Unwin, Nicholas (1999) Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (196). pp. 337-352. ISSN 1467-9213Full text not available from this repository.
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily confused with merely refusing to accept that sentence. I argue that Blackburn’s model-set semantics for his ‘Hooray!’ and ‘Boo!’ operators requires logical apparatus to which he is not entitled. I consider various modifications, but show that they do not succeed.
|Journal or Publication Title:||The Philosophical Quarterly|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited On:||19 Oct 2012 11:49|
|Last Modified:||27 Feb 2017 03:23|
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