De Silva, Dakshina G. and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2005) Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4). pp. 183-201.Full text not available from this repository.
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the earlier auctions are more likely to participate in later auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.
|Journal or Publication Title:||International Journal of Industrial Organization|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Auctions ; Procurement|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Economics|
|Deposited On:||06 Feb 2012 16:36|
|Last Modified:||09 Apr 2014 23:03|
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