Breithaupt considers that side-taking in conflict situations can either channel empathy or block it. Moral evaluation, including (un)fairness perception and causal fault attribution, is one of the secondary mental processes which could influence side-taking (p. 86).

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[41] Stockwell proposes the notion of *deictic braid* (2002, 2009) to analyse the ethical positioning of reader and character, which consists of perceptual, spatio-temporal, social, compositional, and textual deixis (see 2013, p. 271).

Moral evaluation can work as a control mechanism through which readers make "conscious efforts to selectively understand or distance [themselves] emotionally" from characters (p. 86).

Side-taking also produces the reasons for such support or positioning; that is, it legitimises and provides justification for one's choice (p. 88). This justification is a way to make sense of the other's (i.e. the character's) situation: "this process of sense-making could be described as producing a narrative order" (p. 88). When taking sides, "the observed conflict will often be connected to various other events, thereby creating a narrative with temporal progression and suggested causality" (p. 89). When moral evaluation comes into play, "incrimination and acquittal often come about by means of narrative calculations that causally connect events and intentions (Thiele, 2006)" (p. 89). An important feature of my data is that these legitimation strategies could well be articulated by readers during the group discussion.

A final point worth discussing in relation to readers' moral evaluation of stories is to do with (de)humanisation. Lynne Cameron's discourse analytical approach to the dynamics of empathy in conflict situations points out (de)humanisation as a condition which may facilitate and/or block empathy. If dehumanisation blocks empathy by reducing the other person to something less than human (Cameron, 2013, p. 17), then humanisation makes empathy more readily available because human qualities are attributed to the other person (i.e., the character). Processes of (de)humanisation are, then, closely related to empathy: "empathy can be a moral or ethical choice to accept the Other as a

fellow human being, complex and particular, deemed worthy of being understood"
(Cameron, 2013, p. 7).

The psychological literature sheds light on what is meant by *humanness* and
(de)humanisation. Haslam (2006) establishes two different senses of 'humanness' after
reviewing several theoretical perspectives on dehumanisation. First, *uniquely human*
characteristics (those which distinguish humans from animals) are to do with civility,
refinement, moral sensibility, and higher order cognition. Second, *human nature*
characteristics (those that are central to humans) involve emotional responsiveness,
interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, individuality, and depth. These
characteristics correspond, in turn, with two types of dehumanisation — animalistic
dehumanisation and mechanistic dehumanisation — when the respective characteristics
are denied to other people (see Figure 3.1 below).

Figure 3.1. *Haslam's (2006) account of forms of dehumanisation*

The concept of dehumanisation refers to the denial of "full humanness" or "membership of the human species" to others (Haslam, 2006, p. 252). Animalistic dehumanisation involves "denying uniquely human attributes to others", whereas mechanistic dehumanisation involves "denying human nature to others", thus representing them "as objects or automata" (Haslam, 2006, p. 252).

The focus in Haslam's (2006) article seems to be on how perpetrators dehumanise their victims. In contrast, my focus is on how readers might perceive characters as dehumanised through "extremely negative evaluations of others" (p. 255). I apply Haslam's insights to the context of my data; that is, to a reading situation where the reader is not a participant in the story-world events (they are neither perpetrator nor

victim) but is in a position to evaluate characters and their behaviour (cf. Breithaupt's three-person model of empathy previously introduced). Thus, I am concerned with how the perpetrator characters' behaviour is evaluated by readers, and on what basis readers may perceive these characters as dehumanised.

3.1.5 Top-down influences: Observer-target relationship

Another top-down influence that may regulate empathy is the interpersonal relationship between empathiser and target, since it is well-known that our attitudes toward the object of empathy can affect our empathetic responses (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 90). This sub-section looks into observer-target similarity (including group identity, closeness and familiarity) and autobiographical alignment.

One of the situational factors that may play a role in empathetic responsiveness is observer-target similarity since "for most people perceived similarity encourages empathy" (Keen, 2006, p. 228). Especially salient in the scholarly discussions is the role of *group identity* (i.e., in-group and out-group identity) in the elicitation of empathy:

> We have a hard time identifying with people whom we see as different or belonging to another group. We find it easier to identify with those like us — with the same cultural background, ethnic features, age, gender, job, and so on — and even more so with those close to us, such as spouses, children, and friends (de Waal, 2009, p. 80)

Empathy thrives when encountering "those who have been 'preapproved' based on similarity and closeness" (de Waal, 2009, p. 81). De Waal (2009) and Mageo (2011) support the view that empathy is more often directed at members of the in-group, however defined, while being usually withheld from members of the out-group (Hollan,

2012a, p. 73). Hence, empathy "builds on proximity, similarity, and familiarity, which is entirely logical given that it evolved to promote in-group cooperation" (de Waal, 2009, p. 221).

Empathy is also thought to occur more readily when there is *autobiographical alignment*[42] (Sanford and Emmott, 2012) between reader and character. In the previous chapter (see 2.5.3) I discussed the idea that readers' empathy with characters might be facilitated when reader and character share autobiographical characteristics such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, etc. (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 211). This can also be the case if readers have already experienced events and circumstances that characters are undergoing, or if they are able to imagine themselves undergoing a similar situation in the future (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 211).

However, even if interpersonal similarity and autobiographical alignment might facilitate empathy, scholars consider these two aspects are not strictly necessary for empathy to occur (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, pp. 211-212; see also Gallagher's discussion of the diversity problem, 2012, pp. 363-364).

3.2 The textual dimension of narrative empathy

As well as readerly factors, textual factors can also influence readers' experiences of narrative empathy. The role of the text is emphasised by the theoretical models I draw on — cognitive stylistics and cognitive narratology (see 1.5). Characters, as potential

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[42] Despite the popular use among scholars of the concept of *identification* when discussing empathy (see e.g. Keen, 2006, or de Waal, 2009), I deliberately avoid the term and instead use *autobiographical alignment* (Sanford and Emmott, 2012).

targets of empathy, are shaped by textual linguistic choices, which influence readers' interpretation and responses. As van Peer puts it, character is "what readers infer from words, sentences, paragraphs, and textual composition depicting, describing or suggesting actions, thoughts, utterances or feelings of a protagonist" (1988, p. 9). As a result, linguistic choices in the text "will predetermine to a certain degree the kind of 'picture' one may compose of a [character]" (van Peer, 1988, p. 9). Given that linguistic choices and patterns in the text guide, open up or narrow down certain interpretative possibilities, it follows that "the particular forms by which this is achieved need to be studied in detail" (van Peer, 1988, p. 9).

The remainder of this chapter provides a review of some textual cues — narrative techniques more specifically — that have been discussed in the literature as having the potential to influence empathy with story characters. I first present an overview of a variety of narrative techniques that have been associated with empathy (Section 3.2.1), and introduce my linguistic approach to textual factors (Section 3.2.2). Then I zoom in on some of these narrative techniques — point of view presentation (3.2.2.1), characters' discourse presentation (3.2.2.2), characters' emotion presentation (3.2.2.3), and characterisation techniques (3.2.2.4). These storytelling devices are particularly appropriate to analysing my data, and so they are particularly central to my analytical framework (see chapter 4).

3.2.1 An overview of Keen's (2006) "empathetic narrative techniques"

This section introduces some of the connections that have been made in the literature[43] between narrative techniques and empathetic effects on readers. As mentioned in 2.7.1, Suzanne Keen's (2006) theory of narrative empathy gathers previous scholars' views on the empathy potential of some narrative techniques. It is worth highlighting that Keen explicitly refers to empathy, whereas other scholars (such as those studying point of view) might refer to similar effects by using the terms "sympathy" or "closeness". This section focuses mostly on those discussions where scholars use the term *empathy* explicitly. First I introduce the techniques, and then provide a critical evaluation of Keen's work.

Keen (2006) gathers a series of claims about what she calls "empathetic narrative techniques" (see pp. 215-220). Table 3.1 below gives an overview of the narrative techniques that Keen mentions at the level of detail she provides. The left column displays Keen's distinctions, and the right column includes the potential textual realisations:

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[43] Most of the existing work on narrative empathy focuses on *fictional* narratives, especially novels and films (Keen, 2013, para. 2).

Table 3.1. *An overview of Keen's (2006) "empathetic narrative techniques"*

Narrative technique categories	Textually realised as…
Character identification "the most commonly nominated feature of narrative fiction to be associated with empathy is character identification" (p. 216) Character identification "is not a narrative technique (it occurs in the reader, not in the text), but a consequence of reading that may be precipitated by the use of particular techniques of characterization" (p. 216)	*Characterisation techniques* "Specific aspects of characterization, such as naming, description, indirect implication of traits, reliance on types, relative flatness or roundness, depicted actions, roles in plot trajectories, quality of attributed speech, and mode of representation of consciousness may be assumed to contribute to the potential for character identification and thus for empathy" (p. 216) "The naming of characters (including the withholding of a name, the use of an abbreviation or a role-title in place of a full name, or allegorical or symbolic naming, etc.) may play a role in the potential for character identification" (p. 217) "The descriptive language through which readers encounter characters is assumed to make a difference" (p. 217) "direct description of a character's emotional state or circumstances by a third-person narrator may produce empathy in readers just as effectively as indirect implication of emotional states through actions and context" (p. 218) "not necessarily complex or realistic characterization" (p. 214) "the critical preference for psychological depth expressed by the "roundness" of characters "capable of surprising in a convincing way" (Forster 78), does not preclude empathetic response to flat characters, minor characters, or stereotyped villains and antagonists (…) flat characters—easily comprehended and recalled—may play a greater role in readers' engagement in novels than is usually understood." (p. 218) "The fullness and fashion by which speech, thoughts, and feelings of characters reach the reader are very often supposed by narrative theorists to enhance character identification (…) but relatively externalized and brief statements about a character's experiences and mental state may be sufficient to invoke empathy in a reader. Novelists do not need to be reminded of the

	rhetorical power of understatement, or indeed of the peril of revealing too much. Indeed, sometimes the potential for character identification and readers' empathy *decreases* with sustained exposure to a particular figure's thoughts or voice" (pp. 218-219)
Narrative situation "a close second for formal quality most often associated with empathy would be narrative situation (including point of view and perspective): the nature of the mediation between author and reader, including the person of the narration, the implicit location of the narrator, the relation of the narrator to the characters, and the internal or external perspective on characters, including in some cases the style of representation of characters' consciousness" (p. 216)	*Access to characters' consciousness* • "It has been a commonplace of narrative theory that an internal perspective, achieved either through first person self-narration, through figural narration (in which the 3rd person narrator stays covert and reports only on a single, focal center of consciousness located in a main character) or through authorial (omniscient) narration that moves inside characters' minds, best promotes character identification and readers' empathy." (p. 219) • "Most theorists agree that purely externalized narration tends not to invite readers' empathy" (p. 220) *Person of the narration* • "first person fiction[44], in which the narrator self-narrates about his or her own experiences and perceptions, is thought to invite an especially close relationship between reader and narrative voice." (p. 220) • Despite the "the commonplace that first person fiction more readily evokes feeling responsiveness than the whole variety of third person narrative situations", empathy may be "enhanced or impeded by narrative consonance or dissonance[45], unreliability, discordance, an excess of narrative levels with multiple narrators, extremes of disorder, or an especially convoluted plot. Genre, setting, and time period may help or hinder readers' empathy." (p. 215). • Thus "contrasting first person with third person puts the question too broadly, with too many other

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[44] Leech and Short also consider that "first-person narration is often thought to make readers feel closer to the characters" (1981, p. 275)

[45] These terms are defined as follows: "consonance (relative closeness to the related events) and dissonance (greater distance between the happening and the telling)" (Keen, 2006, p. 224).

	variables, to reach a valid conclusion" (p. 216)
	Modes of representing inner life • Narrated monologue or Free Indirect Discourse: "Subsequent theorists have agreed that narrated monologue has a strong effect on readers' responses to characters." (p. 219) • "Despite the frequent mention of narrated monologue as the most likely to produce empathy, quoted monologue and psycho-narration also give a reader access to the inner life of characters." (p. 220)

Other narrative techniques

Use of generic and formal choices	• Formulaic conventions vs. unusual representations which promote foregrounding (p. 215) • "While literary critics and professionals value novels that unsettle convictions and contest norms, readers' reactions to familiar situations and formulaic plot trajectories may underlie their genuinely empathetic reactions to predictable plot events and to the stereotyped figures that enact them" (p. 218)
Plot	"Aspects of plot structure and narration that might have a role in invoking readers' empathy include the control of timing (pace), order (anachronies), the use of nested levels of narrative (stories within stories), serial narrative, strong or weak closure, the use of subsidiary (supplementary, satellite) plot events, repetition, and gaps" (p. 217)
Other elements of fiction	"repetitions of works in series, the length of novels, genre expectations, vivid use of settings, metanarrative commentary, and aspects of the discourse that slow readers' pace (foregrounding, uses of disorder, etc.)" (p. 216)

These narrative devices associated with empathetic effects are regarded as "empathic in nature by some theorists and researchers" whereas for other scholars it is more about the disposition of readers themselves (Keen, 2006, p. 216). Caracciolo sees textual features as existing only as a result of readers' experiencing them (2013, para. 14). A similar point is made by Whiteley and Canning (2017, p. 72):

> The stylistic study of textual form and interpretative effect is grounded on the understanding of literary works (indeed, all texts) as heteronomous objects; that is, objects which are brought into being by the observing consciousness of a reader (Ingarden, 1973a, 1973b; Stockwell, 2002: 135–136).

I agree with the latter view: the reading experience of narrative empathy ultimately depends on the reader. For instance, the empathy potential of a textual cue such as internal perspective might be overridden by a reader's strong moral condemnation of a character. However, it has to be conceded that texts can still be described as independent entities.

Keen highlights that no narrative technique *per se* has yet been proven to facilitate readers' empathy across the board. She argues that narrative techniques work alongside many other variables such as readers' own empathetic dispositions, which vary (p. 214) (see 3.1.1); the similarity between readers and characters (p. 217) (see 3.1.5); or the timing and context of the reading experience, which is to do with the text's "relevance to particular historical, economic, cultural, or social circumstances, either in the moment of publication or in later times" (p. 214).

Thus, Keen concludes that the empathy potential of these storytelling devices has yet to be confirmed (p. 216). Van Lissa et al. (2016) also comment on the absence of

compelling evidence about the connection between empathetic arousal and narrative techniques. As already mentioned in 2.7.2, they state that "literary scholars tend to overestimate the effects of textual cues on readers' responses" (van Lissa et al., 2016, p. 60). As Keen convincingly puts it,

> the commentary on narrative form often asserts (or assumes) that a specific technique inevitably results in particular effects (…) in readers. These views, in my opinion, should be subjected to careful empirical testing before any aspect of narrative technique earns the label of 'empathetic' (p. 225)

In this respect, I fully agree with Keen and van Lissa et al.'s appeal for *caution* when it comes to making claims about the effects of narrative techniques on readerly experiences, since extra-textual factors are an essential part of the picture and should not be ignored. Extra-textual, readerly factors alone might account for differences in readerly responses: "as empirical research in discourse processing reveals, individual readers respond variously to narrative texts, depending on their identities, situations, experiences, and temperaments" (Keen, 2011, as cited in Keen, 2013, para. 7). As I will show in Chapter 6, readers' engagement with characters results from a complex interplay between textual cues and readerly factors.

This section finishes with a brief critical evaluation on Keen's (2006) work. Her theory of narrative empathy has a number of strengths. The article flags up the connections that have been previously made between narrative techniques and empathetic effects on readers. In so doing, it showcases both theoretical insights and empirical findings that support the claims about techniques and effects. Thus, her catalogue of empathetic narrative techniques is an invaluable starting point for new-comers to narrative empathy research.

However, from a linguistic-stylistic perspective, it can be observed that there are some weaknesses in Keen's (2006) articulation of empathetic narrative techniques. I consider this is simply the result of the differences in disciplinary backgrounds. Despite being neighbouring disciplines, narratology (Keen's background) and stylistics (my background) sometimes differ in the way narrative phenomena are labelled and defined. Keen's approach to what each of the techniques constitutes is sometimes rather vague since narrative techniques are not always defined, and they are at times referred to in rather broad terms. Moreover, her inventory of techniques is at times confusing since there is significant overlap between some of the categories, yet such overlap is not explicitly mentioned. Finally, some categories that would need separate treatment are sometimes conflated into a single category. For example, when discussing the effects of free indirect discourse (Keen, 2006, p. 219), there is no distinction as to the difference between free indirect *speech* and free indirect *thought*, a distinction which stylisticians Leech and Short (2007) take to be meaningful — other things being equal, FIS is said to create distance while FIT is supposed to invite closeness with the given character (see 3.2.2.2). These contrasting potential effects on readers should be incorporated into a more nuanced account of linguistically-induced narrative empathy.

My work will hopefully provide a more unambiguous account of potential textual empathy triggers and/or barriers for other analysts to work on. Drawing on the discipline of stylistics enables a more refined and systematic account of what each narrative technique constitutes, thus making the analysis more workable from a linguistic perspective. I further justify my linguistic approach in the following section.

3.2.2 A linguistic approach to textual factors

Keen's (2006) theoretical account of narrative empathy has been a useful starting point for designing my analytical framework. However, in the light of the relative limitations of her work (see 3.2.1), I draw on linguistically based approaches to the textual devices under analysis. I pay special attention to textual phenomena that have been closely associated with empathy effects in the literature, and explore them in the light of specific frameworks — point of view presentation (Fowler, 1996; Short, 1996), characters' discourse presentation (Leech and Short, 2007), characters' emotion presentation (Langlotz, 2017) and characterisation techniques (Culpeper, 2001). The analytical frameworks which I draw on enable me to add more *linguistic descriptive detail, precision and systematicity* to the study of narrative empathy. Keen acknowledges that "narrative theorists can contribute specificity and subtlety to the research into narrative empathy" (2006, p. 216), but in my view the potential wealth of insights that linguistics can offer should not be disregarded.

The following sub-sections provide a selective review of the literature on the four textual phenomena under analysis (3.2.2.1 point of view presentation, 3.2.2.2 characters' discourse presentation, 3.2.2.3 characters' emotion presentation, 3.2.2.4 characterisation techniques). The purposes of this review are manifold — to unpick how these textual devices work in narrative, how they are linguistically realised, and what their empathy potential might be. Moreover, this literature review sets the ground for my analytical framework (see 4.2), which is used for the stylistic analysis of the linguistic features of Galeano's stories and their empathy potential (see 4.3). Despite important overlaps

between these notions (which I address when relevant), it seems sensible to keep them apart for expository and analytical convenience.

3.2.2.1 Point of view presentation

In narrative analysis a customary distinction is made between a story[46] and the position, perspective or orientation from which the story is told (Fowler, 1996, p. 160; Short, 1996, p. 256). The term *point of view* is used to refer to the perspective adopted in the telling of a story, whether that be "the angle of telling" (Simpson, 1993, p. 2) or the "angle of vision or perception" (Wales, 2011, p. 326). Prince defines viewpoint as "the physical, psychological, and ideological position in terms of which the narrated situations and events are presented" or "the perspective through which they are filtered" (2005, p. 442). The analysis of point of view involves, broadly speaking, the ways in which the content of a story is (re)presented. It is thus concerned with "language as representation, as a projection of positions and perspectives, as a way of communicating attitudes and assumptions" (Simpson, 1993, p. 2).

The notion of point of view is a rather complex concept that has been extensively studied and discussed from different perspectives, and as a result there exists "a proliferation of often conflicting theories, terms and models" (Simpson, 2004, p. 27). For example, there is a range of competing terms such as *narrative perspective*, *narrative*

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[46] Similarly, it is customary to distinguish between *what* is told (i.e. existents, states and events) and *how* it is told (i.e. technique — temporality, voice/narration, vision/focalisation and style) (Phelan and Booth, 2005, p. 370). This distinction has been named differently — *fabula* and *sjuzhet* by Russian formalists, *histoire* and *discours* by French structuralists, and *story* and *narration/discourse* in the English-speaking world. Even though the terms do not correspond neatly due to having originated in different intellectual traditions, the point is to distinguish between the content of a story and its treatment in the narration (Fowler, 1996, p. 161).

manner, *focalisation* (Hargreaves, 2015, p. 3) or *central intelligence*, *vision*, *filter* and *slant* (Prince, 2005, p. 442). Point of view has traditionally been a concern of both stylisticians and narratologists in their respective study of narrative fiction (Shen, 2014, p. 195), and in fact narratology has contributed a great deal to stylisticians' understanding of point of view (Leech and Short, 2007, pp. 283-284). Due to space constraints though, my work is unable to do full justice to the richness and complexity of the concept of point of view.

This sub-section first presents some distinctions which are of crucial importance in discussions of point of view in narrative fiction, such as issues of narration and focalisation. Then it introduces the two linguistically-informed frameworks which I draw on for analysing point of view presentation, namely Fowler's (1996 [1986]) model of point of view and Short's (1996) checklist of linguistic indicators of point of view. I make use of these frameworks because together they provide for a systematic account of the linguistic features which can indicate viewpoint, and so they allow for the kind of linguistic detail and precision which my study hopes to contribute to the study of narrative empathy.

Mode of narration

Narration can be understood as the verbal production of narrative by a narrator (Porter Abbott, 2005, p. 340). A narrator, in turn, can be defined as the agent that tells and transmits the existents, states and events in a narrative (Phelan and Booth, 2005, p. 388). Similarly, Toolan defines the narrator as "the individual or 'position' we judge to be the immediate source and authority for whatever words are used in the telling" (2001, p. 64).

Different kinds of narration and of narrators have been discussed in the tradition of literary criticism (Toolan, 2001, p. 68). Narration has traditionally been classified in terms of the tense (i.e. past tense, historical present narration, etc.) and the grammatical person (i.e. first-, second- and third-person narration) of the narrating voice (Porter Abbott, 2005, p. 340). Within third-person narration a distinction can be made between omniscient versus limited narration, and within omniscient narration there can be intrusive versus impersonal/objective narration (Toolan, 2001, p. 68).

In view of the inadequacy of classifications based only on tense and grammatical person, other systems of classification have been developed. For instance, Genette (1980) developed a distinction between narrators based on their mode of participation in the narrated events; that is, narrators who do/did or do/did not participate in the events being narrated — homodiegesis and heterodiegesis. He distinguishes between *homodiegetic narration* (which emanates from a story character) and *heterodiegetic narration* (which comes from a voice which is outside the story). Stanzel (1984) proposed a model according to the degree of mediacy of the narration, which included the three main categories of *first-person narration*, *authorial narration* and reflector-mediated *figural narration*, where the narrator is, respectively, internal to the story, external to the story or conveyed through a reflector[47] or focalising character. In addition, Booth (1983) discriminated between reliable and unreliable narration, and later on Phelan and Martin (1999) developed further categories of unreliable narration depending on how the narrator performs the functions of reporting, reading/interpreting, and regarding/evaluating (Phelan and Booth, 2005, p. 390). Other typologies of narratorial

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[47] As will be discussed below, the reflector/focaliser is the "person whose point of view is represented" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 301).

mode have been developed by Uspensky (1973), Fowler (1986) and Simpson (1993), the

latter being a revision of the traditional Uspensky-Fowler framework (Toolan, 2001, p. 69;

see below).

Another aspect which has been considered in narrative analysis is that the narrator may

provide different kinds and quantity of information in more or less explicit, objective and

evaluative ways, with different degrees of authority, confidence, reliability and skill as

communicator (Prince, 2005, p. 442). The visibility of the narrator can be established

depending on whether certain kinds of material are included in the telling. These types

of reporting indicate narratorial presence in increasing order of intrusiveness and can

include different degrees of specificity, insight, and understanding:

> 1. Description of settings
> 2. Identification of characters
> 3. Temporal summaries
> 4. Definition of characters
> 5. Reports of what characters did not think or say
> 6. Commentary — interpretation, judgement, generalisation
>
> (Toolan, 2001, p. 69)

The latter particularly foregrounds the narrator's presence. *Commentary* refers to

narratorial speech acts that go beyond providing information about facts and events in

the story-world (Nünning, 2005, p. 74). Commentary may be either explicit or implicit,

and can be divided into two main sub-types: commentary about the story and

commentary about the narrator's own discourse (Chatman, 1978). I pay attention to the

former since it features in Galeano's stories, as will be shown in Chapter 4. Commentary

on the story can be divided into explanatory, evaluative, and generalising comments

(Nünning, 2005, p. 74). In these cases, when providing commentary on the story "a

narrator can explain or interpret an event, a character's motivation, or the significance of a narrative element (interpretation), express his or her personal values and moral opinions (judgement), or express 'gnomic' and philosophical statements (generalisation)" (Nünning, 2005, p. 74). Finally, commentary can serve different functions, from the purely ornamental to fulfilling rhetorical and ideological purposes because commentary communicates a narrator's voice, values, and norms, and in so doing projects an image of the narrator that "can either function as a distancing device or as one which engages the reader's sympathy" (Nünning, 2005, p. 74).

Focalisation

It is conventional within narratology to examine the notion of *focalisation* since many narratologists consider that point of view involves both[48] a narrating agent and a focalising agent (Prince, 2005, p. 442). Genette (1980) noted that some studies of point of view tended to conflate two distinct domains: voice or narration (who speaks) and vision or perception (who sees or perceives) (Phelan and Booth, 2005, p. 372). Put simply, Genette's concept of *focalisation*, which is a narratological term for point of view, refers to the angle of perception (Shen, 2014, p. 195). It can be defined as the angle from which events are seen (*seen* in a broad sense), "the orientation we infer to be that from which what gets told is told", or the adoption of "a viewpoint from which things are *implicitly* seen, felt, understood, and assessed" (Toolan, p. 60, emphasis in the original). The terms *focaliser* or *reflector* refer to the filtering or perceiving entity; that is, the

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[48] Even though it is useful to keep the domains of narration and viewpoint/focalisation separate, it may not be always possible to do so: "while it may be accepted (…) that narration always entails focalisation, it is debatable whether we need to posit a focaliser position distinct from the narratorial one in all texts, and whether we should typically work on the assumption that we can identify a focaliser's spatiotemporal, psychological and ideological orientations as distinct from those of the narrator" (Toolan, 2001, p. 63).

holder of point of view (Prince, 2005, p. 442). Later on Bal (1997 [1985]) proposed adding the category of the *focalised*; that is, the object of focalisation.

Scholars have put forward typologies based on whether the focaliser is situated in the story or out of it. Genette distinguished between *zero/free focalisation* (narration from the perspective of a heterodiegetic narrator, usually a third-person omniscient narrator who knows more than characters do), *internal focalisation* (narration from the limited perspective of a character, which can be fixed, variable or multiple), and *external/objective focalisation* (narration from the perspective of a heterodiegetic narrator who says less than characters know and who does not offer an inside view of characters) (Phelan and Booth, 2005, p. 372).

A rather popular account of point of view was provided by the Russian semiotician and narratologist Boris Uspensky (1973), who put forward the idea that viewpoint manifests itself on four different planes or levels: ideological, phraseological, spatiotemporal and psychological (see below). At each level a distinction can be made depending on whether the focaliser is inside or outside the diegesis, and whether the information given comes from an inner or outer view on characters (Prince, 2005, p. 443). Uspensky's model was later on refined by the linguist Roger Fowler (1996 [1986]), whose work is introduced below.

Fowler's (1996 [1986]) model of point of view

Fowler's (1996) model is commonly known as the *Fowler-Uspensky model* within stylistics (Simpson, 2004, p. 77). The aim of Fowler's model is to offer an account of linguistic

characteristics which enables critical linguistic description of point of view (Fowler, 1996, p. 161). Fowler draws mainly on Uspensky's framework for the study of viewpoint (p. 161). Uspensky made a distinction between four planes of point of view: (i) spatial and temporal, (ii) phraseological, (iii) psychological, and (iv) ideological. *Spatial viewpoint* is concerned with the viewing position (i.e. camera angle) and spatial relationships signalled in the story (Fowler, 1996, pp. 162-163; Simpson, 2004, p. 79). *Temporal viewpoint* is concerned with narrative time relationships such as repetition, analepsis/flashback, prolepsis/flashforward or duration (Simpson, 2004, p. 79). *Phraseological viewpoint* refers to the naming of characters and the representation of character's speech (Fowler, 1996, p. 162), but Fowler abandons this category in his model. *Psychological viewpoint* is about accessibility to characters' minds. Finally, *ideological viewpoint* refers to the values conveyed in the narrative. In my study I consider only point of view on the psychological and ideological planes because these two categories are the most relevant for analysing Galeano's short stories in relation to potential empathy effects.

Psychological point of view

The psychological or perceptual plane of point of view corresponds to Genette's *focalisation* (Fowler, 1996, p. 169). Fowler makes use of Genette's concept of *focalisation* because it "allows us to distinguish alternative viewing positions from which a story might be told" (p. 161). Psychological viewpoint is concerned with "the question of who is presented as the observer of the events of a narrative, whether the narrator or a participating character" (p. 169). Psychological viewpoint can be subdivided into *internal*

and *external* perspective, both being further subdivided into two categories — Internal type A and B, and External type C and D.

Internal type A refers to narration from a point of view within the consciousness of a character, which tells the reader about the character's evaluations and feelings. It may be either first-person narration by a story character or third-person narration which is highly permeated with indicators of the character's world view. When the narrator is a participating character the textual presentation of point of view may be signalled by the use of first-person singular pronouns, modality markers, *verba sentiendi*, and choices of diction, syntax and transitivity (p. 171).

Internal type B refers to narration from the point of view of a third-person omniscient narrator who does not participate in the events but "who claims knowledge of what is going on in the characters' heads, reporting their motives and feelings" (p. 173). Because of its focus on characters, this category of internal perspective offers accounts of characters' perceptions, mental processes, and feelings, and so the main linguistic indicator of this type of internal narration is the "presence of *verba sentiendi* detailing intentions, emotion, and thoughts" (p. 173). Here lexical choices, deixis, and transitivity patterns can be ascribed to the authorial narrator rather than to the characters.

Regarding external perspective, this type of narration is characterised by the "avoidance of any account of the thoughts or feelings or characters, or at least, avoidance of any claim to the fidelity of such an account" (p. 177). E*xternal type C* is the most impersonal form of third-person narration for two reasons. First, it describes events and characters

from a position which offers no access to characters' consciousness, feelings and evaluations. As a result, it does not report any internal processes of characters — manifested in the (near) absence of *verba sentiendi* — and it "claims to be objective in not offering to report what an ordinary unprivileged observer could not see" (p. 177). Second, it is impersonal in that it does not offer any authorial or narratorial judgements on characters, and so this objectivity is marked by a (near) lack of evaluative modality. This type of narration may include physical description, actions, and reports of direct speech with narratorial comments being absent or kept to a minimum.

In contrast, *external type D* highlights the persona of the narrator through the use of first-person pronouns and explicit modality. In this type of narration "the impression is created of a speaker who controls the telling of the story, and who has definite views on the world at large (announced in generic sentences, perhaps) and on the actions and characters in the story (evaluative adjectives)" (p. 178). The limited knowledge of the narrator, who has no access to characters' thoughts and feelings, is indicated by epistemic modal markers, metaphors and comparisons. External type D narration highlights the narrators' speculation and interpretation regarding the psychology of characters by reference to external signs, and so there may be *verba sentiendi* accompanied by expressions of appearance and speculation (p. 178).

Ideological point of view

Ideological point of view is concerned with "the set of values, or belief system, communicated by the language of a text" (Fowler, 1996, p. 165). These values and beliefs

can be attributed to different levels in the discourse structure[49] — author, narrator or character(s). As Simpson puts it, point of view on the ideological plane refers to "the way in which a text mediates a set of particular ideological beliefs through either character, narrator, or author" (2004, p. 78). Fowler suggests that ideological viewpoint can be manifested rather explicitly through the use of modal structures such as modal auxiliaries (*may*, *might*); modal adverbs or sentence adverbs (*certainly*, *probably*); evaluative adjectives and adverbs (*lucky*, *luckily*); verbs of knowledge, prediction and evaluation (*seem*, *guess*, *dislike*); and generic sentences (i.e., propositions claiming universal truth) (pp. 166-167).

However, the term *ideological point of view* became somewhat problematic because Fowler used it as synonymous with *mind style* and *world view* (McIntyre, 2006, p. 143), which refer to very different notions within stylistics. Semino (2002) offers a more satisfying alternative to this terminological conflation. She considers that this concept is "most apt to capture those aspects of world views that are social, cultural, religious or political in origin", including for example moral judgements or attitudes toward different social groups, thus befitting Fowler's own definition of ideological point of view (Semino, 2002, p. 97). In this narrower view, ideological viewpoint can be described as the "socio-political slant put on what is described" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 299). Despite its usefulness as an analytical category, Simpson worries that if taken broadly it can encompass "just about any aspect of narrative," and so it should be applied with caution (2004, p. 78).

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[49] The discourse structure of fictional prose normally includes at least three levels or layers: author-reader, narrator-narratee, and character-character (Short, 1996, pp. 256-257)

Short's (1996) checklist of linguistic indicators of point of view

Point of view can be analysed at the level of the story as a whole, at the level of major sub-divisions within the story, or at a sentence-by-sentence level since viewpoint can shift within a single sentence. Short's (1996) checklist is particularly useful for the latter micro-level analysis. In order to establish point of view, Short provides a checklist for the close and systematic analysis of linguistic indicators of viewpoint. These small-scale linguistic choices made by authors include eight linguistic means by which viewpoint can be indicated and manipulated (Short, 1996, pp. 263-264):

1) *Schema-oriented language* might indicate point of view when details and facts are observed and described from a particular character's position. Moreover, schema-related language can also be reflected in the kinds of vocabulary usually associated with particular people or characters (pp. 264-265).

2) *Value-laden expressions* refer to evaluative, ideologically slanted expressions which indicate attitudes and value judgements (p. 265).

3) *Given vs. new information* involves the use of definite and indefinite reference to refer to aspects of the story-world depending on whether or not the information provided is assumed to be part of the audience's general background knowledge. Among its linguistic indicators are definite vs. indefinite articles, or full noun phrases vs. (anaphoric or cataphoric) pronominal references. Different viewpoint effects can be associated with this handling of information. When indefinite reference is used readers can have the impression of getting a distanced bird's-eye view. When definite reference is used (e.g. when stories begin *in medias res*) readers are positioned in the know, and since they are

assumed to be familiar with what is being told they might get a sense of being intimately involved in what is happening (pp. 266-268).

4) *Indicators of a particular character's thoughts or perceptions* include the use of verbs of perception and cognition (*see*, *believe*), adverbs of factivity (i.e. *apparently*, *actually*), and verbs of factivity — factive verbs (i.e. *know*), non-factive verbs (i.e. *believe*), and counter-factual verbs (i.e. *pretend*). Modal verbs (*can*, *may*) can also signal the internal representation of characters' perceptions and thoughts (pp. 268-269).

5) *Deixis* involves pointing expressions which are relative to the speaker's viewpoint. Deictic expressions apply both to time (time deixis) and space (place deixis), and can indicate closeness or remoteness. Deixis indicates viewpoint because the reflector or focalising character "forms a deictic centre, an 'origo', around which objects are positioned relative to their relative proximity or distance to the reflector" (Simpson, 2004, p. 28). Place deixis can be manifested through locative expressions such as demonstrative pronouns (*this*, *that*), adverbials (*here*, *there*), and verbs (*come*, *go*). Time deixis can be found in adverbials (*now*, *tomorrow*) and tense (past and present) (Short, pp. 269-272).

6) *Social deixis* refers to proximity in social relations; that is, how close or remote in social terms the speaker is to other people. This can be indicated through the way people are addressed (e.g. title and last name formulation vs. first name). These socially deictic naming strategies can create effects of distance or closeness at different levels: narrator-character (depending on how the narrator names characters), character-character (depending on the terms of address

characters use to refer to one another), and reader-character as a result of the other two kinds of relationship (pp. 272-274).

7) *The sequencing and organisation of actions and events* may indicate viewpoint because it shows the narrator's or reflector's position and perception in relation to actions and events. Viewpoint can thus be marked by the grammatical organisation of clauses, or by relationships between sentences or clauses. For example, a particular perception can be represented by withholding information, by using passive constructions with agent deletion, or by moving from vague descriptions and references to more precise ones (pp. 275-276). These choices in event coding contribute to creating the effect of *psychological sequencing*, which refers to cases where "textual order reflects the order in which impressions occur in the mind" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 190).

8) Finally, *ideological viewpoint* or *world-view* does not refer to a particular kind of indicator; rather, it involves "ways in which groups of indicators can be linked together interpretatively" (p. 277). Ideological viewpoint is to do with "a generalised mind-set or outlook on the world that a person, often as a representative of a *group* of people, might have" (p. 277, original emphasis). This can be manifested in language through overt value-laden expressions which represent different socio-political views and assumptions (pp. 277-279).

3.2.2.2 Characters' discourse presentation

Stories contain action and events but they also convey characters' discourse; that is, characters' speech and thought (Simpson, 2004, p. 30). The presentation of speech and

thought is different from what is conventionally labelled as Narrator's Representation of Action (NRA), which "encompasses all non-speech and non-thought phenomena" (Simpson, 2004, p. 81). The three analytical domains of Narrator's Representation of Action, speech presentation and thought presentation allow us to draw distinctions, respectively, between what is *done*, what is *said* and what is *thought* (Short, 1996, p. 304).

Linguists and narratologists have been much concerned with researching the ways in which speech and thought is (re)presented[50] in stories (Fludernik, 2005, p. 558). In the analysis of narrative fiction, the most systematic model for examining discourse presentation is the one developed by stylisticians Geoffrey Leech and Mick Short (2007 [1981]). Later developments to the model were introduced by the Lancaster Speech, Writing and Thought Presentation research project (see, e.g., Semino and Short, 2004), which applied Leech and Short's (1981) model to a corpus of both fictional and non-fictional written narratives, but also to a corpus of spoken English (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 302). The model enables the analyst to (i) describe the methods and techniques which writers can use to report speech and thought, as well as to (ii) account for the effects which might result from the choice of mode of presentation (Simpson, 2004, p. 30). I make use of this framework because the model allows for analytical precision when it comes to studying characters' discourse presentation (2007, p. 302).

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[50] When discussing non-fictional real-life discourse, linguists use the term speech *representation* because two speech situations are involved — the reported speech situation takes place first, and then the reporting situation ensues. In fictional discourse, however, it is conventional to talk about character speech *presentation* because there is no previous speech event or situation. Since the writer is making it all up, readers' only access to the words of characters is through the report found in the story (Short, 1996, pp. 290-291). Although scholars sometimes use the two terms interchangeably, I will mostly stick to the term *presentation* for the reasons provided here.

I now turn to reviewing the model, paying particular attention to the forms and functions of the different presentational scales and categories, the various degrees of narratorial interference and faithfulness claims associated with the categories, and the effects that can be related to the different modes of presentation depending on what the norm is considered to be for each scale. Then, I deal briefly with the much-discussed categories of Free Indirect Speech and Free Indirect Thought. Finally, I wrap up the section by commenting on the relationship between character discourse presentation and point of view. My review[51] draws primarily on Leech and Short (2007), Short (1996), Semino and Short (2004), and Simpson (2004).

Presentational scales and categories

The different categories in the speech and thought presentational scales are parallel to each other (except for NI), as shown in the list below:

SPEECH	THOUGHT
(FDS) Free Direct Speech	(FDT) Free Direct Thought
(DS) Direct Speech	(DT) Direct Thought
(FIS) Free Indirect Speech	(FIT) Free Indirect Thought
(IS) Indirect Speech	(IT) Indirect Thought
(NRSA) Narrative Report of Speech Act	(NRTA) Narrative Report of Thought Act
(NRS) Narrator's Representation of Speech[52]	(NRT) Narrator's Representation of Thought[53]
	(NI) Narration of Internal States[54]

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[51] For the sake of word count the frequent citations to these sources will omit the year of publication.

[52] This category was added by Short (1996, p. 297). The same category was given a different name — Narrator's Representation of Voice (NV) — by researchers working at the Lancaster speech, writing and thought presentation project to capture sentences which are more minimal than NRSA (Leech and Short, p. 303).

[53] This category was added by Short (see 1996, p. 311).

[54] This category was added by Semino and Short (2004). This category has no correspondence with speech presentation. It captures references to internal states of characters which are not straightforward reports of thought acts (Semino and Short, 2004, p. 46), such as non-verbal consciousness.

The categories are distributed along a cline of increasing or declining narratorial interference, depending on how full the report of the speech or thought is — as signalled by the presence of features of directness or indirectness. Thus, the more direct forms are conventionally interpreted as reflecting the words as if they were being used verbatim, whereas the more indirect forms contain the reporter's own words to express the content of the speech or thought (Leech and Short, p. 255). The categories can be distinguished by formal features at the three major linguistic levels of *graphology* (i.e. presence and absence of quotation marks to indicate that quotation is occurring), *grammar* (i.e. presence and absence of an introductory reporting clause; whether the reported clause is grammatically (in)dependent of the reporting clause; tense; person of the pronouns; deictics), and *lexis* (i.e. fullness and directness of the content that gives some flavour of the original manner of expression). These formal linguistic features change when we move from one category to another, and they might be appropriate to the narrator/reporter or to the character(s). Table 3.2, which I borrow from Semino (2004), defines the main categories linguistically and provides examples[55] (N.B. only the speech presentation categories are illustrated; thought presentation categories are formally parallel to speech categories):

Table 3.2. *Speech presentation categories explained (Semino, 2004)*

Category	Description	Example
Direct Speech (DS)	Representation of an utterance or utterances typically via a reporting clause (e.g. 'she said') and a (grammatically independent) reported clause, which is typically enclosed within quotation marks. The language used in the reported clause is appropriate to the speaking character (in terms of pronouns, tense, deixis	'Didn't you recognize me?' he asked.

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[55] Examples from an extract from Julian Barnes's *England, England* unless otherwise stated (Semino, 2004).

	generally, lexis, etc.)	
Free Indirect Speech (FIS)	Representation of an utterance or utterances typically without a reporting clause (e.g. 'she said') and using language that is partly appropriate to the narrator (e.g. tense and pronouns) and partly to the character (e.g. lexis, deixis, grammatical structures).	He wondered if they could meet. What about lunch one day.
Indirect Speech (IS)	Representation of an utterance or utterances via a reporting clause (e.g. 'she said') followed by a (grammatically subordinated) reported clause. The language used in the reported clause is appropriate to the narrator (in terms of pronouns, tense, deixis generally, lexis, etc.)	He told her she had grown into a most attractive woman.
Narrative Report of Speech Act (NRSA)	Reference to the illocutionary force of an utterance or utterances (possibly with an indication of the topic)	She asked her friends for advice.
Narrator's Representation of Voice (NV)	Minimal reference to speech taking place.	She talked on. (Aldous Huxley, 1928, *Point Counter Point*, p. 140)

Degrees of narratorial interference

The clines of speech and thought presentation blend "the contributions of character and narrator, in different proportions at different points" on the scales (Short, p. 289). As a result, various degrees of *freeness vs. narratorial interference* are associated with the different points along the continuum depending on how (un)mediated by the reporter/narrator the content is. In other words, whether what is reported is assumed to be under the character's control (unmediated by the reporter) or under the narrator's control (mediated within the narrator's discourse) (Fludernik, 2005, p. 559). As Table 3.3 below shows, the least mediated forms occupy the top part of the scale (i.e. the character end of the scale) while the most mediated forms are placed towards the bottom of the scale (i.e. the narrator end of the scale):

Table 3.3. *Degrees of narratorial interference*

	SPEECH	THOUGHT
low narratorial interference ↑	(FDS) Free Direct Speech	(FDT) Free Direct Thought
	(DS) Direct Speech	(DT) Direct Thought
	(FIS) Free Indirect Speech	(FIT) Free Indirect Thought
	(IS) Indirect Speech	(IT) Indirect Thought
	(NRSA) Narrative Report of Speech Act	(NRTA) Narrative Report of Thought Act
high narratorial interference ↓	(NRS) Narrator's Representation of Speech	(NRT) Narrator's Representation of Thought
		(NI) Narration of Internal States

The categories towards the top of the scale are assumed to be less under the narrator's apparent control, and so there seems to be a lesser degree of narratorial interference. The effect is usually one of narrative immediacy where "characters apparently speak to us more immediately without the narrator as an intermediary" (Leech and Short, p. 258) and "without being 'filtered' through the narrator" (Short, p. 299). In contrast, the categories towards the bottom of the scale reflect more distance towards the speech or thought that occurred, and so they are associated with higher degrees of narratorial interference. The effect of narrative reports of speech or thought is that of a noticeable presence and interference of the mediating narrator, who "intervenes as an interpreter" (Leech and Short, p. 256). Consequently, narrative reports of speech or thought create the impression that readers see events from the narrator's perspective (Leech and Short, p. 260). Ultimately, at the NRSA end of the speech presentation scale "speech presentation is integrated with the rest of the narration of what happens" in the story (Short, p. 306). The different degrees of narratorial interference are illustrated in Figure 3.2 below, which makes particular reference to the speech presentation cline:

Figure 3.2. *Clines of interference in reporting speech (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 260)*

Cline of 'interference' in report

Narrator apparently
in total
control
of report

Narrator apparently
in partial
control of report

Narrator apparently
not in control
of report
at all

Varieties of speech presentation

NRA   NRSA   IS   FIS   DS   FDS

Faithfulness claims

Along with different degrees of interference, the different points on the continuum indicate different faithfulness claims towards what is reported. Distinctions can be drawn depending on the different truth or faithfulness claims that the reporter commits himself/herself to regarding the 'original' speech or thought. In Direct Speech the reporter claims to report faithfully both "(a) what was stated and (b) the exact form of words which were used to utter that statement" (Leech and Short, p. 257). The freer and more direct modes of presentation are thus associated with effects of authenticity and realism (Fludernik, 2005, p. 559). In contrast, in Indirect Speech the reporter only commits himself/herself to reporting (a) what was stated — "the writer gives the *substance* of what someone said without commitment to the words used to express it" (Leech and Short, p. 276, original emphasis). Indirect Speech is content-oriented (Fludernik, 2005, p. 562) and conveys the illocutionary force of the character's utterance (Fludernik, 2005, p. 561). In a nutshell, "DS claims to represent accurately the propositional content and the words originally used to utter that content, whereas IS claims only to represent the original propositional content, using instead the words of

the person reporting the speech" (Short, p. 289). Moving further towards the indirect end of the scale, the category of Narrative Report of Speech Act (NRSA) captures cases where it is reported that a speech act occurred (and a minimal, summarised account of the statement is provided) but the reporter does not commit him/herself "entirely to giving the sense of what was said, let alone the form of words in which they were uttered" (Leech and Short, pp. 259-260). The range of faithfulness claims captured by the different categories can be usefully illustrated with particular reference to speech presentation:

> 1. Speech occurred [NV]
> 2. Speech occurred + speech act (and topic) specified [NRSA]
> 3. Speech occurred + speech act (and topic) and propositional content specified [IS]
> 4. Speech occurred + speech act (and topic), propositional content and the words and structures used to utter that propositional content specified [DS]
> (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 303)

Norms and associated effects

Faithfulness claims are closely related to what the norm is considered to be for each presentational scale. In speech presentation Direct Speech is assumed to be the norm or baseline, whereas Indirect Thought is regarded as the norm for thought presentation:

Figure 3.3. *Norms for speech and thought presentation (Leech and Short, 2007, p.* 276)

As noted above, Direct Speech claims to render a verbatim account of what was said. Direct Speech is thus "the mode that represents speech in the form in which it is directly manifest to a listener" (Leech and Short, p. 276), the reason being that "speech could be overheard and reported by any bystander to an interaction" (Simpson, p. 32). By contrast, the norm for thought presentation is necessarily placed at a different point on the continuum because in real life we cannot access other people's minds. Since other people's thoughts are not directly accessible to us, the norm or baseline for thought presentation is Indirect Thought (IT), the reason being that "a mode which only commits the writer to the content of what was thought is much more acceptable as a norm" (Leech and Short, p. 276). Again, the position of the norm on each scale determines different degrees of narratorial interference in the presentation of what characters utter and think in the story-world. Any movement to the right of the norm in either scale (speech or thought) produces effects of greater freeness (i.e. unmediated character discourse presentation) whereas any movement to the left of the norm is likely to be regarded as a move towards interference away from verbatim report (i.e. mediated by the narrator) (Leech and Short, p. 268).

The fact that the norm for each scale is located at different points on the continuum has important implications for the potential effects of the various modes of presentation, especially in the case of Direct Thought (DT) and the free indirect category (Short, p. 311). Whereas Direct Speech is considered to have realistic effects, Direct Thought is regarded as seeming to be more artificial than other indirect forms of thought presentation (Leech and Short, p. 277). The reason for this impression of artificiality is that, as mentioned above, in real life it is not possible to directly enter other people's

consciousness: "we cannot look into the minds of other people in the actual world in the way that, as readers, we look into the minds of people in a fictional storyworld" (Palmer, 2005, p. 602). Consequently, the presentation of character thought in fiction is seen as somewhat counterfeit (Simpson, p. 32), as an artifice (Leech and Short, p. 270), as an artificial device which makes fictional narrative distinctive (Palmer, 2005, p. 602). The seemingly artificial category of DT is thus reserved for presenting conscious, deliberate thought (Short, p. 312). In contrast to DT, Free Indirect Thought (FIT) seems to be less artificial and manages to keep the vividness in the thought report, and so "FIT gets the best of both worlds" (Leech and Short, p. 277).

Regarding the free indirect form, whereas FIS distances readers from what a character says, FIT has a closeness effect. Free Indirect Speech involves a move towards the left of the norm (i.e. towards narratorial intervention), and so FIS distances us from the character who utters the words (Leech and Short, p. 276). In short, FIS involves a move towards narratorial control and narratorial viewpoint (Short, p. 307). Contrastingly, FIT involves a move towards the right of the norm (i.e. towards the character end of the scale), a move towards "the exact representation of a character's thought as it occurs" (p. 275). Thus, FIT seemingly puts us "directly inside the character's mind" and provides an impression of the vividness and immediacy of the character's mental processes (p. 276).

Free Indirect Speech and Free Indirect Thought

Free Indirect Discourse (FID) — which subsumes both its speech (FIS) and thought (FIT) variants — is a much-discussed category that "has come under particular scrutiny from

a stylistic perspective" (Simpson, p. 81). It has been variously called *indirect interior monologue*, *style indirect libre*, *dual voice* (Simpson, pp. 81-82) or *narrated monologue* (McHale, 2005, p. 188). Basically, FID is a mixture of direct and indirect features. Interestingly, some degree of ambiguity has been associated with both FIS and FIT because sometimes "it is not clear whether a character's speech or thoughts are being presented" (Palmer, 2005, p. 605). Since the two categories have contrasting effects due to the different norms on each scale, I briefly discuss FIS and FIT separately.

Free Indirect Speech is a freer version of IS which lacks both the reporting clause and quotation marks, and where the tense and pronoun selection must be "appropriate to the form of narration in which the FIS occurs" (Leech and Short, pp. 262-263), be it past-tense or present-tense, third-person or first-person narration. Put differently, "the pronoun choice must be consistent with the primary discourse situation" (p. 264). FIS, thus, "has the grammatical characteristics of IS, but some of the 'production flavour' and deictic properties of DS" (Short, p. 306). In terms of truthfulness claims, FIS occupies "a sort of halfway house position, not claiming to be a reproduction of the original speech, but at the same time being more than a mere indirect rendering of that original" (Leech and Short, p. 261) because readers get some flavour of characters' words. The effect of FID is that it gives the impression of "both a character and narrator speaking simultaneously", and so the two voices seem to blend (Simpson, p. 82). Consequently, sometimes it is difficult to tell which words are the narrator's and which the character's (Short, p. 306).

FIS has been associated with different effects, mostly to do with irony and distancing potential — Short calls it a "'distancing with original flavour' effect" (p. 308). FIS is often regarded as a device which produces ironic distance; that is, a useful device for "casting ironic light on what the character says" (Leech and Short, p. 262). In Leech and Short's words, "the irony arises because FIS is normally viewed as a form where the authorial voice is interposed between the reader and what the character says, so that the reader is distanced from the character's words" (p. 268). However, the authors point out that FIS does not necessarily or automatically produce ironic (p. 268) or distancing effects (p. 269). Instead, it may produce a sense of immediacy (p. 266) and relative directness (p. 270) which results in liveliness and realistic effects (Fludernik, 2005, p. 562). In addition, it may serve to "channel our sympathies" towards some characters and away from others (Leech and Short, p. 269).

Free Indirect Thought, in contrast, is commonly associated with effects of sympathy and closeness: "we feel close to the character, almost inside his head as he thinks, and sympathise with his viewpoint" (Short, p. 315). FIT has a "close-up, sympathetic feel" (Short, p. 315) — "because the FIT form combines the position of the character and narrator we are bound to want to sympathise with the character's position" (Short, p. 316). Importantly for my study, Palmer uses the word *empathy* rather *sympathy* when discussing possible effects of FIT: "the relationship between the two voices of narrator and character can cause the well-recognised effect of (...) empathy" (2005, p. 605). Unfortunately, though, he does not elaborate on this point.

Other effects have been associated with FIT. Similarly to FIS, FIT is also linked to effects of vividness and immediacy: FIT "has an immediacy that is very suitable for use in situations of tension, crisis, upheaval, turmoil, spiritual searching, and inward struggle" (Palmer, 2005, p. 605). Another effect of FIT is ambiguity. Sometimes it is difficult to tell what the source of the words is, whether the character or the narrator (Short, p. 316); that is, "whether one is reading the thoughts of the character or the views of the narrator/author" (Leech and Short, p. 271). As Simpson puts it, "this coalescence results in an apparent blurring of focus where it is often difficult to distinguish whether the thoughts relayed are to be attributed to a participating character or to the external third-person narrator" (Simpson, p. 82). This has obvious implications for viewpoint presentation: "ambiguity [in FIT] can result in interesting and complex confusions over shifting point of view" (Palmer, 2005, p. 605). This brings the discussion to the final point; namely, the relationship between character discourse presentation and viewpoint.

Character discourse presentation and point of view

The presentation of characters' speech and thought has been related to point of view: "both narratorial viewpoint and character perspective can be mediated through techniques of speech and thought presentation" (Simpson, p. 81). So much so that Leech and Short highlight "the almost boundless versatility of speech and thought presentation as a means of varying point of view, tone and distance" (p. 279). As discussed above, the effects of distance and irony or closeness and sympathy might be brought about as a result. However, the many interactions between viewpoint and character discourse presentation are difficult to classify, and so they remain an open-ended area of research: "it is not easy to pin down and catalogue the many variations of

point of view achieved through manipulation of the author's voice in relation to the voices of participants in the fiction" (Leech and Short, p. 281).

Regarding character viewpoint, it is assumed that when character speech or thought occurs it indicates that the narrator is taking that character's viewpoint (Short, p. 288) and so "we see things, even if momentarily, from that character's point of view" (Simpson, p. 85). This is especially the case when a character's thoughts are presented: readers are encouraged to view things from the viewpoint of that character, who becomes the reflector of fiction or focaliser (Leech and Short, p. 273) — see Fowler's internal psychological point of view (3.2.2.1). It is important to notice that the reverse is not necessarily true, since we can see things from a character's viewpoint without getting any access to their thoughts (Leech and Short, p. 273). Moreover, the presentation of character thought is a "very visible mark of the omniscient narrator in fiction" (Palmer, 2005, p. 602) since it implies the presence of an omniscient narrator (Leech and Short, p. 274). Manipulation of viewpoint can also result from ambiguities that arise when one cannot tell whether speech or thought is being presented, and whether one is reading the views of the character or the views of the narrator. Such ambiguity

> allows an author to slip from narrative statement to interior portrayal without the reader noticing what has occurred, and as the reader has little choice but to take on trust the views of the narrator, when character and narrator are merged in this way he tends to take over the view of the character too (Leech and Short, p. 272).

Narratorial viewpoint can also be mediated through modes of character discourse presentation. As discussed previously, the presentational scales of speech and thought

have a character end of the scale and a narrator end of the scale depending on the degree of apparent control over what is being reported. As we move along the scale from the more direct forms towards the narrative report categories, the presence and viewpoint of the narrator becomes more noticeable; that is, "the control and influence of the narrator's viewpoint over the reporting of what the character said gets stronger and stronger" (Short, p. 306).

3.2.2.3 Characters' emotion presentation

Narrative empathy involves the reader's grasping and simulation of the target character's mental states. As noted in Chapter 2, the vicarious sharing of *emotional* states and experiences is central to empathy. It follows then that the presentation of characters' emotional states is directly relevant to experiences of narrative empathy. The ways in which characters' emotions are presented in any given narrative are crucial to the story's effect on its recipients and the latter's potential empathetic engagement. This section reviews some analytical concepts that will enable me to examine the ways in which information about characters' emotions is portrayed in Galeano's stories (see Chapter 4). This review draws primarily on work by Andreas Langlotz (2017), who takes a linguistic pragmatic perspective. Even though his work is primarily concerned with emotion in fiction, his insights can be usefully applied to non-fictional narratives.

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, we can get to know other beings' emotions, be they real people or narrative characters, in different ways. In real life we can know about other people's emotional experiences from their overt, explicit affective displays, or via inferences we make (Singer and Lamm, 2009). When it comes to narrative discourse, an

important question to ask is how the story conveys characters' emotions — for example, through characters' linguistic and paralinguistic behaviour — and how the story triggers inferences about characters' mental states. In the context of narrative, emotion-related utterances might be regarded as authorial strategies which are used to manage processes of emotional arousal or emotionalisation in readers (Dijkstra et al., 1994, as cited in Langlotz, p. 519).

Below I pay attention to various aspects that can provide information about characters' emotional states and experiences: (1a) verbal and non-verbal cues, (1b) characters' situation and context, and (1c) point of view. Then I move on to discussing (2) the explicitness and implicitness of emotional cues.

1a) Verbal and non-verbal cues

Langlotz (2017) offers a useful list of the ways in which emotions can be cued (verbally and non-verbally) through different communication channels which either express or describe emotion. These channels are (i) the body (i.e. facial expressions; gesture, posture, and physical actions); (ii) prosody and speech rhythm (i.e. loudness, lengthening, pitch, voice quality, and repetition); (iii) lexicon (i.e. emotion words, word connotations, expressive words such as interjections and swear words); (iv) phraseology and metaphor (i.e. idioms, similes, metaphor); and finally (v) syntax and pragmatics (i.e. emotional propositions, expressive speech acts, and emotional implicatures of speech acts and propositions) (see pp. 524-526 for examples).

1b) Characters' situation and context

Character emotion occurs "when a character in a story allegedly experiences emotional arousal in a specific situation, particularly in the case of goal success or goal failure" (Dijkstra et al., 1994, p. 140). The display of characters' emotions signals characters' stance toward story-world situations as well as toward other characters and objects they interact with (Langlotz, p. 523). Since character emotion is inevitably tied to the situation they find themselves in, the *story-world situation* has to be taken into account. Because of the nature of my data, Galeano's characters find themselves in extremely unpleasant situations as victims of torture or dictatorial regimes. As a result, character emotions in my data are often negative, usually to do with intense suffering. Crucially for my analysis, Keen notes that empathy with story characters and their situations occurs "more readily for negative emotions" (2006, p. 214) (see empathy for pain in 4.1).

Readers' interpretation and emotional cue evaluation are part of the contextual appraisal of characters' situation, which was discussed as a form of top-down modulation of empathy (see 3.1.3). Readers need to take the context into account in order to interpret emotional cues, which might be ambiguous without a proper sense of the context. When encountering potentially emotion-related textual cues, readers can engage in complex appraisal processes that take into account both contextual information from the text and readers' own world knowledge (Langlotz, p. 522).

1c) Point of view

Narrative viewpoint or perspective influences readers' access to the emotional content of stories — whether the narrator is omniscient or has limited knowledge, or whether or

not the narrator allows internal access to characters' consciousness and emotional states (Langlotz, p. 539). It should be noted that emotional states can still be attributed to characters even without internal access to characters' internal states (see below). Narrative perspective thus plays a crucial role in "mediating the readers' access to the emotional experiences in a given story" (p. 540) since "through perspectivization the implicitness and explicitness of emotional portrayals can be further manipulated" (p. 541).

2) Explicit and implicit presentation of emotional cues

The presentation of characters' emotions in narrative can be extremely complex — and so is its analysis. It is widely agreed that emotion can be presented in direct/explicit and indirect/implicit ways (Bednarek, 2008; Sanford and Emmott, 2012). Narrative empathy can occur both when emotions are communicated explicitly and implicitly, since empathy is a response to the "directly perceived, imagined or inferred feeling state of another being" (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 82).

The *explicit* presentation of emotion refers to cases in which emotional experiences are directly expressed or described in the narrative by means of verbal or non-verbal emotional cues. This direct communication helps readers learn about characters' feelings without much inferencing. All things being equal, it may be assumed that a large amount of emotional information given in an explicit fashion would facilitate empathetic experiences. Nonetheless, this may not always be necessarily the case. Importantly, explicit descriptions of a character's emotional state may elicit empathy

"just as effectively as *indirect implication* of emotional states through actions and context" (Keen, 2006, p. 218, my emphasis).

In addition, emotions might be conveyed by *implicit* means, and so "inferences have to be made in order to reconstruct a character's emotional reaction" (Dijkstra, 1994, p. 140). The nature and quantity of the contextual information given to readers about characters' emotions and other mental states becomes crucial since readers make emotional inferences and form representations of characters' inner states on that basis (Sanford and Emmott, 2012). Readers' inferences are then made on the basis of the context presented in the text (e.g., events and outcomes, characters' goals and expectations) and the knowledge activated by the text, such as *emotional knowledge schemas* (Langlotz, p. 542).

Yet a further possibility is that there is an absence (or near absence) of bottom-up textual cues conveying character emotion. It may be the case that readers do not know whether a particular character experiences emotion because the story does not convey so directly, as when the response of the character is underspecified (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 211). In these cases empathy "may be based entirely on our assessment of the situation affecting the character" (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 211). When readers have only limited cues they can resort to contextual information, imagination, perspective taking, general knowledge, and memory (i.e., previous personal experiences) in order to determine a character's mental state (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5; Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 91) (see 2.2.2 and 3.1.2).

Langlotz offers a list of ways in which emotions can be portrayed in fiction, with examples from *Billy Elliot*, which includes both explicit and implicit emotion presentation. Figure 3.4 (Langlotz, 2017, p. 258; adapted from Bednarek, 2008, p. 150) includes the verbalisation of emotion but also non-verbal cues, which can be described in narratives:

Figure 3.4. *Ways of portraying emotion (Langlotz, 2017, p. 258)*

Portraying emotions	How	Examples from *Billy Elliot*
referring to emoters' emotions	the use of mental disposition terms	*I'm scared.* *She'd be so proud of you, son.*
	fixed figurative expressions	*I could feel my heart just sinking down to me toes.* *I felt like I'd turned to stone.*
referring to emoters' psycho-physiolog-ical expressions of emotion	the use of behavioural surge terms	*They were all frowning and glaring at us.* *tears pouring down his face*
referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)	describing mental behaviour	*... he felt that lucky. Oh, I envied him. I wish I felt like that about my wife.*

	describing linguistic behaviour
	   speech act terms
	   emotional talk devices
		'Piss off!' I yelled.
		 'Piss off!' I yelled.

	describing (physical) behaviour
	   actual
	
	   hypothetical
		I kissed her again, and she hugged me tight all over again.
		 I thought I was going to die of shame.

referring to causes of emotions	describing elicitors/antecedent events	*People were laughing. I gritted my teeth.*

The figure captures Bednarek's (2008) cline of *implicitness* in the portrayal of emotion. Towards the explicit end we find the use of *mental disposition terms* such as "fear" and "pain"; that is, words that label feelings which are "mentally experienced as an ongoing emotional state" (Bednarek, p. 146). Towards the middle of the scale Bednarek includes the use of *behavioural surge terms* such as "tremble" or "hug"; that is, words that "denote behaviour that also directly expresses emotion" (p. 146). Emotional states might

be inferred from these behaviours. Finally, towards the implicit end of the scale, we find the use of *description of unusual (physical) behaviour* such as "staring" or "very quiet" — words that "describe unusual behaviour which we read as an indirect sign of emotion" (Martin and Rose, 2003, as cited in Bednarek, 2008, p. 146).

3.2.2.4 Characterisation techniques

As with point of view and characters' discourse presentation, the issue of character(isation) also lies at the interface between stylistics and narratology. However, my attention to this particular phenomenon is guided primarily by work within cognitive stylistics; more specifically Jonathan Culpeper's (2001) model of characterisation (see 2.5.1). My discussion is also informed by other relevant research such as Eder, Jannidis and Schneider (2010), McIntyre (2014), and Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla (2017). In this section I review the textual component of characterisation, which I use to explore the characterisation techniques in Galeano's short stories (see Chapter 4).

The textual construction of character

As noted in 2.5.1, characterisation involves the integration of information retrieved from prior knowledge with information from the text. Textual cues, regarded as "bottom-up or data-driven aspects of characterisation", can also trigger characterising information (p. 163). Below I discuss some textual phenomena that can shape characterisation such as (a) sources of characterising information, (b) self-presentation and other-presentation, and (c) explicit and implicit characterisation cues.

Textual cues: Sources of characterising information

Culpeper's model distinguishes between textual characterising information which comes from characters themselves and that which is provided by the author. Specifically, he divides textual cues into explicit, implicit and authorial cues (p. 164). Explicit characterisation cues are those whereby characters make explicit statements about themselves or other characters. Implicit characterisation occurs when recipients infer information from characters' (linguistic) behaviour. Authorial characterisation cues refer to character information that comes directly from the author rather than the characters, and is particularly relevant in narrative descriptions in prose fiction (p. 164). Authorial cues are those "cues over which the character notionally has no power of choice" (p. 229) such as proper names and stage directions (see pp. 229-232). This latter claim is seen as problematic by McIntyre (2014), who considers that it implies a humanising approach to character. According to McIntyre, "cognitive approaches to characterisation attempt to avoid the extreme positions of the humanising and de-humanising approaches in favour of explaining how readers construct mental models of characters as they read" (p. 157).

As an alternative, McIntyre (2014) proposes a reformulation of Culpeper's categories. In McIntyre's view, "all textual cues for characterisation stem from the author and are thus authorial in nature" (p. 156). His argument runs as follows:

> it would perhaps be more accurate to describe all characterisation cues as authorial but to specify at which discourse level of the text they operate; in other words, whether this is the level of author addressing reader (discourse level 1), narrator addressing narratee (level 2, in the case of prose texts) or character addressing character (level 2 for plays, level 3 for prose) (McIntyre, 2014, p. 157)

This solves an important issue relating to differences between drama and prose fiction: whereas drama has two main discourse levels (author-audience and character-character), fiction is seen as comprising, at least, three main discourse levels (author-reader, narrator-narratee, and character-character). Thus, McIntyre's suggestion has useful implications for the analysis of characterisation: a distinction can be made between characterisation triggers that come from the authorial-narratorial discourse level on the one hand, and characterisation triggers that arise from the character-character discourse level on the other.

In narrative the narratorial level has important implications for characterisation since "narrators 'filter' how and what we learn about characters" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, p. 98). Thus, narrators can influence the perception of characters. Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla suggest three narratorial filters — point of view, mind style and narratorial report of speech and thought. In my discussion I leave aside mind style because it is beyond the scope of this research.

Point of view presentation can be a source of characterisation, in particular ideological and psychological viewpoint. Ideological viewpoint can yield character information, for instance "when value judgements are found in a particular character's speech and/or thoughts" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, p. 107). Psychological point of view is also relevant since "gaining knowledge of a character's inner life is an important factor in characterisation, and one likely to lead to a 'rounder' impression of character" (Culpeper, p. 170). In addition, the way narrators describe characters' internal processes can implicitly characterise them (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, p. 108). Finally,

narrative report of speech and thought can be a narratorial filter for characterising information. The manner in which characters' discourse is presented in a story can influence characterisation depending on the extent to which the presentation of characters' discourse is assumed to be under the narrator's control (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, p. 110) (see 3.2.2.2).

Textual cues: Self-presentation and other-presentation

In self-presentation a character gives explicit information about themselves (p. 167). Eder, Jannidis and Schneider call it instead *self-characterisation* when characters ascribe properties to themselves (p. 33). Self-presentation can be further sub-divided into self-presentation in the absence of other characters and self-presentation in the presence of other characters, which affects the validity of the presentation due to strategic considerations (see Culpeper, 2001, pp. 167-171). Strategic considerations, such as wanting to present oneself positively while trying to hide negative aspects, might distort self-characterising information (p. 168).

Other-presentation occurs when a character gives explicit information about another character (Culpeper, p. 167). The phenomenon of other-presentation is sufficient for analysing drama but not so for analysing fiction, where the narrator plays a role. In fiction characters might well give information about other characters, but this characterising information can also come from the narrator. Eder, Jannidis and Schneider (2010) use the term *altero-characterisation* to refer to information about characters which is "provided by agencies other than the character (the narrator, for instance, or other characters in the same fictional world)" (p. 33). Interestingly, altero-

characterisation may be a source of indirect self-characterisation since the statement can reveal the utterer's own values (p. 33).

Issues of the validity of the information may arise also in other-presentation and altero-characterisation depending on a number of factors, such as the credibility or reliability of the agent providing the information, be it character or narrator; and the possible motivations of the characteriser. Thus, "before we can assess the value of the characterising statement for the target character, we must first discount aspects motivated by the characteriser or the situation" (Culpeper, p. 171).

Textual cues: Explicit and implicit characterisation cues

In the process of characterisation recipients associate information with characters. Culpeper's model establishes that characterisation can result from explicit and implicit characterisation cues, the latter involving inferences (p. 164). Thus, characterising information may come from "textually explicit ascription of properties to a character" or from "inferences that can be drawn from textual cues" (Eder et al., p. 34).

Characterising information may be given in texts in explicit, direct ways, as is the case when character traits are named explicitly; that is, there is a verbal ascription of traits in the text by the narrator or by characters themselves. In addition, characterising pieces of information may be conveyed in implicit, indirect ways. Implicit characterisation cues are to do with the "verbal and non-verbal cues that are important in conveying *implicit* information about a character; that is character information which has to be derived by inference" (p. 172), and context needs to be taken into account. According to Scherer, in

indirect presentation "the traits, and the entire personality of a character or a person need to be guessed from words, opinions and actions" (as cited in Eder et al., p. 32). Indirect characterisation is thought to be more realistic because this is how we infer the characteristics of people around us in the real world (Eder et al., p. 33), and is arguably more common (McIntyre, p. 155). Importantly, Eder, Jannidis and Schneider point out that it is best to conceive of direct and indirect characterisation as a continuum rather than as a binary opposition, and so characterisation strategies may be described as more or less explicit or direct (p. 33).

Within the domain of play texts, Culpeper offers a list of implicit cues which may function as characterisation triggers — conversational structure and implicature, lexis, syntactic features, accent and dialect, verse and prose, paralinguistic features, visual features, and context (see pp. 172-229). Because his model was developed for the purposes of analysing drama, some of these features will be more or less relevant to analyses of prose. This being so, I now pay attention to the textual cues which are most relevant for analysing my narrative data; in particular conversational structure, lexis, and context.

Indirect characterising information may be derived from *conversational structure*. The field of conversation analysis (see, e.g., Sacks et al., 1974; Levinson, 1983) offers useful tools for examining characters' conversational behaviour which can shed light on characterisation. Conversational behaviour and features such as frequency and length of turns, volume of talk, turn allocation, topic management and interruptions (p. 173) may

indicate a number of character aspects, such as power relationships, attitudes, or degrees of involvement in the given interaction (p. 173).

Lexis, including surge features and terms of address, can also function as indirect characterisation triggers. Some lexical features may reveal characters' social status and level of education, such as formal vs. informal lexis, simple vs. complex lexis, as well as the etymological origin of words and the richness and diversity of lexis. This use of lexis may lead to impressions such as whether a character is natural, spontaneous, intimate and so on, or whether (s)he is artificial and detached (pp. 182-188). *Surge features* (a term coined by Taavitsainen, 1999) are linguistic features which express emotion, such as "evaluative lexis, hedges, modal verbs, lexical repetition and pronouns" (p. 190) as well as exclamations, swearing, and taboo words (p. 191). These may indicate different emotional states of characters such as anxiety, anger, surprise, etc.

Terms of address, which include vocatives and pronouns, may signal social information such as social group belonging (in-group, out-group indicators) and social relationships (p. 193). Leech identified a number of semantic categories which indicate social relations ranging from the intimate and familiar to the distant and respectful in the English language — endearments, family terms, familiarisers, first names, title and surname, and honorifics (1999, pp. 109-113, as cited in Culpeper, pp. 193-194).

Finally, *context* may be another source of indirect characterisation. Characters' surroundings, including their company (human surroundings) and setting (physical surroundings), can trigger characterisation (pp. 225-226). In addition to the above list,

proper names are another characterisation device which can be placed at different points on the direct-indirect characterisation continuum (Eder et al., p. 37). Proper names may indicate gender, age and social class, race and ethnicity, and a number of other attributes (Kasof, 1993, p. 140, as cited in Culpeper, pp. 229-230). Importantly for my purposes, "a writer can exploit the meaning potential of names in constructing a character" (p. 230). In Shakespeare's plays, for instance, character names perform characterising functions such as referring to historical figures, marking nationality, and being intrinsically meaningful, indicating character traits (see Culpeper, pp. 229-231). The latter category corresponds broadly with what Eder, Jannidis and Schneider call *telling names*, which "overtly hint at individual characteristic qualities, features or habits" (p. 37).

3.3 Concluding remarks

This chapter has established empathy as a highly flexible and context-dependent phenomenon, and it has considered a number of factors that could modulate experiences of narrative empathy. I have paid attention to non-textual factors that revolve around the reader as potential empathiser, and also to a series of textual factors (narrative techniques specifically) which can shape characters as potential targets of empathy. All of this sets the ground for the next chapter, which (i) introduces the data under analysis, (ii) presents the linguistic-stylistic analysis conducted on the stories, and (iii) discusses the potential of the stories to (dis)invite an empathetic engagement with the different characters.

4. Chapter 4. Textual analysis of Galeano's stories

4.0 Orientation to Chapter 4

The previous chapters (2 and 3) have established my conceptual framework around the notion of narrative empathy as well as the textual and readerly factors that may be involved in this phenomenon. The present chapter focuses on analysing the *linguistically-induced potential for empathy* of a set of Galeano's stories. In so doing, this chapter provides an account of the data and analytical framework which have been used to answer Research Question 1:

> 1. To what extent and how does Galeano use narrative techniques in his stories that have been associated with the potential elicitation of readers' empathy with characters?

The present chapter is divided as follows. First I introduce the stories under analysis and justify my choice of data (Section 4.1). Then I outline the analytical framework which is applied for textual analysis (Section 4.2). After that I present results from the stylistic analysis of the three stories which were used with my study participants, each story in turn (Section 4.3). Finally I discuss how the analytical findings can answer Research Question 1 (Section 4.4).

4.1 Dataset 1: Galeano's stories from *The Book of Embraces*

This section introduces the data under analysis, and then provides my rationale for the data selection. The stories which make up the dataset for the stylistic analysis of potential empathy triggers and/or barriers consist of a selection of three short texts authored by Eduardo Galeano (see Appendix A). My rationale for choosing to work with

stories by this particular author was given in the introduction (see 1.2). The selected texts

are taken from Galeano's *El libro de los abrazos* [*The Book of Embraces*] (2002 [1989]).

The three stories have a non-fictional status and are based on actual historical events

(see 1.2 on Galeano's journalistic and political writing).   The stories are summarised

below:

- Story 1 (*Celebration of the Human Voice*) tells about the situation of a group of

  prisoners who were imprisoned by the Uruguayan dictatorship (1973-1985). As

  the title indicates, the story celebrates the triumph of communication over the

  dictatorship's efforts to the contrary. The characters are Fernández Huidobro

  (Uruguayan politician, writer and journalist) and Mauricio Rosencof (Uruguayan

  playwright and writer). As they explain in *Memorias del calabozo* [*Memoirs from

  a Cell*] (1987), during their twelve-year-long imprisonment they developed a

  system of communication by tapping on the wall, whereby a particular number

  of taps stood for the letters of the alphabet in order (i.e., two taps for *b*).

- Story 2 (*Gelman*) is about the Argentinian poet Juan Gelman, whose relatives

  were kidnapped by the military during the Argentinian dictatorship (1976-1983).

  While in exile in 1976, his son Marcelo and his then pregnant[56] wife were

  murdered, and his daughter Nora was tortured but then released. In the story

  the narrator reflects on the painfulness of these experiences.

- Story 3 *(Professional Life)* is based on the torture suffered by Lucien Ahmadou

  Gherab, who fought in the National Liberation Front against France during the

  Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). It focuses on the unnamed civil

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[56] After the dictatorship Gelman was able to find his grand-daughter. The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo is a human rights organisation that works towards finding (and restoring the identity of) the children of those who were arrested during the 1976-1983 dictatorship — children who were raised in families different from their own and thus deprived of their identity.

servant (i.e. the Torturer) who tortured Ahmadou day after day for several months. Ahmadou survived the torture, and later on became ambassador for Algeria in South America.

The Book of Embraces (2002) brings together 191 strongly biographical and autobiographical stories. Even though this book features an apparent lack of thematic unity, at least initially, the restoration of memory and experience could well be said to be the author's principal motivation behind this collection of stories (González, 1998, p. 103). This apparent lack of thematic unity proved to be advantageous since each story can function perfectly well on its own — "none contributes to an overarching plot, but each speaks and adds to the rest" (Olsen, 2004, p. 134). This made them appropriate to be used individually during the group discussions with readers. Moreover, the shortness of the stories was also quite practical in terms of resources — asking participants to read much longer narratives (e.g. a full novel) would have been more time-consuming and would have demanded a much bigger effort on their part. In this respect, Keen notes that novels are seldom studied empirically because their length is "at odds with the current modes of empirical verification" (2013, para. 9). Even though longer narratives might be thought to better facilitate empathy because they offer potentially longer periods of immersion in the story-world and more sustained engagement with characters, "short texts and vignettes (...) can have the potential to be extremely moving" (Sanford and Emmott, 2012, p. 200).

The short stories in *The Book of Embraces* have been referred to as *narraticules* (Olsen, 2004), *fragments* (González, 1998), and *vignettes* (Lovell, 2004). They are considered

"narraticules (most only a few lines long, none more than two pages of prose)" which are sometimes political and sometimes philosophical, but highly metaphorical and meditative (Olsen, 2004, p. 134). Regarding the label of "fragments", González writes that the literary device of the fragment or fragmentarism (1998, p. 104) endows this work with a kaleidoscopic structure, thus

> revealing a subtle discursive strategy: the author, aware of the impossibility to represent everything, chooses to invoke it indirectly. In this way the reader is involved, at the same time, in a task which does not have, at least initially, pre-established limits or closure (...) an implicit world whose retrieval is carried out by the recipient (González, 1998, p. 105)

In this manner, the strategy in *The Book of Embraces* is the "textual integration of a plurality of worlds and realities" (p. 106), and so the reader can experience such plurality and diversity (p. 107). Regarding the label of "vignettes", Galeano is considered a master of this literary form, as the following encyclopaedia entry puts it (Lovell, 2004, p. 217):

> As a prose stylist, Galeano's mastery of the vignette is unparalleled in Latin American writing. He is economical with words, blessed with a keen ability to pare things down to the quick; the reader is left marvelling at how much can be said with so little text. Galeano's vignette style (...) flourished and became his literary trademark with *Memoria del fuego* [1982]. Since then Galeano has authored three books in which the vignette is the preferred, characteristic mode: *El libro de los abrazos* (The Book of Embraces) (1989) (...)

In essence, these scholars point out a key characteristic of *The Book of Embraces*: the briefness of the stories means that much of what is said is left implicit, thus leaving plenty of room for the reader to do inferential work based on their world knowledge. This had interesting implications for the focus-group participants' responses to the characters, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Regarding the sample size, I chose to limit my dataset to only *three* texts since stylistic

analysis is conducted in great depth — the language of the stories is examined in close

detail by simultaneously considering several narrative techniques in each text. Therefore

I conducted a small-scale but close and systematic linguistic analysis of the stories. The

type of close linguistic scrutiny that is carried out in stylistics "could only conceivably be

applied to short extracts" since "analysing a long novel in close stylistic detail could take

a lifetime" (Short, 1996, p. 255). Given that my study also comprises empirical work with

readers, the limited time available for the completion of this research project justifies the

number of stories under analysis.

The rationale for choosing these three texts for analysis and subsequent work with

readers comes down to these factors: the texts (1) are of a narrative nature, (2) focus on

characters' experiences, and (3) deal with experiences of suffering.

(1) The texts are of a narrative nature

The texts conform to the definition of *narrative* as established by narratologist Monika

Fludernik (2009, p. 6):

> A narrative is a representation of a possible world in a linguistic and/or visual
> medium, at whose centre there are one or several protagonists of an
> anthropomorphic nature who are existentially anchored in a temporal and spatial
> sense and who (mostly) perform goal-directed actions (action and plot
> structure). It is the experience of these protagonists that narratives focus on,
> allowing readers to immerse themselves in a different world and in the life of the
> protagonists.

The language which shapes Galeano's stories represents story-worlds inhabited by

human characters that are situated in particular spatiotemporal contexts in 20th-century

Uruguay, Argentina and Algeria. Characters' actions and motivations contribute to the plot structure. On the one hand, dictators and colonisers carry out particular actions (i.e., imprisoning, punishing and torturing dissidents) while pursuing their political goals. On the other hand, the other set of characters is at the receiving end of the perpetrators' actions: the Prisoners have been imprisoned, Gelman's family have been taken away, and Ahmadou is being tortured. For the purposes of my analysis, characters are positioned into the character slots of perpetrators and victims due to their dramatic role in the stories (in line with the traditional character typology developed by Propp, 1968).

(2) The texts focus on characters' experiences

Importantly, the selected stories revolve around characters' experience of story-world events. As Fludernik (2009, p. 6) notes in the above definition of narrative, stories' focus on characters' experience enables immersion into the story-world and into characters' lives. The selected stories are character-focused since they recall non-fictional (auto)biographical experiences. Because of their focus on characters' experiences, the stories can facilitate the readers' appreciation of what it feels like for characters to undergo story-world events (see my discussion of the *what-it's-like dimension* in 2.6.2). As Sanford and Emmott put it, "character-based narratives gain much of their force and interest from the portrayal of emotion in characters, and often invite us to appreciate how a character must feel as a result of the things that happen to them" (2012, p. 191). Thus, the selection of stories that focus on characters' experiences is useful in explorations of narrative empathy.

(3) The texts deal with experiences of suffering

Another criterion for selecting my data was the thematic component of the texts. The selected stories deal, broadly speaking, with human conflict and suffering within contexts of political struggle, thus reflecting Galeano's literary endeavour of denouncing social problems. It is worth mentioning that *empathy for pain* (also called "negative empathy") commonly attracts the attention of empathy researchers because observing others' pain is seen as "a model paradigm to evoke empathic responses" within social neuroscience (Singer and Lamm, 2009, p. 85). So much so that "negative empathy (e.g. pain/sadness) is often given prominence in the literature" (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 5). Keen even suggests that empathy with characters occurs "more readily for negative emotions" (2006, p. 214).

Several scholars have called for research on empathy in different contexts other than pain/suffering[57] situations. Keen points out that even though "psychological and philosophical studies of empathy have tended to gravitate towards the negative, empathy also occurs for positive feelings of happiness, satisfaction, elation, triumph, and sexual arousal" (2006, p. 209). This direction needs to be further pursued in the future so as to have a more complete picture of narrative empathy where situations and emotions of both positive and negative valence are involved.

In the case of these written narratives, Galeano's texts linguistically represent social conflict — dictatorial regimes, torture, murder, civil wars, discrimination, etc. — resulting

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[57] A wide range of emotions (other than pain and sadness) can elicit empathy, such as fear, anger, anxiety, or disgust (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, and Northoff, 2011) and so other emotional states have also been studied as stimuli (see Jabbi et al., 2007; Wicker et al., 2003).

in situations where human characters' suffering is foregrounded. Because of their subject matter, these texts arguably provide fruitful scenarios for exploring experiences of narrative empathy for pain, suffering and sadness. In some accounts of narrative, it is prototypical for stories to include some sort of conflict that disrupts the story-world's initial state of equilibrium (Herman, 2005, p. 83), thus adding tellability (i.e. making the story worth telling (Ryan, 2005, p. 589)). As a result, characters' goals and plans may be impeded, and so narratives trace the experiences of characters that face this (internal or external) conflict (Herman, 2005, p. 83). In Galeano's stories there is often a clash of goals and desires between the two sets of characters (victims and perpetrators), and from the point of view of victims, a clash between their goals and the current state of affairs. The story-world conflict might have implications for readers' evaluation of and positioning regarding characters (e.g., in terms of Breithaupt's (2012) three-person model of empathy; see 3.1.4).

4.2 Framework for textual analysis

This section outlines my framework for textual analysis briefly because the analytical tools have already been established in Chapter 3. I examine textual phenomena that are commonly associated with empathy effects in the literature (see 3.2.1), which I analyse through linguistically-based analytical frameworks (see 3.2.2). I especially focus on (i) the ways in which characters, as potential targets of empathy, are linguistically shaped by the following narrative devices, as well as (ii) the potential implications of these devices for narrative empathy:

- *Point of view presentation*, including narration and focalisation. I analyse the perspective adopted in the telling of the stories, especially psychological

viewpoint and ideological viewpoint, through Fowler's (1996) and Short's (1996) analytical frameworks (see 3.2.2.1).

- *Characters' discourse presentation*. I analyse the techniques for presenting characters' speech and thought, as well as their potential effects on readers' interpretation, through Leech and Short's (2007) analytical framework (see 3.2.2.2).

- *Characters' emotion presentation*. I analyse the ways in which characters' emotional states are conveyed, with different degrees of explicitness, through Langlotz's (2017) framework (see 3.2.2.3).

- *Characterisation techniques*. I analyse textual cues that can shape readers' perception of characters, or characterisation triggers, through Culpeper's (2001) framework (see 3.2.2.4).

4.3 Textual analysis of Galeano's stories

The aim of this linguistic-stylistic analysis is to describe the empathy potential of Galeano's use of language (i.e., linguistic choices and patterns) within the stories. As noted in the previous section, the analysis will revolve around the linguistically-induced potential for empathy of (i) point of view presentation, (ii) characters' discourse presentation, (iii) characters' emotion presentation, and (iv) characterisation techniques.

It should be noted that the analysis is carried out on the original texts in Spanish, but translations of all relevant examples are provided throughout to make my analysis accessible to non-Spanish speakers. The published translation by Belfrage (Galeano, 1989/1991) is adhered to as long as the language (both syntactic and semantic elements)

remains faithful to the original. When this is not the case, I provide my own translation, which is indicated with an asterisk (e.g. *mientras se encoge de hombros* [*as he shrugs* his shoulders]). The full texts, both the Spanish version (Galeano, 2002 [1989]) and the published translation into English (Galeano, 1989/1991), are provided in Appendix A.

When providing textual evidence and examples, the Spanish version is presented in italics and the English translation is given within quotation marks in square brackets. Finally, the order in which I present the stories below follows the sequence in which the stories were discussed in both focus-group discussions.

Before moving on to the analysis, I highlight some common features that characterise all three stories:

- The victim characters go through extremely distressing events and experiences (i.e., imprisonment, loss of family, torture). This is likely to bias the reader in a particular direction (i.e., toward particular reactions such as empathy or sympathy).

- The mode of narration is first-person, extradiegetic narration. The three stories involve the same first-person narratorial voice that seems to be closely aligned with the author. Because the narrator is extradiegetic all story-world participants are referred to in the third person. In each case it is likely that readers will identify the 'I' as Galeano himself, who presents his own version of and reflects on these historical events and what happened to these political victims.

- There is a shift from a focus on the story-world situation (with references to characters in the third-person) to a focus on the narrating situation (with first-

person reference), which highlights the relationship between the narrating voice and the source of information about story-world events. In two of the stories (1.*Celebration* and 3.*Professional Life*) the narrator explicitly relies on something that the victims said. At some point the narrator says "so-and-so told me this", so this 'I' is both the receiver of some information about what happened and the narrating voice.

4.3.1 Story 1: *Celebration of the Human Voice*

Celebración de la voz humana [Celebration of the Human Voice] tells the story of a group of prisoners among whom are Pinio Ungerfeld, Fernández Huidobro and Mauricio Rosencof (see Appendix A). From the text readers are likely to infer that these characters were imprisoned by the Uruguayan dictatorship (1973-1985). The story celebrates the triumph of communication, which was so vital to the prisoners, despite the dictatorship's efforts to prevent assembly and communication with others.

In my analysis of the stories (in the present chapter) and my analysis of readers' responses (Chapter 6) I refer to individual characters by name (i.e., Pinio Ungerfeld) when relevant, and I capitalise *the Prisoners* when referring to them as a group. Also, I treat the Uruguayan dictatorship as a character or group of characters, and so I capitalise the name *the Uruguayan Dictatorship*.

a) Point of view presentation

The story begins *in medias res* (Latin for "in the middle of things"), a device which is used to "begin the story at a crucial point in the middle" (de Jong, 2005, p. 242), and so

readers are taken directly into the setting of the prison. The story starts by providing the definite reference *tenían las manos atadas* ["their hands were tied"], which is presented as given information, and so it is assumed to be known to readers. This is a cataphoric reference since readers find out whose hands they are later on in the second sentence (i.e. the Prisoners'). Viewpoint effects can result from this choice: since readers are assumed to be familiar with what is being told, they may get a sense of being intimately involved with what is happening (Short, 1996, p. 267).

The story is conveyed through a heterodiegetic narrator who takes no part in the events being narrated. There is linguistic evidence of a first-person narrator in *me enseñó* ["taught me"], and *me dijo* ["told me"]. Thus, the narrator learned about this first-hand from Pinio Ungerfeld himself. The narrator's relationship with this character might invite more closeness with the Prisoners than with the Uruguayan Dictatorship.

In terms of psychological point of view, the story features an internal perspective because the viewpoint is from within the Prisoners' consciousnesses, and so readers are given access to these characters' perceptions and inner states. Regarding Fowler's (1996) categories of internal narration, the psychological viewpoint adopted in this story can be labelled as *internal narration type B* because the story is told "from the point of view of someone who is not a participating character but who has knowledge of the feelings of the characters" (Fowler, 1996, p. 170). In this case, readers seem to get the viewpoint of several characters (the Prisoners), and so viewpoint is not restricted to one particular character.

Given that the narrator adopts these characters' viewpoint, the story is focalised through the Prisoners. The fact that the Prisoners are the focalisers or reflectors in the narrative can be seen in the presence of v*erba sentiendi* which indicate perceptual orientation (see underlining below): *inclinándose alcanzaban a <u>ver</u> algo, alguito, por abajo* ["leaning back, they could <u>see</u> a bit, just a bit, down below"]; *sin <u>escuchar</u> más voces que el estrépito de las rejas o los pasos de las botas por los corredores* ["<u>hearing</u> nothing but clanging bars or footsteps in the corridors"]. The first example includes what Simpson calls *attenuated focalisation*; that is, a situation where "point of view is limited, even if temporarily, to an impeded or distanced visual perspective" (2004, p. 29). Evidence for this can be found in the lexical item with unspecific reference *inclinándose alcanzaban a ver <u>algo, alguito</u>, por abajo* ["leaning back, they could see *<u>something, a little something</u>,* down below"], thus presenting the limited view of the hooded prisoners. From this, readers may get the impression that they are "restricted to the visual range" of these particular characters (Simpson, 2004, p. 29), who are the reflectors or focalisers.

As to potential implications for empathy, in the literature it is assumed that an internal perspective creates greater emotional closeness with characters than an external perspective (Keen, 2006, p. 219). In this case, readers get an internal perspective on the Prisoners and a totally external perspective on the Uruguayan Dictatorship. Schneider points out that empathy is likely to be inhibited when a character's inner life is not represented (2001, as cited in Keen, 2006, p. 228). In addition, the circumstances presented in the story lead in the same direction, as the actions of the Uruguayan Dictatorship have the potential to block empathy on moral grounds (see characterisation techniques below).

Even though the story is told from the viewpoint of the Prisoners, there are certain kinds of reported material which indicate a rather strong degree of narratorial presence or visibility (Toolan, 2001, p. 69). In the story the narrator very much filters what we learn about characters; however, the visibility of the narrator becomes particularly noticeable at the end:

> *Cuando es verdadera, cuando nace de la necesidad de decir, a la voz humana no hay quien la pare. Si le niegan la boca, ella habla por las manos, o por los ojos, o por los poros, o por donde sea. Porque todos, toditos, tenemos algo que decir a los demás, alguna cosa que merece ser por los demás celebrada o perdonada.*
>
> ["When it is genuine, when it is born of the need to speak, no one can stop the human voice. When denied a mouth, it speaks with the hands or the eyes, or the pores, or anything at all. Because every single one of us has something to say to the others, something that deserves to be celebrated or forgiven by others."]

The last paragraph provides an explicit commentary about the story; that is, a statement of judgement or generalisation which might work as the moral or key message of the story. Here the authorial narrator overtly establishes his ethical perspective, as is commonly done in fables, where a succinct statement of the didactic point is given at the end (Tate, 2005, p. 157).

This leads into a discussion of ideological point of view. In 3.2.2.1 it was noted that ideological viewpoint can be attributed to author, narrator, and characters. Regarding authorial point of view, the setting of the story has a strong autobiographical connection with Galeano. After the coup d'état in Uruguay, not only were the characters in the story imprisoned, but Galeano was also imprisoned before being forced to leave the country. The story's emphasis on celebrating communication might also be a

reference to the frequent censure of Galeano's work by the Uruguayan, and later on the Argentinian, dictatorship.

This authorial ideological viewpoint is manifested as well at the level of the narrator (or authorial narrator). Despite the Prisoners' physically impeded situation and the ban on speaking, the Prisoners nevertheless communicated, as can be seen in the first paragraph, where there is a list of three sentences containing contrasts (*sin embargo, pero, aunque* ["yet", "but", "although"]. This, together with the narratorial commentary at the very end of the story (which advocates the value of freedom of speech), might be interpreted as conveying the idea that no dictatorial regime can ever manage to silence people when there is a willingness and a need to communicate. This ideologically-laden statement might invite readers to align themselves with the Prisoners and against the Dictatorship.

At the character level, ideological point of view can be inferred from the fact that the Prisoners keep talking to each other (through the finger alphabet and by tapping on the wall) despite the dictatorial regime's prohibition on communicating. Readers can draw inferences that these prisoners are political prisoners whose values are at odds with the dominating political system. In 2.5.1, I discussed the role of readers' schematic knowledge about the real social world when it comes to interpreting narrative texts and characters. Depending on readers' historical knowledge about this particular dictatorial regime in Uruguay — or, even, of *any* dictatorial regime — they might side with the characters according to their personal views and socio-political values regarding this historical event and similar ones.

In addition, ideological viewpoint can be seen much more implicitly in narratorial description through a contrast in linguistic choices when referring to the two sets of characters. In the narration, whatever concerns the Prisoners is described in detail, often metaphorically, and in ways which are likely to trigger emotional reactions (N.B. I address metaphor below). For example, at the beginning readers are told that despite the Prisoners' hands being tied or handcuffed *los dedos danzaban, volaban, dibujaban palabras* ["their fingers danced, flew, drew words"]. In contrast, the reality of their imprisonment and the people who imprisoned them (the Uruguayan Dictatorship) is presented in a rather matter-of-fact, unembellished way — *tenían las manos atadas, o esposadas* ["their hands were tied or handcuffed"]; *los presos estaban encapuchados* ["the prisoners were hooded"]; *hablar estaba prohibido* ["it was forbidden to speak"]; *la dictadura uruguaya quería que cada uno fuera nada más que uno, que cada uno fuera nadie* ["the Uruguayan dictatorship wanted everyone to stand alone, everyone to be no one"]; *la comunicación era delito* ["communication was a crime"].

b) Characters' discourse presentation

As noted above, the narrator adopts the viewpoint of the Prisoners. Similarly with regards to discourse presentation, the only characters whose discourse gets presented in this short story is the Prisoners'. In the first paragraph we find out that the Prisoners

> *Tenían las manos atadas, o esposadas, y sin embargo los dedos danzaban, volaban, dibujaban palabras. Los presos estaban encapuchados; pero inclinándose alcanzaban a ver algo, alguito, por abajo. Aunque hablar estaba prohibido, ellos conversaban con las manos.*

["Their hands were tied or handcuffed, yet their fingers danced, flew, drew words. The prisoners were hooded, but leaning back, they could see a bit, just a bit, down below. Although it was forbidden to speak, they spoke with their hands."]

Here the fingers are personified and seem to have a life of their own, even though they are moved by the person. In this context, because the only way to communicate is through the fingers, this is what the story focuses on at this point. This extract metaphorically describes the way the fingers are moving. In other words, the visual characteristics of the movement of the fingers are described metaphorically as dancing and flying. The speech presentational scale (see 3.2.2.2) captures oral communication, whereas here we have the presentation of *non-verbal communication*. If we use the speech presentation categories, this would be labelled as Narrator's Representation of Voice (NV) or Narrator's Representation of Speech (NRS). However, the whole point is that prisoners were not allowed to speak, and so they resorted to non-verbal communication. So what makes this story interesting is that despite communication being a crime prisoners managed to talk to each other through their hands. This representation of communication can be assumed to foreground the narrator's presence because the narrator mediates what we learn about the Prisoners' communication.

Regarding speech presentation, Direct Speech is found in the following extract:

—*Algunos teníamos mala letra*— me dijo—. *Otros eran unos artistas de la caligrafía*.
["*Some of us had bad handwriting*," he told me. "Others were masters of calligraphy."]

This instance of Direct Speech is attributed to the character Pinio Ungerfeld because of the reporting clause *me dijo* ["he told me"]. As discussed in 3.2.2.2, DS is often assumed to have the effect of closeness to characters since readers get characters' words without any mediation from the narrator. The DS extract can be interpreted metaphorically: some prisoners managed to communicate more skillfully and successfully than others, and so a contrast is made between beautiful and poor handwriting.

More indirect instances of characters' discourse presentation are found later on in the story. In the following extract different types of communication are underlined:

> *(...) pudieron hablarse, con golpecitos, a través de la pared. Así se contaban sueños y recuerdos, amores y desamores; discutían, se abrazaban, se peleaban; compartían certezas y bellezas y también compartían dudas y culpas y preguntas de esas que no tienen respuesta.*

> ["they could talk to each other by tapping on the wall. In that way they told of dreams and memories, fallings in and out of love; they discussed, embraced, fought; they shared beliefs and beauties, doubts and guilts, and those questions that have no answer."]

Here we are told about the types of communication that took place, but the available discourse presentation frameworks do not fully account for this type of communication. For example, the speech presentation category of NV would be unsuitable because we find out more about the kind of communication than merely "speech" occurring. This narrative report of communication between the two characters does not produce distancing because the narrator summarises or generalises on many instances of communication between Fernández Huidobro and Mauricio Rosencof. The narrator highlights the emotional content of the communication between the Prisoners, and

what the characters communicate about (i.e., dreams, doubts) suggests a relationship of intimacy between them.

Finally, there is a contrast between the mode of communication (i.e., tapping on the wall) and the description of what the Prisoners communicated about (i.e., dreams, memories), which seems to require sophisticated communication. This might emphasise the richness of the communication since it was so vital to the Prisoners. Thus, the author seems to be taking some liberties to portray characters' experiences in the most vivid and involving way possible.

c) Emotion presentation

In the previous sub-sections, it was noted that only the Prisoners' viewpoint and discourse are presented. Similarly, only the emotions of the Prisoners are portrayed in the story, and this alone might play an important role in triggering empathy for them. Absence of emotional information with regards to the Uruguayan Dictatorship, together with the use of the term 'dictatorship' and the representation of the inhumane treatment they subjected prisoners to, may hinder empathy for them.

The story presents the Prisoners' emotional states in implicit ways. Emotional states can be potentially attributed to the Prisoners based on the situation they find themselves in: they are handcuffed, hooded, and kept in very small solitary cells. Readers are thus likely to attribute states of discomfort, isolation, powerlessness, or even anguish to the characters. The metaphorical expression *enterrados en solitarios calabozos del tamaño de un ataúd* ["buried in solitary cells the size of coffins"] provides information from

which readers might infer the anguish of the prisoners' physical situation. The metaphor *buried* and the comparison of the cells with coffins might suggest that the characters felt almost as if they were buried alive during their imprisonment. Some form of embodied simulation might be facilitated through this description of the physical situation the characters find themselves in, which might in turn facilitate empathy. Some researchers (Semino, 2010; de Waal, 2009; Cameron, 2013) refer to embodied simulation as possibly being involved in empathic experiences. Cameron (2013, p. 13) expresses it as follows:

> Explanations for automatic empathy posit a process of embodied simulation that enables an observer to make sense of the physical actions of others (...) In this process, the Self understands how the Other feels by simulating their actions, perceptions and emotions as if they were the Self's own. The use of vivid or emotive language in dialogue, for example in accounts of traumatic events, may contribute to evoking automatic empathy (Arbib, 2002).

Thus, the reference to coffin-like cells could give rise to an embodied simulation. Finally, the narratorial evaluation of this situation as being *condenados a esa soledad* ["condemned *to that solitude*"] further contributes to establishing the characters' negatively-valenced emotional experience of isolation.

Moreover, clues as to the Prisoners' emotional experiences can be inferred from the discourse presentation in the second half of the story:

> *Así se contaban sueños y recuerdos, amores y desamores; discutían, se abrazaban, se peleaban; compartían certezas y bellezas y también compartían dudas y culpas y preguntas de esas que no tienen respuesta.*

> ["In that way they told of dreams and memories, fallings in and out of love; they discussed, embraced, fought; they shared beliefs and beauties, doubts and guilts, and those questions that have no answer."]

Emotional states of both positive and negative valence can be inferred — positive emotions resulting from their metaphorical embraces, and their sharing of dreams and memories; and negative emotions resulting from their reported fights.

d) Characterisation techniques

Naming is one characterisation technique that may have implications for the relationship readers establish with the different characters. At first the Prisoners are presented as a group (*los presos* ["the prisoners"]), but then individual characters are introduced who have proper names: Pinio Ungerfeld, Fernández Huidobro, and Mauricio Rosencof. In contrast, the characters behind the Uruguayan Dictatorship remain as a group all throughout the story since they are only mentioned once. Cameron's (2013) notion of "lumping" is very suitable here: the name category given to the Uruguayan Dictatorship lumps all members of this group into a homogeneous group. Apart from the choice of mode of naming, the fact that very little information is given about them might also contribute to this lumping effect, which according to Cameron has distancing effects and may thus potentially hinder empathy. In her words, since "empathic connection is individual to individual, by hiding the individual within the group, lumping effectively removes the possibility of connection" (2013, p. 25).

Another relevant notion that can be applied to examine the potential effects of the naming choice of "Uruguayan Dictatorship" is found within Langacker's (2008) *empathy scale* (as cited in Stockwell, 2009). This scale classifies features in literary texts in terms of their potential to attract the reader's attention (Stockwell, 2009, p. 24). A feature of attraction in the scale is *empathetic recognisability*, which proposes that objects in a text

vary in the degree to which they are good attractors in this order: "human speaker > human hearer > animal > object > abstraction" (Stockwell, p. 25). Thus, active human speakers are better attractors than human hearers and, in turn, humans are better attractors (i.e., more figural) than objects (Stockwell, p. 24). In the light of this, it can be hypothesised that individual characters (i.e., the individually named prisoners) are better suited to attract readers' empathy than the homogeneously grouped Uruguayan Dictatorship, especially given the latter's name, their being mentioned once, and the little amount of information about them.

Importantly, the *actions* performed by the different characters also work towards characterising them. First, characters' actions may automatically position them into the character roles of victims and perpetrators. That in itself might achieve, respectively, closeness and distancing effects. The Prisoners engage in the habitual action (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002) of talking to each other in prison. The Uruguayan Dictatorship has implicitly imprisoned, handcuffed and hooded these characters, and explicitly forbids any kind of communication. Their habitual actions, which are not one-offs or one-time actions, are the only information readers are given about them. Characters' actions and situation might activate readers' schematic knowledge about dictatorial regimes and imprisonment. As a result, readers are likely to characterise the two sets of characters in rather different ways by attributing them different goals and ideological values, and physical and emotional experiences. Readers' schematic knowledge and their contextual appraisal of the story-world situation may combine to trigger moral evaluations, and all of this is likely to influence readers' empathy with the different characters.

4.3.2 Story 2: *Gelman*

The second story (see Appendix A) deals with Juan Gelman, an Argentinian poet and journalist who fought against the dictatorial regime in Argentina (1976-1983). The story invites us to interpret a causal connection — as a result of his political activism, he was exiled and members of his family were kidnapped, tortured and/or murdered. These events, together with the narrator's speculation on what it must have been like for Gelman, are captured in this short story. This story might be described as Galeano's retelling of what happened to Gelman based on what he had learned about the poet's life events and writing endeavours.

a) Point of view presentation

Whereas in the first story the point of view presented was that of the Prisoners, in this story the viewing position or holder of point of view seems to be the narrator, who is presented as the observer of the events being narrated. The story is thus told from the viewpoint of the focaliser narrator, and it is from his perspective that things are "seen, felt, understood and assessed" (Toolan, 2001, p. 60) with different degrees of explicitness. The narrator occupies the role of the focaliser whereas Gelman is positioned in the role of focalised (i.e. the object of observation; Bal, (1997) [1985]). The story presents external focalisation because the narrator-focaliser is outside the story being narrated, and so the focaliser or perceiver is an observer rather than an experiencing character.

In terms of Fowler's categories of psychological point of view, the story can be categorised as *external narration type D* for several reasons: the person of the narrator is

highlighted through the use of first-person pronouns and evaluative statements, and the narrator seems to have limited knowledge about Gelman's inner states.

As noted earlier, there is a shift from a focus on the story-world situation to a focus on the narrating situation. The focus shifts from an account of Gelman's experiences to the authorial narrator's reflections on those experiences. In the former, the narrator refers to the character Gelman in the third person: *el poeta Juan Gelman <u>escribe alzándose</u>* ["the poet Juan Gelman <u>writes, hoisting himself</u>"]; *los militares argentinos (…) <u>le pegaron</u> donde más duele* ["the Argentine military (…) <u>hit him</u> where it hurt the most"]. In the latter, the narrator goes on to reflect and wonder what it must have been like for Gelman to undergo that situation. Linguistic indicators of first-person narration can be found in the fact that the narrator makes references to himself: *me lo he preguntado* ["I've often wondered"]; *me he imaginado* ["I've often imagined"]; *y me he preguntado* ["and I've wondered"]. This, together with other textual features which are examined below, foreground the narrator's presence.

The story shows a strong degree of narratorial presence or visibility. Events seem to be very much filtered through the perspective of the narrator, and so what is told can be attributed to the authorial narrator rather than to the character. Apart from first-person pronominal references, the narrator is highly visible in the framing statement at the beginning, in the evaluation given in the second paragraph, and in the commentary given at the end. Here the narrator can be seen as an "authoritative evaluator" (Stockwell, 2013, p. 272) of Gelman's experiences.

At the very beginning of the story we find a framing narrative statement which broadly summarises the tone and events of the narrative:

> *El poeta Juan Gelman escribe alzándose sobre sus propias ruinas, sobre su polvo y su basura.*
> ["The poet Juan Gelman writes, hoisting himself from the rubble of his life, from its dust and debris."]

This framing statement can be attributed to the authorial narrator, who provides an indication of what he imagines Gelman's feelings are: *escribe alzándose sobre sus propias ruinas, sobre su polvo y su basura* ["hoisting himself from the rubble of his life, from its dust and debris"]. These metaphorical expressions to convey feelings will be examined below (see emotion presentation).

Moreover, the presence of the narrator can be seen in the explicit evaluation given in the second paragraph: *Los militares argentinos, <u>cuyas atrocidades hubieran provocado a Hitler un incurable complejo de inferioridad</u>, le pegaron donde más duele* ["The Argentine military, <u>whose atrocities would have given Hitler an incurable inferiority complex</u>, hit him where it hurt the most"]. The subordinated clause (underlined) shows a rather overt evaluation of the actions of the dictatorial regime, thus signalling ideological viewpoint (see below). The evaluative statement in the main clause can also be attributed to the authorial narrator, whose values are disclosed — the narrator considers that having one's family harmed is the most painful experience for a parent.

Finally, the last paragraph contains what might be called explicit commentary about the story:

¿Cómo se hace para sobrevivir a una tragedia así? Digo: para sobrevivir sin que se te apague el alma. Muchas veces me lo he preguntado, en estos años. Muchas veces me he imaginado esa horrible sensación de vida usurpada, esa pesadilla del padre que siente que está robando al hijo el aire que respira, el padre que en medio de la noche despierta bañado en sudor: Yo no te maté, yo no te maté. Y me he preguntado: si Dios existe, ¿por qué pasa de largo? ¿No será ateo, Dios?

["How does one survive such a tragedy? That is: survive without one's soul being extinguished? I've often wondered these last years. I've often imagined that horrible feeling of having one's life usurped, the nightmare of the father who imagines he has stolen from his son the air he breathes, the father who wakes in the middle of the night, bathed in sweat: "*I didn't kill you, I didn't kill you.*" And I've wondered: if God exists, why does he just walk on by? Could God be an atheist?"]

Here the narrator moves beyond the story-world situation, facts and events, and offers interpretive, evaluative comments about the significance of the events in Gelman's life. This can be seen in the presence of speculative assertions about Gelman's feelings (underlined in the extract above). Despite the high degree of narratorial interference, this attempt to reconstruct Gelman's inner states might facilitate readers' empathy with the character. This would question claims in the literature about narratorial interference having distancing effects, and so different types of narratorial interference might have different potential effects. Of course, it ultimately depends on readers' individual interpretations, but arguably the narrator seems to be closing the distance between readers and Gelman.

Another reason why the story can be labelled as external narration type D (in Fowler's terms) is the limited knowledge of the narrator. The heterodiegetic narrator, who is not a story participant, seems to be knowledgeable only to a certain extent — thus, he is not fully omniscient. His perception is restricted to what he knows about Gelman's life.

Even though the narrator knows about what happened to Gelman's family, he can only speculate about what it must have felt like to *survive such a tragedy* ["sobrevivir una tragedia así"]. Several internal states are attributed by the narrator to the character: *sobrevivir sin que se te apague el alma* ["survive without one's soul being extinguished"]; *esa horrible sensación de vida usurpada, esa pesadilla del padre que siente que está robando al hijo el aire que respira* ["that horrible feeling of having one's life usurped, the nightmare of the father who imagines he has stolen from his son the air he breathes"]. I examine these extracts below under emotion presentation.

Regarding ideological point of view, the value-laden expressions can be attributed to both the author and the narrator, or to the authorial narrator: *Los militares argentinos, cuyas atrocidades hubieran provocado a Hitler un incurable complejo de inferioridad, le pegaron donde más duele* ["The Argentine military, whose atrocities would have given Hitler an incurable inferiority complex, hit him where it hurt the most"]. An indicator of ideological viewpoint can be found in this ideologically slanted comparison between the Argentinian Military and Hitler. This analogy might lead to different interpretations — one that regards this as bitterly humorous exaggeration, or a more literal one that implies that the Argentinians were much more brutal and ruthless than the Nazi regime. The success of this analogy depends of course on readers' experiential background and, in particular, on their knowledge of 20th-century Argentinian and German history. Arguably, the story mediates anti-dictatorial attitudes that are embodied in the negative evaluation of the social group of the Dictatorship, with which readers can establish different positions based on their own socio-political values. Again, this ideological evaluation foregrounds the narrator's presence.

b) Characters' discourse presentation

In the first sentence of the story we find what might be labelled as Narrator's Representation of Writing[58] (NW). Being the counterpart of NRS (Narrator's Representation of Speech) or NV (Narrator's Representation of Voice), this category is "used to capture minimal references to writing activities, which do not provide any information as to the illocutionary force, content and wording of the relevant text" (Semino and Short, 2004, p. 102). Through this NW extract the authorial narrator makes reference to the poet's writing activity. The character Gelman writes despite the events that occurred to him. Semino and Short point out that writing presentation is closer to speech presentation (than thought presentation) because "both speech and writing are modes of communication which result in observable and potentially public verbal behaviour and 'texts', which can then be reported/(re)presented" (2004, p. 98).

The second paragraph does not contain any speech or thought phenomena, and so it is straightforward Narrator's Representation of Action (NRA). Here the narrator offers an account of the facts and events that took place in the character's life.

In the final paragraph we find an instance of hypothetical discourse which is imagined by the narrator. The narrator creates a hypothetical scenario of a father (that we are likely to see as Gelman himself) who *en medio de la noche despierta bañado en sudor: Yo no te mate, yo no te mate* ["wakes in the middle of the night, bathed in sweat: 'I didn't

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[58] In their corpus study of speech, writing and thought presentation, Lancaster researchers added a new scale to the traditional scales of speech and thought presentation — Writing Presentation (see, e.g., Semino and Short, 2004).

kill you, I didn't kill you'"]. This imaginary hypothetical discourse might be either speech or thought, since there is no speech act verb or thought act verb to disambiguate it. This extract can be labelled as Hypothetical Direct Speech or Hypothetical Direct Thought.

Regardless of whether it is considered to be speech or thought, the important point is that it has hypothetical status. In the Lancaster speech, writing and thought presentation research project Semino, Short and Wynne concluded that the use of hypothetical DS (and hypothetical FDS) can be "highly effective in dramatising an imaginary speech event" (1999, p. 314). The same dramatising function can be attributed to the hypothetical discourse found in the story, as it helps to give it a greater sense of vividness. Interestingly, Semino, Short and Wynne made a link between the hypothetical presentation of discourse and authoritative narrators "whether the speculation originates from them or is attributed to participants in their stories" (1999, p. 316). The narrator in this story, as noted earlier, has a highly visible presence. The narrator's attribution of hypothetical discourse to Gelman serves to express the narrator's own belief of what the experience might have been like for Gelman. Arguably, the narrator is trying to empathise with Gelman, to imagine what he must have felt like after his family was taken away.

c) Emotion presentation

Unlike in the other two stories, in this case it is the authorial narrator who *attributes* internal states to Gelman. The story presents what the narrator believes Gelman's emotions are likely to be. The whole story, and especially the final paragraph, can be

seen as an attempt on the part of the authorial narrator to take up Gelman's perspective and to imagine what it must have felt like for him to undergo such events (i.e., empathise). The story conveys emotion mostly by means of metaphor, so inferences need to be drawn to interpret Gelman's internal states.

At the very beginning, the framing narrative statement uses metaphorical expressions to convey the character's likely emotional experiences:

> *El poeta Juan Gelman escribe alzándose sobre sus propias ruinas, sobre su polvo y su basura.*
> ["The poet Juan Gelman writes, hoisting himself from the rubble of his life, from its dust and debris."]

I explain how this metaphorical expression works in Spanish, as it is complex and culturally constrained. In this context, a person is a building, and their well-being or personal integrity is understood in terms of the structural integrity of the building. In addition, the erectness and verticality of the building might suggest the person's positive emotional states. Therefore, an emotionally shattering experience makes the building collapse, resulting in rubble, dust and debris. *Alzándose sobre sus propias ruinas* ["Hoisting himself from the rubble"] would then convey the idea of resilience; of being able to start over again after being emotionally devastated (potentially similar to the conventional expression "a Phoenix rising from the ashes"). Here the authorial narrator is communicating that the poet Gelman keeps writing and thus overcomes his hardships. Thus, it is a creative exploitation of a conventional metaphor.

In the second paragraph readers find about the actual events — *los militares argentinos (...) le pegaron <u>donde más duele</u>* ["the Argentine military (...) hit him <u>where it hurt the</u>

<u>most</u>"]. In the narrator's view having one's loved ones harmed is the most painful experience for a parent, ergo for Gelman. The emotional label (or *mental disposition term*; Langlotz, 2017) is quite explicit — extreme, unbearable pain as a result of having his family taken away instead of him. The phrase *en lugar de él* ["instead of him"] gets repeated twice: in the middle of the second paragraph and at the beginning of the final paragraph. This repetition might have a foregrounding effect closely related to the meaning of the story: the repetition emphasises the painfulness of the dictatorship's retaliation.

In the final paragraph the narrator adopts the character's perspective and attempts to reconstruct Gelman's experiences. There are particularly emotionally-laden expressions which can be labelled as *fixed figurative expressions* (Langlotz, 2017) such as *sobrevivir sin que se te apague el alma* ["survive without one's soul being extinguished"]. In this metaphor, fire represents life itself or having a purpose in life, and, when this fire is put out, one feels as if they were dead. Another figurative expression is found in *esa horrible sensación de vida usurpada, esa pesadilla del padre que siente que está robando al hijo el aire que respira* ["that horrible feeling of having one's life usurped, the nightmare of the father who imagines he has stolen from his son the air he breathes"]. Since Gelman's son was killed because of him, he feels he is preventing this basic function of a living organism (i.e., breathing). His son is no longer breathing (i.e., alive) because of him and his political activism.

Moreover, the sentence *el padre que en medio de la noche despierta bañado en sudor* ["the father who wakes in the middle of the night, bathed in sweat"] also conveys

emotional states implicitly. Here emotion is portrayed by "referring to emoters' actions or behavior (caused by emotion)" (Langlotz, 2017, p. 258), which in this case is hypothetical (see 3.2.2.3). A person can have nightmares, wake up suddenly or be kept awake, and sweat as a physiological reaction when they experience certain emotions. This implicitly conveys intense emotional states of worry, anguish, and possibly guilt.

Despite not being Gelman's first-hand experiences, these narratorial speculations could potentially elicit readers' empathy with Gelman because of the very concrete and vivid emotional picture provided. Readers might be able to imagine what it must have felt like for Gelman to be in that situation because the narrator somehow enables such experiential understanding. The narratorial filtering mediation may thus function as a closeness device which facilitates empathy.

d) Characterisation techniques

Characterising information about Gelman is given through *altero-characterisation* (i.e., by entities other than the character) (Eder et al., 2010). In this case the narrator provides all the information about the character (level 2 in the discourse structure of prose; see footnote 49 in Chapter 3). So, in contrast with the other two stories, there is no speech or thought presentation coming directly from Gelman himself that could contribute to characterisation (level 3 in the discourse structure). At the same time, the narratorial statements given about Gelman work towards characterising the narrator indirectly, since his ideological and affective position is revealed (see above).

In terms of the social schemata that might be involved in forming impressions of the character, the textual information might activate knowledge about certain social group categories (Culpeper, 2001; see 2.5.1). Gelman is characterised explicitly through social role categories such as his *occupational role* as poet and writer (in the first paragraph), and his *kinship role* as father (in the second paragraph).

There are some forms of implicit characterisation in the story. Implicit characterisation cues are to do mainly with Gelman's *actions and values*, which are not explicitly spelled out in the story. Readers are likely to interpret a causal connection and infer that, because of the outcome of events (i.e., the kidnapping of his family), he has somehow opposed the government through certain actions. His values also remain implicit, but the most likely interpretation is that he was dissatisfied with the political establishment, and somehow questioned or criticised it. Further inferencing is needed in the sentence *se llevaron a los hijos porque <u>él no estaba</u>* ["they took his children because <u>he was not at home</u>"], which can be potentially interpreted as Gelman having been in exile at the time of the events. Thus, Gelman is indirectly characterised as a political dissident of the dictatorial regime, all of which has to be derived via inference.

4.3.3 Story 3: *Professional Life*

Professional Life tells the story of an unnamed torturer, who works for the French colonisers of Algeria; and Ahmadou, who fought for the independence of the country. The story invites us to assume that Ahmadou became a political prisoner. The story provides insights into the Torturer's daily experience when performing his professional role and the relationship he develops with Ahmadou (see appendix A).

a) Point of view presentation

As pointed out earlier, a common characteristic of the stories is that they feature an extradiegetic first-person narrator who does not take part in the events. In this story the narrator explicitly relies on something that he was told, as seen in this self-reference: *Ahmadou Gherab (...) me lo contó* ["Ahmadou Gherab (...) told me this"].

Regarding Fowler's categories of psychological point of view, the story can be labelled as *internal narration type B* (as in story 1) where the narrator is not a story character but knows about characters' internal states (Fowler, 1996, p. 170). However, the narrator in this story does not fully fit Fowler's type B because Fowler refers to third-person narration, whereas Galeano's story presents first-person narration. By adopting an internal psychological viewpoint the story grants access to the feelings of the two characters; however, the story seems to favour the Torturer's viewpoint to a greater extent. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that most of the story deals with the Torturer, and his speech and mental processes are portrayed (rather than Ahmadou's). The access to the inner life of the Torturer may, together with the cumulative effect of other textual devices, place readers in his mind so they can see what the world is like from the perspective of a torturer.

As to the knowledge status of the narrator, the narrator in this story is an atypical omniscient narrator because he is not the god-like figure of prototypical omniscient narration. Since it narrates in a way that is reminiscent of omniscient narration, the narrator could be said to be omniscient-like in order to accommodate this slight

variation from prototypical cases. Omniscient narration is regarded as facilitating readers' empathy only in so far as it provides access to the inner world of the characters (Keen, 2006, p. 219). Such a condition is fulfilled in this text — characters' thoughts and feelings are presented through devices such as thought presentation and narration of internal states, all of which will be discussed below.

The contrast in tense (present tense vs. past tense) throughout the story can be explained in terms of the atypical nature of this narrative. One possible interpretation is that the narrative moves in and out of the story-world: the first half is an imagined, hypothetical instantiation of the real-world situation presented in the second half. The first part of the story can be then seen as the narrator's attempt at understanding what it is like to be a torturer, who inflicts pain on a person day after day. Other interpretations should, of course, be allowed for.

I now explore the extent to which textual instances of ideological point of view in *Professional Life* could function as triggers and/or barriers for empathy. Concerning socio-political issues, the only explicit real-world references we are given is that Ahmadou *peleó por la independencia de Argelia* ["fought for the independence of Algeria"], and that *Ahmadou fue torturado por un oficial francés durante varios meses* ["Ahmadou was tortured by a French official for several months"], presumably in Orán, a city in the northwest of Algeria. The socio-political values that can be activated in recipients' interpretations revolve around colonisation and the struggle for independence. Although this story is about the French colonisation of Algeria, the denunciation of abuses in colonial and post-colonial contexts is one of the themes that

Galeano has written widely about, and this can be said to be the *implicit* ideological viewpoint adopted in the story. However, this story does not contain explicit narratorial commentary as Stories 1 and 2 do.

b) Characters' discourse presentation

Speech presentation

There are two main stretches of text where characters' speech occurs. The first of those is the following extract towards the beginning of the story:

(1) —Y yo, ¿qué tengo que ver? —dice él, hablando de él (...)	*(1)* "And I, what have I got to do with it?" says he, speaking of him (...)
(2) —Yo cumplo órdenes— dice o dice:	*(2)* "I carry out orders," he says, or he says:
(3) —Para eso me pagan.	*(3)* "That's what they pay me for."
(4) O dice:	*(4)* Or he says:
(5) —Si no lo hago yo, lo hace otro.	*(5)* "If I don't do it, someone else will."
(6) Que es como decir:	*(6)* Which is as if to say:
(7) —Yo soy otro.	*(7)* "I am someone else"

Overall, this extract only contains instances of Direct Speech (hereafter DS). In (1) we find the reported clause first, and then the reporting clause. In the reported clause *Y yo, ¿qué tengo que ver?* ["And I, what have I got to do with it?"], the first person singular pronoun 'I' and the verb (in first singular person and present tense) signal this fragment as being uttered by the Torturer himself. In contrast, the reporting clause *dice él* ["says he"] is in line with the voice of the narrator due to the presence of the third person singular pronoun *he*, and the verb shift to third person (the inflection *–s* is added to mark the third person reference: *dice* ["says"]).

A pattern emerges since the five utterances follow the conventions for presenting Direct Speech: (1), (2), (2-3), (4-5) and (6-7). This is evidenced through (a) the use of italics in Spanish and quotation marks in the English translation, (b) the presence of both reported and introductory reporting clauses, and (c) the fact that the pronouns as well as the person and tense of the verbs in the reported and reporting clauses are consistent with the character's and the narrator's discourse, respectively. Coming back to the possible interpretations about the relationship between the two parts of the story, the Direct Speech could be taken as hypothetical (if one favours the interpretation that the first part is what the narrator imagines) or iterative (if one takes the first part to be a conversation with himself that the Torturer habitually has).

The second stretch of text where characters' speech is presented is found towards the end of the story:

> *le hablaba de sus problemas familiares* y *del ascenso que no llega y lo cara que está la vida. El torturador hablaba de su mujer insufrible y del hijo recién nacido, que no lo había dejado pegar un ojo en toda la noche; hablaba contra Orán, esta ciudad de mierda, y contra el hijo de puta del coronel que*...

> ["he would speak to him of his family problems and of the promotion that *won't* come and of how expensive life is. The torturer would speak of his insufferable wife and their newborn child who had not permitted him a wink of sleep all night; he railed against Orán, *this* shitty city, and against the son of a bitch of *the* colonel who..."]

In this extract there is a mixture of speech presentation categories: Narrative Report of Speech Act (NRSA) and Free Indirect Speech (FIS). The very first part (i.e., *le hablaba de sus problemas familiares* ["he would speak to him of his family problems"]) can be labelled as NRSA because the sentence reports the occurrence of a speech act and it

gives "a minimal account of the statement" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 260). What follows after that (*le hablaba (...) del ascenso que no llega y lo cara que está la vida* ["he would (...) speak to him (...) of the promotion that *won't* come and of how expensive life is"]) is not a straightforward case of FID. In Free Indirect Speech, "the tense and pronoun are those associated with Indirect Speech" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 261), that is, past tense and third-person pronoun. The pronouns are third-person pronouns, but the tense makes things complicated. Keeping the verb in the past tense would adhere to the narrator's tense; however, this sentence contains two present tense verbs (*no llega; está* ["*won't* come"; "is"]), thus becoming more strongly associated with the character's own discourse. Elements of both IS and DS are combined, which shows that FIS can take different forms. It seems reasonable then to conclude that this passage features NRSA shifting into FIS.

Most of the remaining sentence in the paragraph (i.e., *hablaba de su mujer insufrible y del hijo recién nacido, que no lo había dejado pegar un ojo en toda la noche; hablaba contra Orán* ["speak of his insufferable wife and their newborn child who had not permitted him a wink of sleep all night; he railed against Orán"]) is NRSA again, with the exception of the very last part of the sentence (*esta ciudad de mierda, y contra el hijo de puta del coronel que...* ["*this* shitty city, and against the son of a bitch of a colonel who..."]). It could be argued that the narration suddenly changes to FIS. There are two reasons for suggesting this. First, the determiner *esta* ["*this*"] has not undergone backshift (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 256), meaning that it is in the form commonly associated with the character's speech (cf. *esa* 'that'). If the whole sentence were NRSA, the proximal demonstrative *esta*/this, which indicates closeness to the

speaker/character, would have to be transformed to the distal demonstrative *esa*/that, which would instead indicate some more distance from the speaker. Second, the reported speech ([*this* shitty city, and against the son of a bitch of a colonel who]) seems to include much more detail and specific expletives (*de mierda*, *el hijo de puta* ["shitty", "son of a bitch of"]) than NRSA would normally do. It is as though we are being given the same words that the character used to describe the city and the colonel. Again, this extract involves NRSA shifting into FIS.

There is one more instance in the story that seems to be relevant when analysing speech presentation. At the very end of the story we are told that *Ahmadou (...) no decía nada* ["Ahmadou (...) would say nothing"]. This I would label, due to the lack of an already existing category, as Narrative Report of Absence of Voice (NAV) (cf. Narrator's Report of Voice (NV)). There is stark contrast between the talkative Torturer and the speechless Ahmadou. This absence of voice becomes meaningful since it further foregrounds the unequal power relationship between the two characters, and might convey emotion implicitly (see below).

The final occurrence of speech presentation is that of "Ahmadou (...) told me this", which has been briefly mentioned in the previous section on mode of narration. This can be labelled as NRSA since it offers information about the speech act that occurred, the content of which is the second part of the story. The first part would then become the narrator's own imaginative, hypothetical construction of the moral struggle which being in the role of a torturer might involve.

Stylisticians have discussed the effects of the different speech presentation categories. The mixture of NRSA and FIS creates contrasting effects. With NRSA the characters' utterances are thought to be more under the narrator's control, whereas with FIS the character seems to speak more freely, with less mediation from the narrator (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 260). In DS, the presence of the narrator becomes evident through the use of the reporting clause and the use of italics in Spanish and quotation marks in English. However, the narrator's presence is backgrounded when the full speech of the characters is given. This has implications for the directness that readers perceive when witnessing characters' talk —an impression of closeness is achieved through the direct exposure to characters' words.

Even though DS allows readers to immediately "listen to" what characters utter, this speech presentation category has not been thoroughly yet discussed in the debates concerning potential empathy triggers. Stylisticians' claims about the role of DS (and the rest of the speech presentation categories) should be incorporated into discussions about narrative empathy. In contrast, the category of FIS has received some attention. A few researchers (Adamson, 2001; Keen, 2006) suggest that FIS can be taken to be an empathy trigger. In fact, FIS is regarded as "the most likely to produce empathy" (Keen, 2006, p. 220).

Thought presentation

The only instance of thought presentation in the story is the following extract:

> *Ante el odio de la víctima, el verdugo siente estupor, y hasta una cierta sensación de injusticia: al fin y al cabo, él es un funcionario, un simple funcionario que cumple su horario y su tarea.*

["The hatred of the victim astonishes the executioner, and even leaves him feeling a certain sense of injustice: <u>after all, he is an official, an ordinary official who goes to work on time and does his job</u>."]

The first part has been coded as internal narration or narration of internal states (NI), which is included within the thought presentation categories (Semino and Short, 2004, p. 132). What sets NI apart from other thought presentation categories is that it involves "an experience that can be seen as involving some form of cognition, but without any indication of the occurrence of a specific thought act, let alone of any propositional content or wording that might have formed in the relevant person's mind" (Semino and Short, 2004, pp. 132-133). Such is the case with this extract since it is emotions — astonishment and feeling of injustice — that are being mentioned (see emotion presentation below).

The propositional content of the thought is found in the second part (i.e., *al fin y al cabo, él es un funcionario, un simple funcionario que cumple su horario y su tarea* ["after all, he is an official, an ordinary official who goes to work on time and does his job"]), which can be labelled as Free Indirect Thought (FIT), because it (i) seems to indicate the wording or content of the thought, (ii) lacks the reporting clause, and (iii) uses third-person pronouns, which makes it consistent with the narrator's discourse. Regarding its potential effects, FIT is seen as a closeness device because it places us "inside the character's mind" (Leech and Short, 2007, p. 276).

c) Emotion presentation

Most of the portrayal of emotion in this narrative is associated with the Torturer. From the speech presentation at the beginning of the story readers might infer the Torturer's likely mental states; that is, the emotional conflict and split self which result from carrying out a job that involves torturing other people. The speech itself presents seemingly contradictory statements about issues of responsibility and obedience to authority. The use of the behavioural surge expression (Bednarek, 2008) *mientras se encoge de hombros* ["*as he shrugs* his shoulders"] requires some inferencing because emotion is being conveyed rather implicitly. This para- or extralinguistic cue can be seen as a gesture of doubt and uncertainty but also perhaps of indifference. The ambiguity of this manifestation might lead to varying interpretations for different readers.

Other emotions are described more explicitly through the use of mental disposition terms (Bednarek, 2008) which require less inferencing on the part of readers. For example, *ante el odio de la víctima, el verdugo <u>siente estupor</u>, y hasta <u>una cierta sensación de injusticia</u>* ["the hatred of the victim <u>astonishes</u> the executioner, and even leaves him <u>feeling a certain sense of injustice</u>"]. From these explicit emotional labels readers get a picture of the Torturer's emotional states when facing what he considers undeserved hatred from Ahmadou.

Finally, from the presentation of the Torturer's speech towards the end of the story emotion can also be inferred:

> *le hablaba de sus problemas familiares y del ascenso que no llega y lo cara que está la vida. El torturador hablaba de su mujer insufrible y del hijo recién nacido,*

> *que no lo había dejado pegar un ojo en toda la noche; hablaba contra Orán, esta ciudad de mierda, y contra el hijo de puta del coronel que…*

> ["he would speak to him of his family problems and of the promotion that *won't* come and of how expensive life is. The torturer would speak of his insufferable wife and their newborn child who had not permitted him a wink of sleep all night; he railed against Orán, *this* shitty city, and against the son of a bitch of *the* colonel who…"]

The Torturer talks to Ahmadou about his family problems, the promotion that he is still not getting, and the expensiveness of life. From this, readers can interpret a scenario involving a rather tight economic situation in his household, and so negatively-valenced internal states can be attributed to the character, such as frustration.

Regarding Ahmadou, there are only two textual references to his emotional states. The first of these is *el odio de la víctima* ["the hatred of the victim"], which can be interpreted as an attribution to Ahmadou on the part of the narrator or, alternatively, the Torturer. The other reference to Ahmadou's inner states is the very last sentence of the story:

> *Ahmadou, ensangrentado, temblando de dolor, ardiendo en fiebres, no decía nada.*
> ["Ahmadou, bathed in blood, trembling with pain, burning with fever, would say nothing"]

From this portrayal of his physical situation, readers are likely to infer emotional states such as extreme physical discomfort out of the pain, wounds and fever together with feelings of powerlessness. *Temblando de dolor* ["trembling with pain"] is a rather explicit behavioural surge term (Bednarek, 2008), since this physical behaviour directly expresses the sensation of pain.

The provision of such a level of detail might possibly trigger readers' empathy via embodied simulation (see Semino, 2010). In the text, the author's provision of such detail and use of vivid or emotive language helps us picture the physical situation Ahmadou finds himself in. Part of the strategy of involvement is to possibly create embodied reactions through the portrayal of characters' bodily experience. Linguistic description provides a picture of Ahmadou being covered in his own blood, suffering from a great deal of pain, and feeling feverish after being tortured. The fact that Ahmadou does not speak at all (see the above analysis of speech presentation), adds up to his situation — readers could infer that he would not talk because of his unbearable suffering, possibly combined with fear and/or unwillingness. Thus, readers might infer Ahmadou's likely mental and emotional state from the physical description (*blood*, *pain* and *fever*) and from the general context of torture. Interestingly, "direct description of a character's emotional state or circumstances (…) may produce empathy in readers just as effectively as *indirect implication of emotional states through actions and context*" (Keen, 2006, p. 218, my emphasis).

d) Characterisation techniques

There are contrasting choices of naming for the different characters. Only *la víctima* ["the victim"], also named as *el torturado* ["the tortured man"], is given a proper name, including both first name and surname: *Ahmadou Gherab*. The Torturer is only referred to through noun phrases that are related to his professional role — in line with the very title of the story (*Professional Life*) — *verdugo* ["executioner"], *torturador* ["torturer"], *funcionario* ["*civil servant*"] and *oficial francés* ["French official"]. It could be argued that the two naming strategies may have different effects: distancing towards the Torturer

and closeness towards Ahmadou. In addition, the narrator's relationship with the character (Ahmadou is said to have had contact with the narrator — *Ahmadou (...) me lo contó* ["Ahmadou (...) told me this"]), could also enhance closeness or solidarity with Ahmadou.

The ways characters are named also have implications for character types, since the fact that Ahmadou is called *the victim* may automatically position the Torturer in the "character slot" of the perpetrator or *villain*. This might prompt more empathy for the victim, and even more so if Ahmadou is taken to fit the category of *hero*: after all, he fought for the independence of his country. The use of character types is also closely tied with indirect implication of traits: readers may infer that Ahmadou has a strong commitment for the welfare of his people, which is praiseworthy, while the Torturer, who accepts the task of torturing people, is unscrupulous and therefore blameworthy.

Regarding characters' actions, something that deserves attention is whether the fact that the story presents a character's torture and pain could be an empathy-eliciting device from the very outset, as I acknowledged earlier. The fact that Ahmadou is being subjected to torture is likely to trigger moral reactions in readers, since a human being is abusing another human being. Much of the point of the story is that it does not present a one-off torture session but the habitual action of inflicting pain on another person day after day: *Ahmadou fue torturado por un oficial francés <u>durante varios meses</u>* ["Ahmadou was tortured by a French official <u>for several months</u>"]. This repeated action of torture, together with the fact that the Torturer feels astonishment and a sense of injustice when

faced with "the hatred of the victim", seems to offer room for readers' empathy with Ahmadou and a lack of empathy with the Torturer.

The characterisation techniques that Galeano has used to construct the Torturer may interact in interesting ways. Being given access into the Torturer's life (through description of his daily chores and presentation of his speech and thought) enables readers to know that he is performing his role because he needs to feed his family (his wife and their newborn child). This might facilitate empathy with this character, who at least initially seems to resist empathy.

4.4 Discussion of findings: Textual potential for empathy

This section discusses the ways in which the analytical findings from the previous stylistic analysis enable me to answer Research Question 1:

1. To what extent and how does Galeano use narrative techniques in his stories that have been associated with the potential elicitation of readers' empathy with characters?

In what follows I highlight the ways in which Galeano's use of narrative techniques might potentially (dis)invite empathetic responses toward story characters. Table 4.1 gathers the different findings from the textual analysis as well as the claims I have made throughout this chapter regarding the potential of the stories for eliciting empathetic and non-empathetic responses (N.B. potential effects are underlined):

Table 4.1. *Overview of findings from textual stylistic analysis*

	Point of view, including narration (who tells) and focalisation (who sees/perceives). Focus on psychological and ideological planes of viewpoint. Common aspects: (i) Mode of narration: first-person, heterodiegetic narrator. (ii) Narratorial voice seems to be closely aligned with Galeano (i.e., can be identified as Galeano). (iii) Shift from story-world situation to narrating situation.
Story 1	• Narrator-character relationship: Pinio Ungerfeld told the narrator about these events [potential closeness and solidarity] • Internal perspective on Prisoners: access to inner states [potential emotional closeness] • Narrator adopts Prisoners' viewpoint: internal psychological viewpoint type B (Fowler). Prisoners are focalisers. • External perspective on the Uruguayan Dictatorship [disinvites empathy] • Narratorial visibility in reported material: explicit commentary in last paragraph. Ideological PoV: authorial narrator's overt ethical perspective + Prisoners communicating despite the ban on speaking → advocates freedom of speech. Inference: Prisoners are political prisoners whose values are at odds with the Uruguayan Dictatorship [potential interaction with readers' knowledge of dictatorships + moral and socio-political values]
Story 2	• Narrator is holder of viewpoint and observer of events. Narrator is focaliser; Gelman is focalised. External focalisation: narrator-focaliser is observer (not an experiencing character) • External narration type D (Fowler): person of narrator is highlighted (1st-person pronouns and evaluative statements), and limited knowledge about Gelman's inner states. Strong degree of narratorial presence seen in framing statement at beginning (what he imagines Gelman's feelings are), explicit evaluation (overt ideological PoV + having one's family harmed being most painful experience), explicit commentary about story at the end (interpretation and evaluation of significance of events in G's life; speculation). Narratorial interference but attempts to reconstruct Gelman's inner states [closeness: might facilitate empathy] • Ideological PoV: Argentinian Military is negatively evaluated by narrator: analogy with Hitler. Anti-dictatorial values seen in this comparison [interpretation of analogy depends on readers' history knowledge and socio-political values]
Story 3	• Narrator-character relationship: Ahmadou told the narrator about these events [potential closeness and solidarity] • Psychological PoV: internal narration type B (narrator knows about characters' inner states). Internal psychological PoV grants access to the feelings of both the Torturer and Ahmadou. Omniscient-like narrator that provides access to the inner world of characters. However, Torturer's viewpoint is privileged. Story seems to favour Torturer's viewpoint to a greater extent (than Ahmadou's): most of the story deals with the Torturer + his speech and mental processes are portrayed [potential for reader to see what the world is like from the perspective of a torturer] + 1st part of story: narrator's attempt at understanding what it is like to be a torturer

	• Ideological PoV is implicit: denunciation of abuses in colonial and post-colonial contexts [readers' socio-political values about colonisation and struggle for independence can be activated]
Characters' discourse presentation: speech and thought presentation	
Story 1	Only the Prisoners' discourse is presented: • non-verbal communication (narratorial presence) • Direct Speech (<u>closeness to characters</u>; little mediation from narrator) • narrative report of communication (narratorial interference but highlights emotional content of communication) = character-character intimacy relationship + vivid and involving description
Story 2	Only Gelman's discourse is presented: • Narrator's Representation of Writing (NW) – Gelman's writing activity • Hypothetical discourse which is imagined by the narrator: imagined scenario and Hypothetical Direct Speech or Thought (dramatising function, vividness) • Narrator expresses what he believes the experience must have been like for Gelman (narrator trying to empathise with Gelman)
Story 3	Torturer's speech presentation: • Direct Speech in 1st part of story could be interpreted as (i) hypothetical – what narrator imagines (narrator's imaginative, hypothetical construction of Torturer's moral struggle); (ii) iterative – habitual conversation the Torturer has with himself (DS: narrator's presence is backgrounded – directness gives impression of closeness to character's words) • NRSA shifting into FIS (twice) (NRSA: narratorial control; FIS: less mediation from narrator) [<u>FIS seen as likely to produce empathy</u>] Torturer's thought presentation: • Narration of Inner States (NI): astonishment and feeling of injustice + Free Indirect Thought [<u>closeness device because it places us inside character's mind</u>] Ahmadou's speech presentation: • Narrative Report of Absence of Voice (NVA) • Contrast between talkative Torturer and speechless Ahmadou: foregrounds unequal power relation + might convey Ahmadou's emotional states implicitly
Characters' emotion presentation	
Victim characters undergo extremely distressing events and experiences (i.e., imprisonment, loss of family, torture).	
Story 1	Only Prisoners' emotions are portrayed, and this is done implicitly: • (Physical) situation: discomfort, isolation, powerlessness and anguish • Discourse presentation: both positively and negatively valenced emotions Absence of emotional information about Uruguayan Dictatorship [<u>may hinder empathy with UD</u>]

Story 2	Narrator attributes internal states to Gelman. Narrator takes up Gelman's perspective and imagines what it must have been like for Gelman to undergo that situation (i.e., narrator's empathy). Gelman's likely emotions are conveyed metaphorically (inference required): • emotionally shattered but resilient • having one's loved ones harmed is most painful experience (explicit mental disposition term: *hurt* = painfulness) • emotionally-laden fixed figurative expressions: feeling dead • hypothetical behaviour caused by emotion: intense emotional states of worry, anguish, possibly guilt [narratorial speculations might trigger empathy because of concrete and vivid emotional picture: experiential understanding. Narratorial interference as a closeness device] Absence of emotional information about Argentinian Military [may hinder empathy with AM]
Story 3	Torturer's emotional states: • implicit in DS: emotional conflict and split self + issues of responsibility and obedience to authority • implicit in behavioural surge expression (*shrugs his shoulders*): doubt, uncertainty, possibly indifference • explicit mental disposition terms (*astonishment* and *feeling of injustice*) • implicit in NRSA and FIS: frustration Ahmadou's emotional states: • explicit in *hatred* (attribution by narrator or Torturer) • implicit and explicit in the portrayal of his physical situation (covered in his own blood, suffering from a great deal of pain, feeling feverish): extreme physical discomfort out of the pain, wounds and fever + feelings of powerlessness. Explicit behavioural surge term (*trembling*): pain. Potential for embodied simulation due to provision of detail and use of vivid or emotive language • does not speak: unbearable suffering, fear and unwillingness (indirect implication of emotion through context)
**Characterisation techniques  ** Common aspects: (i) contrast in naming for victims and perpetrators; (ii) perpetrators' actions disinvite empathy
Story 1	Naming: • Prisoners: named as a group but also individual proper names (Pinio Ungerfeld, Mauricio Rosencof, Fernández Huidobro) • Uruguayan Dictatorship: the term "dictatorship" + remain as a homogeneous group [potential lumping effects] combined with little information about them [lumping, distancing that can hinder empathy] Actions: • Prisoners' habitual actions: talk to each other

	• Uruguayan Dictatorship's actions: have implicitly imprisoned Prisoners and explicitly forbids communication, inhumane treatment given to Prisoners on a habitual basis [potential to disinvite empathy on moral grounds – depends on readers' knowledge about dictatorial regimes, their contextual appraisal, moral and socio-political values]
Story 2	• Altero-characterisation: narrator provides all characterising information (level 2 in discourse structure of prose) + indirect characterisation of narrator (ideological and affective position is disclosed) • Social group categories: social role categories of occupational role (poet, writer) and kinship role (father) → activation of social schemata • Implicit characterisation cues: causal connection between events and Gelman's actions and values (has opposed the government, he was in exile). Indirectly characterised as a political dissident of the dictatorial regime (inference required)
Story 3	Naming: • Ahmadou: "the victim", "tortured man", "Ahmadou Gherab". Victim character type/role, possibly hero (indirect implication of traits: praiseworthy commitment to welfare of his people) [potential closeness] Inference: Ahmadou is a political prisoner • Torturer: noun phrases related to his professional role: "executioner", "torturer", "*civil servant*", "French official". Character slot of perpetrator/villain (indirect implication of traits: blameworthy lack of scruples) [potential distancing] Actions: Torturer: habitual action of inflicting pain on another person day after day [potential lack of empathy due to negative moral evaluation]

Looking at the bigger picture, the various narrative devices might play a different role in facilitating and blocking empathy with characters. There is a contrast in terms of the alignment of 'role bias' and textual devices regarding characters. I use *role bias* broadly to mean the expected attitudes and responses towards the characters involved in each story-world conflict — towards victims (e.g., empathy, sympathy, support, closeness, solidarity, etc., because of the harrowing experiences they undergo) and perpetrators (e.g., distancing, rejection, resistance, disgust, etc., because they cause so much hurt to others). Implicit in this idea of role bias is a crucial aspect of readers' experiential background: moral values and assessment.

1) Role bias and textual devices pointing in the same direction: Potential empathy with victims in the three stories and lack of empathy with perpetrators in stories 1 and 2

The role bias in favour of victims in the three stories and against perpetrators in Stories 1 and 2 points in the same direction as narrative techniques; that is, empathy with victims and lack of empathy with perpetrators.

Regarding victims, the combination and *potential cumulative effect* of several narrative techniques (see table 4.1 above) have the potential to facilitate empathy with victim characters based on the following:

- *Role bias in favour of the victims*. In terms of Breithaupt's (2012) three-person model of empathy, it is likely for readers to side themselves with victims. Contextual appraisal, as a top-down modulator of empathy, might result in a favourable moral positioning. This is, arguably, the *preferred response* (Stockwell, 2013) towards the stories in terms of ideological and moral positioning.

- *Information about characters' consciousness and internal states*. This is given through internal focalisation in Stories 1 and 3 (i.e., internal psychological viewpoint). In Story 2 there is external focalisation, but the narrator provides information about Gelman's likely mental states — the narrator attempts to understand what it must have been like for Gelman, and adopts a specific emotional position (i.e., having one's family harmed is the most painful experience). Story 2 thus has a rather complex status with regards to the perspective being external or internal, as it seems to combine both — it is an external perspective that attempts to grant an internal perspective on Gelman,

so the narratorial "interference" would in this case work as a closeness device in facilitating an understanding of Gelman's inner experiences. In the literature an internal perspective is commonly associated with empathetic effects because it may facilitate emotional closeness (Keen, 2006).

- *Narrator-character relationship* in Stories 1 and 3. The narrator, who seems to be closely aligned with Galeano himself, states that Pinio Ungerfeld and Ahmadou told him about the events. In addition, the narrator also establishes an intimate relationship with Gelman in Story 2. This close relation of the narrator to the characters (Keen, 2006) could facilitate closeness and solidarity.

- *Access to victims' emotions as well as their speech and thought*. In Stories 1 and 2 only the victims' emotions and (actual or hypothetical) discourse are presented, not the perpetrators'. Regarding discourse presentation, this has implications for viewpoint in that it is assumed that when character discourse is presented the narrator is taking that character's viewpoint — we momentarily see things from the character's perspective (Short, 1996). Because the narrator's viewpoint seems to be sympathetic toward and in favour of the victims, the high degree of narratorial interference found in some of the discourse presentation does not contribute much to distancing effects (as is usually assumed in the literature). The presentation of characters' consciousness and inner states is thought to encourage empathy (Keen, 2006). Story 3 is different in that there is an absence of speech presentation for Ahmadou, but this could be an empathy-eliciting device since it conveys his emotions implicitly.

- *Emotion presentation*. The emotions of the victims in the three stories are portrayed with different degrees of implicitness/explicitness and

metaphoricity/literalness. This large amount of emotional information might facilitate an emotional understanding.

- *Characterisation techniques*. In terms of naming, all victims are given individual proper names. They are indirectly characterised (i.e., causal inferences are needed) as political dissidents of their respective governments.

Regarding the perpetrators in Stories 1 and 2, the combination and potential cumulative effect of several narrative techniques (see Table 4.1 above) point towards blocking empathy with the perpetrators due to:

- *Role bias and positioning*. Their actions can be negatively evaluated on moral grounds. In terms of Breithaupt's (2012) three-person model of empathy, it is likely for readers to side themselves against perpetrators. Moral evaluation would, in this case, work as a control mechanism whereby readers selectively distance themselves from these characters (Breithaupt, 2012, p. 86).

- *External perspective*. This tends to disinvite empathy (Keen, 2006). However, in contrast to the external perspective given on Gelman in story 2, in the case of these two perpetrators the external perspective works alongside a distancing narratorial position.

- *Narratorial commentary and evaluation*. The role of narratorial commentary about the story (i.e., interpretation and judgement) and ethical evaluation (i.e., ideological viewpoint) places the narrator, with different degrees of explicitness, against the perpetrators. The presence of the narrator is particularly visible in Stories 1 and 2, providing a particular socio-political slant: anti-dictatorial and anti-colonial values, as well as the pro-human-rights values that underlie the two

stories (e.g., in favour of freedom of speech, against abuses). Narratorial commentary is likely to function as a distancing device.

- *Discourse and emotion presentation*. There is no discourse and emotion presentation in relation to perpetrator characters in Stories 1 and 2. This absence of emotional information might further contribute to blocking empathy.

- *Characterisation techniques*. The naming choices of Uruguayan Dictatorship and Argentinian Military might work in tandem with the little information given about them to bring about lumping, distancing effects that can hinder empathy. As mentioned in 4.3.1, they might be worse attractors in terms of empathetic recognisability (see Stockwell, 2009, pp. 24-25). Their habitual actions can also hinder empathy on moral grounds.

2) Role bias towards the perpetrator and textual devices pointing in the same and opposite directions in Story 3: Potential lack of empathy and empathy with the Torturer

In contrast to the above, in Story 3 the alignment between the perpetrator character's role in the story-world situation and the textual devices is more complex, and so responses toward this character may not be as clear-cut as with the perpetrators in the other stories.

On the one hand, the role bias against the perpetrator character and the narrative techniques (see Table 4.1 above) might push in the same direction, thus bringing about non-empathetic responses via:

- *Role bias and positioning*. The Torturer's actions can be negatively evaluated on moral grounds. In terms of Breithaupt's (2012) three-person model of empathy,

it is likely for readers to side themselves against the Torturer.

- *Ideological viewpoint*. The implicit ideological viewpoint taken in the story is the denunciation of abuses in colonial contexts.

- *Characterisation techniques*. In terms of naming, the character is named through noun phrases that reflect his professional role as torturer. This, together with his habitual actions, might have potential distancing effects due to negative moral evaluations.

On the other hand, the role bias and textual devices (see Table 4.1 above) might go in opposite directions, thus facilitating empathetic responses toward the Torturer:

- *Internal perspective, focus on his internal states, and access to his speech and thoughts*. The story seems to favour the Torturer's perspective to a greater extent than Ahmadou's; thus, events might be said to be filtered more through the Torturer's perspective. His speech is presented through Direct Speech, Narrator's Representation of Speech Act and Free Indirect Speech. Both DS and FIS give the impression of immediacy and closeness to the character's words, with little mediation from the narrator. In the literature, FIS is thought to invite empathy (Keen, 2006). In addition, the Torturer's thoughts are presented as Narration of Inner States (NI) and Free Indirect Thought, which can be seen as inviting empathy because NI provides emotional information, and FIT places readers in the character's mind and gives an impression of the vividness and immediacy of the character's mental processes.

- *Emotion presentation*. His emotional states are portrayed both implicitly and explicitly, and the availability of this information might facilitate an emotional understanding.

One conclusion that follows from the above is that there is a relatively objective difference between the different characters (victims and perpetrators), and the extent of their victimhood. The contrast is that between Stories 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Story 3 on the other. Stories 1 and 2 have clear victims, and the perpetrators are almost totally absent. Thus, it would be expected to find readers (i) empathising with the three victims, and (ii) having non-empathetic responses towards the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military.

What is interesting about Story 3 is that the Torturer also has, to some extent, victim characteristics. He has a more complex status in between perpetrator and victim because the text (i) implicitly suggests frustration, emotional conflict and moral struggle, and (ii) explicitly mentions his need to feed his family and his sense of injustice at Ahmadou's hatred. I argue that this is where *linguistic choices seem to make more of a difference* — despite the role bias against the Torturer (i.e., a highly probable negative moral evaluation that would hinder empathy), there is a strong focus on his perspective and internal states. This might facilitate readers' understanding of what it is like to be in the position of a professional torturer. This raises the question of whether readers might respond differently to the perpetrator characters in Stories 1 and 2, on the one hand, and to the perpetrator character in story 3 on the other.

4.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has introduced the dataset under analysis (i.e., the three stories that were used with focus-group participants), and has outlined my analytical framework. After that, it has presented my stylistic analysis, where I have considered the empathy potential of viewpoint presentation, characters' discourse and emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques. When discussing the findings, I have argued that the different narrative devices might work cumulatively to produce different effects on readers: empathy with all three victims, lack of empathy with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military, and possibly mixed responses towards the Torturer.

The next chapter introduces the empirical reader-response element of this project. It deals with the methodological considerations that were taken, such as the data that was needed, insights from previous reader response research, my data collection method, and the coding scheme that was applied to analyse readers' responses.

5. Chapter 5. Reader response research methodology

5.0 Orientation to Chapter 5

This chapter describes the research approach that was adopted to study narrative empathy empirically. Section 5.1 describes the data and method that were used to answer Research Question 2 — *How do readers engage with characters in a selection of Galeano's short stories?* The section provides some background information on empirical reader response research and justifies my methodological choices. Section 5.2 describes in detail how data was collected through the focus group method. Section 5.3 presents the data analysis approach, including the usage of qualitative analysis software (5.3.1), and my analytical framework and coding scheme (5.3.2).

5.1 Dataset 2: Empirical reader response research

This section introduces the methodological approach underpinning the reader-response element of my project. In the following I mention the data that was needed to answer Research Question 2, and I discuss previous reader response research while justifying my methodological choices.

I sought *real* readers' responses to Galeano's texts, and so I take an empirical approach to the question of textual effects on readers, which is one key concern of the disciplines of stylistics, narratology, and the research tradition of empirical literary studies. Within the field of stylistics, there is a need for more empiricism when it comes to understanding readers' responses to texts (van Peer and Chesnokova, 2014; van Peer and Zyngier, 2008). After all, researchers do not really know how readers will react until

they actually investigate how real readers respond to texts and textual devices (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, p. 190). However, my assumption is that both theoretical and empirical research do need and complement one another.

My decision to pursue an empirical direction responds to the limited amount of empirical evidence which is currently available in the published literature[59] regarding the interrelation between empathy with characters and specific narrative devices (see Keen, 2006; van Lissa et al., 2016; László and Smogyvári, 2008). As a result, there have been some calls to address narrative empathy empirically: "the confirmation of many of the hypotheses about specific narrative techniques and empathy has yet to be undertaken in most cases" (Keen, 2006, p. 216) (see also van Lissa et al., 2016; László and Smogyvári, 2008; Sklar, 2009).

My work falls within the tradition of *empirical stylistics*, which is now "far beyond its infancy" (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, p. 202). According to Whiteley and Canning, "the impulse to collect extra-textual data about literary reading in order to inform, develop and reflect upon stylistic analysis is becoming increasingly widespread", and the authors argue that this type of work is bound to become "even more central to stylistics in the future" (2017, p. 72). Empirical stylisticians gather data about readers' experiences when reading literary texts, and try to link interpretative proposals to the workings of texts and stylistic devices (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, pp. 191-192). Put differently, reader response research in stylistics includes "work in which reader response is studied formally through the collection and analysis of 'extra-textual' datasets (Swann and

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[59] See 2.7.1 (a) and 3.2.1 on theoretical insights regarding the empathy effects of narrative techniques.

Allington, 2009: 247) that capture aspects of readers' behaviours, interpretations or evaluations in response to particular literary works (and in specific contexts)" (Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 72). This type of work uses methodology that was developed in related disciplines to examine the reactions and activities of readers (Whiteley and Canning, p. 72).

The empirical approach, and its use of reader response data, can enable stylistics to further explain readerly experiences, and so to "test and develop stylistic approaches to texts and reading" (Whiteley and Canning, p. 75). Regarding narrative empathy, more evidence in the form of what real readers report can (dis)confirm the plausibility of hypotheses about the empathy potential of narrative devices, and so refine the theory of narrative empathy. Thus, the collection and analysis of reader response data can *inform, test, and develop* stylistic analysis in general, and theoretical claims about narrative empathy in particular.

The interdisciplinary nature of the many contributions to empirical reader response research makes it difficult to provide a full overview of work in this area; however, several sources[60] can provide a useful starting point (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, p. 192). On the one hand, empirical reader response studies have focused on the influence of formal features and devices on readers' responses (Miall, 2006, p. 293; Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, p. 190). In this respect, research topics range from iconicity, non-literal language, narrative perspective to deviation (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, pp.

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[60] There are a few journals scholars can turn to in order to find empirical studies, such as *Scientific Study of Literature*, *Poetics*, *Style*, *Language and Literature*, *Poetics Today*, and *Empirical Studies of the Arts* (Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016, p. 193). In addition, useful work has been carried out by the International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature (IGEL) (Miall, 2006; Hakemulder and van Peer, 2016).

193-202). On the other hand, a different strand of research has looked into ways in which readers' sense of self is affected by reading (Miall, 2006, p. 293), such as the impact of reading experiences on readers' memory and self-concept (Miall, 2006, p. 292), or the effects of experiencing empathy while reading on the development of empathic skills and pro-social behaviour (see 2.7.1 (c)). My project fits into the first set of studies; that is, those that aim to investigate the influence or effects of textual devices on readers in the process of reading.

Both experimental and naturalistic approaches to literary reading aim to access readerly experiences, and as Whiteley and Canning argue, both ought to be regarded as *empirical* since "both methodological orientations seek to evidence their claims about reader responses using data" (2017, p. 78). Despite previous reluctance within literary studies, experimental approaches to reading have been carried out since the 1970s (Miall, 2006, p. 292). The tradition of empirical literary studies can be placed within this experimental paradigm. Experimental approaches are concerned with "the controlled testing of hypotheses", and so they collect data "in laboratory or laboratory-like settings in which variables are specifically controlled" (Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 74) (see, e.g., Bortolussi and Dixon's (2003) approach called *psychonarratology*, which combines literary studies with experimental methods from cognitive psychology).

An important question regarding experimental approaches is to do with the extent to which these can access natural, ordinary reading experiences, since these types of studies are conducted in artificial exam-like environments (Allington and Swann, 2009, p. 224) where readers encounter atypical texts and engage in atypical reading

behaviour[61] (Allington and Swann, p. 248). Alternatively, in more naturalistic approaches to the reading experience "reading behaviours are investigated in their usual environment as part of activities and interactions that readers would normally participate in, and in response to texts that they would typically read", such as reading groups, seminar discussions and online review forums (Nuttall, 2015b, p. 17).

The remainder of this section addresses different issues to do with research design, namely (i) the modification of texts, (ii) the choice of participants, and (iii) the procedure for response elicitation. I review these methodological aspects in relation to what has been done in earlier empirical studies in order to justify my choices (see also 5.3). Table 5.1 outlines the methodology used by the three studies that have been previously conducted on the effects of particular textual devices on empathy (see 2.7.2 for a summary). The table also outlines my methodology for the purposes of comparison:

Table 5.1. *Methodology in earlier studies of narrative empathy*

	László & Smogyvári (2008)	van Lissa et al. (2016)	Kuzmičová et al. (2017)	This thesis
RESEARCH QUESTION	Relationship between readers' and characters' *group identity* and its effect on narrative empathy	Whether *first-person narration* has more potential to elicit empathy and trust than *third-person* narrative	Effects of different degrees of *foregrounding* on narrative empathy	Effects of viewpoint, characters' discourse and emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques on narrative empathy
TEXT MODIFICATION	Two versions: group identity of the main characters differed (Hungarian and Slovak)	Two versions: first-person (possibly unreliable) narration and third-person narration with internal focalisation	Two versions: one rich in foregrounding; in the other foregrounding had been reduced	None

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[61] It is interesting to consider whether experimental studies show "what we *can* do 'if we are asked to'" (Hall, 2008); that is, "the competencies on which particular groups or individuals *are able to draw when pressed* than of how reading 'normally' proceeds" (Allington and Swann, 2009, p. 224, original emphasis).

PARTICIPANTS	48 Hungarian participants in a classroom situation (unspecified as to whether secondary or higher education)	76 Dutch high-school students	37 students at a Norwegian university	9 Spanish participants (not in a classroom context; mixed age)
PROCEDURE	After reading: - questionnaire (scales of liking and empathy) - narrative recall (asked to remember and write the story) - questionnaire (identification with nation) - analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively	After reading: - quantitative questions - two open-ended questions about attitude and trust that were analysed qualitatively (thematic coding)	While reading: - mark striking passages After reading: - selected 3 markings and gave reasons - analysed qualitatively (thematic coding) - post-process questionnaire (measured transportation and narrative engagement) - Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (measured ToM skills) - analysed quantitatively	While reading: - annotate texts (to facilitate discussion later on, and keep discussion on topic) After reading: - open-ended questions that led to group discussion - analysed qualitatively (thematic coding)

Regarding *text manipulation*, the three earlier studies in Table 5.1 modified their stimulus text into two versions. Within reader response research, some researchers choose to modify the texts given to participants whereas others prefer to use the original versions of the stimulus texts. Using experimental methods, researchers who perform text manipulations do so in order to identify and measure the effects of certain narrative devices on readers (Sklar, 2009, pp. 584-5) (see, e.g., van Peer and Maat, 1996, on the effects of narrative perspective on sympathy). The manipulation of specific textual features into different versions has become a widespread method of testing (Sklar, 2009, p. 585). By controlling and monitoring several reading conditions, researchers can

compare the effects of different versions (Miall, 2006, p. 292). Despite the advantages of text manipulation, other researchers are more inclined towards using the original versions of the texts. One reason is that "one may distort the effects of the story as a whole by manipulating its constituent parts through addition, deletion, change of narratorial voice or perspective, and so forth" (Sklar, p. 586). In my project I use Galeano's texts in their original, unmodified version because this provides for a more naturalistic approach.

Regarding the *choice of participants*, it is common practice within empirical reader-response studies to recruit "students enrolled at the experimenter's institution" (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 248). Other scholars conduct research in existing reading groups, which offer a more naturalistic approach to literary reading practices than experimental approaches (Swann and Allington, 2009). The participants in my study (see Appendix C) were not university students nor members of a reading group; they were recruited through social networks and notices at public places. The reason is that there is no tradition of reading groups in my home town in Spain, where the data was collected (see 5.2). Regarding the number of participants, the three earlier studies in Table 5.1 had a much larger number of participants: 48, 76, 37, respectively. My study had 9 participants because I was interested in the *detail* of their responses during the discussion (see 5.2).

As for the *response elicitation procedure*, different methods are used to access different aspects of reader response. Whiteley and Canning point out that

reader response can be accessed (*always indirectly*) at different moments: before, during and after the act of reading (sometimes referred to as 'online' (during) and 'offline' moments of reading — see Castiglione, 2017); and in different ways: through the collection of verbal and non-verbal data" (2017, p. 74, my emphasis)

The three earlier studies in Table 5.1 gathered reader responses mostly *after* reading (although in Kuzmičová et al. (2017) participants were asked to mark striking passages while reading). Similarly, my study accesses reader response right after the act of reading through the collection of verbal data.

According to Whiteley and Canning, verbal data includes participants' responses as linguistic expressions, and may be generated[62] through questionnaires, interviews and *focus groups*, or through experimental methods such as think alouds (i.e., participants verbalise their responses to the text at pauses while reading), self-probed retrospection (i.e., participants mark the text and later on report on the reasons for their markings; see, e.g., Kuzmičová et al., 2017) (2017, p. 74, my emphasis). On the other hand, non-verbal data can be gathered through measurements (that aim to capture reading times or reaction times), and through the tracking of physiological features (e.g., eye movement) (Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 74).

The earlier studies in Table 5.1 include the collection of participants' verbal written data: elaborations about markings in Kuzmičová et al. (2017), elicited answers to questions in van Lissa et al. (2016), and narrative recall in László and Smogyvári (2008) — all such

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[62] Nuttall also gathers the variety of experimental methods that are commonly used, such as "underlining and recall tests, reading time measurements, participant ratings, think-aloud protocols, and eye-tracking" (2015b, pp. 16-17)

tasks being carried out individually. In addition, they collect other material in the form of written questionnaires and ratings to measure relevant aspects. In contrast, my study collects only verbal *spoken* data through open-ended questions and *group discussion*.

Finally, regarding empathy in particular, Keen (2006, pp. 210-211) reports that empathy is studied by psychologists through physiological measures, such as changes in skin conductance (e.g., palm sweat) and heart rate; or facial reactions captured by electromyography (EMG). These procedures can be combined with self-reports, where participants are asked about how they feel at the moment, or how they would feel and act in specific situations. In addition, empathy scales[63] (e.g., the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) to measure individual differences in empathy skills; see 3.1.1), as well as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are used to examine empathy (Keen, 2006, pp. 210-211). An important shortcoming of these procedures is that they involve very expensive equipment (Mar et al., 2011, p. 827).

From the above discussion, I conclude that the focus groups I conducted are a half-way house between the more naturalistic reading group experience, and the more experimental laboratory-like conditions that were mentioned earlier. Table 5.2 illustrates some specific differences between the two approaches in terms of research focus and design:

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[63] Empathy scales were used to measure readers' self-reported dispositional empathy in László and Smogyvári, 2008; Sklar, 2009; and van Lissa et al., 2016.

Table 5.2. *Experimental and naturalistic studies (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 248)*

Experimental studies	Naturalistic studies
Focus on contextualized, pre-specified and isolated aspects of reading/ interpretation	Focus on contextualized reading practice(s), usually more broadly/holistically defined
Readers in a controlled but artificial environment, engaged in atypical reading behaviour	Readers in their usual environment, engaged in habitual reading behaviour
Atypical presentation of texts, or textual fragments	Texts presented whole, and in their typical form
Readers often interact only with researcher	Readers interact freely with others

The focus groups I conducted can be said to sit in between experimental and naturalistic approaches to reader research:

- *Experimental-like*. Regarding characteristic 1, my study considers a rather particular aspect of participants' interpretation, which was "pre-specified as of interest to the researcher" (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 248); that is, readers' (non-)empathetic engagement with characters. My project begins by analysing several texts "in terms of the linguistic features that interest the researcher, and follow[s] by devising experiments to discover the 'effect' of those features on the reading experience" (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 253). In relation to characteristic 2, the groups were prompted and organised by the researcher, and so the group reading situation was not a social practice that my participants habitually engaged in (i.e., not naturally-occurring).

- *Naturalistic-like*. Galeano's stories were presented whole and unmodified (characteristic 3). In addition, readers interacted face-to-face among themselves mostly (characteristic 4), with a low degree of moderator control over the discussion — my input was kept to a minimum (i.e., formulating the questions and bringing the discussion back on target on a few occasions).

5.2 Data collection method: Focus groups

I used focus groups as the research method to gather reader responses. Originally named 'focused interviews' (Merton and Kendall, 1946), the focus group method was first used to explore "audience responses to propaganda and radio broadcasts during World War II" (Kidd and Parshall, 2000, p. 295). Afterwards, this method was mainly used in broadcasting, marketing, and public opinion research, and it was not until the late 1970s that it became part of academic research (Merton, 1987, as cited in Kidd and Parshall, 2000, p. 295). From the 1980s onwards, focus groups started to be used in the arts, humanities and social sciences to explore issues of public concern, opinions and beliefs (Moore, 2014).

Through this method, reader response is accessed *indirectly* via the collection of verbal data (Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 74), as mentioned above. This section describes the data-gathering process step by step while justifying the methodological choices that eventually shaped the readers' discussions.

Planning stage

Due to practical considerations such as time constraints, I decided to limit the number of focus-group discussions to two. Regarding stimulus texts, I used this particular sequence (i.e., *1.Celebration of the Human Voice*, *2.Gelman*, and *3.Professional Life*) because in my earlier stylistic analysis I had identified a contrast between Stories 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Story 3 on the other in terms of the alignment of narrative devices and role bias in favour and against characters (see my discussion in 4.4). Story

3.Professional Life was chosen to be the last because, given its complexity in terms of potential (non-)empathetic responses, I wanted to allow enough time for participants to feel comfortable in the group conversation.

When developing the discussion guide and the set of questions (see Appendix D), I was mindful of the crucial issue of how to translate my research questions into actual focus group questions. I needed questions to be open enough to allow participants to express themselves — I decided to have minimal influence on the discussion, and so I opted for open questions (see Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 74, regarding researcher control over verbal data). At the same time the questions had to focus on particular aspects of readers' experiences with the texts (i.e. perception of characters, moral evaluation, etc.) so that the data was relevant for subsequent analysis. Moreover, I was particularly aware of the importance of the actual wording of questions since they could predispose participants to certain responses. If the questions addressed to participants contain the key terms which the study aims to investigate (e.g., empathy) readers might be prompted towards the phenomenon under study, which contrasts with a more spontaneous experience of the phenomenon (cf. both Sklar, 2009, and van Peer and Maat, 1996 included the word *sympathy* in their questionnaires). Thus, questions were carefully phrased to avoid the key word "empathy" so as not to lead participants into considering empathy as a response when they might not have considered it spontaneously.

Another caution was to do with the amount of information participants would be given about the nature of the research, as this information might influence respondents' input

(Litosseliti, 2003, p. 5). Therefore I gave them a very general picture of my research aims — interest in their engagement with characters — in the recruitment poster and the participant information sheet (for both see Appendix B), and in the warming-up stage of the discussions.

Piloting focus groups is highly recommended in the literature (see Krueger, 1998). I piloted my focus group design among colleagues in a research group meeting at Lancaster University in October 2014. The questions were piloted in English even though the final discussions were to be conducted in Spanish: data would be collected in Spain in a period of two weeks during the winter holidays. The colleagues who attended the pilot session provided useful feedback that helped me further refine my questions and overall design. This helped me ensure questions were fully understandable and would elicit open-ended discussion.

Regarding ethical considerations, because my study involved human participants I applied for the required ethics approval at my institution. The ethical risks of my study were considered low because it did not involve vulnerable groups. My participants were adults who had read the information sheet and had signed the consent form before the discussions took place.

Recruitment and group discussions

Once approval was granted, participants were recruited through social networks and notices in public places (e.g., the library and cafés) in my home town in Spain (Cáceres). The poster (see Appendix B) invited readers for an informal discussion about short

stories since I chose not to disclose that the study would focus on empathy or that the stories were authored by Galeano. A total of nine people expressed interest in taking part in the study, so I divided them into two groups (see Appendix C for a description of participants). The sessions took place on the 2nd and 5th of January 2015. Each of the sessions lasted for around two hours, the reason being that between one and a half to two hours is considered the optimal length in order to avoid fatigue, both participants' and moderator's (Tracy, 2013, p. 170; Litosseliti, 2003, p. 5). Discussions were audio recorded using a digital voice recorder.

Two groups were set up: a group of 5 participants and another group of 4. The size of the groups was very suitable since I was aiming for a range between 4 and 6, the reason being that small groups are more effective when the aim is to explore complex, emotional topics, and also when detailed accounts are sought (Litosseliti, 2003, p. 3). What is more, small groups maximise participants' opportunities to talk (Litosseliti, 2003, p. 3) which, in turn, enable in-depth analysis of individual readers' input.

The stories were read in the same sequence in both groups: (1) *Celebration of the Human Voice*, (2) *Gelman*, and (3) *Professional Life*. My main goal was for participants to have a close, deep engagement with the text. On asking participants to read the stories, I invited them to write on the texts themselves, which had been printed on A3 sheets to facilitate highlighting, underlining and jotting down[64] any thoughts and reactions.

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[64] These annotations were only used during the actual discussions. They have not been analysed, as they would constitute a different dataset.

Having participants annotate[65] the text enabled us to keep the discussion as focused on the stories, and the language, as possible because I (as moderator) sometimes asked participants whether they could relate their reactions to something in the text. Finally, discussing three stories was very suitable for the planned amount of time (2 hours maximum) and, importantly, it allowed for deep discussion of the texts.

Advantages and disadvantages of the focus group method

The focus group method offers a number of advantages. Importantly, gathering readers' own experiences offers an alternative to the (equally valid and insightful) researcher's introspection and hypotheses about ideal readers. Focus groups allow the researcher to investigate how different readers react to the same issue (i.e. Galeano's characters). Additionally, this method is well suited to allow for *open-ended discussion* which enables more nuanced and spontaneous self-expression (of impressions, attitudes, feelings, etc.) with, arguably, less researcher control than other methods, such as written questionnaires and ratings made up of closed questions (Sklar, 2009, p. 601; Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 74). Finally, recruiting a small number of participants enables detailed, in-depth responses (and their subsequent detailed analysis).

As for disadvantages, a potential limitation of using focus groups is that this is not as naturalistic a setting as reading groups are considered to be (see Swann and Allington, 2009) in that I organised them and prompted the members to speak. However, I had no access to any pre-existing reading groups since there is no culture of reading groups as

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[65] This enabled me to overcome a potential limitation of the focus group method. As Myers puts it, focus groups "can give us insights into social practices, but with *little sense of how the reading connects to specific details of the text*" (2009, p. 342, my emphasis).

such in my home town in Spain — unlike the long-standing tradition of reading groups in the Anglo-American world. Other potential disadvantages are to do with the possibility that readers' responses can be subject to issues of social negotiation and group dynamics such as politeness (Nuttall, 2015b, p. 19), which might result in social desirability bias and self-censorship given the presence of other participants and the moderator (Lang, 2009, p. 325). Moreover, there might be dominance over the discussion by some participants (Kidd and Parshall, p. 296).

Another limitation of this method is that it does not yield information about readers' experiences *while* reading. Rather, what is captured is readers' discussion of their experiences *after* reading. This may result in potential issues of "forgetfulness and post-hoc rationalisation" (Short and van Peer, 1989, p. 25). Thus, readers' retrospective rationalisations cannot be taken to be the same as their authentic reading experience (Stockwell, 2016). However, what is particularly useful is that these group discussions can yield insights into (i) *how readers talk* about their experience with characters (i.e., participants' discourse strategies, Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 251), and (ii) *what factors might be (explicitly or implicitly) involved* in their perception of and engagement with characters.

5.3 Data analysis approach

Once the data was collected, the audio recordings were transcribed for the purposes of analysis, and were carefully double-checked for accuracy. I used the transcription conventions from Eggins and Slade (1997, pp. 1-5) to meet the needs of my analysis. That is, my transcription did not require an extremely fine level of detail (e.g. fillers,

pauses or length of pauses — pauses remain untimed). The transcription key is as follows:

- Punctuation marks — full stops indicate termination or completeness; commas signal parcellings of non-final talk; question marks signal questions or uncertainty (usually corresponding to rising intonation); and exclamation marks indicate surprise, shock, etc.

- Capital letters indicate emphasis or increased volume.

- Quotation marks were used when participants quote the text or another participant's utterance, and when they verbalise speech and thought which is attributed to characters.

- A dash symbol indicates a false start.

- Three dots indicate hesitations within a turn.

- A double equals sign indicates overlaps between participants' turns.

The focus group material was analysed in Spanish to maintain the integrity of the original responses. The extracts provided as evidence (in Chapter 6) are translated into English throughout. Regarding my approach to translation, I make as literal a translation as possible and stay close to the Spanish original, in some cases at the expense of idiomaticity. For example, the conventional metaphorical idiom "ponerse en la piel de alguien" is translated literally as *to put oneself in someone else's skin*, even if the English-language equivalent "to put oneself in someone else's shoes" would be more idiomatic.

5.3.1 Software-assisted analysis: Atlas.ti

The focus group data (comprising 24,000 words) was analysed with the aid of Atlas.ti, which is one of the programmes known as "Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software" (CAQDAS). A CAQDAS programme is a tool that provides support during the process of qualitative data analysis (Friese, 2014, p. 1). I drew on Susanne Friese's (2014) step-by-step Atlas.ti manual as my main guidance through the process of analysis.

Atlas.ti enables *thematic analysis*, themes being "recurrent and distinctive features of participants' accounts, characterising particular perceptions and/or experiences, which the researcher sees as relevant to the research questions" (King and Horrocks, 2010, p. 150). Thematic analysis is carried out through the development of a coding scheme and the subsequent tagging of relevant data extracts. Codes are interpretive categories that are relevant to research questions, and so coding refers to the process of assigning labels or codes to segments of information which are relevant to the analyst's questions (Friese, 2014, p. 7; p. 24). My code list is fully explained below in 5.4.2.

The main advantages of undertaking software-supported analysis are to do with Atlas.ti's usefulness as an organising tool, its affordances for analysing data in a systematic manner, and the possibility it offers to easily retrieve information according to different criteria (depending on the questions the analyst has in mind). As Friese (2014, p. 1) puts it,

> Software frees you from all those tasks that a machine can do much more effectively, like modifying code words and coded segments, retrieving data based on various criteria, searching for words, integrating material in one place,

attaching notes and finding them again, counting the numbers of coded incidences, offering overviews at various stages of a project, and so on.

In the recursive process of going through the data several times to refine the code list, using this software was extremely useful because it allowed me to modify codes and their associated quotes very quickly. In the early stages of analysis, Atlas.ti enabled the coding process to be "much more exploratory due to the ease of renaming and modifying codes" (Friese, 2014, p. 3). The analysis entailed "beginning with many thousands of interpretative acts, then moving to the macro level in search of patterns across those interpretations, and finally returning to the data itself in search of explanations" (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 252). Using software made it possible to modify codes as often as necessary, and enabled the coding system to be "consistent across the entire data set" (p. 19). Regarding disadvantages, the main (and perhaps the only) drawback was to do with how time-consuming it was to learn how to use the software.

5.3.2 Analytical framework and coding scheme

This section presents the analytical framework and coding scheme that were used for analysing readers' responses. My code scheme contains both deductively and inductively developed codes, so I used what Friese calls a mixed approach (Friese, 2014, p. 3). For instance, the umbrella codes to do with attribution processes or readers' experiential background were derived deductively as these ideas originated in the literature. However, the sub-codes for each of those categories were developed inductively since they emerge from the data. In what follows I describe each of the code

categories in turn (see Appendix E for a complete list of codes). For the sake of economy, hereafter I will refer to Focus group 1 as FG1, and to Focus group 2 as FG2.

A) Participant and character codes

The primary focus of my analysis was character-related talk, and so the most heavily coded stretches of discussion are those that specifically revolve around story characters. The transcripts were systematically coded for participant and character. In other words, whenever a participant made a character-related remark, that stretch of text was given a participant code (e.g. `#Part D`) and a character code (e.g. `@2.Gelman`) depending on the character(s) being mentioned. The two sets of codes are listed in Table 5.3:

Table 5.3. *Participant and character codes*

Participant codes			Character codes
`#Moderator`	FG1	FG2	`@1.Prisoners`
	`#Part A`	`#Part F`	`@1.Uruguayan Dictatorship`
	`#Part B`	`#Part G`	`@2.Argentinian Military`
	`#Part C`	`#Part H`	`@2.Gelman`
	`#Part D`	`#Part I`	`@3.Ahmadou`
	`#Part E`		`@3.Torturer`

In order to anonymise participants I refer to them by means of capital letters. FG1 participants are A-E whereas FG2 participants are F-I. The letters were assigned to them according to the order in which they first contributed to the discussion; that is, A and F were the first ones to talk in their respective group. When reporting my findings in Chapter 6, quotes from participants' contributions are identified by participant letter, primary document[66], and the line number(s) from the transcript (e.g., B2, 89:90).

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[66] The whole Atlas project (i.e. transcription) was further organised into 8 *primary documents* for ease of reference: P-Doc 1 (FG1 discussion on Story 1); P-Doc 2 (FG1 discussion on Story 2); P-Doc 3 (FG1 discussion

Regarding characters, character codes were named so that they reflect the story in which they feature (e.g. `@3.Ahmadou`; see Table 5.3 above).

B) Content codes

In Atlas.ti *attribute* and *content* codes reflect two different layers of analysis (Friese, 2014, pp. 149-151). Both participant and character codes (above) are so-called *attribute codes* because they merely reflect whose utterance it is (i.e. participant) and who the utterance is about (i.e. character). That is, attribute codes are *not* interpretive categories (i.e. content codes). In what follows I outline the content codes or interpretive categories that were used when interpreting the data.

Textual references

When participants make explicit references to extracts from the stories those data segments are coded as `Textual reference`. For example, "there's such a duality in this man, I mean, <u>'I am someone else'</u>" [*hay una dualidad en este hombre, es decir, "<u>yo no soy yo</u>"*] (H6, 29:29). These extracts were transcribed within quotation marks (see 5.4 for a reminder of the transcription conventions).

Perspective taking

I coded verbal displays of perspective taking, and distinguished whether participants' perspective taking is self-oriented (`PT Self-oriented`) or character-oriented (`PT Character-oriented`) because this distinction is highly relevant in my definition of

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on Story 3); P-Doc 4 (FG2 discussion on Story 1); P-Doc 5 (FG2 discussion on Story 2); P-Doc 6 (FG2 discussion on Story 3); P-Doc 7 (FG1 final discussion); P-Doc 8 (FG2 final discussion).

empathy (see 2.2.2). An example of self-oriented perspective taking would be "since I'm not a mother my head is unable to conceive <u>what I would feel</u> if I lost a child" [*mi cabeza como no soy madre no es capaz de concebir <u>lo que podría sentir</u> al perder un hijo*] (B2, 185:185). An example of character-oriented perspective taking would be "<u>I put myself in</u> the protagonist's <u>situation</u>" [*me pongo en la situación del protagonista*] (H5, 75:75).

(Emotional) responses

The code `Responses_emotional` was used when readers use explicit emotional labels to describe their own reactions to the stories; for instance "this text in particular has <u>made me feel much sadder</u> than the previous one because I've related it to my own family history since some of them were killed during the [Francoist] dictatorship" [*este texto en concreto <u>me ha dado mucha más tristeza</u> que el anterior porque lo relaciono con mi propia historia familiar, que mataron gente en la dictadura*] (C2, 142:142). Other responses which are not strictly emotional are labelled as `Responses`, as in "it makes me feel <u>solidarity</u> with the characters" [*me hace sentir <u>solidaridad</u> con los personajes*] (C1, 63:63).

Textual factors

The codes to do with textual factors are the following:

Table 5.4. *Textual factor codes*

Textual factors	Description
`TXT details`	Readers comment on the difference it makes to be given textual details about characters (e.g. "actually we're given more details about the Torturer" G6, 133:133) [*realmente sí nos da un poco más de detalles*

	sobre el torturador]
`TXT no information`	Readers refer to or articulate their interpretation regarding the lack of textual information about characters (e.g. "It's a very short text, actually you don't know who these men are, why they are in prison" B1, 125:125) [*es un texto muy pequeño, en realidad no sabes quiénes son estos señores, no sabes por qué están en la cárcel*]
`TXT discourse presentation`	Readers refer to or articulate their interpretation regarding the presentation of characters' discourse in the stories (e.g. "in the conversation (…) he's trying to convince himself" B3, 18:18) [*en la conversación (…) él intenta auto-convencerse*]
`TXT internal perspective`	Readers refer to or articulate their interpretation regarding the kind of access to characters' consciousness (e.g. "it personalises him by conveying his own thoughts" C3, 166:166) [*lo personaliza al reflejar su propio pensamiento*]
`TXT naming`	Readers refer to or articulate their interpretation regarding the way characters are named in the stories (e.g. "words are very important (…) not giving a name to the Torturer who at the end of the day is a person" B3, 164:164) [*las palabras son muy importantes (…) no ponerle nombre al torturador que al fin y al cabo es una persona*]

Readerly factors

The codes in this category refer to aspects of readers' experiential background, namely:

Table 5.5. *Readerly factor codes*

Readerly factors	Description
`REB self-reported empathic disposition`	Readers refer to their own empathic skills or disposition (e.g. "in any situation I always try to put myself in the situation of both parties" B1, 152:152) [*siempre procuro cuando tengo una situación ponerme en la situación de los dos*]
`REB parenthood`	Readers refer to their own role and experience as parents or non-parents (mostly relevant to story *2.Gelman*) (e.g. "maybe because I am a mother and I

	put myself in the protagonist's situation" H5, 75:75) [*quizás porque yo soy madre y me pongo en la situación del protagonista*]
`REB personal/family history`	Readers refer to their own personal or family history (e.g. "I've related it to my own family history since some of them were killed during the [Francoist] dictatorship" C2, 142:142) [*lo relaciono con mi propia historia familiar, que mataron gente en la dictadura*]
`REB socio-political values`	Readers refer to their own socio-political values (e.g. "I am not in favour of any kind of colony" H6, 105:105) [*no soy partidaria de ningún tipo de colonia*]
`REB real-world references`	Readers make references to the real world, such as historical events or real-world people and situations (e.g. "the Argentinian dictatorship in 1976 (...) I know the amount of people who disappeared, the media influence of the Mothers[67] of the Plaza de Mayo" H5, 120:120) [*la dictadura argentina del 76 (...) yo ya sé la cantidad de personas que desaparecieron, los desaparecidos, la influencia mediática que han tenido las Madres de Mayo*]
`REB moral_ values`	Readers make references to or articulate their own moral values (e.g. "killing is never justifiable" B1, 186:188) [*matar no me parece justificable en ninguno de los casos*]
`REB moral_ negative evaluation`	Readers' moral evaluation[68] is negative (e.g. "the word 'dictatorship' provokes an automatic moral rejection" H5, 111:111) [*la palabra 'dictadura' ya te provoca un rechazo moral automáticamente*]
`REB moral_ positioning`	Readers make references to or articulate their own position in relation to the different characters (e.g. "personally I have to position myself automatically in favour of the oppressed ones because I know the Argentinian dictatorship was brutal" H5, 121:121) [*yo personalmente me tengo que posicionar de manera automática a favor del oprimido porque sé que la dictadura argentina militar fue brutal*]

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[67] See footnote 56 in Chapter 4.
[68] No instances of *positive* moral evaluation were found in the data.

Comparison

Readers often bring into the discussion their own personal experience or make references to real-world situations. They make comparisons between the real world and the story-world, and frame those situations and experiences as being different (`Comparison_different`) or similar (`Comparison_similar`). An example of difference would be "my situation, however oppressed, <u>cannot compare</u> to that of a person whose freedom has been taken away because of the way he thinks" [*mi situación por muy reprimida que esté <u>no se puede comparar</u> con una persona a la que realmente le han quitado su libertad por pensar*] (B1, 79:79). An example of similarity would be "<u>I have related it to</u> the Gag Rule[69] == whereby communication is a crime" [*lo he relacionado <u>con</u> la ley mordaza == en la que la comunicación es un delito*] (C1, 14:15).

Attribution

Different processes of attribution occurred in the data. Readers make inferences to explain characters' actions, behaviour and mental states; that is, to grasp how and why characters act and feel the way they do:

Table 5.6. *Attribution codes*

What is attributed to characters	Description
ATT actions	Actions attributed to characters based on inferences from the story — statements are either unmodalised or indicate certainty (e.g. "this is a man who takes his torture tools (...) pull out his nails, crush his fingers, cut his tongue out, burn his eyebrows and eyelashes (...) place electric current in his genitals" H6, 181:181) [*es un señor que coge las herramientas (...) arrancarle uñas,*

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[69] A Spanish law that had been recently passed at the time of the group discussions which has since restricted freedom of speech, e.g. by regulating public demonstrations, or allowing legal actions to be taken against those that insult or make fun of state institutions such as the royal family or state security forces.

	machacarle dedos, cortarle la lengua, quemarle las cejas, quemarle las pestañas (…) ponerle corrientes eléctricas en los genitales]
`ATT actions_ hypothetical`	Actions attributed to characters, but with a hypothetical/speculative status given the lack of relevant information in the story — modalised statements showing uncertainty (e.g. "perhaps they were murderers opposing the dictatorship" B1, 133:135) [*lo mismo eran dos asesinos del bando contrario a la dictadura*]
`ATT factors_ dispositional`	Participants attribute characters' actions and circumstances to characters' personal disposition or personality; i.e. they provide dispositional explanations for characters' behaviour (e.g. "[the Torturer's behaviour] shows human beings' meanness. There are humans, there are people with no scruples" H6, 22:22) [*demuestra la miseria del ser humano. Hay humanos, hay personas sin escrúpulos*]. This phenomenon seems to rule out empathy in my data, and is applied mostly to the Torturer.
`ATT factors_ situational`	Participants attribute situational forces to characters' actions and circumstances; i.e. they provide contextual explanations for characters' behaviour (e.g. "and then he sits down next to him, but the thing is they're forcing him [the Torturer] to do that" A3, 118:118) [*y luego se sienta con él, pero es que lo están obligando a hacerle eso*]. This phenomenon seems to facilitate empathy in my data, and is applied mostly to the Torturer.
`ATT emotional experience`	Participants make inferences about and attribute specific emotional states to characters. They spell out what characters are likely to feel as a result of the story-world events (e.g. "you put yourself in that situation (…) you're suffering a continuous torment" H5, 87:87) [*es que tú te pones en esa situación (…) estás sufriendo un tormento continuo*]
`ATT goals/needs`	Goals and needs attributed to characters (e.g. "they [Prisoners] have the need to communicate" E1, 58:58) [*tienen esa necesidad de comunicarme*]
`ATT thought processes`	Thought processes attributed to characters (e.g. "he's [the Torturer] justifying himself" H6, 63:63) [*se está*

	autojustificando]
`ATT values/beliefs`	Values and beliefs attributed to characters (e.g. "I automatically thought Fernando Huidobro y Mauricio Rosencof were left-wingers" C1, 140:140) [*yo automáticamente he pensado que Fernando Huidobro y Mauricio Rosencof eran de izquierdas*]
`ATT traits_ humanising`	Humanising characteristics attributed to characters (e.g. "'I am human, I know I have feelings'" I6, 77:78) [*yo soy humano, sé que tengo sentimientos*]
`ATT traits_ dehumanising`	Dehumanising qualities attributed to characters (e.g. "behaviour of a sociopath (...) with no empathy or humanness" F6, 59:59) [*comportamiento de sociópata (...) sin ningún tipo de empatía o humanidad*]
`ATT situation`	Readers spell out features of the situation characters are going through, thus suggesting an understanding of the situation (e.g "whenever the word 'independence' comes up we're talking about a situation where freedom has been taken away" B3, 187:191) [*en el momento en que aparece la palabra 'independencia' ya estamos hablando de momentos en los que se han quitado libertades*]
`ATT speech/thought_ affiliation`	Participants verbally articulate characters' speech/thought in direct form. This may suggest that participants simulate characters' mental activity. This code captures cases where participants have expressed an affiliation with the character's stance (e.g. "he's [the Torturer] waiting for a promotion (...) 'if I get promoted maybe later on I won't do this'" E3, 146:146) [*está esperando un ascenso (...) 'si me ascienden a lo mejor luego ya no hago esto'*]
`ATT speech/thought_ disassociation`	Participants verbally articulate characters' speech/thought in direct form. This code captures distancing from or disassociation with the character's stance (e.g. "[the Torturer] knows that what he does is wrong (...) and then he says 'look, I'm not that cruel or evil, even though I've been torturing you it's because they force me to == and now I tell you about my hardships so that you see how cool and what a good person I am with you'" H6, 63:63) [[*el Torturador] sabe que está haciendo algo mal (...) y entonces dice 'bueno, mira, yo no soy tan cruel ni soy tan malo que aunque te*

	he estado torturando es porque me obligan == y yo ahora te cuento mis penas para que veas lo enrollado y lo buena persona que soy contigo']

Potential linguistic evidence of empathy

The code *Explicit empathy* is used when readers themselves describe their engagement with characters as empathetic. For example, "you directly <u>empathise</u> with the two people who are in prison because you associate dictatorship with evil" [*ya directamente <u>empatizas</u> con las dos personas que están en la cárcel porque tú asocias dictadura a malo*] (B1, 171:171). Furthermore, potential linguistic evidence of empathy can be seen in the combination of a group of codes (some of which have been presented above and so need no further examples). Most of these codes were developed top-down by making use of my own conceptual framework of narrative empathy from Chapters 2 and 3, and Kuroshima and Iwata's (2006) study[70]. Some other codes emerged from the data and so were developed bottom-up. The following codes have been divided into different categories according to whether they indicate:

- *(Other-oriented) perspective taking*, whereby readers represent characters' situations from characters' points of view, and recontruct their experience by adopting their perspective.

- *Emotional understanding*, since the emotional component is central to experiences of empathy.

- *Understanding of other mental states*, since empathy may not be restricted to emotional states and may encompass any mental state.

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[70] Kuroshima and Iwata (2016) investigate, from a conversation analytic perspective, displays of empathy performed by volunteers towards evacuees' experiences in the context of the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and associated Fukushima nuclear power plant explosions in Japan.

- *Situational understanding*, whereby readers understand characters' actions and mental states in their specific context and circumstances.

Table 5.7. *Potential evidence-of-empathy codes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr><th colspan="2">CODE</th><th>DESCRIPTION</th></tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr><td rowspan="3">perspective</td><td>`Character-oriented perspective taking`</td><td>Participants imaginatively adopt characters' viewpoint and focus on characters' inner states and circumstances (rather than self-orientedly imagining themselves in their situation)</td></tr>
<tr><td>`Attribution of speech/thought_ affiliation`</td><td>Participants verbally articulate characters' speech/thought in direct form. This may suggest that participants simulate characters' mental activity. This is seen in sudden shifts to the 1st person pronoun</td></tr>
<tr><td>`Pronoun use/shift`</td><td>Readers' pronoun use shows differences between (i) talking about characters in the 2nd or 3rd person from an observer position and (ii) the verbal simulation or enactment of characters' experience in the 1st or 2nd person, where readers suddenly impersonate characters. Pronoun shifts can be accounted for in terms of a tension: when readers enact a character's consciousness a tension is created between the reader's simulation of the experience in the 1st person and the reader's attribution of the experience to the character in the 2nd or 3rd person (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 110) (see 1.5.2)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">emotions</td><td>`Attribution of emotional experience`</td><td>Participants attribute specific emotional states to characters. They spell out the emotional implications of story-world events; that is, what characters are likely to feel as a result of the story-world events (i.e. *pain, anguish*)</td></tr>
<tr><td>`Evaluation of what experience is like`</td><td>Sometimes the attribution of emotional experiences (above) is coupled with evaluative expressions. This explicit element of evaluation indicates degrees of how distressing and undesirable the characters' emotional experience is (i.e. *the worst*)</td></tr>
<tr><td>`Affective understanding`</td><td>Display of understanding of the character's emotional states based on first-hand experience: readers claim to have first-hand knowledge or experience of a similar situation and, as a result, they verbalise what the experience must be like</td></tr>
</tbody>
</table>

		for characters. These displays of understanding based on similarity of experience can suggest, as noted by Kuroshima and Iwata (2016), (i) affiliation with the target's stance towards the experience, (ii) understanding of the nature of the experience and its meaning (i.e., what the experience is like), and (iii) a congruent affective stance (i.e. potentially shared feelings)
other mental states	`Attribution of thought processes`	Thought processes are attributed to characters
	`Attribution of values and beliefs`	Values and beliefs are attributed to characters
	`Attribution of goals and needs`	Goals and needs are attributed to characters
situation	`Attribution of situation`	Participants spell out characteristics of the situation characters are going through
	`Imagined scenario`	Participants describe a scenario parallel to the events undergone by characters, and they vividly depict the details of the situation, thus suggesting understanding and a potential projection into characters' situation
	`Attribution of situational factors`	Participants attribute situational forces to characters' actions and circumstances; i.e. they provide contextual explanations for characters' behaviour (N.B. in my data situational attribution co-occurs with empathy whereas dispositional attribution co-occurs with lack of empathy)

5.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have explained the methodology that was adopted in my empirical reader response study. I have incorporated insights from previous reader response studies, and specified the methodological considerations that were taken, such as the data that was needed, my data collection method, and the coding scheme that was applied to analyse readers' responses. The next chapter gives an overview of the resulting discussions and presents the analysis of readers' responses.

6. Chapter 6. Analysis of reader responses: Findings

6.0 Orientation to Chapter 6

This chapter is concerned with answering the sub-questions of Research Question 2:

2. How do readers engage with characters in a selection of Galeano's short stories?

   2.1 To what extent and in what ways is there evidence of empathetic responses?

   2.2 To what extent and in what ways do narrative devices play a role in readers' (empathetic) engagement with characters?

   2.3 To what extent and in what ways do readerly factors play a role in readers' (empathetic) engagement with characters?

The chapter presents findings from my analysis of readers' discussions and, in particular, of readers' self-reported engagement with characters after reading three of Galeano's short stories. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 provides an overview of the focus-group discussions. In Section 6.2, I examine the extent to which the data shows potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses (Question 2.1). After that, I consider the role of textual and readerly factors in readers' empathetic and non-empathetic engagement with characters in Section 6.3 (Questions 2.2 and 2.3). The final section (6.4) presents other responses that participants reported during the group discussions.

6.1 Overview of group discussions

For the sake of economy, hereafter I will refer to Focus group 1 as FG1, and to Focus group 2 as FG2. As a reminder, a total of nine people participated in the discussions. FG1 was made up of five participants (A, B, C, D and E) whereas FG2 was made up of four participants (F, G, H and I).

In terms of contribution, some participants were more active than others during the discussions. In FG1 Participants B and C held the floor for longer, whereas in FG2 Participant H dominated the discussion. These three participants were much more articulate and forthcoming than the other participants within their respective group. Because of their greater volume of talk, many of the extract examples that are discussed throughout this chapter belong to the contributions by Participants B, C and H (including both groups together). Figure 6.1 shows the number of quotes associated with the different participants in the two focus groups. As a reminder, a quote reflects a segment of data (i.e., an extract of conversation) that is relevant to my research questions. Thus, Figure 6.1 below shows the number of times in which a code was given that suggests that what participants had said (i.e., that was extracted as a quote) was relevant to my research questions.

Figure 6.1. *Number of quotes associated with participants in the two groups*

Name		Grounded	F
#Part A		15	
#Part B		61	
#Part C		47	
#Part D		15	
#Part E		12	
#Part F		26	
#Part G		17	
#Part H		80	
#Part I		34	

Differences were also found with regards to which characters attracted more and less conversation. In Chapter 4 it was noted that the characters in the three stories can be classified into two character types due to their dramatic roles — victims (the Prisoners,

Gelman, Ahmadou) and perpetrators (the Uruguayan Dictatorship, the Argentinian Military, the Torturer). When discussing Stories 1.*Celebration* and 2.*Gelman* the topic dominating the discussion was the so-called victim characters (i.e. the Prisoners and Gelman). In contrast, when discussing Story 3.*Professional Life* the conversation heavily gravitated towards the perpetrator character (i.e. the Torturer). Figure 6.2 below shows the number of quotes associated with the different characters in the two focus-group discussions:

Figure 6.2. *Number of quotes associated with characters*

Name	Grounded	Fan
@1.Prisoners	40	
@1.Uruguayan Dictatorship	13	
@2.Argentinean Military	10	
@2.Gelman	56	
@3.Ahmadou	16	
@3.Torturer	87	

6.2 Potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses

This section seeks to answer sub-question 2.1 — *To what extent and in what ways is there evidence of empathetic responses?* I address this question first because it involves a methodological issue that needs to be raised and resolved before discussing the potential role of textual and readerly factors in 6.3. A significant challenge arises when trying to determine what actually counts as evidence of empathetic responses. I foreground this as a methodological issue for several reasons. First, there is little explicit orientation in the empathy literature regarding this crucial aspect of analysis (Kuroshima and Iwata, 2016, being an exception). Second, the analyst relies entirely on what readers report and so it is difficult to know whether empathy was *actually experienced* by readers (see my earlier discussion of limitations in Section 5.1).

Consequently, my analytical focus is on *linguistic evidence of empathy as displayed in participants' verbal self-reports* rather than on the actual experiencing of empathy. Therefore, my data offers insights into *how participants talk* (i.e. participants' discursive choices) about their experience and engagement with characters. After examining my data, I attempt to operationalise what may count as evidence of empathy by developing a typology of potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses which ranges from more explicit instances (Section 6.2.1) to less explicit ones (Section 6.2.2).

6.2.1 Explicit potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses

Explicit expressions of empathy can be found in those instances where readers themselves articulated their engagement with the character(s) at hand in those terms; that is, in terms of empathy. Explicit empathy was displayed for all victim characters (the Prisoners, Gelman, Ahmadou) and the Torturer. Table 6.1 lists all the instances where readers expressed empathy explicitly (see bold), considering each story in turn (N.B. at the beginning of each quote I indicate the character(s) with whom participants say they empathise):

Table 6.1. *Explicit expressions of empathy with characters*

Story 1.*Celebration of the Human Voice*	
[1] PRISONERS: *ya directamente **empatizas con** las dos personas que están en la cárcel porque tú asocias dictadura a malo, a represión y a tal* (B1, 171:171)	you directly **empathise with** the two people who are in prison because you associate dictatorship with evil, with repression and so on
[2] PRISONERS: *me identifico quizás más con… quizás la solidaridad esa que he dicho antes de **ponerme en la piel,** se me hace más fácil **empatizar con** estos personajes que con el ente que es la dictadura uruguaya* (C1, 144:144)	perhaps I identify more with… perhaps that solidarity of **putting myself in their skin** that I talked about before, I find it easier to **empathise with** these characters than with the entity which is the Uruguayan dictatorship

| [3] | PRISONERS: *seguirás **empatizando con la situación** porque son oprimidos, o encarcelados, prisioneros de una dictadura* (I4, 196:196) | you will keep **empathising with the situation** because they are oppressed, or imprisoned, prisoners of a dictatorship |

Story 2. *Gelman*

[4]	GELMAN: *quizás porque yo soy madre y **me pongo en la situación** del protagonista* (H5, 75:75)	perhaps because I am a mother and **I put myself in the** protagonist's **situation**
[5]	UNSPECIFIED: *yo creo que en la sociedad actual la palabra 'dictadura' ya te provoca un rechazo moral automáticamente y automáticamente te hace **sentir empatía hacia** las personas que están sufriendo esa dictadura* (H5, 111:111)	I think that in today's society the word 'dictatorship' readily provokes an automatic moral rejection, and it automatically makes you **feel empathy towards** the people who are suffering that dictatorship
[6]	GELMAN: *aquí te dan detalles del sufrimiento de la persona y **te pone en situación** lo que está viviendo, yo creo que en realidad eso influye, no es lo mismo que te diga 'no, esta persona lo está pasando mal porque hay una dictadura', fin, a que te explique exactamente cuál es su situación, yo creo que eso influye mucho* (G5, 117:117)	here you're given details of the person's suffering and **you're put in the situation** he's going through, I think this actually has an influence, it's not the same if it [the text] says 'this person is having a bad time because there is a dictatorship', full stop, than being told exactly what his situation his, I think that makes a difference

Story 3. *Professional Life*

[7]	AHMADOU: *también **me pongo en la situación** del torturado que después de estar ahí hecho polvo que el otro te venga contando los problemas como 'venga hhh ¿te estás cachondeando de mí encima o qué?'* (C3, 136:136)	I also **put myself in** the tortured man's **situation** because after being there feeling crushed the other one [the torturer] tells you about his problems like 'come on hhh are you kidding me or what?'
[8]	AHMADOU AND TORTURER: *yo **me pongo un poco en la piel de** los dos, que deber de ser muy duro que te obliguen a hacer...* (B3, 144:144)	I **put myself a bit in the skin of** both of them, because it must be very hard to be forced to do...
[9]	TORTURER: *Pero yo soy capaz de **sentir más empatía del** verdugo que del torturado porque el torturado es una situación por la que yo no voy a pasar, espero, pero la otra es una situación en la que yo sí puedo tener en mis manos el control de una persona* (B3, 282:283)	But I am able to **feel more empathy for** the executioner than for the tortured one because the tortured one is in a situation which I'm not going to go through, I hope, but the other is a situation in which I can have control over another person

As shown in Table 6.1, explicit empathy was linguistically articulated through the use of:

- Verb "to empathise with the characters" [*empatizar con los personajes*] in

Extracts [1] and [2]; "to empathise with the character's situation" [*empatizar con la situación del personaje*] in Extract [3].

- Verb "to feel empathy" with different prepositions — "to feel empathy towards characters" [*sentir empatía hacia los personajes*] in Extract [5]; "to feel empathy for [lit. 'of'] the character" [*sentir empatía del personaje*] in Extract [9].

- Metaphorical expression "to put oneself in the character's skin" [*ponerse en la piel del personaje*] in Extracts [2] and [8]. The metaphorical expression "to put oneself in someone else's skin" [*ponerse en la piel de alguien*] is used in Spanish to express empathetic perspective taking, and is rather similar to the English-language phrase "to put oneself in someone else's shoes".

- Metaphorical expression "to put oneself in the character's situation" [*ponerse en la situación del personaje*] in Extracts [4] and [7]; and "to be put in the situation of what the character is going through" [*te pone en situación lo que el personaje está viviendo]* in Extract [6].

A methodological problem that arises at this point is whether the above explicit expressions of empathy can be taken at face value as evidence of empathy having taken place. Accordingly, some caveats need to be considered when interpreting the data. One potential issue is to do with how self-oriented or other-oriented the responses seem to be. In Section 2.2.2 it was noted that empathy necessarily involves other-oriented perspective taking. Instances of self-oriented, rather than character-oriented, perspective taking (see Extract [9]) offer unclear evidence of narrative empathy according to my definition, but the possibility needs to be allowed for that some kind of empathetic response might have occurred.

Another important caveat is that there is no way to check in what sense participants used the above expressions. This limitation could have been overcome by simply asking[71] readers to articulate what they meant right after they used these linguistic expressions. There might be potential differences between "lay" versus "expert" notions of empathy; that is, the way in which participants use the term and the way in which it is used in the scholarly literature. When it comes to readers' "lay" notions of empathy it is likely that different people have rather different perceptions[72] of what the term means.

The conclusion to be drawn is that an important methodological consideration in any reader-response study is that the various meanings participants attach to the words they use become an analytical challenge when these meanings are not openly articulated. It would be risky for the analyst to take it for granted that participants use terms in the sense he/she expects them to. A way around this semantic opacity might be to look for implicit evidence of the phenomenon under study, as I discuss next.

6.2.2 Implicit potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses

This sub-section examines the more implicit end of the scale of potential linguistic evidence of empathy. First, I describe what counts as implicit potential evidence of empathy. Then, I introduce a distinction between what I call "enactive" and "attributive" displays of empathy on the part of participants. After that, I reflect on participants' pronoun usage. Finally, I show differences in terms of the kind of empathy which

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[71] However, this can also be somehow problematic in that the moderator would interrupt the discussion and would draw attention to the research focus.

[72] This became evident in FG1 discussion, where readers B and D had major disagreements about the meaning of *empathy*.

participants display (i.e. *emotional* empathy with some characters and *cognitive* empathy with other characters).

A) What counts as implicit potential evidence of empathy

Implicit evidence of empathy was mostly found through the application of the following codes (see 5.3.2 for a reminder of the description of each code):

Table 6.2. *"Implicit evidence-of-empathy" codes*

perspective	`Character-oriented perspective taking`
	`Attribution of speech/thought_affiliation`
	`Pronoun use/shift`
emotions	`Attribution of emotional experience`
	`Evaluation of what experience is like`
	`Affective understanding`
other mental states	`Attribution of thought processes`
	`Attribution of values and beliefs`
	`Attribution of goals and needs`
situation	`Attribution of situation`
	`Imagined scenario`
	`Attribution of situational factors`

Taken together, the codes suggest implicit evidence of empathy in that they indicate that participants

- o adopt characters' perspectives, and re-enact or recreate their speech/thought from the characters' psychological viewpoints;

- o draw inferences about and grasp characters' mental states (including emotions, thought processes, values and beliefs, goals and needs); verbalise what the

experience means for the character (i.e. what it must be like to experience what the character is experiencing); and evaluate its desirability;

o mentally represent the details of the situation which characters are facing, vividly imagine a similar scenario, and attribute characters' actions and situation to contextual forces (cf. attribution of dispositional factors).

In terms of which characters attracted readers' empathy, Figure 6.3 shows the degree of co-occurrence[73] of these codes and the different characters in the two groups (N.B. the use of pronouns will be considered below):

Figure 6.3.*Co-occurrence between character and "implicit evidence-of-empathy" codes*

Codes Co-Occurrency Table							_ ▢
	@1.Prisoners	@2.Gelman	@3.Ahmadou	@3.Torturer	@1.Uruguayan	@2.Argentinean
=1a Character-oriented PT	2	14	6	20	n/a	n/a
=1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation	1	7	1	7	n/a	n/a
=2a ATT emotional experience	3	21	6	2	1	n/a
=2b Evaluation of what experience is like	1	7	2	1	n/a	1
=2c Affective understanding	n/a	6	n/a	1	n/a	n/a
=3a ATT thought processes	1	1	1	16	n/a	n/a
=3b ATT values/beliefs	3	2	n/a	9	2	1
=3c ATT goals/needs	5	n/a	n/a	13	n/a	1
=4a ATT situation	4	2	3	13	n/a	n/a
=4b Imagined scenario	n/a	2	n/a	2	n/a	n/a
=4c ATT factors_situational	n/a	5	n/a	15	n/a	n/a

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[73] Figures 6.3, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 display co-occurrence tables. When the two codes do not co-occur, the cell displays *n/a* for not applicable. Cells that contain numbers show the frequency of co-occurrence. The intensity of each cell's colour reflects the frequency of co-occurrence. Lighter colours indicate a strong relationship (or higher frequency of co-occurrence) between codes whereas darker colours indicate a weak relationship between codes (Friese, 2014, p. 189). These shadings were used as a tool for exploring potential patterns and absences (rather than taking the numbers as significant in and of themselves).

As with explicit empathy, what I call "implicit evidence of empathy" was found in the data in relation to all three victim characters (Prisoners, Gelman, Ahmadou) and the Torturer. The way in which codes were applied is illustrated in the next sub-section.

B) Enactive and attributive displays of empathy

Implicit evidence can be placed along a metaphorical spectrum of *"hot-enactive" to "cold-attributive" linguistic expressions of empathetic engagement* with characters' experience. I borrow the notions of "hot" and "cold" from Breithaupt (2012) and Sanford and Emmott (2012) since the authors[74] use the same terms to describe, respectively, empathy and emotion. I borrow the notions of "enactive" and "attributive" from Caracciolo's (2014) model — he points out enactment and attribution as two reading strategies (see 1.5.2).

Sanford and Emmott use the notion of *hot cognition* to capture the interaction between emotion and cognitive activities (the latter being perception, thinking and understanding) (2012, p. 191). *Cold cognition* involves the knowledge of an emotion and the ability to label and describe it (p. 201). In contrast, *hot cognition* involves the actual experiencing of the emotion (p. 201). Put differently, whereas cold cognition makes use of knowledge of emotions, hot cognition involves feelings and the emotion system (p. 208), and is "an essential ingredient of empathy" (p. 231).

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[74] The following is not included in the literature review chapters because it is a rather local issue affecting only this particular section of the analysis.

Regarding empathy, Breithaupt (2012, p. 84) highlights the distinction between *hot* (simulative-emotional) and *cold* (distanced-analytical) forms of empathy[75]. *Hot empathy* refers to "a form of empathy that involves the simulation of the experience or emotion of the other within one's neuronal network" (p. 88). On the other hand, *cold empathy* refers to "a form of empathy that results in the understanding of the other's mind, reasoning or emotions, without simulating the experience in one's own neuronal networks" (p. 88). The possibility exists for *lukewarm empathy* when cold empathy is accompanied by some simulation.

It should be noted that these authors use the terms "hot" and "cold" to describe the *actual experiencing* of empathy or emotion (e.g., during reading). In contrast, I adapt the notions to describe readers' *verbal display of their empathetic engagement with characters' experience* in their after-reading discussion. Hence, I make no claims about the properties and intensity of readers' experience, but limit my analysis to the ways in which readers verbally describe their experience. The notion of *enactment* can be taken to mean "acting something out, turning it into action" and, in the linguistic domain in particular, enacting human experience can be seen as "turning it into words, giving it verbal and structural form" (Wales, 2011, p. 135). The notion of *attribution*, on the other hand, refers to the process of ascribing something (e.g., an emotion) to characters (see 1.5.2. and 2.5.1).

In the data, implicit potential linguistic evidence of empathy can be positioned at different points on a cline of hot-enactive to cold-attributive verbal displays of

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[75] Breithaupt views these categories as a heuristic idealisation rather than empirical categories (p. 88).

empathetic engagement with characters' experience. The extent to which verbal displays of empathy are seen as enactive or attributive depends on the *presence and clustering* (i.e. cumulative vs. isolated) of the "explicit" and "implicit" empathy codes/features (see Table 6.2 above) in some participants' turns.

The hot-enactive end of the spectrum of potential linguistic evidence of empathy corresponds with the presence and cumulative clustering of the "explicit" and "implicit" empathy features, some of which occur several times in the same conversational turn. A particularly rich extract to illustrate this is one of Reader H's long turns (see Extract [10] below), which shows a rather enactive display of empathetic engagement with Gelman's experience (while discussing Story *2.Gelman*). When displaying extracts of conversation, for each extract I give the English translation first, and then I provide a screenshot from Atlas with the Spanish text on the left-hand side and the codes that apply to the text on the right-hand side.

[10]   *Perhaps also because I am a mother and I put myself in the protagonist's situation. I mean, I can be at home, perfectly available, and if anyone wants to hurt me the only way to hurt me in a brutal way is to take away what I love most, and what I love most is not my life or my freedom, what I love most is my children and my grandchildren, and if they take that away, they take away your reason for living. I mean, when you become a parent you realise there's nothing in the world that matters more than your own children (…) so the very immense PAIN that can be caused to this man is not to imprison him or deprive him of freedom or communication or food… (…) he is empty because they have taken away what's most important, his children, his grandchildren, his legacy (…) Therefore it seems to me that they have caused the greatest of cruelties that can ever be caused, that is, it's been the worst.* (H5, 75:83)

Figure 6.4. *Extract [10]*

H: También quizás porque yo soy madre y me pongo en la situación del protagonista.

- #Part H
- @2.Gelman
- =1a Character-oriented PT~
- =1c PRON_ 1st person
- =Explicit empathy~
- REB parenthood
- =Imp

Es decir, yo puedo estar en mi casa, perfectamente localizable, y me quieren hacer daño a mí y la única manera que tienen de hacerme daño a mí de manera brutal es quitarme lo que más quiero, y lo que más quiero no es mi vida, ni mi libertad ni nada, lo que más quiero son mis hijos y mis nietos y si eso se lo roban, te roban la razón de ser.

- #Part H
- @2.Gelman
- =1c PRON USE/SHIFT~
- =1c PRON_ 1st person
- =2a ATT emotional experience~
- =2c Affective understanding~
- =4b Imagined scenario~
- REB parenthood

Es decir tú cuando llegas a ser padre te das cuenta de que no hay nada en este mundo que te importe más que tus propios hijos y por las personas por las que más te sacrificarías y que lo harías de una manera totalmente desinteresada es por ellos, entonces el DOLOR tan inmenso que le puede producir a este señor no es encarcelarlo, privarlo de libertad, quitarle la comunicación, quitarle la comida...

- #Part H
- @2.Gelman
- =1c PRON_ 2nd person (inc. speaker
- =2c Affective understanding~

- #Part H
- @2.Gelman
- =1a Character-oriented PT~
- =1c PRON_ 3rd person
- =2a ATT emotional experience~
- =2c Affective understanding~

está vacío porque le han quitado lo más importante, a sus hijos, a sus nietos, a su legado porque en definitiva lo que nosotros dejamos en esta vida son nuestros hijos, nuestros nietos==

Entonces a este hombre para mi le han causado la mayor de las crueldades que se le puede causar, es decir, ha sido lo peor.

- #Part H
- @2.Gelman
- =1a Character-oriented PT~
- =1c PRON_ 3rd person
- =2a ATT emotional experience~
- =2b Evaluation of what experience is li
- =2c Affective understanding~

At the beginning of the extract, Reader H's shared trait of parenthood (i.e. her role as a parent) begins to establish similarity of experience with Gelman's based on first-hand experience. She takes a character-oriented perspective, and vividly describes an imagined scenario which might suggest simulation of the character's experience in the first person. She displays an affiliation with Gelman's stance and an understanding of the nature of Gelman's experience. Based on her understanding of Gelman's situation, she attributes several emotional experiences to the character — if one's family is taken away, one is stripped of all reason for living; immense pain (notice the higher volume/emphasis on "PAIN"); feeling of emptiness — and evaluates what the experience must be like ("greatest of cruelties", "the worst"). In terms of pronoun use, there are shifts between the third person, second person (including the speaker), and first person (see below for an interpretation of pronoun shifts).

The combination of the features listed above creates a cumulative effect which can be interpreted as a rather enactive and sustained verbal display of empathy. Reader H's first-hand experience as a loving mother provides understanding of the importance of children in any parent's (including Gelman's) life. In so doing, she is invoking similar experiences to show empathy (see Kuroshima and Iwata, 2016, pp. 102-107). This similar experience of being a devoted parent is used to demonstrate how she can understand what Gelman is going through. Moreover, the emotional experiences she attributes to Gelman, together with some elements of evaluation, show a *verbalisation of the what-it's-like dimension* of Gelman's experience. The remainder of Reader H's turn also shows an articulation of the speech/thoughts that she attributes to Gelman, whereby she re-enacts Gelman's speech/thought from the character's psychological viewpoint:

[11]   *You put yourself in that situation, and it's what it [the text] says, you wake up in the middle of the night when you have a problem, you're unable to sleep, you're unable to rest, that is you're suffering a continuous torment. So of course 'Why didn't they find me? Why did they take my children? What did I do wrong? What did I not do? Why wasn't I there at that moment?' I mean the constant torture of that father who thinks that he is responsible for the harm they've done to his children, that is, 'How can I breathe the air I breathe if it doesn't belong to me? If because of me, because of the way I think they have killed my son, they have taken away my son-in-law, my daughter-in-law, my grandson'. I think the one who has done that reaches such a level of refined TORTURE which is much subtler and greater than what we've seen before. (Turn by Participant I omitted) It says here "writes, hoisting himself from the rubble of his life, from its dust and debris", that is, they have destroyed this human being, they have destroyed him because EVERY day he imagines living the life that belonged to his children. That is, 'I shouldn't be here! What am I doing here if the ones that should be here are my son, my daughter?' (H5, 87:95)*

Figure 6.5. *Extract [11]*

H: Es que tú te pones en esa situación, y es lo que dice, tú te despiertas por la noche cuando tienes un problema, estás desvelado, eres incapaz de descansar, o sea estás sufriendo un tormento continuo.

Entonces claro '¿por qué no me encontraron a mí? ¿por qué se han llevado a mis hijos? ¿qué hice mal? ¿qué no hice? ¿por qué no estuve en ese momento?'

#Part H
@2.Gelman
=1a Character-oriented PT~
=1c PRON_ 2nd person (inc. speaker)
=2a ATT emotional experience~
=2c Affective understanding~
=4b Imagined scenario~

#Part H
@2.Gelman
=1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
=1c PRON_ 1st person

Es decir la tortura continua de ese padre pensando que él es el responsable del daño que le han causado a sus hijos, es decir '¿cómo puedo respirar el aire que estoy respirando si este aire no me corresponde a mí? Si por mi culpa, por lo que yo pienso, a mi hijo me lo han matado, a mi yerno, a mi nuera, a mi nieto, me lo han quitado del medio'

> #Part H
> @2.Gelman
> =1a Character-oriented PT~
> =1c PRON_ 3rd person
> =2a ATT emotional experience~

> #Part H
> @2.Gelman
> =1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
> =1c PRON_ 1st person

Yo pienso que el que haya hecho eso ya llega a un refinamiento en la TORTURA que es muy sutil y muy superior a la que hemos visto anteriormente.

> #Part H
> @2.Argentinean Military
> =2b Evaluation of what experience is li
> REB moral_ negative evaluation~

H: Es que pone aquí, dice "escribe alzándose sobre sus ruinas, sobre su polvo, sobre su basura", es decir, han destrozado a este ser humano, lo han destrozado porque él CADA día se imagina viviendo la vida que era la de sus hijos.

> #Part H
> @2.Gelman
> =1a Character-oriented PT~
> =1c PRON_ 3rd person
> =2a ATT emotional experience~
> Textual reference~

Es decir '¡yo no tendría que estar aquí!' '¿qué hago yo aquí, si los que tendrían que estar aquí son mi hijo, mi hija?'

> #Part H
> @2.Gelman
> =1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
> =1c PRON_ 1st person

In this extract, Reader H alternates between talking about the character in the third person, and suddenly impersonating the character and re-enacting his speech/thoughts on three occasions, with shifts to first person. In addition, she imagines a scenario which mirrors what is being conveyed in the story, thus providing a vivid depiction of the details of Gelman's situation, and, arguably, imaginatively simulating his situation. She attributes concrete emotional states to the character — feelings of torment/anguish, constant torture and devastation — and evaluates what the experience must be like (notice the higher volume/emphasis on "TORTURE" and "EVERY day"). Again, the

combination of these features suggests a rather vivid and enactive verbalisation of the what-it's-like dimension of Gelman's experience, thus providing potential evidence of empathy at the hot-enactive end of the scale.

What is interesting about the "implicit evidence-of-empathy" features is the *ways in which they cluster together*. Sometimes, as I have just shown, participants' turns can be seen as rather enactive verbal displays of empathy (i.e., Extracts [10] and [11]) because of the cumulative effect of multiple features that count as evidence of empathy. In contrast, other turns show more attributive displays of empathy — movement towards the cold-attributive end of the scale corresponds with rather isolated instances of the "explicit" and "implicit" evidence-of-empathy features. For example, in the following extract FG1 participants are commenting on Story *2.Gelman*. The extract contains a turn by Participant B (see bold) (N.B. I present what happens in the discussion before and after B's turn in order to show the length of Participant B's turn):

[12]   C*: But I think that in this case we shouldn't forget that it's not random, it's not a tsunami which is a catastrophe that you cannot avoid, rather it's a group of people making a decision, deciding to kill his children on purpose, to hurt him*

E*: Because the former [i.e., the tsunami] is bad luck, they were there, the wave comes and has taken them away*

B: Basically the man says 'the military took my children away' and that's it, I mean what really hurts him is not that the military took his children away but the fact that his children are no longer there *(B2, 193:193)*

E*: Maybe because of that his projects are ruined, or at least his well [imagination] runs out, or perhaps because his children are missing he no longer has that imagination or gets blocked*

Figure 6.6. *Extract [12]*

C: Pero yo creo que en este caso no debemos olvidar que no

es aleatorio, que no un tsunami que es una catástrofe que tú

no puedes evitar, sino que son unas personas tomando una

decisión, decidiendo matarte a los hijos a propósito, para

hacerte daño

> #Part C
> @2.Argentinean Military
> ATT factors_ dispositional
> ATT goal-outcome relationship_ACI

E: Porque lo otro es mala suerte, estaban allí ha pasado la ola

y se lo han llevado

B: En el fondo el hombre dice 'se llevaron a mis hijos los

militares' y ya está, o sea él lo que realmente le duele no es

que el militar se llevara a sus hijos si no que sus hijos ya no

estén

> #Part B
> @2.Gelman
> =1a Character-oriented PT~
> =1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation
> =1c PRON USE/SHIFT~
> =1c PRON_ 1st person
> =1c PRON_ 3rd person
> =2a ATT emotional experience~
> =Implicit (quote)~

E: Con eso a lo mejor se le chafan los proyectos, o por lo

menos se le agota el pozo, a lo mejor al faltarle los hijos ya no

> #Part E
> @2.Gelman
> =1a Character-oriented PT~
> =2a ATT emotional experience~

Participant B's turn in Extract [12] can be placed towards the cold-attributive end of the

scale because it seems to be less enactive[76] than Extracts [10-11]. The reason is that there

is less presence of the "explicit" and "implicit" evidence-of-empathy features, which are

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[76] As I will discuss in 6.3.1(d), the differences in the degree of how enactive Extracts [10] and [11] (by Reader H) and Extract [12] (by Reader B) are can be connected to a crucial aspect of their experiential background — parenthood — and the different degrees of access to the experience felt by participants.

rather isolated — Reader B attributes to Gelman the emotional experience of pain, and briefly voices the speech/thought that she attributes to him.

A further example to illustrate attributive verbal displays of empathy is the following turn by Participant B, who is commenting on her response to the Torturer in Story *3.Professional Life*:

[13]   *I am very empathetic, and I always try, even though sometimes it's a problem, because I can see the good things in situations which are not good (…). He is an executioner, a murderer, but at the end of the day, and it says so in the second paragraph, "he is a civil servant"… Hmm… I don't know if you've watched the film* The Executioner, *a Spanish film by Berlanga, which is an old one, and it's about a man who is married to a woman and the father of this woman is the executioner at the time of the garrote vil* [death penalty tool]*, and he has to inherit the job whether he wants to or not, and if he doesn't he will go unemployed without a home, and the woman is pregnant, he inherits the job from an old man who is dead, and during the film is the anguish, and the thing is that you feel the anguish (…) you see a man who doesn't want to do it but he has to because his life depends on it. Many times you say 'it's not justifiable, I wouldn't be able to do it'. But the thing is you also have to put yourself in the other situation because at the end of the day it's what it says "he and he are the same person but not the same person",* **on the one hand you see the family man who is worried, who is tormented because he has to harm others, and on the other hand you see the oppressed one who has to do what he is told to do** (B3, 7:12)

Figure 6.7. *Extract [13]*

Yo soy muy empática y siempre intento, y a veces es un problema, porque veo lo bueno de situaciones que no son buenas pero precisamente aquí está lo que he dicho yo en el primer texto.

Es un verdugo, es un asesino pero al fin y al cabo, te lo dice en el segundo párrafo "él es un funcionario"... Mmm...

No sé si habéis visto la película *El verdugo*, una película española de Berlanga, que es una antigua, y es sobre un señor que está casado con una chica y el padre de esta chica es el verdugo en la época de garrote vil y él lo tiene que heredar sí o sí, si no lo hereda se quedan en la calle, sin casa, la mujer está embarazada, de quien hereda él el trabajo es un señor mayor que está muerto y durante la película es el agobio y es que tú sientes el agobio, estamos hablando de Berlanga que un director que más o menos te saca así lo cómico de cualquier situación, pero ves el agobio de un señor que no quiere hacerlo pero lo tiene que hacer porque depende su vida de ello.

Muchas veces dices 'es que para mí no es justificable, yo no sería capaz de hacerlo.'

Es que hay que ponerse también en la otra situación porque al fin y al cabo, y además es que lo dice "él y él son la misma persona pero no son la misma persona", por un lado está el padre de familia que se preocupa que le atormenta tener que hacer daño a los demás y por otro está el oprimido que tiene que hacer lo que le manden porque muchas veces

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- #Part B
- @3.Torturer
- =1a Character-oriented PT~
- =1c PRON_ 3rd person
- =2a ATT emotional experience~
- =2c Affective understanding~
- =4a ATT situation~
- =Implicit (quote)~
- REB self-reported empathic dispositic
- Textual reference~

Here B takes up the Torturer's viewpoint, and attributes emotional experiences to the Torturer — anguish, worry and torment. In this extract, however, the way in which the "explicit" and "implicit" evidence-of-empathy features cluster together does not create as great a cumulative effect as that which results from Extracts [10-11]. In short, enactive verbal displays of empathy are seen in the cumulative effect of multiple features clustering together [Extracts 10-11], whereas attributive verbal displays of empathy are seen in rather isolated instances of the "explicit" and "implicit" evidence-of-empathy features [Extracts 12-13].

C) Participants' pronoun usage

A feature of the data that has not been addressed so far is participants' *pronoun usage*. Pronoun shifts occur, sometimes often, in some participants' turns throughout the discussions. A good example to illustrate this is the following turn by Participant E, who is at this point discussing his perception of the Torturer in Story *3.Professional Life*:

[14]   *It can also be seen that he's there temporarily because he's waiting for a promotion that they are not giving him, so 'damn it, I'm doing this' but maybe it's only a period of his life because 'if I get a promotion maybe I don't have to do this anymore, because I don't want to do this' but, well, he's being forced to do it* (E3, 146:146)

Figure 6.8. *Extract [14]*

E: También se ve que está ahí de paso porque está
esperando un ascenso que no le dan, entonces 'joder, estoy
haciendo esto' pero a lo mejor es una etapa de su vida que
'si me ascienden a lo mejor luego ya no hago esto, que no
quiero yo hacer eso' pero bueno le están obligando.

#Part E
@3.Torturer
=1a Character-oriented PT~
=1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
=1c PRON USE/SHIFT~
=4c ATT factors_situational
=Implicit (quote)~

The extract provides evidence of empathy with the Torturer because participant E adopts the character's perspective and re-enacts the speech/thought that he attributes to him from the character's perspective. What is most interesting about this turn is the frequent shift in pronoun use: participant E goes back and forth between talking about the Torturer in the third person and impersonating the character in the first person.

A possible interpretation is that pronoun shifts might suggest shifts of perspective from an observer stance to an enactment of characters' consciousness. Whereas the former takes third-person pronouns, the latter is realised through the use of the first-person pronoun, but also the second-person pronoun that includes the speaker him/herself — see also extracts [10] and [11] above. At the same time, pronoun shifts might reveal *self-other differentiation*, which is key in definitions of empathy (see 2.2.5). The fact that some readers use a mixture of first-, second-, and third-person pronouns may illustrate how readers do in fact distinguish what the source of the experience is (i.e. the target character), and so readers alternate between verbally enacting the character's experience (in the first or second person) and talking about the character from an observer stance (in the third person) (see Caracciolo, 2014, p. 122).

D) Emotional and cognitive empathy with different characters

A final aspect worth mentioning is to do with differences in the kinds of empathetic involvement that participants displayed with the different characters. The starkest contrast is that between Gelman and the Torturer: readers engaged with Gelman's experience in a rather emotional way, whereas the empathy displayed for the Torturer seems to be more cognitive in nature. Figure 6.9 illustrates the frequency of the "implicit

evidence-of-empathy" codes/features in relation to the different characters that attracted readers' empathy:

Figure 6.9. *Differences in emotional vs. cognitive empathy with characters*

Codes Co-Occurrency Table	@3.Torturer	@2.Gelman	@1.Prisoners	@3.Ahmadou
=2a ATT emotional experience	2	21	3	6
=2c Affective understanding	1	6	n/a	n/a
=2b Evaluation of what experience is like	1	7	1	2
=1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation	7	7	1	1
=3a ATT thought processes	16	1	1	1
=3b ATT values/beliefs	9	2	3	n/a
=3c ATT goals/needs	13	n/a	5	n/a
=4a ATT situation	13	2	4	3
=4b Imagined scenario	2	2	n/a	n/a
=4c ATT factors_situational	15	5	n/a	n/a

The code co-occurrence table shows that participants often attributed emotions to Gelman (see, e.g., Extracts [10-12] above) and displayed an understanding of *how Gelman must feel* in his situation. In contrast, very few emotional experiences were attributed to the Torturer (Extract [13] being the exception), and participants mostly made inferences about *how the Torturer thinks*. What readers attributed most to the Torturer are (i) speech/thoughts, (ii) thought processes, (iii) values and beliefs, (iv) goals and needs, and (v) aspects of his situation, and on that basis they explained the Torturer's actions and behaviour. To illustrate this contrast I provide three extracts below: Extract [13] (which I reproduce again below) shows evidence of emotional empathy with the Torturer, whereas Extracts [15] and [16] show evidence of a more cognitive kind of empathy with the character.

The only instance of emotion attribution for the Torturer in the two group discussions was found in this turn by reader B, which I display in full because the co-text is extremely useful for understanding how she articulates her empathy with the Torturer:

[13]   *I am very empathetic, and I always try, even though sometimes it's a problem, because I can see the good things in situations which are not good (…). He is an executioner, a murderer, but at the end of the day, and it says so in the second paragraph, "he is a civil servant"… Hmm… I don't know if you've watched the film* The Executioner, *a Spanish film by Berlanga, which is an old one, and it's about a man who is married to a woman and the father of this woman is the executioner at the time of the garrote vil* [death penalty tool]*, and he has to inherit the job whether he wants or not, and if he doesn't he will go unemployed without a home, and the woman is pregnant, he inherits the job from an old man who is dead, and during the film is the anguish, and the thing is that you feel the anguish (…) you see a man who doesn't want to do it but he has to because his life depends on it. Many times you say 'it's not justifiable, I wouldn't be able to do it'. But the thing is you also have to put yourself in the other situation because at the end of the day it's what it says "he and he are the same person but not the same person", on the one hand you see the family man who is worried, who is tormented because he has to harm others, and on the other hand you see the oppressed one who has to do what he is told to do* (B3, 7:12)

Figure 6.10. *Extract [13]*

Yo soy muy empática y siempre intento, y a veces es un problema, porque veo lo bueno de situaciones que no son buenas pero precisamente aquí está lo que he dicho yo en el primer texto.

Es un verdugo, es un asesino pero al fin y al cabo, te lo dice en el segundo párrafo "él es un funcionario"… Mmm…

No sé si habéis visto la película *El verdugo*, una película española de Berlanga, que es una antigua, y es sobre un señor que está casado con una chica y el padre de esta chica es el verdugo en la época de garrote vil y él lo tiene que heredar sí o sí, si no lo hereda se quedan en la calle, sin casa,

#Part B
@3.Torturer
=1a Character-oriented PT~
=1c PRON_ 3rd person
=2a ATT emotional experience~
=2c Affective understanding~
=4a ATT situation~
=Implicit (quote)~
REB self-reported empathic dispositic
Textual reference~

la mujer está embarazada, de quien hereda él el trabajo es un señor mayor que está muerto y durante la película es el agobio y es que tú sientes el agobio, estamos hablando de Berlanga que un director que más o menos te saca así lo cómico de cualquier situación, pero ves el agobio de un señor que no quiere hacerlo pero lo tiene que hacer porque depende su vida de ello.

Muchas veces dices 'es que para mí no es justificable, yo no sería capaz de hacerlo.'

Es que hay que ponerse también en la otra situación porque al fin y al cabo, y además es que lo dice "él y él son la misma persona pero no son la misma persona", por un lado está el padre de familia que se preocupa que le atormenta tener que hacer daño a los demás y por otro está el oprimido que tiene que hacer lo que le manden porque muchas veces

In Extract [13], Participant B starts by acknowledging her own empathetic disposition, which frames the rest of the turn. Her previous experience of a narrative text (the film *The Executioner*) enables her to attribute concrete emotional experiences to the Torturer — anguish, worry, torment. This provides potential linguistic evidence of empathy in that Participant B takes up the Torturer's viewpoint and displays an affective understanding of the character's experience. However, the general trend among those who empathised with the Torturer is rather a more cognitive form of empathy, as the two extracts below illustrate:

[15]   *But here is a different story. Because we're seeing the two faces of humanity, the man who apparently fought for independence, and then the other is a soldier, right? A French soldier, yes, I imagine he's a policeman or a soldier who maybe in order not to be sent to the front and not to combat in order not to get killed, because it's really for that reason, in order not to be killed (…) you don't take the risk of getting*

shot or getting blown out and we see it's a man who is a civil servant (…) and has a salary and we see he's a human being who is there because he has to be there, or because he has no other way to live in a better way, (…) but it's the human contradiction of 'I survive even though I have to lose part of my pride and dignity and ethics and morality' (I6, 9:11)

Figure 6.11. *Extract [15]*

I: Pero aquí ya es otro rollo. Porque estamos viendo las dos caras de la humanidad, el hombre que por lo visto peleó por la independencia — y luego el otro es un soldado, ¿no?

Un soldado francés, sí, me imagino que es policía o soldado que a lo mejor para no estar en el frente y no combatir para que no le maten, porque realmente es para eso, para que no le maten, porque tú puedes matar — la conciencia — lo que sea que tiene moralmente.

Pero no te arriesgas a que te peguen un balazo o te revienten el cuerpo en mil pedazos y estamos viendo que es un hombre que es — pues eso, un funcionario que, o lo hace él, y para estar penando, que no lo haga otro y tiene su sueldo y tiene sus cosas y vemos que es un humano, que está ahí porque tiene que estar, o porque no tiene otra manera para poder seguir viviendo de una manera mejor, y que al final dice que el hombre está hablando, el torturador habla con el torturado, y el torturado qué va a hacer, no va a decir 'Joder, ¡pues no te preocupes! Hombre, si aquí charlamos', está claro, pero que es la contradicción humana de 'sobrevivo aunque tenga que perder parte de mi orgullo y mi dignidad y mi ética y moral'.

- #Part I
- @3.Torturer
- =1a Character-oriented PT~
- =1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
- =1c PRON USE/SHIFT~
- =1c PRON_ 1st person
- =1c PRON_ 3rd person
- =4b Imagined scenario~
- =Implicit (quote)~
- ATT goal-outcome relationship_ACHI
- ATT traits_humanising

[16]   *I think what also influences is the fact that he doesn't consider one hundred per cent if what he does is right or wrong, I think perhaps, this is imagining it a bit because the text doesn't say this, but if a man who has been raised at the time of the French*

colonies, etc., I think it's different from a situation of dictatorship because if this man has always been told that 'Algeria is ours, it is French land, and that's how things are', and he has never seen it in a different way he can't see the scale of what he's doing, because in a way, yes, he knows he [is harming] a person, a human being, it's not a nation, he's torturing a person, but it's not his fault that Algeria wanted to become independent at that moment, but at the same time he has that in the background 'I've been raised with this, we're a nation, and now I don't understand why'… (G6, 96:97)

Figure 6.12. *Extract [16]*

G: Yo creo que influye también el que él no se plantee al cien por cien si lo que está haciendo está bien o mal, yo creo que quizás esto también es imaginándolo un poco porque esto no nos lo dice el texto, pero si un hombre que se ha criado en la época de las colonias francesas, etcétera, creo que es un poco distinto a la situación de una dictadura porque si a este señor le han dicho de toda la vida que 'Argelia es nuestra, que es territorio francés y es que es así', y él no lo ha visto de ninguna otra manera jamás no ve la magnitud de verdad de lo que está haciendo porque él de alguna manera,

sí, sabe que tiene a una persona, tiene a un ser humano, no es una nación, tiene a una persona que está torturando a una persona, que no es por su culpa que Argelia se quisiera independizar en ese momento, pero al mismo tiempo tiene eso detrás de 'a mí me han criado con esto, nosotros somos una nación, ahora no entiendo por qué …'

#Part G
@3.Torturer
=1a Character-oriented PT~
=1b ATT speech/thought_affiliation~
=1c PRON USE/SHIFT~
=1c PRON_ 1st person
=1c PRON_ 3rd person
=3b ATT values/beliefs~
=4b Imagined scenario~
=4c ATT factors_situational
=Implicit (quote)~

Both Participants I and G mentally represent the Torturer as having specific goals, values and beliefs: (i) a soldier who tries to avoid death during the independence war, and (ii) a man whose mindset and behaviour are influenced by his upbringing during colonial times. Both extracts provide evidence of empathy with the Torturer because of the presence of several "implicit evidence-of-empathy" features — both participants adopt

the character's perspective and describe an imagined scenario which is framed by the character's own goals, values and beliefs. All of this enables them to understand the character's actions and mental states in the complexity of his situation. I will have more to say about the factors involved in participants' empathetic (and non-empathetic) relationship with the Torturer in 6.3.3.

6.3 The role of textual and readerly factors in readers' empathetic and non-empathetic engagement with characters

In what follows I discuss the factors at play in readers' empathetic and non-empathetic involvement with characters. This section addresses these two research questions:

> 2.2 To what extent and in what ways do narrative devices play a role in readers' (empathetic) engagement with characters?
> 2.3 To what extent and in what ways do readerly factors play a role in readers' (empathetic) engagement with characters?

I discuss the relationships that emerge from the data analysis regarding

- the textual phenomena analysed in Chapter 4 (i.e. point of view presentation, characters' discourse presentation, characters' emotion presentation, characterisation techniques), and

- the readerly factors introduced in Chapter 3 (i.e. observer-target/reader-character relationship and contextual appraisal, the latter including moral and socio-political evaluation).

The discussion of these factors is divided according to the different *empathy patterns* that were observed, as partly expected — empathy with the three victim characters

(Section 6.3.1), lack of empathy with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military (Section 6.3.2), and mixed responses towards the Torturer (Section 6.3.3). These empathy patterns that emerge in the group discussions could be initially attributed to the textual potential identified earlier in 4.4; however, the role of readerly factors has to be examined too. In Stories 1 and 2 (1.*Celebration* and 2.*Gelman*) there is an alignment between narrative devices and the characters' story-world role (i.e. victims vs. perpetrators) in facilitating empathy with the victims and blocking empathy with the perpetrators. However, Story 3 (3.*Professional Life*) presents a marked contrast regarding the perpetrator character; i.e. the Torturer. For some participants (F and H) narrative devices and role bias seem to be pushing in the same direction (i.e. lack of empathy), whereas for other readers they seem to be pushing in opposite directions (i.e. empathy with the Torturer in the case of Participants A, B, C, E, G, I). Since the Torturer is the most complex character in terms of empathy in my data, it seems useful to treat this character as a case study (see 6.3.3).

6.3.1 Victim characters: Prisoners, Gelman, Ahmadou

In Chapter 4 it was suggested that the fact that the victim characters undergo such harrowing experiences might encourage empathy. Unsurprisingly, potential linguistic evidence of empathy was found in relation to all three victim characters. Some relationships in the data might help account for this. The narrative devices associated with these characters (i.e. insight into their internal states and appropriate amounts of characterising information) worked together with readers' value systems and knowledge-based inferences in facilitating empathy with them. The combination of these factors resulted in a moral positioning in favour of the victim characters as the

weak/oppressed and a positive socio-political evaluation of them as dissidents of oppressive political regimes.

A) Amount of information about characters' internal states

Regarding point of view, in Chapter 4 it was found that the three stories grant access to the victim characters' consciousnesses, with different amounts of information and varying degrees of narratorial interference:

- Story *1.Celebration* is told from the Prisoners' point of view, and so it offers an internal perspective on these characters, who are the focalisers. The possible emotional states of the Prisoners are conveyed implicitly through the physical situation of the characters and the presentation of their speech. The narrator's presence also has the potential for facilitating empathy in that the authorial narrator establishes his ethical perspective against the values and actions of the Uruguayan Dictatorship.

- Story *2.Gelman* offers the authorial narrator's viewpoint rather than Gelman's, and so the story provides external narration. However, despite the external perspective on Gelman, the authorial narrator attempts to reconstruct and offers insights into (what he imagines are) Gelman's emotional experiences — e.g., "hit him where it hurt the most"; "survive without one's soul being extinguished"; "horrible feeling (...) bathed in sweat". The narratorial presence also has the potential for facilitating empathy with Gelman in that the authorial narrator (i) offers evaluative comments about the significance of the events for Gelman, and (ii) establishes his ideological viewpoint against the Argentinian Military.

- Story *3.Professional Life* offers an internal perspective on Ahmadou (although the

focus is rather on the Torturer). Ahmadou's internal states are given in the final paragraph: "Ahmadou, bathed in blood, trembling with pain, burning with fever, would say nothing". From this, readers are likely to infer extremely distressing states (e.g., pain, physical discomfort, etc.).

After analysing participants' responses, I found an association between the availability of contextual information about characters' internal states and their situation on the one hand, and readers' display of affiliation and empathetic involvement on the other. The more information about characters' consciousness and mental states, independently of whether they come from the characters' or the authorial narrator's perspective and whether they are actual or hypothetical, the more participants' accounts seem to verbally re-enact the characters' experience, as in the case of Gelman. As I discussed in 6.2.2, a difference was found regarding the verbalisation of participants' empathetic responses toward the different characters. When it comes to the expression of their perception of Gelman, participants' engagement with this character's experience was distinctively emotional when compared to the other characters:

- *Prisoners*. Participants barely discussed the Prisoners' emotions: they attributed to them feelings of isolation, loneliness and a situation of anguish.

- *Ahmadou*. Participants attributed several internal states to Ahmadou based on the final sentence ("bathed in blood, trembling with pain, burning with fever"), such as feeling crushed and worn out, having no strength, having been defeated and destroyed as a person.

- *Gelman*. The discussion on Gelman was especially focused on his emotions. The emotion presentation at the beginning ("hoisting himself from the rubble of

his life, from its dust and debris") was connected to interpretations of the emotional state of the character — his struggle to overcome obstacles, feelings of blame, and suffering a living death. The final paragraph triggered the attribution of several emotional experiences — suffering, immense pain, emptiness and constant torment because his children are no longer with him. Readers affiliated with what the narrator presents as the character's emotional stance — the worst experience for a parent is to survive their children.

Figure 6.13 shows the contrast in the frequency of emotional experiences attributed to the three victim characters:

Figure 6.13. *Co-occurrence between character codes and attribution of emotional experience*

Codes Co-Occurrency Table	
	=2a ATT emotional experience
@2.Gelman	21
@1.Prisoners	3
@3.Ahmadou	6

The differences in the degree of how emotionally-focused readers' discussions of the characters were might be to do with the fact that the textual presentation of emotion for Gelman is richer than that for the two other characters. My data shows a rather emotional kind of empathy being displayed for Gelman (as opposed to a more cognitive type of empathy displayed for the Torturer — see 6.2.2). The following turn by Participant G, which was presented in 6.2.1 as explicit evidence of empathy, shows that

she was acutely aware of the role of textual information in enabling her to imagine

Gelman's experience (N.B. the code `TXT details` was applied):

[6] *aquí te dan detalles del sufrimiento de la persona* *y te pone en situación lo que está*
     viviendo, **yo creo que en realidad eso influye,** *no es lo mismo que te diga 'no, esta*
     persona lo está pasando mal porque hay una dictadura', fin, a que te explique
     exactamente cuál es su situación, **yo creo que eso influye mucho** (G5, 117:117)

     here you're given details of the person's suffering and you're put in the situation
     he's going through, **I think this actually has an influence,** it's not the same if it
     [the text] says 'this person is having a bad time because there is a dictatorship',
     full stop, than being told exactly what his situation his, **I think that makes a
     difference**

B) Appropriate amount of characterising information

Even though the stories offer a good deal of information about the victim characters'

internal states, participants highlighted the absence of another type of information.

Participants were frequently concerned with the lack of background information about

why the victim characters are suffering their respective punishment (i.e. the Prisoners

being imprisoned, Gelman's family having been taken away, Ahmadou being tortured).

The code `TXT no information` was applied several times in relation to the victim

characters, as Figure 6.14 shows:

Figure 6.14. *Co-occurrence between character codes and the codes* `TXT no information` *and* `ATT actions_hypothetical`

Due to this absence of textual information, readers resorted to *attributing hypothetical actions* to the characters (see Figure 6.14). The frequency of these two codes (i.e. `TXT no information` and `ATT actions_hypothetical`) in relation to the victim characters can be better appreciated when comparing it with the frequency of the codes in relation to the perpetrator characters.

The lack of relevant textual information about victims' actions was felt to be important to readers, as the following conversation extracts show:

[17]   *Sí, son situaciones difíciles que desde fuera sin conocer todo lo que puede conllevar alrededor es muy difícil, realmente* **por tu ética y moral todo lo que sea castigo físico o mental de una persona a otra o de miles de personas a otras miles está mal,** *es que es una estupidez, pero es que es la naturaleza humana autodestructiva. A partir de ahí entonces* **una vez que sabemos más datos entonces podremos saber si mejor o peor, que aquí tampoco te dice nada por qué está siendo torturada esa persona... es la coincidencia de tres factores en los tres relatos que hemos tenido. Están siendo torturados sea por no poder hablar, o han matado a su familia o por lo que sea, pero no sabemos tampoco el porqué.** *Es simplemente que los relatos tratan de cómo vemos el daño de una persona o de varias personas a otras. (I6, 129:131)*

Yes, they are difficult situations which from the outside without knowing all that is involved is very difficult, actually **because of your ethics and morality any physical**

or mental harm of a person to another or of a thousand people to other thousand people is wrong, it is stupid, but human nature is self-destructive. From there **once we know more information then we will be able to know if it's better or worse, because here it doesn't say anything about why this person is being tortured... it's the coincidence of factors in the three stories that we've had. They are being tortured because they cannot speak, or they have killed their family or whatever, but we don't know why either.** It's simply that the stories deal with how we perceive the harm of one person or several people on others

[18]   *tú no estás juzgando qué es lo que han hecho [los prisioneros], ni te cuentan qué es lo que han hecho, simplemente que te han privado de la libertad de comunicarte y luego te hablan de la dictadura (H4, 193:193)*

you're not judging what they have [the Prisoners] done, nor are you told about what they've done, simply that they have deprived you of freedom to communicate and then they tell you about the dictatorship

Extract [17] nicely captures Participant I's awareness of how the issue of lack of information about the victims' past actions is common to the three stories. In Extract [18] Participant H highlights that recipients of these stories cannot judge what the victim characters have done. In my participants' view, the victim characters might have engaged in actions as morally unacceptable as the ones they are suffering:

- The Prisoners might have been murderers fighting the dictatorship (B1, 133:135)

- Perhaps Gelman had killed the children of a soldier (D2, 201:201)

- Maybe Ahmadou had attacked innocent families (I6, 137:137)

In view of the absence of relevant information about the victims' past actions, readers ended up conceiving of these characters as political dissidents fighting oppressive regimes. A possible explanation is that the stories triggered inferences that work favourably towards the victims, since readers' attention was shifted away from the victims' actions and was instead more focused on the perpetrators' actions (i.e. how

they treat the victims) (see 6.3.2 below for an account of readers' views and negative evaluation of dictators and colonisers; see 6.3.3(B) for negative views of the Torturer).

C) Moral evaluation and lack of information about victims' actions

The absence of information discussed above interacted with readers' moral values to facilitate a moral positioning in favour of the victim characters. Morally-oriented reasons were given for their positioning on the side of victims. The codes `REB moral_values` and `REB moral_positioning` were attached to extracts of conversation where participants spell out their moral values — killing and harming others is never justifiable; they are in favour of the weak and the oppressed; and they are against oppression and anything that takes away people's rights and freedom.

Readers saw victim characters as *the weak party*, which seems to foreground the socio-cultural mediation of moral values. The "privileging of the weak" is, according to Breithaupt, culturally coded since the Christian tradition privileges pity (2012, p. 89). Generally speaking, my participants can be taken to belong to the same broad socio-cultural context, and the data shows evidence of a potentially culturally-conditioned predisposition to side with victims. Participant B articulated the relationship between the previously discussed lack of information about the victims' actions and moral evaluation when talking about the Prisoners (N.B. the codes `REB moral_values, TXT no information` and `ATT actions_hypothetical` were applied; see bold):

[19]   *en este caso son dos personas que están en la cárcel, **no sabemos lo que han hecho,** lo mismo eran dos asesinos del bando contrario a la dictadura, que también los había. Que **muchas veces tenemos en la cabeza por la educación religiosa, aunque no queramos, que hemos tenido todos, 'pobrecitos,** están en la cárcel... ' 'jolín, es que los otros son unos capullos porque los han metido en la cárcel en la época de una*

*dictadura'. **No lo sabemos, y eso es moralidad que tenemos aquí metida por los cuatro costados,** que yo no creo en Dios y tal pero **mi moral cristiana la voy a tener ahí porque es la con la que me han educado,** con la que han educado a mis padres* (B1, 133:135)

[in this case they are two people who are in prison, **we don't know what they've done**, perhaps they were murderers fighting the dictatorship, which also existed. **Many times we think, because of the religious education we've all had, even if we don't want to, 'poor them**, they are in prison...' 'damn it, the others are bastards because they have imprisoned them during the dictatorship.' **We don't know, and that is morality we've got inside through and through**, I don't believe in God and so on but **my Christian morality will always be there because it's the one I've been raised with,** the one my parents have brought me up with]

[20]   *matar no me parece justificable en ninguno de los casos, pero no tengo los datos suficientes para yo posicionarme y decir pues sí, estoy con estos o estoy con los que les metieron en la cárcel. Porque dices 'le estás cortando la libertad metiéndolos en la cárcel', ya pero ¿y si ha matado a alguien? Por mucho que fuese de un bando o de otro, yo no tengo los datos suficientes como para decir 'ostras, pobrecito que está en la cárcel'... en realidad sólo sé que son dos personas en la cárcel que se comunican a base de golpecitos* (B1, 186:188)

[**for me killing is not justifiable in any case, but I don't have enough information to position myself and say, yes I take sides with these** [characters] **or I take sides with those that put them in prison**. Because you say 'you're taking their freedom away by putting them in prison', all right, but **what if they've killed someone?** However much I belonged to this or the other party, **I don't have enough information** to say 'damn it, poor them they are in prison'... in fact I only know that these are two people who are in prison and communicate through tapping]

The extracts suggest that the stories favour a positive moral response towards the victim characters *despite* a lack of specific information about their past actions. Reader B was critical about this sympathetic tendency towards victims because, even though she was unable to judge what the victims have done, her culturally-determined system of values (i.e. Christian moral values) predisposed her to view victims favourably and to sympathise with them. In Keen's terms, this would reflect the "rhetorical power of understatement" (2006, p. 219), by which writers choose not to reveal too much about

certain characters because the potential for empathy or ideological affiliation might decrease.

D) Observer-target relationships: Autobiographical alignment

In my review of the literature in Chapter 3 I mentioned that observer-target relationships (including group identity, closeness and familiarity) as well as autobiographical alignment are top-down influences that can modulate experiences of empathy. These might facilitate empathy since empathy thrives on similarity and closeness. One readerly factor, or autobiographical characteristic, that seemed to influence readers' engagement with one particular victim character (Gelman) was parenthood. This was particularly salient in the discussion of Story 2.*Gelman*, where the textual presentation of Gelman's experience interacted with readers' status as parents or non-parents. Readers' own personal background of (not) being a parent had implications for the way in which they engaged with the character's experience.

As shown in 6.2.2, Reader H's turns (see Extracts [10] and [11] above) can be seen as rather enactive and sustained verbal displays of empathetic engagement with Gelman's experience, which suggests that she might have enacted Gelman's consciousness in a vivid, first-person way. She invoked similar experiences to show empathy, and verbalised the what-it's-like dimension of Gelman's experience. This can be explained in terms of the *degree of similarity or consonance* between the reading experience and the experience attributed to the character, which depends on "the experiential traces activated by the text: it is easier for us to enact a character's experience if our experiential background resonates deeply with it" (Caracciolo, 2014, p. 124). In other

words, Reader H's autobiographical alignment with Gelman as parents arguably facilitated a rather simulative experiential understanding of the character's situation.

On the other hand, Readers B and C, who explicitly mentioned the fact that they are not parents, reported their engagement with Gelman's experience in rather different terms (N.B. the code `Comparison_different` was attached to the second and third extracts):

[21]   *Yo he subrayado (…) "esa pesadilla de padre que siente que está robando al hijo el aire que respira". Si **para un padre la peor sensación o la peor experiencia es sobrevivir a tu hijo,** encima sabiendo que tú estás vivo porque tus hijos han muerto==* (C2, 166:167)

[I have highlighted (…) "that nightmare of the father who feels he has stolen from his son the air he breathes". If **for a father the worst feeling or the worst experience is to outlive your son,** and on top of that knowing that you're alive because your children have died==]

[22]   *yo creo que el amor de un padre a un hijo es el más incondicional, el amor más puro que puede haber, cuando lo hay, **mi cabeza como no soy madre no es capaz de concebir lo que podría sentir al perder un hijo,** entonces, para mí son conceptos que son súper elevados porque no tengo hijos* (B2, 185:185)

[I think a father's love towards his child is the most unconditional love, the purest love that may exist, when it does, **since I'm not a mother my head is unable to conceive what I would feel if I lost a child,** therefore, for me those are very noble concepts because I don't have children]

[23]   *el sentimiento mayor del que se habla es de la pérdida de los hijos. **Nosotras** [B, C, D] **no hemos sufrido esas cosas. Yo no puedo sentir la angustia que puede sentir una madre** cuando maltratan a sus hijos.* (B7, 92: 92)

[the main feeling which is talked about is the loss of children. **We** [B, C, D] **haven't suffered those things. I cannot feel the anguish that a mother can feel** when her children are mistreated]

Readers B and C appealed to the fact that they are not mothers to suggest that they lack the kind of first-hand experience that would enable them to imagine what it must feel like to lose a child. Their not being parents suggests a sense of partial inaccessibility

to Gelman's experience. As a result, they only attribute experiences to the character and frame these experiences in the third person: "for a father the worst feeling or experience is" and "the anguish that a mother can feel". A possible interpretation is that empathy and experiential understanding are a matter of degree which depends on the extent to which experiencers and non-experiences feel they have access to the target's experience (Kuroshima and Iwata, 2016) (see 6.3.3(A) for a discussion of participants' shared experience with the Torturer).

6.3.2 Perpetrator characters: Uruguayan Dictatorship, Argentinian Military

In Stories 1 and 2 (1.*Celebration* and 2.*Gelman*), the perpetrators' role in the story-world situation and the narrative devices push in the same direction of blocking empathy with these characters. No evidence of empathy being reported for these characters was found in either group discussion. A likely explanation for this is that the narrative devices associated with these characters (i.e. external perspective, naming through collective names, and little amount of characterising information) worked in tandem with readers' value systems and knowledge-based inferences, which resulted in negative moral and socio-political evaluation.

As a reminder, the only available information in the stories about these characters is their actions:

- "The Uruguayan dictatorship wanted everyone to stand alone, everyone to be no one: in prisons and barracks, and throughout the country, communication was a crime."

- "The Argentine military, whose atrocities would have given Hitler an incurable inferiority complex, hit him where it hurt the most. In 1976, they kidnapped his children. They took the children instead of him. They tortured his daughter, Nora, and let her go. They murdered and disappeared his son, Marcelo, together with his pregnant compañera."

A) External perspective, naming and little amount of information: Lumping effects

The cumulative effect of several textual factors seems to have contributed to the lack of reported empathy, namely the external perspective on these characters (i.e. complete lack of insight into their internal states), together with the way they are named and the little amount of textual information given about them. Taken together, these textual factors seem to have resulted in *lumping, distancing effects*. Evidence for this can be found in Participant C's reports (N.B the bits in bold were given the code TXT naming):

[24]   *me identifico quizás más con... quizás la solidaridad esa que he dicho antes de ponerme en la piel, se me hace más fácil empatizar con estos personajes [los prisioneros] que con **el ente que es la dictadura uruguaya.** (C1, 144:144)*

[perhaps I identify more with... perhaps that solidarity of putting myself in their skin that I talked about before, I find it easier to empathise with these characters [the Prisoners] than with **the entity which is the Uruguayan dictatorship**]

[25]   *En el tercer texto es el único en el que he podido justificar, entender la otra parte. Porque se ve más que [el torturador] es una persona concreta, aunque no le dé un nombre. Pero **en los otros [dos textos] que es un ente abstracto o más generalizado, una masa, la dictadura uruguaya o los militares argentinos** pues a lo mejor no tanto (C7, 57:57)*

[In the third text is the only one where I've been able to justify, to understand the other side. Because you see [the Torturer] is a concrete person, even though he isn't given a name. But **in the [other two texts] it is a more abstract or a more generalised entity, a mass, the Uruguayan dictatorship or the Argentinian Military, not so much**]

In these extracts Reader C reports having been able to empathise with the Prisoners more than with "the entity" of the Uruguayan Dictatorship (in Story 1.*Celebration*), and also having been able to understand the Torturer (in Story 3.*Professional Life*) but not so much the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military (in Stories 1 and 2, respectively). The fact that Reader C regards the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military as "the entity", "abstract or more generalised entity" and "mass" might be interpreted as evidence of lumping effects. In contrast, she was able to understand the Torturer because he is presented "as a concrete person" (see 6.3.3(A) for a discussion of individualisation effects associated with the Torturer). Reader C's perception of the differences between the characters can also be explained in terms of Stockwell's (2009) notion of *empathetic recognisability* within his empathy scale (see 4.3.1), whereby humans are better textual attractors than abstractions (p. 25).

Participant B also commented explicitly on her perception of the Uruguayan Dictatorship due to the naming choices and lack of information (N.B the bits in bold were given the codes `TXT naming` and `TXT no information`):

[26]   *Pero es que **la lingüística también hace mucho de eso,** te pone **la palabra "dictadura uruguaya"** aquí y **tú ya no ves nada más,** nada más== que ves que a estos dos les han metido en la guerra la dictadura==* (B1, 148:148)

But the thing is that **linguistics [language] has a lot to do,** it gives you **the word "Uruguayan dictatorship"** there and **you don't see anything else,** you only== see that these two people have been brought to war by the dictatorship

[27]   *tú ves aquí "dictadura uruguaya" y **ya no ves más,** pero yo, tú, y todos los que estamos aquí sentados seguramente* (B1, 158:158)

here you see "Uruguayan dictatorship" and **you no longer see anything else,** but not only me, also you and everyone here most surely

According to Reader B, because of the very words *Uruguayan dictatorship* she was not able to "see anything else" and, in her view, "language has a lot to do". Immediately after the above turns, Reader B reported that she always tries to see both sides in any conflict situation. She commented on her personal tendency, as a History graduate, to consider the perspective of everyone involved, and illustrated this with the case of the Spanish Civil War and the two parties involved. However, despite having a personal disposition to consider both sides of a situation, she seemed not to have been able to do so when reading Story 1.*Celebration* due to a lack of textual information about the Uruguayan Dictatorship (see also Figure 6.14).

It can be concluded that developing understanding for these perpetrator characters (Uruguayan Dictatorship and Argentinian Military) was made difficult due to, among other things, lumping effects which seem to result from a combination of external perspective, naming choices and the little amount of textual information. The distancing, non-empathetic effects brought about by these characters have been explained through Cameron's notion of *lumping*. In her words, "since empathic connection is individual to individual, by hiding the individual within the group, lumping effectively removes the possibility of connection" (2013, p. 25). These effects have also been explained through Stockwell's notion of *empathetic recognisability*, whereby some objects in texts are better textual attractors, or more figural, than others (e.g., human > object > abstraction) (2009, p. 25).

B) Moral and socio-political evaluation: Schema-based impressions

The little amount of textual characterising information about these perpetrator characters (i.e., their actions) seems to have left plenty of room for readers to make inferences about the characters based on their value systems and knowledge structures (i.e. social schemata about dictators and the military). Readers reported a straightforward rejection of these characters based on their moral and socio-political values, which participants articulated as follows (N.B. I give the gist of the relevant turns, rather than showing complete turns, for the sake of word count):

Table 6.3. *Participants' moral and socio-political views on perpetrators*

Dictators and the Military
• H remembers that during the Argentinian Military prisoners were thrown into the ocean from military aircrafts, and babies were taken away from their families and given to the military — Mothers of Plaza de Mayo (H4, 17:22)
• There is no limit to the atrocities committed by humanity against humanity (H4, 23:23)
• Dictators are controllers who do not allow diversity. They kill and destroy whatever is outside their control. Instead of protecting they take away people's chances to improve as individuals (H4, 55:58)
• Dictatorships do not educate but train/tame (H4, 97:98)
• H is against any type of oppression (H4, 181:181)
• H is against any kind of dictatorship, whatever the political leanings (H4, 182:182)
• H is against anything that goes against freedom or harms any person (H4, 188:188)
• H is always in favour of the oppressed people in any dictatorship (H4, 189:189)
• No dictatorship is good because freedom is forbidden, not even Cuba (H4, 206:206)
• Anything that limits freedom of speech is wrong (F4, 219:219)
• Military establishment related to values of rigidity, religiosity, not allowing people to think for themselves (C2, 154:154)
• A dictatorship is a regime where killing is in a one-way direction (C2, 210:210)
• Dictatorships provoke an automatic moral rejection and one automatically feels empathy for the people suffering under the dictatorship (H5, 111:111)
• H lived through a dictatorship in Venezuela when she was little. She remembers the terrible fear about the military and the shootings. Therefore the figure of the military has always produced rejection (H8, 17:17)
• There are no limits to human beings' evilness. It is so cruel to take Gelman's children away (A2, 32:32; 37:38). Taking Gelman's children away is cruel (H5, 71:71) and reaches such a level of refined torture (H5, 90:90)

These data extracts were given the following codes:
- `REB real-world references`
- `REB moral_values`
- `REB moral_negative evaluation`
- `REB moral_positioning`
- `REB socio-political values`
- `ATT actions`
- `ATT values/beliefs`

The comments in Table 6.3 show instances of attribution based on the kinds of information participants associate with dictators and the military. As established in Section 2.5.1, the process of characterisation involves the integration of information from two sources — information from the text and infomation from readers' prior knowledge. Scholars agree that readers draw on knowledge about real-world people and the social world, gained through real-life experiences, when understanding characters (Culpeper, 2001; Schneider, 2001; Eder, Jannidis and Schneider, 2010). The available textual information about these characters (i.e. their actions) is likely to have activated inferences based on schematic knowledge, including specific historical knowledge, which resulted in the attribution of traits, actions and values to these characters (which were evaluated negatively). Readers' prior knowledge and experience seems to have determined their mental representation of these characters. Arguably, participants' impressions of these characters are mostly the result of top-down, or conceptually-driven, processes. Since top-down processing applied in forming impressions of characters, readers formed *schema-based or category-based impressions* (see Culpeper, 2001, p. 83).

As mentioned in 2.5.1, the notion of *schemata* has been used to explain top-down cognitive processes (Culpeper, 2001, p. 64). When interpreting these characters, readers gathered information about their actions from the text, and they resorted to schema-based knowledge about dictatorships and the military. The comments in Table 6.3 show that readers' mental representation of the characters contains more information than what is given in the stories. This means that readers' schematic knowledge enabled inferences and the generation of information which was not always given in the texts. According to Culpeper (2001, p. 99), character impressions which are driven by social schemata afford writers economy of expression since "they can mean more than they say". In short, participants' schema-based impressions of these characters, together with a negative moral and socio-political evaluation, are likely to have prevented empathy.

6.3.3 Case study: The Torturer

As I mentioned earlier, the Torturer is the most complex character in terms of empathy in the whole dataset. There is potential linguistic evidence that some readers (A-B-C-E-G-I) empathised with the Torturer, whereas other readers did not (F-H). I will be arguing that those who empathised with the Torturer took an actor role when perceiving the character and his behaviour, whereas those who did not took an observer role when forming an impression of the character and his behaviour. In my review of the literature in Chapter 2, my discussion focused on an element of Culpeper's (2001) model of characterisation; namely, perceiver biases (see 2.5.1). Scholars consider that certain perceiver biases might affect perceivers' processes of attribution when making inferences about people's behaviour and their personality. In particular, *the actor-observer bias* refers to the phenomenon that perceivers make different attributions

depending on whether (i) they take the role of actor and attribute the target's actions to situational forces, or whether (ii) they take the role of observer and attribute the target's actions to personal dispositions (Culpeper, 2001, p. 138). I will come back to this argument at different points when presenting my findings.

A) Empathetic responses: Participants A-B-C-E-G-I

Some factors can be said to have facilitated empathy with the Torturer for Participants A-B-C-E-G-I. A good deal of textual information about the character (i.e. internal perspective, speech and thought presentation, amount and detail of characterising information as well as naming) seems to have resulted in individualisation effects which humanised the character and made him relatable. Readers' contextual appraisal resulted in displays of understanding of the character based on situational explanations for his behaviour — he has no other choice and needs to feed his family —, and there was no verbal display of negative moral evaluation (cf. Participants F and H, who provided dispositional explanations for the Torturer's behaviour and evaluated it negatively on moral grounds).

A1) Internal perspective, discourse presentation, and plenty of characterising information: Individualisation effects

In Section 6.3.2 above, I showed potential evidence of lumping, distancing effects towards the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military which resulted from a combination of external perspective, little textual information about them and naming strategies. In contrast, the Torturer, as the other perpetrator character, is an exception to these lumping effects. First, readers are given an internal perspective on the Torturer,

whose point of view is privileged in the story (over Ahmadou's). Second, there is a good

deal of textual information about the Torturer since most of the story is focused on him

(see 4.3.3).

The only textual similarity with the other perpetrator characters is the fact that he is not

given a proper name. As a reminder, the Torturer is referred to by means of noun

phrases which reflect his professional role: *executioner*, *torturer*, and *French official*.

However, this impersonal naming was perceived differently in the case of the Torturer,

as the following conversation extract shows:

[28]   B: *yo vuelvo otra vez a lo mismo,* **las palabras son muy importantes** *(…)* **no ponerle nombre al torturador que al fin y al cabo es una persona,** *te lo marca como "el torturador", el que tortura, (…)* **cuando en realidad él está haciendo el acto que viene de atrás,** *no viene de él*
　　　　C: **Lo despersonaliza al no darle una identidad pero también lo personaliza al reflejar su propio pensamiento**==
　　　　B: == *A mí me parece que lo despersonaliza, o sea intenta despersonalizarlo pero* **en realidad lo personaliza**
　　　　C: **O lo humaniza por lo menos**
　　　　A: *Lo humaniza, eso sí.*
　　　　M: *Porque tenemos acceso a su conciencia interna, a sus pensamientos, ¿no?*
　　　　C: *Sí,* **a su condicionamiento también externo** *para hacer esa…* (164: 176)

　　　　B: I go back to the same thing, **words are very important** (…) **not giving a name to the torturer who at the end of the day is a person,** it marks him as "the torturer", the one who tortures, (…) when in fact he is performing an action that [originates somewhere else], it doesn't come from him
　　　　C: **It depersonalises him by not giving him an identity but it also personalises him by providing his own thoughts**==
　　　　B: It seems to me that it depersonalises him, I mean it tries to depersonalise it but **actually it personalises him**
　　　　C: **Or it humanises him at least**
　　　　A: It humanises him, that's right
　　　　M: Because we have access to his internal consciousness, to his thoughts, is that right?
　　　　C: Yes, **to his external conditioning** to do that…

Both Readers B and C comment first on the depersonalising effects which are brought

about by the choice of naming (i.e. *the Torturer*). However, they agree that he is in fact

personalised or humanised because his thoughts are conveyed, and also because we get to know that he is not choosing to do his job but is being forced to do it. Thus, in this case, *access to the character's thoughts and a situational explanation for his behaviour* (i.e. the external conditioning that forces him to do what he does) was more meaningful than not being given a personal name.

Evidence of individualisation effects in relation to the Torturer were found. In Extract [25] above Participant C highlighted the contrast between her ability to understand the different perpetrator characters — she was able to understand the Torturer, who is presented as "a concrete person" despite not being given a name, but she could not understand the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military as much since they were perceived as a "mass" or "entity" (see 6.3.2). Readers I and H also noticed and commented on the contrast in individualisation vs. lumping of the perpetrator characters across the three stories:

[29]   I: *Yo creo que este texto [texto 3] es, digamos, el más neutral para los pensamientos porque* **en los otros dos [textos 1 y 2] te expresa una opresión de un cargo de un alto sector, ¿no? Y aquí [texto 3] estamos hablando de una persona** *(…) pero yo creo que este texto quiere más abrir a la gente las dos posiciones* (I6, 72: 73)

(…)

H: *(…) sí, efectivamente, estoy de acuerdo contigo,* **esta es la personificación de la dictadura, antes hemos estado hablando "los militares argentinos", "la dictadura uruguaya"… Y ahora es Fulanito de Tal contra Menganito de Tal.** *Pero es que esa dictadura en nombre grande no podría llevarse a cabo sin este Fulanito, porque éste es el que está ejecutando el hecho real de la dictadura, que es la tortura.* (H6, 80: 81)

[I: I think this text [text 3] is, so to speak, the most neutral one for our thoughts [judgement] because **the other two [texts 1 and 2] were about the oppression of a powerful group of people,** weren't they? And **here [text 3] were're talking about a person** (…) but I think **this text wants to open people up to the two positions**

(…)

H: yes, indeed, I agree with you, **this is the personification of the dictatorship, before we've been talking about "the Argentinian military", "the Uruguayan dictatorship"... And now it's John Doe against Mr So-and-so.** But the thing is that that dictatorship in capital letters would never be carried out without this John Doe, because he's carrying out the real deeds of the dictatorship, which is torture.]

Individualisation might help explain the contrasting effects which the different perpretator characters had in the readers. The three perpetrators have engaged or are engaging in morally condemnable actions, and as would be expected, a negative moral evaluation would block any empathy. However, the Torturer did somehow invite readers' empathy. A plausible interpretation might be that the individualisation effects related to the Torturer result from the unique combination of narrative devices associated with this character: an internal perspective, presentation of his speech and thoughts, and plenty of characterising information. This might, in turn, make him an attractive figure or rich textual attractor in terms of Stockwell's (2009) scale.

A2) Internal perspective and discourse presentation in interaction with readers' contextual appraisal: Situational explanations for behaviour

As mentioned earlier, the data shows potential linguistic evidence of empathy between Participants A-B-C-E-G-I and the Torturer. A possible explanation is that the great deal of information about the Torturer that is given in the text — through an internal perspective and the different instances of discourse presentation — triggered a series of inferences that resulted in *situational or contextual explanations for his behaviour*. The combination of bottom-up inferences (facilitated by textual information) and top-down inferences (facilitated by readers' prior knowledge) resulted in a perception of the

character in which they considered that his context had forced him to perform this torturer job. These participants

- adopted the character's perspective, and viewed the story-world situation from his viewpoint [code `Character-oriented perspective taking`];

- attributed to him certain aspects such as features of his situation, goals and values that facilitated an understanding of the character [codes `ATT situation, ATT factors_ situational, ATT goals/needs, ATT values/beliefs`];

- perceived a strong similarity between the Torturer's situation and situations in the real world, and this similarity of experience facilitated empathy [codes `Comparison_similar` and `REB real-world references`].

Figure 6.15 below shows the frequency of these codes in relation to the Torturer (N.B. I also include the other characters in case the reader wishes to compare):

Figure 6.15. *Codes that indicate an understanding of the Torturer*

Codes Co-Occurrency Table						
	@3.Torturer	@1.Prisoners	@2.Gelman	@3.Ahmadou	@1.Uruguayan	@2.Argentinean
=1a Character-oriented PT	20	2	14	6	n/a	n/a
=4c ATT factors_situational	15	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	n/a
=4a ATT situation	13	4	2	3	n/a	n/a
=3c ATT goals/needs	13	5	n/a	n/a	n/a	1
=3b ATT values/beliefs	9	3	2	n/a	2	1
Comparison_similar	7	n/a	1	n/a	n/a	n/a
REB real-world references	5	1	n/a	1	2	n/a

As mentioned earlier, my argument is that Participants A-B-C-E-G-I, who displayed empathy with the Torturer, took an actor role when perceiving the character and his

behaviour. In 2.5.1, it was noted that the actor-observer effect has been explained in terms of differences of perspective or viewpoint: for an actor, the situation around them and its situational forces are perceptually more salient than his/her own behaviour. As a reminder, this quote summarises the point neatly:

> *By manipulating point of view and available information*, a novel can affect the salience of the various characters and the features of their situations. *Increasing the salience of a character's environment or situation* will lead the reader-observer to adopt the character's stance to a greater degree and *appreciate the myriad mitigating circumstances* that seem to govern the character's behaviour (Pollard-Gott, 1993, p. 506, as cited in Culpeper, 2001, p. 147, my emphasis).

Since the story privileges the Torturer's point of view and we are given a great deal of textual information about his situation, it seems that the character's *circumstances were made salient* to readers. Participants A-B-C-E-G-I adopted the Torturer's perspective, and displayed an understanding of the character based on particular aspects which they attributed to him, such as certain features of his situation, goals, and values (N.B. I paraphrase participants' turns for the sake of word count):

- *Situational constraints and having no choice*: he is forced to do that job to survive (A3, 118:118; B3, 164:164; I6, 125:125; G6, 13:14); he disagrees with it and is unwilling to do it (as seen in "he talked against Oran and against the son of a bitch of the colonel") (C3, 100:104; I6, 31:31).

- *Goals and needs:* earning a salary and feeding his family (wife and newborn child) are his priority (B3, 98:98; B3, 106:106); he is in such a dilemma that, whatever he decides, he is in trouble – either moral questioning or not feeding his family (C3, 48:49); he is waiting for a promotion (E3, 146:146); due to his colonial mindset his goal is for Algeria not to become independent and he is

doing the dirty work (G6, 219:219).

- *Values and beliefs:* background of having been raised in a colonial mindset during the French colonial period (G6, 96:97; G6, 231:231); he cannot perceive the scale of what he does because he has not looked at it any other way (G6, 96:97).

This provides evidence that these participants, by adopting the Torturer's perspective, were able to appreciate and take into account "the myriad mitigating circumstances that seem to govern the character's behaviour" (Pollard-Gott, 1993, p. 506). Moreover, there is evidence that empathy with the Torturer (i.e. participants' ability to imagine what his situation must be like for him, from his perspective) was facilitated by inferences that resulted from participants' real-world knowledge and experiences. The codes `Comparison_similar` and `REB real-world references` were attached to extracts of conversation that show that participants perceived a strong similarity between the Torturer's situation and relevant events and situations in the real world (N.B. again, I paraphrase participants' turns for the sake of word count):

- Knowledge about the social world: social situation and everyday issues in Spain in 2015, such as judicial staff who are forced to evict people and have no other choice (A3, 55:55); the situation of people (very close to participants) who have to put up with poor, exploitative working conditions to get a salary and feed their family (C3, 24:29; B3, 33:33; B3, 37:37); people who do have a sense of ethics and morality but have no other choice and end up doing things they do not want to do (I6, 57:57; I6, 166:166).
- Narrative knowledge about other story-worlds, such as Spanish film director

Berlanga's *The Executioner*, were used to explain their understanding of the

character's situation (see my discussion of Extract [13] in 6.2.2 above): "you feel

the anguish (...) of a man who does not want to do it but has to because his life

depends on it" (B3, 10:10).

All of this provides potential evidence of empathy in the form of a *display of*

understanding based on similarity of experience — "by claiming to have a similar

experience" and first-hand knowledge of a similar situation "a speaker [i.e. readers] can

demonstrate solid grounds for relating to what the other person is going through"

(Kuroshima and Iwata, 2016, p. 95). Participants' sense of shared experience (i.e. having

to stomach conditions one does not like in order to make a living) seems to have

facilitated an empathetic understanding of what the Torturer's situation must be like.

Rather than forming a schema-based impression of the Torturer based on prototypical

knowledge of executioners and torturers (as with the other two perpetrator characters,

see 6.3.2), participants formed a complex, *person-based impression* of the Torturer

containing personalised information gathered both from the incoming textual

information and prior knowledge (i.e. people who put up with appalling working

conditions which are at odds with their value system to make a living).

Finally, the data shows no verbal displays of blaming or negative moral evaluation by

Participants A-B-C-E-G-I toward the Torturer. Even though none of them agreed with

the practice of torture, none of them showed any moral condemnation of the character.

This contrasts strikingly with Readers F and H's perception of the Torturer, as I discuss next.

B) Non-empathetic responses: Participants F and H

Whereas Participants A-B-C-E-G-I considered that the cause of the Torturer's behaviour is located in his environment (*circumstance attribution*, Culpeper, 2001, p. 127), Participants F and H interpreted the Torturer's actions and behaviour as being located in the character himself (*person attribution*, Culpeper, 2001, p. 127). Arguably, these two readers took an observer role when forming an impression of the character, and provided dispositional explanations for his behaviour (i.e. to do with personality or dispositional factors that govern his behaviour — code `ATT factors_ dispositional`). They did not adopt the character's perspective, and it may be the case that his behaviour was more salient to them than his circumstances, a behaviour that was viewed negatively. Readers F and H's negative moral evaluation of the Torturer, together with their dehumanising perceptions of the character (see below), blocked any empathy with this character.

Lack of empathy on the part of Readers F and H can be seen through the application of the following codes, as I illustrate in the next section:

Figure 6.16. *Codes that indicate non-empathetic responses towards the Torturer*

Codes Co-Occurrency Table	
	@3.Torturer
ATT factors_ dispositional	10
ATT traits_dehumanising	18
REB moral_ negative evaluation	13

B1) The role of moral evaluation: Dehumanising perceptions

Readers' perceptions of the Torturer were, in the two group discussions, related to conceptions of *humanity or humanness*, and so (de)humanisation is a topic that emerged from the data. Remarkably, readers who were able to understand and empathise with the Torturer, as well as those who did not, resorted to notions of humanness when explaining their impressions of the character. In order to explore the potential implications of such perceptions for the readers' engagement with the Torturer, I looked up *human* and its cognates (*humano (adj.)*, *humanidad (n.)*, *humanizar (v.);* human (adj.), humanity/humanness (n.), humanise (v.)) in the transcripts. I coded the instances in which the terms were used *as attributes to evaluate* the character. Instances in which participants used the term "human" (as a noun) in the sense of "people" were disregarded.

Some participants saw the Torturer in a human light (as shown by the code `ATT traits_humanising`). In my earlier discussion of individualisation, Reader C's comment (see Extract [28] above) showed that she perceived the Torturer as humanised

because we can access his thoughts and we find out about his external conditioning. Readers G and I regarded the Torturer as *a human being with feelings* who does his job, regardless of whether he has moral values or not (I6, 77:78). Thus, some readers explictly attributed human nature to the Torturer.

In contrast, Readers F and H regarded the character as inhumane and often reported rather dehumanising perceptions of the character (as shown by the code `ATT traits_dehumanising`). Moral evaluation seems to have been the most determining factor in Readers F and H's rejection of and lack of empathy with the Torturer: they judged his behaviour as unfair and morally wrong, and they often blamed the character. In Section 3.1.4, it was mentioned that two dimensions involved within (morally-relevant) target perception are *fairness perception* and *blame allocation*. These influenced Readers F and H's positioning towards the Torturer since the two resisted and distanced themselves from the character. In what follows I show evidence of dehumanising perceptions by Participants F and H, in turn.

Participant F often attributed negative traits to the Torturer, which strongly suggests a perception of the Torturer as dehumanised:

Table 6.4. *Evidence of Participant F's dehumanising perceptions of the Torturer*

[30]	*Lo que **ha eliminado** es **cualquier tipo de humanidad que tuviera*** (F6, 47:47)	What **he has eliminated** is **any traces of humanity he ever had**
[31]	*A mí no me parece que puedas separar tu **humanidad** de eso, de cualquier tipo de **empatía (...) no es persona de verdad*** (F6, 55:55)	I don't think you can separate your **humanity** from any type of **empathy (...) he is not a real human being**
[32]	***no hay ninguna manera de justificar** lo que no tiene **ningún tipo de humanidad*** (F6, 162:162)	**there's no way to justify what doesn't have any type of humanity**

[33]	*A mí es que precisamente esa parte del texto me parece un poco... un poco optimista porque si la conversación que tiene consigo mismo en el espejo, es que no sé, tiene como **comportamiento de sociópata sin ningún tipo de empatía*** (F6, 37:37)	To me precisely that part of the text seems a bit... a bit optimistic because if the conversation he has with himself in front of the mirror, I don't know, **he has the behaviour of a sociopath without any kind of empathy**
[34]	*a mí me parece, tal y como está escrito el relato que no se está intentando justificar, es más, que la primera parte del texto (...) es imaginada (...) pero es que eso no es lo que dice él, eso lo está interpretando el autor. **A mí me parece que en ningún momento se está justificando a sí mismo y eso es lo que más miedo da en realidad, porque si por lo menos mostrara algún atisbo de valor moral o de humanidad o lo que sea, pero es que no...*** (F6, 112:114)	the way the story is written I don't think he's trying to justify himself. What's more, the first part of the text (...) is imagined (...) but that's not what he says, that's what the author is interpreting. I think **he's not trying to justify himself at any point, and that's really what is most scary, because if at least he showed some traces of moral values or humanity or whatever, but he doesn't...**
[35]	*A mí me parece más eso, **el comportamiento de una persona sociópata,** que al fin y al cabo lo que es **su día a día no está basada en ninguna ética ni moral** sino en rutinas y en convencionalismos si no — ehh — mira **el círculo de Hitler** (...) ¿Qué **humanidad** tenía esa gente? Me parece que el funcionario este y esta gente eran exactamente lo mismo, o sea, **gente sin ningún tipo de empatía ni de humanidad*** (F6, 59:59)	It looks to me more like **the behaviour of a sociopath,** whose **daily life is not based on any ethics or morality** but on routines and conventionalisms. Consider **Hitler's circle** (...) What **humanity** did those people have? It seems to me that this civil servant and those people were exactly the same, that is**, people without any type of empathy or humanity**
[36]	*ese **sadismo,** que es que roza, o sea es que **parece de sociópata. Un sociópata no siente empatía por otro,** entonces la parte de la justificación me parece muy imaginativa* (F6, 204:205)	this **sadism** is close to, I mean it seems like a sociopath's [sadism]. **A sociopath who doesn't feel any empathy for another,** so the extract about the justification seems very imaginative
[37]	*este señor... o se está autoengañando de una manera loable, y a mí me parece difícil que este señor mantenga unas conversaciones así consigo mismo y que luego sea capaz de sentarse a hablar con él, es que me parece de una **persona que no tiene ningún tipo de empatía*** (F6, 214:214)	this man... either he's deluding himself in a praiseworthy manner, and to me it seems difficult for this man to have conversations with himself and then be able to sit down and talk to him, it seems like a **person with no kind of empathy**

The extracts show that, according to her interpretation, the Torturer *lacks moral values and empathy*. In her view, the character does not show any humanness, and this was morally condemned as unjustifiable. Moreover, she explicitly equated humanness with

the ability to empathise. This perceived lack of empathy and moral values[77] is, to her, like the behaviour of a sociopath. Her perception of the Torturer suggests mental-illness dehumanisation, and possibly animalistic dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006). Thus, Reader F denied the Torturer full humanness on the basis of a perceived lack of moral sensibility and empathic skills.

Similarly, Reader H delegitimised the Torturer's behaviour, but with an important difference. Whereas Reader F's dehumanisation of the Torturer was more of a mental-illness type of dehumanisation, Reader H's perception of the Torturer shows a combination of mechanistic and animalistic dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006):

Table 6.5. *Evidence of Participant H's dehumanising perceptions of the To*rturer

[38]	*Yo pienso que demuestra la miseria del ser humano. Hay humanos, **hay personas sin escrúpulos.** Porque tú puedes negarte a hacer eso (…) **Siempre hay otra opción.** (H6, 22:22)*	I think he shows the meanness of human beings. There are human beings, **there are people who have no scruples.** Because you can reject doing that (…) **There is always another option.**
[39]	***lo degradante de este texto** para mí es, ya no que estés torturando a este pobre hombre, si no **que luego tengas la... no sé cómo llamarlo... la capacidad de ponerte a contarle las tonterías de tus problemas familiares** y de si no has dormido porque tu niño llora, lo pesada que es tu mujer, y el jefe que te está puteando, ¿y tú qué estás haciéndole a este pobre hombre? (H6, 23:23)*	**what is most degrading about this text** to me, it's not that you're torturing this poor man, but the fact that **you have the... I don't know what to call it... the capacity to get to tell him about the trivialities of your family problems,** that you haven't had any sleep because your baby cries, how tiresome your wife is, and that your boss is screwing you, and what are you doing to this poor man?
[40]	*entonces la **crueldad máxima** para mí es decir después de todo lo que le ha hecho a este pobre hombre, **se sienta y le cuenta la historia banal de que no ha dormido,** imagínate cómo está este pobrecito [Ahmadou] al que le han hecho estas cosas (H6, 185:185)*	so the **highest cruelty** to me is that after everything he's done to this poor man, **he sits down and tells him all about the banal story that he has not had any sleep,** imagine how the poor one [Ahmadou] who's got these things been done to him must be [feeling]
[41]	*la primera parte obviamente te pone el antecedente 'yo cuando me levanto soy una persona pero ahora voy a ser otra porque*	the first bit obviously gives you the antecedent 'when I get up I am another person but now I'm going to be another

[77] It is interesting to add that Reader F reported that the Torturer's lack of moral values is what is *most scary* to her (see section 6.4).

*voy al trabajo y ¿por qué tengo que desdoblarme en dos personalidades? Porque no estoy de acuerdo con una y me estoy justificando' y yo es lo que pienso. 'Me estoy justificando, sé que estoy haciendo algo que no es correcto en el fondo y lógicamente me tengo que justificar de alguna manera' pero es un torturador y **es un cruel total, porque lo demuestra al final: 'me siento y le cuento mi vida. Por el amor de Dios, si este hombre está machacado. Y soy yo el que le he hecho eso'.** (H6, 190:191)*

person because I'm going to work and why do I have to split myself into two personalities? Because I don't agree with one and I'm justifying myself' and that's what I think. 'I am justifying myself, I know that I'm doing something which deep down is not right and logically I have to justify myself some way or another' but he is a torturer and **he's completely cruel, because he shows that at the end: 'I sit down and I tell him about my life. For God's sake, this man is devastated. And it's me who has done that'**

[42]   *demuestra **tal falta de sentimiento** (H6, 61:61)*

he shows **such a lack of feeling**

[43]   *La clave de lo que tú [Participante F] estás diciendo, **que no tiene empatía, la clave es la frase de 'mira con estupor como diciendo es que no me comprende lo que le estoy haciendo, es que éste es mi trabajo'. Ahí me demuestra la frialdad, la falta de empatía, la falta de conexión con la persona a la que está torturando.** (H6, 216:217)*

The key to what you're [Participant F] saying, **that he has not empathy, the key is the sentence 'he's astonished as if saying he doesn't understand what I'm doing**, this is my job'. There he **shows me the coldness, the lack of empathy, the lack of connection with the person he's torturing.**

[44]   *No. Eso es autojustificación, propio **egoísmo,** es decir perdóname, torturador, estás machacando a un ser humano y por mucho que lo intentes, no te justifiques (H6, 64:64)*

No. That's self-justification, **selfishness**, I mean, excuse me, Torturer, you're shattering this human being and however much you try, don't justify yourself

[45]   *Yo al torturador en este caso sólo sé que es **egoísta,** que demuestra el egoísmo del ser humano, es decir, 'yo me tengo que auto-justificar y tengo que buscar el recurso que sea para justificar que lo que estoy haciendo está mal y que yo soy consciente de que lo que estoy haciendo está mal' (H6, 70:70)*

In this case I only know that he's **selfish,** that he shows human beings' selfishness, that is, 'I have to justify myself and I have to look for a way to justify that what I'm doing is wrong and I am aware that what I'm doing is wrong'

Reader H's comments display a rather mechanistic dehumanisation of the character because she attributes him *superficiality*, a *lack of warmth and emotionality*, and a *lack of individual agency* or a refusal to use agency. In other words, the Torturer was given traits similar to those of an automaton. Her perception of the character also shows features of an animalistic sort of dehumanisation in that she attributed the Torturer a *lack of empathy and moral sensibility* (but, unlike Reader F, she did not frame this as a mental disorder).

In short, these processes of dehumanisation can account for Readers F and H's non-empathetic engagement with the Torturer. Both F and H strongly disassociated themselves from the character on moral grounds because, according to them, there is no justification for what he does, and so they evaluated him negatively and attributed to him less-than-human traits. As Haslam puts it, "people can be dehumanised by the perception that they lack prosocial values and/or that their values are incongruent with one's ingroup values" (2006, p. 255). In denying the Torturer full membership of the human species, the possibility for empathy and understanding was arguably blocked.

B2) The role of internal perspective and discourse presentation in interaction with readers'
moral evaluation

The internal perspective on the Torturer (i.e. access to his thoughts, feelings, motivations, etc.) produced different interpretations depending on readers' moral evaluation of the character. This internal perspective and access to his consciousness seems to have facilitated an empathetic understanding of the character *only in so far* as readers' moral evaluation was not negative (see Section A above). In my data, a moral negative evaluation seems to override the potential for empathy of narrative devices.

Participants' interpretation of the Torturer's speech and thought was consistent with their perception of the character. Readers F and H's negative moral evaluation of and positioning against the Torturer could have determined their interpretation of the textual information associated with the character's internal perspective and the different instances of discourse presentation. The different instances of discourse presentation

provided Readers F and H with further evidence that supported their negative assessment of the Torturer (N.B. I provide the interpretations of Readers F and H as well as those of participants who displayed empathy with the Torturer to better illustrate the contrast):

Table 6.6. *Participants' interpretation of the Torturer's discourse presentation*

Instance of discourse presentation	Readers' interpretations
Conversation which the Torturer has with himself in front of the mirror (Direct Speech)	Reader F was the only reader who interpreted this as coming from the authorial narrator and not from the Torturer himself. Thus, she attributed to him the behaviour of a sadist sociopath with no empathy, morality or humanity since he never even considers whether he should do what he does
	Reader H interpreted this instance of speech presentation as evidence that the Torturer is aware that what he does is wrong and he tries to justify himself so as to liberate himself from his responsibility. She attributed to him a split personality and selfishness
	The readers who had a more positive disposition toward the Torturer saw this instance of speech presentation in a different way — he is trying to convince himself, despite having double standards, and feels remorse
When the Torturer feels astonished and a sense of injustice (Internal Narration)	Reader F interpreted this as coming from the author — the author's optimism to think that the Torturer even considers these things. In her view this was not the Torturer's own discourse, and so the character was seen as having eliminated any traces of humanness
	Reader H reported feeling amazed at the Torturer's feeling of injustice, and this showed his coldness and lack of empathy
	Those readers who had a more positive disposition toward the Torturer saw this instance of Internal Narration as a way to clean up his sense of moral wrongdoing

When the Torturer talks to Ahmadou about his problems (Narrator's Representation of Speech Act shifting into Free Indirect Speech)	Reader H reported that this was the most degrading aspect of the story — having the capacity to talk to Ahmadou about these trivialities after torturing him shows the greatest cruelty and sadism
	Those readers who saw the Torturer in a more understanding light, interpreted this instance of speech presentation as showing that (i) he disagrees with his job since "he talked against Oran, and against the son of a bitch of a colonel" who ordered him to torture people, (ii) he is externally conditioned and forced to do it (and this humanises him), (iii) he is doing it temporarily while he gets a promotion, (iv) he distances himself from the torturer role and becomes a normal person who needs to let go of tensions, hardships and family burdens (see section A above)

The table shows that the Torturer's discourse presentation was interpreted in strikingly different ways depending on readers' dispositions toward the character. These differences in interpretation raise questions about the possibility that readers' positioning greatly influenced their interpretation of these instances of discourse presentation *depending on whether the character had been morally pre-approved or not*. Most readers attributed to the Torturer a moral conscience and a struggle to do what he is forced to do. On the other hand, those who condemned the Torturer on moral grounds (Readers F and H) took the instances of discourse presentation as yet further evidence that he has no sense of morality because he does not even consider what he does, and so he is seen as a sociopath (F), or that he knows it is wrong but does it nevertheless, and so he is seen as cruel and sadistic (H). Readers F and H made *correspondent inferences* (see 2.5.1) about the Torturer's behaviour and his personal disposition (as a sociopath and a cruel sadist). In the case of these two readers, it can be concluded that it is very likely that negative moral evaluation did override the empathy potential of both internal perspective and discourse presentation.

6.4 Responses other than empathy

Responses other than empathy were also reported by participants. When responses are not strictly emotional I use the code `Responses`. The extracts that were coded as `Responses_emotional` include explicit emotional labels that were articulated by participants. The emotional responses presented below necessarily involve feelings which are *different* from the emotional experience being attributed to characters, since empathetic responses have already been discussed earlier in this chapter. However, I do mention empathy when relevant.

Participants reported some character-oriented emotional reactions that do not involve affective congruence (i.e. are *not* the same as the experiences they attribute to characters). For example, these responses range from *sympathy and sadness* for victim characters, to *fear and astonishment* toward the Torturer. Reactions which are strictly speaking not emotional include *solidarity* toward victims and *rebelliousness* toward perpetrators.

Sympathy is an emotional response consisting in feeling sorrow or concern for another (Eisenberg, 2000) (see 2.3.2). On several occasions participants expressed sympathy for the victims and a tendency to side with the weakest party in a conflict situation (see 6.3.1 (C)). Evidence of sympathetic responses (i.e., sorrow and pity) were found in Reader B's comments regarding the Prisoners (see Extract [46] below), Gelman (Extract [47]), and Ahmadou (Extract [48]):

[46]   *Me hace sentirme muy pequeña, **me da pena** porque creo que es así, [los prisioneros] se han inventado este lenguaje como una manera para no perderse en el 'no somos nada', ¿sabes? Y en realidad **lo que me produce es pena,** que haya en el mundo gente que esté por encima de otra que les haga sentirse así. Dice "condenados a esta soledad se salvaron", pero al fin y al cabo han tenido que inventarse un método para no estar tan solos y para no morirse, morirse de desaparecer para el resto de la sociedad. Que me parece que es incluso la peor venganza que se le puede hacer a alguien: matarle en vida, y **me hace sentir pues triste.*** (B1, 65:69)

> [It makes me feel very little, **I feel pity/sorry** because I think it's that way, they [the prisoners] have made up that language in order not to get lost in the 'we're nothing', you know? And actually **it makes me feel sorry** the fact that there are people in this world who are more powerful than others and make them feel that way. It says "thus condemned to solitude, they survived", but at the end of the day they have had to come up with a way in order not to be that lonely and not to die, to die in the sense of disappearing for the rest of society. Which to me seems even the worst revenge that can be taken against someone: (…) and so **it makes me feel sad**]

[47]   ***Me da más pena el tema del padre que sobrevive al hijo*** *que no sólo la dictadura militar* (B2, 181:181)

> [**I feel more sorrow for the father who outlives his son**, not only for the fact that it is a dictatorship]

[48]   *Sí que es verdad que **te da mucha pena** la frase del final y sobre todo lo de "no decía nada" que es lo que dice ella [D], no decía nada pero sí que lo estaba diciendo. Tú estás viendo a una persona que está hecha un desecho no por sí misma sino por otra persona, por una situación* (B3, 266:267)

> [It's true that the last sentence **makes you feel pity/sorry** and especially the bit "he would say nothing", as she [D] says, he would say nothing but he was in fact saying it. You see a person who is shattered not because of himself but because of another person, because of a situation]

These self-reported affective states of sorrow and sadness indicate that Reader B is feeling *for* the characters rather than *with* the characters, and so these responses are different from empathy. In addition, *solidarity* was another response, attitude or form of engagement that Reader C expressed in relation to the Prisoners:

[49]   *A mí, así de primeras toda la situación esta de dictadura, de represión, pues no es una situación en la que me haya visto, obviamente, que me haya visto tan reducida mi persona a la nada, pero* **me hace sentir solidaridad con los personajes** *y luego* **rebeldía interna** *hhh* (C1, 63:63)

> [To me this situation of dictatorship, of repression, is not one that I have found myself in, obviously, that I've found myself so reduced to nothingness, but **it makes me feel solidarity with the characters** and then **inner rebelliousness** hhh]

[50]   **me identifico** *quizás más con... quizás* **la solidaridad** *esa que he dicho antes* **de ponerme en la piel,** *se me hace más fácil* **empatizar con** *estos personajes que con el ente que es la dictadura uruguaya* (C1, 144:144)

> [perhaps **I identify** more with... perhaps **that solidarity of putting myself in their skin** that I talked about before, I find it easier to **empathise with** these characters than with the entity which is the Uruguayan dictatorship]

Extract [50] is particularly interesting because it suggests that different kinds of responses (see bold) might have taken place simultaneously. Reader C starts by reporting identification, but this false start is aborted. Then she talks about solidarity in the sense of putting herself in the character's situation (which might suggest implicit potential linguistic evidence of empathy), and finally she reports empathy explicitly. It is not easy to establish how empathy interacts with other kinds of response in this reader's engagement with the Prisoners. However, the extract could suggest that even though identification, solidarity and empathy are different phenomena they might have occurred together.

Regarding perpetrator characters, Readers F and H expressed fear and astonishment toward the Torturer. Participant F expressed fear at what she perceived as a lack of humanness and moral capacity on the part of the Torturer (see Extracts [51] and [52]

below), whereas H reported feeling "absolutely astonished" by the Torturer's behaviour

(see Extract [53]):

[51]   *A mí me parece que en ningún momento se está justificando a sí mismo y **eso es lo***
         ***que más miedo da** en realidad, porque si por lo menos mostrara algún atisbo de*
         valor moral o de humanidad o lo que sea, pero es que no... (F6, 113:113)

> [It seems to me that he is not justifying himself at any point and actually
> **that is what's most frightening**, because if at least he showed any traces
> of moral value or humanity or whatever, but he does not...]

[52]   *yo creo que ni se lo plantea de si debería hacerlo o no debería hacerlo, es que eso **lo***
         ***que más miedo da** de la historia* (F6, 127:127)

> [I think he doesn't even consider whether he should or should not do it,
> and **that's what's most scary** about the story]

[53]   *la primera parte una auto-justificación, **me queda absolutamente alucinada** el tema*
         de que se extraña de que la víctima le odie, como diciendo '¿cómo me puede odiar, si
         es que es mi trabajo?' (H6, 243:243)

> [the first part is self-justification, **I am absolutely astonished** at the fact
> that he is surprised that the victim hates him, as if saying 'how can he hate
> me, if it's simply my job?']

As seen in 6.3.3, these two readers were the ones that felt most negatively about the

Torturer, and my analysis showed evidence of dehumanising perceptions. In Extracts [51]

and [52] Reader F reports that what she perceives as a lack of moral values is what is

most scary to her. Haslam (2006, p. 254) mentions that the emotions that most

commonly accompany dehumanisation are fear and contempt. In addition, these two

readers often reported a complete lack of understanding of his behaviour, and so

Reader H's feeling of astonishment (Extract [53]) is in keeping with her general response

to the character.

The responses that have just been discussed can be labelled as *fictional emotions* (Dijkstra et al., 1994) or *narrative emotions* (Oatley, 1994) since they are directed at story-world characters. Apart from that, emotional responses were also found in relation to aspects of the story-world other than existents (i.e., characters), such as *story-world events*. For example, Reader A reported feeling fear about getting to a situation similar to the one the Prisoners are going through:

[54]   *A mí lo que me provoca es **mucho miedo, miedo de que nosotros lleguemos a esa situación*** (A1, 86:86)

>   [What it [the text] produces in me is **a lot of fear, fear that we get to that situation**]

[55]   *Ese es el **miedo**, que nosotros [A y E] somos mayores y quizás a lo mejor ya no, pero que vosotros [B, C, D] que sois jóvenes que **os pase a vosotros lo que le pasó a nuestros abuelos**, porque nosotros eso no lo hemos vivido pero nuestros abuelos sí lo han vivido* (A1, 90:90)

>   [That is the **fear**, that we [A and E] are now old enough and perhaps we don't, but you [B, C, D] who are still young might **go through what happened to our grandparents**, because we haven't experienced that but our grandparents did]

She articulates her fear at the risk that the same might happen to them, and expresses (self-oriented) concern about herself and the other group participants. Thus, her fear was directed at story-world events and situations (i.e., dictatorial regime). Another type of response that was also oriented to story-world events was *sadness*, as seen in the following quote by Reader C when discussing Story *2.Gelman*:

[56]   *Este texto en concreto **me ha dado mucha más tristeza** que el anterior [texto 1] porque lo relaciono con mi propia historia familiar, que mataron gente en la dictadura [Franquista]* (C2, 142:142)

>   [This text in particular **has made me much sadder** than the previous one [text 1] because I relate it to my own family history, people from my family were killed during the [Francoist] dictatorship]

Her sadness is oriented toward the story-world events (i.e., dictatorship) and the very situation Gelman is going through (i.e., his relatives having been abused as political retaliation). Her sadness is caused by the similarity between the textual events and her family history since some of her relatives were killed during the Francoist dictatorship (1936-1975) in Spain (codes `Responses_emotional, Comparison_similar` and `REB personal/family history`).

Regarding the factors potentially involved in these responses, in 2.5.3 it was noted that readerly reactions depend on readers' perceptions and inferences about story-world events and characters, and might involve some form of appraisal. Indeed, the above responses reflect individual readers' *contextual appraisal*; that is, the way they perceived and assessed story-world events and characters. Moreover, some of the responses reflect the influence of the *observer-target relationship* given that sometimes explicit links are made, and similarity is established, between the story-world and readers' experiential background (e.g., real-world events, family history, etc.).

The above discussion indicates how different types of responses (emotional or otherwise) can occur simultaneously with, before or after empathetic and non-empathetic responses when readers experience story-worlds. Thus, empathy is simply one response within a larger spectrum of possible responses toward narratives.

6.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has presented the analysis of my participants' responses to characters during the two focus group discussions. First, I addressed the issue of what counts as

evidence of empathetic responses, and I have offered a typology of potential linguistic evidence of empathetic responses that ranges from more to less explicit instances. Later on, I discussed the role of textual and readerly factors in readers' (non-)empathetic engagement with characters. I did so in relation to the empathy patterns that emerged in the discussions: (i) empathetic engagement with the victim characters; (ii) non-empathetic engagement with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military; and (iii) mixed responses towards the Torturer. Finally, I have presented other responses that participants reported during the group discussions.

The next and final chapter is the conclusion chapter, where I point out the implications of my findings, contributions and limitations of my study, as well as suggestions for further research.

7. Chapter 7. Conclusions

7.0 Orientation to Chapter 7

This final chapter gathers the different conclusions that have been reached from my study. First, I provide a summary of the whole project (7.1), and then discuss the key findings that result from the insights gained from both the textual analysis of Galeano's stories and the analysis of reader responses (7.2). After that, I discuss my study's contribution in relation to narrative empathy and empirical stylistics (7.3). Later on, I spell out the limitations of my project (7.4), and suggest some recommendations for further research (7.5).

7.1 Thesis summary

Before moving on to the conclusions, I briefly restate the aims and methodological approach of my study. This project has aimed to investigate narrative empathy from an empirical stylistic perspective. In particular, it has examined how various textual and readerly factors seem to have influenced my participants' responses to characters in three of Galeano's stories. My research questions were concerned with (i) the potential of certain narrative techniques in the stories to affect readers' empathy with characters (RQ1); (ii) how real readers respond to characters (RQ2); and (iii) the interplay between textual and readerly factors in participants' (non-)empathetic responses (RQ3). The theoretical position underpinning my study establishes that readerly experiences are the result of the dynamic interaction between incoming textual information and the reader's prior knowledge and experiences.

Regarding methodology, I adopted an overall qualitative research approach. First, I conducted a stylistic-narratological analysis of three of Galeano's stories, and identified the empathy potential of some narrative techniques that had been previously mentioned in the literature as being involved in empathy effects — point of view, characters' discourse and emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques. Then, I took an empirical approach to readers' responses, given the limited amount of previous empirical research on the relationship between textual and readerly factors and empathy effects on readers. Two focus group discussions were conducted with a total of 9 Spanish readers. Finally, I analysed readers' discussions thematically with the aid of Atlas.ti. I examined the potential linguistic evidence of empathy, and the textual and readerly factors that seem to be involved in participants' responses.

7.2 Discussion of findings: Revisiting the research questions

This section presents the key findings of this study, which result from the insights gained after analysing the two datasets (i.e., the textual analysis of Galeano's short stories (Chapter 4) and the analysis of reader responses (Chapter 6)). In this section I discuss the ways in which these findings enable me to answer Research Questions 2 and 3:

2. How do readers engage with characters in a selection of Galeano's short stories?
3. What is the interplay between textual and readerly factors in readers' empathetic and non-empathetic engagement with characters?

It should be noted that in the discussion that follows I tend to group textual factors together because most of the time I have identified a cumulative effect; that is, the

various different textual factors seem to have worked cumulatively to bring about certain responses (see 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and also 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3). Therefore, I tend not to isolate specific narrative devices. My findings indicate a more organic relationship between factors than is sometimes acknowledged in the narrative empathy literature. This means that in my study narrative empathy results from the cumulative effect of various textual devices. Thus, it would be limiting to conceive of (potential) empathy triggers and barriers as comprising lists of separate factors that work in isolation (see also 7.3.1).

7.2.1 RQ2: Readers' engagement with characters

In 4.4, I highlighted the potential contrast in the alignment of role bias and textual devices in facilitating and blocking empathy with the different characters. As shown in 6.3, this was largely the case in the group discussions, as seen in the empathy patterns that emerge from the reader data:

a) Readers' empathetic engagement with victim characters: Role bias and textual devices pointing in the same direction

In 4.4, I mentioned that the combination and potential cumulative effect of several narrative techniques had the potential to facilitate empathy with victim characters. These characters are textually shaped through access to and information about their internal states; access to their emotions and large amount of emotional information (whether actual or hypothetical); presentation of their speech and thought (whether actual or hypothetical); a close relationship of the narrator with the characters; and characterisation through individual proper names and implicit status as political

dissidents. In addition, the distressing experiences they undergo and their role as (political) victims is likely to facilitate a favourable moral positioning. This potential for empathy identified earlier seems to materialise in the reader response data (see 6.3.1). Readers displayed an empathetic involvement with the victim characters, as well as other responses (i.e., sympathy, sadness, solidarity; see 6.4) which indicate that they aligned themselves with these characters in the three stories.

b) Readers' non-empathetic engagement with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military: Role bias and textual devices pointing in the same direction

In 4.4, I suggested that the combination and potential cumulative effect of several narrative techniques pointed towards a potential blockage of empathy with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military. These characters are textually constructed through an external perspective; distancing narratorial commentary and (moral and socio-political) evaluation; absence of both discourse and emotion presentation; and characterisation through collective names and very little textual information (i.e., only their actions) possibly resulting in lumping, distancing effects. This, together with their actions and role as perpetrators, may bring about a negative moral evaluation and positioning against them which may, in turn, hinder empathy. In the actual group discussions (see 6.3.2), evidence of non-empathetic engagement with the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military was found mostly in the negative moral and socio-political evaluations that were articulated by participants.

c) Readers' empathetic and non-empathetic engagement with the Torturer: Role bias and textual devices pointing in different directions and the same direction

In 4.4, it was found that the Torturer was the most complex character in terms of potential empathetic responses because there is room for different responses:

Empathetic engagement

One possibility is that the narrative techniques and role bias work in opposite directions to facilitate empathy with the Torturer, due to narrative devices such as a strong focus on his perspective, and access to his internal states given through emotion, speech and thought presentation. This access to his consciousness makes it possible to infer that the Torturer has some victim characteristics (e.g., emotional conflict and frustration; need to feed his family; sense of injustice at Ahmadou's hatred). In 4.4, I argued that this is, crucially, where *textual linguistic choices can make more of a difference*. The information gained through exposure to his perspective and inner states indirectly gives him some victim status (or at least some mitigating factors), which goes in the opposite direction to his role bias as perpetrator (since it would hinder empathy on moral grounds). Surprisingly, this was true for the majority of participants: linguistic evidence of empathy with the Torturer was found in the reports by Readers A, B, C, E, G and I. This has been explained through the lens of the actor-observer bias (see Culpeper, 2001, p. 138). It can be argued that these readers, by adopting the Torturer's perspective and feeling some degree of shared experience, took an actor position and ended up attributing his actions and behaviour to situational or contextual forces. In short, he was seen as both victim and product of his environment.

Non-empathetic engagement

Another possibility which was identified in 4.4 is that the role bias and narrative techniques might push in the same direction to bring about non-empathetic responses due to an implicit distancing ideological viewpoint; and characterisation through naming (i.e., being referred to by his professional role as torturer) and habitual actions (i.e., torture). This, together with his role as perpetrator, may result in negative moral evaluations and positioning against him which may, in turn, hinder empathy. Therefore, in 4.4 I suggested that it would be expected that negative moral evaluations would very likely block empathy with the character. Quite the reverse, only two participants out of nine (F and H) condemned the Torturer morally (see 6.3.3). Again, this has been explained in the light of the actor-observer bias. Arguably these two readers, by *not* adopting the Torturer's perspective and strongly rejecting him morally, took an observer position and attributed his actions and behaviour to his own disposition (e.g., as cruel, sadistic, psychopath-like). Particularly interesting were these two readers' perceptions of the Torturer in relation to a lack of humanness: their reports suggest mental illness, animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation of the character.

In short, as largely expected, the contrast between Stories 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Story 3 on the other, produced different responses. Stories 1 and 2 have clear victims and absent perpetrators and, as expected, readers displayed empathy with the victims and resistance towards the perpetrators. The same pattern applies to Story 3 regarding Participants F and H, who positioned themselves in favour of Ahmadou and against the Torturer. What was most unexpected is that a large number of participants (6 out of 9) displayed empathy with the Torturer. The latter has been explained in relation to the

unique combination of narrative devices that shape the Torturer (i.e., strong focus on his perspective and internal states), which seem to have enabled these 6 readers to adopt the Torturer's viewpoint, take an actor role, and attribute his actions to the situation — all of which despite the role bias against him.

7.2.2 RQ3: Interplay between textual and readerly factors

Attempting to answer RQ3 (i.e., the interplay between textual and readerly factors in readers' (non-)empathetic engagement with characters) is challenging because in some cases I have been unable to pinpoint what the relationship between textual and readerly factors might be. However, in other cases the data has revealed specific relationships between factors in relation to certain responses. These relationships are, of course, a matter of interpretation and might be subject to alternative explanations. Another issue is that in some cases findings cannot be generalised even across my dataset. However, some trends can be pointed out with the appropriate nuances and caveats.

a) Participants' humanising approach to characters: Characterising inferences driven, to different extents, by schematic and textual information

Readers took a humanising approach to characters (see Culpeper, 2001, pp. 6-7), meaning that, when encountering these textual entities, readers attempted to interpret characters "in large part with *knowledge about people* acquired through [their] real life experiences" (Culpeper and Fernandez-Quintanilla, 2017, p. 95, emphasis added). This finding is consistent with the claim that readers mentally represent characters' traits, goals, beliefs and emotions in a similar way as they do real people's (Gernsbacher et al., 1992; Graesser et al., 1994). Thus, my participants drew on their real-life knowledge of

people when forming impressions of characters, which can be partly explained by the non-fictional status of the stories.

However, a contrast was found in the extent to which textual information interacts with readers' schematic knowledge to create different perceptions of characters. I illustrate this contrast with two examples:

- On the one hand, the little amount of textual information about the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military seems to have resulted in schema-based impressions. The little textual information given about them in the stories (i.e., only their actions) seems to have facilitated inferences and attribution processes that were largely based on readers' social schemata (including specific historical knowledge) about dictators and the military. As I showed in 6.3.2, readers' mental representation of these characters can be said to be mainly the result of top-down processes which resulted in schema-based or category-based impressions.

- On the other hand, a greater amount of incoming textual information about the other perpetrator character (i.e., the Torturer) interacted with participants' social schemata to facilitate person-based impressions of the Torturer. As can be seen in 6.3.3, participants' impressions of the Torturer seem to reflect a more balanced combination of bottom-up, textually-driven inferences and top-down, knowledge-driven inferences.

b) Moral positioning: The role of role bias in favour and against characters despite having little or no textual information about them

The kind of textual information (i.e., little or none) given about characters in some cases worked hand in hand with the role biases identified in 4.4 to trigger different perceptions of characters:

- The little amount of textual information given about the Uruguayan Dictatorship and the Argentinian Military (i.e., only their actions) worked hand in hand with the role bias against them. Participants' schema-based impressions of these characters (see (a) immediately above) were strongly associated with negative moral and socio-political evaluations, all of which resulted in non-empathetic responses.

- The lack of textual information given about victims' past actions (before the story-world events took place) was taken to be meaningful by participants (see 6.3.1(B)). However, *despite this absence* of information, readers sided with and took a favourable moral positioning in relation to the victims. I suggested that this could reflect a culturally-conditioned predisposition to side with the weak party in conflict situations. This might only be applicable to the context of these stories where readers' attention seems to be directed to perpetrators' actions rather than to victims' actions: after all, the stories focus on the harrowing experiences undergone by victims (i.e., imprisonment, loss of family, torture) as recipients of perpetrators' actions.

Taken together, this may suggest that the role biases in favour of victims and against perpetrators had a significant influence since participants' responses were largely in

keeping with them. Readers might have pre-approved the victims because of their role as victims, and they might have pre-disapproved of the perpetrators because of their role as perpetrators. The conflict in the stories (i.e., the clash between the goals and actions of victim characters and perpetrator characters) resulted in different positionings in relation to characters. These positionings seem to be mostly linked to readers' moral evaluation regarding the actions of perpetrators and the negative experiences inflicted upon the victims. However, an exception to this was the empathetic stance taken by Participants A, B, C, E, G and I toward the Torturer.

c) Moral positioning: Access to characters' consciousness tends to facilitate empathy, but a negative moral evaluation can override this potential

In my data, readers' empathy with characters tends to happen when the texts allow access to characters' consciousness and mental states — e.g., their emotions, speech and thought — whether actual or hypothetical, and whether achieved through internal *or external* focalisation. For example, Story *2.Gelman* offers external focalisation: the narrator is the holder of the viewpoint and the focaliser, whereas Gelman is the focalised; however, the narrator functions as a closeness device in speculating about Gelman's inner states. The group discussions offer evidence of a rather emotional kind of empathy with Gelman in the case of some readers, likely due to the rich emotion presentation in the story. In this respect, my findings can add some nuance to claims made in the stylistic and narratological literature about the potential of an internal perspective to facilitate empathy — an external perspective, given an adequate narrator, can also facilitate empathetic responses.

An interesting finding was that it is possible for textual devices to facilitate empathy with characters that exhibit morally repugnant behaviours *in so far as readers' moral evaluation is withheld*. Textual devices seem to have made more of a difference in facilitating an empathetic involvement between Participants A, B, C, E, G and I and the Torturer (despite the role bias against him and the likely moral rejection associated with it). The cumulative effect of the narrative techniques that shape the Torturer can be said to have facilitated empathy, as seen in these participants' (i) adoption of the Torturer's perspective, and (ii) sense of shared experience. I accounted for this in terms of the actor-observer bias, and argued that these participants seem to have taken an actor role whereby they provided situational explanations for the Torturer's actions and behaviour.

But access to characters' consciousness did not always facilitate empathy with characters. An important caveat to consider is that in some cases the presence of readers' *negative moral evaluation seems to override the empathy potential of textual devices* (e.g., the access to characters' consciousness), as in the case of Readers F and H in relation to the Torturer (see 6.3.3(B)). Readers F and H's negative moral evaluation seems to have outweighed the potential for empathy of the narrative devices that characterise the Torturer, and so their non-empathetic response was consistent with the role bias against him. Evidence was found of non-empathetic engagement between these two readers and the Torturer, as seen in (i) their morally-condemning judgments and dehumanising perceptions, and (ii) their *not* adopting the character's perspective. I have argued that these two readers took an observer role and explained the Torturer's behaviour in terms of his personality and disposition. Thus, moral evaluation (as part of contextual appraisal) played an important role in blocking empathy with this character.

This finding is consistent with the scholarly views reviewed in 3.1 that empathy is a highly context-dependent phenomenon which is morally sensitive.

d) Observer-target relationship: The role of participants' autobiographical alignment and similarity of experience in facilitating empathy

The degree of consonance between (i) participants' real-life knowledge and experiences, and (ii) the experiences they attribute to characters, can partly explain two of the empathy patterns found in the data — empathetic engagement with Gelman and the Torturer. I relate this finding to one of the top-down control mechanisms that can influence empathy: autobiographical alignment (as part of observer-target/reader-character relationships; see 3.1.5).

Regarding Gelman, *parenthood* was an autobiographical characteristic that had implications for the ways in which participants verbally displayed empathy. In 6.3.1, I showed a contrast between the accounts of Reader H, on the one hand, and those of Readers B and C on the other. This contrast in their verbal display of empathy can be attributed to the extent to which readers (do not) have first-hand knowledge and similarity of experience that enable them to imagine what the character's experience must be like. I suggested that empathetic engagement can involve different degrees of experiential understanding depending on the extent to which empathisers feel they can grasp the nature and meaning of the target's experience. Thus, the accounts by Reader H (as experiencer) can be seen as claiming access to Gelman's anguish and pain, given that her first-hand knowledge of what parenthood means to a parent enabled her to grasp the nature and meaning of Gelman's experience. In contrast, the accounts by

Readers B and C (as non-experiencers) suggest a sense of partial inaccessibility to what it means (or what it feels like) to have one's children harmed.

Regarding the Torturer, Participants A-B-C-E-G-I engaged in attribution processes that attempted to explain the character's behaviour — their interpretation was that his context forces him to do his job. These attributions were generated partly by textual information and partly by readers' prior knowledge. Regarding the latter, participants displayed empathy with the Torturer by making references to real-world circumstances that suggest a high degree of similarity of experience with the Torturer's situation (see 6.3.3(A2)). These participants reported a strong degree of similarity between the Torturer's situation and everyday situations faced by themselves or people they know. This suggests that participants' first-hand knowledge and sense of shared experience — autobiographical alignment, in short — facilitated empathy with the character.

The autobiographical alignment seen in these cases seems to have been activated or facilitated by (the cumulative effect of) textual factors. Both stories (Story 2 on Gelman and Story 3 on the Torturer) do present a great deal of textual information about the two characters. The richness of the textual information, *together with* a high degree of consonance between participants' real-life experience and the experience they attribute to the characters, arguably enabled participants to perceive the *what-it's-likeness* of these characters' situation. Thus, in these cases textual factors and readerly factors can be said to have worked in tandem.

7.3 Contributions

This section spells out the significance of my empirically-derived findings and the different contributions of my study in relation to narrative empathy research and empirical stylistic methodology.

7.3.1 Narrative empathy

My main aim has been to enrich our understanding of the phenomenon of narrative empathy from a particular angle; namely, the factors (both textual and readerly) that can influence experiences of empathy with characters. I hope with this study to contribute to the growing body of knowledge in this particular research area.

I have revealed (and hopefully contributed to somewhat disentangling) some of the conceptual conflation regarding empathy and other responses such as sympathy or identification. I have reviewed the literature on both empathy and narrative empathy, and have developed a conceptual framework that integrates the current knowledge on (narrative) empathy across disciplines. This conceptual framework can be a starting point for new-comers to this research area.

After surveying the empathy literature, I have offered an account of the *potential* role that several phenomena might play in experiences of narrative empathy:

- On the readerly side, several top-down control mechanisms can modulate empathy: contextual appraisal (including moral evaluation) and the

empathiser-target/reader-character relationship (such as autobiographical alignment).

- On the textual side, I have offered a detailed linguistic description of a few potential textual triggers and/or barriers for empathy. I have done so in relation to viewpoint presentation (including mode of narration and focalisation); characters' discourse presentation (mainly speech and thought, and to a lesser extent writing); characters' emotion presentation; and characterisation techniques.

Regarding the latter, I have gathered insights from different linguistically-based analytical frameworks which can make the textual analysis of the stimulus texts more workable from a linguistic perspective. This is a practical contribution which can benefit others conducting similar work, as it offers an investigation of potential textual effects on readers which is *stylistically informed* (in Kuzmičová et al.'s (2017) terms) or *stylistically aware* (in Whiteley and Canning's (2017) terms). Given that analysts will develop their own hypotheses based on the stimulus text(s) to be subsequently investigated with real readers, it is crucial to point out the stylistic properties and underpinnings of such texts. Thus, my study supports Kuzmičová et al.'s (2017) view that reader response research, in relation to empathy or otherwise, should be stylistically informed regarding the stimulus text(s).

Also in relation to the textual dimension, I have shown nuances and complexities around some of the textual devices that can potentially influence empathy. For example, even though an external perspective is thought to disinvite empathy (Keen, 2006, p. 220), my

study provides evidence that, given an adequate narrator, an external perspective can also facilitate empathetic responses (i.e., in the case of the character Gelman in Story 2). This points out the need for a theoretically nuanced approach to the question of textual factors.

Regarding the question of textual and readerly factors, even though some claims in the scholarly literature are only concerned with the role of textual factors in determining reader responses, my study has broadened the scope to include non-textual readerly factors. My findings in 7.2 indicate that neither the textual nor the readerly dimension works in isolation. I have defended the view that both are equally relevant to character engagement in general and experiences of empathy in particular. Some of my findings in 7.2 might even suggest that *in some contexts* readerly factors can override textual devices (e.g., in the case of negative moral evaluation).

Thus, my findings support evidence from previous observations in the literature in two respects:

- *Textual factors not working in isolation*. Van Lissa et al. (2016) conclude that the evidence from their study "does question assumptions about the direct effects of textual strategies on narrative empathy" and that "literary scholars tend to overestimate the effects of textual cues on readers' responses" (p. 59). My study also challenges claims about direct textual effects on readers, and warns against generalisations (as seen in my use of mitigation/hedging in my summary of findings in 7.2). Likewise, Keen highlights that "caution should be taken not to

oversimplify predictions about the effects of particular narrative techniques" (2013, para. 8).

- *The interplay between textual and readerly factors*. Van Lissa et al. (2016) conclude that their results "show that empathy should be conceptualised as an emergent phenomenon depending on the interaction between textual and non-textual[78] factors" (p. 60). Similarly, László and Smogyvári (2008) conclude that their results suggest that readers' empathy is not only governed by textual devices such as perspective, but also by readerly factors such as "cultural background of the reader, or stage of the identity development" that may influence readers' meaning construction and the allocation of empathy (p. 115).

In this respect, an important implication of my study is the *variability of context* and, in turn, the *variability of readerly responses*. The complexity of the reading context needs to be taken into account, and so more tentativeness is needed when making claims about one-to-one relationships between textual devices and effects on readers. Swann and Allington point out that "readers' interpretational activity is contingent upon aspects of the contexts in which they read" (2009, p. 250), and so the context of elicitation should be acknowledged and seen as relevant to the resulting interpretations (p. 262). They convincingly argue that

> the study of literary reception, if it is genuinely interested in 'real readers', needs to incorporate a contextualized perspective in which reading is acknowledged as shaped by and shaping the contexts in which it is made to appear (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 262).

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[78] As a reminder, van Lissa et al. (2016) mention readers' *age, reading expertise, and dispositional empathy* as non-textual factors.

Therefore, the theory of narrative empathy would benefit from a more nuanced, tentative approach to the question of textual effects on readers. In accordance with the views presented above and the background literature consulted, my study shows that narrative empathy is a highly flexible and context-dependent phenomenon given the complex interaction between textual and readerly factors.

7.3.2 Empirical stylistics

My project reflects the increasingly widespread "impulse to collect extra-textual data about literary reading in order to inform, develop and reflect upon stylistic analysis" (Whiteley and Canning, 2017, p. 72). My study offers some methodological contributions which can be hopefully useful to other researchers conducting similar work. My research has revealed a number of methodological complexities that are under-emphasised in the literature despite the key role of methodology in the production and interpretation of data, analysis and results.

I have offered my own analytical framework (drawing on the literature) to analyse reader responses in relation to empathy. I have shown the way in which my definitions of empathy and narrative empathy can be translated into actual codes that capture different aspects of readers' perception and interpretation of characters in conversation. This necessarily narrows down the evidence of the phenomenon under study to participants' linguistic expressions and discursive strategies, thus showing the need for a linguistically-aware analysis of the reader-response data.

I have suggested a way forward when it comes to looking for potential evidence of empathy in the analysis of elicited verbal data (i.e., spoken group interaction). My codes have been developed and separated out depending on whether they capture the distinction between *explicit* or *implicit* potential evidence of empathy. The latter (see "implicit-evidence-of empathy codes" in 6.2.2) might be a useful springboard for others when beginning to explore reader-response verbal data. If applied to other reading contexts, my analytical framework and codes would have to be adapted to what occurs in those other contexts with different readers (i.e., readers who are speakers of a different language, readers who belong to a different culture, readers who are given different texts to read, readers who respond to a different set of questions from the moderator, etc.).

I have also drawn on the literature to develop the notions of *hot-enactive* and *cold-attributive* linguistic expressions of empathy, which I have used to describe different verbalisations of participants' engagement with characters' experience, depending on the clustering of the "explicit and implicit evidence-of-empathy" codes or features. Enactive displays of empathy were associated, for example, with a higher degree of vividness in participants' accounts when expressing (i.e., giving verbal form to) the *what-it's-like dimension* of the character's experience (as with Gelman, see 6.2.2) given the cumulative effect of several features.

The use of the focus group method is another original component of my study when compared to previous reader response studies on empathy, which tend to be conducted with individual readers. This method allowed the collection of verbal data

during group discussions. The fact that the discussions were relatively long (around 2 hours) had the advantage that readers could still articulate their views on a previously discussed text even when the discussion had moved on to a different story. An advantage of working with several texts is that readers sometimes compared in explicit ways their perceptions of different characters across the three stories, which was highly valuable to my analysis.

Another advantage of the focus group method is that it allows in-depth insights into the understandings of my research participants *from their perspective*. Qualitative research celebrates "richness, depth, nuance, context, multidimensionality and complexity", and is not "embarrassed or inconvenienced by them" (Mason, 2002, p. 1). As Mason argues,

> instead of editing these elements out in search of the general picture or the average, qualitative research factors them directly into its analyses and explanations. This means that it has an unrivalled capacity to constitute compelling arguments about how things work in particular contexts (Mason, 2002, p. 1)

Another strength of the method is to do with the advantages it has over individual interviews or questionnaires where individual participants mostly interact with the researcher (see 5.1). As Litosseliti puts it,

> Individual interviews focus on individual beliefs and attitudes, and can be more easily controlled by the interviewer than focus groups, which aim to *obtain multiple views and attitudes*, and often require complex negotiation of the on-going interaction processes among participants (2003, p. 2)

Some weaknesses of the method, however, should be taken into account, such as uneven contributions from the different participants, potential false consensus effects, or time-consuming data transcription and analysis (see 5.2 for further discussion).

Another innovative feature of my study is that I have mapped out the connections between participants' responses and the different factors that could have prompted those interpretations. In this sense, my study shares one of the strengths of Kuzmičová et al.'s (2017) study. As they phrase it, their study "contributes *a level of detail in pairing stimuli with verbal responses* that is difficult to find elsewhere" (p. 149).

These connections differ in the degree of explicitness — sometimes participants do point out themselves that a particular factor is relevant to their response, whereas in other cases the role of a specific factor remained implicit in the discussion. The two types of potential evidence, explicit and implicit, have been approached with caution, and I have made several caveats along the way. For example, the analyst should not take it for granted that when a participant uses the word *empathy* the meaning is unproblematically the same as what the analyst takes it to mean. Thus, reader-response researchers need to develop ways to check (i) the meanings behind participants' use of the key terms and concepts that the study aims to investigate when they use them spontaneously, and (ii) the meanings participants attribute to these terms and concepts when they are found in questionnaires or ratings. What participants actually mean may not be as straightforward as it might seem at first sight. Even if the relationships which I have attempted to establish between responses and underlying factors have to be taken with some caution, these relationships offer an understanding of the various ways in which real readers understand and engage with story-worlds and their inhabitants.

In my view, methodological complexities should be more openly discussed in the published literature. Explicit attention to methodological challenges, and issues to be solved, can pave the way for other empirically-oriented scholars when designing their studies. For example, one such challenge might be to do with the application and adaptation of different interdisciplinary aspects into a consistent working framework.

7.4 Limitations

The approach taken in my study has a number of shortcomings which, in hindsight, if I were to conduct the study again, I would re-consider.

Limited number of participants. An obvious limitation is that my study includes a very small amount of participants (a total of 9). This has been justified in relation to the time-consuming nature of in-depth qualitative research and the combination of two datasets for analysis (Galeano's stories and readers' responses). However, this can also be seen as a strength given the in-depth and detailed analysis conducted on the data.

Participants. With respect to the selection of participants[79], Keen notes that it is habitual to make "the reactions of white, western, educated readers home base for consideration of reader response" (2006, p. 223), which mostly applies to my participants (see Appendix C). Likewise, Stockwell observes that empirical studies tend to "use students and semi-professional readers as informants rather than 'civilians': as a result we know an awful lot about the reading responses of young middle-class educated people in

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[79] Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) raised the issue of a potential bias within behavioural research toward participants from what they call "Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies", and so universaling generalisations should not be made based on these participant samples only.

college under test situations" (2009, p. 12). This potential bias could be addressed in future empirical work on reader response.

Limited number of factors. My study has only tapped into a small number of factors. Regarding the textual dimension, I have considered point of view, characters' discourse and emotion presentation, and characterisation techniques. Regarding the readerly dimension, I have investigated contextual appraisal (including moral evaluation) and the reader-character relationship.

Selection of stories. My selection of stimulus texts inevitably leads to the limitation of textual devices under study. For example, previous research (Keen, 2006; van Lissa et al., 2016) have discussed the role played by the person[80] of the narration. However, in the three stories that I have used the narration was in the first-person mode (although a slightly unusual first-person since the 'I' is not a story-world participant). A similar point can be made about the heterodiegetic nature of the narration in my stories.

Generalisability. The knowledge gained from my results can be applicable to and have implications for other reading contexts. However, it is worth mentioning that my findings are necessarily *not representative* of all readers. As Swann and Allington observe, readers' responses and interpretations occur in a particular cultural and historical context, among particular people in a particular place and time, thus "we can make no assumptions about the generalisability of any interpretations or responses,

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[80] Van Lissa et al. (2016) found that first-person vs. third-person narration made no difference in relation to empathy; only in relation to trust and (un)reliability. In this respect, my participants made no explicit comments on their perception of trust, reliability or authoritativeness of the narratorial voice.

whether arising naturally or elicited under experimental conditions" (2009, p. 261). This means that "we cannot assume that similar topics would be raised, and similar interpretations made, by different readers in different times and places, or indeed by the same readers on another occasion" (Swann and Allington, 2009, p. 261).

Text variability (i.e, the infinitely different combinations of stylistic choices), character variability (i.e., how empathy-worthy characters are in the eyes of readers); reader variability (i.e., the views, values, knowledge and experiences that readers bring into the act of reading); and context variability (i.e., the "infinitely variable contexts of reception" (Toolan, 2014, p. 17) that are possible) also make generalisability a complex issue. The effect a particular factor seems to have for a specific reader in one context may well differ from the experience of another reader.

Time of responses. My findings do not necessarily match or reflect readers' experiences while reading. What they capture is readers' impressions of characters in the group discussion *shortly after* the reading. As pointed out in 5.1, issues of memory, post-hoc rationalisation, and retrospective interpretation should be taken into account.

Empirical approach. Empirical research does not have all the answers and, what is more, it raises new issues. This thesis has been written in the belief that both theoretically-oriented and empirically-oriented work can offer valuable insights to understanding the complex (and only partially accessible) phenomena of readerly experiences. Every method has its own affordances and shortcomings, and every approach is successful and partial to certain extents. I hope to have shown that my study is necessarily partial

and that there are, inevitably, other sides to the questions I address — as well as other possible interpretations that can account for what occurs in my participants' discussions.

7.5 Directions for further research

Interdisciplinarity. The development of reader response research in general, and narrative empathy research in particular, would mostly benefit from interdisciplinary collaboration from linguists, narratologists, social psychologists and neuroscientists, to name but a few. As Keen argues, "further research into narrative empathy will be best served by cross-disciplinary conversation and interdisciplinary collaboration" (2013, para. 14). For instance, there is plenty of work to be done on integrating stylistic knowledge into the theory of narrative empathy. As I have suggested at different points throughout the thesis, narrative empathy research would greatly benefit from insights gained in stylistics; for instance, when it comes to effects associated with characters' speech and thought presentation.

The role of textual and readerly factors in (non-)empathetic effects. Even though my study can cast some tentative light on the issue, much research remains to be done regarding the interplay between textual and readerly factors and their role in (non-)empathetic responses to characters. The question has already been addressed in specific ways — László and Smogyvári (2008) considered readers' and characters' group identity; Van Lissa et al. (2016) looked into the differences between first- and third-person narration, and considered non-textual factors such as readers' age, reading expertise, and dispositional empathy; and Kuzmičová et al. (2017) examined different degrees of foregrounding.

However, the role of textual and readerly factors in empathy remains open to future questions and approaches, for example, by asking new questions that have not been previously formulated in either theoretical or empirical work. Future similar studies, either theoretically- or empirically-based, should accommodate this dynamic interaction in context. Work of that kind can enrich the ongoing scholarly debate on empathy effects by drawing attention to previously neglected aspects. This call for future research is in line with Keen's view that there may be "many aspects of narrative form that have not yet been associated with readers' empathy, but which ought not to be ruled out without careful consideration" (2006, p. 216). For example, the implications of metaphorical choices in texts in relation to readers' emotional responses and empathy would be an interesting avenue for research.

Empathy for other kinds of experiences. In 4.1 it was noted that negative empathy (i.e., pain and sadness) is commonly studied and, what is more, some scholars consider that empathy is more likely to occur for negative emotions. This determined my choice to use stories that present scenarios of conflict and suffering within contexts of political struggle. An interesting research direction would be to work with stories that portray a wider range of (e.g., more positive) situations and character emotions in order to examine readerly responses under different conditions. This is another empirical question that could be addressed in future work.

Other hypotheses. Researchers might find it useful to read Keen's (2007) collection of hypotheses about narrative empathy (pp. 169-171), whose specificity is a considerable

advance on previous "broad assertions about narrative empathy that take the form of un-testable generalisations" (p. 169).

7.6 Concluding remarks

My study has aimed to contribute to the understanding of readers' experiences of empathy with characters from a qualitative linguistic-stylistic perspective. It is an empirical contribution to the growing body of research on narrative empathy. I have argued that both textual and readerly factors play a relevant role in bringing about different perceptions of and responses to characters, and that claims about empathy effects should accommodate the role of context. The insights gained from my study, even if sometimes specifically addressed to questions of narrative empathy, ultimately speak to, and add to, traditional stylistic concerns about readerly experiences, textual effects on readers, and readers' emotional engagement with characters.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Galeano's stories

Story 1 (Spanish original by Galeano, 2002 [1989])

Celebración de la voz humana

Tenían las manos atadas, o esposadas, y sin embargo los dedos danzaban, volaban, dibujaban palabras. Los presos estaban encapuchados; pero inclinándose alcanzaban a ver algo, alguito, por abajo. Aunque hablar estaba prohibido, ellos conversaban con las manos.

Pinio Ungerfeld me enseñó el alfabeto de los dedos, que en prisión aprendió sin profesor:

—*Algunos teníamos mala letra*— me dijo—. *Otros eran unos artistas de la caligrafía*.

La dictadura uruguaya quería que cada uno fuera nada más que uno, que cada uno fuera nadie: en cárceles y cuarteles, y en todo el país, la comunicación era delito.

Algunos presos pasaron más de diez años enterrados en solitarios calabozos del tamaño de un ataúd, sin escuchar más voces que el estrépito de las rejas o los pasos de las botas por los corredores. Fernández Huidobro y Mauricio Rosencof, condenados a esa soledad, se salvaron porque pudieron hablarse, con golpecitos, a través de la pared. Así se contaban sueños y recuerdos, amores y desamores; discutían, se abrazaban, se peleaban; compartían certezas y bellezas y también compartían dudas y culpas y preguntas de esas que no tienen respuesta.

Cuando es verdadera, cuando nace de la necesidad de decir, a la voz humana no hay quien la pare. Si le niegan la boca, ella habla por las manos, o por los ojos, o por los poros, o por donde sea. Porque todos, toditos, tenemos algo que decir a los demás, alguna cosa que merece ser por los demás celebrada o perdonada.

Story 1 (published translation into English (Galeano, 1989/1991))

Celebration of the human voice

Their hands were tied or handcuffed, yet their fingers danced, flew, drew words. The prisoners were hooded, but leaning back, they could see a bit, just a bit, down below. Although it was forbidden to speak, they spoke with their hands. Pinio Ungerfeld taught me the finger alphabet, which he had learned in prison without a teacher:

"*Some of us had bad handwriting,*" he told me. "*Others were masters of calligraphy.*"

The Uruguayan dictatorship wanted everyone to stand alone, everyone to be no one: in prisons and barracks, and throughout the country, communication was a crime.

Some prisoners spent more than ten years buried in solitary cells the size of coffins, hearing nothing but clanging bars or footsteps in the corridors. Fernández Huidoro and Mauricio Rosencof, thus condemned, survived because they could talk to each other by tapping on the wall. In that way they told of dreams and memories, fallings in and out of love; they discussed, embraced, fought; they shared beliefs and beauties, doubts and guilts, and those questions that have no answer.

When it is genuine, when it is born of the need to speak, no one can stop the human voice. When denied a mouth, it speaks with the hands or the eyes, or the pores, or anything at all. Because every single one of us has something to say to the others, something that deserves to be celebrated or forgiven by others.

Story 2 (Spanish original by Galeano, 2002 [1989])

Gelman

El poeta Juan Gelman escribe alzándose sobre sus propias ruinas, sobre su polvo y su basura.

Los militares argentinos, cuyas atrocidades hubieran provocado a Hitler un incurable complejo de inferioridad, le pegaron donde más duele. En 1976, le secuestraron a los hijos. Se los llevaron en lugar de él. A la hija, Nora, la torturaron y la soltaron. Al hijo, Marcelo, y a su compañera, que estaba embarazada, los asesinaron y los desaparecieron.

En lugar de él: se llevaron a los hijos porque él no estaba. ¿Cómo se hace para sobrevivir a una tragedia así? Digo: para sobrevivir sin que se te apague el alma. Muchas veces me lo he preguntado, en estos años. Muchas veces me he imaginado esa horrible sensación de vida usurpada, esa pesadilla del padre que siente que está robando al hijo el aire que respira, el padre que en medio de la noche despierta bañado en sudor: *Yo no te maté, yo no te maté.* Y me he preguntado: si Dios existe, ¿por qué pasa de largo? ¿No será ateo, Dios?

Story 2 (published translation into English (Galeano, 1989/1991))

Gelman

The poet Juan Gelman writes, hoisting himself from the rubble of his life, from its dust and debris.

The Argentine military, whose atrocities would have given Hitler an incurable inferiority complex, hit him where it hurt the most. In 1976, they kidnapped his children. They took the children instead of him. They tortured his daughter, Nora, and let her go. They murdered and disappeared his son, Marcelo, together with his pregnant compañera.

Instead of him: they took his children because he was not at home. How does one survive such a tragedy? That is: survive without one's soul being extinguished? I've often wondered these last years. I've often imagined that horrible feeling of having one's life usurped, the nightmare of the father who imagines he has stolen from his son the air he breathes, the father who wakes in the middle of the night, bathed in sweat: "*I didn't kill you, I didn't kill you*." And I've wondered: if God exists, why does he just walk on by? Could God be an atheist?

Story 3 (Spanish original by Galeano, 2002 [1989])

La vida profesional

Tienen el mismo nombre, el mismo apellido. Ocupan la misma casa y calzan los mismos zapatos. Duermen en la misma almohada, junto a la misma mujer. Cada mañana, el espejo les devuelve la misma cara. Pero él y él son la misma persona:

—*Y yo, ¿qué tengo que ver?* —dice él, hablando de él, mientras se encoge de hombros.

—*Yo cumplo órdenes* —dice o dice:

—*Para eso me pagan.*

O dice:

—*Si no lo hago yo, lo hace otro.*

Que es como decir:

—*Yo soy otro.*

Ante el odio de la víctima, el verdugo siente estupor, y hasta una cierta sensación de injusticia: al fin y al cabo, él es un funcionario, un simple funcionario que cumple su horario y su tarea. Terminada la agotadora jornada de trabajo, el torturador se lava las manos.

Ahmadou Gherab, que peleó por la independencia de Argelia, me lo contó. Ahmadou fue torturado por un oficial francés durante varios meses. Y cada día, a las seis en punto de la tarde, el torturador se secaba el sudor de la frente, desenchufaba la picana eléctrica y guardaba los demás instrumentos de trabajo. Entonces se sentaba junto al torturado y le hablaba de sus problemas familiares y del ascenso que no llega y lo cara que está la vida. El torturador hablaba de su mujer insufrible y del hijo recién nacido, que no lo había dejado pegar un ojo en toda la noche; hablaba contra Orán, esta ciudad de mierda, y contra el hijo de puta del coronel que...

Ahmadou, ensangrentado, temblando de dolor, ardiendo en fiebres, no decía nada.

Story 3 (published translation into English (Galeano, 1989/1991))

<u>Professional life</u>

They have the same first name, the same surname. They live in the same house and wear the same shoes. They sleep on the same pillow, next to the same woman. Every morning the mirror confronts them with the same face. But he and he are not the same person:

"*And I, what have I got to do with it?*" says he, speaking of him and shrugging his shoulders.

"*I carry out orders,*" he says, or he says:

"*That's what they pay me for.*"

Or he says:

"*If I don't do it, someone else will.*"

Which is as if to say:

"*I am someone else.*"

The hatred of the victim astonishes the executioner, and even leaves him feeling a certain sense of injustice: after all, he is an official, an ordinary official who goes to work on time and does his job. When the exhausting day's work is done, the torturer washes his hands.

Ahmadou Gherab, who fought for the independence of Algeria, told me this. Ahmadou was tortured by a French official for several months. Every day, promptly at 6:00 P.M., the torturer would wipe the sweat from his brow, unplug the electric cattle prod and put away the other tools of the trade. Then he would sit beside the tortured man and speak to him of his family problems and of the promotion that didn't come and of how expensive life is. The torturer would speak of his insufferable wife and their newborn child who had not permitted him a wink of sleep all night; he railed against Orán, that shitty city, and against the son of a bitch of a colonel who...

Ahmadou, bathed in blood, trembling with pain, burning with fever, would say nothing.

Appendix B. Recruitment poster, participant information sheet and consent form

Estimado lector,

con motivo de mi **tesis doctoral**, necesito formar **grupos de lectores**
que articulen sus respuestas hacia una selección de textos.

Me dirijo a ti para invitarte a formar parte de un grupo en el que se
te ofrece la oportunidad de **leer a un nivel íntimo, y a compartir tu
experiencia** sin tapujos.

Leeremos microrrelatos ágiles, lúcidos, cargados de una fuerza
y una belleza que no te dejarán indiferente.

Para ti, las respuestas del grupo serán una experiencia distinta en la
que podrás **reflexionar sobre lo que te ocurre cuando lees**.

Para mí, esas respuestas serán la materia prima de un proyecto que
quiere **comprender al ser humano a través de la literatura**. Para ello, estoy
analizando las reacciones psicológicas y emocionales en el
proceso de lectura.

Si conoces a alguien a quien también le pueda interesar,
no dudes en venir con ellos.

Contacto y más información:
*****************@gmail.com

**Escribe antes del 31 de diciembre.
Los grupos se reunirán la primera semana de enero.**

Dear reader,

on account of my **doctoral thesis**, I need to form **groups of readers**
to articulate their responses toward a selection of texts.

I turn to you to invite you to be part of a group which offers you
the opportunity to **read on an intimate level, and to share
your experience** openly.

We will read agile, lucid micro-stories, whose power and beauty
will not leave you indifferent.

For you, responding in the group could be a distinct and new
experience in which you will have the chance to **reflect about what happens
to you while you read**.

For me, those responses will be the raw material of a project that seeks to
understand the human being through literature. To that end, I am
analysing psychological and emotional reactions in the process of reading.

If you know someone else who could also be interested,
do not hesitate to bring them along.

Contact and further information:
*****************@gmail.com

**Contact me before 31st December.
The groups will meet during the first week of January.**

Lancaster University
Linguistics and English Language

Participant information sheet

Title: Exploring readers' responses to literary characters

Researcher: Carolina Fernandez Quintanilla

c.fernandezquintanilla@lancaster.ac.uk

07*********
+34*********

Department of Linguistics and English Language
County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg
Lancaster, United Kingdom
LA1 4YL

You are invited to take part in this research study. Please take time to read the following information carefully before you decide whether or not you wish to take part.

What is the purpose of this study?

I am carrying out this study as part of my doctoral studies in the Department of Linguistics and English Language. The aim of the study is to explore readers' responses to literary characters in short stories written by Eduardo Galeano.

What does the study entail?

My study will involve recording focus group discussions about your own (and the other group members') responses to the characters in the stories. I will provide you with three short texts by Eduardo Galeano so that you can read them, and then you will be asked to share with the rest of the group your thoughts and feelings regarding the different characters in the stories.

 Why have I been invited?

I have approached you because I am interested in understanding the way readers react to characters in stories depending on how the latter are presented. I would be very grateful if you would agree to take part in my study.

What will happen if I take part?

If you decided to take part, this would involve the following: you would be reading three of Galeano's stories and you would discuss with the rest of the group your own reactions to the different characters. The discussion shall take one and a half hours, and it will be tape recorded for later analysis.

What are the possible benefits from taking part?

If you take part in this study, your insights will contribute to my understanding of readers' experiences of characters in narrative texts. Moreover, taking part in the focus group will allow you to reflect on, and share, your own experiences of characters when reading stories.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

It is unlikely that there will be any major disadvantages to taking part. Time-wise, taking part will mean investing around 90 minutes of your time.

What will happen if I decide not to take part or if I don't want to carry on with the study?

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you do not have to give a reason. If you withdraw while the study takes place or until 2 months after it finishes, I will not use any of the information that you provided. If you withdraw later, I will use the information you shared with me for my study.

Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

All the information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Any identifying information, such as names and personal characteristics, will be anonymised in the PhD thesis or any other publications of this research. The data I will collect will be kept securely. Any paper-based data will be kept in a locked cupboard. Electronic data will be stored on a password protected computer and files containing personal data will be encrypted.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of the study will be used for academic purposes only. This will include my PhD thesis and other publications, for example journal articles. I am also planning to present the results of my study at academic conferences.

What if there is a problem?
If you have any queries or if you are unhappy with anything that happens concerning your participation in the study, please contact myself or my supervisor:

Dr Elena Semino
e.semino@lancaster.ac.uk

+44 **********

Department of Linguistics and English Language
County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg
Lancaster, United Kingdom
LA1 4YL

Further information and contact details

Carolina Fernandez Quintanilla
c.fernandezquintanilla@lancaster.ac.uk

07*********
+34*********

Department of Linguistics and English Language
County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg
Lancaster, United Kingdom
LA1 4YL

Thank you for considering your participation in this project.

Hoja de información para los participantes

Título: Explorando las respuestas de los lectores hacia personajes literarios

Investigadora: Carolina Fernández Quintanilla

*****************@gmail.com
c.fernandezquintanilla@lancaster.ac.uk

+34*********
07*********

Department of Linguistics and English Language
County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg
Lancaster, United Kingdom
LA1 4YL

Has sido invitada/o a participar en este proyecto de investigación. Por favor, tómate tu tiempo para leer la siguiente información detenidamente antes de decidir si deseas participar.

¿Cuál es la finalidad de este estudio?

Estoy realizando esta investigación como parte de mis estudios de doctorado en el Departamento de Lingüística y Lengua Inglesa de la Universidad de Lancaster (Reino Unido). El objetivo del estudio es explorar las respuestas de los lectores hacia personajes literarios en una selección de textos narrativos.

¿Qué conlleva el estudio?

Mi estudio conllevará la grabación (en audio) de debates en grupo sobre vuestras respuestas hacia los personajes de los textos. Os proporcionaré tres microrrelatos para que los leáis, y después os pediré que compartáis con el resto del grupo vuestros pensamientos y sentimientos hacia los personajes que aparecen en las narraciones.

¿Por qué he sido invitada/o?

Estoy interesada en comprender la manera en que los lectores interactúan con los personajes de los relatos dependiendo del modo en que éstos son presentados por el autor. Estaría muy agradecida si aceptaras formar parte de mi estudio.

¿Qué sucederá si participo?

Si decidieras participar, eso supondría lo siguiente: leerías tres historias cortas y hablarías de tus reacciones hacia los diferentes personajes. El debate de grupo durará una hora y media aproximadamente, y será grabado (en audio) para su posterior análisis.

¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar?

Si tomas parte en este estudio, tus aportaciones en el debate contribuirán a mi entendimiento de la experiencia de los lectores respecto a los personajes de los textos narrativos. Participar en este grupo también te permitirá reflexionar acerca de, además de compartir, tus propias experiencias a la hora de leer relatos.

¿Cuáles son los posibles riesgos y desventajas de participar?

Es improbable que haya alguna gran desventaja a la hora de participar. En cuanto se refiere a tiempo, participar supondrá invertir alrededor de 90 minutos de tu tiempo.

¿Qué sucederá si decido no participar o si no quiero seguir con el estudio?

Tienes libertad para retirarte del estudio en cualquier momento y no tienes que dar ninguna razón. Si te retiras mientras el estudio está tomando lugar o hasta 2 meses después de que termine, no usaré ninguna información que hayas proporcionado. Si te retiras después, usaré para mi estudio la información que compartiste conmigo.

¿Está garantizada la confidencialidad de mi participación en este proyecto?

Toda la información recopilada sobre ti en el transcurso de la investigación será guardada de manera estrictamente confidencial. Cualquier información de identificación, como nombres y características personales, serán anonimizados en la tesis doctoral o en cualquier otra publicación de esta investigación. Todos los datos que recopile serán guardados de forma segura. Cualquier información en papel será guardada en un armario con llave. La información electrónica será guardada en un ordenador protegido con contraseña y los archivos que contengan datos personales serán cifrados.

¿Qué le sucederá a los resultados del proyecto de investigación?

Los resultados del estudio serán utilizados solamente para fines académicos. Esto incluye mi tesis doctoral y otras publicaciones, como por ejemplo artículos en revistas científicas. También tengo previsto presentar los resultados de mi estudio en conferencias académicas.

¿Y si hay algún problema?

Si tienes alguna pregunta o si no estás satisfecho con cualquier aspecto en lo relativo a tu participación en el estudio, por favor ponte en contacto conmigo o con mi directora de tesis:

Doctora Elena Semino
e.semino@lancaster.ac.uk

+44 **********

Department of Linguistics and English Language
County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg
Lancaster, United Kingdom
LA1 4YL

Más información y datos de contacto

Carolina Fernández Quintanilla
****************@gmail.com
c.fernandezquintanilla@lancaster.ac.uk

07*********
+34*********

¡Gracias por considerar tu participación en este proyecto!

Declaración de consentimiento

Título del proyecto: Explorando las respuestas de los lectores hacia personajes literarios

1. He leído la hoja de información relacionada con este proyecto, y me ha sido explicada por Carolina Fernández Quintanilla.

2. Se me han explicado los objetivos del proyecto así como qué se me pedirá, y cualquier pregunta ha sido contestada satisfactoriamente. Estoy de acuerdo con las disposiciones descritas en la hoja de información en cuanto a lo relacionado a mi participación.

3. Entiendo que mi participación es enteramente voluntaria y que tengo el derecho a retirarme del proyecto en cualquier momento, pero no más tarde de 2 meses después de su conclusión. Si me retiro después de este período, la información que he proporcionado será usada para el proyecto.

4. Entiendo que todos los datos recogidos serán anónimos y que mi identidad no será revelada en ningún momento.

5. He recibido una copia de esta declaración de consentimiento y la hoja de información que lo acompaña.

Nombre:

Firmado:

Fecha:

Consent Form

Project title: Exploring readers' responses to literary characters

1. I have read and had explained to me by Carolina Fernandez Quintanilla the information sheet relating to this project.

2. I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be required of me, and any questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to the arrangements described in the information sheet in so far as they relate to my participation.

3. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw from the project any time, but no longer than 2 months after its completion. If I withdraw after this period, the information I have provided will be used for the project.

4. I understand that all data collected will be anonymised and that my identity will not be revealed at any point.

5. I have received a copy of this consent form and of the accompanying information sheet.

Name:

Signed:

Date:

Appendix C. Demographic information sheet and description of participants

<div align="right">
Sesión de lectura en grupo
Cáceres, enero de 2015
</div>

Información demográfica sobre los participantes

1. Edad

2. Sexo

3. Origen (¿Dónde creciste? ¿Dónde vives ahora?)

4. Educación (¿Cuál es tu titulación? Si sigues estudiando, especifica qué)

5. ¿Conocías al autor de los relatos (Eduardo Galeano) previamente? ¿Qué piensas de él?

6. En las historias, ¿has encontrado algo que guarde relación contigo?

7. ¿Añadirías algo sobre los temas que se han tratado durante la sesión de lectura? ¿Te gustaría aportar algo más?

¡Muchísimas gracias por participar en mi investigación! (:

Participant demographic information

1. Age

2. Sex

3. Origin (Where did you grow up? Where do you live now?)

4. Education (What are your qualifications? If you are still studying, specify what)

5. Did you know the author of the stories (Eduardo Galeano)? What do you think of him?

6. In the stories, have you found anything that has any relationship with you?

7. Would you add anything about the topics that have been discussed during the reading session? Would you like to say anything else?

Thank you so much for participating in my research! (:

a) Overview of all 9 participants

Age	20-30	3
	30-40	3
	40-50	1
	50-60	1
	60-70	1

Sex	Male	2
	Female	7

Origin	Grew up in	Cáceres (Spain)	6
		Caracas (Venezuela)	1
		Jaraicejo (Cáceres, Spain)	1
		Seville (Spain)	1
	Lives in	Cáceres (Spain)	6
		Brussels (Belgium)	1
		Brussels/Corsica/Barcelona	1
		Seville (Spain)	1

Education	Secondary Education [GSCE]	2
	Professional training	1
	Bachelor's Degree	5
	Postgraduate Degree	1

Did you know Galeano before?	Yes	5
	No	4

b) According to individual participants

Participant A (FG1)

Age	48
Sex	Female
Origin	Cáceres
Education	Secondary Education [GSCE] and hairdressing
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	Yes, I knew him. He is a very good writer, but I do not agree with many of the things he says.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	In many cases you have to do things which you do not want to do.
Anything to add?	Situations are not always the same and you have to see the two versions.

Participant B (FG1)

Age	32
Sex	Female
Origin	I was raised in Jaraicejo and now live in Cáceres
Education	Bachelor's Degree in Art History. Now I study a Bachelor's Degree in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Education is important, and knowing the human being is crucial for a better development.
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	Yes. I like his manner of expression and the way he brings up such complex themes through very easy concepts and in such an entertaining and intelligible way.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	Fortunately I have not yet been through such a brutal situation of repression; however I have identified myself with the pain of some of the characters. Likewise, I have felt a minimum closeness to Ahmadou Gherab's torturer.
Anything to add?	If so, I would add some topic regarding socialisation, a concept that seems very important to me given that the way in which we relate to one another tends to be different in every situation and every society. And this, sometimes, does not allow us to see beyond our own viewpoint.

Participant C (FG1)

Age	32
Sex	Female
Origin	I was born in Seville and I currently live there
Education	Bachelor's Degree in Advertising and Public Relations, and Master's Degree in Cultural Management
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	Yes, I had read the book from which the texts are taken and I have seen several interviews. I identify with a major part of his ideas and speeches.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	Yes, the stories to do with situations of dictatorship arouse feelings because of their relationship with my own family history, political education and personal ideology. This makes me position myself in a particular way regarding the texts and the characters.
Anything to add?	No. I think we have discussed extensively and we have been able to express ourselves freely.

Participant D (FG1)

Age	23
Sex	Female
Origin	Cáceres
Education	Still studying. Bachelor's degree in Fine Arts
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	Yes, I got to know him when listening to the online radio. I cannot give an opinion because I do not know enough about him.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	In all of the stories something relates to me and I do not believe in humankind when it is dehumanised. I think in every problem there are things which we can see very clearly and others which are more subtle. These are the ones we should identify more promptly.
Anything to add?	We should live closer to reality, even if you end up being dead or "crazy". Even though I would not call it crazy but real!

Participant E (FG1)

Age	53
Sex	Male
Origin	Cáceres
Education	Secondary Education [GSCE]
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	I have only heard of him. He is socially committed.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	Yes, the responsibility for what we do.
Anything to add?	There are people who know how to take advantage of society by setting up systems.

Participant F (FG2)

Age	27
Sex	Female
Origin	I was raised in Cáceres, and live in Brussels
Education	Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Bachelor's Degree in Law
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	I did not know him. I think the stories are very interesting, especially the different points of view which [the author] expresses in them.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	No. fortunately my life has developed so far in total freedom and I find it hard to imagine the situation these people [characters] are going through. I can empathise, but I cannot compare experiences.
Anything to add?	

Participant G (FG2)

Age	23
Sex	Female
Origin	Cáceres (until I was 18). Brussels/Corsica/Barcelona
Education	Bachelor's Degree in Translation and Interpreting (French)
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	No. From what I have read, he knows how to focus the narrative and the reflection in very short stories.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	The story of the torturer reminds me (in a <u>very</u> distant way) to some situations where I have thought about the ethics and morality of my job and professional context.
Anything to add?	No.

Participant H (FG2)

Age	60
Sex	Female
Origin	Caracas / Cáceres
Education	Bachelor's Degree in Physical Education
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	No. I don't have enough information, but he seems engaged with social issues.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	No.
Anything to add?	No.

Participant I (FG2)

Age	30
Sex	Male
Origin	Cáceres
Education	Welder and blacksmith
Did you know Galeano before? What do you think?	No, I think he is a writer who arises feelings.
Relationship with anything from the stories?	Yes, in my ethical and moral thoughts.
Anything to add?	

Appendix D. Discussion questions

1. A) Primero me gustaría que leyerais este relato de forma individual. Tomaos todo el tiempo que necesitéis para leerlo y cuantas veces sea necesario. Vamos a trabajar estrechamente con el texto, por lo tanto os animo a destacar, subrayar o a escribir donde queráis cualquier cosa en el texto que despierte una reacción en vosotros. Esto puede incluir pensamientos y sentimientos de cualquier tipo, o fragmentos del texto que sean destacables por algún motivo.

   B) Así que leemos el texto en silencio y destacamos o escribimos cualquier cosa que nos provoque un sentimiento o reacción de cualquier tipo.

2. A) Ahora me gustaría que hablarais con la persona que está sentada a vuestro lado. Me gustaría que compartierais vuestra opinión general de la historia. Podéis utilizar los posters que os voy a dar para escribir mientras habláis. Os voy a dar 5 minutos o así.

   B) Repito: nos decimos lo que pensamos del texto a grandes rasgos y mientras vamos escribiendo/subrayando en el poster. Y también os animo a que compartáis lo que habéis escrito/señalado en vuestra propia hoja.

3. Ahora me gustaría que respondierais algunas preguntas ya como grupo. ¿Cuál fue vuestra reacción inicial a la historia? ¿Qué sentiste? [¿Ha sido igual para el resto de vosotros? ¿Hay alguien que haya reaccionado   de   manera   diferente?]

4. ¿Qué os parece la situación en la que se encuentran los personajes? ¿Podríais describir cómo os hacen sentir los personajes? ¿En qué punto/momento de la historia/texto has sentido eso? [¿Por qué crees que puede ser? ¿Y tú?]

5. Algunos de vosotros habéis mencionado los valores morales o éticos. ¿Podríais describir vuestra reacción moral hacia los personajes? ¿Hay alguna cosa en el texto que te invite especialmente a pensar así? [¿Pensáis lo mismo/algo diferente?]

6. Como os dije antes, me gustaría que tengáis el texto en sí muy presente y que trabajemos estrechamente con él. ¿Qué tipo de cosas habéis señalado? ¿Por qué? [¿Qué tiene esa palabra/ese fragmento que te hace reaccionar así?]

7. ¿Hay alguna otra cosa que queráis comentar?

- Ahora vamos a pasar al segundo texto. Vamos a hacer exactamente lo mismo que hemos hecho con el primer texto.
- Texto tercero.

¿Quiere alguien añadir alguna reflexión final sobre las conversaciones que hemos tenido o sobre alguno de los temas que hemos tratado?

1. A) First I'd like you to read this story individually. Take as long as you need to read it, and read it as many times as necessary. We're going to work closely with the text, so I encourage you to highlight, underline or jot down anything on the text that makes you react in any way. This can include thoughts and feelings of any kind, or extracts from the text that are remarkable for some reason.

    B) So we will read the text in silence and we highlight or write down anything that arises a feeling or reaction of any kind.

2. A) Now I'd like you to speak to the person sitting next to you. I'd like you to share your overall opinion about the story. You can use the posters I'm giving you to write as you speak. I'll give you around 5 minutes.

    B) I'll repeat: we tell each other what we think about the story in general terms and meanwhile you can highlight/write on the poster. And I also encourage you to share what you highlighted/wrote down in your own sheet.

3. Now I'd like you to answer a few questions as a group. What was your initial reaction to the story? How did you feel? [Was it the same for the rest of you? Is there anyone who reacted differently?]

4. What do you think about the situations the characters find themselves in? Could you describe how you feel toward the characters? At what

point of the story did you feel that? [Why do you think that is? And you?]

5. Some of you have mentioned moral or ethical values. Could you describe your moral reaction toward characters? Is there anything in the text that especially invites you to think that way? [Do you think the same/something different?]

6. As I told you earlier, I'd like you to keep the text in mind and to work closely with it. What type of things have you highlighted? Why? [What is there in that word/extract that makes you react that way?]

7. Is there anything else you would like to discuss?

- Now we're going to move on to the second text. We'll do exactly the same.
- Third text.

Would anyone like to add a final reflection about the discussions we've just had or about any of the topics we've covered?

Appendix E. List of Atlas.ti codes

A) Participant and character codes

Participant codes			Character codes
`#Moderator`	**FG1**	**FG2**	`@1.Prisoners`
	`#Part A`	`#Part F`	`@1.Uruguayan Dictatorship`
	`#Part B`	`#Part G`	`@2.Argentinian Military`
	`#Part C`	`#Part H`	`@2.Gelman`
	`#Part D`	`#Part I`	`@3.Ahmadou`
	`#Part E`		`@3.Torturer`

B) Content codes (see 5.3.2)

CATEGORY	CODES
Perspective taking	`PT self-oriented`
	`PT character-oriented`
Textual factors	`TXT details`
	`TXT no information`
	`TXT discourse presentation`
	`TXT internal perspective`
	`TXT naming`
Readerly factors	`REB self-reported empathic disposition`
	`REB parenthood`
	`REB personal/family history`
	`REB socio-political values`
	`REB real-world references`
	`REB moral_values`
	`REB moral_negative evaluation`
	`REB moral_positioning`
Textual references	`Textual reference`
Comparison	`Comparison_different`
	`Comparison_similar`
Responses	`Responses`
	`Responses_emotional`
Attribution	`ATT actions`

	ATT actions_hypothetical
	ATT factors_ dispositional
	ATT factors_ situational
	ATT emotional experience
	ATT goals/needs
	ATT thought processes
	ATT values/beliefs
	ATT traits_humanising
	ATT traits_dehumanising
	ATT situation
	ATT speech/thought_affiliation
	ATT speech/thought_disassociation
Empathy	Explicit empathy

Potential linguistic evidence of empathy

perspective	Character-oriented perspective taking
	Attribution of speech/thought_ affiliation
	Pronoun use/shift
emotions	Attribution of emotional experience
	Evaluation of what experience is like
	Affective understanding
other mental states	Attribution of thought processes
	Attribution of values and beliefs
	Attribution of goals and needs
situation	Attribution of situation
	Imagined scenario
	Attribution of situational factors