Opportunities and contradictions: The policy paradox of entrepreneurial education and university-business engagement since 1960

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by
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Writing in 1987, after the emergence of the so-called 'enterprise culture', Allan Gibb commented:
'the Entrepreneur in the UK has become the god (or goddess) of current UK ideology and a leading actor in the theatre of the new economics.' (quoted Coffield 1991, p. 59)

This was not reflected in attitudes towards entrepreneurship education and what became known as outreach activity, in many universities through to the 2000s. Despite a sustained growth of both entrepreneurship education and outreach, 'academic entrepreneurship' was often viewed as part of a 'heroic resistance movement' within the university, of 'partisans of enterprise' battling as mavericks in an entrenched academic culture (Lockett and Robinson 2007; Gibb, 2002: 236). This sense of being an embattled minority is also evidenced by the sense of distance between the practice, objectives and experience of the real world and that in academic ivory towers. This prompted this article, to provide an analysis why enterprise activity has so often been viewed as peripheral in UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).

Engagement between higher education and business, by English universities, had its origins in the establishment of the nineteenth century civic universities and was reinforced during each of the World Wars, through to the 1960s. (Sanderson 1972) Understanding attitudes to enterprise and entrepreneurship education among conventional academics, in UK universities since 1960 and especially since the 1970s, requires them to be placed within the complex set of forces shaping
British industrial and education policy. This article explores how the combination of challenging economic conditions and political change, from the 1960s to the 1990s, helped shape attitudes within and outside universities to enterprise and entrepreneurship in often perverse ways. This was especially so during the Thatcher years, when policy was inspired by the academic work of Martin Weiner and Correlli Barnett and the 'enterprise culture' was championed by a deeply anti-university government. (Riddell, 1989:) Over the last twenty years enterprise and the encouragement of entrepreneurship have been a major element of UK government industrial policy. To complement this, successive governments have given priority to developing closer ties between higher education and business, through technology transfer and commercialisation, on the one hand, and entrepreneurship education and enterprise support on the other. (Della Guista and King 2006;)

This article addresses the forces shaping attitudes to entrepreneurship education and outreach activity from three inter-related perspectives- macro, institutional and personal. It begins with a long term overview of shifts in economic, social and policy forces which provides the macro context for the analysis. Episodes such as the Thatcher higher education cuts of the 1980s can be described as ‘moments in history’ which had far reaching and often unpredicted implications for culture and attitudes of individual universities and those working within them. Equally, contemporary interviews are also ‘moments in history’ providing fleeting snapshots of perceptions at a particular point in time. But, they are nonetheless shaped by the past, making an understanding of the wider history surrounding themes vital for their interpretation.

The culture and attitudes of any institution are shaped by history and this may affect absorptive capacity. (Cohen and Leviathan, 1990). This article explores the way in which the responses to policy initiatives played out in differing ways within individual universities and the implications for understanding shifting attitudes to entrepreneurship education and outreach. A further dimension of the article relates to the way the personal and shared history of those involved in engaging with business in HEIs can affect their responses. We will examine the ways history need not always be a constraint. Rather than staying trapped by their past, networked
individuals may engage in 'mindful deviation' and in so doing create new innovative pathways. (Garud and Karnøe 2001:6; Bessant, Birkinshaw, and Delbridge 2004: 32-3)

Path creation has much in common with opportunity recognition by the innovating entrepreneur who identifies, assesses and combines opportunities. It is entrepreneurial imagination that transforms the shadow of the past into an inspiration for the future. In the context of entrepreneurship education and outreach, such 'mindful deviation' inevitably involves boundary crossing, whether within universities or between universities and business. To be successful it involves individuals engaging with new worlds, fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991, Wenger 1999) which typically have differing practices, 'rules of the game', forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986), languages and routines.

The article therefore addresses a number of interrelated issues, which are set against the long term historical context of the changing interplay of government-university-industry relations since the Second World War, and especially since 1960. Firstly we ask how policy changes have affected the relationship between universities and industry. This leads to the second question of how these changes affected attitudes towards entrepreneurship education and outreach activity within universities since the 1980s. Moving from the macro to the micro level, we use case studies to consider the processes which individual HEIs used to respond to the opportunities offered by government policy. In this context we explore the social processes and the forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986), especially social capital, which helped and inhibited the development of first entrepreneurship education and, from 1997, outreach. In assessing these processes, we examine how they were shaped by both the history of the HEI and of the personal histories of individual players within them. The use of social theories based on history, especially communities of practice, deepens understanding of the influence of the past on institutions and on the individuals working within them. This provides us with the tools to understand why and how history underpins both new innovative pathways, as well as bringing
the potential for 'lock in'.

The combination of historical analysis and methodology with social theory helps us identify how and why choices were made by universities to pursue entrepreneurship education or outreach. It also provides the opportunity to use history to appreciate contemporary experience of entrepreneurship education and outreach. The three case studies of Lancaster, Salford and Manchester Metropolitan University were chosen as examples of a 1960s university, a previous College of Advanced Technology (CAT) and a post 1992 university. We undertook 15 semi structured interviews personnel in these institutions and other stakeholders, including employees in RDAs. These were set against secondary sources for each institution and against its history.

The article is divided into four sections. The history of policy change relating to HEI, government, industry relations - the so called Triple Helix, provides the changing context for the study and is reviewed in the first section. The second section identifies . This demonstrates the links between theory based upon history and the methodology of the article. The third section identifies the theoretical tools used to understand the relationship between institutional and individual histories and the shaping of attitudes to ‘mindful deviation’ in the shape of entrepreneurial education and outreach activity. It focuses on three case studies of the universities of Lancaster, Salford and Manchester Metropolitan. In the fourth section conclusions are drawn.

I The Historical Context : The source of opportunities

The UK has a long history of successful community based knowledge exchange, linked to largely informal social relations, dating back to the industrial revolution and stretching forward to the 1960s.(Sanderson, 1972) In such a context the idea that education has community serving as well as academic objectives can be taken as given. The process becomes much more complicated when, as occurred after 1945, governments become involved. In this context successful knowledge
exchange depends upon the building of trust between universities, business and government, where worlds, practices, expectations and motivations are often very different. Relationships and understanding are often complex, with countervailing forces at work. This paper focuses on these relationships since the 1960s, to help make sense of the barriers to knowledge exchange which can occur within institutions.

The Second World War significantly deepened links between UK universities, industry and the government, and public awareness of the importance of university science research to the war effort. This especially focused on radar and atomic energy, but more generally research laboratories were taken over and university scientists redeployed into government and scientific work (Sanderson 1972:340-347). The tight government-industry, industry-university contact that emerged during the Second World War helped to develop a set of close, personal relationships which were of crucial importance during the post war period.

Scientists, such as Patrick Blackett, a leading physicist with socialist sympathies first met Harold Wilson, the future Labour leader, in the 1940s. Blackett had a remarkable influence on Labour party thinking in the 1950s. He was instrumental in placing science at the heart of socialism in Harold Wilson's 1964 election agenda (Kirby, 2003:91-117; 315-25). He and other scientists including, John Desmond Bernal, Bertram Vivian Bowden, later principal of Manchester College of Science and Technology, C.P Snow and Charles Carter, later the first Vice Chancellor of Lancaster University, met regularly at the Reform Club. They discussed how to build scientific and technological policy to address the supply side weaknesses of the post war British economy and the widening productivity gap with the United States. The expansion of higher education lay at the heart of Blackett and his followers' vision, and he favoured using the University Grants Committee as a means of channelling money into basic research. (Horner 1993:51) They were often joined by leading Labour party members, but Blackett's major influence was on Wilson, whose conception of the 'scientific revolution' was about much more than subsidising science. As C.P Snow observed science became 'a part of and compatible with the socialist conception of life' (Horner 1993:52-3). This thinking was at the very heart
of Wilson's 1963 'White Heat' of technology speech at the party conference, when Wilson's election winning climax was to conclude: 'In all our plans for the future, we are refining and we are re-stating our Socialism in terms of the scientific revolution, but that revolution cannot become a reality unless we are prepared to make far reaching changes in economic and social attitudes which permeate our whole system of society. The Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or outdated methods on either side of industry...In the Cabinet room and the boardroom alike those charged with control of our affairs must be ready to think and speak in the language of our scientific age'. (Quoted Pimlott 1992:302) A profound faith in the link between science, technology and economic and social well-being, lay at the heart of 1960s Labour policy and linked higher education and industrial policy more strongly than at any other period of the twentieth century. The vision was therefore of a classless technocratic future. Armed with the 1963 Robbins Report inherited from the Conservative administration, the 1964 Labour Government combined plans for an unprecedented expansion of higher education, with the establishment of Mintech to control science and industrial policy in 1964 (Coopey 1993:103) By linking wider access to higher education to interventionist economic and industrial planning, the Government aimed to confront both their social and economic agenda. Between 1961-2 and 1967-8 student numbers (undergraduate and post graduate) grew from 113,143 to 200,121 outstripping the Robbins projections. (Sanderson, 1972:365)

This was partly achieved by growth of the civic universities and when a number of the former Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATS) including Battersea (University of Surrey), Aston, Loughborough, Brunel, Salford and Northampton (City) became universities. The establishment of the 7 new universities of Sussex, York, Canterbury, Lancaster, East Anglia, Essex and Warwick was the most visible sign of growth and became a symbol of 1960s public sector expenditure. They were established as a challenge to the elitism of the civics and the ancient universities, to better prepare students for the world of work and break down barriers between disciplines, especially between arts and science. (Perkin, 1991: 296) Higher education expansion was not restricted to university expansion because in 1966
27 technical colleges became polytechnics. The Open University, established in 1970, was the education initiative of which Wilson was most proud (Sanderson, 1972:360-88).

It is easy to assume that the long, if shifting, history of close relationships between industry and universities would have provided the foundation for a sustained and developing relationship between industry and higher education, an objective at the heart of government policy in this period. There is some evidence of existing links being initially sustained and sometimes strengthened. Of the new universities only Essex, Warwick and Lancaster really demonstrated intent to engage with industry. Warwick was the only 1960s university where a strong case for the institution was made by local business stakeholders and was the most industrially orientated of the new universities. The industrialist Lord Rootes was the first Chancellor and the university set up a range of endowed chairs, as well as close co-operation with the automobile industry (Bobe, 2002:91).

Clearly the intent of the Wilson government in the 1960s was to foster university/industry links. Yet by the 1980s and 1990s the gap between higher education and industry was in many instances far wider than it had been in the past, while a chasm had emerged between many in universities and the Thatcher Government. To understand why the initiatives of the 1960s failed, it is important to place them in the wider economic, social, cultural and political environment.

After a brief period of high level of expenditure in the 1960s, universities suffered from nearly 25 years of expenditure stringency and cuts lasting through until the 2000s. Part of the motivation for Wilson's technocratic policies had been the supply-side weaknesses of the British economy, revealed in poor international competitive performance and balance of payment deficits during the 1950s and 1960s. Therein lay one of the inherent weaknesses of the policy, because linking long term economic planning, with short term fiscal policies and an overvalued pound was doomed to failure. In the first place, fiscal manipulation exacerbated rather than improved economic performance, leading to cries of short termism throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. (Pollard, 1982: 124) But the real problems came in
the 1970s when a combination of rising unemployment and inflation prompted the Barber boom of 1972-3. The most infamous 'go' cycle of them all, a year ahead of the Oil Crisis, was the death knell of Keynesian demand management and heralded a period of confused, crisis driven policy formulation by both the Tory and Labour governments in the 1970s. (Rose 1994: 129) Stagnating growth and inflation, combined with sharply rising government borrowing in 1972-3 and again in 1974 (under the Labour Government), led public borrowing to rise to £12 billion or 10% of GDP. Combined with industrial relations problems, this had profound implications for international confidence in sterling. This led the then Chancellor Dennis Healey to approach the International Monetary Fund for temporary support in 1976. The cost of this support was public expenditure cuts, including universities and the funding of university research beginning in the autumn of 1976. (Cairncross, 1992:206-225)

Part of the motivation for Harold Wilson's 'white heat' of technology speech in 1963 had been Britain's declining economic performance. By the mid 1970s all faith in the policies related to that 'moment in history', including university expansion was lost. Between 1966 and 1981 manufacturing employment fell from 9.2m to 6m. For 25 years Britain had been in a perpetual state of impending economic crisis, but in the 1970s the collapse of manufacturing industry became a core political issue. Tory and Labour politicians became increasingly attracted to the work of Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis. They argued that Britain's manufacturing industry was being 'crowded out' by high taxation, and by 'unproductive' investment and employment in services, especially public services. (Kirby, 1981: 107-8)

Labour party support for stringency was largely pragmatic. However, public expenditure and the public sector was seen as a prime cause of Britain's ills by Margaret Thatcher's Tories and cuts were pursued with evangelical zeal from 1979. Economic decline, Thatcher believed would only be reversed by a renewal of spirit 'a recovery of self confidence and self respect'. Challenging the nation's sclerosis involved weakening trade unions, nationalised industries, and by challenging and undermining established values and attitudes and cutting public expenditure. (Riddell, 1989: 7)

All areas of the public sector were savaged, but universities exceptionally so. In
December 1980 the Government announced a reduction of £30m in expenditure on universities, amounting to a 3.5% cut in recurrent grant in 1980-81 with a further 5% cut in both 1982-3 and 1983-4. Described in an article the following March by education minister Rhodes Boyson as 'Pruning in the pursuit of excellence' (The Guardian, March 31 1981) these cuts were combined with significant shifts in funding arrangements, the management, priorities and incentive structures within universities. This especially saw the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise in 1986 as a mechanism to allocate resources by assessing the quality of research. This became a major financial driver of universities through the 1990s and was linked closely to both internal incentive structures and the culture of universities. (Henkel, 2000:115-6)

The Tories were able to achieve the high level of cuts, without incurring the wrath of voters, partly because universities were an easy target, (Trow 2006: 77) and by the 1980s they had few friends. Faith in higher education had dwindled, not least because of the simplistic notion that they had failed to deliver on the hopes of the 1960s. For many the new plate-glass universities were seen as isolated ivory towers epitomized by the student unrest of the 1960s and early 1970s, by images of sexual freedom and drug taking. Scandalized local people, in often small provincial towns, took many years to forget 'well heeled middle class students demanding rights they did not have in the factories and offices. Local businesses were offended by publications like Warwick University Ltd.' (Perkin 1991:303)

In addition, while middle class Tory parents were always outraged by cuts in government funding of student grants, cuts in capital budgets, efficiency savings in universities and erosion of salary differentials of academics with other professions went largely unchallenged. (Trow 2006:77)

The origins of what might be described as entrepreneurship education pre-dates the Thatcher era and an introductory course in entrepreneurship was introduced by Manchester Business School in 1971. This was followed by similar courses at Sheffield Polytechnic, Durham University, London Business School and Cranfield. (Watkins and Stone, 1999: 32-389) The expansion of entrepreneurship education
was, however, a significant but, as will emerge, sometimes contradictory legacy of the Thatcher years. Cuts in public expenditure were a key element of Thatcherism, while another was the building of entrepreneurial values. Drawing heavily on the academic work of Corelli Barnett and Martin Wiener, Lord Young and Sir Keith Joseph identified 'lack of enterprise' as one of the key failings of the post-war British economy. (Riddell, 1989: 71) For Lord Young in the 1980s, a major problem lay in the gap between education and business in Britain. Thereafter, the promotion of an 'enterprise culture' gathered political momentum. In the later 1980s it was part of a campaign to counter rising unemployment as traditional manufacturing declined and this provided opportunities for course development (Della-Giusta and King, 2006; Gibb and Hannon, 2007). In 1982 enterprise education was introduced into schools followed by 'Enterprise in Higher Education' in 1987. Grants were offered to embed enterprise into university curricula and these 'raise[d] fundamental questions about learning and teaching and the nature of the curriculum and about the culture and ethos of higher education' (Training Agency, 1989, quoted Tasker and Packman, 1994:152).

By 1999 38% of British HEIs offered courses in entrepreneurship (Levy 1999; Mason 2000). Interest in enterprise education was not confined to the UK, however, and was growing across Europe (OECD, 1989). This of course gathered momentum in the 1990s, in central and eastern Europe, with the break up of the Soviet Union and the spread of greater economic liberalism. (Anderson and Jack, 1999:189) The growth of entrepreneurship education was most rapid in the United States, where it can be said to have originated. By 2005 almost every university in the United States offered some course or programme in entrepreneurship (Greene et al, 2004; Katz, 2003) In the UK the 1980s experiments were the precursors of many subsequent government funded initiatives, first under the Major government and then, after 1997, under New Labour, for government to promote closer ties with business. While designed to embed enterprise across the university curriculum, this funding became associated
first with the development of enterprise education and later with outreach activity.

If the development of entrepreneurship education was associated with an era of stringency, the increasing emphasis of outreach activity in government policy between 1997 and 2010, occurred during a period of increased public spending, akin to the 1960s. Growing emphasis by the Blair government on policies encouraging knowledge and technology transfer was informed in part by a visit to the United States, by the then Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principles (CVCP), in 1998. The aims of the visit were to:

've to learn first hand about the experience of universities prominent in technology transfer, to build links and networks and to give UK Technology Transfer a boost by disseminating lessons learned.'(CVCP 1999: 5)

The idea that knowledge and technology transfer are a key route to innovation and international competitive advantage became firmly embedded in the policies of the New Labour government from 1997. A number of UK Government reports sought to increase awareness of the importance of knowledge transfer most noticeably the DTI’s Innovation Report (DTI 2003), the Lambert Review (Lambert 2003), HM Science and Technology Committee reports (House of Commons 2006) the Government Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014 (HM Treasury 2004) and most recently the HM Treasury Report The Race to the Top (Sainsbury 2007). For over a decade there was unprecedented interest, from government at regional, national, European and international levels in involving HEIs in KT with industry. This included a sustained interest in entrepreneurship education and a 2009 report concluded:

'While education is one of the most important foundations for economic development, entrepreneurship is a major driver of innovation and economic growth. Entrepreneurship education plays an essential role in shaping attitudes, skills and culture- from primary level up. (quoted Martinez et al 2009: 9)
II History and Attitudes: The source of contradictions and incentives

The preceding overview has demonstrated the policy initiatives leading to the considerable growth of both entrepreneurship education and outreach activity in the UK since the 1980s. Yet in 2002, at the very height of New Labour’s drive to increase the level of business engagement, the status of entrepreneurship education was still fragile, with debate continuing around the respectability of entrepreneurship as an academic discipline (Gibb, 2002:233-66). Similarly research on the standing of outreach activity in UK universities in the early 2000s concluded that whilst business engagement was a growing activity, it was perceived as the work of ‘mavericks’ by many conventional academics. (Lockett and Robinson, 2007). In many institutions, therefore, the so-called Triple Helix Model where, through the interplay of universities, industry and government, universities teach and research and undertake a ‘third mission’ of contributing to the economy has been a sometimes uneasy compromise.

Explaining this apparent contradiction involves understanding the forces shaping attitudes to engaging with business, that have developed inside universities. Sources of the contradiction range from a culture of suspicion of working with business in universities per se, to viewing entrepreneurship education as directly related to the values Thatcherism. It is also important to consider the way perceptions of the role of universities are formed, as well as the attitudes to new disciplines. In addition, incentive structures and the internal organisation and power structures of universities are also important considerations. All of these forces are shaped by levels of trust and appreciation of the meaning of behaviours, routines and languages and these are, in turn, underpinned both by history and social processes.

There are strong reasons for setting the analysis of policies designed to promote
an enterprise culture and entrepreneurship education against the background of the cuts and managerial changes in universities in the 1980s and 1990s. The cuts and the twenty year shift in government policy towards universities were to have profound and sometimes perverse implications for the culture and attitudes within universities and also in their attitudes to business, that last through to the present day (Tasker and Packman 1994, 150-162). The impact of and reaction to the cuts and managerial changes varied significantly between institutions, with variations within the established university sector, among the plate-glass universities and amongst the ex-polytechnics. It undoubtedly influenced attitudes to entrepreneurship education leading Gibb to observe:

‘One of big difficulties of enterprise education in UK is dealing with the political and ideological overtones- seen as the arm of the 1980s Conservative government - the term 'Enterprise Culture' is widely used without being defined - by politicians - it is part of the rhetoric and there have been a spate of publications- Indeed some academics have made broad criticisms of enterprise and associated education as if they are somehow a systematic embodiment or extension of a programme of ideological and political indoctrination.’ (Gibb, 1993:25)

While Gibb was clearly frustrated by the political undertones associated with the development of entrepreneurship education and wanted to move beyond it, there is no denying some cynicism surrounded it. (Coffield, 1990-1 : 59-78; Ritchie, 1991: 20) The rise of ‘managerialism’ and the encouragement of more ‘entrepreneurial’ behaviour by academics was by no means universally welcomed. (Becher, 1989, 10-14)

Suspicion of the teaching of entrepreneurship and later of outreach activity, however, goes deeper than the legacy of the Thatcher era in the UK, and is related, in part, to the growing pains experienced by any new discipline. In the 1970s the experiments in entrepreneurship education were largely carried out by
isolated individuals usually in the new business schools. In many cases the courses were developed despite, rather than because, of the attitudes within institutions (Watkins and Stone, 1999:383; Wilson, 1992: 77-8).

During the 1980s and 1990s two kinds of courses in entrepreneurship developed in the UK, those which revolved around what entrepreneurship is and courses for entrepreneurs. Since entrepreneurs are action oriented this has shaped the way entrepreneurship is taught; entrepreneurs learn by doing, trial and error, problem solving and discovery (Deakins and Freel, 1998; Young and Sexton, 1997). Opportunity identification is also an important element of entrepreneurship education (DeTienne and Chandler, 2004). While for others it should reflect the entrepreneurial mind-set and “fit” people with the skills they need to be able to take decisive action based on considered responses to the situation at hand (Shepherd, Douglas and Fitzsimmons, 2008).

From the 1980s onwards, as entrepreneurship education spread in the UK, there was an ongoing debate around whether or not entrepreneurship could or should be be taught. The debate centred around the focus on experiential, as opposed to formal learning, with suspicion amongst the academic establishment that entrepreneurship was not and could not be ‘learned behaviour’. (Matlay and Mitra, 2002: 13) The position was summed up by Levy in his 1999 report: 'The English were against and found that entrepreneurs arise by themselves, just like fluff. The Germans were for and found that entrepreneurs are created through goal oriented and hard work on well structured courses. The French discussed the question and found pros and cons.' (Levy, 1999:5)

The scepticism around entrepreneurship education can be traced in part to the newness of the discipline and the suspicion with which new areas of study are often viewed by established academics. This stems, in part, from the growing specialisation of academic disciplines since the Second World War. This trend has turned boundaries into barriers, not just between arts and science, but within and between social sciences and management. Such specialisation spawned new
Disciplines, and has meant that understanding and communication between new and old is limited and reflected in increasingly ‘tribal’ behaviour: 'It is around the disciplines that faculty sub cultures increasingly form. As the work and the points of view grow more specialised men [and women] in different disciplines have fewer things in common, in their background and daily problems. They have less impulse to interact with one another and less ability to do so... Men of the sociological tribe rarely visit the land of the physicists and have little idea what they do over there. If the sociologists were to step into the building occupied by the English department, they would encounter the cold stares if not slingshots of the hostile natives... the disciplines exist as separate estates, with distinctive sub cultures’. (Clark, 1963 quoted Beecher, 1989: 45)

Disciplines have, therefore, developed in silos with particular language, rituals and behaviours, associated with a shared history and community of practice.

For entrepreneurship, developing in British business schools, particular barriers to acceptance and understanding of entrepreneurship education have been identified. These include an increasing gap between business school research and the world of business, as business schools themselves fought for academic respectability through research excellence (Locke, 1989: 184). The relative tardiness in the development of business schools in Britain, delayed until the 1960s, has itself been interpreted as in part a reflection of a suspicion of working with business. But it was a two way process and business did not typically take British academics seriously. In addition, the firm intellectual and scientific basis of business school subjects found, in the United States and Germany, was not initially replicated in Britain. So certainly through to the 1970s and 1980s, “there [was] a dark suspicion that... the rest of the British university’s scientific community does not think business studies are respectable’ and debates abounded around the intellectual rigour of the business school (Locke, 1989:146;184; Caswill and Wensley, 2007:298). It has been argued that this in turn led to a quest for research excellence which further separated the research of business schools from the world of business in ways that worked against entrepreneurship education. (Binks, et al 2006:7).This
was especially true by 1992, when the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE),
‘had become one of the most powerful influences on the senior management
in universities and department based academics alike’. (Henkel, 2000:43)
Interestingly it was not until RAE 2001 that Entrepreneurship was separately listed
under Business and Management. The panel was largely dismissive of the overall
quality of UK entrepreneurship research at this point, confirming some of the
scepticism already discussed:
‘Of the outputs submitted to the RAE, a low proportion was of international
standard, and less than half of national standard’. (RAE, 2001: 1)

What was revealing, however, was that it was observed that leading
business schools had entrepreneurship provision with the suggestion that
growing ‘legitimacy for discipline will involve career academics who can span
academe and business [and by implication research and teach it]. (Levie, 1999:15)

The considerable cultural gaps in business school specialisms makes achieving
inter-disciplinarity, of the kind needed in entrepreneurship, challenging (Binks et
al, 2006:1-18). The development of entrepreneurship as a discipline, in the UK,
through the emergence of an ‘invisible college’ of academic journals, professional
organisations and peer review, has been crucial to legitimation. For example,
the evolution of the Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship (ISBE)
from its early beginnings, shortly after the Bolton report on small business in
1971, to its current position at the leading edge of entrepreneurship teaching
and research with a major annual conference, has been a crucial dimension. (Watkins and Stone, 1999: 384; ISBE website: http://www.isbe.org.uk/history).
ISBE undoubtedly spans the worlds of academia and business practitioner, thus
facilitating boundary crossing between these worlds, creating opportunities for
discourse and knowledge sharing.

Yet the very building of a new discipline itself creates its own barriers and
exclusivity, leading potential to lost opportunities for collaboration. For example,
despite having much to offer the study of entrepreneurship and management,
business history has developed in a separate silo, which has resulted in the spread
of influential theories based on ill-informed understandings of the past”. (Jones, 2008) The origins of this separation are historically embedded, reinforced by the emergence of distinctive communities of practice and hence norms of behaviour, priorities and languages between business historians those in even near neighbours such as entrepreneurship. Put simply the differing worlds, priorities and ‘invisible colleges’ occupied by business historians and those studying entrepreneurship from a management perspective help keep potentially complementary interests separate.

Interest in the role of universities became especially potent during the early years of the Blair Government, when the growing range of policy initiatives emphasised the importance of interaction between business and HEIs. (Rinne and Koivula, 2005: 94). Yet a rhetoric encouraging engagement needs to be set against a longer term set of influences on the role of British universities, if attitudes to outreach activity are to be understood. History shaped expectations around what should be studied and who should or should not be involved. Traditionally the ancient universities had a disdain for technical and commercial education and ‘prided themselves on their lack of practicality’( Locke, 1989:4-5). The shifts in the British higher education provision from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, saw changes in its subject base and scale, to better reflect the needs of an industrial nation (Sanderson, 1972). Yet, although there was an initial embedding of universities within their industrial communities, the principle objectives of universities emerged as teaching and research, rather than a mission of economic development or a ‘service role’ for universities as was common both in the United States and Continental Europe. This distinction especially impressed the CVCP visitors to the United States in 1998 and they reported:

‘We were struck by the way US Universities ( including those with strong income streams) saw their work in technology transfer primarily as a contribution to the public interest of civic role of the university rather than as income generation.’ (CVCP, 1999: 7-8)
The origins of the public service role for many American universities can be traced at least to the final third of the nineteenth century onwards American universities developed a ‘public service’ role, which in many cases was strengthened by the interaction of academic researchers and business and underpinned and reinforced by a range of legislative changes. Beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862 which provided the basis of the Land Grant universities, many American universities became linked to the economic well being of their communities, a role that became embedded in their culture and eventually in incentives structures, in ways rarely found in Britain. The relationship between scientific research, business engagement and the development of venture capital stimulating technology transfer, also proved synergistic, especially after the Second World War. They contributed to the development of so-called ‘entrepreneurial universities’ such as MIT and Stanford, while the Bayh Dole Act of 1980 which institutionalise technology transfer across the American university system, by passing the Intellectual Property Rights of federally funded research to universities, in an effort to revive the competitiveness of the ailing economy (Etzkowitz, et al: 326; Etzkowitz, 2002: 15).

These trends were not widely shared by those in British universities after 1960. Despite the closeness of government- industry-university relationships during the Second World War conditions played out in different ways and without the emergence of equivalent synergistic relations which were witnessed in the United States. This is not the place for a detailed analysis for the reasons for the differences in attitudes to the role of universities in Britain and the United States, but rather to consider the consequences. Values within British HEIs have been shaped by history, shared experience and moulded by incentives and power structures which within institutions. Since the 1980s, academic identity in Britain, has been further shaped by the Research Assessment Exercise which has extraordinary symbolic and actual impact over attitudes within universities. (Henkel, 2000: 116) Almost a footnote in the 2001 the ‘end-user’ reported concerns about the limited extent to which industry and commerce were disengaged from
the national research agenda and the limited study of small and medium sized enterprises and entrepreneurship. (RAE,2001:8)

III Institutional cases: the present - social and historical embeddedness and change

Behaviour within HEIs is shaped by the external environment, but also by their own histories, which influences their culture and values and these develop through time. This section of the paper takes a case study approach to understanding current practices in three universities, with differing histories and cultures, in the North West of England. The universities of Salford, Manchester Metropolitan and Lancaster, are all post 1960 universities, all engaged in entrepreneurship education and/or outreach activity. They were chosen for variety of responses found in such a small geographic area. They provide the context for examining how present attitudes within three very different universities have been formed.

Table 2  Summary of entrepreneurship education and outreach activity at University of Salford, Manchester Metropolitan University and Lancaster University in 2008

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<th>Description</th>
<th>University of Salford</th>
<th>Manchester Metropolitan University</th>
<th>Lancaster University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Post 1960 University (ex CAT)</td>
<td>Post 1992 University World class reputation in specialist areas (especially Art and Design)</td>
<td>Founded 1964, 'Plate-glass’ university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Creative; entrepreneurial; philosophical commitment to this type of engagement</td>
<td>World class excellence</td>
<td>Research excellence (especially post 1985-6)</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area of Engagement</td>
<td>City region (area of urban regeneration)</td>
<td>National and International</td>
<td>Across the geographical region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of Engagement</td>
<td>Primary sector; KTPs x 10; mini KTPs; Media City; Creative industries; tech-transfer; medical; sustainability; social projects</td>
<td>Close industry links; tech transfer,</td>
<td>Regional development funded projects; spin out companies; incubation; tech-transfer; KTP x 1; Innovation Voucher; ESRC Entrepreneur in Residence, ESRC Innovator in Residence, entrepreneurship education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Pro Vice Chancellor (worked in ICI, civil engineering) KT Practitioners, academics</td>
<td>Academics; KT practitioners</td>
<td>Fixed term KT workers/professionals; Non-academic outreach directors; few but prominent academic champions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership Top down (corporate management team) academic enterprise support division</td>
<td>Research-led by academics supported by tech-transfer Enterprise center support for graduate enterprise; Cross faculty collaboration</td>
<td>Centralised through University House and Faculty specific/ compartmentalised, IEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>Spin out companies; Patents links to teaching and learning</td>
<td>Patents; Cutting edge; collaborative; novel</td>
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Main Findings

Sources: Interviews

Table 1 summarises the types of outreach and entrepreneurship education undertaken in each institution highlighting differences in experience, location and type of engagement and leadership. In this section we analyse a number of interviews and case study documentation, including institutional websites and historical accounts to understand behaviour and concentrate on apparent motivations, approaches and strategies towards entrepreneurship education and outreach. Such an approach highlights a number of issues relating to what is valued within these institutions. We use an analytical framework which is informed by Bourdieu’s concepts of field (1991) and forms of capital (1986) to explore the nature of each institution in terms of what is privileged and valued in each and which we suggest shape the outcome of their strategy towards outreach and entrepreneurial education in practice. The analysis focuses on distinctive features of each ‘field’ and conceptualises them in terms forms of capital valued.

Bourdieu 1991 defines the concept of ‘field’ (le champ, les champs sociaux as ‘a kind of arena in which people play a game which has certain rules, rules which are different from those of the game that is played in the adjacent space’ (Bourdieu 1991:215). He argues that each field or ‘autonomous universe’ constitutes a social space where the ways in which people act and interact can be very different from the ways that they act and interact in other fields. For Bourdieu, a field consists of ‘a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital)’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:16). So Bourdieu uses the concept of field to refer to a social and historical space in which individuals interact within the parameters or boundaries of the particular rules of the game that regulate the ways individuals behave and interact (Bourdieu 1991:215). However these rules are neither explicit nor codified and the field is dynamic and so forms of capital (see below) necessary in order to negotiate and position oneself in that space are also ‘dynamic and arbitrary’ (Dika and Singh 2002:33).
Bourdieu argues that individuals need to acquire different forms of capital in order
to negotiate and establish their positions within a particular field. Thus, although
very important (and perhaps ultimately the most important), economic capital
(material possessions and so on) is not the only kind of capital that functions in
the social world. Bourdieu makes it clear that other types of capital, for example
cultural capital (knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, as exemplified
by educational or technical qualifications), symbolic capital (accumulated prestige
or honour; see Thompson 1981:14), and social capital (the networks a person
can draw on as a resource) are also significant in getting on and getting by both
professionally and personally. These forms of capital are interrelated, although, as
Bourdieu intimates, all forms of capital can ultimately be converted to economic
capital (Calhoun et al. 1993). For example, the more social capital someone has,
the more likely it is that he/she will get a better-paid job or promotion through, for
example, personal connections. Conversely, Bourdieu also argues, different types of
capital can be acquired from economic capital (Bourdieu 1986:252).
Salient aspects in shaping institutional profiles include physical situation, age
and present/past purpose of the institution or it’s component parts, the role of
leadership at different the levels of the organisation, networks, funding/cuts,
teaching interface, relation to research. can all have an affect on the shaping of the
field, the practices within the field in this case the types of activities undertaken.

Important insights into differences in the experience of the three HEIs is provided
by placing them in both long and short term historical perspectives.

**Table 2 Summary History of Manchester Metropolitan University and
University of Salford**

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<th>Manchester Metropolitan University</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>University Charter signed</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester School of Design, 1838</td>
<td>Salford Working Men's College 1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School of Domestic Economy and Cookery, 1880</td>
<td>Pendleton Mechanics' Institution, 1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester College of Commerce, 1889</td>
<td>Royal Salford Technical Institute, 1896, Re-Named Royal Technical College, Salford, 1921</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training College of Domestic Economy, Didsbury 1919</td>
<td>Hollings College 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dalton College of Technology, 1964</td>
<td>Royal College of Advanced Technology, becomes University of Salford, 1967</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manchester Polytechnic established, 1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merger between</td>
<td>Merger between Manchester Polytechnic,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hollings College and</td>
<td>Hollings College and Didsbury College, 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Didsbury College, 1977</td>
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Sources: (Sanderson 1972:367-8; Gordon, 1975, Fowler and Wyke, 1993)

As Table 2 shows, the origins of both Manchester Metropolitan University and University of Salford were linked to the nineteenth century industrial needs of Manchester and its surroundings. More specifically, the driving force for the technical and industry colleges which sprang up from the 1830s onwards were concerns for the international competitiveness of British manufacturing industry. The constituent colleges of University of Salford were originally established to meet district’s needs for technical education. The transition from college to University began in 1957 when the Royal Technical College, Salford was one of 10 colleges to become colleges of Advanced Technology (CAT). (Stewart, 1989: 84). Its University Charter was signed in 1967, declaring its role as being,

‘to advance education and knowledge by teaching and research, and in doing so to foster an academic environment which is enterprising and applied to business and the professions, for the benefit of society at large’. (Salford University Charter, 1967)

Of the three universities in our study Salford’s charter brought it closest to the business community and yet Salford was hit hardest by the Thatcher cuts of the
1980s, facing a 44% cut in government funding. As Frank Allaun, MP for Salford East commented in the House of Commons debate on the cuts:

‘Is it not crazy, when the country is crying out for better technology, to impose the worst blows on the technological-based universities such as Salford, Aston, Bradford and others? Is the Secretary of State aware that 700 engineering places are to go at Salford as well as 500 other students and 550 staff? (House of Commons Debate, University Grants Committee Cuts, 1 December 1981)

Facing a cut of 44% was inevitably a defining moment in the history of the University of Salford. It was also a key factor shaping the University’s attitude to outreach activity. Such devastation with its attendant job losses, department closures and reduced student numbers was indeed a defining ‘moment in history’ for those left working in the university and for those who came later. Recovering from such a cataclysmic train of events has affected Salford University policy, attitudes and rhetoric for the last 25 years.

John Ashworth, University of Salford’s Vice Chancellor (1981-1990) described the atmosphere in 1981 graphically:

"I was told that there were some members of staff who just sat weeping in their offices and refused to come out. It was very difficult to convey the sheer depression of the place and my first job was to say... the other side of a threat is an opportunity." (John Ashworth quoted in BBC News Magazine, 3 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8545982.stm)

Salford’s survival depended upon its ability to re-invent itself financially and metaphorically. As Ashworth wryly observed the very survival of the university was in doubt, but the national prominence which this brought itself became part of the opportunity to reduce future reliance on government funding:

‘We would find ways to earn our living. An unprecedented PR campaign, the
Campaign to Promote the University of Salford (Campus), followed, paid for by local people and businesses. We even rattled tins in the street. When I finally arrived as vice-chancellor in the autumn, Campus had nearly 100 subscribing organisations and had evolved into the mechanism whereby the university solicited and organised industrial and other inputs into its activities. (John Ashworth, 26 November 2009, Times Higher Education: http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=409222)

This began the process of re-focusing and re-orientating University of Salford and catapulted the university into ‘academic enterprise’ of necessity. Today, 30 years after the Thatcher cuts, the university is presented on its website as ultra modern in terms of orientation and physical space. The buildings shown are plate glass high rise; the Victorian buildings belonging to the colleges of Royal Technical College, Salford, are not visible. The former Vice Chancellor’s office, in the spectacularly renovated show case Victorian fire station, has recently been sold off. This is presented very much as it was described by the pro Vice-Chancellor for Enterprise James Powell as the ‘A renaissance university’ on one hand recovering from devastating Thatcher cuts and on the other to be seen as a modern trend setter. This in some ways mirrors its physical surroundings, bombed during the Second World War, rejuvenated in the 1950s and 1960s followed by serious degeneration in the 1970s 1980s and 1990s. Since 2000, it has undergone a decade of serious urban regeneration with the development of Salford quays and the move of the BBC into the area in 2005.

The university is very much seen been able to make the most of all opportunities to quote one KT professional: ‘is in all our documentation. That is one of our unique selling points we are an enterprising university’ (academic, Salford university). This is therefore seen as a distinguishing feature, that most universities are in fact not ‘enterprising’ – how is this demonstrated and what is therefore valued? ‘We are enterprising; we had to find a way of using it; we are not a traditional university; we are good at it; and we think we have got a market edge. And so when we sat down we knew about demand as well as need.’ (academic, Salford
One specific feature is 'the a core academic enterprise support division or support department who work with the schools, the faculties and importantly the staff at the coal face to help them develop and support their ideas' (KT practitoner  Salford University)

The emphasis here is on research starting as a result of academic endeavours and working with academics themselves drawing on their core activities and finding ways help them develop their ideas to be of use to immediate and more distant outreach communities. This engagement with academics or ‘academic enterprise’ is an important feature of Salford’s activities and the feature of which the Pro VC is most proud, coining the phrase ‘enterprising’ academics to describe those who have engaged in this way towards creating ‘Universities for Modern Renaissance’, Powell (2007:323)

The role of leadership has played an important part in this story to the extent there is the question of possible void once this leadership is no longer in place – what infra structure is in place for the renaissance and enterprising activities to continue? Certainly the outgoing Pro Vice Chancellor for Enterprise believed:

‘even though we’re going through major change in this university the one thing that isn't changing is academic enterprise, its still, it's actually moved interestingly enough from being as it were the third stream of this university. I don't know whether you know that the [Higher Education Funding Council of England] (HEFC) have this project called third stream second mission. And I refuse to get any money in that third stream second mission because I refuse to have this university involved in a second mission. I argued that we only wanted this to be you know third area maybe, first mission.’

Even in Salford, where necessity had led to increased levels of engagement it could take time to build understanding:
What you have to do is you have to start a conversation with those professionals and totally convince them that they should change their way of working and the way they adopt new technology. And most academics won't do that. And what we've been trying over the last 10 years here is to help our own staff learn different ways of working.’ (Salford PVC)

For Manchester Metropolitan University there are striking synergies between outreach, entrepreneurship education and art and design. Art and design had a long and chequered history stretching back into the 19th century. In the 1830s concerns over the quality of design prompted one of a series of Select Committees which highlighted the importance of linking fine art and mechanical design. This led to the establishment of provincial design schools of which the Manchester Design School, founded in 1838 was one. It was intended for the encouragement of the fine arts and those branches of mechanical science immediately connected with art,’ (21 February 1838 Manchester Guardian; (Fowler and Wyke, 1993: 10). Yet by the 1850s - just 15 years after establishment, the Manchester Design School was renamed the Manchester School of Art, changing both its name and character and weakening its links with industry. (Rose and Johnston, 2009) The establishment of Manchester Polytechnic in 1970 as an amalgamation of existing colleges was part of a Labour policy initiative to create HEIs which were ‘directly responsive to social need.’ (See Table 2) The 28 polytechnics were to provide more than advanced technical education and were to be funded from local rather than central government. In the case of Manchester Polytechnic, the constituent parts of art, business and commerce had strong nineteenth century origins, as Table 1 shows. A major impact of the Thatcher reforms to higher education in the 1980s was to break their financial ties to locality paving the way for polytechnics to become universities in 1992 (Fowler and Wyke, 1993 :115, 242-3). Although at first sight Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) presents itself as a traditional teaching and research university as illustrated by the fairly traditional picture on the homepage, links to other pages show a slightly different story with a focus on design and innovation, an aim reflected by the look and shape of its new flagship
building. Fashion design and opportunities for graduate designers (as colourfully illustrated by graduate fashion week) is very much at the forefront of activities in the public domain. These attempts to make gradates enterprising is shown by the work of the Enterprise Centre through the Innospace Project an incubator centre for MMU graduates from across the curriculum. They have established strong links with leading UK fashion retailers.

The Innospace project highlighted the importance of cross fertilisation of ideas as one of its founders observed:

_The idea Inno_Space started two years ago primarily to promote more active engagement with business and our students in the business school. The way in which Inner Space has developed across the university so one of the things that we are keen to do is to promote ‘space’ to students from a range of different backgrounds so that we can create a real learning environment so they can share their ideas. Its a pre-incubator ( MMU Academic)_

Yet achieving shared understanding across faculties was not without its challenges as an Arts and Humanities academic and designer observed:

_the business school model doesn’t fit the creative industries because you know I mean there isn’t a single model, it’s a sweeping statement I know. But its like the business school would want to, would always say well you need to do this and then you do that and you put that in place and then you grow and you put that in place and then you grow. So as long as you’re growing you’re succeeding. (Arts and Humanities)_

In addition were the tensions relating to academic perceptions of what was core academic activity as emerged in all of the three universities we studied. As one KT practitioner observed:
Tensions of people’s time, particularly the RAE recently. People thinking it’s very complicated to do engagement with business. I mean in some ways it’s not in people's mind sets to engage so it's quite a leap, its out of the comfort zone, teaching and research are in their comfort zone. So its more than just the time, it's about encouraging them to take a different approach really. Other tensions include the bureaucracy of doing it.’

**Lancaster University**

During the 1990s and 2000s, Lancaster University built a strong reputation for both outreach activity and entrepreneurship education. Yet as this activity expanded tensions remained around its standing and position alongside the core activities of teaching and research. It was observed by one of the University’s outreach professionals:

“ We have talked “third mission”, “third leg” ... things like that get bandied around and that is confusing. People seem to think that is a sort of Grade 3... a sort of third rate kind of thing’. (Interview from SR,N.L paper)

Similarly a member of a Lancaster outreach team believed their activity was seen by academics in conventional departments as:

‘a bit like unclean. ... not proper,... doesn’t belong here, .... nothing to do with us, its what Business Link do’....(Outreach team member)

Understanding how and why these attitudes developed, why despite them outreach emerged so strongly and the social capital building which underpins successful delivery involves setting individuals’ experience within the historical context of the development Lancaster University. Only then can sense be made of both shared experience and the emergence of boundaries and barriers which are often invisible to outsiders.

It also helps us appreciate why and how some individuals were able to identify
opportunities for engaging with business and how this was viewed within the university.

In the nineteenth century the civics had been established to challenge the elitism of the ancient universities. Similarly, the seven new 1960s universities were set up to broaden access to higher education, fill regional gaps in the university system and foster less conventional approaches than typically found in the established university sector. (Perkin, 1991: 296). Founded in 1964 as one of this wave of ‘plate glass’ universities, Lancaster’s Charter identified its key objectives as being ‘to advance knowledge, wisdom and understanding by teaching and research and by the example and influence of its corporate life’. (University Charter, 1964) From the outside the new universities, with the exception of Warwick, were seen as isolated from their local and business communities in ‘an unreal world of academic isolation, a rural idyll far from the madding crowd where those who paid for their privileged life made their living’ (Perkin, 1991: 301). But, as the university archivist reflected:

[the 1960s] new universities were designed not to be technological universities because places like Surrey and so on, Bath, were coming up alongside them. So the very traditional approach in the way the university presents itself, the way it manages its students and the curriculum were designed to be traditional and designed to capture teaching and research’ (Interview with University Archivist 2010)

Despite its fairly conventional and traditional objectives, Lancaster, from its earliest years pioneered new academic subjects a number of which involved industrial engagement. The origins of the Management School lay in the establishment of the UK’s first chair in Marketing in the 1960s, followed by chairs in Systems Engineering and Behaviour in Organisations. It was also the home for first university chair in Operations Research and an engineering department was established in 1967, two years after the Vice Chancellor tabled a paper jointly prepared with local industrialists suggesting the Lancaster should co-operate with industry to develop a degree course in engineering. (Kirby, 2003:23; Perkin, 1991:
Unlike Warwick, Lancaster was not embedded within an industrial area and experiments were on quite a small scale. Among conventional academics, the reliance on mathematical modelling for largely industrial applications was ‘quite an alien concept’. (MM, University Archivist)

But from the start Charles Carter, the first Vice Chancellor held the deep conviction that the University had an important role to play in the locality and was keen to attract science-based industries to the region:

‘Very very early on, I’m talking now 1960s, he [Charles Carter] … went out to the local community to ask for ideas about research work or project work that they would like to have done and set aside small sums of money to do it, things about the shoreline or the local chamber of commerce, this kind of thing. … So the instinct was there. The initiatives were very small scale and set in the context of a university which didn’t have the capability for anything very substantial, but it showed an intention. (MM University Archivist; McClintock, 1974:306)

Business engagement therefore lay at the very heart of the early development of both the Lancaster University Departments of Operations Research and Systems in the 1960s and this was reinforced through the 1970s. As one past member of the Systems Department observed:

‘The Department of Systems was utterly committed to making sense of systems engineering through engagement - every one of the staff members came out of industry…. Peter Checkland was part of the passion of the time. Peter was appointed to his chair directly from industry. He had no previous experience. He was fingered by ICI to apply around 1969. Peter’s Action Research was empathetic to the industry-university agenda Soft Systems Management (SSM) necessitated engagement (Lancaster academic) International Systems Corporation of Lancaster (ISCOL) was a company founded in 1970 … it was one of the first of the university companies…ISCOL was innovative- a genuine attempt to build some thing
outside world facing and brought it into the classroom.’ (Past member of Systems Department)

The link between research methodology, pedagogy and business engagement therefore lay at the very heart of some of the departments which later formed the core of the Management School at Lancaster between 1964 and 1980. During the following two decades a combination of external challenges and internal changes, affected motivation and shaped attitudes to business engagement.

Universities responded to the 1980s cuts and the growth of managerialism, including the Research Assessment Exercise, in differing ways. Against the external background, internal changes specific to Lancaster shaped responses, attitudes and structures within the university. In 1984:

‘the University of Lancaster was a punch-drunk place, a plate-glass academic pit village: depressed, demoralised, wrestling with money troubles, shedding staff, winding down in an orderly way to lower levels of activity.... agonised debate had angrily ended with the phased closure of 4 departments, killing off the teaching of Archaeology, European Studies and six languages: Russian, Czech, Serbo-Croat, Arabic, Latin and Greek’. (Inkster: 1996)

Harry Hanham, a historian from MIT, was appointed Vice Chancellor of Lancaster University in 1985. His principle objective was for Lancaster to become a research led university of international standing and so protect it from further cuts. His appointment marked a break from the founders of the university and although his period of office ended in controversy, it undoubtedly contributed to the significant rise in the external research standing of Lancaster. Hanham looked closely at the Management School in the mid 1980s and found it lacking in both research quality and outreach education in the form of an MBA. (Interview with University Archivist) Ironically, the changed structures, objectives and drivers introduced in the Management School to build its profile for both outward facing executive education and research, in this period, contributed to the notion that outreach activity was
at best peripheral to research active academics. The Teaching Company ISC
closed, somewhat controversially during the 1980s. The establishment
of the Management Development Division (MDD) to support Central School
activities facilitated the development of the British Airways MBA, but symbolically
separated outreach activity from mainstream teaching and research in the minds
of academics. (University Archivist) Typically members of MDD were not research
active, which combined with the growing financial and status importance of the
RAE, led to a reduction in the level of business engagement in core Management
School departments. As an ex-member of the Systems department observed:
‘The RAE gave a metric to research which was only measured by publications
- now there is no other game in town but it started as a device to share limited
budget. Through time its influence grew and no-one joined that couldn’t meet the
conventional model of the academic and relevance weakened.’ (Ex member of
Systems Department)

When the establishment of the North West Regional Development Agency brought
opportunities for outreach activity conventional academics were indifferent if not
disdainful at a Heads of Departments meeting in 1999:

I couldn’t get my first sentence out before I was being given 20 reasons why
this was never going to happen. And one very senior academic took the
briefing notes and sort of dropped it on the table with a curl of the lip and
said ‘I can guarantee not a single academic could be involved in any of this
activity’. (LUMS Academic involved in Business Engagement)

It in this climate that outreach activity and entrepreneurship education developed
at Lancaster and with hindsight it is remarkable that these activities took off at all
in the 1990s and 2000s. In this context there existed an important combination of
individuals prepared to behave ‘entrepreneurially’ and innovate through ‘mindful
deviation’ by developing entrepreneurship education and engagement with small
and medium sized enterprises. with support of leaders within the University
hierarchy. A new Vice Chancellor appointed in 2001 recognised the importance of regional funding and engagement for enhancing the University’s fabric and the Management School Dean who provided ‘creative space’ and support for outreach.

The journey towards successful outreach activity in the Management School was by no means simple or linear. There were undoubtedly challenges in achieving innovative practice which can be explained by barriers to mutual understanding. ‘They are more engaged now... more than ever than in the first 4 years... They didn’t have any input..they had their own agenda to to do teaching and research..and we have been brought in to deliver the projects

As one outreach project manager observed:
‘We had these things, we had monthly targets, reports, audits every quarter. We had our own kind of things to focus on so we weren’t bothered about us being integrated into research... we used to ask academics to come and get involved but they didn’t...and we weren’t bothered because it wasn’t an issue... The issue was to make it work.

IV Conclusions

This paper has placed contemporary attitudes to entrepreneurship education and outreach in both their historical and social contexts. At the macro level it has demonstrated that, in contrast to experience in the United States after the Second World War, policy designed to encourage business engagement often had perverse or unexpected effects reflected in attitudes to business engagement within universities. This was especially the case with the Thatcher university cuts and their coincidence with attempts to create an ‘enterprise culture’ with opportunities to develop entrepreneurship education. Such initiatives were viewed with suspicion in some academic departments because of their association with an ant-university government.

It is, however, analysis at the level of individual universities and those working
within them that shows the complexity of the process and the ways in which the combination of history and social processes shape attitudes and behaviours. The three case studies demonstrate that achieving successful and sustained entrepreneurship education, outreach activity and thus business engagement takes time. As this paper has shown, the time involved is as much to do with the building of understanding within HEIs as between HEIs and business.

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ISBE website URL: http://www.isbe.org.uk/history


ACTIVITIES

Online materials: