Moral pride:
Benefits and challenges of experiencing and expressing pride in one’s moral achievements

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Word count: 8,474

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Introduction

People often experience pride in their moral accomplishments (Etxebarria, Ortiz, Apodaca, Pascual, & Conejero, 2015), and pride derived from such activities may encourage further cooperative and prosocial conduct (Dorfman, Eyal, & Bereby-Meyer, 2014; Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Sanders, Wisse, Van Yperen, & Rus, 2016). At the same time, pride may have a dark side, as the experience of pride has been linked to competitiveness, status striving, arrogance, narcissism, and overconfidence (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Holbrook, Piazza, & Fessler, 2014a; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Research on moral licensing, although yet to be directly linked to pride, also suggests that feeling proud of one’s moral activities may under certain circumstances lead to temporary disengagement from moral activities (Effron & Conway, 2015; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Mullen & Monin, 2016). That is, reflecting on a moral accomplishment, as one is prone to do during experiences of pride, may at times decrease the likelihood of repeating the behavior in the immediate future.

In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the literature on pride outside of the domain of morality, in the domain of expertise and competence, which some would argue is pride’s proper domain. Indeed, the majority of the psychological literature on pride has focused not on pride elicited by moral or prosocial action, but pride elicited by demonstrations of competence or skill, such as winning a gold medal in a sports competition or an award for academic excellence (e.g., see Cheng et al., 2010; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010; Williams & DeSteno, 2008, 2009). Consistent with Williams and DeSteno (2008), we argue that pride is a highly “social” emotion, insofar as the experience of pride is greatly amplified when the agent perceives there to be a public recognition of their accomplishments or the
Moral pride is thought to have societal value. Secondly, we argue that it is the presence of a beneficiary that principally distinguishes moral pride from competence pride. This “other-focused” aspect of moral pride, we contend, creates unique challenges in the communication of this pride to others.

It has been argued that pride’s motivational role is to promote continued effort toward future achievement and status striving (Williams & DeSteno, 2008, 2009). Yet, at the same time, recent work on moral licensing suggests that reflecting on one’s moral achievements may not always foster renewed effort toward one’s moral goals, as performing a moral deed can sometimes serve to justify (or “license”) inaction or even misconduct. In this chapter, we offer a model for discriminating when feelings of pride are likely to promote persistent effort, rather than licensing effects. We build on the work of Effron and Conway (2015), Fishbach and Woolley (2015), and Mullen and Monin (2016), who argue that consistency effects (i.e., when reflecting on one’s past accomplishments motivates similar goals and behaviors) are more likely when the agent has a stake in the activity, such that an important aspect of a person’s identity would be compromised by disengaging from the activity.

We close the chapter by reviewing the unique challenges posed by the experience of moral pride. We argue that the expression of pride is largely perceived by others as communicating a competitive, status-striving orientation (e.g., Shariff & Tracy, 2009), while moral evaluations depend on the perception of genuine altruistic motives (Chee & Murachver, 2012; Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Newman & Cain, 2014). Therefore, expressing pride in one’s moral achievements may serve to overturn the perceived altruistic motive guiding the act and therefore undermine the fundamental social benefit of engaging in moral acts, namely, that others perceive one as a truly moral person worth interacting with. By contrast, people who display pride
in achievements in competitive arenas, based on difficult-to-acquire skills, may be given a social “pass” in a manner different from expressions of moral pride, since their motives for achieving are aligned with the self-interested transmission of such achievements.

**Pride as a Highly Social Emotion**

Pride has been defined as a “self-conscious” emotion insofar as its experience requires a self-evaluation, which may not be true of all emotions (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989; Tangney, 1990; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2007b; Tracy & Robins, 2004). We would agree that pride is a self-conscious emotion in that one of its psychological antecedents is the recognition of a goal attained via a person’s efforts, or, in the case of “vicarious” pride, a goal attained by someone with whom one strongly identifies (in this manner, the person’s accomplishments are an extension of the self – see Figure 1). However, our model places equal emphasis on the personal and social dimensions of pride. On our view, it is not enough to achieve a goal—the goal should be one that the agent believes will be valued by others. We do not expect an individual to experience pride when the activity of their agency fails to produce a socially merited outcome. Indeed, consistent with this assertion, a recent study by Etxebarria, Ortiz, Apodaca, Pascual, and Conejero (2014) had Spanish teenagers, ages 14-16 years, consider hypothetical scenarios where they might help someone that fellow group members either liked or did not like. Contrary to what might be expected based on the difficulty of the act, the teenagers in their study reported that they would experience *less* pride when helping someone disliked by the group than when helping someone liked by the group. This was true independent of the perceived cost of helping the individual. Thus, even
effortful behaviors may fail to produce much pride if the agent appraises their actions as disjunctive with relevant social norms shared by valued others.¹

There have been a number of attempts to model the cognitive antecedents of pride (Decrop & Derbaix, 2010; Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2007b; Weiner, 1985). At their core, what these perspectives appear to agree on is that pride is an emotional reaction to the awareness of agency, i.e., the goal-directed activity of an agent. In attributionist terms this involves an internal attribution, i.e., locating the cause of the activity inside the agent rather than attributing the cause of the success to external forces or luck (Weiner, 1985). Tracy and Robins (2007a, b) have gone further and articulated two variants of pride, “authentic” and “hubristic” pride, that divide along additional appraisal dimensions of temporal stability and controllability. In this formulation, both authentic and hubristic pride are elicited following an internal attribution, yet authentic pride involves appraisals of unstable and controllable causes (e.g., temporary effort), while hubristic pride involves appraisals of stable and uncontrollable causes (e.g., enduring skill).

There is mixed evidence for this “two-facet” model of pride. Holbrook et al. (2014a) and Holbrook, Piazza, and Fessler (2014b) have argued that hubristic pride, as it has been measured by Tracy and Robins (2007a) with words such as “conceited,” “stuck up,” and “arrogant,” is simply a critical appraisal of someone expressing pride, and not a second “facet” of pride emotion (cf. Tracy & Robins, 2014). Nonetheless, what seems to be uncontroversial is that perceptions of agency, or goal attainment, are essential for experiencing pride.

¹ Of course, people may experience pride in counter-normative actions insofar as their achievements represent actions that violate the prevailing views of a majority group, while at the same time being fully consistent with a minority opinion, e.g., an animal advocate experiencing pride in opposing the widespread consumer purchasing of animal products.
We have used the term “agency”—rather than internal attribution or self-efficacy—in our model to highlight that pride requires appraisals of goal-directed activity generated by an agent. We prefer the term agency on account of research on group-based and vicarious pride (e.g., van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013), which highlights that the experience of pride is not limited to evaluations of one’s own agency or competence. One may experience pride when reflecting on the achievements of one’s own group or a close other, and the magnitude of this vicarious pride, like all vicarious emotions, depends on how strongly one identifies with the group/other (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014).

While perceived agency may be necessary for pride, not just any agency will do. We think it’s safe to surmise that most adults no longer experience pride when they tie their shoelaces as they did when they were first learning this skill as a young child. Thus, there must be something beyond agency that causes an individual to experience pride. We submit that this additional component is the belief that the activity has social merit (see Figure 1). As adults, we know that tying one’s shoes is no longer a challenge, and we know that others will not consider it to be an accomplishment. We do not expect to be socially rewarded for this activity because we have moved well beyond the age expected for mastery of this skill. However, children who are still learning this activity are often praised when making steps towards mastering it. As children come to acquire this skill, they may experience pride in the experience of their own agency. Indeed, work by Lewis et al. (1992) reported that 3-year-old children displayed more pride after successfully completing difficult tasks than after successfully completing easier tasks (“pride” was operationalised in terms of presenting an erect posture, smiling, social referencing via
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Eye contact with a parent, and/or verbalised self-praise). Yet we would argue that pride in the mastery of a task soon fades as children become aware that the act no longer merits praise. On our model, children experience more pride not simply due to their developing understanding of what it takes to master a skill, but because they are becoming increasingly aware of what merits praise.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1.** Modelling pride: its antecedent causes, and its outcomes. Whether someone benefited from the person’s agency discriminates moral pride from competence pride. Awareness of the social merit of the activity is a critical, amplifying cause of pride. Consistency with self-concept and social accountability are posited as mediators of the influence of pride on perseverance vs. coasting/licensing outcomes.
In our model, there is no need to posit a separate emotion “moral pride” in relation to pride in one’s competence or skill. We urge for parsimony in the conceptual modelling of pride. Our position is that there is one emotion, pride (cf. Tracy & Robins, 2007a, b, 2014), which is comprised of core affective features (i.e., it is felt as arousing and has a positive valence) and is highly social in nature. Whether a person experiences pride in either a socially valued skill or a morally praiseworthy action, there must be a belief that the activity has social value for the full expression of pride. From the perspective of audience members, this could mean that others are envious of the accomplishment (Lange & Crusius, 2015), inspired by it (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), or grateful for having benefitted from it (DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010). The latter outcome (gratitude), we contend, is a unique feature of experiencing pride in one’s moral achievements that appears to be absent from the experience of skill-based pride. Unlike competence pride, which may result from the social recognition of unmatched expertise or physical prowess (Cheng et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2010), moral pride tends to involve actions where a person/entity benefits from the agent’s goal-directed activities. Indeed, the additional and central social component of moral pride – i.e., that there is a social beneficiary of the accomplishment – might explain why past research has shown that moral achievements tend to elicit more intense feelings of pride than competence-based individual achievements. For example, Nakamura (2013) had men and women report their experiences of pride, both in the workplace and at home, over the course of seven consecutive days. Participants reported feelings of pride following “achievement experiences” and “prosocial experiences.” Although both experiences elicited pride, prosocial experiences produced more intense levels, both in the workplace and at home.
A similar perspective on pride has been put forth by Williams and DeSteno (2008, 2009), who argued that pride has a specifically social function, which is to promote activities that are positively merited by important others, thus enhancing the actor’s social standing. Research conducted by Williams and DeSteno (2008) supports this social functionalist approach to pride. These psychologists had participants perform a novel and difficult task, involving visual perception and cognitive ability—estimating the number of dots that briefly appeared on a screen in different arrays. All participants received bogus feedback about how they had performed: some participants learned they were high achievers, while others learned they performed only moderately well; additionally, some of the high achievers also received social praise from the experimenter (“You got a score in the 94th percentile—great job! That’s one of the highest scores we’ve seen!”). Participants who received this positive social feedback felt more pride in their accomplishment and persevered longer on a follow-up cognitive-ability task of a similar nature (rotating objects in three-dimensional space), compared to non-achievers and even compared to participants who learned they were high achievers but did not receive the social praise. One way to interpret these results is that participants who received the added social encouragement received additional information about the social value of their accomplishment, and it is this additional social information that led to their increased levels of pride and perseverance on the follow-up task. But there are other ways to interpret their results, to which we now turn.

**When Does Pride Promote Perseverance vs. Coasting/Licensing?**

Receiving social praise for an action may be motivating because social praise amplifies our experience of pride, and, in turn, these feelings of pride may be intrinsically motivating. Indeed, participants in Williams and DeSteno’s (2008)
studies reported higher levels of pride when receiving social praise for their display of cognitive ability, and these feelings of pride mediated the influence of the experimental conditions on the length of time participants spent on a similar follow-up task (see also Williams & DeSteno, 2009). But another potential interpretation of the Williams and DeSteno’s study is that participants in the social praise condition were more likely to view the activity as diagnostic of their intelligence than participants in the other conditions, who did not receive social praise. When given the second opportunity to achieve high marks on the mental rotation task, participants in the social praise condition may have been highly motivated to prove that the earlier results (on the dot estimation task) were not a random fluke but truly reflected a key aspect of their identity—namely, that they are cognitively adept.

Research by Fishbach and colleagues on self-regulation suggests that identifying an action as “self-diagnostic,” i.e., as diagnostic of an important aspect of one’s self-concept (e.g., how intelligent or generous one is), motivates people to be attentive to conflicts that could potentially jeopardise their self-view (see Fischbach & Woolley, 2015, for a review of this research). In the context of Williams and DeSteno’s experiment, participants who received direct praise from the experimenter on their accomplishment may have been placed under added accountability to affirm the self-diagnosticity of the results, and this might explain their additional perseverance on the task.

Another way of modelling the self-regulatory role of the self-concept is in terms of “psychological connectedness” (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). This refers to the perceived stability of some aspect of the self, or how similar one perceives the current self to be connected to one’s prospective self. Research by Bartels and Urminsky (2011) shows that when a person perceives greater overlap
between the current and future self, they are more willing to forgo an immediate reward for a delayed outcome. Presumably this is because the person sees the immediate outcome as having more consequence on their future self than if they perceived the immediate outcome as unconnected to whom they would like to be. Similarly, Fischbach and Woolley (2015) argue that when people perceive their current and future self to be tightly linked they are better able to identify conflicts that could potentially challenge this important self-image. Therefore, they are better able to exert control to avoid temptations and persevere toward an identity relevant goal.

The importance of psychological connectedness for avoiding temptation was demonstrated in studies by Van Gelder, Hershfield, and Nordgren (2013). These researchers manipulated the vividness of people’s future selves either by having them write a letter to their future selves or witness an older, age-morphed version of their self within an immersive virtual reality environment. Participants who wrote a letter to their “self” 3 months in the future were more likely to succumb to an act of delinquency compared to participants who wrote a letter to their 20-years-into-the-future self. Likewise, participants who interacted with an age-morphed version of themselves in VR were less likely to cheat on quiz than participants who interacted with a non-morphed version of themselves. Apparently, by making the future self more vivid, these researchers increased participants’ motivations to pass over an immediate temptation to preserve the integrity of the self into the future.

Building on research pertaining to self-diagnosticity and psychological connectedness, we assert that the self-diagnosticity of a meritorious activity is an important mediator of motivational outcomes of pride (Figure 1). Pride might not always promote perseverance on a task, and at times may even promote coasting (i.e., cessation of further effort following an accomplishment). Even more strongly, pride
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may at times promote the licensing of unethical behavior. An increasingly large
literature on moral self-licensing (for recent reviews, see Effron & Conway, 2015;
Mullen & Monin, 2016) suggests that the realisation of a moral accomplishment can
oftentimes result in subsequent licensing of morally questionable actions, such as not
helping others, cheating on a task, or expressing more prejudicial views (Effron,
Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Mazar & Zhong,
2010; Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). In a recent review of these moral
licensing effects, Effron and Conway (2015) argued that licensing primarily occurs in
situations where people are reflecting on their virtuous behavior, and the subsequent
action or temptation is not related to an important aspect of the self. In the language of
psychological connectedness, this means that the implications of the tempting
situation, e.g., the temptation to not expend further effort, is psychologically distant
from the self that one aspires to be. Effron and Conway argue that consistency effects,
in contrast, are more common when a person focuses on moral deeds that are central
to a person’s moral identity.

Other evidence for the importance of psychological stability in the self-concept comes from a study by Young, Chakroff, and Tom (2012). These researchers
found that individuals who intrinsically valued their moral character were more likely
to display consistency effects than those who were motivated by impression-
management concerns. Participants were asked to recall and write about good deeds
they had recently performed, to write about some recent conversation they had
(baseline control), or write about recent bad deeds. Participants who wrote about good
deeds subsequently donated almost twice as much money to a charity of their choice,
compared to participants in the other two conditions. Interestingly, the highest
donations were offered by individuals who did not mention whether their good deeds
were recognised or unrecognised by others, suggesting that the deed reflected an important aspect of their identity, and thus the motivation to preserve this identity was reinvigorated by writing about the good deed they recently performed.

The self-diagnosticity of an action may be an important predictor of perseverance. However, when focusing on the future behavior, it may be equally important to consider whether a person is being held accountable for their actions (Figure 1). If a person has reason to believe that their performance will go unnoticed or unmerited, then this may reduce the motivational power of pride on future performance. This is another way to interpret the findings of Williams and DeSteno. It may not have been that participants viewed mentally rotating objects as reflecting on a diagnostic aspect of their self-concept. Rather, it may simply have been the perceived accountability of the second task, the belief that the experimenter would continue to evaluate their performance as they did in the original task, which spurred participants on in the social praise condition. Consistent with this accountability interpretation, research by Greene and Low (2014) has shown that, after participants recalled a morally positive action they had performed, they were less likely to exhibit licensing effects if they believed their future actions would be made public to others than if they thought their future actions would be kept private. Thus, social accountability may be another important moderator of the outcomes of experiencing pride, above and beyond the self-diagnosticity of the activity.

Are There Benefits to Expressing Pride?

Our model posits that pride ultimately serves a social function, motivating the enactment of behaviors that are valued by others. However, emotions also serve a more general social function in that they communicate important information to others (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012; Van Kleef, 2009).
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Here, we consider what pride expressions might communicate to others, and what benefits expressing pride might have for the agent.

When an individual expresses pride, they are communicating to others that they have done something that others should take notice of. Prototypical bodily expressions of pride involve an expanded bodily posture, with chin lifted, chest raised and outstretched arms (Lewis et al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2007c). Research has shown that people in various cultures reliably identify this posture with feelings of pride, rather than other emotion categories (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). Studies by Shariff and Tracy (2009) has shown that people implicitly associate this bodily expression, particularly with arms raised overhead, with notions of high status. Likewise, Horberg, Kraus and Keltner (2013) found that people associate bodily displays of pride with self-interested attempts to “get ahead” and an endorsement of competitive, meritocratic values. Tracy and Matsumoto (2008) documented how Olympic athletes behaved following victory at the Olympic and Paralympic Games. They reported that sighted, blind, and congenitally blind athletes reliably and automatically demonstrate bodily aspects of pride, particularly raised arms, immediately after achieving victory. Congenitally blind athletes, who never had visual experience with the raised arm victory display, engaged in this expression much like sighted athletes and those who lost their sight later in life. Tracy and Matsumoto argued that this is evidence for a “biologically innate” bodily expression of pride. Alternatively, congenitally blind athletes may have learned to raise their arms in victory via non-visual channels of social learning (e.g., hearing descriptions of other athletes when celebrating).

Whether or not bodily expressions of pride are “biologically innate,” it is clear that the bodily configuration identified by Tracy and colleagues, with arms
outstretched and chest inflated, entails an attempt to make the person more noticeable. That is, the bodily expression of pride seems to afford or almost command social attention, which might explain why people in various cultures associate such a display with notions of status striving. This commanding of social attention may be useful in some contexts, but in other contexts it may prove counterproductive, as signalling pride could be viewed as bragging or a blatant attempt to gain status, which could transform the meaning of an otherwise altruistic act.

To understand the adaptive value of pride as an experience or as an expression, it is helpful to first consider what social status is, and why it is beneficial to enhance it. According to evolutionary psychologists, high social status grants an individual greater influence over group resources and collective decision making (Barkow, 1975; Cheng et al., 2010). As such, social status has been linked with improved reproductive fitness and wellbeing (Cowlishaw & Dunbar, 1991). Of course, for human beings, who compete not only through physical prowess and aggression, like other mammals, but as well via displays of political acumen and cognitive ability, there are multiple pathways to achieving high status (Barkow, 1975; Fessler, 2007; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone and Henrich (2013) argue that there are fundamentally two streams of activity that may be employed by individuals to gain status: activities aimed at dominating others via the use of force or intimidation (this stream is thought to be evolutionarily more ancient, and is subject to sanctioning in many social hierarchies), and activities aimed at cultivating a desirable skill or expertise that can be shared and learned by others, thus conferring the expert status without the use of force. To this list we might add the pursuit of moral attributes, such as establishing oneself as a caring, reliable, fair, and loyal partner in social exchange (Piazza & Bering, 2008; Sperber & Baumard, 2012)
or an impartial, diplomatic, and devoted leader (Sanders et al., 2016). Thus, an emotion that, first, encourages status-seeking behaviors, whether via dominance or the cultivation of valued skills and traits; second, reinforces those behaviors to maintain the enhanced status, while, third, signalling one’s accomplishments or traits to others would have clear adaptive value. Pride has been posited to serve each of these adaptive functions (Tracy et al., 2010), which might explain the widespread use and identification of pride displays.

Psychologists often discuss the positive social consequences of pride in terms of *social capitalization*, which is the sharing of individual achievements so as to derive additional social benefits above and beyond the achievement itself (Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004). When experiencing pride, people are drawing attention to their achievements, and thereby sharing them. In motivating individuals to share their accomplishments with others, pride is therefore helping to maximise the social benefits of individual and joint accomplishments. Not surprisingly, then, certain aspects of pride, such as the self-directed, positive valence that accompanies success, has been positively linked with predictors of interpersonal functioning, such as dyadic adjustment, relationship satisfaction, and self-esteem, and negatively linked to antisocial behaviors, such as aggressiveness and Machiavellianism (Tracy et al., 2009). At the same time, other aspects of pride, such as the inclination to engage in ostensible displays of pride, may be counterproductive to adaptive social functioning, insofar as others may be in direct competition for resources or important social outcomes, and may resent visible attempts to gain advancement. Indeed, work by Tracy et al. (2009) found that individuals who are inclined to displays of pride, which others may perceive as arrogance, suffer a loss of social support and are less satisfied with their social relationships. By contrast, individuals who are more conscientious
about appearing immodest, and who avoid over-attributing their successes exclusively to underlying abilities and not also to hard work, tend to be better socially adjusted (Holbrook et al., 2014a). This is not to say that there are not contexts in which it pays to engage in displays of pride. As argued by Holbrook et al. (2014a) the adaptive value of a pride display depends on the normative constraints operating within a situation. While it might be appropriate to express pride by raising one’s hands in the air after winning a medal at the Olympic Games, it would be socially offensive (and perhaps even comical) to do so if one has just won an argument with a colleague in a staff meeting.

So, what evidence is there that pride expressions can improve social status? At an implicit level, individuals who express bodily displays of pride are thought to have greater social status than individuals who display other emotions, such as shame, embarrassment, or happiness (Shariff & Tracy, 2009). However, these implicit association studies have been conducted within context-free environments, without any prior information about the person’s character or abilities. Studies by Berman, Levine, Barasch and Small (2015) have shown, with regards to altruistic giving, that engaging in communication about a moral achievement can improve one’s social status, but this is largely the case for someone whose reputation is unknown to audience members. When a person is already thought to be charitable (e.g., is a social worker) or the good deed is already known to audience members, further communication about the charitable activity has little benefit or even counter-productive effects. Thus, pride displays may enhance social status, but this may be limited to contexts in which audience members are mostly lacking relevant information about the individual’s behavior or character; otherwise, the display may be interpreted as arrogance or wanton competitiveness.
Pride may operate to improve social status, not necessarily via displays of pride, but through the experience of proud feelings which foster perseverance on socially relevant tasks. Williams and DeSteno (2009) had participants rate the social status of group members, following a group problem-solving task. Some of those group members had, immediately prior to the group task, completed an individual task and been told they had done exceptionally well. Thus, half the participants began the group problem-solving task feeling proud of their prior performance. These proud participants tended to assume more active roles during the group task, and, presumably, as a consequence, were perceived as more likeable by other members of the group. The authors concluded that the pride elicited in response to their individual accomplishment had enhanced their social status during the group task by motivating increased effort.

Besides enhancing social status, another social consequence of expressing pride is the emotional reactions that pride expressions elicit in others. Different emotional responses elicit distinct emotional reactions. For example, Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa (2010) showed that someone responsible for a transgression is likely to feel guilty about what they have done if their victim expresses anger, but is more likely to feel ashamed about who they are if their victim expresses disgust. This appears to be the case because disgust and shame are more focused on stable aspects of a person, while anger and guilt are focused more on specific actions. In an analogous manner, studies on pride have shown that pride expressions often evoke envy in others (Lange & Crusius, 2015). Like pride, envy is part of the affective-motivational psychological suite that regulates social status, and it usually occurs when there is perceived inequality between two individuals, and the disadvantaged individual is motivated to re-establish an equal standing. If pride is thought to
Moral pride enhances the agent’s social status following one’s own success, envy may enhance one’s social status following another person’s success that one is in competition with. Being able to respond to another person’s achievements with increased efforts to restore balance, is a response with clear adaptive value. This may be why people are quite accurate at identifying pride expressions in others (Liu, Yuan, Chen, & Yu, 2016).

Note, however, that just as psychologists have distinguished between two “facets” of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a), so too have psychologists distinguished between two facets of envy. Benign envy is characterised by the envious individual holding positive thoughts about the target (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009) and a desire to become as successful as the target (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012). While benign envy can inspire individuals to achieve their own success, it has a nastier sibling, malicious envy, which is characterised by a person having negative thoughts about a rival (van de Ven et al., 2009) and taking pleasure in the rival’s suffering (van de Ven et al., 2015). Lange and Crusius (2015) report that expressions of pride more often elicit benign envy than malicious envy, presumably because most expressions of pride occur between affiliates who are devoted to mutualistic goals, rather than between direct competitors. Consequently, work on envy suggests yet another adaptive function of pride: the elevation of others. Just as a rising tide raises all ships, expressions of pride might inspire other individuals to strive for similar skills and successes, thus increasing the fitness of the group via the increased efforts of individual members.

What Are the Challenges in Communicating Moral Achievements?

Moral pride involves an agent acting in a manner that benefits someone else, and thus may be construed as a prosocial act, guided by a regard for others, rather
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than solely as a personal triumph, motivated by self-interest (Figure 1). As such, challenges exist in expressing moral pride that do not exist for expressing pride in a competence or skill-based achievement. While expressing pride in any type of achievement may smack of arrogance when the expression is deemed extreme or unwarranted (Holbrook et al., 2014a), we highlight two specific challenges that moral achievers face when expressing their pride that competence achievers may not similarly experience.

First, because expressing pride may be construed as an attempt to capitalise on one’s successes, expressing pride over a moral achievement may undermine the perceived altruistic motive underlying the act. Second, expressing pride in a moral achievement might serve to make non-achievers feel morally threatened by highlighting the fact they have failed to act in a concurrently praiseworthy manner. Although a competence-based achievement may also be threatening in an analogous way, insofar as audience members may share in the same competence-based goals as the achiever, or may be in direct competition with the achiever, we argue that moral achievements have a greater scope to induce envy and resentment since moral activities are often available to audience members and are more likely to have implications for other people’s moral-identity goals, compared to competence-based activities, which tend to require more time and effort to cultivate and may not impact on other people’s competence goals. In Table 1, we have summarised the challenges of expressing pride by achievement domain.

Table 1. Challenges involved in the expression of pride as a function of achievement domain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Skill-based Achievement</th>
<th>Moral-based Achievement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Alters the perceived motivation for acting.</td>
<td>NO (actor is still perceived as skilful)</td>
<td>YES (actor no longer perceived as altruistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Achievement is a source of implicit threat or criticism for others.</td>
<td>OCCASIONALLY (only when the skills are in the same domain)</td>
<td>OFTEN (since most moral traits are desirable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Perceived as arrogant, competitive, or status driven.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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Expressing pride in moral achievements can undermine perceptions of altruism

There exists a catch-22 when expressing pride in one’s moral activities. On the one hand, a sizeable literature supports the notion that altruistic behaviour, and possessing a moral reputation, enhances one’s social desirability and status (e.g., Sperber & Baumard, 2012). It is therefore in the individual’s interest to communicate one’s moral activities. Consider a study by McAndrew and Perilloux (2012) which had a confederate appear to behave altruistically by seeming to voluntarily endure pain so that their fellow group members would not be subjected to it. In a later task that required each of the participants to privately decide how they would like to divide a sum of money between the rest of the group, the altruistic confederates were rewarded with a greater portion of the money, and were considered to have greater
social status, than confederates who had not volunteered. There is also evidence that such helping behavior can enhance an individual’s attractiveness. Arnocky, Piché, Albert, Ouellette and Barclay (2016) found that self-reported altruism positively predicted the number of sexual partners and frequency of sex within relationships that participants reported having. In a second study, the amount of money participants donated to charity positively correlated with the amount of lifetime sexual partners, casual sexual partners, and sexual partners in the past year. Although these results are correlational, they are suggestive that there may be an advantage in drawing awareness to one’s moral behavior.

On the other hand, the problem with expressing moral pride is that doing so might undermine the prosocial nature of the act itself (Berman et al., 2015). Altruism is characterized by a motivation to help another individual without personal benefit (Batson, 1990). The existence of intrinsic rewards such as pride or warm feelings experienced following a moral action raises the question of whether a truly altruistic act can exist (Batson, 1987; de Waal & Suchak, 2010). Yet, separate from this philosophical debate about the existence of “pure” altruism, we might question the moral character of a person who fails to display any emotion upon engaging in an action that benefits others. Emotions are often thought to be involuntary and thus reliable cues to a person’s character (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014). Thus, it may not be the experience of pride that we criticise moral achievers for, but the perceived attempt to capitalise on the achievement for reputational gain.

Research by Barasch et al. (2014) highlights that individuals who feel positively about their altruistic behavior still receive moral credit for their actions. In one study, participants read feedback ostensibly from a person who claimed that they had experienced a “warm, positive feeling” after donating to charity, and the
experimenters manipulated the intensity of that emotional response. The greater the intensity of the positive emotion that the moral do-gooder experienced, the more they were perceived to be motivated by their emotional state. Importantly, the intensity of the positive emotion following the donation also predicted ratings of moral character: the greater the emotional intensity, the more moral the person was considered to be. Hence, it seems that expressing positive emotion about one’s good deeds can lead to positive social evaluations under certain circumstances.

One noteworthy aspect of Barash et al.’s study is that the positive feelings experienced by the person were communicated to participants by the experimenter, rather than the person themselves. Thus, participants may not have viewed the target as attempting to gain status for their moral deed. Another study conducted by this research team manipulated whether participants perceived the do-gooder as motivated for material (a tax break) or reputational (media coverage) benefits in exchange for their charity donation. In both cases, such a person was rated as having less moral character than a person motivated by positive feelings, highlighting that it is the attempt to gain status (i.e., social capital) that participants found distasteful, not the experience of positive emotion itself, following a moral achievement. This study also suggests that whether the actor themselves is seen communicating information about the moral deed, or another person (e.g., a friend) who communicates the information, may be an important moderator of the social response to expressing moral pride, as the former suggests a greater orientation towards status striving. Communicating directly to others about a moral deed may be more likely to signal an attempt to engage in competitive altruism, whereas hearing about another’s moral deed through other channels may preserve the innocence of the act as a truly other-oriented deed.
Work by Newman and Cain (2014) on “tainted altruism” further highlights the challenges of communicating moral deeds. Their research identified that people who perform charitable actions are perceived to be less moral if they personally benefit from the charitable action, irrespective of how generous the action is perceived to be. The challenge of communicating one’s good deeds is exacerbated by how easily people question the authenticity of altruistic motives. Critcher and Dunning (2011) asked participants to reflect on selfless and selfish actions, and reported that participants were relatively more cynical of the motives of selfless actions than they were of selfish actions. A subsequent study by the same authors showed that participants were more likely to suspect a philanthropist had selfish motives than selfless motives, when reflecting on why they behaved altruistically. Lin-Healy and Small (2013) found that people even question the motives of moral do-gooders in circumstances where the personal benefit is a matter of chance. In their study, raffle winners were perceived as being less nice than those who did not win the raffle, despite everyone having performed the same altruistic act to be entered into the raffle.

Berman et al. (2015) refer to the catch-22 surrounding the transmission of moral acts as the “braggart’s dilemma.” Their research is particularly relevant to the topic of pride, because they define bragging as the “informing others of a positive, self-relevant behavior or trait…[with a specific focus on] those who brag about their good deeds” (p. 91). Expressions of moral pride, on this view, are bragging by definition. However, the results of Berman and colleagues’ research do not suggest that all moral bragging has an equally negative effect on how altruistic a person is perceived. Communicating information about a good deed was only counter-productive when participants were already aware of the person’s actions, or the person was already considered to be highly moral. Thus, it is possible that pride
expressions might initially serve some benefit in drawing attention to one’s good deeds, when little is known about the action or the person’s character. Yet, the data presented by Berman and colleagues suggest that prolonged or repeated expressions of pride might ultimately taint the moral accomplishment and raise questions about the actor’s altruistic motives.

The motives underlying skill-based achievements, such as winning at a sports contest, are fully apparent—the motive is to be the best; thus, such communications are unlikely to be scrutinized to the extent that moral-based achievements are. In this way, the communication of competence-based achievements may not pose the same dilemma as when communicating pride in one’s moral achievements. Important for our comparison between competence-based and moral pride, in later studies Berman et al. also contrasted evaluations of individuals who bragged, or did not brag, about prosocial actions vs. skill-based (athletic) achievements. They found that bragging about skill-based achievements did not undermine the motivation for the action (e.g., having a genuine passion for running) as it did bragging about prosocial actions (e.g., having a genuine passion for helping others). Furthermore, while prosocial actors were penalised for advertising a moral deed, in terms of being seen as less moral, skill-based achievers were not penalised, in terms of being seen as any less skilful.

Research into the Braggart’s dilemma leads to the tentative conclusion that the “taint” of communicating moral deeds occurs mostly in situations where audience members suspect the actor of having performed the act for reputational gain. It also highlights clear differences in the social challenges faced by moral and skill-based achievers. We propose that vicarious pride may offer a solution to this dilemma surrounding moral pride. Expressing pride in joint activities or in others’ moral achievements with whom one identifies may serve the purpose of communicating
one’s own moral character, while at the same time avoiding criticisms of an attempt to gain a competitive edge. Thus, vicarious pride may be a more successful way to accomplish the signalling function of moral pride—i.e., signalling to others the moral composition of the self—by avoiding the cynicism aroused by transmitting moral information about oneself.

**Pride as a source of implicit moral criticism for others**

The second major challenge of transmitting moral-based achievements involves the scope of the threat that moral achievements have for audience members, relative to the scope of ability-based achievements. A person’s moral character is perceived, by many, to be “core” to who they are as a person, more so than other traits, such as those related to competence or ability (Goodwin, 2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Furthermore, a person’s moral character is the most valued and sought after aspect of a person, certainly more so than aspects related to competence (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Moral traits are also more likely to be viewed as tightly interrelated, comprising a wholistic “moral self” (Aquino & Reed, 2002), while competence traits are not interrelated in the same way, but tend to be viewed more in isolation (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2015). For example, research by Goodwin et al. (2015) suggests that we do not expect someone who is highly competent with mathematics to be a great athlete, or vice versa, but we do expect a person to be both kind and honest, trustworthy and fair, and so on, and failure to attain any single aspect of morality may be detrimental to evaluations of a person’s moral character, while this is not true for evaluations of competence.

Because morality is so fundamental to a person’s self-concept, and morality traits are treated as reflecting more globally on a person’s moral character, whereas a
person’s competence is viewed as more divisible and domain specific, we anticipate that people are more likely to share morality-relevant goals with each other than competence-relevant goals. This feature of moral self-regulation, we argue, makes the communication of moral achievements a more prevalent threat to others than achievements based on particular skills. Furthermore, competence-based achievements often take years of hard work and practice to cultivate, while moral achievements, though at times may require great skill (e.g., a soldier’s performance in combat or a vegan’s forgoing of pleasurable commodities), more often than not require nothing more than simple sacrifices of time or effort, which make moral activities more readily available to others. These two aspects of moral achievements, we posit, combine to make the communication of moral deeds particularly troubling for others.

Minson and Monin (2012) coined the term “do-gooder derogation” to describe what happens when somebody is made aware of, and their own moral self-view threatened by, another person’s moral successes. Their findings suggest that people can respond defensively to the do-gooder’s achievement. The authors specifically proposed that such defensive behavior results from backlash against the threat to self-worth. Focusing on the topic of how meat eaters perceive vegetarians to view them, the researchers discovered that when meat eaters were made to feel morally criticised by vegetarians, they verbally derogated vegetarians to a greater extent than when they did not perceive vegetarians to make claims to moral superiority. What is unclear from this study is the precise source of do-gooder derogation. Were omnivores in this study more reactive because they thought vegetarians would be critical of their meat-eating practices, which they felt guilty about, or because they perceived that vegetarians were claiming more credit than meat eaters thought they deserved?
Some recent unpublished data from our lab sheds some light on the mechanisms underlying do-gooder derogation. In one study (Piazza & McLatchie, unpublished), participants were presented with filler information about a young woman who was described to be “dedicated” to a vegan diet, eating fair-trade foods, or styling hair. Thus, in all three conditions the woman displayed the virtue of dedication, with only the activity she was dedicated to varied across condition. Participants rated one of the targets on how much they liked them, how guilty they made them feel, how critical they thought the target would be of them, and how much credit they deserved for their activities. In line with Minson and Monin's (2012) do-gooder derogation effect, participants rated that they liked the target less when she was dedicated to a moral activity, i.e., was a vegan or someone who eats only fair-trade products, relative to when she was dedicated to an amoral activity (hair styling). Critically, in a multiple mediation analysis, ratings of deserved credit did not serve as a mediator of target category and liking for the target. Only feelings of guilt and anticipating the target to be critical of one’s own actions emerged as significant, independent mediators. Thus, at least based on this study, do-gooder derogation appears to work primarily via concerns about how the target will criticize one’s own actions, and not via perceptions that the other person is over-claiming credit.

In line with this argument, we posit that the reflective sting of a moral achievement is likely to be greatest among individuals who perceive morality to be an important aspect of their identity, but this should only operate in contexts where audience members perceive there to be a moral deficit in themselves and thus anticipate criticism from others. Research by Aquino and Reed (2002) has shown that individuals vary to a measurable degree on how strongly they strive to be moral. To the extent that a person is motivated to be viewed as moral, and see their moral
character as central to their self-concept, they should find the moral achievements of others more threatening. Indeed, a study by Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers, and van den Bos (2013) exposed omnivorous participants to a person refusing to eat a sausage on moral grounds. The researchers measured the extent to which participants considered being a moral person central to their identity using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. The study found that people who scored highest on the moral identity scale felt the worst when the confederate in the experiment refused to eat the sausage on moral grounds. Yet this study was carried out with participants who eat meat, so it remains unclear whether this might only be true of individuals who view the moral activity as reflecting poorly on their own moral identity.

Individuals who are secure in their own moral identity, for example, because they can rely on their own moral credentials based on past deeds, may be inoculated from the sting of others’ moral achievements and may even seize on them as opportunities to bask in their own moral successes.

Consistent with this idea, a study by Jordan and Monin (2008) found that when people had time to reflect on a highly valued skill or aspect of their identity, they were inoculated from the do-gooder derogation effect. In one study, participants witnessed a person rebelling against an action that reflected poorly on them. Some participants had a chance to write about a valued quality of themselves before evaluating the moral rebel, while others did not. Those who had a chance to self-affirm did not derogate the rebel’s character as those who did not have a chance. Thus, providing individuals with an opportunity to affirm important aspects of themselves may be one way to minimise the implicit threat lurking within the moral achievements of others.

**Conclusion**
Here, we have proposed a comprehensive model of pride that parsimoniously draws a distinction between pride in response to skill-based achievements and moral activities. While identifying pride as a self-conscious emotion, our model agrees with previous literature identifying pride as a highly social emotion. As we have argued in this chapter, pride-eliciting events must be thought to be valued by relevant others. Our model primarily addresses two questions surrounding moral pride: first, the conditions in which pride is likely to motivate perseverance toward future goals versus coasting or resting on one’s laurels. Drawing on the licensing literature, our model posits that achievers are likely to persevere with their behaviour when the activity is considered central to their self-identity and/or the actor is held socially accountable. Second, we identified two unique challenges that exist when communicating pride in response to a moral achievement, not typically faced when communicating pride in skill-based achievements: expressions of moral pride can taint the praiseworthy motive of the moral activity, and threaten the moral self-regard of audience members. Thus, while pride has clear adaptive benefits in the form of motivating status striving and signalling success to others, these benefits are not without constraints and, at times, expressing pride may even be self-defeating.
References


Moral pride


Moral pride


https://doi.org/doi: 10.1037/a0015669


