Conyon, Martin and Peck, S (1998) Board Control, Remuneration Committees and Top Management Compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41 (2). pp. 146-157. ISSN 0001-4273Full text not available from this repository.
Assesses the relationship between boards of directors, compensation committees and top management pay, focusing on the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the structure of boards of directors to explain variations in top management pay in the UK. Uses data from the 'Financial Times' top 100 companies to examine the relationship between: top management compensation, non-executive directors and corporate performance; top management compensation, existence of compensation committees and proportion of non-executives on these committees; and the relationship between top management compensation and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. Finds that, in general, boardroom control and vigilance has a limited effect in shaping top management compensation, neither the proportion of outside directors, nor CEO duality being related to management compensation; and companies adopting compensation committees have higher levels of top management pay. Demonstrates that the direct effect of boardroom control variables on the level of management compensation is minimal.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Academy of Management Journal|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
|Deposited On:||26 Jun 2012 11:41|
|Last Modified:||09 Apr 2014 23:24|
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