Cooper, Rachel (2007) Aristotelian accounts of disease:what are they good for? Philosophical Papers, 36 (3). pp. 427-442. ISSN 0556-8641Full text not available from this repository.
In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which we think about the harms that afflict human beings. While they cannot offer an account of ‘disease’ they can offer an account of ‘harm’-and this it turns out, is ultimately of greater importance.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophical Papers|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited On:||08 Nov 2011 15:22|
|Last Modified:||26 Jul 2012 19:45|
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