Lancaster EPrints

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Conyon, Martin and Peck, S and Sadler, G (2009) Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23 (1). pp. 43-55. ISSN 1558-9080

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Academy of Management Perspectives
Uncontrolled Keywords: EXECUTIVE compensation ; BUSINESS consultants ; CHIEF executive officers ; EMPLOYEE fringe benefits
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance
ID Code: 53922
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 26 Jun 2012 09:32
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 26 Jul 2012 20:19
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/53922

Actions (login required)

View Item