Conyon, Martin and Peck, S and Sadler, G (2009) Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23 (1). pp. 43-55. ISSN 1558-9080Full text not available from this repository.
Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Academy of Management Perspectives|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||EXECUTIVE compensation ; BUSINESS consultants ; CHIEF executive officers ; EMPLOYEE fringe benefits|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
|Deposited On:||26 Jun 2012 09:32|
|Last Modified:||30 Mar 2017 04:42|
Actions (login required)