Developing and utilising a Realist-Constructivist
analytical framework towards understanding the
European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy

**A thesis submitted to Lancaster University for the Degree of
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ABSTRACT

This thesis develops and utilises a realist-constructivist framework for the purposes of analysing the development of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. This thesis challenges 'paradigmatic thinking' within the discipline of International Relations to demonstrate that constructivist elements are not only commensurable to realist analysis of international relations, but can bring added value to our understanding of how states' interpret and respond to the threats and incentives of the international system.

Inspired by readings of classical realism, this thesis recognises that whilst structural realism provides theoretical parsimony and elegance in its appreciation for the role of power within the international system, it lacks the necessary analytical toolkit to understand how states respond to the threats and incentives of anarchy. This is demonstrated with specific reference to the shortcomings of extant realist approaches to the complex empirical puzzle that is the Common Security and Defence Policy, which have resulted in realist theorising being relatively side-lined in relation to this policy area. To address this gap in the literature, it draws upon a neoclassical realist multi-level model of foreign policy analysis, to integrate structural realist analysis at the system-level with constructivist analysis at the unit-level.

In order to demonstrate the utility of this novel framework this thesis applies it to understanding the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, making the case that this development may be interpreted as an instance of limited transatlantic bandwagoning under unipolarity to ameliorate the 'alliance dilemma' – the dichotomous dangers of entrapment and abandonment by the senior partner in the alliance. However, the approaches of EU member states facing similar system-level threats and incentives to this policy area diverge. Therefore the 'black box' of the state is opened to explore whether the scope and pace of involvement is impacted by ideational factors at the national level. This thesis takes account of the security cultures of the United Kingdom and Germany specifically as a basis by which to understand their respective approaches towards developing security and defence cooperation through the EU.

In this sense, the thesis aspires to make a contribution to the literature in both empirical and conceptual terms. The investigation into the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy is understood through reference to both material and ideational factors and the interaction between these provides empirical findings, but the thesis also formulates a realist-constructivist framework to integrate these factors into a single analysis, which has attracted limited scholarly attention thus far. Furthermore, the developed realist-constructivist analytical framework offers significant insights on the continuing relevance of the realist tradition within International Relations to complement existing scholarship, on both theoretical pluralism and the Common Security and Defence Policy. The thesis thus offers a particular formulation and demonstration of realist-constructivist synthesis, but points to further opportunities of the framework within EU and global politics.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, to any other university or institution in application for a degree or qualification. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented here is entirely my own.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFISMA:	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
BMVg	German Federal Ministry of Defence
CAR:	Central African Republic
CARD:	Coordinated Annual Review of Defence
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF:	Combined Joint Task Force
CMC:	Crisis Management Concept
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC:	Crisis Management Concept
CMF:	Combined Maritime Forces
CTF:	Combined Task Force
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC:	European Community
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA:	European Defence Agency
EDAP:	European Defence Action Plan
EDC:	European Defence Community
EEAS:	European External Action Service
EIS:	European Integration Studies
ENP:	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERP:	European Recovery Programme
ESDI:	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EU:	European Union
EUFOR:	European Union Force Mission
EUGS:	European Union Global Strategy
EUISS:	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC:	European Union Military Committee
EUMS:	European Union Military Staff
EMAM:	European Union Advisory Mission
ESDI:	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
EUNAVFOR:	European Union Naval Force Mission
ENP:	European Neighbourhood Policy
EUTM:	European Union Training Mission
FPA:	Foreign Policy Analysis
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
IFOR:	Implementation Force
IR:	International Relations

ISAF:	International Security Assistant Force (Afghanistan)
ISTAR:	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
MoD:	UK Ministry of Defence
MPCC:	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MSCHOA:	Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVCENT:	United States Naval Forces Central Command
NCR:	Neoclassical Realism
OEEC:	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OHQ:	Operational Headquarters
OpsCen:	European Union Operations Centre
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P5:	Permanent Members of the UN Security Council
PESCO:	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP:	Partnership for Peace
PSC:	Political and Security Committee
PSI:	Pan Sahel Initiative
R&D:	Research and Development
SDIP:	Security and Defence Implementation Plan
SFOR:	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SHADE:	Shared Awareness and Deconflictation
SHAPE:	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU:	Treaty on the European Union (1991 Maastricht Treaty)
TSCTI:	Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative
UK:	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN:	United Nations
UNPROFOR:	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR:	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WEU:	Western European Union
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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INTRODUCTION

In 1939 *The Twenty Years' Crisis* was first published, written by E. H. Carr, perhaps the most notable of all British realists.[1] This piece of scholarship, which continues to be studied in depth by those wanting to gain a firm grasp of the realist tradition in the discipline of International Relations (IR), railed against projects of international law and institution building as ways to guarantee a long-lasting peace in Europe. Carr labelled this as 'utopianism', comparing it to Plato's *Republic* in that it embodied an imaginative solution for serious problems, but without a basis in reality. For Carr, the key issue of 'utopianism' was that the "failure to recognise that power is an essential element of politics has hitherto vitiated all attempts to establish international forms of government, and confused nearly every attempt to discuss the subject". [2] Carr, as well as others working in the wider political realist tradition afterwards, stressed the importance of power (defined most often in terms of material capabilities) and its distribution in the anarchic environment in which international politics occurs. Since the publication of Carr's seminal work in the United Kingdom and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*[3] in the United States of America (US), realism, for better or worse, has enjoyed the status of being something of a "default setting" for IR theorising.[4]

In the modern day though, in stark contrast to Carr's Europe of 1939, the European Union (EU) stands as the world's most successful example of regional political, economic and security cooperation, promoting peace and stability on a

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[1] E. H. Carr (2001), *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, 2001 Edition, Palgrave, Basingstoke.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[3] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *Politics Among Nations*, 1962 Edition, Knopf, New York.
[4] C. Brown (2012), 'Realism: rational or reasonable?' *International Affairs,* Vol. 88, No. 4, p. 857.

continent ravaged by war prior to its existence.[5] Indeed, the EU won the 2012 Nobel peace prize to honour this achievement, though the real testament to its success has been argued to be the advent of a rare 'long peace' on the European continent.[6] The argument has thus been put forth that a complex and sophisticated EU has transcended the limitations of state-centric power politics, the putative realist research focus, and instead can be better (or only) understood in ideational, value-based and normative terms.[7]

This logic has not least been applied to the development of a security and defence aspect to the wider European integration project. Consisting of over 500 million people across 28 member states[8], with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) bigger than the US and combined defence expenditure only second in the world behind it, the EU certainly has the economic capacity to be a global security actor deserving of attention.[9] It could also well be said to have the ambition for this, Javier Solana, whilst serving as the EU's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 2007, commenting that whilst the history of the EU could be described as "building peace amongst its member states", the modern EU had a role to play in

[5] A. Moravcsik (2001), 'Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 603-624.

[6] J. S. Duffield (1994), 'Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 369-388.

[7] See for example, J. Howorth (2011a), 'The EU's Security and Defence Policy: Towards a Strategic Approach', in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 197-245.

[8] On 30th March 2017, the UK government formally notified the European Council of its intension to leave the EU under the process laid out by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. This does not impact upon the core arguments of this thesis as retrospectively applied to the development of the CSDP, but the uncertainty of this ongoing process may well have important implications for the future of the CSDP and UK involvement with European security and defence cooperation more widely. These developments will therefore be discussed in the conclusion in relation to opportunities for wider exploitation of the analytical framework and further research.

[9] Source: World Bank (2016), *European Union, United States, China*, Washington DC. Available Online: http://data.worldbank.org/?locations=EU-US-CN ; SIPRI (2015), *Military Expenditure Database*, Stockholm. Available Online: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

"peace-building worldwide".[10] Furthermore, with the development of the concept of 'soft power' by Joseph Nye, debates have taken place regarding the role of the EU as a civilian and normative power.[11] This debate refers to the EU as both an actor and the European integration project as a process that utilises civilian (soft) or normative power instruments and civilises the international politics of the region.[12]

Since at least 2003, with the operational launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[13], it could be argued that this ambition is being transformed into reality to some extent. Over the past decade the EU has projected power far more widely and successfully than at any time previously, providing on occasions unified action to protect international peace and security across the globe.[14] Utilising both its civilian and military resources through the CSDP, Kosovo, Gaza, Afghanistan, Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are amongst those having experienced some form of EU security intervention. Whilst such interventions have been on a relatively small scale in terms of force deployment compared to similar operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), or the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the fact that the political will and necessary policy instruments existed to enable them may be argued to be significant. Furthermore, this trend of security and defence integration was further built upon in the Lisbon Treaty (effective 1st December 2009).[15] State leaders and agencies within Europe have since begun to

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[10] J. Solana (2007), 'The Lisbon Treaty: Giving the EU more coherence and weight on the international stage', *Fakt*, Warsaw, Print, 10/12/07.

[11] J. Nye (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York.

[12] I. Manners (2006), 'Normative Power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 182-199.

[13] Initially this development was named the 'European Security and Defence Policy' and only re-baptised the CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty (2007). However, for clarity it will be referred to throughout this thesis with its present label, the CSDP.

[14] J. Rehrl and H. Weisserth (2012), *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*, Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna.

[15] European Union (2007), *Treaty of Lisbon*, Lisbon, signed 13/12/07.

speak optimistically about the 'pooling and sharing' of military resource and building an increasingly integrated and coherent CSDP.[16] Furthermore, this policy area has witnessed significant achievements, such as the formulation of the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003[17] and the production of important policy documents on issues as substantive as non-proliferation.[18]

However, despite the fact that research on the historical development of the CSDP is abundant, as Bickerton et al. have noted, it lacks substantial discussion applying theoretical analyses of IR.[19] Furthermore, it may be argued that the traditional theoretical branches within IR and its sub-discipline of European Integration Studies (EIS) largely failed to predict, explain and understand this development. For the realist tradition in particular, the question of why states would decide to pool sovereignty on matters vital to the national interest such as security and defence post-1989 in the distinct absence of any direct and existential threat has been an acutely puzzling one.[20] Thus Howorth, amongst others, reaches the conclusion that we must, "look elsewhere than to the realists for an explanation" of this development.[21] Such alternative understandings of the CSDP have come through to focus on the role of institutional socialization and inception of a certain EU 'strategic culture', as noted in the work of Biava, Drent and Herd.[22]

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[16] European Defence Agency (2013)*, Pooling and Sharing*, Available Online: http://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/Whatwedo/pooling-and-sharing [Accessed December 2013].

[17] Council of the European Union (2003), *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

[18] B. Kienzle (2013), 'A European contribution to non-proliferation? The EU WMD Strategy at 10', *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 1143-1159.

[19] C. Bickerton, B. Irondelle and A. Menon (2011), 'Security Co-operation Beyond the Nation State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy', *JCMS*, Vol. 49. No. 1, pp. 1-21.

[20] For a discussion of this, see, S. Rynning, (2011), 'Realism and the CSDP'*, JCMS*, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

[21] J. Howorth (2011b), *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 201.

[22] A. Biava, M. Drent, and G. P. Herd (2011), 'Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework', *JCMS*, Vol. 49, No. 6, pp. 1227-1248.

It is the core motivation of this thesis to dispute the abandoning of realist theorising in relation to this issue, arguing that turning a blind eye to the entirety of the realist tradition would be to overlook analytical concepts that can add value to our understanding of the CSDP. Specifically, it would overlook the possibility for a realist informed approach that may integrate both material and ideational factors within its analysis. Indeed, several scholars have drawn attention to the lack of such integration between material and ideational factors being a deficiency within IR theory more widely. Sørensen, for instance, comments on the extent to which '[At] a time when we have two major theoretical traditions in IR that emphasise material and social forces respectively, we have very little attempt to examine the relationship between those forces as they play out in the real world of international relations'.[23] Similarly, Glenn highlights that the predominant focus of IR research taking the form of a theoretically pitched battle between material-based and value-based theorising, which has been at the expense of a potentially fruitful theoretical cross-fertilisation.[24] This thesis will thus explore a neglected aspect of IR theory and apply it to the case of the EU's CSDP.

Specifically, it will do so through developing a 'realist-constructivist' analytical framework and investigate the potential added value that this may bring to the study of the CSDP. This is a framework for the analysis of international politics that moves away from what it understands to be a false dichotomy between explanations utilising either material *or* ideational factors, and instead integrates how *both* material and ideational factors impact actor's policy formation and must therefore be understood in relation to each other to understand CSDP development.

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[23] G. Sørensen (2008), 'The Case for Combing Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 6.

[24] J. Glenn (2009), 'Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 523-551.

1. Statement of the Problem

The interrelated linkages between material and ideational factors in driving the historical development and the continuing practice of the regionalisation of security in the EU will form the core focus of this thesis. The regionalisation of security refers to the making of security and defence policy on the regional level, as opposed to the national, local or global levels. A region is usually defined as a group of countries within a local geographical space with a regional consciousness and multifaceted cooperation.[25] For Hettne et al., Europe, due to the formal regional organisation of the EU, represents the paradigm of regionalisation.[26] As a homogenous region, the EU sets out its borders clearly through its membership, plays a role in the management of these borders, such as through Frontex[27], and targets policies beyond these borders, such as through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).[28] Specifically though, this thesis will address the importance of the interaction of material and ideational factors in the development of the CSDP, in which securitization is undertaken by intergovernmental institutions and non-governmental organisations, in addition to the nation state, in Europe following the end of the Cold War.[29]

Particular emphasis will be accorded to the difficulties this interaction of material and ideational factors poses for the explanatory power of traditional theories within the academic discipline of IR and sub-discipline of EIS, with regards to the CSDP. The consequent limitations of these theoretical analyses will then be discussed,

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[25] For an in-depth discussion of 'regionalisation', see, B. Hettne, A. Inotai, and O. Sunkel (2001), *Comparing Regionalisms. Implications for Global Development*, Palgrave, London.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[27] A. W. Neal (2009), 'Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX', *JCMS*, Vol. 47. No. 2, pp. 333-356.
[28] K. E. Smith (2005), 'The outsiders: European neighbourhood policy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 757-773. See also, C. J. Bickerton et al. (2011), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-21.
[29] For a historical overview of this development, see, J. Howorth (2011b), *op. cit.*

leading to an alternative theoretical conception of the historical development of the CSDP and its continuing practice whereby the relative power capabilities of states in the international system (the independent variable) may be understood in terms of creating the constraining and enabling conditions for specific foreign policy action (the dependent variable). However, this strategic environment must be processed through a sub-systemic ideational intervening variable, that being the domestic security cultures of EU member states. This impacts policy makers' perception of the system and therefore how they respond to it through the production of policy regarding the scope and pace of EU security coordination and integration. In this analytical framework, issues of identity and culture will be examined in relation to the context of shifts in the distribution of material capability and this thesis will therefore contribute to the wider nascent awareness of current scholarship in the discipline of IR regarding the interrelation of these factors. This thesis will do this through a piece of empirically informed research regarding the CSDP, exploring the material-ideational nexus outlined by Adler in which 'the material world shapes, and is shaped by human action and interaction', stressing the link between ideas and material reality whereby both material and ideational factors impact policy formation.[30]

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[30] E. Adler (1997), 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 322.

2. Ideational Factors, Material Factors and 'Realist-Constructivism'

It is important at this juncture to be clear about what is meant by ideational and material factors in the context of this thesis.

Although definitions of and focus upon diverse 'ideational factors' vary widely throughout the discipline of IR, this thesis specifically refers to ideas that policy makers within international politics hold about themselves and the environment in which they find themselves, including norms, culture and identities.[31] A focus on such ideational factors to understand policy is well established within IR and EIS, particularly through the social constructivist tradition, with scholars such as Risse highlighting divergence between British, French and German national identity to enrich our understanding of their differing approaches to the European monetary union.[32] Specifically relating to security and defence, Katzenstein's edited volume addresses the role of ideational factors in this policy area.[33]

In social constructivist scholarship from which this thesis draws its 'constructivist' element, ideas, norms and culture contribute to the formation of state 'identity', which may be defined as the "basic character of states".[34] Social constructivism itself has three key components. First of all, it includes a metaphysical

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[31] A number of IR scholars have drawn attention to the importance of such factors, including, A. Wendt (1992), 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425.; J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (1993*), Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).; J. K Jacobsen (1995), 'Much Ado About Ideas', *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 283-310.; P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *The Culture of National Security*, Columbia University Press, New York.; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (1998), 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 887-917.; J. T. Checkel (1998), 'The constructivist turn in International relations theory', *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 324-348.

[32] T. Risse (2003), 'The Euro between national and European identity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 487-505.

[33] P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*

[34] R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. J. Katzenstein (1996), 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 33.

position on reality, knowledge and the relationship between the two. This position is not limited to international politics but applicable across the spectrum of the social sciences (and to the natural sciences, through the philosophy of science). Secondly, it constitutes a social theory regarding knowledgeable agents in the constitution of the social world. In other words, actors are not only passively constituted but take an active role in constituting the social reality. Thirdly, it represents a theoretical and empirical perspective on international politics. A key example of this is provided by Wendt in perhaps the most quoted phrase of all social constructivist scholarship, "anarchy is what states make of it".[35] This is not to say that states can make of the international system what they wish, but rather that the idea of the anarchic system has been accepted by states which have thus constructed this feature of international politics instead of it being an inherent certainty. Likewise, states are not understood as being constrained to act within the anarchic structure of the system in a certain fashion, such as following a rational logic of competition, but have scope to make of it what they will. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that constructivism is neutral with regards to the ontological assumptions of classical realism and classical liberalism as a social and relational theory of international politics and does not imply peaceful or non-peaceful outcomes. As Buzan and Hansen state, "ideas, norms and culture might spur as well as dampen expansionist and aggressive behaviour".[36]

Ideational factors are used by constructivist scholars to understand 'social facts', such as money or sovereignty, which are vested with an importance beyond their material reality independent of the social world.[37] Furthermore, the importance and

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[35] A. Wendt (1992), *op. cit.*, pp. 391-425.
[36] B. Buzan and L. Hansen (2009), *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 197.
[37] See, for example, C. Weber and T. J. Biersteker (1996), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; J. R. Searle (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*, Free

meaning of such 'social facts' can change through the collective intentionality of actors. For example, the concept of sovereignty transformed over the twentieth-century to accommodate a shared belief that gross human rights violations by a national government may legally justify international intervention.

However, it is also important to note the diversity within social constructivist scholarship. What had been termed 'modern' constructivism recognises that the material world does exist independently of the social world (e.g. metallic coinage) but contend that it is only given meaning (e.g. money as a medium for the exchange of resources) through norms, values, beliefs, which are reproduced through social interaction.[38] The focus for such constructivist scholars in regards to the study of security policy has been to explain and understand state-centric security and has therefore rather conformed to traditional IR research agendas, as opposed to 'postmodern' or 'critical' constructivism, which like poststructuralist, feminist and emancipatory approaches, has largely concerned itself with security as 'individual', 'gendered' or 'societal'.[39] Indeed, scholars such as Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein explicitly distance the 'modern' constructivist movement away from wider poststructuralist theorising.[40]

In contrast to constructivist scholarship is a focus on 'material factors' for the understanding and explanation of outcomes in international relations. This entails the view that, irrespective of interpretation of objects by actors, a material reality exists and that the 'reality out there' can be objectively understood. Such an approach may be

Press, New York.; G. Ingham (1996), 'Money is a Social Relation', *Review of Social Economy*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 507-529.

[38] E. Adler (2013), 'Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and Debates', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds.), *SAGE Handbook of International Relations*, London, pp. 112-144.

[39] *Ibid.* See also in this volume, M. Zehfuss (2013), 'Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, and Postcolonialism', pp. 112-144.; L. Sjoberg and J. Ann Tickner (2013), 'Feminist Perspectives on International Relations', pp. 170-194.

[40] R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 34.

illustrated through reference to structural realist scholarship, which may be said to be explicitly 'materialist' in its understanding and focus on 'power' (meaning chiefly military power, along with its prerequisites, although the underlying complexity behind this concept is discussed in later chapters) as a material resource, with its relative distribution being "the key factor for understanding world politics", according to Mearsheimer. [41] However, an often-overlooked detail within structural realist scholarship is that the link between material structure and the action of states is indirect, through what Waltz calls the "socialization and competition" of states pursuing their key goal of survival.[42] Indeed, the lack of clear linkage between material factors and the 'social programming' that leads states to act in ways contrary to realist theory has been a matter for criticism.[43]

Nevertheless, material factors, in the form of the relative distribution of military capabilities forms the core explanatory variable for many working with structural realism as a theoretical framework, with ideational factors playing little role if at all. This position is reversed within the modern constructivist analysis discussed above, where ideational factors are prioritised and material forces acknowledged, but pushed to the side-lines.[44] The promise of a realist-constructivist framework is to integrate both ideational and material forces into a single framework for analysis and thus provide opportunities to understand how these factors interact.

Finally, before moving on to the specific research objectives of this thesis, it must be noted that there have been a number of wide ranging attempts by scholars from diverse theoretical backgrounds investigating the interaction of material and ideational

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[41] J. Mearsheimer (1995), 'A Realist Reply', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 91.
[42] K. N. Waltz (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reeding (CA), p. 74.
[43] G. Sørensen (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-32.
[44] See, for example, C. O. Meyer and E. Strickmann (2010), 'Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence', *JCMS*, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 61-81.

factors, both within the discipline of IR and in the wider social sciences. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive survey of such approaches, but to illustrate this diversity, Stephen Walt's realist theory of alliance formation and Robert W. Cox's critical approach with regards to historical structures, both interpret the meaning of 'ideational' and 'material' factors differently and attempt to integrate them to create richer theories of international relations.[45] Furthermore, a number of scholars have previously argued for an integration of material and social factors. Sørensen makes the case for moving away from material factors as being understood as driving a reductionist social programming and towards a realist-informed constructivism in which ideational factors are investigated in their material context.[46] Approaches to the integration of material and social factors have also come from Poststructuralism, Neo-Gramscianism and the wider critical theories of IR, in addition to more mainstream approaches.[47] However, to metaphysically position this thesis clearly within the scholarly literature of the discipline, it attempts to utilise and contribute to valuable efforts at developing an analytical framework that draws from insights from the broad tradition of political realism integrated with elements of social constructivism at the unit-level. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to utilise this realist-constructivist analytical framework in application to a case study of the development and practice security and defence policy cooperation, coordination and integration in the EU through the CSDP.

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[45] R. W. Cox (1996), *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; S. M. Walt (1987), *Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).
[46] G. Sørensen (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-32.
[47] See, M. Zehfuss (2013), 'Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, and Postcolonialism', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds.), *SAGE Handbook of International Relations*, Sage, London, pp, 112-144.

3. Research Objectives

Whilst the core research objective of this thesis is to develop a potential realist-constructivist framework for contributing to our understanding of EU member state security and defence cooperation undertaken through the CSDP, this leads into a number of broader objectives.

The first of these broader objectives is to set out the possibility for an analytical framework that draws upon elements from across traditional paradigmatic boundaries within IR. Specifically, it will assess how far and in what way this approach of 'theoretical pluralism' can integrate insights from the realist tradition together with constructivist perspectives on ideational factors, in a way which both elements are not only theoretically compatible but complementary.[48]

The second of these broader objectives is to scrutinise current theoretical accounts for the development of security and defence integration undertaken through the EU's CSDP by realist and constructivist approaches to the study of international relations. The thesis will briefly set out the context for how security and defence integration emerged from the wider European integration project, before interrogating the theoretically informed narratives that have been developed to understand these developments from both realist and constructivist perspectives and ask whether these factors constitute a sufficient and valid understanding. Specifically, what are the strengths and shortcomings of the realist account that the post-Cold War development of the CSDP being due to the balance of material power capabilities within the

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[48] For an overview of some theoretical approaches beyond traditional paradigmatic boundaries, see, R. Sil and P. J. Katzenstein (2010), *Beyond Paradigms, Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

international system.[49] Equally, it will interrogate the strengths and limitations of a constructivist analysis of security and defence integration undertaken through the EU, which emphasises the importance of ideational factors in shaping preferences and policies.[50]

The third broad objective of this thesis is to develop increased understanding of regional security and defence cooperation and integration through utilisation of a realist-constructivist framework for analysis. This analytical framework will be applied to the case study of the CSDP and returns the thesis back to its core aim, analysing the extent to which such an approach presents a coherent and convincing means by which we may develop our understanding of this policy area. Furthermore, it seeks to explore the ways in which such an approach complements existing understanding of the CSDP and considers the possibilities for such an approach to open up new and important avenues for investigation, particularly with regards the regionalisation of security and defence in the EU. Specifically, it seeks to examine utilising a realist-constructivist approach the impact of EU member state security cultures on the scope and pace of their cooperation and integration on security and defence through the CSDP.

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[49] See, for examples, R. J. Art (2006), 'Striking the balance', *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 177-185.; S. G. Jones (2007), *The Rise of European Security Co-operation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; B. R. Posen (2006), 'European Union security and defence policy: response to unipolarity?', *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 149–186.

[50] See, for examples, A. Miskimmon (2004), 'Continuity in the Face of Upheaval - British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 273-299.; M. V. Rasmussen (2005), 'What's the Use of it: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 67-89.; A. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2006), 'Muddling Through: How the EU is Countering new Threats to the Homeland', in A. J. K. Bailes, G. Herolf and B. Sundelius (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 288-298.

4. Methodology

The central methodology of this thesis is based on theoretically-informed historical process-tracing. This involves the development of a theoretically informed analytical narrative where key findings are verified through triangulation between a number of data sources.[51] Specifically, this thesis develops a novel theoretically informed analytical narrative of the EU's CSDP that draws from the existing theoretical traditions of realism and constructivism within the discipline of IR, integrating elements of both within what it terms a 'realist-constructivist' analytical framework. It does not seek to find a 'covering law' to explain foreign policy in general, nor does it seek to examine other instances of security and defence policy coordination and integration more widely, either in Europe or in other regional settings, but rather it seeks to contribute towards deepening understanding of the causal chain behind the development of the CSDP.

The above is achieved through the formulation of the theoretically informed narrative of the CSDP that serves to contextualise and conceptualise what are argued to be important outcomes in international relations related to the development of this policy area of the EU. Specifically, as will be discussed in Chapter 1, this analytical framework draws upon a neoclassical realist multi-level understanding of foreign policy to integrate realist and constructivist concepts and identify causal linkages between independent, intervening and dependent variables with regards to the development of the CSDP. This includes the qualitative investigation of several factors that interact in a complex way and that may not be rigorously quantified due to incomplete, lacking or unreliable data availability.[52] As will be explained in Chapter 2,

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[51] See, R. H. Bates et al. (1998), *Analytic Narratives*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).
[52] G. King, R. O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).

this approach differs substantially from extant realist-informed approaches to the CSDP, which often do not consider why interaction with the development of the policy area is temporally and spatially uneven amongst EU member states, the linkage between the system and unit levels of analysis, or the interaction of material and ideational factors.[53]

However, due to issues of space, this thesis does not seek to provide an exhaustive analytical account of the CSDP in application to all EU member states, nor does not seek to perform a comprehensive study of all CSDP actions, how they were agreed, resourced and implemented, nor does it critically evaluate the success of the EU in this policy area. Instead, it explores how we may understand the CSDP in relation to realist concepts regarding the relative distribution of material power capability within international relations and how this may be understood to be processed at the domestic level of member states through the constructivist concept of 'security culture'. Bearing this in mind, process-tracing becomes the logical methodological choice to develop both the theoretical framework and our understanding of a specific policy area, within a specified time-period and without a controlled comparison. [54]

The primary goal of this investigation is to advance the development of theoretical pluralism in IR with regards to realist-constructivist synthesis and

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[53] See, R. Art (2004), 'Europe Hedges its Security Bets', in T. V. Paul, J. J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA), pp. 179-238.; B. R. Posen (2006), *op. cit.*, pp. 149–186.; S. Coxard-Wexler (2006), 'Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 397-432.; Hyde-Price, A. (2006), ''Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 217-231.; Hyde-Price, A. (2007), *European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity*, Routledge, London.; S. G. Jones (2007), *The Rise of European Security Co-operation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; S. M. Walt (2009), 'Alliances in a Unipolar World', *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 86-120.; L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (2013), 'Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 264-288.; A. Hyde-Price (2013a), 'Realism: A dissident voice in the study of the CSDP', in S. Biscop, and R. G. Whitman (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, Routledge, London.

[54] For an in-depth discussion of case study methodology, see, A. L. George and A. Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA, Cambridge (MA).

secondarily to contribute to disciplinary knowledge of security and defence cooperation, coordination and integration in the EU through the CSDP. In order to achieve these goals and in accordance with the process-tracing methodology, this thesis utilises extensive secondary material from the academic discipline of IR and sub-disciplines of EIS, Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis. This is triangulated through drawing on a wide range of primary documentation on European security and defence, including that produced within EU institutions, EU member states and other interested states, as well as non-governmental institutions that have been impacted by the CSDP and therefore have taken an acute interest in analysing its development. Furthermore, this thesis consults a number of contemporary news reports, speeches and secondary literature from over the 1990s and 2000s to gain a wider ranging and richer insight into security and defence policy developments over this period.

Particular focus will be accorded to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) as EU member states, through drawing on the scholarly literature relating to their security cultures and their interaction with European security and defence policy cooperation. Specifically, consideration is made regarding how their unit-level security cultures may be understood to impact the interpretation of, and response to, threats and incentives provided by the distribution of material power capabilities within the international system. The rationale for this selection of EU member states will be returned to and explained in Chapter 4, in reference to the realist-constructivist analytical framework as developed and applied over the course of earlier chapters.

5. Outline of the Thesis

In order to accomplish the research objectives outlined above, this study will proceed as follows. The focus of Chapter 1 is to delineate a theoretical space for the formulation of a realist-constructivist analytical framework which will constitute the theoretical contribution to the scholarly literature of this thesis and this will later be used to guide analysis of the CSDP in following Chapters. It will first of all consider the possibility of a theoretical framework not bound to a particular tradition of IR and the extent to which constructivist elements are not only compatible with the realist tradition, but could potentially bring added value to our understanding of international relations. This Chapter will therefore outline the theoretical framework of realist-constructivism that will then be operationalised for the analysis of the CSDP in the form of a case study.

Chapter 2 then proceeds with a review of the scholarly literature on the CSDP and how it has been theoretically understood thus far by scholars working within EIS and IR. It begins by providing a brief overview of the historical development of the CSDP, before going on to address theoretical understandings of these developments from EIS and then the discipline of IR more widely in the form of realist and constructivist informed research. This serves to highlight not only the value of these theoretical traditions, but also the respective shortcomings of current approaches to the complex empirical puzzle that is the CSDP from them. Therefore, it illustrates the gap in the literature that the realist-constructivist approach to this policy area may address through examining the role of material power structure and its relation to unit-level ideational factors within a single analysis.

Once this gap in the scholarly literature surrounding the CSDP is established, Chapter 3 makes the case that the CSDP may be understood to a certain extent through reference to the distribution of material power capability in the international system, in terms of representing an amelioration of EU member states' 'alliance dilemma' with the US. Following this, Chapter 4 recognises divergent national approaches to the CSDP and makes the case that we may understand this to an extent through reference to the differing security cultures of EU member states. It illustrates this in relation to two states in particular and their divergent approaches to the CSDP, these states being the UK and Germany. To draw further attention to the alliance dilemma and the shaping effects of security culture, Chapter 5 goes on to consider the uncertainties surrounding the advent of the Trump administration in the US in 2016 and the submission of the UK's notification to leave the EU in 2017. It considers the current and potential impact of these events on the CSDP, with a particular focus on the UK and Germany.

Finally, there is a concluding chapter which draws together the main findings and contribution to the literature of the thesis. It finishes by noting potential avenues for research in the further development of the realist-constructivist analytical framework and provide a discussion of the possibilities for wider application of the framework based upon the findings presented in this thesis.

CHAPTER 1:

Towards A Realist-Constructivist

Analytical Framework

It is important to consider why a realist-constructivist approach is considered innovative, novel and even controversial within the discipline of IR. In essence, this is because the traditions of realism and constructivism are often portrayed as 'paradigms' in direct opposition to each other and incommensurable.[55] Clearly, if this were the case it would rule out all possibilities of realist-constructivist dialogue and theorising. Therefore, the first task of this chapter is to examine the basis for these claims, in the form of 'paradigmatic thinking' in IR, and to challenge this in order to open up a potential theoretical space for synthesis approaches such as a realist-constructivist analytical framework to emerge. Following this, the chapter goes on to set out the possibilities for the approach of realist-constructivism, arguing that it represents a logical potential extension to the broad realist tradition and that it can bring added value to purely realist and solely constructivist theorising in regard to our understanding of the CSDP. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an explanation of how realist-constructivism will be operationalised into an analytical framework that will then be employed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

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[55] S. M. Walt (1998), 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 29–45. See also, D. S. Geller, and J. A. Vasquez (2004), 'The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations: Introduction', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 1–6.

1.1. Theoretical Pluralism and Realist-Constructivist Analysis

First of all, it is important for our purpose of developing a realist-constructivist analytical framework, to draw attention to the fact that the adoption of Kuhnian language of the 'paradigm' to discuss theories of IR has been identified as obscuring the potential for synergistic theoretical approaches to the study of international politics. Barkin compares this issue to a siege-like mentality, where the building of paradigmatic castles "encourages insular thinking" and "a focus on emphasising differences" rather than opportunities for mutual compatibility.[56] Furthermore, it could be argued that the result of such 'paradigmatic thinking' in IR is that much scholarly work is concentrated in exploring paradigmatic boundaries, contractions, criticisms and incompatibilities, rather than opportunities for development, such as through synthesis.

Perhaps the most striking examples of this may be observed in a number of unsuccessful attempts to demarcate the precise boundaries of realism in IR. Colin Wight, for instance, has noted that something of a cottage industry exists in attempting to place Thucydides within, or exclude him from, the realist tradition.[57] This issue is not limited to scholarly thinkers who pre-date the discipline of the IR, as we can see in examples of modern scholarship, such as Andrew Moravcsik asking, 'Is anyone still a realist?' among countless examples of attempts to lock down what exactly it means to be of the realist tradition.[58] As Jackson notes, such debates are more insidious for the discipline than mere distraction as they "solidify stances [to world politics] that should

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[56] J. S. Barkin (2010), *Realist Constructivism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-12.

[57] C. Wight (2002), 'Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations', in W. E. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage, Thousand Oaks (CA), pp. 23-51.

[58] A. Moravcsik and J.W. Legro (1999), 'Is anybody still a realist?', *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 5-55.

remain open". [59] Additionally, for Waever, the term 'Inter-Paradigm Debate' is something of a misnomer, not only due to its misuse of the term 'paradigm' but also because 'paradigmatic thinking' encourages approaches that talk past, rather than to each other.[60] Therefore talk of the 'paradigms' of IR is not only a cavalier misuse of a key term from the Philosophy of Science, but arguably a potential barrier to progress within the discipline.

It is important to note that this thesis is far from alone in advocating an approach that transcends traditional theoretical boundaries. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, but particularly in the late 2000s, an approach of 'Theoretical Pluralism' has gained increasing prominence. Maliniak et al. highlight this trend in a recent state of the discipline exercise, recognising calls for greater theoretical, methodological and epistemological diversity within IR.[61] Furthermore, this movement has included calls to move away from addressing meta-theoretical traditions in isolation and towards drawing upon a range of conceptual sources in order to provide "compelling analyses of empirical puzzles".[62]

However, whilst it may be true that theoretical traditions of IR are not necessarily incommensurable with one other and there may be possibilities for a 'pluralistic' approach, it is not automatically the case that all theories and elements within them are compatible for a synergistic approach that would bring added value towards addressing certain research puzzles of international politics. Furthermore, regarding a potential realist-constructivist synergy, it is important to note that this thesis

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[59] P. T. Jackson (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 907-930.
[60] O. Waever (1996), 'The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate', in S. Smith et al. (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 163-164.
[61] D. Maliniak et al. (2011), 'International Relations in the US Academy', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 437-464.
[62] P. J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara (2002), 'Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism', *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 177. See also, R. Sil and P. J. Katzenstein (2010), *op. cit.*

clearly limits itself to the examination of a single policy area, the CSDP, rather than attempting to construct a theoretical framework universally applicable to the entirety of global politics.

Indeed, it is the case that not all elements of the broad tradition of constructivism are compatible with the extremely diverse tradition of political realism, with its many branches. It is therefore important to illustrate clearly the practical opportunities for a realist-constructivist analysis through drawing attention to the specific areas for the two approaches to share common ground and bring added value to one another in a fresh analytical framework that will help us to better understand certain aspects of the CSDP.

The first step towards realising these practical opportunities for synthesis is to understand the separate elements of 'realism' and 'constructivism' on their own terms. Some have claimed that realism and constructivism are merely divided types of analysis, others have stressed a sense of fundamental incompatibility, whilst more promisingly for our purposes, others still have noted the possibility for a more complementary relationship with the incorporation of insights from both. It is important to understand the basis for these views, before going on to assess which elements from these two broad traditions may be utilised and what value they may bring to the synergy. It is also important to identify and provide clear working definitions for these elements as, over time, different scholars have used even key concepts within these traditions in multi-faceted manners.

1.2. Delineating the Realist tradition in International Relations

It is important to set out what is understood by 'realism', in order to fully understand how it relates to and is drawn upon by the realist-constructivist analytical

framework. Furthermore, it is vital to highlight the key concepts of the realist tradition, how they have developed over time and how they are capable of being integrated with constructivist elements into a logical analytical framework that does not undermine the whole basis of the tradition. Without specifying this, the meaning of 'realism' would be too broad and unclear to be useful within a realist-constructivist analytical framework.

Political realism (thusly referred to only as 'realism') is a broad theoretical tradition within the discipline of IR that seeks to bring order to seemingly disparate and unique events. It has been described as an 'eclectic and diverse' approach, that considers both the role and nature of the human condition and the international political structure within which the conduct of international politics takes place, placing differing importance to these factors amongst its many variations.[63] It is for this reason that the realist tradition is a rather broad and disparate one. Navigating the field of realism, as Chris Brown has noted, has become a challenging task in itself.[64]

There is a difficulty in 'lumping all realism together', because as Kenneth Waltz rightly notes, they begin from different basic assumptions.[65] In order to draw attention to the key concepts of realism, it is helpful to draw attention to these assumptions and how they developed ever more complexity. A logical way of achieving this is to examine the historical development of realist thought through the work of some of its philosophical inspirations and influential texts, namely from the work of E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. This enables us to distinguish between incidental and essential features of this broad school of realism, before going on to assess its complementarity with elements of constructivism.

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[63] S. Molloy (2006), *The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 2.
[64] C. Brown (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 857-866.
[65] K. N. Waltz (1997), 'Evaluating Theory', *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 913.

As noted within the introduction to this thesis, E. H. Carr is widely regarded as a key early realist thinker for having drawn attention to the importance of power within international politics. In his work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* Carr argues that a "harmony of interests" between nation states is not universal, with 'realism' being the recognition of this and to believe otherwise being 'utopian'. 'Utopianism', according to Carr, is based upon the false assumption that all states share ideas of common interest in peace and international economic harmony, meaning that any nation that undermines peace is "both irrational and immoral".[66] Carr argues that whilst some states may indeed be satisfied with the status quo, others will be left unsatisfied with this state of affairs and therefore be 'revisionists' who seek to bring about change as it is in their interests to do so. Carr states clearly that the "clash of interests is real and inevitable; and the whole nature of the problem is distorted by an attempt to disguise it".[67] Furthermore, Carr argues that attempts to bring such a harmony into existence through appeals to public opinion and morality, in opposition to the rationality of the pursuit of divergent interests, is folly.

Hans J. Morgenthau, another scholar whom is widely recognised as having made a significant contribution to the realist tradition, similarly sets up a dichotomy between two understandings of "the nature of man, society and politics".[68] The realist understanding, for Morgenthau, is based upon a realisation that the world consists of actors who hold opposing interests and that leads to conflict among them. Rather than appealing to "universally valid abstract principles", this understanding of politics recognises that selfish interests are vital.[69] Furthermore, Morgenthau sets out a belief in objective laws that find their roots in human nature, thus allowing for the testing of

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[66] E. H. Carr (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[68] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

hypotheses against the facts of past political action[70] and recognises a normative dimension to realism in that it states how foreign policy *ought* to be pursued rather than always *is*. Realist foreign policy is *good* policy for Morgenthau as it is in accordance with "the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success" through its pursuit of "interest defined in terms of power".[71] However, Morgenthau disregards the impact of psychological motives and ideological preferences on foreign policy making and seeks instead to "focus on the rational elements of foreign policy".[72]

In addition to this, Morgenthau recognises that although realism analyses "interest defined in terms of power", both interest and power are not endowed with universally understood meanings.[73] Although power may, simply put, be understood as "anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man", the mechanism of this may range from physical violence to a vast array of psychological means.[74]

Both Carr and Morgenthau, are said to be members of the 'classical realist' school of thought and are recognised as drawing attention to enduring key concepts of realist scholarship.[75] Primarily there is a focus on 'power', which is placed as a fundamental feature of international politics. This is linked to a skepticism and humility regarding the amount of change that may be enforced on international politics, with the best we can hope for being a less violent world rather than a perpetually peaceful one.[76] For this reason, the realist tradition is often identified with *realpolitik* or 'power politics', with claims of philosophical ancestry coming from a broader tradition that pre-dates the academic discipline of IR. Such influences upon realism include that of Carl von

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[70] *Ibid*., Chapters 1 and 2.
[71] *Ibid*., p. 8.
[72] *Ibid*., p. 6.
[73] *Ibid*., p. 6.
[74] *Ibid*., p. 11.
[75] C. Brown (2012), *op. cit*., pp. 857-866.
[76] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.,*pp. 68-69.

Clausewitz's understanding of states operating in a condition of 'war of all against all', the power politics of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thucydides' history of the Great Peloponnesian War, where "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".[77] However, what power consists of exactly and how it is utilised in the analysis differs widely amongst realist scholars, as shall be explored.[78]

In addition to this there is an assumption that humans primarily face each other as members of groups or polities, rather than as isolated individuals. These 'social collectivities' are a locus of power and therefore the primary point of analysis for realism. For practical purposes though, Grieco succinctly surmises that, "States are the major actors in world affairs" and envisages no practical challenger to the primacy of the nation state in international politics.[79] It is important to note that many realists are also aware of E. H. Carr's point on this matter that, "Few things are permanent in history; and it would be rash to assume that the territorial unit of power is one of them".[80] Similarly, Morgenthau recognised that modern states are a "product of history, and… therefore bound to disappear in the course of history".[81] More recently, Schweller and Priess argue against downplaying the importance of other actors in international politics within the work of scholars identified as being within the realist tradition, noting that "traditional realists... recognise that institutions are a vital part of the landscape of world politics".[82] For this reason, the commonly made axiom that

[77] C. von Clausewitz (1997), *On War*, Translated by J. J. Graham, Revised and Edited by F. N. Maude, 1997 Reprint, Wordsworth Editions, Hertfordshire. Thucydides (2000), *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Translated by R. Warner, 2000 Reprint, Penguin, London. N. Machiavelli (2003), *The Prince*, Translated by G. Bull, 2003 Reprint, Penguin, London.

[78] D. A. Baldwin (2013), 'Power and International Relations', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons., *Handbook of International Relations*, eds., 2nd ed., SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 273-297.

[79] J. M. Grieco (1988), 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist of the Newest Liberal Intuitionalism', *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 485-507.

[80] E. H. Carr (2001), *op. cit.,* pp. 228-229.

[81] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[82] R. L. Schweller and D. Priess (1997), 'A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 2.

realism is 'statist' perhaps goes too far; states are the object of realist analysis only so far as they are a nexus of group power, or as Niebuhr puts it, "the most absolute of all human associations", rather than due to a particular research commitment to the nation state.[83] The important implication of this is that aspects of international politics beyond that of the nation state, such as a *sui generis* EU, more than an alliance but less than a state, should not be assumed to be non-conducive to a realist analysis.

However, although a focus on power may be a useful starting point, how it may be operationalised into a framework for the analysis of international politics has differed widely. Whilst 'classical realism' has been derided by its behaviourist critics of as constituting an unscientific 'wisdom knowledge' of foreign policy, the work of Waltz in contrast has been cited as taking the realist tradition into a more 'scientific' era.[84]

In contrast to Morgenthau's assertion that the struggle for power "is the result of forces inherent in human nature"[85], Waltz makes assumptions regarding the 'structure' of the international arena that leads to conflict.[86] Unlike Carr and Morgenthau, Waltz limits the scope of this 'structural realism' (also often referred to as 'neo-realism'), to the system-level of global politics, the so-called 'third image', utilising the relative distribution of power within this system of nation states as the single causal variable by which the competitive realm of international politics can be explained.

Waltz's analysis of international relations begins somewhat with an echo of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, Chapter 13, in which the absence of the state is

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[83] R. Niebuhr (1932), *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Society*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, p. 83.

[84] J. Donnelly (2000), *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11.

[85] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[86] K. N. Waltz (1959), *Man, the State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York.

considered.[87] In this 'state of nature', Hobbes regards men as crudely equal (in that the weakest either through confederacy or subterfuge, has the power to threaten the survival of the strongest), operate in a situation of anarchy (without a recognised authority to impose a rule of law) and must compete over limited resources. This leads to life that is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short".[88] However, whereas the existence of the state can be understood as bringing order to this situation in domestic politics through what Weber regards as a "monopoly of legitimate violence", representing the collective interest and will of its people, international politics lacks such an overarching authority.[89] Waltz therefore argues that the international arena may be characterised as an environment of 'anarchy'.[90] This is not to say it is chaotic, but rather that it is without any central authority to moderate the interaction of the actors, primarily meaning states. In short, there are no 'emergency services' to call for the state in peril. This is sometimes taken to be a pessimistic understanding of the international system, but (like the Hobbesian state of nature) is not necessarily a situation of war of all against all but perennial insecurity.[91] Waltz does not at all rule out possibilities for international cooperation, but like Carr and Morgenthau, recognises that power relations will play a role in all attempts to impose order on the international structure, such as may be argued to have occurred through the EU.

It should also be noted that Waltz abstracts the prime actors (states) of his analysis to be rational and unitary 'black boxes'.[92] For this reason, some working with

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[87] *Ibid*.; K. N. Waltz (1979), *Op. Cit.*; T. Hobbes (1996), *Leviathan*, 1996 Reprint, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[88] *Ibid*., p. 186.

[89] M. Weber (1919), *Politik als Beruf*, Duncker & Humboldt, Leipzig. Quote translated from the German, "das Monopol legitimer physicher Gewaltsamkeit".

[90] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*

[91] For a discussion of Thomas Hobbes and Realism, see J. Donnelly (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

[92] For an example of this in Realism, see: J. Mearsheimer, (2007), Structural Realism, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 72-86.

the realist tradition utilise rational-choice models to analyse international politics, whereby self-interested actors calculate the outcomes of action and act accordingly.[93] Such analysis takes place across the social sciences, employing an 'instrumental' understanding of rationality where the costs and benefits of action are calculated.[94]

However, it would be a misunderstanding of the tradition more widely to assume that such an adherence to rational-choice models is universal within the realist school of thought. Indeed, it would be an exaggeration to apply such an understanding of rationality universally to the realist tradition. For example, Thucydides' 'The Peloponnesian War', a work often claimed to be a key antecedent of classical realism, asserts clearly the argument that foreign policy can be driven by 'passions' in place of sound rationality.[95] Carr likewise brandishes liberal idealists who place their faith in states acting 'rationally' as naive for believing that 'revisionist' states could be constrained by the mutual benefits of an ordered and stable international system.[96] Glaser makes the distinction between 'greedy states' and 'security seekers', emphasising the importance of state motivations that are not sourced from the international system.[97] Some critics, such as Lebow have been scathing of the import and conflation of rational-choice with realist analysis, asserting that it strips the tradition bare of its complexity and subtlety, all in a naïve hope of achieving some sort of scientific status and instead leading to a nadir.[98]

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[93] P. Toft (2005), 'John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 381-408.

[94] J. Scott (2000), 'Rational Choice Theory', in G. Browning, A. Hacli, and F. Webster (eds.), *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present,* Sage Publications, London.

[95] Thucydides (2000), *op. cit.*

[96] E. H. Carr (2001), *op. cit.*

[97] C. L. Glaser (2010), *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), pp. 87-90.

[98] R. N. Lebow (2007), 'Classical Realism', in T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 53-69. See also: M. Nicholson (1998), 'Realism and Utopianism Revisited', in K. Booth, M. Cox, T. Dunne (eds.), *The Eighty Years Crisis: International Relations 1919-1999*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 74-76.

The core importance of this delineation of the realist tradition within IR is that it challenges the oversimplification of the realist tradition as being necessarily defined in parsimonious, but somewhat anaemic terms, that would otherwise limit the possibilities for the formulation of a realist-constructivist analytical framework for the purposes of contributing to our understanding of the CSDP. Rather than being necessarily bound to statist and rational-choice analysis, it is argued that the realist tradition is broader than is perhaps often appreciated. What this sub-section instead identifies as being the core characteristics of 'realist' scholarship is a focus on the centrality of power within international relations that operate under conditions of anarchy and a resulting research interest in the nexuses of this power. Therefore, the realist-constructivist framework developed within this thesis may rightly be argued to fit within this broad realist tradition as it retains both this core focus and research interest as shall be explored within the remainder of this chapter.

1.2. Understanding Security and Defence Policy under Anarchy

As the core focus and substantial research interest of the realist tradition within IR has now been made clear, it is important to understand how realist concepts may be utilised to deepen our understanding of security and defence policy analysis. The importance attached to power for the realist tradition, understood largely as the resources available to the state to coerce other actors, flows logically from the understanding of the international system as anarchic.

However, it would be wrong to portray realist scholars as deterministic with regards to the making of policy in this manner. Indeed, Waltz understands the outcomes of his assumptions with regards to state behaviour in rather more prescriptive terms,

arguing that states are placed into a position whereby if they do not take an interest in their own survival, relying upon themselves and adopting a position of egoistic self-help, they are not likely to last in an anarchical world.[99] Whilst this may be no empty threat, Poland for example was partitioned out of existence in the eighteenth-century,[100] it does not impose a straitjacket of rationality upon states.[101] In effect, Waltz recognises that states can and do make 'bad' policy decisions in opposition to realist logic. Indeed, it may be argued that this is a key aspect of the realist tradition, which builds upon the work of Morgenthau's critique of US involvement in Vietnam over the 1960s and continues to play an important role within realist scholarship, such as the criticism of the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, most notably by Mearsheimer and Walt.[102] As Waltz argues, structural realism deals with the pressure of the anarchic structure on states, "not with how states respond to the pressures".[103] This leads to a situation in which these pressures 'shape and shove' state choices, but leaves room for a wider range of factors to influence the formulation of specific states foreign policy behaviour, with this being defined as "that is, what a state does" by Elman.[104]

Nevertheless, realist analysis has tended to categorise the foreign policy strategies of states in a zero-sum game into one of two ideal-type categories of behaviour; 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning'. It should first of all be stressed though

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[99] M. P. Sullivan (2005), '"That dog won't hunt': the cottage industry of realist criticism, or must you play that Waltz again?' *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 327-354.
[100] See, J. Lukowski (1999), *The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795*, Routledge, New York.
[101] J. Baylis et al. (2013), *op. cit.,* pp. 162-179.
[102] L. Zambernardi (2011), 'The impotence of power: Morgenthau's critique of American intervention in Vietnam', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 1335-1356.; J. Mearsheimer and S. M. Walt (2003), 'An Unnecessary War', *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb, pp. 50-59.; J. Mearsheimer (2005), 'Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism', openDemocracy.net, Available Online: www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp [Accessed May 2014].
[103] K. N. Waltz (2000), 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p 27.
[104] C. Elman (2003), 'Introduction, Appraising Balance of Power Theory', in J. Vasquez and C. Elman (eds.), *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A new Debate*, Pearson, Prentice Hall (NJ), p. 8.; K. N. Waltz (1983), 'A Response to my Critics', in R. O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, p. 343.

that, as ideal-types, actual state behaviour "will only approximate either model", with more nuanced strategies discussed at length within the wider IR literature.[105] However, such strategies effectively lie on a continuum between competitive (balancing) and cooperative (bandwagoning) behaviour.

Balancing, according to Morgenthau and Thompson, is "the attempt on the part of one nation to counteract the power of another by increasing its strength to a point where it is at least equal, if not superior, to the other nation's strength".[106] For Waltz, balancing is *the* recurrent tendency of international politics, as to pursue otherwise would usually risk the autonomy and therefore survival of the state.[107] Indeed, the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz has even been labelled by some a 'balance-of-power theory', with Waltz going as far as to claim that "if there is any distinctly political theory of international politics, then balance-of-power theory is it".[108] Waltz furthermore argues that states are more concerned with "maintaining their place within the system" than maximising their power, and that balancing has the effect of creating an equilibrium in the system.[109] In addition, Waltz notes a further distinction between 'internal' balancing, whereby states develop their own capabilities, and 'external' balancing whereby states enter into alliances.[110] Others have identified that that balancing can occur through both military (hard balancing) and non-military means (soft balancing), with the latter focused on delaying, complicating and increasing the costs of the other states to utilise their power.[111]

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[105] S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 282. For an overview of an extensive range of more nuanced strategic responses, see, H. Ebert, D. Flemes and G. Struver (2012), 'The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and Pakistan Deal with their Rising Neighbors', *GIGA, Working Papers*, No. 206, p. 8.
[106] H. J. Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson (1950), *Principles and Problems of International Politics*, Knopf, New York, p. 103.
[107] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[110] *Ibid.*, p. 168.
[111] R. A. Pape (2005), 'Soft Balancing against the United States', *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45.

Stephen Walt attempts to offer a refined notion of balancing, arguing that considering power alone is flawed as it "ignores the other factors that statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies".[112] Walt therefore argues that 'balancing' occurs according to 'threat', where power is not the only part of the equation.[113] Although Walt maintains that power relationships are an important factor in states' calculations of threat, he maintains that it is not the only factor. Therefore, Walt focuses upon a "more general concept of threat", which includes "geography, offensive capabilities and intentions".[114] This requires states to make an assessment of threats, including judgment on the motivations of others and leading states to balance against the most 'threatening', rather than simply 'powerful', states.[115]

In contrast to the competitive behaviour of balancing, bandwagoning is defined in terms of cooperation. Whereas Waltz cites states balancing *against* stronger powers, bandwagoning is defined as *joining* the stronger coalition, as the junior partner.[116] Stephen Walt defines bandwagoning similarly in opposition to 'balancing', albeit within the framework of 'balance of threat' and regards alignment as taking place in relation to the "source of danger" of the state, rather than necessarily in relation to the most powerful state.[117] Schweller too contrasts balancing and bandwagoning behaviour, but goes further in stating that whereas "the aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed… the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted".[118] The argument

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[112] S. M. Walt (1985), 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power', *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 3.
[113] S. M. Walt (1985), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-43.
[114] S. M. Walt (1997), 'The Progressive Power of Realism', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4, p. 933.
[115] S. M. Walt (1985), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-43.
[116] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, pp. 124-128.
[117] S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 17.
[118] R. L. Schweller (1994), 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 72-107. See also, S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 21.; G. H. Snyder (1997), *Alliance Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), pp. 158-161.

here is that bandwagoning is not necessarily a response to a threat, but a strategy that may be adopted in order for a state to gain something, including increased security.

This is not without risk however, as junior partners face the 'alliance dilemma', whereby states are vulnerable to overreliance ('entrapment') on the one hand through not developing autonomous security and defence capacity and de-alignment ('abandonment') if they do so.[119] To ameliorate this concern to an extent though, states can build mutual dependencies with the senior partner (such as demonstrating value to contribute towards shared interests) and cultivate viable alternatives.[120] This ultimately constitutes a limited form of bandwagoning with the greater power, but also a hedging of risk through diversifying the portfolio of tools available for security and defence.

However, in his analysis covering alliance formation in the middle-east in response to external threats, Walt doubts the prevalence of bandwagoning behaviour outside of extraordinary conditions regarding the proximity and dependence on a threatening state(s) and the lack of capable allies to aid in opposing it.[121] This is echoed by other realist scholars who have argued that bandwagoning is both rarer and of higher risk for states than balancing. Chiefly, Waltz argues for the dominance of balancing as a strategy, noting that "if states wished to maximise power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged".[122] From the offensive realist perspective, Mearsheimer also regards balancing rather than bandwagoning to be the predominant behaviour of states in an anarchic international

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[119] G. H. Snyder (1984), 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 461-495.

[120] *Ibid*.; O. Theiler (2003), *Die NATO im Umbruch: Bündnisreform im Spannungsfeld konkurrierender Nationalinteressen*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 21-22.

[121] S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.* p. 173.

[122] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 126.

system, at least amongst great powers, due to the opportunities of power maximisation.[123]

Notwithstanding this, it must be stressed that the overwhelming focus of these analyses has been upon great powers, with the record on second-rank and weaker states less clear. Indeed, Walt recognises that, "in general, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than balance".[124] Indeed, a number of quantitative studies have been conducted on balancing and bandwagoning behaviour by states, which have illustrated the prevalence of both across history.[125] In relation to 'bandwagoning for benefit' in particular, Sweeney and Fritz provide quantitative evidence suggesting the regularity of such behaviour by states from 1816 to 1992, even among great powers.[126]

A contemporary example cited of secondary/weak state bandwagoning for benefit is Poland's alignment with the US over the 2003 intervention in Iraq, which included Poland sending troops.[127] This was despite the absence of any specific threat to Poland posed by either Iraq or the US, but may be understood in relation to a context of shared goals and opportunity for gain according to Mizerska-Wrotkowska.[128] Brooks and Wohlforth build upon this in their examination of overwhelming single power systems (such as arguably the current constellation of power), in which it is argued that the logic of the 'security dilemma' is effectively reversed once the leading power passes

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[123] See, J. Mearsheimer (2001), *op. cit.*

[124] S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[125] P. Schroeder (1994), *The Transformation of European Politics* 1763-1848, Clarendon, Oxford.; R. N. Rosecrance and C. Lo (1996), 'Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 479-500.; R. Powell (1999), *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ); J. S. Levy and W. R. Thompson (2010), *Causes of War*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.

[126] K. Sweeney and P. Fritz (2004), 'Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 428-449.

[127] M. Mizerska-Wrotkowska (2015), *Poland and Sweden in the United Europe*, Schedas SL, Madrid, Chapter 1.

[128] *Ibid*.; BBC (2003), 'Poland seeks Iraqi oil stake', *BBC News*, 03/07/2003. Available Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3043330.stmM ; R. Bernstein (2003), 'Bush Visit Will Lift Poland to Status of Special Friend', *New York Times*, Print, 29/04/2003.

a security threshold: "The stronger the leading state is and the more entrenched its dominance, the more improbably and thus less constraining counterbalancing dynamics are".[129] This is not to argue that balancing is not possible in such a power distribution, but rather "patently self-defeating and hence highly improbable".[130]

However, the explanatory power of 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning' as broad classifications may be questioned when dealing with the foreign policy behaviour of specific states. To return to the above example of Poland bandwagoning with the US in 2003, it begs the question of why similar states to Poland, in terms of relative material power capability and threats faced, did not also adopt this behaviour. As Dyson has argued, the 'pace and scope' of states' policy behaviour can differ substantially despite facing largely similar international environments.[131] Such differing policy output can pose a complex empirical problem for structural realism, as we shall see later with regards to EU member states' decision making vis-à-vis the development of the CSDP.

This is certainly not a cause for the complete abandonment of the realist tradition with regards to the analysis of foreign policy decision making though. Whilst traditionally the task of understanding the foreign policy behaviour of specific states has been undertaken within the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), often utilising *Innenpolitik* (unit-level) approaches[132], scholars working within the broad realist tradition have begun to explore the possibilities of integrating *Außenpolitik* and *Innenpolitik* theorising for this task. [133] This latest offshoot of realism, labelled

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[129] S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2008), *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Hegemony*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), p. 48.

[130] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[131] See, T. Dyson (2016), *Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

[132] F. Zakaria (1992), 'Review: Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 177-198.

[133] See, for example, W. C. Wohlforth (1993), *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).; T. J. Christensen (1996), *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).; R. L. Schweller (1998), *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World*

Neoclassical Realism (NCR) by Rose, offers a multi-level model of foreign policy analysis whereby the distribution of power at the system-level functions as the independent variable and unit-level factors act as intervening variables. This has sought to overcome the issues of structural realism highlighted above and also the problem faced by domestic politics theories that "have difficulty accounting for why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the foreign policy sphere", effectively the reverse of the issue faced structural realism.[134] NCR attempts to overcome these dichotomous problems, through drawing on both the rich philosophical approach and complexity of classical realism alongside structural realist focus on the impact of anarchic international relations in order to forge a more complete analysis of empirical puzzles relating to foreign policy output.[135]

NCR does not dispute the importance of system-level theorising or the focus on power relations that characterises realism broadly, but insists that to take this in isolation as is done by structural realism presents a distorted picture.[136] NCR instead asserts that system imperatives must be processed through the domestic policy apparatuses in which the business of foreign policy making is actually conducted, thus building upon Waltz's claim that states 'do what they want'. This is not conceived of as a simplistic input-output system, by which policy makers respond to the system perfectly as pressures would seemingly demand. Security and defence policy-makers instead are understood to observe and respond to these conditions of pressure imperfectly and therefore sub-optimal strategy formation results. This builds upon unit-

Conquest, Columbia University Press, New York.; F. Zakaria (1998), *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).

[134] G. Rose (1998), 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 144-172.

[135] *Ibid*.

[136] For a wide-ranging discussion on developing this neoclassical realist approach, see S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, and J. W. Taliaferro (2009), *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

level studies that have identified flawed decision-making and military bias in the pursuit of strategy.[137]

For this reason, NCR may be understood more as a theory of foreign policy formation rather than of international politics more generally. Schweller likens this process of foreign policy formation to a "transmission belt", rather than a "conveyor belt" and opens up the possibility for unit-level variables to play an important role (albeit as intervening factors) in understanding the development of security and defence policy output.[138] At the unit-level, scholars have drawn from works of classical realism, as well as models of FPA; bureaucratic, organisation and cognitive, to analyse intervening variables that include the impact of interest groups, elite actor psychology, perceptions of state leaders and the efficiency of national bureaucracies.[139]

The NCR development within the realist tradition has not been without critics however, with some notably drawing from Waltz's critique of theory lacking in parsimony and 'elegance'.[140] The counter-argument to this though is that such complexity adds greater explanatory richness.[141] Gideon Rose borrows from the precept of Ancient Greek poet Archilochus that 'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing', to liken NCR to the 'fox' as opposed to the structural realist 'hedgehog'.[142] In effect the 'big thing' that structural realist analysis 'knows' is

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[137] For example, S. Van Evera (1999), *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY); J. Snyder (1991), *Myths of Empire*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).

[138] R. Schweller (2006), *Unanswered Threats*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), p. 6.

[139] See, for example, W. C. Wohlforth (1993), *op. cit.*; R. L. Schweller (1998), *op. cit.*; F. Zakaria (1998), *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).; J. W. Taliaferro (2004), *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).

[140] A. Moravcsik and J. Legro (1999), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-55.; S. Guzzini (2004), 'The enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 533-568.; On parsimony in structural realist theorising, see, K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, Chapter 1.

[141] For an in-depth discussion of theoretical progress in Neoclassical Realism see, R. L. Schweller (2003), 'Neoclassical Realism', in C. Elman and M. Elman (eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 311-347.

[142] M. L. West (1989*), Iambi et elegi graeci ante Alexandrum cantati*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Archilochus fragment 201.; G. Rose (1998), *op. cit.*

the importance of system-level pressures on states, but NCR sacrifices the parsimony of this to an extent in order to further our understanding of a great 'many things' regarding the detail of individual cases of policy analysis.[143]

A further critique of NCR has centered on concerns regarding the intellectual distance a theory may develop from its 'core' and yet still remain true to itself. Moravcsik and Legro, for instance, question whether the NCR development dilutes the insights of structural realist scholars, accusing it of reductionism and abandoning what they term the "core assumptions" of realism. [144] Others have accused NCR as representing the latest recasting of realism and attempting to prop up a degenerative research programme.[145] However, such charges often misrepresent the entire realist tradition as being limited only to the 'structural' branch and ignore the common features of classical realist scholarship within NCR.[146] For example, NCR retains the focus on nexuses of power and the international system being characterised by a lack of central authority, meaning that states operate under a scope condition of anarchy. What NCR does not accept however is the ideal type of states as unitary rational actors as analytically paramount for the study of complex policy making. Whilst this is an important component of Waltz's structural realist theorising, it is not an essential characteristic of the wider realist tradition in general.

What becomes clear over the course of this sub-section is that the broad realist tradition in IR is capable not only of contributing to our understanding on how postulated conditions of anarchy within the international system result in pressures

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[143] G. Rose (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 144-172.
[144] A. Moravcsik and J. Legro (1999), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-55.
[145] J. Vasquez (1997), 'The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programmes: An appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, pp. 899-912.
[146] See, S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, and J. W. Taliaferro (2009), *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

upon states, but also provides a multi-level model in NCR through which we can begin to understand how states respond to these pressures with foreign policy output. Furthermore, the role of the intervening variable, introduced to realism through NCR, provides for an existing model through which ideational variables may be logically integrated into realist analysis within a framework of realist-constructivism. This is a useful starting point for the formulation of a realist-constructivist framework for the analysis of the CSDP, as it allows for differing factors to be explored at the system and unit levels and provides a method by which to combine these into a single analysis. However, the focus of NCR thus far has been largely on domestic institutional factors and posed in theoretical opposition to the usage of ideational factors.[147] The result of this is that the incorporation of ideational elements within such a multi-level realist model remains underdeveloped. Therefore, the following section will make the case that constructivist elements are commensurable with the core features and focus of the realist tradition in IR as discussed in this chapter through utilising such a model, before later chapters argue that their inclusion brings added value to our understanding of certain policy issues, such as the CSDP.

1.3. The Commensurability of Constructivist elements to Realist Analysis

In order to demonstrate the commensurability of ideational elements within a realist-constructivist analytical framework, it is important to challenge the conception that the realist tradition is solely 'materialist', and therefore represents the binary opposite of constructivist scholarship. Instead, it is argued that there is commensurability with ideational factors being integrated into a multi-level realist-

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[147] See for example, T. Dyson (2016), *op. cit.*

constructivist analytical framework and that this presents an opportunity for deepening our understanding of the CSDP. It does this through disputing the claim that realist theorising is incapable of integrating non-material variables into its analysis. As the basis for this claim differs depending on whether it is being applied to classical or structural realism each will be therefore addressed in turn.

For classical realism, the claim of materialism may be put down to its emphasis, particularly with Morgenthau, on an unchanging human nature as the basis upon which further assumptions, such as the pursuit of power, are made.[148] Therefore, the claim is made that a naïve form of biological, or perhaps psychological, materialism is the basis for further claims made in classical realism.[149] However, classical realism is not alone in beginning with an understanding of human nature. Indeed, it can be argued, as Barkin does, that to begin any enquiry in the social sciences without some understanding of the nature of the human creatures under study is impossible.[150] It is therefore also possible to detect an understanding of human nature within the other approaches to IR that one would not usually associate with being identified as 'materialist'. For instance, the constructivist understanding of human nature does not judge human beings as perfectible or otherwise, but does rely upon it being in possession of a degree of social malleability, however the case is rarely made that constructivism is therefore materialist on this basis.[151]

Regarding structural realism, the link to materialism appears to be more substantiated. Waltz, in attempting to formulate a parsimonious realist analysis of international relations, concentrates upon the system-level and the distribution of power

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[148] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.*
[149] See, J. Donnelly (2000), *op. cit.*
[150] J. S. Barkin (2010)*, op. cit.*
[151] *Ibid.*

capability within it.[152] This focus on the distribution of power has been argued to be not only structurally deterministic, but materialistic in that it may ignore non-material dimensions to power.[153] However, it would be going too far to state that this would prohibit the possibility of ideational consideration within broader structural realist analysis. To evidence this, structural realist scholars such as John Mearsheimer stress the importance of non-material dimensions of power, such as military organisation and doctrine, towards the overarching power capability of a state.[154] Such a view is supported by scholars of asymmetric warfare, whom have long highlighted the inadequacy of a wholly materialist analysis to capture the complexity of power relations at play, for example between the US and her enemies with regards to the relative number of thermonuclear weapons in their possession.[155] In contrast to this, some realist scholars have understood power politics in far more relational terms, as it relies on actor A compelling actor B to do as A wishes.[156] Whilst actor A may possess vast destructive power, such as through thermonuclear weaponry, it is certainly not always the case that the deployment of such overwhelming firepower would, or could even, lead to the desired outcome. Even the destruction of a nation does not mean the objectives of the survivor have been necessarily achieved.[157]

In contrast to the understanding of the realist tradition as one whose sole focus is based upon the study of rationalist-materialistic variables, it is possible to make the case for a rich tradition capable of incorporating a wide range of explanatory factors and that this allows for a realist-constructivist dialogue and analysis to emerge. Indeed,

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[152] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*

[153] R. O. Keohane (1986), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).

[154] J. Mearsheimer (1983), *Conventional Deterrence*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).

[155] N. Tannenwald (1999), 'The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use', *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 433-468.

[156] B. C. Schmidt (2005), 'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power', *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 523-549.

[157] This argument is returned to with regards to 'unipolarity' in Chapter 3.

over the course of much of this chapter, it is clear that the realist tradition is certainly a broad school. Beyond the identified focus on the centrality of power within international relations that operate under the condition of anarchy and the resulting realist research interest in the nexuses of this power, there is much differentiation. Whilst there are branches of realist scholarship conducive to the integration of aspects of constructivism, this is not necessarily true of the entirety. Structural realism, with its focus entirely upon the system-level, has limited utility in understanding the foreign policies of individual states. This is particularly the case for differing approaches taken by states, with similar relative power capabilities and facing similar system environments.

To account for such challenges, without abandoning the core realist focus, has been the development of the realist tradition through NCR. Whilst this branch of the realist tradition does not deny the importance of the system-level, it also does not confine its analysis to it. In opening realist analysis to ground beyond system-level, it is possible to integrate ideational factors at the unit-level into a framework of realist-constructivism. Thus, ideational factors function as an intervening variable in order to be coherently integrated within realist-constructivist analysis that can clearly retain the identified core focus of realist scholarship. Furthermore, such a realist-constructivist analytical framework can be understood as a further development of NCR, through utilising its multi-level model, with the distinguishing element being that as opposed to other examples of NCR studies that have thus far utilised a wide range of domestic institutional variables, this realist-constructivist framework explicitly focuses solely upon the impact of ideational factors at the unit-level.

1.4. Integrating Constructivist elements into a Realist-Constructivist Framework

This section outlines constructivist elements that are not only compatible, but also potentially complementary to realist analysis through the form of a realist-constructivist framework as discussed above. To achieve this, it briefly outlines the fundamentals and divisions within constructivist scholarship on international relations, as was done above regarding realism, before going on to explore this diversity and the opportunities for a synthesis approach in the form of a realist-constructivist analytical framework.

The constructivist turn in IR represents a shared commitment to a set of ontological and epistemological conditions, surrounding the study of norms, values, ideas and culture arising out of the social sciences but applied specifically to the study of global politics.[158] Whilst on the one hand this has led to much work of constructivist meta-theory, the importance of these concepts has also informed empirical studies.[159]

The label of constructivism may have been coined by Nicholas Onuf, but it was Alexander Wendt who, through a series of journal articles and a book, went on to set out clearly the key concept of the approach in the 'social construction' of international politics.[160] It is important to note that constructivism itself did not arise out of a theoretical vacuum, but owes a clear debt in its foundation and evolution with regards

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[158] K. M. Fierke (2007), 'Constructivism', in T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory's*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 166-84.
[159] See for example, F. Debix (2003), *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk (NY).; K. M Fierke and K. E. Jørgensen (2001), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk (NY).
[160] N. Onuf (1989), *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia.; A. Wendt (1992), *op. cit.*, pp. 391-425.;
A. Wendt (1995), 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 71-81.; A. Wendt (1999), *op. cit.*

to security studies, to the English School[161] and to the critique of material rationalism and structural determinism as dominant approaches to the study of international politics.[162] It is for this reason that constructivism is often viewed as challenging materialist and rationalist assumptions, not least those arising from the structural realist school of thought.

However, beyond core beliefs regarding the social construction of knowledge and social reality, there is much division within constructivist scholarship.[163] As Guzzini notes the "sheer diversity seems to make the category of constructivism explode".[164] It should therefore be stressed that not all forms of constructivist scholarship are compatible with integration into a realist-constructivist analytical framework that utilises ideational factors as unit-level intervening variables, rather than being understood as the independent variable. Wendt in particular understands the international system as a socially constructed anarchy, with anarchy being "what states make of it" and ideational factors being the "basis of interests".[165] This 'system-level constructivism' effectively dismisses the realist focus on 'power' and 'interest' through insisting that these aspects of the international system are socially constructed ideas, with state identity created through mutual interaction in the international arena. In this form of constructivism, ideational factors have been posited as the independent variable

[161] T. Dunne (1998), *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Basingstoke, Macmillan. See also, C. Manning (1962), *The Nature of International Society*, Macmillan, London.; M. Wight (1966), 'Western Values in International Relations, in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, Allen and Unwin, London. pp. 89-131.; H. Bull (1977), *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York.
[162] For example, poststructuralism. See, J. Edkins (1999), *Poststructuralism & International Relations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (CO).; T. Berger (1998), *Cultures of Antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (MD).
[163] See for example, A. Wendt (1999), *op. cit.*; J. Ruggie (1998a), *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, Routledge, New York.; Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1998), 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 887-917.
[164] S. Guzzini (2000), 'A reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 148.
[165] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

driving policy change.[166] Critics of this form of constructivism have insisted that it is reductionist in the sense that interests are reduced to ideas (whereas in structural realism, ideas may be said to be reduced to being interests).[167] However, the understanding of ideas acting 'all the way down' and therefore constituting the driving force for action in global politics (and thus the independent variable is ideational) entirely rejects system material imperatives arising out of realist balance-of-power considerations and is therefore not susceptible to inclusion into the particular formulation of realist-constructivism formulated within this thesis, which draws upon a NCR multi-level model.[168] It should be noted however that this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of other formulations of constructivist and realist synthesis, nor does it comment upon the utility of the ideational independent variable more widely, but rather regards this as beyond the scope of this thesis.

Apart from this though, whether the inclusion of ideational factors more widely represents a contradiction of realism or whether such factors may be utilised to supplement realist theorising remains disputed. Whilst Snyder makes clear the differences between constructivism, realism and liberalism, Desch, for instance, argues that cultural approaches to security studies do not supplant realism but can be used to enrich the realist tradition.[169] Others have argued for a pre-existing realist inclusion of ideational factors, with Katzenstein making the case that some realists have been guilty of tacitly "smuggling in" cultural factors into their "ostensibly materialist analysis".[170] Williams argues for a re-reading of Morgenthau that recognises an overlap between

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[166] See, for example, D. Béland (2009), 'Ideas, institutions, and policy change', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 701-718.
[167] N. Kitchen (2010), 'Systemic pressures and domestic ideas', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 117-143.
[168] C. O. Meyer and E. Strickmann (2011), *op. cit.*, pp. 61-81.
[169] J. Snyder (2004), 'One World, Rival Theories', Foreign Policy, Vol. 86, No. 6, pp. 52-62.; M. Desch (1998), 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 141.
[170] R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 39.

modern constructivism and classical realism. [171] Barkin too makes the case for substantial overlap between classical realism and constructivism, with a number of scholars agreeing on the premise, but disagreeing on the specifics.[172]

A potentially fruitful avenue for constructivism to be integrated into a realist-constructivist framework, whereby domestic ideational factors play a role as intervening variables, is provided by the literature emphasising the impact of 'security culture'.[173]

Katzenstein defines 'culture' as "both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another".[174] This is further built upon by literature on 'security' and 'strategic' culture. As Haglund persuasively argues, attempts to draw distinction between these two labels is superfluous, if not meaningless, as they are often used interchangeably. [175] For

[171] M. C. Williams, 'Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 633-665.
[172] J. S. Barkin (2010)*, op. cit.*; P. T. Jackson et al. (2004), 'Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 337-352.
[173] The scholarly literature on this is considerable, having been applied to regions, specific nation states and policy areas such as arms-control. See, for example, B. Klein (1988), 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American power and alliance defence politics', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 133-148.; P. J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara (1993), 'Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 84-118.; A. I. Johhnston (1998), *Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).; E. Kier (1995), 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 65-93.; K. Krause (1999), *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control, and Security Building*, Frank Cass, Oxon.; T. Farrell (1998), 'Culture and Military Power', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 407-416.; T. Farrell (2001), 'Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 63-102.; K. Booth and R. Trood (1999), *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Palgrave Macmillan.; J. S. Duffield (1998), *World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions, and Germany Security Policy After Unification*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA).; T. Farrell and T. Terriff (2001), *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder (CO).; A. Biava (2011), *op. cit.*
[174] P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[175] D. G. Haglund (2011), 'Let's Call the Whole Thing Off? Security Culture as Strategic Culture', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 494-516. Though certainly not always the case, it may be argued that 'strategic culture' has been refined to more narrowly applied to studies relating to the use of military force in warfare, and 'security culture' broader in its understanding of threats and instruments by which to address them, in line with moves towards a general broadening of the security agenda in IR and Security Studies. As the CSDP explicitly blends civilian and military security and defence instruments, it is felt the most appropriate of these largely interchangeable labels for this thesis.

consistency, this thesis will use 'security culture', and adopt the definition of Krause, that it is the "enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites".[176]

On understanding the security culture of a state, it is important to note that it is not argued to be static or a fixed anchor of the state, but rather constructed and reconstructed over time.[177] This is said to occur through, for example, the impact of major historical events, the conscious agency of 'strategists' and the wilful influence of foreign powers.[178] The importance of major events in the past may be witnessed through the consequences of historical foreign occupation for states' security cultures in the present, such as the USSR's occupation of the Baltic states in June 1940 possibly contributing towards these states' suspicion of Russian foreign policy in the present.[179] The ability of a foreign power to shape the security culture of a nation has also been explored in the literature through reference to Japan, with the introduction of a pacifist constitution under allied occupation in 1947 explored in reference to the preceding 'ultra-militaristic' society.[180] Meanwhile, the impact that policy makers may have on the security culture of a nation through conscious agency may be illustrated with the Ataturk Devrimleri series of political, economic, legal and religious reforms, over the

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[176] K. Krause (1999), 'Cross-Cultural Dimension of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview', in, K. Krause (ed.), *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building*, Frank Cass, London, p. 14.

[177] See, E. Longhurst (2004), *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990-2003*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

[178] 'Strategists' in this context refers to those responsible for the formulation and implementation of strategy. According to Rogers this includes think tanks, policy makers, agencies and academia.
J. Rogers (2009), Strategy, Value and Risk, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

[179] S. Jones (2016), 'Estonia calls for Patriot shield to deter Russia in Baltic region', *Financial Times*, London, 26/05/16. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/b9453544-228c-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d [Accessed May 2016].; A. Rikveilis (2013), 'Latvia', in, H. Biehl, B. Giegerich and A. Jonas (eds.), *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Springer, Wiesbaden, p. 207.

[180] T. Berger (1996), 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, Columbia University Press, New York., pp. 317-356.

1920s and 1930s in Turkey overseen by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, leading to the military being interpreted the 'guardian' of the secularist tradition.[181] Since this time, Turkey has undergone a number of coup d'état or attempts at such (in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1993, 1997, 2007), supported by the military or elements within it.[182]

These examples also highlight the notion of a unitary security culture should be questioned. If it is accepted that there are multiple keepers of the security culture of a state, such as the public, elites and institutions then it is perhaps most helpful to think of the security culture of a state as an umbrella concept under which multiple subsidiary cultures are at play.[183] Indeed, there may be differing subsidiary cultures inside a states' Defence Ministry than its Foreign Ministry.[184] Instead, it has been noted as helpful to think of multiple 'cultures of security' at play, with the national 'security culture' an umbrella concept under which these multiple subsidiary cultures exist and compete.[185] In terms of examining security culture, this thesis will primarily focus on elites. The rationale for this is that they are at the centre of a state's policy decision-making process, set the agenda (sometimes irrespective of public opinion) and possess a detailed knowledge of the security and defence arena.[186] Furthermore, elites express their opinions, highly relevant due to the above, publicly through press releases and speeches.[187]

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[181] Y. Bozdaglioglu (2003), *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, Routledge, London.

[182] N. Narli (2000), 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 107–27.;.

[183] C. S. Gray (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 221-241

[184] A. Miskimmon and W. Paterson (2003), 'Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation', in K. Dyson and K. Goetz (eds.), *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 338-339.

[185] C. S. Gray (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 221-241

[186] E. Longhurst (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[187] J. S. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

1.5 Security Culture as the Intervening Variable in Realist-Constructivism

The idea that culture could influence approaches to security and defence is long lived, indeed it may be argued to be grounded firmly in what is often regarded as a foundational realist text in the writings of Thucydides.[188] Clausewitz, another identified key realist thinker, also may be regarded as stressing the important role of culture.[189] However, it was arguably Jack Snyder's work in 1977 that brought culture and security together most prominently in the modern discipline of IR.[190] Snyder, in seeking to interpret Soviet nuclear strategy as in some ways distinct from that of the US, applied a cultural framework that argued for 'semi-permanent' facets of society, rooted in history and forms of governance, that impact strategy formation. Arguably the key division within the literature on the role culture as applied to IR is in the 'debate' between Colin Gray and Iain Johnston, on the relative merits of the concept for the purposes of explanation and/or understanding, and whether definitions of culture should include behaviour.[191]

Since this time, the concept has undergone generations of development, with scholarship on security culture somewhat flourishing through a number of empirical

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[188] J. Monten (2006), 'Thucydides and Modern Realism', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 3-25.

[189] Von Clausewitz (1997), *On War*, Translated by J. J. Graham, Revised and Edited by F. N. Maude, 1997 Reprint, Wordsworth Editions, Hertfordshire.

[190] J. Snyder (1977), *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica (CA).

[191] C. S. Gray (1986), *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, University Press of America, Lanham (MD).; C. S. Gray (1999), 'Strategic culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 49-69.; C. S. Gray (2002), 'European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 279-310. C. S. Gray (2009), 'Out of the wilderness: Prime time for strategic culture', in: J. L. Johnson (ed.), *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights and Comparative National Security Policymaking*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 221-241.; A. I. Johnston (1995), 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol 19, No.4, pp. 32-64.; Johnston, A. I. (1998), *Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).

case studies, such as of India, Japan, Latin America and also of states within Europe.[192]

As Williams explains, through socialization processes, security culture is argued to frame the core assumptions, beliefs and values of policy makers with regards to how security challenges can and should be dealt with.[193] The impact of this according to Duffield is, "to predispose societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others. Some options will simply not be imagined… some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate or ineffective than others".[194] Howorth similarly argues that socialized security culture results in certain states preferring to cultivate and utilise some security instruments rather than others.[195]

It is from the wide-ranging security culture literature that Glenn is able to identify four branches of scholarship relating to the concept, two of which are argued to be potentially ripe for collaboration with realist research and therefore will be considered in turn.[196]

The first of these promising classifications is an understanding of security culture from what Glenn terms 'conventional' constructivism. This 'conventional' understanding regards culture as impacting upon state 'identities', which in turn impact their preferences. These identities represent the basic character of states as well as their interests, which according to this model are formed endogenously to interaction.[197] This means that the interests of states themselves can vary depending upon the domestic

[192] C. S. Gray (2002), *op. cit.*; A. I. Johnston (1998), *Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).; E. Longhurst (2004), *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990-2003*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.; C. Lord (1985), 'American Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 269-293.; P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*

[193] P. D. Williams (2007), 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture', *African Affairs*, Vol. 106, No. 432, pp. 256.

[194] J. S. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[195] J. Howorth (2002), 'The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture', *Politique Europeenne 8*, pp. 88-108.

[196] J. Glenn (2009), *op. cit.,* pp. 523-551.

[197] A. Wendt (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 384.

cultures. Studies of this have been conducted on post-second world war Japan and Germany, wherein non-military means of promoting security are argued to be particularly favoured in policy making.[198] However, the prohibitive issue with this understanding of culture is the same as identified with the constructivism of Wendt, namely that ideas are conceptualised as the independent variable, functioning 'all the way down'. This means that the overall causal basis for policy making is understood as ideational, effectively contradicting, rather than complementing the realist causal understanding.

More promising for our purposes of developing a realist-constructivist framework that operates within the bounds of a multi-level model utilising system balance-of-power as the independent variable is provided by what Glenn label's an "epiphenomenal understanding" of culture.[199] This is where security culture may be understood to create conditions of constraint and opportunity for policy makers.[200] Glenn cites the work of Jack Snyder and that of Stephen Van Evera as examples of this epiphenomenal understanding of culture in relation to security.[201] It is important to note that such an understanding of security culture does not contradict the basis of realist analysis, as explored above, but has the underexplored potential to expand upon it by developing understanding of limited cases where states deviate from the general pattern of behaviour expected according to balance-of-power. It is for this reason that Dueck is able to make the case that, "culture is best understood as a supplement to and not a

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[198] T. Berger (1998), *op. cit.*; J. Duffield (1999), 'Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism', *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 765-803.; P. J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara (1993), *op. cit.,* pp. 84-118.

[199] J. Glenn (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 523-551.

[200] *Ibid*.

[201] S. Van Evera (1984), 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War', *International Security,* Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 58-107.; J. Snyder (1984*), The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making the Disasters of 1914*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).; J. Snyder (1990), 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in C. G. Jacobsen (ed*.), Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, Macmillan, London.

substitute for, realist theories" as it can help explain deviations from balancing or bandwagoning behaviour.[202] The epiphenomenal understanding of culture therefore challenges the idea of state rationality, instead seeking to find cultural understanding for why states may act sub-optimally in pursuit of the goals outlined by realism.

However, as explored in the above section on realism, state rationality is not an essential component of the realist tradition taken as a whole and therefore such an understanding of national security culture is ripe for integration into a realist-constructivist framework as an intervening variable. Indeed, it even may be argued to represent something of returning realist scholarship to its intellectual roots in classical realism. Furthermore, constructivist scholars have also made the case that a research collaboration with realism on security culture is not only possible, but a potentially fruitful avenue for future development.[203]

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[202] C. Dueck (2005), 'Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America's Peculiar Path to World Power', *Security Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 204.

[203] M. Desch (1998), 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 141. J. Duffield (1999), 'Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies', *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 156-180.

1.6. Conclusions: Realism, Constructivism and a Realist-Constructivist Framework

In conclusion to this chapter, the possibilities for an approach that transcends the traditional paradigmatic boundaries within IR is not only possible from a standpoint in relation to the philosophy of science, but a logical possible extension to existing realist scholarship. The result of this is the development of a realist-constructivist analytical framework.

This realist-constructivist framework finds its origins in the realist tradition in the sense that foreign policy is understood to be guided generally by considerations of the distribution of power capabilities within an anarchic system, with material capability being understood to be the most effective type of power within this system. This is ultimately argued to set the limits and opportunities of state action in the long-term. However, in contrast to seeking the theoretical parsimony of Waltzian structural realism, a realist-constructivist analytical framework can draw from classical and neoclassical realism in recognising that the translation of system-level imperatives into specific policy making takes place through a complex process impacted by multifarious factors domestically. These represent intervening unit-level variables through which the independent system-level variable must be processed to produce specific foreign policy output, the dependent variable (see figure 1.). Furthermore, the realist-constructivist analytical framework proposed in this thesis gains its constructivist element through the key intervening variable under analysis being ideational at the unit-level. Specifically, it focuses upon the security cultures of states and how these can play a key role in shaping how policy makers react to their international environment.

Figure 1. *The Realist-Constructivist Framework*

The next step for the realist-constructivist framework is to demonstrate its potential analytical utility regarding specific foreign policy making, particularly within the context of this thesis, the creation and development of the CSDP.

CHAPTER 2:

Competing Theoretical Approaches

to the CSDP

Before applying the realist-constructivist framework to a case study of the CSDP, it is essential to first of all gain an appreciation of the development of the CSDP into its current form and how these developments have been understood in the context of existing theoretically informed approaches. An understanding of the fundamentals of the CSDP, and an exploration of the ways in which scholars have thus far attempted to conceptualise this development from the theoretical traditions of realism and constructivism will serve to outline their relative shortcomings and therefore illustrate the gap in the literature that this thesis will, at its core, seek to address. Whilst a number of other theoretical approaches to the CSDP exist, notably from liberal and critical branches of IR theory, for issues of space these will not be examined as this thesis is specifically concerned with integrating elements from the realist and constructivist traditions within IR and therefore it is most essential to assess these in order to identify the added value a realist-constructivist approach may bring.[204]

In short, this chapter will illustrate the need for a fresh approach, such as the realist-constructivist analytical framework, to be utilised in order to bring added value to our understanding of the CSDP.

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[204] For an overview of approaches to the CSDP from these other theoretical traditions see, K. E. Jorgensen and A. K. Aarstad (2013), 'Liberal, Constructivist and Critical Studies of European Security', in S. Biscop and R. G. Whitman (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, Routledge, London, pp. 28-37.

2.1. What is the CSDP?

Prior to reviewing the theoretical literature surrounding the CSDP, it is first of all important to briefly consider its development, from the first steps towards European integration up to the present stage in order to gain a full appreciation of the theoretical analyses over this period. Particularly, this will highlight the constantly evolving nature of European security policy integration that poses a unique challenge to theoretical frameworks attempting to explain and understand it.

Although often regarded as a recent development in the EU integration process, it must be noted that there has long been ambitions of creating European security cooperation and using European integration as a driver of security. The Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947 alongside the Treaty of Brussels 1948 both concerned themselves with the matters of security and defence in Europe and contained mutual defence clauses, establishing the Western European Union (WEU).[205] Furthermore, the failed attempt at forming a EDC also illustrates an early ambition to place security and defence within a supranational framework.[206] The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) too has long been understood as a means of ensuring that German economic recovery would not also lead to a re-emergence of German military ambition.[207]

Despite this, the European Community (EC) and its transformation into the EU remained untouched by security and defence policy and came to be known as 'civilian' actor, due to its overwhelming focus on economic and trade policy in addition to its

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[205] France and UK (1948), *Treaty of Dunkirk*, Dunkirk, signed 04/03/1948; Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK (1948), *Treaty of Brussels*, Brussels, signed 17/03/1948.
[206] For an in-depth account of the EDC, see K. Rune (2000), *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
[207] Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (1951), *The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community*, Paris, France, signed 18/04/1951.

total lack of military ambition.[208] This was in contrast to US-led NATO that came to play a central role in the Cold War defence of Western Europe.

Upon the end of the Cold War though, the EU made the first tentative steps towards developing a European security and defence integration. This was reflected at Maastricht in the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, which stated an ambition for "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".[209] The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, built upon this by labelling the establishment of such a policy an objective of the EU.[210] Furthermore, this treaty worked to absorb previous aspects of European integration into a single area; through absorbing the WEU and its Petersberg Tasks[211], and creating a Political and Security Committee (PSC) to integrate the broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the more military and defence focused European security and defence policy area.[212] These treaty revisions were complemented in no small part at Saint Malo, with a bilateral summit between Britain and France in 1998. From this summit emerged the Saint Malo Declaration, a document that revolutionised the practice of European security and defence integration.[213] This was built upon further by the European Council, who in 1999 established the Helsinki Headline Goal, to develop a

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[208] R. G. Whitman (1998), *From Civilian Power to Superpower: The International Identity of the European Union*, Macmillan, London.

[209] European Union (1992), *Treaty on European Union*, Maastricht, the Netherlands Signed 07/02/1992, Article J.4.

[210] European Union (1997), *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Amsterdam, Signed 02/10/1997.

[211] Set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU, June 1992. These cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. See European Union (2017 *Petersberg Tasks,* Available Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html [Accessed March 2017].

[212] European Union (1997), *op. cit.*

[213] UK and France (1998), *Text of a Joint Statement by the British and French Governments*, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, 04/12/1998.

deployable joint European defence capability by 2003. [214] These developments culminated in the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), enshrined in the 2001 Treaty of Nice.[215] The following years would see significant further developments in this policy area, such as the formulation of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004.[216] The ESDP would later come to be renamed the CSDP at the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which also ushered in further developments, such as the creation of the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the elevation of the EDA to the status of a formal EU institution.[217]

Despite these policy and institutional developments though, it has long been argued that the EU has achieved less than expected in terms of the development of capabilities. [218] This criticism has only been amplified by the perceived failure of European states to act through means of the CSDP in a military campaign in Libya in 2011, with some EU states (such as Britain and France) instead working with the US through NATO and others declining to participate in military operations.[219] This has served to highlight continuing divergence between EU states in security and defence, not only regarding forces, budgets and deployability but also approaches to crisis management.

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[214] European Union (1999), *Helsinki Headline Goal*, Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf [Accessed June 2014]

[215] European Union (2001), *Treaty of Nice*, Nice, signed 26/02/2001.

[216] Council of the European Union (2003), *op. cit.*

[217] European Union (2007), *op. cit.*

[218] C. Hill (1993), 'The Capabilities-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol. 1, pp. 305-328.; A. Toje (2008), 'The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, pp. 121-141.

[219] A. Menon (2011), 'European Defence Policy: From Lisbon to Libya', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 75-90.

Since the advent of the CSDP there has been considerable variation in defence expenditure between EU member states. This variation was particularly highlighted over the 2009/2010 period, when budgets came under pressure from the financial crisis and whilst some states, such as Poland and Sweden, increased their defence spending and over this period, others cut back defence budgets, such as Italy and Spain, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP.[220] However, there have also been issues of inefficient defence spending by EU states. Former head of the EDA, Nick Witney, has pointed to issues of wastefulness due to the purchase of "obsolescent equipment and duplication" and a focus on "national priorities rather than collective (European) interest)". [221] Furthermore, there remains significant divergence in terms of the effectiveness (and willingness) with which defence capability may be deployed. Germany in particular is seen as representing something of a reluctant participant in contributing towards European defence, which despite being willing to work alongside allies in contributing towards low-intensity operations, such as *Operation Atalanta*, an EU anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast, is less willing to engage in high-intensity missions, with Libya 2011 being cited as a specific example of this.[222]

A further example of institutional evolution but real-world inaction through the CSDP has been with the EU Battlegroups. These are pairs of battalion-sized forces (1,500 troops), on a rotational standby, capable of being operationally deployed "within 5 days of approval by the Council in response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, to undertake simultaneously two battlegroup-size operations sustainable for a

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[220] European Defence Agency, Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, Brussels, 07/03/12.

[221] N. Witney (2012), 'European Defence Capabilities: lessons from the past, signposts for the future', *European Union Select Committee*, House of Lords, note 38.

[222] A. Menon (2011), 'European Defence Policy: From Lisbon to Libya', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 75-90.

maximal period of 120 days".[223] However, whilst the first Battlegroups were at full operating capacity in 2007, they have never been deployed on an active operation, potentially undermining the credibility of the CSDP.

The continuing divergence of EU member states in terms of security and defence budgets and capability may well indicate there is an important critique of the CSDP to be made in terms of its effectiveness. However, some scholars have gone much further, claiming the CSDP to be an irrelevance. For example, Andrew Moravcsik dismisses security and defence cooperation and integration within the EU as a "European pipe dream" of rivaling the US.[224] Yet, this critique seems to be based on something of a misreading of the CSDP and its goals. Indeed, in stark contrast to this, policy makers have gone out of their way to state how the CSDP offers an opportunity to strengthen European contribution to the transatlantic alliance. Instead of the creation of a standing European army, it could be argued that the goal has been to develop a peace support capacity for the region and its neighborhood. This would be supported by the range of active missions currently pursued through the CSDP. Instead of replacing national policy making on security and defence, it could be argued that the CSDP is intended to produce and take advantage of agreement on commonalities between member states. This can be demonstrated in reference to the initial inclusion of the CSDP (then ESDP) within the second pillar, with the strict intergovernmental control and member states taking major decisions on the basis of unanimity.[225] Whilst the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure for the EU and renamed the policy, the

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[223] European Union (2005), 'The EU Battle Groups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell', *Fact Sheet*, Available Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/battlegroups_factsheet_/battlegroups_factsheet_en.pdf [Accessed, November 2014].

[224] A. Moravcsik (2003), 'The World is Bipolar After All', *Newsweek International*, 5 May, Print. See also, A. Moravcsik (2003), 'How Europe Can Win Without an Army', *Financial Times*, London, 03/04/2003, Print.

[225] European Union (1992), *op. cit.*

intergovernmental versus community aspects remained, with the continuing responsibility of the nation states regarding national security reiterated in article 3a.[226]

What emerges with this overview of the CSDP is that it is not a policy area of irrelevancy but a deeply interesting one and deserving of an in-depth theoretical analysis. One the one hand, there has existed a clear intention from state leaders to carve out a European level of security and defence policy, with the development of policy making apparatus, institution building and the development of capacity to deal with peace support operations, as demonstrated by a growing number of operations under the EU banner. However, on the other hand, there is also a clear argument that the CSDP could be characterised as ineffective in terms of developing capability with regards to European security and defence. This seeming contradiction is one that will be examined further in later chapters, as it is certainly one that any analytical framework of the CSDP should seek to understand and address.

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[226] European Union (2007), *op. cit.*

2.2. European Integration Theory and the CSDP

Although one may debate the depth, spread and impact of security and defence cooperation in the EU through the auspices of the CSDP, it is clear from the previous sub-section that change is taking place to some degree. Surrounding this change has been a healthy scholarly debate and growing body of academic literature that has sought to bring theoretical understanding of these developments. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully catalogue this rich body of work, it is worth briefly reflecting upon these contributions at this point in order to situate the realist-constructivist approach adopted in this thesis towards the CSDP in relation to the European Integration Theory literature, before going on to consider extant realist and constructivist approaches from IR in greater detail.

Perhaps the most important point to first note in surveying theoretical accounts of security and defence as an aspect of the European integration project is, as Bickerton argues, that for the longest time the scholarly literature has been focussed on explaining its absence, rather than existence or development.[227] This point is illustrated clearly in the approach of intergovernmentalism, developed over the 1960s and spearheaded by the work of Stanley Hoffmann.[228] This tradition asserted the primacy of nation states within European integration, accounting for lack absence of a security and defence dimension by arguing that integration would only take place in policy areas where gains would far exceed losses for nation-states. For this reason, it was argued that integration would not be possible in areas of 'high politics', these being matters vital to the interests of nation states such as security and defence. Instead, Hoffmann argued that these

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[227] C. Bickerton (2011), 'Security Co-operation Beyond the Nation State', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 1-21.
[228] S. Hoffmann (1995), *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-94*, Westview Press, Oxford.

policy areas would be kept separate from integration and maintained independently by the state.[229]

However, as Rosamond notes, this distinction was challenged as states, "willingly surrendered control over issues of central importance to national sovereignty" through a succession of the Single European Act, Maastricht and the eventual development of the CSDP.[230] With this changing reality, intergovernmental approaches have adapted to account for these developments, principally through analysis considering this further integration the result of a series of strategic bargains among member states.[231] Furthermore, it argued that these bargains were the result of considerations of national interest and that outcomes on the CSDP are reflective of the lowest common denominator consensus that can be reached between bargaining member states, not least due to the fact that states hold an effective veto on developments in this policy area.[232] The analytical corollary of this is that the agental role of supranational institutions is downplayed by intergovernmental scholars.

This intergovernmental approach also branched off through attracting proponents from within liberal IR theorising, the most prominent example of this being Andrew Moravcsik.[233] Although Moravcsik's 'liberal intergovernmentalism', does not focus explicitly on the development of security and defence integration, his framework is nonetheless applicable to the CSDP in understanding the role of the EU as an

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[229] S. Hoffmann (1966), 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-915.

[230] B. Rosamond (2000), Theories of European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p. 79.

[231] For example, U. Peutter (2012), 'Europe's deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and the European Council in EU economic governance', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 161-178.

[232] This point is explored further in Chapter 4.

[233] A. Moravcsik (1993), 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 473-524.; A. Moravcsik (1998), *The Choice for Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).; A. Moravcsik (1999), 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation', *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 267-306.

important hub of the pooling and delegation of sovereignty, interstate negotiation and strategic bargaining between states, alongside performing analysis of domestic polity preference formation.[234]

In both liberal and classic intergovernmental approaches, it is the national power of states that is understood as key to driving through effective bargains, including on security and defence cooperation. In this sense, the realist-constructivist framework advanced in this thesis draws implicitly from intergovernmentalist approaches through a primary focus on member state control of integration in this area, which may well be argued to be *the* mainstream point of departure for a number of modern approaches to theoretical analysis of European integration in security and defence.[235] However, it is also important to note that intergovernmentalism has been critiqued by realist scholars for failing to focus on relative gains within the international system, instead focusing on absolute gains for the states involved, whilst constructivist scholars have criticised this approach as failing to account for the ideational background conditions of states and institutions.[236]

An alternative to the intergovernmentalist approach has been offered by neofunctionalism. Scholars within this school of thought understand integration as an evolving process over time, which develops its own force. This approach, pioneered by Ernst Haas in 1958, gives prominence to a wider range of actors than

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[234] W. Wagner (2003), 'Why the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain Intergovernmental', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 576-595.

[235] See for example, 'Supranational Intergovernmentalism', in J. Howorth (2010), 'The Political and Security Committee: A Case Study in 'Supranational Intergovernmentalism'', in R. Dehousse (ed.) *The 'Community Method'*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 91-117.; 'Rationalised Intergovernmentalism', in W. Wessels and F. Bopp (2008), 'The institutional architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty', *CEPS Challenge Paper*, No. 10. ; 'deliberative intergovernmentalism', in U. Puetter (2003), 'Informal Circles of Ministers: A Way Out of the EU's Institutional Dilemmas?', *European Law Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 109-124.

[236] J. Mearsheimer (1995), 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5-49.; A. Gheciu (2005), *NATO in the New Europe: The Politics of International Socialization after the end of the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA).

intergovernmentalism, particularly to supranational actors. Whilst these actors are (likewise to intergovernmentalism) acknowledged to be self-interested, they are also understood to have a capacity to learn, evolve preferences and even develop loyalties over time. For this reason, neofunctionalist scholars have focussed more on the more incremental transformation from initial cooperation to greater integration than the intergovernmentalist interest in grand bargains in the form of treaty change. The basis for this development is conceptualised as occurring in areas of 'low politics', yet strategically key economic sectors (such as coal and steel industries), that would be integrated under the authority of a supranational authority. [237] This would create pressure for both wider and deeper integration due to the material benefits of this process, all under the guidance of a supranational high authority. The driving force behind the integration mechanism for neofunctionalist scholars is not attributed to the nation states involved, but rather to societal elites who would exercise a 'loyalty shift' from the national to supranational regional level due to the material benefits involved.[238] This would happen both within and between different economic sectors, in a process known as functional 'spillover', a concept previously developed by David Mitrany.[239] Furthermore, in order for democratic and pluralistic governments to cope with this evolving transnational integration of economic sectors, a complex regulatory system would be required. This, it is argued, would ultimately make political integration a necessity, in a process known as 'political spillover'.[240] With regards to security and defence though, Haas remained sceptical on integration occurring in this area, asserting that this policy area would be the last bastion of nation state

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[237] E. B. Haas (1958), *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA).
[238] B. Rosamond (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.
[239] See, D. Mitrany (1943), *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
[240] Ibid., pp. 45-66.

sovereignty.[241] For this reason, as Øhrgaard has noted, the traditional theories of European integration, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism (for different reasons) have somewhat struggled to account for the advent of the CSDP.[242]

Nevertheless, a number of scholars have been indirectly informed by neofunctionalist logic in theoretical approaches towards the study of security and defence cooperation in the EU. Most notably, this has included a body of work on the institutionalization of cooperation, where there is taken to be a 'coordination reflex' among national actors to reach common positions with European partners on external affairs.[243] Other scholars have pointed to the entrepreneurial role of supranational EU bodies and experiential learning taking place in driving forward aspects of cooperation on security and defence.[244] In this vein has been in scholarship considering 'Europeanization' processes, supranational entrepreneurship, and the socializing effects of European institutions.[245] This includes studies examining the co-evolution and mutual adaption of subnational, national and EU levels to one another, through processes of 'uploading', 'downloading' and 'cross-loading'.[246] This involves the "a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and

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[241] E. B. Haas (1961), 'International integration: The Europe and the University Process', *International Organization*, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 368.
[242] J. C. Øhrgaard (1997), 'Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Co-operation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 1–29.
[243] B. Tonra (2001), *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. Dutch, Danish, and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Ashgate, Aldershot.; M. E. Smith (2004), *European Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[244] A. Niemann (1998), 'The PHARE programme and the concept of spillover: neofunctionalism in the making', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 428-446.; M. E. Smith (2017), *Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy: Capacity Building, Experimental Learning, and Institutional Change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[245] P. M. Norheim-Martinsen (2010), 'Beyond Intergovernmentalism: European Security and Defence Policy and the Governance Approach', *JCMS*, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 1351-1365.
[246] E. Gross (2009), *The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: continuity and change in European crisis management*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

norms". [247] Such literature does not deny the importance of states to European integration in this policy area but asserts that the European-level of analysis may be supplemented by the consideration of institutionalised actors with a degree of autonomy. [248] Such approaches may also be broadly categorised as part of the 'governance' turn in European integration theory, which developed over the 1990s and drew on scholarship cross-disciplinarily from Public Administration Studies.[249] This school has sought to move European Integration Studies away from debates on the hierarchical drivers of integration, instead seeking to analyse processes of policy decision-making and implementation as 'multi-level' or 'networked'.[250] However, as recently as 2015, Norheim-Martinsen noted that "while governance has emerged as a useful concept for approaching other areas of EU policy, security and defence have been kept firmly outside the so-called governance turn in EU studies".[251]

Whilst fully recognising the rich potential of emerging the scholarship from the 'governance turn', particularly its insight into the day to day operation of the CSDP as a relatively stable policy-making system, it is important to note that approach of realist-constructivism diverges from this.[252] Namely, the realist-constructivist approach seeks to understand the development of security and defence cooperation through the auspices of the EU in reference to global dynamics related to the distribution of material

[247] C. M. Radaelli (2004), 'Europeanization: Solution or Problem?', *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 8, No. 16, p. 3.
[248] P. Müller (2011), 'The Europeanization of German Foreign Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Between Adaptation to the EU and National Projection', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 385-403.
[249] B. Guy Peters and J. Pierre (1998), *Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration*, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 223-243.
[250] G. Marks, L. Hooghe and K. Blank (1996), 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance', *JCMS*, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 341-378.; M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (1996), 'Einleitung Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem', in M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (eds.), *Europäische Intergration, Leske und Budrich*, Opladen, pp. 15-44.
[251] P. M. Norheim-Martinsen (2015), The Governance of European Defence, in *The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, p. 251.
[252] *Ibid*, pp. 251-263.

power resources within the international system, drawing on realist insights, and considers how these are processed at the unit-level utilising constructivist scholarship on security culture. This is no slight on extant theoretical approaches, agreeing with Mauer in the observation that, "one school alone cannot explain the emergence of the EU as an, albeit limited, security actor", and this thesis seeks to contribute towards the plurality of approaches towards understanding the CSDP.[253] Nevertheless, there is a certain cross-fertilization with governance approaches through the adoption of a multi-level framework, as outlined in Chapter 1, as well as a sympathetic view of intergovernmental approaches which also concentrate on the role of the member states in the development of the CSDP.

As this thesis specifically seeks to integrate conceptual elements from both realist and constructivist traditions of IR into a synthesis realist-constructivist approach, extant analysis of the CSDP from these perspectives will be considered in greater detail in the sub-section below.

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[253] V. Mauer (2010), 'The European Union: From Security Community towards Security Actor', in M. Dunn and M. Mauer (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, Routledge, London, p. 372.

2.3. Realist approaches to the CSDP

Despite being regarded as the dominant theory within IR more widely, the case has been made that the realist tradition has become side-lined from theoretically informed understanding of the CSDP, to the extent that it is reduced to something of a 'dissident voice'.[254] This section explores extant realist approaches to the CSDP, in addition to their relative shortcomings, in order to highlight the potential for an innovative realist-constructivist framework to contribute towards our understanding of this policy area.

As the previous chapter made clear, realism as a tradition within IR has chiefly concerned itself with examining the power relations between nation states, with a particularly analytic focus on 'hard' military power, coercive diplomacy and the 'high politics' of grand strategy, whereas the EU in contrast has often been portrayed as representing multilateral cooperation with an overwhelming focus on the business of 'low politics'.[255] This has perhaps been a factor in the foundational texts of the structural realist school either dismissing or declining to explain the development of European integration. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the particularly bleak prospects for European cooperation predicted by Mearsheimer at the end of the Cold War.[256] Indeed, Mearsheimer went as far as to state that Europe would "soon miss the Cold War" due to its conclusion bringing an end the a broadly equitable distribution of power between two superpowers that was viewed as ensuring a degree of stability and peace amongst European nations.[257]

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[254] A. Hyde-Price (2013), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[255] S. Hoffmann (1966), 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-915.

[256] J. Mearsheimer (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.

[257] J. Mearsheimer, (1990), 'Why we will soon miss the Cold War', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 266, No. 2, pp. 35-50.

However, incongruously to the somewhat pessimistic predictions of Mearsheimer, European security and defence integration developed at increased pace and scope following the conclusion of the Cold War, East Germany was peacefully reintegrated with West and the EU (and NATO) expanded their membership significantly into Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, European security and defence integration developed significantly following the end of the Cold War as outlined above. This leads one to question whether the realist tradition is unsuitable for understanding the complex empirical puzzle that is the CSDP.[258]

More recently though, scholars working within the realist tradition have sought to engage more proactively with the wider European integration project, with arguably mixed results. For instance, Sebastian Rosato's interpretation of the development of the EU has been accused, at length, of placing too much emphasis on European integration during the Cold War period and vastly underestimated it since this time.[259]But it is important not to overlook the potential value of the realist analytical toolkit to our understanding of European security and defence integration specifically. In the analysis of this, realist scholars have attempted to place EU integration into the context of international geopolitics, emphasising that global politics can be explained through the system-level distributions of power and threat as the key causal variable. This has led

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[258] Though beyond the strict scope of this thesis, it is potentially worth noting that the Liberal Institutionalist tradition in IR is also accused of failing to anticipate the emergence of the CSDP, but yet argued to bring added value to our understanding of its development. See, A. Moravcsik and F. Schimmelfennig (2009), 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism', in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.; F. Richter (2015), 'The Liberal Approach', in L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (eds.), *International Relations Theory and European Security: We Thought We Knew*, Routledge, London.; Jorgensen, K. E., and Aarstad, A. K. (2013), 'Liberal, Constructivist and Critical Studies of European Security, in S. Biscop and R. G. Whitman (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, Routledge, London, pp. 28-37.
[259] S. Rosato (2011), *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY). For an in-depth critique see: U. Krotz, R. Maher, D. M. McCourt, A. Glencross, N. M. Ripsman, M. S. Sheetz, J. Haine and S. Rosato (2012), 'Correspondence: Debating the Sources and Prospects of European Integration', *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 178-199.

to two potential avenues to explore this problem being offered up by structural realism through the previously discussed concepts of 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning'.

2.3.i. Balancing

It is important to consider that 'balancing' has been applied to the CSDP in both 'internal' and 'external' dimensions, with the former in relation to a regional interpretation of the balance-of-power dynamic and the latter a global interpretation of the concept. Seth G. Jones puts forward an explanation of European security and defence integration from an internal balancing perspective, in which the development of security and defence cooperation through the EU, may be understood as dealing with an emerging 'security dilemma' in the form of a destabilisation of the balance-of-power between European states. [260] According to Jones, this destabilisation of the European regional system is the result of a re-united Germany.[261] As Jones states, "the greater the power of Germany, the greater the impetus for cooperation".[262] This, combined with a wavering US commitment to guarantee European security following the end of the Cold War, as demonstrated through the withdrawal of US military personnel, leads European states to adopt a "binding strategy… to tie Germany into Europe and increase the likelihood of peace on the continent".[263] Other scholars within IR have also argued that the root cause of EU security and defence integration (or perhaps even European integration more widely) can be found in internal power balancing considerations, with

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[260] S. G. Jones (2007), *The Rise of European Security Co-operation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[261] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[262] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[263] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier labelling it 'institutional binding', whereby Germany is heavily incentivised away from becoming a regional hegemon. [264]

However, in the face of the empirical reality in which Germany had been reunited for almost a decade prior to the substantial developments regarding EU security and defence at Saint Malo, the explanatory power of this internal balancing analysis is questionable. Furthermore, as Meyer and Strickmann note that contrary to expectations regarding a 'balanced' state, Germany has been consistently open to further European integration, including developing security and defence cooperation.[265]

An alternative explanation utilising the concept of balancing is the argument that European security and defence coordination integration is a rational response to US unipolarity. Huntington, for instance, referred to European integration as "the single most important move" against US unipolarity, that "would produce a truly multipolar 21st century".[266] Whilst not going as far as to state that the EU currently occupies the status of a great power, Waltz too engages with the EU as an emerging pole within global great power politics, balancing against unipolar US power following the Cold War.[267]

However, the immediate issue that this prospective explanation faces is the overwhelming disparity between EU and US military power. The deployable military power of the EU, even if the most ambitious targets for the CSDP were met, would only amount to a fraction of the manpower available to the US Marine Corps, the smallest of the US Armed Forces.[268]

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[264] M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and D. Verdier (2005), 'European Integration as a Solution to War', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 99-135.
[265] C. Meyer and E. Strickmann (2010), *op. cit.*, pp. 61-81.
[266] S. Huntington (1999), 'The Lonely Superpower', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35-49.
[267] K. Waltz (2000), 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 28.
[268] S. Coxard-Wexler (2006), 'Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 397-432.

Barry Posen therefore refined the structural realist understanding of the EU's development of a security and defence aspect being a means by which member states may balance US power. Instead of understanding the EU as a means by which to directly oppose the US, Posen asserts that increased security and defence cooperation through the EU is an attempt to develop the ability to independently deal with security issues and deal with the unhealthy overreliance on the US as the security provider for the European region and neighbourhood.[269] The rationality behind this is that EU member states cannot rely on the US to always take action, or to take action in a way in which EU states feel is most appropriate, and therefore there is a need to disentangle their transatlantic security dependence, which Walt defines as 'soft balancing'.[270] The policies of George W. Bush are often referred to as against European state preferences and Robert Art adds that developing an autonomous security capability will enable the EU to adopt positions that are against US preferences.[271]

A particular strength of this realist understanding of the CSDP is that it echoes the views of policy makers, such as former President of France Jacques Chirac, who in 1999 argued that, "Europe has to be able to take action in support of… its American ally when the United States wants to be involved on the field. But it must also be able to operate on its own when it wishes to".[272] Chirac went further in a 2003 interview, stating that, "any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions. That's why I favor a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has its place."[273] Similarly, former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in

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[269] B. R. Posen (2006), *op. cit.*, pp. 149–186.
[270] S. M. Walt (2009), 'Alliances in a Unipolar World', *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 86-120.
[271] R. Art (2004), 'Europe Hedges its Security Bets', in T. V. Paul, J. J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA), pp. 179-238.
[272] J. Chirac (2006), 'A Responsible Europe', *Speech*, 19/10/1999, quoted in, B. R. Posen (2006), *op. cit.*
[273] P. Ford (2003), 'Between Bush and Iraq- Jacques Chirac', *Christian Science Monitor*, News Article, Boston (MA), 21/02/2003.

1999 voiced his fear that US support in matters of security and defence "...is something we have no right to take for granted and must match with our own efforts."[274]

However, the limitations of this structural realist account of the CSDP being understood as a form of 'balancing' the US, either soft or hard, should be been questioned on several grounds that must be briefly set-out in order to illustrate the shortcomings of this approach.

First, there is the empirical criticism that if balancing was occurring one should expect to observe an EU intent to limit the influence of the US in European security, alongside a desire to limit US influence in other parts of the world also. This should translate into policy, such as through the CSDP, which would mean the development of genuine European strategic autonomy from US-led NATO. In contrast to this, as Howorth and Menon point out, the empirical reality has been the maintenance of NATO as the premier security organisation in Europe and importance of continued US involvement in European security continually stressed by national and supranational policy makers.[275]

Second, in relation to what structural realist scholars identify as the major geostrategic issues faced by EU member states and the US, such as Middle East interventions, tension with Russia, or China as a rising power, the development of the CSDP may be said to be of little practical relevance. The CSDP has not targeted the US indirectly, through obstructing or confounding what the US conceives of as its national interest or decoupling the majority of EU member states' reliance on their alliance with the US. Indeed, to the contrary and as shall be explored below in relation to

[274] T. Blair, (1999), 'Doctrine of the International Community', *Speech to the economic club of Chicago*, 22/04/1999, Available Online: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html [Accessed December 2014].
[275] J. Howorth and A. Menon (2009), 'Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is Not Balancing the United States'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 727–744.

bandwagoning, CSDP operations may be argued to have, at least in a limited and indirect way, supported US interests and provided a means of cultivating EU member states' value as US allies.

Third, the development of the CSDP has not resulted in an anti-US military alliance, EU states seeking to support rivals of the US or the substantial build-up of military capability. Despite a number of attempts at addressing European capability shortfalls, the Helsinki Headline Goal and its Catalogue of forces, the European Capability Action Plan, the establishment of the EDA in 2004 and the Headline Goal 2010, the success of these initiatives has been modest. Writing in 2014, Shepherd concludes that "15 years after the launch of the CSDP and 10 years since the EDA was established, the EU as a whole is still struggling to fulfil its ambition to be a 'strategic global actor' and 'security provider'".[276] Indeed, more widely, the capability of EU member states to challenge the US in any meaningful way is questionable. As Cross highlighted in 2011, the militaries of a number of EU member states continue to be organised on the basis of Cold War scenarios, leading to only 4% being able to be deployed on EU missions.[277] Menon similarly draws attention to the fact that, in 2011, 70% of EU member state land-based military forces were incapable of operating outside of their own national territory.[278]

Forth, the direction of travel regarding the CSDP may be argued to be declining, rather than growing, military ambition. This can be demonstrated in relation to both force concepts and operations. For example, the flagship 'Battlegroup' concept, with

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[276] A. J. K. Shepherd (2015), 'EU military capability development and the EDA', in N. Karampekios and I. Oikonomou (eds.), The European Defence Agency, Routledge, London, p. 65.

[277] M. Cross (2011), *Security Integration in Europe*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour (MI), pp. 62-63.

[278] A. Menon (2011), 'European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya', *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 3, p. 79. See also, N. Witney (2008), *Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy*, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, p. 22.

proposals for forces to conduct Petersberg Tasks has been repeatedly watered down, from an initial proposal of 60,000 troops to only 1,500 troops, and even that has not yet seen deployment on operations.[279] Indeed, regarding the missions undertaken through the CSDP, the largest-scale EU military operation in terms of manpower was its earliest of those still active as of 2016 (*Althea*), with declining resources deployed in subsequent missions.[280]

Fifth, whilst division in approaches to security and defence have occurred between certain EU states and the US, such as regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is important to point out this has also been amongst EU member states. This involved Britain and Poland joining with the US 'coalition of the willing' in Iraq, with other states such as France and Germany opposing the intervention.[281] Furthermore, even during this year of diplomatic tension, the ESS was published and clearly labels the transatlantic relationship as 'irreplaceable'.[282]

Finally, were the US the target of balancing from the EU, it may be expected to oppose its development of a EU security and defence toolset. Instead, as shall be explored in Chapter 3, the US has maintained a broadly supportive, albeit nuanced, approach towards the CSDP. Whilst stressing the importance of the EU not replicating or replacing NATO functions, successive US administrations have cautiously welcomed the development of the CSDP as a means by which to develop the capacity of its European allies to share an increased share of the burden in the transatlantic alliance.

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[279] A. Barcikowska (2013), 'EU Battlegroups - ready to go?', *November Brief Issue*, EUISS, Paris.
[280] J. Rehrl and G. Glume (2015), *Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations*, Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, pp. 171-172.
[281] S. Wood (2003), 'The Iraq War: Five European Roles', *National Europe Centre Papers*, No. 112, 13/06/03.
[282] Council of the European Union (2003), *op. cit.*

2.3.ii. Bandwagoning

An alternative understanding of European security and defence integration from realism may draw upon the concept of bandwagoning, as opposed to balancing. Due to the convincing critique of a balancing understanding of the CSDP as outlined above, this makes an exploration of its opposite understanding from a realist perspective in constituting a form of bandwagoning behaviour potentially compelling. This argument would be to make the case that the EU is not balancing *against* the US, but rather bandwagoning *with* the US, as a strategic response to the balance-of-power dynamic brought about by US unipolarity.

Namely, it may be argued that the CSDP represents a means by which EU member states can develop capability and a niche security and defence toolset to assist the US, such as through bearing a more equitable share of the burden in providing for international order and stability, which benefits both the US and EU states. Thus far though, the literature on bandwagoning as applied to the CSDP remains limited and lacking in-depth analyses.[283]

Nevertheless, within a structural realist framework, a bandwagoning understanding of the CSDP remains necessarily somewhat limited. This is because, as will be explored in Chapter 4, EU member states may be observed to diverge substantially in their approaches to the CSDP. These divergences are important, according to Ringsmose, as structural realism fails to account for them at the system-level in relation to relative material power capability (balance-of-power) or external vulnerability (balance-of-threat), and therefore understanding CSDP development as

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[283] This approach has been proposed by Cladi and Locatelli as a potentially fruitful avenue to explore, but as yet there lacks any in depth case-studies. This is returned to in Chapter 3 in reference to the realist-constructivist approach. See, L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (2013), *op. cit.*, pp. 264-288.

either large-scale balancing or bandwagoning behaviour through structural realism alone may therefore be regarded as importantly weakened.[284] To address this other factors may be considered, such as ideational level divergence within member states, but this presents an issue more widely in structural realist analysis leaving us without the conceptual toolkit to interrogate factors relating to the identities and perceptions of actors. Instead, these must be analysed utilising concepts outside the traditional toolbox of realism. Adopting such concepts into realist analysis may constitute a fruitful path for research under the guise of a realist-constructivist framework, however, to integrate ideational factors into realist analysis without explicitly recognising so is theoretically problematic in my view.[285] This will, therefore, be returned to and explored further in Chapter 3 in relation to the development of a realist-constructivist framework.

To conclude this section on extant realist approaches to the CSDP, though a core strength of structural realist analysis is traditionally seen to lay in its parsimony, when confronted by the complex empirical puzzle that is the CSDP the case can be made that this also illustrates an important shortcoming that it bears.[286] This conclusion is also reached by Howorth, whom argues that "we must therefore look elsewhere than to the realists for an explanation" of security and defence cooperation in the EU.[287] This thesis accepts this view to an extent, and indeed it is a view also recognised within the realist tradition itself. As Hyde-Price acknowledges, in the case of the CSDP, it is difficult to recommend that the scholar "limit him- or herself to the realist conceptual toolbox".[288] The argument has been made by critics of the structural realist account of

[284] J. Ringsmose (2013), 'Balancing or Bandwagoning? Europe's Many Relations with the United States', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 409-412.
[285] This is a view shared by Katzenstein, see, P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 39.
[286] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, Chapter 1.
[287] J. Howorth (2011a), *op. cit.*, p. 201.
[288] A. Hyde-Price (2013b), 'Neither Realism nor Liberalism: New Directions in Theorizing EU Security Policy', *Contemporary Security Policy,* Vol. 32, No. 2, 2013, p. 400.

the CSDP that the EU needs to be understood in more multi-dimensional and multi-level ways than the single material focused causal variable of structural realism traditionally allows, as this would be to overlook the complex institutional environment in which CSDP policy-making is conducted on the one hand, and the importance of norms and beliefs on the other. However, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 1 in relation to the realist-constructivist framework, it is possible to bring in constructivist concepts outside the traditional conceptual toolbox of realism and utilise these in synthesis with realist concepts in a way that may bring added value to our understanding of the CSDP.

2.4 Constructivist Approaches to the CSDP

In order to demonstrate the potential added value of a realist-constructivist framework applied to the CSDP, it is also important to interrogate the relative merits, and shortcomings, of constructivist analysis in its own right as applied to the CSDP. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, constructivism does not represent a traditional branch of IR scholarship akin to realism, but rather a commitment to a set of ontological and epistemological conditions, stressing the importance of norms, values, ideas and culture, which have also informed empirical studies.[289] It has therefore been used to underpin a number of different investigations into the nature of European security and defence policy integration thus far. Each of these approaches the empirical puzzle of the CSDP from a different angle and therefore need to be addressed in turn prior to consideration of how such approaches may be integrated with realist-constructivism.

2.4.i. Civilian and Civilising Power EU

One major branch of constructivist theoretical understanding of security and defence policy integration within the EU is built heavily upon the longer tradition of 'Civilian Power' Europe, which pre-dates the label of 'constructivism' itself.[290] Duchene, often cited as a key inspiration behind the development of this concept, stated that the Cold War nuclear stalemate had 'devalued purely military power' and thus new forms of power were to be sought.[291] This would result in the European integration

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[289] M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (2001), 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 391-416.
[290] F. Duchene (1973), 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community*, Macmillan, London, pp. 1-21.
[291] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

process being understood as a form of civil power actor and utilising civilising power as a means of conducting foreign policy action. The evidence for this was that the European Community had seemingly sought to remove military force from the equation of its conduct of international politics, firstly between its member states and then secondly in their own external relations with non-members. Hanns Maull set out three key criteria for a Civilian Power, which although were being applied in his work to the cases of Germany and Japan, have gone on to be applied regularly in reference to the EU.[292] These three criteria were, first of all, that international objectives would be pursued from the basis of an acceptance of the necessity of cooperation. Second, the Civilian Power would concentrate on achieving foreign policy objectives through non-military means. Military power was not necessarily absent as a potential instrument to be utilised, but it was to be very much relegated as a means to safeguard other methods for the conduct of foreign policy. Third, the Civilian Power would demonstrate a willingness to develop supranational structures.

Over time, the concept of Civilian Power Europe has been developed and critiqued, with the debate rumbling on regarding the relevancy of the concept throughout post-Cold War era. Robert Kagan in particular has popularised the term by contrasting the EU, as a utiliser of 'soft power', to the US wielding 'hard power' regularly and operating from the perspective of an actor that understands international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature.[293] The civilising power of the EU has been linked to its 'comprehensive approach' to security and defence.[294] This involves a

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[292] H. W. Maull (2000), 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 56-80.
[293] R. Kagan (2003), *Of Paradise and Power*, Knopf, New York.
[294] Council of the European Union (2014), 'Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach', Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 12/04/14, Brussels. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf [Accessed May 2017]

comprehensive philosophy on three counts, firstly on what security is and what the threats to it are, secondly on what the appropriate remedies are in response to such threats and thirdly what actors and tools should be available for enacting the response.

The result of this is an expanded security agenda to include not only national security but human security and an understanding that peace is intimately linked with development issues in which symptoms (such as piracy against international shipping) result from long-term root causes (such as poverty and bad governance).[295] In response, multilateralism (i.e. involving a range of actors including allied states, international organisations, NGOs, local authorities and civil society) and a range of political, civilian, military, humanitarian and development assistance tools are required. This 'comprehensive approach' may not only be identified as a 'trademark' of the EU but can also be argued to illustrate the centrality of shared values within the EU (such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance and market economy) to understanding EU involvement in this policy area.[296] The argument has been made that the EU is a civilising power as member states have put 'civility' at the heart of their relations internally and now seek to export their values beyond the EU's external boundary in order to achieve "a secure Europe in a better world".[297]

Other scholars working within a constructivist framework have gone further in explaining why it would be that norms and values have such an impact and are relevant to understanding EU security and defence policy making. Manners in particular went

[295] M. Kaldor, M. Martin and S. Selchow (2007), 'Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe', *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 273-288.

[296] M. E. Smith (2011), 'A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU's changing role', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 148.

[297] Council of the European Union (2014), 'Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach', Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 12/04/14, Brussels. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf ; B. Germond, T. McEnery and A. Marchi (2016), 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach as the Dominant Discourse: A Corpus-Linguistics Analysis of the EU's Counter Piracy Narrative', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 135-153.

on to develop the concept of 'normative power'.[298] This is defined as power that is not sourced from military or economic strength, but is rather a transformative power that works through ideas. These ideas shape conceptions of 'the normal', and therefore have the power to influence the behaviour of actors.[299] Civilian Power, could be understood as a type of normative power according to Diez, as it is based upon the promotion of a particular type of ideas and values.[300] In 2009, Germond and Smith provided supporting evidence to this analysis to an extent by identifying that the vast majority of CSDP missions undertaken thus far lacked clear European security interests, were limited in ambition and largely civilian in nature.[301] Whilst *Operation Atalanta*, sending warships to deal with the clear threat posed by piracy (amongst a broader range of action undertaken utilising the 'comprehensive approach', as discussed above) was highlighted by Germond and Smith as something of a departure from this from being justified in terms of promoting EU interests as well as values.[302]

Manners argues that the EU has become a unique form of international actor due to certain 'core characteristics', which lead to the EU being predisposed to privilege the use of this normative power, instead of military power in its foreign policy making. These 'core characteristics' were identified by Manners as threefold. [303] Firstly, the historical context of the EU as arising from the ruins of post-Second World War, with an original intent to supress the type of nationalism that had brought such destruction. Secondly, this was done through an institutional mechanism that provided new

[298] I. Manners (2002), 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-258.
[299] *Ibid.*, p. 239.
[300] T. Diez (2005), 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'', *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 613-636.
[301] B. Germond and M. E. Smith (2009), 'Re-thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 573-593.
[302] *Ibid.*
[303] I. Manners (2002), *op. cit.*, pp. 235-258.

supranational forms of governance alongside the traditional national models. Finally, this was achieved through an agreed political-legal framework that placed the rule of law in the conduct of international affairs at its fore, alongside the promotion of democracy and adherence to standards of human rights, even in 'the absence of obvious material gains'.[304] In essence, European foreign policy making was to be understood through the prism of norms which would provide the environment in which policy makers would conceive their interests and take action.

However, there has been much critique surrounding the analysis of the EU as a normative power as a way to understand EU security and defence policy cooperation. Chief critic perhaps is Hedley Bull, whom argues that European integration was civilian focused, not due an inherent ideational uniqueness, but rather prompted by factors within the strategic environment of the Cold War.[305] This concept has also seen empirical criticisms from scholars who have observed a degree of *realpolitik* in EU foreign policy, as opposed to one that clearly prioritises civilising power.[306] As a supposed civilising power, it has been noted that the EU is inconsistent in supporting its values externally, leading to claims it should now perhaps be treated as a strategic (rather than normative) actor within international politics. To illustrate this, Fernandez points out that in dealing with Russia and the issue of energy security, the EU has repeatedly pursued *realpolitik* objectives over a normative agenda.[307] This saw the EU support Russian WTO membership from 2004, despite growing concerns regarding the

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[304] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[305] H. Bull (1982), 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 149-164.; A. Hyde-Price (2006), ''Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 217-231.
[306] G. Noutcheva (2009), 'Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU's normative power in the Western Balkans', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 1065-1084.; R. Youngs (2004), 'Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU's external identity', *JCMS*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 415-436.
[307] S. Fernandez (2008), 'EU Policies Towards Russia, 1999-2007', in N. Tocci, *The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor*, CEPS Working Document, No. 281, pp. 9-11.

rule of law, human rights and minority rights in Russia. Indeed, over the issue of Chechnya in particular, Fernandez identified an increasing normative gap between the EU and Russia which developed alongside the emergence and growth of a mutually beneficial economic partnership from 1999-2007.[308]

The case of Libya provides further examples to question the normative nature of EU policy making. From 2005 to 2010, the EU terminated a longstanding ban (1986-2004) against the export of arms to Libya, despite serious concerns regarding human rights violations in the country and its support for brutal regimes.[309] This was within the context of a pledge by the Gadaffi regime in Libya to abandon the pursuit of WMDs and the Italian government's insistence that deepening ties with Libya was essential to limiting illegal migration across the Mediterranean.[310] As Hansen and Marsh emphasise, the lifting of this arms ban resulted in lucrative defence export contracts for EU state companies, a developed EU-Libya partnership on migration, and the provision of funding to the Libyan government for projects supposedly related to migration.[311] However, this funding and cooperation with Libya lacked normative stipulations (conditionality), leading not only to charges of hypocrisy but also somewhat undermining interpretations of the EU as a civilising power.[312] Indeed, particularly in light of the subsequent human rights violations committed by the Libyan government, resulting in a Civil War and the eventual overthrow of the Gadaffi regime, the case may be made that the EU decided to privilege strategic industrial interests and overlook the normative considerations that may be expected of a civilising power.[313]

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[308] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
[309] SIPRI (2012), *EU Arms Embargo on Libya*, Stockholm. Available Online: https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/libya/libya-1986
[310] L. Martinez (2008), 'European Union's exportation of democratic norms: The Case of North Africa', in Z. Laidi (ed.), *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World*, Routledge, London, pp. 118-133.
[311] S. T. Hansen and N. Marsh (2015), 'Normative Power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms exports to Libya', *European Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 264-286.
[312] *Ibid.*
[313] *Ibid.*

What emerges from the criticism of the 'civilian' and 'civilising' power EU is not that these are unhelpful concepts, or that they do not bring value to our understanding of the EU's security and defence policy making, but rather that they only account for a part of the overall picture. As the relationships with Russia and Libya highlight, in order to gain a full appreciation of the EU as a security and defence policy actor through the CSDP, constructivist research could benefit from a consideration of power relationships that could be undertaken through integrating elements of realist scholarship into the analysis. This strengthens further the case for the development of a realist-constructivist framework to contribute to our understanding of the CSDP.

2.4.ii. Security Communities and EU Strategic/Security Culture

Another strand of constructivist research on security and defence cooperation in the EU has also focussed upon understanding the type of actor that the EU represents, explored utilising the concept of 'security communities'. This concept, first introduced in 1957 by Deutsch et al., refers to a group that is brought together by a sense of community, this being "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'".[314] Whilst on the one hand this can represent the emergence of a new larger unitary political actor from previously separate constituent parts, such as the emergence of the US from previously independent states, known as amalgamated security communities, it can also represent formally independent and autonomous states working in partnership, known as pluralistic security communities, to which Deutsch et al. provide the example of Scandinavia.[315]

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[314] K. Deutsch et al. (1957), *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), p. 5.
[315] *Ibid.* See also, E. Adler and M. Barnett (1998), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Though originally conceived during the Cold War and largely applied to the spheres of influence of the US and USSR, the concept of the security community has since been taken up by constructivists and theoretically reformulated beyond a mutual commitment to peaceful change, to include "shared identities, values and meanings", in addition to multifaceted direct interaction between members and a shared joint long-term interest in dealing with foreign threats.[316] The formation of security communities then produces instances of cooperative security making.[317] This type of security making does not rule out the possibility of disputes between members of the community, but does insist, "they occur within the limits of agreed upon norms and established procedures".[318] The result of this according to Adler is that they promote "strategic stability and peaceful change", through the adoption of shared standards of conduct.[319] Others, such as Williams and Neumann have linked the security community concept to alliance politics.[320]

This concept of the security community has come to be applied to the EU through both the ENP and the CSDP.[321] This has also been linked to another vein of constructivist research on the CSDP examining the strategic and security cultures of EU member states, the degree of divergence/convergence between these and the possible emergence of a European level of culture within the EU.

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[316] E. Adler and M. Barnett (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[317] A. Tuscany (2007), 'Security Communities and their Values: Taking Masses Seriously', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 425-449.

[318] J. E. Nolan (1994), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, p. 5.

[319] E. Adler (2008), 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 207.

[320] M. C. Williams and I. B. Neumann (2000), 'From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 357-387.

[321] M. Ekengren (2007), 'From a European Security Community to a Secure European Community Tracing the New Security Identity of the EU', in H. G. Brauch et al (eds.), *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.; N. Bremberg (2015), *Diplomacy and Security community-building: EU crisis management in the Western Mediterranean*, Routledge, London.;
N. Bremberg (2015), 'The European Union as Security Community-Building Institution: Venues, Networks and Co-operative Security Practices', *JCMS*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 674-692.

This, it is argued, has consisted of a move away from the 'culture of anarchy', as has traditionally been analysed by the structural realists, and towards what the European Council itself has labelled a 'culture of co-ordination', that is to say based on shared norms and values rather than selfish interests.[322]

However, although the development of an EU security culture was made a policy objective in the 2003 ESS, a number of scholars have questioned whether it can yet be said to exist due to a failure of the EU to act coherently on a number of occasions. Critics, such as Daniel Keohane have pointed to occasions such as the EU's security mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with EUFOR *Althea* and the disputes surrounding it as evidence for a lack of clear EU security culture.[323] Beyond this, debate continues on the future possibility of an EU security culture and the impact such a development would have. Rynning provides a realist critique of the EU culture concept in stating that whilst there may be elements of socialization occurring in Brussels to create a unique type of security culture, the impact of this on security and defence policy within the EU would be severely limited, due to the continuing importance of the nation states and thus labels the CSDP a "fragile construction in search of solidarity", rather than the bedrock of a comprehensive security culture. [324] Although EU member states may be committed to building a 'culture of co-ordination' on one level, when security threats emerge that can only be solved unilaterally or with an ad-hoc coalition, then they have been dealt with this way, as witnessed in the 2011 Libya intervention.[325]

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[322] M. Drent (2011), 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Coordination?', *Studia Diplomatica*, LXIV-2.; T. Flockhart (2013), 'Why Europe Confounds IR Theory', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 392-396.

[323] D. Keohane (2009), 'EUFOR ALTHEA. The European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea)', in G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EUISS, Paris.

[324] S. Rynning (2011), 'Strategic Culture and the Common Security and Defence Policy - A Classical Realist Assessment and Critique', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 542.

[325] T. Vogel (2011), 'EU Divided Over Libya', *European Voice*, 10/03/11. Available Online: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/march/eu-divided-over-libya/70525.aspx [Accessed June 2016]

In sum, there is both value and shortcomings within the constructivist research agenda with regards to the study of the CSDP. On the one hand, constructivist scholarship has uncovered ideational factors in the form of norms, values, ideas and culture that in some ways may be regarded as underpinning the development of the EU as a security and defence actor, as well as national approaches towards it. However, a purely constructivist research agenda may also be argued to be lacking in appreciation of the importance of international material power relationships. Indeed, this is an issue noted within constructivist scholarship itself.[326] For our purposes, it is emphasised that the realist-constructivist framework, as formulated within Chapter 1 and as applied below, allows a means by which to consider ideational factors, material conditions and the relationship between the two and therefore contribute towards our understanding of the CSDP.

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[326] See, for example, C. Meyer and E. Strickmann (2010), *op. cit*., pp. 61-81.

2.5. Conclusions

This chapter discussed various theoretical informed approaches, with a specific focus on those from both the realist and constructivist traditions, towards understanding and explaining the development of security and defence policy cooperation in the EU through the CSDP.

What emerges is that there are certain shortcomings in the approaches taken by both theoretical traditions in terms of being thus far largely limited to purely ideational or material factor explanation. However, both realist and constructivist traditions also have the potential to integrate elements of each other through a realist-constructivist framework, as identified in the previous chapter. It is furthermore argued that there is a potential for such an analytical framework to bring added value to our understanding of the CSDP through considering the constraints and opportunities presented by the distribution of material capability in an anarchic international system with an interpretation of how these are processed at the unit-level through ideational factors. The realist-constructivist framework as developed in the previous chapter allows an opportunity to integrate such material factors in terms of balance-of-power at the system-level as the independent variable, with the ideational factor of security culture playing an important role as an intervening variable at the unit-level, into a single analytical narrative of CSDP development. The task of Chapters 3 and 4 is now to apply this framework to specific aspects of the CSDP and to demonstrate the findings that may be derived from this.

CHAPTER 3:

Accounting for the System-Level into

a Realist-Constructivist analysis of the CSDP

The realist-constructivist framework, as was outlined in Chapter 1, finds its origins in the realist tradition in the sense that foreign policy is understood to be guided generally by considerations of the distribution of power capabilities within an anarchic system, with material capability being understood to be the most effective type of power within this system. This is ultimately argued to set the limits and opportunities of state action in the long-term. However, in contrast to seeking the theoretical parsimony of structural realism, a realist-constructivist analytical framework can draw from classical and neoclassical realism in recognising that the translation of these system-level imperatives into specific foreign policy making takes place through a complex process impacted by multifarious factors domestically. These represent intervening unit-level variables through which the independent system-level variable must be processed to produce specific foreign policy output, the dependent variable. The realist-constructivist analytical framework as developed in this thesis gains its constructivist element through the key intervening variable under analysis being ideational at the unit-level.

Within a realist-constructivist framework, the CSDP may be understood primarily as a process of EU member states adapting to system-level pressures, much a structural realist scholarship understands all security and defence outcomes. However, where it diverges from structural realism is in its recognition that this process is an uneven one, both temporally and spatially amongst EU member states. Whilst structural

realist scholars may attempt to explain this differentiation by accounting for the variable geostrategic pressures placed upon different EU member states within the international system, a realist-constructivist framework posits that this leaves an unnecessarily incomplete picture.

This section begins the development of an alternative, realist-constructivist, narrative of this process in order to more fully account for the temporal and spatial differentiation of CSDP support through first of all considering the system-level pressures acting upon EU member states arising out of balance-of-power considerations, before later chapters go on to consider the unit-level ideational impact on states' responses to these pressures. It is important to proceed in this order, for as Schweller notes, "only when behaviour and outcomes deviate from these structural system-level variables should unit-level variables associated with neoclassical realism be added to these theories to explain why".[327] Therefore, prior to analysing in detail the domestic strategic cultural circumstances of EU member states Britain and Germany and the impact of this on these states approaches towards the CSDP, it is essential to consider the shifting topography of power relations relating to European security within which the CSDP has developed.

In the realist-constructivist framework, as outlined in Chapter 2, the structure of state power relations is the dominant factor in order to understand the foreign policies of states, as it provides the independent variable which 'pushes and shoves' states in certain directions, prior to the domestic intervening variables playing a role in influencing the more specific strategic responses of states to system threats and opportunities. This chapter examines how the propositions of realism, as set out in Chapter 1 (regarding international anarchy and the relative distribution of power

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[327] R. L. Schweller (2003), op. cit., p. 346.

capabilities), provides an analytical toolkit to examine the dominant role of international structure with regards to the development of the CSDP. It furthermore demonstrates that the CSDP may be understood as EU states adapting to these system pressures, albeit unevenly. It does this through considering the 'system-level' approach to IR, the application of realist concepts to this and how the CSDP may be understood in relation to member states adapting to system pressures first and foremost. Furthermore, it makes the argument that EU member states have developed security and defence cooperation, particularly an institutionalised military dimension, in order to bandwagon with the US in response to structural incentives provided by a system-level which may be characterised as 'unipolar'.

3.1 Operationalising a Realist Analysis of International Structure

Charles McClelland sets out a description of the 'system-level' approach to international relations, arguing for the existence of 'organised complexity' in international relations, whereby individual actions may be complex, but broad patterns may be discerned. [328] This is much the same as a sociologist analysing migration; whilst recognising that a myriad of motivations may be found amongst individuals, there is also an important context to be observed in terms of broad demographic patterns. Therefore, "any specific phenomena, entity, trait, relationship or process should be considered in its context or milieu rather than in isolation".[329] Dessler explains that in realist theorising, structure is understood as "an *environment* in which action takes

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[328] C. McClelland (1968), *Field Theory and System Theory in International Politics*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, pp. 14-55.
[329] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

place. Structures means the 'setting; or 'content' in which action unfolds."[330] As noted in the previous chapter, for realists this environment is anarchic, meaning without a hierarchy of states baring that based on relative material power and is "inherently threatening" meaning that states have an "ever-present and ongoing" interest in survival, according to Sterling-Folker.[331] As Waltz elegantly puts it, apart from the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities, survival is a prerequisite for a state achieving any goals it may have.[332].

The starting point of structural realist analyses of this system-level environment is in identifying and categorising the relative distribution of material power capabilities into ideal-type constellations, with each of these being recognised to have differing implications regarding the prospects for cooperation between states. Three main ideal-type constellations of power distribution are specifically focused upon within such analysis; unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems, with these referring to one, two or more loci of power (traditionally meaning states) dominating the system respectively on measures of material power capability.[333] Beyond these important 'poles' though are a number of 'secondary' or 'weak' states, whom are recognised to occupy positions within regional sub-system ideal type power constellations. Waltz argues that the weaker the state, the "narrower its margin for error" and therefore the greater the system-level pressures they face.[334] It is important to recognise that the definition of a 'pole' remains in dispute in the literature, as ongoing debates on categorising the

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[330] D. Dessler (1989), 'What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?', *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 466.

[331] J. Sterling-Folker (2002), 'Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 71.

[332] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

[333] See, R. Little (2007), *The Balance of Power in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[334] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

contemporary international system as unipolar or otherwise illustrate clearly.[335] This issue is returned to later in this chapter, in agreement with the former position, and adopting Ikenberry, Mastanduno Wohlforth's refined definition of a pole that it,

> "(1) commands an especially large share of the resources or capabilities states can use to achieve their ends and that (2) excels in all the component elements of state capability, conventionally defined as size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military might, and organizational-institutional 'competence.'[336]

As Wilkinson observes, this results in unipolarity being a situation whereby there is "one superpower, with global reach, capable of conducting or organizing politico-military action anywhere in the world system", whom fulfils the above, notwithstanding regional-level powers "capable of conducting such action at a regional level, and on a small scale or cooperatively".[337] The share of resources and material power capabilities within a states means may be assessed through reference to quantitative measures such as the Composite Index of National Capability, proposed by Singer et al. in 1972.[338] Further means of measuring of states' relative positions within the international system according to realist scholars include reference to economic (such as GDP, public debt and productivity) and military (defence expenditure, defence R&D expenditure) indicators, though no precise formula is widely

[335] C. Layne (2012), 'This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 203-213.; 'How Not to Evaluate Theories', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 219-222.

[336] G. J. Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno and W. C. Wohlforth (2009), 'Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences', *World Politics*, Vol. 62, No. 1, p. 4.

[337] D. Wilkinson (1999), 'Unipolarity without Hegemony', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 142.

[338] J. D. Singer et al. (1972), 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War', 1820-1965, in B. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Sage, Beverly Hills, pp. 19-48. For an in-depth discussion of measuring national power, see, G. F. Treverton and S. G. Jones (2005), *Measuring National Power*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica (CA).

agreed upon.[339] These quantitative measures are not without limitations however and have seen resulting efforts to also consider relative material capabilities qualitatively, enabling judgements on the efficiency of allocated resources.[340] These capabilities are also changeable, as states may accumulate further power through a number of means, though the most prominent are said to be "armament, territorial aggrandizement, and alliance formation", whilst power can also be diminished.[341] As discussed within Chapter 1, from these observations, analysts working within the realist tradition have identified two ideal-typical patterns of strategic state behaviour under these conditions; *balancing* and *bandwagoning*.

Such behaviour is not theorised to be taken in isolation from other states however. Rather, it may be in conjunction with other states through alignment. According to Snyder, alignment refers to states bringing their policies together in close cooperation, and alliance a further subset of this which involves greater formalization.[342] As Fedder observes, alignment behaviour may include a process of statecraft to deepen security cooperation.[343] Walt defines an alliance as "a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states".[344] Members of an alliance combine capabilities to a certain extent in order to derive benefit. This differs from 'coalition behaviour', whereby a number of states act in concert on an issue, or even a number of issues, but in contrast to an alliance tends

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[339] G. J. Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno and W. C. Wohlforth (2011*), International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 8.

[340] S. Guzzini (2005), 'The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis', *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 495-521.; B. C. Schmidt (2005), 'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power', Millennium, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 528.; B. C. Schmidt and T. A. Juneau (2009), 'Neoclassical Realism and Power', in S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman and, J. W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 61-62.

[341] G. H. Snyder (1984), 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4, p. 461.

[342] G. H. Snyder (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[343] E. H. Fedder (1968), 'The Concept of Alliance', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 68.

[344] S. M. Walt (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 12.

to be formed during crisis rather than peace time.[345] Coalitions, such as that formed by the US and its allies for the 2003 Iraq War, are ad-hoc creations and lack the broader political functions that characterise an alliance, which include multilateral security arrangements and are often treaty-based according to Pudas.[346] Although realist scholars have long been regarded as being focused on the state as the unit of analysis, it would be wrong to overlook the importance attached to the concept of 'alliance' amongst realist scholars also. As Morgenthau observes, "the relations between one nation or alliance and other alliance" form "the historically most important manifestation of the balance-of-power".[347] In cases of both balancing and bandwagoning, realists consider acts of cooperative alignment, alliance and coalition logical at times, as such acts are theorised as consistent with 'self-help'.[348]

As Liska observed in the 1960s, "it is impossible to talk of international relations without reference to alliances", and it may be argued that this remains the case and is particularly relevant in reference to the EU and CSDP.[349] Furthermore, over the past century, Europe may be judged to have witnessed unipolar, bipolar and multipolar power distributions at either the global system or regional sub-system-levels. This, it may be argued, provided important incentives for security and defence cooperation, coordination and integration to develop and therefore shall be explored over the following section of this chapter.

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[345] R. E. Osgood (1968), *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, p. 17.
[346] T. J. Pudas, 'Preparing Future Coalition Commanders', *JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 3, (1993-1994), p. 41.
[347] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit.*, p. 169.
[348] C. L. Glaser (1994/95), 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 50-90.
[349] G. Liska (1962), *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (MD), p. 3.

3.2. International Structure and European Security Cooperation

In order to develop a theoretically informed narrative of the development of the CSDP, it is important to understand the wider context from which it has emerged. This is wider than the current EU both temporally and spatially. Therefore, this chapter will begin by setting out and providing a brief overview of this context, before applying a realist analysis of the international structure and its impact on European security.

Europe, as a geographical expression is agreed to refer to the north-west peninsula of the Asian land mass, but beyond this there is much disagreement, with divisions particularly over the eastern border. [350] This thesis conceives Europe in geographical terms to encompass the land between the island of Iceland in the West to the Ural Mountains of Russia in the east, from the south it encompasses the islands of Malta, Cyprus and the Greek islands to the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard in the North. This geographical space incorporates 28 EU member states, but also a number of non-members such as Norway and Switzerland. In addition to this are parts of Turkey and Russia, states that whilst not being wholly in Europe, are recognised as being integral to what Buzan and Waever have termed the 'European security complex'. [351] However, the core focus of this thesis is upon the nation states that have engaged in the institutionalised security and defence cooperation, coordination and integration through the EU's CSDP. [352]

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[350] H. L. Wesseling (1998), 'What is Europe?', *European Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 391-393.

[351] B. Buzan and O. Waever (2003), *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[352] This includes all EU member states as of 2016, apart from Denmark which 'opts-out' of this aspect of European integration. See, Forsvarsministeriet (2016), *EU - The Danish Defence Opt-Out*, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen, Available Online: http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-Out.aspx [Accessed June 2016].

From what has long been regarded as the birth of the modern system of nation-states[353] at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia – the collective term for the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, Europe has been interpreted to be an example of a multipolar international system, with material power capabilities distributed unevenly between larger, medium and smaller powers. According to realist analysis, the 1648 Peace may be interpreted as a result of a 'balance-of-power' between the larger, often known as 'great' powers of Europe.[354] This 'balance' was formally recognised with the Peace of Utrecht, which included a series of treaties to end the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1713/14). Specifically, the Hispano-British Peace of 13 July 1713, Article 2, stipulated that the 'balance-of-power' must be preserved in order to secure peace in Europe, even if this meant overruling normal dynastic legitimacy and succession which would allow for union between France and Spain.[355] Over the following centuries, a number of powers joined or left the ranks of the 'great', but the historical norm was for a multipolar distribution of power, rather than one or two powers dominating this regional system.[356]

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[353] L. Gross (1948), 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 20-41.; D. Croxten (1999), 'The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty'*, The International History Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 569-591. For a critique of this within IR see, A. Osiander (2001), 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 251-287.

[354] H. J. Morgenthau (1962), *op. cit*, p. 189.

[355] Great Britain and Spain (1713*), Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and Spain*, Article 2, signed at Utrecht, 13//071713. Available Online: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:oht/law-oht-28-CTS-295.regGroup.1/law-oht-28-CTS-295 [Accessed April 2015].

[356] B. Healy and A. A. Stein (1973), 'Balance of Power in International History', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 38-39.

3.2.i. Bipolarity and European Security: 1945-1990

Though the CSDP itself is a most decidedly post-Cold War phenomenon, it is in the post-Second World War period where global and European shifts in the distribution of power occurred and the wider European integration process emerges. Furthermore, this period witnesses earlier attempts (and failures) of European security and defence cooperation. A realist analysis of this period and its distribution of material capability within the international system reveals a number of key points with relevance for the development of institutionalised multilateral security cooperation in Europe. These surround the relegation of Europe's traditional great powers to secondary status, the development of economic and strategic ties between these states and the US in the face of a common existential threat and permissive conditions for cooperation between these states; foundational to the later development of the CSDP.

The period of the Second World War is recognised as representing a significant change from the long-held multipolar to bipolar constellation of power as well as considerable developments in weaponry.[357] At the start of this war there were seven great powers, by the end only two; the US and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), whilst the three major European powers prior to the war had been diminished. Whilst Germany had been most obviously defeated and divided, both Britain and France had been left in relative economic ruins and thus declined to secondary status.[358] In contrast, the US had developed its economy, its military and began to realise its potential as a great power.[359] The USSR, whilst suffering the most civilian and military

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[357] K. N. Waltz (1981), 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better', *Adelphi Papers 171*, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

[358] R. H. S. Crossman (1946), 'Britain and Western Europe', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-12.

[359] P. Kennedy (1987), *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, Random House, New York, pp. 460-462.

deaths of all belligerents in the war, had occupied much of the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe.[360]

Though the USSR and US had been in alliance during the Second World War, rivalry between these two states ensued (or perhaps more accurately, resumed, as hostility had been prevalent since the Russian Revolution and placed aside to balance a common threat in Nazi Germany[361]) thus beginning the Cold War between the two and their respective allies, including in Europe. This consisted of tension between two groupings, one led by the US and the other by the USSR, with periods of both high tension (1950, Korean War; 1965; Vietnam bombing) and low tension (1955 US-Soviet détente; 1963, Test Ban Treaty) over this time.[362]

According to a realist analysis of events by Waltz, this confrontation was not the result of domestic differences, but a result of system bipolarity, whereby each state was the only serious rival to one another. Indeed, this period is taken to be almost the definition of bipolarity as the two 'great powers' of the US and the USSR sought to balance one another, with such language largely adopted and accepted both in academic discourse and policy circles.[363]

The European integration process itself finds its genesis in this period. This cooperation that had been conceived of by political philosophers such as Jean-Jaques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham (who went as far to argue for the creation of a common European army) for centuries, as well as Austrian politician Richard Nikolaus, Count of Coudenhove-Kalergi and French foreign minister Aristide Briand, in the more

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[360] J. W. Young (1991), *Cold War Europe 1945-1989*, Edward Arnold, London pp. 1-7.
[361] J. Donelly (2013), 'Realism', in S. Burchill (2013), *Theories of International Relations*, 5th ed., Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 38.
[362] P. Terry Hopmann (1967), 'International Conflict and Cohesion', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 226.
[363] K. N. Waltz (1988), 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 615-628.

immediate pre-war period moved towards a political reality through the 1951 Treaty of Paris.[364]

A realist analysis of this development emphasises system-level of the distribution of power within the international system that created the permissive conditions for the ECSC to be successful, expand, deepen and evolve into the EU of the present day, including its security and defence aspect through the CSDP.

Waltz argues that a bipolar system is inherently more stable than a multipolar one, the effect of this for Europe being that initial cooperation between Western states was easier to achieve.[365] Furthermore, it is argued that this period saw the US acting as an effective 'offshore balancer' for Europe.[366] This involved the US preventing the rise of a regional hegemon, 'pacifying' security competition and therefore creating permissive conditions for regional cooperation.[367] Joffe argues that this was crucial for rapprochement between France and West Germany in the Cold War period, identified as a crucial foundation for further European cooperation.[368] Though US policy makers had initially envisaged a swift post-war withdrawal of forces from Europe, fears of Soviet expansion led to The North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the formation of NATO.[369] This involved an effective US security guarantee for Western Europe during the Cold War through the extension of the nuclear deterrence to cover these states and

[364] J. J. Rousseau (1917), *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War,* translated by C. E. Vaughan, Constable and Company, London.; J. Bentham (1838-1843), 'Principles of International Law', in J. Bentham (ed.), *The Works of Jeremey Bentham*, William Tait, Edinburgh.; R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1926), *Pan-Europe*, Knopf, New York.; A. Briand (1929), 'Memorandum on the Organization of a System of Federal European Union', quoted in F. J Murphy (1980), 'The Briand Memorandum and the Quest For European Unity 1929-1932', *Contemporary French Civilization*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 319-330.; Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (1951), *op. cit.*
[365] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, pp. 167-170.
[366] A. Hyde-Price (2007), *op. cit.*
[367] J. Joffe (1984), 'Europe's American Pacifier', *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, pp. 64-82.
[368] *Ibid*.
[369] The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Washington DC, Signed 04/04/1949. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf [Accessed April 2014]

the stationing of US forces (both conventional and nuclear) on the European continent. Rees argues that this led to indivisible security agendas on both sides of the Atlantic, to such an extent that an 'Atlantic Union' was considered at the height of the Cold War.[370]

As Hyde-Price observes, whereas Western European states had been previously overwhelmingly concerned with the pursuit of relative gains, they now had the opportunity for the pursuit of milieu goals and did so through processes of multilateral integration.[371] The milieu goals aim at "shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries", according to Wolfers, such as promoting international law to establishing international organisations and differ from the relative gains pursued by "possession goals".[372]

The US role is further emphasised in the argument that it actively supported the development of European integration, whose armed forces were required elsewhere than the European continent, and therefore made clear that there was a need for a greater European contribution to defence including the rearmament of Western Germany.[373] The proposal for the accomplishment of this was named the 'Pleven Plan' after French Prime Minister René Pleven, calling for the establishment of a European Defence Community which would create the post of a European defence minister to oversee the establishment of a common European army which would in turn be funded by a common budget.[374] Although the Pleven Plan was ultimately rejected by the French legislature and thus West German rearmament was subsequently pursued through the structures of NATO, it is a notable instance of the US supporting European integration

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[370] W. Rees (2011), *The US-EU Security Relationship,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 2.
[371] A. Hyde-Price (2007), *op. cit.*
[372] A. Wolfers (1962), *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (MD), pp. 73-75.
[373] J. Chace (1998), *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*, Simon & Shuster, New York, p. 324.
[374] R. Dietl (2009), 'The genesis of a European Security and Defence Policy, 1948-2008', *Europe Since 1945*, K. Larres (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. pp. 323-354.

in accordance with its military needs. It is furthermore noteworthy that German rearmament was pursued actively through cooperation with other European powers and alongside the US promoting other forms of cooperation.

Indeed, in addition to the development of strategic attachment between the US and European states, further economic ties were formed through the formulation of the Bretton Woods monetary regime and through the 1947 European Recovery Programme (ERP), more commonly referred to as the 'Marshall Plan'. This may be cited as an early instance of US support for European integration, through the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) as a means for ERP funding to be distributed to European States. Indeed, US congressmen even argued that European integration was essential for the efficient management of this funding and demanded evidence of European integration in order to support the authorisation of payments.[375] Though a realist assessment may argue that this funding was based more on a pragmatic promotion of self-interest by the US rather than charitable sentiment, with a similar case being made for the development of a deep security relationship, it remains a notable instance of the US influencing the European integration process.[376]

What emerges over this period is a centrality of importance of the US for the states of Europe and the European integration process. From this time onwards, US support for enhanced European integration in security and defence has been unsteady, on the one hand encouraging and supporting developments that would increase the capacity of European states to shoulder an increased military burden in what may at times appear to be a 'freeriding' alliance, whilst on the other hand not wishing to

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[375] M. Hogan (1987), *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 90.
[376] *Ibid*.

undermine European commitment to NATO as the prime source of security and defence.

What clearly emerges over this period is not that European states are balancing against the US, but rather that cooperation with the US is extensive, thus potentially leading one to conclude that a form of limited bandwagoning may be observed. Although this period is prior to the emergence of the EU and more specifically the CSDP, it is important to understand this long-term cooperative relationship between European states and the US in a threatening global environment. The basis for this cooperation remains a matter for debate; scholars working within the traditional school of liberalism may point to an important economic relationship between the US and European states, structural realists may point to the shared threat posed by the USSR (with cooperation a form of balancing against the USSR), and constructivist scholars may point to shared norms between the US and European states. However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to state that cooperation between the US and European states was extensive throughout this period and the US was an active supporter of intra-European cooperation, not least regarding security and defence.

3.2.ii. Unipolarity and European Security: 1991-2016

The breakdown then breakup of the USSR and the end of the Cold War resulted in scholars once more reassessing the structure of global power, with a debate ensuing on the order that would emerge. A number of scholars identified a unipolar order to the global system, with considerable power asymmetry between the US and all other states.[377] This not only marked the end of the Cold War, but left the US as the 'last remaining superpower', as illustrated in *Figure. 2.* in reference to relative military expenditure.[378]

Figure 2. Relative Military Expenditure, 1985-1995.
Source: Authors own calculations based upon figures from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1995), figures in constant 1995 USD$ terms.[379] See data in Appendix 1.

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[377] C. Krauthammer (1990), 'The Unipolar Moment', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 23-33.; C. Krauthammer (2002), 'The Unipolar Moment Revisited', *The National Interest*, Vol. 70, pp. 517.;
W. C. Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 5-41.
G. J. Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno and W. C. Wohlforth (2011*), International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; T. S. Mowle and D. H. Sacko (2007), *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.;
N. P. Monteiro (2014), *Theory of Unipolar Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[378] J. Joffe (2002), 'Defying History and Theory: The United States as the Last Remaining Superpower', in G. J. Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), pp. 155-180.
[379] Data from, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1995), *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer*, Washington DC. Available Online: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185645.pdf , pp. 49-99.

As Krauthammer argued, "the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The centre of world power is an unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies".[380] Though scholars disagreed on whether this new state of affairs would last only a brief moment or would signal more significant era of 'unipolarity', many echoed the statement of Kenneth Waltz that the US "could be no longer be held in check".[381]Despite expectations regarding imperial overstretch, concerns about an economically rising Japan, then a rising economically and militarily rising China, in 2002 historian Paul Kennedy boldly went as far as to consider the raw power differential of the US from other states to be unparalleled in history.[382] Whilst unipolarity came to be questioned over the 2000s, writing in 2009, Ikenberry et al. note that US relative power asymmetry continued according to military and economic indicators, despite potential competitors such as Japan, China, India, Russia, the EU states or indeed the EU increasing their portfolio of capabilities.[383]

Utilising economic indicators of polarity as discussed above, this may be argued still to be the case as of 2015 (using the latest World Bank data available). This demonstrates that the US remains the world largest economy accounting for over 24% of nominal GDP globally and over 39% of nominal GDP of the seven richest states and three other nuclear armed states not on already within this seven (the second-ranked state on these measures is China, with nominal GDP representing almost 15% globally and almost 24% of these states) - See *Table 1*.

[380] C. Krauthammer (1990), *op. cit.*
[381] F. Halliday and J. Rosenberg (1998), 'Interview with Ken Waltz', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 371-386.
[382] E. Kennedy (2002), 'The Eagle has Landed', *Financial Times*, London, Print, 02/02/02.
[383] G. J. Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno and W. C. Wohlforth (2011), *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 7.

	GDP in $ USD Millions	% GDP of these States	% of World GDP	GDP PPP, Current Exchange to $USD	% of World GDP PPP, Current Exchange to $USD	GDP Per Capita ($USD)	Public Debt (as % of GDP)	Productivity (average hours worked per person in employment)
US	18,036,648	39.08%	24.31%	18,036,648	27.60%	56,116	73.8	1743
China	11,064,665	23.97%	14.91%	19,815,111	30.32%	8,069	20.1	Unavailable
Japan	4,383,076	9.50%	5.91%	5,175,259	7.92%	34,528	234.7	1729
Germany	3,363,447	7.29%	4.53%	3,924,035	6.00%	41,179	69.0	1368
Russia	1,365,865	2.96%	1.84%	3,687,406	5.64%	9,329	13.7	1985
France	2,418,836	5.24%	3.26%	2,729,182	4.18%	36,353	96.5	1463
UK	2,861,091	6.20%	3.86%	2,722,455	4.17%	43,930	92.2	1675
Pakistan	271,050	0.59%	0.37%	946,667	1.45%	1,435	58.5	Unavailable
India	2,088,841	4.53%	2.82%	8,003,408	12.25%	1,593	52.3	Unavailable
Israel	299,416	0.65%	0.40%	306,510	0.47%	35,729	63.2	1884

Table 1. Economic Indicators of Continuing Unipolarity
Source: GDP data from World Bank (2017) for 2015, public debt data from CIA World Factbook (2017) and for 2015, productivity data from OECD (2017) and for 2014.[384]

In military terms, continuing US unipolarity is perhaps even clearer due its advantage in terms of global power projection capabilities over any potential competitors. Based on military indicators from the 2015 datasets[385], the US maintains unmatched global power capabilities, alongside a military recognised to be one order of magnitude more powerful than any other. [386] Furthermore, this is not expected to change in the short-term as the US continues to invest heavily in defence, with this demonstrated by reference to spending both on R&D and assets.[387] Whilst Russia is

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[384] World Bank (2017), *Gross Domestic Product 2015*, Washington DC. Available Online: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf , pp. 1-4.; CIA (2017), *World Factbook*, Langley (VA). Available Online: https://www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2186.html ; OECD (2017), *Productivity Statistics*, Paris. Available Online: http://www.oecd.org/std/productivity-stats/

[385] Following the recording of these figures, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) announced it had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, in January 2016, and subsequently a nuclear warhead in September 2016. Information on North Korea remains opaque, however based on economic and military estimates from the CIA (*op. cit*), North Korea is not believed to be at all close to representing a peer competitor to the US.

[386] International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015), *The Military Balance 2015*, Routledge, London.; R. J. Lieber (2005), *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[387] D. Walker (2014), 'Trends in US Military Spending', *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available Online: https://www.cfr.org/report/trends-us-military-spending

roughly equal to the US with regards to nuclear weaponry (in quantity at least), this is not an argument for of bipolarity as polarity is indicative of the power constellation in aggregate, not in every single category.[388]

	Defence Expenditure $ USD Millions	% Defence Expenditure of these States	% of World Defence Expenditure	Defence Expenditures % of GDP	Defence R&D expenditure $ USD Billions
US	596,010	52.09%	37.58%	3.30%	78.6
China	214,093	18.71%	13.50%	1.90%	Not available
Japan	41,103	3.59%	2.59%	0.90%	1.0
Germany	39,813	3.48%	2.51%	1.20%	1.2
Russia	66,419	5.80%	4.19%	4.90%	Not available
France	55,342	4.84%	3.49%	2.10%	1.3
UK	53,862	4.71%	3.40%	1.90%	2.1
Pakistan	9,483	0.83%	0.60%	3.60%	Not available
India	51,295	4.48%	3.23%	2.40%	Not available
Israel	16,764	1.47%	1.06%	5.40%	Not available
Combined	1,144,184				
Global	1,586,000				

Table 2. Military Indicators of Continuing Unipolarity
Sources: Defence Expenditure data from SIPRI (2015) for 2015, Defence R&D Expenditure for 2012, GDP data from World Bank (2017) for 2015.[389]

A counter-argument to the identification of the international system as being unipolar is that the US is weakening relatively to other states due to their strong economic growth in comparison to the US in recent years, or that groupings of other states such as the EU may come to represent competing poles.[390] However, as Brooks and Wohlforth make clear, to proclaim multipolarity at this stage would be to mistake

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[388] J. Mearsheimer (2001), *op. cit.*, 381. See also, J. Mueller (1988), 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons', *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 55-79.

[389] SIPRI (2015), *op. cit.*; World Bank (2017), *op. cit.*; Industrial Research Institute (2016), *Global R&D Funding Forecast*, Arlington (VA). Available Online: https://www.iriweb.org/sites/default/files/2016GlobalR%26DFundingForecast_2.pdf , p. 5.

[390] See for example, L. Van Langenhove (2010), *The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0 Environment*, Egmont, Brussels.; M. Leonard (2013), 'Why Convergence Breeds Conflict', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2013.

trends for outcomes.[391] On this point, it is furthermore important to make a distinction

between unipolarity and 'hegemony'. As Reich and Lebow argue, the US is not a

'global hegemonic power', as its economic and political influence is limited.[392] Yet,

this in itself is not logically inconsistent with unipolarity. Wilkinson makes clear this

distinction between hegemony and unipolarity, with the former a goal (or not) for states,

whereas unipolarity can be regarded a fact.[393] This is because, as classical realist

scholars have long recognised, power does not directly translate into influence, thus the

US cannot achieve all its goals, yet remains the unipole in terms of the distribution of

material power capabilities until another pole rises to challenge it.[394]

Though the durability of a unipolar system has been questioned since its first

identification at the end of the Cold War, with Waltz amongst others claiming that other

great powers would soon emerge to challenge the US, it is not *yet* the case according to

the 2015 military and economic indicators.[395] Whilst the combined economic power of

the EU (though still secondary to the US) and the EU-28 defence expenditure (less than

half of the US) is perhaps significant, it should be stressed that this is in the midst of

severe qualitative military inefficiencies arising from widespread duplication (such as

17 main battle tank designs amongst the EDA members as opposed to only a single US

model).[396] Therefore, as of 2016, we can confidently assert that the US remains the

unipole and the only 'great' power – defined to be a state with capability to "contend

[391] S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2009*), International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), p. 55.
[392] S. Reich and R. N. Lebow (2014), *Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).
[393] This is distinction is elaborated on in, D. Wilkinson (1999), 'Unipolarity without Hegemony', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 141-172. On unipolarity as a 'fact', R. Jervis (2009), 'Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective', *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1, p. 188.
[394] Carr (2001) *op. cit.*; Morgenthau (1962) *op. cit.*
[395] K. N. Waltz (1993), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 44-79.
[396] Munich Security Conference (2017), *Munich Security Report 2017*, Munich, p. 21.; World Bank (2017), *European Union, United States*, Available Online: http://data.worldbank.org/?locations=EU-US

in a war with any other state in the system", leaving all other states as either 'middle' or 'small' powers, from a realist perspective.[397]

Whilst the post-Cold War conditions examined by structural realism under which the CSDP has developed may be therefore identified as unipolar globally, an examination of the European regional sub-system reveals it to be a balanced multipolarity according to Hyde-Price.[398] As Hyde-Price argues and can be illustrated at the end of the Cold War through reference to *Figure 2.* and presently through reference to *Table 1.* and *Table 2.*, Germany, France and the UK are in broadly similar positions in terms of their material power capabilities, with Germany currently behind militarily but ahead economically.[399] This is an assessment borne out by the more detailed dataset utilised by the Correlates of War Projects' Composite Index of National Material Capabilities measure of material power.[400]

However, the European regional sub-system cannot be taken in isolation from the global system-level, with the US continuing to act as an effective 'offshore balancer'.[401] This has been argued to play an important role, without which "the EU could disintegrate into a twenty-seven-state free-for-all".[402] Europe itself has seen much geopolitical change with the end of the Cold War, with what has been termed the 'Europe of Yalta' comprehensively dismantled.[403] This including the breakup of not

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[397] R. Ross (2009*), Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics*, Routledge, New York, p. 87.; Posen classifies Britain, France and Germany as second-rank powers. B. R. Posen, (2006), 'European Union security and defence policy: response to unipolarity?', *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 149–186.

[398] A. Hyde-Price (2007), *op. cit.*

[399] *Ibid.*

[400] Correlates of War Project (2017), 'CINC Index 1816-2012 Dataset 5.0', Available Online: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/national-material-capabilities-v4-0 ; J. D. Singer, S. Bremer, and J. Stuckey (1972), 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965.' in Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Sage, Beverley Hills, pp. 19-48.; J. D. Singer (1987), 'Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985', *International Interactions*, Vol. 14, pp. 115-32.

[401] J. Mearsheimer (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 380.

[402] A. Toje (2010), 'The Tragedy of Small Power Politics', *Security Policy Library*, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, p. 19.

[403] A. Hyde-Price (2007), *op. cit.*

only the USSR, but also Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in addition to the reunification of East and West Germany.

It should also be noted that the end of the Cold War brought about significant domestic changes to states that are now EU members, through the collapse of communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe which paved the way for eight to gain EU membership in 2004, with, two more admitted in 2007. Most notable of these are perhaps the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as former constituent elements of the USSR itself now members of the EU (as well as NATO). These states in particular have a complex relationship with the Russian Federation, viewed largely in terms of security, as Forbrig demonstrates in relation to the latest crisis in Ukraine. [404] Further developments over this post-Cold War period have emerged in terms of security threats facing EU states, with Fraser noting terrorism has developed as an international, as well as domestic, security and defence policy issue.[405] Further security challenges of this period include nuclear proliferation, piracy, state-building, energy-security and climate change.[406]

The impact of the end of the Cold War and US unipolarity on European states' own security has been multifaceted. During the Cold War the US stationed a substantial number of troops and military equipment (including nuclear weaponry) on the European continent, with a clear commitment to containing the spread of Soviet influence and acting as a 'security guarantor' for its NATO allies.[407] However, the end of the Cold War saw the focus of US foreign policy shift somewhat away from Europe,

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[404] J. Forbrig (2015), 'A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis', *Policy Paper 19/02*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Avalable Online: http://www.gmfus.org/file/4250/download

[405] C. Fraser (2012), *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London, pp. 223-236.

[406] M. E. Brown et al. (2004), *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA); M. E. Brown et al. (2010), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).

[407] R. N. Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen (1995), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, New York.

including through the substantial reduction in the number of US military personnel based in EU states.[408] This has been combined with a focus on what some analysts and US policy makers have termed a US 'pivot' towards the Asia-Pacific region, with China emerging as an increasingly influential regional power, with this area now argued to represent the "new centre of gravity for US foreign policy, national security and economic interests".[409] In addition to this, the US has become deeply involved in seeking to resolve instability in the Middle-East region, most notably intervening in Afghanistan, Iraq and most-currently Syria, including through the regular use of US military force (with variable levels of both diplomatic and military backing from EU member states).

Though not involved in the military operations that invaded Afghanistan (*Operation Enduring Freedom*) and Iraq (*Operation Iraqi Freedom*), with ad-hoc coalitions preferred by the US, it is important not to underestimate the continuing relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War period. Tertrais recognises the role of NATO in changing from one of potentially "waging war" on the European continent, to "enforcing peace" across the globe.[410] Over the 1990s NATO intervened in the Balkan wars (culminating in *Operation Allied Force* in 1999) and through the 2000s following the US invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after 9/11. NATO, following a UN mandate, led the post-invasion International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2003 to December 2014, and led the 2011 *Operation Unified Protector* in Libya. This has been alongside numerous and ongoing relief, support,

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[408] US Army Europe (2015), 'History', http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/history.htm [Accessed November 2015]

[409] M. E. Manyin et al. (2012), 'Pivot to the Pacific?' *Congressional Research Service*, Washington DC, 28/03/13, p. 6.

[410] B. Tertrais (2004), 'The Changing Nature of Military Alliances', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 144.

training, monitoring and escort missions around the world, including off the Horn of Africa, Kosovo and in the Mediterranean.

However, following the Russian annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine there has been a clear reorientation of NATO towards the territorial defence of Eastern Europe and deterring further Russian aggression.[411] This has involved an increased deployment of US weaponry to Baltic states and the stated intention to create a rapid reaction force to deal with potential crises involving Russia.[412]

In addition to cooperation undertaken through NATO though, EU states in the post-Cold War period have also deepened their security and defence cooperation outside these structures and undertaken it through the EU. Indeed, according to Steinmetz and Wivel, the CSDP itself may be understood as a form of 'limited alliance'.[413] This view has arguably gained increased credence with the mutual defence clause of Article 42.7 and its invocation by France following the November 2015 Paris terror attacks. This development of the CSDP has included creation of significant institutional architecture, through the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the PSC, operational development, increasing the capacity of EU states to launch and maintain missions in its neighbourhood, industrial development including joint capability procurement programmes and the establishment of the EDA to enhance the pooling and sharing of military capabilities.

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[411] NATO (2014), 'Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales', *Press Release*, Issued 05/09/14. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm [Accessed November 2014]

[412] Financial Times (2015),'NATO shifts strategy in Europe to deal with Russia threat', *Financial Times*, London, 23/06/15, Print.

[413] R. Steinmetz and A. Wivel (2010), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*, Routledge, London, p. 54.

Whilst this cooperation takes place at the EU level, it is largely controlled and funded by the EU member states themselves, with the Council of the European Union – representing the executive governments of EU member states – acting on the basis of unanimity. The centrality of the member states to the CSDP is emphasised further in the division of costs incurred through CSDP military operations. The means for financing military missions is set out in the *Athena* mechanism, whereby a fund co-financed by all member states has been established to cover a 'catalogue of common costs'.[414] This level of supranational funding includes fuel, transport, medical services and numerous other specific items of expenditure, but in practice only amounts to between 10-15% of CSDP military mission costs.[415] The remainder of costs incurred falls under the principal that they 'lie where they fall', meaning that the individual member states are responsible for their own expenses during operations incurred due to their participation in, and contribution to, military missions.[416] In sum, whilst other aspects of EU foreign policy making, most notably the civilian dimension of the CSDP may have a greater supranational dimension, the military side in particular is very much controlled by the nation states and conducive to a realist analysis with the states as the primary actors.

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[414] Council of the European Union (2011), *Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP*, 19 December 2011. Available Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011D0871 [Accessed June 2015]
[415] EUISS (2013), *Financing CSDP Missions,* Available Online: http://www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/euiss/documents/Books/Yearbook/5.4_Financing_CSDP_missions.pdf [Accessed June 2015]
[416] *Ibid*.

3.3. CSDP: Hedging under Unipolarity?

As noted in the previous chapter, the development of the CSDP as an instance of balancing is unconvincing, whether internal or external, 'hard' (due to its implausibility and ineffectiveness) or 'soft' (due to lack of evidence of anything other than routine diplomatic friction with the US) variety. Indeed, Beinart identifies a clear lack of a 'balancing' competition to the US at the end of the Cold War widely.[417] Fiammenghi argues that the US has reached a security threshold whereby the capability asymmetry is so extreme that it may not be balanced for the moment.[418]

Instead, it is possible to make the case that we can understand the development of security and defence cooperation through the CSDP as a limited bandwagoning with the US – a partial alignment with the US on the one hand, but hedging this against developing greater European autonomy on security and defence on the other. This section makes this case, arguing that the CSDP may be interpreted as EU member states responding to the pressures and opportunities of US unipolarity, consistent with a realist-constructivist framework that posits balance-of-power considerations as the independent variable. It does this though observing the US response to CSDP development, the state of the EU/US/NATO institutional relationship and the extent to which CSDP operations display evidence of coordination with the US, support of US objectives and being of benefit to US interests, which may be taken as evidence of alignment behaviour. In contrast, a lack of coordination with the US, facing opposition from the US and confounding US interests may be taken as evidence of balancing behaviour on the part of EU member states through the CSDP.

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[417] P. Beinart (2008), 'Balancing Act: The Other Wilsonianism', *World Affairs*, Vol. 171, No. 1, p. 83.
[418] D. Fiammenghi (2011), 'The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis', *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 126-154.

3.4. US Responses to CSDP Development

Initially the post-Cold War scope of the US response to developments in European integration fell within the purview of economic collaboration. Shortly following the fall of the Berlin wall, the US made clear its commitment to further strengthening relations with the EC, with Secretary of State James Baker calling for enhanced US-EC consultations.[419] This culminated in the signing of the Transatlantic Declaration in November 1990, which formalised a number of biannual consultations between the two, recognised common goals and foresaw a role for each other in pursuing these. [420] Following this, the EC was transformed into the EU at Maastricht, with the 1992 treaty including a commitment to "define and implement a common foreign and security policy", which would eventually include the "framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".[421]

The scope of the US relationship with the EU was then explicitly widened beyond economic affairs through the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, which stated "our common security is further enhanced by strengthening and reaffirming the ties between the European Union and the United States within the existing network of relationships which join us together".[422] Whilst reaffirming NATO as the "centrepiece" of transatlantic security for its members, this agenda also set out that the EU and US shared a "common strategic vision of Europe's future security".[423] Furthermore, it drew attention to a joint commitment to the construction of a new European security

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[419] J. Baker (1989), quoted in M. Egan and N. Nugent, 'The Changing Context and Nature of the Transatlantic Relationship', in L. Buonannio et al. (eds.), *The New and Changing Transatlanticism: Politics and Policy Perspectives*, Routledge, London, Chapter 2.

[420] For a wide-ranging discussion of US-EC relations in the Post-Cold War era with particular reference to the New Transatlantic Agenda, see A. L. Gardner (1997), *A New Era in US-EU Relations? The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda*, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot.

[421] European Union (1992), *op. cit.*

[422] European Union and United States of America (1995), *New Transatlantic Agenda*, Available Online: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf [Accessed March 2016]

[423] *Ibid.*

architecture in which NATO, the EU, the WEU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe all had complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play.[424] This reflected NATO's new Strategic Concept that had been previously set out in 1991, recognising the dramatic changes that had occurred in the transatlantic security and defence landscape following the end of the Cold War, but at the same time reaffirming the core function of NATO in the defence of the security interests of its members.[425]

This reformed security and defence architecture was supported by the US, which oversaw the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (EDSI) within NATO and cooperation with the WEU. US Permanent Representative to NATO, William Taft IV, in a number of speeches dated February and March 1991, welcomed a 'European pillar' of security and defence, with the important proviso that it must not weaken the "transatlantic bond".[426] Agreement at the Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers in June 1996 allowed information-sharing, the provision of headquarters and the release of NATO assets for WEU-led crisis management operations such as *Operation Sharp Guard* in 1992, aimed at enforcing UN embargoes (specifically under UNSCR 787) on the former Yugoslavia.[427] It is notable that this early example of European-led crisis management operation was conducted concurrently with NATO's own mission with this objective, *Operation Maritime Guard*, before both the NATO and WEU missions were combined into *Operation Sharp Guard*, under a single chain of command and control. This development of NATO-WEU cooperation was coupled with the earlier formulation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept in 1993

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[424] *Ibid.*

[425] NATO (1991), The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, London, 07-08/11/1991. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/cps/sl/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm [Accessed May 2016]

[426] W. Taft (1991), 'European security: lessons learned from the Gulf war', *NATO Review*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 3-11.

[427] NATO (1996), Ministerial Communiqué from Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, Press Release, Issued 03/06/96. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm [Accessed May 2016], Paragraphs 2; 7; 8 and 20.

(and endorsed at NATO's Brussels Summit in January 1994) which allowed for all-European 'coalitions of the willing' to undertake a wide range of tasks not involving the defence of NATO territory.[428]

This early stage of post-cold war European leadership in crisis-management is very much taken with US support. However, the niche and need for European security to be developed *outside*, rather than *inside*, NATO structures was advanced with US reluctance to launch non-Article 5 missions in Europe, as demonstrated in Yugoslavia.[429] This culminated in the creation of the CSDP, which has involved the creation of institutional structures, civilian-military concepts and civilian-military missions as detailed in Chapter 2.

The US response to the EU's development of the CSDP has largely been one of a pragmatic "Yes, but...", with reservations that it must not undermine NATO as the premier defence alliance.[430] This may be traced back to a memorandum sent to European leaders by US Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholomew warning most bluntly against European states attempting to "reduce or marginalize the US role in Europe", with a transatlantic separation ultimately harming both parties through "weakening the integrity of our common transatlantic security and defence".[431] A continuation of this position was set out under the Clinton-administration by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998, stating that there should be no decoupling from NATO, no unnecessary duplication of NATO structures or resources and no

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[428] R. E. Hunter (2002), *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor?*, Rand, Santa Monica (CA).

[429] See, D. H. Allin (2002), 'NATO's Balkan Interventions', *Adelphi Paper 347*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London.

[430] P. Keller (2012), *US Policy Towards The European Project of Common Security and Defence*, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Berlin.

[431] R. Bartholomew (1991), 'Memorandum', 20/02/1991. Quoted in S. Duke (2000), *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, Macmillan,* Basingstoke, p. 95.

discrimination of NATO members that are not EU members.[432] This position has been labelled the "3 D's" by Daniel Keohane and has been echoed on numerous occasions subsequently by US policy makers.[433] Bush-administration Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld warned against developments that could "reduce NATO's effectiveness by confusing duplications or by perturbing the transatlantic link".[434] In particular, operational planning and collective defence are highlighted by Secretary of Defence William Cohen as areas that the US wishes to retain within NATO.[435] However, at the same time and as Dobson and Marsh emphasise, it has been a consistent goal of successive post-Cold War US administrations to get "the EU to accept greater international security commitments".[436]

This view, also shared by a number of EU states, has seen a complex institutional relationship develop between NATO and the CSDP, with the former playing an influential role on the evolution of the latter.[437] The Obama-administration though has perhaps been the most enthusiastic supporter of CSDP, with the President remarking he regards the EU to be a "strategic partner", and Vice-President Biden previously making clear the US position that "we support the further strengthening of European defence, an increased role for the EU in preserving peace and security, and a

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[432] M. K. Alright (1998), *Remarks to North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Brussels*, December 1998. These remarks were repeated in the media, M. K. Albright (1998), 'The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future', *Financial Times*, London, 07/12/1998, Print.

[433] D. Keohane (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[434] D. Rumsfeld (2001), quoted in *The Guardian*, 'Missile Shield is moral requisite US tells allies', 05/02/01, Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/feb/05/usa.richardnortontaylor [Accessed May 2016]

[435] W. S. Cohen (2000), *Meeting the Challenges to Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: A Way Ahead for NATO and the EU*, Remarks at the Informal Defence Ministerial Meeting, Birmingham, UK, 10/10/00.

[436] A. P. Dobson and P. Marsh (2000), *US Foreign Policy Since 1945,* Routledge, London, p. 148.

[437] J. A. Koops (2012), 'NATO's Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor' in O. Costa and K. Jorgensen (eds.), *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 155-187.

fundamentally stronger NATO-EU partnership". [438] As Giegerich and Pushinka observe, the US has "in general welcomed a stronger European approach to international security and improved European military capabilities as long as long as it remains assured that NATO will not be undermined". [439] Furthermore, Tertrais makes the case that the US can be understood to desire a re-calibrated division of labour in terms of security and defence with its allies, happy to take on including command, control, communications, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), but wishing her allies to shoulder a greater burden of other tasks, such as providing ground forces. [440]

However, whilst the continuation of NATO is widely understood as in US interests, and an avenue through which European states may burden-share with the US, with the US clearly the senior and leading partner in this coalition of states, its relationship to the EU is less clear. [441] Put simply, as the US is not an EU member state, it cannot as clearly be seen to be leading the CSDP and therefore the US/EU/NATO security and defence relationship must be considered.

The formal institutional relationship between the EU and NATO is set out in the Berlin Plus agreement, which is designed to regulate strategic and operational cooperation. [442] This allows for the EU to effectively 'borrow' US military planning,

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[438] B. Obama (2010), quoted in S. McNamara (2011), 'How President Obama's EU Policy Undercuts US Interests', *The Heritage Foundation*, 16/02/11; J. Biden (2009), *Remarks to 45th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 07/02/09.

[439] B. Giegerich and D. Pushinka (2006), 'Towards a Strategic Partnership? The US and Russian Response to the European Security and Defence Policy', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 388.

[440] B. Tertrais (2002), 'ESDP and Global Security Challenges: Will There Be a Division of Labor between Europe and the United States?', in E. Brimmer (ed.), *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role - ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC, pp. 117-133.

[441] T. Mowle and D. Sacko (2007), 'Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Uni-Polar World', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 597-618.

[442] Council of the European Union (2002), *EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus*. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf [Accessed May 2016].; M. Dembinski (2005), 'Die Beziehungen zwishen NATO und EU von Berlin zu Berlin plus, Konzepte und Konfliktlinien', in J.

capabilities and assets allocated to NATO, or at least have the possibility of doing so in the event of crisis escalation.[443] The importance of this framework being in place was made clear at the 2002 Council meeting in Seville, which regarded it as an essential precursor to the first EU military mission (*Concordia*). This first mission highlighted the depth of the EU-NATO relationship, as it as it effectively involved the EU taking command and control of NATO-led *Operation Allied Harmony*.

This institutional framework also handed a degree of control to the US over the direction of EU security and defence through allowing NATO (and thus the US) a 'first right of refusal' on undertaking missions proposed by the EU.[444] Furthermore, the EU's access to NATO assets under Berlin Plus must be agreed unanimously at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), thus allowing non-EU states an effective veto on EU missions requiring access these assets. According to Weiss, successive US administrations interpreted Berlin Plus as a means by which to strengthen European contribution to security and defence tasks (thus greater transatlantic burden-sharing), without representing a de-coupling of EU states from the US.[445] Indeed, Larivé argues that this allowed the US to support the EU through the auspices of NATO, but yet retain an element of control over the development of the EU as a security and defence actor.[446]

Varwick (ed.), *Die Die Beziehungen zwishen NATO und EU. Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalitat?*, Barbara Budrich Verlag, pp. 61-80.

[443] Council of the European Union (2002), Presidency Conclusions, Seville 21-22/06/22. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf-1993-2003/presidency-conclusions_seville-european-council_-21-and-22-june-2002/ [Accessed March 2016]

[444] European Union (2004), *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations*, 07/12/04. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20-%20EU-NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf [Accessed March 2016].; For an analysis of this, see, M. Reichard (2006), *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate, Aldershot.

[445] M. Weiss (2011), *Transaction Costs and Security Institutions*: Unravelling the ESDP, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 71-73.

[446] M. H. A. Larivé (2014), *Debating European Security and Defence Policy*, Routledge, London, pp. 80-85.

In addition, under Berlin Plus, permanent military liaison has been put in place between NATO and the EU in order to facilitate operational cooperation, with an EU Cell operating within SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), NATO's strategic command headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and a NATO Permanent Liaison Team operating at the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).[447] This further underlined the point that the EU-NATO institutional relationship allowed for what had been termed "separable, but not separate forces" by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and thus would develop transatlantic burden-sharing without full European autonomy[448] Further US support for the CSDP may be observed through a US-EU framework agreement in 2011 that allows for US participation in EU missions directly through seconding civilian personnel, units and assets.[449] This allowed for the US to contribute as a 'third party state' to EU missions in the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo) and built upon an ad hoc 2008 agreement that had allowed for US participation with the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX).[450]

The importance of the US-EU relationship, specifically EU access to assets is stressed by Moens, who points to the development of both informal and formal layers of dialogue between EU and US through NATO representatives regarding the CSDP in order for action to be appropriately coordinated and for the EU not to duplicate NATO functions.[451] Prior to the launch of EUFOR *Althea*, the Franco-British Summit at Le

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[447] Council of the European Union (2002), *EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus*. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf [Accessed March 2016]

[448] W. Christopher (1993), 'Towards a NATO Summit', *NATO Review*, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 3-4.

[449] United States and European Union (2011), *Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union on the Participation of the United States of America in European Union Crisis Management Operations*, 17/04/11.

[450] United States and European Union (2008), *Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Participation of the United States of America in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo*, 22/10/08.

[451] A. Moens (2003), *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, Praeger, Westport (CT).

Touquet in February 2003 had expressed that the EU's operations would "build on the close relationship that the EU and NATO have developed in the Balkans, taking it to a new level and contributing to a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership".[452] The detail of Le Touquet and Berlin Plus indicated more of an aligned partnership than any possibility of 'balancing' in a sense understood by realist informed international relations theory.

3.4. CSDP Operations in the Context of Transatlantic Relations

The contribution of the CSDP towards a limited bandwagoning with the US can also be illustrated through reference to the close collaboration between US-led or supported operations and CSDP missions on both formal and informal levels. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively account for all past and/or presently active CSDP operations and mission, it is argued that indicators of a limited form of bandwagoning can be observed among a number of these, as shall be explored below.

EUFOR ALTHEA

The longest running of the EU's currently active military operations is EUFOR *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreed on 12 July 2004 and launched on 2 December 2004, EUFOR *Althea* assumed the responsibility from NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) peacekeeping mission and maintained the same force level, at least initially.[453] Previously deployed to this area had been a UN force (UNPROFOR), followed by a 60,000 strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR).[454] The continued

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[452] France and UK (2003), *UK-France Summit Communique*, Le Touquet, 04/02/03.

[453] European Union (2004), *EU Military operation in Bosnia in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR Althea)*, Available Online: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf [Accessed January 2016]

[454] R. G. Whitman and S. Wolff (2012), *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*, Routledge, London, p. 147.

objective of these missions has been the enforcement of the agreement at the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord which put an end to the Bosnian War between April 1992 and December 1995.[455] It should be noted however that the specific mandate of the mission has been reconfigured over the course of, and within, the deployments with the current EU mission mandated by UNSCR 2183 (2014).[456]

EUFOR *Althea* represents perhaps the most convincing case of an EU military operation that is supported by transatlantic burden-sharing, with the US as senior partner, rather than representing tension between the EU and US. The deployment of EUFOR *Althea* followed the agreement of a "Framework for an enhanced NATO-EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability" that had been agreed with reference to the Western Balkans on 25 July 2003.[457] Secondly, the deployment of the mission was made possible by the EU being able to draw on NATO assets and capabilities through the 'Berlin Plus'[458] mechanism, the agreement for which had been finalised in December 2002.[459] A number of EU states, including France and Belgium, had initially wished to deploy an EU force to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia prior to the conclusion of an EU-NATO agreement, however this was blocked by Britain, Germany and Spain.[460] Indeed, NATO had been labelled by British

[455] OSCE (1995), *Dayton Peace Agreement*, 14/12/95. Available Online: http://www.osce.org/bih/126173 [Accessed March 2016]

[456] UN (2014), UNSCR 2183 Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted 11/11/14. Available Online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2183 [Accessed March 2016]

[457] Framework for an enhanced NATO-EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability (2003), Press Release, Brussels, 29/07/03. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76840.pdf [Accessed January 2016]

[458] WEU Council of Ministers (1996), *Ostend Declaration*, 19/11/96. Available Online: http://www.weu.int/documents/961119en.pdf [Accessed April 2016]

[459] Council of the European Union (2002), *EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus*. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf [Accessed May 2016]

[460] O. Croci and A. Verdun (2013), *The Transatlantic Divide*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 52.; Council of the European Union (2002), *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, 24-25/11/02, Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf-1993-2003/presidency-conclusions_-brussels-european-council_-24-and-25-october-2002/ [Accessed April 2016]

Defence Minister Geoff Hoon as the "only game in town" when it came to "significant crisis management operations"[461]. This may be demonstrated through reference to the decision and timing for the EU to take over NATO's SFOR mission with EUFOR *Althea* being decided primarily by the US in conjunction with NATO and the EU according to classified diplomatic cables released into the public domain.[462]

It is also important to note that the military mission *Althea* has been supported by EU civilian missions for police training, monitoring and rule of law strengthening, thus demonstrating what the EU has termed the 'comprehensive approach' to crisis management, utilising a range of political, civilian and military crisis management instruments.[463] This arguably represents a niche capability of the EU as a security and defence actor, in being able to utilise a wider range of toolkit than would be available under NATO, allowing it to play an important burden-sharing role.

EU NAVFOR Somalia and EUTM Somalia

EU NAVFOR Somalia, *Operation Atalanta*, launched in December 2008 following six months of strategic planning and operates in the southern waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Somali basin and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles. The first-ever naval mission of the EU, *Atalanta* is in support of UNSCR 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008), namely to ''help deter, prevent and supress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia' in this geographical area and to specifically protect the humanitarian convoys to Somalia of

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[461]G. Hoon (2000), Washington, quoted J. Howorth (2000), 'European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?', *Chaillot Papers*, No. 43, Institute for Security Studies, p. 60.

[462] Classified US diplomatic cable, released to the public domain via Wikileaks.org. Available Online. [Accessed March 2016]

[463] N. Pirozzi (2013), 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management', *EU Crisis Management Paper Series*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Brussels.

the World Food Programme".[464] Britain has played a leading role in *Atalanta* providing

the operational commander and the operational headquarters (OHQ) at Northwood.

Though only initially mandated for one year, with common costs of 8.3 million euros,

this was subsequently expanded by the Council of the EU. This mission is also

complemented on land with action in Somalia, the source of the piracy, through the

auspices of the comprehensive approach. Specifically pertaining to the CSDP though

is the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia), a military training

mission specifically focused on leadership to contribute to the strengthening of the

Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Somali institutions. This was

launched in April 2010 and, like Atalanta, has had the mandate extended a number of

times.[465]

As Sven Biscop points out, *Atalanta* is perhaps particularly notable as there are

"vital EU interests" at stake with regards to the important Gulf of Aden trading route,

as well this being a strategically important location.[466] Germond and Smith conclude

that *Atalanta* directly serves member states' national interests due to a range of threats

posed in the Horn of Africa through piracy, to citizens, to trade, to energy security, to

the maritime environment, to the Somalian population and with a potential for

escalation through linkages to terrorism.[467]

However, that is not to say that the material interests pursued by the EU through

Atalanta are not also of importance to a number of international actors. Indeed, both

the EU and US hold important interests in securing the Sea Lines of Communication

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[464] European Union (2015), 'Fact Sheet', *EU Naval Force Somalia Operation ATALANTA*, Available Online: http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/20170330_EUNAVFOR_Factsheet.pdf [Accessed May 2016].
[465] European Union (2016), 'Fact Sheet', *EU Training Mission Somalia. Available Online*: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eutm_somalia_en.pdf [Accessed May 2016].
[466] S. Biscop (2010), 'A strategy for CSDP - Europe's ambitions as a global security provider', *Egmont Paper*, No. 37, p. 18.
[467] B. Germond and M. E. Smith (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 573-593.; S. Berger (2008), 'Somali pirates drive up world prices', Print, *The Telegraph*, London, 18/11/08.

around the Horn of Africa.[468] As Remnek observes, this is due to its strategically and economically significant proximity to two international waterways in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, meaning importance as a trading route to Asia for goods and commodities, as well as for the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Americas.[469] Indeed since 2007, a number of different actors including the Netherlands and Canada operated in this area to secure UN/World Food Programme Ships from piracy, with EU NAVFOR eventually taking over this task from NATO's *Operation Allied Provider* in December 2008. [470] The continuing importance of this region internationally is demonstrated with two other international task forces that also operate in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy; NATO mission *Operation Ocean Shield* and US-led *CJTF-151*.[471] In addition to this are *CJTF-150*, commanded from the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and *Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa*, a US-led coalition combatting militant Islamism and piracy in the Horn of Africa and off the Eastern coast of Somalia – these two issues being linked by funding and the dangers of military hardware being hijacked.[472] Members of the EU have been involved in all three of these missions. This clearly demonstrates a US interest, of which the EU is assisting in, whilst also meeting its own ends.

Furthermore, other non-NATO and non-EU states, including Russia and China, have sent military personnel, naval vessels or surveillance aircraft to the Gulf of Aden

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[468] For an in-depth analysis of the EU's maritime security needs and obligations, see, B. Germond (2015), *The Maritime Dimension of European Security: Seapower and the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

[469] R. B. Remnek, 'The Strategic Importance of the Bab al-Mandab and the Horn of Africa: A Global Perspective', *The Horn of Africa and Arabia*, Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP), Washington DC, pp. 1-16.

[470] B. Germond and M. E. Smith (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 581.

[471] L. Ploch et al. (2011), 'Piracy off the Horn of Africa', *Congressional Research Service*, Washginton DC, 27/04/11.

[472] M. N. Murphy (2007), 'Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: the threat to international security', *Adelphi Paper*, No. 388, IISS, London.; X. Rice (2008), 'Somali pirates capture Ukrainian cargo ship loaded with military hardware', Print, *The Guardian*, London.

to conduct or participate in anti-piracy operations. Whilst the concurrent EU, NATO and US-led missions with similar mandates in the same region may, to some extent, represent the sort of duplication opposed by the US, the EU mission brings unique political and financial instruments, demonstrating its niche role as a security actor and value to the US. This has included civilian crisis management missions to the region to aid in capacity building and enhancing the rule of law (EUCAP *Nestor* for example), alongside the EU entering into agreements with states in the region allowing for legal frameworks for the prosecution of pirates.[473] This may be held to be demonstration of a 'comprehensive' EU approach to security and defence.

Due to the concurrent EU, NATO and US-led operations, EU NAVFOR – *Operation Atalanta* and EUTM Somalia had been hoped to provide an ideal case of EU-US-NATO cooperation and coordination, according to declarations from officials.[474] However the record is in fact rather mixed, leading to the claim that it arguably represents a 'missed opportunity' for multilateralism.[475] Institutional division between the EU and the US regarding *Atalanta* has focused particularly on US opposition to the duplication of NATO capability through the CSDP, specifically in planning and operational headquarters.[476] Furthermore, claims of EU-NATO division have arisen due to a lack of formal linkage between the two chains of command, which cannot meet due to *Atalanta* being undertaken outside of formalised Berlin Plus arrangements. In addition to this, classified NATO information cannot be shared with

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[473] C. Gebhard and P. Norheim-Martinsen (2011), 'Making Sense of EU Comprehensive Security Towards Conceptual and Analytical Clarity', *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2011, pp. 221-241.
[474] C. Ashton and A. F. Rasmussen (2010), 'Press Briefing of NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Right Honourable Baroness Ashton of Upholland', *Transcript*, 25/04/10. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_63848.htm [Accessed April 2016]
[475] J. A. Koops (2011), *The European Union as an Integrative Power: Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' with NATO and the United Nations*, VUBPress, Brussels, p. 382.
[476] C. Gebhard and S. J. Smith (2015), 'The two facts of EU-NATO cooperation: Counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 107-127.

the EU, as it would be shared with all members and Cyprus has no agreement in place to allow it access.[477] This arguably highlights the inadequacy of formal institutionalised cooperation between the EU and NATO through the Berlin Plus mechanism, which is designed for mutually exclusive operations (with NATO having first refusal), rather than mutually supporting ones as is the case with *Atalanta* and *Ocean Shield*. However, there is a clear distinction between institutional difficulty in coordination and successfully pragmatic coordination on the ground according to Gebhard and Smith.[478] The Chief of Staff's from the US-led Combined Maritime Force, NATO and *Atalanta*, jointly established the Shared Awareness and Deconflictation (SHADE) mechanism, in order to facilitate the coordination of allied naval forces in the region.[479] This has since been expanded from a EU-US-NATO forum to include representatives from over twenty national governments as well as representatives from the shipping industry. Furthermore, there is a rotating Chair of the Conduct Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, previously held by the US and subsequently held by the EU. In addition, there has been intensified information exchange between US AFRICOM, stationed in Stuttgart, and the EU regarding overall engagement in the Horn of Africa, according to Chairman of the EU-Military Committee General Patrick deRousiers.[480] This is alongside substantial informal communication in order to "explain and dissuade any concerns" regarding actions taken, such as an onshore action to disrupt pirate logistic dumps in Somalia.[481] This is not least aided by the fact that *Atalanta* and NATO's

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[477] *Ibid*.

[478] *Ibid*.

[479] D. Helly (2009), 'EU NAVFOR Somalia. The EU Military Operation Atalanta', in G. Grevi , D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EUISS, Paris, p. 399.

[480] P. deRousiers (2013), 'Transatlantic security in 3D: from Afghanistan to Mali', Speech at EUISS-CTR Seminar, Washington DC 14/03/13. Available Online: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CEUMC_intervention_on_Maritime_Security.pdf [Accessed April 2016]

[481] *Ibid*.

Ocean Shield share an Operational Headquarters at Northwood, UK. In total, this level of EU-US-NATO cooperation has been praised by Rear Admiral Hudson, in evidence to a British Parliamentary Select Committee, along with shipping industry representatives.[482] This demonstrates that EU cooperation with the US through the CSDP is possible, despite institutional difficulties which have been much alluded to in the scholarly literature on EU/NATO relations. Whilst not in itself evidence of bandwagoning, this is arguably an important precondition to it.

Furthermore, following praise of the EU's mission for its effectiveness in protecting vessels and disrupting pirate activity, the EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana apportioned an "important part of our success" regarding *Atalanta*, to "coordination with other international counter-piracy efforts".[483] Indeed, *Atalanta* demonstrates the importance of coordination and cooperation between the EU and US, both bilaterally and through NATO. As the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta made clear in 2011, it is vital to the US that its allies "share the burden" in defending their common interests.[484] *Atalanta* contributes towards EU member states effectively dividing the labour of serving common EU-US interests and shares this 'burden' with the US through its own contribution of naval forces to the region. Effectively, *Atalanta* provides a means for EU states to contribute to a security toolset that protects joint US

[482] House of Lords European Union Select Committee (2010), Combating Somali Piracy: the EU's Naval Operation Atalanta, Available Online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/10304.htm [Accessed April 2016]

[483] J. Solana (2009), *Remarks at Meeting of EU defence Ministers in the frame of the General Affairs and External Relations*, 16-17/11/09. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/111304.pdf [Accessed April 2016]

[484] L. Panetta (2011), 'Leon Panetta from Tripoli to Chicago: Charting NATO's Future on the Way to the 2012 Summit'. *Speech,* Brussels, 05/10/11. Available Online: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/05/leonpanetta-from-tripoli-to-chicago-charting-nato-sfuture-on-way-to-2012-summit/5dvz

and EU strategic and economic interests posed by the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and thus represents a form of limited bandwagoning.

EUTM Mali

At the request of the Malian authorities and in accordance with UNSCR 2085 (2012), the EU launched on 18 February 2013 a training mission for the armed forces of Mali.[485] This mission is currently ongoing, with 22 EU member states contributing military personnel over the 24-month mandate with a common budget of €27.7 million. The activity of this operation does not extend to partaking in combat operations, but rather focuses on assisting the Malian authorities to exercise their sovereignty over the country in order to neutralise security threats (such as terrorism and organised crime) to Mali, and in the wider sense to Africa and Europe. This mission involves training Malian units on operational and organic command, logistic support, human resources, operational preparation, intelligence international humanitarian law, human rights and the protection of the civilian populations. In a wider context, this mission has been cited as forming a point of the EU's 'comprehensive approach' to the Sahel region, which otherwise includes development funding and a CSDP civilian mission (EUCAP Sahel Niger) to assist and advise Malian authorities in implementing security sector reform.[486]

The interest and involvement of the US in Mali, as well as the wider Sahel region is extensive. This can be demonstrated in reference to programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which like EUTM Mali also included the training of Malian units

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[485] European Union (2013), 'Fact Sheet', *EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)*, Available Online: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf

[486] Council of the European Union (2011), *Council conclusions on a European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*, 21/03/11.; Council of the European Union (2014), *Council conclusions on implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*, 17/03/14.; House of Lords European Union Select Committee (2016), *EU Strategy for the Sahel, Summary and Committee's Conclusions*, Available Online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/10304.htm [Accessed May 2016]

(as well as Chadian Nigerien, between 2002 and 2004 before being succeeded by the expanded and better funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and its military component through *Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahara*.[487] The PSI expressed clearly the US security interest in the region in terms of representing an extension of the "war on terrorism" and the goal of "enhancing regional peace and security", whilst the TSCTI has made clear the US interest and focus on counterterrorism and counterextremism for this region.[488] This has been demonstrated through US support provided for multilateral military and civilian missions in Mali, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (*MINUSMA*) which subsumed an earlier (also US-backed) African-led International Support Mission in Mali (*AFISMA*) and the French-led *Opération Serval*.[489] These operations were supported by a number of states in planning, intelligence and logistics, however, the US in particular provided extensive support through *Operation Juniper Micron* which provided airlift capacity, aerial refuelling, information-sharing, intelligence and reconnaissance, in addition to planning and liaison teams.[490] This mission provides a key example of the extensive EU-US cooperation involved in CSDP missions, with the US demonstrating clearly its support for its partners in the operational theatre, including the EU, to conduct missions that it deems as complementary to its interests.

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[487] J. L. Jones (2005), *Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander United States European Command Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 28/09/05. Available Online: http://web.archive.org/web/20070110031318/http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/JonesTe stimony050928.pdf [Accessed May 2016]

[488] US Department of State (2002), *Pan Sahel Initiative*, Office of Counterterrorism 07/11/02.

[489] K. Bannelier and T. Christakis (2013), 'Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 855-874.

[490] P. Gros (2014), *Libya and Mali Operations, Foreign Policy Papers*, German Marshall Fund of the Unite States, Washington DC, p. 7.

3.5. An EU Niche in Security and Defence

Quite to the contrary to the expectations of balancing explanations of the CSDP envisaging the EU delaying, frustrating or undermining the efforts of the US in the pursuit of its interests through the CSDP, we may argue that it has been utilised effectively as a tool to deal with international security threats that the US itself has identified as being a threat to its own interests. The relatively modest actions undertaken through the CSDP have demonstrated EU member state cooperation to deal with issues of shared concern. At times these security concerns have been more widely shared with the US, as has been clearly demonstrated with regards to the issue of piracy around the Horn of Africa, whilst on other occasions the US interests are possibly less clear, such as with irregular migration across the Mediterranean. In both cases however, it is possible to make the case that the CSDP may be an avenue that allows for a more equitable division of tasks within security and defence between EU states and the US and therefore represents a form of limited bandwagoning behaviour to ameliorate the alliance dilemma.

As was noted in the summaries of active CSDP military missions above, the US frequently has resources concurrently deployed in the theatres of CSDP operations, but with objectives focused more clearly on what may be termed 'hard' security. In some cases, the US has played a supporting role for the EU, its member states, or other international organisations (such as the African Union), through providing support including expertise and logistics. However, the US has also made clear its desire not to need to always to lead from the front and thus encouraged EU states play a greater role in the security of its neighbourhood, as can be demonstrated with the Libyan

intervention.[491] Whilst Libya was not undertaken through the CSDP and possibly even represents a weakness of the policy, EU member states otherwise developed a niche capability to contribute to international security. Through the CSDP this has involved EU instrumentation being utilised to deal with a limited range of security tasks, and therefore contribute towards shared security goals with the US and frees up NATO capacity to deal with other challenges.

The CSDP can, therefore, be understood as a limited bandwagoning support from EU states, the desire for which has long been expressed by the US. Whilst recognising that US policy makers have adopted a somewhat caveated approach regarding the CSDP since its inception, as discussed above, Sloan also discusses the early hopes that it may "relieve the United States of some defence burdens".[492] According to Larivé, US support for the EU to play such a role increased following the 2007 financial crisis in particular, which served to highlight the substantial costs to the US as a global security provider.[493] Whilst Secretary of Defence Panetta called for capability building in Europe through greater defence spending, the development of the CSDP has provided an alternative means for EU member states to share the burden of being a security provider, rather than simply security beneficiaries. As Cladi and Locatelli note, this benefits EU states as well as the US, not only through the generated security but through providing a means to ameliorate (to a small degree) the asymmetry in the transatlantic alliance and promote the continued privileged relationship enjoyed

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[491] S. Chesterman (2011), 'Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya', *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers*, Paper 282, 06/01/11. Available Online: http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/282, see also C. Krauthammer (2011), 'The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind', *The Washington Post*, Print, 28/04/11.

[492] S. R. Sloan (2000), 'The United States and European Defence, Chaillot Paper 39, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p. 40.

[493] M. H. A. Larivé (2012), 'Obama 2: Future Implications for EU-US relations', *The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 3-11.

by the EU and its member states with the US.[494] In short, the CSDP may be understood as a mutually beneficial limited bandwagoning behaviour, with the US in a something of a mentoring and paternalist role.

Furthermore, the nature of the CSDP provides a 'niche capacity' that can support the US and in the defence of its own interests that is beyond what would be possible purely within NATO structures or on a national level.[495] This from the EU as a security and defence actor representing a collection of member states with a military dimension, like NATO (indeed, partly through NATO/US capability due to Berlin Plus), but also crucially has access to complementary non-military instruments unavailable to NATO, important for stabilisation tasks and included within the broad 'comprehensive' approach to security and defence.[496] In effect, the CSDP provides a means by which the EU can "wash the dishes" at the lower-end the combat intensity spectrum whilst the US/NATO is occupied with higher-intensity military tasks (namely, combat expeditionary missions and territorial defence).[497] US support for such a crisis management role for the EU was evident at the US-EU Summit in April 2007, which produced a joint statement on crisis management and through the US support provided for EU military missions noted above.[498] EU willingness to play such a role in assisting the US as a low-intensity security provider was demonstrated perhaps

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[494] L. Cladi. and A. Locatelli (2013), 'Worth a Shot: On the Explanatory Power of Bandwagoning in Transatlantic Relations', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 374-381.

[495] T. Tardy (2015), 'CSDP in Action - What Contribution to International Security?', *Chaillot Papers 134*, EUISS, Paris.

[496] B. Tertrais (2002), 'ESDP and Global Security Challenges: Will There Be a Division of Labor between Europe and the United States?', in Brimmer, E. (ed.), *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role - ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC, pp. 117-133.

[497] NATO refocus on such tasks was expressed at the Cardiff Summit in 2014. See, NATO (2014), 'Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales', *Press Release*, Issued 05/09/14. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

[498] Council of the European Union (2007), 'EU-US Summit', *Press Release*, Washington, 30/04/07. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/93890.pdf

most clearly in reference to *Althea*, with the EU expressing as early as 2002 a readiness

to assume the burden of assuring stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO's SFOR

mission at a time when NATO resources were becoming increasingly committed to a

higher-intensity mission in Afghanistan.[499] Furthermore, as noted previously, the US

has contributed to the EU's most ambitious civilian crisis management mission,

EULEX Kosovo, placing US police officers, prosecutors and judges under EU

command.[500] In sum, this demonstrates clearly the US position which supports and

encourages the development of the EU as a security provider which complements,

rather than threatens, its security interests and therefore this development may be

understood to represent an instance of limited bandwagoning behaviour.

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[499] Council of the European Union (2002), *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen 12-13/12/02. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=40802198183 [Accessed March 2016]

[500] Council of the European Union (2008), 'Joint Press Statement by the United States of America and the European Union on US participation in the EULEX mission in Kosovo', *Press Release*, Brussels, 22/10/08. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/103487.pdf

See also, European Union (2008), 'Fact Sheet', EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), Available Online: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/factsheet_eulex_kosovo_en.pdf [Accessed January 2016]

3.6. Conclusions

This chapter has clearly demonstrated that rather than seeking to alter the balance-of-power away from the US through opposition, the above military operations undertaken through the CSDP illustrate that EU member states are cooperating closely with the US, both in NATO and elsewhere. Indeed, this is in agreement with Pohl's assessment that goes as far as to state that "most EU member states seem content to acquiesce into US hegemony".[501] It is argued that we can understand this through a realist framework to represent a logical response to system unipolarity (as well as balanced regional multipolarity). This has been demonstrated through reference to overwhelming US material power capability in the international system and relative parity between the UK, France and Germany regionally.

In contrast to realist positions on the CSDP representing balancing or Hyde-Price's downplaying of the cooperation through arguing that this system-level distribution of power results from a lessening of the 'security dilemma' and a freedom for EU states to pursue 'second order concerns' such as humanitarianism through the CSDP, this chapter has argued that it is possible to view the CSDP as an effort to ameliorate the alliance dilemma.[502] As discussed above, this relates to the threats of US abandonment on the one hand, and overreliance on the US on the other – both of which leave European states effectively vulnerable.[503] In the context of this, but also relative European decline globally, it is possible to argue that there are system-level threats and incentives for EU member states to cooperate more closely on security and defence.[504]

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[501] B. Pohl (2013a), 'The logic underpinning EU crisis management operations', *European Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 307-325.

[502] A. Hyde-Price (2006), ''Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 222-223

[503] G. H. Snyder (1984), 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 461-495.

[504] European Commission (2013), *Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament*, The European Economic and Social

This shall be in a way which enhances European capacity to act internationally on security and defence, but does not serve to undermine the integrity of the transatlantic alliance, instead seeking to support it and demonstrate worth as a partner. This can be achieved, it is argued, through the CSDP due to the EU's niche capability as a security and defence actor. Indeed, in dealing with certain types of crisis management, the EU's access to a wide-ranging toolbox of economic, political, civilian and military instruments have been said to represent a 'one stop shop', thus allowing the EU to play an important burden-sharing role.[505] This niche is demonstrated particularly in relation to NATO, with which the EU has demonstrated a certain division of labour in its operations, though the need for further inter-organisation cooperation should also be noted.

However, whilst this analysis of the CSDP as an amelioration of the alliance dilemma through limited bandwagoning and capacity building is an important addition to extant realist theorising of the EU as a security and defence policy actor, it is nonetheless incomplete without reference to EU member states themselves. This is due to the divergence in approaches taken to the CSDP amongst the EU's member states. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, these approaches diverge substantially even among states facing similar system-level threats and incentives. Furthermore, these divergent approaches may be argued to be at the heart of a key issue in CSDP development. As Barcikowska observes, whilst on the one hand development of the CSDP has been rapid since its operationalisation in 2003, in other ways it has ground

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Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels. Available Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52013DC0542

[505] B. Tertrais (2002), 'ESDP and Global Security Challenges: Will There Be a Division of Labor between Europe and the United States?', in Brimmer, E. (ed.), *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role - ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC, p. 125.

to a halt, or even not got off the ground.[506] In order to further examine this puzzle of CSDP development, the following chapter argues that we should go beyond structural realist examination of the system-level in terms of the relative distribution of material power capabilities and consider the unit-level through realist-constructivism.

[506] A. Barcikowska (2013), *op. cit.*

CHAPTER 4:

Accounting for the Unit-Level into

a Realist-Constructivist Analysis of the CSDP

As outlined in Chapter 1, the realist-constructivist framework finds its origins in the realist tradition in the sense that foreign policy is understood to be guided generally by considerations of the distribution of power capabilities within an anarchic system, with material capability being understood to be the most effective type of power within this system. Whilst Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of this for the development of security and defence cooperation through the EU's CSDP, this chapter seeks to highlight that our understanding of this development should also be supplemented through reference to ideational factors at the unit-level, a realist-constructivist approach. This chapter argues that these ideational factors impact the translation of system-level threats and incentives into specific foreign policy (namely, the development and operation of the CSDP), through processes of policy formation domestically. In the nomenclature of neoclassical realism, these are intervening unit-level variables through which the independent system-level variable must be processed to produce specific policy output, the dependent variable.

This chapter begins by making the case that opening and examining the black box of the EU member states is both empirically and theoretically justifiable through a realist-constructivist approach with regards to the CSDP. This includes drawing attention to important national divergence of approach to the CSDP from member states. It rejects that these divergences can be understood purely through reference to the distribution of material power considerations at the system-level of international

relations and therefore underlines the case for examining unit-level factors. Finally, this chapter illustrates that we may understand this divergence of national approach to the CSDP through reference to ideational factors at the unit-level, interacting with system-level imperatives, with a realist-constructivist framework. Specifically, it considers the security cultures of the Germany and the UK and how these may be interpreted to play a role in the policy formation process with regards to these EU member states' national approaches to the CSDP.

4.1. The Case for Examining the 'Black Box'

Whilst the previous chapter made clear the argument for a system-level realist approach to the CSDP, realist-constructivism expands the realist conceptual toolkit by bringing in a constructivist dimension, at the unit-level. First of all though, it should be made clear that unit-level analysis of EU member states is empirically justified in relation to the CSDP. This is important to consider because, as discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, whilst considering ideational factors represents an important departure from extant realist-informed approaches to the CSDP, examination of the member states contrasts with approaches from EIS which emphasise the supranational (EU) level or examine the EU as an actor of international relations in its own right.[507]

Initially the limited role of supranational bodies was relatively clear with regards to the security and defence aspect of the European integration project, with former European Commission Vice-President Lord Brittan said to have noted a general 'taboo' even surrounding the discussion of security policy at the supranational level, with defence policy to an even greater degree being a topic 'too sensitive' at the time.[508] However, this has clearly changed in more recent times, with the European Commission becoming increasingly involved in the business of security and defence to an extent, through the ENP, CFSP, EEAS and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission).

In spite of these developments though, the supranationalization of the CSDP in particular remains somewhat limited through its original setup within the rigid intergovernmental framework of Pillar Two of the Maastricht Treaty and under the

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[507] See for example, A. Toje (2011), 'The European Union as a Small Power', *JCMS*, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 43-60.

[508] H. Wyatt-Walter (1997), *The European Community and the Security Dilemma 1979-92*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, pp. 176-177.

Lisbon Treaty remains subject to the unanimity rule.[509] This has led scholars to regard the role of the European Commission as specifically restrained in this particular policy.[510] Similar has been argued of the European Parliament, viewed as restricted to something of an observing and lobbying role with regards to the CSDP.[511] Instead, under the Lisbon Treaty, decisions relating to the CSDP are nominally made within the Foreign Affairs Council (comprising of the defence ministers of EU member states and chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the European Council (comprising of heads of state or government of EU member states, the European Commission President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).[512] Though the participation of the High Representative brings a certain role for the Commission, Wouters and Raube are clear to conclude that "the CSDP decision-making processes remains the 'intergovernmental island' within the EU", even post-Lisbon.[513]

However, it is important to caveat this *de jure* understanding of the CSDP with an appreciation for the *de facto* role of actors beyond national governments, such as the agenda-setting role of supranational EU bodies, initiatives and agencies as well as think tanks, working groups, security/defence institutions and academic departments (this broad group being labelled the 'euro-strategists' by Rogers).[514] Nevertheless, it is also

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[509] European Union (1992), *op. cit*.; European Union (2007), *op. cit.*

[510] S. Vanhoonacker and K. Pomorska (2013), 'The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 9, pp. 1316-1331.; T. Dyson (2013), 'The Material Roots of European Strategy: Beyond Culture and Values', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 419-445.

[511] J. Wouters and K. Raube (2012), 'Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny', *The International Spectator,* Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 149-163.

[512] C. Lord (2011), 'The political theory and practice of parliamentary participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy'*, Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 8, pp. 1133-1150.

[513] J. Wouters and K. Raube (2012), 'Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 47, No. 4, 149-163.

[514] J. Rogers (2009), 'From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory', *JCMS*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 831-862. See also, J. Howorth (2012), 'Decision-making in security and defence policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism', *Conflict and Cooperation*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 433-453.

true that much of the impetus for moves in realising EU security and defence cooperation have come from national governments. This can be observed in relation to a number of major developments that have taken place between member states – both through bilateral accords (such as at Saint Malo) and at European Council meetings (such as at Cologne and Helsinki), that have advanced EU security and defence cooperation, albeit with supranational support and encouragement along the way. Therefore, it may rightly be argued that member states continue to play a central role with regards to the CSDP and therefore that the states themselves are deserving of analytical attention. It is important to caveat this by making clear it is not to say that other levels should not be considered in relation to the CSDP also, but rather that there is an intellectual space and justification for considering the role of the member states.

Furthermore, EU member states' input into the CSDP is important to consider due to varying levels of commitment to cooperation in advancing this policy area, with possibilities to shape and hold up cooperation arguably not seen to the same extent in other aspects of the EU integration project (or even other aspects of EU external relations). Whilst differentiated integration, both temporally and spatially, does indeed occur in other areas of the EU integration (for example, the UK has an opt-out of the European Monetary Union), with regards to the CSDP states have a great deal of leverage to 'pick and mix' their commitment. For example, member states may decide their level of support (if any) given to individual military CSDP missions as there is no EU army, navy or air force (or prospect thereof), with the EU instead reliant upon voluntary member state contributions.[515] In effect, each member state has very clear

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[515] T. Tardy (2015), 'CSDP in Action - What Contribution to International Security?', *Chaillot Papers 134*, EUISS, Paris.

veto and abstention options in terms of blocking or not contributing towards military CSDP missions.

It may therefore be argued that much of what has and may be developed through the CSDP depends upon the levels of cohesion and consensus present amongst the member states of the EU, due to the general requirement for unanimous decision making. The importance of this has been long recognised, with Grevi, Helly and Keohane noting in their assessment of the first 10 years of the CSDP that "the stronger the cohesion between EU Member States, the larger the potential for an ESDP mission to be effective in the field" and that, "action... is predicated on the consensus of EU Member States on the need for and objectives of intervention".[516]

However, the reality has often been a "lack of cohesiveness" according to Toje, leading to a shortfall in the EU's "capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them".[517] Furthermore, Toje argues that whilst the EU has somewhat addressed issues with regards to capability availability (important to a previously identified capabilities-expectations gap[518]), what has emerged is evidence of a consensus-expectations gap amongst EU member states, impacting the development of cooperation through the EU on security and defence.[519]

To go further, instead of a 'common' security and defence policy, it is perhaps only a slight exaggeration, as Howorth notes, to regard twenty-eight policies, or at least approaches, as existing towards the CSDP - one from each member state.[520] An understanding of the possible sources of such divergence amongst EU member states will be explored later in this chapter, however it is first of all important to clearly set

[516] G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (2009), *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EUISS, Paris, p. 405.
[517] A. Toje (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 122.
[518] C. Hill (1993), *op. cit.*
[519] A. Toje (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 121-141.
[520] J. Howorth (2011a), *op. cit*, p. 234.

out its existence, demonstrating clearly the divergence amongst member states' towards security and defence cooperation through the EU.

The following two sub-sections do this by considering the divergence of approaches taken amongst member states with regards to two specific areas; the operational conduct of CSDP missions and the development of EU security and defence capability. This divergence amongst EU member states is relevant to our purposes as it challenges extant realist approaches to the CSDP, which understand its development through the broad categories of bandwagoning or balancing behaviour. Instead, it points to a need for a more nuanced realist understanding that can be brought through considering domestic ideational factors, which may be done through the lens of realist-constructivism.

4.1.i. Divergence on CSDP Operations

At the operational level, the CSDP is very much differentiated amongst the member states due to a number of reasons. First of all, similar to other areas of EU integration, such as the Schengen Agreement, the CSDP is subject to an explicit opt-out, from Denmark. This was formalised by Denmark in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, who had long opposed security and defence integration and held an earlier opt-out of the WEU through the Edinburgh Agreement of 1992.[521] According to the opt-out, Denmark does not participate in the "elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". In practice, this means that

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[521] European Union (1997), *op. cit.*; European Council (1992), *Edinburgh Agreement*, 11-12 December 1992. Available Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/default_en.htm [Accessed May 2015].

Denmark does not participate in any decisions, planning or conduct of EU military operations.[522]

This is the most obvious example of a divergent approach taken by a member state towards the development and conduct of the CSDP. However, whilst this lack of participation by Denmark in the CSDP is clear and formalized, there is also a considerable differentiation amongst a great deal of member states' participation in the decisions, planning and conduct of EU military missions. As highlighted earlier, this is important due to the requirement for unanimity, allowing EU member states clear veto and abstention options.

Indeed, this differentiation in participation levels was recognised within the Treaty of Lisbon, which allows for willing member states to participate in smaller groupings. [523] This includes opportunities for 'enhanced cooperation' [524] between groupings of at least nine member states, 'joint-projects' for specific groupings under the EDA, and the Council "may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of member states which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task".[525] The result of this, according to Keukeleire and Delreux, is that CSDP operations are launched very much on an ad-hoc basis, with it depending upon the 'entrepreneurship' of one or more member states.[526]

Whilst such a model has advantages and disadvantages in terms of reliability and flexibility, it is certainly the case that it has resulted in member states' relative

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[522] Forsvarsministeriet (2016), *EU - The Danish Defence Opt-Out*, Danish Ministry of Defence, Available Online: http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-Out.aspx [Accessed June 2016].
[523] European Union (2007), *op. cit.* Article 45(2).
[524] *Ibid*., Article 20.
[525] *Ibid*., Article 44.
[526] S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux (2014), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, p. 178.

contributions to the multinational forces of the EU being very uneven.[527] For example, whilst between 1999-2008, member states contributed 14,722 military personnel to CSDP military missions in total, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Cyprus are estimated to have contributed only 13 personnel to this number.[528] Whilst these member states do have some of the smallest military capabilities, these numbers may be considered as no more than token contributions. Indeed, between 1999-2008, Malta supplied no personnel whatsoever to EU military missions, despite having an active military of over 2000 persons.[529] At the upper end of the spectrum, the overwhelmingly largest contributor of military personnel to CSDP military missions over this 1999-2008 period was France (5,470), followed by Germany (2,045) and Italy (1,274). Meanwhile, the UK (805) was only the fourth biggest contributor over this period despite being the second largest military power amongst EU member states, ranked in terms of budget.[530]

Whilst differentiated contribution of personnel towards individual missions can sometimes be explained due to operational requirements, for example the need for French speakers (therefore requiring predominant participation from France or Belgium) to be deployed to missions in francophone African states, the total contribution numbers for the sum of missions is revealing of states' divergent approaches to the CSDP as a preferable means by which to conduct operations.[531]

Furthermore, due to the nature of the *Athena* funding mechanism for military operations, whereby the majority of costs are paid for by the participant member state rather than through the EU budget, the burden of an active participation in CSDP

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[527] R. H. Ginsberg and S. Penksa (2013), *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 145-149.
[528] A. C. Marangoni (2008), *Le financement des opérations militaires de l'UE: des choix nationaux pour une Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense*, Thesis, College of Europe, Bruges.
[529] *Ibid*.
[530] *Ibid*
[531] R. H. Ginsberg and S. Penksa (2013), *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 66.

military mission is born overwhelmingly by the member states involved rather than shared amongst the group through common funding.[532] The outcome of this is that states who may directly benefit from EU military operations can pay little if they decline to contribute resources towards its conduct. This may be expanded upon considering the internal-burden sharing within CSDP missions, which reveals the possibility that certain states effectively 'free ride' (receive benefits out of proportion to their efforts) based upon an analysis of their respective security gains through the protection of their citizens, border protection and economic benefits accrued in ratio to their levels of participation and expenditure on CSDP operations.[533]

It has also been noted that despite a range of institutional and conceptual progress with regards to security and defence integration through the EU, the number of operations and levels of force deployment undertaken through the auspices of the CSDP remains limited in comparison to other multinational bodies which launch armed forces operations, such as the UN and NATO. This has been pointed to as particularly concerning given the number of crises in international security that have emerged impacting Europe since the creation of the CSDP and which seemed to suit its instrumentation. Yet on numerous occasions no CSDP operation emerged, often due to a lack of consensus amongst member states, which has arguably undermined the CSDP as a serious forum for military coordination. Indeed, Watanbe and Haine have both observed that certain member states, most notably France, have become frustrated with

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[532] European Union (2014), 'Financing of military operations: the ATHENA mechanism', *Fact Sheet*, Brussels, 10/01/14. Available Online: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139880.pdf

[533] H. Dorussen, E. J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (2009), 'Sharing the burden of collective security in the European Union', *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 789-810.; F. Terpan (2015), 'Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations: explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure', *European Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 221-263.; N. I. M Novaky (2016), 'Who wants to pay more? The European Union's military operations and the dispute over financial burden sharing', *European Security*, Volume 25, No. 2, pp. 216-236.; T. Haesebrouck and A. Thiem (2017), 'Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations', *Defence and Peace Economics*, forthcoming.

a failure of the EU to act decisively on a number of occasions, specifically regarding Mali in 2013, Libya in 2011 and the Central African Republic in 2014.[534] In each of these cases, France has resorted to deploying troops under its own national banner, with EU missions (in the cases of Mali and the Central African Republic) arriving subsequently, "slow and modest at best".[535] The division amongst EU states regarding Libya in 2011 was perhaps most notable, with France and Britain playing leading roles in calling for action to be taken, whilst Germany diverged from this position through abstaining from the UN vote imposing the no-fly zone.[536] According to Menon, planning for a CSDP mission (EUFOR Libya), took place but could not be deployed due to disagreement among national government delegations in the European Council.[537]

The result of this lack of consensus amongst EU member states regarding when and where to deploy CSDP missions has led some scholars to argue that missions have not been necessarily deployed where they were most needed, but rather where political consensus can be most achieved amongst the member states.[538] In addition, a lack of consensus on the broader foreign policy approach to a crisis can lead to thinly developed policy on the issue or even complete lack of common EU policy.[539] According to Fiott, on more detailed issues of mission deployment, the lack of

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[534] J. Y. Haine, 'The Failure of a European Strategic Culture - EUFOR Chad: The Last of its Kind?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 582-603.; L. Watanbe (2015), 'Keeping France in the CSDP', *CSS Politics Perspectives*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 1-4.

[535] L. Watanbe (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[536] U. Speck (2011), 'Pacifism unbound: Why Germany limits EU hard power', *FRIDE Policy Brief 75,* FRIDE, Madrid. See also, N. Helwig (2015), 'Europe's New Political Engine, Germany's role in the EU's foreign and security policy', *FIIA Report 44*, Finish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki.

[537] A. Menon (2011), 'European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya', *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 75-90.

[538] V. Margaras (2010), 'Common Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty Fudge: No common strategic culture, no major progress', *EPIN Working Paper 28*, European Policy Institutes Network, Brussels.

[539] D. E. Mix (2013), 'The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy', *Congressional Research Service*, Washington DC, 08/04/13, p. 2

consensus amongst EU member states has extended to the numbers of personnel that should be deployed, resulting in outsized forces being deployed without the necessity for these numbers according to the mission objectives.[540]

It should be noted that the disunity demonstrated above regarding member states' approaches to CSDP missions does not necessarily represent a failure of the policy. In contrast, it is possible to argue that the CSDP in some ways represents a mechanism to manage a range of views from member states regarding the appropriate responses to crises and provides a means for action to be taken where some form of agreement can be reached amongst the states. In situations where consensus cannot be reached, action can be taken on a national or multinational basis outside of the EU. However, it does demonstrate that EU member states may not be considered a homogenous mass that uniformly cooperate on security and defence, out of balance-of-power considerations or otherwise, and this diversity shall be considered in our realist-constructivist approach.

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[540] D. Fiott (2015), *The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives*, Egmont, Brussels.

4.1.ii. Divergence on CSDP Capability Development

In addition to requirements of political will and national contributions of personnel to CSDP operations, it is a further necessity for the conduct of CSDP that European states hold appropriate security and defence assets. Therefore, alongside the development of strategic concepts and a process by which to launch EU-led missions, the EU instigated a process of identifying capability shortfalls and a development plan to address these. Though perhaps not as high-profile an aspect of the CSDP as EU-led operations, for some member states such as the UK, the enhancement of European security and defence capability has been a key rationale behind the development of the CSDP.[541]

Further to the nominal intergovernmental nature of security and defence integration through the CSDP outlined above, Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community makes clear that the defence industries of member states are considered outside the rules of the single market and firmly under the sovereignty of the nation states and whose working has remained unaltered in subsequent treaties, stating that,

> Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.[542]

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[541] C. Mills (2013), 'The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy', Briefing Paper SN06771, *House of Common Library*, London. Available Online: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06771/SN06771.pdf

[542] European Union (1992), *op. cit.*, Article 296(1b).

This clearly allows for the nation states to control the scope and depth of the integration of this area. It is also important to note that the previously discussed opt-out of Denmark on the CSDP includes an exclusion from cooperation on development and acquisition of military capabilities Excluding Denmark though, the intention for integration in this area was set out most clearly as an ambition of the EU in December 2008 in the, 'Declaration on Strengthening Military Capabilities', which stated that "we undertake to seek new methods for developing and optimising our capabilities, and will accordingly explore the pooling of efforts, specialisation and sharing of costs".[543]

Previous to this, the EDA, an explicitly intergovernmental agency of the EU, had been tasked with encouraging coordination and integration of products of research, development and procurement of defence equipment since its creation in 2004. [544] This has resulted in some successful coordination in this area, particularly through the development of the Capability Development Plan, the Research and Technology Joint Investment Programme, the Long-Term Vision Report and the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. The European Commission identifies the motivation for this integration as allowing for more efficient 'bang for buck' defence expenditure.[545] With regards to the CSDP, this has been deemed as foundational to providing the required capabilities in order for the CSDP to be able of fulfilling its tasks.[546]

Despite this though, the scope and depth of integration in this area has been clearly limited, not least due to a divergence of approaches taken by national

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[543] Council of the European Union (2008), 'Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities', *Press Release*, Brussels, 11/12/08. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf

[544] For an in-depth assessment of the developments of the EDA, see, N. Karampekios and I. Oikonomou (2015), *The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe*, Routledge, London.

[545] European Commission (2015), 'Defence Integration as a Response to Europe's Strategic Moment', in, *Defence of Europe*, No. 4, European Political Strategy Centre, Brussels.

[546] E. Aalto (2008), *Towards a European Defence Market*, EUISS, Paris.

governments. This may be demonstrated with reference to research and technology projects, for according to EDA figures in 2007, only €347 million of was spent on collaborative R&T[547], amounting to 13% of EU government (excluding Denmark) R&T investment.[548] Whilst some areas of joint procurement and the pooling/sharing of resources have seen progress, for example with air-to-air refuelling, scholars such as Biscop have noted that there is definite room for improvement in terms of its depth of cooperation.[549] In other areas, the cooperation is decidedly uneven both temporally and spatially among member states, with Dyson noting in 2016 that EU states' cooperation continues to 'lag behind' in certain areas of defence integration, specifically drones, smart munitions and military satellites.[550]

It may be argued that this 'lagging behind' is due to national divergence of approaches towards the development of security and defence capability amongst EU member states. Perhaps the highest profile example of this divergence of national approaches to integration in this area came with the proposed merger between BAE Systems plc and EADS N.V. in 2012. According to the Chief Executives of both companies, the merger was based upon "sound industrial logic", with clear benefits across the commercial aerospace and defence sectors.[551] This has also been recognised by scholars and economists, particularly with rising technology costs making

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[547] Collaborative R&T is defined as where agreement for the project/programme contracts are by at least two Ministries of Defence, of which at least one is an EDA participating Member State.

[548] EDA data is available through the Defence Data Portal: https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal ; For a discussion of the drivers and limitations of collaborative defence procurement in Europe, see A. James, T. Teichler and A. T. H. Tan (2009), 'Post-Cold War defence procurement in Europe', in A. T. H. Tan (ed.), *The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook*, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 133-150.

[549] S. Biscop (2013), 'Military CSDP: The Quest for Capability, in S. Biscop and R. Whitman (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of European Security*, Routledge, London, pp. 78-90.

[550] T. Dyson (2016), *op. cit.*

[551] BAE Systems plc and EADS N.V. (2012), *Merger Update*, 10/10/12. Available Online: http://otp.investis.com/generic/regulatory-story.aspx?cid=288&newsid=277213

economies of scale highly desirable.[552] Such processes had resulted in a number of mergers previously in the defence industry, particularly in the US over the 1990s, which had been welcomed by US policymakers as beneficial.[553] Indeed, in Europe, both BAE and EADS themselves were both the results of mergers, with the former a result of two British companies (merging and the latter an international merger of French (Aerospatiale, Matra), German (Dasa) and Spanish (CASA) aerospace companies.

However, the possible BAE-EADS merger was terminated due to failure of the national governments of the UK, France and Germany to overcome political objections. Britain had a "golden share" in BAE allowing it to veto any deal, Germany controlled EADS through shareholding of the Daimler group whilst France maintained a direct share of EADS. A joint-announcement from BAE and EADS regarding the termination of merger negotiation talks stated clearly that "the interests of the parties' government stakeholders cannot be adequately reconciled with each other".[554] The Wall Street Journal specifically pointed to German opposition to increased defence industry integration, due to fears from Chancellor Merkel that the merger would have proved to have been against the national interest.[555] Meanwhile, it was contemporarily reported in Das Spiegel that the British government itself had misgivings regarding the extent to which the integrated company would be under the influence of the French and German governments.[556]

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[552] A. James, T. Teichler, A. T. H. Tan (2009), 'Post-Cold War defence procurement in Europe', in A. T. H. Tan (ed.), *The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook*, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 133-150.

[553] E. Gholz and H. M. Sapolsky (2000), 'Restructuring the US Defense Industry', *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 5-51.

[554] BAE Systems plc and EADS N.V. (2012), *Merger Update*, 10/10/12. Available Online: http://otp.investis.com/generic/regulatory-story.aspx?cid=288&newsid=277213

[555] D. Michels D. Gauthier-Villars, D. Cimilluca and M. Walker (2012), 'Government Discord Derails Massive European Merger', *Wall Street Journal*, 11/10/12. Available Online: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443294904578048180379906930

[556] D. Deckstein and G. Traufetter (2012), 'EADS-BAE Deal Collapses amid High-Level Bickering', *Spiegel*, 08/10/12. Available Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eads-bae-fusion-fails-amid-bickering-among-germany-france-and-britain-a-860064.html

The legacy of this merger failure, according to Caruso and Locatelli, has been that cooperation on the European defence industrial base remains fragmented particularly when compared to the US, which has become laregely concentrated into three firms (Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman) and highlights the divergence of approaches taken by EU member states to the R&D of European security and defence capability.[557]

Whilst there are other examples providing evidence of high profile efforts at developing closer R&D cooperation amongst EU member states, such as the Eurofighter project undertaken by Britain, Spain, Italy and Germany, even this was competing with separate EU-based fighter development projects, specifically those undertaken by France (Rafale) and Sweden (Grippen).[558] Furthermore, Grevi, Helly and Keohane demonstrate the continuing duplication of effort in European defence production most starkly in relation to the 23 separate armoured-fighting-vehicle development programmes being undertaken for the production of "essentially the same type of equipment".[559]

Such examples may be regarded as resulting not only in economic inefficiency, but also the erection of barriers to interoperability and common logistic support systems, undermining EU security and defence cooperation to a degree.[560] It is also in spite of the need for coordination in this area becoming more acute in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and national defence budgets being under strain across EU member

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[557] R. Caruso and A. Locatelli (2013), 'Finmeccanica amid International Market and State Control - a Survey of the Italian Military Industry', *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 89-104.

[558] J. P. Darnis et al, (2007), 'Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes', *Occasional Paper no. 69*, EUISS, Paris.

[559] G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EUISS, Paris, p. 82. More detail on the widespread and inefficient duplication of weapon system in the EU can be found in, Munich Security Conference (2017), *Munich Security Report 2017*, Munich.

[560] L. Hughes (2014), 'Europe's Strategic Airlift Gap', *JAPCC Journal 19*, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, pp. 21-25.

states.[561] Furthermore, such lack of cooperation has resulted in shortfalls of capacity in a number of strategically important areas (such as airlift) and a continued reliance on NATO's (US) assets according to Hughes.[562] In sum, this demonstrates that there are clear barriers to closer EU security and defence cooperation through a divergence of national approaches to capability development and acquisition.

With regards to EU security and defence capability for the pursuance of CSDP operations, arguably the chief development has come through the conceptual formulation and evolution of the EU 'Battlegroup'. This was agreed to constitute a rapidly deployable force capable of stand-alone operations or capable of acting in the initial phase of larger operations, that may be deployed by the EU itself or another body.[563] It was initiated through a trilateral British-French-German food-for-thought paper in 2004, developed into a single document in October 2006 and declared to be of full operational capability since 1st January 2007.[564] The Battlegroup comprises of a combined-arms force of about 1,500 personnel strong, capable of deploying in support of Petersberg Tasks within five to ten days of Council approval of the Crisis Management Concept for a mission, with two Battlegroup forces being on standby at any one time.[565]

However, as noted by Chappel, there is a profound difference in member state approaches to the Battlegroup Concept and "these divergences encompass when force is used, threat perceptions and multilateralism".[566] Lindstrom points to member states being divided on whether a UN and/or OSCE mandate is a precondition for Battlegroup

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[561] N. I. M Novaky (2016), 'Who wants to pay more? The European Union's military operations and the dispute over financial burden sharing', *European Security*, Volume 25, No. 2, pp. 216-236.
[562] L. Hughes (2014), *op. cit.* pp. 21-25.
[563] Council of the European Union (2007), 'The European Union Battlegroups', *Fact Sheet*, Brussels.
[564] L. Chappel (2009), 'Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP', *European Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 417-439.
[565] Council of the European Union (2007), *op. cit.*
[566] L. Chappel (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 417.

deployment, with certain states resenting implication that to require as much would represent the subjugation of EU decision making to non-EU states represented on the UNSC or OSCE.[567]

Furthermore, Chappel highlights a clear division between states such as Germany whom have argued that an external mandate is an essential prerequisite legitimisation to engage EU forces and other states, such as Poland, whom argued that a UN mandate, although desirable, may be superseded by other factors such as a responsibility to protect in situations requiring a rapid response.[568] Divisions have also arisen between member states on whether the Battlegroup may be deployed to Africa and whether the CSDP more widely is too predominantly focussed on the Africa region.[569] In addition, the possible deployment of troops through an EU battlegroup has raised divisions between member states on the level of national mandate required, such as national parliamentary approval.[570] The ultimate result of such divergences has been that, as of June 2017, no EU battlegroup has been deployed into action.

In summary, whilst there has been a process of cooperation regarding security and defence from EU member states through the CSDP, on substantial issues of contribution to CSDP missions, decisions on when/where to launch CSDP missions, and the joint-development of material capability, that there have also been important divergences resulting in limitations of this cooperation. The following case-study section thus questions whether we can adequately understand such divergences through utilising the realist conceptual toolkit at the system-level alone, and instead argues that we may consider the unit-level through the realist-constructivist approach.

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[567] G. Lindstrom (2007), 'Enter the EU battlegroups', *Chaillot Paper 97*, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p. 52.
[568] L. Chappel (2009), *op. cit*., pp. 417-439.
[569] J. Ryjacek (2008), 'The Decision-Making Process on the Deployment of German Armed Forces for Protecting the Elections in Congo', *Zeitschrift Fur Parlamentsfragen*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 219–232.
[570] G. Lindstrom (2007), *op. cit.*

4.2. The UK, Germany and the CSDP

This section continues the application of the realist-constructivist framework to the development of the CSDP through examining the national approaches of two states in particular, Germany and the UK. It is argued that whilst the distribution of material power capabilities within the international system has set incentives and opportunities for security and defence cooperation to take place amongst EU member states, such as through the CSDP, how states interpret and respond to this factor is impacted by their interpretation at the unit-level. Specifically, the remainder of this chapter argues that the UK and Germany utilise the CSDP as a process by which to ameliorate the alliance dilemma vis-à-vis the US, but the scope and depth of this is impacted by the intervening ideational factor of their respective domestic security cultures, with implications for CSDP development more widely.

Prior to considering the security cultures of the UK and Germany and how we may use these as a lens through which to understand aspects of their respective approaches to the CSDP, it is important to consider why these states in particular were selected for the further application of the realist-constructivist framework. The prime reasoning behind the selection of the UK and Germany is that they provide 'difficult' cases for the application of the realist-constructivist framework to the CSDP. As Campbell notes, utilising such cases is important because if the framework can account for these, the confidence in its overall validity is greatly enhanced.[571]

The UK has traditionally been viewed as an awkward partner within the EU, due to its demands for special status within the European integration project. For

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[571] D. Campbell (1975), 'Degrees of Freedom and the Case Study', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 187.

example, enabling permanent opt-out from adopting the euro currency, a permanent annual rebate relating to part of financial contributions to the EU budget, an opt-out from the Schengen Agreement border-free area, and opts-in only to elements of the Area of freedom, security and justice previsions relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the fight on drugs and the Schengen Information System.[572] Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that Tim Oliver is to characterise the UK's overarching relationship with the EU as being one of "aloofness, vetoes and opt-outs".[573] Indeed, as George notes, the UK has long been understood as the EU's 'awkward partner'.[574] Unlike Denmark though, which opts-out from the CSDP, the UK has not only opted-in but been something of a driving force behind this policy development. Whilst the UK has maintained certain provisos relating to the CSDP, much similar to the US regarding the importance of maintaining NATO as the premier defence guarantor for Europe and tool for high intensity out-of-area combat operations, it has also been a key supporter for the development of a complementary European capability toolset in security and defence.[575] Therefore, the assessment may be made that the UK approach to European security and defence cooperation through the CSDP is somewhat at odds with its wider approach to the EU integration project.

Germany, in contrast to the UK, has been regarded an enthusiastic supporter of the European integration project more widely. West Germany was a founding member of the ECSC and was as a consistent proponent of 'more Europe', with cooperation and coordination with its European neighbours being a process from which it has benefitted

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[572] European Union (2009), 'EUR-LEX, The Schengen area and cooperation', http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33020 , [Accessed February 2017].

[573] T. Oliver (2015), 'To be or not to be in Europe: is that the question? Britain's European question and an in/out referendum', *International Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1, pp. 77-91.

[574] S. George (1998), *An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[575] D. Lidington (2012), 'EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective', *Speech*, London, 27/06/12. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-perspective

considerably.[576] Following the reunification of Germany, it is possible to argue that it had perhaps the most to gain from the opportunities of cooperative and coordinated security and defence through the EU to modernise its armed forces and play a key leadership role that its strong economy and largest EU population would seemingly suggest it deserved. However, contrary to the assertions of structural realists such as John Mearsheimer that a resurgent and assertive Germany would emerge in the post-Cold War period, Germany has been cautious and somewhat reluctant to avail herself of these opportunities, including to a degree through the CSDP.[577] Thus, Germany too presents something of a puzzle with regards to its national approach to the CSDP.

	Germany	UK
Spending ($ b.)	39.4	55.5
World Share (%)	2.4	3.3
Spending Share of GDP (%)	1.2	2

Table 3. Germany and UK Military Expenditure, 2015.
Source: SIPRI (2016)[578]

Theoretically, a solely structural realist analysis of the puzzle of differentiated approaches from Germany and the UK towards the CSDP would be through a consideration of their relative positioning in system-level balance-of-power or balance-of-threat terms. As we can observe from *Table 3* above, the UK has a greater military expenditure than Germany, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP. Additionally, unlike Germany, the UK possesses nuclear weapons. However, according to the

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[576] K. K. Patel (2011), 'Germany and European Integration Since 1945', in. H. W. Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Germany History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[577] As we will later explore, the EU possibly offers German policy makers a means to bypass barriers to a German leadership role in security and defence, through embedding German policy in multilateral structures rather than representing unilateralism which is seen as unacceptable to wider German society.

[578] SIPRI (2016), *Trends in World Military Expenditure 2015*, Stockholm, 01/04/16. Available Online: http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf [Accessed April 2016]

Correlates of War Projects' Composite Index of National Material Capabilities, a statistical measure of material power which includes potential power capabilities, Germany actually ranks marginally higher than the UK as of 2012, although the two states are overall highly comparable within the overall ranking of states, both globally and within Europe.[579]

In addition, the geographic positioning of these two states and the threats that they face have been identified as largely similar by Longhurst and Miskimmon, which can be furthermore demonstrated through the threats they themselves identify within their national strategic documents.[580] Indeed, what variations there are in these states balance-of-threat considerations may be argued not to correlate well to their CSDP divergences.[581] Furthermore, both states are full NATO members and have been integrated into NATO military command structures over the timespan of the CSDP, with the resulting access to resources and collective defence mechanisms that this implies.[582]

Within the European balance-of-power sub-system the positions of the UK and Germany are also highly comparable, with both states deemed to have both the capability to bring valued contribution to cooperative security and defence, or to pursue security and defence through other means, and with both argued to play an important though different role in shaping the CSDP.[583] However, how these states have

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[579] Correlates of War Project (2017), 'CINC Index 1816-2012 Dataset 5.0', Available Online: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/national-material-capabilities-v4-0 ; J. D. Singer, S. Bremer, and J. Stuckey (1972), 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965.' in Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Sage, Beverley Hills, pp. 19-48.; J. D. Singer (1987), 'Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985', *International Interactions*, Vol. 14, pp. 115-32. See also, *Table 1*. And *Table 2*. in Chapter 3.

[580] K. Longhurst and A. Miskimmon (2007), 'Same challenges, diverging responses: Germany, the UK and European Security', *German Politics*, pp. 79-94.

[581] *Ibid*.

[582] In contrast, France left NATO integrated military command structures in 1966 and only returned in 2009.

[583] T. Dyson (2016), *op. cit.*

responded to the similar international system conditions as examined by structural realist scholarship varies substantially. As Longhurst and Miskimmon identify and as will be discussed, the UK and Germany essentially face the 'same challenges' but with 'different responses'.[584]

In sum, this makes the selection of the UK and Germany to further apply the realist-constructivist framework congruent with the neoclassical realist multi-level model that it adopts. Specifically, as Schweller outlines, to further explore cases where states' positions diverge despite similar system-level conditions.[585]

In order to continue our application of the realist-constructivist framework, this chapter proceeds by unpacking the 'black box' of these states to consider their national security cultures as an intervening variable impacting how policy makers interpret and respond to the threats and incentives presented by the distribution of power and threat in the international system. As discussed in Chapter 1, this involves drawing attention to the socialised norms, beliefs and assumptions, which impact states' understanding of acceptable and preferable behaviour in relation to the distribution of power dynamics within an anarchic self-help international environment.

It should be noted that this does not seek to uncover *new* aspects of UK or German security culture through wide-ranging textual or discourse analysis of documents or historical experience, but rather draws upon extant studies of ethnography and secondary literature relating to strategic norms, ideas, beliefs and typologies of culture to identify particularly salient features of these states' security cultures over the post-Cold War period in which the CSDP has been developed. Furthermore, it illustrates, confirms or discredits these features as identified by the secondary literature

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[584] *Ibid.*
[585] R. L. Schweller (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 346.

through triangulation with primary documentation and the rhetoric of policy makers, with the objective of furthering the development of the analytically informed narrative of the CSDP as begun in Chapter 3. Ultimately, it is argued that we may bring added depth in understanding of these states' divergent approaches to the CSDP, an important feature of the policy area, by considering their respective security cultures within a realist-constructivist framework.

4.3. Outlining the Security Culture of the UK

Whilst clearly a 'second-rank' power in comparison to the US, in more global terms, the UK is a high ranking economic (5th) and military (6th) power, with a history as a great global power and an expansive empire, which at its height included 23% of the world's population and 24% of land area, prior to its dissolution over the course of the twentieth-century.[586] This history has contemporary impact upon the UK, most notably through its retention of an independent nuclear deterrent and permanent seat on the UN Security Council, membership of the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly known as the British Commonwealth – an intergovernmental grouping of territories the majority of which formerly of the British Empire), interest in Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories. The latter of these being territories under the sovereign jurisdiction of the UK and includes strategically important areas such as Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the island of Cyprus, being identified by Secretary of State for Defence Phillip Hammond as "in a region of geo-political importance and high priority for the United Kingdom's long term national security interests".[587]

However, aside the material power implications of the post-colonial nature of the UK, this history has also had an impact upon the contemporary culture of the state according to ethnographers. This not only manifests in imperial icons[588], but shapes the UK's approach towards security and defence according to culturalist scholars of international politics. Indeed, there is a rich literature pertaining to UK strategic ideas

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[586] Global Firepower, The Centre For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2016), 'Countries Ranked by Military Strength', Available Online: http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp ; World Bank (2017), 'Gross Domestic Product 2015', Available Online: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf , p. 1.; R. Talebear (1997), 'Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 475-504.

[587] P. Hammond (2012), Written Statement, Ministry of Defence, 15/12/12. Available: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/9-Defence-Cyprus.pdf

[588] S. Ward (2001), *British Culture and the End of Empire*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

and role conceptions regarding security, through sixteenth-century writing of Walter Raleigh and Francis Bacon to modern generations of constructivists, there is a rich exploration of strategic norms, ideas, beliefs and typologies of UK culture to draw upon.[589]

Utilising this, it is possible to make the case that there are three important aspects of UK security culture that have played a salient role in the development of socialized norms, beliefs and assumptions related to the role and use of force, shaping the national approach to the security and defence policy making. This may thus also be applied to the national approach to the CSDP through a lens of realist-constructivism.

The first of these aspects of UK security culture, counterintuitively, it to explore the argument that the lack of UK effectively lacks one. As shall be explored, this relates to UK executive autonomy of action, enabling the UK government to pursue its security and defence policy goals with 'pragmatic solutions' rather than bound by timeless precepts. Following this, it explores reported elements of UK security culture in an 'outsized global ambition' as an international actor and secondly a prioritization of what has been termed *ad nauseam* a 'special relationship' with the US on matters of security and defence. This section will now explore each of these key aspects to understanding UK security culture in turn, before going on to consider the UK approach to the CSDP and how the UK security culture may be argued to play a role in shaping this.

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[589] W. Raleigh (1829), quoted in R. C. Rugel (2012), 'Command of the Sea, An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 21-33. For a discussion of such literature related to the UK, see, A. Macmillan (1995), 'Strategic culture and national ways in warfare: The British case', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 140, No. 5, pp. 33-38.; See, for example, K. Stoddart and J. Baylis (2012), 'The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Status (Part Two)', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 493-516.; A. Macmillan (1995), 'Strategic culture and national ways in warfare: The British case', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 140, No. 5, pp. 33-38; A. Miskimmon (2004), *op. cit.*; T. Oliver and A. Knuppe (2014), 'Britain's Strategic Culture in Context: A Typology of National Security Strategies', in T. Edwards, J. Gaskarth, Jamie and R. Porter (eds.), *British Foreign Policy and the National Interest Identity, Strategy and Security*, Palgrave, London.

4.3.i. UK Executive Autonomy – *A Free Hand?*

An important first feature to consider of the UK 'security culture' landscape is an argument from certain scholars that the UK effectively lacks one, in a certain sense at least.[590] Indeed, Cornish argues that in the sense of a "coherent and discrete framework of ideas which is authoritative and generally applicable, which can endure as circumstances change, which is manifest in the behaviour of strategic actors and which has some degree of predictive power", then for the UK, "paradoxically, the most decisive cultural influence upon strategy is not to have one".[591] In contrast, the UK executive may be identified to have a high degree of autonomy to pursue security and defence goals, resulting in a 'pragmatic' and 'problem-solving' approach, however this in itself may be argued to be a distinctive feature of UK security culture, as Cornish goes on to state.[592]

The scope of such UK executive autonomy may be argued to be in many ways a product of history. This is because the use of the armed forces, including their maintenance, development and deployment are 'Crown Prerogative' powers. These, originating from when the monarch was directly involved in the business of government, have progressively moved since the 17th Century to the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the elected government. Further such prerogative powers contributing to UK executive autonomy in security and defence include powers to make treaties, declare war and regulate the civil service in pursuit of the 'public good'.[593] Although the institutional makeup of UK security and defence policy is unquestionably more

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[590] P. Cornish (2013), 'United Kingdom', in H. Biehl, B. Giegerich and A. Jonas (eds.), *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Springer, Wiesbaden.
[591] *Ibid.*, p. 371.
[592] *Ibid*.
[593] L. Maer and O. Gay (2009),''The Royal Prerogative', *Commons Briefing Papers SN03861*, House of Commons Library. Available Online: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03861/SN03861.pdf

complex than this might suggest, it has also been argued that other bodies involved (such as the military) have been wary of being seen to question the direction set by the executive due to this convention.[594]

However, since the turn of the millennium, it is possible to argue that to a certain extent at least the autonomy of the UK executive to act in the realms of security and defence has been challenged. Specifically, following the 2003 intervention in Iraq in spite of popular opposition, there been argued to be a shift in UK security culture to an extent, with Meyer making the assessment that "it is doubtful whether future British governments will be able to overcome popular opposition to join a second US-led mission aimed at regime-change in another country". [595]

This has been argued to have led to increased scrutiny and oversight coming from Parliament, including debates on national strategy and monitoring through the Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Defence and International Development Select Committees as well as the auditing undertaken by the Public Administration Select Committee.[596] This has led to the production of strategic documents, such as the SDSR and NSS being composed in an increasingly transparent manner and subject to more frequent reappraisals, with biennial updates to the National Security Risk Assessment.[597]

The judgement of Meyer on the limitations of UK executive autonomy is furthermore supported to a degree by the failure of the UK government in 2013 to obtain

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[594] T. Edmunds (2014), 'Complexity, strategy and the national interest', *International Security*, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 525-539.; G. Faleg (2013), 'United Kingdom: The Elephant in the Room', in F. Santopinto and M. Price (eds.), *National Approaches to European Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings,* CEPS, Brussels, pp. 132-154.
[595] C. Meyer (2006), *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 63.
[596] P. Cornish (2013), *op. cit.*
[597] MoD (2008), *National Security Strategy.;* MoD (2010), *National Security Strategy 2010.*; MoD (2015), *Strategic Defence and Security Revie;* MoD (2015), *National Security Risk Assessment.*

authorization to intervene in Syria.[598] This may be argued to be illustrative not only due to the result of the parliamentary vote, but through how the UK government framed the argument for intervention in terms of international norms and law for intervention in Syria, as opposed to making the case nakedly in terms of power politics. As Anthony points out, in itself may be regarded as evidence of a cultural impact on UK policy making. [599]

Whilst there remains "an urgent need for greater clarity" on the issue of UK executive autonomy in security and defence institutionally, it is clear there is a certain room for cultural factors on UK policy. [600] It is even possible to agree with the assessment of Cornish on the one hand regarding a lack of UK 'security culture' which *directs* policy, but recognise the shaping effect of cultural factors on the other. [601] Indeed, this understanding of culture not 'freeing' policy makers from the pursuit of interests as understood in realist analysis (or constraining them to pursue ideology), but being understood epiphenomenally as outlined by Glenn and as discussed in Chapter 1 is wholly commensurate with the realist-constructivist approach.[602]

4.3.ii. UK Outsized Ambition – *A Global Role?*

Another important element of UK security culture may be argued to be 'outsized ambition'. This relates to a cultural sense of global responsibility to play an important

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[598] BBC News (2013), 'Syria Crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action', 30/08/13. Available Online: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783

[599] I. Anthony (2013), '30 Aug. 2013: The Syria vote in the British Parliament', *SIPRI Commentary,* Stockholm. Available Online: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/2013/30-aug-2013-syria-vote-british-parliament

[600] PCRC (2011), 'Report: Parliament's role in conflict decisions', House of Commons, London. 17/05/11. Available Online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpolcon/923/92304.htm

[601] P. Cornish (2013), *op. cit.*

[602] J. Glenn (2009), *op. cit.*

role in international affairs, out of proportion to ranking in military and economic terms. It is important to make clear that this does not relate to the argument that the UK does (or does not) have an outsized role or influence on global affairs, rather that the ethnographical literature stresses that the UK maintains consistent ambitions and pretensions of such, and security culture scholars have argued that this goes beyond simply seeking material advantage.[603]

Miskimmon highlights this feature of UK security culture and by way of explanation, links it with the UK's collective memory of dealing with the traumatically steep decline of her relative power status over the course of the twentieth-century.[604] Similarly, Martin and Garnett cite the UK's 'nostalgia for past glory' and post-colonial heritage as key to understanding the aim to be a "major player on the world stage".[605]

The 'outsized ambition' of the UK as a cornerstone of its security culture may be illustrated through reference to number of core policy documents relating to post-Cold War security and defence during which time the CSDP has developed. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review, for example, underlined the UK's defence aim of being a "force for good in the world", noting a pro-active approach to security policy whereby the UK would not "stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead.".[606] The 2003 Defence White Paper also gives specific focus to the ambitious international role of the UK, with clear aims to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy international terrorists or the regimes that harbour them and counter terrorists' efforts to acquire chemical, biological, radiological

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[603] See, for example, L. Martin and J. C. Garnett (1997), *British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century*, Pinter/RIIA, London.

[604] A. Miskimmon (2004), 'Continuity in the Face of Upheaval - British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 273-299. See also, J. Baylis (1986), 'Greenwoodery' and British Defence Policy, *International Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 443-457.

[605] L. Martin and J. C. Garnett (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[606] MoD (1998), *Strategic Defence Review*, London, pp. 4-5.

and nuclear weapons on a *global* scale.[607] Furthermore, despite diminishing relative material power status across the post-Cold War period, the National Security Strategy (2010) made clear that the *global* role for the UK would not be downgraded, with a commitment to a policy of "no strategic shrinkage" and "no shrinkage of our influence".[608] As Cornish sums up, the UK has both a "high level of ambition in, and a sense of responsibility for international security".[609]

Operationally, the outsized ambition of the UK may be illustrated through reference to patterns of behaviour, specifically through willingness for the UK to become involved in expeditionary military operations, both with and without UN legitimisation. In particular, the UK made substantial military contributions to interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011), being secondary in its contribution only to the US. Furthermore, the domestic legitimisation for these operations was undertaken through a framework of responsibility to promote 'democratic' and 'humanitarian' values, and broadly being a 'force for good in the world'.[610] Indeed, Miskimmon identifies UK membership and participation with international bodies, such as UN humanitarian efforts, as an enation of both global role and global responsibility aspects of UK security culture.[611]

Furthermore, outsized UK ambition is also arguably visible to an extent within British armed forces capability and development. Sondhaus, for example, argues that the UK's commitment to 'full spectrum capability' including independent nuclear deterrent is in itself the "most visible, and most expensive, element of the British quest

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[607] MoD (2003), *Defence White Paper*, London, p. 3.

[608] MoD (2010), *National Security Strategy 2010*, London.

[609] P. Cornish (2013), *op. cit.* p. 371.

[610] T. Blair (2002), 'Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library', *Speech*, Texas, 08/04/02. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/apr/08/foreignpolicy.iraq ; D. Cameron (2011), 'Statement on Libya', *Speech*, London, 05/09/11. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-libya

[611] A. Miskimmon (2004), *op. cit.*

to maintain a semblance of great power status".[612] The ambitious posture of the UK in relation to security and defence policy does not result in the excessive use of force, however.[613] The argument here is that the UK 'learned' from its colonial legacy the importance of perceived legitimacy for security and defence actions, where the UK relied upon both international and local consent to govern, due to access to only limited military resources to enforce its rule.[614]

Nor does this ambition result in unilateralism with regards to its security and defence policy, instead Miskimmon argues that the UK pursues security and defence policy rooted in conceptions of international community as a basis by which to achieve UK interests.[615] However, as Hyde-Price argues, due to its role in the Second World War, the UK was left with a "positive view of their armed forces and a belief in the efficacy of military power" more widely.[616]

The UK has been accused of displaying a gap between rhetorical ambitions and capability to act effectively as a security and defence actor on a global scale though. Indeed, Clarke points to the "aspirational" nature of 'no shrinkage' for the UK role, acknowledging that whilst "some part of those aspirations can be met, probably not all of them".[617] This may be argued to be due not only to military insufficiencies and budgetary pressures, but also lack of consensus outside of the executive for the role of UK military involvement in international affairs. This may be illustrated through the House of Commons vote on the 30th August 2013, which with a split of 285-272 votes,

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[612] L. Sondhaus (2006), *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*, Routledge, New York.
[613] R. Thornton (2004), 'The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 83-106.
[614] T. R. Mockaitis (1995), *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
[615] A. Miskimmon (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 285.
[616] A. Hyde-Price (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 326.
[617] House of Commons (2015), 'Evidence from Professor Michael Clarke - Director of RUSI', *Records*, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 20/07/11. Available Online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/76106.htm#note66

defeated a government motion that would have seen the UK joining US-led air strikes on the Syrian regime accused of violating the norms and law of the international community.[618] The result of this led Chancellor George Osborne to state that the UK would require a "national soul searching about our role in the world".[619] Indeed, since the famous observation that "Great Britain had lost an empire but was yet to find its role", a core feature of UK security culture may be argued to involve much soul searching regarding the balancing of relative material decline and persistent global ambitions.[620]

What this aspect of security culture makes clear is the desire of the UK to play an international role as a 'global player' in international security and defence. In more colloquial terms, this feature of UK security culture has been referred to as the UK "punching above its weight" internationally.[621] In one sense, this may be understood as the UK rationally attempting to maximise its international influence as well as security and defence capability in order to solidify and build upon its relative material power capability, commensurate with extant realist theorising. However, it is also possible to make the case that the UK goes beyond this. Indeed, as Martin and Garnett point out, the UK has had ample opportunity to act in a more calculated fashion in security and defence to maximise its material power resources, which it has not taken up.[622] As realist scholars have drawn attention to, the level of support given to operations such as the invasion of Iraq make little sense in terms of their draw on national resources in

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[618] House of Common (2013), 'Commons Debate on Syria', *Records*, 30/08/13, London. Available Online: http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2013/august/commons-debate-on-syria/

[619] G. Osborne (2013), Radio Interview, BBC Radio 4, 30/08/13. Quoted, BBC News, Available Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783

[620] D. Acherson (1962), 'Speech at West Point', 05/12/1962, quoted in D. Brinkley (1990), 'Dean Acheson and the 'Special Relationship': The West Point Speech of December 1962', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 599-608.

[621] P. Mangold (2001), *Success and Failure in British Foreign Policy, Evaluating the Record, 1900-2000*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 173.

[622] L. Martin and J. C. Garnett (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 83.

comparison to the levels of strategic threat posed or benefits accrued.[623] However, as Longhurst and Zaborowski point out, bearing in mind the security culture of the UK with outsized ambition as a cornerstone, perceiving the international system through this lens and responding to it accordingly, this 'irrationality' is arguably clearer.[624]

4.3.iii. UK and the US – *A 'Special' Relationship?*

A further important feature of UK security culture has been argued to be its commitment to maintain a privileged relationship with the US.

Although ethnographers trace the importance of the US relationship to the UK back historically much further, as Freedman points out, it was during the Cold War that maintaining the UK-US 'special relationship' became the "centrepiece of British strategy".[625] Indeed, Miskimmon argues that the British development of an independent nuclear deterrent over the post-Cold War period and its maintenance since has been symbolic of a commitment to US-led NATO and effort to retain US involvement in European security.[626]

The continuing basis for the 'special' place of this relationship within UK security culture within the post-Cold War argued to be grounded in a number of material and cultural factors. Firstly, the US has an important impact upon the operational capability of the UK. The UK and US armed forces not only deploy on operations together, but train together.[627] Although this may not be an exclusive

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[623] Mearsheimer (2006, *op. cit.* p. 86), observes that "almost every realist opposed the Iraq War", which subsequently turned into a "strategic disaster for the USA and UK".

[624] Longhurst and Zaborowski (2004), *op. cit*.

[625] L. Freedman (1995), 'Alliance and the British Way in Warfare', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 145-158.; J. Baylis (1984), *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1984: The Special Relationship*, Macmillan, London.

[626] A. Miskimmon (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[627] Prime Minister's Office (2012), Number 10 Press Briefing - US and UK Defence Cooperation, 14/03/12. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/number-10-press-briefing-us-and-uk-defence-cooperation

relationship with regards to training for more limited operations, it has been argued that the UK can only undertake large-scale military operations in coordination with the US. [628] As the 2003 Defence White Paper identified, "the most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO".[629]

For these reasons, it is not surprising the UK has consistently pursued the interoperability of its forces with US armed forces as military doctrine.[630] According to Hodder-Williams, this has led to a general 'expectation' that these two states would further cooperate and coordinate their security and defence activates.[631] However, in addition to this further demonstrating UK ambitions to play an important role in international security, former British ambassador to the US Sir Christopher Meyer has argued that the core rationale behind this is not based upon threat assessment but rather due to the transatlantic relationship.[632] In line with a state consisting of multiple cultures of security of security internally (as discussed in Chapter 1), the division in both UK politics and society regarding support for the US, particularly regarding participation in US-led military interventions, should also be noted.[633]

The material basis for a close US-UK relationship is clear. This includes institutionalised cooperation on a number of core security and defences area such as the UK's independent nuclear deterrent capability (the Trident missile system upon which

[628] T. Edmunds and A. Forster (2007), *Out of Step: The Case for Change in the British Armed Forces*, Demos, London, p. 41.; A. Dorman (2007), 'Britain and Its Armed Forces Today', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 320-327.

[629] MoD (2003), *Defence White Paper*, London, p. 8.

[630] A. Miskimmon (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[631] R. Hodder-Williams (2000), 'Reforging the 'special relationship': Blair, Clinton and foreign policy', in R. Little and M. Whickham-Jones (eds.), *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 92-110.

[632] C. Meyer (2013), Article in the Daily Telegraph, Print, 09/13/13.

[633] Ipsos MORI (2003), 'Iraq - The Last Pre-War Polls', https://www.ipsos-mori.com/newsevents/ca/287/Iraq-The-Last-PreWar-Polls.aspx, 21/03/03.

the nuclear warheads are mounted was designed in the US and the UK draws from a commingled US/UK pool[634][635]), conventional forces (collaboration on US developed Joint Strike Fighter and Boeing Chinook helicopters scheduled to be hosted upon the two next-generation UK Aircraft Carriers[636]) and intelligence sharing (1947 UKUSA Agreement, Echelon network, but also human intelligence).[637] According to Wallace and Phillips, this relationship is "institutionalised, automatic and rarely questioned".[638] Indeed, the central importance of this relationship is heavily embedded within the strategic documents of the UK.[639] It is perhaps sufficient though to take the conclusion of Daddow and Gaskarth of the 1997-2010 period that, "the importance of the [US-UK] relationship was accentuated in every single major strategic document produced by the FCO and the MoD".[640] This position has not changed subsequently, with the 2015-2020 Single Department Plan for the Ministry of Defence reaffirming "the essential nature of our special relationship with the US" and noting it as the "pre-eminent partner for security, defence, foreign policy and prosperity".[641]

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[634] Freedom of Information Request (2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http:/www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E2054A40-7833-48EF-991C-7F48E05B2C9D/0/nuclear190705.pdf , 19/07/05.

[635] US and UK (1962), *Nassau Agreement*, Nassau, 22/12/1962.

[636] P. Sabin (2009), 'The Future of UK Air Power'*, The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 5, pp. 6-12.

[637] M. Rudner (2004), 'Britain Betwixt and Between: UK SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic and European Connections', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 571-609.

[638] W. Wallace and C. Phillips (2009), 'Reassessing the Special Relationship', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, p. 274.

[639] The 2003 Strategic Defence Review: New Chapter, stresses modernisation of the British armed forces to integrate better with the US, and that "currently our focus is on our interface with the US" whereas interoperability with other countries is something to be considered "in due course". The 2003 Defence Ministry White Paper noted that, "security and stability in Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship remain fundamental to our security and defence policy". The UK's National Security Strategy document, produced in 2008, notes the primacy of the US as an ally, as did its revision in 2010 which regarded the US key to the UK capacity to "project power" in order to maintain collective security. See, MoD (2003), *Strategic Defence Review: New Chapter*, London; MoD (2003), *Defence Ministry White Paper* London.; MoD (2008), *National Security Strategy*, London.; MoD (2010), *National Security Strategy*, London.; MoD (2015), *Strategic Defence and Security Review,* London.

[640] O. Daddow and J. Gaskarth (2011), *British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 90.

[641] MoD (2017), 'Single Departmental Plan: 2015 to 2020', *Report*, 20/03/17. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mod-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020/single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020

The centrality of the US relationship to the UK may be viewed to not only manifest itself with regards to dealings with the US though, but also in the UK approach to Europe. This has been explored in the security culture literature in relation to a Howorth's typology of Atlanticist (defined by support for the Transatlantic Alliance) and Europeanist (defined by support for the process of European integration) states, with the latter wishing to develop autonomous intra-European ties in security and defence and the former reluctant or refusing due to fears it may side-line the transatlantic partnership.[642] Somewhat ironically, this opposition has occurred despite stated US desire to see increased EU capacity to assist in security tasks, as explored in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. For more ethnographical scholars, the centrality of the UK-US relationship to UK security culture is clear and demonstrable in history, public opinion and strategic thinking.[643] However, within IR scholarship, UK commitment to this relationship is also argued to go beyond the rational, being as Menon titles it a matter of 'faith'.[644]

This bilateral tie been referred to *ad nauseam* both in the media and in policy making circles as the 'special relationship'.[645] Whether this relationship is indeed special, privileged or merely a mixture of sentiment and wishful thinking is a matter for debate elsewhere, but within the scope of this thesis it is enough to regard it as an important aspect of UK security culture which impacts how the UK interprets and responds to the incentives and threats of the international system, as will be explored in relation to the CSDP.

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[642] J. Howorth (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[643] See for example, K. Burk (2007), *Old World, New World. The Story of Britain and America*, Abacus, London.

[644] A. Menon (2010), 'Between Faith and Reason: UK Policy Towards the US and the EU', *Chatham House Briefing Paper*, July.

[645] J. Dumbbell (2009), *op. cit.*

4.4. Outlining the Security Culture of Germany

In global terms, Germany, like the UK is clearly a 'second-rank' power in comparison to the US, but in global terms Germany is a high ranking economic (4th) and medium-high military (18th) power.[646] Germany has a complex history as a nation, from a loose league of sovereign states through its formation as a republic following defeat in the First World War, division following defeat in the Second World War, and unification into its modern form and final settlement of its borders in the Post-Cold War period.[647]

This history may be argued to play an important visible role in modern Germany foreign policy, for whilst Germany is the most populous EU member state with the biggest economy, it lacks both a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and an independent nuclear capability (unlike two other EU members, France and the UK). A further considerable impact of this history has been argued to be upon the security culture of modern-day Germany. Unlike the UK's security culture which may be viewed in relation to centuries of historical experience and learning, it is possible to argue that German security culture is defined very much in opposition to its history, particularly following the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War and its division into Western and Eastern successor states by the victorious allied powers.

According to Longhurst, who has offered the most comprehensive examination of Germany security culture thus far, it emerges most clearly out of the "intensive

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[646] Global Firepower, The Centre For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2016), 'Countries Ranked by Military Strength', Available Online: http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp ; World Bank (2017), 'Gross Domestic Product 2015', Available Online: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf

[647] The 1990 German-Polish Border Treaty finally settled the demarcation of the border between these two states, an issue which had remained unresolved since 1945; H. W. Smith (2011), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Germany History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

collective physical and moral trauma" following the Second World War which represents 'zero hour' (*Stunde Null*).[648] It has been argued that this was due to a number of both endogenous and exogenous factors, relating to the victorious powers "disarmament and demilitarisation" [649] of Germany and also what scholars have identified as the widespread de-legitimisation of military values in German society after the war.[650] As Aggestam identifies, this involved the adoption and socialization of western democratic values into German political culture, such as the rule of law[651], social market economics and civic political rights.[652] This is argued to have played an important role in its defining German security culture also, though a focus upon international responsibility (*verantwortung*) and an opposition to both the *realpolitik* and unilateralism (*sonderweg*) of Nazi Germany. During this time, it has been argued that West Germany effectively pursued a 'civilian power' (*civilmacht*) role in international affairs, rejecting the use of material power projection and even possibly seeking to minimise its role in international affairs more widely.[653]

Following the unification (*wiedervereinigung*) of West and East Germany in 1990, along with the changes in material power capability and expanded geographical position in the centre of Europe that this brought, there was also much debate and soul-searching regarding the implications for German identity, its role as a foreign policy actor and the extent to which a normalization (*normalisierung*) process would or should occur with respect to its security and defence policy making.[654] This pertains to whether

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[648] E. Longhurst (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[649] US, USSR, UK (1945), 'Berlin and Potsdam Conference', *Protocol of the Proceedings*, 01/08/1945.

[650] Germany (2017), *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin. Articles 4 and 26.

[651] Particularly the upholding of the federal constitution is argued to be a core element of the West German identity.

[652] L. Aggestam (2001), 'Germany', in I. Manners and R. Whitman (eds.)*, The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

[653] See, H. W. Maull (2000), 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 56-80.

[654] P. Gordon (1994), 'Normalisation of German Foreign Policy', *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 225–244.

Germany adopts a role "more like other powers in its class" in terms of its relative material power capability.[655]

Following this time a central tension is argued to exist at the heart of German security and defence policy, on the one hand there being a sense of duty (*verpflichtung*) to intervene, even provide leadership on occasion, but in all cases analogies with the approach of pre-war Germany must be avoided.[656] As Longhurst notes, this results in German foreign policy being a "puzzling array of continuities and changes" and one method that scholars have turned to in order to understand this tension has been the study of German norms, beliefs and typologies of security culture.[657] Utilising this rich literature, it is possible to make the case that there exist three important aspects of German security culture that have played a salient role in shaping its approach towards security and defence policy making, and thus also the national approach to the CSDP. These, it is argued, are a disinclination towards the use of force, a caveated relationship with the US and the embedding of foreign policy within multilateral frameworks and thus each shall be explored in turn.

4.4.i. German Amilitarism - *Never Again?*

There is certain evidence to suggest that the German public at large is at the least uncomfortable with force projection, even within NATO or on UN mandated missions. Historically, this is illustrated clearly in reference to the controversy generated surrounding the prospective deployment of Bundeswehr forces on UN

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[655] A. Hyde-Price and C. Jeffery (2001), 'Germany in the European Union: Constructing normality', *JCMS*, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 690.

[656] See for example, Spiegel (2011a), 'Kritik an deutscher Libyen-Politik: Schwerer Fehler von historischer Dimension', *Print*, 23/03/11.

[657] E. Longhurst (2004), *op. cit.*

sanctioned peace operations when West Germany first became a member of the UN in 1973.[658] German disinclination to sanction the use of force, even within multilateral frameworks was further highlighted during the Gulf War, in which Germany would not allow the use of the Bundeswehr forces for the out-of-area NATO combat operation.[659] Although Germany sought to contribute to the operation through other means, through financing, the sale of military equipment, diplomatic efforts and the contribution of minesweepers in the Adriatic, it revealed much about German security culture.[660]

The central tension illustrated above is between German obligations towards its allies, particularly the US, and what has been labelled a 'pacifist reflex', alluding to what is politically feasible regarding the use of military force. Indeed, Sedivy and Zaborovsky go as far to as to claim that Germany developed a security culture "that verged on the pacifist" during the Cold War, due to its direct dependence on the US.[661] Hyde-Price goes on to argue German security culture was deeply rooted in conceptions of the state as a civilian power due to its experience in the Second World War. As Duffield notes, German policy makers are clearly aware of the weight of cultural impact on security and defence policy making.[662] This is very prominent in the national strategic documents of Germany, as well as through speeches and debates, which refer most clearly and frequently to the 'lessons of German history.[663] According to Aggestam and Hyde-Price, this has led to a security culture "characterised by the belief

[658] J. A. Koops (2016), 'Germany and United Nations peacekeeping: the cautiously evolving contributor', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 652-680.

[659] A. Miskimmon (2007), *Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 36.

[660] B. Schollgen (1993), 'Putting Germany's Post-Unification Foreign Policy to the Test', *NATO Review*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 15-22.

[661] J. Sedivy and M. Zaorowski (2004), 'Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 187-213.

[662] J. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*

[663] See, E. Longhurst (2004), *op. cit.*

that the purpose of the Bundeswehr was to deter another war, and that as soon as it fired its first shot in anger, it had failed its mission".[664]

The amilitary preference within German security culture is also embedded within the legal system of Germany, most notably through the Basic German Law's Article 87a. This specifies that that armed forces may only be employed for defence or for specified civilian tasks under certain limited conditions, such as supporting police measures, protecting civilian property. This, it may be argued, effectively precludes Germany from engaging in power projection, although there is a clear tension between this aspect of the Basic Law and concepts of responsibility with regards to playing a role in providing international stability and security, also in acting as an ally.[665] A legal turning point, if not also perhaps a cultural one, surrounding the use of the German armed forces came in 1994, when the constitutional court interpreted the provisions of Article 87a to allow for German armed forces to be deployed outside the national territory in compliance with international law and UN resolutions.[666] This paved the way legally for Germany to play a role in the 1999 war in Kosovo, seen as significant for stated that whilst Germany remains "one of the more reluctant countries in Europe to deploy force, it's no longer off the charts".[667]

However, at least initially, this intervention came to be seen as an exception rather than the rule of German security and defence policy, for the reticence of German policy makers to sanction the use of the armed forces remained, barring exceptional

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[664] L. Aggestam and A. Hyde-Price (2000), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 139.

[665] R. A. Miller (2010), 'Germany's Basic Law and the Use of Force', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 197-206.

[666] J. S. Lantis (2002), *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, Praeger, Westport (CT), p. 109.

[667] T. Valasek (2012), quoted in The Guardian, News Article, 18/09/12, London. Available Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/18/germany-military-modernise-foreign-intervention?newsfeed=true [Accessed June 2015].

cases of humanitarian justification.[668] As Hyde-Price noted more recently regarding the German approach to *Operation Unified Protector* in Libya, Germany not only abstained from UNSCR 1973 which authorised the NATO operation to enforce a no-fly zone, but also withdrew its personnel from duties in enforcing the UN-mandated arms embargo on the Libyan government.[669] Thus, clearly and over a substantial period, a German preference for avoiding the use of military force may be regarded as evident.

However, it is possible to argue that this stance has become more untenable in the post-Cold War period. It has been argued that in the eyes of other states at least, Germany has moved from an accepted beneficiary of security through its unique placement at the front lines of Cold War to expectations that it should be a security provider with regards to the emerging security wave of security challenges that have faced its allies in the 21st century.[670] This led to questions of whether German conceptions of security and defence can be as focused on traditional security and defence as previously and therefore Germany has, slowly, transformed its capability to meet the realities of this new environment, including through abolishing conscription finally in 2011 and shifting towards a smaller, more professional and perhaps most importantly more mobile armed forces.[671]

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[668] Until 1994 all operations of the Bundeswehr had been humanitarian assistance missions.
[669] UN (2011), 'UNSCR 1973 (2011), The Situation in Libya', adopted 17/03/11. Available Online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1973
[670] B. W. Kubbig and A. Nitsche (2005), 'Germany: Selective security provider in the Schröder/Fischer era', *Contemporary Security Provider*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 520-543.
[671] M. E. Nyuken (2012), *Between Domestic Constraints and Multilateral Obligations: The Reform of the Bundeswehr in the Context of a Normalized German Foreign and Security Policy*, PhD thesis, University of Stirling, Stirling.

4.4.ii. German Multilateralism - *Never Alone?*

Beyond the aversion to the use of military force as outlined above, it is possible to make the case that that Germany holds a preference for non-confrontational security and defence options more widely. This not only involves the minimisation of force-based war-fighting strategy, but an aspiration towards pursing consensus-based security and defence through compromise on security decision making, both at the unit-level within internal German politics and society, along with broad agreement amongst other states in the international system. [672] This effectively forms an approach of 'multilateralism' as a further salient feature of German security culture, defined by Keohane as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states".[673]

This may not only be characterized by an institutional dimension, as Keohane identifies, but also normative one in the case of Germany that stands in opposition to unilateralism (*sonderweg*) of German history.[674] The embedding of German security and defence policy making in multilateral structures can be witnessed in Article 24 of the German basic law, which states that Germany is permitted to "enter a system of mutual collective security for the purpose of preserving peace", as well as the Defence Policy Guidelines (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, VPR) which emphasise the importance of multilateralism (*Multilateralität*) through underlining that military missions shall only take place in conjunction with the UN, NATO or the EU.[675]

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[672] C. Hofhansel (2005), *Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy, and Central Europe*, Routledge, New York; T. Dyson (2008), *The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era*, Berghahn Books, New York.

[673] R. O. Keohane (1990), 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', *International Journal*, Vol. 45, pp. 731-764.

[674] J. Ruggie (1992), 'Multilateralism: the anatomy of an Institution', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 561-598.

[675] Article 24, Grundgesetz; BMVg, (2003), *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, Berlin.

The German preference towards the embedding of the pursuit of security and defence goals through multilateral structures can be traced back clearly to the Cold War period, during which time West German rearmament was undertaken multilaterally and integrated into NATO command structures. Wittinger goes as far as to claim the raison d'état of West Germany was multilateralism, through integration into the institutions of the West (*Westbindung*).[676] Upon the conclusion of the Cold War, contrary to the assumptions of Mearsheimer that Germany would allow her ties with multilateral security groupings such as NATO and the WEU to weaken or lapse, German policy has been notable for its continuity in the commitment to cooperative approaches to security.[677]

It cannot be overlooked that multilateralism has served the concrete interests of Germany both in the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. As Hofhansel notes, the a state doctrine of multilateralism allowed post-Second World War Germany to regain sovereignty (at least partially) and thus an ability to pursue its economic and political interests as a member of the international community.[678] In the post-Cold War period, Garton Ash has argued that by "laying on the golden handcuffs that Germany set herself free" regarding multilateralism.[679] This is to say that through surrendering German sovereignty to multilateral institutions, Germany has been able to conflate German national interests with multilateral interests as a means by which to achieve specific objectives. As Garton Ash explains, 'attritional multilateralism' instrumentally involves the "patient, discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral institutions

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[676] R. Wittinger (2000), *German National Identity in the Twenty-First Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 92. See also, R. Baumann (2002), 'The Transformation of German Multilateralism: Changes in Foreign Policy Discourse since Unification', *German Politics and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

[677] See, J. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*

[678] C. Hofhansel (2005), *op. cit.*

[679] T. Garton Ash (1994), 'Germany's Choice', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 65-81

and negotiations, whether in the European Community, NATO or the Helsinki process".[680] The preference for multilateralism has also been justified by policy makers with the argument that return to the *Sonderweg* would ultimately lead to international isolation and thus insecurity.[681] However, whilst multilateralism has this instrumental dimension, as Duffield makes clear, "For many German leaders, it has become a leading goal in and of itself".[682] As Klaus Kinkel, former Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor stated, "Germany has a clear preference for acting together with other states rather than acting alone, even at the sacrifice of national prerogatives". [683] This German multiateralism preference has therefore been conceived of as being impacted by an ideational 'logic of appropriateness', in addition perhaps to a 'logic of consequences' behaviour based upon material considerations .[684]

Furthermore, it has also been noted that this German security culture of multilateralism is extremely stable. As Duffield observes, "few, if any discernible differences have existed among the ministries and offices of the federal government with responsibilities in this area (of the multilateral approach), including the German military".[685] As Banchoff identified, the commitment to multilateralism has been made by successive leaders in Germany over decades, with Chancellors from Konrad Adenauer through Helmut Kohl, to Gerhard Schroeder each expressing a clear

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[680] *Ibid*.

[681] R. VonWeizsäcker (1993), „Zur deutschen Außenpolitik", *Bulletin,* No. 109, 07/12/1993.; H. Kohl (1993), '30. Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung des Elysee-Vertrages: Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers', *Bulletin*, No. 8, 25 January.; R. Scharping (1995), 'Deutsche Außenpolitik muß berechenbar sein', *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 8, pp. 38-44.

[682] J. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[683] K. Kinkel (1993), ‚Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe bei Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen', *Bulletin*, No. 32, 23/04/1993, pp. 277-80.

[684] T. M. Wilke (2008), *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the Past to Contemporary German Strategic Choice*, Lit Verlag, Berlin. See also R. Baumann (2005), ‚Der Wandel des deutschen Multilateralismus. Verschiebungen im außenpolitischen Diskurs in den 1990er Jahren', in C. Ulbert and C. Weller (eds.), *Konstruktivistische Analysen der internationalen Politik*, VS-Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp. 119-120.

[685] J. Duffield (1998),op. cit., p. 65.

preference for multilateralism and a contrasting distaste for unilateralism.[686] Thus, Edinger was rightly able to observe in 1986 that the difference between successive German governments was least pronounced in respect of their foreign and defence policies.[687] This stability is in many ways linked to another aspect of the multilateral character of German security culture in emphasising the importance of stability and continuity in order to be a reliable, even predictable, actor within international politics. This consensus is noted to be in place over the post-Second World War period in German history and also amongst the majority of the German political spectrum. Indeed, Berger regards national security as the "least disputed issue" in German politics at election time.[688]

To an extent, the incentives regarding multilateralism and an aversion to the use of force within German security culture are complementary, with the label "never again, never alone", being given to encompass the broad political culture of German security and defence policy and alluding once again back to Nazi Germany. However, scholars have also recognised that ideas of responsibility in multilateral structures, in both NATO and EU contexts, can be in tension with militarism where Germany is expected to bear a burden of military capability. Whilst a generalised 'culture of restraint' endures for Germany, it would be wrong to categorise Germany as a 'civilian power' in totality. Deployments of the Bundeswehr have increased post-9/11, with Germany notably contributing to missions to out-of-area stabilising operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (post-invasion).[689] Germany, as the VPR of 2011 makes clear, maintains a

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[686] T. Banchoff (1999), *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (MI). See also, R. Baumann (2002), 'The Transformation of German Multilateralism', *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 1-26.
[687] J. L. Edinger (1986), *West German Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York.
[688] T. Berger (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[689] Providing for Peacekeeping (2017), *Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany*, Available Online: http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-germany/

cultural preference for non-military solutions, but requires capability to fulfil the "international responsibility for peace", as a "strong partner in a united Europe".[690] Therefore we can expect Germany to interact with the CSDP, but also to have clear ideas regarding the appropriate direction for its development.

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[690] BMVg, (2011), *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien,* Berlin.

4.4.iii. Germany and the US - *A 'Critical' Relationship?*

Much like the UK, Germany has a critical bilateral relationship with the US in the sense of its crucial importance historically. Particularly during the Cold War, the US played a crucial role as security guarantor against the Soviet Union and its allies whilst also arguably acting as something of a cultural role model for Germany with its anti-authoritarian and democratic values. However, this relationship has also been more of a critical one, in the sense that Germany has been more willing to diverge from US preferences and express dissatisfaction with the direction taken by the US than other European states (such as the UK).

Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11th 2001, noted as a particularly traumatic event for Germany as the attackers had lived and studied in Hamburg, Chancellor Shröder promised "unconditional solidarity" with the US. However, over the coming years would be at the forefront of criticism towards the US approach to international coalitions for military intervention, human rights and the environment. Shröder claimed the "right to disagree in friendship" as the German coalition government lodged protests against US conduct in the build-up and operationalisation of the 2003 Iraq War[691], the use of the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay for the indefinite detention and torture of inmates[692] and refugee policy.[693]

This relationship was again test in October 2013, possibly the nadir of US-German relations came with revelations that US intelligence services had been hacking

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[691] Spiegel (2006), 'Schröder on Iraq: "The Mother of all Misjudgements"', Hamburg, 25/10/06. Available Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/schroeder-on-iraq-the-mother-of-all-misjudgements-a-444748.html

[692] Financial Times (2006), 'Merkel urges US to close detention Camp', *Financial Times*, London, 09/01/06. Available Online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5ac147a-80b4-11da-8f9d-0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true

[693] The Guardian (2017), 'Merkel 'explains' refugee convention to Trump in phone call', Print, London, 29/01/17. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/merkel-explains-geneva-refugee-convention-to-trump-in-phone-call

into the mobile phone of Chancellor Merkel. According to a survey from the Allensbach Institute, there was a clear decline in the levels of trust and feeling of friendship amongst the wider public of Germany at this time.[694]

However, despite this decline in German public trust of the US, it is important to make clear the centrality of the US-German relationship to German policy makers. This can be demonstrated in reference to the 2011 VPR, which emphasises the commitment of the US to the security of Europe being regarded as "a vital interest of Germany", and therefore a prime duty is to "preserve the unique quality of transatlantic relations, to strengthen our ties and our exchanges to continue to develop the partnership with the United States by performing our tasks responsibly".[695] Indeed, maintaining American involvement in European security is, "considered a fundamental security interest" of Germany according to Aggestam.[696] Indeed, whilst Howorth offers a distinction between 'Europeanist' and 'Atalanticist' EU member states, German policy makers have been careful to avoid this dichotomy.[697] Unlike the UK, which has been linked heavily to the US, and France's somewhat more distant US relationship, German policy makers reject acknowledging even the existence of a dichotomy in this regard, labelled a *sowohl-als-auch* approach by Garton Ash.[698] This is to say that, in essence, German security culture does not privilege either Europe or the US, but understands both as important aspects to the pursuit of its security and defence aims.

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[694] T. Peterson (2014), 'Der Gross über den großen Bruder', *Report*, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 17/09/14.   Available   Online: http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/uploads/tx_reportsndocs/FAZ_Sept_Amerika.pdf

[695] BMVg, (2011), *op. cit.*

[696] L. Aggestam (2004), 'Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy', in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen, *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester University Press, p. 94.

[697] J. Howorth (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[698] T. Garton Ash (1996), *Germany's Choice*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, p. 92.

4.5. Diverging Security Cultures – UK and Germany

Now that we have established features of UK and German security cultures, it is important to draw attention to some divergences between these. These differences may be sub-divided into two key areas, first regarding attitudes towards the use of military force and second towards alliance preferences.

As identified above, the UK has a long tradition of global influence as a security and defence actor, particularly during the colonial period of the British Empire. UK security culture with regards to the role of the military may also be characterised as 'pragmatic' to a degree, with military tasks historically defined by a relatively autonomous political leadership to meet the objectives of the UK overseas. This has involved power projection for the protection of overseas territories, such as with the Falkland Islands, but also UK interests tied to a proactive global security role, such as being the second-largest military contributor to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, despite the tradition of expeditionary warfare and force projection, there are also clear practical limitations on the ability of the UK to act outside of multinational frameworks, or more specifically without direct US leadership, as was demonstrated clearly in Libya.[699] This may be said to reveal a key tension at the heart of UK security culture between global ambition and what it is possible for the UK to achieve according to the resources available and thus a 'problem-solving' approach focused upon 'ends' may be regarded as emphasised.

In contrast to this is German security culture, which scholars such as Longhurst, Duffield and Berger make clear has a strong preference for non-military security and defence, to the point of being considered practically 'amilitary'.[700] This is not to say

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[699] E. Hallams and B. Schreer (2012), 'Towards a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya', *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 313-327.
[700] T. Berger (1998), *op. cit.*; J. Duffield (1998), *op. cit.*; E. Longhurst (2004), *op. cit.*

that Germany shuns hard power instrumentation entirely as it maintains capable armed forces, but rather that its usage is conceived of as limited – *never again*, in relation to a history of German use of force as a foreign policy instrument. This 'culture of reticence' has been linked with military force being socially and institutionally embedded in German politics with extensive authorisation and legitimisation requirements demanded of the executive for deployment overseas. This, it may be argued, has contributed towards German preference for the pursuit of civilian, rather than military security.

However, at the heart of this cultural influence in Germany also lies a key tension, between 'reticence' regarding the use of force on the one hand and a sense of international responsibility on the other. This may be applied particularly towards German responsibility to assist in international humanitarian efforts, commensurate with Germany's status as one of the world's most prosperous nation-states. It is furthermore argued that Germany has developed a cultural preference towards the multilateralisation of its security and defence policy making, to be *never alone* in foreign policy at the expense of individual freedom. This leads into the second sub-division of UK and German security culture divergence in alliance preferences. With regards to this, Germany may be said to have a preference for embedding its security and defence policy making into multilateral frameworks, such as through the UN and NATO, and also the EU, through the CSDP. To an extent, Germany may be said to 'upload' her security and defence policy to the multilateral level to free itself of both domestic constraint and international responsibility and therefore favour security supranationalization. This, it may be argued, has contributed towards an institutionally and socially embedded German preference for the 'means' of security and defence to be pursued through multilateral forums.

The UK also integrates elements of its security and defence multilaterally, notably through NATO, the UN and the CSDP, but also through 'coalitions of the willing', such as during the 2003 Iraq War. Furthermore, the UK also cooperates bilaterally with a number of states, most prominently with the US, but also with other states, notably with France.[701] However, the UK has also closely guarded its individual freedom and intergovernmental control over security and defence cooperation, core to UK executive autonomy in this policy area. Nevertheless, the UK may well also be accused of instrumentalising multilateral forums of security and defence cooperation for use as influence multipliers to overcome a gap between cultural ambition and material resources resulting from an outsized view of the UK global role.[702]

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[701] B. Jones (2011), 'Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?', *Occasional Paper 88*, *EUISS*, Paris, February.

[702] House of Lords (2013), 'Lord Hannay of Chiswick - Written Evidence', *Soft Power and the UK's Influence Committee*, London, pp. 616-619. Available Online: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/soft-power-ukinfluence/SoftPowerEvVol2.pdf

Preferences	UK	Germany
The Use of Force	• Grand tradition of expeditionary warfare and force projection. • Sustains nuclear weapon capability for deterrence. • Belief in 'pragmatic' approach; focus on problem-solving 'ends' rather than ideological 'means'. • Strong executive autonomy, weak force authorisation requirements.	• General preference for non-military security and defence. • Largely averse to the use of force and power projection, 'culture of reticence', barring humanitarian responsibilities and territorial defence. • Non-nuclear power, does not openly pursue nuclear weapon capability. • Executive faces strong force authorisation requirements, requiring legislative and international legitimisation. Belief in 'means' being equal/more important than 'ends'.
The Role of Alliances	• Security and defence instrumentally embedded in multilateral frameworks (UN, NATO, EU), but retains options for unilateral/bilateral/coalition action. • Privileges bilateral security and defence cooperation with the US, including through 'coalitions of the willing'. Part rational, part ideological. • Pragmatically supports limited EU role in security and defence to provide 'value for money', support NATO and share burden with US/UK. • Resistant to supranational security and defence and sceptical of further European integration.	• Security and defence reflexively embedded in multilateral frameworks (UN, NATO, EU), restricts own options for unilateralism. • Supports development of EU role in security and defence. Has led 'coalitions of the unwilling' opposition to US-led action. • Preference for the deepening of the European integration process more widely. 'More Europe' as panacea. Important to be 'European Germany' rather than viewed as 'German Europe'. • Resistant to security and defence cooperation which requires military deployment & financial costs.

Figure 3. Summary of UK and German preferences towards the use of force and role of alliances.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the socialization and/or institutionalization of postulated norms, beliefs and attitudes through elite interviews or survey data. Public opinion surveys, such as *Eurobarometer*, the *World Values Survey*, and *Transatlantic Trends* are frequently used to discuss states' strategic culture.[703] The utility of such polls may be disputed on sample size, representativeness,

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[703] T. B. Gravelle, J. Reifler and T. J. Scotto (2017), 'The structure of foreign policy attitudes in transatlantic perspective: Comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany', *European Journal of Political Research*, forthcoming. See also, C. O. Meyer (2006), *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.; W. Mirow (2009), *Strategic Culture Matters: A Comparison of Germany and British Military Interventions Since 1990,* Forschungsberichte

and the conclusions that we may thus draw from them. However, it is generally recognised that there lacks a better alternative to discern the strategic culture of a general population and this, along with other data, can be useful in triangulation. Bearing this in mind, it is worth noting that research on national approaches to foreign policy would appear to give a degree of credence to the work of culturalist scholars who emphasise that public attitudes towards these policy areas diverge among states (see, for example, *Table 4.* below, as well as *Appendix 2.*), although the precise extent, impact and direction of this divergence remains in dispute.

Internationale Politik, Berlin.; J. W. Davidson (2011), *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Table 4. UK and German Public Attitudes on Foreign Policy.

Topic/Question	UK % Agree	Germany % Agree	Divergence %
The Use of Force			
[Country] should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power.	41	32.6	8.4
[Country] needs a strong military to be effective in international relations.	56.7	31.4	25.3
In dealing with other nations, our government needs to be strong and tough rather than understanding and flexible.	51.7	34.1	17.6
[Country] should be more committed to diplomacy and not so fast to use the military in international crises.	57.2	56.6	0.6
Multilateralism			
[Country] should work more through international organisations, like the UN.	40	40.9	0.9
In deciding on its foreign policies, [Country] should take into account the views of its major allies.	40.5	39.1	1.4
The best way for [Country] to be a world leader in foreign affairs is to build international consensus.	46.6	51.5	4.9
Isolationism			
[Country's] interests are best protected by avoiding involvement with other nations.	24.8	34.7	9.9
[Country] shouldn't risk its citizens' happiness and well-being by getting involved with other nations.	44.6	36	8.6
[Country] needs to simply mind its own business when it comes to international affairs.	25.3	41	15.7
Unilateralism			
Sometimes it is necessary for [Country] to go it alone in international affairs.	67.7	64.3	3.4
[Country] doesn't need to withdraw from international affairs, it just needs to stop letting international organisations tell us what we can and can't do.	65.7	43.3	22.4
[Country] should always do what is in its own interest, even if our allies object.	56.7	41.8	14.9

Source: Survey data reproduced with permission from T. Scott, J. Reifler, H. Clarke, and P. Whiteley, (2015), 'The Structure, Causes, and Consequences of Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Cross-National Analysis of Representative Democracies', *Project 10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142*, ESRC UK Data Service, Available Online: https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=851142&type=Data%20catalogue [704]

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[704] For analysis of this survey data, see T. B. Gravelle, J. Reifler and T. J. Scotto (2017), *op. cit.*

4.6. The UK, Germany and the CSDP: Divergent Approaches through the lens of Realist-Constructivism

Bearing in mind the aspects of UK and German security cultures as outlined above, it is possible to further build upon our theoretically-informed narrative of the CSDP, which draws from both realist and constructivist elements of IR theory, with specific reference to these two states.

As outlined in Chapter 4, there is a clear incentive in the post-Cold War period for EU states to develop increased European cooperation on security and defence to ameliorate the alliance dilemma in their relations with the US. This includes limited bandwagoning with the US through developing a niche EU capability to bear an increased burden of contributing to international security, whilst at the same time developing a certain European autonomy to deal with security and defence issues where the US cannot or will not act, or sanction action in line with European preferences.

This final section of the thesis will therefore consider whether these previously discussed incentives may be seen to have affected UK and German policy towards the development of European security and defence cooperation. It argues that concurring with the system-level incentives, both the UK and Germany were willing to reinforce security and defence cooperation among EU states. However, concurring with differences in their security cultures, as outlined above, the UK put more emphasis on the 'problem-solving' capacity of the CSDP and opportunities for UK 'leadership'; whereas German policy focused more on the civilian dimension of the CSDP and utilised its development as a means to integrate national security and defence multilaterally. Therefore, this section finds understanding of the CSDP in the interplay of material and ideational factors, as per the analytical framework outlined in Chapter

1. Ultimately, it argues that whilst EU member states face system-level incentives to participate in the CSDP, the manner in which they respond to this is shaped to an extent through the unit-level ideational factor of security culture.

Background

As explored in Chapter 3, for Germany and the UK, the system-level incentive to engage in EU security and defence cooperation is argued to arise from the shift in the distribution of power globally with the end of the Cold War. However, it is important to consider that this not only had global consequences, leaving the US as the last remaining superpower, but had profound consequences in Europe; not least through paving the way for German reunification and thus substantial increases in its material power positioning.[705] Scholars thus questioned whether Germany would emerge as a European regional hegemon and policy makers feared Germany would break free of the 'golden chains' of multilateralism, with which it had bound its security and defence policy in the Cold War period, whilst among policymakers serious discussions reportedly took place on slowing down or even halting the German reunification process.[706]

Meanwhile, the UK suffered no comparable change in its power status to Germany, but the international security environment in which it was operating did change. This not only included a reunited Germany in the European region, but

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[705] It should also be noted that reunification left a financial constraint on Germany, as Chancellor Schröder argued, "No other member of the EU had a burden as heavy as the one carried by Germany following reunification." See, G. Schröder (2007), *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, Hoffman and Campe, Hamburg, p. 88.

[706] F. Bozo (2009), *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification*, Berghahn Books, New York (NY).; P. Zelikow and C. Rice (2008), 'German Unification', in K. K. Skinner (ed.), *Turning Points in Ending the Cold War*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford (CA), pp. 229-54.; P. An (2006), 'Obstructive all the way? British policy towards German unification 1989-90', *German Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 111-121; M Thatcher (1993), *The Downing Street Years*, Harper, London, pp. 790-799.; A. Legloannec (1992), 'The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe', P. B. Stares (ed.), *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Brookings Institute, Washington DC, p. 252.

concerns surrounding continued US commitment to European security, with its focus viewed as shifting (already) to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle-East.[707] This was justified in the wake of Congressional pressure to cut the overall US defence budget, leading President Bush Snr. to cut the force structure by 25%, including forces stationed in Europe, a trend that has continued subsequently.[708]

As Toje notes, the US "pledged to maintain its engagement in European security in return for a European commitment to work towards collective external defence and internal stability".[709] At the same time, the emerging opportunities and developing security threats provided by the changed international system were becoming clear to policy makers, with French Foreign Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement observing as early as 1989 that, "International events are encouraging us to take our security in our own hands, at the same time offering possibilities to do so".[710] Over the 1990s the US saw a financial boom (leading it to overtake the combined economies of EU states) and a further widening of the capabilities-gap between European states and the US, as the US undertook a security and defence investment programme entitled the 'Revolution in Military Affairs', whilst in contrast European states generally cut back their defence budgets.[711]

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[707] R. Betts (1993), 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 37-77.; L. Freedman and E. Karsh (1995), *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ).

[708] M. R. Gordon (1990), 'Cheyney Gives Plan to Reduce Forces by 25% in 5 Years', *New York Times*, News Article, 20/06/1990. Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/20/us/cheney-gives-plan-to-reduce-forces-by-25-in-5-years.html See also, Heritage Foundation (2004), *Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2003*, http://www.heritage.org/defence/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 , published 27/10/04.

[709] A. Toje (2009), *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain*, Routledge, London.

[710] Wall Street Journal (1989), 'Article', Print, 17/02/1989. Quoted in J. S. Nye and R. O. Keohane, 'The United States and International Institutions in Europe after the Cold War', R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye and S. Hoffman (eds.), *After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, p. 119.

[711] T. Dyson (2016), *op. cit.*

This contributed in no small part to US dissatisfaction with the security and defence contributions of European states, an issue long-standing from the Cold War, with efforts in the US congress to limit the US deployment to Europe to a proportion of European troop levels.[712] However, US disenfranchisement with 'European free-riding' was brought to a head in the post-Cold War period and made clear with US expectation for EU states to take up a role in security and defence during the Yugoslav crisis of 1991, in which US Secretary of State Baker commented, "We do not have a dog in that fight".[713] In this case the EU states failed to live up to the task and according to Toje, "Washington was thoroughly unimpressed by the ineffectual EU initiatives to end the conflict".[714]

Contrary to expectations that the end of the Cold War would see a loosening of the bonds of integration between European states, it was in this post-Cold War period that moves towards closer integration took place, not least with regards to the security and defence dimension.[715] This supports the proposition that the development was not in response to the emergence or strengthening of existential threats, but rather an attempt to respond to the exacerbation of the alliance dilemma for EU states, as the US had made clear that its security and defence focus would no longer be as tightly interlinked with European interests as during the Cold War period.

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[712] P. Williams (1985), 'The Nunn amendment, burden-sharing and US troops in Europe', *Survival*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 2-10.

[713] J. Baker (2001), *Speech*, quoted in D. Halberstam (2002), *War in a Time of Peace*, Simon & Schuster, New York, p. 46.

[714] A. Toje (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[715] See, J. Howorth (2000), *op. cit.*, p. 379.; R. N. Lebow (1994), 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 249-277.

Material and Ideational Factors in Interaction

Overall, both the UK and German positions on the development of the CSDP may be regarded as multifaceted. Whilst both states have recognised the value of a competent toolset for the EU to address certain security issues, both place important caveats on their support. To a certain extent this is understandable within the confines of a realist system-level analysis utilising the concept of bandwagoning. This would be to understand the development of the CSDP as a means by which EU states may ameliorate the alliance dilemma through developing niche contribution to the valuable transatlantic alliance whilst at the same time not wishing to imperil said alliance through side-lining NATO, which binds European security and defence with the US.

However, this still leaves puzzling aspects with regards to specific UK and German approaches to the CSDP. Why, for example, the UK took an early leadership role in developing a security and defence aspect to the European integration project, but since its support has somewhat waned. Indeed, Biscop questions in 2012 whether the UK should be considered 'leading or leaving' the drive towards greater EU security and defence cooperation.[716] Similarly, the German position on the CSDP may be regarded equally puzzling, with German contribution to limited bandwagoning through transatlantic division of labour somewhat lacking (indeed, not only through the CSDP) and incommensurate with its newfound post-Cold War relative power status.[717]

To further our understanding of such issues, the UK and German approaches towards the development of the CSDP may be seen to be at the intersection of both changes in the international environment and domestic pressures, related amongst other factors to the facets of security culture discussed above.

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[716] S. Biscop (2012), 'The UK and European Defence: leading or leaving?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 6, pp. 1297-1313.

[717] B. Schreer (2013), 'The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use of Force', in, J. Matlary and M. Petersson (eds.), *NATO's European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will*, Palgrave, London.

UK – Material Power and Identity in Interaction

In the UK, there was a pronounced shift in approach towards support for greater European autonomy in security and defence at the end of the Cold War. This can be illustrated perhaps most starkly through the juxtaposition of two quotes either side of this major change in the distribution of material capability within the international system. Whereas Prime Minister Thatcher in 1989 noted that, "all military matters should continue to be conducted through NATO and the Warsaw Pact", Prime Minister Major regarded in 1991 that "NATO must adapt to the process of European integration. I am strongly in favour of Europe doing more for its own defence".[718] Initially, the UK pursued Europe 'doing more for its own defence' through the NATO framework, specifically through the creation of a NATO rapid reaction forced comprised solely of European troops – the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.[719] However, whilst this may be interpreted as a first move towards ameliorating the alliance dilemma, as Saracino notes, it was largely ineffectual in terms of leaving European forces heavily reliant on US capability provided within NATO, specifically with regards to operational planning, transport and communications.[720]

Following this, the UK supported an enhancement of the WEU through the Anglo-Italian proposal of October 1991, calling for a WEU force capable of power-projection. This UK proposal too was closely to be linked to NATO, as WEU units to were still to be available to NATO through 'double-hatting'.[721] The eventual outcome of this was evident at Maastricht later that year, however, this development too was

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[718] Quoted in, D. Peters (2015), *Constrained Balancing: The EU's Security Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 125.

[719] I. Manners (2000), *Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 192.

[720] P. Saracino (1994), 'ARRC at the Sharp End: NATO's Rapid Reaction Emergency Service', *International Defence Review*, Vol. 27, Vo. 5, pp. 33-35.

[721] T. Birch and J. Crotts (1993), 'European Defence Integration: National Interests, National Sensitivities', in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), *The State of the European Community, Vol. 2: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder (CO), p. 271.

ultimately flawed in ameliorating the alliance dilemma, as the legal authority of the EU to draw on the WEU was not utilised over the 1990s, despite numerous opportunities to engage operationally during this period, particularly in the Balkans.[722]

It was only following these failures that the UK increasingly acknowledged the 'problem-solving' benefits of greater cooperation on security and defence through the EU, specifically evident in the "vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy" for the EU noted in the 1998 *Strategic Defence Review*.[723] This was in the wake of a post-Kosovo report by the influential think-tank, the Centre for European Reform, led by Charles Grant, which had issued a call for the UK to pursue a greater European cooperation in this policy area.[724]

Prior to this had been two other major reviews of the UK's armed forces capability in the post-Cold War period, the 1990 *Options for Change* and the 1994 *Front Line First* papers, both of which had enacted major cuts in British armed forces manpower and defence expenditure.[725] The rationale behind such cuts was, as the 1998 Review noted most strongly, that the post-Cold War strategic environment contained "no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe".[726] Instead, as the 1998 Review emphasised, British security and defence was to be orientated towards expeditionary warfare rather than traditional territorial defence. As Blair stated in 1998, "the military challenges we face are increasingly about crisis prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping - about humanitarian operations rather than the collective defence of territory."[727] A year earlier, the UK had agreed to an EU contribution in dealing with

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[722] European Union (1992), *Op. cit.*, Article J. 4. 2.; Article J. 7.
[723] MoD (2002), *Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, London, point 39.
[724] C. Grant (1999), *European Defence post-Kosovo*, Centre for European Reform, London.
[725] MoD (1990), *Options for Change,* London.; MoD (1994), *Front Line First,* London.
[726] MoD (1998), *Strategic Defence Review,* London, p. 8.
[727] T. Blair (1998), *op. cit.*

such challenges with the integration of the Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty of the European Union at Amsterdam, implicitly marking a clear division of tasks with NATO's Article V.[728]

Arguably, the core moves from the UK on EU security and defence cooperation came towards the end of 1998, first in October at an EU summit at Pörtschach where the UK supported the EU fielding military force, a position maintained by the UK in an unprecedented meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna that November, before being fully solidified with a British-French declaration at Saint Malo in December. The joint-declaration of this summit called for an EU "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises", however, it also importantly highlighted that NATO remained "the foundation of the collective defence of its members".[729] Writing in 2000, Howorth observed that there was more progress on integrating European security and defence "in the 18 months since Saint Malo than the entire 50 years preceding the summit".[730] This bilateral initiative was later integrated into EU policy, through the CSDP, which itself formed an important element of the earlier formed CFSP, and effectively signalled the end for the ineffective efforts at creating an ESDI within NATO.[731]

Whilst there is voluminous literature marking Saint Malo as a 'turning point' in the UK approach to the eventual CSDP, it is also important to understand the context of British policy developments since the end of the Cold War, as we have seen.[732] The

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[728] European Union (1997), *op. cit.* See also, F. Algieri (1998), 'Die Reform der GASP - Anleitung zu begrenztem gemeinsamen Handeln', in W. Weidenfeld (ed.), *Amsterdam in der Analyse*, Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, pp. 89-120.; R. Hunter (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[729] UK and France (1998), *op. cit.*
[730] J. Howorth (2000), 'Britain, NATO and the CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 379.
[731] European Union (1992), *op. cit.*
[732] See, S. Biscop (1999), 'The UK's Change of Course: A New Chance for the ESDI', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 253-268.; R. G. Whitman (1999), 'Amsterdam's Unfinished Business:

timing and sequence of these UK policy moves may be understood as a pragmatic shift towards limited bandwagoning to ameliorate the alliance dilemma over this period, with the UK increasingly recognising the need for greater European autonomy in security and defence but not wishing to undermine the 'special relationship', in both material and ideational dimensions. As noted though, early efforts through NATO and the WEU were insufficient, leaving European states dependent on US capability to launch and conduct missions autonomously and thus the EU as a means to develop as aspect of bandwagoning was emphasised. Furthermore, the unpalatability of dependence on the US had been made increasingly clear over this period, from as early as the 1990/91 Gulf War[733], before being reinforced in the Balkans over the 1990s[734], though the Bartholomew Memorandum had expressed that the US did not wish European states to "reduce or marginalize the US role in Europe".[735]

The UK may therefore be viewed as opting to respond to system-level incentives through means that would least imperil the 'special relationship', by closely linking in the development of European security and defence cooperation with NATO. However, this preference had limits and was balanced with clear moves towards pursuing a greater EU autonomy in security and defence, particularly with the Petersberg tasks as a guideline and NATO's collective defence as a boundary.

The Blair Government's Imitative and the Future of the Western European Union', *Occasional Paper*, No. 7, Institute for Security Studies.; A. Dorman (2001), 'Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era', *Defence Analysis*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 187-202.; S. Mayer (2003), 'Die Erklarung von St. Malo und die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Bedingungsfaktoren des britichen Strategiewandels 1998', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 133-156.

[733] See quotes from Foreign Secretary Hurd, in S. Kirby and N. Hooper (1991), *The Cost of Peace: Assessing Europe's Security Options*, Routledge, London, pp. 85-87. Also, J. Myers (1992), *The Western European Union: Pilar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC*, Stone & Stone, London, p. 52.

[734] R. De Wijk (2000), 'Convergence Criteria: Measuring Input or Output?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 401. See also, D. S. Yost (2000), 'The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union', *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 97-128.

[735] Quoted in S. Duke (2000), *op. cit.*, p. 95.

These incentives have also been referred to by UK policy makers, such as Blair stating, "We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own".[736] Such sentiments were subsequently echoed in the EU's own 2003 ESS, which the UK played a key role in shaping.[737] Indeed, Blair explicitly acknowledged the opportunity for the UK "to influence the debate in Europe" through the ESS.[738] Both the ESS and British 2002 *Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter* document examined security and defence threats in a post-9-11 context, with an emphasis on their transnational nature that would therefore require multilateral responses.

Based on such assessments, the UK identified the ability of the EU to be a useful component in shaping the international security environment going forward, both on diplomatic and military levels to 'problem-solve' such threats, particularly in the wake of the 2003 Defence White Paper.[739] This document, entitled *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, initiated a further round of budgetary and manpower cutbacks on the UK armed forces. Early UK backing of an EU role in security and defence was illustrated through support and contribution to early EU operations once NATO

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[736] T. Blair (1999a), 'Address at NATO's 50th Anniversary', *Speech*, Washington DC, 08/03/1999. Available Online: http://www.ukpol.co.uk/tony-blair-1999-speech-at-natos-50th-anniversary/

[737] M. Overhaus & H. W. Maull (2004), 'Interview with Dr Heusgen on the Genesis of the ESS', *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, Vol. 5, No. 14, pp. 29-31.; C. Major (2006), 'The European Security and Defence Policy: Preserve of a Franco-German-British Directorate?', *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association*, San Diego, CA, USA, 22/03/06. Available Online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98577_index.html, [Accessed September 2013].

[738] T. Blair (2003), *Doorstep interview by the Prime Minister in Brussels*, Brussels, 12/12/2003. Available Online: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050301192918/http://number10.gov.uk/page4987 [Accessed 23 June 2013.]

[739] MoD (2003), *Defence White Paper*, London.

'primacy' had been made clear,[740] playing an important role in developing the Battlegroup concept,[741] founding of the EDA[742], and focusing upon the CSDP in its 2005 EU Presidency (which included the launch of a number of EU missions).[743]

However, such developments were framed by the UK as increasing EU member states' autonomy, rather than EU independence, somewhat summed up by Simon Webb, policy director at the MoD, in observing, "Everything we can do to make the EU more usable actually provides a capacity that is available also to NATO".[744] Thus, to a certain extent at least, we may interpret the development of a pragmatic problem-solving approach to the CSDP from the UK, which is not only in line with system incentives to bandwagon in a limited way with the US, but also ideational factors related to UK security culture.

This interplay between system-level material power incentives and ideational factors may also be viewed in the UK approach to the CSDP through the security culture feature of 'outsized ambition'.

The UK government's eye on leadership was illustrated in its domestic presentation of the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, which emphasised the opportunity for the UK to take an ambitious lead on the security and defence dimension of EU integration, whilst concurrently playing down the potential for EU independence from NATO. This was particularly notable as it differed substantially from the domestic

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[740] T. Blair, (2002), 'PM Statement on European Council Meeting', *Speech*, London, 16/12/02.; C. Mace (2008), 'Operation Concordia: Developing a European Approach to Crisis Management', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 485.

[741] L. Chappel (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 417-439.

[742] J. Mawdsley (2015),' France, the UK and the EDA', in N. Karampekios and I. Oikonomou (eds.), *The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe*, Routledge, London. pp. 139-154.

[743] G. Faleg (2013), 'United Kingdom: The Elephant in the Room', in F. Santopinto and M. Price (eds.), *National Approaches to European Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings,* CEPS, Brussels, pp. 132-154.

[744] House of Lords (2004), 'Evidence of Simon Webb, Policy Director MoD', Minutes of Evidence, 04/03/04, *Paper 180*, European Union Committee (Sub-Committee C) - EU Security Strategy, Available Online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/180/4030402.htm

legitimisation presented by other states. As Zielonka notes, France, in complete contrast to the UK, emphasised the positive possibilities for an EU defence independent from NATO.[745] This is also noted as differing from other EU member states, such as the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, in how these developments were presented domestically, suggesting that internal dynamics may indeed play a contextual role in shaping the UK perspective on CSDP development.[746] Furthermore, the interplay of system-level material power and ideational factor influence may be viewed through UK attempts to address the 'ambition-capability' gap via the CSDP, with its development allowing for the efficient utilisation of limited resources to fulfil an outsized influence role, leading within the EU and globally.[747] As Blair stated, the UK believed "that by being part of Europe we advance our own self-interest as the British nation. This is a patriotic cause."[748] Such a reference to self-interest may be conceived of not only in terms of the development of material power capability to ameliorate the alliance dilemma, but also the reinforcement of outsized ambitions related to UK security culture. Indeed, as Dover points out, security and defence was identified as an important area that the UK could be seen to be playing a leading role internationally.[749] Bearing in mind the circumstances under which moves towards EU security and defence were developing, White argues that such a regional leadership role for the UK in the European integration project had been made all the more pressing as it was already clear that the UK would not be joining the other major development at the time, the

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[745] J. Zielonka (2001), 'Transatlantic Relations: Beyond the Common Foreign and Security Policy', in H. Gardner and R. Stefanova (eds.), *The New Transatlantic Agenda*, Ashgate Press, Aldershot, p. 69.
[746] *Ibid*. See also, G. Edwards (2000), 'Europe's Security and Defence Policy and Enlargement – A triumph of hope over experience?', *EUI Working Paper 69*, European University Institute, Florence.
[747] S. Lehne (2012), 'The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy', *Carnegie Europe*, Brussels, 05/07/12. Available Online: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2012/07/05/big-three-in-eu-foreign-policy-pub-48759
[748] T. Blair (1999), 'The Case for Britain in Europe', *Speech*, London Business School, 14/10/1999. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/business/1999/jul/27/emu.theeuro2
[749] R. Dover (2007), Europeanization of British Defence Policy, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 49.

European Monetary Union.[750] In contrast, the CSDP was an area in which the UK could fulfil its ambition to play a lead regional role, not least due to comparative UK advantage in security and defence; being one of the EU's strongest military powers alongside extensive expeditionary experience.[751] As Blair stated, the intention was to put Britain "at the heart of the European integration project".[752] This was also evident in strategic documentation, such as the 'New Chapter', making clear the UK government's goal, "to shape the evolution of new multinational doctrine", including through the EU's emerging multilateral crisis management framework.[753]

However, it must also be acknowledged that this UK leadership role with regards to the CSDP diminished in the time subsequent to Saint Malo. This disengagement was witnessed clearly by 2007, where the UK opted not to contribute any forces to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, limiting its support to financial assistance and since then UK CSDP support has been very much on a case-by-case basis.[754] The UK has supported EU involvement in Iraq (EUJUST LEX) and Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), following US-led interventions in these states, but not countenanced the operational deployment of the EU Battlegroup. This too may also be linked to security culture, through UK concerns regarding the EU as a credible means to problem-solve rather than support for an independent EU. Specifically, Faleg cites the scepticism of interviewed UK policy makers regarding EU capacity to realise, "impact on the ground", rather than only making institutional and conceptual progress.[755] Pohl too, cites such scepticism, noting a UK official regarding opposition to EUFOR

[750] B. White (2001), *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, p. 118.
[751] See, S. Croft (2001), *Britain and Defence 1945-2000*, Routledge, London.
[752] T. Blair (1997), Address to the Lord Mayor's Banquet, *Speech*, London, 10/11/1997.
[753] MoD (2002), *Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 13.
[754] C. O'Donnell (2011), 'Britain's Coalition government and EU defence Cooperation: Undermining British Interests', *International Affairs*, Vol. 87. No. 2, pp. 419-433.
[755] G. Faleg (2013), *op. cit*, p. 150.

Tchad/CAR,regarding the operation to "achieve no fundamental change in the security situation", and instead "distracted forces" from other important areas (namely Afghanistan and Iraq).[756] Defence Secretary George Robertson somewhat summed up this UK opposition to CSDP institution building rather than capability creation, in stating, "you cannot send a wiring diagram to a conflict".[757] Indeed, Blair, noted that "European defence is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities", with this also being a focus within NATO, as demonstrated by the Defence Capabilities Initiative, launched at its 1999 Washington Summit and subsequently built upon with the Prague Capability Commitment.[758]

From the perspective of a 'problem-solving' security culture and an understanding of the CSDP as partial means towards realizing 'outsized ambitions', rather than ideological commitment to European multilateralism, if the CSDP is not perceived to be capable of 'deliverables', then UK support may be expected to waver. As Faleg concludes, if the CSDP is not understood to be providing 'value for money', there is little normative motive for the UK to engage with it.[759]

The reverse of this, however, is that where there may be regarded synergy between CSDP development and fulfilling UK ambitions, the UK will take a more enthusiastic position towards the CSDP. This is arguably evident with the 'comprehensive approach' of the EU. As a House of Commons Defence Committee report identifies, the 'comprehensive approach' of the EU (as discussed above) is viewed by the UK as a comparative advantage for utilising the CSDP toolkit (as

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[756] B. Pohl (2014), 'To what ends? Governmental interests and European Union (non-) intervention in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 201. (191-211)

[757] G. Robertson (1999), quoted in Howorth, J. (2002), 'France, NATO and European Security: Status Quo Unstainable; New Balance Unattainable?', *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 7.

[758] T. Blair (1999a), *op. cit.*; M. Clarke and P. Cornish (2002), 'The European defence project and the Prague summit, *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 777-788.

[759] G. Faleg (2013), *op. cit.*, pp. 132-154.

opposed NATO/UN/Coalition forces).[760] Indeed, Faleg cites the belief of UK officials

that the EU's 'comprehensive approach' both benefited and formed a part of the pursuit

of the UK's own broader 'comprehensive' grand strategy.[761]

Such UK support for the EU's 'comprehensive approach' as a pragmatic means

to achieve concrete results may be illustrated through reference to EU anti-piracy action

at the Horn of Africa. This was a clear occasion where NATO resources were stretched

in relation to Afghanistan and wider terrorism monitoring tasks, therefore UK support

for *Atalanta* being undertaken through a CSDP framework became logical. Indeed, the

UK provided a Multi-National Headquarters at its site in Northwood for the

EUNAVFOR OHQ, which also hosts NATO's Allied Maritime Command

(MARCOM) at this location.[762] As such, this site provided NATO's, *Ocean Shield*

OHQ, which had overlapping goals with the CSDP operation, and to which the UK also

contributed warships (the UK did not initially provide ships to *Atalanta*, but did do so

subsequently).[763]

Furthermore, this joint effort had quantifiable results with the reduction and

prevention of piracy, allowing for the successful conclusion of the NATO mission in

December 2016, though the EU mission remains ongoing at the time of writing.[764] In

addition, EUNAVFOR Somalia may be regarded as providing an exemplar of the type

of civilian-military coordination central to the EU's security and defence niche in a

'comprehensive approach', including integration with EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor

[760] House of Commons (2010), 'The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace', *Defence Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2009-10*, 18/03/10, p. 1.

[761] G. Faleg (2013), *op. cit.*

[762] MoD (2015), '2010 to 2015 government policy: piracy off the coast of Somalia', *Policy Paper*, London, 08/05/15. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-piracy-off-the-coast-of-somalia/2010-to-2015-government-policy-piracy-off-the-coast-of-somalia#appendix-2-the-uks-contribution-to-international-efforts-to-prevent-piracy-at-sea

[763] *Ibid*.

[764] NATO (2016), 'NATO concludes successful counter-piracy mission', *Press Release*, Washington DC, 15/12/16. Available Online: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_139420.htm

and efforts to enable the prosecution of captured pirates (a clear value-added of the EU toolset compared to NATO).[765] This EU 'comprehensive approach' to Somalia is also evident in the establishment of the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa, which provides an interactive website for maritime industry vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden with the latest anti-piracy advice, including navigation alerts and guidance in response to pirate attacks.[766]

However, there is something of a contradiction in the UK's attitude to the CSDP, for whilst the UK pursues a pragmatic approach towards developing the 'problem-solving' capacity of the CSDP, it has also played an important role in blocking developments that would otherwise enhance EU capability for such action. The most notable instance of this is the UK's veto of a permanent and standing EU military headquarters. At present, the EU 'borrows' its OHQ from either NATO, through the Berlin Plus arrangement, from a member state acting as a 'framework nation', or, since 2004, may utilise an independent EU Operations Centre (OpsCen).[767] This latter option, part of the EUMS, is not permanent and limited in size, thus can only manage operations of around 2,000 troops.[768] The UK opposed the usage of OpsCen for several years though, and continues to block the creation of a standing EU OHQ.[769] The establishment of a permanent and standing EU OHQ has been argued to be important for the smooth conduct of CSDP missions by national policymakers, supranational agents and scholars, particularly in enabling the EU to act militarily with haste and be capable of dealing with challenging operations.[770] Nevertheless, the UK

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[765] C. Gebhard and P. Norheim-Martinsen (2011), *op. cit.*, pp. 221-241.
[766] European Union (2017d), *About MSCHOA and OP ATALANTA*, Available Online: http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us
[767] S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux (2014), *op. cit.*, p. 181.
[768] M. E. Smith (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 121.
[769] S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux (2014), *op. cit.*, p. 181.
[770] See, N. Hynek (2011), 'EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ', *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 81-102.; L. Simon and A. Mattelaer (2011), 'EUnity of Command: The Planning and Conduct of CSDP Operations', *Egmont*

consistently opposed the creation of this, making the case that such a headquarters in Brussels would not only undermine the intergovernmental underpinnings of EU security and defence integration but also could be "antagonistic to, and potentially undermining, NATO".[771] British Foreign Secretary Hague described plans for an EU OHQ as a "red line" for the UK, stating that it would "block any such move now and in the future".[772] Whilst the UK not wishing to undermine NATO is consistent with system-level material power incentives related to bandwagoning, the US has urged the UK to build a stronger EU defence capability and other EU member states have pushed for this development most strongly. [773] If it is accepted that the establishment of a permanent OHQ enhances the EU's niche capability whilst also not being contrary to limited alignment with the US, it is therefore important to consider domestic security culture attitudes towards European integration in shaping the UK approach to this aspect of the CSDP. In light of this, we may understand UK opposition to the EU OHQ partly through reference to ideational factors, namely beliefs related to European supranationalization.

The UK has, however, supported CSDP developments that better integrate the EU with NATO structures. This has included the establishment of a Permanent Liaison

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Paper, No. 41, pp. 1-26.; BBC News (2016), 'Juncker proposes EU military headquarters', 14/09/16. Available Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37359196 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux (2014), *op. cit.*, p. 181

[771] P. Koutrakos (2013), *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, Oxford EU Law Library, Oxford, p. 102.

[772] The Telegraph (2011), 'Britain blocks EU plans for 'operational military headquarters'', *Article*, London, 18/07/11, Available Online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html

[773] This point was made most strongly by US Ambassador Nuland at a speech in London, "You will think this is strange, a little suspicious -- to have the US Ambassador to NATO, standing here, urging you – the British and international leaders of the future to build a stronger EU... I am here in London today to say that the United States needs, the UK needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough." V. Nuland (2008), 'Bringing Transatlantic Security into the 21st Century', *Speech*, London, 25/02/08.

Team in 2005 at the EUMS and, since 2006, an EU Cell operational at SHAPE.[774] Furthermore, the UK was a key supporter of the Berlin Plus agreement allowing the EU to draw upon NATO assets and capabilities.[775] Difficulties surrounding NATO-EU cooperation became clear soon afterwards though, not least following the accession of Cyprus in 2004 and a 'veto game' with NATO member Turkey being commenced. This limited Turkish involvement in the CSDP, which had previously contributed as a third-party to *Althea*, and blocked Turkey from participating in the EDA. As the EU refused to agree the exchange of classified material with Turkey on the one side, Turkey blocked the sharing of NATO intelligence information to the EU. Effectively, as Aghniashvili argues, this limited the ability of the EU as an instrument through which member states could burden-share with NATO.[776] Furthermore, this can perhaps also be used to frame the UK's moves towards deeper bilateral agreements with European partners, notably the Lancaster House agreement with France in November 2010, being due to difficulties in EU development but a continuation of response to system-level material power incentives.[777]

In sum, the UK may be regarded a supporter of CSDP development and utilisation particularly in areas where there is a synergy with UK security culture and bandwagoning efforts with the US, such as with *Atalanta*, missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and dividing tasks with NATO in the Balkans supports this. Such CSDP operations can match UK aspiration with EU capability to achieve concrete results in terms of delivering security goals, thus aligning well with the 'pragmatic' but 'ambitious' UK

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[774] European Union (2017), 'Military Staff of the European Union', *Eur-Lex*, Brussels. Available Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r00006
[775] K. Longhurst and A. Miskimmon (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 84.
[776] T. Aghniashvili (2016), 'Towards More Effective Cooperation? The Role of States in Shaping NATO-EU Interaction and Cooperation', *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 67-90.
[777] UK and France (2011), *Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation*, signed 02/11/10, Lancaster House, London.

security culture. However, it is also clear that there have been difficulties for the UK with the CSDP in cases where such synergy is lacking, particularly where there is felt to be a danger of weakening transatlantic ties. This may represent a limited bandwagoning response to the international system, perhaps shaped also by factors of ideological commitment to the 'special relationship' and lack of ideological fervour for European integration.[778]

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[778] A. Menon (2010), *op. cit.*

Germany – Material Power and Identity in Interaction

In contrast, the German position on the CSDP has been largely consistent in its efforts to solidify the EU as a multilateral framework through which a certain type of security and defence policy may be pursued over the post-Cold War period, at least in principal. However, in practice Germany may be accused of what we may term 'underbandwagoning' in relation to US unipolarity (indeed in relation to burden-sharing within Europe, and not only through the CSDP) – i.e., not contributing to the division of security tasks within the alliance commensurate with its material power status.[779] An appreciation of this principal/practice juxtaposition may be gained in light of our realist-constructivist consideration of the intersection of material power capability at the system-level and facets of German security culture at the unit-level however.

At the end of the Cold War, reunification dominated the German political agenda. As Peters notes, "the issue of European security and defence cooperation did not really enter the German agenda before December 1990", and Germany "did not bring up potentially controversial issues of European defence cooperation until unification had been secured".[780] Germany did put forward policy proposals on the future of the European integration project, but did not mention increased security or defence within this remit.[781]

In December 1990, following unification, came a joint-letter from Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand to the Presidency of the EC proposing to make

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[779] This is a play on Schweller's concept of 'underbalancing', see, R. L. Schweller (2004), 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing, International Security', *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 159-201.

[780] D. Peters (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 132 and p. 135.

[781] See, H. Kohl (1990b), 'Die deutsche Frage und die europaische Verantwortung', *Speech*, Paris, 17/01/1990.; H. Genscher (1990), 'Die deutsche Vereinihung als Beitrag zur europaischen Stabilitat', *Speech*, Luxembourg, 23/03/1990.; H. Kohl (1990c), 'Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Sondertagung des Europaischen Rates in Dublin', *Speech*, Bonn, 10/05/1990.

the WEU the defence component of the European integration project.[782] This was formalised into more specific proposals in a joint-paper in February 1991, which stressed the German view that European integration is effectively incomplete without a security and defence dimension.[783] Furthermore, a subsequent joint-letter in October 1991 made clear the German preference that the WEU should be subordinate to the EU and made operationally capable.[784] This latter point was advanced in principal during the German 1991/1992 WEU Presidency in which the Petersberg decision was made. Initially Germany did not specify the NATO relationship, leading to concerns from the US particularly regarding the German-French 'Eurocorps' proposal, but afterwards clarified this force was to remain assigned to NATO.[785] Indeed, Defence Minister Stoltenberg explained at a NATO meeting following the proposal that the idea had been to strengthen NATO and "draw France more closely into NATO structures".[786] Indeed, Chancellor Kohl went as far as to state the WEU was to be a "European foundation" to the Atlantic Alliance that would ultimately "strengthen the transatlantic bond" in line with system-level incentives.[787]

Despite not being present at Saint Malo, Germany may rightly regard itself as being in the 'vanguard' on key early CSDP developments, not least during its EU and WEU Presidency in 1999.[788] Indeed, in his speech to the European Parliament in January 1999 on the aims of this Presidency, Foreign Minister Fischer noted that "the

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[782] F. Laursen and S. Vanhoonacker (1992), *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, pp. 313-314.

[783] W. Wagner (2006), 'Missing in Action? Germany's Bumpy Road from Institution-Building to Substance in European Security and Defence Policy', in G. Hellman (ed.), *Germany's EU Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanization by Default?*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 103.

[784] *Ibid.*

[785] C. Cogan (2001), *The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defence, 1989-2000*, Praeger, Westport (CT), pp. 53-54.

[786] J. Stoltenberg (1991), 08/10/1991, quoted in W. Wagner (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[787] H. Kohl (1991), 'Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa', *Speech*, Berlin, 22/03/1991.

[788] W. Wagner (2005), 'From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European Security and Defence Policy', *German Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 455-469.

EU must develop its own capabilities for military crisis management for cases where the EU collectively understands the need for action but which its North American friends do not wish to be involved".[789] In March 1999, Germany produced a paper for the General Affairs Council in Eltville, proposing "autonomous European-led operations", with a number of institutional proposals.[790] However, this has been noted as very much in contrast to the UK position focused on practical capability development as discussed above, with Foreign Minister Cook emphasising on this occasion that European capabilities rather than institutional questions, should be of paramount importance.[791] Furthermore, also in contrast to the UK, Miskimmon notes that Germany was acting in "a reaction to events, rather than symbolic of Germany's playing a leading role in shaping events".[792]

Since this time, Germany has played an important role in shaping and contributing to the CSDP. Indeed, the case has been made that Germany utilised aspects of the CSDP to build upon the European integration process, with the ESS in particular argued by Irlenkäuser to have been instrumentalised by Germany as a means to re-assert a semblance of European unity following divisions over Iraq, not least on the appropriate juncture to utilise force.[793] As an end in itself, the CSDP was justified by Foreign Minister Fischer as a means to "strengthen European visibility" and allowing European states "to accomplish more of a common foreign and security policy".[794]

[789] J. Fischer (1999), 'Rede Von Bundesminister Fischer in Straßbourg', *Speech*, Strasbourg, 12/01/1999.
[790] Germany (1999), 'Strengthening the Common Policy on Security and Defence', *German Proposal for the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers*, Eltville, 13-14/03/1999.
[791] W. Wagner (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 118.
[792] A. Miskimmon (2007), *Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 109.
[793] P. Daehnhardt (2012), 'Germany in the European Union', in R. Wong & C. Hill (eds.), *National and European Foreign Policy: Towards Europeanization*, Routledge, London. pp. 35-56.
[794] J. Fischer (2001), 'Speech to Deutscher Bundestag', Berlin, cited in, A. Wimmel & E. E. Edwards (2011), 'Party Contestation over the future of European Integration: The Case of Germany', *Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies Association*, Boston (MA), 3-5/03/11.

Indeed, a focus on the CSDP as an "integral" part of the wider European integration project was noted in the 2003 VPR.[795]

The German approach to the CSDP might well be understood on one level through incentives arising from the international system, in the post-Cold War shift to US unipolarity; to reinvigorate the transatlantic security and defence relationship through contributing European value, without also making the US irrelevant to European security. Indeed, German strategic documents repeatedly stress the importance of the NATO alliance, as well as the positive relationship with the US, as bedrocks of its security and defence.[796] In addition, such incentives for Germany were made clear in numerous government statements over the post-Cold War period, from Parliamentary State Secretary for Defence Ottfried Hennig noting, "It is in our vital interests to maintain substantial nuclear and conventional US presence in Europe. The highly desirable stronger political influence of Europe requires also the capability and readiness to take on greater military responsibilities."[797] As Defence Minister Scharping argued during the influential German EU/WEU Presidency, "there will be no competition with NATO", but rather "our American friends rightly expect that Europe, in an act of solidarity, takes over a larger part of the burden, especially where European interests and responsibilities are primarily concerned".[798] Thus, as Chancellor Merkel has more recently argued, the CSDP is viewed by Germany not as "competition" to NATO, but as representing a "new form of cooperation with NATO".[799]

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[795] BMVg, (2003), *op. cit.*, guideline 50, p. 11.

[796] See, BMVg (2003), *op. cit.*, Berlin.; BMVg (2006), Das Weißbuch, Berlin.; BMVg (2011), *op. cit*, Berlin.; BMVg (2016), Das Weißbuch, Berlin.

[797] O. Hennig (1991), 'Der Auftrag der Bundeswehr im vereinigten Deutschland', *Speech*, Bielefeld, 12/06/1991.

[798] R. Scharping (1999), 'Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung bei der Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft', *Speech*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 18/04/1999.

[799] A. Merkel (2009), 'Address by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the 45th Munich Security Conference', *Speech*, Munich, 07/02/09. Available Online:

However, how this has been responded to by Germany may be argued to be shaped domestically, representing an interplay of ideational factors with system-level material power incentives. Ideationally, this has been discussed in relation to Germany's 'multilateral reflex', aversion to the use of force and amilitary identity, as discussed with regards to German security culture above.[800] In light of these features, it may be argued that German multilateralism served both practical and normative considerations, with practical limitations placed on the pace and scope of German engagement with the developing CSDP being evident. For example, whilst Germany enthusiastically engaged in the more symbolic and institutional developments towards an eventual CSDP as discussed above, it resisted binding commitments to raise defence investment expenditure and opposed reforms of the Bundeswehr that would threaten its long-standing policy on conscription, viewed as central to the 'amilitary' identity.[801]

Furthermore, Germany particularly supported the civilian dimension to the CSDP, as Rudolph Adam notes.[802] Irlenkäuser provides an illustrative example of Germany 'civilising' the CSDP, through insisting on the wording of 'preventative engagement' being substituted for the initial wording of 'pre-emptive engagement' in the 2003 ESS.[803] This has also been evident over the operationalisation of the CSDP, where over the first ten years Germany was the second largest contributor to EU missions, behind only France, but at the same time somewhat notable by its absence of in-field participation in a number of military operations, namely EUFOR TChad/RCA

http://www.bundesregierung.de/statisch/nato/Content/EN/Reden/2009/2009-02-07-rede-merkel-sicherheitskonferenz-en_layoutVariant-Druckansicht.html [Accessed July 2016.]

[800] See, L. Chappel (2012), *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[801] F. Meiers (2001), 'Deutschland: Der dreifache Spagat', *Security and Peace*, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 67.

[802] R. Adam (2002), 'Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Eurpäischen Rat von Nizza', in G Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (ed.), *Europäische Außenpolitik*, Nomos, Baden-Basen, p. 141.

[803] J. Irlenkäuser (2004), 'A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Union's Security Strategy A German Perspective', *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, Vol. 5, No. 13, pp. 7-14.

(2008) and EUFOR RCA (2014).[804] In contrast, Germany was a strong proponent of EUNAVFOR Atalanta (2008), participated in EUTM Mali (2012) and led EUFOR DRC (2008), providing the operational headquarters.[805] However, as Simon observes, such German support "usually came at the expense of or reductions in military ambition", in line with features of German security culture discussed above.[806]

This point may be illustrated in reference to Afghanistan, which Germany argued the CSDP could provide important civilian crisis management capability for during its Presidency in early 2007.[807] Through the EU, Germany was the lead nation for EUPOL Afghanistan, launched in June 2007 to support the Afghan National Police. As Smith recognises, this was partly a rebranded continuation of a German national mission (the German Police Project Office), which had been operating in Afghanistan to assist in the reconstruction of Afghan police forces since April 2002.[808] It is also important to note that this action may be regarded of key value to the transatlantic alliance, as the US had been in a process of recognising the importance of Afghan Police Reform to its own objectives and thus US contribution to funding in this area had increased over one-hundredfold, from $25.5 million in 2002, to $2.7 billion in 2007.[809]

[804] C. Wurzer (2013), 'A German Vision of CSDP: 'It's Taking Part That Counts'', in F. Santopinto and M. Price (eds.), *National Approaches to European Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings,* CEPS, Brussels, pp. 27-46.

[805] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[806] L. Simon (2013), 'The EU-NATO conundrum in perspective', in L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (eds.), *International Relations Theory and European Security: We Thought We Knew*, Routledge, London p. 152.; K. Brummer (2013), 'The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-20.

[807] E. Gross (2011), 'The EU in Afghanistan', in E. Gross and A. E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions and Politics*, Routledge, London, pp. 117-130.; R. Kempin and S. Steinicke (2009), 'EUPOL Afghanistan: Europas ziviles Engagement am Rande des Glaubwürdigkeitsverlustes', in M. Asseburg and R. Kempin, *Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und -Operationen*, SWP, Berlin.

[808] M. E. Smith (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 134.

[809] R. Kempin and S. Steinicke (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 138.

Indeed, according to Koustrakos the decision to launch the CSDP mission was largely the result of US encouragement for greater burden-sharing of responsibilities in Afghanistan with her allies and the German government pushing for this action to be taken under the CSDP framework, demonstrating German preferences for the EU role, but also transatlantic consideration.[810] However, German involvement in this area may also be argued to be illustrative of wider German preferences for the shape and scope of CSDP missions, namely multilateral operations with a focus upon a civilian security toolset. This is emphasised when taken in comparison to the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, larger in scope than EUPOL Afghanistan, with over 500 trainers as opposed to the EUPOL's mandated 200, and aimed at developing 'counter insurgency forces' through integrated military and police training. In contrast, the EUPOL mission led by Germany had a greater civilian policing approach, more in line with German amilitary security culture as outlined above.[811]

Like the UK, Germany also initially opposed calls for the establishment of an EU OHQ. As Simon notes, the creation of an EU OHQ would represent "military and strategic autonomy from NATO".[812] This was understood in Germany to be a step in the wrong direction for the EU, which preferences the civilian crisis management role for the CSDP, with hard security tasks delegated to NATO. Longhurst and Miskimmon sum up the German emphasis, on "the indispensability of the transatlantic partnership", as, "NATO remained essential for wider combat missions, whilst EU forces should focus upon the Petersberg Tasks.".[813] It was only during the nadir in relations between

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[810] P. Koustrakos (2013), *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 147.

[811] European Union (2015), 'EU Police Mission in Afghanistan', *Fact Sheet*, Available Online: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/pdf/eupol-afghanistan_factsheet_2015_en.pdf

[812] L. Simon (2017), 'Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma', *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 185-212.

[813] K. Longhurst and A. Miskimmon (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 88.

Washington and Berlin over the 2003 Iraq invasion, arguably a demonstration to German policymakers regarding the seriousness of the alliance dilemma, that Germany became more sympathetic to calls for greater EU strategic autonomy, including a Belgian proposal for the creation of an EU OHQ at Tervuren.[814] This proposal was scaled back, not least due to UK opposition (who supported the US position on Iraq), and compromise reached involving the creation of a civilian-military cell to improve EU planning and the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation for EU capability development.[815]

Conclusions

To conclude on Germany, an element of security culture relevance with regards to its approach towards the CSDP seems clear. This may be argued to derive from the 'culture of reticence' towards the use of military force and preference towards embedding external policy multilaterally. However, this potentially begs the question of whether the German approach towards the CSDP might be guided wholly by cultural factors leaving no role for interplay with system-level material power incentives. This important argument can be countered through noting two points. First, that the influence of cultural factors is not logically incompatible with a concurrent important role for material forces, as discussed in Chapter 1. Second, through reference to the 'normalization' process that Germany has undergone in its approach to security and defence, involving an adaptation of German policy towards its position within the strategic environment, including a declining emphasis on amilitarism. This is not to

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[814] Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg (2003), *Brussels Summit*, Brussels, 29/04/03.
[815] A. Menon (2004), 'From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 631-48.

argue that security culture is presented as immutable by constructivist scholars, but rather that the interplay of material and ideational factors should be taken into account in driving cultural change.[816] In particular relation to Germany, as Wurzer points out, both "legal and political restrictions of Germany towards the use of force [have] undergone a gradual relaxation since German reunification".[817]

Such 'normalization' has involved both the reform and utilisation of the Bundeswehr. A key element of reform in opposition to amilitarist German security culture but congruent with material incentives was the gradual hollowing out (in terms of extent and duration) of conscription, before placing it into full abeyance in 2011.[818] In terms of deployment, from *Operation Libelle* in 1997, the first time that the post-second world war German armed forces fired shots in combat[819] to the use of military force in high-intensity operations (alongside civilian capability for low-intensity operations) in Afghanistan have been seen a gradual (albeit temporally uneven) incorporation of Bundeswehr out-of-area involvement as part of the German security toolset.[820] Whilst legally the use of German military force and out-of-area operations is now clearly acceptable under certain circumstances, on the political level recognition for the role of 'hard power' as part of a security and defence toolset was illustrated in the 2009 Bundestag Coalition Agreement.[821] Yet a central tension remains in German policy, as Foreign Minister Westerwelle recognised in stating, "we want to shoulder

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[816] Spiegel (2011b), ''End of an Era' as Germany Suspends Conscription', 04/01/11. Available Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-end-of-an-era-as-germany-suspends-conscription-a-737668.html [Accessed January 2017]

[817] C. Wurzer (2013), *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[818] See, C. O. Meyer (2011), 'The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 669-690.

[819] Bundeswehr (2017), 'Vor 20 Jahre: Operation Libelle - Evakuierung aus Albanien', *Press Release*, 14/03/17. Available Online: https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal

[820] B. Schreer (2013), *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[821] CDU, CSU, FDP (2009), 'Internationale Einsätze und Instrumente deutscher Sicherheitspolitik', Der Koaliionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 26/10/09, Berlin, Available Online: http://www.csu.de/common/_migrated/csucontent/091026_koalitionsvertrag_02.pdf , p. 123.

international responsibilities, but we also want to continue our culture of military restraint", in the wake of President Köhler's resignation in 2010 for suggesting Germany may use military force to further its economic interests.[822] Nevertheless, as Menon rightly notes, "it is too often forgotten how far Germany has come since the 1990s in terms of its willingness to deploy combat troops abroad".[823] Even only taking into account CSDP operations, German contribution must be regarded as remarkable to a degree considering its position in the early 1990s, and this may be interpreted through the interaction of cultural and material forces at play; pressures from the alliance dilemma for Germany to contribute more towards international security, but at the same time influences from elements of its security culture shaping and shoving its policy responses.

In contrast, the influence of the UK's security culture might be regarded as more questionable in guiding the British position towards the CSDP. However, to ignore this element entirely would not tell the whole story, for as Martin and Garnett note, the UK has had ample opportunity to maximise its limited resources to a greater extent by other means.[824] Instead, we might understand the UK approach to the CSDP as also being shaped by aspects of its security culture, specifically with regards to the UK's 'outsized ambition' to impact politics globally and lacking ideological commitment to European integration, in contrast to other EU states. The 'problem-solving' advantages of the CSDP to the UK can be illustrated through a dissonance between stated security and defence objectives and means to achieve them, which EU cooperation develops a

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[822] G. Westerwlle (2010), 'Foreign Minister's Statement to the German Bundestag on NATO's Strategic Concept', *Speech*, Berlin, 11/11/10.; Spiegel (2010), 'German President Horst Köhler Resigns', News Article, Hamburg, 31/05/10. Available Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/controversy-over-afghanistan-remarks-german-president-horst-koeler-resigns-a-697785.html [Accessed April 2016]

[823] A. Menon (2009), 'The ESDP at ten', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, p. 233.

[824] L. Martin and J. C. Garnett (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 83.

capacity towards addressing. This ambition-capability gap was illustrated most starkly in reference to the 2011 intervention in Libya, where the UK had to operate without aircraft carrier capability following the decommission of HMS Illustrious as a cost-saving measure in the previous year's SDSR.[825] In addition though, Libya also demonstrated the limitations of the CSDP toolset, with the stillbirth of EUFOR Libya due to lack of consensus amongst EU states and the US placed into a position of 'leading from behind' on the joint France-UK air campaign.[826] Nevertheless, to a certain extent at least, the CSDP may be argued to allow the UK to address its cultural ambition - material capability gap through encouraging other European states to bear a greater burden (not only with the US, but also with the UK) and through leveraging the relative advantages of the EU's 'comprehensive approach', as was demonstrated with *Atalanta*, thus also illustrating an interplay of material and ideational forces at work.[827]

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[825] MoD (2010), *op. cit.*; N. Hopkins (2011), 'Prolonged Libya effort unsustainable, warns Navy chief', *The Guardian*, News Article, 13/06/11. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/13/prolonged-libya-effort-unsustainable-navy-chief [Accessed January 2017]

[826] M. Boyle (2011), 'Obama: 'leading from behind' on Libya', Print, *The Guardian*, London, 27/08/11.

[827] House of Lords (2012), 'European Defence Capabilities: lessons from the past, signposts for the future', *European Union Select Committee Report 31*, London, 24/04/12.

CHAPTER 5:

Emerging Incentives and Responses

on EU Security and Defence

As outlined in Chapter 4, the realist-constructivist framework seeks to bring understanding of EU Security and Defence cooperation through drawing attention to neglected incentives that may be viewed as underlying its historical and ongoing development. Specifically, this relates to the distribution of power capabilities within an anarchic system, with material capability being understood to be the most effective type of power within this system and the processing of this at the domestic level, such as through the ideational factor of security culture. Whilst Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of this for the approaches of the UK and Germany towards EU security and defence cooperation through the CSDP, this chapter seeks to illustrate the utility of this framework in furthering our understanding of as-yet still emerging incentives and responses with regards to this policy area.

Specifically, this chapter argues that the alliance security dilemma facing EU member states, as discussed in Chapter 4, plays an important role in incentivising security and defence cooperation and that this has been exacerbated by two key processes enacted in 2016, but whose medium to long-term outcomes remain in flux. The first of these relates to the 'America First' agenda of the Trump administration in the US, which took office in January 2017, and the second to 'Brexit', the notification by the UK government to begin a withdrawal process from its EU membership in March 2017.

This chapter therefore begins by exploring the potential impact of these factors. With regards to Brexit, it argues that this not only represents the loss of one of the EU's most capable member states in security and defence, but also a key driver and influential veto player influencing the direction of the CSDP, in addition to being a 'bridge' between the US, NATO and the EU. In reference to the Trump administration's 'America First' agenda, it draws attention to an undermining of European confidence in the reliability of continued US leadership in European security and defence.

Through the lens of the realist-constructivist framework developed over earlier chapters of this thesis, this chapter goes on to argue that these two processes represent an exacerbation of the alliance security dilemma facing EU states, as they serve to highlight the caprices of the US on the one hand, and the shortfalls of the EU to act autonomously in security and defence on the other. The chapter examines EU responses to these challenges, using the previously outlined realist-constructivist analytical framework, arguing that understanding of the significance of these current events in global politics can be brought through considering responses to be driven to a degree by the interaction of material and ideational concerns.

Finally, the chapter returns to the case studies of the UK and Germany. With regards to the UK, it outlines the prospects for continued UK cooperation on security and defence with the EU post-Brexit, illustrating that the outcomes of this process may be expected (and indeed already observed through the ongoing negotiations) to be a product of ideational and material power in interaction. With regards to Germany, it outlines the prospects for an altered 'balance of power' within the EU, where Germany may be expected to take up a greater leadership role (including on security and defence). For Germany, it will argue, EU security and defence cooperation may be regarded as too important to fail, but perhaps still ideationally problematic to lead.

5.1 Trump and Brexit: 'America First' and 'Global 'Britain'

In the US election of Donald Trump US and his administrations 'America First' agenda, as well as the pending exit of the UK from EU membership and the 'Global Britain' vision outlined by Prime Minister May, it is possible to make the case that these events may not only be regarded as shocks to the international community, but highly relevant to the future development of the CSDP.[828] This section of the chapter makes this case through reference to previously discussed concept of the alliance security dilemma argued to be facing the EU, before the responses to these challenges will be explored in relation to the realist-constructivist framework as advanced over the course of earlier chapters.

5.3.i *Trump*

A relatively recent shock in international politics relevant to the 'alliance security dilemma' facing EU states relates to the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, in November, 2016.[829] As President Trump stated in his inaugural address,

> "From this moment on, it's going to be America First. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our border from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength."[830]

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[828] P. Healy and J. W. Peters (2016), 'Donald Trump's Victory Is Met With Shock Across a Wide Political Divide', Article, *The New York Times*, New York, 09/11/2016, Available Online: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/donald-trump-election-reaction.html ; M. Bentham and C. McDonald-Gibson (2016), ''Damn': Eu referendum result shocks world leaders as Britain backs Brexit', Article, *Evening Standard*, London, 24/06/2016, Available Online: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/damn-eu-referendum-result-shocks-world-leaders-as-britain-backs-brexit-a3280031.html

[829] P. Healy and J. W. Peters (2016), *op. cit.*

[830] D. Trump (2017), 'Inaugural address', *Speech*, Washington DC, 20/01/2017. Full Transcript Available Online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address

In a broad sense, as a number of scholars have already noted, this may be reflective of a wider unilateralist and protectionist 'America First' foreign policy doctrine of the US under Trump, reflected in approaches towards a range of international issues related to the rule of law and global governance.[831] With specific regards to security and defence though, this has been evident in a questioning of the continuing relevance and usefulness of the NATO alliance by the Trump Presidential campaign and subsequent administration. Indeed, Trump personally went as far as to suggest that NATO may be regarded as "obsolete" and openly doubted the extent to which US policy-makers should feel bound to commitments of collective defence with allies that have not fulfilled certain "obligations".[832] In an interview with The New York Times, Trump described that he would "force allies to shoulder defence costs that the United States has borne for decades, cancel longstanding treaties he views as unfavourable, and redefine what it means to be a partner of the United States".[833] Such positions, reinforced on a number of occasions, were much to the dismay of European policy-makers, with European Council President Tusk summarising that this "puts the European Union in a difficult situation; with the new administration seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign policy".[834] In light of such statements, analysts such as Keohane have argued that European states would be "wise to plan for

[831] M. Clarke and A. Ricketts (2017), 'Donald Trump and American foreign policy: The return of the Jacksonian tradition', *Comparative Strategy,* Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 366-379.; J. R. Haines (2017), 'Diving a 'Trump Doctrine'', *Orbis*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 125-136.; T. Wright (2016), 'Trump's 19th Century Foreign Policy', *Politico*, Arlington County (VA), 20/01/2016. Available Online: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546
[832] J. Masters and K. Hunt (2017), 'Trump rattles NATO with "obsolete" blast', News Article, *CNN Politics*, 17/01/2017. Available Online: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-takeaways/
[833] D. E. Sanger and M. Haberman, 'Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies Against Attack', News Article, *The New York Times*, New York, 20/07/2016, Available Online: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html
[834] D. Tusk (2017), '"United we stand, divided we fall": letter by President Donald Tusk to the 27 EU heads of state or government on the future of the EU before the Malta summit', *Press Release*, Brussels, 31/01/2017. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31/tusk-letter-future-europe/

their own defence, in case they can no longer depend on NATO - meaning primarily the United States".[835]

Whilst the translation of Trump's rhetoric into substantial policy action are an ongoing matter and therefore the outcomes remain unclear for the moment, there has been evidence to suggest a developing rift in US and European approaches to international affairs across a range of policy areas. This may be observed through executive action to review, abrogate or draw-down US commitments to a number of multilateral treaties, including The Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership and the P5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal Framework.[836] As shall be made clear in the following section of this chapter, this may be regarded as in sharp contrast to the EU, which has restated its commitment to the further development and maintenance of a "ruled-based international order" in its 2017 Global Strategy document.[837]

However, it is important not to overstate the emergence of this possible transatlantic rift with regards to security and defence cooperation. The updated National Security Strategy of the US, published in December 2017, restated the bonds of US-European interests, values and vision, whilst Secretary of Defence Mattis, Secretary of State Tillerson and Vice-President Pence sought to assure European audiences that the US remained committed to collective defence, albeit with the important caveat that "No longer [would] the American taxpayer carry a disproportionate share of the defence of

[835] D. Keohane (2016), 'Make Europe defend again?', *Carnegie Europe*, 18/11/16. Available Online: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/66199

[836] J. W. Knopf (2017), 'Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 26-34.; D. Trump (2017), 'Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord', *Speech*, Washington DC, 01/06/2017. Available Online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-acco ; D. Smith (2017), 'Trump withdraws from Trans-Pacific Partnership amid flurry of orders', News Article, *The Guardian*, London, 23/01/2017. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/donald-trump-first-orders-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp ;

[837] European Union (2016), *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, Brussels, 28/06/2016.

Western values".[838] Indeed, Kaufman draws attention to the historical challenges of the security and defence relationship between the US and her European allies, somewhat suggesting the impact of the Trump Presidency should not be overstated as a threat that cannot be endured.[839] Furthermore, standing alongside NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, Trump later stepped back from his earlier position in declaring NATO to be "no longer obsolete".[840]

Nevertheless, it is possible to point towards an undermining of European confidence in the US as a reliable partner and putative leader of security and defence matters. Indeed, German Chancellor Merkel summarised this succinctly in noting that, "The times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over", following the unexpected omission of the US President to reaffirm commitment to NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause at a meeting of state leaders, and this being subsequent to the aforementioned *volte face.*[841] The implication of this for the EU was drawn out by President of the Commission Junker, noting that the US was "no longer interested in guaranteeing Europe's security in our place", that Europe's security and defence "can no longer be outsourced", and also "deference to NATO can no longer be used as a convenient alibi to argue against greater European efforts" at cooperation in this policy area.[842]

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[838] A. Beesley (2017), 'James Mattis threatens to 'moderate' US backing for NATO over budgets', News Article, *Financial Times*, London, 15/02/2017. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/4af0377e-f3a1-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608

[839] J. P. Kaufman (2017), 'The US perspective on NATO under Trump: lessons of the past and prospects for the future', *International Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 251-266.

[840] J. Johnson (2017), 'Trump on NATO: 'I said it was obsolete. It's no longer obsolete'', *News Article*, Washington Post, Washington DC, 12/04/2017, Available Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/04/12/trump-on-nato-i-said-it-was-obsolete-its-no-longer-obsolete/

[841] P. McGee and G. Parker, 'Europe cannot rely on US and faces life without UK, says Merkel', News Article, *Financial Times*, London, 28/05/2017. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/51ed8b90-43b9-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996

[842] J. Juncker (2017), 'In defence of Europe', *Speech*, Prague, 09/06/2017. Available Online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm

From a realist-constructivist perspective, such statements point towards a sharpening of the alliance security dilemma facing EU member states as outlined in Chapter 3, whereby the danger of US abandonment are becoming progressively clearer. Although policy positions regarding the future US role in European security and defence diverge significantly in Washington, it should be noted that the Trump administration may no longer be dismissed a considerable outlier in advancing the position that its grand strategy formation should consider withdrawing forces from Europe and/or curtail US commitments vis- à -vis NATO.[843] Furthermore, from an EU perspective, such positions may be understood to further incentivise member states to make greater efforts on their own security and defence, including utilising the CSDP to cooperate more autonomously without a reliance on US support and leadership. However, as shall be explored later in this chapter, ideational concerns may be observed to interact with these incentives and the issue of 'Brexit' threatens to pose a potential issue for the EU in achieving meaningful autonomy as a security and defence actor.

5.1.2 *Brexit*

Following the outcome of the referendum asking the British electorate, "Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?", a victory for the 'Leave' campaign, it has been clear that there are certain challenges in forging the future EU-UK relationship.[844] Whilst this referendum was not binding in and of itself, the notification by the UK government of Article 50 of the TEU on 29th March 2017 set in motion the process of EU membership withdrawal, to

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[843] See, B. Posen (2014), *Restraint. A new foundation for US Grand Strategy*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY).; J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt (2016), 'The case for offshore balancing: a superior US grand strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp. 70-83. ; A. Bacevich (2016), 'Ending endless war: a pragmatic military strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 5, pp. 36-44.

[844] L. Peter (2016), 'Brexit: Five challenges for the UK when leaving the EU', News Article, *BBC News*, 24/06/2016. Available Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36575186

complete upon completion of an agreement or two years subsequent to the triggering.[845]

It must be stressed that the process of negotiation between the EU and UK remains ongoing at the time of writing and thus the future configuration of this relationship remains in flux. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to make the case that the now likely loss of the UK as an EU member state has an impact on the union, not least with regards to the security and defence aspect of the European integration project.[846]

In the broadest sense, the outcome of the Brexit referendum may be argued to represent an existential threat to the future of the EU, in the form of being a potential precursor to a wider breakup of the membership.[847] This was acknowledged by Mogherini in the forward to the EUGS, released only weeks following the shock UK referendum result, stating that the "purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned".[848] Whilst as yet there has been little sign that other member states will follow the UK in submitting notification to withdraw from EU membership, it is important for our purposes to consider in greater detail the impact of 'Brexit' in relation to the ongoing development and conduct of the CSDP. This encompasses the material capability and expertise that the UK contributes within the 28 EU member states that may be made unavailable (or less available) for the CSDP upon conclusion of the

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[845] European Council (2017), 'Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) on the UK notification', *Press Release*, Brussels, 23/03/2017. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29/euco-50-statement-uk-notification

[846] S. Biscop (2016), 'All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 431-445. For a wider overview of Brexit policy impact, from a UK perspective, see, V. Miller (2016), 'Brexit: Impact Across Policy Areas', *Briefing Paper*, House of Commons Library, 26/08/16.

[847] See for example, K. Lyons and G. Darroch, 'Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who will be next to leave the EU', News Article, *The Guardian*, London, 27/06/2016. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-who-will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu

[848] European Union (2016b), *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, Brussels, 28/06/2016.

withdrawal process and the impact of this upon the previously discussed alliance security dilemma.[849]

From the standpoint of capability, the UK holds a significant capacity that is nominally available to the EU for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, as we can observe from Figure 4. (below). In terms of R&D and procurement spending, it has been noted that the UK and France are in their own league with regards to EU member states.[850] Furthermore, based on these estimates, the UK is one of only a handful of EU-NATO states (the others being Poland, Greece and Estonia) to currently meet the commitment of spending 2% or more of national GDP on defence.[851]

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[849] Prospects for the availability of UK capability to the CSDP post-Brexit are examined below.
[850] A. Bakker, M. Drent and D. Zandee (2017), 'European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?', *Clingendael Report July 17*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague.
[851] EDA (2017), Collective and National Defence Data, Available Online: http://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-(2015-est)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf

Figure 4. *Estimated EDA Member Expenditures, 2015*. Data Source: EDA (2017), Collective and National Defence Data, Available Online: http://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-(2015-est)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf

The point is further emphasised in relation to a number of specialist capacities that the UK armed forces contribute towards the overall portfolio of the EU members' security and defence assets. This includes strategic airlift capacity, long identified as a vital area of concern for CSDP operations[852], where the UK holds around 50% of heavy

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[852] S. Bicop and J. Colemont (2011), 'Europe Deploys Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP', *Egmont Paper*, No. 49, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, p. 13.

transport aircraft and more than 25% of all heavy transport helicopters among the 28 EU member states.[853] In addition, as Giegerich and Mölling identity, the UK has a number of comparative advantages across air, land and sea forces among the EU-28, with the UK and France being by far the closest member states to achieving full-spectrum military capability.[854]

The importance of the UK within EU security and defence is further emphasised with regards to expertise, where the UK has demonstrated an ability and willingness to deploy its armed forces on high-intensity expeditionary operations around the globe, including acting as the lead nation for multinational divisions and brigades.[855] With regards to intelligence, the UK has also been praised as a European leader in counter-terrorism related information collection, analysis and sharing across European jurisdictions. [856] Indeed, the UK holds accounts for around 40% of the EU-28's electronic-intelligence aircraft and about 50% of CISR (combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) unmanned aerial vehicles. [857] Furthermore, in the field, the UK has been shown to be important for the command and control of operations.[858]

However, it should also be recognised that the UK's substantial catalogue of material power resources and expertise in the arena of security and defence have by and large thus far not been made available to the EU for operational use. Whilst the UK hosts the OHQ for *Operation Atalanta* at Northwood and has, as of February 2018,

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[853] B. Giegerich and C. Mölling (2018), 'The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence', *IISS Report*, February 18, IISS, London, p. 7.

[854] *Ibid*.

[855] See, C. L. Elliot (2015), *High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[856] J. I. Walsh (2006), 'Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union, Institutions are Not Enough', *JCMS*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 625-643.; M. Easton (2018), 'Europol head fears loss of UK influence after Brexit', News Article, *BBC News*, 31/01/2018. Available Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42874985

[857] B. Giegerich and C. Mölling (2018), *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[858] See, S. Biscop (2012), *op. cit.*

participated in 23 military and civilian CSDP missions and operations, it remains significantly behind both France and Germany in terms of leadership of operations.[859] Indeed, the UK ranks only 11th among EU member states for CSDP personnel contributions, clearly not commensurate with punching at the weight of its capabilities as illustrated above. Furthermore, the UK has thus far refrained from participating in the most comprehensive and complex efforts towards European capacity development within the EDA, the so-called 'Category A' projects.[860] Nevertheless, it would be remiss to overlook the UK as being of importance to the vitality and credibility of the EU as an autonomous actor in security and defence, in light of its capabilities and expertise, in particular relating areas where the UK can make a unique contribution (such as strategic airlift).

Bearing in mind the realist-constructivist framework advanced over the previous chapters of this thesis, it may be argued that the alliance security dilemma facing EU states has been effectively sharpened by both the uncertainties surrounding the new Trump administration and the role of the UK in European security and defence post-Brexit. As perceptions regarding the risk of US abandonment have been strengthened through the remarks and actions of the Trump administration, the capacity of the EU to achieve a level of autonomy to effectively deal with this challenge have been somewhat undermined by the prospect of losing access to UK capabilities, expertise and influence. As Patrick argues (in relation to US allies in Asia, facing a similar dilemma), "like investors, states can manage their risk by diversifying their portfolios", and in this vein, it is possible to argue that EU states are incentivised by the

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[859] EEAS (2018), *CSDP Missions and Operations*, Available Online: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations .; R. G. Whitman (2016), 'The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?', *National Institute Economic Review*, Vol. 238, No. 1, p. 47.

[860] A. Bakker, M. Drent and D. Zandee (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

risks of Trump and Brexit to further cooperate on security and defence, including through the CSDP, in order to deepen the toolbox of crisis response mechanisms.[861] This may serve to accommodate US demands for more effective transatlantic burden-sharing efforts on the part of her European allies on the one hand, whilst also developing a pathway towards a more autonomous European security and defence framework on the other. However, as the realist-constructivist framework made clear over the course of Chapter 4, we should also expect to see the scope and nature of this cooperation being shaped to an extent through unit-level ideational factors, specifically domestic security cultures. In order to explore this further, the following section shall examine nascent EU initiatives towards the building of further cooperation in this policy area and the extent to which our realist-constructivist analytical framework may contribute towards understanding of these developments.

5.2 CSDP Developments, Prospects and Constraints

This section continues the application of the realist-constructivist framework to the CSDP through examining the development of EU responses to the developments discussed above. Specifically, it argues that member states have moved to strengthen security and defence cooperation in a number of ways through the EU, congruent with the exacerbation of the alliance security dilemma as discussed above. It is argued that whilst this has furthered the incentives and opportunities for security and defence cooperation to take place amongst EU member states, such as through the CSDP, how states are interpreting and responding to these challenges remains impacted by

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[861] S. M Patrick (2017), 'Trump and World Order: The Return of Self-Help', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 2, p. 53.

interpretation at the unit-level. Specifically, the remainder of this chapter argues that the further development of the CSDP may be understood as a means to address to some degree the alliance security dilemma vis-à-vis the US, but the scope and depth of cooperation is impacted also by divergent unit-level security cultures. In order to illustrate this, the chapter continues by outlining key developments relating to the CSDP since the Brexit and Trump votes, illustrating these as congruent with a response to the alliance security dilemma, before going on to explore how these events have been interpreted and responded to thus far by our case study states from Chapter 4, Germany and the UK.

5.2.i New Momentum on EU Security and Defence

As Major and von Voss rightly identify, "ideas on how to improve the CSDP have flourished" in the time since the Brexit referendum.[862] Firstly, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) was published in June 2016, detailing policy proposals, an approach of 'principled pragmaticism' and restated the EU's commitment to a rules-based international order based on universal principals and multilateral institutions.[863] This was followed by a number of further actions to operationalise this vision, including a joint Franco-German paper that recommitted to "a shared vision of Europe as a security union, based on solidarity and mutual assistance between member states in support of common security and defence policy" and urged the EU to "step up their defence efforts" with the creation of a European Security Compact.[864]

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[862] C. Major and A. von Voss (2017), 'European defence in view of Brexit: Europe's military power might not suffer, but its political clout is at risk', *SWP Comments*, Vol. 10, April, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin, p. 1.

[863] European Union (2016b), *op. cit.*

[864] J. Ayrault and F. W. Steinmeier (2016), *A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties*, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin. Available Online: http://www.voltairenet.org/article192564.html

These initiatives were built upon at the European Council meeting in Bratislava on 16th September 2016, which issued a roadmap for greater European defence capacity and a vote in the European Parliament on the 22nd November 2016 that called for the establishment of a European Defence Union.[865] This was further expounded upon in the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on the 15th November 2016, which adopted the Security and Defence Implementation Plan (SDIP), and the European Commission published a European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) on the 30th November 2016.[866] These implementation plans were later endorsed at the European Council meeting on the 15th December 2016, which set out concrete measures to further the EU in responding to external conflicts and building the security and defence capacities of partners.[867] This included the launch of a coordinated annual review of defence (CARD), aimed at enhancing defence cooperation among member states and the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) to develop EU crisis management structures, viewed by some analysts to be part of the initial steps towards an integrated EU Military Command.[868] Furthermore, this European Council meeting in December 2016 also saw the activation of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), made possible under the Lisbon Treaty but never acted upon, in order to enable willing and able member states to deepen cooperation on a more limited

[865] European Council (2016), *Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap*, Bratislava, 16/11/2016. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21250/160916-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmapen16.pdf ; European Parliament (2016), Resolution 2016/2052(INI) on the European Defence Union, Strasbourg, 22/11/2016. Available Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0435+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN

[866] EU (2017), 'Fact Sheet', *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, Brussels. Available Online: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/2016-12_-_factsheet_-_implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence.pdf .; European Commission (2016), 'European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund', *Press Release*, Brussels, 30/11/2016. Available Online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm

[867] European Council (2016), *European Council conclusions*, Brussels, 15/12/2016. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21929/15-euco-conclusions-final.pdf

[868] T. Tardy (2017), 'MPCC: Towards an EU Military Command?', *Policy Brief*, EUISS, Paris. Available Online: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2017%20MPCC.pdf

multilateral basis, specifically in developing capabilities to implement the operational requirements of the CSDP.[869]

Whilst there have been warnings from US officials against closer EU cooperation undermining NATO, or "distracting" from tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq, the overwhelming focus has been for all states to contribute their "fair share of the load" in security and defence.[870] The EU has sought to reassure the US that the CSDP may prove a means to channel precisely this, and as would be expected in relation to the realist-constructivist framework advanced over previous chapters, these developments from the EU are couched in a language of complementarity rather than competition to NATO and the US. Most notably, the EUGS recognises that,

> "When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two."[871]

This position has been solidified by further developments in EU-NATO inter-organisational relations through a joint declaration, signed 8th July 2016.[872] This sought to "give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership" through identifying strategic areas to develop stronger cooperation between these

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[869] EEAS (2017), 'Fact Sheet', *Permanent Structured Cooperation -PESCO*, Brussels. Available Online: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_13-12-2017_final.pdf
[870] K. Manson and M. Peel (2018), 'US fears closer EU defence ties could undermine NATO', News Article, *Financial Times*, London, 12/02/2018. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/70aafe9c-1018-11e8-8cb6-b9ccc4c4dbbb ; G. Chazan and K. Manson (2018), 'US rattled by plans to forge closer European defence ties', News Article, *Financial Times*, London, 18/02/2018. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/a1e82b7a-147c-11e8-9376-
[871] European Union (2016b), *op. cit.*, p. 4
[872] European Council (2016), *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Brussels, 08/07/2016. Available Online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf

bodies, whilst a further of 42 commonly agreed proposals were endorsed by both NATO and the EU in December 2016.[873]

In sum, the CSDP has been significantly advanced in the time subsequent to the Brexit and Trump votes, and the alliance security dilemma provides a conceptual framework through which to understand the relationship between these developments; as a means to address to some degree the dangers of US abandonment and overreliance on the transatlantic relationship through increasing the capacity of EU states to act more autonomously in security and defence. Moving onwards from this though, as the previous chapter identified, it is also important to consider the unit-level of EU member states in order to further understanding of how such challenges and opportunities related to the development of increased European security and defence cooperation have been responded to.

5.2.ii Continuing Constraints on German Leadership?

At the unit-level of Germany, there has been evidence to indicate developing support for security and defence cooperation through the EU, as may be expected due to the sharpening of the postulated alliance dilemma discussed above. However, in addition to the incentives from the uncertainties surrounding Brexit and the Trump presidency there are also indicators that the ways and means by which Germany pursues CSDP development is impacted too by domestic ideational factors, such as security culture, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst according to Martill and Sus, Germany has begun to "overcome its historical reticence to get involved in matters of

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[873] *Ibid.* EEAS (2016), 'EU and NATO start new era of cooperation', *Press Release*, 06/12/2016, Brussels. Available Online: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/16643/EU%20and%20NATO%20start%20new%20era%20of%20cooperation

international security", it is also possible to argue that significant elements of this 'reticence' remains.[874] This factor, rooted in security culture, may be argued to play an important continuing role in German interaction with the development of security and defence cooperation through the auspices of the EU.

As a number of scholars have identified, illustrative examples that Germany has become a more prominent leader in matters of international affairs have been plentiful over recent years, including its efforts in forging a joint European response to the conflict in Ukraine, the settlement of refugees and management of eurozone finances.[875] However, Germany has at the same time faced the accusation that such examples of diplomatic leadership have not been accompanied by any equivalent in terms of defence, with critics pointing to a relative lack of investment in, and participation of, the Bundeswehr in international crisis management.[876]

Moves towards addressing these criticisms have been made though, notably with a White Paper from the Federal Ministry of Defence in 2016 which expanded the scope for German-led military operations and recognised a more expansive definition of 'self-defence' that had already provided the basis for military action against the jihadist group Da'esh in Syria, December 2015.[877] A more active international role for German armed forces has also been promoted by the recently re-elected Chancellor Merkel, with this being used as justification for a commitment to substantially increase the funding of defence, rising from 1.2 to 2% of national GDP by 2020, which means

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[874] B. Martill and M. Sus (2018), 'Known Unknowns: EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit', *Working Paper*, Dahrendorf Forum, Berlin, p. 12.

[875] S. Bulmer (2014), 'Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics', *West European Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 1244-1263.; E. Pond and H. Kundnani (2015), 'Germany's Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, March/April.; F. Heisbourg (2015), 'The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis', *Survival*, Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 7-20.

[876] G. Gressel (2018), 'Germany's defence commitments: nothing but paper tigers?', *ECFR*, Berlin, 27/03/2018. Available Online: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germanys_defence_commitments_nothing_but_paper_tigers

[877] BMVg (2016), *op. cit.* E. Langland (2016), 'Germany's Vote to Strike ISIS in Syria Signals a Shift in its Approach to International Law', *Working Paper*, DGAP, Berlin.

in practice an additional 20 billion euros on the previous budget-plan for the Bundeswehr over this period.[878] Further support for Germany overcoming historical reticence surrounding a leadership role in international security may also be found in the context of developments on security and defence cooperation through the auspices of the EU, where a renewed French-German axis has been noted as being at the heart of moves to strengthen integration in this area.[879] This has been specifically the case with the activation of the PESCO mechanism and plans for a fighter jet project "under the direction" of the two states.[880] This bilateral partnership within the EU may not only be argued to be illustrative of a shifting balance of power among member states with the UK heading towards the exit, but reflective of both the 'engine' and 'essence' of deepening European integration more widely.[881]

However, despite this singular progress of Germany towards a greater security and defence role more commensurate with its power status in the European and international systems (see *figure 4.*), it may be argued that a significant element of 'reticence' related to leadership and military deployment remains. Specifically, the case can be made that German preferences for the development of European security and defence cooperation remain closely tied to its security culture as discussed in the previous chapter.

This may first of all be illustrated through reference to Germany's approach of privileging multilateralism as both an end and means. This is made clear in the

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[878] Deutsche Welle (2016), 'Merkel: Germany to heavily increase Bundeswehr budget', *News Article*, Bonn. Available Online: http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-to-heavily-increase-bundeswehr-budget/a-36054268

[879] A. Billon-Galland and M. Quencez (2017), 'Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defence?', *GMF Policy Brief*, No. 33, Washington DC.

[880] P. Hollinger (2017), 'France-German fighter jet plans threaten to leave UK grounded', *Financial Times*, London, 23/07/2017. Available Online: https://www.ft.com/content/16c8cca6-6bd6-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa

[881] S. Biscop (2018), 'Brexit, Strategy and the EU: Britain Takes Leave', *Egmont Paper*, No. 100, Brussels, p. 7.

aforementioned 2016 White Paper, where first of all Germany appears ready to assume a more active role in matters of security and defence, but secondly that such activism shall only be, as Rynning notes, "channelled through the familiar key institutions", namely the EU, NATO and the UN.[882] This position had been previously evident in the German government's case to strike Da'esh targets in Syria, which specifically referenced Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, a mutual defence clause invoked by France in November 2015, as core justification for the action.[883] It has also been explicitly stated in the 2016 White Paper that "Germany is striving to achieve the long-term goal of a common European Security and Defence Union".[884]

This continuing multilateral reflex in Germany's approach to international security is also evident through its positions taken on the activation of the PESCO mechanism, where analysts have noted two competing visions for the project as emanating from policy makers in Berlin and Paris respectively.[885] Whereas France is argued to have favoured a form of PESCO to maximise operational deployment possibilities, therefore necessitating a more exclusive interpretation of the cooperation enabled under this mechanism, German policy makers are noted to have successfully lobbied for PESCO placing greater emphasis on the widest possible inclusivity among member states.[886] The corollary of this it may be argued was that Germany effectively privileged inclusiveness over (and to the detriment of) EU defence capability and deployability, with socialisation of member states around PESCO being viewed as an

[882] S. Rynning (2017), 'Germany's Return to European Leadership', *E-International Relations*, 05/01/2017. Available Online: http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/05/germanys-return-to-european-leadership/
[883] Auswärtiges Amt (2015), 'The Fight against ISIS: German Bundestag Approves Bundeswehr Mandate', *Press Release*, Berlin, 07/12/2015. Available Online: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Syrien/151204-SYR-Mandat.html
[884] BMVg (2016), *op. cit.*
[885] A. Billon-Galland and M. Quencez (2017), 'Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defence?', *GMF Policy Brief*, No. 33, Washington DC, pp. 2-3.
[886] B. Fägersten and A. Danielson (2018), 'Order, integration and the development of European security and defence', *UIPaper*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, No. 01/18, p. 19.

end in itself, in line with expectations surrounding German security culture on multilateralism as discussed in the previous chapter.[887]

Furthermore, German leadership on international security and defence has also not been without a degree of apprehension domestically, both among policy elites and the wider populace, including within the governing coalition.[888] Indeed, in order to overcome domestic opposition to increased military spending, the 2018 Coalition Agreement included provision for any increases in the defence budget to be mirrored by a commensurate increase in the international development budget.[889] As research by the Körber Stiftung has identified, reticence among the German populace regarding a more active role for the state in international security remains strong, where a surveyed majority (52 percent) were found in 2017 to respond that the country should hold back from engaging in international military interventions or involving its forces with foreign conflicts.[890] This showed a continuation of a trend earlier identified, despite shifting international conditions related to the Brexit and Trump dynamics, albeit the majority in opposition to German international activism had decreased somewhat since a similar studies were conducted in 2014 and 2016.[891] Similar findings on widespread

[887] See also, U. E. Franke (2017), 'PESCO, the impotent gorilla', *News Article*, ECFR, Berlin, 12/11/2017. Available Online: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_pesco_the_impotent_gorilla

[888] M. Becker (2016), 'Gabriel rebelliert gegen Tillerson', *News Article*, Spiegel, Hamburg, 31/03/2017. Available Online: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nato-treffen-sigmar-gabriel-verweigert-rex-tillerson-die-gefolgschaft-a-1141408.html ; Deutsche Welle (2016), 'No more missions for Germany's navy,' warns armed forces ombudsman', *News Article*, Bonn, 11/02/2018. Available Online: http://www.dw.com/en/no-more-missions-for-germanys-navy-warns-armed-forces-ombudsman/a-42535481

[889] CDU, CSU and SPD (2018), *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa, Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland, Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD*, 07/02/2018, Berlin.   Available   Online, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf

[890] Körber Stiftung (2017), *Einmischen oder zurückhalten? Eine repräsentative Umfrage im Auftrag der Körber-Stiftung zur Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik*, Körber Stiftung, Hamburg. Avaliable Online: https://www.koerber-Stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/handlungsfeld_internationale-verstaendigung/pdf/2017/Einmischen-oder-zurueckhalten-2017_deutsch.pdf

[891] Körber Stiftung (2014), *Einmischen oder zurückhalten?,* Körber Stiftung, Hamburg. Available Online: http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/fileadmin/user_upload/allgemein/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_Aussenpolitik_Broschuere.pdf ; Körber Stiftung (2016), *Einmischen oder*

continuing aversion to militarism can be found in Germany on key issues, such as on the possibility of German acquiring its own nuclear weapons and the continuance current nuclear sharing arrangements with the US on German territory.[892] Such issues continue to pose a challenge to German policy makers regarding a leadership role in international security, particularly in light of requirements for Bundestag approval for military deployments.[893]

In sum, as Rynning rightly argues, Brexit has accelerated German prominence in European security and defence, but also accentuated all the inherent dilemmas and difficulties of German leadership.[894] These dilemmas and difficulties may be argued to be inextricably linked to aspects of German security culture, for whilst policy makers may have begun to overcome some degree of historical reluctance to take on a prominent role in matters of European security and defence, there remain preferences to embed policy within multilateral frameworks and issues surrounding what constitutes the legitimate use of military force.

zurückhalten?, Körber Stiftung, Hamburg. Available Online: http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/fileadmin/user_upload/allgemein/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_Aussenpolitik_Broschuere.pdf
[892] C. Major (2018), 'Germany's complicated relationship with nuclear weapons could turn into a big risk for European security', *Carnegie Europe*, Brussels. Available Online: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75351
[893] W. Wagner et al (2017), 'Politicization, party politics and military missions' deployment votes in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom', *WZB Discussion Paper*, No. SP IV 2017-101, Social Science Research Centre, Berlin.
[894] S. Rynning (2017), 'Germany's Return to European Leadership', *E-International Relations*, 05/01/2017. Available Online: http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/05/germanys-return-to-european-leadership/

5.2.iii A Future UK Role in EU Security and Defence?

Similarly to the case of Germany, there remain indicators that the UK remains influenced by elements of its security culture in responding to the developing incentives for greater European security and defence cooperation. Even whilst the UK appears to be moving towards the EU exit, it is possible to make the case that the 'divorce' negotiations shall make a fascinating illustration of the interaction of system-level and unit-level concerns. Specifically, that incentives to cooperate on security and defence across Europe due to the alliance security dilemma may be understood to interact with UK culturally-bound preferences to maintain an important role in matters of European defence but aversion to deepening supranational control, ultimately influencing the future UK-EU relationship.

In terms of the direct impact of the pending 'Brexit' on UK involvement in EU security and defence matters, as the European Chief Negotiator for the UK Exiting the EU Michel Barnier has made clear, that there a number of "logical consequences" based upon existing institutional arrangements.[895] Namely, these mean that a UK outside the EU's formal membership structures shall no longer expect to be a full member of the EDA, nor able to act as a framework (lead) nation for either EU Battlegroups or CSDP operations. The UK shall also no longer be expected to be involved in CSDP decision making, nor be involved in the planning of EU security and defence instruments, whilst also losing the right to fully participate in the FAC, PSC and meetings of EU Defence Ministers.[896]

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[895] M. Barnier (2017), 'Speech by Michel Barnier at the Berlin Security Conference', *Speech*, Berlin, 29/11/2017. Available Online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-5021_en.htm
[896] *Ibid*.

For its part, the British government set out its position on the issue of continued UK involvement in EU security and defence cooperation through two major position papers, both published in September 2017.[897] These outlined hopes for a "deep and special partnership", effective as of 2019, with both Prime Minister May and the MoD stating repeatedly that the UK expected to retain an "unconditional commitment" to European security post-Brexit.[898] With regards to possibilities for UK involvement with the CSDP as a non-EU member, this may take place as a third-party contributor on an ad-hoc or bespoke basis, through NATO arrangements, or other multilateral or bilateral means, with at the very least UK resources available to the EU through the Berlin-Plus arrangement or with the UK as a third-party contributor on a case-by-case basis.[899] Such potential is illustrated by the EU Battlegroup rotation, where there is precedent for third-party states' contribution, such as Ukraine with the Baltic Battlegroup from 2011-2014, as well as third-party involvement in a number of CSDP missions.[900]

However, aligning with the realist-constructivist framework developed over the course of earlier chapters of this thesis, it is possible to argue that an interaction of material and ideational pressures should be observed with regards to Brexit. Specifically, the case can be made that there exist systemic incentives for the UK to continue to cooperate in this policy area due to the alliance security dilemma, but that

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[897] HM Government (2017a), *Foreign policy, defence and development: A future partnership paper*, London, 12/09/2017. Available Online https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policydefence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper ; HM Government (2017b*), Security, law Enforcement and criminal justice: A future partnership paper*, 18/09/2017. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-law-enforcement-and-criminal-justice-a-future-partnership-paper

[898] Prime Minister's Office (2017), 'PM: Britain is unconditionally committed to the defence and security of Europe', *Press Release*, London. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-britain-is-unconditionally-committed-to-the-defence-and-security-of-europe ; B. Fox (2018), 'UK's tortured approach to EU defence takes new twist', *News Article*, Euractiv, London. Available Online: https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/uks-tortured-approach-to-eu-defence-takes-new-twist/

[899] Council of the European Union (2002b), *op. cit.*

[900] L. Chappel (2009), *op. cit.*

ideational factors shall impact the scope and depth that this occurs to and that this feature may be observed in the rhetoric UK policy makers, policy documents and continued efforts as a member inside the EU to shape the parameters of cooperation in this area. Indeed, even limiting to the referendum campaign itself these features were evident, with US President Obama visiting London to support Prime Minister Cameron's campaign for the UK to remain a member of the EU, specifically citing CSDP work in East Africa as an important contribution to international security.[901] Conversely, the prospect of greater supranationalisation of the CSDP (particularly the creation of an 'EU Army') and the 'undermining' of the North Atlantic Alliance, were put forward in the British media as important arguments in the favour of the UK leaving the EU.[902]

Following the referendum, this case can also be made, with the UK having worked to curtail the scope of the MPCC over 2017, echoing long-running UK opposition to the creation of independent EU operational planning capabilities as identified in the previous chapter and linked to elements of UK security culture.[903] At the same time and also in-line with the UK preferences as discussed in Chapter 4, the UK has opted-in to participating in the CARD trial, and indicated preferences to continue involvement with the EDA, Battlegroups and the nascent European Defence Fund.[904]

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[901] B. Obama (2016), 'Remarks by the President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron in Joint Press Conference', *Speech*, London, 22/04/2016. Available Online: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-joint-press

[902] See for example, M. Nicol and N. Craven (2016), 'Invasion of the EU army! Worried Euro tanks may park on our lawn, Minister? Too late... they're already here', *News Article*, Print, Mail on Sunday, London, 21/05/2016. ; C. Moore (2016), 'Field Marshal Lord Guthrie: Why I now back the Leave campaign', *News Article*, Print, The Telegraph, 17/06/2016.

[903] See, FCO (2017), 'Explanatory Memorandum on the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy', *Unnumbered Document submitted to House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee*, 23/06/2017, pt 17. Available Online: http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2017/07/Signed_EM_(1).pdf .

[904] B. Fox (2018), *op. cit.*

However, the continuance of UK involvement in the CSDP shall be expected to face difficulties based upon current institutional arrangements that limit the scope for third-parties to play a meaningful role in policy formation, via direct participation in key institutions. Indeed, as Whitman notes, the EU only offers third-party states the opportunity to sign-up for CSDP operations "after decisions on content, scope and action have already been determined".[905] This is also the case with PESCO, where the UK is one of only three member states not participating, and therefore will have no power of voting rights on the strategic direction or projects of the cooperation mechanism, whilst governance structures for the inclusion of third-party states remain under formulation.[906]

Essentially on offer from the EU's existing institutional arrangements is a 'take-it-or-leave-it' involvement with the CSDP that is not likely to be particularly attractive to the UK, as it poses issues as to how it may 'plug in' whilst maintaining the preference for developing greater decision-making autonomy.[907] This preference has been made clear in the UK government's emphasis on pursuing a strategy of 'Global Britain' post-Brexit, involving greater control over foreign, security and defence policy – although the details on the nature of this and how it shall diverge from the existing approach of the UK operating from inside the EU remains vague.[908] This approach does, however, converge with expected UK preferences based on a reading of its security culture as playing an important role on its interaction with the CSDP.

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[905] R. G. Whitman (2017), 'Avoiding a Hard Brexit in Foreign Policy', *Survival*, Vol. 59, No. 6, p. 49.
[906] C. Mills (2017), 'EU Defence: the realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)', *Briefing Paper*, No. 8149, House of Commons, 12/12/2017.
[907] R. G. Whitman (2017), *op. cit.* pp. 47-54.
[908] T. May (2016), 'Prime Minister: Britain after Brexit: A Vision of a Global Britain', *Speech*, Conservative Party Conference, Birmingham, 05/10/2016. Available Online: http://press.conservatives.com/post/151239411635/prime-minister-britain-after-brexit-a-vision-of

In light of the above, it is understandable that Prime Minister May has sought to open a form of UK-EU security and defence cooperation that seeks to go beyond existing institutional arrangements and precedents. This approach was set out in major speeches at Lancaster House and in Florence respectively, the latter of which specifically calling for "a bold new strategic agreement" to provide a "comprehensive framework for future security, law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation", reiterating that UK was "unconditionally committed" to European security. [909] However, as per the realist-constructivist framework presented in this thesis, the success or failure of these efforts should not only be understood in the context of the structural incentives related to the shared challenges facing the UK and other EU member states, but also on the domestic ideational context of divergent security cultures across the UK and EU-27 that would need to find agreement to forge such a meaningful reconfigured future relationship.

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[909] T. May (2017a), 'The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech', *Speech*, Lancaster House, London, 17/01/2017. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech ; T. May (2017b), 'PM's Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU', *Speech*, Florence, 22/09/2017. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu

5.3 Conclusions

This chapter has explored emerging catalysts for deepening security and defence cooperation through the EU and the responses that have thus far taken place from a realist-constructivist perspective. These two key processes, enacted in 2016 but whose medium to long-term outcomes remain in flux, relate to impeding voluntary withdrawal of one of the EU's most capable states in this policy area through 'Brexit', and President Trump's 'America First' doctrine, which has included accusations of EU free riding and threats to continued US leadership in the European security architecture. Taken together, these structural developments are found to represent an exacerbation of the alliance security dilemma facing EU member states, whereby the risk of US abandonment has increased concurrently with the capacity of the EU deal with this being called into question through the UK membership withdrawal and corollary regarding the potential loss of access to British capability, expertise and influence.

The impact of this uncertain international environment is argued to have put lacking EU capabilities on security and defence into sharp relief, thus incentivising the further development of the CSDP in order to diversify the portfolio of capabilities and crisis response mechanisms available. In the context of the alliance security dilemma, this serves to both accommodate US demands for more effective transatlantic burden-sharing efforts on the part of her European allies, whilst also developing a pathway towards a more autonomous European security and defence framework in the future.

Although these recent developments are still in relatively embryonic stages, this chapter has pointed towards a number of EU developments that have sought to deepen cooperation on security and defence. This identified a fresh impetus to develop the CSDP and related mechanisms, most notably the activation of PESCO, and how this

has been both portrayed and largely viewed as complementary to transatlantic relations and NATO. This lends further credence to the view developed over the course of Chapter 3 that the development of the CSDP may be more rightly understood as a form of limited bandwagoning than balancing, from a realist perspective. Furthermore, aligning with the findings from Chapter 4, in exploring the cases of Germany and the UK it also finds indications that unit-level ideational concerns related to security culture also play a role in member states' interpretation of the scope, depth and form that EU security and defence cooperation should take. For the UK, the future of its post-Brexit security and defence relationship with the EU is argued to be impacted in-part by ideational concerns, whilst for Germany, its 'culture of reticence' towards the use of military force and preferences on embedding external policy multilaterally are argued to remain important to understanding its approach to EU security and defence cooperation. In both cases, this may be interpreted through the interaction of cultural and material forces at play. Namely, pressures from the international environment for Germany to contribute more towards international security and similarly for the UK to maintain an important role in European security and defence, but at the same time important influences from elements of their respective security cultures that shape and shove policy responses to such incentive structures.

To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated a further added-value of the realist-constructivist framework constructed over the course of this thesis in providing a means of understanding current developments in world politics. Specifically, it points towards the potential of viewing the most recent and undertheorized developments on the CSDP through a realist-constructivist perspective, through considering the interplay of material and ideational factors as per the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 1 and operationalised in Chapters 3 and 4. Though questions remain on the EU translating

the recent ambitious steps towards greater integration on matters of security and defence into concrete contributions to EU capability, interoperability and deployability[910], ultimately early indications considered in this chapter provide further credence to the argument that whilst EU member states face system-level incentives to cooperate further, the manner in which they respond shall be shaped to an extent through unit-level ideational concerns.

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[910] For a critical perspective on this, see L. Simon (2017), 'Don't believe the hype about European Defense', *War on the Rocks*, Texas, 27/07/2017. Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense/

CONCLUSION

This thesis has engaged with important theoretical and empirical debates in the discipline of IR, namely the development of a realist-constructivist approach to utilise ideational and material factors in conjunction to further our understanding of the development of the EU's CSDP. This approach was inspired by a critical reading of the extant academic literature within IR, which has been understood to largely limit analysis to either material or ideational factors in understanding this policy area. Whilst recognising a number of perspectives within IR, it is the case that theoretically-minded efforts to delineate how realist and constructivist concepts may interact within a single analysis are lacking. In light of this, it has been the aim of this thesis to advance IR theory and debate on the CSDP through examining the interaction of material and ideational factors in shaping differing national approaches to this policy area. The preceding chapters have sought to illustrate that such an approach is not only feasible, but fruitful in terms of added value both from theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Thus, the contribution to the literature of this thesis is argued to be two-fold; first of all the developing of a realist-constructivist analytical model through which material and ideational factors are integrated into a single analysis of outcomes in international politics and secondly the application of this model to provide a theoretically informed narrative regarding differing national approaches towards deepening security and defence cooperation through the CSDP.

The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the findings of the thesis, conclude upon the usefulness of the framework, its utility in deepening our understanding of the CSDP and discuss the wider empirical and theoretical implications. It begins with an overview of the approach taken and key findings made.

It considers the research objectives as set out in the Introduction and, in view of the cumulative evidence gathered, the extent to which we can conclude upon the analytical value of the realist-constructivist framework developed for the analysis of security and defence policy cooperation through the CSDP. As shall be discussed, based upon the evidence presented within the application of the analytical framework to the development of the CSDP, realist-constructivism may be argued with confidence to provide a unique insight.

The second part of this chapter discusses the wider implications of this research. This situates the findings of this thesis within the extant scholarly literature and argues that the realist-constructivist approach has a number of advantages that should be further explored, whilst also recognising certain important limitations. It proposes an agenda for future research with regards to the realist-constructivist approach to analysing international politics, and also integrative theoretical approaches more widely. Finally, it highlights some most recent developments with regards to the CSDP and discusses these in relation to the realist-constructivist position taken throughout this thesis on the joint importance of unit-level ideational variables and system-level relative material power relationships.

1. Looking Back: Overview of Approach and Key Findings

The core argument of the thesis is that within the realist and constructivist schools of thought in the discipline of IR are opportunities for dialogue, commensurability and therefore the potential for the formulation of an analytical framework that can incorporate conceptual elements of both and thus potentially enhance our understanding of aspects of international politics. The identification of this and formulation of a logically robust framework to integrate material and ideational factors into an analysis constituted the bulk of the theoretical contribution to the scholarly literature of this thesis. This was achieved through first of all delineating a theoretical space for the approach to occupy within the discipline of IR consistent with existing realist and constructivist scholarship. Foundationally, the approach of theoretically informed analysis was defended, with the first chapter making the argument that such an approach serves the important function of making clear the assumptions, purposes and limitations of our analysis, vital to the process of sorting of the relevant facts and producing a narrative of events through which we may understand outcomes in international politics.

However, this thesis diverged from the bulk of extant research within IR through taking issue with the notion that the discipline consists of incommensurable Kuhnian 'paradigms', and instead it sought to draw upon conceptual elements across traditional theoretical boundaries. Indeed, Chapter 1 made the case that the realist and constructivist traditions within IR lack the background conditions equivalent to Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigms within the natural sciences that produce incommensurability. Specifically, Kuhn's three sources of potential incommensurability between paradigms; terminological, observational and methodological differences are capable of being bridged between the realist and

constructivist traditions within IR. As this chapter made clear, this is not simply a matter of theoretical naval-gazing, but rather an important first step in breaking down a key barrier to the possibility of a cross-fertilization between realist and constructivist theorising.

Building upon this, Chapter 1 also sought to understand how a synergy of realist and constructivist concepts was not only theoretically possible but has the potential to bring added value to our understanding of empirical outcomes in international politics. Thus, a logically consistent realist-constructivist analytical framework is formulated in this chapter, prior to it being operationalised in later chapters towards the development of security and defence cooperation through the EU's CSDP, and differing national approaches taken towards this by the UK and Germany.

This analytical framework is formulated through first exploring the core of the realist understanding of international politics, which asserts the centrality of power to relations between states. Although power encompasses ideational and material dimensions, realist scholars emphasise the material power capabilities of states within the international system as essential to securing their survival, a 'prerequisite' for a state achieving any goals it may have[911] within an "inherently threatening" anarchic international system.[912]

However, this focus (particularly within Waltzian structural realism) is upon the pressures of power relations upon states, not upon how states respond to these pressures. This leads to a situation in which these pressures 'shape and shove' state behaviour, but leaves room for a wider range of factors to influence the specific state responses in the form of foreign policy; such as whether, to what extent and in what

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[911] K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.
[912] J. Sterling-Folker (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 71.

form states opt to engage in the development of security and defence cooperation through the EU.[913]

In order to understand how states respond to the pressures of their relative power status within the international system, the realist-constructivist framework offered within this thesis argued the necessity of opening the 'black box' of the state to further our understanding of outcomes in international relations. This drew upon recent neoclassical realist scholarship, which has developed a theoretically coherent multi-level model, in order to utilise unit-level factors as a 'transmission belt' between the independent variable (the distribution of material power in the international system) and the dependent variable (policy output). [914] Thus, it balances a sacrifice of Waltzian parsimony for greater richness in understanding outcomes of international politics.

It is within this theoretical space, as an intervening variable, in which constructivist conceptual elements may contribute towards deepening our understanding of state responses to the pressures of the international system, in the context of power relationships. It is furthermore argued that the reduction of constructivism for use as an intervening variable is important within a realist-constructivist approach, as it retains the realist core focus on the primary importance of material power in international politics, yet also provides an avenue for dialogue with constructivism that enables the incorporation of ideational factors into an analysis. At the same time, it acknowledged that whilst this represents a particularly compelling logical formulation of realist-constructivist dialogue, this does not rule out other possibilities of synthesis between these two theoretical traditions, nor does it delimit the opportunities for also integrating conceptual elements from other schools of thought

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[913] K. N. Waltz (1983), *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[914] G. Rose (1998), *op. cit*., p. 147.

within a broad realist approach to IR. Indeed, Chapter 1 drew attention to the non-material dimensions of the realist tradition more widely, most notably within classical realist scholarship, which emphasises further possibilities for commensurability with constructivism.

Following on from these findings on the development of a realist-constructivist approach, Chapter 2 proceeded with a review of the scholarly literature on the CSDP. This outlined the historical development of the CSDP and acknowledged previous forms of security and defence cooperation amongst European states, before it went on to address theoretical understandings of such developments in the guise of realist and constructivist informed research. This highlighted not only the value of these traditions' contributions to our understanding of the CSDP, but also their respective shortcomings towards this complex empirical puzzle represented by the development of this policy area.

Extant realist theorising with regards to the CSDP is noted to have largely emphasised the CSDP as an instance of *balancing* behaviour, either regionally within Europe against a reunited Germany, or globally in relation to a hegemonic US. However, contrary to expectations that are derived from such approaches to the CSDP, neither the transatlantic relationship nor European cooperation have thus far collapsed following the shift in the distribution of material capability at the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, both EU member states and the US have sought to encourage, rather than limit, the German role in international security and defence.

In contrast, the constructivist conceptualisation of international relations emphasises that ideas matter in shaping the self-understanding of actors and examines the collective cognitions behind this. This approach has been at the forefront of much research regarding the development of the EU as an actor in international relations,

particularly through accounts of the EU as a normative, civilian and/or civilising power. Such an approach to the EU has argued that its *sui generis* identity, founded on liberal values and multilateral cooperation, shapes the EU approach to external action.

However, whilst this ideational dimension of the EU is important to appreciate, such an interpretation has had difficulties in accounting for the 'civilian power' developing the 'teeth' of military force to address civilian crisis management, conflict resolution and peace-building objectives. Furthermore, Chapter 1 highlighted that the EU has acted inconsistently as a foreign policy actor in relation to its values. In total, this is argued to be illustrative of a lack of focus on how material factors may interact with ideational factors to play a role in impacting the direction of cooperation on security and defence through the EU.

In light of this, the realist-constructivist framework sought to consider the interplay of material and ideational factors in an analysis of the CSDP. With regards to realism, it disputes Howorth's recommendation that "we must… look elsewhere than to the realists for an explanation" of security and defence cooperation in the EU as it finds value in the realist tradition towards helping us understand the dynamics at play with regards to the CSDP.[915] However, simultaneously, it agrees with Hyde-Price who argued that it is difficult to recommend that the scholar "limit him- or herself to the realist conceptual toolbox" in consideration of this policy area.[916] In sum, the realist-constructivist approach foregoes the total abandoning of realist theorising in relation to the CSDP and instead points to the added value to our understanding of it through the utilisation of realist analytical concepts, but recognises that this should be complemented with other explanatory factors outside the traditional realist conceptual

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[915] J. Howorth (2011a), *op. cit.*, pp. 197-245.
[916] A. Hyde-Price (2013), *op. cit.*, p. 400.

toolbox at the unit-level. Specifically, it draws upon constructivist informed research at the unit-level, which stresses the importance of norms, values, ideas and culture.[917]

In seeking to address the shortcomings of realist and constructivist approaches, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 went on to apply the realist-constructivist approach, as developed in Chapter 1, towards understanding the development of the CSDP. As noted above, the realist-constructivist approach utilises the relative distribution of material power capability as the independent variable within the analytical framework, therefore Chapter 3 began this process with a realist analysis of the system-level material power distribution, the "environment in which action takes place",[918] before Chapter 4 would go on to consider the unit-level.

On the basis of realist assumptions, Chapter 3 considered the impact of the distribution of power capabilities within an anarchic system, as posited by realism, with material capability being understood to be the most effective type of power in this system. Furthermore, it draws upon the realist literature regarding *balancing* and *bandwagoning* as two ideal-type state responses to the uneven distribution of material capabilities in the international system. Utilising this, the US is argued to represent the predominant power in a unipolar system, due to its overwhelming material power capability, in a shift from the bipolar system of the Cold War. Chapter 3 thus explored the relationship between the US, EU states, the European integration project and specifically its security and defence dimension. It considered the important roles the US has played as both 'security guarantor'[919] and 'offshore balancer'[920] for the European region, which has served to ameliorate the regional security dilemma, whilst

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[917] A. Wendt (1992) *op. cit.*, J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (1992*), op. cit.*; P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (1998), *op. cit.*; J. Checkel (1998), *op. cit.*
[918] D. Dessler (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 466.
[919] R. N. Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen (2005), *op. cit.*
[920] J. Mearsheimer (2001) *op. cit.,* p. 380.

also pointing to long-running (and continuing) US support for the European integration project alongside US calls for European states to share a more equitable share of the burden of international security obligations. Furthermore, the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is argued to have two important impacts, first, whilst not going as far as to make *balancing* impossible, it does make it "patently self-defeating and hence highly improbable".[921] Second, it effectively relegated Europe's traditional 'great powers' to a 'secondary' status and emphasised the importance of a continued and deep security relationship between European states and the US, including the maintenance of the NATO alliance, despite the dissolution of the USSR.[922]

With regards to the CSDP, it is argued that evidence for it representing a process of EU member states adapting to system-level pressures through *balancing* behaviour is weak, whether 'hard' (due to its implausibility and ineffectiveness) or 'soft' (due to lack of evidence of anything other than routine diplomatic friction, mainly surrounding the 2003 Iraq War, which was also intra-European).[923] However, it makes the case that an alternative realist-informed understanding of the CSDP is possible through reference to underdeveloped literature on *bandwagoning* behaviour. This, Chapter 3 argued, may be understood as a form 'alliance management', with the CSDP serving to ameliorate the dangers of the alliance dilemma for EU member states viz-à-viz the US relationship.[924] This 'dilemma' refers to dichotomous dangers faced by the junior partners in an alliance; on the one hand they can become vulnerable to overreliance ('entrapment') through not developing autonomous security and defence capacity, but

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[921] S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 48.
[922] R. Jervis (2009), *op. cit.*; T. S. Mowle and D. H. Sacko (2007), *op. cit.*; S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2009), *op. cit.*
[923] See, J. Howorth and A. Menon (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 727–744.
[924] G. H. Snyder (1984), *op. cit.*

on the other hand face an equally unpalatable de-alignment ('abandonment') if they do so.[925]

To ameliorate this concern, states may build mutual dependencies with the senior partner (such as demonstrating value to contribute towards shared interests) and cultivate viable alternatives. Chapter 3 argued that this has occurred through the CSDP, which has provided a means to develop the security and defence capacity of EU states and at the same time created a niche capability for the EU to be involved in international security to the complement of the pre-existing NATO alliance (which has a large overlap of membership with the EU, but is also heavily reliant on US leadership and resources). This analysis is argued to be compelling as the US is demonstrated to be conditionally supportive of CSDP development and European states' apparent desire to renew and reinforce the transatlantic alliance clear. Furthermore, an examination of CSDP military missions revealed a certain division of labour with US and/or NATO missions, argued not only to be illustrative of a niche CSDP toolset 'added value' to serve the interests or values of member states in certain circumstances, but also developing European capacity to contribute towards burden-sharing of tasks with US and NATO.

This analysis provided an important development of realist-informed approaches to the CSDP. It retained a core realist focus upon power but utilised concepts in the scholarship on 'bandwagoning for profit', 'alliance politics' and 'unipolarity' that had thus far not been rigorously applied to this policy area.[926] Overall, this contributed to our understanding of the CSDP, through placing its development within a plausible system-level material power context.

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[925] *Ibid.*

[926] G. H. Snyder (1984), *op. cit.*; G. H. Walt (1985), *op. cit.*; R. L. Schweller (1994), *op. cit.*; G. H. Snyder (1997), *op. cit.*; T. Mowle and D. Sacko (2007), *op. cit.*; S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2009), *op. cit.*; L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (2012), *op. cit.*; L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (2013), *op. cit.*

However, whilst this analysis provided a useful starting point for a realist-informed approach to the CSDP, it was noticeably incomplete in not accounting for diverging EU member state engagement with European security and defence cooperation, both temporally and spatially. This is demonstrated in Chapter 4, which identified that EU member states have differed markedly with regards to CSDP operations, concepts and capacity-building. Furthermore, these divergences are argued to be significant as EU member states have an important influence on the overall development of the CSDP, particularly in relation to other aspects of the European integration project. In addition, considering cases of states facing a 'similar environment' but with 'different responses', this satisfies Schweller's condition that, "only when behaviour and outcomes deviate from these structural-systemic variables should unit-level variables… be added to these theories to explain why". [927]

Thus, a unit-level analysis is operationalised in Chapter 4 marking a clear departure from Waltz's parsimonious structural realism, but instead drawing upon classical realist scholarship, which has long-recognised the importance of the unit-level, and a neoclassical realist multi-level model to integrate such an approach with the system-level analysis already performed in Chapter 3. Whilst a number of unit-level factors such as domestic politics, bureaucratic organisation and the outlooks of individual leaders may be argued to play a role in the processing of system-level pressures through to the divergent approaches of states towards the CSDP, this thesis has chiefly concerned itself with the interplay between accepted structural realist focus on the relative distribution of material power capabilities amongst states and the ideational focus of scholars working within the broader constructivist movement, thus

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[927] R. Schweller (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 346.

constituting a 'realist-constructivist' approach. [928] Therefore, Chapter 4 continues through a consideration of the differing 'security cultures' of two member states facing highly comparable system-level pressures and incentives, Germany and the UK.[929] A security culture is conceptualised as "enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites". [930] Furthermore, within the approach of realist-constructivism, this is taken to impact states' understanding of acceptable and preferable behaviour in response to system-level pressures arising from relative material power dynamics in an anarchic international environment.

Based upon this conceptualization and drawing on extensive and triangulated secondary literature, the evidence shows that there are key differences between the security cultures of Germany and the UK. With regards to Germany, this is said to have resulted in preferences for amilitarism and the pursuit of policy objectives within multilateral frameworks. In contrast, it is argued that the UK has an outsized global ambition, favours a pragmatic problem-solving approach to foreign policy and a 'special' relationship with the US (which has an ideational, as well as material, dimension).

These facets of UK and German security culture are then explored in relation to the CSDP, where it is argued that concurring with the system-level incentives, both the UK and Germany were willing to reinforce security and defence cooperation among EU states over the post-Cold War period, but that concurring with differences in their security cultures, the UK placed emphasis on the 'problem-solving' capacity of the

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[928] S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman and J. W. Taliaferro (2009), *op. cit.*
[929] K. Longhurst and A. Miskimmon (2007), *op. cit.*
[930] K. Krause (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 14.

CSDP and opportunities to realise UK ambition with regards to European 'leadership', whereas German policy focused on the civilian dimension of the CSDP and institutionalising multilateralism.

The plausible conclusion of this, it is argued, is that both German and UK approaches to the CSDP may be understood through a framework of limited bandwagoning to ameliorate the alliance dilemma, involving system-level incentives to participate in the CSDP, but the manner in which these member states respond argued to have been shaped to an extent through the unit-level ideational factor of their security cultures.

This is further discussed in Chapter 5, which considers the application of the analytical framework in relation to the thus far theoretically underexplored latest developments of the CSDP and wider EU security and defence cooperation, including the activation of the PESCO mechanism with projects allocated in March 2018. It considers these developments in light of 'Brexit' – the UK's notification of its intention to leave EU membership and the 'America First' agenda of President Trump in the US. In both cases, it argues, there has been a further sharpening of the alliance dilemma facing European states and therefore security and defence cooperation through the EU is further incentivised. However, aligning with findings from the earlier chapter, the scope and nature of the nascent CSDP developments are found to be still impacted by domestic security cultures and thus demonstrates the framework as useful to understanding current issues in world politics.

It is important to caveat this this analysis to acknowledge that this does not mean other forces are superfluous to influencing national approaches to the CSDP. Indeed, an important limitation of this analysis to acknowledge is that it does not seek to explore such other factors, or weigh their relative influence. Furthermore, the conclusions we

can draw as applicable to other EU member states are necessarily limited and therefore further research involving wider application is most welcome. Nevertheless, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 may well be argued to find an overall rich understanding of the development of the CSDP, in particular relevance to the UK and Germany, through examination of the interplay of material and ideational factors, as per the realist-constructivist analytical framework as outlined in Chapter 1.

2. Looking Ahead: Wider Implications and Future Research Agenda

Bearing in mind the above, the case can be made that this thesis engages with a number of debates within the academic discipline of IR. It is interesting to note that since this research begun, several studies have been published which have supported the position of integrative theoretical approach towards the study of EU foreign policy. A representative example of this is the 2013 special edition of the *Journal of Contemporary European Research* which facilitates cross-paradigmatic dialogue with regards to EU trade policy.[931] Furthermore, Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli produced in 2015 an edited volume that brings together contributions of analytic eclecticism in application to the CSDP.[932] This thesis adds further support to this exploration of epistemological analytic eclecticism towards the CSDP. Specifically, it agrees that the complex hybrid political nature of the EU, being neither a state nor traditional international organisation, and particularly its security and defence dimension being neither fully intergovernmental nor supranational, and utilising a range of civilian and military force instruments means that a certain degree of

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[931] J. Orbie and B. Kerremans (eds.) (2013), 'Special Issue: Theorizing European Union Trade Politics', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Vol, 19, No. 4.
[932] L. Cladi and A. Locatelli (2016), *op. cit.*

parsimony for sake of theoretical elegance should make way for a more problem-driven research approach.

Much of the history of IR as a discipline may in some ways be understood as an ongoing debate between scholars who privilege the usage of material or ideational factors to understand and/or explain outcomes in foreign policy and global affairs. This thesis instead sought to draw upon both material and ideational factors and consider their interaction in shaping a particular aspect of international relations, specifically, national approaches to increased security and defence cooperation and coordination through the EU's CSDP. It attempted to address the deficiency that Sørensen draws attention to in having 'two major theoretical traditions in IR that emphasise material and social forces respectively, [yet] very little attempt to examine the relationship between those forces as they play out in the real world of international relations'.[933]

An observation may be made that realist-constructivism, as it is formulated within this thesis, is to a certain degree neither realist nor constructivist in nature. Indeed, certain scholars may argue that it violates the core assumptions of realism to integrate ideational factors into the analysis. This argument was rebutted at length in Chapter 3 which brought attention to the fact that realist scholarship (particularly within classical realism) incorporates a multitude of factors into its broad research agenda on international politics. Indeed, to a certain extent the approach adopted within this thesis may be said to represent a return to the realism of E.H. Carr, who whilst pointing out the limitations of liberal ideas to pacify international politics in the wake of diverging material power interests, did not dismiss entirely the importance of ideational factors.[934]

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[933] G. Sørensen (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[934] E. H. Carr (2001) *op. cit*.

Indeed, nor did Thucydides, an oft-claimed antecedent of contemporary realism and quite possibly more of an antecedent to constructivism than is often realised.[935]

Furthermore, this thesis may be argued to build upon the complexity of classical realist scholarship, without the complete abandonment of the pursuit for parsimony that has characterised its development from Waltzian structural realism. This has been achieved through building upon the multi-level approach of neoclassical realism and retaining a core focus on the distribution of material power capability at the system-level, whilst allowing for the integration of further factors at the unit-level.[936] Thus, this thesis is also situated within the broader analytical eclecticism movement within IR that has sought to draw together insights from across traditional theoretical boundaries, along with the resurgent classical/neoclassical realist research agenda that has sought to return a certain analytical richness to realist scholarship.

Finally, it is important to end by considering a number of the important issues and processes facing the CSDP, directly or indirectly, at the time of writing that are still in flux and opportunities for the further exploitation and development of the realist-constructivist approach presented in this thesis.

Bearing in mind the analytical framework utilised within this thesis, it is important to first of all consider developments related to the balance-of-power and balance-of-threat within the international system. Whilst it may be too early to declare the unipolar distribution of material power capability over for the moment, as Chapter 3 argued most strongly, there has also been a clear argument that it may be increasingly under threat in the coming years.[937] As Layne states, this is down to two factors, first the "breathtakingly rapid" rise of China (a characterization which we might also apply

[935] R. N. Lebow (2001), 'Thucydides the Constructivist', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 547–560.
[936] S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman and J. W. Taliaferro (2009), *op. cit.*
[937] C. Layne (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 203.

to other BRIC states, in addition to Turkey, South Korea, Indonesia) and second, concerns surrounding the "financial underpinnings of US primacy", essential to maintain current relative levels of military spending.[938] China in particular has been singled out as a potential 'regional hegemon'.[939] Furthermore, this is clearly perceived within the US as an issue to be addressed.[940]

Setting aside the continuing debate on the resiliency of unipolarity, the implication of other powers seeking to challenge the US is that one may expect the alliance dilemma between the US and its European allies, as US focus drifts away from Europe and 'free-riding' becomes an increasingly untenable option.[941] A possible illustration of this may be increasing US dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the burden of international security it bears inside the NATO alliance. Although this has long been an issue for successive US administrations, as discussed in Chapter 3, President Trump has emphasised this frustration most bluntly, with a clear and direct berating of European states whom "must finally contribute their fair share" of "financial obligations" within NATO.[942] Whilst European leaders have responded to this rhetoric with their own speeches of taking "our fate into our own hands", the extent to which the EU develops capacity for autonomous action (which would also placate US dissatisfaction with over reliant NATO allies), in response to this incentive remains to be seen.

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[938] *Ibid*. For a contrasting view, see, W. C. Wohlforth (2012), *op. cit.*

[939] J. Mearsheimer (2006), 'China's Unpeaceful Rise', *Current History*, Vol. 105, No. 690, pp. 160-163. See also, P. E. Robertson and A. Sin (2017), 'Measuring hard power: China's economic growth and military capacity', *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 91-111.

[940] See for example, R. O'Rourke (2017), *China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 06/06/17.

[941] See, J. Matlary and M. Petersson (2013), *NATO's European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will*, Palgrave, London.

[942] D. Trump (2017), 'Remarks at NATO unveiling ceremony of the Berlin Wall monument', *Speech*, Brussels, 07/06/17.

Indeed, the future of the US-EU relationship remains in flux and may be argued to be at the intersection of ideational and material drivers, not only driven at the system-level but shaped importantly at the unit-level, requiring an analytical opening-up of their respective 'black boxes' to reveal the security cultures, sub-cultures, and other domestic factors, at play. This shall not only relate to a potentially stagnant or declining US relative power position, but also to the relative power positions of European states, as well as to the way these developments are processed and responded to domestically, thus bringing possibilities for the further exploitation of the realist-constructivist framework as developed in this thesis.

Furthermore, it is important to consider the resurgence of the threat perception of Russia in Europe, particularly following the Ukraine/Crimea crisis. As noted with regards to both the UK and Germany, moves towards the CSDP may be linked to an extent with a European regional threat assessment that, differing from the Cold War, plays down the issue of traditional territorial defence. However, an increasingly bellicose Russia may be argued to be altering such calculations. The reaction to this was evident at NATO's 2014 Wales Summit, where the declaration talked of "Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine" that "challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace".[943] This has involved the 'annexation' of Crimea and a flow of money, weapons, equipment and people from Russia to separatists inside eastern Ukraine.[944] Russian action in Ukraine has also been put into the context of Russian action against the preferences of NATO states, including its support of the Assad regime in Syria, action in Georgia, behaviour with regards to Moldova and violation of security arrangements and commitments (such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Conventional

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[943] NATO (2014), *op. cit.*
[944] J. Mankoff (2014), 'Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, Summer/June Issue.

Armed Force in Europe Treaty).[945] The conclusion of NATO was that Russia formed a threat to "rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic Security".[946]

Alongside the ending of NATO's military role in Afghanistan in December 2014 (though it maintains a non-combat 'Resolute Support Mission' to assist, advise and train Afghan forces), this development in the balance-of-threat may present something of an opportunity for the CSDP. Not only has this threat reinvigorated NATO, but provides an incentive for European capacity building that can be of use to the CSDP, namely to "reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities."[947] As the 2017 Progress Report on EU-NATO relations recognised, "Activities of the two organizations are complementary to each other. At the same time, EU-NATO cooperation constitutes an integral pillar of the EU's work aimed at strengthening European security and defence which also contributes to Trans-Atlantic burden sharing. A stronger EU and a stronger NATO are mutually reinforcing."[948]

Furthermore, as Eastern EU states had argued, this presented the possibility for NATO to "recover its traditional role, not just as an Alliance but as a military organisation" in terms of a focus on territorial defence.[949] This may create possibilities for greater clarity on the otherwise too opaque burden-sharing relationship between NATO and the EU.[950] As Biscop stated in 2011, the current situation may be characterised as "On occasions when Europeans and Americans both want to engage it will be NATO. But on other occasions, Americans might have other priorities than

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[945] NATO (2016), 'Warsaw Summit Communiqué', *Press Release*, Brussels, 09/07/16.
[946] NATO (2014), *op. cit.*
[947] *Ibid.*
[948] NATO (2017), *Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Council on 6 December 2016*, Brussels, 14/06/17, p. 2.
[949] Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Sikorski (2008), quoted in L. Chappel (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 80.
[950] See, S. Hofmann (2011), 'Why institutional overlap matters: CSDP in the European security architecture', *JCMS*, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 112.

Europeans, or might already be engaged elsewhere, or for political reasons NATO might be less welcome in a region".[951] In terms of maximising the efficiency of resources and minimising unnecessary duplication (as decried by the US), this is sub-optimal, both for the CSDP and NATO. Effectively it means NATO must be prepared for all circumstances[952] and the CSDP must be a secondary option in all cases where NATO is presently occupied (or the EU a more "acceptable face"[953]), rather than each body having a more specialised focus. Not only is this seemingly unfeasible, bearing in mind the failure to launch EUFOR Libya mission in 2011 (coupled with a number of missed opportunities for the EU to act forcefully), but a potential distraction from the 'added value' of the CSDP.[954]

However, a reorientation of NATO in terms of geographical scope and/or operational intensity would suggest an opportunity for a clearer division of labour with the CSDP. An exemplar of this is EUFOR Somalia, operating in close cooperation with NATO, securing concrete joint interests, involving joined-up operations of capacity-building and state-building.[955] Whether opportunities for increased NATO-CSDP cooperation emerge and/or are grasped is unclear, but the realist-constructivist framework as developed in this thesis may provide a unique approach towards understanding the interaction of ideational and material factors in driving the eventual outcomes of such developments, between values, ambitions, capabilities and outcomes.

It is also important to consider recent developments with regards to the CSDP. Perhaps the most significant development directly pertaining to the CSDP was on 28

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[951] S. Biscop (2011), 'From Lisbon to Lisbon: Squaring the Circle of EU and NATO Future Roles', *Security Policy Brief,* No. 16, p. 4.
[952] See for example, the NATO (2010), *Strategic Concept 2010*, Brussels, 19/10/10.
[953] M. E. Smith (2017), *op. cit.,* p. 268.
[954] See, N. Koenig, (2011), 'The EU and the Libyan crisis - in quest of coherence?', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 11-30.; R. Del Sarto (2016), 'Normative empire Europe: The European Union, its borderlands, and the 'Arab Spring'', *JCMS*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 215-232.
[955] B. Germond and M. E. Smith (2009), *op. cit.*

June 2016, when High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission Mogherini released the EUGS. This document, building upon a strategic review that preceded it, detailed policy proposals, an approach of 'principled pragmaticism' and restated the EU's commitment to rules-based international order based on universal principals and multilateral institutions.[956] This has been regarded as encompassing a reiteration or reformulation of existing concepts within existing CSDP documentation (for example, the 'comprehensive approach' of the ESS, to the 'joined-up approach' of the EUGS) within an expanded scope of ambition, which may be regarded "a great deal of wishful thinking", not least due to the difficulty the EU has had in fulfilling past (less ambitious) rhetoric.[957]

Whatever the outcome, this is likely to have a significant impact upon the future of security and defence cooperation in the EU. Indeed, it is important to recall that this thesis began by considering the work of E. H. Carr in railing against projects of international law and institution building as a means to guarantee a long-lasting peace in Europe.[958] In something of a reversal of Carr's observation that the failure of such projects was due to the ignorance of material power as an essential element of international politics. Conversely, this thesis reaches plausible conclusions regarding the distribution of material power capability being an important factor incentivising European cooperation, but seeks to draw attention to this also being shaped to an extent by cultural divergences at the national level. Through the development of EU security and defence cooperation, the CSDP may provide strong examples of the interaction between material power and ideational forces shaping outcomes in international

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[956] European Union (2016b), *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, Brussels, 28/06/16.
[957] M. E. Smith (2017), *op. cit.,* p. 304.
[958] E. H. Carr (2001), *op. cit*.

relations over coming years, and this is likely to prove fascinating for the further exploitation and development of the realist-constructivist framework.

APPENDICES

Year	Canada	China	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	UK	USA	USSR
1985	9825.00	53470.00	48990.00	5400.00	19460.00	37550.00	45850.00	353800.00	379900.00
1986	10190.00	52140.00	49160.00	53660.00	20380.00	39340.00	45260.00	374900.00	383900.00
1987	10390.00	52460.00	50780.00	53720.00	22780.00	41380.00	44570.00	373000.00	392200.00
1988	10450.00	53090.00	50700.00	53150.00	22940.00	43370.00	42070.00	365900.00	398300.00
1989	10380.00	52370.00	51570.00	53190.00	23130.00	45110.00	42480.00	364300.00	363000.00
1990	10560.00	55660.00	51480.00	55790.00	22010.00	46820.00	42630.00	351900.00	335600.00
1991	9797.00	53270.00	51910.00	51480.00	22030.00	48430.00	43780.00	309700.00	335600.00
1992	9871.00	55390.00	50300.00	49260.00	21530.00	49510.00	39340.00	309700.00	171200.00
1993	9895.00	56390.00	49680.00	44820.00	21670.00	50070.00	37790.00	328200.00	131000.00
1994	9644.00	58470.00	50190.00	42050.00	21220.00	50540.00	36330.00	312000.00	95330.00
1995	9077.00	63510.00	47770.00	41160.00	19380.00	50240.00	33400.00	295300.00	76000.00

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1995), Data from, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1995), *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer*, Washington DC. Available Online: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185645.pdf , pp. 49-99.

Appendix 2. **Public Opinion in the UK and Germany on a common security and defence policy among EU member states, 1999-2016. Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it: A Common defence and security policy among EU member States.**

	UK			Germany		
Date	**For %**	**Against %**	**Don't Know %**	**For %**	**Against %**	**Don't Know %**
Oct-99	56.17%	22.59%	21.25%	76.38%	11.79%	11.82%
Apr-01	50.83%	25.44%	23.73%	79.23%	9.34%	11.43%
Oct-01	53.42%	26.78%	19.80%	78.26%	13.88%	7.85%
Mar-02	48.88%	29.40%	21.72%	78.55%	11.38%	10.07%
Oct-02	49.00%	32.89%	18.11%	79.23%	11.10%	9.67%
Mar-03	47.38%	31.13%	21.48%	80.65%	9.82%	9.53%
Oct-03	47.73%	34.80%	17.48%	76.21%	12.36%	11.44%
Feb-04	52.02%	27.64%	20.35%	79.64%	12.19%	8.16%
Oct-04	59.77%	26.64%	13.59%	86.98%	9.72%	3.30%
May-05	58.72%	26.80%	14.48%	85.06%	10.34%	4.61%
Oct-05	58.71%	28.64%	12.65%	87.03%	10.82%	2.15%
Mar-06	56.63%	30.34%	13.03%	85.98%	10.42%	3.60%
Sep-06	57.08%	29.30%	13.62%	84.00%	11.54%	4.46%
Apr-07	55.88%	30.78%	13.34%	86.92%	9.97%	3.10%
Sep-07	52.91%	31.19%	15.90%	88.20%	8.55%	3.25%
Mar-08	56.36%	30.70%	12.94%	87.81%	9.78%	2.41%
Oct-08	56.57%	30.12%	13.30%	82.18%	14.61%	3.21%
Nov-10	48.23%	40.38%	11.38%	81.09%	11.94%	6.97%
May-11	55.08%	32.85%	12.07%	79.67%	14.72%	5.60%
Nov-11	53.20%	36.05%	10.75%	80.62%	15.28%	4.10%
May-12	51.80%	37.16%	11.03%	78.43%	15.98%	5.59%
Nov-12	51.92%	37.04%	11.04%	80.79%	15.17%	4.03%
May-13	56.17%	33.79%	10.04%	79.28%	15.44%	5.28%
Nov-13	54.30%	31.90%	13.80%	82.11%	13.80%	4.08%
May-14	52.22%	28.91%	18.86%	78.17%	15.55%	6.28%
Nov-14	61.35%	26.27%	12.38%	83.29%	11.68%	5.03%
Feb-15	61.07%	26.20%	12.73%	78.73%	15.81%	5.46%
May-15	59.85%	29.58%	10.57%	80.69%	13.84%	5.47%
Nov-15	61.57%	28.08%	10.35%	78.68%	16.93%	4.39%
May-16	58.31%	30.52%	11.16%	82.16%	13.44%	4.40%
Nov-16	60.24%	25.91%	13.85%	85.12%	11.62%	3.26%
Average 1999-2016	**54.95%**	**30.32%**	**14.73%**	**81.65%**	**12.54%**	**5.81%**

Source: Eurobarometer Surveys 1999-2016. European Commission (2017), 'Eurobarometer', Brussels. Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm [Accessed June 2017]

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