Conyon, Martin and He, Lerong (2011) Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17 (4). pp. 1158-1175. ISSN 0929-1199Full text not available from this repository.
We investigate executivecompensation and corporategovernance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executivecompensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US–China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Corporate Finance|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||China ; Executive compensation ; Equity incentives|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
|Deposited On:||25 Jun 2012 14:38|
|Last Modified:||19 Dec 2013 15:09|
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