Lancaster EPrints

The reputational constraint on monetary policy

Whittaker, J (2001) The reputational constraint on monetary policy. Working Paper. The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

[img]
Preview
PDF (Document.pdf)
Download (306Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    In the context of a standard model of optimal monetary policy, I argue that expectations should be treated as adaptive rather than rational. This argument is justified by considering the rational expectations equilibrium of this model as the limit point of a sequence in which agents progressively modify their forecasts of inflation to make them efficient. I show that this learning process is unlikely to occur, in real time, because of the large amount of data that would be required. When expectations are adaptive, there is no longer a time-inconsistency problem, and since inflation policy influences expectations of future inflation, the central bank s concern for its reputation induces it to deliver optimal (time-consistent) policy. In a final section, the implications of these results for central bank independence are discussed.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Subjects: UNSPECIFIED
    Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
    ID Code: 48542
    Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
    Deposited On: 11 Jul 2011 21:59
    Refereed?: No
    Published?: Published
    Last Modified: 09 Apr 2014 20:50
    Identification Number:
    URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/48542

    Actions (login required)

    View Item