Territory, Politics, Governance and Multispatial Metagovernance

Bob Jessop

Pre-copy-edited version of a paper with the same title in Territory, Politics, Governance, 4 (1), 8-32. DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2015.1123173

Please cite the published version if you refer to this paper

Abstract

This article interrogates the concepts in this journal’s title and, drawing on the strategic-relational approach in social theory, explores their interconnections. This conceptual re-articulation is then contextualized in regard to the European Union as a political regime that serves as a real-time laboratory for experiments in government and governance with implications for redesigning polities, politics, and policies, especially in response to symptoms of political and policy failures and other crises. Mobilizing the territory-place-network-scale schema, and drawing on critical governance studies, this article offers an alternative account of these developments based on (1) their sociospatial and temporal complexities, (2) recognition that sociospatial relations are objects and means of government and governance and not just sites where such practices occur, and (3) extension of this approach to multispatial meta-governance, i.e., attempts to govern the government and governance of sociospatial relations. The article ends with suggestions for future research on the state and state power, governance of the European Union, and the role of Territory, Politics, Governance as a major forum for future discussion on multispatial metagovernance.
This article addresses some theoretical and empirical connections among the terms, *Territory, Politics, Governance*, in the light of the strategic-relational approach to structure-agency dialectics as developed in sociology and political science and applied by some geographers. In the inaugural issue, its editor described the journal’s remit as ‘territorial politics, spaces of governance, and the political organization of space’ (AGNEW 2013, p. 1). Yet, on my reading, these three themes are rarely investigated together in *TPG* and their mutual implications are neglected. I suggest ways to remedy these deficits below. First, for *territorial* politics, I supplement the Continental European traditions of general state theory and classical geopolitics by noting the non-territorial aspects of state power and adding the role of state projects and political imaginaries. Second, I consider the kind of *politics*, whether territorial or non-territorial, at stake in these areas. Specifically, I use the polity, politics, and policy triplet to explore how state power reorders the polity, which is the strategically-selective terrain on which politics occurs as well as a crucial site for contesting policies. Third, for *governance*, inspired by Antonio GRAMSCI (1975) and Michel FOUCAULT (2007, 2008), I redefine state power as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. The conjunction of the first two terms in this redefinition signifies that spaces of governance are not exclusively territorial and reference to hierarchy indicates the key role of state power in metagovernance, that is, the governance of governance. This has various forms, including, notably, what, after Andrew DUNSIRE (1996), I term collibration.

In developing these arguments and exploring their interconnections, I suggest that the socio-spatial arrangements of the state and state power (as redefined above) involve more than the capacity to territorialize, and hence to ‘contain’, political authority and thereby define the terrain within which state powers are exercised and from and among which inter-state relations are conducted. For the ‘political organization of space’ is by no means confined to territory but extends, almost by definition, to all dimensions of sociospatial relations. This points not only beyond ‘territorial politics’ to the complex politics of place, scale, and networks considered individually but also to their variable articulation with territory in sociospatial imaginaries, spatial strategies, and spatiotemporal fixes (see LEFEBVRE, 1991, 2009; BRENNER and ELDEN,
In short, several sociospatial dimensions can serve as 'spaces of governance' and be targeted as an object of spatial strategies and/or mobilized as the medium through which these strategies are pursued. I relate these arguments to the socio-spatio-temporal dynamics of the European Union as a still emerging state or state-like body in a continuing and contested process of formation as well as an important site for experimentation with forms of governance. Specifically, I revisit accounts of multilevel government and multilevel governance in the EU and argue that 'multispatial metagovernance' would provide a better heuristic and guide to the search for solutions to the current economic and political crisis. A further dimension is added by introducing the concepts of institutional and spatio-temporal fixes as crucial aspects of governance and metagovernance. I conclude with comments for future research on these topics.

The Terrestrial, the Territorial and Statehood

Space comprises socially produced grids and horizons of social action that divide and organize the material, social, and imaginary world(s) and also orient actions in the light of such divisions. Space can be a site, object, and means of governance and, in terms of orienting action, is associated with various spatial imaginaries. First, inherited spatial configurations and their opportunity structures are sites where governance may be established, contested, and modified. Second, it is an object of governance insofar as it results from the fixing, manipulation, reordering, and lifting of material, social, and symbolic borders, boundaries, frontiers, and liminal spaces. These arrangements are not limited to those established through territorialization. Third, space can be a means of governance when it defines horizons of action in terms of ‘inside’, ‘outside’, ‘cross’, and ‘liminal’ spaces and when it configures possible connections among actors, actions, and events via various spatio-temporal technologies. And, fourth, because no actors can grasp geo-socio-spatial relations in all their complexity, this forces them to view space through spatial imaginaries that frame their understandings, orientations, directly spatial projects, or other projects with spatial aspects (on enforced sense- and meaning-making as a condition of going on in the world, SUM and JESSOP, 2013).

One form of organizing space is territorialization. In analysing states and state power as well as empires and imperial governance, it is crucial to distinguish territory from the wider, generic notion of terra or the terrestrial. The latter encompasses ‘land’ in its
broadest sense, i.e., land and the subterranean, the sea, its depths and seabed, the air above, and, where relevant, outer space, and, as such, it provides the variable geophysical and socially appropriated ‘raw material’ or substratum for territorialization as one mode of organizing space, politically or otherwise. Among other spatial turns, a recent one is the ‘return to earth’ (CLARK, 2011: ix), including the resurgence of geopolitics (DEPLEDGE, 2015). As it gets appropriated and altered through territorialization, the landmass is divided into more or less clearly delimited areas governed by a political authority (especially a state, see below) that can make binding decisions on their residents and defend its sovereignty against internal and external threats (DELANEY, 2005; WEBER, 1978). This kind of demarcation does not generally apply to the ‘high seas’ that lie beyond territorial waters and this, in turn, affects maritime flows of goods, technologies, people, ideas and other transformative forces. Both kinds of organization of space are nonetheless contested and may lead to alternating or conjoint processes of de- and re-territorialization, cycles of state and empire formation, or the co-existence and even intermeshing of maritime and land empires, with variable implications for the state as a ‘power container’ or connector.

Land without centralized political authority is sometimes termed terra nullius – that is, land without a sovereign (the Antarctic land-mass is a rare current example); its maritime parallel, as noted, is ‘the high seas’ (on the contrasting political dynamics of land and sea, see SCHMITT, 1997; DERMAN, 2011; MÜNKLER, 2007; PHILLIPS and SHARMAN, 2015). This raw material shapes claims to sovereignty (contrast, for example, continental and archipelagic states), underpins different kinds of territorial organization and political imaginaries and strategies (on the social construction of the ocean, see STEINBERG, 2010), prompts different kinds of territorial dispute (e.g., navigation rights through straits), influences the variegated forms of land-based and maritime empires, and shapes the evolution of international law (MOUNTZ, 2013, 2015). The distinction between territorial rule and space of flows is more relevant to early stages of land and sea empires than it is at their peak. For MÜNKLER, ‘the former arose through a consolidation of the spaces under rule, whereas the latter expanded by making their trade relations both more intensive and more extensive’ (2007, p. 48).

The territorial organization of political authority is the essential feature of premodern as well as modern statehood (e.g. LUHMANN, 1989). It has different forms, rests on
specific political and calculative technologies that support territorialization, and can be combined with other forms of political authority and broader patterns of spatial organization, resulting in different kinds of state and polity (ELDEN, 2010). We can relate this to Continental European constitutional, juridical, and state theory (for example, JELLINEK, 1905; HELLER, 1983). These traditions identify three components of the state: (1) a politically organized coercive, administrative, and symbolic apparatus endowed with both general and specific powers; (2) a clearly demarcated core territory under more or less uncontested and continuous control of the state apparatus; and, equally important, (3) a permanent or stable population, on which the state’s political authority and decisions are binding. For modern states, this implies that no state should be formally subordinate to external authority: it should be sovereign in its territory and over its own population. To this one can add a fourth component: (4) the state idea, i.e., political imaginaries that provide a reference point for efforts to integrate the state and define the nature and purposes of the state for the wider society in specific types of state, regime or conjuncture (JESSOP, 2015; cf. MACLEAVY and HARRISON, 2010). Inter alia, these imaginaries and associated state projects typically include significant socio-spatial features and aspirations.

Many forms of political authority that predate the modern state fit the three-component definition, starting with groups of hunter-gatherers or herders that tend to roam within a space that has porous borders but also crucial nodes (such as oases, ritual sites) that these groups seek to defend; and then developing through simple and complex chiefdoms to early forms of state and empire, where nomadic empires may co-exist with sedentary ones (MÜNKLER, 2007; VAN DER PIJL, 2007; CUNLIFFE, 2015). Chiefdoms and states often formed networks based on competitive alliances and, in the case of states, these sometimes crystallized into a single political unit, which incorporated several states and polities to form land-based ‘empires’ ruling larger areas and bigger populations (EISENSTADT, 1963; FINER, 1997b; MÜNKLER, 2007; REDMOND and SPENCER, 2012; WRIGHT, 1977, 2006). Limits on administrative control over such bigger political units and the dialectics of expansion and overreach produced cycles of expansion and contraction, (de-) or (re-)territorialization. A similar logic is reflected in maritime empires, albeit with different kinds of economic and political bases that reflect their emergence from controlling flows of goods, capital, and
people rather than controlling territory (MÜNKLER, 2007). On the co-existence of different forms of rule (on the interaction of maritime empires, land-based states, and overseas trading companies, see PHILLIPS and SHARMAN, 2015; on trading companies, see als STERN, 2011).

Control over land was also central to the feudal era but the latter rested on a tangled patchwork of partly overlapping or superimposed territories, ‘in which different juridical instances were geographically interwoven and stratified, and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainies and anomalous enclaves abounded’ (BEAULAC, 2004, p. 189; cf. ELDEN, 2013, p. 5). Modern parallels include enclaves and exclaves and the claim of superpowers to extra-territorial rights in and over other states (e.g., spheres of influence, a Schmittian Großer Raum, the US ‘empire of bases’, see COHEN, 2015; SCHMITT, 2003; JOHNSON, 2000) as well as other privileges that weaken national sovereignty. Non-Westphalian modes also include principalities, city-states, absolutism, formal empires, suzerainty, tributary relations, warlordism, vassal or client states, modern imperial-colonial blocs, and colonies (BRAUDEL, 1975; DODGSHON, 1987; ANDERSON, 1996). Further, some forms of political power are only loosely related to tightly demarcated territory. They include network governance, governance without government, charismatic rule, transnational religious authority like the Vatican or Islamic ummah, informal empires, or self-governing consociations of communities.

New expressions of statehood are also said to be emerging. These include, rightly or wrongly, the re-emergence of empire as an organizing principle (BURBANK and COOPER, 2010; MÜNKLER, 2007), networks of world cities as a new form of Hanseatic League, the revival of subnational regions as key economic and political players (OHMAE, 1995), cross-border regional cooperation, a new medievalism (ANDERSON, 1996; FRIEDRICHs, 2001), supranational blocs, a global state or, at least, a western conglomerate state (SHAW, 2000), and an embryonic world state – or even global governance – that is oriented to securing perpetual peace (WENDT, 2003). Added complications come, as we shall see, from competing accounts of the internal political configuration of the European Union (as opposed to the form and modalities of its external power projection) as a rescaled ‘national’ state, a neo-medieval revival of the medieval political patchwork (WÆVER, 1997), a post-modern medieval political system (ZIELONKA, 2006), a Westphalian superstate, a

This discussion indicates that, besides the connection between a territory, a state apparatus, and a population, states have other spatial aspects. The latter comprise their roles in place building and place connection; in organizing and reorganizing the scalar division of labour; and in (meta-)governing networks. This is even clearer when we examine non-statal forms of exercising political authority. For example, in contrast to the ideal-typical modern state, an empire (not to be confused with imperialism) governs several relatively distinct territorially-defined political jurisdictions that are organized in the shadow of one centre with prerogatives over assets, policies, or activities that are superior to those of other jurisdictions (COLOMBI, 2004; BURBANK and COOPER, 2010; FINER, 1997a). Whereas states deploy hierarchical authority at different scales with a view to integrating the territory under its control; an empire seeks to accumulate power and resources by governing flows and networks among places in more complex, fractal forms of centre-periphery relations with boundaries that are less well defined and more permeable than those of state (ZIELONKA, 2006). By the same token, the terrestrial (broadly defined) is not only subject to territorialization but also to place-making, scaling processes, and reticulation. This is a crucial issue for political geography because, although the territorialization of political power is one of the state’s three defining features, it does not follow that this is the most important aspect of its socio-spatial organization – especially if one considers what happens within a state’s territorial boundaries rather than focusing on their constitution (cf. AGNEW, 2013 on place, space and territoriality as a compound theoretical lens to study politics and governance). Territory, place, scale, and network are also the elements in the TPSN schema (JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES, 2008; JONES and JESSOP, 2010; JESSOP and JONES, 2016). In these terms, the relative weight and overall articulation of these dimensions provides another way to describe and differentiate state forms and political regimes (see below).

States also have temporal moments. These include specific temporal metrics and intertemporal linkages and have their own discursive, strategic, and material temporalities, their own temporal horizons of action, and their logistical implications (see, for example, DEIBERT, 1999; EKENGREN, 2002; SCHEUERMAN, 1998). In
addition to their current space-time coordinates, they have path-dependent spatio-temporal legacies and future spatio-temporal horizons of action. Further, they have their own internal and interiorized spatio-temporalities, which depend in part on the linkages between the spatio-temporal features of the state in its narrow sense and those of the social order in which they are embedded. For example, as the world market becomes more integrated, the state’s spatial matrix and horizons of action typically change in response to challenges to its territorial sovereignty. Likewise, with the general trend towards social acceleration, the state’s temporal sovereignty is being threatened. This creates pressures to speed up political and policy routines, leading to ‘fast policy’ (PECK and THEODORE, 2015), which has its own dynamic compared with more normal political routines. Conversely, states and state power have spatiotemporal effects on other institutional orders and everyday life; and the impact of state activities, successful or not, spreads out in space and time, with potentially path-shaping effects. Combining socio-spatial and socio-temporal aspects of the state (in short, spatio-temporal aspects) is useful for analysing institutional fixes, spatiotemporal fixes, contradictions in particular socio-spatial configurations, socio-spatial strategic contexts, and transformative strategies.

Drawing on these arguments, the following four-component definition is useful:

The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions and organizations [Staatsgewalt] whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society [Staatsvolk] in a given territorial area [Staatsgebiet] in the name of the common interest or general will of an imagined political community identified with that territory [Staatsidee]. (JESSOP, 2015: 49)

This definition permits a strategic-relational analysis of state power (JESSOP, 2007) that is sensitive to the interaction of the various structural components of the state with political imaginaries and state projects as mediated through the balance of forces. Seen in these terms, the preceding account must be qualified in three respects. First, as an ensemble of power centres and capacities that offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state, the state itself does not exercise power. For,
second, its powers are activated by changing sets of politicians and officials in specific sites, acting in specific conjunctures, using specific modes of governance and specific horizons of action. Thus, to talk of the state or its managers exercising power is a convenient fiction that masks more complex political relations that extend well beyond the state system and its capacities. And, third, as a social relation (more precisely, as an institutionally-mediated condensation of a shifting balance of forces located within the state, the wider political system, and the wider sets of social relations within which the state is embedded, it involves far more than the state in its narrow, juridico-political sense. This is reflected in the expanded, or integral, definition of the state, proposed by GRAMSCI, which points beyond the state apparatus and political society to the dependence of state power on civil society (1975, Q6, §88; and below).

**Polity, Politics, and Policy**

We can develop this analysis through the conceptual triplet of polity, politics, and policy, which highlights the ontological depth of the political field (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986; JESSOP, 2014). The nature of the polity affects capacities to engage in politics and this in turn constrains feasible policies (policy-making as art of the possible). Yet some policies transform politics (witness the depoliticizing aim of neoliberal policies or the politicizing effects of the feminist claim that the personal is political) with consequences for the architecture of the polity and/or reshape political practices (e.g., changing the balance of forces and stimulating new political claims and movements).

*Polity* is a spatial concept demarcating the sphere of political activities from other spheres; related metaphors include domain, realm, field, area, arena, stage, scene, and site (PALONEN, 2006). It covers the institutional architecture of the political field, including its boundaries and boundary-maintenance activities vis-à-vis non-political spheres, and their asymmetric effects on political practice. This implies two forms of depoliticization of the polity (as opposed to politics or policy): depoliticization *and/or* destatization. The former redraws the boundaries between the political and other fields to locate social relations and/or sets of social issues outside the political field. The latter removes issues from the formal purview of a territorial state – whether this occurs through electoral politics, legislative deliberation, executive decision, bureaucratic administration, or judicial determination – and moves them into an ill-defined political
sphere where diverse interests may contest how to define and govern them. This preserves a space for ‘politics without (official) policy-making’ and has recently been described as a movement from government to governance (see below). In this sense, in the modern state, governance straddles the conventional public-private divide and may involve ‘tangled hierarchies’, parallel power networks, or other linkages across tiers of government and/or functional domains. The implications of these phenomena for governance, governance failure, and metagovernance are explored below.

**Politics** refers to formally instituted, organized or informal practices that are directly oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power. In contrast to the presumed relative stability of the polity as an instituted space in this conceptual triplet, politics refers to dynamic, contingent activities that take time. They may occur within the formal political sphere, at its margins, or beyond it. Relevant political activities range from practices to transform the scope of the political sphere, define the state’s nature and purposes, modify the institutional integration and operating unity of the state, exercise direct control over the use of state powers, influence the balance of forces inside the state, block or resist the exercise of state power from ‘outside’, or modify the wider balance of forces that shapes politics as the art of the possible.

Lastly, **policy** concerns the overall strategic line of a state, the changing responsibilities of branches and tiers of government, specific modes and fields of state intervention and non-intervention, the aims and content of particular decisions and non-decisions, and so on. All three Ps have institutional (structural) and practical (strategic) features that also interact with each other (for discussion, see JESSOP 2002, 2007, 2014; also BRAND, 2013 on historical materialist policy analysis).

**Government and Governance**

Combining Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives with the polity-politics-policy distinction, I suggest that state power can be analysed as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. This reinterprets Gramsci’s proposition ‘that the state = “political society + civil society”, in other words, hegemony armoured by the protection of coercion’ (GRAMSCI 1975, Q6, §88, pp. 763–4). It shifts attention from the state as a juridico-political apparatus formally at the heart of the polity to the various modalities
of state power considered in broader, integral terms. This shift also requires attention to politics and policy. Overall, this reinterpretation implies that state power: (1) extends beyond coercion, imperative coordination and positive law to include other ways in which the state can mobilize active consent or passive compliance from forces situated and/or operating beyond the state in its narrow juridico-political sense; and (2) includes efforts by the state to strategically rebalance modes of government and governance – including their spatiotemporal aspects – to improve the effectiveness of direct and indirect direct state intervention in and across different social fields.

I discussed aspects of government above and here I consider governance and, from a Foucauldian perspective, governmentality. Interest in governance revived in the 1980s thanks to an alleged shift from government to governance. This was also the time when Foucault sought to ‘behead the king’ by diverting attention from the state as a sovereign authority to the complex forms and modalities of its role in the strategic codification of power relations in specific social formations (FOUCAULT, 1980, 2007, 2008). In this context he studied governmentality through the triple optic of the urgences (social problems, crises, emergencies), discourses, and dispositifs (or apparatuses) that together create and temporarily stabilize sets of social relations at various scales, from the micro-level (the microphysics of power) through to larger scale phenomena (including the global spread of neoliberalism). Foucault’s work, although not always interpreted in terms of these three interrelated concerns, has been increasingly prominent in political economy and geography, as it has been elsewhere, but often to the neglect of its relation to the state, state power, and state effects.

General studies identify three or four modes of governance: ex post co-ordination through exchange (e.g., the anarchy of the market), ex ante co-ordination through imperative co-ordination (e.g., the hierarchy of the firm, organization, or state), reflexive self-organization (e.g., the heterarchy of ongoing negotiated consent to resolve complex problems in a corporatist order or horizontal networking to co-ordinate a complex division of labour), and, less routinely, solidarity based on unconditional commitment to others (e.g., loyalty within small communities or local units or across imagined communities in times of crisis). More detailed research has identified many additional forms of governance and examined specific practices or regimes oriented to specific objects of governance, linked either to the planning, programming, and
regulation of particular policy fields or to issues of economic performance. Within the political field, however, attention often focused on the shift from government to governance, that is, the growing importance at various scales of networking, negotiation, and public-private partnerships (e.g., HARVEY, 1986; SWYNGEDOUW, 2005). Further, reflecting in part Foucault’s work, attention also turned to the wide range of governance mechanisms, only some of which are grounded in the state, especially one regarded as sovereign in its territory and vis-à-vis other states. In these terms, pursuit of state projects involves not only mobilization of state capacities unique to the state in its narrow sense (e.g., a legitimate monopoly of organized coercion, tax powers, and legal sovereignty) and modes of governance or governmentalization such as the market, dialogue, and solidarity that operate beyond the state.

Metagovernance in the Shadow of Hierarchy

While the significance of governance and governmentality was soon affirmed in the geographical literature, metagovernance was discovered somewhat later. This term is obviously supervenient on governance and refers to the governance of governance. This may occur in response to the tendency of all forms of governance and associated policies to fail (market failure, state failure, network failure, or collapse in trust), leading to attempts to redesign them; or it may occur because certain social forces wish to rebalance modes of governance. Metagovernance occurs at many sites and scales as governance problems or the shifting balance of forces prompt efforts to improve governance or change its strategically selective impact on ideal and material interests.

Nonetheless governments tend to intervene in metagovernance in areas of societal significance, whether these are formally private or public. They get involved in redesigning markets, in constitutional change and the juridical re-regulation of organizational forms and objectives, in organizing the conditions for networked self-organization, in promoting social capital and the self-regulation of the professions and other forms of expertise, and, most importantly, in the collibration of different modes of governance and first-order metagovernance (i.e., redesign of individual dispositifs or particular modes of governance). This is especially true in periods of serious crisis in (and, even more, of) institutional orders that are critical to societal reproduction.
More specifically, governments provide the ground rules for governance and the regulatory order in and through which governance partners can pursue their aims; ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and regimes; create forums for dialogue and/or act as the primary organizer of the dialogue among policy communities; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information in order to shape cognitive expectations; serve as a 'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to re-balance power differentials and strategic bias in regimes by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; take material and/or symbolic flanking and supporting measures to stabilize forms of coordination that are deemed valuable but prone to collapse; subsidize production of public goods; organize side-payments for those making sacrifices to facilitate effective coordination; contribute to the meshing of short-, medium- and long-term time horizons and temporal rhythms across various sites, scales, and actors, in part to prevent opportunistic exit and entry into governance arrangements; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in diverse strategic contexts and so alter their import for preferred strategies and tactics; organize redundancies and duplication to sustain resilience via requisite variety in response to unexpected problems; and also assume political responsibility as addressee in last resort in the event of governance failure in domains beyond the state (based in part on JESSOP, 2002). Such collibratory practices suggest that governance (in its various forms) occurs 'in the shadow of hierarchy' (SCHARPF, 1994, p. 40). In other words, there is a continuing role for the state in the organization of self-organization as well as other modes of governance (see also BEVIR, 2010; MEULEMAN, 2008). Indeed, for BELL and HINDMOOR (2009), metagovernance is the government of governance.

While these remarks highlight the state’s role in collibration, other scholars have identified functional equivalents to the state’s ‘shadow’ role in this regard. These include: (1) the more or less spontaneous, bottom-up development by networks of rules, values, norms and principles that they then acknowledge and follow (KOOIMAN and JENTOFT, 2009; and TORFING, PETERS, PIERRE and SØRENSEN, 2012); (2) increased deliberation and participation by civil society groups through stakeholder democracy, putting external pressure on the state managers and/or other elites involved in governance (BEVIR, 2010); and (3) actions taken by international
governmental and non-governmental agencies to compensate for the inability of failed or weak states’ to engage in metagovernance (BÖRZEL and RISSE, 2010) – although this third case seems to involve a rescaling of the shadow of hierarchy insofar as these actions are typically backed, as BÖRZEL and RISSE concede, by powerful states.

Moreover, because governance and government mechanisms co-exist in a complex sociospatial matrix, success in regard to political redesign, politics, or policies in one dimension of this matrix may depend on practices and events in other dimensions. Different government and governance mechanisms may also have different temporal horizons with a corresponding potential for disjunctions that may undermine the viability of any given mechanism. Poul Fritz KJAER (2010) notes a further paradox that, in the EU, government and governance are mutually constitutive such that more governing implies more governance and vice versa. In turn, Bengt LARSSON suggests that, whereas the state can enhance its power by using networks to govern, networks depend on sovereign power to maintain the conditions for effective network governance (LARSSON, 2013). These comments focus mainly on the formal organizational and institutional features of governance and government. They deserve to be elaborated in the light of the socio-spatial arguments outlined above.

Building on these ideas, we might argue that governance (in its narrow sense of networking, negotiation, etc.) and metagovernance depend on the organization of reflexive self-organization among multiple stakeholders across several scales of state territorial organization and, indeed, in diverse extra-territorial contexts. In this context, the state’s role (at any scale) is that of primus inter pares in a complex, heterogeneous, and multilevel network rather than that of the sovereign authority in a single hierarchical command structure and its primary contribution is as one actor-cum-stakeholder among others than can contribute distinctive resources to governance arrangements and projects that may originate beyond the state. In this context, formal sovereignty is better seen as a series of symbolic and material state capacities than as an overarching, dominant resource. Other stakeholders contribute other symbolic or material resources (e.g., private money, legitimacy, information, expertise, organizational capacities, or the power of numbers) to be combined with states’ sovereign and other capacities to advance collectively agreed (or accepted) aims and objectives. Thus states’ involvement in multilevel governance thereby becomes less
hierarchical, less centralized, and less directive and, compared to the clear hierarchy of territorial powers theoretically associated with sovereign states, it typically involves tangled hierarchies and complex interdependence.

Three further sets of remarks will help to put governance and metagovernance in their place within a strategic-relational approach. First, governance is certainly not a purely technical matter limited to specific problems defined by the state (or other social forces) that can be solved by experts in organizational design, public administration, and public opinion management. This is not only because of the ‘wicked problems’ generated by a complex world but also because governance (and, \textit{a fortiori}, meta-governance) practices involve not only specific political and/or policy outcomes in particular political and policy fields but also have broader effects on state capacities. They modify the available mix of government and governance techniques and change the balance of forces. Indeed, those engaged in metagovernance may redraw the inherited public-private divide, alter the forms of interpenetration between the political system and other functional systems, and modify the relations between these systems and civil society in the light of their (perceived) impact on state capacities.

Second, while collibration is a core meta-political activity of states, an activity where it has a privileged strategic position, it is often hotly contested because of competing meta-governance projects. More generally, the state reserves to itself the right to open, close, juggle, and re-articulate governance not only in terms of particular functions but also from the viewpoint of partisan and global political advantage. This is related in the last resort to the declaration of states of emergency, which give extraordinary powers to state officials to reorder government and governance arrangements. Even in less extreme situations, this can often lead to self-interested action on the part of state managers to protect their particular interests rather than to preserve the state's overall capacity to pursue an (always selective and biased) consensual interpretation of the public interest and to promote social cohesion.

Third, Claus Offe once noted that modes of policy-making are better for some purposes than others and that, as policy objectives change, so would the best mode (\textit{OFFE, 1975}). Nonetheless even appropriate forms have their own problems and generate others in turn. Offe asked how the state apparatus survives in the face of
these tendencies towards policy and state failure. His answer was that it does so through a continual *fuite en avant*, i.e., it escapes from an emerging crisis in one mode of policy-making by moving to another that is also likely to fail. His argument can be extended, as I argue below, to modes of governance and, hence, to the need for specific institutional and spatio-temporal fixes that provide temporary, provisional, and partial solutions to these challenges. But first I will consider the implications of these arguments for the study of multilevel government and governance.

**Multilevel Governance or Multispatial Metagovernance?**

The complexities of the EU as a state and/or empire in the process of formation have prompted a proliferation of descriptions of its emerging form, some of which question its character as a territorial state. Besides its treatment as a supranational state, there are three other prominent descriptions: (1) a site of intergovernmental relations and negotiation; (2) network governance or network polity; and (3) multilevel government or governance. Each concept has its own theoretical problems and, in addition, even where a particular concept pertains to observable trends and underlying tendencies, its scope is limited because EU government and governance arrangements are multidimensional and polycentric, encompassing many kinds of political, legal, social and executive actors (ESPON 2013) and many modes of government and governance. These operate along and across regional, national and supranational levels of authority. In addition, the novelty of spatial governance in Europe and its crucial role in the ongoing, trial-and-error process of state- and/or empire-building has led to a proliferation of new spatial concepts, new spatial imaginaries, and new spatial projects (cf. ALLMENDINGER, CHILLA AND SIELKER 2014; LUUKKONEN 2015).

The claim that the European Union is like a territorial state that has been rescaled to a supranational level is implausible. So is the claim that it is but one (perhaps major) site for intergovernmental relations and negotiation. Indeed, developments in the EU, especially around the Eurozone and refugee crises, show the limits of both accounts. Thus we observe, inter alia, a new political axis based on Franco-German interest in keeping the Eurozone intact with decisions being imposed on weaker member states (notably Cyprus and Greece but also Portugal and Italy). And, conversely, we see an
alliance of Northern European Union states with strong economies against Southern Europe (including here France). The weakness of the supranational and intergovernmental approaches and the obvious asymmetries in the power and influence of European Union member states (casting doubt on the network polity approach) helps to explain why multilevel government or governance became the leading approach for studying European integration (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001; BACHE and FLINDERS, 2004; BACHE, 2008, 2010; on the more general challenge of marked asymmetries to the network governance, see DAVIES, 2011).

Initial work on multilevel government highlighted how power and decision-making in the EU seemed to be shifting from a hierarchical system of government based on imperative coordination towards ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (MARKS, 1993, p. 392). This was then extended to include non-state actors, for which the term multilevel governance seems more appropriate (ALCANATARA et al., 2015; PIATTONI, 2010). Later work multiplied the levels included and emphasized the blurring of the private-public distinction or of that between state and ‘civil society’ (itself a polyvalent and vague term).

Research on multilevel government and governance is still strongly associated with the study of the EU, with other studies modelled on this paradigmatic field. Much work involves taxonomic refinement (for example, confederal, federal and unitary forms or the types of non-state actor engaged at different scales) and the fine-tuning of case studies of specific policy fields. Thus there is less concern with developing explanatory arguments that go beyond noting the sheer complexity of governance issues or the complex reciprocal interdependence among different kinds of actors at different levels. Nor is there much effort to disambiguate ‘level’ so that it is clear whether it refers to territorial jurisdictions, core-periphery relations among places, the scalar division of labour (with its potentially tangled hierarchies), the nodal character of networks, and so on (see below).

Efforts at European integration over some 250 years – and not just during the period of post-war European integration – illustrate the trial-and-error nature of government and governance design and policy learning. This is especially clear since the 1950s. Indeed, the EU is now widely regarded as the world’s leading experimental site in
multilevel government and/or governance and in attempts to overcome its crisis-tendencies (COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 2009b; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2014). These attempts in Europe and elsewhere reflect, inter alia, the growing disjunction in integrated regional and global economies between the formal structures of political power associated with sovereign territorial states and the substantive circuits of economic flows and transnational power. Where government is based on territorial representation, it is challenged by the relativization of scale (a loss of primacy of the national scale), by de- and re-territorialization (the territorial re-scaling of government powers and authorities), and the resulting increase in variable geometries and tangled hierarchies of political power (the loss of territorial congruence and/or of neatly nested hierarchies of power across a growing range of fields of government action). We also observe challenges to the traditional bases of national citizenship and mutual solidarity in some states thanks to multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, and divided political loyalties. Moreover, with growing interdependence among functional systems with their own operational codes, logics of appropriateness, temporalities, spatialities, etc., it gets harder for one system (even the state as the core of the political system) to control the operations of other systems or institutional orders from outside and above them.

The development of the constitutional and political (polity) arrangements in the EU is a reflexive process, with convention working groups, intergovernmental conferences, other contested metaconstitutional debates and continued calls for critical self-reflexion and resilience. This reflects MONNET’s (1976) remark that ‘Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’. The European Parliament resolved in 2008 to strengthen multilevel governance (MLG) urgently; José Manuel BARROSO claimed in 2009 that MLG was vital to the EU’s competitive edge and that, in the prevailing economic crisis, its further development was a priority (cited in COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 2009a); this same Committee also published the White Paper on Multilevel Governance, which envisages governance systems that involve regional and local authorities in formulating and implementing Community policies (COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2009b). Such developments, marked by varying degrees of self-criticism and reflexivity, indicate the relevance of the concept of metagovernance to the institutions and practices of MLG
in the European Union. This was reflected in the concepts of multilevel *metagovernance* (JESSOP, 2004) and *multiscalar metagovernance* (JESSOP, 2007). For the EU can be seen as a major and, indeed, increasingly important, supranational instance of meta-governance in relation to a wide range of complex and interrelated problems.

Returning to the initial concept, Gary MARKS, who pioneered the MLG paradigm, defined it as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ and noted that ‘supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (MARKS, 1993, pp. 402-3). This indicates some problems with early formulations of the term: (1) it focuses on vertical nested tiers of territorial political authority and neglects other socio-spatial structuring principles; (2) it is often confined to EU member and candidate states and neglects the role of other states and international institutions; (3) it ignores the space of flows, a major source of governance problems; (4) it reifies scale and ignores tangled scalar hierarchies; and (5) it ignores evidence of incoherence, mutual contradictions, etc. (see BACHE and FLINDERS, 2004; HENDERSON, JEFFERY, WINCOTT and JONES, 2013; JESSOP, 2007; PIATTONI, 2009; STUBBS, 2005).

The first problem was partially resolved by including horizontal linkages (such as cross-border regions) into the set of jurisdictions but the focus on territorial government often remained, which explains why concepts, such as network polity, are proposed as complements or rivals to MLG. The second problem is partly resolved when attention turns to the integration of the EU into wider European economic space, the near neighbourhood, the Eurasian region, the Middle East and North Africa, or the Transatlantic region. But this maintains a Eurocentric focus and tends to neglect the extent to which other states and international institutions are key players in MLG in the EU itself. This is a special challenge regarding the range of institutions involved in managing the Eurozone crisis, which, as well as member states and the Troika, includes the United States, other international financial institutions, and other key stakeholders. There are many similar cases that vary by problem and policy area.

Third, the contrasting logics of territorialization and space of flows are also deeply problematic for government and governance and its analysis. This issue is sometimes
related to complex interdependence to justify the need for intergovernmental relations and/or MLG but this justification underplays the complexities of governing the space of flows as well as to problems grounded in other kinds of spatial dynamics. Indeed, because the sources and reach of these problems go well beyond the territorial space of its member states, multilevel government and/or governance cannot be fully understood without considering their complex relations with other nodes located above, below, and transversal to the EU. Each scale and node is involved in complex, tangled relations with others located above, below, or transversal thereto and many parallel power networks are also involved in their coordination and collaboration. Indeed, while one might well suggest that the European scale is becoming increasingly dominant within the EU’s multispatial metagovernance regime, it is merely nodal in the emerging multispatial metagovernance regimes that are developing on a global scale in the shadow of (an increasingly crisis-prone) the United States. This argument indicates the need to look beyond the territory of the EU and/or its internal scalar division to study networks that cross-cut territorial boundaries and are transversal to specific scalar hierarchies, whether neatly nested or twisted and tangled.

Revisiting the TPSN Schema

These brief remarks indicate that the challenge of effective European Union government and/or governance is not just one of redesigning the polity, organizing politics, or formulating and implementing policies on two or more levels (whether understood in terms of nested areas or scalar hierarchies). Similar problems also exist in federal states – and, indeed, have led some scholars to model the challenges in EU politics on similar lines (e.g., SCHARPF, 1988 on the joint-decision trap). A more fundamental problem is that the challenges of EU governance also involve territory, place, and network – as, indeed, do other kinds of polity, politics, and policy. The reference here is to the territory-place-scale-network (or TPSN) schema developed by JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES (2008). This schema explores the interaction between these four spatial moments of social relations considered both as structuring principles and as fields of socio-spatial organization. These moments of socio-spatiality can be combined to produce more concrete–complex analyses of particular socio-spatial configurations, tied to specific substantive relations and processes, and articulated in different kinds of spatial strategy (on the latter, see BRENNER, 2004).
Overall, building on my earlier remarks on space as a site, object, and means of social practices (including government and governance), a brief reflection on this two-dimensional matrix (see Table 1) suggests that:

(1) Different TPSN configurations could be the site for elaborating spatio-temporal strategies and fixes, that is, sites where strategies and fixes are elaborated and pursued (e.g., states, land-based empires, global city networks, virtual regions such as the Four Motors Region or the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies; cf. on bounded territories, networked territories, fluid territories, see JAUHIAINEN and MOILANEN, 2011; and on territory, place, and network in the new regionalism, see HARRISON, 2010).

(2) They could be the object of spatio-temporal strategies and fixes, that is, themselves be the object of recalibration, reorganization, collibration, and so forth – either in their actually existing form (e.g., spatial rebalancing, MARTIN, 2015, creating soft spaces with fuzzy boundaries to aid metagovernance, ALLMENDINGER and HAUGHTON 2009; or refocusing on territorial governance in the modern metropolis, SCHINDLER, 2015) or as potential objects yet to be formed (e.g., the development of ‘soft spaces’ in Danish spatial planning, OLESEN 2012; or the halting movement of the BRIC economies from an asset class for investment to an emerging transnational economic bloc and intergovernmental regime, SUM, 2013).

(3) They could have different roles as means in securing, modifying, or disrupting the coherence of spatiotemporal relations in social formations in different stages of development, historical contexts, and specific conjunctures (e.g., promoting cluster policies as part of a knowledge-based economy strategy, GU and LUNDVALL, 2006; or introducing inter-urban competition as part of neoliberal projects to weaken spatial Keynesianism, BRENNER, 2004).

(4) The relative significance of territory, place, scale, and networks as structuring principles for sociospatial relations is likely to vary with types of institutional and spatiotemporal fix and hence to be reflected in efforts to secure the overall
coherence of social relations in a given spatiotemporal envelope (e.g., the relative primacy of territory and place in Atlantic Fordism versus the relative primacy of scale and network in an emerging transnational post-Fordist economy based on flexible accumulation, JESSOP, 2002).

Table 1. Towards a Multidimensional Analysis of Socio-Spatiality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structuring principles</th>
<th>Fields of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TERRITORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRITORY</td>
<td>States as power containers defined by their frontiers or boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>Core-periphery relations, land-based empires, borderlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCALE</td>
<td>Scalar division of political power (unitary vs federal state, MLG, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETWORKS</td>
<td>Cross-border region, virtual regions, nomadic shadow empires</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: greatly modified version of Table 2 in JESSOP et al., 2008

(5) Strategies of crisis resolution could involve attempts to reorder the relative importance of the four dimensions and their associated institutional expressions and, hence, to modify the weight of their role in displacing crisis tendencies and contradictions (cf. HADJIMICHAELIS, 2011; MURPHY, 2013; and DAWSON, 2015).
(6) Crises, attempts at crisis resolution, and the emergence of new spatiotemporal fixes may lead to shifts in the most effective (imagined) sociospatial bases, organizational structures, and strategies for sub- or counter-hegemonic projects (e.g., the social economy, the Occupy movement) (e.g., AMIN, CAMERON and HUDSON, 2002; ANTENTAS, 2015; CALHOUN, 2013).

Viewed in these terms, the concept of MLG ignores many other ways of approaching governance (based on other sociospatial structuring principles) and other kinds of socio-spatial governance problems (each with its own more or less distinct spatio-temporal as well as substantive features), especially those generated by the specificity of place and the space of flows rather than by issues of territoriality or scale. Problems that are revealed through the use of the TPSN schema include: the growing disjuncture between ‘fixed’ national territory and global flows; destabilization due to increasing uneven spatial development among places and their role in political-economic crisis generation; the increasing significance of sub- and supra-national scales of political-economic organization; and the proliferation of networks that are neither co-extensive nor isomorphic to national territories.

The limited descriptive and explanatory scope of the MLG concept can be seen from the fact that it occupies just two cells in the sixteen-cell two-dimensional TPSN table – those concerned with territorial ordering along scalar lines and the (re-)scaling of territorial relations. Its narrow scope compared with the potential range of forms of socio-spatial governance, especially once one goes beyond two-dimensions to more complex sociospatial configurations, also shows the limits of the alternative concept of multiscalar metagovernance. For, while it transcends government and governance, it merely substitutes scale for level as the site of relevant metagovernance practices.

This suggests that multilevel government and/or governance should be put in their place within a broader multispacial metagovernance approach and that its agents should therefore be related not only to their position in a scalar division of labour but also in territorial, place-based, and network-mediated forms and modes of agency. In practice, it must be conceded, much work that is presented under the rubric of MLG (whether the third letter in the acronym is interpreted as government or governance)
does take account of at least some of these complexities, either theoretically or, more often, when presenting its findings. In this sense the MLG approach is a misleading and oversimplified self-designation of work in this field and this partly accounts for the growing body of work intended to clarify different meanings and dimensions of MLG (see, for example, HOOGHE and MARKS 2003, PIATTONI, 2010). An alternative strategy, with the benefit of highlighting what is actually at stake, is to propose a new term or rubric under which to explore these issues.

I therefore propose the notion of *multispatial metagovernance* as an alternative approach to thinking about the issues addressed in the MLG literature and, indeed, to other issues of governing social relations marked by complex reciprocal interdependence across several spatio-temporal social fields. There are has four potential advantages over multilevel government, network governance, multilevel governance, and other widely used concepts. First, it affirms the irreducible plurality of territorial area, social scales, networks, and places that must be addressed in attempts at governance. In other words, it notes the complex interrelations between territorial organization, multiple scalar divisions of labour (and other practices), networked forms of social interaction, and the importance of place as a meeting point of functional operations and the conduct of personal life. Second, it recognizes the complex, tangled, and interwoven nature of the relevant political relations, which include important horizontal and transversal linkages – indicated in notions such as ‘network state’ or ‘network polity’ – as well as the vertical linkages implied in multilevel government and/or governance. Third, in contrast to a one-sided emphasis on heterarchic coordination, it introduces metagovernance as the reflexive art of balancing government and other forms of governance to create requisite variety, flexibility, and adaptability in coordinated policy-formulation, policy-making, and implementation. Fourth, it insists on the plurality and, indeed, heterogeneity of actors potentially involved in such institutions and practices, which stretch well beyond different tiers of government and well beyond the confines of any given administrative, political, or economic space.

Following Gramsci’s distinction between narrow and integral senses of ‘the state’ (see GRAMSCI, 1975 Q6 §155, Q17 §51, and Q6 §10) and my proposed redefinition of the state as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’, we can also explore
their narrow and integral spatiotemporal dimensions and their implications for multispatial metagovernance. The narrow dimension refers to spatialities of the state regarded as an ensemble of juridico-political institutions and regulatory capacities grounded in the territorialization of political power. It includes the changing meaning and organization of state territoriality; the evolving role of borders, boundaries, and frontiers; and the changing intranational geographies of the state’s territorial organization and internal administrative differentiation (cf. BRENNER, 2004). Also included are the state’s roles in promoting, addressing, or reversing uneven development in the relation between places, in reorganizing its own internal scalar division of labour, and in managing networks within and beyond the state’s juridico-political apparatus. State space in its ‘broad’ or ‘integral’ sense denotes the wider sociospatial supports and implications of state space and the sociospatial embedding of particular TPSN configurations of the state apparatus and of state power. It covers the TPSN-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized strategically to regulate, govern and reorganize social and economic relations and, more generally, the changing geographies of state intervention into social and economic processes.

A related concept is state spatial strategies – again to be understood in integral terms à la Gramsci and/or in relation to ‘government + governance’. These strategies refer to the historically specific practices through which state (and imperial) institutions and state managers (and the social forces they represent) seek to reorder territories, places, scales, and networks to secure the reproduction of the state in its narrow sense, to reconfigure the sociospatial dimensions of the state in its integral sense, and to promote specific accumulation strategies, state projects, hegemonic visions, or other social imaginaries and projects. These strategies have important infrastructural as well as despotic dimensions (MANN, 1984), are related to specific spatiotemporal imaginaries, and depend on specific technologies and governmental practices (LEFEBVRE, 1991; PRESCOTT, 1987; HANNAH, 2000; BRENNER, 2004). Such strategies are important aspects of multispacial metagovernance (see below).

Combining these arguments, it seems that ‘multispatial metagovernance’ needs even more serious disambiguation than multilevel government or governance. Specifically, multispatial can denote the site, the means, and the object of governance, first-order metagovernance (the redesign of a given mode of governance), and second-order
metagovernance (the judicious rebalancing of the relative weight of different modes of
governing, or collaboration) insofar as these practices are also oriented to shaping the
socio-spatial dimensions of their respective objects. Thus all sixteen cells in Table 1
can be seen as sites of government and governance, objects of government and
governance, and means of government and governance. As such they can be used to
plot trajectories in space-time and to identify alternative spatial strategies and fixes.
More crucially, of course, these cells represent analytically distinct types of two-
dimensional socio-spatial configuration that will co-exist, often in hybrid or three-
or four-dimensional forms in actual sociospatial worlds. Thus the governance of a specific
space will involve more complex sociospatial configurations and this hugely multiplies
the complexities of governance. In turn, in terms of metagovernance, we can envisage
competing or rival sociospatial strategies that seek to rebalance the relative weight of
the sociospatial configurations illustrated by the descriptions in these cells.

Extending the TPSN Research Agenda by Revisiting Spatiotemporal Fixes

Each socio-spatial organizing principle has its own forms of inclusion–exclusion and
entails differential capacities to exercise state powers. This opens a strategic field in
which social forces seek to privilege different modes of socio-spatial organization to
privilege their ideal and material interests. Regarding the state in its narrow, juridico-
political sense, examples include gerrymandering constituency boundaries, voter
suppression, promoting or weakening place-based uneven development and centre–
periphery inequalities, reordering scalar hierarchies and scale jumping, and organizing
parallel power networks that cross-cut formal vertical and horizontal divisions of power
within and beyond the state.

Further, given the contradictions and dilemmas linked to basic structural forms (such
as the capital relation) and with different socio-spatial forms, we might explore how
these contradictions are managed through spatial displacement and/or temporal
deferral of the direct and indirect costs of efforts to manage them. Two interrelated
concepts that highlight the role of structure and strategy in these regards are those of
institutional and spatiotemporal fixes. Neither is uniquely concerned with the polity and
state powers. They are nonetheless fundamental features of the state in its narrow
and integral senses; and, in addition, the state system and the activation of state powers shape institutional and spatiotemporal fixes more generally.

An institutional fix is a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, imposition, or chance evolution offer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in securing economic, political, or social order. Nonetheless, it is not purely technical and, rather than providing a post hoc solution to pre-given coordination problems, it is partly constitutive of this order. It rests on an institutionalized, unstable equilibrium of compromise or, in extremis, an open use of force. Such a fix can also be examined as a spatiotemporal fix (or STF), and vice versa (the following definition differs from that offered by David HARVEY, 1982; see JESSOP, 2006). STFs set spatial and temporal boundaries within which the always relative, incomplete, and provisional structural coherence (and hence the institutional complementarities) of a given order are secured – in so far as ever occurs. One of their key contributions is to externalize the material and social costs of securing such coherence beyond the spatial, temporal, and social boundaries of the institutional fix by displacing or deferring them (or both) in more or less complex socio-spatial ways that can be analysed using the TPSN schema. Such fixes delimit the main spatial and temporal boundaries within which relative structural coherence is secured and displace certain costs of securing this coherence beyond these boundaries. The primary socio-spatial moments and temporal horizons around which fixes are built and their coherence vary widely over time. This is reflected in the variable coincidence of different boundaries, borders or frontiers of action and the changing primacy of different scales in complex configurations of territory-place-scale-network relations.

Thus an important aspect of governance success (or, more precisely, conveying the impression thereof) is the discursive and institutional framing of specific STFs within which governance problems appear manageable because certain ungovernable features manifest themselves elsewhere. Two corollaries are that current zones of stability imply future zones of instability and that zones of stability in this place imply zones of instability in other places – including within a given zone of stability that is internally differentiated and stratified. Indeed, capacities to defer and displace problems was one source of ‘steering optimism’ in early governance and
metagovernance literatures – especially when reinforced by the ability to engage in a *fuite en avant* by producing new fixes to escape the consequences of past failures. Nonetheless, these fixes only appear to harmonize contradictions, which persist in one or another form. Such regimes are partial, provisional, and unstable and attempts to impose them can lead to various forms of ‘blowback’.

In this context, to the extent that these fixes are oriented to specific contradictions and their associated dilemmas, these may be handled through

- *hierarchization*: treat some contradictions as more important than others;
- *prioritization*: give priority to one aspect of a contradiction or dilemma over the other aspect;
- *spatialization*: rely on different territories, places, scales, and action networks to address one or another contradiction or aspect or to displace the problems associated with the neglected aspect to marginal or liminal territories, places, scales, or networks; and
- *temporalization*: routinely treat one or other aspect of a contradiction in turn or focus one-sidedly on a subset of contradictions, dilemmas, or aspects until it becomes urgent to address what had hitherto been neglected (for further discussion, see JESSOP, 2013).

While contradictions, dilemmas, and antagonisms cannot be reconciled permanently, they may be moderated – partially and provisionally – through mechanisms and projects that prioritize one aspect of a contradiction, one horn of a dilemma, or just some interests over others with resulting asymmetrical effects. This can be achieved ‘ideally’, at least in the short run, by successfully presenting specific, necessarily selective solutions as the expression of an (always illusory) general interest. In other cases the ‘resolution’ will involve more visible, even forcible strategies and tactics.

This is a contested process, involving different economic, political, and social forces and diverse strategies and projects and this, in turn, is one source of the instability of institutional and spatio-temporal fixes that are consolidated, if at all, only provisionally and partially and that are always the product of a temporary unstable equilibrium of compromise. It is also fractal. That is, at whatever scale of analysis we adopt, we find
competing, contrary, and contradictory attempts to establish organizational, institutional and spatio-temporal fixes on many sites, with alternative targets of government and/or governance, using different kinds and combinations of socio-spatial organizing principles and strategies, intended to serve different kinds of ideal and material interests, and reflecting different sets of social forces. This poses a series of challenges, for those actors as well as observers, on how to reconcile micro-social diversity and a contingent macro-social order. If a strategic line rather than chaos can be discerned, this may be related to relatively successful meta-governance practices pursued in the context of specific institutional and spatiotemporal fixes that privilege some interests and strategies over others and, for a time, displace or defer the conflicts, contradictions, and crisis-tendencies associated with these fixes (for a case study of crises of crisis-management conducted in these terms, see JESSOP and JONES, 2016).

Conclusions

This article has employed the strategic-relational approach and the TPSN schema to develop a heuristic framework for exploring the articulation of territory, politics, and governance with the aid of a novel interpretation of state power as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. Among several theoretical and conceptual innovations associated with this approach, one of the most significant is the notion of multispatial metagovernance. As a concept that is supervenient on many others, MSMG (Multispatial metagovernance) highlights the complexity of issues that are often treated in oversimplified ways, even, indeed, against the rich empirical evidence studied under the rubric of multilevel governance. At this stage of meta-theoretical, theoretical, substantive, strategic, and policy elaboration, however, MSMG is mainly a place-holding concept that identifies a range of problems to be addressed in future research.

First, regarding state theory, governmentality, and critical governance studies, the new approach suggests at least four areas for investigation. One is how to displace the Westphalian sovereign state as the focal point of state theory, drawing in particular on Gramscian and Foucauldian insights, to explore the diverse modalities of state power understood in its inclusive, or integral, sense. A related issue is how to move beyond
methodological territorialism in regard to the spatiality of the state and state power, drawing on an elaborated, multidimensional version of the TPSN schema to disclose and analyse the complexities of their sociospatial aspects. Another crucial issue is the explicit recognition in this approach of the possibility of government and governance failure, the significance in this context of different forms of metagovernance, and, especially, the role of multispacial metagovernance in efforts – themselves prone to failure – to rebalance different aspects of government and governance. Last, but not least, sociospatial relations are not merely the site of government, governance, and metagovernance but also objects and means of governance. This point serves to counteract the tendency to restrict MLG and analogous concepts to descriptors of the levels, scales or sites of politics and policy and to neglect how governance practices can also focus on efforts to recalibrate TPSN relations as a specific strategic object(ive) or, again, on attempts to reorder the strategic sociospatial selectivities of the polity, politics, and policy or other important fields of action.

Second, regarding the European Union as a real-time laboratory for trial-and-error experimentation in governance, the MSMG approach helps to reveal the limits of the dominant approaches in terms of multilevel government, multilevel governance, and the network polity. This matters because, often against the thrust of associated empirical analyses, these approaches juxtapose hierarchical levels and/or horizontal networks rather than considering how they might be articulated and also neglect other and more complex forms of sociospatial organization. In addition, they tend to focus one-sidedly on levels and networks as sites of politics and policy to the neglect of sociospatial arrangements as objects and means of government and governance. This approach also indicates the need – theoretically, empirically, and strategically – to look beyond the supranational institutions of the European Union as the ‘peak’ level in multilevel governance to consider how the EU, considered as a heterogeneous ensemble of apparatuses, institutions, and discursive-material practices, is inserted into wider sets of government, governance and metagovernance relations across different sets of sociospatial relations. Relatedly, but conversely, one can explore how non-European political and non-political forces are always already present inside the government, governance, and metagovernance arrangements of the EU considered as an evolving ensemble of government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy (this issue is explored in a companion piece, JESSOP and JONES, 2016).
Third, given that this article draws on a plenary lecture sponsored by *Territory, Politics, Governance* and that it is inspired in part by its inaugural editorial statement, it is worth highlighting that this journal could offer a productive forum for exploring the potential of multispatial metagovernance as a theoretical approach and heuristic framework. As noted above, in important respects, this is a place-holding concept that identifies a set of problems rather than already resolving them. Its appeal is that it is part of a much broader conceptual toolbox that provides multiple entry points into ‘territorial politics, spaces of governance, and the political organization of space’ (AGNEW 2013, p. 1), indicates the many ways in which these substantive issues can be articulated, suggests further combinations of the three terms (as well as their further complication through different kinds of TPSN linkage), and, as a concept, is supervenient on a range of other concepts concerned with socio-spatial relations, government and governance, structures and strategies. Thus, rather than limiting discussion to taxonomic refinements, empirical extensions, and routine comparative studies based on the MLG paradigm, the approach suggested here opens the space for wide-ranging theoretical and empirical debates about the future of territory, politics, governance with obvious relevance to MLG but with far broader implications for the pursuit and further elaboration of the journal’s original mission.

**Acknowledgements:** the author thanks the Regional Studies Association for inviting him to deliver the plenary lecture on which this article builds, Sally Hardy for her organizational acumen and warm welcome in Chicago, interlocutors at the lecture itself, Martin Jones and John Harrison for their advice on how to strengthen the arguments, and two *TPG* referees whose comments further improved the final version. Neil Brenner and Gordon MacLeod were key contributors to the original TPSN schema that this article has further developed.

Bob Jessop ORCID: http://orcid.org/000-0001-8134-3926

**REFERENCES**


transfer and the politics of scale in South-Eastern Europe. *South East European Politics* 6 55–87.


