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Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis

Klumpes, P J M (1998) Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis. Working Paper. The Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University.

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    This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a competing standard setting body, the IASC. Applying a scenario developed by Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and (c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory authority s preferences coincide.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Uncontrolled Keywords: property rights ; accounting standards ; compensation.
    Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance
    ID Code: 48577
    Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
    Deposited On: 11 Jul 2011 22:00
    Refereed?: No
    Published?: Published
    Last Modified: 18 Jun 2018 01:21
    Identification Number:

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