How ‘hate’ hurts globally

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Introduction: The terroristic impact of hate violence

We sat down for dinner with three armed guards defending the restaurant door. That’s when we first started mentally drafting this chapter. We weren’t in the heat of a war zone. It was a cold March evening in Brussels. Our dinner companions were two dozen or so colleagues attending the Facing Facts Forward conference on a victim-centred approach to hate crime in Europe (CEJI 2015). Earlier in the day we were discussing how to improve the reporting of hate crime. Now, with the guards at the door, we were mindful that we were a potential target of hate violence ourselves. We pondered on what our chances of survival would be if what the restaurant owner feared actually came to pass. A former police officer, he insisted on arranging the guard when he heard that the dinner booking was made by a Jewish organisation. On seeing that one of us wore a kippa, a Jewish head covering, he respectfully but forcefully insisted it not be worn in the city, so that we minimise our chances of becoming the victims of hate violence. Thankfully, we enjoyed our dinner in peace and left the restaurant and the Belgian capital without incident.

Others have not been so fortunate. In Brussels the previous year, in May 2014, a gunman shot dead two men and a woman and seriously wounded a fourth person in an attack on the Belgian capital’s Jewish museum (BBC News 2014). More recently in Denmark, a couple of weeks before our dinner, a gunman killed one man and injured three others in an attack on a free speech debate in a café in Copenhagen in February 2015 (BBC News 2015a). In a second shooting near Copenhagen’s main synagogue some hours later a Jewish man was killed and three police officers wounded (BBC News 2015b). Just over a month before the Copenhagen shootings, twelve people—eight journalists, two police officers, a caretaker and a visitor—were shot to death in Paris in early January 2015 in an attack on the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. According to news reports, witnesses

1 Parts of this chapter have been adapted and amended from the book Hate Crime. A Global Perspective, by Paul Iganski and Jack Levin (New York: Routledge, 2015).
said they heard the gunmen shouting ‘We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad’ and ‘God is Great’ in Arabic (BBC News 2015c). Two days later, during a siege of a kosher supermarket at Porte de Vincennes in the east of Paris, four hostages—all Jewish—were killed (BBC News 2015d).

Occasional high profile incidents of extreme hate violence such as these in Europe have occurred against a backcloth of rather more frequent routine violence in which prejudice, hate or bigotry plays some part. Elsewhere in the world, acts of hate violence resulting in many fatalities have had extreme consequences and profound impacts upon the communities of people afflicted. In this chapter we unfold the spatial and psycho-social consequences of hate violence—everyday and extreme, local and global—which, we argue, when viewed from a global perspective provide evidence of a major global public health problem that requires a paradigm shift away from a narrow criminal justice focus on the problem of ‘hate crime’. We argue that there needs to be a shift of thinking and focus towards a public health approach to the problem of ‘hate violence’.  

**The spatial impact of hate violence**

To date, the spatial and behavioural consequences of hate violence in relatively socially stable nations have received sparse attention in the scholarly hate crimes literature. From the small amount of research that has been undertaken, analysis of data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales concerning defensive and avoidance measures taken by small numbers of crime victims following victimisation, indicate similar but also different behavioural patterns between hate crime victims and victims of otherwise motivated crime. In the case of victims of household crime, it is evident that hate crime victims are more likely to report moving home and being more alert and less trusting of other people, while victims of otherwise motivated household crime are more likely to report increasing the security of their vehicles and valuables. In the case of victims of crimes against the person, hate crime

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\(^2\) In this chapter we use the term ‘hate violence’ to refer to violence in which the denigration of a person’s perceived identity such as their ‘race’, their ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability status, or sexual identity plays some role. We also conceive of ‘violence’ not only in terms of direct physical acts but also as ‘violence of the word’, such as threats, slurs, epithets and other forms of verbal denigration and hateful invective (Matsuda 1989: 2332). The term ‘hate violence’ is more inclusive and consistent than the term ‘hate crime’ as there is very uneven recognition in the criminal law across nations of prejudice, hate or bigotry as motivating forces for criminal acts when viewed from a global perspective.
victims are more likely than victims of otherwise motivated crime to say that they have started to avoid walking in certain places (Iganski & Lagou 2014). However, much more research is needed of crime survey data internationally, to explore the particular behavioural impacts of hate violence beyond these very limited findings.

A small number of qualitative studies of the impacts of hate crime victimisation offer some explanations for the behavioural impact of hate violence. Some participants in a small qualitative study of hate crime victims in Latvia published by the Latvian Center for Human Rights (Dzelme 2008) described how their spatial mobility, or their movements around town, were constrained as they sought to escape potential further victimisation by avoiding seemingly risky places. Given that many attacks occur in public places — on the street in residential neighbourhoods as well as downtown, in shopping malls, on public transportation, in places of leisure and recreation such as bars, sport arenas, cinema complexes — the confinement can be profoundly limiting.

The spatial impacts of hate crime do not only affect those who are direct victims. Others who share the same identity as the victim and who come to hear about the violence — perhaps family, friends, or other people in the neighbourhood, or even people elsewhere in the region or the country — can suffer the same intimidatory impact and likewise take avoidance measures. Members of targeted communities carry mental maps of ‘no go areas’ in their heads (Rai and Hesse 1992: 177). They will understand that hate crimes are not personal: victims are attacked not for the individuals they are, but for what their visible social group identity represents to the attacker. They realise that they could be next.

In some cases, a whole country can assume the complexion of a ‘no go’ area — as evidence about the recent migration of Jews out of France shows. The recent spate of recent high profile attacks against Jews in Europe have occurred in a climate of an apparently increasing occurrence of rather more frequent and less dramatic instances of anti-Jewish violence. While Jews comprise less than one per cent of the French population, data from the French Interior Ministry suggest that a disproportionate
share of recorded racist attacks in the country have been carried out against Jews in recent years. In 2011, 31 per cent (389 of 1256) of racist acts in France were perpetrated against Jews, rising to 40 per cent (614 of 1539) in 2012, falling to 33 per cent (423 of 1274) in 2013 and then increasing dramatically to 51 per cent (851 of 1662) in 2014 (Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive 2013, 2015).

The frequency of everyday anti-Jewish incidents in France, along with more high profile incidents such as the 2015 attack on the Kosher supermarket in Paris, have been associated with an increasing number of Jews leaving the country in recent years. In 2012—a year when an Islamist extremist killed three children and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse (BBC News 2012)—1,920 French Jews emigrated to Israel. In 2013, the year after the Toulouse attack, that number grew to 3,295. In the following year, 2014, the number of Jews leaving France for Israel more than doubled to 7,230. The Jewish Agency for Israel, the organisation responsible for immigration to the country, forecasted the number to continue to grow after the Charlie Hebdo shootings and the accompanying attack on a kosher supermarket. Based on the figures for the first half of the year, they have predicted 9,000 immigrants from France in 2015 (The Jewish Agency for Israel, 2015). Should that estimate come to fruition, it would signify the emigration of almost 7 per cent of France’s Jewish population to Israel in the space of just four years. At the same time, internal migration of French Jews within the EU is likewise thought to have increased significantly, with a quarter of the estimated 20,000 French Jews living in Britain in 2015 believed to have arrived in the last four years.

Britain, however, is not a safe haven for Jews fleeing violence elsewhere. It has also been the site of apparently increasing anti-Jewish violence—leading some Jews to also consider emigration. Data from a Jewish communal organisation, the Community Security Trust (CST) suggest that during the last decade and a half, antisemitic incidents in the UK have generally been on an upward trend, with particular spikes noted at times of conflict in the Middle East. In 2014, the organisation recorded the highest number of annual hate incidents against Jews in Britain (1,168) since it began recording such
data in the 1980s, with 542 of those incidents reported in July and August alone, the two months of conflict in Gaza (Community Security Trust, 2015).

It is now well-known that each time there is an upsurge in the Israel-Palestine conflict there is a rise in violent and other abusive incidents against Jews around the world (cf. Iganski 2011 & 2013). The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has become a global phenomenon spreading from Gaza and the Occupied Territories of the West Bank into some of Europe’s major cities and other cities around the world. Jews are seemingly targeted as representatives for the State of Israel and attacked as proxies for the Israel Defence Force. It is a crude form of political violence. Given the context of the Gaza war in July and August 2014, the year was one of the worst years on record for antisemitic incidents globally according to the Tel Aviv University Kantor Centre Antisemitism Worldwide 2014 report (Kantor Center 2015).

As concern about increasing antisemitism in the UK has intensified, so a variety of statistics on those considering emigration due to fears about antisemitism have also arisen. An online survey carried out in January 2015 by an ad-hoc communal organisation, the Campaign Against Antisemitism (2015), suggested that 25 per cent of the 2,230 Jews surveyed had in the previous two years considered leaving Britain due to antisemitism, and 45 per cent were concerned that Jews may not have a long-term future in Britain. While controversial and criticised for its non-representative nature (Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2015), the findings of the survey were deemed sufficiently concerning for Communities Secretary Eric Pickles to release a response on behalf of the UK Government stating, ‘Jews are an important part of the British community, and we would be diminished without them’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015). A poll of British Jews carried out shortly afterwards on behalf of the Jewish Chronicle, a UK Jewish newspaper, focusing specifically on feelings in the aftermath of the shootings in Paris, suggested that the events had led 32 per cent to feel much more concerned about their safety, and 41 per cent slightly more concerned (Survation, 2015). More specifically, 11 per cent of the sample of 500 British Jews polled suggested that the events had made them consider leaving Britain. A survey of Jews across Europe carried out by the
European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) two years earlier had suggested that 18 per cent of those surveyed in Britain had considered emigrating in the previous five years because they did not feel safe as a Jew. The survey had also suggested other behavioural impacts of anti-Jewish hate crime in Britain, with 21 per cent of those surveyed stating that they always or frequently avoided wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people identify them as Jewish in public, with a further 37 per cent suggesting that they occasionally did so (FRA, 2013). The adoption of steps to avoid identification as Jews was even more pronounced amongst those surveyed in other EU countries, with 60 per cent of Swedish, 51 per cent of French, 45 per cent of Belgian, 38 per cent of Hungarian, 31 per cent of German and 30 per cent of Italian Jewish respondents suggesting that they did so either all the time or frequently. The survey also found that fear had led many respondents to curtail ‘the extent to which they take part in Jewish life’ (2013: 35), with almost a quarter (23 per cent) of respondents across the eight EU countries, and 42 per cent in Belgium, 41 per cent in Hungary and 35 per cent in France, suggesting that they avoided visiting Jewish events or sites at least occasionally due to concerns about their safety.

Notably, close to one third (29 per cent) of Jews in the eight European countries covered by the FRA survey had considered emigrating because they did not feel safe as a Jew in the country they lived (FRA, 2013). This was most pronounced in Hungary, France and Belgium, where 48 per cent, 46 per cent and 40 per cent respectively of those surveyed had thought about leaving their country in the past five years.

Elsewhere in the world beyond the relative social stability of European nations, hate violence has had even more profound spatial impacts and claimed many lives. The phenomenon has a long history. But even in recent years there have been numerous episodes of large-scale killings around the world in which denigration of the victims’ identities and violent mobilisation around ethnic and religious identity in particular has played a role in the violence. In looking globally beyond Europe, such violence has led to people fleeing en masse from the areas of victimisation. And when hate violence is
perpetrated in regions of conflict, the spatial impacts can occur on a massive scale. In all situations of mass conflict, in wars and civil wars, the impact of violence is not confined to the combatants. Civilian populations too suffer profoundly as human collateral damage. But in conflicts motivated by ethnic and religious hatred, or where such hatred plays a role in inter-communal conflicts, civilian populations are not only collateral damage: they are the deliberate target of violence—indiscriminately targeted because of their identity. And while numerous types of violence can constitute crimes against humanity, hatred has featured prominently in such crimes as testified by the violence in Rwanda, Bosnia and more recently in Iraq and Syria. The targeting of women through sexual violence has also been characteristic of such conflicts, used to intimidate, inflict terror, and ethnically cleanse. Wars are often waged because of disputes involving land, markets, or other resources. Hatred may not be the primary cause of such conflicts, but it is an important aggravating factor that makes the impact even more egregious and keeps warfare from being resolved.

Most recently, the spotlight of the world’s media has been on the consequences of the atrocities committed by so-called ‘Islamic State’ extremists in Iraq and Syria. In the summer of 2015 the flight of refugees into Europe, particularly from Syria and Iraq, has dominated the headlines. Many of the refugees from Syria and Iraq have fled sectarian violence with atrocities propelled by religious zealotry. In an early episode of the large scale impact of hate violence in the region widely reported by the international news media in August 2014, Islamic State extremists allegedly slaughtered hundreds of Iraq’s Yazidi ethnic and religious minority community in and around the village of Kocho in northern Iraq. The Islamic State fighters reportedly demanded that the Yazidis convert to Islam or face death. After refusing to convert, men were shot and women and children abducted. In the same month, in a gruesome hate murder, an Islamic State fighter, apparently speaking with an English accent, beheaded American journalist James Foley in an act which clearly belied extreme hatred of America. By the summer of 2014, fleeing from the advances of Islamic State in northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis from minority communities were seeking refuge near the Turkish border. The international news media widely reported the humanitarian crisis facing tens of thousands of Yazidis trapped in harrowing conditions and exposed to a hostile climate of soaring
temperatures after fleeing to Mount Sinjar. Air drops of humanitarian aid including water and shelter were made by U.S., U.K., and Iraqi air forces.

Less well reported by the international news media has been the sectarian violence between ethnic Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Arakan state, Myanmar, in June and October 2012 which claimed the lives of 211 people according to the Myanmar Government. Human Rights Watch estimated many more (Human Rights Watch 2013). There is a long history of violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Arakan State stretching back over decades. And while both populations have faced past oppression by Myanmar governments, the Rohingya population, which is denied citizenship and considered by many to be an illegal immigrant community, has particularly faced routine persecution and forcible displacement. The outbreak of violence in June 2012 was triggered in late May by the rape and murder of an Arakanese woman in Ramri Township by three Muslim men. Arakanese villagers retaliated by stopping a bus southeast of Ramri and killed 10 Muslim passengers. Communal violence then escalated between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya and other Muslims. Allegedly, state security forces initially stood-by without intervening to halt the violence, and later joined Arakanese mobs in attacking and burning Muslim villages and neighborhoods (Human Rights Watch 2013: 7). In further violence in October 2012, Muslim villages in nine townships across the Arakan State were attacked by Arakanese men armed with swords, machetes, home-made firearms, and Molotov cocktails. Again, security forces allegedly either stood-by or participated in the violence. Further outbreaks of violence against Muslims in 2013, which spread beyond Arakan State to other parts of Myanmar, claimed more lives with numerous homes burnt to the ground.

In the two years following the upsurge of intercommunal violence in Myanmar in 2012 the United Nations Commission for Human Rights estimated that 87,000 people had departed irregularly by sea from the Bangladesh-Myanmar border region heading for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia (UNHCR 2014). Many were transported by smugglers in cramped conditions and subject to verbal and physical abuse. Hundreds reportedly died from the deprivations of the journey: illness, heat, lack of food and water and violence by smugglers. Some drowned while trying to escape in desperation.
Bangladesh closed its borders, returning Rohingya asylum seekers to sea. Thailand also resisted the influx of asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch 2013: 16).

Elsewhere in South East Asia, in September 2013, communal violence between Hindu Jat and Muslim communities in the Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts of Uttar Pradesh in India left at least 65 people dead and many injured. The violence was stoked by hate speech and incitement in print and social media escalating a number of trigger incidents. The violence occurred in the context of regular incidents of inter-communal violence and the sowing of communal hostilities by political parties (Hassan 2014). Numerous homes in villages were burnt to the ground and 50,000 people were reportedly displaced by the violence (Hassan 2014).

Overall, when viewed from a global perspective, it is obvious that the displacement of people by violence and conflict, whether in relatively settled regions or regions of conflict, results in multiple negative impacts for those persons affected. Among them, it is widely recognised that displaced persons are more prone to mental health and psychosocial problems (Meyer 2013). However, the impacts for those fleeing hate violence can be even more egregious, as such violence potentially inflicts significant psychosocial consequences irrespective of any spatial consequences.

**The psychosocial impact of hate violence**

All violence is hurtful in terms of the emotional and psychological impact. But there is a reason why there is a particular concern about hate violence. Hate violence can be more harmful than other forms of violence. Recognition of the particular harms involved has prompted some nation states to enact hate crime laws which impose higher penalties for convicted offenders compared with non-hate motivated crimes.

Most victims of violence suffer some post-victimisation impact. Sometimes there is physical injury. Sometimes, there are behavioural changes as just discussed. More often, there are emotional and psychological consequences. In the case of hate violence, however, there is evidence to show
specifically that the emotional and psychological harms inflicted can potentially be greater (cf. Ehrlich et al., 1994; Herek et al., 1999; Iganski 2008; Iganski & Lagou 2015 & 2016; McDevitt et al., 2001).

While the pattern of difference is not consistent for every single victim, on average it is clear that hate violence hurts more when the emotional and psychological injuries are measured in crime surveys for hate crime victims as a group compared with victims of parallel crimes. Victims in incidents of hate violence are more likely to report having an emotional or a psychological reaction to the incident and with a greater intensity, compared with victims of otherwise motivated violence. In terms of specific symptoms of distress, victims of hate violence are more likely, when compared with victims of other forms of violence, to report suffering higher levels of depression and withdrawal; anxiety and nervousness; loss of confidence; anger; increased sleep difficulties; difficulty concentrating; fear and reduced feelings of safety. In short, victims of hate violence are more likely to suffer post-traumatic stress type symptoms. Interviews with victims of hate violence indicate that the aftermath of the victimisation is characterised by a pervasive feeling of fear (McDevitt, et al 2001). Their fear may be based on threats by the offender or friends of the offender but often it is simply based on the random nature of the crime which, because it involves an attack targeted against the victim’s social identity, bespeaks a risk of similar future victimisation. Differences in reported post-victimisation emotional and psychological impacts between victims of hate violence as a group and victims of other types of violence even hold when controlling for differences in type of crime experienced (Botcherby et al., 2011; Iganski & Lagou 2014).

The impact of hate violence can also extend well beyond the person who is on the immediate receiving-end (although such consequences are methodologically more difficult to scientifically demonstrate compared with the consequences for individual victims). Hate violence sends a terroristic message to everyone who shares the victim’s identity: this ‘could be you’.
Understanding why greater hurts are potentially felt by victims of hate violence and those around them who share their social identity has been informed by a body of qualitative research which suggests that such injuries are due to the perception by victims of their victimisation experience as an attack upon the core of their identity: the very essence of their being (Craig-Henderson and Sloan 2003). The victim carries around with them the reason for their victimisation: their visible appearance and what it represents to others in the dominant culture. Hate violence can be seen as sending a message to the victim, and those who share the victim's identity, that they are devalued, unwelcome, denigrated, despised. As victims of hate violence are attacked because of their social identity, such crimes are not personal. Because of this they also convey the potential for further victimisation and therefore have a terroristic impact. Some victims, and potential victims, where possible, will try to manage their visibility to avoid potential victimisation (Mason 2001). This terroristic impact also accounts in part for the higher level of post-traumatic stress type symptoms reported by victims of hate violence.

The emotional and psychological impact of hate violence has also been illuminated in greater depth than can be achieved by survey research, but with necessarily smaller and generally purposive samples, by a number of qualitative studies which have focused solely on hate crime victims without comparison samples of victims of parallel crimes. The study of hate crime victims in Latvia mentioned earlier in this chapter drew out, in-depth, the profound and long-lasting psychological impact that can be inflicted (Dzelme 2008). Participants in the research reported that the psychological trauma suffered by victims of hate violence surpassed any immediate physical injuries inflicted. Some victims felt that it was the very essence of their being that was attacked. But at the same time, because it is the victim’s group identity that is attacked, hate crimes are not personal. Because of this they convey the potential for further victimisation. Consequently, some victims in the Latvian study said that they felt powerless and a constant sense of insecurity and alertness to the potential for further attacks marked by suspicion of others, and made constant assessments of their immediate surroundings with calculations of safety and danger.
Victims of violence against women have to date not been incorporated into the research exploring the emotional and psychological injuries of violence explicitly framed as ‘hate violence’ or ‘hate crime’. However, there is much available evidence. The European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in its recent EU-wide survey of violence against women (2014) assessed the short-term emotional responses and the long-term psychological consequences of violent victimisation. Overall, the reported impact of sexual violence was seen to be greater than the impact of physical violence, and the long-term psychological impact was greater when the perpetrator was a partner. The survey indicates:

- Women who experience sexual violence are more likely to report feeling fearful, ashamed, embarrassed, and guilty. There seems to be little difference between women victims of partner and non-partner sexual violence in reporting these emotional reactions.

- Women victims of sexual violence by a partner are less likely to report feelings of shock — possibly because the violence is part of a continuum of abuse.

- While the emotional reactions of women victims of physical violence are less pronounced than victims of sexual violence, victims of physical violence by a partner are more likely to report feelings of fear, shame, and embarrassment, than victims of non-partner violence.

- A majority of victims of physical and sexual violence by partners and non-partners report long-term psychological consequences. For both physical and sexual violence, long-term psychological impacts are more likely to be reported by victims where the violence is perpetrated by a partner—possibly as a consequence of repeat victimisation or the ongoing fear of further violence.

- The long-term psychological impact of sexual violence is also more pronounced than the impact of physical violence. Victims of sexual violence by partners and non-partners are more likely to report long-term psychological impacts and more likely to report experiencing a combination of impacts.
Studies of sexual violence used for ‘ethnic cleansing’ in conflict zones indicate the severe long-lasting mental trauma inflicted on women victims. For instance, a study of 65 women victims of systematic mass rapes during the 1992 to 1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted during the war and in the early post-war period (Lončar 2006) illuminates the profound and enduring mental health impacts inflicted. A third of the women were raped every day and by different rapists while held captive and most were physically and sexually tortured in further ways. In a number of cases the rapists were neighbours. While none of the women had a history of psychiatric disorder before the rape, approximately a year after the violence a majority suffered from depression, a majority manifesting ‘social phobia’, and almost a third suffering post-traumatic stress disorder. Seventeen out of 29 women who fell pregnant as a consequence of rape had an induced abortion, with the decision to abort their pregnancies precipitated by suicidal thoughts and impulses. Only one of the 12 women who gave birth kept their baby: the rest were given up for adoption.

**Discussion and conclusion: Hate violence—a global public health problem**

The harm of hate violence begins with the act: it is intrinsic to the doing of the violence (Perry & Olsen 2009). All instances of hate violence, whether they involve mass violence amounting to crimes against humanity—of the type of some of the instances discussed in this chapter—or isolated acts by individuals, whether they occur in conditions of social turmoil or relative calm, involve some form of violation. The immediate harm of hate violence fundamentally lies in this violation. While hate violence in relatively stable societies is rather more routine and everyday compared with the episodic outbreaks of mass hate violence in areas of communal conflict or war, given the scale of the problem of hate violence in more peaceful societies the problem also involves numerous violations even in relatively calm nations. The violation lies in the message sent. Hate crimes are ‘message crimes’. The message inherent to, and sent by, hate violence is that some persons because of their identity have a lesser or little worth, and are not entitled to dignity and respect. While all violence is an assault against a person’s dignity, hate violence is particularly egregious in terms of violation as it is a discriminatory assault on dignity.
Beyond the initial violation, hate violence has the potential to inflict serious post-victimisation impacts as the discussion in this chapter of the spatial and psychosocial impacts of hate violence shows. When examined globally, given the scale of the problem—which we only partially document in this chapter—it is evident that hate violence amounts to a major public health problem.

A public health approach to hate violence lays emphasis on prevention, rather than solely trying to ameliorate the effects of the problem. Prevention involves educative efforts with potential perpetrators and rehabilitative efforts with actual perpetrators. More broadly, preventative work involves addressing the cultural and social conditions in which hate violence is nested. Educational and civil society organisations are best placed to undertake such work. Furthermore, in responding to violence, a public health approach lays emphasis on support for entire communities rather than just individual care. This involves strengthening resources for community resilience. Civil society organisations can be well-placed to help build community resilience against hate violence. A public health approach to any problem requires collective action (Dahlberg & Krug 2002: 3-4). This is certainly the case for hate violence where cooperation between civil society, education, social service, health and criminal justice sectors is needed for addressing what has largely up to now been articulated as a criminal justice problem. A public health approach therefore requires a shift in the balance of resources away from a narrow criminal justice response to the problem towards civil society and community action. Attaining recognition that hate violence is a global public health problem which demands public health intervention is the challenge that lies ahead.

References


