Macleod, Christopher (2013) Was Mill a Non-Cognitivist? The Southern Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0038-4283 (In Press)
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on ‘art’ and ‘science’ do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, I suggest in Section IV, a non-cognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism, and is difficult to reconcile with a clear commitment in Utilitarianism IV.3 to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Journal or Publication Title: | The Southern Journal of Philosophy |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Departments: | Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01) |
| ID Code: | 59474 |
| Deposited By: | ep_importer_pure |
| Deposited On: | 25 Oct 2012 13:25 |
| Refereed?: | Yes |
| Published?: | In Press |
| Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2012 13:25 |
| Identification Number: | |
| URI: | http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/59474 |
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