Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi (2011) The phenomenal separateness of self:Udayana on body and agency. Asian Philosophy, 21 (3). pp. 323-340. ISSN 1469-2961Full text not available from this repository.
Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western philosophers. He also provides some inkling of how alternative ways of defending phenomenal unity without self fail. A criticism of some Western phenomenological theories of self is that they do not explain how unity is provided by the ‘mineness’ of cognition. Udayana's suggestion that a sort of agency provides such an explanation can be developed as an original argument for a phenomenally unitary self.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Asian Philosophy|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited On:||25 Jun 2012 12:01|
|Last Modified:||09 Apr 2014 23:41|
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