Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi (2011) The phenomenal separateness of self:Udayana on body and agency. Asian Philosophy, 21 (3). pp. 323-340.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western philosophers. He also provides some inkling of how alternative ways of defending phenomenal unity without self fail. A criticism of some Western phenomenological theories of self is that they do not explain how unity is provided by the ‘mineness’ of cognition. Udayana's suggestion that a sort of agency provides such an explanation can be developed as an original argument for a phenomenally unitary self.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Journal or Publication Title: | Asian Philosophy |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion |
| Departments: | Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01) |
| ID Code: | 55386 |
| Deposited By: | ep_importer_pure |
| Deposited On: | 25 Jun 2012 12:01 |
| Refereed?: | Yes |
| Published?: | Published |
| Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2012 15:00 |
| Identification Number: | |
| URI: | http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/55386 |
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