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Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

Ray, Indrajit and Sen Gupta, Sonali (2013) Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games. International Journal of Game Theory, 42 (2). pp. 541-562. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Game Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: Duopoly ; Coarse correlation ; Simple devices ; Sunspots
Subjects: UNSPECIFIED
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 60338
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 29 Nov 2012 19:49
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2013 16:28
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/60338

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