Conyon, Martin and Peck, S and Sadler, G (2001) Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK. Strategic Management Journal, 22 (8). pp. 805-815. ISSN 0143-2095Full text not available from this repository.
This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Strategic Management Journal|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||executive compensation ; tournament theory|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
|Deposited On:||26 Jun 2012 10:20|
|Last Modified:||28 Oct 2016 02:59|
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