Existence Philosophy and The Work of Martin Heidegger: Human Diversity As Ontological Problem (Related to Mainstream Management Education)

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EXISTENCE PHILOSOPHY AND THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER: HUMAN DIVERSITY AS ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM (RELATED TO MAINSTREAM MANAGEMENT EDUCATION)

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Behaviour In Organisations

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1. The Approach

This study offers an analysis of a series of conceptual aspects of the management education discourse as embodied in the MBA framework. It raises certain issues regarding the MBA directly, as a system of references about human practices of managing and organising, but also issues regarding some of the deeper sources and nature of the modes of representing the diversity of the human subject, of the world as historical space, and of time as horizon of practice. The aim is, however, partial to the extent that its focus relates to the homogenising direction of mainstream business education discourses with regard to the representation of the diversity of the human condition. To achieve this aim, however, it is not sufficient simply to address a critique toward business education and its paradigms as objects of enquiry. The implicit origin of this critique must also be made explicit.

This study aims to show that diversity is an ontological feature of human existence and that human practices cannot be conceived outside this condition. In other words, human diversity is irreducible – hence representations (especially theories) of practice must account for this elementary experience of human beings in their historical and cultural worlds.

2. Diversity as an ontological problem

The main reason for which the language of such an analysis leads to a fragmentary and unclear image of its own aims is the apparent inconsistency with which it refers to the problem of diversity itself. The idea that mainstream management education (embodied in the MBA) is ordered by paradigms characterised by a homogenising mode of representing practices is – in itself – meaningless without a clarification of its own terms. Moreover, the use of the notions of “diversity” and “difference” may appear as inconsistent. How reference is made to the diversity of individuals, teams, cultures, historical contexts, or practices needs elucidation. To anticipate it can be said that the inconsistencies which occur are less due to a lack of clarity of the analysis itself, as they are a reflection of the way in which the world of practice is represented in the mainstream account offered by MBA programmes. They offer an inconsistent set of accounts characterised by sudden shifts of unit of analysis, which in turn lead to associations of incommensurable modes of modelling the world.

But are these levels of analysing difference itself, different? Can diversity be seen as a conceptual problem which raises specific issues for each analytic focus: “individual”, “group”, “organisation”, or “culture”? The current MBA design implies it can. Furthermore, it implies that these units are clearly defined and can be clearly modelled;
in other words, it implies that all are in fact transcended by a common essence which makes their diversity a mere appearance, a mere *fata Morgana* of the surface of practices rather than a dimension of the human condition. Confusing for the uninitiated, this surface phenomenon can be modelled and managed by those who use appropriate concepts. The message is that the world is in fact homogenous in nature and manageable by educated managers because *all* human practices unfold along economic and functional lines.

This representation of diversity as being transcended by a common essence of the human in space and time is, however, intensely problematic from the point of everyday human experiences in the *life-world* as the ground of practice. It seems that the continuous variety of life, of practices in space and time, the shifting nature of meaning and problems – in other words, the incommensurability of “self” and “other” in their relationship – is an *irreducible* feature of existence. Everything is the same (argue homogenising theories of practice), but everything is different (argue the realities of practice). How can this circular and paradoxical argument be overcome? Is there something in the nature of *human diversity* itself that makes its conceptualisation difficult, perhaps inherently mysterious – hence, irresolvable in causal, deterministic terms?

The general MBA design treats diversity either as situated in the individual – hence it uses models which focus upon the individual subject of labour (motivation models in particular, but also an entire host of psychological techniques in of HRM, which aim to “resolve” difference as a management problem); or as situated in the collectivity – hence, structural models of managing organisational cultures, or models for managing national cultural characteristics. Neither unit, however, explains the variety or unity of the other. Diversity remains unexplained in its most fundamental terms, i.e. in its omnipresence in human space and time.

Diversity, as inextricably present in experience, was the starting point for the overall analysis, but more particularly forms the basis of the approach in this study. The engagement with diversity as an *ontological* problem (rather than a mere problem of morphology) begins at this fundamental level: the elementary and uninterrupted co-presence of “self” and “other” in human experience. The sense of this relationship of difference is the ground of human being in the world. Moreover, this does not appear to be a phenomenon which can be reduced to a common structural or transcendent “ingredient”. That is why neither individualistic paradigms, nor collectivity-based approaches can bring stable closure to this issue in both space and time. Diversity is a feature of existence which belongs to both its spatial and temporal dimensions.

Human differences cannot be explained in structural terms. If “culture” is taken as a unit of analysis, then internal individual variations are not considered; if the “individual” is focused upon then the unitary appearance of cultures remains unexplained. Anthropological, sociological or psychological accounts remain confined to a specific ontological region which they describe. Yet the experience of difference between one’s self and “others” in the temporal horizon of everyday existence in the world is more primordial than that.

It can be argued that the experience of the “other” is not simply a constant feature of individual existence; in fact, it is not a “constant” at all. Its nature is its variable
character in which inter-subjective encounters are the “matter of life”, especially the matter of social practices, of organisations and management. Throughout time, from dawn till dusk and on through the dream-world of the night, or from birth to death, the “self” is in permanent constitution through its relationships with “other” entities (other people, other meanings, other practices, other institutions, objects, or landscapes). In that, however, it retains a sense of its own unity. But this unity is variable too: as a self, the human “learns”, “develops”, “acts”, “has agency”; it changes its self and the world around it. This is the horizon of everyday practices as they are in the “real world” of management and organisations. The reduction of this horizon to functional-economic models leads to the abandonment of the very reality these models purport to represent.

The twentieth century has been profoundly marked by the problem of intersubjectivity. Both human sciences, but especially philosophies have taken the problem of human difference as foundational to the encounter between human subjects to be essential to understanding what it means to be human. One of the traditional tendencies in both social science and philosophy is to resolve difference via a transcendental operation – that means to reduce its experiential occurrence to a homogenous transcendental essence. “Essence precedes existence” can be the inverted paraphrase of the Sartrean conclusion which would apply to most of the transcendental accounts. In the sense of transcendental philosophy, the co-presence of “self” and “other” is based, as Theunissen demonstrates in his landmark study, on a reduction and assimilation of the “other” to an “alien I” (Theunissen, 1984). The self “sees” in the other an instantiation of the common essence of all, and it translates it into an alter ego. This can be exemplified, for instance, by Kant’s a priorism which implies the constancy, or homogeneity of the fundamental categories of human existence (space and time). This means that the scheme of existence is common; hence the other is already predetermined by its similarity to “my I”.

The MBA is an exemplar which embodies this tradition. The appeal of a view of the human subject as “rational economic being” (a direct echo of Descartes’ ego cogito and of Kant’s critique of reason – the thinking subject) is due to Homo oeconomicus' capacity to serve as central pillar for an account of human practices which can be predicated as universal, deterministic and reliable.

Although entirely dominant in the mainstream account of practices offered by business education, the transcendental reduction of diversity has not gone unchallenged in philosophy. Indeed, diversity has been the ground upon which the most substantial confrontation of twentieth century philosophy and social science took place1. Sartre’s later conclusion that “existence precedes essence” sums up the alternative search of twentieth century philosophy for more life-oriented conceptions of human experience. These philosophies have added fundamental reconsiderations of both the scientific obsession of modernity and its accounts of human existence, and of the centrality of the problem of diversity as pillar of reflection upon the nature of the human condition. In their terms, the relationship between a “self” and its “other” is always a relationship between an “I” and a “Thou” to use Buber’s terminology, a relationship mediated by the act of people addressing one another in a dialogical partnership.

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1 Despite the fact that these debates never affected mainstream management education.
2 see Theunissen, 1984.
It is this double intention which makes one of this accounts, namely Heidegger’s, an important contribution to thinking about diversity and which allows this present project to close the circle of its heuristic intention. This study aims to offer an alternative – and mirroring – view of the same three themes approached in part II, but this time from the perspective of existence philosophy as developed in Heidegger’s work. The reasons for this choice relate precisely to the critical arguments addressed so far to the homogenising accounts which form the foundation of business education as a system of references to human practices. In other words, it is exactly because Heidegger represents a tradition which (a) grew from a critical stance regarding transcendental reductions of human existence, and (b) developed philosophical alternatives centred on the problematic nature of diversity in existence that his work can inform and bring to a constructive end the present critique.

3. Phenomenology, existence philosophy and hermeneutics: philosophical backgrounds

These three terms have cannot be easily separated. They are applied with some license by different commentators with regard to different contributions of key authors associated with certain ideas, circles, and periods. An accurate distinction is not particularly essential for the present purpose. Thorough and cardinal readings in this regard are Levinas’, Spiegelberg’s and Lauer’s analyses of the phenomenological movement (Levinas, 1998; Spiegelberg, 1978; Lauer, 1978). In the present context, the terms “phenomenology” and “existence philosophy” refer respectively to part of the origins of Heidegger’s thought as a student and anticipated heir of Husserl’s chair and work at Freiburg, and to the radical re-working of philosophical phenomenology into a philosophy of existence beginning with Being and Time (published in 1927). The notion of “hermeneutics” or the adjective “hermeneutic” is more problematic still. Its history is long and complex, and in philosophy it has been used in many different ways and with many different nuances. From Aristotle’s treatise Peri Hermeneia, to Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and on to Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur or Vattimo, this category has undergone fundamental shifts. They are extensively reviewed in Palmer’s work (1969) as well as Bleicher’s (1980). In the present project, it is perhaps sufficient to warn the reader that in Heidegger’s philosophy the word “hermeneutics” occurs in relation to the dynamic of human existence in its use of language and interpretation in the process of sense making of both self and other in everyday practices. The notion refers to the interpretative nature of human formation of meaning.

It is imperious to consider that making recourse to the philosophical work of Heidegger in this thesis requires a conceptual bridge between his ideas and the central preoccupations of the present project. How can existence philosophy enlighten the problematic of diversity, and how does it relate to the MBA?

The answer can be put in deceptively simple terms. On the one hand, existence philosophy allows a grounding of the claim that diversity is irreducible, and that it cannot be “regionalised” – i.e. it cannot be separated, reified and researched as “diversity of individuals”, “diversity of teams”, or “diversity of cultures”. Diversity, it will be argued, is present in all of these “aspects” all of the time inasmuch as all these supposed “entities” are co-present in all human practices (outside which, of course, diversity
would be meaningless). On the other hand, the MBA (and business education generally) claims to be a theory of practice as it is and as it should be; in this respect, business education makes certain claims about the nature of all the elements that make practices what they are (as shown in parts I and II). In doing so, it necessarily theorises diversity in a specific way: it places at its centre an economic human ego which can be seen as the functional unit of history at a global scale, and whose existence unfolds in a time unified by the expansion of an “optimal model” of social order (liberal democracy and market economy) whose institutions, in turn, emphasise and reinforce the very conception of human nature with which theorising has started in the first place.

On what basis can Heidegger’s work be shown to offer the ground for some mode of answering these two complementary questions in this context? In order to make clear the details of Heidegger’s arguments, his work must be placed in the wider enquiry from which it has originated.

The debate over the nature of human existence in the world which has been taking place since the birth of philosophy in classical Greece has culminated paradoxically in the decline of philosophy and the rise of science. For twentieth century existence philosophers like Heidegger, the origins of this radical change must be sought in Descartes’ work and in his shift away from ontology (as inquiry into the nature of being), to epistemology (as philosophy of knowledge). Later, this development was extended, especially in the works of Kant who made transcendental doctrines of knowledge the ground of philosophising itself.

As Dreyfus writes:

“Since Descartes, philosophers have tried to prove the existence of a world of objects outside the mind. Kant considered it a scandal that such a proof had never been successful. Heidegger holds that the scandal is that philosophers have sought such a proof.” (Dreyfus, 1991:248)

As shown in Costea, 2000a and Costea, 2000b, the tendency to secure a universal and causally clear representation of the world is deeply embedded in the MBA orientation. The latter seeks in sciences of man the basis of secure determinable knowledge of practices in order to make them objects of rational action.

In general terms, phenomenology and existence philosophy are philosophies of experience. Phenomenology’s original intention was to attempt to describe the historical origin and constitution of reality in all its manifold and interrelated layers of meaning, without deterministic presuppositions. Existence philosophy can be seen as a continuation based upon a radical re-interpretation of the original phenomenological intention. It thus turned away from certain phenomenological principles by re-inserting the interpreter in the world which is interpreted. This meant that one of the concerns of philosophising became the question of how meaning is made in human experience, how it is inextricably linked to intersubjective encounters, to language and to the relationship between “self” and “other”. Existence philosophy successfully achieved this reconnection of philosophy with life and showed that the human condition can only be understood through the human “lived experience of the world” as the foundation of meaning. Later, Husserl too came to accept as foundational and called the “life-world” –
das Lebenswelt – which remains perhaps one of the most accepted philosophical categories of the past century.

Phenomenology and existence philosophy raised the concern with the presence of others to a central principle which sees consciousness as always situated and never self-sufficient or complete in itself. Moreover, the situatedness of experience in social, linguistic, bodily contexts is not incidental; it is, rather, the indispensable dimension of human ability to “mean” and “understand”, to “exist” which the idealistic quests for transcendental structures of consciousness miss.

The conceptual consequences of this mode of enquiry are profound – especially with regard to the way in which human practices are researched and understood. Yet to answer the often-asked question “what is phenomenology and existence philosophy?” is particularly difficult since their unity as philosophies is not by any means established.

The common and most adequate path in such circumstances is to explore philosophical ideas and arguments through their histories. In the case of phenomenology and existence philosophy this would be an extensive task and not required in this present context. That is why, since the focus of this study is on Heidegger’s contribution, it is perhaps more advisable to discuss some of the elements of phenomenological enquiry which influenced his work and which are pertinent to the present analysis of understanding of practice.

The path can lead from the Danish Christian existentialist Søren Kierkegaard, to the German atheist existentialist Friedrich Nietzsche, to the Catholic “father” of descriptive psychology Franz Brentano, and to the Scottish medieval thinker Duns Scotus. Religion has an important albeit ambiguous place in his philosophy. Heidegger, it must be noted, joined the Jesuits early on in his life. Other influences were his predecessor at Freiburg University, the “father” of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and the historian and originator of “hermeneutics”, William Dilthey. His own works influenced decisively the future contributions of many of his contemporaries: Scheler, Schutz, or Ingarden, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, up to the more recent “hermeneutic phenomenologists” – Gadamer and Ricoeur. There were many other thinkers at the time preoccupied by the problem of existence with whom Heidegger’s thought was to be associated in various ways. Examples include the theologians Karl Barth, Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Bultmann, and Paul Tillich, the ethical thinker Nicolai Hartmann, the students of religion Rudolf Otto, Hans Jonas, indirectly even the writer Franz Kafka, New Realist philosophers like Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin and Ernst Jünger, and the Dadaist movement.

This section will try to explain some of the defining themes and ideas which informed Heidegger’s own work and which can be firmly placed in the phenomenological movement. Although it can be described as a “movement”, phenomenology was and is extremely diverse and contested. Its history can only be understood as a continuous debate which led to its various contributions through internal critiques and through challenges from other philosophical positions.

Overall, phenomenology must be seen as a “family” rather than as a monolithic “school”, a family of preoccupations with overlaps and resemblances among its members, but with no immutable core shared by all, and not without considerable
Diversity makes it hard to define phenomenology. It explains, however, its lasting appeal, especially throughout a very intense century when other philosophical movements have come and gone. Taking a historical line in this introductory section allows not only a brief explanation of phenomenology’s and existence philosophy’s key ideas, but also allows certain key they have been used, criticised, developed, and changed (sometimes discarded).

For phenomenology and existence philosophy, meaning is bound up with the intersubjective nature of human being in the world, with the lifelong, everyday encountering of an “other” and inquiring what it means to be one’s self rather than an other (what it means to be different), with how the thinking, speaking or writing human subject uses language, how it orients, or stretches itself to the world in an intentional “move”.

For philosophers of the phenomenological movement, the “linguisticality” of human intersubjectivity and thus of practices becomes a primary site of enquiry: on the one hand, because it is how human beings experience “self” and “other”; on the other hand, because it is how history and traditions are transmitted via the rules and conventions of language, in their use, and how language becomes the source of personal meaning in existence and of historical semantic innovation. New meaning, novelty in the world, the very ground of human uniqueness, bound up with the possibility of a future different from the past are defining some of phenomenology’s and existence philosophy’s values. This is the way in which the third key qualification of the nature of these philosophies – i.e. hermeneutic – comes to play a central role in characterising the work of different theorists sharing these views.

The notion of “hermeneutic” applied to the phenomenological and existence philosophy contributions refers precisely to the way in which these philosophies aimed to show that meaning in experience is grounded in the intentions and histories of human “selves” which lead to personal interpretations of everyday situations, and in their relevance for “others” (who also interpret and re-interpret situations from their own horizons of understanding). From a hermeneutic angle, speech, texts, language are means for transmitting experience, beliefs and judgements from one subject or community to another. Hence, meaning is situated in those practice where it occurs, in the everyday practical judgement and common sense reasoning of participants – not in an a priori cognitive frame which subject practice to theoretical and scientific proof, and hence to a future optimisation.

In particular, phenomenology’s importance and its relevance for this thesis lies in its explicit and developed critiques of science and “scientific objectivism”. Gadamer describes phenomenology as a “science of the life-world” (Gadamer, 1976:182). The syntagm reveals an association of intentions which characterised especially Husserl’s work and that of his closest followers. Phenomenology was intended, by Husserl, to become a “science” which moved enquiry away from Kant’s and Descartes’ lines of epistemological philosophical enquiry (basically, away from philosophy as mere research of the foundations of science), toward the wide field of human experience.

1 Accompanied at times by profound and painful personal distanciations.
3 In contrast, analytic philosophies usually identify meaning with the external referents of texts (or utterances), i.e. in the objects supposedly described; structuralism finds meaning in the arrangement of words in texts.
For phenomenology, it is the way experiences are *given* that requires primordial philosophical attention, rather than the structure of scientific knowledge which in fact leaves the world behind, seeking transcendental common structures to lived experiences. Experience is based on *intentionality* (Brentano’s initial insight and contribution); it is thus that its mode of “being given”, or its “givenness” should be understood and approached. The “objects” of human experience – the objects of practices – must be seen as the matter of intentional analysis, seeing givenness and intention as constitutive of phenomena (the “object” of phenomenology) rather than reducing human experiences to mere objects of “physics” (Gadamer, 1976:184). An account of human practice cannot revolve around a theory about a single, a-social and a-historical being. On the contrary, practice may only be understood in its cultural and historical setting in which intersubjective encounters occur, and in which discursive or dialogical self-other situations take place. Truth and meaning are not transcending human situated existence, they do not await the scientific discovery of their “first principles”, but are existential in that they pertain to the existence of people relating to each other through discourse. This perspective stands in sharp contrast with the research principles which seek to determine language-use and language-learning by investigating a monological model of the competence of the ideal speaker-hearer abstracted from its finite historical situation. Such researches focus study exclusively on syntax and semantics positing them as sufficient for an adequate grasp of the structure of the human linguistic faculty and thus of the universal structures of meaning. Examples are numerous; most belong to the analytic programmes of research on formal languages such as Chomsky’s (1957; 1965).

From this position, phenomenology engaged in deep critiques of Cartesian and Kantian analyses. This is one of the central reasons why phenomenology, and – more importantly – Heidegger’s existence philosophy can be used as a basis for the present critique of representations of diversity in management education and will be gradually developed in this study.

It is important to summarise phenomenology’s conceptual relations to other human science paradigms in order to understand how it differs fundamentally from functionalist and structuralist paradigms of social theory, and how it problematise the Kantian and neo-Kantian transcendental searches for the *a priori* nature of man and knowledge. Both phenomenology and existence philosophy stand in contrast to theories which focus the study of practice purely upon social and material structures (certain sociological, anthropological, and historical accounts), and to those focusing on the individual (different schools of behavioural and cognitive psychology).

Thus, on the one hand, a phenomenological and existential understanding of practice moves the locus of their origin from the objectivity of social or material structures.

The structuralist and functionalist approaches to the study of practices as objects of sociological research suspend reference to the historical world behind what appears to be the present which is the sole object of study. These accounts focus on behavioural inventories (or surface manifestations) of present interconnections between elements which are supposed to make up the social structures and process of which existence is made up. As noted earlier, structural interpretations bring out the formal “algebra” of the theoretical pre-established model of human nature whose reflection is sought in the “real world” but not through a description of this world’s reality in its space and time, rather
through categories of research which translate the model into empirical research methodology. Structural methodologies appear to give an objective account of reality, while in fact they ignore the very subjectivities of the humans who make practices what they are: series of inter-subjective encounters in historical (existential) time.

The accounts of globalisation which ground business education’s view of the world, for example, with their conceptual roots in histories such as Braudel’s structuralism and indirectly in anthropologies such as Levi-Strauss”, are direct illustrations of such views of practice. Organisational and national cultures are abstract, structurally defined containers for human practices. They are manifestations of some causal mechanism in which the manager has a defining role. Whether leadership or culture management, the functional role of managerial action is more or less presented as the univocal force which shapes the structures in which practices take. Practices as such – the everyday events, activities of other people – are only contingently related by the structures or indeed “cultures” organised for them. As emerged in previous works, the absence of the problematic of language and meaning from the thematic content of culture management is a clear indication of the structural and functional perspective which dominate the view of what organisations and management are. Thus the “space of culture”, of organisations, and of management become universal, everywhere and anywhere the same. It is only the morphology of organisations and cultures that differs; but this difference is only a result of functional cognitive adaptations and choices deviating from optimality (of which the weakest are always weeded out by history seen in an evolutionary manner).

Phenomenology and existence philosophy are profoundly different from structuralist and functionalist social theories (especially Parsons”, but also others”) which see individual human experience as causally subordinate to the social, cultural, and historical factors which determine or shape it. Phenomenology and especially existence philosophy are concerned with how experience is paradoxically both personal and social, private and non-shareable in some respects, but also irreducibly intersubjective and communal.

On the other hand, these starting principles have not gone unnoticed by social theorists upon many of whom they had major influence. From early on, students of Husserl’s seized some of the opportunities opened up by his new line of inquiry. The interest for phenomenological understandings of the social world grew throughout the twentieth century. Many important contributions can be traced either directly or indirectly to the inspiration provided by phenomenological and existential philosophy. Among the first and perhaps most productive contributors to a phenomenological sociology (or social ontology, as Theunissen (1978) terms it) is Alfred Schutz, whose direct engagement with Parsons” functionalism yielded a very rich debate beginning with Schutz’s move to the U.S. in the “30s (see Schutz, 1967; 1974; 1982). Soon the New School of Social Research which was established in New York led to the development of the phenomenologically-inspired social constructionist theories of Berger and Luckmann (1967). Many prominent anthropologists and ethnographers also incorporated phenomenological considerations in their work. Perhaps most illustrative is the impact phenomenology and existence philosophy had upon Clifford Geertz who remarked in his Local Cultures (1993, orig. 1983) the influence these developments had upon his thinking:

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1 Sartre offers a coherent phenomenological critique in his Search for A Method (1960).
“The penetration of the social sciences by the views of such philosophers as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, or Ricoeur, such critics as Burke, Frye, Jameson, or Fish, and such all-purpose subversives as Foucault, Habermas, Barthes, or Kuhn makes any simple return to a technological conception of those sciences highly improbable.” (Geertz, 1993:4)

And Geertz is certainly not the only one to be influenced to this extent by phenomenological ideas. Equally important are the work of Goffman (1959) or Garfinkel (1967). In the field of organisation studies, there are many examples of work based or inspired by phenomenology in particular. Schwartzman (1993) reviews ethnographic studies of organisational life. Weick’s work is deeply phenomenological (1979, 1995). A profound affinity between activity theory and some of the language and categories of phenomenology and more recently existence philosophy is illustrated by Blackler, Crump and McDonald’s studies of activity systems as modes of engagement with the complexities of practice (Blackler, 1993; Blackler, Crump and McDonald, 1997; 2000).

Besides the reconsiderations of traditional sociologies which they have occasioned, phenomenology and existence philosophy are also radically different from the views which situate the origins of practice purely in the structures of the psyche. Structural subjectivity as understood by cognitive psychology or psychoanalysis, as the main exemplars of structural psychology, is equally problematic for an understanding of the dynamics of existence. The structural focus on motivation models in business education is another manifestation of its tendency to seek what might be presented as a universally common structure of being of the human subject.

Both needs and process theories of motivation are instances of the creation of a universal ideal of the balanced, or motivate individual. They are ways of making causal imputations of “motives” to human action in a way which leaves the context of that action unaccounted for. The absolute focus on the individual and his or her own personal dynamic, pointing the conceptual finger to the psyche means – in phenomenological terms – to ignore a human being’s inescapable situatedness in the life-world. As in the case of structural linguistics, structuralist psychologies are, from phenomenology’s perspective, methodologically inconsistent with the way practices in the life-world present themselves – namely, interconnected, dynamic, and impossible to tract with causal models simply pointing to a supposed psychological mechanism as the a-historical and a-social basis of human nature.

Many authors have shown how the phenomenological critiques of psychology can allow the questioning of models of human nature proposed in different disciplinary discourses. For example, Dreyfus (1979), Winograd (1980), and Winograd and Flores (1986) have questioned the functionalist cognitive science paradigm that guides most contemporary research in the field of computer programming, particularly in natural language processing and common-sense reasoning. Dreyfus shows how, on the basis of Heidegger’s work, the possibility of formalising mental processes, and therefore, of creating artificial intelligence can be denied. Winograd and Flores reach a similar conclusion based on a hermeneutically-informed technical argument. In this context, it must be re-iterated, although it has already been mentioned above, that phenomenology and hermeneutics stand in contrast to linguistic structuralism (of Saussurean origins)
which informs much of these searches for an ultimate, universal machine-human
language. Phenomenology argues that such a linguistic philosophy which locates
primary responsibility for human meaning in the codes, conventions, or rules of
language ignores the nature of meaning itself as a manifestation of a unique self’s
existential intention or concern (see Ricoeur, 1974; Detweiler, 1978; Caws, 1988).

These arguments are additional evidence regarding the impossibility of modelling the
life-world of practices on the grounds of functionalist or structuralist psychologies or
linguistics. Thus these critiques are themselves direct illustrations of the problems raised
in this thesis with regard to the representation of human nature as a functional-economic
machinery of cognition which processes data internally and then decides and makes
rational choices of action.

Phenomenology can also be contrasted to psychoanalysis, which sees the unconscious as
universal structure of the human psyche with a universal function: to “collect” desires
and repressed wishes as the primary source of meaning, to be disclosed by unmasking
various signs in which they manifest themselves like symptoms, dreams, or slips of
tongue. This makes psychoanalysis a hermeneutics of suspicion, as opposed to
phenomenology’s emphasis on description, and focuses it on a structural, static version
of “unconsciousness” as home of meaning, even when distorted by instinctual forces
(see Ricoeur, 1965). For phenomenology and existence philosophy, an understanding of
how consciousness is dislodged of its control over meaning – in other words, of how it
is-in-the-world – must of necessity start by analysing consciousness and its being with
others in the world rather than purely in the realm of the psyche.

But, as in the case of social theory, phenomenology and existence philosophy have had
depth and even more consequential impacts upon psychology, psychoanalysis itself,
psychiatry and psychopathology, and upon different psychotherapeutic approaches.
Spiegelberg devoted an entire volume to a comprehensive review of these influences
(1972); another valuable analysis of these influences can be found in Misiak and Sexton
(1973). It is perhaps worth mentioning however that an entire generation of thinkers
across Europe has been influenced by these philosophies. Gestalt psychologists
psychoanalysts like Binswanger, as well as many others were stimulated by attending
classes of Husserl’s, Stumpf’s or Pfänder’s. It is important to note here that in contrast
to the use of psychological models of the individual in management education, which
focus upon motivation as a source of labour problems, one of the main influences the
phenomenology had upon psychology was the reorientation of thought from explanation
to a preliminary act of description. In other words, instead of seeing very human being
as a potential bundle of problems, phenomenology made psychologists think about
describing prior to explaining the “patient”. The need to manage supposed pathologies
could only be justified after a more contextualised understanding of the unique personal
psyche. This was reflected in the wide adoption of the concept of life-world which,
however many its interpretations were, led psychologists influenced by it to re-consider
the nature of their own empirical engagement with the “patient reality” as part of a wider
but unique personal world. Instead of holding on to pure monadological individualism
(such as Freud’s principles), phenomenological and especially Heidegger’s existential
influences meant that psychiatry could enlarge their view of the interdependence

1 eminently reviewed in Rose, 1996.
2 An important account offered by Foucault on Binswanger’s approach can also be found in Foucault
and Binswanger (1993).
between the patient’s self and that of others without imputing a prejudged causal model upon it. The lessons of the influences of phenomenology and existence philosophy upon psychology and psychiatry are perhaps one of the ways in which much of the conceptions underlying the teaching of motivation on MBAs can be critiqued in their own right.

The relevance of this brief review of the relationships of phenomenology and existence philosophy with other social sciences needs to be emphasised. The question of whether the “individual”, the “collective”, or the structures of language are the site of the primordial cause determining the dynamics of practices – in other words, the question whether human sciences ought to be psychological, sociological or grammatological – becomes irrelevant for existence philosophy or for phenomenology.

Phenomenological and existential thought can best be understood if the logical functors “either, or” (with which deterministic sociologies and psychologies operate) are not applied. The meaninglessness of this undeterminable duality can be seen in the structure of knowledge itself, through an observer’s sense that his or her perceptions are at one with language, and at the same time uniquely a result of his or her own particular “being” – habits, position, interests – even though they belong to a shared social world jointly occupied with other perceivers whose observations (we assume) would complement our own. A vicious circle of indeterminacy is thus engendered, and its “truth” let alone usefulness are fundamentally questionable.

These contrasts provide a sense of some of the defining characteristics of phenomenology. But here they may appear more marked than they actually are. Part of the history of phenomenology and existence philosophy consists of their attempts to answer challenges from other philosophical and scientific positions regarding its focus on lived experience and its ability to account for comprehensively language, desire, and society. The transformations phenomenological thought has gone through, the very emergence of existence philosophy through Heidegger’s radical contribution are all examples of how interpretative communities are not closed on themselves but move on and not only through internal critique, debate, and conversation but also through argument and exchange with other interpretative communities. In this manner, existence philosophy can become ground for reflecting upon representations of management and organisations in business education.

4. The idea of man in Heidegger’s Being and Time (the analytic of the Dasein as a philosophy of human uniqueness

Phenomenology and existence philosophy are, on the one hand, philosophical approaches characterised by a certain unity of purpose discernible in the works of all thinkers mentioned in relation to them. On the other hand, these authors are in fact very diverse and original in their conceptions. This means that there would be a disadvantage to explore phenomenology or existence philosophy independent from the way in which they are embodied in the works of different authors. It is widely established that it would be a historical error to speak of a unified method or account which holds true for all members of this family (Spiegelberg, 1978; Lauer, 1978). Hence it would be difficult in this context to make indiscriminate references to what phenomenology or existence philosophy have to say in general about man and his existence in the historical world.
That is why it seems that the only adequate approach is to focus upon the work of one representative of this orientation and to try to decipher what are the implications of a new way of engaging with human existence and diversity for understanding management and organisations as part of everyday life, culture, and history. Of all their representatives, it is perhaps Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) who occupies the key place in the history of these philosophies. On the one hand, he is widely regarded as one of the central figures of both movements which, in turn, are also central to twentieth century philosophy, although, on the other hand, he was never inclined himself to assume such a role nor to be identified with the problematic of twentieth century philosophy. It is perhaps from this paradoxical self-situation in the horizon of philosophical questioning that Heidegger’s contribution to ontology may be more easily made relevant to the context of this thesis.

As already mentioned, Heidegger’s contribution is central to understanding what phenomenology and existence philosophy have to say. The reason is twofold. First of all, Heidegger was Husserl’s assistant and later, following Husserl’s own recommendation, succeeded him in his chair at the University of Freiburg. This is significant because Heidegger was seen – in the eyes of Husserl and of the entire community of phenomenological thinkers – as the “natural” successor to the chair of philosophy at Freiburg with which phenomenology’s intellectual centre was associated. Indeed, Heidegger was appointed professor of philosophy at Freiburg in 1928 after the publication of *Being and Time* a year earlier.

Secondly, it is essential to note that, ironically, with this work came Heidegger’s radical departure from phenomenology as understood by Husserl, as well as his original contribution to philosophy. This departure marked the systematic beginning of a new “era” of philosophising, the era of existence philosophy, as Jaspers, Heidegger’s friend, had already named it earlier. Although Husserl considered *Being and Time* almost as heresy, the book can be seen as an extension of his own project from its narrow focus on epistemology to larger structures of existence, but it can also be seen as an abandonment of Husserl’s methodological caution, of his characteristic avoidance of speculation (“don’t give me big bills,” he is reported to have said, “I’m only interested in the small change”). Heidegger’s work is even more susceptible to this charge in his second phase, the later work on language and poetry as the “house of Being.”

The tension with Husserl was mostly based on the tendency he had to be rigidly focused on his own ideas and not entirely open to critique. In this, Heidegger saw the dangers of doctrinal “idolatry” and misplaced exaltation. His view of the intellectual atmosphere created around Husserl and his philosophy was uncompromisingly expressed in a letter to Jaspers:

“A lot of idol worship has to be eradicated – i.e., the various medicine men of present-day philosophy have to be exposed for their awful and miserable craft –

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1 The example of Edith Stein, Husserl’s personal assistant, is notorious. She worshipped the professor and became so profoundly committed to phenomenology that she saw in it a new mode of religious engagement. She converted to Christianity but felt too intensely about Husserl’s demands and left the office. Unprotected, she was taken to Auschwitz where she met a tragic end in 1943. She was later beatified by the Catholic Church.
while they are alive, so they shouldn’t think the kingdom of God had arrived with them already."

“I leave the world its books and its literary ado and instead I get the young people so that for the whole week they are “under pressure”; some of them can’t take it – the simplest way of selection – some need two or three semesters before they understand why I will not allow any laziness, any superficiality, any cheating, or any phrases – least of all “phenomenological” ones [...]” (letter to Jaspers, July 14, 1923, quoted in Safransky, 1998:128)

On the other hand, Heidegger’s own impact on students earned him the nickname the “Magician from Messkirch”:

“It was as if a gigantic flash of lightning was rending a darkness-clothed sky ... in almost painful brightness the things of the world lay revealed ... it was not a matter of a system, but of existence ... It had me speechless when I left the Aula. I felt as though for a moment I had gazed at the foundations of the world.” (H.W. Petzet, after the lecture “Was ist Metaphysik?”, 1929, quoted in Safransky, 1998:178)

In terms of labels, between “phenomenology” and “existence philosophy”, both Heidegger and Jaspers were later to choose phenomenology and specifically refuse to be associated with existentialism in a move to reject the turn given by Sartre to the term. They were not alone in this; Gabriel Marcel, Jean Hering and Dietrich von Hildebrand rejected the label “existentialist” too.

To understand Heidegger’s contribution and his relevance to thinking about the nature of human difference and its irreducible presence in the nature of man’s being in the world requires a specific inquiry. As is the widely accepted manner of approaching such a task, the present undertaking follows the philosophical tradition which could be described in Foucault’s terms:

“Original forms of thought are their own introduction; their history is the only kind of exegesis that they permit, and their destiny, the only kind of critique.”

(Foucault and Binswanger, 1993:31)

Hence, this studz follows the thread of Heidegger’s work in order to disclose its main axes with regard to what can be seen as the nature of man in relation to his own existence in both space and time. The move is justified both because the analysis would thus mirror the effort so far developed in parts I and II, but also because Heidegger’s own course of thinking advances along these lines to culminate in regarding time as the central concept through which existence can be understood in its foundations.

Heidegger’s philosophical work has been the subject of many and valuable commentaries. In terms of its general unity, it was characterised in various ways with regard to the degree of unity it displays over the many and very prolific years of his writing life (Richardson, 1967; Theunissen, 1984; Dreyfus, 1991; Macquarrie, 1968; Löwith, 1966; Löwith, 1995; Palmer, 1969; Polt, 1999; Philipse, 1998; Safransky, 1998; Kisiel, 1995; Kisiel and Van Buren, 1994). Some commentators regard his work as revolving around a relatively constant thematic and approach; others see it as made of two comparatively distinct periods, an early and a late Heidegger (the change having occurred between 1930 and 1940). There are also scholars (for example, Philipse, 1998)
who treat Heidegger’s personal biography and the essence of his work as interrelated and who bring forward novel and stimulating perspectives on his contribution.

In the context of this thesis, one of the ways in which Heidegger’s existence philosophy is relevant is through its attempt to overcome monadological, individualist models of man – such as *Homo oeconomicus*, or motivation theories – by recognising the blurred boundaries between man and his world, by dissolving the structural economic unit and re-inserting personal existence in time both as uniquely individual but also as inextricably linked to the collective phenomena of language, history and culture. Seeking the grounds of human uniqueness requires a grammar of thought which allows these multiple layers of being to co-exist in an account of experience in time.

This occurs through the way in which *Being and Time* broadens phenomenology’s focus of analysis from consciousness as bound up with the individual, to *Dasein*, or “being-there” seen in its “being-in-the-world.” This is part of Heidegger’s move from epistemology to ontology. The latter – as the study of “being”, or of what it means to be – is, for Heidegger, the origin of European metaphysics and should be restored as its central concern. Paradoxically, for Heidegger, the effort of “pure philosophy” has been in decline since the time of the Presocratics (Heraclitus and Parmenides). In other words, it was not only with Descartes but as soon as it was born that philosophy drifted into a secondary line of inquiry, into epistemology or the theory of “knowing”. After the first philosophers, or “thinkers” as Heidegger insists in calling them, *Being* (the subject of ontology) becomes divorced from thinking, and man becomes alienated from his most profound concern. His interest in the Presocratics as contrasted to the Hellenistic period (mainly referring to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) led him to the idea that, for the former (the Classical period of ancient Greek philosophy), thinking was a “penetrating reflection”, whereas, with the latter, it becomes fragmented, regionalised into the separate disciplines of poetry, philosophy and sciences. From then on, Heidegger suggests, the three diverged continuously leading to representations in which the image of man as an existential whole in a historical and variable world cannot be recognised – especially as it emerges from the accounts of epistemological metaphysics and from scientific theories.

Heidegger thought that an answer to the fundamental question of the human condition (namely, what is it?) can only come from a return to a classical, integrative philosophical understanding of the basic sense of the verb “to be” which probably, Heidegger thought, lies behind the variety of usages it has in everyday language and thus beyond the reach of regional sciences which deal only with “fragments” of being.

Thus, as opposed to classical Western metaphysics, for Heidegger the problem of philosophy is, in fact, the problem of returning to ontology. Namely, he argues that Western thinking had been led to wander fruitlessly in epistemological theory since Descartes turned philosophical questioning away from ontology to pure theory of rational knowledge. Heidegger thinks that philosophers should not spend time any longer asking the question “IS THERE A REAL WORLD OUT THERE”. Heidegger thinks that such a mode of questioning is premised on the wrong Cartesian assumption that man is...

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1 An interesting image of the historical evolution of this problematic appears in Nietzsche’s chapter *How the Real World At Last Became Myth* in *The Twilight of the Idols* (1990).
primarily a thinking subject having the ontological possibility of standing outside the world of objects and contemplating it as some external collection of things. Rather, he saw the nature of being human as being inextricably in-the-world. But this also meant for him that for philosophy to return to ontology, man himself must find original ground from which ontological questions can be addressed.

Heidegger left twentieth century philosophical concerns behind and returned to the beginnings of philosophy, to ancient Greece, asking anew the question “WHAT IS?” – τι το ov? (ti to on?). Not “WHAT IS BEING?” or “WHAT IS IT TO BE?” as if being was a “something” substantial, an “it” (as Aristotle’s ousia). For Heidegger, being is not reality as thinghood. Hence the question of ontology can consider things only in secondary (or, as will be the case with Heidegger, tertiary) circumstance. The “question of being” has two aspects for Heidegger. On the one hand, there is the most fundamental aspect of ontological inquiry, namely, the question of Being – the ontological question. In asking about “Being”, philosophy is engaging, for Heidegger, with the ultimate ontological mystery – why is there something rather than nothing? Perhaps one of the most illustrative expressions of this ultimate ontological wondering is Coleridge’s in the nineteenth century:

“Hast thou ever raised thy mind to the consideration of existence, in and by itself, as the mere act of existing? Hast thou ever said to thyself thoughtfully, it is! Heedless in that moment, whether it were a man before thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand? Without reference, in short, to this or that particular mode or form of existence? If thou hast indeed attained to this, thou wilt have felt the presence of mystery, which must have fixed thy spirit in awe and wonder. The very words, There is nothing! Or, There was a time, when there was nothing! are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light, as if it bore evidence against the fact in the right of its own eternity.

Not to be, then, is impossible: to be, incomprehensible. If thou hast mastered this intuition of absolute existence, thou wilt have learnt likewise, that it was this, and not other, which in the earlier ages seized the nobler minds, the elect among men, with a sort of sacred horror.”


Which is to say that, for Heidegger, every “why?” question ultimately asks “Why is there Something rather than Nothing?”. To anticipate, Heidegger’s provisional answer was that the meaning of Being is Time. In this respect, it resembles both the Zurvanitic and Gnostic representations of time discussed in working paper 003 (by the same author): the former because it places Time (and not space) at the centre of existence; the latter because it sees in the finitude of human existence in the world the source of permanent tensions to which there is no final, trans-temporal solution.

But the ontological question has another fundamental aspect: the question of being or beings – the ontic question. In other words, “Being is in every case the Being of some

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1 It can be said that Heidegger was never interested directly in the problem of reality or of particular kinds of reality (such as scientific disciplines are) as central to ontology.
entity”. Hence, ontological research must also have an ontic dimension, an engagement with “entities whose character of Being is [like Dasein’s and] other than that of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1962:29). To ask these foundational questions of existence Heidegger does not think is a task only for philosophers. Rather, Heidegger understood the mission of philosophy as that of encouraging each person to ask this question, and to question with the maximum involvement, because, in a sense, this questioning itself is the central aspect of personal existence. Yet the answer, Heidegger thought, was not going to yield a final model for being. Quite the opposite: each questioning will yield its own unique answer. The only general thing that can be said is that it is the condition of being human to inherently ask this question throughout a person’s finite existence.

Mankind’s crisis was, for Heidegger, the result of a “fall” of Western thinking which, through improper concentration upon technological science, led to a one-sided technical development whose logic is to culminate in the alienation of man to a province of “highly inauthentic way of being” (Heidegger, 1982a:311-341). Partly, Heidegger understood the seeds for this inauthenticity as already sown in man’s very existential condition. Such “fallenness” is itself an existential, essential potentiality within humanity’s being. On the one hand, “thrown” in history; on the other hand, as individuals, alone with the finitude of the “self” as the period of time between birth and death. The epoch of birth colours and can be coloured to varying degrees by each person’s coming into being.

To understand human existence, the only path, in Heidegger’s view, is coming closer to Being, to the “thinking of Being”, as a way of engaging with what is wholly human, and for which a “solution” could not be given either by sciences or by technology.

How did he conceptualise his radically novel search? How did he distinguish it from the discourses on man and his world which can be found in other metaphysicians and especially in the modern human sciences? How does it compare with the model of man and his world in time and space which founds the MBA paradigm? The beginning of any attempt to answer these questions requires a premise which is at once clarifying yet leading to a cryptic conceptual space in which Heidegger’s language seems on the surface to be more confusing than revealing. The premise is that the threads which lead to an anticipation of this answer have to be held together in the reader’s mind. Heidegger’s work and his writing are in fact not confusing; they are painstaking attempts to do justice to the aim of the project. In other words, in Heidegger’s work concur his critique of ontology and epistemology in Western traditions, his critique of the sciences of man, and his underlying message that the language of contemporary Western thought is fraught with sense defined and deeply dependent upon the very traditions he aims to criticise.

One way to interpret his main message and to briefly define his radical re-conceptualisation of the human condition is to return, paradoxically, to a scientific language procedure: namely, to say that Heidegger’s new “object of inquiry” is not any longer “man” as a structure which presents itself and which needs to be explained in its present through proper application of the scientific method. His new concern is “existence” as the condition proper to being human. It is a “complex” of features to be accounted for and in fact it is not an object for the empirical social sciences at all. Existence is not an object which can be set before the researcher and examined from the outside, in some partial aspect as sociology, psychology or anthropology do. The
“researcher” is the “object” to be described. The difficulty comes not simply from the accepted premise that self-knowledge is problematic. The most important aspect which needs to be considered is that human existence is in time, that the main concern of being human is with the temporal finitude of this condition, that existence is a questioning in time of what it means to be. “Ex-ist-ence” means to “ex-ist”, literally “to stand out from”, as well as to conventionally “be”. To be human means not simply to be, but to ex-ist, to be born into a world but also to stands out or apart from things in the world, and to never be completely absorbed by them. However, the notion of “out” for Heidegger, has undergone a fundamental transformation of horizon: “out” is not a spatial “out-side”, the side in space which simply, horizontally away from man (usually away from the body which is the Cartesian extensio of the human being in space). In Heidegger’s sense, “to stand out”, to “ex-ist” is a temporal category. It indeed frustrates the way in which categories tend to be used in everyday language, but Heidegger suggests that this should not prevent an understanding of the fact that human being exists in time as will be shown below. This is due, in his view, to the condition which concerns this thesis first and foremost: the irreducible singularity of every human self as a temporal entity. In other words, being somewhere and at some point in time in the world does not solve the personal quest defined by the uniqueness of a person’s temporal passage through the world between birth and death. In appearance, man is continually “thrown into” dwelling in the world. This “thrownness”, being thrown “into” things, creates the existential condition of “being-there” concretely in the world (rather than being an abstract, distanced subject in relation to a world out-there), but also the potential of a subsequent “falling away”. This comes, Heidegger suggests, from the anxiety of finitude which every person seeks to resolve mainly by forgetting it and letting themselves to be submerged or absorbed into things. If man becomes completely absorbed or submerged into things then he loses all personality and individuality, becomes a “nowhere man,” a no-one, a “they-self”. Such a man measures himself only with reference to peers, with the consequence that personal thought is continually absorbed by an “other,” constantly craving the new “other”, seeking distraction in objects. Yet Heidegger suggests that this flight from the sense of finitude which provokes an unbearable anxiety leads in fact to the contrary of its aspiration, to a mode of being in which there is no genuine relation to people or objects. Critics of consumerism and “post-industrial” society argue perhaps that such a type of man is already prevalent. For Heidegger, influenced by Kierkegaard, this flight from one’s unique self is not “bad” – it is simply impossible. But, he adds, it is also part of the human condition. It manifests itself historically and Heidegger saw in the rise of the secular, technology- and consumption-driven modern European society one of the worst and least creative historical moments of man’s collective or cultural dissolution into an increasingly meaningless “they-self”. Instead, only through “sober” anxiety might a contemplation of authentic Being and freedom be disclosed again as a potentiality. It is only in such anxiety that time is considered and enframed. For Heidegger, the contemplation of Time enables the finitude of human existence to be realised as a freedom; a freedom, a readiness to meet others as unique persons and to meet one’s own death. In this state of anxiety, other entities or things cannot be “used” to postpone the realisation of one’s own unique situation in-the-world. In realising one’s personal condition, things can not “help”, they sink into nothingness.

1 This phrase may seem to repeat the fundamental Cartesian split between ‘subject’ (man) and ‘objects’ (forming the world). This is due to the need to clarify somewhat too briefly Heidegger’s starting point and it is not aimed to confuse the distinctions which will later emerge.
For Heidegger, when this occurs, man reaches authentic Being. As in Kierkegaard, it is this extremity of feeling that reveals the fundamental nature of existence – namely, its finitude in time but also its endless potential for novelty in as much as every person’s finitude is irreducibly unique. In the confrontation with and contemplation of death, authentic Being is revealed to man. But Heidegger does not represent this revealing of Being in dark, morbid terms, but as something akin to an existential “enlightenment”. A person’s own Being is a “light”, a “true home”, and the sense of the root of phenomenological insight – phainesthai – is realised: the “coming into light”. It would however be dangerous to draw religious parallels between Heidegger’s philosophy and this language of revelation. What is clear however is the move away from the “cult of man” or “doctrine of man” which characterises Europe after Enlightenment. This realisation probably inspired Foucault’s famous secular pronouncement of the “death of the subject” not as an existential entity but as the object of the traditional sciences of man and the contemporary cult of man as labourer-consumer (Foucault, 1970).

Exposed in this compact way, Heidegger’s philosophy seems nothing more than a moralising exhortation to observe a certain site of tension in human life, the tension between the existence of one’s “self” and that of “others”. At such a level, the work would not have much significance. The most substantive contribution comes from Heidegger’s approach to the questions of ontology introduced above. His constant research preoccupation was to give this questioning systematic and methodical form. Nonetheless, he explicitly states in the introduction to Being and Time that his work “will provide only some of the “pieces”. ... Our analysis, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, provisional” (Heidegger, 1962:38).

The notion of “conducting ontological research” implies the question how can it be done? Heidegger’s “method” is in itself one of questioning. In relation to his fundamental inquiry into Being and beings, he asked two research questions. First, what is philosophy? what can it mean “to philosophise”? Secondly, who is the being who can philosophise?

These two questions shaped Heidegger’s ontological project. Its main expression is Being and Time (published in 1927, under pressure regarding his confirmation as professor ). The work had been in preparation for a number of years, at least since 1915. Although Heidegger did not publish any preliminary version or smaller studies, the scheme of his philosophy develops in his teaching. Courses, manuscripts and volumes of lecture notes anticipate the work which appeared in 1927 (see, especially, Heidegger, 1992; 1999; Kisiel and van Buren, 1994; Kisiel, 1995). Being and Time, however, was never finished in its original design, as explained by Heidegger at the end of the extended two-part Introduction (Heidegger, 1962:63-64).

The project was supposed to consist of two parts, each, in turn, containing three divisions. Part One was concerned with “The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of Time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being” – it is, in other words, an attempt to answer the second question, “who is asking the question of Being?” Heidegger proposed this preliminary analytic of Dasein as the being asking the question of ontology. Its three divisions were planned as:

-Division I. the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein;
**Division II.** Dasein and temporality;

**Division III.** time and Being.” (Heidegger, 1962:63)

The published volume of *Being and Time* consists, however, only of the first two divisions of part I. As a continuation of the whole project, the remaining four parts were never published.

In **Part Two**, Heidegger planned to explore the “Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue”. The idea of a *destruction of metaphysics* pertains to Heidegger’s way of articulating his attempt to give an answer to the question of Being which would not repeat the epistemological mistakes of Western metaphysics up to him. Three divisions were planned for this part too. **Division I** concerned “Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage of a problematic of Temporality”. The elements of this analysis can be found in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) whose closing section is, with hindsight, the best propaedeutic to *Being and Time*, and whose main body is the best interpretation of the latter. Also important elements of this theme are developed in *The Essence of Ground* (1929), anticipated in “What Is Metaphysics?” (inaugural lecture, 24 July 1924, in Heidegger, 1982a). **Division II** was supposed to deal with “the ontological foundation of Descartes” *cogito sum*, and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the *res cogitans*. The main piece on Descartes is “The Time of World-as-Picture” – delivered as a lecture in 1938 and published in *Holzwege*, part of which has been translated in English in Heidegger, . However, Descartes” decisive influence on epistemology is also analysed in extended chapters in the main works. **Division III** was aimed at “Aristotle’s essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient philosophy”. Interestingly, there is no separate Heidegger treatise on Aristotle. In the idea for division III, he refers to Aristotle’s work on time in *Physics*, which established the tone of European inquiry into the nature of time presented in working paper 003/2000. There are, of course, many references and detailed discussions of Aristotle in all of Heidegger’s works, though all read as quasi-preliminary awaiting a final clarification in a separate piece. Yet, perhaps the clearest reference to the problem of time in Aristotle appears in a draft of some personal notes for a seminar in 1940, “On the Essence and Conception of Φυσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I.” (published in Heidegger, 1998 and extensively discussed by Richardson, 1967).

The main contribution, therefore, of *Being and Time* (as it was published) is a new analytic of how being human might be philosophically interpreted. Placing “existence” at the centre of inquiry, the work develops a new mode of conveying the concept of the life-world as the space of practices.

Heidegger’s own way of describing and naming what he means by the being of man is *Dasein*. Heidegger is not the first to use it; it was present in German philosophy for a while being common in the philosophical language of German authors. As such, Dasein is a simple word, but in its constitution it respects the uniqueness of each man’s locality in existence. “Da-sein” means “being-there” (*da – there, sein – being*). Many translators have tried to convey the sense of the syntagm together with the idea that, linguistically, it is a relatively straightforward German composite word. But, despite its
simplicity, Dasein means a whole deal more in Heidegger’s philosophical construction. Hence, it is not translated in other languages being used directly in all translated texts.

Heidegger’s position regarding his own philosophical project is that ontological philosophical inquiry is not only possible but imperious for the very entity that makes it possible: for the human being, or Dasein. In other words, for Heidegger, man’s existence is both ground of Being and of ontological research. What does this mean? On what basis is this position founded?

To begin with, why does the history of metaphysics – in other words, the main tradition of Western philosophy itself – have to be “destroyed” in order for ontology to re-gain its proper ground? Heidegger’s radical re-positioning of thought is beguilingly simple in this respect. He suggests that in Aristotle – and, since, in the sciences – the nature of Being has been treated by metaphysics as fundamentally homogenous. Aristotle’s concept of being has two poles: one of unity, one of differentiation. In Metaphysics V.7, he suggests that the differentiated way in which “to be” is used in everyday language can be reduced to four modes and it can be seen to apply to ten categories (substance – ousia, quantity, quality, relation, action, affection, position, time, place, state). But these differentiations are only due to the imperfections of entities in the world. Aristotle thus suggested that in fact all beings must be reduced to two unified modes: ousia (substance) which characterises all entities in the world (objects, humans, elements, etc.), and ousia which characterises the Deity. The relationship between them is basically that the truth of being belongs to the Deity which manifests itself in its eternity and the perfection of its always present stillness, whereas worldly entities are not strictly true, nor perfect because they are not eternal and must seek their being in motion which defines time as their horizon of finite imperfection (a notion discussed in working paper 003/2000). If an ontology is to find truth, it must seek it in an understanding which would itself pertain to eternity because thus it would be always present – hence always true. Philosophy for Aristotle was the ground of salvation because it would deify man by transforming his existence into one similar to the contemplative position of the divine. This was due also to Plato’s influence on Aristotle who assumed, like his teacher, that only what is stable, immutable – i.e. eternal – really is. In this manner, Aristotle established implicitly that the sense of the verb “to be” is “to be always present”. The reduction which occurs is, on the one hand, of all beings in the world to the sense of being of the Deity, and, on the other hand, a reduction of temporal existence to the present as the only “real” moment (as explained in working paper 003/2000 regarding the notion of time in the Physics).

Heidegger argues that this reduction of all beings to a homogenous nature (“substance”) has led to the general misinterpretation of the nature of man’s being which requires a different set of ontological categories in order to be described (Heidegger, 1962; Heidegger, 1982). Dasein does not belong to the general domain of entities which European thought has eventually managed to amalgamate in the notion of “objective world”. Moreover, as opposed to Aristotle’s view, the effort to philosophise, i.e. to reflect upon the human condition will not lead to a deification of the philosophising creature, but rather to making life more human albeit more difficult (since the human condition is, for Heidegger, difficult) in its temporal finitude or incompleteness (Heidegger, 1997).

Thus he suggests that, through Aristotle and his later appropriation in Western metaphysics, sciences have had a relatively easy way of homogenising domains of
reality in which they could conduct research unperturbed by the existential finitude of their own engagement (Heidegger, 1962). Hence, not only have sciences not arrived closer to eternal truth, but they have gradually moved even further away from the “object” of inquiry most in need of reflection: man. This is due, in Heidegger’s view, partly to the grounds of Aristotle’s ontological contribution: the science of being was premised wrongly upon reflection on entities drawn from the sphere of artefacts or manufactured goods, rather than considering the different problematic of human being as existence in time. Aristotle generalised his metaphysics (developed using typical examples of material artefacts which, once finished, “have” being) to human existence in the *Nichomachean Ethics* and in *De Anima*. This mode of understanding being and human history is evident in Braudel’s material and non-human structuralism, but also in the general debates with regard to the primacy of technology in the scenarios of globalisation.

Heidegger suggested that an inverted study of the history of Western philosophy will show how the false value of “presence” – or eternity – as the ground of “true” Being became the basis of metaphysical thought, epistemology and – eventually – of the misunderstood supremacy of scientific studies of regionalised ontologies. In other words, Heidegger thinks that ontological philosophising has lost its ground in a subtle shift from reflection about the problem of Being to inevitably partial and mis-conceived studies of “present” beings as objects for the thinking consciousness of the human subject to ponder about. Sciences of man use categories alien to the very subject they aim to represent. More recently, managerial disciplines offer a similarly confusing metaphysical ground: the assimilation of the human in theories of material and economic production would be seen by Heidegger as an alienating approach whose final conclusions cannot avoid being untrue. In this, Heidegger stands in profound opposition to all the forms of Kantian and neo-Kantian schematism which allow some form of model of man to transcend existence itself by postulating the *a priori* character of fundamental categories. Heidegger’s re-orientation of inquiry into the nature of man’s being renders more visible the limitations of models such as those discussed in chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Costea, 2000a, entirely premised upon Kantian a-historical and acultural structures.

To offer structural views of the human – such as motivation theories, or economic-functionalist models – means to misinterpret the nature of the way reference can be made to it in the use of the copula “is”. To say “every human beings is motivated by a search for self-actualisation”, or “X is an introvert” means to offer meaningless generalisations (*homogenising* statements, in the terms of this thesis) about properties or features of objects which belong to a different realm of inquiry than that of humanity. To say “the sky is blue”, or “the sky is above”, or “the stone is hard”, or indeed “the car is working” is to use the verb “to be” to refer to properties, states, modifications belonging to entities other than human beings.

Heidegger’s radical contribution is to challenge these views by offering a new set of categories for the analysis of man’s historical being in the world and of his relationships with other entities encountered in it. Heidegger’s point is twofold and profound. He is not only implying that Dasein has a different range of characters, dispositions or properties than a stone. In other words, it is not simply a different range of similar statements to say “Prometheus is brave” as opposed to “the stone is hard” – simply because the latter obviously does not possess the type of property the former does.
Heidegger’s message is a deeper one: what it is for Prometheus to have such a feature is different than what it is for a stone to be hard. Being brave, Prometheus projected his existence into the future. He did so because he was concerned with his own being and with “living it out”. The experience of bravery is not simply a feature which can be described by a Belbin or Myers-Briggs indicator, nor can managing job design be a predictor of performance in a static, stable, present way. The features of human existence are always in time, they cannot be conceived of, grasped or modelled otherwise.

Whereas models appear as always present, or available, what they model is not there in that manner of static being. Thus the notion of closure to the process of defining problems and solving them which is implied in MBA teaching is impaired by its own ontological ground which uses a form of functional schematism to reduce the temporal diversity of human contexts to an a-temporal explanation. The possibility of a human being (a Dasein) to be innovative, motivated, enthusiastic, caring, team-oriented or not, presupposes the entire existential and temporal structure of concern and being with others in the world as the very condition of its possibility. In other words, a present moment in any human context always implies the particular, unique existential horizons of all the Daseins present in it. It is thus that “problems” are framed and that people engage with them as an expression of their engagement with each other – not in general and abstract, but in concrete, local, historically situated systems of activity (see, for example, Blackler, Crump and McDonald, 1997; 2000) in which human practices occur.

Whereas sophisticated theories of practice have developed around some of these ideas, the discourse of business education is an attempt to the contrary, namely to seize human practices outside their human, temporal contexts, to render them into sites of problem identification and problem solving, but literally outside their own local situatedness. This aspect has been raised repeatedly by Mintzberg (1995-2000) with regard to the notion that problems do not exist as neat objects, naturally framed in the functional divisions in which business education splits organisations and management practices. Hence, models of problem analysis are themselves a problem in the way they represent the world of practice. The latter can only be understood, in Heideggerian terms, if Dasein’s own being is understood in the manner of finite temporality. That is, if theories of practice explicitly reflect upon the temporal structure of the existences of those who make them. Finite temporality is the horizon of understanding human being because it is the horizon of being.

On the basis of his rejection of Aristotelian categorisation, Heidegger suggests that the question of Being can be addressed anew and, paradoxically, by the same being who could misinterpret it (historically) in the first place. But what gives Dasein this privilege? And how can this questioning be – “technically” – done?

This massive dialectic is made possible by Heidegger’s claim that the ontic position of Dasein as ontological. For Heidegger, [man as] “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological”. In other words, “understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being” (Heidegger, 1962:32). Moreover, for Heidegger it is this condition that sets man apart in his existence:

“Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a “world”, and to the understanding of the Being
of those entities which become accessible within the world” (Heidegger, 1962:33).

This notion of the human condition – original in philosophy – allows the project of understanding it on a new basis:

“Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all the other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1962:34).

This assertion is fundamental to Heidegger’s ontology. On what basis is it made? Richardson explains it in the following manner:

“Let us begin with an initial fact: even before posing the question, man has some comprehension of Being. No matter how dark or obscure Being itself may be to him, still in his most casual intercourse with other beings, they are sufficiently open to him that he may experience what they are, concern himself about what they are and how they are, decide about the truth of them, etc. He comprehends, somehow, what makes them what they are, i.e. their Being. Again, every sentence that he utters contains an “is”. His exclamations (e.g. “Fire!”) suppose the “is”. His very moods reveal to him that he himself “is” in such and such a way. He must comprehend, then, no matter how obscurely, what “is” means, else all this would have no sense.

This radical comprehending of Being, however, even if undeniable, is not for that reason seized by any clear concept. It is pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined, therefore inevitably vague.” (Richardson, 1967:33)

The undetermined nature of this understanding does not mean however that it is not implied in the condition of the human search for meaning in everyday experiences.

“Vague, undefined, unquestioning, the comprehension of Being is nonetheless an irreducible fact, which the research accepts in order to begin.” (Richardson, 1967:34)

How does the analytic of Dasein unfold? The method of the analytic is phenomenological. For Heidegger, the exposition of phenomenology proceeds from a characteristic etymological move. From its original Greek meaning, Heidegger suggests that “phenomenology” can be formulated as λεγειν τα φαινομενα (legein ta phainomena) which means,

“to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” (Heidegger, 1962:58)

This implies, in terms of understanding human being, that “we have no right to resort to dogmatic constructions and to apply just any [preconceived] idea of Being and actuality to this entity, no matter how “self-evident” that idea may be; nor may any of the “categories” which such an idea prescribes be force upon Dasein without proper ontological consideration” (Heidegger, 1962:37). Rather, to let it show itself in itself and from itself, the analytic must take “Dasein as it is proximally and for the most part – in
its average everydayness” (Heidegger, 1962:37-38). This requires that the thinker comes at it “from the side of man’s existence and from his firsthand understanding of what it means to be in the world” (Macquarrie, 1968:9).

What does such an analytic reveal about Dasein (being human)? It positions the foundations of being human in a particular there-ness, in the particular existential situation of each person between their birth and death, hence in a unique horizon. It conveys one of the fundamental contributions of Heidegger’s philosophy to understanding the difference between being human and other ways of being. Dasein exists between its Da (unique and “unitary” sense of there-ness) and the “facticity” of being always dispersed in its world. The text of Being and Time can be read as a grammar of uniqueness: each category deepens the situation of meaning to make it more and more personal/unique to each Dasein. No two people can be in the same “there,” no two people address the same questions to the same destinations. Meaning is unique. Thus, every asking of the question “what is?” ultimately rests upon a unique orientation. Yet, on some basis and to some extent, meaning thus formed is also shared.

In its facticity – which is a favourite term for Heidegger – every Dasein exists in its concern to be authentically itself, in its unique “there”. “Da” is always “mine”. It is not simply “me” as an “extension” in the sense of “me” being one of the Cartesian res extensa perceived by others as an object. Nor are others for me – seen this time as res cogitans – objects to be perceived. Yet, Dasein is also inescapably in-the-world, in an open but finite horizon of time, dispersed (“fallen” – i.e. alienated, scattered) between work, rituals, institutions, organisations, values, or roles in which at the same time it seeks support and is dispersed, “loses” itself in a horizon of a common ground of groups which give Dasein a new identity: the “inauthentic” they-self.

This tension specific to Dasein Heidegger calls the “existentiell” question. It is specific to the mode of being of Dasein as existent (as opposed to the modes of being of other entities), and requires different categories for a proper understanding. This imperative leads Heidegger to suggest that, “the Self cannot be conceived either as substance [in Aristotle’s sense] or as subject [in Descartes’ sense] but is grounded in existence” (Heidegger, 1962:381).

In its existence, Dasein’s specific mode of being is described by Heidegger through a series of categories which he calls existentials (in German existentialia). They are his response to the need to overcome the universal Aristotelian categories when engaging with human beings. As will be shown below, with regard to beings other than Dasein, Heidegger will introduce a set of separate categories with special relevance to understanding Dasein’s engagement in the world of work and social practices.

The existentials create the basis of thinking about the condition of Dasein in a way which is not possible in the language of metaphysics. They are couched in words which offer a

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1 Yet again, translators found the German term hard to render in other languages. It is one of Heidegger’s original words and it is not surprising that it proposes a language which is often times awkward and ‘unnatural’. His point was however precisely this: to ground a new understanding of Being, thinkers will have to ‘invent’ language anew. On the one hand, Heidegger maintained that this language will be closer to the natural orientation to existence inherent in man’s being; on the other hand, the task was going to be more difficult since the prejudices of millennia of metaphysical and scientific language are deeply embedded in everyday sense-making in European cultures.
grasp of being closer to what appear as everyday expressions; yet the sense of these
notions begins deepens with the advance of the analytic in Being and Time.

The main “existential structure”, in Heidegger’s words, of Dasein is care (Heidegger,

“Care is the term for the being of Dasein pure and simple.” (Heidegger,
1992:294)

But this “pure and simple” notion is intimately connected to the world it is always in.
But Dasein is not a res (a thing) in this world; it is a being-in-a-relation, being related to
an other – it “holds itself out” to the “world”.

“...in this Dasein there is something like a being out for something.” (Heidegger,
1992:294)

In this “holding itself out” to the world (which is not escapable), Dasein “cares” not to
lose itself as its own sense of “there”, which would mean to cease being as Dasein.
Dasein’s being is always at stake – that is why everyday life is care for self-in-existence.
Heidegger makes his most radical move at this particular juncture: Dasein’s care is
temporal:

“...there is a puzzling character which is peculiar to care and, as we shall see, is
nothing other than time.” (Heidegger, 1992:295)

What does this mean in a way which makes it an original idea? Some examples from the
context of the theoretical matrix of business education itself might clarify the notion of
being human as a “structure of temporality”. In caring for its self, Dasein is not the
subject of evolutionary theory, nor is it simply the subject seeking self-actualisation as in
the motivation theories which dominate OB modules. It is not these things in temporal
terms. More precisely, the self of evolutionary models of man – culminating in Hayek’s
Homo oeconomicus, in Braudel’s totally dependent pawn of historical structures, or
indeed in Fukuyama’s “last man of capitalism” avoiding all risks through calculative
reason – is a self seeking preservation of that which it has become in its own past as an
individualised monad. The moment of the self seen in these ways is a mechanical, a-
historical past which is embodied in the individual as a unit ensuring the survival of the
species, or society by ensuring that what it now is as a product of the past is preserved. It
is neither a present nor a future oriented being; rather it is represented as a minimal
structure with which management can operate on the ground of its simplicity and
linearity. The rationality of the survival principle implies that when “threatened”, the
human self will retreat, move back, to preserve what it already is as an “accumulation
from its past”. Motivation models which place need satisfaction or achievement at their
core operate with a self whose concern is not the past, but the present as the moment of
need gratification. Management thus operates with a “unit” which is implicitly equally
rational in that it seeks gratification in the present, in the “now”. In other words,
managing the human postulated by mainstream business education means managing a
“moment” in which the articulation of its being is based on a rational, functional
mechanism of self-preservation and self-gratification.

Heidegger’s view is different from both. His existential temporality implies that,
“The innermost structure of Dasein’s caring about its being can be conceived formally as *Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself.*” (Heidegger, 1992:294)

Not only are past, present, and future not simply linear, but the sense of *future* implied in the “ahead” of existence also indicates the mystery implied in the very notion of care. “Care” is Dasein’s being because human existence in its unique destiny in the world is not guaranteed by past accumulations, nor by present gratifications. It is always ahead-of-itself caring for its future which can not be known before hand or modelled and rationalised through simple projections or applications of functional theories of the “agent”.

But Heidegger also adds that this “future” orientation is not to be understood simply as a moment which comes linearly after the present and the past of Dasein. This because at the same time with being concerned with what is ahead of itself, Dasein is also “already intimately involved in something. ... the overall structure of care in the formal sense [is] that *Dasein* [is a] being-ahead-of-itself always already being involved in something [in the world]” (Heidegger, 1992:294).

Dasein’s being in the world must also be distinguished, say, from the being of a house in physical space; the house does not think itself anxiously in the world, in the terms of its own finitude or in a caring relation to other houses. But it is also important to note here the fundamental distinction Heidegger makes between Dasein’s care and the notion of “consciousness” (at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenology) or that of “subject” (at the heart of Descartes” metaphysics). In its care,

“Dasein must be understood to be more basic than mental states and their intentionality.” (Dreyfus, 1991:13)

In other words, Dasein is not a *cognitive* entity in the sense this notion has for psychology or for functional social theory. Indeed, this throws light upon the limitations of Hayek’s economic model of man and upon the functional view of the agent which pervades the analytic of labour and production characterising the general paradigm of business education. In Heidegger’s sense,

“Dasein names being like you and me, while at the same time preserving the strategy of *Being and Time*, which is to reverse the Cartesian tradition by making the individual subject somehow dependent upon shared social practices.”

(Dreyfus, 1991:14)

This leads Heidegger to propose that Dasein’s mode of existing is self-interpretative:

“Its ownmost being is such that it has an understanding of that being, and already maintains itself in each case in a certain interpretedness of its being.”

(Heidegger, 1962:36)

This nature of Dasein leads Heidegger to assert that,

This means that Dasein’s being is not a “what”, a substance like that of other beings, but rather an unfolding in time of this interpretation of “self” which is given in its possibility to take a stand regarding what it means “to be”. And it is not only at the level of an individual person that this holds true for Heidegger, but also with regard to groups, institutions and cultures. Approaches to organisational behaviour, these entities cannot be conceived as mechanisms for being, as functional or dysfunctional collections of homogenous agents. They are rather “existences” themselves, continuously self-interpreting.

“Thus Dasein is what, in its social activity, it interprets itself to be.” (Dreyfus, 1991:23)

As Dreyfus also makes clear, human entities, individual or collective,

“do not already have some specific nature. It makes no sense to ask whether we are essentially rational animals, creatures of God, organisms with built-in needs, sexual beings or complex computers. Human beings can interpret themselves in any of these ways and many more, and they can, in varying degrees, become any of these things, but to be human is not to be essentially any of them. Human being is essentially simply self-interpreting.” (Dreyfus, 1991:23)

In “caring to be”, Dasein is interpreting, making sense, of its being-in-the-world. In doing so, however, Heidegger warns that Dasein always interprets itself as having some essential nature in which it grounds its actions and its belongingness to some particular group or “culture”. This Heidegger sees as the basis of how, in everyday life, Dasein also misinterprets itself. The latter is soothing in respect to the anxiety referred to in the pages above. This also is, for Heidegger, the basis of much of the general scientific misunderstanding of human essence as stable, trans-temporal and universally homogenous.

To counteract this tendency of thought, Heidegger suggests from the beginning that Dasein has as its fundamental mode of being that it is always someone”s, that it can never be abstracted from a particular human being.

“The being of any such entity is in each case mine.” (Heidegger, 1962:67)

Yet he warned as early as 1923 that this “mineness” is not to be understood as a move to isolate a Dasein in solipsistic world of experience (Kisiel, 1995). Rather he specified that this “ownness” is a way of being characterising the human (Dreyfus, 1991:26). On this ground of irreducible uniqueness, Dasein takes a public stand as to “who it is” as this particular entity encountering the “other”. This idea is important in the case made in this thesis that diversity is irreducible and is of the essence of human practices which cannot be theoretically abstracted in a universal model such as those which found the MBA framework. The notions Dasein has of “who it is” can come in Heidegger’s view from three sources:

“Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got into them, or grown up in them already.” (Heidegger, 1962:33)
In everyday existence, a human being is confronted with all three. It is partly formed by public interpretations given by the culture in which it is socialised. But it can also stand over against these interpretations, in a rebellious move (such as conflicts of generation show) which can, in turn, result in some other undertaking of a public model of self-interpretation (such as self-interpretation through roles, stereotypes, etc. – many of these characteristic of the consumer society and its patterns of identification). Finally, however, it can also realise that it can never achieve its own individuality by playing out a public role. It can then “choose” to manifest itself in the world in its own existential dynamic without having to rely on a model improper to its self.

In these modalities, many of the social practices of re-articulating human conduct in order to align it to a particular model are evident. Especially this can be referred to the “production” of the “corporate human resource” (Crump, 1998; 1999), or of “corporation man” characteristic of the culture management ideology.

Heidegger develops the next category of Dasein’s existence. In its care for being, Dasein always finds itself “in” the world. This is another “existential” for Heidegger. It is not a relation of spatial inclusion of objects. Dasein does not find itself “in” the world as “money is “in” the pocket (or not)”. For Dasein, to be in-the-world is not a “property” which it sometimes might have, at other times not.

To be in the world as a human being Heidegger calls “throwness”. It is the basis of Dasein’s facticity. This expresses the “fact” that Dasein always finds itself in a situation. Heidegger uses the expression “throwness” meaning that Dasein is “thrown” in a world (most radically at birth) and is always already in a world. This world does not offer horizons which are wide open to any possibility. At any given moment, the world is made of many “givens”. In its everyday being in the world, Dasein’s care for its being manifests itself in concerns with these “givens”: to go to work, to relate to others, to converse, to not confront in an existential sense, to problematise and to think about solutions, to find “tools” to bring about a solution (as closure to a problem), and so on. Dasein does not problematise its being cognitively as an ontological question; it simply is that being for which everyday existence (as a complex of practices) means trying to find meaning in order to be itself in a world which it cannot escape.

Concern is the “existential” category which Heidegger introduces to concretise the manifold manifestations of care as “pure and simple mode of being of Dasein”.

“Concern itself is the mode of being of care, specifically because care is the character of being of an entity which is essentially defined by being-in-the-world.” (Heidegger, 1992:294)

Another inescapable existential aspect of being related to concern as Dasein’s care “thrown in the world” is – for Heidegger – the sense of Dasein’s moods. Moods are affects of some sort; they somehow disclose the affective state of “how we are” or “how we find ourselves”. They manifest a peculiar attunement to everyday existence, a mode of entering practices, especially as it shapes Dasein’s unique orientation from its “there” in relation to “others”. Heidegger’s examples include joy, fear, boredom, or anxiety. The “power” of moods to disclose will lead Heidegger to his famous discussion of anxiety as the most basic affect of authentic being because it reveals Dasein’s radical finitude.
The “existential” category which shows the mode of finding everyday meaning, of making sense of our concerns in the unending variety of everydayness, of being uniquely our “there” in-the-world, is understanding. This is how Heidegger sees Dasein’s active comportment towards its possibilities, its projects. Heidegger says that understanding is altogether permeated with possibilities. Dasein is always confronted with the “possible” by being able to question everything meaningfully, i.e. to address to everything the question “what is?”

But Heidegger warns again – and his warning concerns the current domain of management directly in its new found preoccupation with “knowledge” and the “knowledge economy” – that understanding is not a “mental state”, nor is “possibility” to be seen in terms of “actual possibilities” (today I must wake up at this clock-hour, and turn up at this pre-defined activity). Rather they are two of the existential categories introduced by Heidegger to describe the ground for the way in which every Dasein directs itself from its “there” to the world.

“Understanding is not a primary phenomenon of knowledge but a way of primary being toward something, toward the world and toward itself.”
(Heidegger, 1992:299)

It is Dasein’s specific condition to have the “possibility of having possibilities” of choosing how to throw itself forward into its possibilities which is specific to Dasein.

“Being a possibility essentially means being capable of this being-possible.”
(Heidegger, 1992:315)

Moods and understanding are never separate from one another, they form the unity of Dasein’s concernful being:

“By way of having a mood, Dasein “sees” possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure [understanding] of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case.” (Heidegger, 1962:188)

This unified view of affect and understanding is not to be interpreted in a psychological manner. “Moods” are not “emotions” in the sense in which psychology opposes them to “cognition” or “rationality”. Heidegger’s notion of “mood” is more profound than that; his attempt to make it a central “existential” category is proof of precisely the intention to avoid psychologising about emotion as opposed to some form of non-emotion. That type of language is inappropriate both to how Dasein really is, and to interpreting Heidegger’s ideas.

Being thrown in a world, having inescapable moods may seem to give life a sense of pre-determination. This is not so for Heidegger, not in deterministic terms. Being amidst limited “options” does not necessarily mean that Dasein’s only alternative is to lose its self (“falls”) in the they-self, if it stops engaging with its own concerns and assumes those provided by the collective other. Now, one of the crucial concerns of Heidegger’s is that this sense of loss of authentic self is in fact the way in which most of human lives pass. Instead of arguing for an untenable position that Dasein is always consciously or unconsciously preoccupied by its uniqueness as feature it possesses (say,
like someone is psychologically preoccupied with their physique), Heidegger suggests that being thrown in the world means that Dasein can be seen as permanently “falling” in some way from its authentic, unique situatedness in existential time into inauthentic modes in which it “lives out” another “self”, the “they-self” introduced above.

To put in rather abrupt terms, this falling is a function of different modes of engaging in interpretation, self-interpretation, conversations – in other words, in everyday practices with others in the world. As already indicated, the specific mode of in which Dasein “projects” its understanding of its own possibilities Heidegger calls interpretation. This reveals Dasein’s peculiar possibility of understanding itself, of engaging in self-interpretation – but also the inescapable potential of falling away from its authentic being.

Interpretation creates the most profound bond between Dasein and the world because it is only possible in language; and language – as Gadamer (1976) says – is not ours, it does not belong to Dasein itself, nor to any other Dasein. But neither is it possible in the absence of human beings. This is a difficult notion – albeit its intuitive original appeal. On the one hand, it is immediately comprehensible that the language in which all humans speak (say, English or Sanskrit) is not someone’s personal creation. On the other hand, it becomes very difficult to see the transcendence of language other than in terms of some sociology of transmission – i.e. if it is not a function of individual creation, then it must be one of social determination. This, however, is precisely what Heidegger (and later Gadamer) tried to avoid. His understanding of language as the “home of Being” leads in exactly the opposite direction from a traditional linear and deterministic historical search for the origins of language in the manner in which evolutionary hypotheses are unfolding (moving ever backwards toward the arche of entities: the Arch-human, Arch-life form, Arch-language, etc.).

Heidegger’s sense of language is that of an existentially conditioning of Dasein’s finite possibilities, which is a more powerful proposition in keeping with the overall architecture of the argument regarding the seamless notion of human being as being-there, but also in-the-world.

Some potential examples of the relationship between self and other (as world) through language are, say, the implicit topographies polarising self and world, inner and outer, individual and collectivity after the Cartesian split between subject and object – leading to a contemporary set of languages and knowledges which make it extremely hard to overcome these rifts (Taylor, 1989:3-25, 143-159). Or, indeed, the tension between local and international languages in the development of cross-cultural exchanges through inscribed material – not to be an English-language writer, preferably a native English language writer, means that in the current historical moment a Dasein is trapped in a different horizon of intellectual exchanges with the academic community.

1 Perhaps the best way to explain Heidegger’s ‘falling’ is to use the word ‘alienation’. However, this has its own history related to the way Marx and Marxist theorising uses it. There are differences of sense, although alienation through commodification is certainly one of the modes in which modern society leads personal being to an inauthentic collective loss of self. Heidegger and Marx do not diverge; it is only the historical context of the use of the word alienation which needs to be taken into account in understanding the differences between them.
Hence, Dasein’s understanding is torn between the common ground of language and the unique ground of its own search for meaning in caring for its own Being. This is where Heidegger makes important distinctions between “word” and “discourse”. This relationship between Dasein’s self-expression through “words” chosen as result of personal intention or self-interpretation, and public “discourses” as modes of encountering the other in social practices is, for Heidegger, the “site” of the permanent struggle between authentic being one’s self (as inescapable personal destiny in time), and inauthentic being (as an entity which has fallen away into being one of the endless manifestations of a they-self).

Heidegger sees much of social life as implicitly characterised by “falling” – but not necessarily in an altogether negative sense. He uses three specific modes to characterise fallen or inauthentic, alienated being. All three are specific modes of engaging in everyday discourses which characterise social practices: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity (Heidegger, 1962:211-219; Heidegger, 1992:272-280). But Heidegger clarifies that they are not to be used in “disparaging signification” (Heidegger, 1962:211). Rather, because self-interpretedness is only possible in language, Heidegger suggests that to be one’s self, in other words, for Dasein to be authentically it is always an incomplete possibility.

“In language, as things have been expressed or spoken out, there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted [already]. ... Proximally, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the state-of-mind belonging to it.” (Heidegger, 1962:211)

This means that the past traditions of meaning are “deposited” together with present self-expression in everyday conversation or discourse. Part of what is being said by the “self” is understood by the “other” in terms of their own personal interpretative past, part of it is truly related to the speaking Dasein. “Self” and “other” – as irreducibly different – do not have a primordial, existential understanding of each other’s being in practice. Language does not work like a “tool” for communication. In this respect, a re-iteration must be made to the reference to culture management models in management education: the proposition to use symbolic means in organisations (see Johnson and Scholes’ “cultural web”, 1993) as if they were univocal, or unmistakable ignores the core ambiguity, equivocality of language in everyday life. Perhaps this is one of the modes in which the failure of culture management can be explained (see, for a direct Heideggerian analysis, Barret, Thomas, and Hocevar, 1995).

For Heidegger, the role of differences in language is an especially illuminating instance of the fundamental “rift” which separates irreducibly “self” from “other”. This difference in the way language is actually used in both personal understanding and shared social practices with others allows the notion of human difference to emerge again. Heidegger regards the workings of language and conversation as a work differentiation through which language sets up worlds. The distance, or gap in self-interpretation and the interpretation others have of one’s self provides a more immediate way of reflecting about how meaning is formed both individually and in collective practices. Thinking about language is, for Heidegger, a way of confronting more directly the processes of disguise and disclosure and the relations of absence and presence through which diversity manifests itself. The notion of “falling” examines how
the personal use of words and how it is interpreted in public discourses sets up worlds, structures of differentiation which allow beings to reveal themselves in their particularity as finite beings, different from other beings, but also to share in collective activities and institutions.

The power of a word used by Dasein to express something is not something inherent, expressive of the essence of the thing referred to, but depends rather on how it establishes the possibility of recognising distinctions made by the user regarding the world. The qualities a word conveys suggest how a Dasein gives the world dimensions, a directedness, by providing a centre and axes of measurement. But that centre is unique to that Dasein’s way of using the word. The act of speaking is contingent through and through upon the unique understanding of the Dasein which engages in it. It is not essential – i.e. it does not reflect objects in their essence – but it happens somewhere and sometime. The particularity of the utterance suggests the finitude and the historical difference between Daseins that is a sign of their existential separateness. It aims to discover the meaning personal to the speaker.

Yet language comes with public meanings handed down by collective, historical traditions. However, the meanings of words in languages and the meanings that can be found in public discourses are not “arbitrary,” or intrinsic as structuralist thinkers suggest starting with Saussure. He claims that the relation of signifier to signified is set up by convention, and conventional agreement about their relation is what gives signs the power to mean. In this view, which characterises much of the tradition of anthropological research, language is a self-sufficient structure, a system of arbitrary signs established by convention which, for formalists, seems self-enclosed and self-referential, not about a world outside itself.

For Heidegger, the relationship between self and other established in understanding and interpretation is a world-hermeneutic which is linguistic but which also ties language itself to the world in which people live. This is due, for Heidegger, to the fact that language itself is used by existential beings, by Daseins, whose mode of being can only be grasped through the existential categories proposed in the treatise. Whereas there seems to be a clear distinction in the way humans use language just as there seems to be a clear distinction between “self” and “other” in the world, these distinctions are not determined by stable structures such as linguists in the formalist school or anthropologists in the structural school argue. Rather, beneath the use of language in everyday life lies a fundamental indeterminacy with regard to the boundary between self and other in terms of interpretations of meaning. This experience has a certain sense of immediacy with regard to its everyday character; yet it always leaves thought with an uncomfortable feeling. Musil’s character in The Man Without Qualities, Ulrich, offers a direct expression of it:

“...an uneasy feeling that “Everything I am attaining is attaining me” [gave him] a gnawing surmise that in this world the untrue, uncaring, personally indifferent statements will echo more strongly than the most personal and authentic ones. “This beauty,” one thought, “is all well and good, but is it mine? And is the truth I am learning my truth? The goals, the voices, the reality, all this seductiveness that lures and leads us on, that we pursue and plunge into – is this reality itself or

1 Also used in chapter 7.
is it no more than a breath of the real, resting intangibly on the surface of the reality the world offers us? What sharpens our suspicions are all those prefabricated compartments and forms of life, semblances of reality, the moulds set by earlier generations, the ready-made language not only of the tongue but also of sensations and feeling.” (Musil, 1995:135)

What every single word means universally can not be specified. This is acceptable for existence philosophy, but unacceptable for certain schools in social science – of which perhaps the most structural views inform business education. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues that this very vagueness suggests that what anything is, or means, can only be seen in a context, in circumstances or relations that situate it and give it a specific meaning that “depends” on that context. He thus establishes a fundamental difference between the existential and purely semantic views of the working of language. From the existential perspective which emerges from Heidegger’s view of man as Da-sein, it is only through the “there” and through the “in-the-world” that reflection can find both a situation for a Dasein to create meaning by relating itself existentially to objects and other Daseins in specific contexts through similarities and differences, and a linguistic location that narrows the possible meanings and functions of words.

5. Dasein’s “World” and the Space of Existence

To clarify the relationships which occur in the world as the space where human diversity manifest itself, it is important to clarify how Heidegger see this world.

Through this clarification, it will become clearer how space cannot be reduced to physical characteristics of objects in it. But it will also become clearer why the world as space of history cannot be conceived as Braudel and Wallerstein do, namely, as a unified, homogenous whole in which agents are determined by material, geographic and technological structures independent of the human way of being. This involves a clarification of the tension implicit at the heart of globalisation scenarios which are predicted upon the generalisation of certain technologies and forms of economic exchange (i.e. markets).

In other words, in Heidegger’s view, the world can not be seen as a static, perennial scheme of things with an immutable essence, a container for human existence, a labyrinth with hard walls, complicated yet lifeless.

The consequences of traditional Cartesian ontology – manifested in structuralist and functionalist historiographies – have been explored in their relationship to the particular view of the world represented by the current perspective dominant in the MBA paradigm. As shown previously, the modern ontological stance characteristic of mainstream management education – and its implicit view of the world as space for human existence – has its origin in the Cartesian conception of a world existing “out there,” a world with objective reality. The notion of “objective reality” is key in Descartes’ conception and also for the subsequent developments in science as a particular onto-epistemology. In essence, objective reality is a reality made of objects, a space characterised by Descartes as the space of res extensa. The nature of real objects in Descartes view is fundamentally material inasmuch as their reality must be based upon an essence similar to Aristotle’s substance (ousia). For Descartes, this essence is
the extensio of every thing, which means that the being of objects in the world is only conceivable along the main dimension of the extent to which matter itself occupies space. In other words, the basic stuff of the universe is its physical nature and not much else. When it comes to explaining the nature and dynamics of this universe, for Descartes and for modern scientists, the method is to choose certain elements of this objective space and make them into a system of reference in terms of which everything in the world can be explained including human history. This is the strategy explored in working paper 003/2000 and that which grounds the choice of “facts” upon which currently globalisation can be proposed as future history.

For Heidegger, this view is not adequate for an explanation of human experience of the world.

“There is some phenomenal justification for regarding the extensio as a basic characteristic of the “world,” even if by recourse to this neither the spatiality of the world nor that of the beings we encounter in our environment... can be conceived ontologically.” (Heidegger, 1962:134)

At this point it is important to explain the alternative set of categories which Heidegger develops to describe the phenomenology of things, of entities other than Dasein. Again, in a move which places existence philosophy in contradistinction to the Aristotelian ontology of substance, Heidegger suggests that the categories which apply to objects encountered in the world are, on the one hand, “present-at-hand”, – which is the mode of being of objects understood as isolated, determinate substances (in Aristotle’s sense, or what the Greeks would have called ta physica: things as they come forth from themselves). A short poem by Zbigniew Herbert, entitled The Stone, captures the character of present-at-hand most readily:

“The stone
is a perfect creature
equal to itself
obedient to its limits
filled exactly
with a stony meaning” (cited in Taylor, 1989)

On the other hand, there are objects whose nature is, for Heidegger, “ready-to-hand”, or what the Greeks would have called ta chremata: things when they are in use by Dasein, be them physica or poioi mena (made by man).

In the environment, Dasein encounters such objects, such other beings that are not Daseins: the field that it “walks by” but does not “tread upon”, the book that it has bought at so and so’s, etc. This is to say, Dasein encounters entities (beings) that are not like itself because, on the ontological level, it is never without a world (i.e., “worldless”) as it never is without others (i.e. is never an “isolated” “I”). The relations to these entities are part of human being in the world.

1 Dreyfus’ option may be, however, more inspiring in English: ‘occurrentness’ (1991).
2 Dreyfus calls this category “availableness” (1991).
But what does “world” mean? In 14, Heidegger gives a preliminary sense of the term “world” (Heidegger, 1962:91-95). First, Heidegger gives “world” a negative characterisation. World is not the totality of things as res extensa, nor is it the Being of that totality (“Nature” in the ontological sense). Neither approaches the “phenomenon” of the world. Hence, secondly, Heidegger indicates that world in the sense of worldhood has a relation to Dasein, that in some sense “world” and “Dasein” are bound together. Worldhood is to be seen as an existential structure of Dasein. The preliminary discussion yields four senses of the word “world”. First, world can be understood as an ontical concept which refers to the totality of things encountered by Dasein in it, the totality of things present-at-hand. Secondly, the world can also be understood as a concept referring to the Being of the totality of these present-at-hand entities. Thirdly, the world can be seen as the complex in which Dasein itself “lives”, akin to the notion of “life-world”. The world, in this sense, is the undifferentiated surroundings in which human beings live and engage in practices. Fourthly, the goal of Heidegger’s analysis is to arrive at a final concept of world, namely a concept which would give an ontological existential notion of worldhood. Heidegger, discerningly, focuses his analysis upon the structures that underlie and make possible the sense of world in the third description, namely as the everyday, lived world. As he made his method clear from the beginning, the phenomenological architecture of the work leads to the need for uncovering the world as that “world” which lies closest to Dasein.

In this sense, Heidegger allows the world to emerge as an existential category itself. It is not the physical space of material objects and other bodies of people, but the existential space wherein engagement between beings can take place and which renders this engagement possible. It is the world in which every human being is thrown in the sense of explained above; in it, Dasein exists in its care for its self and in which it encounters others.

This encounter between Dasein and other entities of the nature of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is one which Heidegger explains as an existentially instrumental one. Dasein’s preoccupation with its concerns gives meaning to objects which it intrinsically adapts (existentially, not physically) to certain purposeful patterns which characterise its preoccupations in themselves.

What makes objects to be instruments? An object present-at-hand – such as the ground one walks upon, or the air one breathes, or the landscape around – is not an instrument as such. It becomes one only if Dasein orients itself toward it. For example, the Lake District becomes through social practices and cultural (public) meanings both instrument for the tourist industry and for holiday-making (for rest). In this way, the present-at-hand becomes ready-to-hand. The air, water, or animal species can become “instruments” for negotiation of environmental issues; landscape can be both “nature” for some, or potential space for future human habitation for others.

Objects, spaces, physicality acquires meaning, becomes existentially “some thing” through Dasein’s preoccupations. The purposefulness of these preoccupations has within its structure a reference, a meaningful intention which gives significance to objects as “objects of activity” (Blackler, 1993). Referred beyond itself to a task to be accomplished, an object accompanied by other objects does not reside simply and univocally in physical space; rather, its “space” is a pattern of reverences which constitute it as purposeful, hence as a “tool”. It is, moreover, not simply some essential
nature of an object which gives it its unity of meaning as a tool, but the task which results from Dasein’s concrete concern that create the unity through its pattern of meaning. The task itself is part of the broader pattern of concern which is reflected in a moment of action. In average everydayness, the world is the environment in which Dasein is caught up in its concerns and activities. Thus Heidegger describes Dasein’s predominant way of being-in this world as involving a certain kind of “dealing” with the world.

Dasein is caught up in its dealing with the world. It is in this manner that objects have the ontological structure that Heidegger gives them through the two specific categories he has introduced. Objects are characterised by references beyond themselves, references made by Dasein who alone has an existential world (objects as such are “worldless”). Through these references, objects are inserted in the world of practices as purposeful patterns emerging from the specificity of man’s way of being.

In other words, it is not that material structures determined causally the relationships people have with them. Braudel’s history, for example, but also globalisation models, invert the relationship between man and the world, disregarding the fact that neither world exists without man nor man outside the world. But the relationship between the two is specific to man in that it is existential, it is through projections of human concerns that objects acquire a certain significance rather than imposing one through their inherent essences. Similarly, the analysis of production systems in which managers must make labourers fit in as if by a natural rationality disregards the real nature of human activities as irreducible manifestations of unique human beings engaged in them.

Forgetting this relationship is natural, suggests Heidegger, in that it is a taken for granted mode of being. It only becomes apparent when instruments break down – i.e. when patterns are disturbed. Thus Dasein realises that from the beginning it was a certain existential pattern which was at work in the use of objects in a particular way, at a particular moment.

This marks again the irreducibility of human agency over work, rather than the other way around. By being human, work, or practice is also unfolding in the unique manner of being of Dasein. Therefore, the anticipation of homogenisation of practices by the use of similar technologies would be interpreted by Heidegger as premised upon a distorted ontological conception of their nature. One of the historical arguments which are often overlooked in the debate about the relationship between man and world is the fact that, since its coming into the world, man has exchanged, adopted, and used the same technologies – from fire, to mobile phones. Yet there has never occurred a homogenisation of practices simply because the same technologies are involved. To use Braudel’s example, the Mediterranean is indeed an immovable feature of the landscape of Europe. But it does not mean that the human history unfolding around it has been causally determined by it. It has unfolded in patterns which expressed the specific ways in which generations, cultures ad individuals related to it, rather than the other way around.

Again, there can come a point at which the question of causal precedence is asked – which came first? An answer has not been possible, nor would it be, Heidegger would probably argue. The relationship is existential, it unfolds in time and thus it is not determinable through an a-temporal explanation. If a deterministic answer seems naïve,
an existential answer seems implied in Heidegger’s conceptual construction. If every
tool or object is encountered in the world of Dasein, then it has a relationship to it which
is based upon the pattern of concern in which it has occurred. The world of Dasein is
itself already anticipated in the way Dasein understands its being in it. A purpose is
itself a relation of meaning from a “there” to its “world”. This totality of the life-world
of individuals and collectives working together is the ultimate term of their reference
(which is finite because of the finitude of its temporal character). Hence the world is not
outside subjects, but rather intimately and reciprocally associated with the ontological
structure of Dasein. Instruments are entities with which Dasein is engaging daily in the
life-world with its own existential concerns. These objects are thus referred beyond
themselves to the world of the Dasein in which they are destined to some end. The
example Heidegger uses is the hammer which is destined to hammer a nail, which is
destined to build a house and so on. But not indefinitely. The house is for Dasein. It is
Dasein that is the term of reference of all destinations, not in an egocentric way, but due
to its ontological structure of care.

What is the nature then of this world in which Dasein discovers meaning for other
objects? To begin with, for Heidegger, the “there” of “Being-there” must be taken into
account. It is not accessible on its own, in abstract contemplation of a cognitive type. A
personal sense of one’s won “there” can not be affirmed by someone at some point in
time purely independently of that person’s surrounding life-world. To think about the
“there”, the structure of existential care must be brought back to the fore. As indicated
before, its essence lies in existence which is in time. The nature of the “there” is thus not
spatial, it is temporal. It is from the perspective of this temporal concern with existence
– which can be blandly expressed as the concern to continue to be “tomorrow”, i.e. in the
future – that the “there” from which Dasein orients itself in the world must be
understood.

However, the notion that “there” – as a category of space – can be understood as a
category of temporality is certainly counterintuitive in the traditions informed by
traditional European thought. And it still does not answer the question of the
relationship between “there” of being and the world of being.

Heidegger’s answer is simply that the world is the Wherein in which existential Daseins
encounter others and objects and in which the concerns of everyday life manifest
themselves. However, this manifestation is evidently primordial temporal from on
ontological point of view. So the world itself seen as horizon of existence is not simply
to be understood spatially, but rather as a “residence” for beings. In it, things are in
matrices of relations which give them meaning and which thus constitute their being as
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. The unity which makes these matrices possible,
however, is Dasein. But Dasein comprehends these matrices of relations in the same
manner in which it comprehends itself, and it refers itself to them in the same overall
way in which it refers itself to the world as horizon of factual existence: in a historical
“here and now” about which it does not have a temporal choice, but in which it must live
out its own destiny.

This temporal mode of being of Dasein in the world gives particular meanings to the
matrices of relations in which it enters with other objects. Caring about its being, Dasein
already possesses a horizon in which it comprehends objects. Thus Dasein also lets
these objects be toward their purposes. In a sense, they already are, of course. But they
are worldless, or meaningless because the world is a possibility of relationships and it is only Dasein’s continuous questioning “what is this or that?” that gives this or that its meaning in the world.

Thus the world becomes a space of relationships, of practices, not in abstract but in the multitude of diverse encounters between beings. The impression of space as distance is, in conclusion, not of a physical nature. Rather it is the gap which opens between Daseins who find themselves in relations to others which they at once discover as different. This elementary but irreducible experience both creates the sentiment of distance between “my” existence and another’s, and the impulse to overcome it in the everyday practices in which one cannot be without the other.

Heidegger suggests that “spaces receive their essential being from locations and not from “space”” (Heidegger, 1982a). Locations are existential, they are the encounters between the different “theres” of different human beings engaged with their own destiny and with their others.

Before moving on to discuss the final and key aspect of Heidegger’s analytic, it must be emphasised that this excursus through his view of space and of the world throws light upon the earlier critiques of both the direct representations of the world in the MBA context, and upon the representation of world history as a global condition in which the human is devoid of agency, practices being simply an outcome of adaptation to material structures. For the human being, the world’s spaces are relationally constituted in historical and existential time (Tilley, 1990) and they form the contexts for social practices. Practices are not simply functional adaptations to immutable and neutral space structures or to technology. What people think about their environments is not irrelevant to the way in which they engage with the world and their destiny within it. Heidegger’s extensive discussion, only briefly introduced here, shows that to avoid both empiricist objectivism and cognitive idealism it is important to understand the world in existential categories which reveal how the “locales” of human practices occur – when in fact the world appears to be “one” – and are historically always irreducibly different amongst themselves regardless of the apparent constancy of physical conditions. Rather, Heidegger argues radically, space must be seen in time – rather than time as a simple function of motion in space (as Aristotle and European thought since him implicitly maintained).

6. Dasein and Temporality

As repeatedly maintained in the present text, the question of homogenous conceptual frameworks imposed upon the world of human existence and upon practices must be raised about the different axes along which a system of references to this world – in this case business education – unfolds its implications. So far a contrast has been offered between homogenising images of man and of the world (as space) and a view which constructs a philosophy which shows the ontological irreducibility of diversity which characterises these categories in relation to human beings. In keeping with the aspiration to offer a mirrored critical reflection upon conceptual elements discussed in part II, here in part III, time has been left as a concluding element.

Working paper 003/2000 has already raised this problem. It has explored the tension between the attempts of science to find a unified meaning for time itself.
003/2000 has concluded with a suggestion that although the problem of a unified theory of time has not been resolved, the functionalist view ground of business education nonetheless portrays local and global time as homogenous in the context of production. Yet again what occurs is a reduction of the complex problem of human diversity as a main element of the very fabric of production practices, of management and of organisations.

Working paper 003/2000 (Costea, 2000b) ended with a promise to show how the Kantian heritage of seeing time as an *a priori* category with which the human mind is universally endowed can be critiqued through an alternative philosophy which makes time the irreducible ground of human existence, and thus inherently shows time’s own diversity in the context of human life. In this final section of the overall analysis, this promise must be fulfilled. But it is not a mere question of convenience that a study discussing Heidegger should end with the problematic of time. It is also a natural conclusion in Heidegger’s own work. Division II of *Being and Time* deals with time, and it proved to be the end of the project of Dasein’s analytic itself.

Hence it is adequate both with regard to Heidegger’s view and with the format of this project that a discussion of the possibility that time itself must be bound up with the diversity of being human should be offered here.

Working paper 003/2000 set the scene for a contrast between the notion of time as a universal – i.e. *homogenous* – form of sensible intuition in the sense Kant gave it, and the Heidegger analytic of time in *Being and Time*, Division II. As shown there, the notion of time as a category which is *a priori* in human reason, which is thus the same for all humans has led to many attempts to develop some form of undifferentiated theory of time both in natural and social sciences. But what has also been explored preliminarily in the working paper referred to above was a series of philosophical preoccupations in the twentieth century whose aim is to demonstrate that such an unified time theory is not possible, moreover, that it is ontologically problematic.

Heidegger develops his own direct critique of the Kantian view of time. He suggests that an absolute notion of *a priorism* has not been secured by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Thus, unlike Husserl and Bergson, who did not directly relate their theories to Kant’s, Heidegger takes issue directly with Kant (and not just with Aristotle). Because of this direct contestation of Kant, Heidegger is the first philosopher to radically and originally develop new theoretical means to approach the problem of time, as opposed to those established by the *Critique of Pure Reason* and retained by Bergson, Husserl and all neo-Kantians. Heidegger discussed his arguments first in a lecture, and then systematically in the volume on Kant (Heidegger, 1929). There are references to Kant in *Being and Time* itself.

Heidegger argues that Kant has elaborated his notion of time in a horizon which Kant himself fails to illuminate. Heidegger argues that time as a universal notion, as “objective time” (as it emerges from the *Transcendental Aesthetic*) is in fact only conceivable in those terms as a decentralised and relativised category rather than a unified, absolute, transcendental one (Heidegger, 1997:31-36). In the context of this

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1 *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* – in the year *Being and Time* was published (1927) – to which reference is made but has not directly informed the present analysis.
thesis, what Heidegger underlines is that, even from Kant’s own perspective, the “formal intuition [of time] is not a primordial, but a derived conception” (Heidegger, 1997:34-35). In other words, time cannot be conceived of as an intuition of the human mind, a dimension of being “built-in” the universal model of man, or one which a person comes “wired-up” at birth. Rather, time can only be understood as relative to existence, as inextricably bound up with existence itself. Heidegger considers that the notion of time as a pure form of sensible intuition has been unresolved by Kant, only reformulated by Bergson and Husserl as a question of the intrinsic temporality in subjectivity, but that it should in fact be tackled again as an existential question, namely one which leads to direct reflection upon the genuinely practical means of temporal self-projection of Dasein in its existence.

As has emerged so far, to be human in Heidegger’s terms means to exist as Dasein. As such, Dasein needs to find meaning for everyday existence; it does so in care. But care’s main dimension is – for Heidegger – temporality. The Being of Dasein is care which is ahead-of-itself, but being-already-in-the world, which means also being-alongside-entities (objects) and caring-for-others (other Daseins). In this modality, existential time is not a line of past which has been, present which is, and future which is not yet – in the Aristotelian sense (which can be seen as the temporal modality of objects); nor is it simply an abstract horizon in the mind of a thinking but “worldless” subject (namely the Cartesian ego cogito with which Kant too operated). For Heidegger, Kant “did not see the phenomenon of the world”. The fundamental insight Heidegger has about the relationship between Dasein and the world of existence must be re-emphasised in a critique of Kant’s transcendentalism: “In saying ‘I’, Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1997).

Thus, an enquiry about the conditions of possibility of the human sense of time cannot be abstract, leading to some form of abstract knowledge – or unified theory of time. It has to be a quite concrete reflection about the nature of time for Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In the Division II of Being and Time, Heidegger develops what has been repeatedly iterated here, namely that “temporality” is the basic existential structure forming the fundamental dimension which underlies the Dasein’s structure of care (as discussed in the first division).

Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger becomes more manifest, in that Heidegger suggests that existence is a “double-movement” which both creates the “there” (in the “being-there”), and opens the world for Dasein. This can almost be seen as a double temporal occurrence, perhaps even as a spiral.

The first partial movement in this movement is Dasein’s existence as an anticipation of the future; the second partial movement is a “coming back” to the present as an opening upon the world, and as determined by the past – or, as Heidegger puts it – the “having been”.

Heidegger writes down this idea in a characteristically obscure fashion, although every term contributes perfectly to its sense:

“Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of “having been” arises from the future, and in such a way that the future “has been” (or better, which is “in the process of”
having been”) releases from itself the present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as “temporality”. “ (Heidegger, 1962:373)

In other words, time for Dasein is a unity of three existential “moments”: (a) the “ahead-of-itself” manifests the futural; (b) the “already-in-a-world” manifests the “past” (or the “having been”); and (c) the “being-alongside” manifests the “present” actualisation of the other two moments – which, in more direct terms, could read:

‘We reach out towards the future while taking up our past thus yielding our present activities.’

In this existential temporality, the future – and hence the aspect of existential possibilities which orient the everyday present – has priority over the other two moments:

“Time is primordial ... and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality temporalises itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite.” (Heidegger, 1962:380)

But on the existential level, the future as temporal condition is not the concrete future, determined by certain concrete, substantive aims, but the future in general:

“The primary meaning of existentiality is the future…. [But] By the term “futural”, we do not here have in view a “now” which has not yet become “actual” and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself.” (Heidegger, 1962)

This is due to the certainty and indefinable character of death as the ultimate concern of Dasein’s care for its being. For Heidegger, death is disclosive inasmuch as it brings Dasein back towards its ownmost self. The reasons which make possible this disclosure are that: (1) death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility; because (2) death is non-relational (death individualises Dasein because Dasein “takes over” its ownmost Being); hence (3) death is not to be outstripped (surpassed, “ignored”): it is Dasein’s uttermost possibility and must be recognised as such (in this recognition, Dasein “frees” itself for its death and for its own possibilities); moreover, (4) death is certain; and (5) death is indefinite (it can happen at any moment).

But orienting the concept of future toward death is not, in Heidegger’s designation of this basic structure of Dasein, either morbid nor pervaded by some form of religious fatalism. Heidegger has defended his ideas against theological inferences or fatalistic readings of his work from as early as 1924 when, in a lecture to theologians in Marburg, in which he had just formulated the general ideas behind his analysis of temporality, he emphasised in the Kantian manner:

“The philosopher does not believe. If the philosopher asks about time, then he has resolved to understand time in terms of time (...)” (Heidegger, 1998).
To understand time in terms of time, Heidegger suggested, means to try to “temporalise” time, to regain its essence as a concept from the distortion created by measuring time as motion in space. Analysts need to try again to think about time temporally, or to be in favour of a temporalisation of time. Heidegger’s programme is thus entirely secular and consistent with his overall metaphysics of human, not divine, existence. Thus Heidegger’s reader must also understand his designation of “futurality” (as being the “coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself”) within the general context of his work.

It is important to use this distinction to emphasise Heidegger’s deepest message about understanding the uniqueness of human existence as a temporal phenomenon. Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard, the very notion of existential “double-movement” is of Kierkegaardian origin. But for Kierkegaard, the double-movement of human existence leads the human person into desperation when it happens in the consciousness of belief in God. In other words, being one’s self means to realise the hopelessness of the human condition not only in terms of its finitude but also of its inherent meaninglessness. Heidegger stands on completely different teleological ground. For him, Dasein can realise its uniqueness through successful temporal self-fulfilment which is possible in the absence of divine transcendence.

This is another element of consistence in his work. As indicated, he conceptualises Dasein’s anticipation of its own future as a “being-towards-death”. Yet this anticipation of the “possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence” (which occurs with death as a cessation of existence), allows Dasein’s “authentic” existence at its most genuine. Heidegger’s argument is relatively simple:

“With death, which at its time is only my dying, my ownmost being stands before me, is imminent: I stand before my can-be at every moment.” (Heidegger, 1992:313)

As shown before, because death is indefinite, i.e. it can happen at any moment, every moment is moment of Dasein’s most personal being. The uniqueness of each Dasein is in its personal, unique time – a time which passes for Dasein’s self alone in an irreducibly particular way. This experience of radical “finiteness” does not occasion for Heidegger some form of Kierkegaardian desperation. It rather opens up new horizons of manifold possibilities, within which each person’s everyday Dasein is always caught up, without always having its own personal possibilities entering its consciousness. This radical view of “the future as coming towards” in anticipating one’s own death as the “ownmost, non-relational possibility, which is not to be outstripped” is understood by Heidegger to be the self’s own “resoluteness” to be itself, by offering it the authentic “potentiality-for-Being-one”s-Self”.

This is, in brief, how Heidegger establishes the irreducible diverse character of time itself, the impossibility of reducing it to a universal schema with which the entire humanity could be “known”, or conceptualised as homogenous mass. But whereas this is perhaps clear in Heidegger’s theoretical language, he is the first to suggest that this is not necessarily what he calls “everyday understanding of time” – i.e. the apparently “objective” time of the clock and calendar.
Referring back to the notion of they-self, to the manners in which Dasein falls in common, undifferentiated mechanisms of social life, Heidegger shows however that the everyday understanding of time is only a derivative of the original temporality of human Dasein. In other words, clocks and calendars are expressions of human temporal processes of self-constitution, of being-in-the-world, that is, of the temporality of the double-movement of unique human existences engaged in practices with each other. Put at its simplest, the clock is not and can not be a representation of time in its “true” nature.

Heidegger’s argues that Dasein’s being is inextricably linked to time existentially, in having to cope with the anticipation of its own death. Heidegger however also shows that, in everyday concerns, people anticipate futures whose content is determined by their concrete needs and plans, and whose final horizon, death, is excluded because it creates a fundamental anxiety. This reduced, practical everyday form of temporal double-movement, Heidegger calls the “inauthentic temporality”. But it is not to be understood as similar to the clock. In this inauthentic, practical everyday temporality a “reflection of the ecstatical constitution of temporality” can still be sensed. But in the dominance of clocks in modern society, the temporal origin of time as temporality of Dasein is totally obscured.

Heidegger makes this distinction clear by referring to a paradox which characterises economics and management with regard to time:

“...precisely that Dasein which reckons with time and lives with its watch in its hands (...) constantly says ‘I have not time.’” (Heidegger, 1962:472-480)

This shows, in Heidegger’s terms, the misconception of “arithmetic” time inherited from Aristotle. Heidegger suggests that this paradox occurs because in the terms of strategies of production, time is frozen and split into series of “nows” of commodified, homogenous, thus exchangeable seconds, minutes, days, weeks, months and years. It is the time of production which thus acquires a dominant, objectivised authority over human time. This “economic time” appears like an infinitely divisible, endless line which lies before the manager and which at once promises continuously increased productivity, yet about which he also knows that it can never really be “filled” with productive activity.

Objectivised time “slips” through the cracks of management systems, as oil leaks from a faulty engine. Time must be saved through skilful time management. This is the main message of business education. Aligning labour to production rhythms is presented as the common nature of time. Time only imposes itself when it is “empty” and in need of being filled with work. It is no longer existential concerns which are recognised as the way in which practices unfold in time. Rather, it is a form of “productive emptiness” which dictates rational planning of time itself, which in turn will generate new needs, and will forces its own effective management for capitalisation as a resource.

This form of dealing with time has become the norm in modern society, Heidegger argues. But he saw it as a historical form in itself. The “vulgar conception of time” was for him an extreme case, but still he could see the way in which certain societies “manage” themselves such as to attempt to push people to live in a totally inauthentic temporality could still be clearly delineated. In other words, in the practical context of everyday concerns in business and management, time does not appear as exactly external
to human practices, nor is the physically determined power of the clock or “nature-time” controlling practices from outside. Rather, the clock is an institution of the “they-self” which has been built into everyday concerns and has come to be seen by unique human beings as the “true” “world-time”. Heidegger identifies three aspects through which this can be seen as having come about: datability, tension and publicness. They are central characteristics which show how what is taken to be “physical time” is in fact a form of inauthentic temporality. Heidegger’s point can be shown particularly clearly through the example of datability (Heidegger, 1962:403-418). The notion that time is obviously physically linear, like the clock’s, is developed by asserting that every “now-point” is defined solely through its immanent relation to other now-points, i.e. through the Aristotelian abstract relationship “before-after”, or “earlier-later”,

But Heidegger argues that time is never experienced in that way by Dasein however far removed from its own self it might be, however deeply steeped in the “they-self”. Rather, “linear time” placed in the context of everyday production systems is always integrated with some concrete reference to human daily concerns, whose “datability” is provided by: there is a “now that...” which is a reference to a particular “something” with meaning. In this context Heidegger notes:

“When we look at the clock and say “now” we are not directed toward the now as such [i.e. an absolute physical moment] but toward that wherefore and whereto there is still time now; we are directed toward what occupies us, what presses hard upon us, what it is time for, what we want to have time for.”  
(Heidegger, 1962:415)

He concludes from this that,

“The fact that the structure of datability belongs essentially to what has been interpreted with the “now”, “then” and “on that former occasion”, becomes the most elemental proof that what has thus been interpreted has originated in the temporality which interprets itself. When we say “now”, we always understand a “now that so and so ...” though we do not say all of this. Why? Because the “now” interprets a making-present of entities. In the “now that ...” lies the [existential] character of the Present. The datability of the “now”, the “then” and the “on that former occasion”, reflects the [existential] constitution of temporality, and is therefore essential for the time itself which has been expressed.” (Heidegger, 1962:418)

It is this unbreakable connection between temporality and human existence in whatever forms it may be researched that gives rise to Heidegger’s discussion of history at the end of the treatise. “How we find ourselves” expresses the fact that Daseins are thrown into a “world” already there before them – this is most evident in the radical sense of birth, and the ultimate concern with death. Hence, Dasein is literally “thrown into a world” beyond its control – but this “world” is not merely a particular “environment”. It has its place in history: Dasein is, broadly speaking, thrown into a historical moment.

The historicity of Dasein is doubly evident being bound up with both the temporality of existence and the historical nature of the “world”. Heidegger’s analysis of “historicity”
(Geschichtlichkeit) in chapter V of Division II is an explication and further grounding of temporality in the everyday sense that history is real in some way. In this part of the analysis (which is closer to the end of the treatise), history begins to take precedence as the essential phenomenon of temporality with regard to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Thus, the ideas advanced repeatedly so far in this thesis that human practices are irreducibly different because the are also irreducibly historical find their echo in the way in which Heidegger can be interpreted as arguing that existential time is indistinguishable from historical time. Hence, a unified theory of the latter can only occur if there was a unified theory of the former. But, since the temporality of existence has been shown to be bound up precisely with the uniqueness of each Dasein which thus makes impossible a unified determination of existential time in any meaningful fashion, then a unified theory of historical time (of history itself) is not possible either unless it is, in fact, a theory of the varied character of histories.

“Historical”, Heidegger explains, implies a reference to the past. Dasein thus exists as part of a historical world, a history which does not simply, mechanically begin at birth. As seen above, Dasein’s existence happens in a unity of the three moments. The “past” figures in existence as a permanent character in the mode of what Heidegger calls “is-as-having-been”. In other words, the present is bound up to the past because the nature of the “there” itself is its relation to the historical world in which it has been “thrown” and upon which it depends for its references. This is how Heidegger introduces the notion of Dasein’s assuming a “heritage”, but the latter is not understood simply as an external imposition upon the self of the former. This heritage is not a falsification of Dasein’s self, but rather it is a part of its very way of being-in-the-world-historically. In everyday life, “historical moments” are not isolated moments either, and it is this “heritage” which creates this unbroken continuity and co-presence of the historical past with the historical present. Dasein’s being in the world involves a “carrying forth” of history. A certain tradition gets “passed down” through language (writ large), and “taken over” (in its own fashion) in every epoch. The past, in some sense, gets taken up in the present – though often in a manner in which its character as past gets forgotten and covered over.

Heidegger writes:

“Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial “sources” from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand.” (Heidegger, 1962:43)

This forgetting of history as such is not, however, an anomaly of Dasein’s existence in time; rather it is only the way in which every person engages authentically in their own finitude, the way in which, in other words, a human being focuses upon its “there” but as connected to the world. This taking up of history, this handing-over is an essential part, Heidegger says, of a “freely chosen discovery of the potentiality of its [Dasein’s own] existence” – a freedom which is immanent in history, but not seen in absolute terms as Hegel did; rather only if this freedom is understood in terms of Dasein’s finitude.

Through tradition, Dasein takes over its own heritage. Through it, history can be seen as part of human being. Heidegger argues that the forgetting of the past in modern society is also due to the way in which historical sciences always end up by creating an image of
the past as “finished”, disconnected from the present. By understanding the “heritage” which is inextricably part of every Dasein – existentially, not mechanically – Heidegger suggest that the historical nature of everyday practices can be understood more clearly. In this manner, as opposed to figuring as an “absence”, history is shown to be a “presence”. This seems a paradox to the modern consciousness with its understanding of history – the past cannot be both past and present – but this is only due to the traditions of historiography which disengaged the present of human existence from its own past along a linear temporality, or indeed disengaged human existence altogether from the making of world history.

Yet by understanding history as somehow present, Heidegger warns against the potential misunderstanding of Dasein as past-oriented. On the contrary, Dasein can assume its own historical heritage not because it is oriented to the past, but because it is already and inevitably historical. The historicity of Dasein comes from the future: the present is a Dasein’s “coming to itself”, a presencing of Dasein’s care which implies a backward movement from the future to the present – the future is anticipated. In this movement, a human being makes references to understand its own potentialities, the backward movement of the future is a way for Heidegger to show how, in being concerned with its future, a person takes over its own heritage through the way in which it thinks through references about the future but which are made in terms of its heritage. This retrieval of heritage, Heidegger argues, “makes manifest for the first time to Dasein its own history” (Heidegger, 1962:435).

The notion of Dasein as historical, more revealingly still: as “historising”, appears from the first step of Heidegger’s analysis of time as history to be individual, self-consuming as well as consumed within the self. Such a perspective, however, Heidegger evidently shows, is incomplete. The argument so far has shown that being an individual is only possible in the world, with others, the existence of the self itself is a relation with others. Hence, the temporality of a person’s existence, its relationship to history, can never be purely personal. History and thus existence “happens” as a community. Within this community, the heritage taken over by persons is not simply its individual history but somehow the heritage of the entire people with which a human being is. The process of taking over a communal heritage, the sense of communal existence comes to the fore in the actualisation of the sense of cultural destiny of an entire folk. The common traditions, some shown in working paper 003/2000 for example, allow a way of referring to the common feature of human existence, i.e. its finitude, through myths, or, as Jung suggested, through archetypes – in other words, through religious and secular mythologies seen as modes of referring to personal “theres” but in a collective historical sense. Thus being together with others in the world allows each Dasein to be what it inevitably is: its own being.

In the terms of Heidegger’s analytic, both the everyday run of life, apparently “uneventful”, and the major historical “upheavals” reveal the way in which individual and collective lives are intermingled inseparable in history. Thus, neither the history of the ancien regime centre on the agency of political figures alone, nor the Braudelian reading of history as unaffected by human agency almost at all represent, in Heidegger’s view, adequate ways of understanding the phenomenon called “history”. Modern historiographies – inevitably focusing on particular historical findings about certain people or certain material structures – will shed no light on human historicity. This is because any results of historical investigation will presuppose precisely what is at issue
in the very notion of history – namely a mere exploration of the past as a time “gone”,
exhausted. Historical disciplines have not in these terms engaged properly with their
subject-matter because none have taken into account a full existential-ontological
perspective on the nature of Dasein’s historical being. None have asked about the
conditions for the possibility of history in themselves and thus have not understood that
historical disciplines themselves are only an activity of a being whose way of being is
itself inherently worldly and historical.

The relationship between a human being and the culture and history in which it is born
make some form of “enlightened” transcendence of this context existentially impossible.
Whereas for cultures it is possible to be together in the world on the basis of the
irreducibility of their own character, Heidegger suggests that the attempts to appropriate
the history and traditions of another culture, to be in another existential world are
intensely problematic and perhaps a complete misinterpretation of history and culture
itself. He would see today’s notions of mechanical multiculturalism as superficial and
improbable:

“...the opinion may now arise that understanding the most alien cultures and
“synthesising” them with one’s own may lead to Dasein’s becoming for the first
time thoroughly and genuinely enlightened about itself. Versatile curiosity and
restlessly “knowing it all” masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein.”
(Heidegger, 1962:222)

This note allows a returning to the beginning of this project. Questioning the
universality of the MBA with regard to its capacity to engage understandingly with a
multitude of cultures – when it is itself embodying its own traditions of which it seems
unaware – may have found that this is, indeed, perhaps an impossible aspiration. The
fact that it is nonetheless embraced points back to the foundations of the approach which
makes this ideal appear legitimate. In some way, the contrast between part II and III in
this text have been attempts to do just that by questioning the “cosmological matrix” of
the MBA as the central form of mainstream business education.

But in this way, Heidegger’s closing of Being and Time also provides a clue for
returning to the kind of beginning that Heidegger anticipated in his own treatise. In a
sense, through the reflections on history at the end, his entire work bends back upon
itself and shows the necessity of always beginning at “the origins” of a problem.

This final section of this study has been a brief review of Heidegger’s complex analysis
of time. Its brevity, however, is justified in that it sought only to connect time itself to
the overall aim of the study, namely, to think about human diversity as an irreducible
ontological feature of man’s being and about space and time as bound up with this
condition.

Indeed, Heidegger’s work is probably the most radical expression of philosophical
concern with time as the defining horizon of human existence. Heidegger’s
differentiation between Dasein’s authentic temporality, inauthentic temporality and the
vulgar conception of physical time is an original mode of thinking about the existential
relativity of time, which Kant began with his concept of time as subjective. Heidegger,
however, took this much further, and showed the ontological link between time and the
concrete conditions of human being-in-the-world. He achieved this through recourse to
existential categories which show how profoundly complex the problem of the
difference between a “self” and what “surrounds” it is. What Heidegger’s philosophy
shows is that theorising about human practices – such as business education implicitly
and explicitly does – has to account for this difference in one way or another.
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