Unwin, Nicholas (1999) Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (196). pp. 337-352.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily confused with merely refusing to accept that sentence. I argue that Blackburn’s model-set semantics for his ‘Hooray!’ and ‘Boo!’ operators requires logical apparatus to which he is not entitled. I consider various modifications, but show that they do not succeed.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Journal or Publication Title: | The Philosophical Quarterly |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Departments: | Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01) |
| ID Code: | 57973 |
| Deposited By: | ep_importer_pure |
| Deposited On: | 19 Oct 2012 11:49 |
| Refereed?: | Yes |
| Published?: | Published |
| Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2012 11:49 |
| Identification Number: | |
| URI: | http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/57973 |
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