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Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

De Silva, Dakshina G. (2005) Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation. Economic Inquiry, 43 (1). pp. 55-66. ISSN 1465-7295

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Abstract

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Economic Inquiry
Uncontrolled Keywords: Auctions ; Synergies ; Procurement
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 52458
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 06 Feb 2012 16:52
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2014 23:03
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/52458

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