Ioannidou, Vasso (2005) Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14 (1). pp. 58-85. ISSN 1042-9573
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper examines whether monetary policy responsibilities alter the central bank's role as a bank supervisor. The analysis focuses on the United States, where the Federal Reserve System shares supervisory duties with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Among the three institutions, the Fed is the only one responsible for monetary policy. Hence, the Fed's supervisory behavior—as captured by formal actions—is compared with the behavior of the other two agencies. The results suggest that the Fed's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its bank supervisory behavior: indicators of monetary policy affect the supervisory actions of the Fed, but do not affect the actions of the other two agencies.