Lancaster EPrints

The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Conyon, Martin and Peck, S and Read, L and Sadler, G (2000) The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. Long Range Planning, 33 (4). pp. 478-503. ISSN 0024-6301

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Abstract

In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically ‘demanding’. Finally, we show how the pay–performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensationcontracts and how they are set.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Long Range Planning
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance
ID Code: 53993
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 26 Jun 2012 11:08
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2014 23:24
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/53993

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