

**ISLAMOPHOBIA:  
REALITY  
OR  
MYTH?**

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work and no part of it has been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

**Signed:** .....

**Date:** .....**2016**

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Dedicated to Faith.

‘The quality of the data can be seen as the keystone of a project’s success, and perfection should be the standard to strive for on all levels of the operation.’

**Stouthamer-Loeber and van Kammen**

‘There are some enterprises in which a careful disorderliness is the true method.’

**Herman Melville**

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the concept of 'Islamophobia' using statistical data from available large-scale social surveys. The primary aim of the presented research is to determine the extent to which available statistical data support or challenge assertions and conclusions concerning 'Islamophobia' found within recent scholarly and policy literature. It uses five large social survey datasets containing data collected and made available between 2006 and 2011. In total, these data relate to the reported attitudes and experiences of over 15,000 Muslim respondents in respect of crime victimization, discrimination and attitudes towards British society and the British state, and the reported attitudes of over 300,000 non-Muslim respondents towards Muslims and Islam. The central contention of this thesis is that available statistics challenge the scholarly literature in that they suggest a more nuanced and complex picture of Muslim victimization and discrimination than the one offered by the various conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' within the literature. Although there is an expansive and expanding body of published research concerning British Muslim communities, 'Islamophobia', anti-Muslim discrimination and anti-Islamic sentiment, recent studies have been dominated largely by political, rhetorical or polemical writing, and by qualitative research designs that have used only small samples. This study of nationally representative survey data aims to make a contribution towards criminology and the social sciences by offering a large-scale quantitative study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities and the foundation of an evidence base for future research in this area.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ‘ISLAMOPHOBIA’**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The British Muslim population is young, growing in number, and diverse in character. During the past quarter of a century it has been the subject of much discussion, speculation and controversy. For some, the Muslim population gives cause for celebration: a thriving symbol of Britain’s commitment to the peaceful co-existence of people and values from around the world. For others, the Muslim population is a cause of anxiety: an anxiety voiced by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These concerns emanate from a broad array of political and ideological positions. Some anxious or concerned voices form a robust defence of the British Muslim population; other voices represent vitriolic attack. Some defend the right of British Muslims to contribute towards a diverse and pluralistic society but worry that this contribution is being undermined by the bigotry, prejudice, and hostility inherent within certain sections of British society. They seek to round on these sections of society, and limit the influence and harm caused to Muslims by prejudicial views and hostile actions. Other voices seek to challenge, or even withdraw, the right of British Muslims to make such a contribution to British society. These anxious voices question the nature, role and validity of Muslim culture and politics in Britain. They suggest that British Muslims represent diversity in its more negative, divisive form: a diversity that instead of strengthening, threatens to erode the traditional character, cohesion and well-being of modern British society.

#### **THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ‘ISLAMOPHOBIA’**

These numerous, competing voices are now such that the religious, cultural, and political ideas which underpin public debates and define Muslim lives (as well as the objects and actions that physically symbolize these ideas) are increasingly well-known to people from non-Muslim backgrounds (Lewis, 2007). Media stories related to Britain’s military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan; acts of international and domestic terrorism (such as those done in the

name of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or ISIS); and depictions of Muslim and Islamic culture in the British press have together raised the profile of Muslims living in Britain and generated interest in the religion, culture and politics that shape Muslim identity. An understanding, alongside a sizeable and demonstrable misunderstanding, of these ideas and symbols is used to inform debates concerning not just Muslim communities but modern British society as a whole. Issues that shape the British Muslim population inform and propel discourse (both popular and scholarly) that is related to a broader spectrum of topics and themes. Themes include: national identity and citizenship; domestic and foreign politics; multiculturalism and social cohesion; the nature of religion and secularism; patriarchies and feminism; issues of gender and sexual orientation; issues around immigration; and around access to public services and criminal justice. These themes fuel debates that ring with diverse and sometimes disparate views and that link topics of broad national interest to specific elements of Muslim life in Britain and the experiences of those within Muslim communities. Many issues concerning British Muslims may be described as being a lens through which may be viewed the changing and varied nature of British society as a whole; national and cultural identities shaped and re-shaped by the ways in which ethnic minority communities are viewed by non-members and the ways in which those communities view wider society. A study of the relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim groups in Britain (as well as their ideas and values) may reveal therefore not only how one views or is viewed by the other, but how each views itself.

This thesis aims to make both an examination of and a contribution towards the debates around the British Muslim population. It focuses on a controversial concept that has been used to describe the relationship between the British Muslim population and a variety of other groups: non-Muslim communities, state agencies, and the media: 'Islamophobia'.<sup>1</sup> The concept is used often to define instances of bigotry, prejudice and hostility against Muslim

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<sup>1</sup> The word 'Islamophobia' is given quotations marks throughout this thesis. This is to reflect the objectivity with which the word and concept are analysed.

people and the Islamic faith. However, it is a concept the use of which has itself become the subject of discussion, speculation and controversy.

### **THE ETYMOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE TERM 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

The word 'Islamophobia' has etymological roots in the French language. 'Islamophobie' may be traced to early twentieth century France where it was used to describe the dislike or mistrust of Islam by Muslims (Allen, 2010; Cesari, 2006). This definition developed through the intervening years and its translation into English significantly altered the original concept for use by a new host language. The Muslims represented by the original French term are replaced in the contemporary English definition by non-Muslims. The term, therefore, no longer relates to criticisms of the Islamic religion made by its members but to those made by non-members; non-Muslim people. The development of the English term 'Islamophobia' was refined by academics and practitioners throughout the nineteen eighties and nineties (Allen, 2010). The term emerged in the United Kingdom in the late nineteen nineties with the publication of a report by the Runnymede Trust entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (Runnymede Trust, 1997). If the progeny of the word may be described as easily understood, its exact definition and current usage are significantly less so. The word causes disagreement over whether it is an appropriate label for the social phenomena it describes (cf. Halliday, 2002; 2010; CBMI, 2004; Malik, 2005; Iganski, 2009; 2011; Allen, 2010). Debate concerning the utility of the word 'Islamophobia' is coupled with epistemological disagreement over the conceptual basis of the word. Such debate is centred on whether or not there exists a social phenomenon of sufficient distinction, and of appropriate nature, to require a label such as 'Islamophobia' (or any label that describes something in terms more specific than 'prejudice'). For some, the social phenomena that the term 'Islamophobia' represents and describes have been exaggerated (Malik, 2005). Others have viewed descriptions of prejudice and hostility towards Muslims and Islam as less exaggerated, but as a problem for which the label 'Islamophobia' is neither appropriate nor adequate (Halliday, 2002). It may be argued however, that those involved in these debates

form a minority sub-group within a wider group who employ the term 'Islamophobia' and its related concept. For a majority of the users of the word 'Islamophobia', and despite its relatively youthful age, it is employed by those who question neither the term's genesis nor its validity.

### **AN OVERVIEW OF A CONTESTED TERM**

'Islamophobia' has successfully evaded a single universally-accepted definition. It is used widely, and often uncritically, for numerous discursive purposes. It is deployed to help describe the targeting of people due to their affiliation to Islam or because of actual or assumed Muslim identity. It has also been used to describe instances of demonization or stereotyping of Muslims and Islam by elements of the British media; and the open hostility and prejudice towards Muslim communities and Islamic culture displayed by right-wing political groups such as the English Defence League and the British National Party. It is possible therefore to describe 'Islamophobia' as an umbrella term incorporating criminal behaviour, open hostility and bigotry and prejudice aimed at Muslim or Islamic targets. Some have argued that phenomena described as 'Islamophobic' may be described using the more traditional lexicon of racism. This is especially relevant where people of actual or assumed South Asian backgrounds are identified (rightly or wrongly) as being Muslim and are, on that basis, made the target of prejudicial attitudes or actions. Incidents such as these may pose the social scientist a problem (albeit one that is far less great in magnitude and severity than faced by the victim of the unwanted targeting): the over-lap between 'Islamophobia' and 'racism' is one which may present a challenge to the assertion that 'Islamophobia' represents a distinct type of social phenomenon and thus deserves a distinct moniker. It may be seen that the concept of 'Islamophobia' is capable of describing a wide range of actions and targets. Actions may range from the direct harm of criminal violence to indirect harm caused by the construction of stereotypes. Targets may include those chosen by the perpetrator on the basis of religion, ethnicity, and culture, or a combination of these elements. Hence there exists a broad ambit

under which actions and targets may inform deeds or words which may be individually or collectively described as 'Islamophobic'.

The Runnymede Trust report offered one of the few attempts to provide a comprehensive definition of the term 'Islamophobia'. This definition centred on 'closed' views of Islam (which represent Islam as monolithic, static, inferior, and as an enemy) and of Muslims (which represent Muslims as manipulative). One of the few other notable attempts to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for the term was made by Chris Allen in a book published in 2010. Allen offered a lengthy definition of 'Islamophobia' as an ideology similar to, yet distinct from, racism that casts Muslims and Islam as the 'Other' within theological, social, cultural or racist contexts (through implied or explicit means). For the purposes of this introductory discussion, Allen's definition may be described as having mounted a challenge to the earlier Runnymede Trust definition. Allen not only challenged the theoretical basis on which the numerous authors of the Runnymede Trust report constructed their definition of 'Islamophobia' but asserted that the Runnymede definition is too limited in scope, and therefore in utility (Allen, 2010). The Runnymede Trust report and Chris Allen's book are both discussed at greater length in the following chapter.

### **LIMITATIONS TO THE DEBATES AROUND 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

The debates around 'Islamophobia' may be characterized by two key observations. One such observation is that there is the aforementioned absence of a single, universally-agreed definition. The second observation relates to the rhetorical and polemical manner in which debates are conducted: the debates rarely include the use of supporting evidence. The heightened awareness of issues around the British Muslim population, and wider Islamic world, and the increased profile of British Muslims have in turn increased the amount of discussion and debate in Britain about issues that include or relate to facets of Muslim life and culture. In criminology, the discourse around British Muslims and Islam may be viewed as part of wider discourse on the relationship between crime and ethnic minority communities.

The nature of this criminological discourse, especially emanating from state-sponsored sources (governmental and quasi-governmental reports, surveys and committees) has not remained stable in recent years. For example, the Scarman Inquiry report, which followed the Brixton Riots in London in 1981, asserted the association between members of African-Caribbean communities and criminal culture and behaviour (Rowe, 2004). The Macpherson Report, published eighteen years later following the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence, asserted an alternative dynamic: African-Caribbean communities caught by the failings of the criminal justice system; a system that failed to protect such communities and that failed to properly account for these shortcomings (Rowe, 2007). Macpherson used the vocabulary of the Black civil rights movement in 1960s America and a term to describe the relationship between African-Caribbean communities and the British police and criminal justice system: 'institutional racism' (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). Much of the academic literature concerning crime and ethnic minority communities pertains to this shift in emphasis, and some of it to discussion around 'institutional racism'. The aims of this literature (explicitly stated or implied) are to describe and defend multicultural Britain against the perceived failings of politics past. Much of what is written about British Muslims may be seen, therefore, as corrective for past analyses of ethnic minority communities by state bodies. These debates have been highly politicized. This politicization rests on the conflation of the aforementioned corrective and the fact that issues related to the British Muslim population are commonly perceived as embodying wider issues related to British society. The debates around 'Islamophobia' have adopted both these 'corrective' and 'wider issues' elements and have been shaped into a highly political discourse. Thus, 'Islamophobia' may be viewed as a discursive and rhetorical tool facilitating political and academic debate that links topics related to tolerance, social exclusion, and multiculturalism. Due to its rhetorical and political nature, the discourse has often been highly polemical. It is the polemical nature of the discourse that leads to the concept's other notable absentee of evidence. The debates around 'Islamophobia' are often highly political and highly polemical but are often conducted without recourse to empirical data and often include arguments made without the adduction of supporting

statistical evidence. The two key texts briefly outlined above (Runnymede Trust, 1997; Allen, 2010) both demonstrated that there are many participants in the debates around ‘Islamophobia’ who are willing to conduct discussion without adducing empirical evidence as to the nature and scope of the prejudice and hostility they describe. Allen made two significant admissions in his book. First, that no-one has asked the simple question: ‘Does Islamophobia exist?’ Second, that there is little statistical evidence to accept (or reject) a hypothesis that ‘Islamophobia’ is a distinct and widespread social phenomenon affecting British Muslim communities. Notwithstanding these admissions, Allen asserts that ‘Islamophobia’ is a widespread problem. More recently however, Allen has argued for the systematic collation and analysis of statistical data concerning anti-Muslim hate crime (Allen, 2011).

## **THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH**

This thesis presents a study of large-scale social survey data related to Muslim and non-Muslim respondents and ‘Islamophobia’ and in doing so focuses on three related tasks that directly address the absence of statistical data within the debates surrounding ‘Islamophobia’:

- an examination of the assertions and conclusions found in the scholarly literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’;
- statistical analysis of large-scale social survey data pertaining to the attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards Muslims and Islam;
- statistical analysis of large-scale social survey data pertaining to attitudes and experiences of Muslim respondents, particularly in relation to experiences of discrimination and crime victimization, experiences and attitudes in regards to the police, and to attitudes held in British Muslim communities towards the British state and British society.

The research examines the strength of relationship between the conceptualization of ‘Islamophobia’ and the available statistical evidence. In order to achieve this comparison, five large-scale social surveys were selected for their large sample sizes and their inclusion of

survey questions designed to explore attitudes towards Muslims and Islam and attitudes and experiences of Muslim respondents.

The surveys are:

- British Election Study, Ethnic Minority Study (known sometimes as EMBES)
- British Social Attitudes Survey
- Crime Survey of England and Wales (formerly the British Crime Survey and referred throughout this thesis as the Crime Survey)
- Citizenship Survey
- Scottish Social Attitudes Survey

The findings reported in this thesis were used to determine the extent to which the statistical evidence supports or challenges assertions and conclusions within scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' given that many scholars have sought to describe all, most or many British Muslims within such studies. Thus, the primary aim of the project was to examine whether the constructions of British Muslim experiences asserted by the scholarly literature are reflected in conclusions drawn from the findings of statistical analyses. The study aims to contribute towards a more measured debate on 'Islamophobia' with the use of conclusions based on rigorous and robust statistical analysis given that much of the previous debates rest on speculation and conjecture.

This research project asserts the principle that arguments that are rhetorical and polemical in nature, and that seek to describe a community in ways that are not properly supported with evidence and data, create risks for that community (regardless of its ethnicity or minority status). The research project is guided by the principles that to assert by unfounded exaggeration the victimization of an individual or community is to risk the unnecessary creation or reinforcement of negative stereotypes, and that all negative stereotypes carry the propensity to be the source of a prejudice which may lead to the exclusion of an individual or

community. Unfounded exaggeration also risks the unnecessary creation or reinforcement of negative views of self. These views of self may induce another type of exclusion that lessens within an individual or community the desire or ability to contribute towards a more tolerant and cohesive society. The research project is guided by further principles: that it is equally harmful to wrongfully dismiss as exaggerated a destructive social phenomenon; and that to do so is to risk the unnecessary prolonging of the disadvantage caused by that phenomenon to an individual or community. This thesis concludes as to whether the term, and the theories and assertions of those who employ it, describe accurately the everyday lived experiences of British Muslim communities as reflected in available statistical data. However, this research project is not merely empiricism for empiricism's sake. It uses statistical findings to re-engage with the literature by undertaking a critical appraisal of the dominant narratives underpinned by the definitions and conceptualization of 'Islamophobia'. In order to achieve its primary aim, the thesis first presents a review of the scholarly and policy literature related to 'Islamophobia' in the United Kingdom. The following chapter presents the key themes from the review. It informs both the primary research questions and the research methods employed to answer these questions.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARLY AND POLICY LITERATURE ON THE PROBLEM OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA' IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents a comprehensive review of scholarly and policy literature related to the concept of 'Islamophobia'. Presented in the sections that follow is an examination of previous studies undertaken in the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States from the time of the term's entry into common usage until the present. In doing so, it identifies definitions and conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' and the major characteristics, dominant narratives and key themes found within recently published research and policy literature. The chapter focuses primarily on books and journal articles that deal explicitly with 'Islamophobia', or on materials that present discussion around related topics, such as discrimination and crime victimization against British Muslim communities, where such materials have a clear and demonstrable influence on debates more directly related to the specific concept of 'Islamophobia'. Reports commissioned by British and European state agencies and those published by non-governmental organizations have also been included in this review. These reports have discussed 'Islamophobia' at both national and pan-European levels and have often featured contributions from leading scholars. (European reports have been included where they made specific mention of the United Kingdom or British Muslim communities.) The primary aims and objectives of this chapter are to examine studies of 'Islamophobia' in order to place the research within the context of existing scholarly and policy literature, and to identify potential gaps in the scholarly research and knowledge. In doing so, this chapter provides a rationale for the research reported in this thesis and establishes the basis on which the findings contribute to the study 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities. Thus, the primary objective of the literature review is to serve as a research tool to inform and guide the research project by establishing a theoretical framework and its lines

of enquiry. This chapter proposes one over-arching research question and several secondary questions that prompted the use of statistical data to test many of the assertions and conclusions found throughout the literature. The findings reported in this thesis were generated via an iterative approach to the comparison of scholarly literature and statistical data. To reflect this approach and to locate the statistical analysis squarely within a framework provided by the scholarly literature this chapter will introduce the characteristics, narratives and themes revealed by the review and developed in the later findings chapters. The present chapter opens with the identification of the most common and useful definitions of 'Islamophobia' and develops with an examination of the features and themes found within the scholarly and policy literature in order to generate and sharpen the research questions for this thesis.

### **DEFINITIONS OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

The initial stage of the literature review process identifies and examines the various definitions of 'Islamophobia' found within the reviewed literature. In the first instance, the results of this endeavour provides the basis for an understanding of the various conceptualizations present throughout the literature. In turn, this allows for the comparisons made between literature and statistical data. An investigation into the definitions of 'Islamophobia' also provides the means by which the term could be operationalized in order to undertake the statistical analysis of survey data (particularly useful in the processes undertaken to identify suitable variables).

Overall, the review revealed that the term 'Islamophobia' has been contested and is still without a single, universally-agreed definition or even much agreement over its precise meaning (Allen, 2010; Bleich, 2011). This contestation is due, at least in part, to the fact that the concept has been applied to diverse phenomena ranging from racist and xenophobic discourse, to the criticisms of British press coverage of Muslims and Islam, to the use of various counter-terrorism measures by the British state (Cesari, 2006). The concept of

'Islamophobia' has thus been both loosely defined and broadly applied (EUMC, 2006a; Nimer, 2007; Scott, 2007). Examination of the literature revealed a spectrum of opinions and attitudes related to the term 'Islamophobia' and varying degrees of emphasis placed on component parts of its various definitions. 'Islamophobia' has been described as a concept that is 'fluid, protean, and largely inconsistent', as an 'ambiguous phenomenon' (Allen, 2010: 102), and as an 'umbrella and somewhat imprecise term' (Field, 2012: 147). This ambiguity has been noted and challenged robustly by scholars (cf. Halliday, 1999), and the lack of single definition lamented for its effect in negating 'systematic comparative and causal analysis' (Bleich, 2011: 1581).

Although ill-defined throughout much of the literature, a small number of scholars have attempted to forge single definitions of 'Islamophobia' in order to provide a departure or focal point for discussion and debate around anti-Muslim prejudice and hatred (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; Allen, 2010; Bleich, 2011). However, the review revealed that the definitions found most commonly throughout the literature (including the definition on which most scholars have relied) were not the ones that offered the best opportunities for the operationalization of the term (and thus, were not the most useful research tools). The most useful definition in terms of its application for the analysis of variables related to 'Islamophobia' was provided by the American scholar Erik Bleich (2011). The discussion, however, turns first to the more popular definitions used throughout the literature.

#### **THE RUNNYMEDE TRUST REPORT DEFINITION OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

The definition of 'Islamophobia' found in the Runnymede Trust report (1997) was identified as (by far) the most popular with an extensive and enduring influence on conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' and thus throughout the selected literature (cf. CBMI, 2004; Weller, 2006; Sheridan, 2006; OIC, 2008; Allen, 2007a; 2007b, 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011). Its wide popularity and repeated rehearsal by scholars provided a common thread linking much of the scholarly and policy literature in this

field. Whilst the production of a lengthy annotated bibliography containing multiple books and journal articles is beyond the scope of a thesis such as this, some detailed discussion of the Runnymede Trust report is required because the definition provided has become central to the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' both in Britain and beyond.

The Runnymede Trust report defined 'Islamophobia' as anti-Muslim prejudice, 'unfounded hostility and prejudice' towards and a 'phobic dread' of Islam (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 4). This definition was developed with descriptions of a phenomenon rooted in 'closed views' about both Muslim communities and the Islamic faith. According to the report's authors, these 'closed views' construct Islam as: monolithic, static, other, separate, inferior, and as an aggressive enemy (1997: 4). This definition was developed with eight statements, each describing the nature of anti-Muslim prejudice: key attributes of the concept and, in particular, the perceptions of Islam and Muslims that underpin the types of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment purported to cause negative outcomes for Muslim communities. These points are reproduced verbatim below:

'In summary form, the eight distinctions which we draw between closed and open views are to do with:

1. Whether Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic.
2. Whether Islam is seen as other and separate, or as similar and interdependent.
3. Whether Islam is seen as inferior, or as different but equal.
4. Whether Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner.
5. Whether Muslims are seen as manipulative or as sincere.
6. Whether Muslims criticism of 'the West' are rejected or debated.
7. Whether discriminatory behaviour against Muslims is defended or opposed.

8. Whether anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural or as problematic.' (1997: 4)

Evidence for the significance of the eight point Runnymede Trust definition among scholars may be found in discussion centred specifically on it (cf. Allen, 2007a; 2007b; 2010), theoretical work that widened the definition to describe other contemporary fears of Muslims (cf. Abbas, 2004; Green, 2015), and numerous contributions that have proposed the modification or improvement (or even rejection) of the definition and its related theoretical model (cf. Halliday, 2002; 2010; van Driel, 2004; Sajid, 2006; Allen, 2010; Abbas, 2010; Bleich, 2011; Kalin, 2011). The review of literature revealed that the Runnymede Trust report appeared to act as a clarion call answered by several European organizations responsible for publishing studies of 'Islamophobia' that used the conceptual framework provided by the report's authors (cf. Allen and Neilsen, 2002; EUMC 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Amghar et al, 2007; OIC, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). Despite this apparent durability, however, the definition and framework offered by the Runnymede Trust report has been the subject of several compelling challenges by scholars (cf. Halliday, 2002; 2010; Allen 2010; Bleich, 2011). Most significantly for this thesis, the Runnymede Trust model has been criticized for its lack of utility as a quantitative research tool for studies rooted in the social sciences (Bleich, 2011). The terms used by the report, particularly in the eight point list, are almost entirely abstract and do not provide researchers the practical tools needed to measure the extent of 'Islamophobia'. Further, the reliance on the term 'Islam' rather than 'Muslim' implies negative attitudes operating at an abstracted level rather than the practical consequences of such attitudes (again, limiting the definition's utility for quantitative social science studies). These criticisms have been related to wider criticisms regarding the appropriateness of the label 'Islamophobia': a term that has been applied more frequently to the practical hatred of Muslims than to the psychological fear of Islam (Halliday, 2002; 2010; Iganski, 2009). The use of 'Islam' and 'Muslim' (as well as 'the West') has been subjected to criticism for being too simplistic, for being monist abstractions, and for failing to capture the diversity and plurality within the populations described (cf. Halliday, 2002; 2010; Allen 2010). Mindful of these

limitations, the analysis presented in this thesis incorporated other demographic factors (e.g. age, gender and ethnicity) and various socio-economic factors (e.g. employment, education and housing) in order to avoid simplifications and to provide a more nuanced study of British Muslim respondents and 'Islamophobia'. The Runnymede Trust report offered only one negative construction of Muslims as a group: 'closed views' which represent Muslims as 'manipulative' (1997: 4). This rather limited construction of negative views towards Muslims is of little utility for the purposes of analysing anti-Muslim sentiment within social survey data (although this was not an explicitly stated aim of the report). Overall, use of the word 'manipulative' offers too narrow an interpretation and represents a specific view which is unlikely to be found directly within the available statistical data. No survey question asked: 'Do you find Muslims manipulative?' The analysis stages of this research project assumed a broader construction of 'closed views' in order to examine *all* negative views of Muslims and Islam reflected in the social survey datasets selected for analysis.

### **OTHER DEFINITIONS OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

Other definitions of 'Islamophobia' offered little of applicable utility for the statistical analysis processes although did provide insights into the various conceptualizations forged and shared by scholars, and thus aided the comparisons made between statistical findings and conclusions. A report by the EUMC described 'Islamophobia' as being 'associated with reductionist attitudes to other cultures/religions/ethnic groups (sic), where emphasis is placed on aspects which are purveyed as being of the essence of the belief system, and which are then characterized as alien and threatening to the host culture/religion/ethnic group (sic)' (EUMC, 2003: 73). A later report by the same organization (EUMC, 2006a) stated that in the absence of a legally agreed definition, or a common definition from the social sciences, 'Islamophobia' and its manifestations ought to be understood using previously agreed definitions of racism and its applications by the Council of Europe and United Nations – the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, national, or ethnic origins justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons, or the notion of superiority of a person or a group

of persons. Cesari (2006) described the term 'Islamophobia' as grouping together different forms of discourse, speech, and action by suggesting that they emanate from an irrational fear of Islam. A report by FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), an American organization monitoring press coverage of Muslims and Islam (predominantly by American journalists but with reference to several British sources), described 'Islamophobia' as a term that refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence' (Hollar and Naureckas, 2008: 4). The first observatory report of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC, 2008) attempted to move beyond a 'simplistic' definition of 'Islamophobia' as an irrational or very powerful fear or dislike of Islam and the feeling that Muslim people are under siege and attack (2008: 8). The OIC offered 'racial hatred, intolerance, prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping' (2008: 8) as other important components and concluded that 'Islamophobia' is in essence 'a religion-based resentment' with two distinct aspects: one from the viewpoint of the protagonists, the other from that of their victims (2008: 8). The UN Human Rights Council defined 'Islamophobia' as 'a baseless hostility and fear vis-à-vis Islam, and as a result a fear of and aversion towards all Muslims or the majority of them' and stated that it also refers to the 'practical consequences of this hostility in terms of discrimination, prejudices and unequal treatment of which Muslims (individuals and communities) are victims and their exclusion from major political and social spheres.' (UNHRC, 2007: 8). Ameli et al (2011) equated 'Islamophobia' to aggression, discrimination and hate crime towards Muslims.

Not all sources were as instructive or as useful. In many books, journal articles and reports precise definitions of 'Islamophobia' were noticeably absent. Some scholars alluded briefly to the term's uncertain genesis and progeny, and to previous definitions and applications, whilst not specifying or developing an exact definition of their own. For instance, Kalin described 'Islamophobia' as 'a term that has come to denote acts of intolerance, discrimination, unfounded fear and racism against Islam and Muslims' (Kalin, 2011: 4). Some

sources present more than one definition in a single source (cf. Allen and Neilsen, 2002; Amghar et al, 2007). Other scholars set aside the 'forlorn quest' of defining 'Islamophobia' to focus instead on the application of the term (Sayyid and Vakil, 2011: 3) or its purported impact on the lived experiences of Muslims (Poynting and Mason, 2007). Inayat (2007) discussed 'Islamophobia' within the contexts of psychology, and relationships between doctors and their Muslim clients, but without recourse to any definition. Despite these conceptual ambiguities around its definition, 'Islamophobia' has been described as a serious problem in modern British society (Allen, 2010). For some, it is 'part of the landscape for Muslims in the UK' (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004: 7). Elsewhere it is described as a 'scourge' that remains 'unabated' (OIC, 2011: 1). The Runnymede Trust report (1997) asserted that it is 'a challenge for us all' (Runnymede Trust, 1997).

#### **ALLEN'S DEFINITION**

As stated, the 'first decade of Islamophobia' (i.e. the term's usage in the United Kingdom for the years immediately after the publication of the Runnymede Trust report) were marked by conceptual uncertainties, theoretical weaknesses and on-going, unresolved debates (Allen, 2007b; 2010). However, and as the above definitions demonstrate, there appeared an appetite among some scholars at least to resolve such uncertainties and provide a conceptual framework able to reflect lived experiences of discrimination and hate among Muslim communities. As Bleich stated, '...debates about Islamophobia are taking place across several levels: around its definition, key components, and intensity; around its cause; and around its effects' (Bleich, 2011: 8). Chris Allen, in many ways a pioneer of the study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities, attempted to dissipate these uncertainties in a major study (2010). Allen conceptualized 'Islamophobia' by using a critical exploration of past analyses and by offering a new definition. Unfortunately, the definition, arrived at after an in-depth discussion concerning the concepts and theories underpinning past definitions, is over twenty lines long and rather complex (Allen, 2010: 190). (For the purposes of the discussion presented in the present chapter it has been reproduced in full in Appendix B.) The definition of

'Islamophobia' offered by Allen may be summarized as: an ideology similar to racism which sustains and perpetuates negatively valued meaning about Muslims and Islam found in social action, attitudes, power relations, and exclusionary practices. Allen argued that the presence of 'Islamophobia' is not predicated on the naming or identification of 'Muslim' or 'Islam'. Instead, use of the labels may be explicit or implied through shared meanings that are theological, social, cultural or racial in nature. It has been argued that definitions such as Allen's create difficulties for social researchers (Ekerwald, 2011; Field, 2011). Allen's definition of 'Islamophobia' has been criticized as being too complicated and too broad to be operationalized by future research projects (Field, 2011). As Field reasoned, the study holds no utility for empirical social scientists who wish to develop attitude scales to measure the extent of 'Islamophobia'. Nor is it, Field contested, likely to satisfy those seeking data on incidents or behaviour attributable to 'Islamophobia' or a framework to aide analysis and understanding. Other more general criticisms have been levelled against Allen's conceptualization. 'Islamophobia' in Allen's study has been described as having a 'ghost-like' presence (Ekerwald, 2011). Very few individuals are identified as being responsible for generating 'Islamophobia' and the disadvantages caused by it: a phenomenon without easily identifiable agents. Allen described 'Islamophobic' sentiment within the British National Party but no other, more mainstream groups or agencies were identified. Thus, and for the most part, Allen's 'Islamophobia' was without readily identifiable agents or culpable perpetrators. As a consequence, gaining an understanding of the extent of mainstream exclusionary practices faced by British Muslim communities would be difficult with the exclusive and uncritical use of Allen's model.

### **BLEICH'S MODEL AND THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

Bleich identified that both the term and the concept of 'Islamophobia' have numerous potential uses and broad applications. Bleich argued that the term has been used on 'multiple registers' across public and scholarly debates (Bleich, 2011: 1581). One issue identified by Bleich, and highly informative for this thesis, was that 'Islamophobia' is a concept used to

describe not only the causes of prejudice and hostility, but also the practical consequences of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment: an ideology and the manifestations of that ideology. In this respect, the concept of 'Islamophobia' differs from classical definitions of 'racism' such as that by Miles (1989). Miles argued that 'racism' is an ideology and treated prejudicial actions as the signifiers of the phenomenon, but not as the phenomenon itself. As Bleich later reflected, this is not always the case with the conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia'. Arguably, this muddled arrangement of applications of the term has created difficulties for its operationalization. The practical consequences of 'Islamophobia' are defined widely enough so as to include individual financial disadvantage to mass social unrest: the Runnymede Trust report argued that 'Islamophobia' is 'bad for business' and 'risks social disorder' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 12). The report also asserted that 'Islamophobia' can disrupt the creation of commercial wealth, international trade and diplomacy (although did not offer an explanation as to how). Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, the report argues that 'Islamophobia' may mute mainstream Muslim voices and in so doing thereby increase violent Islamic extremism (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 12). Both the wide application of 'Islamophobia' and the fact it has been applied to the causes and consequences of the ideology are evident in numerous other descriptions of the phenomenon. An example of this conflation of ideology and action is given when ill-informed views of Muslim and Islam are said to fuel discrimination. State agencies are described as viewing Muslims as likely to cause security risks, subjugate women, and exhibit failings. These views are described as resulting in police profiling, withdrawn rights to dress codes, violent attacks and discrimination at school and work: all are capable of being described as 'Islamophobia' (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004). This broad application of the concept often links issues related to Muslim communities with issues related to the Islamic faith. For example, the Runnymede Trust report links the 'dread or hatred of Islam' with the 'fear or dislike of all or most Muslims' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1).

Knowledge and understanding of the nature and scope of anti-Muslim attitudes and their practical manifestations and consequences requires a definition that is clear, simple and

of practical use to social scientists. The research and theorizing of Bleich represented an attempt to fulfil this requirement (Bleich, 2011). His definition and conceptual model are unique within the scholarly literature reviewed here in that they represent an attempt to define 'Islamophobia' using terms which may be operationalized. Bleich recognized that previous usage of 'Islamophobia', whilst potentially comparative, caused problems in terms of measuring the phenomenon across time, location or social groups. Bleich also argued that the lack of a clear definition negated effective comparison to other phenomena such as racism, xenophobia or anti-Semitism. By way of a remedy, he offered the following definition of 'Islamophobia': 'indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims' (2011: 1581). The use of the word 'indiscriminate' is analogous with the Runnymede Trust's construction of the distinction between 'closed' and 'open' views although suggests types of negative attitudes that target Muslims without careful consideration, or that do not discriminate against circumstances or context (i.e. that target and disadvantage Muslims at every given opportunity). The words 'negative attitudes or emotions' is a deliberate move away from the hard-wired anti-Islamic sentiment at the hearts of previous conceptualizations (i.e. the rather vague notions of fear or dread of Islam). Similarly, use of the word 'Muslims' reflects the fact that 'Islamophobia' targets Muslim people and their religion. Bleich drew on the theoretical framework of Goertz (2006) to employ this definition within a model of 'Islamophobia' that may be used to test empirically its presence and effects. Bleich concluded that 'Islamophobia' may be measured effectively by observing and examining 'non-causal indicators'. 'Non-causal indicators' are component parts of Goertz's 'indicators and concepts' model as used in his 'disease-symptom' metaphor (where a distinction was made between the disease, such as cirrhosis of the liver, and the symptoms of that disease, such as discoloured or yellow eyes). For Goertz (and later, Bleich), a 'non-causal indicator' is something which may be used also to observe and identify the presence of a social phenomenon. Goertz suggested a three-tiered model to help analyse concepts such as 'Islamophobia'. First, the basic level, the phenomenon itself: in this case, a phenomenon or series of phenomena labelled 'Islamophobia'. The secondary level is the definition: in Bleich's case, the 'indiscriminate

negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims'. The third level is represented by 'indicators'. Indicators are, in effect, practical consequences: the outward signs of the social phenomenon under study. Within this context, indicators may be evidence of violent attacks against Muslim people or feelings of social exclusion within Muslim communities. Bleich used the adoption of Goertz's model and the rejection of anecdotal or circumstantial evidence within the debates around 'Islamophobia' and concluded that only direct survey, focus-group or interview data enables social scientists to bridge the gap between abstracted theoretical concepts and real world observations. In essence, Bleich's definition and model encouraged common-sense conclusions capable of eventually underpinning practical solutions. For Bleich, merely theorizing about the abstract nature of 'Islamophobia' was not enough. It is Bleich's definition that was identified as being the most effectively operationalized for the purpose of addressing the research questions for this thesis.

## **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REVIEWED LITERATURE**

As discussed in the introduction, one of the main characteristics of the scholarly literature is the demonstrable lack of empirical evidence used to support discussion and debates around 'Islamophobia'. These features were particularly discernible in what might be regarded as 'early' scholarly and policy literature related to 'Islamophobia' (books, journal articles and reports published in the immediate aftermath of the Runnymede Trust report and during the first half of the intervening period). Whilst some more contemporary literature (particularly that published in the last five years) appeared to redress this methodological imbalance, it is still the case (as will be demonstrated) that many of the current debates around 'Islamophobia' rest on theoretical, political and conceptual concerns with few British scholars making recourse to empirical evidence (and even fewer to large-scale social survey data). Following an examination of these key characteristics, the discussion turns to the dominant narratives within the literature and the most common assertions and conclusions presented by scholars. These include: the magnitude of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment, the widespread extent of discrimination against British Muslims (across social, political and

economic spheres), negative experiences of and attitudes towards the British state and various state bodies (including the police and security services), and experiences of crime victimization among British Muslims (particularly crimes motivated by religion or ethnicity). Many scholars engaged in theoretical studies of ‘Islamophobia’ rely on historical perspectives related to the postcolonial concept of ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 1978) – a critique of ‘Western’ perceptions of ‘the East’, and the long history of prejudices founded on them.

### **THE DOMINANCE OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

For much of the published output concerning ‘Islamophobia’, and particularly that from 1997 to around 2010, the term ‘research’ is perhaps something of a misnomer. Only a relatively small proportion of scholarly work was rooted in empirical investigation. Very few of the scholarly books, journal articles and reports from that period contained the products of research into the nature and extent of ‘Islamophobia’ using primary data (whether qualitative or quantitative). Similarly, very few research studies analysed the lived experiences of large numbers of British Muslim communities using nationally representative samples. This reliance on theoretical perspectives was observed in discussion that linked ‘Islamophobia’ to debates around multiculturalism and social cohesion (Abbas, 2004, 2005; Modood, 2007; Hopkins and Gale, 2009; Allen, 2010). This type of research eschews research methods that might otherwise have been used to describe the extent of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice faced by British Muslim communities. Reports by scholars and commentators who were well-placed to reveal the scope of discrimination against British Muslim communities instead leant towards abstract theorizing and the assertion of highly political and rhetorical arguments (cf. Malik, 2005; Abbas, 2007; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). Consequently, research findings were seldom applied to the identification or formulation of practical solutions to problems faced by British Muslims. Any questions around the degree to which these findings may be considered compelling or persuasive remain contingent not on the strength of the evidence presented, but on the degree to which author and reader share political viewpoints. The combined three-fold effects of the

lack of a universally-agreed definition, the political and rhetorical nature of the discourse, and the tendency to adduce conclusions without evidential support, together informed a body of literature that has presented problems for those wishing to gain an understanding of scope of prejudices and hostilities suffered by British Muslim communities. A review of the literature revealed the need to more often apply quantitative research designs to the study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities. Such methods were at the core of the research design formulated and undertaken for this thesis.

The Runnymede Trust report was one of the few early sources to adduce empirical evidence (although as discussed below this evidence was not entirely compelling). Elsewhere, discussion and debate leant towards theory, politics and history. Poynting and Mason (2007) compared 'Islamophobia' in the United Kingdom and Australia examining migration, government policy and the ideologies of xenophobia and contested a causal relationship between racial and ethnic targeting of minority groups by state agents and acts of 'racial hatred, vilification and discrimination' (2007: 61). An entry concerning the United Kingdom in a report published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Allen and Neilsen, 2002) summarized media reporting of British Muslims and reactions from the British Government. The report asserted widespread 'Islamophobia' and offered discussion around xenophobia and racism and, in particular, the politics and activities of far-right parties. EUMC (2003) a report on anti-Semitism and rising 'Islamophobia' focused on issues of European identity and other related political concerns. Cesari (2006) focused on political and social and legal background, and described the increased risks of violent physical attacks using a small amount of anecdotal evidence (a short list of single incidents) and a lengthy theoretical discussion around British Muslim communities and media, public and political spaces. Much of the discussion within Amghar et al (2007) oriented on the political background to widespread prejudice and discrimination against British Muslims and the threat to multiculturalism purported to be its most clearly discernible consequence. Abbas (2004) examined theoretical and conceptual concerns around British Muslim communities and

multiculturalism to describe Muslims as 'disempowered, disenfranchised, disenchanting, and disaffected groups existing at the margins of Britain's economy, society, and polity' (2004: 34). Grosfoguel (2012) discussed 'Islamophobia' and various forms of racism from a 'world-historical perspective' (2012: 10): cultural racism, Orientalism, and epistemic racism - described, in part, as having emanated from 'Eurocentric social science' (2012: 24). Even where scholars have disagreed and refuted such assertions about the nature of 'Islamophobia', it has often been theory, rather than empirical evidence of Muslim lived experiences, that has been used to bolster counter arguments. For example, assertions made to counter notions of 'Islamophobia' as a historical continuum, and in relation to modern anti-Muslim prejudice being largely contingent on contemporary social and political forces, have not been supported with empirical evidence: in essence, theoretical perspectives are used to counter other theoretical perspectives (cf. Halliday, 1999).

#### **THE LACK OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE**

A review of the literature revealed that a lack of evidence was widespread and formed a recurring and prominent pattern running throughout the examined books, journal articles and reports. Absences of empirical evidence are observable from the most perfunctory analysis of the material and have been noted by numerous scholars (cf. Allen, 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010; Runnymede Trust, 1997, EUMC, 2006a). The Runnymede Trust report from 1997 presented only a handful of newspaper articles and half a dozen tables of statistics (Runnymede Trust, 1997) to assert that 'Islamophobia' is a 'challenge for us all'. The report placed emphasis on Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, rather than adducing evidence from across the diversities of British Muslim communities, weakening the argument for a specific anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic phenomenon (Allen, 2007b). The stated aim of the report was to assess 'Islamophobia' and 'reduce its impact' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1) yet did not quantify the scale of the problems described. The report warned that 'Islamophobia' was capable of causing economic disadvantage and social unrest (1997: 12) but failed to offer evidential support as to the extent of such potential problems. Speculation abounded

elsewhere. A report by the EUMC (2005) described an ongoing backlash against Muslim communities using faith related hate crime data that did not aggregate victims by religion. Studies have focused on discrimination against British Muslim communities in the form of unemployment, a lack of education and poor housing but with no clear attempt to relate each of these factors to anti-Muslim prejudice or discrimination with evidence (cf. Cesari, 2006; EUMC, 2006a). EUMC (2006a) asserted a wave of anti-Muslim hostility using faith hate crime data after the July 2005 London bombings that did not include the victims' religion. The report used Crown Prosecution Service data related to just 23 religiously aggravated cases from 2004 to 2005 and three waves of Crime Survey data pertaining to Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents (rather than to the Muslim population as a whole). Abbas (2004) adopted the aforementioned theoretical and conceptual perspectives to make assertions concerning the disempowerment and disenfranchisement of British Muslims. As elsewhere, discussion described the nature but seldom the extent of problems facing British Muslim communities. Legislative anti-terror measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and immigration law such as the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 were described as disproportionately affecting Muslim communities through the identification and targeting of extremists and foreign nationals who are Muslim. Anti-terror measures used to tackle perceived threat from groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun were purported to affect all British Muslims but conclusions lacked evidence as to the scope of these alleged consequences. A report produced for Channel 4 (Osborne and Jones, 2008) described physical attack against British Muslim communities as 'the manifestation of a growing anti-Muslim sentiment' (2008: 4), yet supported this assertion with interview data from only one respondent plus partial, anecdotal secondary data. A report by the EUMC (2006a) used data collected by the Crown Prosecution Service between 2004 and 2005. These purported to show the increased risks of victimization among Muslim respondents but did not reveal whether incidents were 'Islamophobic' in nature. Ameli et al (2004) surveyed 1125 Muslim respondents and found eighty percent had

suffered discrimination. However, the case study conceded that the research findings were neither representative nor easily generalizable.

This lack of evidence is observable throughout Allen's study of 'Islamophobia' (2010). As described in the introduction, two significant admissions were made by Allen. First, that no-one had asked the simple question: 'Does Islamophobia exist?' Second, that there was little statistical evidence to accept (or reject) a hypothesis that 'Islamophobia' is a distinct and widespread social phenomenon affecting British Muslim communities. Despite these perceived shortcomings, Allen asserted 'Islamophobia' as a widespread problem. Others have disagreed, and in doing so support the argument that the concept of 'Islamophobia' lacks evidence: 'so pervasive is the acceptance of Islamophobia, that no-one even bothers to check if it is true' (Malik, 2005: 2; see also Malik, 2009). This demonstrable absence of empirical evidence throughout scholarly literature is highly pertinent to the research design being proposed in this chapter. There is a clear and demonstrable need to bring quantitative research methods to bear on the study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities.

## **THE MAGNITUDE OF ANTI-MUSLIM AND ANTI-ISLAMIC SENTIMENT**

A sizeable proportion of the scholarly literature regarding 'Islamophobia' concerned, as perhaps might be anticipated, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment. As discussed, the Runnymede Trust model of 'Islamophobia' was predicated on 'closed views' of Islam and Muslims. The report developed the notion of 'closed views' with detailed discussion around each of the eight points and an examination of various anti-Islamic statements made by British scholars and journalists. Media portrayals of Muslims and Islam have been made the focus of a number of scholarly studies, most of which analysed empirical evidence (in the form of newspaper articles) and found varying degrees of systematic negative bias against Muslims and Islam (Abbas, 2001; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; 2009; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008; Baker, 2010; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013). In many ways, the study of media representations of Muslims and Islam represented the only scholarly enterprise related to

British Muslim communities where the systematic analysis of large-scale data has been commonplace rather than the exception. Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) examined a corpus of 143 million British newspaper words from over 200,000 articles published between 1998 to 2009. A comprehensive and compelling series of findings included: evidence of explicit Islamophobic content in right-leaning tabloids alongside more ‘subtle and ambivalent’ ‘Islamophobia’ found elsewhere (2013: 255); monolithic depictions of Islam, aggressive Muslim men, victimized Muslim women, ‘hostile, easily angered and undeserving’ Muslim leaders (2013: 255) and negative portrayals of imams (so-called ‘hate preachers’); and a bias towards news stories featuring war and conflict, and the use of words and concepts such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. These findings echoed earlier findings from scholars (cf. Richardson, 2004; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008) and correspond with the assertions from more theoretical works (cf. Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata, 2006; Schenker and Abu-Zayyad, 2006).

Elsewhere, studies identified the rising importance of ‘Muslim’ as a research topic within surveys since the late-nineteen eighties (Field, 2007; 2012). In the earlier study (2007) Field analysed data from 104 public surveys and shed light on public attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. Findings included an increased knowledge of Islam, a strong prejudice against Muslims held between one in four and one in five of the respondents, stereotypical images of Muslims perceived by non-Muslim and an overall increase in ‘Islamophobia’ since 2001 (using the Runnymede Trust’s definition and various data related to majority views of Muslims and Islam). In the later study (Field, 2012) data from numerous opinion polls were examined and related to negative perceptions of Muslim integration, extremism and patriotism, alongside more general prejudices toward Muslims. The study concluded that the scale of ‘Islamophobia’ had further increased during the period 2007 to 2010 and that one fifth of respondents were strongly ‘Islamophobic’ (perceiving Islam as warlike, and reporting negative attitudes towards Muslim neighbours and politicians). Field argued that Britain was less ‘Islamophobic’ than Western Europe but more so than the United States, although

conceded that the many of the analysed surveys contained small sample sizes and that his analysis included little in relation to education, ethnicity, or other religions. In conclusion, Field called for an ‘academically driven survey among a large sample of adult Britons’ (2012: 159).

Taken as two distinct groups, there appeared to be a certain degree of tension between the more theoretical research studies and the smaller group of research studies that presented analysis of large-scale social survey data. Studies that relied on theoretical and political perspectives tended to assert only widespread demonization, discrimination and victimization among a large proportion of British Muslim communities (with several studies arguing that all Muslims were at risk). Empirical studies represented a more nuanced overall picture. For example, Sheridan’s surveyed of over 200 Muslim respondents measured ‘Islamophobia’ before and after September 11th 2001 (Sheridan, 2006) and found that a large of majority of respondents (76.3%) suffered an increase in general discriminatory experiences (2006: 325). Such incidents included ‘being ignored, overlooked, or not given service in a shop, restaurant etc.’ and ‘being closely observed or followed in public places’ (2006: 325). These findings clearly correspond with those asserted elsewhere in the literature. Other studies revealed differing degrees of discrimination and exclusion (cf. Helbling, 2012). Jackson and Doerschler’s analysis of aggregate statistical data from studies in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom revealed discrimination and fear of crime among Muslim communities but no evidence as to any failure or reluctance to integrate into wider society (Jackson and Doerschler, 2012). The study also revealed positive attitudes towards democratic practices and processes held among Muslim communities across the sampled countries. Bleich and Maxwell (2012) used large-scale social survey data to argue that ‘Islamophobia was not as severe as previous studies inferred, that non-Muslims did not place Muslims at the bottom of the ‘minority hierarchy’, and that high levels of positive national identification and political trust existed throughout British Muslim communities. Overall, they described ‘Islamophobia as ‘not yet the most significant cleavage defining the nature of group

divisions in British society' (2012: 53). van der Noll's analysis of data from 5,632 Dutch respondents revealed tolerance towards Muslim communities and practices, and questioned the popular notion that the 9/11 attacks had a negative impact on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims (van der Noll, 2012). Field (2012) contested that the level of anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the United Kingdom, increasing as it may have been, was still lower than that in other European countries. In a related study, Dekker and van der Noll (2012) found balanced views towards Muslims and Islam, and concluded, that interaction and socialization with Muslim people had a positive effect on reducing negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam (a more positive practical application of research findings than is perhaps usual for studies of 'Islamophobia'). The analysis presented in this thesis tested the prevalence of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes within the survey respondents using statistical analysis techniques beyond the reporting of simple percentages (Field, 2007; 2012). In doing so, it aims to replicate the types of in-depth quantitative studies that have been undertaken among Muslim communities in other European countries (cf. Helbling, 2012).

## **ANTI-MUSLIM DISCRIMINATION**

Perhaps as also might be anticipated, discussion around discrimination against British Muslim communities has formed a major feature of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' (Runnymede Trust 1997; IHRC, 2000; Ameli et al 2004; Abbas, 2004; CBMI 2004; Cesari, 2006; EUMC 2006a; 2006b). Overall, conclusions are unequivocal: the risks of discrimination faced by British Muslim communities are significant and worsening. The Runnymede Trust and CBMI report both conceptualized 'Islamophobia' using a model that included discrimination (and exclusion) across multiple social dimensions: employment, education, health, and politics (cf. Runnymede Trust 1997: 11; CBMI, 2004: 27). Elsewhere, the 'rise and rise' of discrimination following an 'accelerated backlash after 9/11' was described across similarly diverse social spheres: hostile behaviour, abuse, harassment, assault and alienation, and suffered by a large majority (80%) of respondents (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004: 22). A European report considered 'Islamophobia' and discrimination to be near-homogenous

concepts (EUMC, 2006a) and like previous reports focused on employment, education and health contesting widespread discrimination across these spheres, having adduced only limited evidential support (for instance, anecdotal evidence from an informal experiment on British radio station featuring six job candidates). Unemployment data from 2004 were reported (13% unemployment among Muslim men, 18% among women) although linking these data to acts of discrimination remained, as in many other sources, largely speculative. Whilst employment practices from other European countries were criticized heavily - for example, the absence of effective French diversity in the workplace initiatives (2006a: 48) - the report offered positive descriptions of British employment practices under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 provisions from which now form part of Equality Act 2010 (2006a: 50). The theme of the disadvantage caused by political factors is far more prevalent than descriptions of the disadvantages caused by socio-economic factors although a notable exception to this is the scholarly examination by Ceri Peach of British Muslim communities within the 2001 Census (Peach, 2005; 2006). The analysis of discrimination reported in this thesis aimed to contribute to previous empirical studies of British Muslim communities and apply the statistical methods used by Peach to the study of 'Islamophobia'. The topic of discrimination was well served by social survey questions within the selected datasets and forms the theme of chapter 5. Further, the analysis of statistical data concerning discrimination played a crucial role in determining the overall strengths and weaknesses inherent within conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia'.

## **BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE POLICE**

The Runnymede Trust report does not contain discussion on police relations and the topic may be considered almost entirely absent from the early conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' among British scholars. Police relations were added to models of 'Islamophobia' after the security and anti-terror measures introduced by the British Government following 9/11. By 2004 and the publication of the CBMI report (in many ways a direct follow-up report to the Runnymede Trust report) debates included consideration of

police relations using a lexicon taken from previous debates around British African Caribbean communities and the police (cf. Rowe, 2004). A Muslim councillor from a London borough stated on the subject of police and community relations, 'Muslims have become the new political black...I went to a school in west London with a lot of black lads. I never had the kind of grief they had from the police. But I am beginning to realise how they felt' (CBMI, 2004: 3). Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010) labelled this shift in community relations as 'significant and discernibly negative'. Two major themes emerged: general concerns around counter-terrorism policing strategies such as Prevent (Kundani, 2009; Mythen, 2012) and one of the most common expressions of counter-terrorism strategy, police stop and search (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Parmar, 2011). Lambert and Githens-Mazer made reference to 'suspect communities' (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), a concept used to describe the over-zealous and disproportionate targeting of all British Muslims (although not always in conjunction with specific mention of 'Islamophobia'). Elsewhere, scholars have argued that experiences of young Muslim men are 'qualitatively different' (i.e. worse) from those of people from other groups (Bowling and Phillips 2003: 3). Descriptions of poor relations with the police have been common (Bowling and Phillips, 2003; Chakraborti, 2007; Innes et al, 2011; Kundani, 2009). Reports, such as that by Lambert and Githens-Mazer, offered an example of the symbiotic relationship between scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and more general literature pertaining to British Muslim communities beyond that of a shared subject matter. Literature pertaining to poor police relations but that did not explicitly mention 'Islamophobia' influenced that which did. Many available data related to the police may be found within the datasets selected for examination for this thesis. Respondents were invited to report experiences of stop and search and their attitudes towards the police. The analysis for this thesis sought to establish the extent to which criticisms of the police made by scholars engaged in debates around 'Islamophobia' were reflected in the experiences and attitudes of British Muslim communities as represented by response data from Muslim respondents surveyed within the selected datasets.

## **RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH STATE AND BRITISH SOCIETY**

Much of the reviewed literature featured descriptions of British Muslim communities within the context of their on-going relationships with British state agencies and policy (cf. Abbas, 2004; 2005; Cesari, 2006; Brittain, 2009; Fekete, 2009). A significant part of such policy discussion concerned counter-terrorism (Fekete, 2004; 2009; CREUB, 2006; Kundani, 2009; Innes et al, 2011). 9/11 and 7/7 have both been described by scholars as catalysts for the increased (negative) attention given to Muslim communities and Islam in Britain (Lewis 2004; 2007; Abbas, 2005; Sheridan, 2006). Exclusionary practices by state agencies, including the discriminatory effects of counter-terrorism initiatives such as Prevent, were described in the literature as deep-rooted and far-reaching (Fekete, 2004, 2009; Innes et al, 2011, Peirce, 2008; van Driel, 2004). There are obvious links and multiple overlaps between the themes of relationships with the state, attitudes towards the British Government and relationships with and attitudes towards the police. Scholars have also drawn links between counter-terrorism measures and their effect in stirring up 'Islamophobic' sentiment (Abbas, 2007; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Such 'Islamophobia' is either explicitly-stated or implied throughout discourse that links issues of national security, immigration and civil liberties (Anwar and Bakhsh, 2003; Fekete, 2009; Peirce, 2008). Likewise, the term has been used to describe and explain unequal opportunities and discrimination in employment and in the provision of health services for Muslim families (Abu Sway, 2006). There is evidence of dissenting voices, but overall such voices represent a minority view. Scholars such as Greer (2010) have expressed concern over the assertion of a direct, causal relationship between the disadvantage and discrimination faced by British Muslim communities and domestic, foreign and counter-terrorism policy made by others (cf. Peirce, 2008; Fekete, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Hickman et al, 2011). Similarly, the assertion of a direct and causal link between the actions of the state and the aforementioned disadvantage and discrimination of Muslim communities is either done speculatively (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997), with reservation (cf. Allen, 2011), or is otherwise made the subject

of potential future challenges (cf. Baker, 2010). Elsewhere, criticisms of the British state have been used to assert widespread disadvantage and dissatisfaction among British Muslim communities. Given the strengths of these criticisms (some of which alleged wholesale state discrimination against British Muslim communities) it might be expected that Muslim respondents would report highly negative attitudes towards the British state and strong feelings of negativity and exclusion towards what might be perceived as more mainstream non-Muslim British society (cf. OSI, 2015). Consequently, the research design for this thesis included an attempt to observe the consequences of such discrimination in the reported levels of trust in the British Government, attitudes towards state agencies (including the police and the criminal justice system) and the reported level of 'Britishness' or feelings of being part of British society among Muslim respondents.

## **FEAR OF CRIME AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION**

Whilst the fear of crime among Muslim communities is neither a distinct component of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' nor a major topic within more general studies of British Muslim communities, words related to the concepts of 'fear' and 'anxiety' are found throughout the scholarly and policy literature, although mostly in conjunction with fears of Islam rather than fearful Muslim individuals or communities. Whilst the Runnymede Trust report offered no in-depth analysis of fear of crime, it described Muslim victims of 'Islamophobia' as feeling 'increasingly unsafe' and 'increasingly unable to enjoy a normal life' (1997: 38). The CBMI report describes a 'climate of fear' but around Muslim attitudes towards anti-terrorism legislation rather than crime victimization (2004: 3). However, research undertaken in 2002 reported evidence of a state of heightened anxiety about crime among British Muslim communities (Spalek, 2002). The first OIC report (2008) described the need for practical measures to tackle 'Islamophobia' as also being required to tackle the fear of 'Islamophobia'. More recent studies have considered more fully the consequences of alleged widespread 'Islamophobia' hatred on British Muslim communities and the long-term effects of discrimination and violence regardless of whether such victimization is perceived,

threatened or actual (Brittain, 2009; Mythen et al, 2009; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). An initial review of the statistical datasets selected for the analysis presented in this thesis revealed a series of fear of crime survey questions related to fears and worries around general crime and specific offences (including religiously and racially motivated crime). The analysis thus incorporated fear of crime as a distinct research topic using a theoretical framework provided by previous criminological studies of the concept (cf. Hough and Mayhew, 1983; Walklate 1989; Hale, 1996; Walklate and Mythen, 2008) and empirical evidence generated by Muslim respondents. A more detailed examination of this criminological framework and how it was utilized for the analysis of fear of crime data is offered in chapter 7.

For the most-part, criminological discussion of ‘Islamophobia’ rested on actual experiences rather than on the perceived threat or likelihood of crime (cf. Cesari, 2006; EUMC, 2006a; Osborne and Jones, 2008; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Moreover, when crime victimization has been used in the conceptualization of ‘Islamophobia’ it is often informed by a typology of violent crime, such as murder and physical attack (cf. Cesari, 2006; EUMC, 2006a; McClintock and LeGendre 2007; Engage, 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013). As for other debates around ‘Islamophobia’, the risks faced by Muslim communities in respect of crime, and particularly violent crime, were seldom quantified in the reviewed studies. In many ways, the heightened risks of crime are more often implied (through the prominence of the topics within the typologies of victimization and discrimination). Arguably, most readers may be led to assume or infer the increased risks faced by British Muslim communities through the frequency with which such issues are raised by scholars. Without quantification however, and as is the case for other topics raised in conjunction with ‘Islamophobia’, these assertions and emphases around crime victimization among Muslim communities represent generalizations from unconvincing anecdotal evidence or speculation used to assert the extent of such problems. These assertions provided the basis for the analysis of crime survey data presented in this thesis. Being the central concern of the Crime Survey, there are numerous questions

from the selected datasets that invite respondents to describe experiences of victimization. Data from various religion and ethnic groups (where each constituted a nationally representative sample size) were examined for this thesis. The statistical analysis reported in chapter 8 measures the risks of crime victimization among Muslim and non-Muslim respondents (including crime perceived as having been motivated by religion and ethnicity), and tested the extent to which emphasis placed on violent crime in the literature may be considered justified or reflective of lived experiences among British Muslim communities. The analysis seeks to redress the bias towards violent personal crime by examining household crime victimization (e.g. burglary and property damage). The analysis used personal and household crime data to measure the effect of 'being Muslim' on victimization levels controlling for a range of other factors (sex, age, location of residence and various measures of social and economic deprivation). This was done in order to contribute a more measured and less speculative approach to the study of 'Islamophobia' as it pertained to crime and, more generally, a more empirical approach to the criminological understanding of British Muslim communities.

## **ORIENTALISM**

'Islamophobia' has been conceptualized as having firmly embedded roots as well as far reaching branches. Many scholars have viewed 'Islamophobia' using historical perspectives incorporating medieval and colonial histories of Western Europe. The concept of Orientalism (Said, 1978) is one such perspective that draws on historical roots of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment. Its use as a tool with which to examine 'Islamophobia' has been a major component of the conceptualization among scholars (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; Esposito and Kalin, 2011). Orientalism has described understandings of Muslims and Islam that rest on imperialist expansion of Western non-Muslim countries and functioned primarily to fuel public and scholarly fascination in the Orient and to reflect and project the power and authority Britain and France exercised over the Middle East and North Africa. A fear of Islam, based on perceptions of its military, political and cultural strength among medieval Christians

led to the demonization of Muslims and Muhammad. 'Western' objections against the 'Islamic' sanctioning of polygamy led to an overall construction of Muslims as violent, sexualized people (Weller, 2006). These images became secularized through the types of political and cultural processes described by Said (1978). British and French scholars described the 'irrationality, barbarity, obscurantism and backwardness' of Muslims and Islam (Zebiri, 2008b), emphases that have been purported to resonate through more contemporary understandings, and fears, of the Islamic faith, Muslim people and various aspects of Muslim and Islamic culture (Sajid, 2006; Chahuan, 2006). Such understandings have been described as 'overwhelmingly negative' (Abbas, 2004: 28). 'Islamophobia' has been conceptualized as prejudices that cement the historical links between Islam, the Middle East, terrorism, violence, misogyny and anti-modernity (Maira, 2011). Contemporary relations were described as having been informed by constructions of backwardness and progress: the 'inevitable' Orient and the 'normative' Occident (Allen, 2010: 31). For some scholars, the problem of 'Islamophobia' was exasperated by the publication of Orientalist and racist views held by writers such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004; Al-Shaikh-Ali, 2011; Chahuan, 2006).

Other scholars have argued that Orientalism has merely informed the theorization and conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' (Abbas, 2011; Allen, 2010; Runnymede, 1997; Zebiri, 2008b) and should be considered alongside more recent factors such as post-colonialism, neo-colonialism, decolonization, migration, immigration and post-war racism; factors absent within the classical Orientalism paradigm. For some, these new facets aid legitimization of 'existing modes of domination and subordination in social, economic and political life' (Abbas, 2011: 65): a more modern, and wholly secular, anti-Islamic discourse and practice (Cesari, 2006). The relationships asserted between 'Islamophobia' and Orientalism throughout the scholarly literature provide examples of the major weakness inherent within the *mêlée* of definitions, contexts and applications that define the conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia'. Namely, there is very little (arguably, perhaps even nothing) to assist researchers and practitioners wishing to analyse the extent of the problem. Use of the Orientalism framework

has done little to describe the extent of contemporary anti-Muslim prejudices (save for vague conclusions regarding their age). Consequently, the assertion of Orientalism within the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' has not resulted in the identification of anything that may act as a relief for any of the actual disadvantage and suffering caused to British Muslim communities (Bleich, 2011; Halliday, 2002). Asserting the continuum of Orientalism is of little practical use when devising solutions to problems related to personal and household crime victimization, immigration and anti-immigration violence, housing and employment issues, racial prejudice and social exclusion, and general inequality. For Halliday, such interpretations represent a 'monist abstraction' (2002: 124). Halliday argued that it is misleading and impractical to link contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment to the history of Islam and 'the West' and that focus should be placed on a divergent Muslim people rather than on a monolithic construction of the Islamic faith. Further, solutions to problems, where they exist at all, are easier to find when issues are attributed to contingent socio-economic and contemporary political factors rather than to an anti-Islamic sentiment embedded deep within the Western psyche: a *longue dureé* rather than a strict continuum (Halliday, 2002; Miles and Brown, 2003; Allen, 2010). Given the strength of the criticisms against the practical use of Orientalism, the research design used for this thesis does not rest on assumptions derived from post-colonial theory. This is done to avoid an approach that might otherwise treat British Muslim communities as an abstracted or essentialised group, and in order to locate the study within more contemporary social, economic and political contexts.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Overall, the literature review revealed a number of assertions and conclusions that appeared to form a pattern or consensus running through books, journal articles and reports concerning 'Islamophobia'. British Muslim communities have been depicted repeatedly as suffering from a unique and destructive set of prejudices. According to many scholars, British Muslim communities have been demonized, particularly by the British media, excluded from various spheres of public life by discrimination, and victimized by acts of racist physical

violence. However, these assertions and conclusions have seldom been made with recourse to empirical evidence. Problems of anti-Muslim prejudices and hostilities have rarely been measured with quantitative research methods, and even less commonly measured with nationally representative data and statistical tools more advanced than percentages proportions. Therefore, the aim of the research for this thesis was to use available statistical survey data in order to shed new light on the lived experiences of British Muslim communities. To that end, and given the dominant themes and conclusions from the scholarly and policy literature pertaining to 'Islamophobia' the following research questions were pursued.

**PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION:**

To what extent are the assertions and conclusions concerning 'Islamophobia' supported or challenged by available large-scale social survey data?

**SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS (BY THEME):**

**1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS AND ISLAM:**

To what extent are assertions and conclusions regarding the purported magnitude of negative sentiment towards Muslims and Islam reflected in the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed non-Muslim respondents? Is there statistical evidence for widespread anti-Muslim attitudes?

**2. DISCRIMINATION**

To what extent are assertions and conclusions regarding widespread discrimination and prejudice against British Muslim individuals and communities reflected in the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Are British Muslim communities as discriminated against as is suggested by scholars?

### **3. EXPERIENCES OF THE POLICE**

To what extent are descriptions of the purported targeting of Muslim communities by the police and security services, and allegations of disproportionate interference from police stops and searches, supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Are Muslim people stopped and searched more frequently than non-Muslim people? Are attitudes towards the police as negative as might be supposed from an uncritical reading of the literature?

### **4. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BRITISH STATE AND BRITISH SOCIETY**

To what extent are assertions and conclusions concerning negative attitudes towards the British state and state agencies including the police, and the widespread exclusion of British Muslim communities from mainstream British society, supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is there statistical evidence for the type of exclusion so often asserted within the literature?

### **5. FEAR OF CRIME**

To what extent are descriptions of fears and anxieties around 'Islamophobia', discrimination and crime victimization among British Muslim communities, reflected in the reported attitudes of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is there evidence of the fears and anxieties among British Muslim communities as asserted by scholars?

### **6. CRIME VICTIMIZATION**

To what extent are conclusions regarding increased risks of physical and violent crime supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? To what extent are assertions concerning 'Islamophobia' reflected in the experiences of religiously and racially motivated crime as reported by surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is violent crime as big a problem for British Muslim communities as asserted or implied throughout the literature? Are Muslims more likely than other minorities to be the victims of

hate crime? Is 'being Muslim' the largest single determinant factor effecting reported crime victimization among British Muslim communities?

### **RESEARCH METHODS SUMMARY**

The following types of statistical data were analysed in order to answer the primary and secondary questions:

- Nationally representative data - data generated by thousands of Muslim respondents and tens of thousands of non-Muslim respondents were selected and examined.
- Comparisons were made between several groups of respondents including: Muslim and non-Muslim respondents; Muslim respondents and respondents who self-identified as belonging to religions other than Islam; Muslim and non-Muslim respondents who self-identified as belonging to certain ethnic groups (e.g Asian British and Black British).

### **TOPICS NOT COVERED BY THIS PHD RESEARCH PROJECT**

Discussion around 'Islamophobia' has been related to a variety of contexts and to numerous countries and geographic regions: addressing all of these contexts is not possible within the limitations of a doctoral thesis. Practical considerations informed a research strategy that inevitably excluded whole areas of important research topics related to 'Islamophobia'. This was necessary in order to undertake thorough research work within the resource constraints of a single research project, to make best possible use of statistical data available in the United Kingdom (and in English), and to produce as coherent and complete a study as possible. Due to these limitations and considerations, there are two major areas of study excluded from this thesis: a study of 'Islamophobia' from countries other than the United Kingdom, and an examination of the relationship between anti-Muslim and anti-Islam prejudice and hostility and the British media. Research undertaken in the United States and which links 'Islamophobia' to 'anti-Americanism' (Nimer, 2007) or to right-wing politics (Hollar and Naureckas, 2008) is outside the scope of this research project. Issues that relate

to the French concept of state-sponsored secularism or 'laïcité' (Scott, 2007; Williamson and Khiabany, 2010), and issues related to Germany (EUMC, 2006b; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Jackson and Doerschler, 2012) are also beyond the scope of this research. Similarly, the research project did not undertake an examination of literature specifically related to the Danish cartoon depictions of Mohammad in Jyllands Posten newspaper (Amghar, Boubekour and Emerson, 2007) or the controversy surrounding Geert Wilders and the film *Fitna* (Allen, 2010). Research around 'Islamophobia' has sought to link the media depictions of Islam directly to prejudice and hostility faced by British Muslim communities (Runnymede Trust, 1997). Critically engaging with the role of the media is problematic (Allen and Nielsen, 2002). It is conceded that there may well be a strong relationship between the media and 'Islamophobia' and that it is possible to correlate the holding of certain political views with the regular reading of particular newspapers (cf. Abbas, 2001; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; and Poole and Richardson, 2006). However, it is submitted that it is impossible to ascertain the direction of causality from the selected social survey datasets selected (i.e. whether these newspapers inform or reflect opinions and attitudes held by the British public). Further, it is doubtful whether statistical analysis is an appropriate research tool for such a question. Instead, the concept of 'Islamophobia' has been explored where it has been conceptualized either by British scholars or where the conceptualization has focused on the experiences of British Muslim communities. The research questions have been formulated mindful of the limitations presented by the research designs and the survey questions each selected survey dataset offered. The main topics of study around 'Islamophobia' were selected where the available statistical data afforded an opportunity to explore a major characteristic of the scholarly literature or a dominant narrative within it. The research design did not include any interview data, another notable absence from the study. An extensive review of the literature revealed many successful attempts to describe the nature of anti-Muslim attitudes, discrimination and hostility. As discussed, the most obvious overall weakness in previous research studies is the relative underuse of large-scale, nationally representative social survey data. Whilst interviews and focus groups would have provided useful means of further

exploring issues around identity, victimization cohesion and exclusion, they would not have provided the means to establish generalizable findings or conclusions that might otherwise have attempted to describe large numbers of British Muslim communities. As discussed in the introduction, many assertions and conclusions from the literature relate to all, most or many British Muslims: undertaking analysis of large-scale data, rather than one to one interviews or small focus groups, appeared to be the most useful method for testing the validity of such assertions.

## **CONCLUSION**

This thesis aims to contribute towards research around the subject of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities by applying quantitative research methods given that much of the debates found within the scholarly literature to date have rested largely on theoretical and political arguments. A review of scholarly and policy literature concerning 'Islamophobia' revealed multiple assertions in relation to the alleged widespread nature of discrimination and disadvantage many (and sometimes all) British Muslim communities. This chapter has argued that a study comparing nationally representative statistical data from large-scale social surveys in the United Kingdom and scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' in British has yet to be undertaken in a comprehensive and systematic way. Further, it has been argued that the nature of much of the recent discourse around 'Islamophobia' has invited a study that is rooted in the collection of empirical evidence and informed by the type of quantitative research methods described in the methodological appendix and used throughout this thesis. However, the analysis presented in this thesis does not aim to redress an imbalance of qualitative work. In fact, it has been submitted that much of the recent 'research' undertaken employs neither quantitative nor qualitative research methods. Where theoretical debates around the definitions of 'Islamophobia' have served often to further inflate and confuse, this thesis aims towards the specification and quantification of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes and actions. Previous attempts to define, redefine and finesse the concept of 'Islamophobia' by the Runnymede Trust report and the scholars influenced by it have offered

theoretical rather than practical insights. The conceptual uncertainties around the study of 'Islamophobia' has so far negated applied research that has sought to provide any degree of relief to British Muslim communities. With the exception perhaps of research into media depictions of Muslims and Islam, the problem has become circular. The lack of empirical work has led to a lack of conceptual clarity that has further hindered the collection and analysis of otherwise useful data (Allen, 2010; Bleich, 2011; Sheridan, 2006). In order to make an effective comparison between 'Islamophobia' as described in the literature and anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice and hostility as reflected in large-scale social survey data this research project has adopted a definition of 'Islamophobia' based on that of Bleich. However, the research project widens the interpretation of this definition so as to reflect the broad application of the concept within the literature. Thus Bleich's definition of 'negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims' (Bleich, 2011) provided a suitable conceptual framework and a theoretical departure point for the analysis.

In the chapters that follow, and as indicated by the primary and secondary research questions, large-scale survey data will be examined to assess whether there are any significant and widespread negative attitudes held by non-Muslims towards Muslim communities or the Islamic faith. An examination of reported attitudes and experiences of Muslim respondents will be analysed to measure discrimination, exclusion and victimization and to compare such measurements with attitudes and experiences reported by respondents from other minority groups. As suggested by Goertz and Bleich, and wherever possible this research study will separate the ideology of 'Islamophobia' from its practical consequences. The research will examine the relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, experiences of discrimination and crime victimization and a range of demographic, social and economic factors. This will examine the relative significance of self-describing as Muslim against other relevant factors. In conclusion, the research for this thesis applied quantitative research methods in order to fill a discernible gap in the scholarly knowledge around 'Islamophobia' and to contribute towards a greater sociological and criminological understanding of British

Muslim communities. The following chapter begins the reporting of statistical analysis and focuses on attitudes towards Muslims and Islam.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS AND ISLAM**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents findings from the analysis of survey data used to measure the reported attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards Muslims and Islam. The analysed data came from three of the five surveys examined for this thesis: namely, the British Social Attitudes Survey, the Citizenship Survey and the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (these were the surveys from the five selected that included questions relevant to the topics covered in this chapter). The primary aim of this chapter is to use attitudinal data to determine the extent to which they support or challenge the dominant assertions and conclusions concerning 'Islamophobia' where they relate to negative views held about Muslims and Islam. The analysis seeks to determine the extent to which statistical data provides evidence for assumed widespread negative attitudes held about Muslims and Islam and evidence of an anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic ideology. Discussion in this chapter locates such attitudes within more general attitudes towards religious and ethnic minority groups by comparing response data from survey questions which offered response items related to Muslims, Islam and 'Muslim countries' alongside those relating to a range of other items (i.e. attitudes towards other religious and ethnic minority groups and towards 'non-Muslim countries').

#### **CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ANTI-MUSLIM AND ANTI-ISLAMIC SENTIMENT**

As demonstrated in the literature review, 'Islamophobia' has been conceptualized in a number of ways although, arguably, the most influential and enduring expression of the concept was offered by the Runnymede Trust (1997) and its definition: 'closed views about Muslims or Islam' (Op. cit.: 4). Within the context of 'closed' views about Muslims and Islam, the report focused primarily on negative attitudes towards the Islamic faith held by various British scholars and commentators. Discussion centred on claims about otherness and inferiority (1997: 6), racist commentary on Islam and the West from the likes of Peregrine

Worsthorne and Samuel Huntington (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 7; Huntington, 1993), and a series of comments made about the perceptions of Islam as a threat to 'the West' (Runnymede Trust 1997: 9). Most of the cited materials were from published commentators, newspaper articles or people within positions of relative power. The report reflected on depictions of Islam and Muslim in the British press (1997: 19) and urged readers unhappy with such depictions to make complaints to the Press Complaints Commission. There was little, if anything, on 'everyday' views of Muslims and Islam among non-Muslim members of the British public. The analysis presented in this chapter aims to fill this significant gap in the evidence.

As previously discussed, a review of the relevant scholarly literature revealed that negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam has formed a significant part of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia'. A common theme for scholars engaged with the concept was the negative media portrayals of Muslims and Islam (Abbas, 2001; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Baker, Gabrielatos, McEnery, 2013). Scholars have presented a compelling case for discernible, although not always explicit, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudices that may be located throughout British mainstream media (Poole, 2002; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008). Findings generated from the use of content analysis and discourse analysis methods, and from the focus group interview data (Poole, 2002) have been used to portray British Muslim communities as excluded from mainstream British society by media stories that frequently asserted cultural difference and non-assimilation (for example, through descriptions of cultural practices and religious beliefs constructed as strange or 'other'). Such stories highlighted supposed links with countries outside the United Kingdom and Europe. In doing so, they constructed British Muslim communities as foreign, subversive, disloyal and threatening; propagating notions of 'them' and 'us', and 'Islam' and 'the West'. Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008) analysed nearly a thousand British newspaper articles related to British Muslims from 2000 to 2008. The analysis revealed a dominance of negative or problematic contexts, and prevalence of words such as 'radical', 'fanatical', 'fundamentalist', 'extremist', 'militant'. Case studies of stories related to 'war on terror' highlighted how depictions were

framed within the perceived threat or fear of Islam (conceptualized via descriptions of ‘no go’ areas, extensive mosque building, and fears around the adoption of Sharia law). Scholars have drawn links between such media depictions and the prejudice and hostility felt by British Muslim communities. Abbas stated, ‘Muslims in Britain feel that the reason for their continued existence as an unaccepted and often despised minority is based on the presence of the ‘evil demon’—the media’ (2001: 251).

Elsewhere, the media misrepresentation of Muslims is purported to underpin incidents of discrimination (Abbas, 2001; Ameli et al, 2007; Fekete, 2009; Hickman et al, 2011). Arguably, only a large-scale and in-depth survey of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic perpetrators would enable researchers to begin to analyse the strength of causality between negative media depictions and incidents of Muslim discrimination or victimization (unfortunately, such a study is beyond the limitations of currently available data). However, the findings presented in this chapter provide evidential clues as to the nature and extent of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes held by members of the British public.

Although the analysis was not able to establish the direction of causality (i.e. whether media depictions reflected or influenced public attitudes, or both), the findings are presented in order to shed further light on attitudes towards Muslims and Islam held by ‘everyday’ non-Muslim Britons (i.e. rather than journalists or commentators). Given this approach, the research presented in this chapter is analogous with that of previous research into attitudinal data of opinion polls and surveys that sought to capture attitudes towards Muslims and Islam between 1988 and 2010 (Field, 2007; 2012). Such research has supported conclusions of widespread negative anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment, and a deterioration of sentiment contingent on world events and an increased prevalence within the public sphere of associations between Muslims and conflict and between Islam and threat. Field argued that his findings revealed a perception among non-Muslims that ‘Muslims in Britain are slow to integrate into mainstream society, feel only a qualified sense of patriotism and are prone to espouse anti-Western values that lead many to condone so-called Islamic terrorism’ (2007:

466). Whilst some analysis of opinion poll data revealed positive attitudes towards Muslims, Field presented a pessimistic overall view. He adduced evidence for mounting concerns around perceived Muslim integration and assimilation into British society and the perceived threats posed by Muslim people and by Muslim and Islamic culture. Field also concluded that the number of Britons inclined to perceive Muslims as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers doubled in the period immediately after 7/7, as did the perception among non-Muslims that Muslims' loyalty to both Britain and Islam was in potential conflict (2007: 465). Field presented evidence to support his descriptions of widespread perceptions of Islam as a threat to Western liberal democracy. Such findings echo near-contemporaneous research around international events such as 9/11 and the War in Iraq and the increasing negative newspaper coverage of Muslims and Islam (Poole, 2006), described by Richardson as a 'hostile and stereotyping discourse' (Richardson, 2009: 376). Overall, and by using a cross-section of reported attitudinal data, Field found that between one in four and one in five of respondents displayed either a strong dislike of or prejudice against Muslims and Islam and argued that this prevalence of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiment was more negative, more intense and more overt than anti-Semitic sentiment at that time. Later related research (Field, 2012) suggested a further deterioration of attitudes towards British Muslim communities. Whilst bearing some similarities to this research, the analysis presented in this chapter relied on more sophisticated statistical tools than the simple proportions used in the analysis of opinion polls described above. Further, the analysis attempted to effect comparisons between attitudes towards Muslims and Islam and attitudes towards other religions and minority groups.

For the reasons set out in the literature review, the research design used throughout this chapter did not include use of the Runnymede Trust report definition of 'Islamophobia' but instead relied on Bleich's later definition: 'indiscriminate attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims' (2011). This definition was identified as being a more operationalizable and thus a more appropriate research tool. In the context of Bleich's model and his use of Goertz'

model of social phenomena (Goertz, 2006; Bleich, 2011) anti-Muslim or anti-Islam attitudes captured by the selected surveys may be regarded as a cue or indicator of 'Islamophobia'.

The review of scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia', and an initial review of variables from the selected datasets, revealed the limitations in terms of the extent to which the two sources provided the basis for a direct comparison. Whilst there are survey questions which invite non-Muslim respondents to report attitudes towards Muslims, criminological discussion concerning non-Muslim attitudes is more difficult to source in the literature: 'like for like' comparisons were not always readily available. The views and attitudes of large samples of non-Muslim populations are seldom, if ever, the subject of research amongst scholars interested in 'Islamophobia'. Rather, there is a tendency amongst scholars to present either a rather vague notion of the extent of beliefs and values that are purported to underpin anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes, or else, as discussed, focus on media presentations of Muslims and Islam. Similarly, difficulties are presented by terms and concepts used in the literature but that are difficult to operationalize and measure using available social survey data. For example, no research question in the five surveys selected for analysis related directly to the subject of fearing, dreading or hating the Islamic faith (cf. Lee et al, 2009: 93; Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1). No survey question probed the respondents' psychological responses to Islam. 'Social anxiety' towards Muslims and Islam (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008: 5) is arguably an ill-defined concept which did not lend itself to exploration using available social survey statistics. 'Unfounded hostility' towards Muslims and Islam (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4) created similar problems (not least because whether or not something is perceived as 'unfounded' is wholly subjective). Arguably, the current conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' is limited by the insufficient focus given to its perpetrators. For some, 'Islamophobia' is 'flying as a ghost' (Ekerwald, 2010): a concept which is rarely used to describe the perpetrators of anti-Muslim hate and their attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. There is a tendency among scholars and commentators to use newspaper articles as evidence for the existence of widespread 'Islamophobic' sentiment within the UK (cf. Allen, 2010). While studies have

described accurately the existence and nature of these negative views, far less (if anything) is revealed about the scope or distribution of such ideas among the wider British population, or about the transformation of such views in their journeys from printed page to attitudes held by the British public. For example, discourse on ‘Islamophobia’ in the media has focused on the widespread nature of newspaper articles purported to contain anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; Allen, 2010; Baker, Gabrielatos, McEnery, 2013; Esposito and Kalin, 2011) rather than identifying and tackling issues around individual journalists, with the possible exception of scholars who cite the journalistic writing of Melanie Phillips (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; Allen, 2010). Similarly, analysis and discussion focuses frequently on politically active groups such as the British National Party and less frequently on members of the British public (cf. Allen, 2010). The extent to which these newspaper articles represent or reflect the views of readers, and the extent to which this form of racism and prejudice extends beyond groups such as the BNP both remain largely without quantification. Thus, whilst ‘Islamophobia’ is described as widespread its conceptualizations seldom include large-scale evidence of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes and opinions held by identified, or readily identifiable individual agents. The research findings here identify attitudes and opinions held by individual non-Muslim survey respondents (rather than ill-defined abstractions such as ‘within the UK’ or ‘the British public’). Instead, the statistical analysis reported here was undertaken to determine whether there is evidence of the type of views described in the scholarly and policy literature and the extent to which such views may be described as widespread (as is asserted or implied by scholars and commentators engaged in discourse around ‘Islamophobia’). The data analysed below relate to large numbers of individuals, and more importantly, actual non-Muslim members of the British public with measurable everyday attitudes towards Muslims and Islam – human beings as opposed to ghosts.

## **SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN**

Survey response data were selected for analysis where they were generated by survey questions which asked non-Muslim respondents (i.e. respondents who self-described affiliation to a religion other than Islam or to no religion) to report their feelings about Muslim people, the Islamic faith, or people from countries commonly perceived to be 'Muslim' or that have sizeable Muslim populations. The primary source of data was the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (the dataset with the most questions deemed pertinent to the research question) although data from the British Social Attitude Survey and the Citizenship Survey were also examined. Cross-tabulation, Pearson chi-square tests and two proportions z-tests were used to examine these data. Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam were compared to attitudes towards people from other religious and ethnic minority groups specified by the surveys (for instance, Jewish, Asian and Black people). Attitudes towards immigration from countries and geographic locations commonly perceived as 'Muslim' were examined, as were attitudes related to a range of issues concerning the perception of Muslim communities: integration, inter-faith marriages and their effect on national identity. In order to examine whether widespread views may be described accurately as 'indiscriminate' the analysis examined attitudes towards Muslim dress, the building of mosques, the suitability of Muslim people as teachers, and issues related to rights protection and public funding of Muslim communities. A series of logistic regression models were used to explore the effects of sex and age upon the likelihood of holding strong anti-Muslim attitudes. The analysis was undertaken to contribute an answer to the primary research question by examining the extent to which the statistical findings support or challenge the literature and to provide an answer for the relevant secondary research question: To what extent are assertions and conclusions regarding the purported magnitude of negative sentiment towards Muslims and Islam reflected in the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed non-Muslim respondents.

## **FINDINGS**

### **ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIM PEOPLE**

Analysis of these data sought to examine general attitudes towards Muslim people and compare these attitudes to those reported to be held towards people from other minority groups. Respondents to the BSAS 2008 were asked to rate their feelings towards Muslim people on a scale of 1 to 100, where 1 was cold (or negative) and 100 was hot (or positive). The analysis focused first on the attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards Muslim people. These non-Muslim respondents returned an average score of 45.87 (a score implying feelings that are slightly more negative than positive, although a finding of little utility if used in isolation). This average score was then compared with those for feelings towards other specified groups: Asian, Black and Jewish people (see Table 3.01). In each case, data from respondents from the specified group were excluded alongside Muslim respondents (for instance, attitudes towards Jewish people were examined using data from respondents who were both non-Muslim *and* non-Jewish). This reflects the methods used in other social attitudes surveys (such as the Scottish Social Attitude Survey), and ensured that the findings were not skewed by the positive attitudes of respondents towards their own religious or ethnic group. An average score of 52.70 was returned when non-Muslim (and non-Asian) respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards Asian people. Feelings towards Jewish people were slightly higher (an average score of 56.47); and higher still were feelings towards Black people (an average score of 58.36). Differences between the score for Muslim people and each of the other scores (taken individually) were statistically significant at the 0.001% level (although findings were indicative as the samples were not independent). Although statistically significant the findings revealed differences that were not large (with the arguable exception of reported attitudes towards Black people).

The findings suggest feelings towards Muslim people which, to use the language of the survey question itself, were cooler than those towards other minority communities, although

these reported findings suggest that feelings were neither particularly positive nor negative. Some of the respondents clearly had views akin to the ‘closed views’ described in the Runnymede Trust report (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4) and the ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes against Muslim people’ from Bleich’s model (Bleich, 2012). Whether there were a sufficient number of respondents reporting negative feelings and attitudes towards Muslims and Islam to offer strong evidential support to the conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘Islamophobic’ attitudes as found in the scholarly literature is perhaps more doubtful.

**Table 3.01 British Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards various other groups**

Feelings towards:	Average score (where 1=cold and 100=hot)	Unweighted base
Muslim people	45.87	19,025
Jewish people <sup>1</sup>	56.47*	18,905
Asian people <sup>2</sup>	52.70*	18,409
Black people <sup>3</sup>	58.36*	18,529

Data source: BSAS 2008

Variables used: religion, raceori2, ftmuslms, ftfews, ftnsns, ftblks

p weighted with wtfactor

\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

<sup>1</sup> Data from non-Muslim, non-Jewish respondents

<sup>2</sup> Data from non-Muslim, non-Asian respondents

<sup>3</sup> Data from non-Muslim, non-Black respondents

Statistical significance results are indicative only as the samples were not independent

## **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION BY MUSLIM PEOPLE**

The analysis of data related to immigration was undertaken to examine the extent to which non-Muslim respondents reported negative attitudes towards Muslim migrants to the UK. Difficulties concerning the difficulty in distinguishing ‘Islamophobia’ from general racist, anti-foreigner, anti-migrant or anti-asylum seeker sentiments were noted by scholars and found throughout the reviewed literature (cf. Allen and Nielsen, 2002; EUMC, 2006; Iganski, 2009). Notwithstanding these difficulties, and whilst conscious of the difficulties in attempting to locate explicitly anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment, analysis was undertaken to compare a range of attitudes towards migrants from countries commonly held to be ‘Muslim’, and how immigration by Muslim people impacts upon national identity. Analysis sought to

examine the extent to which data supported the assertions related to indiscriminate, negative views about Muslims and Islam: findings are presented in the following sections.

### **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION FROM 'MUSLIM COUNTRIES'**

Unlike other surveys analysed for this research project, the Citizenship Survey did not include questions that directly addressed attitudes towards Muslims and Islam (unlike for instance EMBES which asked: 'How comfortable are you speaking to a Muslim woman with a full veil (niqab)?' Notwithstanding the absence of such direct questioning, the Citizenship Survey asked respondents to describe their attitudes towards immigration and, more specifically, towards immigration from individual countries and geographic regions. The research for this thesis sought to determine whether 'closed views' or 'indiscriminate negative attitudes' towards Muslim people were reflected in attitudes towards migrants from 'Muslim countries'.

In order to deal with the rather subjective business of identifying countries as being 'Muslim' or not, the research employed a model designed by Fish (2011). For the purposes of his research Fish counted as 'Muslim' any country with a Muslim population which accounts for at least 55% of the country's total population. This approach was combined with a common-sense approach to the analysis of attitudes towards migrants from countries or geographic regions without a Muslim majority but ones which might be presumed wrongly to have one (a possible example being India) or presumed wrongly not to have one (a possible example being Malaysia). Thus, the research looked at all countries in the survey but focused particularly on countries and regions with Muslim majorities (both actual and perceived).

A survey question asked: 'Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, reduced or should remain the same?' In the CS 2009/10 wave, respondents who answered either 'reduced a little' or 'reduced a lot' were then asked the question: 'When you said the number of immigrants coming to Britain should be reduced,

which countries in particular were you thinking of?’ The research focused on non-Muslim respondents who were born in the United Kingdom. It was presumed those migrating to the UK may be more likely to have positive attitudes towards others doing the same, and thus would reveal less about which countries generate negative attitudes than analysis focused on UK-born respondents. The analysis revealed general widespread anti-immigration sentiment (see Table 3.02). A majority of respondents (58.4%) felt that immigration should be ‘decreased a lot’, and 82% reported that there should be some sort of decrease in immigration (i.e. a lot or a little).

**Table 3.02 Citizenship Survey: Geographic areas chosen most frequently when respondents were asked to specify a region from where immigration should be decreased ‘a lot’**

Geographic areas	% of respondents	Unweighted base
All countries	64.9	628
East Europe	12.5	628
Asia	3.6	628
Africa	3.2	628
Middle East	3.2	628
Caribbean	0.8	628

Data source: CS 2009/10

Variables used: redgps\_1, redgps\_28, redgps\_26, redgps\_25, redgps\_27

Analysis was undertaken to determine the extent to which this anti-immigration sentiment appeared to target migrants from Muslim countries. The responses were spontaneous (i.e. not prompted with a list of available response options) and varied, from specific countries (for example, Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria and Canada) to broader geographic regions (for example, Africa and Eastern Europe) and also all countries (see Table 3.03). Again, the analysis used response data from non-Muslim respondents born in the UK. Respondents could choose more than one option from a list containing both individual countries and broader geographic regions (the percentages reported in Tables 3.02 and 3.03 contain extracts of reported data and thus do not total 100%). By far the largest group of respondents is represented by those who simply answered ‘All countries’ (64.9%). In terms of broad geographic regions, Eastern Europe was mentioned most frequently (a response given,

unprompted, by 12.5% of respondents). Other geographic regions given as responses were: Asia (3.6%); Africa (3.2%); the Middle East (3.2%); and the Caribbean (0.8%). Poland was the individual country mentioned most often (by 9.2% of respondents). 7.3% of respondents (the second largest group in this category) opted for the response 'No particular country'. Pakistan was mentioned by 5.2% of respondents. Romania was mentioned by 3.7% of respondents; India by 3.3%; Somalia by 2.5%; Bangladesh by 1.7%; Turkey by 1.1%; Nigeria by 1%; Sri Lanka by 0.6%. Afghanistan was mentioned by 0.5% and Iraq by 0.3%. Analysis of these data provided only limited evidence for anti-immigration sentiment that targets 'Muslim countries' more often than 'non-Muslim countries'. Eastern Europe was mentioned three times more often than the Middle East and Asia (regions commonly associated with sizeable Muslim populations). Poland (the individual country mentioned most frequently) was mentioned more often than Pakistan. It could be argued that the sizeable Muslim populations in countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo were considered when respondents gave the response 'Eastern Europe'. However, there is evidence to support a claim that anti-immigration sentiment among non-Muslim respondents who were born in the UK does not frequently target 'Muslim countries'. Poland was a more popular choice than Pakistan; 'All countries' was the single most popular choice (chosen by nearly two thirds of respondents); from the ten most frequently chosen countries only three have majority Muslim populations; these three countries were each chosen by less than 10% of respondents.

One possible explanation (or conjecture) could be that respondents (who are non-Muslim and born in the UK) do not necessarily perceive Muslim communities as being synonymous exclusively with recent immigrants and recent immigration. Awareness of established Muslim communities in most major cities could have shifted anti-immigrant sentiment towards those perceived as more recent newcomers (for instance migrants from Eastern Europe).

**Table 3.03 Citizenship Survey: Countries chosen when respondents were asked to specify a country from where immigration should be decreased ‘a lot’**

Countries	% of respondents	Unweighted base	Population over 55% Muslim?
All countries	64.9	628	--
No particular country	7.3	628	--
Poland	9.2	628	No
Pakistan	5.2	628	Yes
Romania	3.7	628	No
India	3.3	628	No
Somalia	2.5	628	Yes
Bangladesh	1.7	628	Yes
Slovakia	1.7	628	No
Lithuania	1.6	628	No
Russia	1.4	628	No
Bulgaria	1.2	628	No

Data sources: CS2009/10, The CIA World Fact Book 2014

Variables used: redgps\_14, redgps\_13, redgps\_15, redgps\_8, redgps\_17, redgps\_3, redgps\_18, redgps\_10, redgps\_16, redgps\_4

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND SCOTTISH IDENTITY

Respondents surveyed by the Scottish Social Attitude Survey in 2006 and 2010 were asked a series of questions related to Scottish identity and immigration. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement that Scotland would lose its identity if more Muslim, East European, or Black and Asian people came to live in Scotland. As before, the analysis focused here on non-Muslim respondents born in the UK. As before, the analysis excluded respondents who self-described as belonging to the same ethnic or geographic category as the one included in the survey question. This was not possible for the category ‘East European’ as there were no means by which respondents could self-describe as East European. However, analysis of response data related to Asian and Black migrants excluded those generated from the responses of Asian and Black respondents. The analysis revealed a range of attitudes about Scottish identity and immigration to Scotland (see Table 3.04). 51.5% of non-Muslim respondents reported some level of feeling that more Muslim people in Scotland would threaten Scottish identity (i.e. either agreeing or agreeing strongly with the statement). This was slightly higher than the level of negative feelings towards an increase in Black and Asian people East and European people (47.9% and 47.7% respectively, differences

between those opting for these responses and those opting for the ‘Muslim people’ response appeared statistically significant). As before, while it is possible to identify attitudes towards Muslim people that were more negative than those towards other minority groups, differences were relatively small.

**Table 3.04 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards immigration and its threat to Scottish identity**

Scotland would lose its identity if more...		
	% of non-Muslim respondents who answered ‘agree’ or ‘agree strongly’	Unweighted base
...Muslim people came to live in Scotland <sup>1</sup>	51.5	2,829
...Black or Asian people came to live in Scotland <sup>2</sup>	47.9*	2,847
...East European people came to live in Scotland	47.7*	2,834

Data source: SSAS 2006, SSAS 2010

Variables used: idmus, idbasian, ideaster, relgcens, ethnicity\_1

p weighted with wtfactor

<sup>1</sup>Analysis excludes Muslims respondents

<sup>2</sup>Analysis excludes Asian and Black respondents

\*p<0.05 (both comparisons with ‘Muslim people’ response)

Statistical significance is indicative only as the samples were not independent

## **OTHER MISCELLANEOUS NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS AND ISLAM**

This section presents the analysis of various survey questions exploring respondents’ attitudes towards a series of hypothetical scenarios involving Muslim people and the Islamic faith. The questions, taken from two sources, the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) and the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS), presented imagined scenarios employed to measure the respondents’ attitudes towards various groups. Response items related to Muslims were identified (such as marriage between non-Muslims and Muslims, clothing items commonly associated with Muslim people, the building of mosques, and the perceived suitability of Muslim people as members of the teaching profession). Taken individually, analysis of these survey questions, and the response data they generate, does reveal the existence of a proliferation of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment. Viewed holistically

however, these data may provide at least some evidential clues as to the extent of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam attitudes in the UK.

### **ATTITUDES TOWARDS A RELATIVE MARRYING SOMEONE WHO IS MUSLIM**

SSAS 2006 and 2010 included a series of questions asking respondents how happy they would be if a close relative married (or formed a long-term relationship with) someone who is Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, or Black or Asian. The analysis, as throughout this chapter, focused on the attitudes of non-Muslim respondents. Nearly a half of those asked (48.7%) reported that they would be happy or very happy for a relative to marry someone who is Muslim. This compared to 50.5% of non-Muslim respondents who were positive (happy or very happy) for a relative to marry someone who is Hindu. 55.7% of respondents reported being positive about a relative marrying a Jewish person, and 69.2% who reported being positive about someone marrying a Black or Asian person. It would appear that marrying someone who is Muslim or Hindu is perceived as less welcome perhaps than marrying someone who is Jewish or from an ethnic minority community. This clustering of percentages in relation to attitudes concerning Muslim and Hindu people is echoed, and is more pronounced in fact, when the negative responses to these survey questions are compared (see Table 3.05). Again, it is arguable that attitudes towards Muslim people are perhaps less positive than towards certain other religious or ethnic groups. 23.6% of respondents reported that they would be very unhappy or unhappy at the prospect of a relative marrying or having a long-term relationship with someone who is Muslim and 18.6% felt the same about someone who is Hindu. This compared with only 9.4% of respondents who reported some level of unhappiness at the prospect of such a relationship with a Jewish person, and 10.4% unhappy with someone who is Black or Asian.

By contrast, attitudes towards marrying an asylum seeker or a traveller are demonstrably more negative. 40.1% of non-Muslim respondents when asked stated that they would be unhappy or very unhappy for a close relative to marry an asylum seeker and 38.5% reported the same in relation to a gypsy or traveller. It would appear that, in this context at

least, labels such as ‘asylum seeker’, ‘gypsy’ and ‘traveller’ generate more negative sentiment than ‘Muslim’ and the others used here to denote religious or ethnic identity.

**Table 3.05 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Negative attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards marrying or forming a long-term relationship people from various specified groups**

How would you feel if a close relative of yours married or formed a long-term relationship with...		
	% of non-Muslim respondents who answered ‘unhappy’ or ‘very unhappy’	Row totals (unweighted)
...an asylum seeker <sup>1</sup> ?	40.1	1459
...a gypsy or traveller <sup>2</sup> ?	38.5	2952
...a Muslim person <sup>3</sup> ?	23.6	2980
...a Hindu person <sup>4</sup> ?	18.6	2964
...a Black or Asian person <sup>5</sup> ?	10.4	2984
...a Jewish person <sup>6</sup> ?	9.4	2987

Data source: SSAS 2006, SSAS 2010

Variables used: marasyl, margyp, marrmus, marrhin, marblas, marrjew, relgcens, p weighted with wtfactor

<sup>1</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim respondents

<sup>2</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim respondents

<sup>3</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim respondents

<sup>4</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim and Hindu respondents

<sup>5</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim, Black and Asian respondents

<sup>6</sup> Analysis excludes Muslim and Jewish respondents

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS VISIBLE MUSLIM IDENTITY

Respondents were asked if they were comfortable with seeing a woman with her face covered in public. The largest single group of respondents were those registering the absence of a strong feeling: 45.8% of respondents stated they were neither comfortable nor uncomfortable. 31.9% of respondents reported some degree of comfort (i.e. comfortable or very comfortable); fewer (22.3%) reported feeling uncomfortable or very comfortable. Unfortunately, there were no related survey questions in the 2006 wave that asked attitudes towards the wearing of traditional forms of dress commonly associated with other religions (a turban or a yarmulke for example).

**Table 3.06 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards Muslim dress**

How comfortable or uncomfortable does it make you feel if you see a Muslim woman with her face covered in public?		
	% (weighted) of non-Muslim respondents	Unweighted base
Very comfortable	15.5	214
Comfortable	16.4	227
Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	45.8	633
Uncomfortable	14.1	195
Very uncomfortable	8.2	114
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,383</b>

Data source: SSAS 2006

Variables used: relgcens, muslimcm

However, a series of questions in the 2010 wave asked the respondent to report their attitudes towards the wearing of traditional religious dress or religious items in the workplace, thus establishing the means by which a comparison could be made. The survey question used a hypothetical scenario in which an imaginary individual (i.e. not the respondent) is being interviewed for a position serving customers at a bank. The survey asked the respondent whether the imagined bank should insist that a Muslim woman takes off a headscarf (that does not cover her face) while at work: only 10.6% answered 'yes' and that the bank 'definitely should'. Another question used the same scenario to pose a question related to a woman wearing a veil that covers her face: 43.7% of respondents answered that the bank should definitely insist she takes it off whilst at work. By comparison, 12.8% of respondents felt that the bank should definitely insist a Sikh takes off his turban at work, while 6.1% felt that it should definitely insist on a Christian woman taking off her crucifix.

**Table 3.07 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards religious or cultural clothing or items at work**

Should a bank be able to insist that...?		
	Non-Muslim respondents who answered 'definitely should' %	Unweighted column totals
...a Muslim woman takes off her headscarf (not covering her face) at work?	10.6	1,263
...a Muslim woman takes off her veil (covering her face) at work?	43.7	1,260
...a Sikh man takes off his turban at work?	12.8	1,230
...a Christian woman takes off her crucifix while at work?	6.1	1,253

Data source: SSAS 2010

Variables used: relgcens, bkmushd, bkmusvl, bksikh, bkchrist

## **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS BUILDING A MOSQUE IN THE LOCAL AREA**

Attitudes towards the building of mosques and churches were analysed and compared in order to determine whether response data suggested any strong anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment. Attitudes towards the building of churches were used as a comparative measure. 55.5% of respondents would be bothered by the building of a mosque (to adopt the language of the survey); only 15.7% felt the same about the building of a church.

A cross-tabulation table of mosque and church responses was generated. As shown in Table 3.08, 18.5% of respondents reported being 'not bothered' by a church and 'bothered a lot' by a mosque. 33.9% of respondents reported being 'not bothered' by a church and bothered to some extent (i.e. a little or a lot) by a mosque. A similar proportion of respondents (34.6%) were not bothered by either the building of a church or mosque. Negative responses to both the building of churches and mosques could be indicative of negative feelings towards any religious buildings or the construction of new buildings. Arguably, respondents who reported the building of a church as something s/he would welcome whilst being 'bothered a lot' by the building of a mosque might indicate or suggest anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic tendencies. The frequency of such responses (i.e. being strongly for church-building and strongly against mosque-building) is arguably capable of indicating the extent of indiscriminate anti-Muslim

and anti-Islamic attitudes among these respondents. A large majority of respondents (85.3%) reported positive attitudes towards the building of a church (see Table 3.08). Of those that reported positive attitudes towards church building, attitudes towards the building of mosques were divided equally between respondents whom reported positive attitudes (41.5%) and those whom reported negative attitudes (43.8%). 4.7% of respondents reported that they would welcome a church and be bothered a lot by a mosque – thus arguably indicating low levels of indiscriminate negative attitudes towards Muslims among this group (or at least less widespread anti-mosque and anti-Muslim sentiment than expressed in much of the ‘Islamophobia’ literature). Younger respondents appeared less likely to be ‘bothered a lot’ by the building of a mosque although differences between the age groups were not particularly large (see Table 3.09).

#### **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS SUITABILITY OF MUSLIM PEOPLE AS PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS**

Respondents in SSAS 2006 and SSAS 2010 were asked whether they think Muslim people are suited to the job of being a primary school teacher. On the surface, this may appear to be a rather banal survey question. Without more information from the survey, or the respondent, it is impossible to know whether the respondent perceived the question as referring to Muslim primary school teachers generally (i.e. those working anywhere in the world) or teachers working in Scotland. However, analysis of the survey question is included here as it arguably provides an example of ‘indiscriminate’ negative views as per Bleich’s model (Bleich, 2011).

**Table 3.08 British Social Attitudes Survey: Non-Muslims attitudes towards the building of mosques and churches**

Building of a mosque						
	Bother a lot	Bother a little	Not bother	Welcome	Weighted % row totals	Unweighted base n
<b>Building of a church</b>	%	%	%	%	%	
Bother a lot	4.5	--	0.1	0.1	4.7	47
Bother a little	3.4	6.1	0.4	0.1	10	119
Not bothered	18.5	15.4	34.6	1.3	69.8	760
Welcomed	4.7	2.9	3.7	4.2	15.5	151
Weighted % column total	31.1	24.4	38.8	5.7	100	--
Unweighted base n	354	270	424	29	--	1,077

Data source: BSAS 2008

Variables used: religion, bldms, bldch

p weighted with wtfactor

**Table 3.09 British Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards a large mosque being built in their local area**

Respondents from each age group who selected 'bother you a lot'	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-59	60-64	65-66	Totals
% of respondents	24.8	27.5	28.8	31.8	41.3	37.7	37	--
Unweighted column totals	77	143	205	204	92	96	259	1,076

Data source: BSAS 2008

Variables used: religion, ragecat, bldms

p weighted with wtfactor

Errors in BSAS2008 resulted in small difference between totals (1,077 and 1,076)

A survey respondent who feels that Muslim people do not make good teachers (whether in Scotland or elsewhere) arguably has discernible, indiscriminate negative attitudes towards Muslim people (i.e. a perceived characteristic shared by all Muslim people that makes them inherently bad at teaching in primary schools). It appears that the majority of respondents had no such views, although overall attitudes towards Muslim teachers are more negative than towards Black and Asian teachers (considered here together due to the wording of the survey question). 58% of non-Muslim respondents feel that Muslim people are suited (either fairly or very) to the job of primary school teacher. 6.8% reported feeling such people are very unsuitable (with only 16.4% reporting some level of unsuitability - see Table 3.10). This

compared to 75.6% of respondents who reported feeling that Black or Asian people are suitable as primary school teachers. 5.2% reported that Black and Asian people are unsuitable or very unsuitable for the role of primary school teachers. Respondents were also asked about the suitability of a 'Gypsy' or a 'Traveller' as a primary school teacher. 26.9% reported feeling such a person would be 'very unsuitable' and a majority of respondents (51.2%) reported feeling that such a person would be unsuitable to some degree.

**Table 3.10 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards various groups of people as teachers**

How well do you think people from the following groups would be suited to the job of being a primary school teacher...?		
	Non-Muslim respondents who answered 'unsuitable' or 'very unsuitable' %	Unweighted row totals
A Muslim person?	16.4	2,573
A Black or Asian person?	5.2	2,613
A Gypsy or Traveller person?	51.2	2,562

Data source: SSAS 2006 and 2010

Variables used: relgcens, teachmsm, teachblk, teachgyp  
p weighted with wtfactor

## **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES**

This section of findings explores the attitudes of non-Muslim respondents in the Citizenship Survey and the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey to the relationship between the state and Muslims in the UK. Two survey questions were identified as apposite and data from them analysed. It is conceivable that anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes may be located in attitudes towards how much protection or support ought to be extended by the British Government to British Muslim communities. Taken in isolation responses related to Muslims and Islam are of limited utility: negative attitudes towards corporate state engagement with Muslim communities might be driven by overarching conservative, liberal or libertarian views supporting a limited role of the state. In an attempt to control for such views, and as elsewhere, attitudes towards Muslims and Islam were compared, wherever possible, to other minority groups and faiths.

## NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE RIGHTS PROTECTION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

The Citizenship Survey asked respondents to describe how much they think the British Government is doing to protect the rights of people belonging to different religions in Britain. There were four available response categories: ‘too little’, ‘about the right amount’, ‘too much’, and ‘don’t know’. Analysis was undertaken to determine whether there existed feelings that the Government is doing too much to protect the rights of people belonging to differing religions. The most frequently chosen response option was ‘about the right amount’ (38.5%) and options ‘too little’ and ‘too much’ were chosen by groups of respondents of roughly equal size (27.4% and 26.4% respectively).

**Table 3.11 Citizenship Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards Government protection of rights of people belonging to different religions in Britain**

How much do you think the Government is doing to protect the rights of people belonging to different religions in Britain?	
	Non-Muslim respondents
	%
Too little	27.4
About the right amount	38.5
Too much	26.4
Don't know	7.7
Weighted % column total	100
Unweighted base n	37,290

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10  
 Variables used: relig, relhow  
 p weighted with wtfinds

A subsequent question asked respondents of which religious groups in particular they were thinking when considering the level to which religious people are protected (see Table 3.12). The most popular responses for respondents who thought there is too little done and for those who thought there is too much done was Muslims (mentioned by 47.8% of those who answered ‘too little’ and 81% of those who answered ‘too much’). As before, the analysis excluded the responses from respondents belonging to the religion used in the response option (for example, analysis of non-Muslim respondents who chose ‘Sikh’ also excluded Sikh respondents). Muslims were mentioned three times as often as Christians (see Table 3.12), and

over ten times more frequently than the second most mentioned minority religion (Sikhs, mentioned by 4.3% of respondents). Similarly, Muslims were mentioned over ten times more frequently than other religions by those who stated the Government is doing too much (see Table 3.13). The prominence of the response 'Muslims' in both categories (i.e. too little and too much) is perhaps of use only as further evidence as to the high-profile nature of Muslim communities within the collective consciousness of the British public and within societal and political debates such as those concerning immigration. Arguably, these findings demonstrate that issues surrounding Muslim communities are capable of eliciting strong sentiment from non-Muslim respondents but not that such sentiment is necessarily negative or anti-Muslim. The analysis revealed evidence to show that Muslims occupy a primary position within the public's perception and consideration of issues concerning the protection of religious rights (especially among minority groups). Whether the analysis reveals evidence to support or challenge the concept of 'Islamophobia' is however rather less certain. While the data highlight the prominence of both Muslims and constructions of Muslims have within the popular debates concerning religious protection in Britain, it would appear that counter-balancing the views of those who think too much is done for Muslims are views which would appear to support the protection of Muslim rights.

**Table 3.12 Citizenship Survey: Religious groups reported by non-Muslim respondents as receiving too little rights protection**

Of which particular group were you thinking?			
	Non-Muslim respondents		Unweighted base
	Mentioned	Not mentioned	
	%	%	
Muslims	47.8	52.2	9902
Christians <sup>1</sup>	16	84	2631
Sikhs <sup>2</sup>	4.3	95.7	9638
Hindus <sup>3</sup>	4.2	95.8	9392
Jews <sup>4</sup>	4	96	9849
Buddhists <sup>5</sup>	1.9	98.1	9825

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: relig, relhowa1, relhowa2, relhowa3, relhowa4, relhowa5, relhowa6  
p weighted with wtfinds

<sup>1</sup> Analysis excludes Christian respondents

<sup>2</sup> Analysis excludes Sikh respondents

<sup>3</sup> Analysis excludes Hindu respondents

<sup>4</sup> Analysis excludes Jewish respondents

<sup>5</sup> Analysis excludes Buddhist respondents

**Table 3.13 Citizenship Survey: Religious groups reported by non-Muslim respondents as receiving too much rights protection**

Of which particular group were you thinking?			
	Non-Muslim respondents		Unweighted base
	Mentioned	Not mentioned	
	%	%	
Muslims	81	19	8235
Hindus <sup>1</sup>	7.9	92.1	7979
Sikhs <sup>2</sup>	7.3	92.7	8129
Christians <sup>3</sup>	3.9	96.1	2036
Buddhists <sup>4</sup>	2.9	97.1	8178
Jews <sup>5</sup>	2.8	97.2	8213

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: relig, relhowb1, relhowb2, relhowb3, relhowb4, relhowb5, relhowb6  
p weighted with wtfinds

<sup>1</sup> Analysis excludes Christian respondents

<sup>2</sup> Analysis excludes Sikh respondents

<sup>3</sup> Analysis excludes Hindu respondents

<sup>4</sup> Analysis excludes Jewish respondents

<sup>5</sup> Analysis excludes Buddhist respondents

**Table 3.14 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Attitudes of non-Muslim respondents towards the use of public money to help Muslim and Black or Asian people find work**

<b>Government money to help...</b>		
	<b>Non-Muslim respondents who answered 'a bad' or 'a very bad' use of government money</b>	<b>Unweighted base</b>
	<b>%</b>	
<b>...Muslim people find work</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>1440</b>
<b>...Black or Asian people find work</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>1445</b>

Data source: SSAS 2010  
 Variables used: relgcens, orgmus, orgbla  
 p weighted with wtfactor

### **NON-MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS USING GOVERNMENT MONEY TO ASSIST MUSLIM PEOPLE FIND WORK**

Respondents were asked whether they considered money used to help Muslim people find work is a good or bad use of government money. This is arguably a less reliable tool for analysing the topics covered by the survey question (employment, public spending, and religious and ethnic minority communities) than it is for analysing general, indiscriminate negative attitudes towards Muslim people. Opinion appeared divided: 38.5% of non-Muslim respondents felt it was either a good or a very good use of government money, compared with 32.7% who felt it was either a bad or very bad use (see Table 3.14). These attitudes were broadly similar to those surveyed in relation to giving money to help Black or Asian people find work: 29.1% reported that it was a bad or very bad use of money.

### **FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ANTI-MUSLIM AND ANTI-ISLAMIC ATTITUDES ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES IN SCOTLAND**

Given the absence within the literature of any attempt to describe individuals with anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes further analysis was undertaken to explore the characteristics of such respondents within the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS). The findings below are presented with a degree of caution. The analysed data are presented only as an attempt to begin to address the deficiencies within the current conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' and as an indication as to

the nature of those with anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment. Findings from a single year of data collected in Scotland are insufficient to describe or predict anti-Muslim attitudes across the UK (or across Scotland). They are presented here as a means to inform future research in this area. Further, the r-squared values for each of the models was between four and ten percent (i.e. the models described less than ten percent of the variation in anti-Muslim attitudes). Thus findings here are presented as being indicative rather than conclusive. A scale measure of anti-Muslim attitudes was created using data generated by four survey questions from the 2006 wave of the SSAS. These questions asked the respondents:

- How would you feel if a close relative of yours married or formed a long-term relationship with a Muslim?
- How comfortable or uncomfortable does it make you if you see a Muslim woman with her face covered in public?
- [Would] Scotland [...] begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland?
- How well do you think [a Muslim person] would be suited to the job of being a primary school teacher?

Each survey question employed a scale of Likert items to record responses. Negative response data (i.e. unhappy/very unhappy, uncomfortable/very uncomfortable, agree/strongly agree, and fairly unsuitable/very unsuitable) from respondents who selected negative responses were used to create a new variable measuring anti-Muslim attitudes (where 0=no negative responses and 4=negative responses to all four questions). Via this process 213 respondents were identified as holding strong negative views about Muslims. A series of binary logistic regression models were employed to discern and explore further patterns and trends within this group.

Sex was found to have had no statistically significant effect on whether or not respondents held strong anti-Muslim attitudes. This finding was also reflected in the results of a chi-square test ( $\chi^2=0.624$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). However, age did have a statistically significant

effect and the findings revealed that older respondents were more likely to report negative attitudes towards Muslims. The odds of reporting such attitudes increase very slightly according to age ( $Exp(\beta)=1.032$ ). However, and as might be expected, such incremental changes have a more noticeable effect over long periods. The analysis revealed that respondents aged 60 were three and half times more likely to report anti-Muslim sentiment than those aged 20 once sex had been controlled for ( $Exp(\beta)^{40} = 1.032^{40} = 3.525$ ). Similarly, and when analysed as a group, respondents aged 45 or over were more than three times more likely to report anti-Muslim attitudes than those under 45 once sex had been controlled for ( $Exp(\beta) = 3.127$ ). As Tables 3.15 to 3.17 reveal, sex had no significant effect on attitudes. Further, once sex and being over 45 had been controlled for (see the modified model in Table 3.17 with dichotomised age groups), the findings revealed differences between respondents who were employed, unemployed and retired (further suggesting a relationship between being older and holding anti-Muslim attitudes). Unemployed respondents were just under twice as likely to report anti-Muslim attitudes than those in work although the results were, by convention, at the outer limits of statistical significance ( $Exp(\beta) = 1.945$ ;  $p=0.051$ ).

**Table 3.15 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Anti-Muslim attitudes in Scotland - Logistic regression model 1**

	$\beta$	S.E	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	C.I. 95%	
					Lower	Upper
Constant	-3.600	.270	.000	.027		
Sex (male)	.102	.150	.499	.903	.673	1.213
Age (years)	.031	.004	.000	1.032	1.023	1.040

Data source: SSAS 2006

Variables used: relgcens, rsex, rage, marmus, muslimcm, teachermsm

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = .034, Nagelkerke = .062, Hosmer and Lemeshow -  $\chi^2 = 12.609$  df = 8, Sig. = .126

**Table 3.16 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Anti-Muslim attitudes in Scotland - Logistic regression model 2**

	$\beta$	S.E	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	C.I. 95%	
					Lower	Upper
Constant	-2.696	.171	.000	.067	-	-
Sex (male)	.095	.150	.526	1.100	.819	1.476
Age (45 and over)	1.140	.179	.000	3.127	2.200	4.443

Data source: SSAS 2006

Variables used: relgcens, rsex, rage, marmus, muslimcm, teachersm

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = .030, Nagelkerke = .055, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = .525$  df = 2, Sig. = .769

**Table 3.17 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey: Anti-Muslim attitudes in Scotland - Logistic regression model 3**

	$\beta$	S.E	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	C.I. 95%	
					Lower	Upper
Constant	-2.806	.187	.000	.060	-	-
Sex	.103	.152	.497	1.108	.823	1.492
Age (45+)	.879	.202	.000	2.409	1.621	3.580
Working			.003			
Unemployed	.665	.341	.051	1.945	.996	3.797
Retired	.643	.186	.001	1.902	1.320	2.740

Data source: SSAS 2006

Variables used: relgcens, rsex, rage, reconsum, marmus, muslimcm, teachersm

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = .038, Nagelkerke = .070, Hosmer and Lemeshow -  $\chi^2 = 8.634$ , df = 6, Sig. = .195

As stated, these findings are presented cautiously as being indicative of, rather than as strong evidence for wider trends. However, these findings suggest a challenge to some of the more common stereotypes of anti-Muslim hate crime perpetrators. Although, and as demonstrated, the concept of 'Islamophobia' has been criticized for commonly being conceptualized without agents, 'Islamophobia' is sometimes linked to far-right groups such as the BNP. Descriptions of BNP members often assert or imply descriptions of young, white men. These findings suggest female respondents are just as likely as male respondents to report negative views towards Muslims as men and that older, rather than younger, respondents are the ones most likely to report anti-Muslim attitudes.

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

- **Feelings towards Muslim people were less positive than those towards other minority groups (although the differences were not large).**
- **Anti-immigration sentiment is not targeted primarily towards migrants from ‘Muslim countries’ (instead ‘Muslim countries’ are one type amongst many reported by respondents).**
- **Survey questions from the SSAS were of more use than those from the BSAS for the study of ‘Islamophobia, although the data were not as nationally representative.**
- **The migration of Muslims to Scotland is seen in Scotland as a bigger threat to national identity than migration by Asian and Black, and Eastern European people (although differences are small).**
- **A large majority of Scottish respondents reported being happy to have a relative marry a Muslim person.**
- **Only a minority of respondents thought strongly that a bank should not allow its employees to wear a veil at work; attitudes towards headscarves, turbans and crucifixes at work were also largely positive.**
- **Respondents reported positive feelings about Muslim people working as teachers.**
- **Respondents also felt positively about public funds being used to help Muslim people find work.**

- **Muslim people featured strongly in people's attitudes concerning groups that they perceived to be protected both too much *and* too little by the state.**

## CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to analyse statistical data related to anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes in order to test the assertions from the scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and to contribute empirical evidence to the current discussion around anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes. Overall, there was little evidence of widespread 'indiscriminate attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims' (as per Bleich) and little evidence to support the notion that anti-Muslim attitudes and sentiment are widespread or deep-rooted within the British public. When invited to rate their feelings towards Muslim people, respondents reported less positive feelings towards Muslim people than towards people from other minorities, although feelings were neither particularly positive nor negative. Similarly, although some respondents held negative views about migration from countries perceived to be Muslim, most anti-migration attitudes appeared not to be focused on 'Muslim countries' (or indeed any single country or region). Less than five percent of respondents both welcomed the building of a church and were 'bothered a lot' by the building of a mosque. The fact that Muslims were the most frequently considered group by respondents reporting that the British Government is doing too little and too much to protect the rights of people from different religions further demonstrates the fairly equal distribution of positive and negative attitudes. Attitudes towards Muslim people in Scotland appeared to be diverse perhaps but not especially negative. Reported attitudes related to Muslim people threatening Scottish identity, the suitability of Muslim people as marriage partners and primary school teachers, and the level of comfort at seeing a Muslim woman with her face covered in public revealed that positive and negative attitudes were held by broadly similar numbers.

Overall, the social survey data give only limited support to those wishing to argue that 'Islamophobia' is widespread throughout the British public, or that negative media portrayals inform and reflect widely held anti-Muslim attitudes. Nearly a half of respondents felt Muslim women definitely ought to take off a veil (covering her face) whilst at work. Roughly a third of thirty-five to sixty-six year old respondents would be 'bothered a lot' by the building of a local mosque. A greater number of respondents felt Muslim people are more unsuitable as primary school teachers than Black or Asian people. Taken together, these findings are persuasive rather than conclusive. Findings also revealed characteristics of respondents in Scotland with strong anti-Muslim attitudes. Although relatively few in number, these respondents appear to be capable of confounding some of the assertions made about the perpetrators of 'anti-Muslim' prejudice and hostility. It would appear that popular images of young white male hate crime perpetrators in this context do not offer a complete picture. The analysis of this attitudinal data was undertaken whilst being mindful of Herbert Hyman's famous remark that all scientific inquiry is subject to error (Hyman, 1954). Error in this case could have been generated by 'social desirability bias': a distortion of data that is caused by respondents' attempts to construct an account that conforms to a socially acceptable model of belief or behaviour (Bryman, 2012). It has been asserted that there exists a strong relationship between people's assessments of the social desirability of certain characteristics and the reporting of the presence or absence of those same characteristics within themselves (Philips and Clancy, 1972). However, there remains debate and uncertainty around the overall effects of 'social desirability bias'; particularly around the question of its strength and distribution across datasets (Bryman, 2012). The findings here are presented whilst recognising the potential threat of 'social desirability bias' but whilst also recognising the limitations to its current conceptualization and the over-riding necessity within the field of Muslim and Islamic studies to bolster present and future discourse with empirical evidence. The following chapter continues the analysis of social survey data and focuses on experiences of discrimination and prejudice by Muslim respondents reported to the social surveys selected for analysis.

## CHAPTER 4

### EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents findings from a detailed examination of survey data related to experiences of discrimination and prejudice reported by Muslim respondents. The analysis presented below focuses on two social surveys: the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES), and the Citizenship Survey. The research findings described presented below sought to explore issues and data related to reported experiences of discrimination and prejudice and to compare these with the descriptions of each in the established scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. The EBMES and Citizenship Survey both included questions which explicitly asked the respondents to report attitudes and experiences of prejudice and discrimination; the other three surveys examined for this thesis did not. Concepts such as 'discrimination' and 'prejudice' are a prominent feature of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' in the UK (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; CBMI, 2004; Sheridan, 2006) yet such concepts are represented by highly subjective terms that are capable of conveying a multitude of meanings for both victim and researcher. For victims, exact definitions and constructions of 'discrimination' and 'prejudice' will undoubtedly vary. Such variance may lead to the under-reporting of incidents (perhaps where they are perceived as minor or forgotten, or else perceived as being part of normal, everyday life). For researchers (and others, such as practitioners within the criminal justice system), discrimination may be perceived as a broad term and as such capable of describing a wide variety of negative sentiments, actions and outcomes. To be told that an individual or group has been targeted by anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic prejudice or discrimination is arguably to be told very little. Information conveyed by survey data does not (and indeed cannot) describe fully the unfolding contexts or eventual consequences of the harms visited upon a victim of discrimination. However, reported experiences of prejudice and discrimination (when the

terms are constructed and deployed in their broadest, everyday senses) nevertheless still provide an opportunity to consider at least the extent, if not always the exact nature, of reported prejudicial and discriminatory actions against British Muslim respondents. This in turn offers an opportunity to contribute towards a criminological understanding of 'Islamophobia' that has thus far rested on assertions related to the increased risks of discrimination faced by Muslim communities without necessarily quantifying such risks or comparing the purported risks faced by such communities with those faced by other minority communities and groups. Although a full picture of discrimination remains elusive through the use of statistical data alone, clues as to the nature of discrimination are offered by a series of survey questions in the EMBES that invited respondents to describe scenarios in which discrimination has occurred. The analysis examines whether Muslim respondents were more likely than respondents from other religions to report being the victim of discrimination in general, and more likely to perceive incidents of discrimination as being religiously or racially motivated. Survey questions explored the perceived roles of religion and ethnicity as factors influencing and underpinning the instances of discrimination and prejudice described by Muslim respondents. Discourse associated with the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' often describes, or implies, a distinct social phenomenon related to discrimination and prejudice (and racism) and capable of uniquely, or at least disproportionately, affecting many British Muslim communities. The research presented below sought to determine the extent to which statistical evidence from social survey data supports or challenges these descriptions. As stated, the analysis also sought to detect and map patterns of discrimination against Muslim respondents by examining data related to survey questions which asked respondents to describe scenarios in which they had suffered discrimination. The findings presented here were generated from a research methodology that adopted a victim-centred approach to the identification and labelling of incidents featuring some form of prejudice or discrimination. This approach is informed by the definition of racism from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report: '...any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person' (Macpherson, 1999: 328). Thus, reports of prejudice and discrimination are taken as prima

facie evidence. As discussed, definitions of the concepts under investigation may vary, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is the victims' perceptions that always takes precedence.

## **CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ANTI-MUSLIM DISCRIMINATION**

As discussed, debate concerning discrimination against British Muslims is a significant component of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' within much of the scholarly literature. Discrimination is a theme explored by scholars and within a variety of reports concerning anti-Muslim hate crime (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997; CBMI, 2004; EUMC, 2006a; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). The concept is also served well by various variables from the selected datasets; survey questions ask respondents to report the frequency with which they have been discriminated against, to describe situations where they have suffered discrimination (e.g. in the workplace or in the street) and to indicate whether discrimination was due to a number of factors relevant to this study (e.g. religion and ethnicity). The topic therefore appears to lend itself relatively well to a comparison of literature and statistical data. The Runnymede Trust report placed discrimination and exclusion at the centre of its conceptual model of 'Islamophobia', including discrimination in 'everyday' locations: for example, 'direct or indirect discrimination in the workplace' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 9). Discrimination was also described as inherent within social, political and economic institutions, particularly where institutions do not accommodate the practices of observant Muslims (1997: 9). The Runnymede Trust report also includes uses of the terms 'Islamophobia' and discrimination within the contexts of employment, education, health, and, rather vaguely and with no elaboration of these notions offered by the report's authors, as exclusion from 'society's moral deliberations and debates' (1997: 10). All such discrimination and exclusion (whether actual or perceived, detailed or vague) were identified as being possible practical consequences of 'Islamophobia' (Bleich, 2011) and were thus fitted into a widened model of discrimination for the purposes of the analysis presented in this chapter.

Later conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' also place similar emphasis on discrimination (CBMI, 2004), with a discernible focus on the spheres of employment, education and health and on alleged consequences such as feelings of social exclusion. Previous Government reports noted that discrimination played a significant role in the fact that rates of employment, wages and progression at work were persistently lower for people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds (Cabinet Office, 2003). The Cabinet Office linked discrimination to disadvantage. Employment and unemployment data from within Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were analysed and findings generalized so as to describe fundamental problems faced by all Muslim communities in the UK. This use of conceptual conflation and speculative inference represents a further example of the type of conclusions found commonly within the scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia': asserted often with confidence but seldom with supporting evidence. Weller (2006) explored religious discrimination within the context of British history and the rise of liberal democracy in order to shed light on discrimination on British Muslims in modern Britain. The report uses earlier findings from a Home Office research project (Weller, Feldman and Purdam, 2001). Lambert and Githens-Mazer also give the topic of discrimination prominence within their studies of 'Islamophobia' (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010), although its treatment is slightly different to that of the Runnymede Trust and CBMI reports. Discrimination is not presented as a constituent part of 'Islamophobia' but instead is presented alongside it as a related social phenomenon; a social action for which 'Islamophobia' may be viewed as an influencing factor: hence, the authors describe 'Islamophobic discrimination' (Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010: 137). To identify such differences may be seen as adhering excessively to the principles of semantics (or even pedantry) but such distinctions, however subtle, perhaps remind us that whilst a broad consensus has developed around the use of the term 'Islamophobia' the word is still capable of conveying an array of meanings and discursive modes for its various users. As elsewhere, descriptions by Lambert and Githens-Mazer include various public and private loci. Discrimination is described as being suffered by Muslims 'in their neighbourhoods, workplaces or in their engagements with

officialdom' (Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010: 137). Discrimination is described in politics, evident when seen to be underpinning 'a powerful lobby that argues forcefully against victim status for Muslims who face discrimination' (2010: 137) and the continued development of anti-terror legislation (2010: 139). Discrimination is also identified when political bodies express support for organizations that are held, by some at least, not to promote the legitimate interests of Muslim communities: these include the Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism think tank (2010: 139). Further, Lambert and Githens-Mazer describe support by the British Government for other think tanks such as the Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion (both described as influential and neo-conservative) as forms of discrimination; the authors argue that the influence of these and other similar groups leads to the demonization of Muslims as threats to both national security and more localized social cohesion. Finally, discrimination by police is described using interview data from a Muslim research participant who described experiences of being stopped and searched under anti-terror legislation (2010: 142).

The research findings presented in this chapter adopt similar research methods as those adopted by previous research studies in this area (with a few notable differences). Sheridan (2006) analysed questionnaire survey data from 222 participants of mixed ethnicity and asserted an increase in implicit and more overt racism and religious discrimination after 9/11. The analysis led to a number of findings that were further explored by the analysis reported in this chapter. Sheridan found no significant differences between male and female rates of reporting racism or religious discrimination; the analysis below tested these conclusions and examined differences between male and female respondents within the selected survey datasets. Sheridan found ethnicity was unrelated to whether or not a specific abusive incident was experienced. Again, to test this conclusion, self-reported ethnic categories were included in the statistical analysis presented here. Although perhaps downplayed by Sheridan, elsewhere the scholarly literature has asserted the ethnic dimensions of 'Islamophobia' (cf. Meer and Modood, 2009). As a concept, 'Islamophobia' has been

described as capable of bridging the gap between discrimination based on religion and ethnicity: religiously motivated hatred directed at Muslims (Zebiri, 2008a; 2008b). Elsewhere the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' has been used to describe hostility towards Islam but also hostility towards Muslims (Miles and Brown, 2003). This merger of issues related to ethnicity, culture and religion is further reflected when 'Islamophobia' is described as the alienation of 'Islamic citizens' by Western societies (Van Driel, 2004) or as 'cultural racism' (Modood, 2005). 'Islamophobia' is thus a concept that blends a range of antagonistic sentiments based on ethnicity, culture and religion. However, the term has been used to describe incidents where these sentiments may be expressed sequentially: 'Islamophobia' as a 'double whammy'; a violent crime event where colour racism is swiftly followed up with anti-Muslim culturalism (Zebiri, 2008). 'Islamophobia' has been considered by some scholars as being closely related to the concept of racism (Allen, 2010; Iganski, 2009; Miles and Brown, 2003). 'Islamophobia' has been described as merely 'racism with a spin' (CBMI, 2004: 5; Iganski, 2009). The present study sought to locate the statistical analysis within scholarly debates around 'Islamophobia' and ethnicity. The analysis included self-described ethnicity categories alongside religion categories and identified survey questions that sought to capture respondents' perceptions related to the reasons for their reported discrimination experiences. Sheridan (2006) concluded that 'implicit' or 'indirect' discrimination rose by 82.6% and 'overt' discrimination by 76.3% following 11 September 2001. Whilst the present study does not include a longitudinal study, the analysis of data provides a snapshot using a much larger sample size than used in the studies described above. To further explore issues related to religion the findings below included the analysis of non-Muslim respondents. This approach was used to compare Muslim, Jewish and Sikh respondents and thus fill a sizeable evidential gap.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission included a study of 'Islamophobia' in their wider study of evidence of religious discrimination between 2000 and 2010 (Weller, 2011). The report concluded that Muslims experience more discrimination and discrimination

of a greater seriousness than other religion groups (although admitted that comparable data for Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs was often lacking (2011: viii). The report presented data from the Citizenship Survey, although only one variable from 2009-10 was analysed by the report's authors. Elsewhere, the report uses anecdotal evidence and summaries of earlier research publications (including, Allen and Neilsen, 2002 and Allen, 2010). This represented an example of how the presence of earlier discussion of 'Islamophobia' has been relied on as evidence as to the extent of current problems (even when such earlier discussion included little supporting empirical evidence). The report concluded that evidence is often 'patchy' and that the evidence base around religious discrimination (of all kinds) needs to be improved (Weller, 2011: 52). The findings reported in the present chapter aim towards such an improvement.

Weller, Feldman, and Purdam (2001) considered the concept of 'unfair treatment' (defined widely as any discriminatory act, deliberate or otherwise) and concluded that Muslim organizations reported more unfair treatment than organizations associated with other religious groups in terms of both the proportion of respondents who experienced at least some unfair treatment and the proportion who reported frequent rather than occasional unfair treatment (2001: 103). The report asserted the risks of criminal forms of 'unfair treatment' (defined as violence, verbal abuse, and criminal damage) faced by Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities. Further suggesting the necessity to consider religion alongside ethnicity, the report asserted the increased risks of religious discrimination faced by religion groups with significant number of ethnic minority members (namely, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) particularly in areas of policing, prisons, and immigration (2001: 104). Unlike previous similar examples, the report (by the Equality and Human Rights Commission) did not give equal weight to the various social areas of discrimination and asserted greater risks in the areas of employment and education when compared to health, housing, transport or leisure. Whereas a similar number of respondents from each religion group identified the practices of individuals as causing discrimination and 'unfair treatment, Muslim respondents were more likely to perceive policy as being an underlying factor. Overall, the report described Muslims

as the most likely to perceive problems of discrimination as getting worse. The report used simple percentages with no statistical significance testing and no use of statistical modelling. This chapter analyses social survey data using a wider and more sophisticated set of statistical tools.

Allen's rather lengthy definition of 'Islamophobia' contained conceptualization of discrimination and prejudice as: 'exclusionary practices' defined as 'practices that disadvantage, prejudice, or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres...' (Allen, 2010: 190, and see also Appendix B). Other related sources assert the strong relationship between the concepts of discrimination and 'Islamophobia', and more specifically, the difficulties inherent within separating Islamophobic attitudes from racist and xenophobic resentments: elements described as being 'inextricably intertwined' (EUMC, 2006a: 5). Discrimination plays a key role in the conceptualization of Islamophobia in various reports by non-governmental organizations (cf. Ameli, Elahi, and Merali, 2004; Ameli et al, 2011; IHRC, 2000); again applied to public spheres, both at work and at school. Disadvantage is described as caused by 'systematic discriminatory behaviour' (Ameli, Elahi, and Merali, 2004: 9). Previous research into British Muslim communities employing quantitative methods in this field found an increase in racism and religious discrimination post-September 11th (Sheridan, 2006: 326) and an increase in general discriminatory experiences (both overt and implicit) at the individual, community, national and international level (Sheridan, 2006: 325). The research undertaken for this doctoral research project and reported here aims to build on that by Sheridan by using more recent data and a larger sample size. It also aims to fill a gap in the empirical evidence noted by several key contributors to the literature (Allen and Neilsen, 2002; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). For example, discrimination against Muslim communities is described as being 'subtle' and discussed with a lack of 'compelling evidence about the anti-Muslim nature of the motivation for the discrimination they have experienced' (Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010: 137). This chapter seeks to interrogate the available statistical evidence. As discussed, 'Islamophobia' has been described in the literature

as an ideology (Bleich, 2011), and as ‘closed views’ towards Islam and Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997). In short, the analysis presented in this chapter examines evidence for the manifestations or practical consequences of this ideology and sought to measure these outcomes.

## **SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN**

All survey questions related to prejudice and discrimination and posed to respondents who self-described as Muslim were selected for analysis. Response data were compared to those reported by respondents from the other specified religion groups. The datasets lent themselves reasonably well to this task, there were numerous questions related to discrimination. However, the analysis was limited by the low numbers of respondents from the other specified minority religion groups. Buddhist and Jewish respondents in the EMBES were excluded from the analysis on account of their low numbers. There were only 3 Buddhist respondents and only 1 Jewish respondent. Where low sample sizes and low cell counts (less than 30) negated the use of statistical significance testing and effective comparison between the specified religion groups the findings were used instead for two main purposes: either to compare the reported experiences of Muslim respondents to those described in the literature, or to contribute the products of empirical research to the current conceptualization of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination where there were none previously or none easily found.

EMBES data provided the means to explore perceptions of prejudice among Muslim respondents. Data related to experiences of discrimination (some of which were also from EMBES) were analysed and comparison made, where possible, with other religion groups. Data related to the various specified locations were used to determine whether data supported recent research studies that have asserted the increased risks of discrimination against Muslim women in public places. The purpose of this examination was two-fold. First, and as throughout this thesis, the analysis compares statistical data and criminological literature in order to answer the primary research question. Second, the analysis presented here is used to

answer the more specific secondary research question related to this topic: To what extent are assertions and conclusions regarding widespread discrimination and prejudice against British Muslim individuals and communities reflected in the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Thirdly, the reported findings contribute empirical research findings related to anti-Muslim discrimination to an area of research characterized by a dearth of such data.

## **FINDINGS**

### **PERCEPTIONS OF PREJUDICE**

This short section presents findings related to perceived prejudice against Muslim communities. More specifically, the analysis below explores EMBES data generated from a survey question which invited respondents to consider prejudice against their own religious group and then to compare these experiences to their perception of prejudice against other such groups. The survey asked respondents whether they felt there was more or less prejudice against the respondent's religion group than against people of other faiths.

Examination of EMBES data suggests Muslim respondents perceived there to be more prejudice against their religion than against others. Using these responses and via engagement with a 'victim-centred' approach to the identification of prejudicial incidents using the framework offered by the Macpherson Inquiry report (Macpherson, 1999) these response data indicate evidence for the practical consequences of 'Islamophobia'. Clearly, respondents to the EMBES felt that their religion more than others has been targeted by acts of prejudice. Further, far fewer respondents from other religions felt the same way (i.e. fewer respondents from other religion groups felt that there was more prejudice against their religion than against others). Analysis of the data revealed that Muslim respondents were the group most likely to perceive itself as experiencing more prejudice than is experienced by other such groups: over 70% of Muslim respondents reported perceiving more prejudice against them than against others (see Table 4.01). Differences between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents in respect

of those who perceived more prejudice against their own religion were sizeable and statistically significant.

**Table 4.01 EMBES: Perception of prejudice against people of respondent's religion relative to others**

	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh	Other <sup>1</sup>
<b>More</b>	71.5	18.7**	8.2**	4.3**	--
<b>Less</b>	5.7	51.9**	52.9**	48**	--
<b>Same</b>	22.8	29.4*	38.9**	47.6**	--
<b>Weighted % totals</b>	100	100	100	100	--
<b>Unweighted base</b>	973	718	176	145	--

Data source: EMBES 2010

Variables used: eq106\_a, eq26

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

\* Difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\* Difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.01% level

<sup>1</sup> Unweighted base < 50

These findings raise questions concerning the extent to which the perceived levels of prejudice against Muslim respondents are reflected in actual reported incidents by the same group (questions revisited in the discussion section towards the end of this chapter). To that end, the analysis focused on reported experiences of discrimination as a method to compare perceived levels of discrimination (at the group level) and reported incidents (at the individual level). The data suggest that Muslim respondents perceived there to be widespread discrimination throughout their community; the analysis reported below sought to determine whether these perceptions corresponded to individually reported experiences of actual discrimination.

## **DISCRIMINATION**

### **REPORTED EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION**

The EMBES asked respondents whether they had been the victim of discrimination in the previous five years. Unusually for survey questions of this type, the EMBES offered respondents a definition of 'discrimination' in the wording of the survey question itself. Whilst we may only speculate as to the exact reasons why, this may have been done to aid the

respondents' memories or to locate past experiences within the context of the EMBES' own definition of discrimination in order to increase the validity of the variable (i.e. to ensure the variable measured that which it was designed to measure – discrimination as defined by the survey designers). The survey question asked:

*'Discrimination may happen when people are treated unfairly because they are seen as being different from others. In the past 5 years, do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?'*

The relationship between religious affiliation and discrimination was tested with Pearson's chi-square; the association was found to be statistically significant ( $\chi^2=62.550$ ,  $df=4$ ,  $p<0.001$ ); thus initial findings suggested that there were real differences between the religion groups. Surprisingly perhaps (given the literature) Muslim respondents were among the least likely of any single religion group to report discrimination and less than a third did so (see Table 4.02). Muslim respondents were less likely to report discrimination than both Christian respondents (44.5%,  $p<0.001$ ) and Sikh respondents (37.7%,  $p<0.01$ ). Muslim respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting discrimination as respondents from the Hindu group (26.2%,  $p>0.01$ ). These findings would appear to challenge assertions and conclusions from the scholarly literature on 'Islamophobia' that describe a unique and distinct form of discrimination capable of uniquely or disproportionately affecting Muslim communities (cf. Allen, 2010; CBMI, 2004; Runnymede Trust, 1997). These findings also confound findings related to perceived prejudice presented earlier in this chapter and arguably suggest a complex relationship between the perceived and actual threats of prejudice and discrimination and between lived experiences and perceptions of the lives of others in this regard.

**Table 4.02 EMBES: Percentage of respondents from each specified religion group who reported discrimination**

Religion	Respondents	Unweighted base
	%	
Muslim	27.9	1,090
Christian	44.5***	804
Hindu	26.2	220
Sikh	37.7*	158
Other <sup>1</sup>	--	--

Data source: EMBES 2010

Variables used: eq106\_a, eq37

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

\* Difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\*\* Difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.01% level

<sup>1</sup> Unweighted base < 50

## FREQUENCY OF DISCRIMINATION

Respondents who reported being the victim of discrimination to the EMBES were asked: ‘In the past 5 years, how often do you feel that you have experienced such discrimination or unfair treatment in Britain?’ Available responses were ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ or ‘don’t know’. A majority of respondents from each of the Christian, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh groups reported experiencing discrimination ‘sometimes’ (see Table 4.03). None of the differences between the individual groups and the Muslim group were statistically significant ( $p > 0.05$ ). ‘Rarely’ was the second most frequently chosen item amongst respondents from each of the religion groups (and as before, no differences between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups, taken individually, were statistically significant). The Monte Carlo test for significance was used to test the strength of relationship between religion and the frequency of incidents of perceived discrimination (the Monte Carlo test was deemed appropriate as some cells had counts less than five). There was no statistically significant relationship between affiliation to one of the specific religion groups and the frequency of discrimination by those reporting discrimination or unfair treatment in the survey ( $\chi^2 = 14.969$ ,  $df = 16$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). Similarly, no individual differences between the Muslim and the other religion groups (taken individually, across all four responses) were statistically significant (i.e.

$p > 0.05$ ). These findings further challenge conclusions and assertions found within the literature that describe (explicitly or implicitly) British Muslim respondents as being uniquely, disproportionately or frequently affected by discrimination. Muslim respondents in the EMBES were no more likely to report discrimination. Muslim respondents who did report discrimination were no more likely to report frequent discrimination than respondents from the other specified religion groups who reported discrimination. In respect of the latter (frequency of discrimination) use of a Monte Carlo chi-square test (used because of the low cell counts) returned a non-significant result ( $\chi^2 = 6.513$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ) indicating no overall relationship between religion and any frequency of discrimination.

It might be assumed that comparing Christian and Muslim respondents might require consideration of the differences in the ethnic backgrounds of respondents from the two religion groups. It might be assumed, for instance, that Christian respondents were more likely to self-describe as being White (as is the case when in the Crime Survey of England and Wales) and, being White, less likely to perceive and report discrimination. In fact, due to the aims and objectives of the survey (to study ethnic minority communities) and the nature of the sample (largely non-White), there were no respondents who self-described as being White, and only 98 respondents (from a sample of 2,787) self-described as being Mixed White. 82% of all respondents who self-described as Christian also self-described as Black or Black British (Black or Black British African, Caribbean or Other). Similarly, 79.5% of respondents who self-described as Black or Black British also self-described as Christian. Arguably, and from the five surveys selected for analysis, the EMBES survey provided the most useful resource to explore the reported experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents aggregated into non-White ethnic categories.

**Table 4.03 EMBES: Frequency of reported discrimination by respondents from specified religion groups**

	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Total weighted %	Row totals (unweighted)
	%	%	%	%	
Muslim	14.7	54.5	30.8	100	319
Christian	13.1	55.2	31.6	100	360
Hindu	18	52	30	100	58
Sikh	8	51	34.4	100	61
Other <sup>1</sup>	--	--	--	--	--

Data source: EMBES 2010

Variables used: eq106\_a, eq38

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

<sup>1</sup> Unweighted base < 50

## REASONS FOR DISCRIMINATION

Respondents who reported having been the victim of discrimination in the EMBES were asked to describe the perceived reasons for their discrimination. Respondents were offered various response options to help prompt their answers and provide further details about their discrimination. Available options were:

- ethnicity race or skin colour
- language or accent
- religion
- age
- gender
- sexuality
- disability

By far the most frequently chosen response was ‘Your ethnicity, race, or skin colour’; chosen by over three quarters of all Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents and by two thirds of Muslim respondents (see Table 4.04). There was a statistically significant difference between Christian and Muslim respondents in this respect. The analysis revealed that Muslim

respondents were less likely than Christian respondents to report discrimination due to ethnicity, race or skin colour (86% and 69.6% respectively,  $p < 0.001$ ). 'Language or accent' was chosen by a quarter of Christian respondents (23.4%); it was chosen by fewer Muslim respondents (11.6%). Too few Hindu and Sikh respondents selected this response item to enable conclusive comparisons.

There were differences between the religion groups in terms of respondents who reported perceiving religion as a reason for their discrimination. Almost a half of all Muslim respondents perceived their religion as a reason for their discrimination (49.3%). Unfortunately, the low numbers of Christian, Hindu, and Sikh respondents meant that comparisons between the religion groups would not have been accurate, although the overall sample size for the Hindu and Sikh groups ( $n=58$  and  $n=62$  respectively) suggests that religion was not considered as important a factor. To summarise, Muslim respondents in the EMBES were less likely than Christian and Sikh respondents and equally as likely as Hindu respondents to report having suffered some form of discrimination. Notwithstanding this, and although it was not the most popular choice among Muslim respondents, Muslims were far more likely to perceive experienced discrimination as having been religiously-motivated. (Overall, and given the small sample sizes in relation to the minority religion groups, the EMBES provides a resource with which to compare discrimination against Christian and Muslim respondents and to compare the reported experiences of Muslim respondents with the assertions in the literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. Comparative study of Muslim respondents and respondents from the other specified minority religion groups is more difficult.)

**Table 4.04 EMBES: Perceived reasons given by respondents for the reported discrimination**

	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh	Other <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	
Religion	49.3	9***	5.1***	16.5***	--
Ethnicity, race or skin colour	69.6	86**	83.8*	83.5*	--
Language or accent	11.6	23.4**	28*	15.5	--
Row totals (unweighted)	319	362	58	62	--

Data source: EMBES 2010

Variables used: eq106\_a, eq39c, eq39a, eq39b

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

<sup>1</sup> Unweighted base < 50

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

(NB. respondents were invited to choose one or more options)

One possible explanation for this could be that discrimination that blends religiously and racially motivated discrimination is more frequently identified by Muslim respondents as being motivated primarily by religion. This could be because for Muslim respondents religious self-identification is stronger than ethnic group self-identification. Where discrimination blends religious and racial motivations, Muslim respondents in the survey may be more perceptive or sensitive to the religiously-motivated component due to self-identification being driven more frequently by religion than by ethnicity. Evidential support for this (rather speculative) hypothesis is given by findings from the analysis of two variables linked to self-identity. Response data from two survey questions were analysed in order to explore this theme of self-identification as related to perceiving religiously and racially motivated discrimination. These findings are presented tentatively. They are included here as being indicative rather than conclusive and perhaps are most useful as signposts towards future, and perhaps more qualitative, research. The survey asked two questions pertinent to the investigation of self-identity among Muslim respondents: ‘How important is your religion to your sense of who you are?’ and ‘How important is your ethnic and racial background to your sense of who you are?’ Muslim respondents were the most likely to respond that religion was ‘very important’, and nearly three quarters did so (74.3%). By comparison, only around a half of Hindu, Jewish and Sikh respondents gave the same response. Differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from all other religion

groups (taken individually) were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). In relation to ethnic background being important, and while Muslim respondents were still the most likely to respond that this factor was 'very important', differences between Muslim, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh respondents were less marked. Neither differences between the Muslim and Jewish group and between the Muslim and Sikh group were statistically significant ( $p > 0.05$ ).

### **DISCRIMINATION IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS OR SITUATIONS**

Analysis of response data concerning a series of scenarios was undertaken to further explore reported experiences of discrimination by respondents in the EMBES survey. Respondents who reported discrimination were invited by the survey to describe the situations in which the reported discrimination occurred. Respondents were offered the following response options:

- On the street
- In a shop, bank, restaurant or bar
- At work or when applying for a job or promotion
- When dealing with the police or courts
- At school, college or university
- When dealing with immigration or other government offices or officials
- At social gatherings with friends [or] neighbours.

The findings revealed differences between the religions in relation to places or scenarios where (or in which) discrimination was reported (see Table 4.05). However, the findings of analysis of Hindu and Sikh respondents are reported here tentatively as only 58 Hindu respondents and 62 Sikh respondents reported discrimination to the survey. Thus, these findings are arguably most useful (perhaps even only useful in this context) when used to compare experiences reported to the survey with those described in the scholarly criminological literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. Respondents from all religion groups

were most likely to report experiences of discrimination 'on the street': the response option was chosen by 56.2% of Muslim respondents, 38.5% of Christian respondents, 38% of Hindu respondents, and 45.6% of Sikh respondents. Given the relatively high percentage of Muslim respondents who reported discrimination who described discrimination 'on the street' (56.2%, compared to 38.5% of Christian respondents,  $p < 0.001$ ), further research was undertaken to explore the data. Analysis explored differences between groups of respondents disaggregated by religion and sex. Overall, there were no statistically significant differences between male respondents from the specific religion groups and experiencing discrimination on the street ( $\chi^2 = 1.1441$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p > 0.01$ ). Male Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of experiencing this type of discrimination (51.1%, 50.8%, 43.9%, and 53.2% respectively,  $p > 0.05$ ). However, there were statistically significant differences between female respondents from the specific religion groups and this type of discrimination ( $\chi^2 = 36.271$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Female Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of experiencing or perceiving discrimination on the street (29.5%, 29.3% and 34.1% respectively). The percentage of female Muslim respondents describing discrimination of this type was 62.2% ( $p < 0.001$ ); Muslim women, who reported discrimination, were twice as likely to report having suffered discrimination whilst on the street.

**Table 4.05 EMBES: Locations of discrimination reported by respondents**

	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh
	%	%	%	%
Street	56.2	38.5***	38*	45.6
Shop, bank, restaurant or bar	21.6	31.8*	35.4	22.3
Work	32.5	51.7***	45.5	45.1
Unweighted base	319	362	58	62
	%	%	%	%
Work <sup>1</sup>	40.3	62.6***	--	--
Unweighted base	156	203	39	39
	%	%	%	%
Police or courts	14.4	17	12.1	3.9**
School, college or university	11.3	15.1	9.1	6.9*
Government officials	14.3	12	7.1	2.9**
Social gatherings	6.2	8	5.1	6.8
Family gatherings	0.7	0.7	5.1	1.9
Unweighted base	319	362	58	62

Data source: EMBES 2010

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

Variables used: eq106\_a, eq40a, eq40b, eq40c, eq40d, eq40e, eq40f, eq40g, eq40h

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

Blank cells unweighted base < 50

<sup>1</sup>Controlled for employment (includes only working respondents)

NB. Respondents were invited to select one or more options

**Table 4.06 EMBES: Discrimination on the street by religion and sex**

	Muslim		Christian		Hindu		Sikh	
	Weighted %	Unweighted base						
Male	51.5	184	50.8	141	43.9	33	53.2	32
Female	62.2	135	29.5**	221	29.3*	25	34.1*	30
Total	--	319	--	363	--	58	--	62

Data source: BES EMS 2010

Variables used: eq106\_a, zq88, eq40a

p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

Blank cells unweighted base < 50

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

Unfortunately, the decision by designers of the EMBES to include ‘shop’, ‘bank’, ‘restaurant’ and ‘bar’ in a single survey response item may have limited the analytical utility of the variable in terms of exploring anti-Muslim discrimination and ‘Islamophobia’. Muslim respondents may have disregarded it as an appropriate or relevant response item because the

item included examples of establishments licensed for the sale of alcohol and perhaps not normally visited by many observant Muslim respondents. The study of Muslim respondents would have been less hindered had pubs and bars been included together as an option separate from another that included shops and banks, and another that included restaurants and food outlets.

The survey offered respondents an option that included 'police or courts'. Doing so perhaps negated in-depth analysis of the respondents' discrimination by the police (a recurrent theme within the literature and a subject discussed in the next chapter), although this response option afforded the opportunity to explore the more general theme of discrimination within the criminal justice system as a whole. The analysis revealed that Muslim, Christian and Hindu respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of perceiving discrimination by the police and courts. Sikh respondents reported less discrimination than these three groups (3.9%). The difference between Muslim and Sikh respondents was statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ). This clustering of Muslim, Christian and Hindu respondents was also evident when data related to immigration or other government officials was analysed. These groups shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting such discrimination. Widespread Muslim discrimination by immigration and other government bodies is described in the scholarly literature (cf. Fekete, 2009) although there is little evidence here to support such descriptions. Elsewhere, the analysis found no differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in terms of discrimination reported in school, college or university and from friends and neighbours or at family gatherings.

## **DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC BODIES AND EMPLOYERS**

The Citizenship Survey asked respondents whether they have suffered religious discrimination by one of the authorities, organizations or institutions listed on a show-card.

Six of the options related to the criminal justice system:

- the courts
- the police
- the Crown Prosecution Service
- the immigration authorities
- the Prison Service
- the Probation Service

Other options included two related to housing:

- a council housing department
- a private landlord or letting agency

Three response items related to local health and education services:

- a local hospital
- a local doctor's surgery
- a local school

A further option allowed respondents to report having received no discrimination from any of these bodies. Unfortunately, the survey did not include questions related to more general discrimination, or discrimination aggregated by factors such as ethnicity or skin colour. This negated the chance to compare the reporting of discrimination as a whole with the reporting of discrimination perceived as being motivated by religion. Notwithstanding this limitation, the analysis revealed that Muslim respondents were the most likely to report religious discrimination across a number of scenarios, although relatively few did so. There were statistically significant differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from minority religions (see Table 4.07). However, 87.6% of Muslim respondents reported that they had received no discrimination across any of the available scenario options. The most

frequently mentioned scenario was discrimination by the police, chosen by 6.3% of Muslim respondents: more frequently than by Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish or Sikh respondents (1.2%, 2%, 0% and 3.9% respectively). All differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents analysed here (and taken individually) were statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ). The other options mentioned most frequently by Muslim respondents were 'local hospital' (chosen by 3.1% of Muslim respondents), 'local school' (2.6%), and 'local doctor's surgery' (2.5%). It should be noted that Muslim and Jewish respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting religious discrimination in these places ( $p > 0.05$ ). These findings appeared to lend support (albeit limited) to descriptions of 'Islamophobia' in the literature. There were several scenarios in which Muslim respondents were the single most likely group to report discrimination (examples include: council housing department, the local council and the police). However, what emerges from the findings is a sense that where religious discrimination exists it is perhaps as likely to emanate from behind the counter of a doctor's surgery as from an outwardly aggressive or politically-motivated individual, or from the discriminatory actions of a state body (such as the disproportionate targeting of Muslim communities by the police). The rhetorical and political nature of the discourse around 'Islamophobia' would appear to neglect these 'everyday' loci of discrimination in favour of more sensationalist interpretations of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice and hostility. These everyday locations of discrimination as reported by Muslim respondents invite further investigation through more qualitative research methods.

**Table 4.07 Citizenship Survey: Reported discrimination by a public body**

		Muslim	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
Local doctor's surgery	Weighted %	2.5	0.6***	0.4***	1.1***	1	0.9***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Local hospital	Weighted %	3.1	0.9**	0.2***	1.1***	2.5	1.4**
	Unweighted base	3,906	282	17,949	1,653	102	695
Local school	Weighted %	2.6	0.6***	0.6***	0.9***	1.4	1.3**
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Council housing	Weighted %	1.9	0***	0.5***	0.5***	0***	0.4***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Local council (except housing)	Weighted %	1.3	0***	0.2***	0.4***	0***	0.4**
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Private landlord or letting agent	Weighted %	1.4	0.6	0.1***	0.9	0.5	0.4***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Courts (Magistrates' or Crown)	Weighted %	1	0***	0***	0.2***	1	0.4*
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Crown Prosecution Service	Weighted %	0.4	0***	0***	0***	0	0.4
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Police	Weighted %	6.3	1.2***	0.3***	2***	0***	3.9**
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Immigration Service	Weighted %	1.6	0***	0.1***	0.8***	2.5	0***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Prison Service	Weighted %	0.4	0***	0.1***	0.2	0***	0***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053
Probation Service	Weighted %	0.4	0***	0.1***	0.2	0***	0***
	Unweighted base	7,693	407	26,552	2,336	140	1,053

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: relig, reldis1, reldis2, reldis3, reldis4, reldis5, reldis6, reldis7, reldis8, reldis9, reldis10, reldis11, reldis12

p weighted with wtfinds

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS

'Work, job, or promotion' was a frequently chosen response option by respondents in the EMBES (see Table 4.05). It was described as a location or situation where discrimination has been suffered by a majority of Christian respondents reporting discrimination (51.7%) and just under a half of all Hindu and Sikh respondents reporting discrimination (45.5% and 45.1% respectively). However, Muslim respondents were less likely to perceive and describe discrimination in the workplace (32.5%). For instance, the difference between Christian and Muslim respondents was fairly sizeable and statistically significant (51.7% and 32.5% respectively,  $p<0.001$ ). This could reflect a lack of discrimination experienced by Muslim

respondents in the workplace. Alternatively, this lower likelihood of experiencing workplace discrimination could be informed by employment patterns found within British Muslim communities. 2001 Census data reveal that among Muslim communities there is a demonstrably lower level of participation in the formal labour market and especially amongst Muslim women (Peach, 2006). These earlier findings are reflected in findings from the analysis of EMBES data. Muslim respondents were the least likely to be in paid work when compared to Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents, there were insufficient Buddhist and Jewish respondents to effect a comparison (43.7%, 54.6%, 64.7% and 66.9%). In all cases, differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from the other religions (taken individually) were statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ). Female Muslim respondents were half as likely as female Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents to be in paid work (26.9%, 52.9%, 59% and 64.9%). Differences between female Muslim respondents and female respondents from the other religions were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ).

**Table 4.08 Citizenship Survey: Reported discrimination when being refused or turned down for a job, or when turned down for a promotion during the last five years**

	Muslim	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>When being refused or turned down for a job</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>7.4***</b>	<b>9.1*</b>	--	<b>8.8*</b>
Unweighted base	3,045	190	9,125	995	41	426
<b>Perceived reasons for discrimination:</b>	%	%	%	%	%	%
Race	60.3	--	1.6***	8.7***	--	--
Religion	42.5	--	20.6***	59.1	--	--
Colour	38.4	--	12.5***	43.5	--	--
Unweighted base	393	21	947	108	9	35
<b>When being considered for promotion</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>7***</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>12</b>
Unweighted base	3,649	263	14,871	1,470	76	630
<b>Perceived reasons for discrimination:</b>	%	%	%	%	%	%
Race	50	--	12.6***	55.3	--	41.2
Religion	34.9	--	1.7***	10.3**	--	5.9***
Colour	33.3	--	8***	43.6	--	41.2
Unweighted base	436	23	1,446	182	10	71

Data source: CS 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: relig, rdisjb1, rdisjb24, rdisjb23, rdisjb25, rdispro, rwhypr3/a3, rwhypr4/a4, rwhypr5/a5

Blank cells = sample < 50

p weighted wtfinds

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

In the 2008/09 and 2009/10 waves, the Citizenship Survey asked respondents whether they thought that they had been discriminated against when being refused or turned down for a job during the last five years. The response required the presence of two distinct components: being unsuccessful in an application for work, and perceiving that action as having been motivated by some form of discrimination. The analysis filtered out these respondents who had not applied for employment. A similar percentage from each of the minority religion groups had not applied for a job in the time period: 10.2% of Muslim, 11.5% of Buddhist, 10.2% of Hindu, and 12.1% of Sikh respondents. 25% of Jewish respondents also had not applied for a job although accurate measurements were difficult due to a small sample of these respondents ( $n=52$ ). Broadly speaking, most minority religion groups shared a similar likelihood of reporting having applied for a job. The 'no' responses were treated with a degree of caution; arguably the 'no' response could be used to describe two distinct experiences. Although it was presumed that in this context 'no' meant 'no, I have not been discriminated

against when turned down for a job', it may have been used to describe making a successful application for a job (i.e. 'no, there seemed to be no discrimination because my application was successful'). The 'yes' response appeared to be less open to alternative interpretations and was therefore focus of the analysis reported here. 13.4% of Muslim respondents reported experiencing discrimination when making an unsuccessful job application (see Table 4.08). Among this relatively small minority who reported discrimination there were statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) differences between Muslim respondents and Hindu and Sikh respondents (taken individually). Hindu and Sikh respondents were less likely to report discrimination (9.1% and 8.8% respectively). The relationship between discrimination when applying for a job and religious affiliation was statistically significant using the Monte Carlo significance test ( $\chi^2 = 32.432$ ,  $df = 7$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). There appears to be a small but statistically significant difference between Muslim respondents and Hindu and Sikh respondents in respect of unsuccessful application for work and discrimination.

The survey then asked respondents to describe the perceived reasons for this type of discrimination. Various response options were listed on a card and shown to the respondent who was able to select one or more as applicable. Unfortunately, analysis for the Buddhist, Jewish and Sikh groups was negated by very low numbers ( $n = 21$ ,  $n = 9$ , and  $n = 35$  respectively). 'Race' was the most frequently selected reason for discrimination among Muslim respondents (60.3% chose it). 'Religion' and 'colour' were the second and third most frequently chosen options (chosen by 42.5% and 38.4%). With such low  $n$  numbers among the other minority religion groups, and with such a specific set of experiences captured by the survey question, these findings are perhaps best described as indicative of a range of factors which appear to underpin Muslim experiences while applying unsuccessfully for employment. It suggests that where discrimination does occur it is likely to be perceived and reported as capable of representing both ethnic and religious discrimination.

Two survey questions in the Citizenship Survey asked respondents to describe their experiences of discrimination at work with regard to promotion. The analysis first looked at

whether there were any differences between the religion groups in terms of reporting this type of discrimination. There were no statistically significant differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from the minority religion groups. Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh respondents all shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being discriminated against when being considered for a promotion (12.1%, 11.2%, 11%, 10.1%, and 12% respectively,  $p > 0.05$ ). Respondents were asked to describe the perceived reasons underpinning their experiences of discrimination. Respondents were able to choose more than one response item; options included race, religion and colour. All respondents from minority religions were analysed except for Buddhist and Jewish respondents as base numbers were too low to afford accurate significance testing. Between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents there were no statistically significant differences between those choosing race as an option (50%, 55.3% and 41.2% respectively,  $p > 0.05$ ). 'Race' was the most popular option for Muslim and Hindu respondents and one of the two most popular for Sikh respondents. Similarly, there were no statistically significant differences between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents choosing 'colour' as an option (33.3%, 43.6% and 41.2% respectively,  $p > 0.05$ ). However, there were sizeable differences in relation to respondents choosing 'religion'. Muslim respondents were more likely to choose 'religion' than both Hindu and Sikh respondents (34.9%, 10.3% and 5.9% respectively). These differences were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting discrimination in relation to promotions at work; however Muslim respondents were over three times more likely to report religious discrimination.

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

- **The patterns of prejudice and discrimination faced by Muslim respondents are more complex and more nuanced than those suggested by much of the literature concerning 'Islamophobia'.**
- **A large majority of Muslim respondents perceived there to be more**

**prejudice against Muslims than against people of other religions.**

- **Muslim respondents were more (and in some cases far more) likely than respondents from other religion groups to perceive there to be more prejudice against their own group than against others.**
- **However, Muslim respondents were less likely than Christian and Sikh respondents to report discrimination.**
- **Muslim and Hindu respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting discrimination.**
- **Christian, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting discrimination incidents as being experienced rarely, sometimes or often.**
- **There was little evidence to suggest widespread anti-Muslim discrimination from public bodies although Muslim respondents were often the most likely to report such.**
- **Muslim respondents were more likely to perceive reasons of ethnicity, rather than reasons of religion, as underpinning acts of discrimination towards them (although Muslims were more likely than non-Muslim respondents to report perceiving religion as an underlying reason).**
- **Muslim victims of discrimination, particularly female Muslim victims, were more likely than female non-Muslim victims to report discrimination in a range of public locations or by a range of public bodies (including on the street, from a local school, from a local hospital).**
- **Muslim respondents were more likely than Hindu and Sikh respondents to report discrimination when applying, and being refused or turned**

**down, for a job although Muslim respondents were more likely to perceive ethnicity as the underlying reason rather than religion.**

## CONCLUSION

This chapter presented statistical data related to perceived and reported prejudice and discrimination in order to determine the extent to which assertions concerning each within the scholarly literature are either supported or challenged. The analysis revealed examples of discrimination suffered and reported by Muslim respondents and a commonly-held perception among Muslim respondents that prejudice was more likely to be targeted towards their own religion group than against others. However, as a group, Muslim respondents were less likely than Christian and Sikh respondents (who largely self-described as non-White) to report discrimination, and no more likely than Hindu respondents to do the same. This discrepancy between Muslim respondents' perceptions of widespread prejudice against all Muslims and respondents' personal experiences of discrimination raises issues and themes that are explored and developed in a subsequent chapter using fear of crime and crime victimization data.

Arguably, the perception of prejudice and discrimination held among British Muslim communities outweighs the actual lived experiences shared by British Muslims. One possible explanation for this discrepancy could be that the image of British Muslim communities as being at an increased risk of prejudice and discrimination (as promulgated by exponents of 'Islamophobia' and the widespread nature of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination) have promoted a commonly-held notion of widespread prejudice and discrimination which, whilst undoubtedly present in British society, is not present to the same extent as described in the literature by scholars and commentators. As fear of crime is not always an accurate reflection of actual crime victimization, so the perception by British Muslim communities of the widespread nature of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination may not always represent an accurate reflection of the level of discrimination faced by individual Muslims in the UK. This

is not to suggest that British Muslim communities or individuals are prone to exaggeration, or that reported experiences should be dismissed or not supported with all available resources. It is possible, however, that the high profile nature of political and social issues faced by British Muslim communities and media reporting of anti-Muslim hate crime (by both formal mainstream news broadcasting and informal social media platforms) has increased the perception that widespread prejudice and discrimination is 'out there' even if evidence closer to home suggests a more complicated criminological picture. Similarly, Muslim respondents who more readily self-identify on the basis of religion may be more ready to perceive actual discrimination based on a combination of religious, ethnic and cultural prejudices as being underpinned largely, or even exclusively, by religiously-motivated actions and hence more likely than other respondents to report religious discrimination (even where overall discrimination remains relatively stable across the specified religion groups). Further, the findings suggest that the literature, with its bias towards the descriptions of targeted discrimination (and abuse) by members of right-wing groups or targeted discrimination by the police and state agencies, may be describing an incomplete criminological picture. There is evidence in the findings presented here to suggest widespread levels of discrimination against Muslim women occurring in everyday locations (according to survey data, two in every three Muslim women on the street) and disproportionate discrimination against Muslim people (of both sexes) by public bodies not commonly associated with the criminal justice system (such as schools and hospitals). There is evidence here to suggest that discrimination is as likely, maybe even more likely, to emanate from normal, mundane, everyday situations. This finding echoes those in recent research studies that have emphasised the risks faced by visibly Muslim women (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). The next chapter develops further the theme of discrimination and explores the subject of policing British Muslim communities.

## CHAPTER 5

### EXPERIENCES OF THE POLICE

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents analysis of data generated from survey questions designed to explore the relationships between British Muslim respondents and the police. The chapter focuses on one of the most controversial aspects of the interaction between British Muslim communities and the state – police stop and search. As will be demonstrated, the topic of policing plays a significant role in descriptions of British Muslim communities and their relationships with the state. Policing is discussed in key sources concerning anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and (most importantly for the purposes of this thesis) in writing that has been used to articulate the various conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ found in both the scholarly and policy literature. Further, and as will also be demonstrated, the subject of police relations has been afforded primacy in the conceptualization and construction of ‘institutional Islamophobia’; a concept which borrows themes from the criminology of relations between the police and ethnic minority communities in the UK. Much of the existing criminology around police relations and British Muslim communities continues to be dominated by theoretical or critical discourse and by analysis driven by qualitative research designs. Although police stop and search has been the subject of numerous recent criminological studies (cf. Farrell et al, 2004; EHRC, 2010; Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Qureshi and Grove, 2013; Home Office, 2014), there appear to be no studies related specifically to British Muslim communities that include the analysis of stop and search data from the Crime Survey. Instead, contributors to police stop and search literature rely on theoretical perspectives (Bowling and Phillips, 2003; Choudury, 2013), qualitative data and anecdotal evidence from Muslim participants (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; OSJI, 2011; Parmar 2011), analysis of police recorded data aggregated by ethnicity (EHRC, 2010; Parmar, 2011), or else contain findings which are framed by explicit reference to the lack of empirical

data on police stops and searches of Muslim people (OSI, 2005). The analysis presented here aims to enhance and widen current research in this field by contributing empirical, quantitative data related to experiences of police stop and search as reported by Muslim respondents to the Crime Survey of England and Wales. This chapter presents the findings of quantitative research findings which aim to enhance existing theoretical work and the products of qualitative research designs. Further, the research presented in this chapter develops previous analyses of ethnic categories and research where findings related to Asian respondents have been used to debate issues around Muslim communities (cf. Parmar, 2011).

### **CURRENT DEBATES AROUND BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES' EXPERIENCES OF THE POLICE**

Whilst the subject of poor police relations occupies a prominent role in literature concerning anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that it is always identified or discussed in the literature as a cause or consequence of 'Islamophobia'. Indeed, there are examples of influential, oft-cited texts which make no mention of relations between British Muslim communities and the police (cf. Allen, 2010; Runnymede Trust, 1997). Further, some scholars have dismissed the notion that Britain is 'institutionally Islamophobic'. They have rejected the idea that relations between British Muslims and the police are best described using a model developed from the concept of 'institutional racism' as defined in the Macpherson report (Allen, 2010: 132). Such repudiation arguably implies that, for these scholars at least, there is insufficient evidence to support descriptions of widespread police discrimination against Muslim communities as described elsewhere in the literature (cf. FitzGerald and Hale, 1996; CBMI, 2004). However, others within the debate (and especially those who adopt a more politically left-leaning or critical approach to relations between the UK state and British Muslim communities) offer alternative perspectives. These others make contributions to the debates which may be compared to findings from the statistical data selected for this study. For some, the counter-terrorism measures in place since 2000 (which include new stop and search legislation) have led to an

unwelcomed expansion of police powers that have been used to explicitly target or disproportionately affect British Muslim lives and are thus an appropriate subject for inclusion within the ambit of 'Islamophobia' (Esposito and Kalin, 2011: 29). Where 'Islamophobia' is construed widely so as to include anything that discriminates against or disadvantages British Muslim communities, it is perhaps unsurprising that poor police relations, and especially negative reactions to counter-terrorism measures, are described as evidence of the 'Islamophobia' or anti-Muslim discrimination faced by many British Muslim communities (cf. CBMI, 2004; Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010; Spalek, 2010). The construction of 'institutional Islamophobia' brings together discussion around poor police relations, the targeting of police stop and search powers, and the distrust this targeting has allegedly engendered within British Muslim communities (CBMI, 2004: 31). Findings used to support such descriptions include those from research undertaken for the European Commission in 2003 where it was concluded that a high proportion of British Muslims perceived the police service to be racist (Anwar and Bakhsh, 2003). The subject of stop and search features frequently in discussion around police relations (cf. Anwar and Bakhsh, 2003; CBMI, 2004; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Discussion around the increased police powers under PACE 1984 granted first by section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Chakraborti, 2009) and later by the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (Bowling and Phillips, 2003) was used to describe communities placed under excessive scrutiny by the state (Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008; Vertigans, 2010). Journalists have also contributed frequently to these narratives (Cowan and Travis, 2005; Freedland, 2005; Woolf, 2005). However, caution has been advised by those who have noted that, whilst British Muslim people may have been unfairly or disproportionately targeted by police stop and search powers, compelling statistical data are missing due to the police practice of recording stop and searches using categories based on ethnicity rather than religion (Garland et al, 2006). In terms of the differences between ethnic groups, recent reported data confirm that a Black person is six times more likely to be stopped than a White person and an Asian person is twice as likely to be stopped as a White person (Ministry of Justice, 2011).

Four significant American research publications lend further context to this chapter's study of police stop and search practices (Smith, 2003; Engel and Calnon, 2004; Farrell et al, 2004; Johnson, 2004). Johnson (2004) considered racial profiling after 11th September 2001 and argued that the treatment of Muslims 'offers a lesson from current events on how easily race, national origin, nationality and religion can be abused by law enforcement' (2004: 68). The focus of the other cited studies was on police stop and search of drivers in North Carolina (Smith et al, 2003), Massachusetts (Farrell et al, 2004) and elsewhere across the United States (Engel and Calnon, 2004). Farrell et al argued that, 'racial disparities in the likelihood of being searched once a vehicle is stopped have become one of the most persistent concerns in assessments of racial profiling' (2004: 16). The report found statewide disparity was relatively low but that non-white drivers were significantly more likely to be searched than white drivers in 40 of the 87 jurisdictions studied. Smith et al (2003) examined the so-called 'driving while black' phenomenon (i.e. racial targeting and disproportionate police interference); the report concludes that there is little evidence of widespread disparity across districts or as a result of overt racist antagonism although some evidence for small degrees of racial disparity. Engel and Calnon (2004) found such disparity in police traffic stop and search experiences among young African American and Hispanic males.

Findings from qualitative research projects have been used to identify and explore the impact of counter-terrorism laws, and especially stop and search, on British Muslim communities. A dominant narrative has emerged from these studies asserting that British Muslim communities are perceived as 'suspect communities' by state agencies whose practices contribute to a climate of fear and hostility (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011, Mythen 2012, Mythen, Walklate, and Khan, 2009). Counter-terrorism measures are often used as factors which explain the disadvantage and discrimination faced by British Muslim communities (Abbas, 2004; Fekete, 2009; Kundani, 2009; Modood et al, 1997; 2005). 'Islamophobia' has been conceptualized in a dominant narrative related to 'criminal communities' (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Greer, 2010). The EUMC's report into 'Islamophobia' in the EU following

the implementation of anti-terror law and security measures after 11 September 2001 described Muslims as having become the object of suspicion by the state (Allen and Neilsen, 2002). In turn, this narrative links experiences of British Muslims with the past experiences of Irish terror suspects (CREUB, 2006; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Peirce, 2008). Orientalism is not the only frame through which the disadvantage and discrimination faced by Muslim communities has been viewed. Debates around the relationships between British Muslim communities and the state have also been placed into a historical and political framework informed by more recent events in Northern Ireland. This discourse forms part of a wider critique of the British Government's response to terror and its purported widespread effect on civil liberties, personal freedom and human rights which in places locates issues faced by British Muslim communities into a continuum informed by the anti-terror legislation passed between 1974 and 1989 (Fekete, 2009; Peirce, 2008; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).

Much of the criminological literature concerning the policing of British Muslim communities echoes the Macpherson Inquiry report and its finding of 'institutional racism' (Macpherson, 1999; Foster, Newburn and Souhami, 2005). Descriptions of 'Islamophobia' and anti-Muslim discrimination in the context of policing centre on abusive interference and unfair targeting. Relations between the police and Muslim communities have been described in the literature as being 'unhappy' (Bowling and Phillips, 2003). A discursive framework for the policing of British Muslim communities is provided by descriptions of the exclusionary practices of state bodies and the subsequent restriction of personal and collective freedoms among British Muslim communities (Fekete, 2004, 2009; Innes et al, 2011; Peirce, 2008; Van Driel, 2004). The rehearsal of victimization and discrimination themes in this civil liberties context centres on allegations of abusive and disproportionate direct interference by state agencies and is directly linked, as might be expected, to issues of national security and counter-terrorism (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Peirce, 2008). Descriptions of Muslim communities in this context orient around the demonization of British Muslim communities by the police and security services and the (alleged) subsequent creation of a 'suitable enemy'

(Fekete, 2009). Stop and search policy is described as ‘racial targeting and social control’ (Hallsworth, 2006); and Muslim communities as the targets and victims of ‘over-zealous surveillance’ (Mythen, 2012). This dominant narrative is expressed using qualitative research methods and, more frequently, in discourse which eschews the use of research methods in favour of political, rhetorical writing. This chapter aims to test these assertions.

## **SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN**

The analysis compared the reported stop and search experiences of Muslim respondents within the Crime Survey with respondents from other religion groups using descriptive statistics and probabilistic statistical tests and models. Data related to Muslim respondents are compared to those related to black non-Muslim respondents in order to measure the extent to which scholars are justified in applying previous models of racism to their analyses of police stop and search within British Muslim communities. The analysis also includes a series of logistic regression models used to explore a range of demographic factors and their relative effects on determining the likelihood of being stopped and searched. These included religion, ethnicity, sex and age. The findings presented below are presented in order to answer the primary research questions and two relevant secondary questions: To what extent are descriptions of the purported targeting of Muslim communities by the police and security services, and allegations of disproportionate interference from police stops and searches, supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Are Muslim people stopped and searched more frequently than non-Muslim people? Are attitudes towards the police as negative as might be supposed from an uncritical reading of the literature?

## **FINDINGS**

### **STOPPED ON FOOT**

The Crime Survey asks respondents: ‘Have you ever been stopped and asked questions by the police when you were on foot?’ Overall, analysis of the response data revealed a


statistically significant relationship between being stopped on foot and self-describing affiliation to one of the specified religion groups (see Table 5.08). Similarly, there was a statistically significant relationship between being stopped on foot and either self-describing as Muslim or non-Muslim. However, and rather surprisingly perhaps, Muslim respondents were less likely than Christian respondents to report having been stopped on foot, although the difference was not large (see Table 5.01). Muslim respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being stopped as Jewish and Sikh respondents. However, Muslim respondents were more likely than Hindu respondents to report being stopped in this way. These initial findings revealed a more complex relationship between belonging to a minority religion group and being stopped than is suggested in the literature. In order to explore this discrepancy further analysis was undertaken of Muslim respondents aggregated by ethnicity (in particular respondents who self-described as Asian). The analysis revealed that respondents who self-described as being Muslim and Asian were no more likely than Asian non-Muslim respondents to report having been stopped – this suggested that reported experiences of being stopped on foot by the police were stable for respondents from the Asian group (regardless of whether or not they self-described as Muslim). The literature around policing and ethnicity has suggested African Caribbean communities suffer from disproportionate targeting by police (cf. Macpherson, 1999; Ministry of Justice, 2011). Indeed, as previously stated, it is often these types of accounts which have influenced the narratives around British Muslim communities and the police. Analysis was undertaken to compare Muslim respondents with non-Muslim Black respondents. The main objective in analysing non-Muslim Black respondents was to test the extent to which the statistical evidence justified the links often made in the literature between the policing of British African Caribbean and British Muslim communities. Non-Muslim Black respondents were deemed an appropriate comparison group as use of this method meant Black Muslim respondents would not be counted twice. Analysis of the data revealed that Muslim respondents were less likely than non-Muslim Black respondents to report being stopped. It would appear that ethnicity plays a more significant role than religion in determining the likelihood of being stopped on foot by

the police. A comparison of responses by White and Asian respondents revealed no statistically significant differences. However, there were such differences between White and Black respondents, and between Asian and Black respondents. A series of logistic regression models were created to further test the emergent hypothesis that ethnicity, and not religion, plays a greater role in determining reported police stops on foot.

Findings from a series of logistic regression models appeared to support these findings in relation to stop and search (see tables 5.02 to 5.04). Models in relation to stop and searches were developed in stages using sex, age, ethnicity and religion as independent variables (Tables 5.02 to 5.04 demonstrate this development). Once it was established that ethnicity and religion had a statistically significant effect on being stopped, related models for police searches were generated which included these same four variables (and also a variable relating to car ownership used in the models for police vehicle stops). In both sets of models the categories 'White' and 'Christian' were selected as reference categories. The use of these reference categories (rather than, for example, 'Asian' and 'Muslim') reflected the dominance of these groups in terms of size, and longstanding reporting practices within Home Office reports concerning ethnic differences within a criminological context (cf. FitzGerald and Hale, 1996).

In relation to police stops, age appeared to be a much more significant determinant of reporting being stopped on foot than ethnicity or being Muslim. Respondents between 30 and 59 were over 5 times more likely than older respondents to be stopped on foot (once other variables had been controlled for). Sex appeared to be an important factor (with male respondents five times more likely to report being stopped than female respondents). Once other variables had been controlled for, Muslim and Hindu respondents appeared to be marginally less likely than Christian respondents to have reported being stopped on foot (see Table 5.04). Thus, there is little evidence from data related to being stopped on foot to suggest anti-Muslim discrimination or to support the assertions found in the literature, and evidence to challenge the strength of assertions found in the literature.

**Figure 5.01 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being stopped on foot by police**



Data source BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopft, relig2, ethgrp

p weighted with indivwt

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 5.01 Crime Survey: Reported experiences of police stop and search**

	Stopped on foot	Searched on foot	Stopped in a car or on a motorcycle	Searched in a car or on a motorcycle
<b>Muslim</b>				
Weighted %	9.3	74	27.6	18
Unweighted base	1,801	58	1,801	227
<b>Non-Muslim</b>				
Weighted %	12.8***	22.3***	50***	9.3**
Unweighted base	52,215	1081	52,221	4,206
<b>Christian</b>				
Weighted %	11.1*	19.6***	50***	8.2**
Unweighted base	40,883	693	40,889	3,006
<b>Buddhist</b>				
Weighted %	11.8	--	37.3***	16.9
Unweighted base	350x	12	350	34
<b>Hindu</b>				
Weighted %	5.5**	--	26.7	12.3
Unweighted base	869	15	869	79
<b>Jewish</b>				
Weighted %	11	--	60***	--
Unweighted base	176	8	176	15
<b>Sikh</b>				
Weighted %	6.9	--	36.9**	--
Unweighted base	355	6	355	24
<b>Minority religion group</b>				
Weighted %	7.8	25.4***	35.5***	16.9
Unweighted base	1,750	41	1,750	98
<b>Black non-Muslim</b>				
Weighted %	16.5***	46.1	36.2***	24.6
Unweighted base	1,631	58	1,630	200

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, ethgrp, pstopft, searc, pstopcar, searcveh

p weighted with indivwt

Black cells = sample < 30

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 5.02 Crime Survey: Stopped on foot - Logistic regression model 1**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for Exp( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	1.594	.033	2,318.795	1	.000	4.923	4.614	5.253
60+	--	--	1,449.265	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	1.682	.044	1,437.452	1	.000	5.377	4.929	5.866
16-29	.889	.039	513.392	1	.000	2.432	2.252	2.626
Constant	-3.908	.043	8,454.851	1	.000	.020	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopft, sex, agegrp

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .076, Nagelkerke = .154, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 12.617$ , df = 4, Sig. = .013

**Table 5.03 Crime Survey: Stopped on foot - Logistic regression model 2**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	1.615	.033	2,358.420	1	.000	5.027	4.710	5.366
60+	--	--	1,542.326	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	1.760	.045	1,531.667	1	.000	5.815	5.324	6.351
16-29	.934	.039	559.097	1	.000	2.543	2.354	2.748
White	--	--	232.548	4	.000	--	--	--
Mixed	.335	.122	7.550	1	.006	1.399	1.101	1.777
Asian or Asian British	-1.140	.083	187.779	1	.000	.320	.272	.377
Black or Black British	.126	.074	2.885	1	.089	1.134	.981	1.310
Chinese or Other	-.765	.134	32.802	1	.000	.465	.358	.604
Constant	-3.910	.043	8,383.270	1	.000	.020	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopft, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .081, Nagelkerke = .164, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 11.785$ , df = 7, Sig. = .108

**Table 5.04 Crime Survey: Stopped on foot - Logistic regression model 3**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	1.601	.033	2,304.572	1	.000	4.957	4.643	5.292
60+	--	--	1,338.578	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	1.682	.046	1,330.621	1	.000	5.377	4.913	5.886
16-29	.892	.040	501.179	1	.000	2.440	2.257	2.638
White	--	--	78.011	4	.000	--	--	--
Mixed	.351	.123	8.096	1	.004	1.421	1.115	1.810
Asian or Asian British	-.786	.135	34.171	1	.000	.455	.350	.593
Black or Black British	.211	.075	7.854	1	.005	1.235	1.065	1.431
Chinese or Other	-.733	.140	27.458	1	.000	.480	.365	.632
Christian	--	--	112.418	7	.000	--	--	--
Buddhist	.305	.186	2.676	1	.102	1.356	.941	1.954
Hindu	-.669	.216	9.611	1	.002	.512	.336	.782
Jewish	-.116	.273	.179	1	.673	.891	.521	1.523
Muslim	-.344	.133	6.704	1	.010	.709	.546	.920
Sikh	.177	.244	.529	1	.467	1.194	.741	1.925
Other	.645	.138	21.756	1	.000	1.906	1.454	2.500
No religion	.293	.035	69.695	1	.000	1.341	1.251	1.436
Constant	-3.936	.043	8,402.132	1	.000	.020	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopft, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .083, Nagelkerke = .067, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 11.569$ , df = 7, Sig. = .116

Early modelling experiments with the data controlled for socio-economic factors. These have been excluded from these models as only one decile (the second most affluent) of the Multiple Deprivation Index (MDI) appeared to have a statistically significant effect ( $p < 0.05$ ). It would appear from the Crime Survey data that general socio-economic deprivation was not a determinant of being either stopped or searched (in either of the scenarios analysed in this chapter).

### **STOPPED IN A CAR OR ON A MOTORCYCLE**

The Crime Survey asked respondents: 'Have you ever been in a car or on a motorcycle which was approached or stopped by police officers?' There were statistically significant differences among respondents from the specified religion groups who answered 'yes' and between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents who answered 'yes' (see Table 5.08). Muslim

respondents were less likely than Christian, Jewish and Sikh respondents to report having been stopped in a vehicle (see Figure 5.02). Muslim and Hindu respondents shared a similar likelihood of being stopped in this way. As before, the findings suggest that ethnicity played a more significant role than 'being Muslim': respondents who described themselves as being both Muslim and Asian were no more likely than non-Muslim Asian respondents to report being stopped in a vehicle. Similarly, age appeared to be a greater determinant than religion. Muslim respondents were compared to non-Muslim respondents who described themselves as Black. The latter group (as before, Black non-Muslim respondents) were more likely to report being stopped in this way by the police, again differences were statistically significant. Similarly, age appeared to be a more significant factor in reporting being stopped in or on a vehicle (see Table 5.07). (The Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic suggested a lack of goodness of fit; findings from Table 5.07 are therefore indicative rather than conclusive.) Respondents aged 16 to 29 were more likely than respondents aged 60 or over to report ever having been stopped (once other variables had been controlled for). Again, Muslim and Hindu respondents were less likely than Christian respondents to report being stopped in or on a vehicle (controlling for other variables). As for data related to being stopped on foot, data related to being stopped in a car or on a motorcycle do not support assertions of police discrimination. The picture is, however, rather different for police searches.

**Table 5.05 Crime Survey: Stopped in a car or on a motorcycle - Logistic regression model 1**


	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for Exp( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	.873	.019	2225.882	1	.000	2.394	2.309	2.482
60+			509.232	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	.072	.028	6.491	1	.011	1.075	1.017	1.136
16-29	.439	.021	451.341	1	.000	1.551	1.490	1.615
Car	1.322	.025	2826.630	1	.000	3.751	3.572	3.938
Constant	-1.708	.027	4133.372	1	.000	.181	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopcar, sex, agegrp, car

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .122, Nagelkerke = .163, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 58.786$ , df = 6, Sig. = .000

**Figure 5.02 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being stopped in a car or on a motorcycle by police**



Data source BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopcar, relig2, ethgrp

p weighted with indivwt

\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 5.06 Crime Survey: Stopped in a car or on a motorcycle - Logistic regression model 2**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for Exp( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	.900	.019	2306.104	1	.000	2.460	2.371	2.552
60+			664.916	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	.195	.029	45.357	1	.000	1.215	1.148	1.286
16-29	.533	.021	638.538	1	.000	1.703	1.634	1.775
White			944.513	4	.000	--	--	--
Mixed	-.098	.096	1.046	1	.306	.907	.752	1.094
Asian or Asian British	-1.132	.043	687.404	1	.000	.322	.296	.351
Black or Black British	-.592	.054	119.481	1	.000	.553	.497	.615
Chinese or Other	-1.105	.078	198.898	1	.000	.331	.284	.386
Car	1.300	.025	2678.531	1	.000	3.668	3.492	3.853
Constant	-1.670	.027	3902.722	1	.000	.188	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopcar, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2, car

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .139, Nagelkerke = .185 Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 71.512$ , df = 6, Sig. = .000

**Table 5.07 Crime Survey: Stopped in a car or on a motorcycle - Logistic regression model 3**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	.894	.019	2255.043	1	.000	2.444	2.355	2.536
60+			622.699	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	.154	.030	26.524	1	.000	1.166	1.100	1.236
16-29	.513	.021	576.621	1	.000	1.670	1.601	1.741
White			310.731	4	.000	--	--	--
Mixed	-.076	.096	.618	1	.432	.927	.767	1.120
Asian or Asian British	-.896	.079	127.780	1	.000	.408	.350	.477
Black or Black British	-.539	.055	96.405	1	.000	.583	.524	.650
Chinese or Other	-1.052	.082	163.543	1	.000	.349	.297	.410
Christian			89.782	7	.000	--	--	--
Buddhist	-.040	.123	.108	1	.743	.960	.755	1.222
Hindu	-.323	.108	8.920	1	.003	.724	.585	.895
Jewish	.360	.167	4.654	1	.031	1.433	1.033	1.988
Muslim	-.289	.082	12.369	1	.000	.749	.638	.880
Sikh	.086	.138	.386	1	.534	1.090	.831	1.428
Other	.380	.109	12.144	1	.000	1.462	1.181	1.811
No religion	.180	.026	48.355	1	.000	1.197	1.138	1.259
Car	1.302	.025	2670.626	1	.000	3.675	3.498	3.862
Constant	-1.689	.027	3936.886	1	.000	.185	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopcar, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2, relig2, car

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .140, Nagelkerke = .187, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 52.984$ , df = 6, Sig. = .000

**Table 5.08 Crime Survey: Police stop and search – differences between groups**

Pearson's chi-square test	$\chi^2$	df	p<0.001?
			--
<b>Stopped on foot</b>			--
Muslim/non-Muslim	30.56	1	Yes
All religion groups	567.38	7	Yes
<b>Stopped in a car or on a motorcycle</b>			--
Muslim/non-Muslim	328.78	1	Yes
All religion groups	727.20	7	Yes
<b>Searched on foot</b>			--
Muslim/non-Muslim	47.24	1	Yes
All religion groups	63.24	7	Yes
<b>Searched in a car or on a motorcycle</b>			--
Muslim/non-Muslim	19.11	1	Yes
All religion groups	41.46	7	Yes

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: pstopft, pstopcar, searc, searcveh, relig2, ethgrp

p weighted with indivwt

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## **SEARCHED ON FOOT**


The Crime Survey asked respondents who had been stopped in the last year: 'Did the police actually search you or anyone with you, or look into any bags or cases?' Unfortunately, the design of the survey meant that only respondents who had been stopped in the last year were invited to report being searched. Those who had been stopped more than twelve months previously were excluded. This filtering reduced the sample size (arguably, rather unnecessarily). Analysis of the data revealed that Muslim respondents were far more likely than Christian respondents to be searched after being stopped on foot (nearly three times as likely, see Figure 6.03). Unfortunately, comparative analysis of Muslim respondents and respondents from each of the other minority religion groups was constrained by the aforementioned small sample size. To allow for further analysis, data from Muslim respondents were compared with data from a group containing Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh respondents collected and analysed together. Muslim respondents were far more likely to report being searched on foot than respondents from combined this group of respondents from the other minority religions.

Analysis of non-Muslim black respondents revealed that the group was less likely than Muslim respondents to report being searched once stopped on foot. From the groups analysed, it would appear that Muslim respondents were not the most likely to report having been stopped on foot, but were the most likely to report having been searched (having been stopped on foot by the police in the last year). Once stopped, Muslim respondents were over 3 times more likely than Christian respondents to be searched on foot.

Data pertaining to being searched on foot by the police have not been discussed in the literature (although such data have been available since 2006). They are presented here as an original contribution to the criminological study of British Muslim communities and 'Islamophobia'. These data would appear, unlike previous findings in this chapter, to lend support to descriptions in the literature which assert the unfair or disproportionate targeting

of British Muslims by the police, police discrimination of minority groups in general, and ‘institutional Islamophobia’.

**Figure 5.03 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being searched by police after a stop on foot**



Data source BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

p weighted with indivwt

Variables used: relig2, ethgrp2, searc

\*p<0.01 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## SEARCHED IN A CAR OR ON A MOTORCYCLE

Respondents who had been stopped in a vehicle in the last year were then asked if they, their vehicle, or anyone they were with had been searched (at the time of the stop). Similarly to the findings related to being stopped on foot and then searched, Muslim respondents were three times more likely than Christian respondents to report being searched after a vehicle stop (see Figure 5.05). Having been stopped (as before, in the last year only), Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being searched. As for the data related to reported searches on foot, the bivariate test results are reported cautiously however.

Again, a relatively small sample size meant that findings could not be reported confidently.

**Table 5.09 Crime Survey: Searched by the police after a stop on foot - Logistic regression model 1**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	1.369	.210	42.386	1	.000	3.931	2.603	5.936
60+	--	--	20.344	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	1.753	.538	10.612	1	.001	5.774	2.011	16.581
16-29	1.124	.545	4.249	1	.039	3.077	1.057	8.959
White	--	--	16.320	4	.003	--	--	--
Mixed	.996	.414	5.792	1	.016	2.707	1.203	6.092
Asian or Asian British	.444	.544	.665	1	.415	1.559	.536	4.530
Black or Black British	.984	.292	11.359	1	.001	2.675	1.509	4.739
Chinese or Other	.405	.514	.621	1	.431	1.499	.548	4.103
Christian	--	--	20.542	7	.005			
Hindu	-1.715	1.140	2.264	1	.132	.180	.019	1.680
Jewish	.644	.888	.526	1	.468	1.904	.334	10.848
Muslim	1.189	.487	5.950	1	.015	3.282	1.263	8.530
Sikh	-19.733	15,815.408	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	--
Constant	-4.088	.556	54.098	1	.000	.017	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: searc, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .131, Nagelkerke = .201, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 5.594$ , df = 7, Sig. = .588

As in the previous section, to compensate for the relatively small sample size (and the low numbers of respondents from non-Muslim minority religions) a comparison was undertaken between Muslim respondents and respondents grouped together from the other specified minority religion groups. There were no significant differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from the other minority religions. Similarly Muslim and Black non-Muslim respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being searched following a vehicle stop. Use of multivariate analysis and logistic regression modelling revealed that for vehicle stops Muslim respondents were over twice as likely as Christian respondents to report being searched. There were no such statistically significant effects for the Hindu, Jewish, Sikh groups (see Table 5.10). Overall, it would appear that these findings support descriptions in the literature that have sought to draw comparisons between experiences of the police in British African Caribbean communities and British Muslim

communities. Whilst there is overlap between these communities (many Black British people are Muslim), the findings reported here suggest that scholarly comparisons of the ‘Black British’ experience with the ‘British Muslim’ experience literature withstand a degree of empirical scrutiny.

**Figure 5.04 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being searched by police after a vehicle stop**



Data source BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, ethgrp, pstopcar, searcveh

p weighted with indivwt

\*p<0.01 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- **Stop and search data provided mixed evidence for police discrimination against British Muslim communities.**
- **Muslim respondents were less likely than others to have ever been stopped than other respondents (including Black non-Muslim respondents – the group most stopped by the police).**

- **Muslim respondents were far more likely than Black non-Muslim respondents to be searched having been stopped by the police in the last year.**
- **Overall, and controlling for other factors, being male and being between 30 and 59 were stronger determinants of being stopped and searched on foot and being stopped in a vehicle than being Muslim.**
- **Overall, and controlling for other factors, being male and being Sikh were stronger determinants of being searched following a vehicle stop than being Muslim.**

## CONCLUSION

This chapter explored experiential response data related to the policing of British Muslim communities and focused on reported police stop and search data. Two research questions were posed: To what extent are descriptions of the purported targeting of Muslim communities by the police and security services, and allegations of disproportionate interference from police stops and searches, supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? And, are Muslim people stopped and searched more frequently than non-Muslim people? Analysis of the data suggested that whilst Muslim respondents, in the main, were as likely as other respondents to report being stopped, there appears to be a case for suggesting British Muslim people are searched more often, arguably and disproportionately. However, it would be unwise to engage uncritically with such findings. The criminological picture provided by analysis of stop and search data (including those analysed here) is arguably limited by the arrangements made for their collection. Police recorded stop and search data are collected and aggregated using a series of factors: the legislation under which the person was stopped, and the ethnicity of that person are the two most pertinent to this research project; police force areas and types of offences are amongst some of the others. These methods of aggregating data present problems for those wishing to

study the relationship between police stop and search and Muslim communities (or any religion group): simply, religion is not used as a category under which data are recorded and hence the data are not available. As discussed, ‘Asian’ has often been used a proxy for ‘Muslim’ although within the merged Crime Survey dataset explored here over twenty percent of Muslim respondents self-describe as ‘Chinese or other’, over ten percent as ‘Black’, and seven percent as ‘Mixed’. Given this, and the continued reliance on the ‘Asian’ category, an incomplete picture is perhaps inevitable.

**Table 5.10 Crime Survey: Searched by the police after a vehicle stop - Logistic regression model 1**

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
Male	.833	.132	39.827	1	.000	2.301	1.776	2.981
60+	--	--	88.973	2	.000	--	--	--
30-59	1.418	.236	36.056	1	.000	4.131	2.600	6.563
16-29	.377	.239	2.501	1	.114	1.458	.914	2.327
White	--	--	31.869	4	.000	--	--	--
Mixed	.916	.316	8.419	1	.004	2.499	1.346	4.639
Asian or Asian British	-.327	.378	.750	1	.386	.721	.344	1.512
Black or Black British	.914	.216	17.965	1	.000	2.494	1.634	3.805
Chinese or Other	-1.058	.636	2.773	1	.096	.347	.100	1.206
Christian	--	--	19.025	7	.008	--	--	--
Hindu	.184	.584	.100	1	.752	1.202	.383	3.775
Jewish	-.025	1.056	.001	1	.981	.975	.123	7.730
<b>Muslim</b>	<b>1.001</b>	<b>.356</b>	<b>7.927</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.005</b>	<b>2.721</b>	<b>1.355</b>	<b>5.462</b>
Sikh	1.304	.678	3.698	1	.054	3.685	.975	13.920
Constant	-4.033	.243	276.067	1	.000	.018	--	--

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: searchveh, sex, agegrp, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .043, Nagelkerke = .101, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 2.696$ , df = 7, Sig. = .912

However, this absence of reliable data has not stopped many scholars and commentators describing the policing of British Muslim communities with conclusions extrapolated from stop and search data from Asian respondents. Further, the conceptualization of ‘institutional Islamophobia’ includes generalizations about Muslim communities based on previous criminological research around African Caribbean communities in the UK. The discourse, again as elsewhere, is limited by these data problems but also by the continued dominance of

qualitative research methods and more critical perspectives. Stop and search data from Muslim respondents in the Crime Survey will not entirely fill this gap in the evidence or, used in isolation, strengthen the conceptualizations of ‘institutional Islamophobia’. There are some limitations to the use of these data. The accuracy of the Crime Survey data relies on each respondent’s memory and recall (rather than a record taken at the time by a police officer) and does not aggregate the stops and searches by crime type (although the respondents are invited to recall the reason given to them by the officer at the time). Reliability in this respect will be increased only when police forces more often collect information about the religious affiliation of those they stop. Notwithstanding these limitations, the data reveal some useful clues in relation to the differences between analysis of the data and the conceptualization of ‘Islamophobia’ or anti-Muslim discrimination by the police. As has been demonstrated so far in these findings chapters and as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, very little of the available statistical evidence lends support to the generalizations about British Muslim communities and the relationships to crime and discrimination offered by the literature – findings from the data suggest a less simplistic and more complex overall picture. This complexity is reflected in the data related to being stopped on foot (age and ethnicity appear to be more significant determinants than religion). However, data pertaining to being searched on foot appears to answer the second research question posed by this chapter in two ways. First, there is evidence here of experiences of police practices which are capable of supporting descriptions in the literature around anti-Muslim discrimination and ‘institutional Islamophobia’ (i.e. evidence of disproportionate targeting by the police). In particular, the finding that Muslim respondents are the group most likely to be searched once stopped on foot raises some questions about police procedure and practice. Do police officers stop individuals who appear to be Asian or Black, seek to establish the person’s religion, and then make a decision as to whether or not to search based on this information? Once stopped, is someone called Ahmed more likely to be searched than someone called Arawinda? The data here suggest they are. The findings reported in this chapter arguably echo those from the aforementioned mentioned US criminological studies that have revealed disparities among

ethnic minority communities in relation to searches following police traffic stops (cf. Engel and Calnon, 2004; Farrell, 2004). Second, the data provide an evidential basis for descriptions of policing which seek to link the experiences of British African Caribbean communities with those of British Muslim communities. This link is made often in the literature but rarely with evidence that convinces. The evidence here is far from conclusive: data related to being stopped on foot would appear to challenge the associations made between being Muslim and being stopped disproportionately. However, limited support for such associations is offered by the similarities between the Black or Black British group and the Muslim group in terms of being searched once stopped (as suggested by the bivariate analysis). Further, the relationship between being Muslim and being searched (in either scenario) is statistically significant (when tested using logistic regression), whereas being Asian or British Asian is not. Most of the statistical evidence presented by this thesis allows for conclusions capable of supporting arguments concerning the lack of distinction between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents (and by implication, the broad similarities among Asian respondents, particularly in terms of the relationship to crime victimization and overall discrimination). The reported experiences of Muslim respondents in relation to being searched suggest relationships with the police that are distinct from Asian respondents (where the two groups do not overlap). Unlike many data elsewhere in the five datasets selected for this thesis, they lend support for a criminological narrative asserting disproportionate state interference, or discriminatory police practices against British Muslim communities. The next chapter continues this investigation into state relations and explores data related to attitudes towards the police, the wider British state and British society.

## CHAPTER 6

### ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BRITISH STATE AND BRITISH SOCIETY

#### INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented findings from the analysis of police stop and search experiences. The present chapter extends the focus of this study by analysing attitudes reported by Muslim respondents in relation to the police, wider British state and mainstream British society. The research presented here focuses on reported attitudes held by Muslim respondents towards the police, the criminal justice system, the British Government and membership of British society. The variables collected and analysed in this chapter are from a variety of sources. As has been noted in leading scholarly work, quantitative research into British Muslim communities is rarely served by a convenient set of survey questions (cf. Field 2007; 2012). Instead, and as ably demonstrated by Field's work, effective research is achieved primarily by piecing together evidential clues from multiple sources. In this case, these multiple sources included survey data gleaned from the Citizenship Survey, the Crime Survey, and the EMBES. Variables were identified as being linked (albeit with varying degrees of strength) to themes exploring the network of relationships between Muslim respondents, the British state, and British society. The research was shaped, and sometimes limited, by the availability of relevant statistical data. The findings in relation to each of the themes discussed by this chapter are presented as evidential clues and as signposts for future research projects. The data are indicative of trends and patterns related to attitudes towards state and society found within British Muslim communities rather than as an exact topography of British Muslim attitudes. Despite the disparate nature of available statistical data, one central trend emerged from the analysis. The data suggest a broader range of opinions and attitudes held towards the police, the wider state and British society than might be assumed from an examination of the literature. There is evidence for positive attitudes towards the police, positive attitudes towards Parliament and the criminal justice system, and response data

which suggest feelings of social inclusion held by large numbers of Muslim respondents. These sentiments are all but absent from the dominant narratives found within the criminological literature. The main argument of this chapter is not to ignore or downplay negative feelings towards the police, state and society, or to downplay the negative attitudes towards policing practices, counter-terrorism measures and discrimination from public bodies which have informed many British Muslim lives. Immigration detention, control orders, enhanced police stop and search powers and domestic raids by police and security services have undoubtedly caused widespread ill-feeling among British Muslim communities (as is evident from the many statements made by Muslim and Muslim-interest organizations and campaign groups). What is less clear, however, is whether *all* British Muslims share these negative sentiments. The literature has often described, suggested or implied as much. The statistical evidence appears to challenge such narratives.

#### **CURRENT DEBATES AROUND THE ATTITUDES OF BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES TOWARDS THE STATE AND SOCIETY**

As stated, an investigation of the scholarly, non-scholarly, criminological and sociological literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-Muslim prejudice, discrimination and hate crime reveals several dominant narrative themes. Attitudes towards the police occupy a prominent position within this narrative although they are often situated within the broader contexts of social inclusion and social exclusion (cf. Rowntree Foundation, 2010). Social inclusion has been conceptualized within the context of British Muslim communities as participation in a range of social and political activities: party politics, public administration, law and justice, education, the arts, science and medicine, the media, industry and commerce (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 32). In some cases the themes are explored using related topics such as ‘feeling British’ which are discussed in leading reports concerning British Muslim relations with the state and society (cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997: 31). Commentators have described a ‘Muslim divide’ (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004). Statistical evidence for social exclusion has been presented under several key themes: education, local and national politics, employment,

health, housing, immigration and the criminal justice system. Some of these topics were explored in the previous chapter concerning prejudice and discrimination (i.e. where survey questions addressed these items within the specified context of prejudice and discrimination) and it is recognized there is a large degree of crossover between discrimination and these themes of social inclusion and exclusion. Therefore, the present chapter discusses variables related to social inclusion and exclusion where the wording of the survey question *does not* refer explicitly to discrimination. The separation of variables related to discrimination was done in order to give focus and clarity to that particular theme.

The Runnymede Trust report contains data from local government agencies (for example, figures concerning the employment of council staff from minority communities). Unfortunately for the purposes of this thesis, where data presented in the Runnymede Trust report were aggregated by demographic factors the categories used were country of origin or ethnicity rather than religion. Thus categories such as 'Bangladeshi', 'Pakistani' and 'Asian' were used in the Runnymede Trust report as proxies for the British Muslim population (see also Shaw, 1988; 2000; 2001). Whilst undoubtedly expedient and practical, this approach, as elsewhere in the report, excludes analysis of the (sizeable) non-Asian Muslim population of the UK and includes analysis of Asian people who are not Muslim. The report concluded that whilst there was evidence of participation in local government, Asian council staff members were under-represented at senior and officer levels. The report also asserted the disadvantage suffered by Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities in terms of employment, housing and health. Both findings are presented as evidence for anti-Muslim discrimination. Elsewhere, discrimination is reported as existing within a range of civil and public bodies (CBMI, 2004). The CBMI report discusses the cumulative effect of Islamophobia as causing Muslims to 'feel that they are not truly accepted, let alone welcomed, as full members of British society' (CBMI, 2004: 9). Further British Muslim communities are described as 'an enemy within', 'a fifth column' and 'under constant siege' (2004: 9). 'Islamophobia' is described as limiting the opportunities for Muslim people to contribute towards ethical and social debates, and

therefore towards a more diverse and democratic society. Muslims are described as holding feelings of powerlessness, impotence and frustration (2004: 9) in the face of discrimination and insensitivity inherent within the provision of public services (2004: 11). These descriptions of public services are combined with those related to laws, customs and practices and together adduced as evidence for 'institutional Islamophobia' to create a bleak and disturbing picture (2004: 12).

Certain debates within this area have asserted these political and social disadvantages in relation to integration. The assimilation of British Muslim communities to mainstream British society has been described as being limited through the recasting of citizenship laws according to security considerations (Fekete, 2004). There has been criticism for the lack of political support given to the victims of firebombed mosques and a lack of tangible support leading to growing isolation in British Muslim communities (Chakraborti, 2009; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Western liberal democracy and secularism is criticized as directly or indirectly leading to the extenuation of religious disadvantage within a climate which has engendered the pre-conditions for anti-Muslim discrimination and 'Islamophobia' (Weller, 2006).

Poor relations with the police have also been described as underpinning political disadvantage at both local and national level (cf. Spalek and Lambert, 2008). The highlighting of such discussion provides an example of the overlap between the debates around policing and social exclusion. Indeed, there is some overlap between issues of policing and issues of social exclusion: and the assertion of a causal or quasi-causal link between the former and the latter. Kundani (2009) argued that a significant failing of the Prevent counter-terrorism initiatives is their effect on limiting voluntary sector organizations within British Muslim communities by funding (and thus legitimising) only those whose members are willing to sign up to the Prevent programme. By way of an extension to this argument, Prevent is also criticized for its purported negative effect on relations between British Muslim communities and local authorities caused by discouraging valid criticisms of governmental processes. These

descriptions related to the lack of collective political representation and the distrust between British Muslim communities and political institutions have been echoed elsewhere in the literature (cf. Mythen, 2012; Spalek 2010).

Despite the dominance of the narratives described above, it is possible to identify previous quantitative research projects where findings and conclusions challenge some of the assertions around exclusion described above. These alternative perspectives describe British Muslims as being more likely than the wider British public to report confidence in several areas (Uberoi and Modood, 2009): the judicial system and courts; national government; financial institutions and banks; the quality and integrity of the media; and the perceived honesty of elections (Gallup, 2009: 23). These conclusions have been used to draw distinctions between Muslim communities in the United Kingdom and those from European countries such as France. According to Gallup, French Muslim communities are less likely to report confidence in the political system. It could be argued that it is these communities (and not British Muslim communities) that more often conform to the generalizations and stereotypes presented by the literature regarding the effects of 'Islamophobia'. Gallup concludes that 'the United Kingdom has approached community cohesion by making a space for cultural diversity within the country' (2009: 24) and that British Muslims are more likely than Muslims from the other countries surveyed to identify strongly with their nation and report confidence in democratic institutions whilst simultaneously maintaining a high degree of religious identity. The analysis presented in this chapter sought to test the relative veracity of these and other conclusions given statistical evidence from the large-scale social survey datasets.

## **SUMMARY OF METHODS**

Variables were selected where they were deemed to capture relevant attitudes towards the British state and British society. The analysis extends that presented in the previous chapter by using a series of descriptive statistics and probabilistic tests to explore attitudes towards the police. This analysis is developed with examination of attitudinal data pertaining

to the criminal justice system, British politicians and British Parliament. Finally, evidential clues as to the existence of widespread feelings of exclusion are sought by examining attitudinal data related to feeling British. The analysis further develops a secondary research question from the previous chapter: Are attitudes towards the police as negative as might be supposed from an uncritical reading of the literature? Also considered are the following further questions: To what extent are assertions and conclusions concerning negative attitudes towards the British state and state agencies including the police, and the widespread exclusion of British Muslim communities from mainstream British society, supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is there statistical evidence for the type of exclusion so often asserted within the literature?

## **FINDINGS**


### **ATTITUDES REGARDING FAIR TREATMENT BY THE POLICE**

A series of Crime Survey questions asks respondents, who had been the subject of a vehicle stop in the last year, whether or not they had been treated fairly by the police. 84.5% of Muslim respondents reported that they were treated very fairly or quite fairly (see Figure 6.01). Although fewer Muslim respondents than Christian respondents described being treated very fairly, the two groups shared a similar likelihood of reporting at least some level of fairness (see Table 6.01). Unfortunately, the analysis of response data related to fair treatment after being stopped on foot was limited by the survey design and the resulting small sample size (some cells had fewer than 20 cases). These findings have been excluded here. Tables 6.03 to 6.08 compare the attitudes of Muslim respondents with those of the dominant Christian group.

### **ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POLICE**

A further series of Crime Survey questions invited respondents to describe their level of agreement with a range of positive statements related to the local police 'in this area'.

**Figure 6.01 Crime Survey: Treated by the police after being stopped in a car or on a motorcycle in the last year**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09  
 Variables: copfair1, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Table 6.01 Crime Survey: How treated by the police after being stopped in a car or on a motorcycle in the last year**

		Muslim	Christian
<b>Treated after being stopped in a car or on a motorcycle in the last year</b>			
	very fairly	47.1	56.8*
	quite fairly	37.4	31
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>87.8</b>
	<b>Unweighted base</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>2055</b>

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: copfair1, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt  
 \*p<0.05


Given the aforementioned literature around British Muslim communities and policing, and the abundance of sources describing the disproportionate targeting of Muslims, unfair treatment of Muslims by the police and the subsequent damage inflicted on relationships between Muslim communities and the police, the findings were surprising. For all seven statements concerning local police a majority of Muslim respondents reported at least some level of agreement (i.e. respondents answered either strongly agree or tend to agree). 56.9% of Muslim respondents agreed that the police can be relied to deal with minor crime. For all other statements over 60% agreed with the statements related to a range of police effectiveness and fairness. Given the literature it might be expected (or presumed) that all or most Muslim respondents would report greater feelings of dissatisfaction or distrust with the police. The

statistical data suggest otherwise. Analysis revealed statistically significant associations between reported attitudes towards the police and religious affiliation (see Table 6.03). Further, for each of the seven statements Muslim respondents were *more* likely to strongly agree than Christian respondents (in all cases, except one, these differences were statistically significant). The statements offered to respondents, and for which Muslim respondents reported positive attitudes were:

- The police can be relied on to be there when you need them (see Figure 6.02)
- The police in this area would treat you with respect if you had contact with them for any reason (see Figure 6.03)
- The police in this area treat everyone fairly regardless of who they are (see Figure 6.04)
- The police can be relied on to deal with minor crimes (see Figure 6.05)
- The police in this area understand issues that affect this community (see Figure 6.06)
- The police in this area are dealing with things that matter to people in this community (see Figure 6.07)
- Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area (see Figure 6.08)


Response data in relation to all seven statements differed between the religion groups and between Muslim respondents and all other non-Muslim respondents (aggregated into one group). In all cases, except one, these differences were statistically significant (see Table 6.02). Overall, Muslim respondents had more positive attitudes towards the police than non-Muslim respondents. Comparisons between the Muslim and Christian group are shown to demonstrate how the attitudes of Muslim respondents compared to those of the dominant respondent group; to show how in all cases Muslim responses were more likely to demonstrate strong agreement with the statements; and to show how these responses differed from assertions made in this regard within the literature.

**Figure 6.02 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The police can be relied on to be there when you need them’**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: relig2, polatt1  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.03 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The police in this area would treat you with respect if you had contact with them for any reason’**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: relig2, polatt2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.04 Crime Survey: ‘Responses to the statement: The police in this area treat everyone fairly regardless of who they are’**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: polatt3, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.05 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The police can be relied on to deal with minor crime’**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: polatt4, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.06 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The police in this area understand issues that affect this community’**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: polatt5, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.07 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The police in this area are dealing with things that matter to people in this community’**



Data source: BCS CSEW 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: polatt6, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

**Figure 6.08 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area’**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: polatt7, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwt

These findings clearly challenge the dominant criminological narratives concerning the alleged poor police relations with British Muslim communities. Arguably, however, caution must be exercised when considering the extent to which they support or challenge the conceptualization of state-sponsored ‘Islamophobia’ and discrimination, and especially when considering them as an instrument with which to counter such notions. It is crucial that the data are not used to overly-simplify respondents’ attitudes towards the police. Individual respondents may hold a wide range of attitudes, even seemingly contradictory attitudes, towards police fairness and effectiveness. The conclusions of the findings presented here do not aim to merely replace one essentialised view of British Muslim communities with another. Each respondent is capable of holding positive attitudes towards her or his local police force whilst being wholly critical of national anti-terrorism initiatives. It might also be possible for an individual respondent to have had a series of positive encounters with the police and yet firmly believe the police force as a whole to be discriminatory. In fact, individual attitudes are less crucial to this thesis than the wider patterns emergent from the data. The literature provided what might be described as a one-dimensional account of British Muslim attitudes towards the police (wholly or mainly negative): the data suggest a more complex arrangement of experiences and attitudes, which in turn suggests the necessity to revise many of the

dominant criminological narratives. The next section widens the focus and analyses from attitudes towards the police to attitudes towards the criminal justice system as a whole.

### **MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

A series of questions sought to explore respondents' attitudes towards the effectiveness, fairness and discriminatory nature of the criminal justice system. In the first instance respondents were asked: 'How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is effective?' Reported attitudes towards the effectiveness of the criminal justice system differed between religion groups and between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian respondents to report being very confident in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system (see Figure 6.09). However, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being very confident. Almost two thirds (64.6%) of Muslim respondents reported being either very or fairly confident in the criminal justice system. Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian, Jewish and Sikh respondents to report at least some confidence in the criminal justice system and shared a broadly similar likelihood as Hindu respondents.

**Table 6.02 Crime Survey: Attitudes towards the police – table shows data from respondents who answered ‘strongly agree’ or ‘tend to agree’**

The police in this area...		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
...can be relied on to be there when you need them	Weighted %	63.3	48.9***	48.8***	66.6*	45***	56.6***
	Unweighted base	5,841	226,138	178,588	2,647	782	1,106
...would treat you with respect if you had contact with them for any reason	Weighted %	82	83.8**	85***	85.5***	83.4	82.8
	Unweighted base	5,863	227,547	179,743	2,653	790	1,111
...treat everyone fairly regardless of who they are	Weighted %	69.7	64.3***	65.4***	75.4***	57***	67.1
	Unweighted base	5,744	223,274	176,246	2,622	756	1,095
...can be relied on to deal with minor crimes	Weighted %	56.9	45.2***	45.5***	55.7	37.3***	48.9***
	Unweighted base	5,720	225,527	178,077	2,622	777	1,099
...understand the issues that affect this community	Weighted %	65.5	64.5	65.4	67.5	62.8	63
	Unweighted base	5,667	223,618	176,607	2,599	765	1,090
...are dealing with the things that matter to people in this community	Weighted %	60.5	53.1***	54.2***	63	52.6***	55.4**
	Unweighted base	5,668	223,339	176,412	2,590	758	1,093
Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area	Weighted %	71.8	67.3***	68.1***	75.6**	64.7**	67.6*
	Unweighted base	5,890	228,073	180,135	2,665	792	1,112

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables: relig2, polatt1, polatt2, polatt3, polatt4, polatt5, polatt6, polatt7  
 p weighted with indivwgt  
 \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)


**Table 6.03 Crime Survey: Results of Pearson's chi-square test analysis of differences in attitudes (5 Likert items) towards the police**

		$\chi^2$	df	p<0.001
<b>Police fairness during a vehicle stop</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	18.48	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	49.62	28	Yes
<b>Police reliability</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	937.89	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,753.36	28	Yes
<b>Respectful treatment by the police</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	128.12	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,194.7	28	Yes
<b>Fair treatment by the police</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	561.09	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	2,123.75	28	Yes
<b>Police reliability with minor crimes</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	518.16	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,051.62	28	Yes
<b>Police understanding of community issues</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	165.29	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	681.46	28	Yes
<b>Police dealing with things that matter to this community</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	338.1	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,242.71	28	Yes
<b>Confidence in police effectiveness to catch criminals</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	569.75	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,118.07	28	Yes
<b>Confidence in the police</b>				
	Muslim/non-Muslim (2x5)	383.87	4	Yes
	All religion groups (8x5)	1,311.85	28	Yes

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/1

Variables: relig2, cjspolb, copfair1, polatt1, polatt2, polatt3, polatt4, polatt5, polatt6, polatt7


**Figure 6.09 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is effective?’**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: relig2, cjsovb1  
 p weighted with indivwgt

These attitudes were reflected in responses in relation to attitudes towards the fairness of the criminal justice system. Respondents were asked: ‘How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is fair?’ Overall, there were statistically significant differences between the religious groups and between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. 72.6% of Muslim respondents reported that they were very confident or fairly confident that the criminal justice system is fair (see Figure 6.10). Muslim respondents were nearly three times more likely than Christian respondents to report being very confident. Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian, Buddhist, Jewish and Sikh respondents to report some level of fairness. Whilst these differences were statistically significant, not all were particularly large. Muslim respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting fairness as Hindu respondents (i.e. differences were neither large nor statistically significant).

**Figure 6.10 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is fair?’**




Data source: BCS CSEW 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: fairova1, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwgt

Some of the response data in relation to attitudes about the discriminatory nature of the criminal justice system appear to support descriptions in the literature concerning anti-Muslim discrimination. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements, one of which pertained to the criminal justice system and asked for responses to the statement: ‘The criminal justice system discriminates against particular groups or individuals’ (see Figure 6.11). Muslim respondents were the most likely to strongly agree that the criminal justice system discriminates in this way. There were statistically significant differences between Muslim respondents and each of the Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh groups when compared individually (see Table 6.04). However, a majority of Muslim respondents (56.3%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (supporting a conclusion that the data suggest a wider spectrum of attitudes than the literature). This was fewer than Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents, although differences were not sizeable, and broadly similar to Jewish respondents. Arguably, the fact that fewer Muslim respondents than others reported agreement towards the statement is weak evidence as to the effects of discrimination, especially where Muslim respondents reporting disagreement make up a majority of those surveyed. Not only are Muslim attitudes towards the criminal justice system better than suggested by the literature, in many cases, and similar to attitudes towards the police, they are better than those reported by Christian respondents. Given the vehement attacks on policing and counter-terrorism practices, it would have been plausible to expect more evidence of very negative attitudes. The findings presented here challenge the notion

that all Muslim communities feel negatively towards the functions of the police, courts and prisons. The only variable response that seems to lend support to state-sponsored ‘Islamophobia’ is the finding that Muslim respondents are more likely than others to report strong agreement with a statement that the criminal justice system is discriminatory in nature (i.e. Muslim respondents are more likely to perceive the general discriminatory nature of the criminal justice system). However, and as shown in Figure 6.11, overall similarities in reported attitudes dilute the power of this evidence. (Also, the wording of the question does not allow us to determine whether Muslim respondents perceived discrimination against other Muslims, and Christians perceived the same against other Christians.)

**Figure 6.11 Crime Survey: Responses to the statement: ‘The criminal justice system discriminates against particular groups or individuals’**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: fairatt7, relig2  
 p weighted with indivwtg

**Table 6.04 Crime Survey: Attitudes towards the criminal justice system**

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
<b>How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is effective?</b>							
Very confident	Weighted %	10.2	2.6**	2.4**	8.9	1**	8.4
Fairly confident	Weighted %	54.6	36.8**	36.3**	53.4	40.1**	45.1**
	Total unweighted base	3058	139749	38.7	62.3	41.1	53.5
<b>How confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is fair?</b>							
Very confident	Weighted %	13.2	4.6**	4.5	11.4	2.9	9.1*
Fairly confident	Weighted %	59.4	54.4**	54.4	63.9*	60.4	58.3
	Total unweighted base	3115	139479	109767	1362	478	567
<b>How much do you agree or disagree that the criminal justice system discriminates against particular groups or individuals? (variable: fairatt7)</b>							
Strongly disagree	Weighted %	10.9	6.2**	5.9**	6.5**	6.8*	7.2*
Tend to disagree	Weighted %	32.8	28.1**	28**	28.9*	32.6	29
	Total unweighted base	2664	120898	94906	1184	411	475

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables: relig, cjspolb, fairatt7, fairova1

p weighted with indivwgt

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## **ATTITUDES TOWARDS BRITISH POLITICIANS AND THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT**


### **TRUSTING BRITISH POLITICIANS AND THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT**

This section of analysis broadens the focus of research into the police and criminal justice system by examining attitudes towards the wider British political system and feelings towards being British or being included in British society. As discussed, the surveys selected for this thesis do not always provide a convenient means by which to measure the practical consequences or outcomes of 'Islamophobia' in terms of national identity or citizenship. Instead, the research described here attempts to identify and analyse variable data that in some way relate to attitudes capable of being shaped by experiences of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. Asserting a causal relationship between acts of discrimination and negative feelings towards the national political system and feelings towards a person's country of residence or nationality is of course extremely difficult (arguably impossible). It is difficult to measure the extent to which the former impacts, if at all, on the latter. To avoid these problems, the following sections present analysis which sought to locate evidential clues to support the types of political and social exclusion described (explicitly or implicitly) by the literature pertaining to 'Islamophobia'.

The survey asked a series of questions related to the level of trust respondents have in the British Parliament and British politicians generally. As discussed, much of the scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and prejudice and hostility felt by Muslim communities is concerned with the breakdown of relations between Muslim communities, state bodies and the British political system (CBMI, 2004; Fekete, 2009; Pantanzis and Pemberton, 2009). Survey response data such as those analysed here provide an opportunity to measure and compare the attitudes of Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Sikh respondents towards various arms and functions of the British state and political system. Unfortunately, numbers in relation to Buddhist and Jewish respondents were not high enough to enable confident generalizations and were therefore excluded from the findings presented below.

Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian respondents to report strong trust with British politicians (the difference was statistically significant). However, use of a Monte Carlo chi-square test revealed that the overall relationship between religion affiliation and trust in politicians was not statistically significant ( $\chi^2=25.380$ ,  $df=12$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), and no statistically significant differences were found between Muslim respondents and respondents from the Hindu and Sikh groups when compared individually. The analysis of the data revealed a statistically significant relationship between the selected specific religion groups and reporting trust in Parliament at Westminster is ( $\chi^2=36.219$ ,  $df=12$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian respondents to report strong trust in Parliament (24.2% and 20.2% respectively) although slightly higher levels of strong trust were shown by Hindu and Sikh respondents (27.2% and 28.7% respectively). These differences were not statistically significant and so these findings remain indicative rather than conclusive. However, regardless of significance, the analysis revealed stronger trust in Parliament than might be presumed from an uncritical reading of the literature.

**Figure 6.12 EMBES: Respondents reported strong levels of trust in British politicians generally**




Data source: EMBES 2010  
 Variables used: eq106\_a, bq16\_3  
 p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5  
 \*p<0.01

**Table 6.05 EMBES: Attitudes towards British Parliament and British politicians**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh	Other
<b>Indicate how much trust you have in British politicians generally</b>						
<b>Strong trust<sup>1</sup></b>	Weighted %	19.5	13.1*	14.5	14.4	
	Unweighted base	1033	685	372	384	
<b>Indicate how much trust you have in Parliament at Westminster</b>						
<b>Strong trust<sup>1</sup></b>	Weighted %	24.2	20.2	27.2	28.7	
	Unweighted base	1002	664	357	261	

Data source: EMBES 2010  
 Variables used: eq106a, bq16\_2, bq16\_3  
 p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5  
<sup>1</sup>Respondents were asked to measure trust on a scale of 1 to 10; here 'strong trust' means reported scores of 8 or higher.  
 \*p<0.01 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Figure 6.13 EMBES: Respondents who reported strong levels of trust in the Parliament at Westminster**



Data source: EMBES 2010  
 Variables used: eq106\_a, bq16\_2  
 p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

## **MUSLIM ATTITUDES TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF CERTAIN ISSUES**

The survey asked respondents a series of questions related to their attitudes about how well the last government handled a series of five political and social issues:

- crime
- immigration
- the NHS
- the risk of terrorism
- the economy


These survey questions attempted to capture attitudes towards the Labour Government of 2007 to 2010, but it was recognized that respondents may well have perceived the term 'last government' as referring to the four Labour administrations from 1997 to 2010. The most relevant issue to the study of 'Islamophobia' is the variable related to 'the risk of terrorism'. According to recent commentary (cf. Fekete, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), and as described above, British Muslim communities have expressed negative opinions towards being targeted by anti-terror legislation and counter-terrorist practices. Analysis of the EMBES 2010 reveals a more complex picture of Muslim attitudes towards these practices. Respondents were asked: 'How well did the last government handle the risk of terrorism?' Notwithstanding the numerous accounts in the literature of supposedly widespread negative feelings towards recently used counter-terrorism measures, the most popular response from Muslim respondents was 'fairly well' (39.5%). Given the literature it is perhaps surprising that a majority of Muslim respondents reported 'fairly well' or 'very well' (52.7%). Only a quarter of respondents reported negative attitudes (25.2% selected 'fairly badly' or 'very badly'), and only 10.5% selected 'very badly'. Generally, Muslim and Hindu respondents shared broadly similar responses; there were no statistically significant differences across any of the conditions (arranged in a Likert scale). However, the findings revealed that Christian and Sikh

respondents were more likely than Muslim respondents to report positive feelings (the differences between the Muslim group and the other two, when tested individually, were both statistically significant).

Respondents were asked in a similar question in relation to crime: 'How well did the last government handle crime?' Again, a majority of Muslim respondents reported positive attitudes (51.4% selected either 'fairly well' or 'very well', see Table 6.06). These positive sentiments towards the government were reflected in other related questions. Two thirds of Muslim respondents (66.6%) reported that the government had handled well the National Health Service. Related questions concerning immigration and the economy elicited positive responses from fewer Muslim respondents: 44.5% thought the government had handled immigration well and 43.7% the economy. In these two cases, however, Muslim respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting positive sentiment as Christian respondents and higher likelihood than Hindu respondents (in both cases, differences were statistically significant. The EMBES data would seem to suggest that Muslim respondents were more likely to report positive feelings towards the government than is suggested by the relevant literature.

The points of analysis pertinent to the study of 'Islamophobia', and a comparison between scholarly literature and statistical data, are that less than 10% of Muslim respondents feel that the last government handled the risk of terrorism 'very badly' and nearly a half of Muslim respondents expressed some form of positive attitude towards it. This conclusion is made tentatively in full recognition of the fact that more data (quantitative or qualitative or both) are required to examine British Muslim attitudes towards counter-terrorism measures and anti-terror legislation together with the findings related to trusting the police as discussed earlier in this section. The findings reveal a wider spectrum of attitudes towards counter-terrorism than is asserted throughout the literature, and fewer examples of the practical consequences of 'Islamophobic' state scrutiny (i.e. negative attitudes towards the handling of terrorism) than might be assumed given dominant assertions within the scholarly and policy literature concerning 'Islamophobia'.

**Figure 6.14 EMBES: Attitudes towards the Government's handling of various issues reported by Muslim respondents**



Data source: EMBES 2010  
 Variables used: eq106\_a, bq3\_1, bq3\_3, bq3\_4, bq3\_5, bq3\_6  
 p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

**Table 6.06 EMBES: Respondents who reported positive attitudes<sup>1</sup> towards British Government's handling of certain issues**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh
Crime	Weighted %	51.4	49.3	44.8	41.9
	Unweighted base	1068	805	219	155
Terrorism	Weighted %	52.7	65.8***	55.3	64.9*
	Unweighted base	1038	770	216	151
Immigration	Weighted %	44.5	41.3	35.2*	25.4***
	Unweighted base	1053	788	217	157
NHS	Weighted %	66.6	66.9	65.1	50.2**
	Unweighted base	1083	809	224	155
Economy	Weighted %	43.7	47.6	33.7*	35.3
	Unweighted base	1067	806	223	153

Data source: EMBES 2010  
 Variables used: bq3\_1 recoded, bq3\_3 recoded, bq3\_4 recoded, bq3\_5 recoded, bq3\_6 recoded, eq106\_a recoded  
 p weighted with weight\_trimmedf2fall5

<sup>1</sup>Data merged from 'very well' and 'fairly well' responses

\*p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS FEELING PART OF BRITISH SOCIETY


The Citizenship Survey asked the respondents: "To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?" Feeling British (or more pertinently not feeling British) is arguably an example of the possible effects of 'Islamophobia': described in the literature as the 'practical consequences' of 'Islamophobia' (Bleich, 2010). Analysis of

these variables was undertaken to determine the extent of feelings of 'Britishness' within Muslim communities and the extent to which there were differences in the levels of such feeling between Muslim respondents and respondents from other minority religion groups. Of course, measuring the extent to which Muslim respondents feel British neither proves nor disproves the existence of 'Islamophobia' as constructed in the literature but such sentiments might offer evidential clues as to the level to which Muslim communities feel that they have been excluded from mainstream British society, as suggested by the Runnymede trust report and its follow up (CBMI, 2004, Runnymede Trust, 1997). Lower feelings of national identity might be symptomatic of exclusion and marginalization, which in turn might be brought about by systematic anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic prejudice and hostility. Assessing the extent to which each of these factors influence and are influenced by the others is impossible using survey data alone. As stated, the findings here are presented as indicative rather than conclusive. Respondents were asked: 'To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel part of British society?' Available responses formed a Likert scale (strongly agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to disagree and strongly disagree). Overall the association between feeling part of British society and religious affiliation was also statistically significant using Chi-square and the Monte Carlo significance test. 92.1% of Muslim respondents registered some level of agreement with the statement (that they personally feel to be a part of British society) by either responding 'strongly agree' or 'tend to agree' (see Figure 6.15). The analysis revealed a relatively small (although statistically significant) difference between Muslim and Christian respondents who choose 'strongly agree', and further similar difference between Muslim and Jewish respondents (see Table 6.07). Analysis of response data revealed that Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting that they agreed strongly with the statement.

It would appear therefore that strong feelings of inclusion in British society were shared by all respondents (regardless of religious affiliation), although there were differences between the religion groups in terms of agreeing strongly with the statement, over 80% of

respondents from each group reported some level of agreement. Analysis was then carried out in which ‘strongly agree’ and ‘tend to agree’ were merged into a category labelled ‘strongly/tend to agree’. Results are presented in Fig. 6.15. Muslim and Christian respondents shared almost identical levels of feeling at least some sense of being part of British society. A similar frequency of Hindu, Jewish and Sikh respondents reported some level of agreement with the statement.

**Figure 6.15 Citizenship Survey: Respondents who agreed that they feel part of British society**



Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10  
 Variables used: relig, febrit  
 p weighted with wtfinds


## ATTITUDES TOWARDS BELONGING TO BRITISH SOCIETY

Another Citizenship Survey variable dealt with a similar theme and afforded the chance to triangulate findings related to feelings of ‘being part’ of British society with those of ‘belonging to’ British society. The survey asked respondents: ‘How strongly do you feel you belong [to Britain]?’ As previously, available responses formed a Likert scale. Overall, and via the use of chi-square analysis that included a Monte Carlo significance test, the findings revealed a statistically significant relationship between religious affiliation and a sense of belonging to Britain ( $\chi^2=389.112$ ,  $df=21$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). 87.5% of Muslim respondents described some level of strong feelings of belonging to Britain: 44.8% of Muslim respondents reported feeling ‘very strongly’ (see Figure 6.16 and Table 6.07). Echoing the findings related to feeling part of Britain, relatively large numbers of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents reporting

feeling very strongly about belonging to Britain.

These findings would appear to challenge assertions with the scholarly literature that assert a depiction of Muslim communities as perceiving themselves to be excluded from mainstream British society. The analysed data reveal instead feelings of inclusion that are shared between other minority groups and which in places differ only marginally with Christian respondents. There is little evidence within the data which support a construction of Muslim communities as alienated or excluded through a lack of British identity or sense of belonging within mainstream British society. As stated earlier, this does not necessarily disprove the existence of ‘Islamophobia’ but it does strongly suggest that if anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment is widespread (as asserted in the literature) there is evidence here that such sentiments have had a negligible effect on Muslim respondents’ sense of feeling British.

**Figure 6.16 Citizenship Survey: Respondents who reported positive feelings towards belonging to Britain**



Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10  
 Variables used: relig, sbegb  
 p weighted with wtfinds

**Table 6.07 Citizenship Survey: Respondents who reported positive attitudes towards feeling part of British society and belonging to Britain**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
<b>To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society</b>						
Strongly agree	Weighted %	48.2	56.4***	48.8	58.2*	51.1
Tend to agree	Weighted %	43.9	36.5***	44.6	37.5	45.4
	Unweighted base	7586	26304	2312	141	1044
<b>How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?</b>						
Strongly agree	Weighted %	44.8	48.7	42.1	39.4	44.6
Tend to agree	Weighted %	42.7	37.5	45.2	40.9	45.9
	Unweighted base	7636	26372	2323	141	1053

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: relig, febrit, sbegb

p weighted with wtfinds

\*p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- **Overall, the analysis revealed positive attitudes towards the police and attitudes that were in most cases more positive than those held by non-Muslims.**
- **The findings suggested that disproportionate police searches did not seem to affect attitudes towards police fairness.**
- **The analysis revealed a higher level of confidence and perceived fairness in the criminal justice system among Muslim respondents than among other groups of respondents.**
- **Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian respondents to perceive the criminal justice system as discriminating against certain groups.**

- **Attitudes towards police and criminal justice in this chapter appear to contradict earlier findings about discrimination, suggesting a complex, nuanced overall picture.**
- **Muslim respondents reported higher attitudes towards British politicians than Christian respondents and similar attitudes as those reported by Hindu and Sikh respondents.**
- **Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents shared positive reported attitudes towards Parliament.**
- **A majority of Muslim respondents (but not a large one) reported positive attitudes towards the handling of crime, counter-terrorism and the NHS by the Government.**
- **Overall, Muslim respondents reported attitudes towards the Government's handling of immigration and the economy that were less positive than those in relation to crime and terrorism (suggesting a complex overall picture of attitudes towards the efficacy and successes of British state policy).**
- **Overall, there was no evidence to show that Muslim respondents felt less British or felt less part of Britain than non-Muslim others.**

## **CONCLUSION**

This discrepancy between literature and data is compounded by research questions regarding attitudes towards the police and the British political system which are not designed to elicit detailed data related to attitudes towards counter-terrorism measures and anti-terror law. For instance only one survey question from the five surveys explored here relates specifically to the 'risk of terrorism'. Although admittedly conjectural, it could be argued that

a respondent might hold negative attitudes towards issues concerning the last Labour Government's handling of terrorism in terms of its effect on civil liberties (as the literature strongly suggests) whilst feeling positively towards the Labour Government's success at thwarting attempted acts of terrorism. Similarly, the finding of overall trust between Muslim respondents and the police confounds assertions found within the scholarly literature. These assertions depict the breakdown of community relations with the police following the terrorist events in New York of 11th September 2001 and the state-sponsored reaction as funnelled by anti-terror legislation and police counter-terrorism initiatives (e.g. Fekete, 2009 and Pemberton and Pantazis, 2009). Data here show that despite the alleged breakdown of community-police relations, Muslim respondents, seemingly, are no less likely to trust the police than members of other religion groups and in some cases more likely. Police measures such as the Prevent and Contest strategies have traditionally targeted British Muslim communities. Prevent was launched as a means to contain extremism of several kinds but has concentrated resources primarily to tackle Muslim extremism. However, one consequence of this focus by police forces (and the subsequent increase in intelligence-gathering in Muslim communities) could be the strengthening of police and community links in some areas. This strengthened relationship could manifest in positive (and perhaps unexpected) ways within the high levels of trust demonstrated by the analysis presented here. Alternatively, and without the assertion of a causal relationship, there could be widespread criticism of Prevent measures alongside a basic level of satisfaction in more 'everyday' forms of policing.

Arguably, the available data related to feeling British do not explore the subject in enough depth or detail to complete the criminological and sociological picture. Again however, the findings presented here raise questions about the extent to which reports such as the Runnymede Trust (1997) and CBMI (2004) reports provide an accurate overall picture of such sentiments with British Muslim communities. In this regard, the findings presented here would appear to lend support to the in-depth exploration and development by the 2009 Gallup research described in the introduction. The confidence in political institutions found by Gallup

among its Muslim participants is echoed in the reported attitudes of Muslim respondents in the Citizenship Survey. The analysis presented here would appear to suggest a more complex, and in many cases, a more positive relationship between British Muslim communities and the state (and in particular the police) than is asserted in the scholarly and non-scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. Whilst it is not possible to explore 'institutional Islamophobia' fully without studying actors within institutions such as British police forces, the analysis indicates that there is scant evidence for the type of universal distrust among British Muslim communities that might be expected if we assume the widespread presence of anti-Muslim prejudices at an institutional level and their frequent manifestation as discriminatory practice and feelings of unfair treatment at the individual level. The next chapter will develop and extend the criminological study of reported attitudes and feelings within British Muslim communities by presenting an analysis of available Crime Survey data pertaining to fear of crime.

## CHAPTER 7

### FEAR OF CRIME

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the subject of fear of crime amongst British Muslim communities using data generated by Muslim respondents participating in the Crime Survey and the Citizenship Survey. The chapter opens with an examination of recent research studies that analysed and discussed fear of crime within British Muslim communities. As will be demonstrated further, although fear of crime is a well-established theme within mainstream criminology, it is still a relatively under-researched topic within the criminological study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities. Notwithstanding the limited availability of research findings, a narrative has emerged in the literature which asserts increased anxiety and fear within British Muslim communities (particularly as a response to incidents of retaliatory violence and discrimination following significant news events featuring Muslims and some form of conflict or violence). A main aim of this chapter is to contribute towards remedying the absence of empirical research in this area and to determine the extent to which common assertions in the literature are supported or challenged by fear of crime data. In order to situate the present study within previous research the chapter offers an overview of the main criminological debates around the use, and usefulness, of large-scale fear of crime data. The chapter then proceeds with analysis of fear of crime data from the Crime Survey and the Citizenship Survey.

Reported fear of 'Islamophobia' is examined using survey variables related to the types of crime most often described in the term's conceptualizations. No survey question analysed in this chapter used the term 'Islamophobia' so instead the research focused on reported fear of crime perceived by Muslim respondents as being motivated by religion and ethnicity. Unfortunately, and as will be demonstrated, the design of the Crime Survey limited opportunities to analyse these types of crimes. Findings were thus indicative rather than

conclusive. Given these limitations, the research focused on fear of personal and violent crime even when these fears were not explicitly linked by the survey to religious and ethnic identity. In this way, the analysis was able to explore criminological issues which, whilst not always corresponding exactly to the conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' or anti-Muslim hatred found in the literature, related to the types of fears and anxieties that are often described as affecting British Muslim lives. The chapter also presents analysis of data related to the reported fear of household crime. Such fears (including the fear of property damage) were identified as being possible components of feeling targeted by anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment. Further, reported fear of household crime data offered the opportunity to investigate emergent trends and patterns within personal crime. These patterns were further explored using fear of general crime and logistic regression modelling used to compare the role of various demographic and socio-economic factors (including religion and ethnicity) in shaping reported fear of crime among all respondents.

Fear of crime is measured by survey questions in two ways: respondents are invited to report their level of worry about specified personal and household crimes; and to report the perceived likelihood of becoming the victim of specified personal and household crimes. It should be noted that none of the survey questions in the Crime Survey and the Citizenship Survey explore specific psychological responses associated to fear. 'Worry about crime' might be a more suitable label. In fact, the question of what is captured by fear of crime survey questions, the usefulness of such data, and their most appropriate applications are central to the current criminological debates around the concept. Given this, the term is not used uncritically here and not without due regard to the more compelling arguments against the methodological utility of current and previous applications of the concept. Notwithstanding these ongoing debates, usage of the term in the present chapter reflects its common usage elsewhere in the social sciences and as short-hand for the range of psychological responses addressed by the survey questions analysed here.

## **EXISTING RESEARCH INTO FEAR OF CRIME AND ITS EFFECTS ON BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES**

Although not all the research in this area emanated from official administrative sources, much of the literature informing the research reported in this chapter was published by governmental departments. Fear of crime is a research topic seemingly well-served by a wide scope of survey questions and available data to which various state and criminal justice agencies have applied statistical methods in order to explore the concept of fear and the role of demographic factors such as gender and age in shaping levels of fear (cf. Hough and Mayhew, 1983). More recent Home Office studies have widened the demographic focus to include the role of ethnicity (Clancy et al, 2001; Ministry of Justice, 2011). However, within this context of broadening demographic considerations, the role of religion has not been a frequently researched topic. Similarly, fear of crime amongst British Muslim communities has not occupied a central position in the conceptualization of ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-Muslim hate crime, prejudice and discrimination. This is perhaps surprising given ‘Muslim’ fear of crime would appear to fit squarely within Bleich’s model (Bleich, 2011) as a practical consequence of ‘Islamophobia’ (i.e. the fear resulting from the actual or perceived risks of hostility, prejudice and discrimination against Muslim individuals and groups), and within the conceptualization of social exclusion found within the Runnymede Trust (1997) and CBMI (2004) reports (i.e. the measurable effects that fear of crime might have on an individual’s daily routine and the avoidance of risk). However, research has seemingly been focused elsewhere (for example, on theoretical and political considerations, or on actual experiences of physical violence). Despite the more recent availability of statistical data and despite the fact that numerous scholars and commentators have asserted the increased risks of crime faced by British Muslim communities there is a demonstrable gap in the criminological knowledge concerning quantitative research around reported fear of crime by British Muslim communities: an empirical gap which this chapter aims to fill. For the purposes of the analysis presented below fear of crime is identified and defined as a possible reflection and consequence of anti-Muslim attitudes and sentiment, and the targeting of British Muslim

communities by prejudice, discrimination and hate crime victimization. Whilst there may be few research projects where the primary aims have been to investigate fear of crime among British Muslim communities, the fears, worries and anxieties of Muslim communities are not without mention within the scholarly literature around 'Islamophobia' and anti-Muslim hate crime. Fear within Muslim communities has been described as 'profound' (Osborne and Jones, 2008: 7). Scholars have described a hostile climate (Brittain, 2009); a climate in which Muslims are unable to live free from the fear of Islamophobia (OIC, 2008). British Muslim communities have been described as having a 'tangible fear' of being assaulted and abused that has affected freedoms of movement and expression (Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009: 749). Such fear has been described as leading to 'restricted freedom of movement in the public sphere', including in the street, in and around shops, and on public transport. These fears are described as having 'limited pivotal aspects of identity building' including visiting friends, going to college or attending a mosque (2009: 749).

Mythen, Walklate and Khan developed the conceptualization of Muslim fear of crime, particularly in relation to its manifestation by asserting the extent to which Muslim people arrange, or more accurately perhaps, re-arrange their daily lives and routines in the face of the purported risks. These 're-arrangements' are evoked when Muslim men are described as having shaven off beards and adopted less visibly Muslim identities (Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010: 22), or when Muslim women are described as too fearful to go out alone during the day (Op. cit.: 166). Other scholars have described fear of hate crime among British Muslim communities as a consequence of impactful incidents (such as the bombing of mosques) or cumulative actions of far-right political groups such as the EDL (Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). The consequences (and also signifiers) of this fear are described here as the under-reporting of anti-Muslim hate crime (implying the fear of further victimization, or the anxiety caused by feeling unprotected by the criminal justice system).

Elsewhere, and in a similar and contemporaneous study, numerous newspapers reports are identified as contributing towards discourse around British Muslim fear of crime

(Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). Findings in a previous chapter revealed that female Muslim respondents who reported discrimination were more likely than women from other religions to report incidents occurring in public places. This chapter seeks to triangulate these findings with the analysis of fear of crime data presented below.

There have been relatively few studies of Muslim women's fear of crime. Amongst these is research undertaken around Muslim women's safety (Spalek, 2002). Spalek employed qualitative research methods (group interviews) and an overall research design situated within a feminist paradigm (including female researcher, female participants, an awareness of the power differentials between both) to explore issues around wearing the veil and hate crime victimization. Spalek did not assert that the fears held by the Muslim participants were related to their 'Muslimness' or that the participants feared crime more than non-Muslims. For Spalek, Islamic and Muslim culture and identity informed the responses to and management of certain difficult social situations and incidents (and in particular sexual harassment by heterosexual males) rather than the initial targeting of the victim.

The research presented here sought to further explore fear of crime with data generated by female Muslim respondents and with research methods that did not require further intrusion into the lives of vulnerable participants. In the context of social survey research methods, and their utility, it is recognized that many individuals may be unwilling to give a full account of their fears about crime victimization (especially to a stranger). However, the findings presented in this chapter largely support Spalek's finding that being Muslim does not necessarily correlate positively with an increased fear of crime. Unlike Spalek's findings however, survey data offer few clues as to how fear and risk are managed by participants. Findings presented below repeatedly demonstrate the parity between the fear of crime reported by Muslim respondents and that reported by respondents from other minority religion groups.

The present chapter aims to extend Spalek's more qualitative work around Muslim women's fear of crime. It seeks to adduce statistical evidence to triangulate earlier findings, to enhance existing research (and broaden available research methods and extend the methodologies used in this area of research from the feminist research paradigm and qualitative research methods), and to make a contribution towards the signposting of future research in this area. If a victim-centred approach to anti-Muslim hostility, discrimination and hate crime is employed (one informed by Macpherson's definition of racism as being anything perceived by the victim as being racist) then we may view Muslim fear of crime as an indicator of the levels of 'Islamophobia' currently found within British society. That said, and as previous research around fear of crime and the elderly demonstrates, the correlation between what is feared and what is 'out there' must be treated with caution. Reported fear of crime will almost certainly reflect the fear of perceived risks alongside those of actual risks; and the two may differ significantly. Arguably however, researchers are duty-bound to accept these fears as being real for the participant. If this acceptance is made by the researcher then findings around fear of crime may be considered as a metric for two quantifiable phenomena. First, reported fear of crime data offered by Muslim respondents may be viewed as a reliable indicator of the amount of 'Islamophobia' currently 'out there'. Second, reported fear of crime data may be viewed as a reliable gauge on which we may observe the practical effects or consequences of 'Islamophobia'. Fear of crime data were analysed in order to establish whether there was evidence for a 'state of heightened anxiety' (Spalek, 2002: 11).

## **RECENT CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH AROUND FEAR OF CRIME**

As stated, the study of fear of crime is a significant and longstanding feature within mainstream British criminological literature (Hale, 1996; Walklate and Mythen, 2008). Introductory texts have described how our fear of crime, often driven by sensationalist media coverage, is capable of affecting daily lives and shaping routine behaviour (cf. Croall, 1998). Where victims are the central focus, fear of crime has been located within the distinction made between the objective impacts of crime, the financial or physical costs, and the subjective

impacts, psychological responses including stress, sleeplessness, illness, and increased fear (Walklate, 1989). It has been argued that fear of crime at the individual and group level often far exceeds the actual risks of crime (Hough and Mayhew, 1983; Hough, 1995). Previous research has found that young men face a greater risk of street violence than young women and the elderly though tend to report far lower levels of fear than either group: suggesting perhaps the irrationality of fear of violent crime among women and the elderly. This use of fear of crime data to measure the rationality of respondents' worries by comparing them to the risks of victimization has contributed to a well-rehearsed narrative around worry and threat and has been central to debates around the use of fear of crime survey data (Lee, 2007). It has been argued that to establish distinctions between rationality and irrationality, between what is reasonable and unreasonable to fear, and between what is an appropriate or an excessive level of worry is to risk 'making highly presumptive but theoretically under-justified judgements about the nature of emotions and cognitions' (Matthews and Young, 1992: 124). Young had argued previously that statements about the rationality of fear of crime risks obscuring differences between social groups and the differing degrees of impact crime can have on these groups in terms of meaning and consequences. More specifically, meaning has been described in terms of social relationships, hierarchies of power, and the inequality of victims and victimization caused by structural differences in power (Maguire, 2007). Later conclusions have extended these critical arguments and attacked criminologists seeking 'conceptual tidiness' through use of an 'actuarial approach' which quantifies criminal behaviour and the associated perceptions of risk but which does not reflect the broad range of social, political, cultural, and economic changes which have restructured both modern-day identities and insecurities (Walklate and Mythen, 2008; for the changes described see Beck, 1992 and Furedi, 2005). Walklate and Mythen argued that fear of crime ought to be located within a range of other worries (worries about employment, housing, health and finance for instance), and that survey questions which seek to uncover truths about fear of crime reveal wider social, economic and political anxieties.

These arguments address legitimate concerns over social survey data and their use but perhaps underestimate the range of motives underpinning their collection by criminologists. The use of social survey data is no longer the exclusive preserve of government bodies and crime agencies (if indeed it ever was). Ethnic minority boosts and variables which collect demographic, ethnic and religious information are now analysed regularly by researchers and organizations motivated by monitoring and reducing discrimination against minority groups (cf. EHRC, 2011). Rather than adopting a critical perspective to reject the fundamental utility of collecting fear of crime data, the research design used throughout this chapter is underpinned by assumptions that structural inequalities exist but that developing further a criminological understanding of British Muslim communities is capable of strengthening approaches towards social equality and justice. Further, a study of fear of crime data pertaining to Muslim respondents is arguably a logical and required response to the recent expansion of scholarly and non-scholarly literature with descriptions of the increased fears and risks suffered by British Muslim communities but without recourse to empirical data. Research in this chapter is underpinned by a further assumption that more knowledge and evidence are needed in this area of research and that an uncritical reading of the literature is at least as undesirable as the uncritical use of statistics.

### **SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN**

Variables were selected where they related to fear, worry or anxiety in relation to various types of crime. The primary source of the data was the Crime Survey although data from the Citizenship Survey were also analysed. As elsewhere, the analysis compares Muslim respondents with respondents from other religion groups. Cross tabulation, Pearson's chi-square tests and two proportion z-tests were used to explore data related to the fear of hate crime, personal crime and household crime. Also included, and by way of comparing assertions around Muslim women, is analysis that focuses on fear of crime among female Muslim respondents. The analysis aims to answer the overarching primary research question (To what extent are the assertions and conclusions concerning 'Islamophobia' supported or

challenged by available large-scale social survey data?), and also answer the following secondary questions: To what extent are descriptions of fears and anxieties around ‘Islamophobia’, discrimination and crime victimization among British Muslim communities reflected in the reported attitudes of surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is there evidence of the fears and anxieties among British Muslim communities as asserted by scholars?

## **FINDINGS**

### **FEAR OF CRIME TYPES THAT CORRESPOND WITH THOSE USED IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ‘ISLAMOPHOBIA’**


This section presents findings generated by fear of crime survey questions which addressed the types of offences linked directly to those described in the literature as being synonymous with ‘Islamophobia’. A small number of survey questions among the five surveys selected for analysis asked respondents to report their fear of crime motivated by skin colour, ethnicity or religion. The Crime Survey invited respondents to report whether it was likely that they would be the subject of physical attack or assault because of skin colour, ethnic origin or religion. The Citizenship Survey asked respondents how worried were they about attack because of skin colour, ethnicity, or religion. These questions provide an opportunity to analyse reported worry and perceived likelihood in relation to offences consistent with those described in the literature as commonly underpinned with anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic hatred: offences related in the literature, either explicitly or implicitly, to the concept of ‘Islamophobia’. Using reported worry or perceived likelihood of crime which target ‘skin colour, ethnicity or religion’ is of course an imperfect metric with which to measure fear of ‘Islamophobia’ per se (no survey question used by this thesis, or any other currently available for analysis, uses the terms ‘Islamophobia’ or ‘anti-Muslim hatred’).

Further, and at first glance, the aggregating of skin colour, ethnicity, and religion might be viewed as a missed opportunity to examine each of these items separately. However, there is a broad consensus within the literature that ‘Islamophobia’ may be constructed as an

ideology or negative sentiment which targets religion, ethnicity and culture (sometimes separately, but often simultaneously). Arguably then, a variable measuring victimization due to colour, ethnicity and religion is more appropriate than one using religion alone. For instance, it may be difficult for a hate crime victim to ascertain which element or elements of their identity (perceived or actual) were targeted and attacked. For example, and in the context of anti-Muslim abuse, a person who is abused by being called a terrorist or told to 'go home' or who suffers verbal abuse in relation to an item of clothing may feel that both their ethnicity and religion have been targeted. A single survey question which addresses both ethnicity and religion is arguably a useful analytical tool; one capable of eliciting responses from Muslim respondents who are not asked to speculate as to the primary motivation of the offender, but only to identify and report that their victimization was motivated by some form of hate. The survey posed two types of questions. The first invited the respondent to report how worried they felt about being the victim of a specified crime (or crimes). A second asked the respondents to report how likely it was that s/he would be the victim of a specified crime. There is of course a difference between being worried about something and perceiving something as likely – each are distinct psychological responses. Within the context of reported fear of crime, it is plausible that these two questions, where they ask about similar types of crime, may well elicit a different type or level of response by the same respondent. It was understood however that both questions sought in some way to measure risk as perceived by the respondent. Accordingly, response data were analysed together as such. Therefore the fear, worry, and perceived likelihood, and risk reported by Muslim respondents are compared to descriptions of the same found within literature concerning 'Islamophobia', anti-Muslim hate crime and British Muslim communities. The analysis of the variables described in this section was undertaken to provide evidential clues as to the level of worry about 'Islamophobia' and, as elsewhere in this thesis, to compare the levels measured here with those described in the relevant scholarly literature.

Crime Survey respondents who reported that physical assault by a stranger next year was very or fairly likely (and only these respondents) were next asked: ‘Do you think you are likely to be physically attacked or assaulted in the next year because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?’ As shown in Figure 7.01 and Table 7.01, a majority of Muslim respondents (57.7%) answered ‘yes’. Muslim and Hindu respondents (where for the former,  $n=168$ , and for the latter,  $n=68$ ) shared a broadly similar likelihood of answering ‘yes’ (i.e. a difference that was non-significant at the 95% level). Low sample sizes (particularly in respect of Jewish respondents (where  $n=11$ ) and Sikh respondents (where  $n=23$ ) made comparison between Muslim respondents and the minority religion groups difficult. Although only a tentative conclusion is possible, the response data for Sikh respondents suggested a shared level of reported likelihood with Muslim and Hindu respondents. (NB. These results of bivariate analysis may well be confounded by the skin colour of respondents. Notwithstanding this, they serve as a basic method to compare Muslim and other respondents for the purposes placing assertions in the literature under empirical scrutiny.)

**Figure 7.01 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported as likely being physically attacked or assaulted in the next year because of skin colour, ethnicity or religion**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: latthat, relig2

p weighted with indivwt

Data in shaded areas where sample size < 50


Unweighted bases: Muslim=169, non-Muslim=2965, Christian=2231, Hindu=68, Jewish=11, Sikh=23

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

Citizenship Survey respondents were asked: 'How worried are you about being physically attacked because of your skin colour, ethnicity or religion?' Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian and Jewish respondents to report being very worried. A larger sample size of respondents from a range of minority religions made comparison of Citizenship Survey data easier than Crime Survey data. As shown in Figure 7.02 (and Table 7.01) Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents shared a broadly similar likelihood of reporting being very worried about this type of attack (non-significant difference at the 95% level). The findings revealed a similar pattern to the Crime Survey data. Muslim and Hindu groups shared a similar level of reported worry to each other and a higher level than non-Muslim and Christian respondents. That said, far fewer Muslim respondents reported some level of worry to the Citizenship Survey (29.1%) than reported the likelihood of a hate crime attack to the Crime Survey (57.7%). Without further research it is difficult to explain the differences between the Crime Survey and the Citizenship Survey in this regard. It could be that the overall nature of the Crime Survey gives an opportunity for the respondents to reflect at length on issues of risk and personal safety and is thus more likely to stir up or magnify existing anxieties about becoming the victim of crime. Notwithstanding these differences, and any speculation as to the reasons underpinning them, the findings revealed a similar pattern of worry between the religion groups. A higher percentage of Muslim respondents than Christian respondents reported being very worried. Response data from Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents appeared to cluster with broadly similar percentages and no statistically significant differences.

**Figure 7.02 Citizenship Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worried about being physically attacked because of skin colour, ethnicity or religion**



Data source: CS 2007, 2008, 2009

Variables used: wraceatt, relig

p weighted with indivwgt

Unweighted bases: Muslim=7,680, non-Muslim=37,107, Christian=26,420, Hindu=2,332, Jewish=141, Sikh=1,051

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

Crime Survey respondents who reported that it was very or fairly likely that they would be harassed or intimidated in the street or any other public place in the next year were then asked: ‘Do you think you are likely to be harassed or intimidated in the next year because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?’ There is some overlap, and a little ambiguity, created by the wording of the two Crime Survey questions analysed here: one used the term ‘physically attacked or assaulted’ (‘Do you think you are likely to be physically attacked or assaulted in the next year because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?’); the other ‘harassed or intimidated’ (‘Do you think you are likely to be harassed or intimidated in the next year because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?’). Under English and Welsh law an ‘assault’ may be occasioned by words as well as by actions (i.e. it does not require physical contact). Therefore words that harass or intimidate may also satisfy the legal definition of an assault. There is no indication given as to whether the first question referred to physical attack and physical assault or whether it referred to physical attack and any kind of assault. Further, there is no way of knowing how the question was understood by the respondents. For those respondents who were asked both questions it is impossible to know the type of distinction (if any) that was made between the types of incidents described in the question. It might have been better to word the survey questions such that one referred explicitly to physical abuse

and one to verbal abuse (although it is possible that the questions were in fact understood in this way by some respondents). Low numbers of Jewish and Sikh respondents made comparison (and significance testing) difficult although findings have been included here, again, to provide an indication of the level of fear reported by each group. As can be seen from Figure 7.03 Muslim and Hindu respondents shared a similar likelihood of reporting the likelihood of being harassed or intimidated due to ethnicity or religion. It appeared likely that this similarity may have been shared with Sikh respondents.

**Table 7.01 Crime Survey: Fear of violent or personal crime**

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
<b>Worried about crime</b>						
Weighted %	15	8.5***	8.9***	15.2	16	16.5
Unweighted base	7,673	37,180	26,482	2,331	142	1,048
<b>Very worried about being...</b>						
<b>...pestered by anybody</b>						
Weighted %	15.4	6.8***	6.7***	15.9	7.1***	17
Unweighted base	3,579	128,231	101,656	1,676	448	692
<b>...mugged and robbed</b>						
Weighted %	23	10.3***	10.5***	25	11.3***	22.6
Unweighted base	3,574	128,234	101,651	1,677	447	693
<b>...a victim of gun crime</b>						
Weighted %	22.2	9***	9.3***	23.9	6.3***	28.2
Unweighted base	1,236	56,468	44,885	545	201	208
<b>Very likely to be...</b>						
<b>...harassed or intimidated</b>						
Weighted %	4.6	3	2.7*	5	7.5	2.3
Unweighted base	760	33,064	26,044	320	108	121
<b>...attacked or physically assaulted</b>						
Weighted %	3.5	1.4***	1.3***	3.2	2.1	3.3
Unweighted base	1,196	55,807	44,342	539	196	197
<b>...mugged or robbed</b>						
Weighted %	3.6	1.2***	1.1***	4.4	1.7	2.4
Unweighted base	1,194	55,798	44,336	537	197	196
<b>...victim of a gun crime</b>						
Weighted %	1.9	0.5*	0.5*	2.2	1	1.4
Unweighted base	757	33,078	26,059	318	109	122
<b>...victim of a knife crime</b>						
Weighted %	3.6	0.9***	0.9**	4.5	0***	2.1
Unweighted base	756	33,027	26,015	319	109	122

Data sources: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10 and BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: wgenworr (CS), winsult, wmugged, wgun, lharr, attack, mugrob, lgun, lknif (all BCS) p weighted with indivwgt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 1% level

\*\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.03 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being harassed or intimidated in the next year due to skin colour, ethnicity or religion as very likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: lharhat, relig2

p weighted with indivwgt

Data in shaded areas where sample sizes < 50

Unweighted bases: Muslim=223, non-Muslim=5,424, Christian=4,041, Hindu=78, Jewish=31, Sikh=30


\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

## **FEAR OF CRIME TYPES COMMONLY ASSERTED AS PREVELANT AMONG BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES**

This section presents findings related to the fear of offences which whilst not described as being motivated by religion or ethnicity are the types of offences described in the literature as being ones to which British Muslim communities are particular prone. These include reported worry and likelihood of attack by strangers, reported worry over being insulted or pestered, and reported likelihood of being harassed in a public place. Analysis of the four variables shown in Figures 7.04 to 7.08 revealed statistically significant differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents and between respondents from each religion group in respect of reported worry or likelihood for each offence (in all cases, significant at the 0.1% level). As before, Muslim respondents share with Hindu and Sikh respondents similar levels of reported worry and perceived likelihood. Muslim and Jewish respondents also share broadly similar likelihood of reporting each of these three fear of crime items except where Jewish were less likely to report being insulted or pestered (see Figure 7.07). Figure 7.08 looks deceiving. The differences appear sizeable but the scale is rather short, the reported likelihood

is relatively stable across the minority religion groups, and the survey design such that the sample size is rather small (hence perhaps the lack of statistically significant differences).

**Figure 7.04 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported worry about physical assault from strangers**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/072007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: watack, relig2

p weighted with indivwt

Unweighted bases: Muslim=3,578, non-Muslim=128,280, Christian=101,705, Hindu=1,677, Jewish=450, Sikh=692

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.05 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being the victim of physical assaulted as very likely**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/072007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: attack, relig2

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.06 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worried about becoming a victim of crime**




Data source: CS 2007, 2008, 2009

Variables used: relig2, wgenworr

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.07 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worried about being insulted or pestered**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, winsult

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.08 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being harassed or intimidated in the street or any other public place in the next year as likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, lharr


p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

## FEAR OF OTHER TYPES OF PERSONAL CRIME

This section presents findings for reported fear of crime for incidents that whilst not adduced in the literature as synonymous with or related to 'Islamophobia' are nonetheless representative of offences that are personal and violent in nature. They are shown below to demonstrate the continuation of the pattern identified and described above: the broad similarities between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents who either reported being very worried about these offences or that such crimes were very likely (Figures 7.09 to 7.13).

**Figure 7.09 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being very worry about being mugged**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, wmugged

p weighted with indivwt


\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.10 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being mugged or robbed as very likely**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: relig2, mugrob  
 p weighted with indivwt  
 \*\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.11 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being very worried about being the victim of a crime involving a gun**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: relig2, wgun  
 p weighted with indivwt  
 \* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.12 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being the victim of gun crime in the next year as very likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: relig2, lgun  
 p weighted with indivwt  
 \* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

**Figure 7.13 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported being the victim of knife crime in the next year as very likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
 Variables used: relig2, lknif  
 p weighted with indivwt  
 \* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level


## FEAR OF HOUSEHOLD CRIME

The Crime Survey posed a series of similar questions in relation to worry about and the perceived likelihood of household crime. Household or property crime is not a key feature of the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' or anti-Muslim hate crime. In fact, it is not mentioned

in any of the literature reviewed for this thesis. The findings reported here are presented as a means by which findings in relation to fear of personal crime may be triangulated, and as a contribution to the current lack of empirical evidence around fear of household crime. The Crime Survey asks respondents to report their fear of crime in relation to household crime. Household crime is rarely, if ever, discussed in the literature. It is neither described as a constituent part of 'Islamophobia' nor described as a fear which disproportionately affects Muslim lives. Fear of household crime is included here in an attempt to fill a gap in the current knowledge and also to further demonstrate the similarities between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents in respect of reported worry or likelihood of crime in general. The survey asks a series of questions in relation to various household crime types (see Table 7.02 and Figures 7.14 to 7.18). All five waves of the Crime Survey posed questions about burglary and vehicle theft. Three waves of the Crime Survey (waves from 2008/09, 2009/08, 2010/11) invited respondents to report their fear of crime in relation to vandalism in relation to a vehicle and their home, garden or household property vandalized in the next year. The Crime Survey asked respondents: How likely is it that you will have your house, garden or household property vandalized in the next year?

Table 7.02 reports data related to female respondents (to continue the analysis of Muslim woman begun in the Chapter 4). Figure 7.20 reports data related to female respondents who reported being very worried about general crime victimization.

**Figure 7.14 Crime Survey: Percentage of respondents who reported suffering vandalism to a house, garden or household property in the next year as very likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11  
Variables used: relig2, lvandp  
p weighted with indivwt

Table 7.02 Crime Survey: Fear of household crime

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
<b>Very worried about...</b>						
...being the victim of a crime						
Weighted %	20.4	7.9***	8.1***	20.4	7.9***	23.2
Unweighted base	3,578	128,376	101,790	1,677	451	693
...being the victim of a crime (female respondents only)						
Weighted %	25.9	10.3***	10.4***	23.8	10***	28.8
Unweighted base	1,749	70,339	57,620	818	252	334
...having your home broken into						
Weighted %	26	11.1***	11.2***	25.8	10.3***	25.6
Unweighted base	3583	128,419	101,821	1,679	450	694
...having your car stolen						
Weighted %	23.3	11.1***	11.1***	21.9	11.5***	25.4
Unweighted base	2584	100,077	79,370	1,377	372	580
<b>Very likely to...</b>						
...have property vandalized						
Weighted %	3.7	2.4	2.3	4.4	4.2	5.5
Unweighted base	759	33,059	26,037	320	107	122
...be burgled						
Weighted %	5	1.7***	1.7***	6	1.8*	5
Unweighted base	1,193	55,809	44,351	537	193	197
...have your car stolen						
Weighted %	4.7	1.6***	1.8***	3	1.9	3.2
Unweighted base	875	44,444	35,220	426	178	174

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: relig, wover, wburgl, wcarstole, lvandp, burgreg, carstole  
p weighted with indivwtg

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 1% level

\*\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.15 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worry about burglary**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, wburgl

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.16 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported having their home burgled in the next year as very likely**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, burgreg

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 5% level

\*\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.17 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worry about vehicle theft**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, wcarstol

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.18 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported having a car or van stolen as very likely**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: relig2, carstole

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

## FEAR OF GENERAL CRIME

The following section analyses fear of general crime. The Crime Survey asked respondents to report their level of worry about becoming the victim of crime (i.e. any crime). As elsewhere, the analysis revealed levels of reported worry shared by Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents (see Figure 7.19). In order to further explore the role of gender, responses from female respondents were analysed, although, as can be seen from Figure 7.20, reported fear of crime among female respondents was higher, although stable across the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh groups.

**Figure 7.19 Crime Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported being very worried about becoming a victim of crime**




Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, wover

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

**Figure 7.20 Crime Survey: Percentages of female respondents who reported being very worried about becoming the victim of crime**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: relig2, sex, wover

p weighted with indivwt

\* difference between specified religion group and Muslim group significant at 0.1% level

## **FURTHER ANALYSIS OF FEMALE MUSLIM RESPONDENTS**

Low numbers of female respondents from the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Sikh groups prohibited any meaningful comparison between Muslim respondents and respondents from the minority religion groups in respect of the reported likelihood of being assaulted because of skin colour, ethnicity or religion. There appeared to be an indication that there is a similarity between Muslim and Hindu respondents who reported such an offence as likely (56.4% and 56.1%,  $p > 0.05$ ) but with less than thirty Hindu respondents ( $n=25$ ) such a finding remains indicative rather than conclusive. More respondents were asked the related question about being harassed or intimidated because of skin colour, ethnicity or religion. Unfortunately, there were low numbers of Buddhist, Jewish and Sikh respondents, although there were more than thirty Hindu respondents ( $n=32$ ). A broadly similar number of Muslim and Hindu respondents reported the likelihood of being harassed or intimidated, 66.8% and 66% respectively (significant at the 5% level).

## **OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO REPORTED FEAR OF CRIME**

A series of binary logistic regression models were fitted to the data. The primary aim of modelling the data in this way was to explore the explanatory power of certain dependent variables whilst controlling for others. This method provided a way by which individual factors (such as sex, age, religion etc.) could be compared and contrasted. The models used a derived fear of crime variable as a dependent variable. The variable - response data related to five Likert items measuring worry about crime from 'not at all worried' to 'very worried' - was recoded into a binary variable: 'very worried' and less than 'very worried'. As can be seen in Figure 7.22 there were a number of independent variables that had a statistically significant effect on reporting being very worried. However, these do not include 'being Muslim', although self-identifying as Hindu or Sikh did appear to have a statistically significant (although relatively modest) effect. Elsewhere, other variables appeared to have a greater effect on reporting being very worried than religious identity. These variables confirm findings from the

previous research described at the start of this chapter. Female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents to report being very worried. Respondents between 55 and 74 were around 50% more likely than those around in their late teens and early twenties to report being very worried. Being a previous victim of crime also appeared to increase the odds of reporting being very worried. Similarly, the odds of reporting being very worried were increased for those living in an urban area, those living in areas of high multiple deprivation and those who reported low levels of confidence in the police (i.e. those who reported disagreement with the statement: ‘Overall I have confidence in the police in this area’). Self-describing as non-White had a statistically significant effect. Asian and Black respondents were around three times as likely to report being very worried: a much greater increase in odds than for respondents self-describing affiliation to one of the statistically significant religion groups. Analysis using the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic (a statistical test related to Pearson’s chi-square test and used to measure goodness of fit) revealed that the model reported here predicted values that were marginally different (i.e. differences were around the 5% level of statistical significance) from those observed (see Table 7.03). The *p* value was .049 – this was deemed to be borderline (especially when rounded up to two decimal places) and thus considered as being statistically significant. A model which excluded the religion variable proved to be a better predictor of worry about crime; differences between predicted and observed values were not statistically significant (a model including religion affiliation is shown by Table 7.03).

**Table 7.03 Crime Survey: Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic results**

	$\chi^2$	df	Sig.
<b>Reported model</b>	<b>15.570</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>.049</b>
<b>Same model without religion</b>	<b>11.136</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>.194</b>

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: agegrp7, emdiddec2, ethgrp2, polatt7, relig2, rural2, sex, victim, wover

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

- **Similar proportions of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents were very worried about being the victim of crime.**
- **Muslim respondents reported high levels of fear of crime around offences related to ‘Islamophobia’ in the literature (i.e. religiously or racially motivated crime and a range of personal crime offences).**
- **Muslim and Hindu respondents shared broadly similar levels of fear of crime in respect of religiously and racially motivated crime and personal crime offences.**
- **Low sample sizes for Jewish and Sikh respondents hindered comparative analysis across all specified religion groups in respect of fear of crime variables.**
- **The analysis revealed similar patterns for other types of personal crime (i.e. offences that whilst not related to ‘Islamophobia’ in the literature are still violent in nature) and a variety of household offences (e.g. burglary and car crime). Muslim and Hindu respondents shared similar levels of fear.**
- **Self-describing as belonging to one of the specified religions was a weaker determinant of fear than being female, living in a deprived area, having low police confidence and previous crime victimization.**
- **Overall, ethnicity was a stronger determinant of fear than religion. Analysis revealed statistically significant relationships between fear of crime and self-describing as belonging to each of the ethnic groups (not all religion groups had similar relationships)**

- **Among the specified religion groups, being Sikh or being Hindu were stronger determinants of fear than being Muslim.**

## CONCLUSION

The use of logistic regression revealed no statistically significant differences in the odds of reporting being very worried about crime between Muslim and Christian respondents. Overall, the findings suggested that gender, ethnicity, multiple deprivation, and low police confidence were factors more crucial in increasing the odds of reporting fear than self-describing as Muslim (or belonging to many of the other specified religion groups). Overall, data from the Crime Survey and the Citizenship Survey do not support assertions concerning disproportionate or increased fear within British Muslim communities. However, findings from the Crime Survey remain indicative rather than conclusive (due to the small sample sizes). Muslim and Hindu respondents shared a similar likelihood of reporting worry about attack or harassment from strangers but too few Jewish and Sikh respondents meant a more complete comparison of minority religion groups was not possible. A pattern emerged from findings of the personal and household variables which provided further evidence for the similarities between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents in respect of reported fear. These similarities were reinforced from further analysis using binary logistic regression which revealed models using religion as an independent variable were less good at predicting the reporting of high levels of fear than those without.

The reported model revealed that ethnicity (in this case self-identifying as non-white), low reported confidence in the police, having been a victim of crime, being female, and residing in the most deprived areas of England and Wales increased the odds of reporting fear more than being Muslim (which itself had a statistically insignificant effect) or being Hindu and Sikh (which both had a statistically significant effect, but one which increased the odds less than the demographic and socio-economic variables listed above). Taking into account other variables, religious identity played a lesser role in shaping reported fear. Of course, used in

isolation these data leave unanswered many questions about fear of crime within British Muslim communities, and particularly fear of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic prejudice, hostility or discrimination.

First, the survey questions frame the respondents' experiences within the limits of actual or perceived criminal offences. Fears about non-physically violent crime types (especially non-physically violent crime types which may not be recognized as criminal offences – such as the fear of verbal abuse) are less well represented in the survey questions and thus within survey data. The Crime Survey asks only one question about being worried about being insulted or pestered. Second, perceiving such incidents as likely, and reporting being worried about them are two separate psychological responses. Additional Crime Survey questions that explored how likely respondents felt being insulted or pestered might have provided more evidential clues as to the existence of 'Islamophobia' and its effects. Similarly, the Citizenship Survey would have been more useful to a study of how Muslim respondents react to risk and safety had it posed more nuanced questions around more 'everyday' incidents.

Table 7.04 Crime Survey: Fear of crime - Logistic regression model 1

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
Sex									
	Female	.758	.023	1065.059	1	.000	2.135	2.040	2.234
Age									
	16-24			201.958	6	.000			
	25-34	-.112	.045	6.276	1	.012	.894	.819	.976
	35-44	.034	.043	.630	1	.427	1.035	.951	1.126
	45-54	.116	.045	6.687	1	.010	1.123	1.028	1.226
	55-64	.312	.045	48.838	1	.000	1.367	1.252	1.492
	65-74	.318	.047	45.250	1	.000	1.374	1.252	1.507
	+75	-.060	.053	1.306	1	.253	.942	.850	1.044
Victim or not									
	Victim	.485	.024	420.208	1	.000	1.623	1.550	1.700
Urban or rural									
	Urban	.324	.033	97.650	1	.000	1.383	1.297	1.475
Police confidence									
	Low confidence	.569	.026	485.002	1	.000	1.767	1.680	1.859
Multiple deprivation									
	Least deprived			833.441	9	.000			
	Most deprived	1.013	.052	385.387	1	.000	2.752	2.488	3.045
	Second	.890	.052	289.834	1	.000	2.435	2.198	2.698
	Third	.753	.053	202.574	1	.000	2.123	1.914	2.355
	Fourth	.531	.054	96.951	1	.000	1.701	1.530	1.890
	Fifth	.450	.055	68.165	1	.000	1.568	1.410	1.745
	Sixth	.336	.056	35.688	1	.000	1.400	1.254	1.563
	Seventh	.328	.056	34.121	1	.000	1.388	1.243	1.549
	Eighth	.144	.058	6.200	1	.013	1.155	1.031	1.293
	Ninth	.065	.059	1.221	1	.269	1.067	.951	1.197

Continued over

Table 7.04 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnic group</b>								
White			778.163	4	.000			
Mixed	.602	.095	40.332	1	.000	1.827	1.517	2.200
Asian	1.105	.070	245.901	1	.000	3.018	2.629	3.465
Black	1.090	.046	565.418	1	.000	2.974	2.719	3.254
Chinese or other	.948	.073	168.673	1	.000	2.581	2.237	2.978
<b>Religion</b>								
Christian			143.116	7	.000			
Buddhist	-.155	.137	1.272	1	.259	.857	.654	1.121
Hindu	.265	.091	8.433	1	.004	1.304	1.090	1.559
Jewish	.174	.171	1.035	1	.309	1.189	.851	1.662
Muslim	.126	.071	3.200	1	.074	1.135	.988	1.303
Sikh	.255	.116	4.810	1	.028	1.291	1.028	1.622
Other	-.209	.120	3.014	1	.083	.811	.641	1.027
No religion	-.395	.036	121.847	1	.000	.673	.628	.722
<b>Constant</b>								
	-4.081	.065	3914.025	1	.000	.017		
Most deprived	1.013	.052	385.387	1	.000	2.752	2.488	3.045
Second	.890	.052	289.834	1	.000	2.435	2.198	2.698
Third	.753	.053	202.574	1	.000	2.123	1.914	2.355
Fourth	.531	.054	96.951	1	.000	1.701	1.530	1.890
Fifth	.450	.055	68.165	1	.000	1.568	1.410	1.745
Sixth	.336	.056	35.688	1	.000	1.400	1.254	1.563
Seventh	.328	.056	34.121	1	.000	1.388	1.243	1.549
Eighth	.144	.058	6.200	1	.013	1.155	1.031	1.293
Ninth	.065	.059	1.221	1	.269	1.067	.951	1.197

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: agegrp7, emdidec2, ethgrp2, polatt7, relig2, rural2, sex, victim, wover

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .049, Nagelkerke = .111, Hosmer and Lemeshow -  $\chi^2 = 15.570$ . df = 8, Sig. = .049

Survey questions about the perceived likelihood of being discriminated against might have provided a more complete picture and stronger evidence of the unique or disproportionate targeting of British Muslim communities and the psychological responses elicited by such targeting. Third, the survey data provide few clues related to the practical consequences of being fearful about certain forms of crime and discrimination. This leaves unanswered questions about the negotiation of public space and identity, the management of risk and personal safety and the types of strategies and measures employed by the participants

in Spalek's research. It is plausible that there are fears and responses that are unique to British Muslim communities but that are subsumed within the response data surveyed in this chapter. The data analysed here do not suggest heightened anxiety, widespread worry and disproportionate fear when compared to respondents from other minority religion groups. Arguably, however, the limited scope of the questions around worry and perceived likelihood, the small sample sizes in respect of survey questions related to religiously-motivated and ethnically-motivated crime, and the very nature of survey data collection could all have limited the usefulness of the data in these regards. These limitations suggest the broader weaknesses inherent within fear of crime data when used in isolation to analyse risk and personal safety. A Muslim victim of crime, or an individual or group with anxieties about the targeting of Muslims is unlikely to be reassured by a Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic. More detailed qualitative research is needed to map the psychological responses taken in the face of perceived threats to personal and community safety and build the foundations for the design and implementation of practical solutions.

In terms of answering the primary research question of this thesis, the literature appears to rely on a narrative around British Muslim fear of crime which is perhaps less nuanced than it could be. To assert that British Muslims exist in a state of heightened anxiety without empirical evidence is problematic. Such descriptions are overly simplistic and do not pay due regard to the range of psychological responses to crime and discrimination against British Muslims. Further, these descriptions strengthen dominant narratives around the demonization and victimization of Muslim communities. The dominance of these narratives may unwittingly preserve and reinforce negative stereotypes about British Muslim communities; stereotypes which are capable of informing and underpinning discrimination by non-Muslim individuals and groups with subsequent negative outcomes in relation social exclusion and social cohesion. Further, the rehearsal of simplistic and poorly-evidenced narratives around widespread fear and anxiety are capable of underestimating and undervaluing successful shared responses to personal risk and safety emanating from British

Muslim communities. It is plausible that one response to the risks faced by Muslim communities (whether actual or perceived, rational or irrational) is the strengthening of bonds within Muslim communities (for instance between family, friends and neighbours within a locality). Arguably, whilst current debates ignore or dismiss such possible alternative perspectives the overall criminological picture remains incomplete. The next chapter develops the analysis of personal and household crime and focuses on reported victimization by Muslim respondents to the Crime Survey.

## CHAPTER 8

### CRIME VICTIMIZATION

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a discussion of crime victimization among British Muslim communities. As in previous chapters, the aim of the reported research is to compare criminological literature with available social survey statistics. More specifically, the primary aim of the chapter is to compare assertions and conclusions found within criminological literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and Muslim crime victimization with findings from analyses of data from the Crime Survey and Citizenship Survey. This comparison was done in order to determine the extent to which statistics related to reported crime victimization support or challenge assertions about the nature and extent of crime, and particularly targeted anti-Muslim crime, suffered by British Muslim communities. As will be demonstrated, literature related to 'Islamophobia' and Muslim crime victimization has been focused primarily on personal crime that includes violence and that is motivated by religion or ethnicity, or both. Given this dominant discursive theme, this chapter also aims to make a contribution towards existing criminological and sociological research around British Muslim communities by broadening the scope of current research so as to include household crime including property theft and damage (a subject that has received scant attention so far by scholars) as well as a broader range of social and economic factors in respect of violence, verbal abuse and harassment than is often considered at present.

The chapter opens with a further review of recent criminological literature related to 'Islamophobia' and crime victimization among British Muslim communities. Dominant themes and commonly found assertions and conclusions identified by this review are then compared to available statistical data. The opening section of findings introduces the main topics of research (religiously and racially motivated crime, hate crime, personal and household crime) and briefly describes a series of bivariate tests used to provide a simple

measure of crime victimization among various specified religion. For the purposes of analysis reported below, these fairly rudimentary measures of crime victimization provided a starting point from which to explore British Muslim crime victimization in greater depth using multivariate statistical models. To this end, a series of binary logistic regression models was created to measure the effect of being Muslim on religiously and racially motivated hate crime, personal crime and household crime whilst controlling for various social and economic factors including ethnicity (which is mentioned often within the literature, although seldom explored in any depth) and socio-economic status (which is seldom mentioned in relation to 'Islamophobia'). Analysis of these multivariate models was undertaken with the aim of providing a broader and deeper understanding of 'Islamophobia' were it pertains to Muslim crime victimization.

Finally, the analysis of data related to harassment is reported. Under English law harassment is capable of being a criminal act and is often conceptualized as including some form of actual or threatened physical attack (as demonstrated by a survey question from the Citizenship Survey analysed in this chapter). Although analysis of harassment could have been situated alongside analysis of discrimination, and whilst not all acts of harassment constitute criminal behaviour, it is included here so as to offer a broad view of crime victimization. Terms such as 'harassment' and 'discrimination' represent protean concepts with numerous points of overlap. However, harassment (in both a legal and everyday sense) is capable of constituting a criminal act and thus represents, in some contexts at least, a form of crime victimization. Harassment data is used here to explore further the perceived motivations underpinning Muslim victimization and to further support this chapter's primary conclusion that there is a need for a more nuanced view of Muslim crime victimization than that portrayed commonly by those engaged in debates around 'Islamophobia'.

## **RECENT DEBATES CONCERNING 'ISLAMOPHOBIA' AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION**

Literature concerning 'Islamophobia' was examined where the conceptualizations included some form of criminal act: as opposed to that which deals exclusively with negative media portrayals; non-criminalized forms of discrimination; and state-sponsored discrimination such as by the police or security services. 'Islamophobia' has been defined broadly in the literature and accordingly is applied broadly throughout this chapter. This point perhaps requires a brief explanation. Discussion around 'Islamophobia' often includes reference to violent crime targeted at British Muslim communities (cf. Runnymede Trust 1997; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Ameli et al 2011): however, the reverse is not always true. Descriptions of violent crime against British Muslims, even where such crime is said to be driven or underpinned by some form of anti-Muslim sentiment or hate, do not always include an explicit reference to the term 'Islamophobia' (cf. Smith et al 2011; Iganski and Lagou, 2014). Crimes related to commonly found definitions of 'Islamophobia' (for instance, anti-Muslim verbal abuse or targeted physical violence) are to be found in a wide selection of criminological sources not all of which make explicit reference to the term. However, there is a large degree of cross-fertilization between scholars who employ the concept of 'Islamophobia' and those who describe anti-Muslim crime victimization without use of the term. Research published by the former group is cited by the latter, and vice versa. Thus, and regardless of whether or not the term 'Islamophobia' appears, the aim of criminological literature concerning British Muslim crime victimization, whether explicitly stated or otherwise, appears often to be largely the same: to assert some form of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic ideology manifesting as criminal and violent action targeted at individuals or groups presumed to be Muslim. Terms such as 'Islamophobia', 'anti-Muslim hostility' and 'anti-Muslim crime' are often used interchangeably throughout recent scholarly and non-scholarly criminological literature and sometimes used interchangeably in a single source (cf. Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Given the highly

symbiotic nature of literature concerning Muslim victimization that does and does not use the term 'Islamophobia', this chapter presents analysis of both.

In order to undertake this analysis the chapter focuses on what might be referred to, by convention at least, as less scholarly forms of criminological literature as well as on books published by academic publishers and peer-reviewed journal articles. 'Less scholarly' literature (for example, non-peer reviewed reports from government departments, 'Muslim organizations' and other NGOs) has had a discernible influence on both the popular understanding of 'Islamophobia' and what may be identified, again by convention, as more scholarly literature (for example citations of Runnymede Trust (1997) in Halliday (1999), Allen (2010) and Esposito and Kalin (2011)). There appears to be a symbiotic relationship between scholarly and non-scholarly literature and regular citation of non-scholarly sources in peer-reviewed journals and books authored by scholars and published by academic publishers (cf. Copsey et al 2013; Feldman and Littler, 2014). Regardless of the characteristics of the sources, and whether by convention they are deemed scholarly or not, a uniform thread of considerations, conclusions and consensus are to be found running throughout: Muslim communities face great risks from a variety of targeted criminal acts.

The Runnymede Trust report asked: 'Is there evidence that Muslims are the victims of such violence more than other groups?' and, 'If so, is anti-Muslim prejudice a reason?' (Runnymede Trust, 1997). It has been argued that there is, in fact, a demonstrable lack of available evidence around anti-Muslim hostility and Muslim crime victimization (Allen, 2010, Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010) and that scholars and public bodies have worked without informed knowledge about the number and nature of incidents against Muslims (EUMC, 2006a). Notwithstanding such admissions, many sources assert disproportionate Muslim victimization. The Runnymede Trust report described a series of 'racial, cultural and religious attacks' (1997: 37) to support the widespread nature of attacks against Muslims. Scholars elsewhere have asserted or implied the increased risks of attack among Muslim communities (Burnett, 2013; Schiffer and Wagner, 2011): for example, the 'greater cumulative threat' of

street violence (Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). Violent attacks have been described as part of the landscape for Muslims in the UK (Ameli, Elahi, and Merali, 2004). 'Islamophobia' and anti-Muslim hate crime have been described as widespread (Hamid, 2011) and increasing; an upsurge of 'Islamophobia' (Faliq, 2010). Such upsurges have been attributed to significant national and international events: 'Islamophobia' as backlash (Ameli et al, 2011). Examples include documented spikes in crime against Muslim communities after reported acts of terrorism such as 9/11 and 7/7, or more recent events such as the Woolwich attack in 2013 (Awan, 2013). Much of the criminological literature related to 'Islamophobia' asserts the increased and widespread risk within Muslim communities of personal attack and hostility (Runnymede Trust 1997; Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004; Allen, 2010). Muslim communities have been depicted as disproportionately targeted by hate crime (Abbas, 2005; Hopkins and Gale, 2009); the victims of the aforementioned 'street violence' (Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010), physical assault (Burnett, 2013; Schiffer and Wagner, 2011), verbal abuse and harassment (Mythen, 2012).

Much of this discussion has been dominated by research that employs qualitative research designs (cf. Spalek 2002; Esposito and Kalin 2011) and is arguably limited by data samples of insufficient size to be nationally representative (cf. Anwar and Bakhsh 2003; EUMC, 2006a; 2006b; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Ameli et al 2011; Mythen 2012). Elsewhere, criminological literature has asserted the prevalence of British hate crime targeted at British Muslim communities (Abbas, 2004, 2005; Allen, 2010; Hopkins and Gale, 2009). In many cases the assertion of prevalence is done either with little supporting evidence or with statements that were not subsequently developed. Terms such as 'widespread' are deployed uncritically and without full explanation (cf. Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004; Awan, 2013; Engage, 2010; Hamid, 2011.). Similarly, assertions that 'Islamophobia' has become part of the 'life landscape for Muslims in the UK' (Ameli, Elahi and Merali, 2004: 7) are rarely developed with adequate empirical evidence.

Some sources have asserted that wider communities are victimized when one of its members is targeted (Runnymede Trust 1997: 37), or that Muslim individuals have been targeted because they represent the values, loyalties and commitments of a wider group. This targeting is described as done to assert and reinforce a white, Christian notion of British identity. Where the focus has been more obviously on the individual, 'Islamophobia' has been described as capable of altering perceptions of personal safety and affecting routine activity: victims become 'virtual prisoners in their own homes' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 39) and 'afraid because of racist violence to venture into public spaces...' (1997: 39). Also mentioned, although less replete with analysis, is the theme of property damage (cf. Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009).

Within this loose typology of 'Islamophobia' and anti-Muslim victimization, personal violence and violent crime have played key roles. However, where the term is used explicitly there are subtle differences in the methods by which 'Islamophobia' is deployed. In some examples of the literature, violence and hate crime are described as being underpinned by 'Islamophobia' (with the implication being that action is the physical manifestation of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic ideology). Other sources described the action itself as 'Islamophobia' with an implied conflation of ideology and physical action (cf. Stolz, 2005). Regardless of the deployment of the term 'Islamophobia', hate crime carried out against British Muslims has remained, according to much of the literature, 'ever present' and 'ever potent' (Engage, 2010: 9).

## **SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN**

Data were selected from the Crime Survey, and to a lesser extent the Citizenship Survey, where such data related to crime victimization and harassment. The analysis uses cross tabulations, Pearson's chi-square tests, and two proportion z-tests to explore the datasets. Logistic regression models were used to determine the relative effects of religion, ethnicity, sex, age and other factors on the likelihood of being victimized by personal crime,

household crime, racially motivated crime and religiously motivated crime. Aside from a further contribution to an answer for the primary research question, the analysis presented in this chapter seeks to answer the following secondary questions: To what extent are conclusions regarding increased risks of physical and violent crime supported or challenged by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents? To what extent are assertions concerning 'Islamophobia' reflected in the experiences of religiously and racially motivated crime as reported by surveyed British Muslim respondents? Is violent crime as big a problem for British Muslim communities as asserted or implied throughout the literature? Are Muslims more likely than other minorities to be the victims of hate crime? Is 'being Muslim' the largest single determinant factor effecting reported crime victimization among British Muslim communities?

## **BIVARIATE ANALYSIS FINDINGS (Tables 8.01 to 8.05)**

### **Religiously motivated crime**

Respondents who reported a crime incident to the Crime Survey were invited to report whether or not they thought the incident was religiously motivated (variable 'relgmot' in the 2006/07 wave, variables 'hatemota' and 'hatem2ta' in waves 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11). Relatively few respondents answered 'yes': 44 in the 2006/07 wave and 185 in other waves. This made analysis of the various specified minority religion groups difficult. Instead, response data from non-Muslim minority religion groups were gathered together. As Table 8.01 indicates, reported crime incidents were more likely to be perceived by Muslim respondents as having been religiously-motivated than by other respondents. These findings would appear to lend support to assertions made within research and policy literature. The Home Office reported that Muslim adults within the British Crime Survey are the group most affected by religiously motivated hate crime (Weller, Feldman and Purdam, 2001; Smith et al, 2011). According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 7.7 per cent of Muslim

respondents in the British Crime Survey reported victimization from crime motivated by religion (Botcherby et al, 2011).

### **Racially motivated crime**

Few sources define 'Islamophobia' in terms of religious abuse alone (although the Runnymede Trust report comes close with its definition of a fear or dread of Islam). More often, conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' describe the intersectionality of religion and ethnicity inherent within hostility against Muslim communities; or at least recognise that other more general factors (such as anti-migrant sentiment) may be found nested within anti-Muslim discrimination. For some, 'Islamophobia' is a 'double whammy' of colour racism and anti-Muslim culturalism (Zebiri, 2008b); for others, 'Islamophobia' is akin to 'cultural racism' (Modood, 2005; 2007). Bivariate analysis was undertaken to provide an indication as to whether there was evidence for the disproportionate targeting of British Muslim communities by crime motivated, in whole or in part, by the victim's ethnicity as asserted in the literature. The findings lent only limited support to such assertions. Non-white Muslim victims were more likely than non-White Christian victims to perceive and report incidents as some form of racially motivated offence (see Table 8.02). However, Muslim and Sikh crime victims shared a similar likelihood of perceiving incidents suffered as racially motivated (i.e. Muslims were not alone in being among the most likely to perceive such offences). Similarly, while Black Muslim victims reported a greater level of racially motivated crime than Black Christian victims, no such differences were revealed between the Asian Muslim and Asian Sikh groups.

### **General hate crime**

Given the intersectionality asserted within many conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia', the research focused on a derived hate crime variable from the victim forms in the 2009/10 and 2010/11 (see Table 8.03). The derived hate crime variable collated response data related to personal and household offences where the victim perceived that the incident was motivated by their race or ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, age, gender or disability. In this respect,

the term 'hate crime' as it relates to the Crime Survey is broadly similar to the term when used by the police and other state agencies. Bivariate analysis suggested only weak evidence for assertions of disproportionate hate crime victimization among British Muslim communities. Muslim respondents were no more likely than Buddhist, Hindu and Jewish victims to report hate crimes. Overall, the data suggest few differences between the minority religion groups in respect of general hate crime.

### **Personal crime victimization**

Overall, the bivariate analysis research suggested a rather complex picture of Muslim personal crime victimization (see Table 8.04). Pearson's chi-square tests were used to test the relationship between crime victimization and being Muslim or non-Muslim, and between crime victimization and belonging to one of the specified religion groups. The tests revealed statistically significant relationships in respect of being Muslim or non-Muslim and overall crime victimization ( $\chi^2=109.22$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), and in respect of crime victimization and belonging to one of the specified religion groups ( $\chi^2=1250.61$ ,  $df=7$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), but no such relationships between being Muslim and reporting more specific offences such as assault ( $\chi^2=0.58$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p>0.05$ ) and offences involving wounding ( $\chi^2=0.06$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). As shown in Table 8.04, Muslim respondents appear more likely than Christian respondents to report offences collated under the derived variable categories (Total BCS crime, for example), but there were no such differences between the groups for most of the more specific offence categories (wounding and threats, for example). Similarly, whilst there were differences between Muslim and Hindu respondents in respect of Total BCS crime and assault, there were few differences between Muslim respondents and respondents from the other minority religion groups in respect of several categories of offences. Overall, the bivariate analysis suggested that Muslim respondents were not the minority religion group most likely to report personal crime.

## Household crime victimization

As stated, criminological literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and Muslim crime victimization rarely, if ever, focuses on household crime. Reference is made to property damage (cf. Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009 and Mythen, 2012) but mainly to establish some form of typology of anti-Muslim crime rather than to mobilize extensive empirical findings. The inclusion of the topic here is done for two reasons. First, to contribute towards a fuller picture of all types of crime affecting Muslim communities (i.e. not just those identified as religiously or racially motivated). Second, to examine whether patterns found within personal crime data are echoed in household crime data. (It should be noted that Crime Survey data concerns only theft or deliberate damage to property belonging to respondents or their immediate family and excludes offences such as the deliberate damage done to mosques.) Pearson's chi-square test was used to determine whether there were statistically significant relationships between being Muslim or non-Muslim and household crime victimization. For all but one of the variables, the relationships were statistically significant at 0.1% level: for instance, total household crime ( $\chi^2=120.74$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) and burglary ( $\chi^2=79.42$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Similarly, chi-square tests revealed statistically significant relationships between the specific religion groups and the household crime victimization (for all variables,  $p<0.01$ ). As shown in Table 8.05, Muslim respondents appeared more likely than those from the Christian group to report household crime victimization in respect of most categories, and more likely than Hindu respondents in respect of two derived variables (All household offences and Comparable household crime) as well as burglary and vehicle theft. As for personal crime, the extent to which Muslim respondents could be described as the most likely to report household crime appeared questionable: for most household offences Muslim respondents shared a similar likelihood of reporting with those from the Jewish and Sikh groups.

**Table 8.01 Crime Survey: Percentages of reported incidents perceived as being religiously motivated**

	Muslim	Christian	Other non-Muslim	No religion
<b>Religiously motivated incidents</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	7.4	0.3*	2.5*	0.2*
<b>Unweighted base</b>	1,746	42,674	1,907	14,131

Data source: BCS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: hatemota, hatem2ta, relig2

p weighted with indivwt

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.02 Crime Survey: Percentages of reported incidents perceived as racially motivated**

	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh
<b>All racially-motivated crime (all respondents)</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	2.4	0.7*	--	--
<b>Unweighted base</b>	859	19,326	--	--
<b>All racially-motivated crime (non-white respondents)</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	7.7	4*	--	--
<b>Unweighted base</b>	762	969	--	--
<b>Yes – racially motivated (all respondents)</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	19	3.4**	12.1**	18.4
<b>Unweighted base</b>	2,751	56,996	910	510
<b>Yes – racially motivated (Asian and Asian British respondents)</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	18.4	8.9**	10.8**	15.4
<b>Unweighted base</b>	1,999	353	851	498
<b>Yes – racially motivated (Black and Black British respondents)</b>				
<b>Weighted %</b>	31.2	10.3**	--	--
<b>Unweighted base</b>	191	1,882	--	--

Data source: BCS 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: racetot\_vf, racemot, relig2, ethgrp2

p weighted with indivwt

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.03 Crime Survey: Percentages of reported incidents identified as hate crimes**

	Muslim	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
<b>Total hate crime</b>						
Weighted %	18.7	5.6**	17.3	21.9	15.1	9.7*
Unweighted base	916	20,000	156	261	111	144
<b>Total hate crime (Asian and Asian British respondents only)</b>						
Weighted %	21.5	9*	-	23.7	-	9.8*
Unweighted base	648	105	-	239	-	143
<b>Total hate crime Black and Black British respondents only</b>						
Weighted %	11.8	15.4	-	-	-	-
Unweighted base	46	551	-	-	-	-

Data source: BCS 2009/10, 2010/11 (victim form)

Variables used: hatetot\_vf, relig2, ethgrp2

p weighted with indivwt

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.04 Crime Survey: Personal crime victimization**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
Victim	Unweighted %	29.4	24.8*	25.3*	32.6	30.9
Total BCS crime	Unweighted %	25.2	21*	21.6*	28.7	26.1
Total personal crime (excluding sex offences)	Unweighted %	6.4	5.3*	4.8*	9.2*	7.2
All violent crime	Unweighted %	3.5	2.8*	2.9	5.4	3.7
All assault crime	Unweighted %	2.5	2.3	1.7*	--	2.9
Common assault	Unweighted %	1.8	1.8	1.4	--	--
Wounding	Unweighted %	0.7	0.7	--	--	--
Robbery	Unweighted %	0.8	0.4*	--	--	--
Mugging	Unweighted %	1	0.5	1.3*	--	--
Threats	Unweighted %	2.5	2.1	1.7*	--	--
<b>Total unweighted n</b>		<b>5,951</b>	<b>181,056</b>	<b>2,689</b>	<b>798</b>	<b>1,118</b>

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables: victim, totalbcs, totalper, totalpers, allviol, allasau, commonassault, wounding, robbery, mugging1, threats, relig2  
p weighted with indivwt

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.05 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.05 Crime Survey: Household crime victimization**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Sikh
All household offences	Unweighted %	20.7	16.2*	17.3*	20.5	21
Comparable household	Unweighted %	18.8	13.5*	16.1*	18.2	19.8
Burglary	Unweighted %	4	2.2*	2.8*	2.9	2.8
Vandalism	Unweighted %	7.8	6.8*	7.1	8.5	10.6*
All vehicle crime	Unweighted %	12.1	8.7*	11.5	12.8	14.7
Vehicle theft	Unweighted %	1.1	0.5*	0.5*	0.9	0.3*
Theft from a vehicle	Unweighted %	4.5	3.2*	4.2	4.8	5.3
Vehicle vandalism	Unweighted %	6.1	4.7*	5.7	6.3	7.9
Other vandalism	Unweighted %	2.2	2.4	1.8	2.4	3.9*
<b>Total unweighted n</b>		<b>5,951</b>	<b>181,056</b>	<b>2,689</b>	<b>798</b>	<b>1,118</b>

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables: totalhh, tohhcltd, burglar, vandalis, allmvcri, theftomv, theftmv, mv.vand, homevand, relig2

p weighted with indivwt

Blank cells unweighted n<30

\*p<0.05 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

## MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS FINDINGS (Tables 8.06 to 8.13, Fig 8.01 to 8.04)

### Religiously motivated crime

A derived variable from the Crime Survey's victim forms from waves 2007/08 to 2010/11 was used to report a prevalence rate for victims of crime who reported one or more incidents of crime where such incidents were perceived as being religiously motivated. This dependent variable was then merged into a dataset containing various demographic, social and economic variables from which binary logistic regression models were generated. Care was taken to ensure a distinction was made between respondents who answered 'no' (i.e. those who reported crime but no religiously motivated crime) and respondents who were not asked the question (i.e. because they had reported no crime victimization of any type). Data used in the models captured reported experiences of the former group. The independent variables

chosen included sex, age, economic activity, multiple deprivation and ethnicity. The age variable used three categories (16 to 25, 30 to 59, and 60 and over). The economic activity and multiple deprivation variables were used to control for factors such as unemployment and socio-economic disadvantage; factors considered in recent evidence-based demographic studies as representing significant issues within British Muslim communities (cf. Ali, 2015; Peach 2006).

Although Muslim respondents were the main group of interest, the Christian group was used as the reference category in all models reported in this chapter. This was done for two reasons. First, the Christian group was considered the most appropriate reference group given its numerical size (akin to the use of the White category in various British policy studies of ethnicity). It is standard practice within Home Office statistical reports to compare various odds among minority groups with those of a numerically and socially dominant group (in order to draw the readers' focus towards issues faced by various minority groups); hence the adoption of a similar approach here. Secondly, the scholarly and policy literature often contains claims about the disproportionate targeting of hostility and prejudice against British Muslims. The explicit or implied reasoning is often that levels of suffering and disadvantage within British Muslim communities is akin to, or more than, that experienced by other minority groups. Using the Christian group as a reference category allows for findings to indicate a comparison of differences between Christian respondents and respondents from each of the specified religion groups. This approach enabled the data to be used to answer, for example, whether the differences between Muslim and Christian respondents were greater or smaller than those between Jewish and Christian respondents. This use of 'pair-wise' comparisons between Christians and non-Christian respondents was perceived as a robust method by which to measure and report any disparities within victimization across the minority religion groups and to determine how well the literature's assertions withstand empirical scrutiny (i.e. this doctoral project's primary research question).

Use of Hosmer and Lemeshow revealed an overall goodness of fit of data within the religiously motivated crime model (i.e. there were no statistically significant differences between observed and expected values). R-squared measures of predictive power indicated that the model explained between ten and eighteen percent of the variance. Clearly, many more variables would be needed to provide a more complete overall picture of the factors underpinning religiously motivated crime. Interaction effects between ethnicity and religion were included in the model. Given this inclusion, comparisons between the religion groups using the main effects were limited to the reference categories White and Christian (cf. National Centre of Research Methods, 2011). As shown in Table 8.06, self-describing as Jewish and White, Muslim and White and Other religion and White had a statistically significant effect on reporting religiously motivated crime having controlled for sex, age, economic activity, multiple deprivation and ethnicity (and when compared to respondents from the White Christian group). The differences between White Muslim and White Christians in respect of perceiving religiously motivated crime could capture the experiences of migrants from Eastern Europe or British converts to Islam, although no indication is given from the model itself.

The analysis revealed that, when asked, White Muslim victims were six times more likely than Christian respondents to perceive religiously motivated crime, having first controlled for other factors. However, White Jewish respondents were twelve times more likely than White Christian respondents to perceive religiously motivated crime. That these groups shared large differences with the White Christian group is perhaps not surprising. Whilst the aim of the thesis is not to establish a hierarchy of victimization the findings suggest that British Muslims are not alone in suffering religiously motivated crime and that it might be inaccurate to assert the unique or disproportionate targeting of British Muslim communities by such abuse.

**Table 8.06 Crime Survey: Religiously motivated crime victimization - Logistic regression model**

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
Sex									
	Female	-.340	.161	4.460	1	.035	.712	.519	.976
Age									
	16-29			3.665	2	.160			
	30-59	-.120	.175	.472	1	.492	.887	.629	1.250
	60+	-.568	.297	3.663	1	.056	.567	.317	1.014
Economic activity									
	Employed			7.100	2	.029			
	Unemployed	.450	.319	1.988	1	.159	1.569	.839	2.933
	Economically inactive	.452	.180	6.324	1	.012	1.572	1.105	2.236
Multiple deprivation									
	Least deprived			19.547	9	.021			
	Most deprived	.520	.406	1.638	1	.201	1.682	.759	3.729
	Second most deprived	.695	.402	2.981	1	.084	2.003	.910	4.408
	Third most deprived	.243	.425	.327	1	.567	1.275	.554	2.933
	Fourth most deprived	-.252	.471	.287	1	.592	.777	.309	1.957
	Fifth most deprived	.577	.421	1.872	1	.171	1.780	.779	4.065
	Sixth most deprived	.124	.462	.072	1	.788	1.132	.458	2.799
	Seventh most deprived	.705	.433	2.654	1	.103	2.025	.867	4.731
	Eighth most deprived	-.553	.574	.929	1	.335	.575	.187	1.771
	Ninth most deprived	-.225	.522	.187	1	.666	.798	.287	2.219
Ethnicity									
	White			14.258	4	.007			
	Mixed	1.283	.727	3.112	1	.078	3.607	.867	15.000
	Asian or Asian British	1.223	1.014	1.454	1	.228	3.398	.465	24.799
	Black or Black British	1.324	.409	10.500	1	.001	3.760	1.688	8.378
	Chinese or Other	.849	1.013	.701	1	.402	2.337	.321	17.025
Religion									
	Christian			52.736	7	.000			
	Buddhist	-15.174	>1,000	.000	1	.997	.000	.000	.
	Hindu	-15.015	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
	Jewish	2.823	.477	35.067	1	.000	16.825	6.610	42.827
	Muslim	1.826	.730	6.256	1	.012	6.207	1.484	25.952
	Sikh	-15.870	>1000	.000	1	1.000	.000	.000	.
	Other	1.756	.598	8.620	1	.003	5.787	1.793	18.685
	No religion	-.468	.323	2.107	1	.147	.626	.333	1.178

Continued over

Table 8.06 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnic by Religion</b>								
Ethnic x Religion			10.361	24	.993			
Mixed x Buddhist	-1.630	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.196	.000	.
Mixed x Hindu	-1.780	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.169	.000	.
Mixed x Jewish	.213	1.395	.023	1	.879	1.237	.080	19.057
Mixed x Muslim	.408	1.263	.104	1	.747	1.503	.126	17.869
Mixed x Other religion	1.134	1.444	.616	1	.433	3.107	.183	52.706
Mixed x No religion	.411	1.273	.104	1	.747	1.508	.124	18.274
Asian or Asian British x Buddhist	-.933	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.394	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Hindu	16.185	>1,000	.000	1	.999	>1,000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Muslim	.080	1.250	.004	1	.949	1.083	.094	12.540
Asian or Asian British x Sikh	17.723	>1,000	.000	1	.999	>1,000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Other religion	.234	1.563	.022	1	.881	1.264	.059	27.021
Asian or Asian British x No religion	-15.990	>1,000	.000	1	.997	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Buddhist	-1.465	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.231	.000	.
Black or Black British x Hindu	-1.700	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.183	.000	.
Black or Black British x Jewish	-19.323	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Muslim	.137	.927	.022	1	.883	1.146	.186	7.048
Black or Black British x Other religion	-18.008	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x No religion	-16.037	>1,000	.000	1	.998	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Buddhist	-.876	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.417	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Hindu	-.784	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.457	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Jewish	-18.985	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Muslim	.507	1.301	.152	1	.697	1.660	.130	21.249
Chinese or Other x Other religion	-17.641	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x No religion	2.566	1.150	4.979	1	.026	13.012	1.366	123.934
Constant	-6.266	.404	240.104	1	.000	.002		

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: hatemota, hatem2ta, sex, agegrp, remploy, emdidec2, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .010, Nagelkerke = .183, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 5.290$ , df = 8, Sig. = .726

Analysis of interaction effects between religion and ethnicity was frustrated by the return of a non-statistically significant value for the overall combined effect ( $Wald=10.361$ ,  $df=24$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). Further none of the interactions were statistically significant with the exception of Chinese or Other\*No Religion. Notwithstanding the apparent relative lack of interactive effects in respect of ethnicity and religion, the model suggests religiously motivated crime against Muslim and Jewish respondents is capable of transcending boundaries of sex, age and class. Log odds estimates for victims from each subgroup (i.e. young, male respondents disaggregated by ethnicity and religion) perceiving religiously motivated crime

were calculated and are reported in Table 8.07 and Figure 8.01. The values were calculated using statistically significant coefficients inputted into the following equation:

$$p = \text{Exp} (a + \beta(\text{Race}) + \beta(\text{Religion}) + \beta(\text{Race} * \text{Religion}))$$


*a* = the intercept (or constant)

**Table 8.07 Log odds estimates for victims perceiving religious motivation**

	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Other	No religion
White	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.032	0.012	0.002	0.011	0.002
Mixed	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.032	0.012	0.002	0.011	0.002
Asian or Asian British	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.032	0.012	0.002	0.011	0.002
Black or Black British	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.12	0.044	0.007	0.041	0.007
Chinese or Other	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.032	0.12	0.002	0.011	0.025

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

**Figure 8.01 Log odds estimates for victims of crime perceiving religious motivation**



Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

As may be seen in Figure 8.01, the log odds for victims within each of the subgroups perceiving religiously motivated crime (having controlled for sex, age, economic activity and multiple deprivation) was relatively low for each subgroup but for Muslim and Jewish respondents did not remain stable across the ethnic groups. For instance, Muslim victims who also self-described as being Black or Black British and Chinese or Other were more likely than their White, Mixed and Asian or Asian British counterparts to perceive their crime to have been motivated by religion. Within the Muslim group, it would appear that Chinese or Other

victims were the most likely to perceive religious motivation. The estimates also indicate that those self-describing as Jewish and Black or Black British might be expected to perceive religious motivation more often than others, although only two Jewish respondents within the merged Crime Survey dataset described themselves in this way (compared to 650 respondents who self-described as Muslim and Chinese or Other). Overall, and in a challenge to conclusions asserted or implied within the literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’, there was little evidence to support descriptions of British Muslim communities as the group most likely to suffer faith hate crime.

### **Racially motivated crime**

As discussed, ‘Islamophobia’ is often conceptualized as a phenomenon that blends religious, racial and cultural prejudices. ‘Islamophobia’ has been described, for example, as ‘anti-Muslim racism’. Thus, it was deemed appropriate to view racism through the lens of religious affiliation and analyse incidents of racism reported by Muslim respondents as examples of anti-Muslim hate crime and the possible manifestations of ‘Islamophobia’ as defined in the literature. A derived variable was used to test the effects of ‘being Muslim’ on perceiving crime as having been racially motivated. As before, this derived variable reported prevalence and was computed from Crime Survey’s victim forms; this time from waves 2006/07 to 2010/11, (the capturing of racially motivated crime data pre-dates that of religiously motivated crime by a year). As before, this derived variable was introduced into a dataset that included demographic, social and economic variables (again, used to emulate and reflect some of the dominant themes within recent demographic studies of British Muslim communities).

The analysis of minority religion groups was limited by the low numbers of crime victims from the Hindu group ( $n=57$ ), Jewish group ( $n=8$ ) and Sikh group ( $n=35$ ). Notwithstanding these small sample sizes, analysis of the model (Table 8.08) an odds increase of nine-fold for White Muslim respondents (having controlled for other factors) when compared to White Christian respondents. This was twice as large as the difference in odds

difference between White Jewish and White Christian respondents (when only main effects were considered Jewish respondents were 4.5 times more likely than those from the Christian group).

The overall Wald statistic value for the religion and ethnicity interaction was statistically significant ( $Wald=52.194$ ,  $df=25$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) indicating an overall interaction between ethnicity and religion (where there was no such interaction between the factors in respect of religiously motivated crime). Three interaction coefficients were found to be statistically significant. In each case, these interaction effects related to Muslim victims of crime (victims who self-described as Muslim and also Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British, or Chinese or Other).

As before, a series of log odds estimates were generated using the constant and coefficients for ethnicity, religion and ethnicity\*religion, where the coefficients were found to be statistically significant (see Table 8.09). As shown in Figure 8.02, these values among each subgroup reveal the differences in estimated likelihood between Muslim victims from the various ethnic groups. Having controlled for other factors, the model estimates suggest that we might expect Muslim victims from the Mixed group to be more likely than other Muslim victims to perceive racial motivation. The chart reveals relative stability across the minority religion groups within the Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British and Chinese or Other groups in respect of perceiving racial motivation with the exception of Jewish victims for whom, as before, the analysis revealed overall disproportionality and discrepancies when compared to other religion groups within each ethnic group.

In terms of addressing this thesis' primary research question, the estimates revealed that the relationship between religious identity perceiving religious and racial motivation (i.e. being a victim of religiously motivated or racially motivated crime) is not the same for all Muslim victims and is different within each of the specified ethnic groups. This overall finding challenges the notion that 'Islamophobia' is a universal phenomenon and that all British

Muslim communities experience hate crime in the same way. Findings suggest a more complex relationships between religion, ethnicity and hate crime victimization for British Muslims than is discussed by scholars.

**Table 8.08 Crime Survey: Racially motivated crime victimization - Logistic regression model**

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
Sex	Female	-.285	.070	16.741	1	.000	.752	.656	.862
Age	16-29			39.833	2	.000			
	30-59	-.081	.076	1.127	1	.288	.922	.795	1.071
	60+	-.960	.154	38.850	1	.000	.383	.283	.518
Economic activity	Employed			6.716	2	.035			
	Unemployed	.287	.144	3.970	1	.046	1.332	1.005	1.766
	Economically inactive	.163	.082	3.973	1	.046	1.177	1.003	1.382
Multiple deprivation	Least deprived			36.485	9	.000			
	Most deprived	.402	.163	6.116	1	.013	1.495	1.087	2.056
	Second most deprived	.354	.165	4.632	1	.031	1.425	1.032	1.968
	Third most deprived	-.012	.173	.005	1	.945	.988	.705	1.386
	Fourth most deprived	.023	.175	.017	1	.896	1.023	.726	1.442
	Fifth most deprived	.079	.178	.198	1	.656	1.082	.764	1.534
	Sixth most deprived	.082	.183	.202	1	.653	1.086	.759	1.554
	Seventh most deprived	-.003	.191	.000	1	.987	.997	.685	1.451
	Eighth most deprived	-.098	.195	.252	1	.616	.907	.618	1.330
	Ninth most deprived	-.406	.213	3.643	1	.056	.666	.439	1.011
Ethnicity	White			562.509	4	.000			
	Mixed	1.898	.226	70.700	1	.000	6.670	4.286	10.381
	Asian or Asian British	2.521	.245	106.242	1	.000	12.437	7.701	20.085
	Black or Black British	2.423	.118	420.900	1	.000	11.278	8.947	14.215
	Chinese or Other	2.402	.216	123.420	1	.000	11.040	7.227	16.864
Religion	Christian			69.368	7	.000			
	Buddhist	.302	.715	.179	1	.672	1.353	.333	5.490
	Hindu	-16.547	>1000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
	Jewish	1.488	.390	14.549	1	.000	4.430	2.062	9.518
	Muslim	2.203	.299	54.435	1	.000	9.054	5.043	16.256
	Sikh	-19.024	>1000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
	Other	.386	.455	.723	1	.395	1.472	.604	3.588
	No religion	-.014	.119	.015	1	.903	.986	.781	1.244

Continued over

Table 8.08 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnic by Religion</b>								
Ethnic x Religion			52.194	25	.001			
Mixed x Buddhist	2.352	1.260	3.488	1	.062	10.510	.890	124.092
Mixed x Hindu	-1.912	>1000	.000	1	1.000	.148	.000	.
Mixed x Jewish	-20.087	>1000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Mixed x Muslim	-.671	.536	1.565	1	.211	.511	.179	1.462
Mixed x Sikh	20.924	>1000	.000	1	.999	>1000	.000	.
Mixed x Other religion	-.298	1.153	.067	1	.796	.742	.077	7.115
Mixed x No religion	.173	.389	.196	1	.658	1.188	.554	2.549
Asian or Asian British x Buddhist	-.271	.921	.087	1	.768	.763	.125	4.634
Asian or Asian British x Hindu	16.500	>1000	.000	1	.999	>1000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Muslim	-2.069	.390	28.118	1	.000	.126	.059	.271
Asian or Asian British x Sikh	19.187	>1000	.000	1	.999	>1000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Other religion	-.817	.897	.829	1	.363	.442	.076	2.564
Asian or Asian British x No religion	-.532	.500	1.130	1	.288	.588	.220	1.566
Black or Black British x Buddhist	-19.239	>1000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Hindu	-2.482	>1000	.000	1	1.000	.084	.000	.
Black or Black British x Jewish	-19.836	>1000	.000	1	1.000	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Muslim	-2.046	.415	24.343	1	.000	.129	.057	.291
Black or Black British x Other religion	-.388	.884	.193	1	.661	.678	.120	3.836
Black or Black British x No religion	-.802	.538	2.224	1	.136	.448	.156	1.287
Chinese or Other x Buddhist	-.680	.878	.600	1	.439	.507	.091	2.831
Chinese or Other x Hindu	17.021	>1000	.000	1	.999	>1000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Jewish	-20.238	>1000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Muslim	-2.011	.439	20.930	1	.000	.134	.057	.317
Chinese or Other x Other religion	-.268	.905	.088	1	.767	.765	.130	4.504
Chinese or Other x No religion	.268	.339	.626	1	.429	1.308	.673	2.542
Constant	-4.551	.162	790.641	1	.000	.011		

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: racemot, sex, agegrp, remploy, emdidec2, ethnic2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .030, Nagelkerke = .177, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 7.618$ , df = 8, Sig. = .472

Table 8.09 Log odds estimates for victims of crime perceiving racial motivation

	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Other	No religion
White	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.047	0.096	0.011	0.011	0.011
Mixed	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.312	0.638	0.07	0.07	0.07
Asian or Asian British	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.0582	0.15	0.131	0.131	0.131
Black or Black British	0.119	0.119	0.119	0.527	0.139	0.119	0.119	0.119
Chinese or Other	0.117	0.117	0.117	0.516	0.141	0.117	0.117	0.117

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

**Figure 8.02 Log odds estimates for victims of crime perceiving racial motivation**

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

### Personal crime victimization

A series of binary logistic regression models was used to test the effects of 'being Muslim' on the likelihood of reporting personal crime victimization to the Crime Survey. As for the religiously and racially motivated crime models, a series of demographic, social and economic variables were selected for analysis alongside religious identity (again, to reflect similar analyses reported in previous studies). Again, the purpose of generating and analysing regression models was to apply the type of statistical work undertaken by the Home Office in respect of ethnic minorities to this doctoral research project's primary research question of testing common assertions regarding 'Islamophobia'. Accordingly, independent variables chosen for the personal and household crime models that emulated or reflected those used in previous Home Office studies (cf. Clancy et al, 2001; Janson, 2006; Smith et al, 2012) whilst developing these studies with an additional focus on religious identity. Home Office studies of personal and violent crime among ethnic minority communities have previously analysed ethnicity whilst controlling for factors such as urban living and the increased risks of personal crime victimization for those who visit pubs and nightclubs regularly (cf. Clancy et al, 2001).

Two binary logistic regression models were generated in order to explore personal crime victimization and religious identity. The first of these two models (see Table 8.10) attempted to use regression analysis to replicate the type of limited considerations found most often within the scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' and personal crime (especially from non-governmental sources): i.e. analysis that focuses primarily on Muslim identity, with only limited consideration of sex and age, if any at all, and no consideration of wider demographic, social and economic issues. Use of logistic regression revealed that, having controlled for the other factors within this very limited model, 'being Muslim' had a statistically significant effect on personal crime victimization but, surprisingly perhaps, challenged commonly held assertions within the literature by appearing to lower the odds of such risks among the Muslim group. These lower odds were also shared with the Hindu group. The model also revealed the greater likely of reporting personal crime victimization among the Jewish, Other and No religion groups. Regression modelling done using the same (few) factors used by many scholars engaged with debates around 'Islamophobia' did not provide support for their more common assertions.

A second, more developed model was used to explore personal crime in a depth more akin to related Home Office studies (see Table 8.11). The effects of religious identity were tested whilst controlling for sex, age, inner city residence, multiple deprivation, employment, the frequency with which pubs were visited in the last month, and ethnicity (i.e. the types of factors commonly found within administrative studies of crime and ethnicity). As for religiously and racially motivated crime, the interaction effects of ethnicity with religion were included in the model.

Although the overall interaction effect between ethnic and religion was not statistically significant ( $Wald=32.205$ ,  $df=28$ ,  $p>0.05$ ), there were individual interaction effects that were, and three which related to the Muslim group: Muslim respondents who also self-described as Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British and Mixed. Individual interaction effects were analysed to determine the odds of personal crime victimization among subgroups defined by

religion and ethnicity. As before, log odds estimates were calculated using coefficients for religion, ethnicity and the interaction effects for religion and ethnicity where such coefficients were found to be statistically significant.

As shown in Table 8.12 and Figure 8.03, Muslim respondents were among those least likely to experience personal crime within each minority ethnic group. Among the White group however, Muslim respondents were among the most likely to be victimized – echoing the finding (shown in Table 8.11) that White Muslim respondents were 44% more likely than White Christian respondents to experience personal crime (having controlled for other factors). The estimates revealed a level of victimization that was more stable across the ethnic groups than was the case for religiously and racially motivated crime. As before, there were disparities in victimization for Jewish respondents from each of the ethnic groups.

In relation to the assertions regarding ‘Islamophobia’ found throughout the literature, a comparison between estimates for personal crime victimization and crime motivated by religion or ethnicity revealed discrepancy. Muslim respondents from the Mixed and Chinese or Other groups had a greater likelihood than others within the same groups of suffering religiously motivated crime and racially motivated crime respectively. However, no such discrepancy was found in relation to the likelihood of suffering overall personal crime. Muslim respondents from the Mixed and Chinese or Other groups perceived more hate crime than others, but in fact suffered fewer personal crimes.

The findings also revealed that living in areas of multiple deprivation, being unemployed, and visiting pubs frequently increased the likelihood of experiencing personal crime. Visiting pubs more than twelve times per month (i.e. almost daily) had the largest statistically significant effect on personal crime when compared to other factors: stronger, for instance, than either religion or ethnicity. The relationship between pub visits and victimization may account, in part at least, for lower rates of Muslim crime victimization. Whatever the explanatory factors may be, this chapter’s primary assertion in relation to

Muslim personal crime victimization is that the criminological literature concerning 'Islamophobia' would arguably be better served with an increased focus on factors such sex, age and class (i.e. factors that are routinely controlled for in crime data studies by the Home Office). Further, future criminological studies might benefit from a renewed focus on ethnicity and the increased likelihood of suffering personal crime for those who self-describe as Muslim and White.

**Table 8.10 Crime Survey: Personal crime victimization (excluding sexual offences) - Logistic regression model 1**

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
<b>Sex</b>									
	Female	-.141	.019	56.331	1	.000	.868	.837	.901
<b>Age</b>									
	16-29			4003.235	2	.000			
	30-59	-.911	.021	1852.994	1	.000	.402	.386	.419
	60+	-1.827	.030	3710.966	1	.000	.161	.152	.171
<b>Religion</b>									
	Christian			109.961	7	.000			
	Buddhist	.158	.120	1.737	1	.187	1.171	.926	1.480
	Hindu	-.277	.092	9.097	1	.003	.758	.634	.908
	Jewish	.576	.134	18.520	1	.000	1.779	1.369	2.314
	Muslim	-.158	.056	8.029	1	.005	.853	.765	.952
	Sikh	-.079	.129	.378	1	.539	.924	.718	1.189
	Other	.494	.092	29.065	1	.000	1.639	1.369	1.961
	No religion	.145	.023	40.473	1	.000	1.156	1.106	1.209
	Constant	-1.933	.021	8127.071	1	.000	.145		

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

Variables used: totperls, sex, agegrp, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .020, Nagelkerke = .060, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 101.784$ , df = 6, Sig. = .000

**Table 8.11 Crime Survey: Personal crime victimization (excluding sexual offences) - Logistic regression model 2**

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
<b>Sex</b>									
	Female	-.085	.020	17.818	1	.000	.918	.882	.955
<b>Age</b>									
	16-24		>1,000	2901.355	6	.000			
	25-34	-.579	.030	366.415	1	.000	.560	.528	.595
	35-44	-.901	.031	832.046	1	.000	.406	.382	.432
	45-54	-1.063	.034	990.643	1	.000	.345	.323	.369
	55-64	-1.495	.038	1547.802	1	.000	.224	.208	.242
	65-74	-1.892	.049	1494.769	1	.000	.151	.137	.166
	+75	-2.026	.056	1325.504	1	.000	.132	.118	.147
<b>Inner city residence or not</b>									
	Inner city	.081	.035	5.363	1	.021	1.084	1.012	1.161
<b>Multiple deprivation</b>									
	Least deprived			163.787	9	.000			
	Most deprived	.368	.048	59.389	1	.000	1.444	1.315	1.586
	Second	.340	.046	54.182	1	.000	1.405	1.283	1.538
	Third	.317	.045	48.783	1	.000	1.373	1.256	1.501
	Fourth	.293	.045	41.817	1	.000	1.340	1.226	1.464
	Fifth	.157	.046	11.919	1	.001	1.170	1.070	1.280
	Sixth	.156	.046	11.453	1	.001	1.169	1.068	1.279
	Seventh	.092	.046	3.929	1	.047	1.096	1.001	1.200
	Eighth	-.025	.047	.287	1	.592	.975	.889	1.070
	Ninth	.049	.046	1.100	1	.294	1.050	.959	1.150
<b>Economic activity</b>									
	Employed			64.918	2	.000			
	Unemployed	.342	.047	52.877	1	.000	1.407	1.283	1.543
	Economically inactive	.119	.026	21.526	1	.000	1.126	1.071	1.184
<b>Pub visits in the last month</b>									
	None			449.792	4	.000			
	1-3 (less than once a week)	.145	.025	32.489	1	.000	1.155	1.099	1.214
	4-8 (once to twice week)	.338	.028	141.452	1	.000	1.403	1.326	1.483
	9-12 (about 3 times a week)	.627	.045	196.670	1	.000	1.872	1.715	2.044
	More than 12 times (almost daily)	.804	.047	286.970	1	.000	2.235	2.036	2.453

Continued over

Table 8.11 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnicity</b>								
White			30.759	4	.000			
Mixed	.528	.098	29.082	1	.000	1.696	1.400	2.055
Asian or Asian British	.027	.148	.034	1	.853	1.028	.769	1.373
Black or Black British	.093	.062	2.257	1	.133	1.097	.972	1.239
Chinese or Other	.032	.127	.063	1	.802	1.032	.806	1.323
<b>Religion</b>								
Christian			64.784	7	.000			
Buddhist	.288	.173	2.755	1	.097	1.333	.949	1.873
Hindu	.712	1.079	.435	1	.509	2.037	.246	16.870
Jewish	.611	.142	18.621	1	.000	1.843	1.396	2.433
Muslim	.366	.155	5.587	1	.018	1.441	1.064	1.952
Sikh	-18.538	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Other	.489	.107	20.811	1	.000	1.631	1.322	2.012
No religion	.119	.025	23.025	1	.000	1.126	1.073	1.182

Continued over

Table 8.11 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnic by Religion</b>	<b>&gt;1,000</b>							
<b>Ethnic x Religion</b>			<b>32.205</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>.266</b>			
Mixed x Buddhist	-.165	.784	.044	1	.834	.848	.183	3.941
Mixed x Hindu	-19.643	>1,000	.000	1	.998	.000	.000	.
Mixed x Jewish	.706	.670	1.112	1	.292	2.026	.545	7.532
Mixed x Muslim	-.794	.379	4.380	1	.036	.452	.215	.951
Mixed x Sikh	18.832	>1,000	.000	1	.999	>1,000	.000	.
Mixed x Other religion	-.584	.513	1.292	1	.256	.558	.204	1.526
Mixed x No religion	-.451	.186	5.846	1	.016	.637	.442	.918
Asian or Asian British x Buddhist	-.716	.397	3.257	1	.071	.489	.225	1.064
Asian or Asian British x Hindu	-.969	1.093	.787	1	.375	.379	.045	3.229
Asian or Asian British x Jewish	-19.170	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Muslim	-.644	.224	8.282	1	.004	.525	.339	.814
Asian or Asian British x Sikh	18.407	>1,000	.000	1	.999	>1,000	.000	.
Asian or Asian British x Other religion	-.184	.400	.213	1	.645	.832	.380	1.820
Asian or Asian British x No religion	.205	.252	.660	1	.417	1.227	.749	2.012
Black or Black British x Buddhist	.411	.789	.271	1	.603	1.508	.321	7.086
Black or Black British x Hindu	-.784	1.496	.275	1	.600	.456	.024	8.572
Black or Black British x Jewish	-18.580	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Muslim	-.700	.247	8.003	1	.005	.497	.306	.807
Black or Black British x Sikh	.648	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	1.911	.000	.
Black or Black British x Other religion	-.254	.449	.320	1	.571	.776	.322	1.870
Black or Black British x No religion	-.303	.233	1.690	1	.194	.739	.468	1.166
Chinese or Other x Buddhist	.025	.304	.007	1	.935	1.025	.565	1.860
Chinese or Other x Hindu	-.902	1.167	.598	1	.440	.406	.041	3.994
Chinese or Other x Jewish	-.166	1.080	.024	1	.878	.847	.102	7.034
Chinese or Other x Muslim	-.624	.264	5.601	1	.018	.536	.320	.898
Chinese or Other x Sikh	19.116	>1,000	.000	1	.999	>1,000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Other religion	.160	.442	.131	1	.717	1.174	.493	2.792
Chinese or Other x No religion	-.282	.202	1.962	1	.161	.754	.508	1.119
Constant	-2.261	.047	2298.894	1	.000	.104		

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: totperls, sex, agegrp7, inner, emdidec2, remploy, pubeve, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .026, Nagelkerke = .075, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 13.825$ , df = 8, Sig. = .086

**Table 8.12 Log odds estimates for respondents experiencing personal crime**

	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Other	No religion
White	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.192	0.15	0.104	0.17	0.117
Mixed	0.177	0.177	0.177	0.326	0.115	0.177	0.288	0.162
Asian or Asian British	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.192	0.079	0.104	0.17	0.117
Black or Black British	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.192	0.075	0.104	0.17	0.117
Chinese or Other	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.192	0.081	0.104	0.17	0.117

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

**Figure 8.03 Log odds estimates for respondents experiencing personal crime**

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

## Household crime victimization

Home Office studies of household victimization within the context of hate crime have previously considered victimization risks among minority ethnic groups whilst controlling for factors such as income and housing tenure type (cf. Corcoran, Lader and Smith, 2015). The models used in the cited report provided a guiding framework for analysis reported in this section and a set of variables that were broadly similar to those used here. Alongside religion and ethnicity, the binary logistic regression model controlled for sex, age, residing in rural, urban and inner city locations, multiple deprivation, economic activity, property tenure type

(i.e. owner, social tenant or private tenant) and ownership or use of a vehicle. As before, the model also included interactions effects for religion and ethnicity (see Table 8.13).

Log odds estimates were generated for each of the religious and ethnic subgroups (see Table 8.14 and Figure 8.04). As shown, and having controlled for other factors, Muslim respondents were among those least likely to experience household crime across all the ethnic groups. In contrast to the findings in relation to religiously and racially motivated crime and personal crime, household victimization among Muslim respondents remained stable across the ethnic groups. In further contrast to the findings concerning personal crime, Muslim respondents from the White group were less likely to experience household crime than White Christian respondents.

As for personal crime, the model revealed the role played by social and economic factors in determining the likelihood of household crime victimization. Living in an urban area and residing in areas of multiple deprivation, appeared to determine household crime victimization to a greater degree than either religious identity or ethnicity (at least when compared to the dominant White and Christian groups). Given the findings from the bivariate analysis of household crime and the disproportionality it revealed in relation to household offences among Muslim households (see Table 8.05), it would appear that these differences may be explained by factors including class and economic disadvantage.

**Table 8.13 Crime Survey: Household crime victimization - Logistic regression model**

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
Sex									
	Female	-.016	.012	1.710	1	.191	.984	.961	1.008
Age									
	16-24			2497.794	6	.000			
	25-34	-.036	.023	2.506	1	.113	.965	.923	1.009
	35-44	-.114	.022	25.515	1	.000	.893	.854	.933
	45-54	-.205	.024	76.079	1	.000	.815	.778	.853
	55-64	-.561	.025	514.106	1	.000	.571	.544	.599
	65-74	-.980	.030	1094.431	1	.000	.375	.354	.398
	+75	-1.314	.035	1439.309	1	.000	.269	.251	.288
Inner city residence or not									
	Inner city	-.083	.022	13.683	1	.000	.921	.881	.962
Rural or urban residence									
	Urban	.390	.016	586.288	1	.000	1.477	1.431	1.525
Multiple deprivation									
	Least deprived			911.278	9	.000			
	Most deprived	.649	.030	468.831	1	.000	1.913	1.804	2.028
	Second	.606	.028	455.092	1	.000	1.832	1.733	1.937
	Third	.519	.028	352.023	1	.000	1.680	1.591	1.773
	Fourth	.446	.027	264.209	1	.000	1.561	1.480	1.648
	Fifth	.345	.027	162.349	1	.000	1.412	1.339	1.489
	Sixth	.265	.028	92.944	1	.000	1.304	1.235	1.376
	Seventh	.185	.028	45.021	1	.000	1.204	1.140	1.270
	Eighth	.133	.028	23.184	1	.000	1.143	1.082	1.206
	Ninth	.113	.028	16.765	1	.000	1.119	1.061	1.181
Economic activity									
	Employed			11.403	2	.003			
	Unemployed	.109	.035	9.855	1	.002	1.115	1.042	1.193
	Economically inactive	-.012	.016	.590	1	.442	.988	.957	1.019
Property tenure									
	Owner			171.638	2	.000			
	Social housing tenant	.237	.018	167.519	1	.000	1.267	1.222	1.313
	Private housing tenant	.028	.018	2.449	1	.118	1.028	.993	1.065
Use or own a vehicle									
	Use or own a vehicle	.727	.019	1473.404	1	.000	2.069	1.994	2.148

Continued over

Table 8.13 continued

		$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
								Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnicity</b>									
	White British			30.666	4	.000			
	Mixed	.087	.078	1.241	1	.265	1.091	.936	1.273
	Asian or Asian British	.126	.109	1.331	1	.249	1.134	.916	1.403
	Black or Black British	-.030	.118	.066	1	.797	.970	.770	1.223
	Chinese and Other	-.125	.087	2.051	1	.152	.882	.744	1.047
<b>Religion</b>									
	Christian			16.613	7	.020			
	Buddhist	-.438	.192	5.191	1	.023	.645	.443	.941
	Hindu	.396	.248	2.553	1	.110	1.485	.914	2.413
	Jewish	-.004	.794	.000	1	.996	.996	.210	4.717
	Muslim	-.260	.132	3.869	1	.049	.771	.596	.999
	Sikh	-.090	.786	.013	1	.909	.914	.196	4.267
	Other	.393	.315	1.560	1	.212	1.481	.800	2.744
	No religion	-.252	.131	3.712	1	.054	.777	.602	1.004

Continued over

Table 8.13 continued

	$\beta$	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% C.I. for EXP( $\beta$ )	
							Lower	Upper
<b>Ethnic by Religion</b>								
Ethnic x Religion			38.268	28	.093			
Mixed x Buddhist	.685	.220	9.700	1	.002	1.984	1.289	3.053
Mixed x Hindu	.326	.752	.188	1	.664	1.386	.317	6.055
Mixed x Jewish	.317	.799	.158	1	.691	1.373	.287	6.579
Mixed x Muslim	.194	.172	1.270	1	.260	1.214	.866	1.701
Mixed x Sikh	-19.723	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Mixed x Other religion	-.191	.323	.351	1	.553	.826	.438	1.555
Mixed x No religion	.332	.132	6.368	1	.012	1.394	1.077	1.804
Asian or Asian British x Buddhist	.092	.673	.019	1	.891	1.096	.293	4.103
Asian or Asian British x Hindu	-1.416	1.076	1.731	1	.188	.243	.029	2.000
Asian or Asian British x Jewish	1.290	.993	1.688	1	.194	3.634	.519	25.455
Asian or Asian British x Muslim	.310	.260	1.422	1	.233	1.364	.819	2.270
Asian or Asian British x Sikh	.001	1.122	.000	1	.999	1.001	.111	9.027
Asian or Asian British x Other religion	-.322	.519	.384	1	.535	.725	.262	2.006
Asian or Asian British x No religion	.340	.190	3.205	1	.073	1.405	.968	2.039
Black or Black British x Buddhist	.143	.284	.254	1	.614	1.154	.661	2.015
Black or Black British x Hindu	-.534	.269	3.954	1	.047	.586	.346	.992
Black or Black British x Jewish	-19.635	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Black or Black British x Muslim	.316	.163	3.734	1	.053	1.371	.995	1.889
Black or Black British x Sikh	.195	.795	.060	1	.806	1.216	.256	5.774
Black or Black British x Other religion	-.318	.406	.613	1	.434	.728	.328	1.613
Black or Black British x No religion	.386	.219	3.119	1	.077	1.472	.958	2.259
Chinese or Other x Buddhist	.047	.786	.004	1	.952	1.048	.225	4.891
Chinese or Other x Hindu	-.505	.685	.544	1	.461	.603	.158	2.310
Chinese or Other x Jewish	-18.947	>1,000	.000	1	.999	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Muslim	.073	.182	.160	1	.689	1.076	.753	1.538
Chinese or Other x Sikh	-18.741	>1,000	.000	1	1.000	.000	.000	.
Chinese or Other x Other religion	-.429	.451	.903	1	.342	.651	.269	1.577
Chinese or Other x No religion	.246	.201	1.492	1	.222	1.279	.862	1.897
Constant	-2.566	.087	873.775	1	.000	.077		

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11


Variables used: totalhh, sex, agegrp7, inner, rural2, emdidec2, remploy, tenharm, car, ethgrp2, relig2

R<sup>2</sup> tests: Cox and Snell = .045, Nagelkerke = .075, Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2 = 5.177$ , df = 8, Sig. = .739

**Table 8.14 Log odds estimates for respondents experiencing household crime**

	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Other	No religion
White	0.077	0.05	0.077	0.077	0.059	0.077	0.077	0.077
Mixed	0.077	0.098	0.077	0.077	0.059	0.077	0.077	0.107
Asian or Asian British	0.077	0.05	0.077	0.077	0.059	0.077	0.077	0.077
Black or Black British	0.077	0.05	0.045	0.077	0.059	0.077	0.077	0.077
Chinese or Other	0.077	0.05	0.077	0.077	0.059	0.077	0.077	0.077

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

**Figure 8.04 Log odds estimates for respondents experiencing household crime**

Data source: BCS (CSEW) 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11

## HARASSMENT

The following section reports analysis of data from the Citizenship Survey related to harassment. The law against harassment is governed in England and Wales by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (and, in particular, sections 2 and 4A which define respectively ‘harassment’ as ‘causing alarm or distress’ and ‘putting people in fear of violence’). The law protects victims where the evidence shows that the action was targeted at an individual, was calculated to alarm or cause her or him distress, and was in itself oppressive and unreasonable. The survey questions in the Citizenship Survey asked respondents: ‘Thinking about anything that has happened in this local area have you personally experienced harassment because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion in the last two years in any of the ways listed on the

card?' A response card shown to the respondents included the options 'Verbal harassment', 'Physical attack', 'Damage to property', 'Threats', and 'Prefer not to say'.

The analysis reported below used bivariate tests to indicate the levels of harassment reported by Muslim respondents. As before, these tests were done to suggest broad patterns among the minority groups described (although these estimates did not control for other social and economic factors). The analysis also focused on the types of harassment reported by respondents in order to establish the most prevalent forms of abuse suffered. Finally, and most pertinently in terms of this thesis' primary research question, the perceived motivation for harassment were analysed. The primary aim of undertaking the analysis was to establish a hierarchy of motivating factors perceived as motivating the harassment of Muslim respondents. This was done in order to determine the predominance (or otherwise) of religiously motivated harassment targeted at Muslim victims. Given this aim, the use of multivariate analysis was deemed unnecessary.

As Table 8.11 shows, the results of bivariate analysis suggested that Muslim and Sikh respondents shared a similar likelihood of answering 'yes' and thus reporting some form of harassment. Although there was a statistically significant difference between Muslim and Hindu respondents in respect of reported harassment, the actual difference was relatively small (less than a point and a half). There were no apparent differences between religion groups among respondents identified by the survey as belonging to the BME group (Black and Minority Ethnic); nor were there any differences between Asian respondents who self-described as Christian, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. Buddhist and Jewish respondents were excluded from this analysis due to the small sample sizes (fewer than thirty respondents). Bivariate analysis of hate crime data revealed differences between Muslim and Christian respondents in reported victimization; no such differences were revealed by analysis of reported harassment (see Table 8.11). Harassment appeared to remain relatively stable across religion groups when all respondents were analysed, and across the same respondents when aggregated by religion and ethnicity. Analysis was conducted to include sex and explore

reported harassment by female respondents. As before, there was a statistically significant difference between Muslim and Hindu respondents. The difference, however, was larger between female Muslim respondents and female Hindu respondents. There were no such differences between female Muslim and female Sikh respondents (echoing the lack of difference found with the analysis of both sexes together).

Analysis was conducted on responses related to the specified types of harassment (see Table 8.12) – the primary focus of this section. The type of harassment most frequently reported by all respondents was verbal abuse. Small samples (particularly for Hindu and Sikh respondents) made difficult a comparison of responses from the minority religion groups. A very small sample of Jewish respondents ( $n=10$ ) meant that the group was regrettably but necessarily excluded from the analysis of Citizenship Survey harassment data. Where analysis was possible, Muslim respondents were more likely than Christian respondents to report verbal abuse. The analysis suggested similarities between Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents in respect of verbal abuse, although with a low sample size for the Sikh group ( $n=90$ ) the results are indicative rather than conclusive. What is of interest in terms of findings that support or challenge the conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ is that harassment because of skin colour, ethnic origin or religion that took the form of physical attack was less likely to be reported by Muslim respondents than Christian respondents: further evidence here perhaps that physical attack is not the primary concern for many British Muslim communities and that verbal abuse and threats are relatively neglected elements in the more frequently used typologies of anti-Muslim crime. It would appear that conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ that assert physical crime and downplay or ignore more ‘low level’ incidents of verbal abuse do not perhaps reflect accurately the lived experiences of British Muslim communities (as also revealed by the analysis of personal crime data). Indeed, harassment in the form of property damage appeared more prevalent than that in the form of physical attack (again, suggesting the necessity to broaden the parameters within which scholars consider anti-Muslim crime victimization).

A related survey question invited respondents to describe the specified part of their identity targeted in the reported incident of harassment due to skin colour, ethnicity or religion (see Table 8.13). Religion was not the most frequently selected option for Muslim respondents (who were all able to select more than one option). Skin colour was the most popular response and more frequently cited as a perceived reason. This finding supports a more multi-faceted conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' and anti-Muslim hate crime (i.e. one that considers factors other than religion) whilst further suggesting the need for a more developed typology of victimization within British Muslim communities.

**Table 8.15 Citizenship Survey: Percentages of respondents who reported harassment due to skin colour, ethnic origin or religion**

	Muslim	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Sikh
<b>All respondents</b>					
Weighted %	15	3*	6.7*	13.6*	15.4
Unweighted base	5,930	17,628	277	1,586	713
<b>BME respondents only</b>					
Weighted %	14.8	15.1	14.8	13.7	15.4
Unweighted base	5,756	4,393	232	1,581	712
<b>Asian respondents only</b>					
Weighted %	15.3	16.2	-	13.8	15.7
Unweighted base	4,474	377	-	1,493	695
<b>Black respondents only</b>					
Weighted %	13.1	15.3	-	-	-
Unweighted base	600	2,922	-	-	-
<b>Female respondents only</b>					
Weighted %	15.4	2.8*	-	10.8*	14.3
Unweighted base	2,857	10,190	-	726	341

Data source: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables used: shrsmt, relig, ethnic2, ethnic5, sex

p weighted with wtfinds

Blank cells unweighted n<30

\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.16 Citizenship Survey: Percentages of victims who reported one of the specified types of harassment**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh
Verbal abuse	Weighted %	77.7	68.6*	71.7	76
Physical attack	Weighted %	16.9	19.2*	-	-
Damage to property	Weighted %	18.8	25.5	24.5	-
Threats	Weighted %	18.8	20.6	15.1	-
Other (prefer not to say)	Weighted %	4.1	5.4	-	-
<b>Total unweighted n</b>		<b>808</b>	<b>855</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>90</b>

Data: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables: shrmnta1, shrmnta2, shrmnta3, shrmnta4, shrmnta5, relig  
p weighted with wtfinds

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

**Table 8.17 Citizenship Survey: Percentages of victims who perceived harassment as being motivated by skin colour, ethnic origin, or religion**

		Muslim	Christian	Hindu
Skin colour	Weighted %	61.8	65.1	73.7
Ethnic origin	Weighted %	41.1	34.4	47.4
Religion	Weighted %	47.3	13.6*	-
<b>Total unweighted n</b>		<b>389</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>74</b>

Data: CS 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10

Variables: swwhyhar1, swwhyhar2, swwhyhar3, relig  
p weighted with wtfinds

Blank cells denote unweighted n<30

\*p<0.001 (all comparisons with Muslim group)

NB. Row and column % values are more than 100 because participants were able to choose more than one option

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

- Overall, the analysis revealed a more complex overall picture of the relationships between Muslim identity and crime and harassment victimization than is asserted in the scholarly and policy literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’.
- Perceptions of religious motivation among Muslim victims of crime differed between ethnic groups. Muslim victims from the Chinese or Other group were the most likely to perceive religious motivation.
- Overall, Jewish victims were more likely than Muslim victims to perceive religious discrimination (i.e. Muslim victims were not the group most likely to be affected by such crimes).
- Perceptions of racially motivated crime also differed across the five ethnic groups. Muslim victims who self-described as Mixed were the subgroup most likely to perceive racial motivation.
- Muslim respondents were less likely to suffer personal crime than other respondents within each of the five ethnic groups.
- Visiting a pub frequently had a greater effect on personal crime victimization than religion or ethnicity (this may partly explain the lower rates of such crime among British Muslim communities).
- Muslim respondents were less likely to experience household crime than other respondents with shared ethnic identities.
- Overall, social and economic factors such as housing tenure and economic status appeared to be greater determinants of household crime victimization than religion or ethnicity. Once controlled for, the

**disproportionate victimization among Muslim respondents as suggested by the bivariate analysis was not evident.**

- **Regardless of what multivariate analysis may have revealed, verbal abuse was a more common form of harassment among Muslim respondents than physical attack, property damage, or threats – suggesting, at the very least, the need for an expanded typology of anti-Muslim crime and abuse.**
- **Skin colour was perceived more often than ethnicity and religion as a factor motivating perpetrators of harassment among Muslim respondents – again, suggesting that a previous focus on religious identity alone has established an incomplete overall picture of ‘Islamophobia’.**
- **The bivariate analysis of religiously and racially motivated crime, hate crime, personal crime and household crime revealed little supporting evidence for assertions concerning the unique or disproportionate targeting of British Muslim communities; nor did similar analysis of data related to harassment.**

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter described multi-faceted, although not necessarily contested, conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-Muslim hate crime that were found throughout the criminological literature concerning British Muslim communities. It was argued that these conceptualizations are applied most frequently to typologies of crime with inherent and demonstrable biases towards physical acts of violence. These applications are often used to assert the distinctive nature and extent of violent crime victimization among British Muslims which in turn are used to support the notion of widespread ‘Islamophobia’. In answer to the doctoral project’s primary research question there was little supporting evidence for the type of assertions made in the scholarly and policy literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’ and little

supporting evidence for the type of assertions made more specifically about the nature and extent of violent crime within British Muslim communities.

In answer to the secondary research questions set in the introduction, conclusions regarding increased risks of physical and violent crime are not supported by the reported experiences of surveyed British Muslim respondents, although, arguably, perceptions of religiously and racially motivated crime among some Muslim crime victims would indicate limited support for a commonly held belief in the prevalence of anti-Muslim hate crime among British Muslim communities (akin perhaps to a fear of anti-Muslim crime), even when such perceptions were not necessarily supported by evidence of disparities in personal crime victimization rates among Muslim respondents.

Although, of course, any and all violent crime must be viewed necessarily as a serious and damaging problem for any individual or group, the notion of a disparity of victimization within British Muslim communities (especially when compared to other minority groups) is not supported throughout the statistical findings. Analysis of harassment due to skin colour, ethnic origin or religion revealed another form of victimization that appeared to remain stable across minority religion groups. Conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' which include elements of anti-Muslim or cultural racism (i.e. some form of intersectionality) were given support by data which revealed that Muslim respondents were more likely to cite ethnicity as a perceived reason than they were religion. The analysis also revealed lower reporting rates of harassment in the form of physical attack among Muslim respondents (when compared to Christian respondents). Further support for the necessity to broaden the existing typologies of Muslim victimization was offered by findings related to harassment by verbal abuse; reported far more frequently than physical forms of harassment. This supports a more nuanced view of anti-Muslim harassment that includes verbal abuse and threats (alongside other non-physical and non-criminal forms of harassment and discrimination) as major components in anti-Muslim sentiment and action that discriminates and excludes. Data related to harassment also provide support for a renewed focus on property crime as a manifestation of anti-Muslim sentiment.

Further support for a widened typology is given by the finding of disparity among certain subgroups of Muslim respondents (e.g. White Muslim respondents and personal crime, and Mixed Muslim respondents and racially motivated crime). Very little of the discussion in the literature relies on social or economic factors when conceptualising Muslim crime victimization, anti-Muslim hate crime or 'Islamophobia' (although reports such as that by the Runnymede Trust assert economic disadvantage as an outcome of 'Islamophobic' discrimination): the analysis in the present chapter suggests an increased focus on factors such as general economic disadvantage, unemployment, housing, and education are perhaps required when considering the disadvantages faced by British Muslim communities.

Arguably, the nature of the Crime Survey data negates a full exploration of crime victimization as it relates to British Muslim communities. The focus on individual victimization excludes hostility and prejudice directed towards small businesses, and particular those engaged with the night time economy, such as disturbances at restaurants, take-away food outlets and minicab offices. Similarly, the focus on individually owned property excludes the deliberate criminal damage of property held publicly or communally such as mosques, Muslim community centres and madrassas. Although waves of the Crime Survey has included young people (aged 10-15) a more concerted effort to survey schools and colleges might reveal incidents of classroom and playground bullying motivated by anti-Muslim hostility. Similarly, the current exclusion of crime data relating to institutions such as hospitals and prisons negates the analysis of crime against vulnerable individuals such as patients and prisoners. Arguably, the inclusion of dependent variables related to these types of crime incidents would increase the accuracy of crime victimization estimates (both overall and in relation to British Muslim communities. Independent variables that describe dress and appearance might enable the analysis of visibly Muslim individuals (particularly perhaps visibly Muslim women). Also in relation to the visibility of Muslim people, the Crime Survey data does not allow researchers to estimate the number of non-Muslim victims who were targeted having been mistakenly identified as Muslim. Concerns around 'Islamophobia'

against Sikh communities have been voiced by British scholars (cf. Sian, 2013) within the context of race and interfaith relations, and American commentators (cf. Singh, 2012) within the context of racism, interfaith issues and police relations. Whilst such incidents may be captured when respondents choose ‘other’ or ‘don’t know’ response options, the present survey design negates the analysis of mistaken identity and thus may well introduce a degree of error into the comparison of religion groups.

This chapter concludes the analysis of the five selected datasets. The following chapter summarizes and discusses these findings and offers conclusions concerning the extent to which the statistical evidence, taken as a whole, challenges or supports conclusion found in the scholarly and policy literature pertaining to ‘Islamophobia’ in the UK. Also discussed in the next chapter are the strengths and weaknesses of the adopted research design, and the prospects for future research in this area.

## CHAPTER 9

### TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED VIEW OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'

#### INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis was to determine the extent to which available statistical data from large-scale social surveys supported or challenged the assertions and conclusions from reviewed scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. On the basis of the data presented, my thesis is that many of the findings from the analysis of statistical data challenge assertions and conclusions from scholarly literature presenting studies of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities and published over the course of the last two decades.

This chapter offers reflections on the key findings that challenge the literature after first engaging critically with the smaller number of key findings that appear (superficially at least) to offer a degree of support. The analysis then turns to the various causes underlying the apparent divergence between assertions and conclusions. In doing so, the chapter will seek to explicate the thesis with a second main contention. This thesis also contends that there are multiple underlying factors that may be used to explain why the statistical findings appear to call into question the dominant narratives of British Muslim communities and 'Islamophobia' offered in the literature. These explanatory factors include:

- The nature and availability of the statistical data (including issues of missing data, and factors related to social acceptability that may reduce the expression of anti-Muslim attitudes among respondents to social surveys).
- The nature of the discourse conveyed by the reviewed scholarly literature (including its dominant themes, narratives and emphases).
- The methodological limitations inherent within much of the scholarly literature (in particular the reliance on qualitative research designs and the use of small sample sizes).
- The historical and theoretical roots of the debates around 'Islamophobia' (including

the aims and intentions of the scholars engaged in such debates, and the nature of their intended audiences).

The main challenge derived from analysis of the statistical data is mounted predominantly against the overarching dominant themes and narratives established by the scholarly literature when considered in its entirety, rather than against individual sources or single assertions. The statistical evidence appears to challenge an overall approach or consensus among scholars that gives precedence to depictions of British Muslim communities as victimized, discriminated against, and excluded by wider non-Muslim society. Given the reliance on theoretical and political perspectives by scholars reviewed in earlier chapters, and the general lack of large-scale empirical evidence adduced in the literature to which they have contributed, it was seldom possible to compare a series of individual statements of statistical 'fact' made in the literature with a series of individual findings from the statistical analysis reported in this thesis. Instead, the study sought to determine whether the dominant themes and narratives, and the demonstrable emphases inherent within these, were persuasive or justifiable given the statistical evidence. In many cases, they were not.

Overall, the statistical findings challenged the assertions and conclusions in that they present more facets of the lived experiences of British Muslim communities, a broader plurality of attitudes held towards the British state and society, and more positive attitudes towards Muslim people than were revealed by an uncritical reading of the scholarly literature around 'Islamophobia'. However, there are exceptions. An overall conclusion that the statistical evidence challenged the literature was reached after considering carefully both divergences and convergences between the two examined sources. Reflecting on these processes of consideration, a more accurate statement might be that on balance the statistical evidence challenges the more common assertions and conclusions found within the literature. In places, the analysis revealed findings that appeared to support the literature. The discussion first turns to these findings and the apparent convergences between analysed data and

reviewed literature. As will be demonstrated, the few 'supporting' findings generated by the data analysis become significantly less compelling once placed under even moderate scrutiny.

### **POINTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE ANALYSED STATISTICAL DATA AND THE REVIEWED SCHOLARLY LITERATURE**

Key findings which support common assertions and conclusions found with the literature may be summarized as follows:

- There was evidence of more negative ('cooler') attitudes towards Muslims than towards Jewish people and towards Asian and Black people conceived in ethnic rather than religious terms.
- The building of mosques was less welcomed than the building of churches.
- Muslims were considered as among the most unsuitable types of people to work as teachers;
- The prospect of a Muslim woman wearing a face veil at work attracted more negative attitudes than that of a person wearing a crucifix or a turban at work.
- Muslim respondents perceived more prejudice against fellow Muslims than against people of other faiths.
- Muslim respondents reported high levels of fear of crime in relation to offences associated with 'Islamophobia' (religiously and racially motivated crime and relevant personal offences).
- Muslim respondents were more likely than other respondents to perceive religion as a motivating factor underpinning acts of discrimination against them.
- Muslim respondents appeared more likely than other respondents to experience religiously motivated hate crime.
- Muslim respondents, and particularly Muslim women, were more likely to report discrimination on the street and in a range of other public places.
- Muslim respondents to the Citizenship Survey were more likely to experience discrimination by the police and a range of other criminal justice agencies.

- Muslim respondents who were stopped by the police were more likely than other respondents to be the subject of a police search.

These statistical findings demonstrate clearly that British Muslim communities have the propensity to suffer hate crime victimization, prejudicial sentiment and discriminatory actions. Taken individually, each of these key findings represents a source of actual or potential disadvantage, exclusion and harm for British Muslim communities. These acts of prejudice, discrimination and hate, whether unlawful, criminal or simply unwelcomed, are rightly condemned by scholars who have engaged in debates around ‘Islamophobia’ and joined practitioners in the search for legal, administrative and practical solutions. However, most of the findings above may be qualified to some degree. By doing so, descriptions from the literature that portray British Muslim communities as being uniquely or disproportionately victimized and excluded by hate crime, prejudice, and discrimination appear to have told only part of the story. For instance, reported attitudes towards Muslims were only marginally more negative than reported attitudes towards other groups. Whilst Muslim people were identified by a number of non-Muslim respondents as being unsuitable potential teachers, many more respondents considered Gypsies and Travellers to be unsuitable for the role. The high levels of fear among Muslim respondents were shared with Hindu respondents (logistic regression revealed the far stronger effects of determinant factors such as ethnicity, gender, and previous crime victimization on an individual’s present fear of crime). Whilst Muslim victims were the group most likely to perceive religion as being a motivating factor in their victimization more Muslim victims of hate crime and discrimination were more likely to perceive their ethnicity as having been their perpetrator’s primary target. Similarly, and whilst Muslim respondents experienced more religiously motivated hate crime than others, experiences of general hate crime (including racially motivated hate crime, the most likely form of hate crime to be suffered by Muslim respondents) were stable across the religion categories (i.e. all respondents from the minority religious category shared a broadly similar likelihood of victimization). Finally, whilst Citizenship Survey respondents reported negative attitudes towards the police, far more positive attitudes, and thus a wider spectrum of overall attitudes,

were demonstrated by respondents to the larger and (arguably) more representative Crime Survey.

### **POINTS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE ANALYSED STATISTICAL DATA AND THE REVIEWED SCHOLARLY LITERATURE**

Conversely, it is not possible to summarize the key statistical findings which challenge the literature as succinctly as the supportive findings listed above. This indicates further how frequently such potential challenges emerged from the data. The findings below were aggregated thematically: crime victimization, non-criminal forms of discrimination, police relations, the attitudes towards the criminal justice system, and questions of citizenship. The key findings around crime victimization may be summarized as follows:

- Generally, there was an equal prevalence of fear of crime and crime victimization among Muslim respondents and non-Muslim respondents (including general hate crime, personal crime and household crime offences). Experiences of general hate crime were relatively stable across the religion groups and among respondents from ethnic minority groups (as were experiences of harassment).
- Ethnicity was a stronger determinant of personal crime victimization than religion, with the exception of being Jewish.
- Being Muslim had no effect on being the victim of general crime, personal crime or household crime (having first controlled for a range of demographic, social and economic factors).
- Overall, social and economic deprivation had more of an effect on household crime victimization than either religion or ethnicity (again, with the exception of being Jewish).

There were similar findings in relation to discrimination. The statistical analysis revealed three key findings that appeared to challenge the literature:

- Muslim respondents to the EMBES survey experienced less overall discrimination than Sikh and (non-White) Christian respondents.
- Muslim victims of discrimination were more likely to perceive their ethnicity, race or

skin colour, rather than their religion, as having been targeted.

- Muslim respondents were no more likely to experience discrimination by employers than Buddhist and Hindu respondents. Again, ethnicity was perceived more often than religion as the reason motivating discrimination.

Analysis of police relations generated two key findings that challenged the literature:

- Muslim respondents to the Crime Survey held very positive attitudes towards the police and in most instances held attitudes that were more positive than those held by non-Muslim respondents. This surprising finding contrasted sharply with descriptions of poor police relations found in the literature (especially within the context of counter-terrorism policing).
- Although Muslim respondents were more likely to be searched once stopped by the police, the analysis revealed that gender and age were stronger determinants of being stopped and searched on foot and stopped in a vehicle than being Muslim: an example of the incomplete picture presented by criminological literature concerning ‘institutional’ forms of Islamophobia.

Positive attitudes revealed by analysis of police relations were also revealed when survey questions addressed issues around the criminal justice system and citizenship:

- Muslim respondents reported positive attitudes towards the British Government’s handling of counter-terrorism and crime (and a range of other political and economic issues).
- Muslim respondents to the Crime Survey had higher levels of confidence and perceived fairness in the criminal justice system than other respondents.
- Muslim respondents reported high levels of citizenship in terms of both feeling British and feelings of belonging to Britain.

The authors of the Runnymede Trust report, the first British scholars to popularize the framing of anti-Muslim prejudice as ‘Islamophobia’, warned readers against the dangers of ‘monolithic’ perceptions of Islam and Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 4). According to the report’s authors, anti-Islamic prejudice and their harmful practical consequences are often predicated on an ideology informed by monolithic (i.e. limited and negative) views of Islam

and Muslims. However, it would appear that across many examples the scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' rehearses and reproduces other monolithic views and narratives: those of widespread Muslim victimization, discrimination and exclusion, and the presence of negative attitudes held by many Muslims towards British state institutions and wider society. As demonstrated by the key findings, these 'monolithic' narratives are seldom supported with compelling empirical evidence. By rehearsing and reproducing these narratives the literature supports discursive themes that have dominated the debates since the popularization of the term 'Islamophobia' nearly two decades ago.

### **CAUSES OF THE DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE STATISTICAL DATA AND THE LITERATURE**

Taken as a whole the findings presented in this thesis suggest a more nuanced overall picture of discrimination and victimization than that presented by much of the scholarly literature. The findings suggest complex networks of symbiotic relationships between religious and ethnic identity, gender, age, social and economic status, crime victimization and discrimination. In contrast, the literature presents more generalized, essentialised descriptions of the relationships between British Muslim communities and the manifestations and practical consequences of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic ideologies. This contrast between nuanced and essentialised perspectives is observable in numerous examples throughout the literature. The following section explores some of the contexts within which these disparities exist. In doing so, the discussion aims to move beyond any naive or unhelpful assertions that the literature is simply wrong, or any implied claims that scholars engaged in debates around 'Islamophobia' have deliberately or maliciously attempted to deceive. Often there are understandable (and sometimes entirely justifiable) reasons for the apparent disparities and divergences between data and literature.

If it is accepted that the entire spectrum of crime victimization and discrimination is not realized in the literature, then it follows perhaps that the statistical data also offer only a partial view. It may be the case that experiences alluded to in the literature (even where they

are not fully elucidated) related to experiences and types of abuse that were known to scholars and practitioners as affecting many British Muslim communities but that were not captured by large-scale social surveys. Indeed, scholars have described the many discrepancies between crime data and the lived experiences of British Muslim communities (cf. Phillips and Bowling, 2003). The nature of the Crime Survey in particular excludes certain offences and types of victim and, when used in isolation, affords researchers only a limited typology of anti-Muslim crime. Offences committed against businesses are not captured by a survey design intended instead to record crimes against individuals and domestic property. Recent empirical evidence (cf. Iganski and Lagou, 2014) suggested that commonly occurring incidents often underpinned by anti-Muslim prejudice are suffered by employees in shops and restaurants (late night takeaways, for instance). The statistical data reported in this thesis also suggest 'everyday' locations as subjects worthy of renewed focus. Other small businesses, and especially those in the night time economy (such as taxi services) may be prone to anti-Muslim hate crime that is not captured by any current series of large-scale surveys. (For example, drivers may not want to stop working in order to report an incident). Further, such incidents in the workplace may be normalized as routine and perhaps obscured by surveys better designed to capture crimes against individuals and property in more domestic settings.

The Crime Survey includes a young adult boost dataset (16 to 24) but does not include younger school children with the effect that (potentially commonplace) incidents of anti-Muslim verbal abuse in school classrooms and playgrounds may go routinely unrecorded. Official data have established that British Muslims (and particularly young British Muslim men) are over-represented in the criminal justice system and, more specifically, in the British prison system (Young, 2014). Although British Muslim communities account for 5% of the population of England and Wales, recent estimates put the Muslim prison population at 13%. Further, and more worrying still, it has been estimated recently that young Muslim men make up 25% of the 'young secure estate' in London (i.e. juvenile and young adult prisoners in the capital's prisons and young offender institutions). Previous studies (particularly Government

research) of minority prisoners have focused on ethnicity (British African Caribbean, British Asian and foreign national prisoners) rather than religion (cf. Ministry of Justice, 2011). It is possible that further comprehensive surveys of Muslim prisoners may reveal yet more missing facets of the relationships between British Muslim communities, anti-Muslim crime victimization, discrimination (at both individual and institutional level) and attitudes towards the British state.

More significantly for data pertaining to the wider British Muslim population, it may also be the case that incidents of crime and discrimination elude capture by social surveys due to the memories or perceptions of those surveyed. The Crime Survey invites respondents to describe experiences of crime from the last twelve months. In doing so it relies on two factors: the recall of the respondents, and the respondent's perception or knowledge that a recalled incident constituted a criminal offence. An obvious barrier to effective data collection in this respect is the varying memory recall of respondents. Another related factor has been revealed by qualitative research among British Muslim communities that has identified processes of normalization whereby incidents involving non-physical forms of violence (verbal abuse for example), or less severe forms discrimination, are accepted as constituent parts of everyday life (cf. Spalek 2002; Sheridan 2006; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Chakraborti and Zempi 2012). Such normalized experiences may well evade capture by the Crime Survey. Similarly, incidents of verbal abuse, certain forms of assault and harassment may also be susceptible to under-reporting and under-recording when not recognized by their victims as criminal acts and not recalled as such to survey researchers.

Another possible factor underpinning the discrepancy between the data and the literature is the unavailability of statistical data pertaining to British Muslim communities during the period when arguments around 'Islamophobia' were being established. Historically, there were no questions in the Crime Survey that sought to capture information about respondents' religious identity (although a long-standing question has captured experiences of physical attack due to ethnicity, skin colour or religion). A survey question

asking respondents to self-identify as belonging to a specific religion (or none) was first included in the 2003-2004 wave of the British Crime Survey (and made available publicly for download and study in 2005). The Runnymede Trust report in 1997 and the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia in 2004 were both produced and published during a period when insights into British Muslim communities were sought using variables related ethnic or national background ('Asian' or 'British Pakistani' for example). Similarly, since 1998, the British Social Attitudes Survey has included questions concerning race and ethnicity rather than religion and has surveyed only around 100 Muslim respondents in each wave. Such problems have persisted. Scholars documenting 'Islamophobia' in the UK and Europe have stated that their work is conducted 'without informed criminal intelligence' about the number and nature of incidents against Muslims (EUMC, 2006a: 18; see also, Allen, 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). This earlier absence of reliable data may explain the rise of a research culture where arguments are repeated and developed without recourse to sources of empirical data and with an uncritical acceptance of the dominant narratives and themes.

The dearth of empirical evidence was apparent throughout scholarly literature reviewed for this thesis. Many scholars relied on political and rhetorical styles of discussion and debate rather than on the analysis of primary data (cf. Allen, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011). In fact, and as demonstrated, one of the defining characteristics of scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia' was the common use of rhetorical and polemical styles of writing. Scholars appeared to have shaped debates around 'Islamophobia' into a predominantly political project; a discursive topic used to incorporate and develop wider debates around, for example, foreign policy and international relations. Where empirical data were presented in support of arguments that asserted the nature and extent of 'Islamophobia' they were often derived from the types of qualitative methodologies and research designs most often associated with more critical forms of social science and criminology, and most often guided by constructionist ontologies and interpretivist epistemologies. These qualitative research designs invariably included findings generated by the use of small non-representative

samples. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that assertions and conclusions were challenged by available larger scale statistical data. Throughout the literature, the use of data from interviews and small focus groups appeared to be the favoured research methods (cf. Anwar and Bakhsh 2003; CBMI 2004; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010). Runnymede Trust (1997) and CBMI (2004) reproduced interview data from only a handful of research participants. Edited collections of work Spalek (2002) and Esposito and Kalin (2011) contained very little empirical work, and none that included findings from large samples: in both cases theoretical and critical perspectives dominated. In the former, several chapters used small sample sizes of less than fifteen participants (El-Hassan, 2002; Macey, 2002; Sharp, 2002; Spalek, 2002), in the latter only one chapter (Zebiri, 2011) presented the products of primary research, thirty semi-structured interviews. A report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2006b) sought to document 'Islamophobia' in the European Union but presented findings from only four research participants. Other studies aimed to establish the extent of problems facing British Muslim communities with interview data from a single research participant (Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Burnett 2013). Other contemporaneous studies used samples that were larger, but not large enough to be nationally representative (Anwar and Bakhsh, 2003; EUMC, 2006a; 2006b; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Ameli et al, 2011; Mythen, 2012). Other scholars have relied on data related to online abuse that fail to describe the contexts within which the incidents occurred and the methods used to gather and analyse the data (cf. Copsy et al, 2013; Gilligan, 2013; Tell MAMA, 2013).

Within the literature there were several examples of scholars who lamented this lack of available statistics but whom, within the same text, also offered generalizations about Muslim victimization. Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010) blamed under-reporting and inadequate police recording practices and yet also offered generalizations concerning all British Muslims. Allen (2010) contested that there is insufficient evidence to assert 'Islamophobia' as widespread, whilst also asserting the sizeable nature of the problem. It is

perhaps understandable why scholars have eschewed the use of large-scale survey data (even where such data have been made available). Large-scale social survey data cannot describe the unfolding contexts of crime victimization, nor the differing impacts of crime on social groups, nor many of the structural dimensions to victimization and the criminal justice system (Matthews and Young, 1992). Similarly, there have been longstanding concerns over the overshadowing of the diversity and plurality within ethnic minority communities with the use of social survey categories such as 'Asian' and 'Black' (Garland, Spalek and Chakraborti, 2006). Moreover, quantitative statistical work underpinned with more realist ontologies and more empiricist epistemologies would appear to run counter to the dominant methodological assumptions and critical perspectives present within the scholarly literature: even where these alternative 'dissenting' positions are capable of being employed for similar long-term objectives – the relief of discrimination and disadvantage among British Muslim communities. Notwithstanding the above observations, it would be a gross exaggeration to argue that statistical work is entirely absent from scholarly literature concerning 'Islamophobia'. As described in the literature review, Sheridan surveyed over 200 Muslims and found widespread abuse against Muslims in the wake of 9/11 (Sheridan, 2006). Other similar studies provided examples of research designs informed by quantitative methods and large samples and findings that have shaped recent debates around British Muslim communities, 'Islamophobia' and social, political and economic forms of discrimination and disadvantage (cf. Peach, 2006; Field, 2007; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013). However, research findings like these are far less common; regrettably for some (cf. Bleich, 2011), over-shadowed by the types of theoretical, political or qualitative research described throughout this thesis.

A further cause of the apparent disparity between statistical data and literature relates to the political and critical perspectives adopted throughout much of the literature, the historic roots of the debates, and the discursive functions inherited from previous studies of racism. Definitions of 'Islamophobia' often include an ethnic or racial dimension or component: reflected in the usage of terms such as 'anti-Muslim racism', or the definitions of

'Islamophobia' as being an ideology similar in 'theory, function and purpose to racism' (Allen, 2010: 190; see also, Meer and Modood, 2009; Sayyid and Vakil, 2011). Similarly, the statistical evidence suggested that Muslim respondents often perceived hate crime incidents against them as being racially as well as religiously motivated (in many cases, more so). It is clear that within the context of 'Islamophobia' there is considerable overlap between religion and ethnicity at both the conceptual and experiential level. Similarly, many of the theoretical debates around 'Islamophobia' are rooted in and influenced by early debates around ethnicity and racism. A direct physical link between the debates around 'Islamophobia' and racism may be observed when we consider one of the authors of the Runnymede Trust and the Commission for British Muslims and Islamophobia. Dr Richard Stone is listed publicly as a member of the Runnymede Trust's Commission for British Muslims and Islamophobia established in 1996 (one year before the publication of the Runnymede Trust report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*) and is listed as the commission's chairperson in the CMBI's *Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action* report in 2004. Stone also sat on the Macpherson Inquiry panel and is listed publicly in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report as one of three advisors to its principle author, Sir William Macpherson of Cluny (Stone, 2013). A further example of this link is present within the report itself. The analysis contains usage of categories such as 'British Pakistani' as proxies for British Muslim. Whilst this usage is largely heuristic - reflecting the lack of available data pertaining to British Muslim communities - it also perhaps serves as an example of a method by which elements of previous debates around racism were deployed to address rising concerns around British Muslim communities. Similarly, and fourteen years after its first publication, Robert Miles' classic text 'Racism' was updated by a second edition that added a chapter on 'Islamophobia' (Miles, 1989; Miles and Brown, 2003): a further example of how the conceptualization of 'Islamophobia' has modified earlier theoretical conceptualizations of racism. It can be seen therefore that the debates around 'Islamophobia' function as an extension of previous theoretical and applied research around ethnicity and racism. Given this function of the literature, and its intended audience, it is perhaps unsurprising that so few large-scale survey data have been adduced as

supporting evidence. The assertions and conclusions within the 'Islamophobia' literature have acted as effective *topoi* (in the original Aristotelian sense): discursive common-places that operate as rhetorical short cuts deployed to trigger empathy within for an audience already aligned to the main conclusions and contestations around the topic under discussion (Kennedy, 1991). Arguably, previous literature around racism (containing both theoretical and empirical perspectives) may be viewed as an available and accessible resource for scholars wishing to develop these *topoi* within the context of increased political and sociological interest around British Muslim communities (cf. Chakraborti 2007; Sharp and Atherton 2007; Meer and Modood, 2009). It would appear that early influential literature around 'Islamophobia' was aimed at a readership who likely demanded neither proof nor persuasion. Put simply, no statistical evidence was adduced in the early rehearsals of debates around 'Islamophobia' because not only was there little available at the time, but also because none was needed. The research findings suggest similarities between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in respect of general discrimination but within that stable figure differences between the groups in respect of religiously motivated hate crime. One possible explanation could rest on the fact that whilst 'Islamophobia' may be conceived as a multi-faceted phenomenon (i.e. combining elements of racism, anti-foreigner sentiment, anti-migrant sentiment, anti-Islamic sentiment), it is a phenomenon most likely perceived by Muslim victims as being primarily anti-Islamic because of the extent to which Muslim people construct their identity through their own religious beliefs and affiliation (again, as suggested by findings from attitudinal survey data).

Given some of the scholarly literature concerning anti-Muslim attitudes it is perhaps surprising that such attitudes were not more prevalent in the statistical data. Studies of media presentations of Islam and Muslims have made a compelling case for the existence of a systematic negative bias towards Islam and Muslim in the British media (Abbas, 2001; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2009; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013). Social scientists have long described a symbiotic relationship between negative media depictions of certain social groups,

the effects of such depictions on public attitudes, and the magnification of contempt and exclusion for the subject group (Cohen, 1972). However, evidence of this symbiosis appeared to be absent from the data. Possible explanations for the lack of congruence between statistical data and literature in this context may rest on issues of social acceptability and ‘social acceptability bias’ (Bryman, 2012, as discussed in chapter 4). Moser and Kalton described (1971) ‘individual true value’: a value or ‘fact’ held by a respondent independently of a survey to which they are participating. It is this independent true value that the researcher is attempting to ascertain through survey questions and interviews but a value which may elude her or him due to the type of question being asked and the nature of the encounter between researcher and respondent. It is plausible that anti-Muslim attitudes are hidden from survey researchers by respondents who consider stating such views as socially disadvantageous. Similarly, the nature of the encounter between researcher and respondent may be unsuitable to build the trust and intimacy needed to elicit such responses (in-depth interviews or participant observation may yield more ‘truthful’ values and thus greater insights).

Overall, the statistical findings suggest a weak association between negative attitudes towards migrant communities and those towards Muslim communities. One possible explanation for this is that British Muslim communities are no longer viewed as ‘migrant’ (or at least, recently migrated) communities by non-Muslim people but as communities that are more ‘settled’ in nature. It could be that anti-migrant sentiment was more often focused by the survey respondents on migrants from Eastern Europe. (It is also possible that such focus shifts over time. More recent waves of migration from North and Eastern Africa across the Mediterranean and mainland Europe, and the gathering of migrants in places such as the French port of Calais and the Greek island of Lesbos may provide catalysts for a further reconfiguration of anti-migrant and anti-Muslim attitudes.)

As discussed, a review of the scholarly literature concerning ‘Islamophobia’ revealed dominant narratives and demonstrable emphases placed on certain features of the relationships between British Muslim communities, crime victimization, discrimination, the

British state and society. Scholars relying on the emphasis of particular themes or perspectives appeared to do so at the expense of others. Missing perspectives appeared to have been displaced by an emphasis on male victimization and counter-terrorism. Literature around British Muslim communities and 'Islamophobia' tended to focus on either male perspectives or non-gendered perspectives. There were of course exceptions, particularly from more recent sources. Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010), Perry (2014) and Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) have described discrimination against Muslim women and the gendered nature of 'Islamophobia' especially within 'everyday' settings. Elsewhere however, and more specifically in the earlier literature, the apparent male bias or use of gender non-specific perspectives may have overshadowed specific research and debates around British Muslim women. Focus on the actions of right-wing political groups often implied (young) male perpetrators and male Muslim victims. Research focused on the relationships between British Muslim communities often centred on male experiences of police stop and search, counter-terrorism legislation and the prison system. Where opinion has been sought among British Muslim communities, male voices have responded most often - imams and senior male members of community organizations and national bodies representing, or claiming to represent, British Muslims. As before, monographs and edited works offer the means by which such emphases may be reckoned. Spalek's edited work (2002) featured chapters on male involvement in crime, male prisoners, and imams and only one chapter focusing on the experiences of Muslim women (and in relation to encounters with other Muslim men rather than non-Muslim perpetrators of discrimination or hate). More recently, Green (2015) described the casualties of 'Islamophobia' in the US as Muslim men under FBI surveillance and Muslim men subjected to detention and deportation by the Department of Justice. Muslim women were discussed in conjunction with debates in France around *laïcité* and the wearing of veils and headscarves. Green does state that victims of hate crime and discrimination are predominantly female but overall the chapter highlights more often the plights of Muslim men. Only one chapter in Sayyid and Vakil (2011) offered a theoretical exploration of gender, sexuality, Orientalism and anti-Muslim prejudice although nothing on the lived experiences of Muslim women. Zebiri

(2011) interviewed twenty Muslim women and ten Muslim men. Elsewhere within the same volume (Esposito and Kalin, 2011) debates around Muslim women are seemingly displaced by theoretical, political, male and non-gendered perspectives. Male perspectives were often foregrounded when research focused on issues of policing and counter-terrorism (cf. Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Mythen, 2012), or whenever a focus was placed on crimes such as murder and serious physical violence (cf. Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010). These emphases on counter-terrorism and serious crime appeared to have displaced not only discussion of Muslim women (who from the statistical analysis appear particularly at risk from anti-Muslim discrimination and hate), but also appeared to have displaced discussion around other forms of policing. This lack of reflection on what might be considered as more 'everyday' forms of community and local policing (i.e. policing other than that guided by Prevent initiatives) recreated a further monolithic narrative of poor relations between British Muslim communities and the police (as highlighted in Chapter 7). Inclusion of a broader spectrum of attitudes towards the police could have established a more balanced discussion of relations between British Muslims and the state but would have given scholars a far weaker case for the purported existence of 'institutional' Islamophobia (Fekete, 2009) and the public hostility towards British Muslim communities (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011) resulting from the Government's constructions of the domestic threat of terrorism. A more nuanced, less essentialised view of police relations would have had to include the thorny, and perhaps rather inconvenient matter of the support for the Government's handling of terrorism found among British Muslim communities (as suggested by the statistical findings).

### **CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE STATISTICAL DATA AND THE LITERATURE**

The domination of the narratives, themes and emphases described above has had various potential consequences for British Muslim communities. First, the repetition and recycling of narratives that describe and assert Muslim victimization risk the reinforcement negative stereotypes around British Muslim communities. If we accept that negative

stereotypes are the foundation of anti-Muslim prejudice (as suggested by authors of the Runnymede Trust report) then it necessarily follows that all such stereotypes are capable of causing harm, regardless of whether or not the harm is intended. The statistical findings among Muslim respondents who perceive people of the Islamic faith to be more discriminated against than members of other minority groups suggests that these harms have an observable, measureable reality. Similarly, these narratives and negative stereotypes may have had, and continue to have, an effect within British Muslim communities in terms of reinforcing notions of 'them' and 'us' with all the psychological and practical consequences of isolation and exclusion such notions invariably deliver. Second, and in respect particularly of attitudes towards the police, the underreporting of positive attitudes towards the police denies the fact that British Muslim communities are as likely as non-Muslim communities to hold a wide variety of views towards the British state; views that are contingent on many more factors than disapproval of counter-terrorism measures. Scholars have rejected this notion on the grounds that describing positive police attitudes denies the right of Muslims to 'voice how they feel' about counter-terrorism policing (cf. Cherney and Murphy 2015: 13). The statistical findings reported in this thesis suggest that we ought to uphold more often the right of any person to voice a multitude of feelings towards the police (or any other issue). Third, crimes that are prevalent among British Muslim communities (such as 'everyday' forms of anti-Muslim hate crime and discrimination) were effectively neglected in the places where the literature presented a more limited typology of anti-Muslim violence that emphasized only serious physical and violent crimes. Whilst it is understandable that a focus on violence should prevail, arguably, many more British Muslim lives are affected by 'everyday' forms of hate crime and discrimination. Fourth, a focus on religious and racial prejudice against British Muslim communities limits and displaces debates around social and economic disadvantage, and the types of debates and discussion that might find commonalities between Jewish, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents. Perceived Muslim victimization could be seen more accurately as a greater propensity for British Muslim communities to suffer socio-economic disadvantage. This is a very thorny issue because to contest this point risks conveying an

implication that traits such as unemployment and low educational attainment are intrinsically 'Muslim'. However, the evidence suggests victimization among British Muslim communities may be more usefully constructed as disadvantage and inequality; or more crudely perhaps as class rather than religion or race.

## **CONCLUSION**

Overall, the research processes enabled the generation of findings and conclusions capable of providing answers to the primary and secondary research questions. In particular, the large-scale data were able to provide evidential clues as to the extent of crime victimization and attitudes towards the police within British Muslim communities. Less effective, arguably, were data related to discrimination in terms of the effectiveness at enabling comparisons between Muslim respondents and respondents from other minority groups. The analysis suffered because the designs of several important surveys sought to capture attitudinal and experiential data from small sample sizes. Analysis of data related to religiously motivated crime was hampered by sample sizes that were too small to enable effective comparisons between religion groups. Similarly, there were too few respondents surveyed about their fears of being attacked or assaulted because of skin colour, ethnic origin or religion. Further, this variable may have been more useful if it had separated these three factors. Analysis of statistical data related to discrimination arguably proved more useful in the study of where such incidents might be likely to occur and seemed capable of providing evidential support for descriptions in the literature of the 'everyday' discrimination and victimization of Muslims (particularly Muslim women) in public places. However, it is conceded that in-depth interview data would have provided a greater understanding of the issues faced by more vulnerable groups within the British Muslim population. Statistics alone will not suffice for this type of study. A potential challenge to the type of statistical work undertaken for this project might target the perceived incompatibility of the research paradigms in which are rooted a large body of the scholarly literature and the types of statistical methods used by quantitative social scientists. Although seldom stated explicitly, most of the scholarly literature and particularly

that which adduces interview or focus group data, or which employs theoretical, political or historical perspectives may be identified as rooted largely in phenomenological research paradigms where qualitative research strategies are guided by constructionist ontologies and interpretivist epistemologies. The methodology adopted for the analysis presented in this thesis is more commonly associated with a positivist paradigm. One potential criticism of the study undertaken could be that it seeks to challenge qualitative work with research guided by more realist ontologies and an empiricist epistemology, principles often challenged by scholars engaged in ethnographic and anthropological approaches to the study of 'Islamophobia' and British Muslim communities. In a sense, comparing the scholarly literature with statistical data might be viewed as an attempt to assert the primacy of systematic scientific enquiry; an assertion that is almost certainly to be challenged by many of the scholars discussed in the literature review. However, it is recognized that a study of the nature of 'Islamophobia' and the extent of 'Islamophobia' may be treated as distinct and that a more complete overall understanding of this (or any) social phenomenon is achievable only when quantitative and qualitative methodologies and methods are adopted in concert with a degree of objectivity throughout the processes by which data are collected and analysed, findings generated and conclusions drawn. This thesis makes no claim as to the primacy of the positivist paradigm but the conclusions drawn in this chapter rest on a belief that early research into 'Islamophobia' was weakened and limited by the dominance of more qualitative research methodologies.

The conclusions drawn and discussed in this chapter invite several further lines of enquiry. The statistical evidence where it both supports and challenges the existing scholarly literature suggests the need for qualitative research using in-depth interviews and focus groups to explore more experiences of discrimination and crime victimization in public places where the incident involves some form of verbal abuse or harassment (rather than serious physical violence). Survey questions that facilitate the analysis of visibly Muslim respondents might further the understanding of 'everyday' discrimination against Muslim communities.

The need for further research is also signposted by apparent discrepancies between reported attitudes towards the police and assertions made in the literature concerning the negative effects of Prevent and other counter-terrorism measures. In-depth interviews within Muslim communities might provide insights into the nuanced and complex relationships between British Muslim communities and the police, especially where that research was able to explore factors such as sex, age and ethnicity and their functions in shaping attitudes. Whilst the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey included some questions relevant to the study of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic attitudes, the inclusion of similar questions within other large-scale social surveys would greatly benefit the study of 'Islamophobia' as it pertains to 'everyday' opinions among non-Muslim Britons. Survey questions related to perceptions of the media coverage of issues related to Muslims might contribute towards a greater understanding of the practical consequences of negative media depictions on British Muslims. Similarly, the findings reported in this thesis suggest that in-depth studies of those who have perpetrated anti-Muslim discrimination and hatred (if such an undertaking were feasible) might answer some residual questions regarding motivations and influence, and may be used to triangulate findings around the perceptions of Muslim victims towards their own victimization and discrimination (especially around the apparent interplay and intersectionality of religious and ethnic identities). Where the present study has focused on the United Kingdom, its findings could form the basis of a larger European study. Recent research studies edited by Helbling (2012) have shed new light on European Muslim communities using quantitative research methods and opinion poll and survey data. Although perhaps costly, a comparative study of large-scale, nationally representative social survey data (and the more frequent use of statistical modelling) would provide further insights into the lived experiences of European Muslim communities as well as the prospects of comparing effective measures used to relieve discrimination and victimization across the continent. The title of this thesis posed a simple question - 'Islamophobia': reality or myth? The analysis suggested a less than simple answer. 'Islamophobia' appears to exist on the pages of many British newspapers. There is strong evidence for a systematic negative bias towards Muslims and Islam. Elsewhere, and in terms

of the lived experiences of Muslim respondents and British Muslim communities, a possible answer to the question might be that 'Islamophobia' is a reality for many British Muslims (particularly perhaps visibly Muslim women in public places) but that statistical evidence implies a more complicated, nuanced reality for British Muslims than the one presented within most of the scholarly and policy literature.

## **APPENDIX A**

## SUMMARY TABLES OF KEY FINDINGS

**Table A.01 Data source acronyms and timeframes**

ACRONYM	FULL TITLE	TIMEFRAME
BCS/CSEW	British Crime Survey / Crime Survey of England and Wales	2006 - 2011
BSAS	British Social Attitudes Survey	2006 - 2010
CS	Citizenship Survey	2007 - 2010
EMBES	Ethnic Minority Survey, British Election Study	2010
SSAS	Scottish Social Attitudes Survey	2006 - 2010

**Table A.02a Key: Evidential support level colour codes**

	<b>Strong supporting evidence</b>	Statistical evidence represents strong support for literature on 'Islamophobia'
	<b>Weak evidential support</b>	Statistical evidence offers limited support to literature on 'Islamophobia'
	<b>Conflicting evidence</b>	Statistical evidence represents a strong challenge to literature on 'Islamophobia'
	<b>Inconclusive findings</b>	No data, few relevant data, or low sample sizes

[NB. Use of these colour codes is meant to indicate level of evidential support across the analysis of datasets and variables and cannot hope to replicate the nuanced and detailed discussion aimed for throughout this thesis.]

**Table A.02b Key: Type of analysis**

<b>B</b>	<b>Bivariate analysis</b>	Two proportion z-score tests and Pearson's chi-square tests
<b>M</b>	<b>Multivariate analysis</b>	Binary logistic regression models (with interaction effects of ethnicity and religion)

**Table A.03 Summary of findings: Chapter 3 – Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam**

Negative attitudes towards...	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>... Muslim people and Islam overall</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>B and M</b>		<b>Evidence suggests a more complex overall picture</b>
... Muslim people (as compared to other groups)	CS, BSAS	B		Less positive towards Muslims (but differences small)
... migration of people from 'Muslim' countries	CS	B		Attitudes not targeted primarily at 'Muslim' countries
... migration of Muslim people	SSAS	B		Scotland only: some evidence of negative attitudes
... marriage of family members to Muslim people	SSAS	B		Scotland only: positive feelings towards marriage
... Muslim people in the workplace	SSAS	B		No evidence of indiscriminate attitudes towards Muslims
...the building of mosques	BSAS	B		Few respondents against mosques <u>and</u> for churches
... the use of public funds to assist Muslim people	SSAS	B		General support for use of public funds

**Table A.04 Summary of findings: Chapter 4 – Experiences of Discrimination**

Discrimination	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>Discrimination against Muslim people overall</b>	<b>EMBES, CS</b>	<b>B</b>		<b>Actual discrimination not as literature asserts</b>
Perceptions of prejudice and discrimination	EMBES	B		High perception within Muslim group compared to others
Experiences of prejudice and discrimination	EMBES	B		Same or lower reported experiences than other groups
Experiences of Muslim women in public places	EMBES	B		Strong evidence of widespread discrimination
Reported discrimination from public bodies	CS	B		High when compared to other groups but not widespread
Religiously motivated discrimination	EMBES	B		High when compared to other groups
Racially or ethnically motivated discrimination	EMBES	B		Respondents more likely to perceive ethnicity as a factor

**Table A.05 Summary of findings: Chapter 5 – Experiences of the Police**

Experiences	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>Experiences of the police overall</b>	BCS/CSEW	<b>B and M</b>		<b>Mixed findings across police stops and searches</b>
Police stop (foot and vehicle stops)	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Muslim people less likely to be stopped than others
Police searches (foot and vehicle searches)	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Muslim people more likely to be searched than others
Determinant factors affecting police stops	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Being male and age more predictive effects than religion
Determinant factors affecting police searches	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Being male and age more predictive effects than religion

**Table A.06 Summary of findings: Chapter 6 – Attitudes towards the British State and British Society**

Attitudes	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>Attitudes overall</b>	EMBES, BCS/CSEW	<b>B</b>		<b>Attitudes more positive than literature asserts</b>
Attitudes towards the police	BCS/CSEW	B		More positive attitudes than among non-Muslim groups
Attitudes towards criminal justice system	BCS/CSEW	B		High confidence but some recognition of discrimination
Attitudes towards Government and Parliament	EMBES	B		Positive attitudes towards handling of various issues
Feeling British and belonging to Britain	EMBES	B		No differences between Muslim and non-Muslim groups

**Table A.07 Summary of findings: Chapter 7 – Fear of Crime**

Fear of crime	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>Fear of crime overall</b>	BCS/CSEW, CS	<b>B and M</b>		<b>Factors other than religion more predictive of fear</b>
General fear among Muslim groups and others	BCS/CSEW, CS	B and M		No evidence of disparity of fear of general crime
Fear of religiously and racially motivated crime	BCS/CSEW, CS	B		Muslim respondents appear among most fearful of both
Fear of other specific personal crime types	BCS/CSEW, CS	B		Low sample sizes for Jewish and Sikh groups
Fear of household crime	BCS/CSEW, CS	B		Levels of fear appear shared by Muslim and Hindu groups
Effect of being Muslim on determining fear of crime	BCS/CSEW, CS	M		Being Hindu and being Sikh had more predictive effect
Effect of religion on determining fear of crime	BCS/CSEW, CS	M		Other factors had more predictive effects on fear of crime

**Table A.08 Summary of findings: Chapter 8 – Crime Victimization**

Victimization	Data	Analysis	Level	Comments
<b>Crime victimization overall</b>	BCS/CSEW, CS	<b>B and M</b>		<b>Challenge to the dominant victimization narrative</b>
Religiously motivated crime	BCS/CSEW	B and M		High victimization within Muslim/Chinese and Other group
Racially motivated crime	BCS/CSEW	B and M		High victimization within Muslim/Mixed group
Personal crime	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Low levels of victimization compared to other groups
Household crime	BCS/CSEW	B and M		Low levels of victimization compared to other groups
Type of harassment	CS	B		Violent abuse less prevalent than verbal abuse
Religiously motivated harassment	CS	B		Skin colour more often perceived as a motivational factor

## **APPENDIX B**

## **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The following short chapter describes the research methods used for this thesis. It outlines the various processes of data selection and analysis used to study the concept of 'Islamophobia'. The discussion begins with an account of the operationalization of the term 'Islamophobia' and develops with a description of the processes undertaken to select and analyse available social survey data.

### **OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA'**

The first step in the analysis process was to operationalize the term 'Islamophobia'. As discussed in Chapter 2, after a review of the relevant recent scholarly literature the analysis adopted the conceptual framework offered by Bleich's definition of 'Islamophobia': the indicators and the effects of 'indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims' (Bleich 2011). The variables chosen for study were deemed either to be capable of providing measures of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic attitudes (the effects of 'indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions') or else capable of measuring the practical consequences for Muslim respondents of such attitudes being 'directed at Islam or Muslims'. Thus, the analysis used constituent elements of the conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia': attitudes of non-Muslims towards Muslims and Islam; discrimination reported by Muslim respondents; reported attitudes towards various elements of the British state and British society; reported fear of crime and reported experiences of crime victimization. This operationalization of 'Islamophobia' provided a means by which available data could be selected for analysis and comparison with assertions and conclusions from the scholarly literature. Bleich intended for his model to be used as the basis for comparative studies of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The analysis presented in this thesis adopted this approach to compare attitudes towards Islam and Muslims with attitudes towards symbols and practices related to other religions, aspects of culture other than that associated with British Muslims, and issues

concerning countries perceived as Muslim and non-Muslim. Similarly, attitudes and experiences were compared, wherever possible, to those of non-Muslim respondents from specified religion and ethnic groups.

## **SELECTION OF DATASETS AND VARIABLES**

With the conceptual framework and working definition of 'Islamophobia' in place, the following stage of the analysis involved the identification of suitable datasets and pertinent response variables. Searches for datasets and variables were made using the Data Archive and UK Data Service websites. Datasets were selected in two phases. First, where they were identified as containing variables related to the indicators of 'Islamophobia'. A variable was identified as being related to the indicators of 'Islamophobia' if it was designed to collect attitudinal response data from non-Muslim respondents concerning reported attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. In the second phase, datasets were selected where they were identified as containing variables related to the measurable effects, or practical consequences, of 'Islamophobia'. In this case, a variable was identified as suitable if designed to capture experiential response data related to some physical or emotional manifestation or assumed consequence of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic attitudes. Such variables included the more direct forms of 'Islamophobia' as captured by reported incidents of discrimination against Muslim respondents across a variety of situations (for example, in public places, in the workplace, or whilst in contact with the police or another government official) and reported personal crime victimization (particularly when the crime was perceived as being motivated by religion or ethnicity). Variables were also selected if identified as being capable of capturing and measuring more indirect forms of 'Islamophobia'. In this context, attitudinal response data were selected for analysis where they measured attitudes towards British society, the British criminal justice system, and relationships with the police and other government agencies. Some conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' described structural or institutional discrimination against British Muslim communities. Evidence of institutional 'Islamophobia' was sought in the reported attitudes of Muslim respondents towards British society and the

British state. It was assumed that experiences of prejudice and discrimination by state agencies would be reflected in negative attitudes or that negative attitudes might reflect the perception among British Muslim communities of a culture of discrimination within state agencies. The time-frame chosen for the research project was 2006 to 2011. The analysis presented statistical findings from data identified as pertaining to 'Islamophobia' that were collected and made available between 2006 and 2011. All social survey datasets available for analysis in the UK from 2006 to the end of December 2011 were considered. The primary advantage of aggregating data from more than one year was that doing so created a dataset of sufficient size to be representative. However, aggregated data such as this masks changes over time and suggest the need for future research that tracks such changes with a greater degree of temporal granularity.

### **THE SELECTION OF SUITABLE VARIABLES AND DATASETS**

Following a preliminary study of response data across a number of available datasets, five large-scale social survey datasets were selected for analysis:

- British Crime Survey (now the Crime Survey of England and Wales, here the Crime Survey)
- British Social Attitudes Survey
- British Election Study, Ethnic Minority Study (EMBES)
- Citizenship Survey (sometimes known in the field as the Community Survey)
- Scottish Social Attitudes Survey

### **CRITERIA**

These five datasets included:

- survey questions concerning attitudes towards Muslims, Muslim culture, Islam, or Islamic practice;

- survey questions concerning experiences of discrimination and prejudice and sufficient Muslim respondents to enable robust comparisons between responses from Muslim and various groups of non-Muslim respondents;
- survey questions concerning attitudes towards various public agencies and institutions and sufficient Muslim respondents to enable robust comparisons between responses from Muslim and various groups of non-Muslim respondents;
- survey questions concerning crime victimization and sufficient Muslim respondents to enable robust comparisons between responses from Muslim and various groups of non-Muslim respondents.

Available waves from each of the datasets were selected from 2006 to 2011. As discussed, this timeframe stretched backwards to the time around which the British Crime Survey, the primary dataset for the study of crime victimization in England and Wales, first began to include survey questions that asked respondents to describe their religious identity, and forward to the year of the project's commencement. During the initial period of the research project (2011 and 2012) the following waves of each study were available for download and therefore selected for examination:

- five waves of the British Crime Survey (2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 2010/11)
- five waves of the British Social Attitudes Study (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)
- four waves of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2006, 2007, 2009, 2010)
- three waves of the Citizenship Survey (2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010)
- one wave of the British Election Study, Ethnic Minority Survey (2010)

Table B.01 shows the datasets selected for study, the number of respondents surveyed by the waves of each study and the number of Muslim respondents surveyed (also expressed as a percentage of the total respondents). The table illustrates why the SSAS were chosen to explore the attitudes of non-Muslim respondents and suggests that improving the prospects for the

BSAS as a source of comparative data related to Muslim and non-Muslim respondents would require a larger annual sample of Muslim respondents alongside amended survey questions.

**Table B.01 Datasets used in the analysis**

Survey	Waves	No. of waves	Total respondents	Muslim respondents	Muslim respondents %
Crime Survey of England and Wales	2006/2007 to 2010/2011	5	235,379	5,951	2.5
British Social Attitudes Survey	2006/2007 to 2010/2011	5	19,618	593	3
Citizenship Survey	2007/2008 to 2009/10	3	45,152	7,721	17
EMBES	2010	1	2,787	1,092	39
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey	2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 <sup>1</sup>	4	6,079	80	1.3
<b>Totals</b>		<b>18</b>			

<sup>1</sup>No survey conducted in 2009

## **SUMMARY OF THE SELECTED SURVEYS (in alphabetical order as referred to throughout the thesis)**

### **BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY**

#### **Frequency of survey:**

Annual

#### **Geographic coverage:**

The survey covered adults aged 16 years and over living in Great Britain (i.e. the study excludes households in Northern Ireland)

#### **Owner/commissioner:**

National Centre Social Research with funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

**Summary of history and methods:**

The BSAS began in 1983 and is designed to produce an annual study of social attitudes and to monitor the extent to which such attitudes change over time. Core subjects included society, education, health culture, and environment with various further subjects included each year.

In order to increase the number of topics on the BSAS, three versions of the questionnaire were fielded (although all shared the same core questions), and respondents were randomly assigned to one of the versions. Addresses are drawn from the Postcode Access File, occupied dwelling units and individuals within these are selected at random. Unequal selection probabilities arising from these methods are factored into the weighting. On average around 4000 respondents were surveyed in each wave, although some waves have as few as 3200 respondents, while others around 4500.

**Weighting:**

A weighting variable (**WtFactor**) was used by the survey designers to allow for non-response and to adjust the sample to the regional age and sex profiles of the population. It was used in the analysis for all reported percentages in the cross tabulations and for the proportions in the two proportion z-tests.

**Where the data may be accessed:**

UK Data Service

<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=200006#access>

**CITIZENSHIP SURVEY****Frequency of survey:**

Bi-annually from 2001 until 2007, annually from 2007 until its cancellation in 2011.

**Geographic coverage:**

The survey covered adults aged 16 years and over, resident in England and Wales.

**Owner/commissioner:**

Home Office and Department of Local Communities and Government

**Summary of history and methods:**

The Citizenship Survey was begun in 2001 to provide an evidence base for the work of the Home Office and Department of Communities and Local Government. Its principle aims were to survey issues around community cohesion, community engagement, race and faith, volunteering and civil renewal. The survey used a multi-stratified random sample to select households and face to face interviews to conduct the research. Around 15,000 people were surveyed in each wave, around 10,000 formed a core sample with the remainder forming a minority ethnic boost sample.

**Weighting:**

The survey used four main weighting variables in the dataset:

- **WTCINDS** - core sample adult weight
- **WTFINDS** - combined sample (core and boosts) adult weight
- **WTCHHDS** - core sample household weight
- **WTFHHDS** - combined sample (core and boosts) household weight

Although no information regarding the exact purposes of the sample it is assumed that they serve to adjust for non-response among different groups and to adjust the sample to the regional sex, age, and ethnicity profiles of the population. The analysis presented throughout this thesis used the combined sample to analyse individual adults and therefore used the **WTFINDS** variable.

**Where the data may be accessed:**

Data Archive

<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=200007#find>

**CRIME SURVEY (BRITISH CRIME SURVEY/CRIME SURVEY OF ENGLAND AND WALES)****Frequency of survey:**

Conducted as the British Crime Survey in 1984 and 1988, and then bi-annually from 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually from 2001 until 2012. Conducted as the Crime Survey of England and Wales from 2012 until the present.

**Geographic coverage:**

Adults aged 16 years or over in England and Wales. The former name 'British Crime Survey' was misleading; the survey has never covered Scotland.

**Owner/commissioner:**

Formerly commissioned by the Home Office, survey data is now collected and managed by the Office for National Statistics.

**Summary of history and methods:**

The Crime Survey began in 1984 to capture data about crime in England and Wales. The CSEW surveyed a 'core sample' of over 40,000 adults every year (for example 46, 754 adults in 2010/11). The 2006/07 wave included non-white ethnic boost sample (since then a boost-type sample has been integrated into the main dataset). The survey uses the Postcode Address File (PFA) as its sampling frame. Once an eligible address is identified, residents of the address are listed alphabetically by first name and picked at random. The sample is stratified

proportionately by PFA and by other various socio-economic factors to ensure a representative overall sample (Home Office, 2011).

**Weighting:**

The survey is weighted for non-response to ensure, as far as possible, the sample reflects the profile of the general population of England and Wales. Weight serves to correct for different sampling rates, to adjust for non-response between different groups of people, and to take account for frequently occurring incidents. Most of the analysis reported in this thesis used either weight variable **indivwgt** (for the analysis of individuals and personal crime) or weight variable **hhdwgt** (for the analysis of households and household crime).

**Where the data may be accessed:**

The Data Archive

<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=200009#access>

**EMBES (BRITISH ELECTION STUDY, ETHNIC MINORITY STUDY)****Frequency of survey:**

The EMBES was a one-off study.

**Geographic coverage:**

England and Wales.

**Owner/commissioner:**

The survey was undertaken by the University of Manchester, the University of Essex, and the University of Oxford and funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.

### **Summary of history and methods:**

The British Election Study is the longest series of nationally representative probability sample surveys in the UK. Its primary stated aim is to explore determinant factors in voting behaviour in Britain. The surveys have been conducted after every general election since 1964. Since then the survey has existed under several guises: Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970; the British Election Study 1974-1983, 2001, and 2005; and the British General Election Study 1983-1997. Over the years the survey has included other inter-linked studies (for example, datasets covering Scottish and Northern Ireland and various ethnic minority boost datasets): the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 is one such study. There were 2787 respondents analysed in a one-time cross-sectional study using a multi-stage stratified random sample. The survey employed a combination of face-to-face interviews and a self-completion questionnaire. Respondents from the following groups were surveyed: Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi.

### **Weighting:**

The survey employed various weighting mechanisms: such weighting enables examination of the various ethnic groups taken individually (i.e. respondents from within each ethnic group) and as a whole (i.e. the whole sample). Weighting was used to ensure survey respondents were representative of the population. Weighting was used to account for unequal selection probabilities to account for differential response among. Five weights in the dataset:

- Design weight (**Weight\_trimmedDESIGN**)
- Final weight for face to face survey within ethnicity (**Weight\_trimmedF2F**)
- Final weight for face to face survey with all 5 groups together (**Weight\_trimmedF2FALL5**)
- Final weight for postal mail back survey (**Weight\_trimmedMAILBACK**)

- Final weight for postal mail back survey with all 5 groups together (**Weight\_trimmedMAILBACKALL5**)

The analysis presented in this thesis used all five groups together (to explore similarities and differences between these groups) and thus used variable Weight\_trimmedF2FALL5.

**Where the data may be accessed:**

The Data Archive

<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=6970&type=Data%20catalogue>

**SCOTTISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY**

**Frequency of survey:**

Annual

**Geographic coverage:**

Persons over 18 years old residing in Scotland.

**Owner/commissioner:**

National Centre of Social Research

**Summary of history and methods:**

The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS) was launched in 1999. Its aims are to facilitate the study of public opinion and inform the development of public policy in Scotland. In this it has similar objectives to the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) and covers issues of politics, society and culture. The survey is a repeated cross-sectional study using a multi-stage random sample. The research is conducted using face to face interviews and self-completed questionnaires and typically surveys around 1,500 respondents.

**Weighting:**

Use of weighting serves to correct bias in the sample in three respects: differential selection probabilities, over-sampling of rural areas and non-response.

Variables weighting variables are used in the dataset. Three for various locations: **RURAL**, **REMOTE** and **URBANAC**; and a general weighting variable. The analysis of the SSAS data did not aggregate by location and therefore used the latter, general weighting variable (**WTFCTOR**).

**Where the data may be accessed:**

The Data Archive

<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=2000049#find>

**MISSING ELEMENTS FROM THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ‘ISLAMOPHOBIA’**

Although the above datasets proved to be a good source of variables for the application of Bleich’s definition and a study of many of the various conceptualizations and constructions of ‘Islamophobia’ not all themes from the literature were able to be scrutinized with statistical data from available large-scale social surveys. No survey question (in the five surveys listed above or elsewhere) used the term ‘Islamophobia’. Further, no survey question invited respondents to report their attitudes towards the depictions of Islam and Muslims in the media (as discussed in the previous chapter, a central theme in the scholarly literature that asserted widespread prejudice and discrimination against British Muslim communities, Muslim culture and the Islamic faith).

**DATA PREPARATION**

The data from each survey were prepared for analysis with various ‘cleaning’ processes. Duplicate cases were deleted where appropriate (for example, some cases were duplicated across core and boost samples). Missing values were assigned discrete values and in most cases

excluded from the analytical procedures (in the main the analysis excluded responses such as ‘don’t know’ or those where the respondent had declined to answer). For the purposes of comparison, religious and ethnicity categories were combined to create new variables that aggregated responses from all non-Muslim respondents, all non-Muslim respondents from minority religions (a category used when the sample included only small numbers of such respondents) and all respondents who described as being non-Muslim and Black or non-Muslim and Asian (categories used to compare Muslim respondents within distinct ethnic groups).

## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

The analysis stages employed the use of various statistical tests. The analysis began with cross-tabulations, followed by Pearson’s chi-square tests and individual two proportion z-tests. Binary logistic regression models were used to further explore the data (and in particular to test the relative effects on discrimination and victimization of ‘being Muslim’ compared to other self-identified demographic characteristics and other assigned social and economic values (such as multiple deprivation). The following section describes the statistical models used and the assumptions underpinning such models.

## **STATISTICAL TESTS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

### **Statistical test of significance between proportions - two proportion z-test**

**(Agresti and Finlay, 2009):**

$$SE = Sp_1 - p_2 = \sqrt{\frac{p_1(100 - p_1)}{n_1} + \frac{p_2(100 - p_2)}{n_2}}$$

$$Z = \frac{p_1 - p_2}{(Sp_1 - p_2) 1.2}$$

**[SE is standard error, Z is z-score]**

Assumptions and conventions of the two proportions z-test:

- The sampling method for each population is simple random sampling.
- The samples are independent.
- Each sample includes at least 10 successes and 10 failures.
- Each population is at least 20 times as big as its sample.

**Pearson's chi-square test (Agresti and Finlay, 2009; Field, 2013):**

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(\text{Observed frequency} - \text{Expected frequency})^2}{\text{Expected frequency}}$$

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(Fo - Fe)^2}{Fe}$$

**Assumptions of chi-square analysis for testing bivariate hypotheses (i.e. testing the relationship between two variables)**

- Data are from a random sample.
- No expected cell frequency is less than five.
- Analysis uses raw (and unweighted) frequencies.
- Independent and dependent variables are measured at the nominal or ordinal level.

Chi-square tests were used in the preliminary stages of analysis (to identify the likelihood of a bivariate relationship). Once a statistically significant relationship (two-tailed) was established between variables, differences between individual categories were explored (e.g. differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents or between Muslim and Hindu respondents).

### 3. Monte Carlo significance test (Field, 2013)

The Monte Carlo significance test is related to the chi-square test and is used for cross-tabulation tables where one or more of the cells contain an expected count of less than five. Other alternative Chi-square tests (such as Fisher's Exact test) operate with an assumption that all cells have low counts (which itself offends one of the basic assumptions underlying all Chi-square calculations). However, whereas Fisher's exact test is appropriate where all counts contain 30 or less cases, the Monte Carlo significance test is used to calculate statistical significance across tables which contain both cells with an expected count of less than five and cells with an expected count of more than thirty. Use of the Monte Carlo significance test is appropriate, therefore, when there is a larger range of frequencies across the cells (i.e. from less than five to more than thirty). The test is available as an addition to software packages such as SPSS. In SPSS, the first step of the calculation is to generate 10,000 sample tables using the same row and column margins as the one observed. SPSS then calculates the probability of finding the observed Chi-square value assuming a normal distribution of these 10,000 sample values.

### 4. Binary logistic regression (Field, 2013):

$$\text{logit}(p) = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \dots + b_kX_k$$

Where  $p$  is the probability of presence of the characteristic of interest and the number of variables are 1 through to  $k$ .

The logit transformation is defined as the logged odds:

$$\text{odds} = \frac{p}{1-p} = \frac{\text{probability of presence of characteristic}}{\text{probability of absence of characteristic}}$$

(And)

$$\text{logit}(p) = \ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$$

**Assumptions and conventions of binary logistic regression**

- The dependent variable is discrete and dichotomous.
- The independent variables are independent of each other.
- Logistic regression is a nonparametric statistical test.
- Logistic regression is advised for samples that are relatively large.
- By convention, it is assumed that the variables are neither normally distributed nor homoscedastic (i.e. the variance and therefore standard deviation is not necessarily uniform across the various groups; the data are not distributed evenly).

**CONCLUSION**

As discussed in Chapter 9, the datasets, processes, methods and statistical tests described above contributed towards an overall research design that was identified as capable of answering the primary and secondary research questions.

## **APPENDIX C**

## **FULL DEFINITION OF 'ISLAMOPHOBIA' FROM CHRIS ALLEN'S ISLAMOPHOBIA**

'Islamophobia is an ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not necessarily as a continuum, subsequently pertaining, influencing and impacting upon social action, interaction, responses and so on, shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes in the social consensus – the shared languages and conceptual maps – that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other. Neither restricted to explicit nor direct relationships of power and domination but instead, and possibly even more importantly, in the less explicit and everyday relationships of power that we contemporarily encounter, identified both in that which is real and that which is clearly not, both of which can be extremely difficult to differentiate between. As a consequence of this, exclusionary practices – practices that disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres ensue, including the subjection to violence – are in evidence. For such to be Islamophobia however, an acknowledged 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' element – either explicit or implicit, overtly expressed or covertly hidden, or merely even nuanced through meanings that are 'theological', 'social', 'cultural', 'racial' and so on, that at times never even necessarily name or identify 'Muslims' or 'Islam' – must be present'

(Allen, 2010: 190).

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