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Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Dunne, Timothy and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2002) Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. Economics Letters, 76 (2). pp. 239-244. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Economics Letters
Uncontrolled Keywords: Asymmetric auctions
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 52454
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 06 Feb 2012 16:14
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2014 23:03
Identification Number:
URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/52454

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