**Emotions in institutional work: a discursive perspective†**

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**Abstract**

This paper focuses on the dynamics and interplay of meaning, emotions, and power in institutional work. Based on an empirical study, we explore and elaborate on the rhetorical strategies of emotion work that institutional actors employ to mobilize emotions for discursive institutional work. In an empirical context where a powerful institutional actor is tasked with creating support and acceptance for a new political and economic institution, we identify three rhetorical strategies of emotion work: eclipsing, diverting and evoking emotions. These strategies are employed to arouse, regulate, and organize emotions that underpin legitimacy judgments and drive resistance among field constituents. We find that actors exercise influence and engage in overt forms of emotion work by *evoking* shame and pride to sanction and reward particular expedient ways of thinking and feeling about the new institutional arrangements. More importantly, however, the study shows that they also engage in strategies of discursive institutional work that seek to exert power—force and influence—in more subtle ways by *eclipsing* and *diverting* the collective fears, anxieties, and moral indignation that drive resistance and breed negative legitimacy evaluations. Overall, the study suggests that emotions play an important role in institutional work associated with creating institutions, not only via “pathos appeals” but also as tools of discursive, cultural-cognitive meaning work and in the exercise of power in the field.

**Keywords:** Institutional work, power, emotions, discourse, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

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Introduction

In the management and organization studies literature, private feelings and public displays of emotions are increasingly recognized as constitutive elements of institutions and institutional processes (Scott 2014). Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen and Smith-Crowe (2014), for example, have elaborated on the ways in which a specific emotion—shame—shapes actors’ commitments to and compliance with institutional prescriptions. Voronov and Vince (2012) have argued that emotional disinvestment from the current institutional order is an essential condition for the triggering of institutional change. Several scholars have also shown how organizations appeal to emotions, employing pathos-based rhetorical strategies in their communication, to persuade their audiences to adopt a particular institutional logic (Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012) and to legitimize institutional change (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).

Despite these important contributions, however, the emotional aspects of institutions and the role of emotions in processes of institutionalization is an under-developed research area. In particular, we still know little about the emotional underpinnings of institutional politics (Lawrence, 2008) and institutional work, i.e. the purposive activity through which institutional actors seek to create, maintain and change institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Yet, as several scholars have argued (Creed et al., 2014; Hudson, Okhuysen, & Creed, 2015; Voronov & Vince, 2012), a focus on the power and politics of emotions in institutional work may open up new perspectives and help better understand the micro-foundations of institutional processes. Omission of emotions from analyses of institutional work privileges the rational nature of human agency and limits our understanding of how individuals and organizations participate in institutional processes (Creed et al., 2014; Hudson et al., 2015; Voronov & Vince, 2012). In this paper, we respond to these research needs by presenting findings from a study that sheds light on the dynamics and interplay of meaning, emotions, and power in institutional politics and discursive institutional work, in an empirical context where a powerful institutional actor is tasked with managing resistance and creating support for a new political and economic institution.

By applying social constructionist theory on emotions in organizations (Callahan, 2002; Fineman, 2006, 2007b; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2007) to the domain of discursive institutional work (Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Schildt, Mantere, & Vaara, 2011), we build a theoretical perspective that shifts attention to emotions as social constructions and judgments of value and an integral part of our system of ethical reasoning (Nussbaum, 2003 [2001]) that underpin institutions. Reason, emotion, and moral evaluation, from this perspective, entwine and interpenetrate in the discursive processes through which institutional actors seek to shape the practices and understandings that constitute institutions. This perspective thus allows us to explore the complex ways in which emotions are implicated in institutional politics and institutional work.

The empirical case study on which we base this article focuses on the early phases of the institutionalization of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) in the 1990s in Finland. At the time, the Finnish government was tasked with generating political support and public acceptance
for the new institutional structures and practices that EMU entailed. We analyze the emotional aspects of the discursive institutional work that the government of Finland undertook to champion EMU in Finland. Based on a discursive analysis of supporting texts that the government produced and circulated at the time, we identify three rhetorical strategies that are designed to ‘work’ on the emotions of their audiences: eclipsing, diverting and evoking emotions. We elaborate on the ways in which these strategies of emotion work are played out in the texts to regulate, organize, and arouse the emotions that underpin negative legitimacy judgments and drive resistance against EMU. We conclude that the strategies operate by wielding discursive power—influence and force—over field constituents in ways that undermine their moral agency and limit their possibilities for participating in the institutional process.

Our analysis suggests that creating support for new institutional arrangements calls for meaning work that is geared at managing the moral emotions and affective ties that underpin legitimacy judgments concerning the new arrangements. This discursive emotion work entails mobilizing—organizing and using—both emotions and meanings as resources strategically: assembling the discursive field in a way that (1) eliminates, invalidates, and incapacitates emotions that drive resistance and (2) makes available, evokes, and promotes emotions that enable actors to gain support for their institutional objectives. In these discursive strategies, explicit appeals to emotions constitute only one form of emotion work. Emotion work exerts its effects not only by overtly evoking or appealing to emotions but also by eclipsing and diverting them.

Our contribution to the literature on institutions and institutional work is threefold. First, we articulate a theoretical perspective on the role of emotions in institutional politics and institutional work that shifts attention to moral emotions and affective ties as discursive constructs and forms of evaluative judgment that are integral to—sometimes even inseparable from—the collective processes of ethical reasoning and legitimation through which institutions are created, maintained, and disrupted. Second, we contribute to a better understanding of the strategies of institutional work that institutional actors deploy to reconstruct the discursive conditions under which constituents make sense of emotions and institutions in an attempt to create support for their institutional projects. Third, our study advances knowledge of the ways in which emotions and emotion work are implicated in the discursive practices through which power/knowledge is exercised in institutional processes. Our study demonstrates, in particular, how emotion work is implicated in the processes of discursive force and influence through which actors wield power to define and delimit the roles and forms of moral and interpretive agency that institutional actors may enact in relation to the institution and the process of institutionalization. In doing so, our study demonstrates how power is exercised in and through discursive institutional work not only by inducing compliance to existing norms but also by shaping the interpretive and moral agency of field constituents.

**Discursive perspective on institutional work**

In this paper, we take a discursive approach to organizational institutionalism and conceptualize institutional work as a discursive practice (Maguire & Hardy, 2013;
By institutions we understand the more or less stable and enduring structures and practices that guide social action “by providing templates for action, cognition, and emotion” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011, p. 53). From this perspective, institutional work may be understood as meaning work and discursive activity: it entails shaping the emergence and evolution of institutions and institutional fields through text, talk and signifying practices. It exerts its effects through the production, circulation, and reception of supporting texts that bring institutional objects into being (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). It is based on what Maguire and Hardy (2013, p. 248) call “discursive work”: efforts aimed at the creation of “shared understandings as to accepted “facts,” causal models, categories and their consequences, as well as to methods for generating and validating knowledge.”

We view institutional work as ‘work’ in the sense that it is intentional: it is purposive activity that is oriented towards achieving potential institutional effects; efforts to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions. While acknowledging that institutional work might fail and also bring about unintended consequences (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), we focus our interest in the purposive activity that is aimed at achieving some institutional effects. Moreover, in theorizing the intentionality of this activity, we also acknowledge that institutional work simultaneously is embedded in, draws on, and transforms existing institutions, and thus adopt a relational perspective on agency (Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).

Taking a discursive perspective on institutions, we view institutional work as something that builds on and is sustained by particular institutionalized discourses and social practices, which both enable and constrain institutional actors in processes of institutionalization. While existing discourses constitute the conditions of possibility, to some extent, for actors to think, feel, and act in the field, they also provide them with a set of discursive, cultural-cognitive resources, e.g. concepts, ideas, “truths”, norms, and frameworks, that they can use to make sense of their institutional environment and to achieve social order (Phillips et al., 2004; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008).

**Emotions as social constructions**

In line with the discursive approach to institutions and institutional work, we view emotions as social and intersubjective constructions (Fineman, 2006, 2007a; Goodwin, 1997; Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001). For the purposes of contributing to a better understanding of the emotional underpinnings of institutional politics and institutional work, we focus particularly on the categories of emotions that are strongly linked to culture, cognition, social order, and moral reflection (Creed et al., 2014; Goodwin et al., 2007; Nussbaum, 2003 [2001]). Affective and moral emotions represent such emotions. They entail longer-term emotional investments and commitments that are grounded in complex, socially constructed moral and cognitive understandings. Affective emotions, such as love, hate, trust, and respect, are positive or negative bonds and commitments that actors have towards people, places, ideas, and things (Goodwin et al., 2007, p. 418). Moral emotions, such as pride, shame, and moral concern, for their part, deal with felt obligations and rights as well as feelings of approval and disapproval based on moral intuitions...
and principles, such as indignation over injustice (Jasper, 2011, p. 143). From a philosophy of emotions perspective, Martha Nussbaum (2003 [2001], p. 1), has argued that emotions, such as fear, may best be viewed as “intelligent responses to perceptions of value” and “part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning”. Defining emotions in this way, we thus distinguish emotions from moods, which have no clear object, and from the many fleeting sensations and sudden psychological reactions that individuals might experience in the course of their everyday lives (Goodwin et al., 2007).

From this perspective, the dualism between reason and emotion is problematized. In the social and discursive processes through which institutions are created, maintained, and disrupted, reason and emotion rather mutually shape each other (see also Creed et al., 2014; Vince, 2006; Voronov & Vince, 2012). Connected to thoughts and evaluations, emotions are important for critical reflection and ethical reasoning—“not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature” (Nussbaum, 2003 [2001], p. 3). Emotions are therefore an intrinsic part of cognitions, beliefs, and moral judgments and, as such, implicated, in many ways, in the processes through which people make sense of and participate in institutional processes (Creed et al., 2014; Voronov & Vince, 2012). As a result, we argue, institutions are partly defined and upheld by emotions: by moral emotions, which reflect normative assessments and legitimacy judgments, and by affective ties, which reflect long-term bonds and commitments or loyalties to collectivities (Goodwin et al., 2007).

Emotions, power and discursive institutional work

As social and intersubjective constructions, emotions are subject to institutional control and can be mobilized for institutional politics and institutional work. Emotional arousal, experience, and display always happen and are interpreted in certain institutional and organizational contexts where particular understandings and expressions of emotions are intelligible and socially sanctioned (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Hochschild, 1979, 1981). Institutional actors also seek to mobilize particular emotions to pursue particular social, political, and economic ends (Creed et al., 2014; Kantola, 2014; Vince, 2001; Voronov & Vince, 2012). Emotions or the management of emotions therefore function as a “micro-technology of power” (Hudson et al., 2015, p. 236), which institutional actors may use as a tool for institutional politics: to leverage institutional control; to engage in resistance; and to gain agency in creating, transforming, and disrupting institutions (Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005; Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001).

To theorize the role of emotions in the politics of discursive institutional work, we build on Arlie Hochschild’s (Hochschild, 1979, 1981, 2003 [1983]) ideas about emotion management or “emotion work”. She discusses several forms of emotion work, of which the notion of “cognitive emotion work” is of particular relevance for this paper. In contrast to bodily and expressive emotion work, it refers to “attempts to recodify a situation” and “to change images, ideas, or thoughts in the service of changing the feelings associated with them” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 562). While her work mainly focuses on the ways in which individual members of the organization manage their emotions in the work place, we draw on the more
recent work on emotions in organizations that extends her work into the domain of collective emotions and other-oriented emotion work, i.e. how emotion management is carried out at collective or group level, guided by certain cultural understandings and norms about appropriate feelings and emotional displays (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Goodwin, 1997; 2007). Ashforth and Humphrey (1995), for example, argue that in organizations, where emotions have often been regarded as the antithesis of rationality, specific mechanisms have evolved for regulating the experience and expression of emotion. Therefore, organizations often seek to neutralize emotion through invoking and institutionalizing norms of rationality; to buffer core operations through compartmentalizing emotionality and rationality, and to normalize unavoidable emotions e.g. through pejorative labels. Finally, where emotional expression is a desired component of role performance, organizations may prescribe norms and expectations for the appropriate emotional stance. (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995, pp. 104-109.)

Hence, as several scholars have argued (Creed et al., 2014; Fineman & Sturdy, 1999; Kantola, 2014; Vince, 2001; Voronov & Vince, 2012), the management of emotions necessarily involves the exercise of power. By power we refer here to “a property of a relationship such that the beliefs or behaviors of an actor are affected by another actor or system” (Lawrence, 2008, p. 174). Emotions, both negative and positive, trigger sensemaking and animate self-regulation (Creed et al., 2014) and can thus be mobilized to fuel, enable, and constrain action. As discursive constructions, emotions also play important roles in the social and communicative processes through which particular versions of reality and cognition are constructed and assembled in text and talk (Edwards, 1999). Emotion work thus exerts its power effects not only by regulating and controlling the display and experience of emotions. Emotion work also performs discursive work: emotions can be mobilized to manage meaning, and meanings can be mobilized to manage emotions in ways that “construct the conditions for how we make sense of the world and act appropriately” (Torfing, 2013).

Consequently, emotions may be mobilized for a dimension of institutional politics that Lawrence (2008, p. 171) discusses as institutional agency, that is “the work of actors to create, transform and disrupt institutions”. Institutional agency is based on the exercise of episodic forms of power, that is “strategies of actors that are intended to transform institutional arrangements through political means” (Lawrence, 2008, p. 172). It “requires actors to mobilize resources, engage in institutional contests over meanings and practices, develop, support or attack forms of discourse and practice – all involving discrete strategic acts of mobilization” by self-interested actors (p. 174). According to Lawrence, two forms of power are fundamental for institutional agency: force and influence. Force involves activities that seek to directly overcome another actor’s intentions or behavior by constructing particular circumstances that restrict the options available to the actor (Lawrence et al., 2005, p. 183). Influence, then, involves one actor persuading another actor to do something that they would not otherwise do through various tactics of moral suasion, negotiation, and rational persuasion for example (Lawrence et al., 2005, p. 185).

Consequently, emotion work—the management of emotions to construct realities and make things happen—may be viewed as a political tool and cultural-cognitive resource for discursive institutional work. Emotion work may be deployed in
in institutional work not only for creating compliance through normative pressure but also for creating shared understandings and templates for action, cognition, and emotion. Normalized and regulated understandings of emotions are integral to the social practices and structures through which people make sense of the world around them and achieve social order. In processes of institutionalization emotion work, therefore, has both normative and constitutive function.

**Methods and materials**

**Empirical case**

To study the emotional underpinnings of institutional politics and institutional work, we analyze an empirical case where a governmental actor is tasked with creating political support and public acceptance for the construction of a new political and economic institution. More specifically, we focus on the *discursive institutional work* of the Finnish government in the public and political discussion and debate on Finland joining the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) in the late 1990s. We understand EMU as an economic and political institution in the sense that it organizes and regulates governmental and marketplace activity in the member states of the EU through centrally managed economic policies and institutional structures. The case allows us to explore the strategies of institutional work that a powerful institutional actor deploys to manage the moral emotions and affective ties that underpin legitimacy judgments and drive resistance among field constituents.

Our analysis focuses on a period of time (1996–1998) when Finland was getting ready to enter the third and final stage of EMU, which involved the creation of a single European currency, the euro, and the establishment of a Central European Bank. At the time, the Finnish government had expressed its strong commitment to pursue membership in EMU, and it was tasked by the EU with championing EMU and the euro through an extensive communication campaign that was to “create the necessary climate of confidence for the changeover to the euro” (European_Commission, 1996b, p. 5).

Finnish participation in the euro area had been on the agenda ever since preparations for EU membership first started in Finland. In the mid ‘90s, however, public opinion in Finland had turned against EMU. According to the 1996 Eurobarometer survey, for example, 53% of the Finnish population was against and 33% in favor of one European currency. EMU had become a topic of heated public debate, generating strong emotional reactions and resistance in public and parliamentary discussions.

In this challenging situation, the government thus faced a major “communications challenge” (European_Commission, 1996b). To deal with resistance and to gain

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‡ The government at the time was the 66th government of Finland, led by Paavo Lipponen as the prime minister. It was a majority government and informally called “The Rainbow Cabinet”, as it contained parties from a broad political spectrum. It was in office from April 13 1995 to April 15 1999.
legitimacy for EMU, they needed to convince the parliament and “win over public opinion” (European_Commission, 1996a, p. 11) by “explaining, justifying, convincing and getting things moving” (European_Commission, 1996b, p. 6). In response to this challenge, the government formed a group, the ‘EMU-project’, to plan and execute a communication campaign for EMU and the euro.

The political decision about entering the third and final stage of EMU was to be taken by the Finnish parliament in April 1998, on the basis of a government proposition. The process also involved the provision of a government report to parliament that focused on the anticipated consequences of EMU membership on the economic and social environment of Finland. The report was based on extensive government research and the work of an expert working group appointed by the Prime Minister. Despite repeated requests by the opposition, the government had decided not to organize an advisory referendum on the proposition.

**Empirical Materials**

Our analysis draws on two sets of historical records (See Table 1). First, to reconstruct the rhetorical situation prevailing in Finland at the time of the debate on EMU, we gathered a wide array of media texts and documentary materials listed and described in Table 1. These materials allow us to produce an account of the intense discussion and debate circulating in public and political domains at a time when the Finnish government sought public support and political acceptance for EMU as a political and economic institution.

The second set of empirical materials, and the primary sources for our analysis of the discursive institutional work carried out by the Finnish government, consists of four key texts that the government produced and circulated during the time leading up to the parliament’s decision on EMU membership. The first two of these texts were produced by the Finnish government and addressed to the Finnish parliament. One is the government report to parliament, referred to above, entitled *Economic and monetary union – Finland’s options and national decision-making* (henceforth the EMU-report). Published in May 1997, the purpose was to provide the parliament with necessary background information for making the decision about joining the EMU. The second, is the *Statement of the Council of State to Parliament on Finnish Participation in the Euro Area* (henceforth the EMU-statement), which was the official document and proposal on the basis of which the parliament was requested to take a stand on Finnish participation in the euro area. It was presented to parliament in February 1998. In addition to these texts, we consulted transcriptions of the comment speeches of the Deputy Prime Minister and party leaders given in the meetings in which the EMU-report and EMU-statement were discussed in parliament.

The third and fourth texts are brochures, issued by governmental offices to inform citizens of the prospective participation in the third stage of EMU and the associated changeover to the euro. Brochure 1, *Euro* (published in 1996), and Brochure 2, *EMU?* (published in 1997) were distributed to homes, banks and grocery stores, where they were readily available to the public. In comparison to policy documents, the public brochures display a more popular, informal style,
The texts that we analyze here as instances of discursive institutional work represent what Bitzer (1981, p. 231) calls political rhetoric, in the sense that they deal with a decision that has significant consequences for the citizens of a nation state. The texts have many qualities that, according to Phillips et al. (2004), increase their possibilities to ‘leave traces’ through influencing broader discourses and the process of institutionalization. First, they are produced in an extraordinary situation that requires sensemaking and legitimation. Second, they are authored by
elite actors with formal authority and high discursive legitimacy (see also Brown et al., 2012). Third, they take the form of recognizable genres in their respective contexts, increasing the likelihood that they will be taken up and used by actors in the way intended by authors (Bitzer, 1981). Finally, the texts may be considered relatively consistent, especially in their view on the economy, the market, and the benefits of EMU membership, which increases the cognitive costs—thought and effort—of imagining alternatives. (Phillips et al., 2004, pp. 639–645.)

**Analysis**

In analyzing our empirical case, we apply rhetorical analysis as a methodological lens that falls in the domain of organizational discourse (Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). It provides an analytical perspective and a method of inquiry (Bitzer, 1981) that allows us to study the strategic and instrumental dimensions of discursive practices (Brown et al., 2012; Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Green Jr & Li, 2011) through which actors manage meanings and exercise power. We define rhetoric as a type of discourse, and rhetorical practices as discursive practices that are strategic in the sense that they are employed to create understandings, endorsing particular views and perspectives while silencing others (Bitzer, 1981; Conrad & Malphurs, 2008; Gill & Whedbee, 1997). Rhetorical texts are pragmatic and perform specific tasks in particular contexts: they respond to societal issues and problems and seek to act upon or change the world (Gill & Whedbee, 1997). As such, rhetoric is thus inherently political and may be deployed as a political tool for institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

Drawing on this methodological perspective, we analyzed our data in four steps.

**Step 1: Mapping the rhetorical situation.** Drawing on Gill and Whedbee (1997) we started with analyzing the rhetorical situation from the media texts and documentary materials listed and described in Table 1. Rhetorical strategies are always somehow oriented towards achieving specific ends with particular audiences in particular contexts, and thus the situation creates certain expectations to which the rhetorical texts need to respond. In analyzing the rhetorical situation, we focused particularly on three aspects: the political context (as discussed above in the case description), the themes and tones of public discussion, and the exigence, i.e. the problem or issue that the texts set out to address (Bitzer, 1981; Vatz, 1973). Through this analysis, we identified a set of prevalent arguments and concerns in the public debate and political discussion on EMU that invoked, in particular, moral emotions and affective ties.

**Step 2: Identifying first-order themes in the government texts.** The first round of our analysis of government texts was data-driven but informed by our understanding of the emotional aspects of the rhetorical context. We read and re-read the texts, identifying and coding for recurring concepts of interest. The analysis was guided by the broad question of whether particular features of the text could be understood as responding to the moral emotions and affective ties identified in the rhetorical context. In analyzing the texts, we looked especially for verbs and structures expressing deontic modality (obligation, ability, necessity); evaluative verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and participles (Fairclough, 2003); reference to authorities such as law, contracts, experts (Van Leeuwen, 2007); and
interpersonal metadiscourse indicating attitude and emphasis (Hyland, 2005). In this way, we were able to identify a wide range of textual features including, as well as beyond, overtly emotional rhetoric such as metaphors or affective vocabulary. The resulting categories, such as ‘theorizing EMU as an economic problem’, ‘defining the role of citizens as consumers’, and ‘emphasizing the obligating nature of existing contracts and agreements’ are descriptive reformulations of the recurring features of the texts that we interpreted as elements of rhetorical strategies deployed to manage emotions in seeking to deal with resistance and gain acceptance for institutional change.

Step 3: Identifying categories of rhetorical tactics. Next, we proceeded to theorize the functions that the identified textual features performed in relation to the rhetorical situation. We engaged in an iterative process that considered in tandem these first-order themes alongside existing theoretical resources§. In this ‘critical dialogue’ (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) between our first-order themes and existing theory, we drew on literatures on emotion regulation (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995), emotion, power and institutions (Creed et al., 2014; Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2005; Lawrence et al., 2001) and legitimation strategies (Suchman, 1995). In this process, we identified relationships among these themes and grouped these into categories that identified and theorized rhetorical tactics deployed in the texts. This was a recursive process, involving repeated examination of relationships and categories, along with existing theory, resulting in the emergence of six second-order categories represented in Figure 1. These theoretical categories represent rhetorical tactics aimed at managing moral emotions and affective ties in order to gain support and acceptance for the government’s institutional project.

Step 4: Identifying strategies of emotion work. Next we grouped these categories of rhetorical tactics into aggregate dimensions (Gioia & Thomas, 1996) identifying three rhetorical strategies of emotion work. In developing these strategies, we drew on our reading of the literature on emotion, power and institutions, highlighting the interplay of meaning, emotions, and power in the discursive institutional work that the government undertook to create support and acceptance for EMU.

Figure 1 presents our data structure, showing the subsequent levels of abstraction, from first-order themes to aggregate categories. In addition to providing quotes from our data in the body of the paper, we also offer ‘proof quotes’ (Pratt, 2009) as additional evidence for our interpretations in Appendix. Where illustrative quotes are not available, e.g. when the rhetorical tactics that we discuss are based on exclusion or implicitness, we provide verbal descriptions of them.

The next sections present the findings of the analysis. We start by describing the rhetorical situation, and proceed to discuss the three strategies of emotion work, focusing on their power effects and the rhetorical tactics through which they operate.

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§ As Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton (2013) note, at this stage the process may be considered more abductive than inductive.
First order themes

- Theorizing EMU as an economic problem (economization)
- Defining the role of citizens as consumers (de-politicization)

- Representing the issue in terms of balancing economic risks, costs, benefits (shifting attention to pragmatic legitimacy)
- Defining the government as the administrator (shifting attention to procedural legitimacy)

- Representing threats to social welfare, employment, and national independence as inevitable consequences of globalization and global capitalism
- Constructing EMU as a way to control globalization

- Representing the consequences of EMU in terms of the concrete, day-to-day implications of the changeover to the euro
- Emphasizing that many things may not change

- Emphasizing the obligating nature of existing contracts and agreements (e.g. Maastricht Treaty)
- Referring to sanctions and negative implications, e.g. losing credibility, if these obligations are not met

- Representing countries that meet the convergence criteria as top performers
- Representing EMU membership as a possibility to be in the core and in-group of European policy-making and lead the way in the future development of Eurozone
- Connecting pride in national distinctiveness with a collective European identity

Rhetorical tactics

- Precluding emotion-based legitimacy judgments by re-framing the issue
- Promoting neutralized legitimacy judgments by invoking specific norms of rationality

- Normalizing fears by theorizing threats as inevitable and unrelated to the issue
- Limiting the scope of moral concern by simplifying the issue

- Creating a sense of duty by mobilizing shame for unmet obligations
- Evoking pride and a sense of belonging to facilitate positive legitimacy judgments

Strategies of emotion work

- Eclipsing emotions to stifle resistance
- Diverting disruptive emotions to fend off resistance
- Evoking useful emotions to enroll actors
Rhetorical situation

At the time of our study, the legitimacy of EMU as a political and economic project was widely problematized by ordinary citizens and members of the parliament alike. Our analysis suggests that in public discussion and debate, it was particularly the moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) of EMU as an institutional project that was being questioned. Many critics viewed EMU as a neoliberal project that constituted a serious threat to the Finnish welfare state, its democratic ideals and principles of distributive justice in particular. Also important were fears concerning the negative implications of EMU membership for employment and labor rights, and negative judgements about the procedural legitimacy of the government’s refusal to hold a referendum on the issue.

In the letters to the editor that we analyzed, the moral legitimacy of EMU is problematized in a number of ways. Critics express fears and concerns that the consequences of EMU might be disastrous for the Finnish welfare state, as the following quote illustrates:

[Government’s commitment to] the ERM parity [European Exchange Rate Mechanism] promises nothing good, for the labor-union, unemployed, families with small children, senior citizens, and public sector employees at least. When the value of [the Finnish] Mark and the EMU [fiscal] discipline are fixed (are inelastic), the pressure to cut down on wages, social security, and labor costs increases. (LE6)

Indignation is another moral emotion commonly used to amplify and justify critique in the material that we analyzed. Expressing their indignation at EMU as an institutional project that “benefits only the rich”, many commentators represent EMU as a threat to the current welfare-based principles of distributive justice, as the following quote shows:

Emu must be fended off! The EU is not an initiative of peace but an initiative of the elite and Emu is the paradise of the rich. And “the paradise of the rich is made out of the hell of the poor,” said Victor Hugo already in his time. (LE86)

Evaluations of consequences also include the suspicion that EMU presents a threat to the strongly-held values of political independence and representative democracy:

What has been eating at many of us, ever since the EU membership took effect, is whether or not citizens and the governmental bodies they have elected will have any power over economic decisions. (LE3)

Finally, in evaluating the moral legitimacy of EMU, many critics mobilize ‘affective ties’, i.e. positive bonds and commitments (Goodwin et al., 2007, p. 418) of citizens to the national currency and to the community of Finland as a politically and economically independent nation state. The following extract from a speech by a member of parliament illustrates this rhetoric:

The Finnish Mark is imbued with strong feelings. A currency of our own is part of our history as an independent state […] This is something that the technically-oriented government report fails to deal with […] that the human being is not a calculator, that people also consider other values and feelings than economic rationality. (MP-Left Alliance)
Our analysis of the rhetorical situation thus suggests that in the public discussion on EMU at the time, moral emotions and affective ties informed and underpinned particular interpretations that rendered EMU unattractive and fueled resistance. The challenge for the Finnish government was to win public and parliamentary support for EMU in an emotionally charged rhetorical context, where both the consequential and procedural legitimacy of the project were widely problematized. From the point of view of the government, public support or at least passive acceptance (Suchman, 1995) was important for ensuring the smooth progress of the EMU institutional project and to minimize the risk of disturbances and delays.

**Rhetorical strategies of emotion work**

Based on our analysis we identify three rhetorical strategies of emotion work through which the texts that the Finnish government produced and circulated operate to champion the new institutional structures and practices that EMU entails: eclipsing, diverting, and evoking emotions. These strategies are geared at leveraging discursive power—force and influence—to manage the moral emotions and affective ties that underpin legitimacy judgments about EMU. In the texts that we analyzed, the strategies are deployed to mobilize support and demobilize opposition not only by arousing and regulating actors’ emotions but also by organizing the discursive space within which actors make sense of these emotions and form legitimacy judgments about EMU. By doing so, the rhetorical strategies that we identify invite their audiences to reconstruct understandings of EMU in particular ways, sanctioning and reinforcing particular views and silencing particular emotion-based legitimacy judgments about EMU.

**Eclipsing emotions to stifle resistance**

Eclipsing emotions is a rhetorical strategy of emotion work that seeks to stifle resistance through incapacitating emotion-based ethical reasoning. It is based on the use of discursive force (Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2005) to ‘organize out’ (Mumby & Stohl, 1991) and neutralize (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995) the emotions that drive critique and resistance and underpin negative legitimacy evaluations. In our case, eclipsing targets particularly the public fears and indignation about the anticipated negative social consequences of Finland joining EMU, as well as the affective ties of citizens to the national currency and to the community of Finland as a politically and economically independent nation state. Eclipsing exerts its effects by shaping the discursive conditions under which actors make sense of their legitimacy concerns, in ways that render certain (moral) legitimacy concerns ‘non-issues’. It operates through two interlinked rhetorical tactics: (1) precluding emotion-based legitimacy judgments by reframing the issue, and (2) promoting neutralized legitimacy judgments by invoking specific norms of rationality.

**Precluding emotion-based legitimacy judgments** refers to a rhetorical tactic that seeks to incapacitate emotion-based ethical reasoning that gives rise to negative legitimacy evaluations by framing the legitimacy issue in a particular way. In the texts that we analyzed, this tactic is deployed by theorizing and by defining (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006): theorizing EMU as an economic problem and
defining citizens as consumers who play a minor role in the political decision-making about EMU. All of the texts invite their audiences to reconstruct EMU primarily as an economic institution and the question of Finland’s potential membership in EMU as an economic problem that needs to be solved by economists. There is a striking absence of discussion on the socio-political and cultural aspects of economic integration, given the centrality of these concerns in the public domain and their salience in the report of the expert working group.

In both the reports and the brochures, the moral legitimacy of joining the EMU is justified through evoking economic goals and benefits. In the widely distributed brochures targeted at citizens, for example, Finnish membership in the monetary union is justified by claiming that an integrated economic policy and a single currency are necessary prerequisites for achieving the full benefits of European integration. The reasoning given in the brochures refer to financial risks and transaction costs associated with exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, foreign trade and the international competitiveness of the Finnish economy and business enterprises. The following excerpt from the Euro brochure illustrates this tactic:

**QUESTION:** Why should Finland start using the euro?

**ANSWER:** The common [European] currency is a prerequisite for the efficient realization of the common market. (...) It has been assessed that with the help of the single currency it will be easier to fight inflation and to keep interest rates low. In the long term, the euro will probably also improve the competitiveness of the business sector and lower consumer prices. (Brochure Euro)

The appropriate role of citizens in the debate on EMU is defined as the consumer. In the brochures, designed to “win over public opinion”, the implications of EMU are discussed mainly in terms of the practicalities of personal finance, consumption, and household management, as the following extract illustrates:

*You will receive your wage, pension or child benefits in euro. And naturally you will also pay your taxes in euro. Adoption of the euro will not affect the terms of existing contracts such as mortgages, rental agreements and consumption credits.* (Brochure Euro)

By reconstructing citizens as consumers in this way, the tactic operates to shift attention from the complex and emotionalized political process of EMU membership to its direct and immediate effects for individuals as market actors. In doing so, the texts rhetorically exclude and organize out a range of relevant public concerns and controversial issues, thus effectively depriving citizens of their political agency in the debate and decision-making on EMU.

**Promoting neutralized legitimacy judgments** is another rhetorical tactic that seeks to incapacitate emotion-based ethical reasoning that gives rise to negative legitimacy judgments. It works by invoking specific norms of rationality in an attempt to make available and promote alternative, neutralized or non-emotional, legitimacy judgments. In the texts that we analyzed, this tactic complements the economization of EMU and is deployed by theorizing questions of legitimacy in terms of pragmatic and procedural legitimacy.

First, by economizing the EMU debate, the texts reconstruct the legitimacy of EMU as a question that needs to be evaluated in terms of its pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The uncontrollable public fears and grievances about the decline of the Nordic welfare state are transformed into calculable and rational
questions about the efficient functioning of markets. EMU is presented as a dynamic system of variables, such as interest rates, prices, and employment rates, amenable to cost-benefit calculations. By foregrounding these economic dynamics over social actors and institutions in this way, the texts make available and sanction meanings and logics that construct the legitimacy of EMU as something that rests on the self-interested economic calculations of their audiences.

Second, when discussing the political aspects of EMU, the texts resort to invoking norms of procedural legitimacy and administrative rationality (Suchman, 1995). The government’s reports to the parliament, for example, meticulously describe the administrative and juridical details of the process, implying that the procedural questions constitute the core essence of the political debate on EMU. This rhetorical tactic, which is illustrated in the following quote, manages its audience’s perceptions of legitimacy by shifting attention from the emotionally sensitive questions of moral legitimacy to more “technical” questions about the procedural legitimacy of the EMU decision-making process.

On several occasions, the Government has announced that the decision on adopting the single currency will be taken by the Parliament. In order for the Parliament to express its political opinion, the Government considers that the issue is best submitted to the Parliament by the so-called ‘statement procedure’ under section 36 in the Parliament Act. The Parliament would decide upon the participation in the Euro Area on the basis of such a statement by the beginning of 1998. (EMU-report)

By means of describing at length the accomplished and forthcoming steps and procedures in implementing EMU, the reports also communicate that they are to be read and understood as institutional documents that serve rational decision-making, in conformity with existing laws, other binding agreements and expert knowledge about EMU. By doing so, the texts define the role of the Finnish government in the process as an administrator or implementer whose actions—and, by extension, the whole project—are to be assessed by procedural criteria such as precision, diligence, and efficiency in progressing the project.

Through these tactics, eclipsing thus treats citizens as objects and allows the governmental actor to exercise discursive force: to impose particular issue interpretations by discursively constructing EMU as a issue where emotions, emotion-based reasoning, and the associated questions of moral legitimacy have no place. In doing so, eclipsing narrows down the potential for debate and reflection, thus inhibiting the discussion of alternative courses of action. In other words, eclipsing serves as a strategy for controlling the political agenda and to limit the scope of the political debate to questions and concerns that are relatively innocuous.

**Diverting disruptive emotions to fend off resistance**

Diverting disruptive emotions is a rhetorical strategy of emotion work that seeks to fend off resistance by invalidating salient emotion-based moral concerns. It is based on using a combination of discursive force and influence (Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2005; Lawrence et al., 2001) to counter and normalize (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995) particular disruptive moral emotions that drive resistance and underpin negative legitimacy judgments in the public discussion. In our case, diverting exerts its effects by explicitly addressing and then rebutting the
emotionalized legitimacy concerns by theorizing causal relationships related to EMU in a way that disconnects the associated emotions from the legitimacy issue at hand. The strategy is thus geared at setting the parameters of what constitutes a relevant and valid emotion-based moral argument for legitimacy assessment. It operates through two rhetorical tactics: (1) normalizing fears by theorizing threats as inevitable and unrelated to the issue, and (2) limiting the scope of moral concern by simplifying the issue.

**Normalizing fears** as a rhetorical tactic operates by refuting the emotion-based moral concerns that give rise to negative legitimacy judgments by attributing them to broader, inescapable developments in the world. In our case, these developments are referred to as “changes [that] are taking place globally, regardless of the project” (EMU-report). This is achieved in the texts by linking the presumed threats and fears with the broader process of economic globalization, which is represented through cosmological rhetoric “as an irrefutable fact that will unfold at its own internal pace” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, p. 46). The underlying message, illustrated by the following extracts, is that economic and market conditions are changing, and new challenges and threats exist, whether or not Finland joins EMU.

In the near future, economic activity in the member states of the European Union will be subject to changes. The effects of many of these changes will be similar in the entire EU area and even in the global economy. (EMU-report)

Upon joining the euro zone, decisions concerning monetary policy would be moved to the European level. On the other hand, due to the quick movement of capital flows, the independence of monetary policy would be marginal also outside the euro zone. (EMU-brochure)

Through systematically dissociating the perceived threats and challenges from the EMU project and associating them with broader and ‘inevitable’ changes in the global market, the texts simultaneously normalize (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995) public fears and concerns, and render them irrelevant to the decision at hand. What is more, in refuting these emotion-based legitimacy concerns, the texts also construct EMU as a solution to these problems of globalization. The EMU-report, for example, uses a problem-solution structure through depicting Europe as a declining economic power, which “appeared to be doomed to a spiral characterized by decelerating growth, job losses and intensifying stability problems” (EMU-report, chapter 2.2) and offering EMU as the answer to these challenges.

**Limiting the scope of moral concern** refers to a rhetorical tactic that operates by limiting the appropriate scope and objects of public concern. In this tactic, which is connected to defining citizens as consumers, the implications of EMU are particularized through associating collective fears with the very practical and day-to-day implications of the EMU project. By focusing attention to everyday, practical challenges, the texts appear to respond to perceived, existing public concerns and fears, but replace the objects of these emotions in a way that renders them trivial, especially in comparison to their articulations in the public discussion. The brochures, in particular, discuss the challenges and threats in a way that focuses on the immediate, direct, and practical challenges and costs of the currency change, as the following quotes illustrate:
It is a lot of work to change all coin-operated machines to operate with euros. This cannot be accomplished during one night. (Brochure Euro)

However, if you have forgotten marks in your drawer or safe deposit box for a longer time, the central bank will change them into euros also after 1.7.2002 (Brochure Euro)

As an extension of this tactic, the brochures actually emphasize that many things will not change at all upon the changeover to the euro, or that changes will have little effect on the everyday life of the ‘private citizen’. For example, in the EMU brochure, a section entitled ‘What changes for a citizen?’ begins with a temporal qualifier and negation: “In the beginning, there would not be many changes for private citizens” (boldface in original). The Euro brochure, in turn, stresses that “[t]he adoption of the euro will not affect the purchasing power, income or savings of citizens in any way.” The reassuring, almost sedative mitigation of change again seemingly acknowledges perceived public concerns, while effectively associating them with only the most immediate effects of the currency change. By doing so, this rhetorical tactic constructs the proper area and scope of public concern in a particular and very limited way, positing that it is not necessary or desirable for citizens to worry about the broader political implications of EMU membership.

Through these tactics, this rhetorical strategy thus functions to divert the disruptive emotions of citizens in ways that render the associated legitimacy concerns invalid or irrelevant. The strategy is based on exercising both discursive force and influence to direct the public to reinterpret their moral emotions concerning EMU in particular ways. In doing so, the strategy suppresses latent conflicts associated with EMU by denying the moral competence of the citizens and discrediting the legitimacy concerns that the disruptive emotions entail. From the perspective of institutional work, the strategy is thus geared at shaping and undermining the interpretive and moral agency of participants in a way that allows the government to fend off existing and potential resistance to EMU.

**Evoking useful emotions to enroll actors**

Evoking useful emotions is a rhetorical strategy of emotion work that seeks to enroll constituents by mobilizing emotions for ethical reasoning. It is based on using influence (Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2005; Lawrence et al., 2001) to prescribe (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995) particular moral emotions and affective ties as valid foundations of legitimacy judgments in ways that render the planned institutional arrangement more acceptable or attractive than its alternatives. In our case, it is geared at moral suasion through sanctioning and rewarding particular ways of thinking and feeling about joining the EMU and operates through two rhetorical tactics: (1) creating a sense of duty by mobilizing shame for unmet obligations; and (2) evoking pride and a sense of belonging to facilitate positive legitimacy judgments.

**Creating a sense of duty** refers to a rhetorical tactic that arouses the anticipation and avoidance of felt shame and embarrassment, which have strong normative force in creating a sense of duty and providing “the impetus for compliance” (Creed, et al. 2014, p. 283). In the texts that we analyzed, the mobilization of shame invokes the understanding that a promise or commitment has been made and must be kept. The reports, in particular, refer recurrently to, and emphasize
the obligating nature of existing contracts and treaties, in particular the Maastricht Treaty, in a way that conceptualizes the EMU decision as a commitment already made. They thus represent the choice that Finland faces as one between honor and shame, or between honorable and dishonorable action. The following quote illustrates this tactic:

Renouncing the ERM system (...) would easily be interpreted as a wish to disengage from the convergence process, which is a precondition for joining the euro zone. (...) In terms of integration policy, and also legally, reverting to floating [the mark] would mean a clear retreat from assumed obligations. (EMU-report)

The texts communicate, explicitly and repeatedly, that Finland has agreed to participate in the third stage of EMU and has no special rights that would allow it to opt out at this stage. The government uses a mixture of categorical statements and obligating vocabulary like ‘requires’, ‘provides’, ‘regulations’, ‘stipulations’, ‘fully in force’, to communicate the significance of regulative rules that bind Finland. In the EMU-report, for example, the very first paragraph (the first extract) sets the obligating tone of prior commitments, which stays consistent throughout the report:

In accordance with the European Council resolution, the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be launched on January 1, 1999. On this date, Member States which fulfil the convergence criteria will adopt the single currency, the Euro, will conduct monetary policy jointly through the European System of Central Banks, and will adopt strengthened arrangements for economic and fiscal policy co-ordination. (EMU-report)

Regulations concerning the Economic and Monetary Union are included in the EC Treaty, which was modified by the February 1992 Maastricht contract. The said regulations provide that the countries that fulfil the convergence criteria will proceed to the use of common currency upon the launch of the third stage of the Economy and Monetary Union. Only Great Britain and Denmark have agreed upon special arrangements, which give them the right to remain outside of the common currency region. (EMU-report)

The texts work to establish shared rules of what constitutes honorable and, by contrast, shameful behavior, thereby mobilizing shame as a form of power that drives compliance (Billig, 2001; Creed et al., 2014). The possibility of shame is also evoked in the texts through threatening with sanctions and negative implications, such as losing credibility, should Finland deviate from the right path by choosing to postpone or abstain from joining the EMU. In an editorial, for example, a member of parliament representing the government argued that Finland’s “reputation as a trustworthy contract party would be gone” in the EU if the country decided to opt out from the third stage of EMU (ED 18). Another potential negative implication, should Finland abstain, is the threat of humiliation from relegation to the role of bystander in Europe, as illustrated in the following quote:

[Not participating in the EMU] would mean ... taking the role of bystander in the development of the Economic and Monetary Union and implementation of common monetary policy. (EMU-report)

Overall, the tactic operates through suggesting that shame will ensue if actors do not fulfill their expected roles in the process of establishing EMU. It thus works
through what Creed and colleagues (2014, p. 284) have theorized as shaming attempts: “situated, purposive uses of episodic power to induce compliance with institutionalized community prescriptions”. In doing so, it prescribes submission and (reluctant) acceptance of EMU.

**Evoking pride and a sense of belonging** refers to a rhetorical tactic that operates by evoking pride and feelings of belonging as valid moral foundations of positive legitimacy judgments of the institutional project. In the texts that we analyzed, this tactic operates by generating a sense of pride in Finland’s achievement in meeting the requirements of EMU membership and by encouraging citizens to see themselves as proud Finns with a common bond to, and sense of belonging with, other EMU nation citizens.

Using descriptions like ‘top performers’, this tactic represents the EMU convergence process as a competition where eligibility and membership are the desired prizes. By representing Finland as a successful competitor in this race, in comparison to less well performing countries, the strategy taps into emotions of national pride. Moreover, Finland’s role in the future union is described as influential and respected—an equal to the larger EU countries—and in contrast to the threat of embarrassment from being in the role of ‘bystander’:

> Most member countries still have to struggle to fulfil the convergence criteria, especially those related to public finances. For Finland, fulfilling the convergence criteria does not seem to present a problem. (EMU-report)

> For Finland, belonging to the monetary union would also entail participation in the decision-making concerning common monetary policy. In the governing council of ECB, the central banks of the member states would be represented by one vote each, which places small member states, in this sense, in an equal position with the large. (The EMU-report)

A sense of pride is also evoked in the texts by connecting the distinctiveness of Finnish national identity with a sense of bond and belonging to something greater: the EMU zone. This tactic shapes affective ties through mobilizing pride in belonging to this select group of nations and in constructing Finnish citizens as European cosmopolitans, while at the same time preserving a sense of Finnish identity. In the brochures, for example, a vision of an easy, relaxed and mobile life in the future euro zone is created:

> When you travel or work in the euro countries, you no longer have to exchange currency but instead you pay easily with the euro. You can thus buy a baguette in Paris and a kalakukko [Finnish fish pastry] at the Kuopio marketplace with the same currency. (Brochure Euro)

Illustrations in the brochures utilize well-known symbols of different European nationalities, such as a beret, a French baguette, and the tower of Pisa, in ways that evoke the importance of national identity while suggesting the possibility of a collective and positive European identity in the future:

> A Finnish man (with a fur hat) buying kalakukko (fish pastry) and a Frenchman (with a beret) buying baguette, depicted against a stylized globe; illustrating both national difference and a (future) European identity (Illustration, Brochure Euro)
Through these rhetorical tactics, this strategy of emotion work, thus, operates to wield influence to enroll citizens by mobilizing both negative and positive emotions. The tactics of evoking pride and mobilizing shame have strong normative force because they rely on constituents’ valued sense of social bonds and the drive to protect one’s standing in a community (Creed et al. 2014). These tactics are also implicated in constructing identities and desires by invoking values that a good Finnish citizen should hold dear and aspire to maintain. This form of emotion work is thus aimed not only at inducing compliance but, potentially, to garner active support for membership in the EMU.

**Discussion**

In this paper, we set out to contribute to a better understanding of the emotional underpinnings of institutional politics and institutional work. In doing so, we respond to calls for greater attention to the emotional aspects of institutionalization (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Voronov & Vince, 2012). We first built a theoretical perspective on emotions as discursive constructs and normative understandings that constitute institutions. Then, we examined empirically how institutional actors work on and through such emotions in their discursive institutional work, in a context where a governmental actor was seeking to create political support and public acceptance for a new political and economic institution.

Overall, our study contributes to the literature on institutional work in three main ways. First, we articulate a theoretical perspective on the emotional intent and dynamics of discursive institutional work. In building the perspective, we continue and extend the nascent stream of literature on emotions in institutional work that takes seriously the idea that emotions are an “intrinsic part of cognitions, beliefs, and moral judgments” (Voronov & Vince, 2012, p. 75). The theoretical perspective we build complements the existing literature by shifting attention to moral emotions and affective ties as discursive constructs and forms of evaluative judgment that are integral to—sometimes even inseparable from—the collective processes of ethical reasoning and legitimation through which institutions are created, maintained and disrupted. From this perspective, emotions are not viewed as drives or experiences that distort or lubricate the processes of negotiation and justification that underlie institutional processes. Emotions are rather viewed as complex, embodied but socially constructed structures of knowledge, feeling, and ethical reasoning that guide and constrain the social action and interaction that underpins institutions. This suggests that emotions play an important role in institutional work not only by providing “pathos-based justifications” that appeal to people’s sense of greed or fear (Green, 2004), for example, but also by informing practices of theorizing (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012; Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002) and shaping the normative associations between institutions and their moral and cultural foundations (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). In these practices, we argue, moral emotions and affective ties serve as political tools and cultural-cognitive resources for institutional work.

Second, we contribute to a better understanding of the strategies of institutional work that institutional actors may deploy to reconstruct the discursive conditions
under which constituents make sense of emotions and institutions in an attempt to create support for their institutional projects. Specifically, we identify and empirically elaborate on three rhetorical strategies of emotion work—eclipsing, diverting and evoking emotions—through which institutional actors may seek to wield power in their attempts to manage resistance and to create support for their institutional projects. Our analysis suggests that creating support for new institutional arrangements calls for meaning work that is geared at managing the moral emotions and affective ties that underpin legitimacy judgments concerning the new arrangements. This discursive emotion work entails strategically mobilizing both emotions and meanings as resources: assembling the discursive field in a way that (1) eliminates, invalidates, and incapacitates emotions that drive resistance and (2) makes available, evokes, and promotes emotions that enable the actors to gain support for their institutional objectives.

We argue that in a politically contested context this kind of emotion work may be viewed as an attempt by institutional actors to control the “discursive spaces” (Hajer, 1995) that open up at times of institutional change or disruption. Institutional fields are made up of multiple discursive spaces, which are generated as actors produce, distribute, and consume texts, potentially creating centers of debate (Hoffman, 1999) in which competing groups seek to influence issue interpretation. In this way, discursive spaces can offer “opportunities for alternative stories to be told” (Hardy & Maguire, 2010, p. 1382) through which institutional change can be influenced. In the politics of institutional work, the control of discursive spaces is therefore important, especially for actors who seek to gain acceptance for particular issue interpretations and institutional projects.

Our analysis thus extends work on discursive spaces by contributing to a better understanding of the ways in which emotions may be mobilized and used as resources for the exercise of episodic power in and over particular discursive spaces. In particular, we advance knowledge of the nature of the ‘rules and understandings’ that govern discursive spaces in contested institutional contexts. Hardy & Maguire’s (2010) work highlights the rules and understandings that govern who may author and distribute texts, what kinds of texts are appropriate, and who may access, alter or act on texts in particular discursive spaces. Our research extends this work by shedding light on the ways in which institutional work acts on the emotions and emotion rules that may enable or constrain forms of participation in discursive spaces. Our analysis suggests that in arousing, regulating, and organizing emotions, emotion work can be implicated in triggering or impeding the kind of sensemaking (Creed et al., 2014) or organizing or inhibiting the kind of public reflection (Vince, 2006) that might generate alternative courses of action. Hence, by highlighting the role of emotions and emotion work in shaping the conditions that enable or constrain the agency of organizational and institutional actors our analysis also extends ideas about the institutional disciplining of spaces and boundaries (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) and the power relations that influence forms of participation in organizational and institutional spaces (Fahy, Easterby-Smith, & Lervik, 2014).

Third, our study advances understanding of the ways in which emotions and emotion work are implicated in the discursive practices through which power/knowledge is exercised in institutional processes. While it is increasingly acknowledged that power is the driving force or catalyst of institutional processes,
we still know relatively little about how it is exercised in institutional work (Hudson et al., 2015; Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 2013). Our study contributes to the literature on power and institutions by offering an empirically grounded account of the ways in which emotion work is implicated in the processes of discursive force and influence through which actors wield power to define and delimit the roles and forms of agency that institutional actors may enact in relation to institutional creation, maintenance, and disruption.

In specific, our analysis shows how power is exercised in and through discursive institutional work not only by inducing compliance to existing norms but also by shaping the interpretive and moral agency of field constituents. In our case, for example, discursive force was implicated in a rhetorical strategy whereby the government ignored prevalent public emotion-based debate about the undesired social-policy implications of joining the EMU and imposed macro-economic analysis by economic experts as a sufficient base for making the decision on EMU-membership. By framing the issue unanimously as an economic optimization problem and by positioning citizens as consumers, the texts that the governmental actors produced and circulated also operated to increase the cognitive and social costs (Phillips et al., 2008) of other possible interpretations and positions. In doing so, the government effectively discouraged citizen participation in the public discussion on EMU, worked to muffle the criticism of the EMU critics, and gave its economists the power to evaluate the advantages, disadvantages and risks associated with EMU-membership, thus silencing alternative legitimacy judgments and reducing the diversity of voices (Bitektine & Haack, 2015).

Our analysis thus complements and extends the work of Creed and colleagues (2014) who theorize a specific social emotion, episodic shaming, as a form of power aimed at eliciting conformity to institutional prescriptions and, ultimately, institutional reproduction. Our study shows that a threat of shame can also be mobilized in the institutional work through which institutions are created. Our analysis suggests that, in creating new institutions, shaming attempts, and the discursive arousal of other moral emotions, may be used to rhetorically construct the idea of a new or ‘imagined’ community and invoke new bonds and affective commitments. For example, in our study, we see how, in evoking shame and pride, the texts rhetorically construct a valued sense of belonging to a select group of qualifying nations and also construct what might be considered shameful behavior as a member of this community. This highlights how evoking shame and pride involves more than appealing to shared rules to elicit compliance. Strategies of emotion work also entail meaning work through which the institution and the constituents are defined in particular ways that work to create support for the institutional project. In doing so these strategies may thus be geared at shaping the agency of the constituents as ethical subjects who not only conform to and internalize specific rules but voluntarily govern themselves to achieve specific objectives (Eraranta & Moisander, 2011).

**Conclusions**

Overall, to conclude, our study highlights that, in institutional work, discursive emotion work has not only rhetorical power but also constitutive and normative
power. A key insight that emerges from our empirical analysis is that explicit appeals to emotions constitute only one form of emotion work. While much of the existing research on emotions in institutional work has focused on the ways in which institutional actors seek to appeal to the emotions of their audiences, as a mode of persuasion or proof in rhetorical strategies, our study suggests that institutional work may also include emotion work that does not involve explicit “emotional justifications” (Green, 2004) “emotive appeals” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), “use of emotionality” (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012) or “emotion evoking arguments” (Brown et al., 2012) at all. As our study demonstrates, in the context of discursive institutional work, emotion work may exert its effects not only by evoking or appealing to emotions but also eclipsing and diverting them. Moreover, there are situations in which eclipsing or ignoring disruptive emotions may serve the interests of institutional actors. For example, whether institutional actors are seeking passive acceptance or active support (Suchman, 1995) may influence the forms of emotion work enacted. Furthermore, engaging in appeals to emotions can have unintended effects (Creed, et al. 2014; Suchman, 1995). For example, emotion work based on explicit appeals may result in “validating the opposition by overtly treating it as a threat” (Suchman, 1995, p. 596) or may trigger sensemaking that leads constituents to reevaluate and withdraw support for, or reject, institutional prescriptions (Creed, et al. 2014). Therefore, an understanding of emotion work beyond explicit appeals to either negative or positive emotions contributes to a fuller appreciation of the available range of rhetorical strategies and discursive practices through which emotions can be mobilized and regulated for institutional work.

Acknowledgements

Information about the underlying data of this paper can be found at: https://dx.doi.org/10.17635/lancaster/researchdata/77)
## Appendix

### Illustrative data extracts and supportive evidence

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<tr>
<th>Rhetorical tactics</th>
<th>First order themes</th>
<th>Illustrative data extracts and supporting evidence</th>
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| Precluding emotion-based legitimacy judgments by reframing the issue | Theorizing EMU as an economic problem (economization) | Economic and Monetary Union is a way to enhance the Union’s goals in terms of growth, competitiveness and employment. Commitment to low inflation and consolidation of public finances in the member countries strengthens the competitiveness of business in the increasing global competition. (EMU-report)  
An abundance of reports and studies on the effects of Economic and Monetary Union are available. The Council of State report to Parliament on the effects of EU membership in Finland (VNS 1/1991 vp) explained the relevance of Economic and Monetary Union for the Finnish economy and for decision-making in economic policy. (EMU-statement) |
| Defining the role of citizens as consumers (de-politicization) | Representing the issue in terms of balancing economic risks, costs, benefits (shifting attention to pragmatic legitimacy) | Participation in the euro area would provide the Finnish national economy with benefits related to both economic efficiency and financial stability, contributing a positively to accelerated economic growth and to the creation of new permanent jobs. (EMU-statement)  
It is probable that the third phase of EMU, i.e. the common currency, will be launched in the beginning of 1999. The options for Finland are either to adopt the common currency or to stay outside the euro zone. Will it be economically more reasonable to participate or to stay outside and wait for a better moment? Will we do better outside or as a member of the euro zone? (Brochure EMU?) |
| Promoting neutralized legitimacy judgments by invoking specific norms of rationality | Defining the government as the administrator (shifting attention to procedural legitimacy) | The Government has informed Parliament about the progress on the Economic and Monetary Union as required by the Parliament Act. The Grand Committee has been regularly informed on issues relating to the EMU handled by the Ecofin Council. Similarly, the Parliament has also been informed of the proposals for secondary legislation concerning the Economic and Monetary Union. Public debate on the effects of the Economic and Monetary Union has been encouraged in many ways. (EMU-report)  
Monitoring of fiscal policy will be enhanced through requiring from each euro country a stability programme that specifies the medium-term goals concerning public finances and public debt, and presents the means to achieve these goals. Within this system, the member states will strive in the medium term to achieve a budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus (EMU-report) |
### Diverting disruptive emotions

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<tr>
<th>Rhetorical tactics</th>
<th>First order themes</th>
<th>Illustrative data extracts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normalizing fears by theorizing threats as inevitable and unrelated to the issue</td>
<td>Representing threats to social welfare, employment, and national independence as inevitable consequences of globalization and global capitalism</td>
<td>The labor market has to face the challenges brought upon by conditions of low inflation, whether within the eurozone or outside of it. (EMU-report) According to the view of the EMU Expert Working Group, the creation of the euro zone, as well as the deepening integration in general, may affect the operational conditions of the welfare state. It is, however, very difficult to distinguish the effects of the eurozone from the whole. (EMU-report) The preconditions of social policy are influenced primarily by other factors than whether Finland joins the euro zone or not. (EMU-report) In all national economies that participate in international market exchange, the framework of economic policy will be shaped in accordance with the global economy. (EMU-report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructing EMU as a way to control globalization</td>
<td>Emphasis on enhancing employment [heading] The European Council meeting in Amsterdam in the summer of 1997 decided to emphasize measures for keeping employment firmly at the top of the political agenda of the Union. EMU will enhance the internal market and foster the macro-economic environment, thereby strengthening conditions for economic growth and employment opportunities. (Brochure EMU?) The reports demonstrate that other options [opting out from EMU] would give no greater latitude to economic policy, whereas the possibilities to influence our economic environment and developments in it would be weaker. (EMU-statement)</td>
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<td>Limiting the scope of moral concern by simplifying the issue</td>
<td>Representing the consequences of EMU in terms of the concrete, day-to-day implications of the changeover to the euro</td>
<td>You will receive your wage, pension or child benefits in euro. And naturally you will also pay your taxes in euro. Adoption of the euro will not affect the terms of existing contracts such as mortgages, rental agreements and consumption credits. (Brochure Euro) The mark notes and coins would stay in use alongside the euro, which would be used as the account currency. Households could still be able to make bank deposits in marks. The pricing of products and services would probably shift gradually to double pricing: prices would be announced in marks and euros. (Brochure EMU?) For the banks, the adoption of the euro will naturally bring about many practical changes, which will be implemented gradually. The banks need to renew at least partly the ATMs, their payment software, as well as all mark-based communications between the bank and the customer. (Brochure Euro) • Illustration: Young woman holding a euro note and old woman holding a FIM note looking at a price tag stuck in a piece of ham with a hesitant expression on both of their faces. (Brochure EMU?)</td>
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<td>Emphasizing that many things may not change</td>
<td>According to the Commission, the Economic and Monetary Union as such will not require changes in the contract system, nor does it mean that the minimum terms or the generally binding nature of the collective labor contracts should be altered or nominal wages lowered.</td>
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<td>Rhetorical tactics</td>
<td>First order themes</td>
<td>Illustrative data extracts and supporting evidence</td>
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<td>Creating a sense of duty by mobilizing shame for unmet obligations</td>
<td>Emphasizing the obligating nature of existing contracts and agreements</td>
<td>In matters concerning the European Union and economic policies, the report is based on previous policy statements of the Government and on the treaties which bind Finland. (EMU-report). Under provisions of the EC Treaty pertaining to Economic and Monetary Union, all Member States fulfilling the conditions, barring countries with explicitly stated special arrangements Protocols (the United Kingdom and Denmark), shall introduce the single currency in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union. The stage three provisions of the Treaty were put wholly into effect in Finland by means of an Implementation Act enacted in the restricted procedure for constitutional amendments. (EMU-statement) The provisions concerning the Economic and Monetary Union in the Treaty on the European Community require that all Member States fulfilling the necessary conditions (excluding the United Kingdom and Denmark which have special arrangements) adopt the single currency at the outset of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. The Treaty stipulations concerning the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union have come fully into force in Finland by the Implementation Act by a qualified majority of two thirds of votes. (EMU-report)</td>
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<td>Referring to sanctions and negative implications, e.g. losing credibility, if these obligations are not met</td>
<td>These benefits have partly been realized along with [Finland’s] increasing commitment to the project and the progressing convergence. These benefits may however be lost if the trust in [Finland’s] commitment starts to waver. (EMU-report) Like corporations, also households would outside the Eurozone be deprived of the immediate benefits of enhanced business and market activity, which the common currency in conjunction with the inner market would bring about within the Eurozone. The new possibilities of the financial markets and the lower interests would also not be realized. (EMU-report)</td>
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<td>Evoking useful emotions</td>
<td>Representing countries that meet the convergence criteria as top performers</td>
<td>Based on [the convergence] criteria, Council of the European Union will choose the member states that are allowed to participate in the adoption of the euro right from the beginning, and thus participate fully in the third stage of EMU. (Brochure EMU?) A common currency is significant for strengthening European identity, and the euro is growing into a currency that essentially challenges the dollar and the yen to compete for the greatest currency in the world. Europe is bigger than its competitors, the level of education of its population is better, and it is in an advantageous position as regards social problems compared to other continents. (MP, Leader of a conservative government party)</td>
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<td>Representing EMU membership as a possibility to be in the core and in-group of European policy-making and lead the way in the future development of Eurozone</td>
<td>The euro area ensures greater efficiency and sustained stability in our national economy, which in turn improves investment potential, economic growth and the creation of permanent jobs. Furthermore, by being a participant country, Finland secures a continued role in the development of the European Union. (EMU-statement) From the point of view of political influence, the Government regards participation in the Euro Area to be favourable for the general objectives of Finnish European policy. If Finland were to participate in the Euro Area from the outset, the Bank of Finland would have a representative in the Council of the European Central Bank. Remaining outside the Euro Area would prevent the Bank of Finland from participating in decision making on common monetary policy. (EMU-report)</td>
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<td>Connecting pride in national distinctiveness with a collective European identity</td>
<td>Illustrations depicting smiling and satisfied people; Illustrations utilizing cultural symbols and stereotypes to visualize European identity:  • A businessman (sturdy man in a suit with a cigar) flipping a FIM-euro coin and smiling at the result – the euro (Brochure EMU?)  • A young woman shopping for a dress, with a crossed-out “change/wechsel/gambio” sign on the background (Brochure EMU?)  • Section of the globe with the future (potential) euro zone highlighted with color, joining Finland visually to Europe (Brochure Euro)</td>
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References


