Conyon, Martin and Read, L (2006) A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (3). pp. 645-659. ISSN 0929-1199Full text not available from this repository.
Why do firms allow their executives to accept outsidedirectorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outsidedirectorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Corporate Finance|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Corporate governance ; Firm performance ; Boards of directors|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
|Deposited On:||26 Jun 2012 09:40|
|Last Modified:||24 Feb 2017 05:57|
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