De Silva, Dakshina G. and Dunne, Timothy and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2002) Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. Economics Letters, 76 (2). pp. 239-244. ISSN 0165-1765Full text not available from this repository.
We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Economics Letters|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Asymmetric auctions|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Economics|
|Deposited On:||06 Feb 2012 16:14|
|Last Modified:||09 Apr 2014 23:03|
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