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Political pressure deflection

Anderson, James E. and Zanardi, Maurizio (2009) Political pressure deflection. Public Choice, 141 (1-2). pp. 129-150. ISSN 0048-5829

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Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Public Choice
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 64765
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 24 May 2013 11:25
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 21 Sep 2017 05:39
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/64765

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