INTRODUCTION

The work of Anne-Marie Fortier has been informative in the development of some of the arguments explored in this special issue. In her recent book on multiculturalism and technologies of citizenship, Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation (Routledge, 2008), Fortier showed how white Britain is haunted by its colonial legacies, histories of domination and difference, and modes of mixing, proximity and distance, and intimacy. She continues to explore these questions in her current work; for instance, her article ‘The Blood in our Veins’ (2008b; see also Fortier 2011) on genes, ancestry and biometric bodies, develops the concept of ‘technologies of reassurance’. Her analysis of national anxieties, affective citizenship and technologies of reassurance has been instrumental in shaping our thinking about ghosts and haunting as well as on affect: for example, looking at anxieties about Britain’s racial make-up which inspired us to think about the ways in which imagined futures might be haunted, and haunting.

We asked Anne-Marie to begin by commenting on the idea of haunted futurities and elaborating on the ways in which the notion of racial ghosts and haunting work in her argument, moving from the past to the future.
Anne-Marie Fortier: First, I would like to thank you for inviting me to be part of this special issue. I really like the temporal framing that you foreground; the emphasis on how we might think of haunting as something that is not confined to the past and present, but which is also projected into the future. In this regard, it’s not only that futures are haunted, but they can also be haunting in the sense that imagined futures have their ghosts that haunt the present and inform present actions.

This takes me to your question on ‘racial ghosts’ and haunting. One of the issues that I seek to examine in all my work is the endurance and reconfigurations of racisms, racial thinking, and ideas of ‘race’. And I look at how these are inflected by ideas of gender, sexuality, and generations. In Multicultural Horizons (MH), I discuss the ambivalence integral to the British nationalist project, which is an ambivalence that Paul Gilroy (2004) has identified in his notion of Britain’s post-colonial melancholia: the ambivalent relationship to the past—to the Empire more specifically—that arises between the distress resulting from the realisation of the Empire’s abuses and violence, on the one hand, and the desire to remember the Empire as a source of national pride, on the other. In MH, I consider how Britain’s melancholic state constitutes the context that allows for particular versions of multiculturalism to develop (including anti-multiculturalism).

But at the same time, multiculturalism and anti-multiculturalism both include a projection into the future. The very logic of the anti-multiculturalist backlash is to look at the assumed past failures of multiculturalism—e.g. that it fosters separatism rather than cohesion—and to project them onto an undesirable, if not nightmare-ish future. Multiculturalism, and now cohesion and integration, are the preferred frames of reference to think about uncertain futures haunted by the urgencies of the present. And various governing strategies are put forward and put in place in attempts to attend to or prevent failed integration, failed cohesion. From New Labour’s cohesion agenda to Cameron’s ‘Big Society’, a range of technologies of citizenship are deployed in attempts to enable cohesive or, as Cameron puts it, ‘real’ communities.

I’ve often been asked what I mean by ‘technologies of reassurance’ in the paper you are referring to, ‘The Blood in our Veins’ (BV). The paper is about a television documentary series called Face of Britain. The series documents a genetic study aimed at tracing ancient migrations in the British Isles and at tracing links between present day rural inhabitants and ancient Celts, Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, and Normans. I examine how digital photography, morphing technologies, population statistics and genetics are variously combined to operate as technologies of reassurance in the context of wider public debates about the future of multi-ethnic Britain, national identity, and fears that the country will be ‘swamped’ by immigrants. So I was asked who it is that is being reassured, and what are they reassured against. This is a fair question. Is it the genetic scientists who are reassuring
themselves that genetic science can answer questions that, according to them, history or archaeology can only speculate about? Is it the television producers or the research team who are reassuring the viewers that they can finally ‘know who they really are’? Who are the viewers? Or who do the producers think the viewers are? I used ‘technologies of reassurance’ to refer to the ways in which the ‘natural facts’ generated through the combination of scientific, visual and statistical technologies are cast as answers to concerns about the nature of national identity in the context of globalization and increased diversity—in the context of what Kim TallBear (2007) refers to as the narrative of the ‘vanishing indigene’ (which I develop further in Fortier 2011). In this way, technologies of reassurance generate ideas about the subjects that need to be reassured (the national ‘we’, particularly the ‘indigenous’ Britons), as well as those against whom they need reassuring (those deemed ‘not-indigenous’, ‘new migrants’). A second feature of these technologies of reassurance is that *Face of Britain* uses visual technologies that resemble nineteenth-century physiognomy, which operated as a technology of reassurance, a kind of ‘survival kit’, as Melissa Percival puts it (2005, p. 22), for the new urban dweller dealing with a new sense of estrangement from her other urban dwellers. By creating ‘average faces’ for different regions of the British Isles, *Face of Britain* is developing a contemporary version of physiognomy that differs from its nineteenth-century predecessor on a number of counts, but that still operates as ‘reassurance’ in the sense that it makes visible, and ‘confirms’ those invisible links to genetic ancestry (see Fortier 2011).

So to return to your question, I see how the reading of MH and then BV takes us from hauntings that move from the past to the future, respectively. But I think that this temporality is not necessarily linear. As I suggest earlier, the anti-multiculturalist backlash has to be understood in its specific manifestations—and in Britain, it is haunted by a post-colonial melancholia, but it is also haunted by imagined futures. And these imagined futures are figured in the body of ‘youths’. David Cameron’s speech about radicalisation, which he delivered at the Munich Security Conference in February this year (2011), is all about young Muslim men. He announces the introduction of the National Citizen Service for 16-year-olds from ‘different backgrounds’. He, like the government before this one, targets young people in the hope that his programmes will shape future ‘good citizens’ who will be active in his Big Society. The figure of the young person does a lot of work in haunting, and is placed as the linchpin between pasts and futures. In that regard, I think that the work on critical multiculturalism has neglected the role of the generational trope, particularly the figure of the young person (and more broadly, ideas of kinship). We can be reminded, for example, of Lauren Berlant’s *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City* (1997), where she writes about the child as needing protection from the state.

**Adi Kuntsman:** There seems to be a shift between two slightly different figures at work here: that of ‘youth’/young person/teenager which you mention here and that of a child (as in Lauren Berlant’s...
work that you are referring to, or, for example, in Claudia Castañeda’s (2002) work on the figure of the child in scientific imaginaries or in transnational adoption). You also turn to the child in your analysis of *The Last White Kids* documentary (in MH), which I would like to ask you about separately. But for now, could you say a few words about the difference between these two figures?

**Anne-Marie Fortier**: I use ‘youth’ to include the ‘child’ while it is not reducible to it. The figure of the child as Castañeda uses it, is about figuring the ‘body-in-process’, which ‘makes it eminently appropriable’. In that sense, it is seen as malleable, as changeable, as available for adoption by the nation, as well as having the potential to develop into a subject that will *adopt* the nation. The figure of ‘youth’, for its part, is that of a body that is perceived as more advanced in the developmental process and in that respect, can be more of a ‘threat’ or a ‘challenge’ to government concerns about good citizenship, cohesion, and so on.

Berlant, for her part, focuses on the infantilisation of citizenship and of the use of the figure of the child as an ideal type of personhood (in the US) ‘on whose behalf national struggles are being waged’ (Berlant 1997, p. 21). My focus on multicultural youth is less about the infantilization of citizenship as it is about the ways in which she/he stands in for the successes, failures, and limits of multiculturalism. And the national struggles that I consider are not so much waged on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed child as they are waged to redress or prevent the growing youth from going on the wrong path—e.g. of excessive love or hate of the other (see *The Last White Kids* about that).

But more broadly, your question suggests that it would be interesting to examine more fully the place of kinship and of the generational trope in multiculturalism, and to distinguish between the different generational figures.

**Adi Kuntsman**: So now coming back to *The Last White Kids*. In thinking about your analysis of multiculturalism in MH and your recent work I am struck by the resonance between this idea of ‘disappearing white Britain’ when you discuss *The Last White Kids* (chapter 4 in MH), and white unease and post-rural melancholia which you address in your work on the genetic *Domesday Book* (BV). Can you elaborate on this link/continuity/rupture here? What I am specifically interested in is the notion of racialised futures, and how some futurities are being put to work. What kind of feelings are mobilised here? What genealogies, routes, and connections are evoked?

**Anne-Marie Fortier**: I think that the link between the two is the issue of the disappearance of white Britain—which is one element that is constitutive of what I call ‘white unease’. Do you remember the television series produced by BBC 2, called *The White Season*, that was broadcast in the Spring of 2008? The subtitle was ‘Is white
working class Britain becoming invisible?’ That’s when I started thinking more about ‘white unease’—which is a mild way of referring to the violence of some racist politics of white supremacy and white dominance. Anyway, what was evoked in The White Season was a romanticised notion of the working class as the moral backbone of the nation which was silenced, under siege and under threat of disappearance because it is neglected by politicians. I am not saying that the working class and the economically deprived are not subject to systems of inequality that the neo-liberal politics of ‘opportunities’ ignores—particularly in the current climate. But this is not specific to the white working class—these issues concern people from a range of different racialised positions. By making this about the white working class, the series was basically making it about white Britain more broadly. And that series was not unique. The Last White Kids, which I write about in MH, was a television documentary about the ‘last white’ working class family living in a largely Asian neighbourhood in Bradford. Issues of class, nation, ‘race’ and gender were woven together here, in a story where the local and the personal are mobilized in debates over definitions of national identity and national culture. And it is worth noting that the documentary inspired a dramatised version (called White Girl) that was broadcast during the BBC Two ‘White Season’.

And here we are back to the young person again, who is the site of projection of anxieties about the national future, particularly a racialised future. The figure of youth is taken up, or created (it is noteworthy that the ‘faces of Britain’ created for the genetic mapping of Britain are all youthful faces), as the embodiment of the possibility of assimilation into, or destabilisation of, Britain and Britishness. There is a mix of desires, hopes, anxieties, and fears projected onto those figures of youth. And I think that what is at stake is the fantasy of national wholeness. Barnor Hesse (1999) writes about multicultural transruptions, i.e. how ‘the multicultural’ reveals the impossibility of full national representation. But that fantasy of national wholeness has so much purchase, and many of the concerns about multiculturalism and immigration are about maintaining a sense of wholeness, a sense of unified ‘identity’. Face of Britain is so interesting in this regard. Its subtitle is ‘Look in the mirror. Thousands of years of history is [sic] looking back at you’. I couldn’t resist doing a Lacanian reading of this and to look at how the ‘average faces’ created with digital morphing technology, were ‘revealed’ to viewers with a spirit of jubilation—the sound track of drumming rose in intensity each time faces were introduced on the screen—that Lacan associates with that moment of identification with the image reflected in the mirror: that moment when the infant sees the composed, ‘whole’ body in the mirror and recognises it as hers. It is a moment where, according to Lacan, that ‘identity’ provides an imaginary mastery over the body that the infant has thus far experienced as fragmented (Lacan 1954 [1988]). Face of Britain, for its part, offered an imaginary mastery over the national body through the creation of these faces that they link back to ancient Celts, Anglo Saxons, Vikings and Normans. The fantasy is further secured by collapsing genetics, history and territory, consequently

**Debra Ferreday:** The figure of the child or the young person suggests orientation towards the future, while notions of ancestry turn us to the past. I would like to think further about the relations between the two. In particular, I'm very interested in the way that nostalgia functions in relation to this sense of a lost rural past. In BV you cite Sarah Neal's argument that fantasies of the rural are ‘based on a de-racialized nostalgia for a pre-multicultural Britain’ (Neal 2002, cited in Fortier 2008b, p. 444). Could you say more about the relationship between stories about the past, and an imagined (and feared) future?

**Anne-Marie Fortier:** The loss of the rural past figures prominently in *Face of Britain*, particularly the book version written by the science journalist Robin McKie (2006). I think more broadly it haunts ideas of ‘real communities’, of ‘cohesion’, and so on, in the sense that there is a nostalgia for close-knit communities. Also, rural or semi-rural areas are struggling against the forces of global capitalism and the impact on the agricultural industry in Britain. What I am interested in is how the rural comes to stand in for the nation and how the attachment to a particular imagining of what rural life is or was should be deployed in debates about the national future. In the book *Face of Britain*, the scientific practice and process is translated into a national narrative of the loss of a rural past, one that ties families to the land from generation to generation. In the television series, that loss is cast against the hyper-mobile, migrant urban setting. Genetics, history and territory are collapsed, blood and soil are intertwined in a nostalgic evocation of the ‘lost rural world’ which constitutes the rural inhabitants as subjects whose connection to the land runs deep, as subjects who worked on the land and constitute the land as the object of their labour. I think that Sarah Neal's words are very apt here—the rural idyll in British popular culture, including 'popularised' versions of science like *Face of Britain*, does mobilise a de-racialised nostalgia for a pre-multicultural Britain. A nostalgia that is based on the notion that the multicultural fosters separation and conflict, even racism—as if racism is something that results from the external forces of migration.

**Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman:** We would like to move from nostalgia now to another affective element in your work, namely, to the topic of fantasy and also to your concept of horizons.

**Adi Kuntsman:** My questions evolve around your use of ‘horizons’ in MH—horizons that are made of witnessing, questioning and imagining. You address horizons as structures of feeling (Williams 1977), and this made me think of Avery Gordon's use of haunting as structure of feeling (Gordon 1997). Can horizons be haunted? Are they—or rather, when are they about haunting? Also, you note that horizons are about space as well as imaginative geographies. Are they also about time? More specifically, how can we put the concept
of horizons to work in thinking about futurities? (You mention also that horizons are about infinite possibilities—dreamlike or nightmare fantasy—this is what I had in mind when asking about futurities and possibly haunting futurities).

Debra Ferreday: Fantasy is important in your work—on page 12 of MH, you cite Jacqueline Rose’s notion of fantasy as not an escape from reality but rather “a kind of psychic glue which protects the nation/al from the horrors of the “real” that threaten the disintegration of the self; it keeps it whole” (Rose 1996, p. 3). This makes me wonder about the status of the ‘real’ in your work. This terrifying imaginary ‘reality’ seems to be part of the fantasy of nation, which leaves me wondering if there is a ‘real’ real that is being obscured by the fantasy. In the conclusion you say that the national fantasy conceals ‘how messy, slippery and fragile’ cultural differences and formations actually are. So what might it mean to come to terms with the real (or the actual)?

Anne-Marie Fortier: Allow me to answer these two questions together, because I think that they are related. I have been thinking about horizons a lot recently, and wondering how it relates to imaginaries. I’ll return to this in a moment.

Horizons in MH are about the simultaneous witnessing (‘we are multicultural’; or ‘we are facing important challenges due to immigration’), questioning (‘how do we create cohesion?’), and imagining (‘the future Big Society’). These deliberations cast the nation/al in different temporalities—the past, present, and future—but they all meet in their quest to understand who the national ‘we’ is, what it means at this particular moment in time, what the limits of the nation/al are, and where it should be headed. The witnessing, questioning and imagining work together like a diagnosis—identifying a problem, seeking a solution, and imagining the world as it will be once the solution has been put in place. So it’s about how the national future is embattled through connections to a ‘reality’ which is said to be in need of improvement or correction. That’s what I was trying to get at with ‘horizons’—to the ways in which the realities of the present, however mediated and differently experienced they may be, are the grounds from which questions and imaginings arise. It was my way of thinking about the national fantasy not as escape, but as something that is entangled with present ‘realities’, indeed constitutive of them. In other words, the national fantasy—or fantasy in general—offers a frame for defining the world around us and through which that world, that ‘reality’, can be lived and acted on. The nation is a fantasy image of the collective self which, as Lauren Berlant (1991) has argued, is brought into being in the public domain by repeatedly imagining that it exists as something real, out there, that binds the ‘national people’ together.

As ‘protective fiction’, the nation as fantasy image is always in tension with that which exceeds representation, that which exceeds
intelligibility—‘the real’. In MH, I look at how ‘children of multicultural Britain’ are differently figured in different ‘faces’—the beautiful ‘models of modern Britain’ versus the ugly ‘bad’ (suicide bombers). I argue that the beauty of the models of modern Britons protect the fantasy of Britain as a tolerant, benevolent, feel-good place to be, while the horror of the suicide-bombers deeply perturbs the fantasy frame through which reality can be assessed and brings the violence of the world we live in to the heart of home, to the heart of the national self. For Lacan, the real is that which exceeds representation; it refers to that materiality of existence that precedes language. What I find problematic in his theory of the real is that it seems to assume a kind of pure ‘natural state’ that infants enjoy before they enter into the symbolic order of language. For me, the real is that which exceeds representation in the sense that it is unintelligible within the fantasy image of our selves. So the ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ faces of multicultural Britain are not separate entities, with the first being the offspring of the nation, and the second being born out of external forces. They are all products of the nation, integral to the national fantasy, and together they force the recognition of the very ambivalence of the nation/al as both heimlich and unheimlich, a thing of beauty and comfort and a thing of dread and death—the uncanny.

Coming to terms with the real—if that’s ever possible—would mean recognising that there is much that exceeds our fantasy frames, and that our reality is always threatened by that excess that can ‘erupt’ at any time. Now when I say that, I am reminded of some feminist arguments in the 1990s—when the idea of the postmodern, fluid, unstable ‘identity’ was celebrated—who reminded us of how easy it is to celebrate the un-rooted, unstable fictional identity when we ‘have’ an identity in the first place, or when the ‘identity’ we occupy is not contested, or pathologised, or criminalised. So coming to terms with ‘the real’ is also about being reflexive about the position from which we create the fantasy images of ourselves and of others.

The main reason I use horizons instead of imagination is because of its spatial connotation—it forces the recognition of the geographies of multiculturalism, or of migration (as in ‘migrant horizons’, the title of a special issue of Mobilities that I co-edited with Gail Lewis, see Fortier & Lewis 2006). Considering how national fantasies produce who the nation/al are, is also about considering where they are. Both MH and BV, which you refer to in your questions, attend to the geographic imaginaries of sameness and difference. And in the case of BV, the politics of indigenisation that are at work in Face of Britain are decidedly about ancestral connections to this land. So at a very simple level, horizons was taken literally to refer to the spatial. In phenomenological terms, horizons are about the boundaries of our experience of the environment. The ‘edge’, the limits and contours of what I see. Looking into the horizon, we only see the contours of objects; we can’t fully grasp them. I think that’s how the multicultural works—as something that can’t be fully apprehended, and as something that is both close and distant, threatening and enriching. And attempts to manage it in Britain have included injunctions (such
as mixing and loving thy neighbour) that are cast within the ambivalent spatial terms of obligations to and dangers of proximity.

Now, I've been thinking about how 'horizons' relates to ‘imaginaries’. The documentary on *Face of Britain* is very much about what Sarah Franklin (2000) and Jackie Stacey (2010) refer to as the genetic imaginary. I won't get into that here, but the point is that ‘imaginary’ as it is used by Stacey (who draws on psychoanalysis), is defined as being structured by desires and anxieties that organise a repertoire of fantasies that come with a set of cultural investments and associations. My thinking is still developing on this matter, but I am wondering if horizons is enough to capture those desires and anxieties that are constitutive of the range of fantasies that invest the national project: for example how migrant imaginaries and genealogical imaginaries meet (or not) in the naturalisation process, which is a new study that I am embarking on.

**Debra Ferreday:** With regards to the relations between ‘horizons’ and ‘imaginaries’, it seems that the use of ‘horizons’ moves away from the psychoanalytic focus on the subject, and is more open-ended?

**Anne-Marie Fortier:** Hmm, maybe yes. In that sense, they could perhaps be used in combination, where horizons is more about the individual or national ‘orientation’ towards the surrounding world and imagined futures (I am thinking of Sara Ahmed's work on orientations here, Ahmed 2009), and where imaginaries addresses the psychic structures of desires and anxieties that shape or colour those orientations. I’d need to think about that.

My thinking about imaginaries is also about trying to further theorise the role of affect in the prescriptions of ‘good’ citizenship in multicultural contexts (this relates to the next question). But it’s more than that. I think that it is difficult to grasp the complexities of, say, citizenship without attending to the psychic processes and structures that shape how it is understood, policed and institutionalised. In the vast and extremely rich literature on citizenship, I am struck at how little attention is given to its psychic dimensions (*pace* Stevens 2010; Isin 2004)

**Debra Ferreday:** Speaking about the role of affect… In places you connect haunting with affect, for example: ‘What does making composite images into a national portrait tell us about the fantasy of the national self? What do these figurations of a multicultural nation tell us about the wider anxieties, desires and imaginings that haunt the prospect, and project, of national introspection and self-transformation?’ (Fortier 2008b, n.p.). It seems like projects such as *Face of Britain* that you discuss in your book represent an attempt to ‘fix’ a present moment and that affect is what threatens to destabilise this ‘closing down’. Do you see affect in terms of potentiality—or as a ‘closing down’?
(On a related note, I’m interested in what seems to me to be the cultural pervasiveness of anxiety as a central way of thinking about privileged identities; the price of privilege seems to be constant anxiety, comparison, fearfulness—which leads me to wonder if this is itself a fantasy: are others imagined precisely ‘free from’ the anxiety that is the ‘price’ of privileged belonging?)

Anne-Marie Fortier: That’s an interesting question. And I wonder if you are referring to the ways in which some of the theorising of affect in cultural studies has conceived of affect as potential that is extra-discursive (e.g. in the writings of Brian Massumi or Eve Sedgwick). In that sense, affect is disruptive because it exceeds representation—not in the Lacanian sense of ‘the real’, but in the physical sense. My problem with this is that there is a risk of depoliticising affect, of de-socialising and de-contextualising affect: as if feelings operate outside of social relations. The body, here, is very much turned onto itself.

I don’t conceive of affect as either potential or closing down. Yes, to some extent, the material I discuss in the book seeks to close down diasporic and multilocal attachments in favour of the unified nation/al. But for me, these different closing down strategies are brim full of affect—in that sense, affect is not an external force that would disrupt government strategies for managing multiculture. Rather, affect is integral to them and to their formation. The question that I open MH with (How can we conceive of ‘multiculture’ in ways that address the complexities and intensities of feelings that it invariably ignites?) aims at capturing not so much the effects of affect on multiculturalist governing strategies, but to put affect at the centre of understandings of multiculture. Crucial here is to approach multiculturalism not so much as a response to the ‘realities’ of cultural and ethno-racial pluralism, but also as an ideal aimed at the achievement of well-managed diversity. Multiculturalism constructs visions of ‘the multicultural’ as much as it is informed by historically specific visions that circulate in the wider public sphere. I consider ‘multiculture’ as something which is put to work in ways that both result from and produce desires, identities, anxieties, and so on, in the reconfiguration of what connects inhabitants of the national space to one another, as well as to the nation itself. One of the upshots of this is to recognise how the subject is addressed as an affective subject by various governing strategies. Since the publication of MH I looked at subsequent developments in the former government’s cohesion policy agenda, and it became clear to me that the subject is addressed not simply as the rational, autonomous, thinking subject of modernity, but also as a feeling subject—the affective citizen (Fortier 2010). And the aims of several of the policies and guidelines produced in view of achieving community cohesion are founded on the assumption that some types of activities will change people’s feelings towards one another and by extension, towards their local community and that consequently, the nation/al will be all the better for it. Community cohesion is figured in localised, inter-personal relationships, and conceived in terms of how people have to make decisions and
choices about their identities/identifications. In other words, the version of citizenship that is privileged in the cohesion agenda is one
where the value of personhood is based not only on individual’s behaviours in their private lives, nor is it only about how they behave in public. It is rather how, as citizens, they direct their feelings towards the public. So there is a policing of the kinds of public feelings that are acceptable and not acceptable—protesting is bad for cohesion, talking about racism is bad for cohesion, meeting your neighbours in ‘meaningful exchanges’ is good for cohesion, doing voluntary work is good for cohesion.

I am not saying that the everyday relationships between neighbours are not to be valued, but what I am concerned about is the top-down managerial strategy that closes down some actions and affects as inherently negative, or that add a value to some actions (voluntary work) at the price of effectively addressing issues of inequality and disadvantage that are structural rather than individual. The Big Society is clearly a way to dispatch social responsibilities to the local, non-profit organisations and to individuals, and is part of the present government’s strategy to whittle down the welfare state to a bare minimum (if that!). This process had already begun under the former government—so it is not simply a matter of right versus centre-left politics. It is characteristic of the neo-liberal governing strategies that numerous states have adopted since the end of the 20th century. All this to say that I think that there has been a kind of ‘affective turn’ in governing strategies that can be related to the individualist politics of neo-liberalism. To be sure, the management of the ‘affective subject’ is not new. Foucault has taught about how the ways in which individuals conduct themselves and manage their feelings in their private lives were subject to governance strategies in the nineteenth century European state. And Ann Laura Stoler (2002) has explored this in the context of colonising states. My point is that the cohesion agenda addresses individual’s feelings and behaviour in and about the public, shared world they inhabit, rather than being concerned with individuals’ behaviours in the private domain.

Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman: To continue with the idea of affective citizenship and management of national feelings… In MH, you talk about bodies that feel—and how boundaries of the nation are felt on, through and by (some) bodies. What are the bodies that feel the future, or through which the future is felt? Following up from that, we are wondering about the relations between bodies, feeling and time. As you write of Face of Britain in your paper (BV),

Decidedly located in the present, these are bodies without history: these are youthful faces with wrinkles, scars, and other blemishes ironed out, and the marks of personal lives erased, thus being offered up as a blank surface with no past and with only an imagined future rooted in a multicultural present. FoB is a ‘national fantasy from the present representing a posthistorical … future’ (Berlant 1997, p. 201). (Fortier 2008b, n.p.)
So, for example, can you elaborate on bodies that feel (and don’t); bodies with and without history, with and without future?

**Anne-Marie Fortier:** It depends what feelings we are talking about. In the current climate of the politics of fear and securitization, who can be fearful and who cannot? Who can be angry and who cannot? Who can be hurt, and who cannot? I think that Debra’s point about the cultural pervasiveness of anxiety as a central axis through which dominant positions are asserted is relevant to this. Looking at populist politics of racism and Islamophobia, for example, we can find a version of the anxious, hurt, fearful, angry white population who is injured by the perceived injustices they suffer and which is used to emphasise the threat posed to the future of the white nation, namely by Muslims. The Muslim body, here, is mobilized as one that doesn’t feel, but that threatens. All bodies are de-historicised in a politics of resentment that displaces resentment onto ‘discourses of injustice other than class’ as Wendy Brown put it (Brown 1995, p. 60), and which victimises a racialised (hence decidedly embodied) white working class.

The problem is that the question of feeling is individualized, and that of history is collectivized, and they are separated. The issue is to think of them together—understanding which bodies can feel what, when and under what conditions invariably requires the recognition of history; of the contingency of feelings and of the cultural politics they are caught up in.

**Concluding remarks**

Following on from these thoughts about the cultural politics of bodies and feelings, we wanted to end this interview by thinking about the ways in which thinking about futurity might open up possibilities for radicalism, for change. We asked Anne-Marie to expand on her thoughts on the relations between hope and future.

**Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman:** *Multicultural Horizons* ends with these words:

> At least when multiculture is openly discussed, the national confronts its own limits and there is still room for some creativity in thinking differently about living with difference ... Therein lies my hope for the future: in the small lives of ordinary people who remind us of the productive gaps between state stipulation and normative discourses, and the politics of everyday social life. (Fortier 2008a, p. 105)

With this in mind, we wanted to conclude our conversation by asking you to elaborate on this vision of hope. Where is it located? How do we find space for this creativity in contemporary Britain? Can hope survive the current political climate?
Anne-Marie Fortier: I am not sure that all futures are hopeful, and again, it depends whose future you are talking about and from whose perspective. In recent years, we have heard a lot about the disaffected youth living in areas where there are no job prospects, areas that are left behind as a result of the developments of global capitalism. In his book *Race, Place and Globalization*, Anoop Nayak (2003) writes evocatively about how young people are finding new ways of wrestling with questions of ‘race’ and class in that context. His ethnography of new urban cultures caught up in the local-global nexus shows that futures can be hopeful but also angry, disaffected, resentful, melancholic... So it’s not only that some futures may be more hopeful than others, but also that ‘hope’ is not the only affect haunting our futures.

Going back to what I said earlier and considering the national register, hope is invariably part of political rhetoric and governing strategies insofar as they are stated as solutions to specific problems or threats. But that hope will also bring disappointment. Think of how Obama’s politics of hope is now reaping disappointment—as Judith Butler predicted in an article published in the days following his election (Butler 2008). On the one hand, his campaign did inaugurate a change from the Bush style of leadership and a decline in the paranoid and persecutory rhetorics that stressed a clash of civilisations, terror and a ‘with us or against us’ mentality. But on the other hand, the characterisation of his politics as ‘hope’ and ‘change we can believe in’ suggests a shift more radical than his politics actually are. He is a Democrat politician, after all! That is very mainstream, not radical!

Returning to the discussion of multiculturalism, the promise of multiculturalism was bound to bring disappointment because it was hailed, in its early days, as a blanket solution to misrecognition and discrimination. In this sense, there is a lot of investment in the fantasy of the omnipotent state that will and should solve social problems by implementing appropriate policies. Similarly, there is a lot of investment in the fantasy of the nation as a unifying bond that will result from appropriately directed feelings. Think of what I was saying earlier about affective citizenship, and how the management of affect has now become a concern for government. Think of Cameron’s £2 million investment in the ‘wellbeing’ survey, in the midst of the most radical cuts in public services we have seen in decades! He is cited in the *Guardian* as saying that ‘It’s time we admitted that there’s more to life than money and it’s time we focused not just on GDP but on GWB—general wellbeing’ (cited in Stratton 2010). It’s worth noting that this politics of wellbeing or politics of happiness is not unique to Britain; it is being examined by other countries such as France and Canada.

My point is that there is a policing of feelings that pushes out some in favour of inviting, indeed prescribing others. The feeling states of the national fantasy are organized around an economy of feelings: the
production, circulation, and distribution of legitimate feelings for and within the nation, where the burden of the emotional labour largely falls upon those in minoritised positions—working-class, women, ethnic minorities, younger generations—who are often required to make the majoritised subject feel better. The currency of feelings and their differential value within the wider economic structure of feelings delineates the codes of conduct of good citizenship. And their exchange value is political: different feelings are attributed different values—or rather, they are differentially located within the ‘national values’ against which the ‘value’ of citizens is assessed. So when wellbeing—a hopeful state of being—is turned into a national value, it leaves little room for ‘bad feelings’ and supports the national fantasy of wholeness not simply in the sense of being ‘one’, but also in the sense of being wholesome. Not much room for those who (also) feel disappointed, angry, left out, or unwell.

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Anne-Marie’s answer gives us much to consider in relation to questions of potential and futurity; it provides a sobering and thoughtful conclusion to our discussion of haunting, affect and the future. We end this interview by thanking Anne-Marie for discussing her work and sharing her thoughts with us and with the readers. And we leave the readers with an open question: how can haunting open up a possibility for a different future, a different affective mode and a different political orientation, without becoming naively utopian, yet without succumbing to national structures of feelings that leave no room to ‘bad feelings’?

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Notes


2 In light of my previous discussion, it is worth noting that Massumi (2002) is not defining excess in the Lacanian sense. He is rather referring to the
neurological sciences that study pre-discursive physical reactions that occur before we are able to name the response as a particular emotion. Sedgwick, for her part, draws on the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins (Sedgwick 2004; Sedgwick & Frank (eds) 1995).

References


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